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## Exploring Contemporary Counterterrorism and Perspectives of Terrorism Experts to Combat Boko Haram

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# Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Walden University  
2020

Abstract

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Combat Boko Haram

by

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MA, Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia, 2003

BS, University of Jos, Nigeria, 1996

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

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Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

February 2020

## Abstract

Within the last decade, the terrorist attacks by Boko Haram have been the topic of considerable scholarly focus; yet, there remains a lack of knowledge and understanding about the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State. Using Wilner's contemporary deterrence theory as the foundation, the purpose of this case study of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) was to bridge the gap in knowledge to understand the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government and to explore alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno State to deter Boko Haram. Data were collected through interviews with 10 NPF counterterrorism experts selected through a purposive sampling strategy. These data were inductively coded and analyzed using Braun and Clarke's thematic analysis procedure. Two primary themes emerged from this study: (a) counterterrorism measures used by the Nigerian government were ineffective and (b) the important distinctions in the perceptions of the participants. De-radicalization and reorientation measures hold the potent dynamics of an enduring and long-term approach to successful counterterrorism and combating insurgency. The results of this study have implications for positive social change including policy recommendations to the Nigerian government to invest in counterterrorism efforts rooted in trust-building at higher levels of government to reduce the impact of potential infiltration of Boko Haram in government as well as implementing education and outreach programs highlighting the ills of terrorism, making it less attractive for vulnerable youths, enthroning peace and normalcy in the community, and promoting a society devoid of the destructive tendencies of terrorism.

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## Dedication

I dedicate this research effort to the glory of God, my dependable stronghold, for seeing me through to a successful completion of this study. I also dedicate this achievement to the memory of my dearly beloved dad late Mr. Willie Akpa Oje who saw only the finest in me and paved the way for me to soar. and reach for the stars To my daughters, Nneoma and Ogonna, who, in their different natures are so uniquely loving and selfless that they inspire me in subtle yet profound ways, to keep going and never relent in my efforts to achieve the goal of completing this doctoral study. To the gracious and warm cheerfulness of my siblings that energizes and replenishes my spirit. And to all the special folks I have crossed paths with through various faith and social communities who have directly and remotely mentored and cheered me on in surprising ways.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

The violence unleashed on the Nigerian populace by the Boko Haram extremist Islamist group is unprecedented in their target of innocent and unsuspecting individuals who the group considers as engaged in un-Islamic activities (Forest, 2012). Churches, Christians, Muslim clerics, strategic government agencies, and politicians have been the usual targets in the spate of attacks (Forest, 2012). Boko Haram wages war against all who have an affinity for Westernization, including Muslims considered by the group to be un-Islamic and corrupt in their practices.

In the wake of these attacks, Boko Haram engenders countrywide insecurities and increased tensions among ethno-religious groups. Due to these deadly acts of terror, Boko Haram has become the focus of national security concern (Oyewole, 2013). Systemic deficiencies in the political environment in Nigeria and failures by the Nigerian government to address the root causes and symptoms of terrorism have been cited as some of the issues that enable the insecurities engendered by the deadly acts of terror by Boko Haram to linger (Onah, 2014; Umar, 2013).

The threat posed to the Nigerian government and citizens by Boko Haram has been debilitating in view of the extensive loss of lives and properties resulting from the indiscriminate terrorist attacks by the group. These attacks have created an atmosphere of civil siege and volatility, with critically dire implications for public peace, safety, and security (Okoli & Iortyer, 2014). Although the Nigerian government had employed various strategies to end the attacks by Boko Haram, such as hard politics, military mobilization (Oyewole, 2013), and an emphasis on repressive state security (Aghedo &

Osumah, 2012), these approaches have been inadequate deterrence against Boko Haram because of the government's focus on militarized responses.

My plan with this study was to conduct a case study of the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). The intent was to explore this real-world situation to better understand the government's past responses and their effectiveness. As I will explain in Chapter 4, my plan changed, and I interviewed members of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) instead. I attempted to capture the perspectives of experts regarding alternative approaches, through interviews with 10 senior officials within the NPF, to the terrorist threat in Borno State, the base of Boko Haram operations.

In this chapter, I present the background to the study, including information on the violent campaigns and insecurities engendered by the Boko Haram attacks, followed by a statement of the problem justifying the need for this study. Subsequently, I present the purpose of the study, with a view toward a better understanding of the reasons why previous efforts had failed. Next, I present the research questions that probed why the past approaches by the Nigerian government failed and what strategies offered more effective deterrence to Boko Haram's attacks. The next section includes a brief overview of the theoretical framework that grounded this research effort, followed by a description of the nature of the study, definitions of key terms, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance of the study.

### **Background of the Study**

The structural reasons, such as incompetent and corrupt government, indicated in the research literature as fueling the grievances of individuals and groups to thrive are

exacerbated by extreme poverty, unemployment, and limited political and socioeconomic opportunities in the community Boko Haram operates from (Forrest, 2012). There is a direct link between the poverty and dearth of development in the Northern states of Nigeria and the emergence of Boko Haram (Owolade, 2014). The group blames this situation on the corrupting influence of the West on the governance of the Northern states (Owolade, 2014). The economic, political, and religious frustrations of marginalized young Muslims in northeast Nigeria find expression in Boko Haram (Warner, 2012). Hence, for Boko Haram, an armed revolt presents a solution to the widening regional economic disparity between the ruling elites and the masses (Owolade, 2014).

Boko Haram's campaign of violent acts of terrorism drew the attention of the Nigerian public between 2002 and 2009, following repeated strikes that started at the headquarters of NPF in Borno State (Maiangwa, Uzodike, Whetho, & Onapajo, 2012). Mohammed Yusuf formed Boko Haram on the philosophy that Western civilization in all its ramifications runs contrary to the tenets of the faith in Islam (Maiangwa et al., 2012). Instilling Islamic education in the youth formed a fundamental goal and means for the group to safeguard the Islamic societies in the north and curb the excess influence of globalization (Mu'azu, 2011).

A violent clash between the group and Nigerian Security Forces resulted in the killing of hundreds of Boko Haram members and, subsequently, the leader of the group, Mohammed Youssef, while in the custody of Nigerian Security Forces (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015). Boko Haram went underground, reconstructed itself, and reemerged as a violent extremist organization under a new and fanatical leadership (Asfura-Heim &

McQuaid, 2015, p. 21). The killing of its members by the Nigerian Security Forces triggered an escalation of brutal terrorist violence by Boko Haram in retaliation (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015). Boko Haram's indiscriminate killing of innocent and unsuspecting people drew violent responses from the Nigerian Security Forces (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015). The Nigerian Security Forces believed these responses to be the best approach to decimate Boko Haram and stop further attacks (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015). The Nigerian Security Forces apparently did not contemplate or expect the resurgence by the remnants of the group under a fanatical leadership with fortified membership or the brutality that defined their increasing attacks (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015). The group failed to capitulate to the Nigerian state despite the existence of a state of emergency in three states and heavy militarization of the North East geographical zone (Gilbert, 2014). These events point to a lack of effectiveness of the measures implemented by the Nigerian government to confront Boko Haram.

