Date of Conferral
Public Policy and Administration
The fast and easy global movement of capital throughout the financial system, from lenders to borrowers and through intermediaries and financial market participants, has been recognized as a source of instability associated with illiquidity and financial crises. The purpose of this research was to better understand how regulation either enables or constrains capital movement. The theoretical framework comprised 2 contrasting public policymaking models, Arrow's rational-comprehensive model and Kingdon's garbage can model, which were used to derive opposing hypotheses. The research question addressed the nature of the relationship between Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) regulations and the flow of capital into Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) when lenders share their borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants. This quantitative study was a quasiexperimental time series design incorporating an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model using secondary data published by the U.S. government. The 2 independent variables were regulatory periods involving 2 CDSs regulations and the dependent variable was capital in the U.S. financial system that is deployed to CMOs. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000's ARIMA model (1,2,1) was significant at p < .05 and was negatively correlated to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008's ARIMA model (1,1,0), r = -.91, n = 18, p < .001. These results suggest that regulations cannot be relaxed and then reinstated with predictable results. The potential for positive social change is from stable financial institutions that mutually benefit depositors and borrowers.
Neill, Jon Patraic, "Credit Default Swaps Regulation and the Use of Collateralized Mortgage Obligations in U.S. Financial Institutions" (2011). Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies. 1135.