Date of Conferral







Robert DeYoung


In the decade following the ten-plus percent stockmarket collapse of 2000, regulators enacted a myriad of regulations in response to increasing angst experienced by U.S. capital market retail investors. Systemic asymmetric disclosures have fractured investor confidence prompting many commentators to characterize the relationship between Wall Street and the investment community on main street as dire. Though copious works exist on the phenomenon of corporate behaviors, especially matters of shareholder welfare, weak boards, pervious governance mechanisms, and managerial excess, current literature has revealed a dearth in corporate governance praxis specific to the question and effects of asymmetric disseminations and its principal impact on the retail/noninstitutional accredited investor's (NIAI) confidence and decision-making propensities. This phenomenological study is purposed to bridging the gap between the effects of governance disclosure and the confidence and decision-making inclinations of NIAIs. Conceptual frameworks of Akerlof's information theory and Verstegen Ryan and Buchholtz's trust/risk decision making model undergirded the study. A nonrandom purposive sampling method was used to select 21 NIAI informants. Analysis of interview data revealed epistemological patterns/themes confirming the deleterious effects of asymmetrical disseminations on participants' investment decision-making and trust behaviors. Findings may help academicians, investors, policy makers, and practitioners better comprehend the phenomenon and possibly contribute to operating efficiencies in the capital markets. Proaction and greater assertiveness in the investor/activist community may provide an impetus for continued regulatory reforms, improved transparency, and a revitalization of public trust as positive social change outcomes.