The response of the Nigerian government to the violent campaign by Boko Haram has shown a dominance of *hard politics* and military mobilization (Oyewole, 2013). The Nigerian government had also placed emphasis on a repressive state security approach (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012). Further, Asfura-Heim and McQuaid (2015) argued that these approaches have perpetuated the conflict rather than abating it.

The government responses have failed to yield the desired result of beating back Boko Haram. Instead, these government approaches highlight the governance vacuum and crisis of paying diminutive attention to the contextual realities and root political, social, and economic causes underlying the emergence and sustenance of the Boko



Haram conflict (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015). Consequently, the efforts have diminished the trust of the Nigerian people in the government to ensure not only the security of the state, but also human security, casting doubts on the legitimacy of the government (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015). The complexity of efforts to curtail acts of terrorism by Boko Haram is compounded by the wide spread of corruption and weakness of state institutions prevalent in Nigeria (Forrest, 2012).

These issues indicate a grave erosion of the legitimacy of the Nigerian government by the failure of government's efforts to contain Boko Haram. Okoro (2014) opined that a remedial strategy to avoid further enabling such resistance must employ transparent governance, concurrent with development. Against this backdrop, I conducted a case study of the NPF concerning Boko Haram's activities.

Violent insurgent campaigns by various groups agitating for specific grievances are not strange in Nigeria. However, Akpan, Ekanem, and Olofu-Adeoye (2014) noted that Boko Haram's classification as a terrorist organization by the United States and its allies is the first of its kind for an insurgent group in Nigeria. This classification stems from Boko Haram's use of sophisticated tactics and unprecedented lethality in its deadly campaign (Akpan, Ekanem, & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014).

Onah (2014) stated that the persistence of systemic deficiencies in the political system in Nigeria, which engenders such realities as corruption, poverty, and underdevelopment, only fosters the kind of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram. Onah further asserted that such violence often only provokes counterviolence from the government and leads to unhindered domination and exploitation of the society without

addressing the issues. In a related study, Umar (2013) opined that the government's current response has been inadequate to address the symptoms of terrorism. The author contended that a more enduring and adequate response by the government should involve a strategy that targets the root causes and symptoms of terrorism (Umar, 2013). On the other hand, Onuoha (2012) argued that the increasing capacity of Boko Haram to execute low-scale and lone attacks as well as the attendant safety challenges demand the attention of the security forces in Nigeria and possibly the global community to eliminate the potential for transnational terrorism. Uzodike and Maiangwa (2012) asserted that the failures of government intelligence and security apparatus exacerbate the security conditions created by the Boko Haram attacks.

The scope and size of attacks by Boko Haram grew such that by 2012, they had been responsible for numerous attacks against the military, police, government, and media organizations, resulting in the death of hundreds of people (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). Members of the group abducted and killed Christians who constitute a minority in northeastern Nigeria, and they attacked churches (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). The general insecurity created by the unabated uprising is a consequence of the failure of governance and institutional fragility, according to Aghedo and Osumah (2012). Similarly, Soyinka (2012) noted that the insecurities across the country following the production of these foot soldiers in mass, who have been deliberately bred, nurtured, sheltered, and ordered to unleash violence largely at the society, has been facilitated by economic factors.

Recommendations based on the findings of my study have important implications for positive social change for residents of the communities in Borno State to minimize or eliminate the unrest in their communities and restore peace to their daily lives.

Recommendations from my study may enable the security agencies to learn, adapt, and respond more quickly to the plots of Boko Haram to stage future attacks, enabling the government security agencies to be more effective in their counterterrorism efforts.

In Chapter 2, I will show that there has been much discussion and research on the threat of terrorist attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria as well as the measures taken by the government to counter the attacks. However, a gap still exists in research and understanding about the reasons why previous efforts by the Nigerian government in Borno State have failed to eradicate the threat posed by Boko Haram and consideration of alternative approaches for counterterrorism efforts by the Nigerian government in Borno State. I addressed this gap by conducting this qualitative case study.

### **Problem Statement**

Within the last decade, the terrorist attacks by Boko Haram have informed considerable scholarly focus, from exploring the root causes of terrorism and the attendant threats to security, to implicating Islam and citing the fragility of state institutions as contributing to the emergence of terrorism, as well as attributing it to the governance crisis. What remains unknown and a gap in the scholarly research led to the research problem for this study—a lack of knowledge and understanding about the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State

and the reasons why alternate approaches were either considered and not used or not considered at all.

The ongoing pursuit of effective counterterrorism measures against the campaign of terror attacks by Boko Haram constitutes an urgent national security objective that I sought to assist with this study. My research explored the governance and counterterrorism crisis of the Nigerian State, why the government through the NPF had been unable to reverse the terrorist trend, and if and why the Nigerian government has failed to consider alternative strategies for counterterrorism that could potentially enhance the deterrence of future acts of terrorism by Boko Haram in Borno State.

### **Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to bridge the gap in knowledge by conducting interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF to understand the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government and to explore alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno State. With the knowledge and understanding gained from my research, I described and explained why previous attempts by the Nigerian government to deter Boko Haram were unsuccessful and provided the Nigerian government with a set of recommendations which, when implemented, may help the government to deter Boko Haram.

### **Research Questions**

The following research questions guided this qualitative case study:

RQ1: What have been the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State?

RQ2: Were alternative approaches considered and not used or not considered at all?

### **Theoretical Foundation**

The contemporary deterrence theory by Wilner (2015) served as the theoretical framework for this study. I briefly overview the theory in this section and will provide a more detailed explanation in Chapter 2. In contemporary times, deterring terrorist attacks is still a fundamental challenge to international security, and Nigeria is no exception; hence, I attempted to suggest aspects of the contemporary deterrence theory to apply in solving the problem of terrorism in Nigeria. There has been a revitalization of deterrence theory in contemporary research after nearly two decades of obscurity since the end of the Cold War. This resurgence has incorporated a mixture of substate and nonstate security concerns, like insurgency, terrorism, radicalization, organized transnational crime, cyber insecurity, and piracy (Wilner, 2015).

There has been an addition to the deterrence agenda of more traditional interstate security dilemmas, stemming from reprobate organizations, nuclear and missile proliferation, and recent advances in missile technology and defense. Strategies like punishment; denial; delegitimization; dissuasion; inducements; and concepts, such as extended deterrence and cumulative deterrence, are being examined in new and exciting ways (Wilner, 2015).

The suspicion about deterrence that started in the early 1990s through the 2001 al-Qa'eda attack on the United States has started to dissipate. It has rather morphed into a community of scholars and practitioners who have partnered to investigate ways to

develop and apply deterrence theory as a strategic tool for addressing emerging and evolving security situations (Wilner, 2015). The effort to expand the scholarship and application of deterrence comes with potential risks of the rate at which the theory is evolving and the inevitable consequences of diluting and complicating their implementation (Wilner, 2015).

