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The growing lack of confidence in public companies arises from the recent accounting scandals and corporate collapses, which have been attributed to the consequences of separation of ownership and control in modern firms. Agency theory predicts a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders that leads to agency costs and weak performance. This study used agency, stakeholders', and stewardship theories as the theoretical framework and multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational performance in nonfinancial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The results of the study could help clarify understanding of corporate governance to managers, investors, and regulators who seek to understand how corporate governance impact firms' performance. In this study, corporate governance mechanisms included board independence, audit committee independence, board size, number of board meetings, and executive compensation. The data were collected from the firms' published accounts on their websites and on the archives of the Nigerian Stock Exchange for a period starting from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2015. The measures of financial performance in the study were return on assets, return on capital employed, and Tobin's Q. The study found a positive but not statistically significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance. This study has implications for positive social change by showing managers and other stakeholders of firms how a good corporate governance system assures investor confidence, employee loyalty and commitment, the reduction in conflict of interest and agency costs, and a strong financial performance.