There may be a need for a doctrinal change as well as a shift in approach by the Nigerian government in its counterterrorism measures, germane to effectively countering the terrorism by Boko Haram in Borno State. These campaigns of terror by Boko Haram continue without showing any sign of abatement despite measures employed so far by the government to stop further deadly attacks. To determine if a change in approach is warranted, it is essential to consider past approaches, successes, and failures in light of Wilner's construct of contemporary deterrence.

### **Nature of the Study**

In this study, I employed the qualitative case study design to explore the causes of failure of counterterrorism measures by the government against Boko Haram in Borno State. The aim was to deliver a thick and rich description of this phenomenon of interest and provide illumination and understanding in answering the humanistic *why* and *how* questions in response to the research questions (see Yin, 2013). The qualitative case study design was appropriate in this regard because it enabled an in-depth exploration of the NPF as a bounded case with careful attention to detail, context, and nuance (see Patton, 2002).

I explored a range of alternative approaches to help the Nigerian government deter terrorist activities by Boko Haram in Borno State. I collected data for this study using semistructured interviews. Ten interview questions (see Appendix D) were developed to answer the research questions relating to the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State and whether alternative approaches were considered and used in the fight against terrorism by the NPF. The outcome of these interviews highlighted the factors that are contributing to the increase in terrorist activities by Boko Haram. Based on the findings, I identified alternate strategies that may aid the Nigerian government in deterring future attacks.

Based on the location and availability of the participants in Nigeria as well as considerations for cost, I planned with my gatekeeper at the NPF to conduct a face-to-face interview in Nigeria with each participant within a period of 1 month. Data analysis consisted of thematic analysis of the responses collected from the in-depth, open-ended interviews. Generation of the codes and collation of the codes into themes and categories were done manually as well as with NVivo for a complete immersion into the data. The nature of the study is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.

### **Definitions**

*Al-Qaeda*: Arabic for “the Base.” An international terrorist network founded by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s that seeks to rid Muslim countries of what it sees as the profane influence of the West and replace their governments with fundamentalist Islamic regimes (Council on Foreign Relations, 2012).

*Boko Haram*: This is the name generally used for the sect, *Jama'atu Ahlis Suna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad*, which translates to *forbid everything Western and Western education* or *Western education is a sin* (Adegbulu, 2013, Amusan & Oyewole, 2014, Oyewole, 2013). An extremist Islamist group that has carried out deadly campaigns of violence against innocent civilians in Nigeria since 2002. It also targets government establishments, churches, Christians and Muslim clerics, strategic government agencies, and politicians (Adegbulu, 2013, Amusan & Oyewole, 2014, Oyewole, 2013).

*Counterterrorism*: A rival political strategy to the political goals terrorism seeks to achieve that involves an obligation to maintain and restore order from the disorder created by terrorism (Oyewole, 2013).

*Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)*: The agency primarily responsible for military intelligence outside and inside Nigeria. Established in June 1986 by Decree # 19 to provide a system of obtaining military intelligence efficiently for the Nigerian Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence (Defence Intelligence Agency, n.d).

*Deterrence theory*: A strategy of deterrence of general war that encompasses conceptions of national security opposed to preventive war, preemptive attack, and massive retaliation (Brodie, 1959).

*Joint Task Force (JTF)*: A special joint military task force established in June 2011, by the Federal Government of Nigeria, specifically to tackle the crisis of Boko Haram in the north. It is comprised of the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Airforce, Nigerian Police, and the Department of State Security Service (SSS) (Begeagle, 2011, June 30).



*Maitatsine*: The Maitatsine riots were a series of violent uprisings instigated by Islamist militants in northern Nigeria between 1980 and 1985 and represented northern Nigeria's first major wave of religiously inspired violence. The riots prompted immense ethnoreligious discord between Muslims and Christians in years to come. The Maitatsine movement was led by Muhammadu Marwa (d. 1980), a Cameroonian residing in Kano who opposed the Nigerian state (*Maitatsine* is a Hausa term for "He who damns," referring to Marwa). He referred to himself as a prophet—to the extent that one account reports that some of his followers referred to Marwa in lieu of the Prophet Muhammad as God's prophet and a reformer (*mujaddid*), with reference to Usman Dan Fodio. He was also notable for his vociferous condemnation of Western culture, education, and technology, and Marwa was known to refer to anyone who sent their children to a state school as an *infidel*, which is echoed in the contemporary Boko Haram movement

*National Intelligence Agency*: The agency responsible for external intelligence and counterintelligence in Nigeria. It was established by Decree #19 in June 1986 (National Intelligence Agency, 2012).

*Nigeria Police Force (NPF)*: The principal law enforcement agency in Nigeria, founded in 1930 under the Ministry of Interior (Nigeria Police Force, n.d).

*Shari'a*: In its Islamic context, Sharia may be defined as the totality of God's commands and exhortations, intended to regulate all aspects of human conduct and guide believers on the path of eternal salvation. The original sources of Sharia are the Koran and the *Hadith*. The Koran is the collection of the utterances believed by Muslims to be the literal words of God transmitted to the prophet Mohammed through the Angel

Gabriel. These utterances, consisting of more than 6,000 verses, were collected shortly after the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632 A.D. and organized into 114 chapters in a single book, the Koran, which is accepted by all Muslims as the authentic Holy Book of the religion. The Hadith is the collection of the *Sunna*, or traditions of the Prophet Mohammed, consisting of his deeds and sayings that are believed by Muslims to have been inspired by God and to, therefore, have the same original value in expressing the divine Will of God as the Koran (Library of Congress, 2011).

*State Security Service:* This agency, also known as the Department of State Security, was established by Decree #19 in June 1986 and is responsible for domestic intelligence in Nigeria. Its mission includes defending and protecting the Federal Republic of Nigeria against domestic threats and the evolving security threats, including counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (State Security Service, 2013).

*Terrorism:* The term faces a lot of definitional challenges due to a lack of consensus among scholars on a generally accepted definition of terrorism. The two definitions adopted as working definitions for this study were (a) the use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence to change the behavior of a whole society by causing fear and by targeting specific parts of society to affect the entire society (Garrison, 2004, 278) and (b) the intentional random murder of defenseless noncombatants with the intention of instilling fear or mortal danger among civilians as a strategy designed to advance political ends (Meisels, 2009, p. 348).

### **Assumptions**

I made the following assumptions in this study:

The interviews effectively explored what had been the causes of failures of counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State.

The senior government officials in the NPF were willing to take part in this study because of the continuing threat of terrorism in Nigeria and the significance of devising effective ways to deter it.

The participants understood and interpreted the in-depth interview questions accurately as worded.

The participants shared their views about the questions asked, openly and honestly in answering the interview questions.

The results of this study may lead to positive social change for the Nigerian communities and more specifically communities in Borno State under the siege of terrorist threats.

### **Scope and Delimitations**

In this study, I interviewed 10 senior government officials in the NPF to explore the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State and whether alternative approaches were considered and not used or not considered at all in the counterterrorism efforts by Nigerian government in Borno State. Therefore, the scope of this study excluded government officials from other security agencies in Nigeria. This limited the boundaries of this study to data that were generated from senior government officials in the NPF.

This study excluded individuals I may have had remote or personal relationships with. These included friends, coworkers of friends, professional associates, family

members, and personal associates connected with the NPF. This exclusion prevented any feelings of coercion to participate in the study due to relationships that exist between us or relationships expected to exist. Consequently, it helped to ensure an objective and unbiased approach to the data that were generated.

### **Limitations**

There were several limitations to the generalizability and trustworthiness of the findings of this study. The use of the case study research design with a purposive sampling of 15 senior government officials within the NPF, with an expectation of interviewing 10 participants, was the first of these limitations because that sample size may be judged by some to be too small to achieve informational saturation. The fact that the data involved the unique perspectives of the participants working in the NPF, which were analyzed to extract emerging codes and themes for reporting my research, implies that there is a limitation to generalizing the results of these unique perspectives, beyond participants in this study or similar populations.

The second limitation pertains to the fact that participants were drawn from a specific agency involved in the fight against terrorism. This implied that their knowledge of terrorism based on their experiences might differ from other security agencies, which may have influenced their responses to the questions. A third limitation related to the fact that deterrence is merely one possibility among many within a broader counterterrorism policy and not a comprehensive solution by itself. A fourth limitation related to the location of participants in Nigeria. I had limited opportunity due to cost to travel to

Nigeria again to ask more probing, follow-up questions to clarify or to probe more deeply into their responses.

The final limitation related to bias and my assumption that participants shared their responses by answering the questions honestly and openly. There was a possibility of social desirability bias, which arises when participants choose to self-report in a positive but dishonest manner, so others may look at them in a good way. I found, however, that the participants were open and honest in answering the questions.

### **Significance of the Study**

There has been much discussion and research on the threat of terrorist attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria as well as on the measures employed by the government to counter the attacks, including reasons why such government measures have been ineffective. However, research is sparse on alternative measures that could enhance the efforts of the Nigerian government to deter terrorism in Nigeria, particularly concerning Boko Haram's activities in Borno State. Therefore, while it is important to note that the opportunity the Boko Haram group had to thrive unrestrained and beyond control stems from the ineptitude of the Nigerian state (see Onapajo & Uzodike 2012), it is also pertinent to explore alternative measures that can enhance deterrence through efforts by the Nigerian government.

The results of this study have implications for social change through the potential to positively impact public policy, administration, and internal and external security management within many agencies in Nigeria, especially policymakers involved in counterterrorism in Nigeria and government security agencies, to assist in formulating

and implementing more effective counterterrorism measures that enhance deterrence. The findings of this study also have the potential to help eliminate or minimize the social unrest caused by Boko Haram's terrorist activities and restore peace and normalcy to the daily lives of the communities of Borno State affected by this unrest. My research led to the recommendation of new strategies that may help the counterterrorist officials in Nigeria to deter terrorism. Other Nigerian security agencies that stand to benefit from this improvement besides the NPF include the SSS, National Intelligence Agency, and the DIA. In addition, the implications of this study are also relevant for the JTF, which is made up of the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Airforce, and Nigerian Police.

The findings and recommendations from my research may help in the performance of counterterrorism by security agencies in Nigeria through the implementation of strategies that deter terrorist attacks by Boko Haram. The recommended strategies could translate to enduring deterrence in efforts towards the pursuit of effective counterterrorism by the Nigerian government in combating the threat of terrorism by Boko Haram in Borno State. This may result in restoring confidence in security that has been considerably diminished or eroded completely by the recurrent terrorist activities as well as boost in credibility to the capacity of the Nigerian government to protect its citizenry and deter acts of terrorism.

### **Summary and Transition**

The results of this qualitative case study filled the gap in knowledge of the NPF through interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF to understand the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government. In addition, I

explored alternate approaches to deter terrorism through the efforts by the government to confront and ameliorate the terroristic threat from Boko Haram in Borno State.

To ground this qualitative case study, Wilner's (2015) construct of contemporary deterrence theory served as the theoretical framework. In-depth, semistructured interviews served as the main data collection instrument for this study. I conducted a face-to-face interview with participants in Nigeria within a period of 1 month. This study is significant because of its implications for the Nigerian security agencies, including the recommendation of more effective strategies to achieve deterrence. The recommendations from this research may aid collaboration among security agencies to detect and deter terrorist plots and enhance prompt and effective counterterrorism responses.

Chapter 1 included the background of the problem, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, research questions, theoretical framework, nature of the study, definitions of terms, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations of the study, significance of the study, and summary. Chapter 2 will include the strategy for literature search, theoretical foundation, overview of terrorism and counterterrorism, governance and crisis in Nigeria, an overview of fundamentalist uprisings and insurgencies in Nigeria, an overview of internal insecurities in Nigeria, responses of the Nigerian government to terrorism, as well as a summary and conclusions.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to fill the gap in knowledge by conducting interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF to understand the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government and to explore alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno State. The Boko Haram extremist Islamist group unleashed a campaign of violence on the Nigerian populace on a scale unprecedented in its target of innocent and unsuspecting individuals that the group consider as engaged in un-Islamic activities (Forest, 2012). Not spared in the spate of attacks are churches, Christians, Muslim clerics, strategic government agencies, and politicians (Forest, 2012). While Boko Haram's rationale for its attacks on these groups may be understandable, its justification for striking at Muslim clerics is still confounding. Owolade (2014) contended that this indicates a politically driven Islamism by Boko Haram, to wage war against all, including Muslims, who are aligned with Westernization. Faith-based Islam is a central theme in the campaign by Boko Haram, even though it does not form a paramount inspiration for the activities of the group (Owolade, 2014). This study highlighted the fact that religious affiliation does not play any role in Boko Haram's choice of targets, such choices are predicated upon whether the targets are un-Islamic and corrupt in discharging their primary official duties.

Boko Haram engenders country-wide insecurities and increased tensions among ethno-religious groups in the wake of these attacks. The deadly acts of terror have made Boko Haram the focus of national security concerns (Oyewole, 2013). Consequently, the United States and its allies classified Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, the first



insurgent group in Nigeria to get such classification (Akpan et al., 2014). Issues such as systemic deficiencies in the political environment in Nigeria and failures by the Nigerian government to address the root causes and symptoms of terrorism tend to stimulate Boko Haram's agenda (Onah, 2014; Umar, 2013).

Incompetent and corrupt governments inhibit the welfare of the citizenry and lead to extreme poverty, unemployment, and limited political and socioeconomic opportunities in the communities in which Boko Haram operates (Forrest, 2012).

Owolade (2014) linked the emergence of Boko Haram directly to the poverty and dearth of development in the Northern states of Nigeria. Boko Haram blames this situation on the corrupting influence of the West on the governance of the Northern states (Owolade, 2014). The group perceives that an armed revolt presents a solution to the widening regional economic disparity between the ruling elites and ordinary citizens (Owolade, 2014).

In view of past efforts by the Nigerian government to contain militant threats, Akpan et al. (2014) examined the processes employed by the government in containing militant threats and argued against replicating the methods used with the Niger Delta militant groups in handling Boko Haram because of differences in their ideologies and core demands. Freeman (2014) argued that the killing of terrorist leaders in expectation of a natural consequence of the collapse of the terrorist organization have yielded mixed results. Boko Haram's attacks and the security ramifications of Nigeria's difficulties in defeating it have increased the need for more effective counterstrategies (Folade, 2016). This points to a failure of the approaches employed by the government to yield the

desired result of beating back Boko Haram. Hence, there is a need to fill the gap in knowledge through a case study of the NPF to understand the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government and to explore alternate approaches to deter terrorism from Boko Haram in Borno State.

Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of the literature search strategy employed in finding resources for this research. I explain the theoretical foundation that grounded this research effort, discuss terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria, and present an overview of Islamic religious uprisings in Nigeria. I also highlight internal insecurities in the wake of the Islamic fundamentalist uprisings, illuminate the Nigerian government's responses to Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies, analyze ethno-religious tensions in Northern Nigeria, and explain the governance crisis that impacted counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government.

### **Literature Search Strategy**

To locate relevant literature for this study, I performed an in-depth search of the Walden University Library research databases covering all the EBSCO databases, such as the Thoreau Multi-Database Search, Academic Search Complete, SAGE Premier, as well as ProQuest Central and Dissertations. Additionally, I retrieved relevant literature from the International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center; websites of relevant organizations, such as the U.S. Homeland Security Digital Library, Military and Government Collection, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism; Dictionaries; and Google Scholar. These websites were perused with a focus on retrieving peer-reviewed journals within 5 years of publication. However,

extending the literature search beyond 5 years was necessary for an overview of fundamentalist Islamic religious uprisings witnessed at various points in time in Nigeria. Search terms included *governance crisis and Nigeria, terrorism, counter-terrorism and Nigeria, fundamentalist Islamic religious uprisings and insurgencies in Nigeria, Boko Haram uprising, national security and Nigeria, corruption, security, and Nigeria, law enforcement, communication and Nigeria, contemporary deterrence and applications, general deterrence and rivals, rational deterrence, and nonstate actors.*

### **Theoretical Foundation**

This section of the literature review is organized in subsections on deterrence theory, early classical philosophers of deterrence theory, Wilner's contemporary deterrence theory, and research applications of deterrence theory.

#### **Deterrence Theory**

There are two main branches of the deterrence theory: (a) general deterrence, which is designed to prevent crime in the general population; and (b) specific deterrence, which aims to discourage the individual offender from future criminal offenses (Morgan, 2017). An important element of general deterrence is its broad scope. The state's punishment of offenders, in the form of the death penalty and corporal punishment, serves as an example for others in the general population who have not yet taken part in criminal events (Morgan, 2017). Corporal punishment is outlawed in the United States and England, even though in the past lynching used to be carried out in public and family members of the offenders could attend so that they would see what happened to those who broke the law (Morgan, 2017). Corporal punishment is a common deterrence

strategy in other countries (Dilulio, 2010). In August 2001, Nigeria introduced shari'a, or Islamic law, that legalized corporal punishment (DiIulio, 2010). Iran sentenced 20 people to be caned for consuming alcohol in that same month, and in November 2001, Saudi Arabia subjected 55 people to be lashed for harassing women (Dilulio, 2010). Human Rights Watch reported that Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq sentenced violators to punishments in the form of amputation of arms, legs, and ears (DiIulio, 2010). Specific deterrence has a narrower scope in that it imposes severe punishment on the individual offender to discourage them from committing that offense in the future (Dilulio, 2010).

### **Early Classical Philosophers of Deterrence Theory**

The deterrence theory of punishment trails back to the early works of classical philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1678), Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794), and Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832). These social contract theorists contested the legal policies that had subjugated European thought for centuries and the mystical justifications on which they were established (Hobbes, 1651). These theorists also postulated the foundation for modern deterrence theory in criminology. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes (1651) described men as creatures of their own volition who want material gain, personal safety, and social reputation and may resort to conflict and resistance when their self-interests are threatened, usually by the government.

To avoid war, conflict, and crime, citizens enter into a social contract with the government where an individual authorizes the sovereign to use of force to uphold the social contract even though this is not an absolute guarantee (Hobbes, 1651). Deterrence, as a social contract, upholds the agreement between the state and the people, and

individuals are punished for violating this social contract (Hobbes, 1651). Beccaria (1963) published a treatise built on the ideals of the social contract philosophers use to challenge the rights of the state to punish crimes. Beccaria sided with Hobbes and other 18th-century Enlightenment writers to advocate the need to judge laws by their propensity to afford the “greatest happiness shared by the greatest number” (p. 8).

Beccaria (1963) argued that if the sole purpose of punishment was to prevent crime in society, then punishment became unjust by crossing the acceptable severity threshold. Swift and certain punishment offer effective ways of preventing and controlling crime (Beccaria, 1963). Siding with other classical theorists, Beccaria posited that people are rational beings with free will to govern their own decisions. The theorist advocated the publication of laws to allow people to know their intent as well as their purpose. As an advocate of the pleasure-pain principle or hedonistic calculus, Beccaria postulated that pleasure and pain are the motives of rational people; to prevent crime, the pain of punishment must outweigh the pleasure obtained from committing the crime.

Bentham, a contemporary of Beccaria, was one of the most prominent 18th-century intellectuals on crime. In a now famous principle of utility, Bentham (1948) postulated that the sovereign masters of pain and pleasure governed humankind. Bentham also believed that penalties, *per se*, were evil to the extent that they did not avert greater evil, or regulate the actions of offenders, and punishment was also unjustified if it failed to promote collective happiness by increasing pleasure and lessening the pain.

### **Wilner's Contemporary Deterrence Theory and Counterterrorism**

In contemporary times, deterrence theory has been revitalized after nearly two decades of obscurity since the end of the Cold War (Wilner, 2015). This resurgence has incorporated a mixture of substate and nonstate security concerns, like insurgency, terrorism, radicalization, organized transnational crime, cyber insecurity, and piracy (Wilner, 2015). Added to the deterrence agenda were traditional interstate security dilemmas, stemming from reprobate organizations, nuclear and missile proliferation, and recent advances in missile technology and defense (Wilner, 2015). Examined in new and exciting ways are concepts like extended deterrence and cumulative deterrence as well as strategies such as punishment, denial, delegitimization, dissuasion, and inducements (Morral & Jackson, 2009).

The suspicion about deterrence that started in the early 1990s through the 2001 al-Qa'eda attack on the United States has started to dissipate (Wilner, 2015). Rather, it transformed into a community of scholars and practitioners who have collaborated to explore ways to develop and apply deterrence theory as a strategic tool for addressing emerging and evolving security situations (Wilner, 2015). The potential risks inherent in the effort to develop the scholarship and application of deterrence comes with the rate at which the theory is evolving and the inevitable consequences of weakening and complicating their implementation (Wilner, 2015).

### **The Origin of the Contemporary Deterrence Theory**

The study of deterring terrorism began in response to a post-9/11 research program that questioned the early assertions made by U.S. President George W. Bush,

U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, and a variety of other political and military leaders that terrorism and terrorists were altogether undeterrable (Broad, Engelberg, & Glanz, 2001). A similar school of thought emerged to contemplate deterrence and rogue states (Wilner, 2015). The debate centered on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Slobodan Milosovic's Serbia, and Muammar al-Qaddafi's Libya in the 1990s but has shifted to deterring nuclear North Korea and nuclear-aspirants (Wilner, 2015).

In both instances, scholars have investigated different ways in which the logic and theory of deterrence might be reapplied, and this effort has provided practical insights for addressing current challenges and future security circumstances. A research program on deterring terrorism (and terrorists, or violent, nonstate actors) has emerged from these questions, and new theories, concepts, and models for deterring terrorism have been proposed (Wenger & Wilner, 2012). Empirical research has tested and refined some of these proposals, and policy recommendations and best practices have begun to circulate (Wenger & Wilner, 2012).

Deterring terrorism places emphasis on targeting the values that militants cherish, like publicity, operational and tactical success, strategic and tactical victory, leadership, group cohesiveness, trust and camaraderie, popular sympathy and social acceptance, religious and political legitimacy, prestige, personal glory, freedom of movement and safe havens, wealth, and other material assets (Jenkins, 1975). Most militant groups lack traditional territorially based assets against which classical threats of punishment and

retaliation might be issued—a dilemma known as the return address problem (Betts, 2002).

Some militant assets rest beyond the realm punishable by military or kinetic destruction alone; therefore, the coercive process involved in deterring terrorism often relies on nonkinetic instruments that target nonphysical resources and assets (Betts, 2002). This situation may call for deterrence by delegitimization, in which militants' political, ideological, or religious rationales and intentions are used against them to sway public sentiment, stem recruitment, alter behavior, and deter support for political violence (Dunn, 2008). Several scholars prefer the broader concept of influence over deterrence. Davis and Jenkins (2002) argued against the term deterrence in the context of counterterrorism because they viewed it as restrictive.

Adding a component of influence to the study of deterring terrorism will facilitate further study (Dunn, 2007). Influence encompasses the concept of deterrence but is intended to be applied in ways that go well beyond relying on threats of punishment or denial to manipulate behavior. The continuum of influence includes a variety of coercive strategies which include co-optation and inducement - convincing an adversary to join an opponent's larger effort, dissuasion and deterrence - using threats and appreciation of negative consequences to convince a challenger to alter intended behavior, denial and defense - creating perceptions of tactical/strategic failure in order to change behavior, and defeat and destruction - demonstrating a capability to decisively punish today, in order to deter tomorrow (Broad et al., 2001).



In each case, a key element of a traditional deterrence theory is evident when a defender attempts to modify a challenger's behavior by altering the cost-benefit analysis. Both approaches have allowed scholars to think creatively about deterring a very large subset of activities related to political violence, radicalization, militancy, insurgency, and terrorism. In the past primary focus was placed on Cold War-era deterrence which involved states and superpowers and their foreign and military relations; however, scholars now place greater attention on the individual actors and subgroups that constitute or support militant organizations, along with the individual processes involved in orchestrating terrorism (Davis & Jenkins, 2002). A variety of coercive strategies that are distinct from those outlined in traditional interstate deterrence theory have been developed through research:

**Indirect deterrence.** This involves manipulating an actor who is only tangentially associated with the unwanted action that is to be deterred. In this case, a state deters terrorism by threatening to retaliate against a state sponsor of militancy. The goal is less terrorism, but the coercive process starts by threatening a sponsor, which then reins in its support for a militant group, which becomes less able to coordinate acts of violence.

**Deterrence by punishment.** A classic coercive process that defined the Cold War, which has been repackaged to deter substate, nonstate, and individual-level actors. This involves targeted killings and the use of drone technology (unmanned aerial vehicles), to locate, track, and target individuals.

**Deterrence by denial or defensive denial.** This involves deterring violence by augmenting structural defenses that restrict the terrorism process.

**Behavioral denial.** This involves deterring violence by introducing environmental uncertainty and unpredictability that degrade terrorist planning; *Mitigation* or *resilience* involves deterring violence by blunting and/or limiting terrorism's social, political, and economic effect. Each of these concepts is rooted in the core assumptions that underpin deterrence by denial, but they offer more fine-grained applications for deterring militancy.

**Deterrence by delegitimization.** This attempts to change an adversary's behavior by manipulating the justifications that inform its preferences (Davis & Jenkins, 2002). This strategy employs a group's interpretation of a sacred narrative or political ideology and foment division among and between militants and their community.

**Intrawar deterrence.** In counterterrorism this involves deterring aspects of a militant group's behavior while simultaneously engaging in military operations geared toward their ultimate destruction and defeat (Wilner, 2013).

**Cumulative deterrence.** This describes how coercion might work within enduring, iterated, and protracted conflicts between a state and a nonstate adversary. The objective is to bank previous military and counter-terrorism successes figuratively, along with general perceptions of conventional and nuclear strengths, and to use that accumulated wealth of strategic might to persuade an organization that further violence is altogether futile (Almog, 2004). The different strategies for deterrence have enhanced the development of tools for countering and containing terrorism and militant groups over the long term. On the contrary, they have also highlighted a plethora of dilemmas, challenges, and paradoxes that need to be reckoned with.

### **Research Application of Deterrence Theory**

Discussions in this section demonstrates that the first wave of deterrence theory had very little impact on policy, and expectedly so, due to its innovative approach which was devoid of evidential justification. Jarvis (1979) argued that at the first wave of deterrence theory, the idea had relatively minimal impact on policy and was deficient in the systematization and richness of the waves that followed (p. 291). The second wave of deterrence theory did not fare much better than the first, as it was subjected to intense criticisms stemming from limited evidence to validate the ideas advanced.

Lupovici (2010) opined that the 1950s saw the emergence of the second wave of deterrence theory, which incorporated the game theory model, particularly the Chicken Game, in the study of deterrence. These perceptions became conventional wisdom aiding scholars to a better understanding of the tactics of actors (p. 706). Jervis (1979) asserted that this wave drew much criticisms however, due to scant evidence in support or validation of these ideas (pp. 291-292). Bringing the fate of the second wave of deterrence theory to the same unyielding crossroads encountered by the first wave of deterrence theory.

The lack of supporting evidence and undue reliance on deduction, posed difficulties to the third wave of deterrence theory akin to the second wave. Jervis (1979) noted however that the empirical research of the third wave, exposed the need to modify deterrence theory in relation to risk taking, rewards, probabilities, misconceptions, and domestic and bureaucratic politics (pp. 303-314). Lupovici (2010) added that with the empirical research on the third wave of deterrence theory, it provided important solutions

to the problems of lack of supporting evidence and heavy reliance on deduction. Further, Walt (1991) noted that these solutions were borne out of animated debates about what constitutes the requirements of deterrence, the framework for rational deterrence, the utility it serves, as well as the proper strategies for evaluating it.

Distinguishing between general deterrence and immediate deterrence, Huth and Russett (1993) opined that a series of escalating threat and counter-threats generally progress to a war, hence war very rarely result from a conflict of interest and non-militarized dispute in peacetime (p. 61). General deterrence the authors contended, is characterized by neither adversary using military force nor making active threat to use it, hence an absence of crisis in this instance does not necessarily imply the success of deterrence.

Explaining further, Huth and Russett (1993) added on the other hand, that immediate deterrence comprises three important elements; active consideration to launch an attack by officials in one of the adversary states on another or its allies, awareness of this by leaders of the other state, and an issuance of a threat to retaliate by the other state to prevent such attack.

### **Terrorism and Counterterrorism**

#### **Terrorism**

Scholars delving into the field of discussions on terrorism are confronted with two distinct challenges. The first relates to the fact that state terror is often ignored by scholars in the study of terrorism because terrorism is not value neutral by any estimation. Consequently, the word *terrorism* forms an object of contention among

parties to a conflict. In a political conflict where the struggle relates to control of power and influence, as well as which of the parties in the conflict gets to label the other, the state often labels political behaviors, since it has control of a large concentration of power (Adegbulu, 2013). Applying the term to activities of a group, organization, or state institution conveys contempt and those to whom terrorism is applied regard it as an accusation and in turn label their accusers the *real* terrorist, adding to the ambiguity and confusion (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirsh-Hoefler, 2004).

The second challenge which has haunted the study of terrorism for decades, relates to definitional problems, consequently, numerous definitions of the term terrorism abound, without any generally accepted definition of the term among scholars. Few terms or concepts have presented challenges of definition as terrorism has, in contemporary political discourse (Weinberg et al., 2004). The problem of defining terrorism Crenshaw (2000) opined, which has hindered analysis since the inception of studies in early 1970, shows few signs of abating as we approach the 21st century.

Schmid, (2004) opined that the challenge of defining terrorism presents similar difficulties involved in attempts to define terrorist organization. Noting further the issue of lack of consensus on general theoretical laws of terrorism, Crenshaw (2014) offered that researchers have rather defined key concepts and deepened explanations of cause, effect, and process (p. 557). This lack of a consensus on what constitutes terrorism, accounts for the lack of a clear classification of insurgent groups in Nigeria as terrorist groups from the inception of their campaign of attacks.

Consequently, Akpan et al. (2014) noted that Boko Haram is the first insurgent group in Nigeria classified by the United States and its allies as a terrorist organization, due to Boko Haram's use of sophisticated tactics and unprecedented lethality in its deadly campaign. Boko Haram has remained the only group in Nigeria to be designated as such, yet the trajectory of attacks by the group remains unparalleled. It is fortunate, however, that their activities have not been replicated by other groups since the start of attacks by Boko Haram in 2009.

However, the ability of Boko Haram to regroup and intensify their vicious attacks, was seen in the reconstruction and reemergence by the remnants of the group with fortified numbers in their membership, after their retreat from a violent clash with Nigerian security forces which resulted in the loss of many of their members. The brutality that defined their increasing attacks, were not contemplated or expected by the Nigerian Security forces. And the unrestrained manner of attacks by the group and the annihilation of villages during their attacks with little or no intervention by the Nigerian security forces, indicate a lack of preparedness by the government to confront Boko Haram.

Furthermore, another dimension to the definitional challenges in the study of terrorism, is the fact that the study of terrorism like other subjects amenable to social scientific analysis, has also undergone significant transformation by technology, which makes aggregate data easily available and accessible (Crenshaw, 2014). This transformation through technology, necessitates the ability of terrorists to continue to evolve in the choice of weapons employed in modern terrorism. As shown in the

September 11, 2001 attacks Hoffman (2002) noted that the weapons of modern terrorism for Bin Laden, are critically not the long-standing traditional weapons of terrorism such as guns and bombs, but the minicam, video tapes, and the Internet (p. 307). Hence the Internet is replete with videotaped and still picture messages of attacks by terrorist groups.

The transformative impact of technology on terrorism, ensures a much wider reach of the goal of terrorism, which in effect includes conjuring fear and trepidation, to guarantee submission to the terrorist demands by the victims targeted (Ajayi, 2012). To be adequate therefore, a definition of terrorism must capture the elements of the weapons employed in modern terrorism, beyond a definitional focus of the use of guns, bombs and other age-old weapons of terrorism.

However, for the focus of this study, a few definitional approaches appear relevant to the focus of devising more effective strategies and approach by the government to contain terrorism by Boko Haram. These will be presented briefly and serve as working definitions for this study. Terrorism was defined as the use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence to change the behavior of a whole society, by causing fear and by targeting specific parts of society to affect the entire society (Garrison, 2004, p. 278). The surreptitious nature of the terrorist attacks by Boko Haram, results in crippling fear that affects every facet of the community subject to the attacks, as well as the entire Nigerian society.

On the other hand, terrorism was also viewed as the intentional, random murder of defenseless noncombatants, with the intention of instilling fear or mortal danger

among civilians as a strategy designed to advance political ends (Meisels, 2009, p. 348). This definition of terrorism reflects the trajectory of attacks employed by Boko Haram in decimating members of the community subject to its attack. The goal of modern terrorists to cause fear and alter behaviors of a whole society, reaches far and wide very easily by their use of technology. Efforts to avert a successful strike and impact of terrorist attacks must also shift from the usual approach of dealing with insurgences after the fact and employ effective strategies to pre-empt and deter terrorist plans.

It follows therefore to note, that while the governance crisis may not necessarily be the initial cause of terrorism, such attendant and prevailing situation is germane to the radicalization of groups advocating for different endemic causes due to corruption, inequality, poverty, and repression by the government. Hence, the governance crisis makes room for terrorism to escalate undeterred, with no signs of abatement, due to the failure of government to deliver on its social contract to the people and as well as failure to employ effective measures to deter and contain the terrorist acts.

### **Counterterrorism**

This section describes counter-terrorism using the same lens employed in viewing terrorism, consistent with the working definition adopted for this study: terrorism is the use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence to change the behavior of a whole society, by causing fear and by targeting specific parts of society to affect the entire society (Garrison 2004, p. 278). It follows then that counterterrorism encompasses a rival strategy that protects the whole society from the use of force or violence or the threat thereof, to ensure the status quo ante. In the same vein, Oyewole (2013) noted that



while terrorism is a means to disorder, counterterrorism is, therefore, by definition, an obligation to maintain and restore order (p. 254).

Oyewole (2013) highlighted three foremost counter-terrorism measures to include (a) military-based, (b) justice-based, and (c) political-based. Proponents of military-based counter-terrorism measures are convinced of the fact that terrorists are nihilist. The author further contended that the fact should not be denigrated therefore, that terrorists who threaten states should be faced with a military counter-terrorism strategy that serves to stop further attacks by the terrorists.

This military-based approach employs the idea of *war on terrorism* which Oyewole (2013) argued that it positions the fight against terrorism in military terms as an enemy-centric war and charges the armed forces with the responsibility of developing and effecting strategic responses. However, this may be emotionally satisfying in the immediate term, in view of the human and material cost of the *war on terrorism*, but on the other hand, it casts a shadow of fear and destruction that no one would want to live with permanently.

In the *justice-policing* counter-terrorism model, terrorism is viewed as a crime deserving legal redress. Criminalization of various types of conduct is paramount to this counter-terrorism approach necessitating the detection, investigation, prevention, and prosecution through the court system of acts of terrorism (Oyewole, 2013). Policing and arraigning terrorists before the law courts, will be executed by the state, which will ensure that internationally acceptable legal standards guide the trial and sentencing of the terrorists (Oyewole, 2013). *Justice-policing* counterterrorism places a high premium on

the need for transparency and protection of human rights (Oyewole, 2013). The justice-policing counter-terrorism model faces the challenge of the inconsistencies and inadequacies apparent in the legal definitions of terrorism as well as the attendant contradictions.

In the political counter-terrorism model, the task of defining what *terrorist*, *terrorism*, and *counterterrorism* means, rests with the policymakers (Oyewole, 2013). The pressure to show due diligence to justice and fairness and demonstrate the capability of the government to respond rapidly to emergencies resulting from terrorist attacks, is coupled with the need for the policymakers to show accountability to domestic and international stakeholders.

These pertinent and equally important needs have led to the emergence of *hard* politics and *soft* politics in the political counter-terrorism model (Oyewole, 2013). *Hard* political counter-terrorism measures involve *militarized* policing and a war-like hunt for terrorists, with the motive of eliminating and deterring them. Oyewole (2013) contended however, that liberal scholars show that *hard* politics makes democracy less practicable and enables dictators to silence oppositions. This is especially true in a country like Nigeria where the government goes to great lengths to shut down oppositions to its unpopular policies, undermining the country's democratic system.

*Soft* political counter-terrorism measures often referred to as the diplomatic model on the other hand, works on the assumption that a political approach yields better dividends of justice for terrorists and against them as well, rather than the courts (Oyewole, 2013). The author further stated that this model of counterterrorism entails a

*soft* power approach, consisting of population-centric methods (Oyewole, 2013) that makes the interests of the population foremost and an intricate part of the process. Featured in this method are such things as capacity building, democratization, economic development, and counter-radicalization policies that highlight the underlying causes that enable terrorism to thrive and focus on addressing these causes (Oyewole, 2013). This *soft* power approach is apparently not an immediate response approach to an ongoing terrorism but should ideally be implemented genuinely and consistently to counter further radicalization efforts of terrorist—in essence providing an effective deterrence against acts of terrorism by Boko Haram that creates crippling siege and civil unrest which rob communities of normalcy in their daily lives.

### **Governance and Crisis in Nigeria**

This section was organized in subsections to cover governance and the governance crisis in Nigeria.

#### **Governance**

The nature of governance in a country is reflective of the difference in culture, values, and developmental milestones between the developed and developing countries of the world, which naturally affects the security parameters obtainable in the country. The World Bank (1992) noted a widely applicable definition of governance as “the exercise of authority, control, management, power of government,” but leans for its purposes towards the definition of governance as “the manner, in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (p. 3). A

government falls short on effective exercise of control, if the government is lacking on any of the indexes of governance.

This definitional approach by the World Bank places good governance synonymously with sound development management, which is fundamental to creating and sustaining an environment that fosters strong and equitable development. Such an environment ensures not only the security of the state through military might, from external aggression, but also guarantees the protection of the critical security of human beings from internal insecurities.

Four areas of governance consistent with the World Bank's mandate include public sector management, accountability, the legal framework for development, and information and transparency. The presence of these elements in the governance of a state, points to its competence and effectiveness. On the other hand, contributing to poor development management are such factors as weak institutions, lack of an adequate legal framework, weak financial accounting and auditing systems, damaging discretionary interventions, uncertain and variable policy framework, and closed decision making, which elevates risks of corruption and waste (World Bank, 1992, p. 4).

### **The Governance Crisis in Nigeria**

The governance crisis here depicts the failure or inability of the government to exercise the important indexes of good governance and meet its basic social contract to the people, of ensuring and guaranteeing the two arms of approach in security studies advanced by scholars. The traditional approach generally regarded as the first approach, takes cognizance of the role of the state and the external military dimension of security.

The second approach on the other hand covers critical security approaches involving human beings (Onoja, 2014).

Further highlighting the vacuum that creates the governance crisis, the author added that since independence, Nigeria has failed to achieve good governance because it lacks most of the indexes of governance, hence Nigeria falls short of the ideal measured yardstick for observing good governance (Onoja, 2014). This also means the government is incapable of employing the important indices of the *soft* power approach to political counter-terrorism, to implement capacity-building, democratization, economic development and counterradicalization policies that address the underlying causes which provide fertile ground for terrorism to thrive and serve as a deterrent to the radicalization efforts of terrorist groups.

### **Fundamentalist Uprisings and Insurgency in Nigeria**

This section was organized in the following subsections: overview of fundamentalist uprisings in Nigeria, emergence of Boko Haram, chronology of attacks by Boko Haram, internal insecurities and insurgencies, and ethno-religious tensions in Northern Nigeria.

#### **Overview of Fundamentalist Uprisings in Nigeria**

Looking back between the periods of 1980s and 1990s, the Nigerian scene had been dotted with pockets of Islamic fundamentalism, the prevalence of which had given rise to ethnoreligious crisis, resulting in grave losses of human and material resources. The manifestation of these crisis was witnessed on a large scale during the Maitatsine uprising which lasted from 1980 through 1985. Adesoji (2011) opined that the Maitatsine

uprisings of 1980 preceded by the Shiite movement of the late 1970s to 1980s, had as its major player Mohammed Yusuf, who would become the leader of Boko Haram years later.

The politicization of the secular Nigerian state along religious lines found strong footing in 1977-1978, with the debate in the National Assembly for and against the provision of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal in the proposed 1979 Constitution, although the ensuing conflict did not end in arms bearing as witnessed in 1980 (Adesoji, 2011). The ongoing politicization and destabilization of the country manifested in the activities of Boko Haram, points to the ethnic and religious divisions in the country, which had widened over the years (Osumah, 2013). The Boko Haram uprising of 2009 share similarities with the Maitatsine uprisings of the 1980s in both advancing Islamic fundamentalism, and an apparent lack of readiness by the Nigerian government to contain the threat (Adesoji, 2011).

### **Emergence of Boko Haram**

There are varying and contradictory accounts of the emergence and transformation of the Sect, *Jama'atu Ahlis Suna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad*, generally known as *Boko Haram* – which translates *to forbid everything western and western education or Western education is a sin* (Adegbulu, 2013, Amusan & Oyewole, 2014, Oyewole, 2013). The official name of the group is *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad*, in Arabic stands for *People committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad*. A literal translation of this is *Association of Sunnas for the Propagation of Islam and for Holy War* (Osumah, 2013).

The variations in the date that the Boko Haram group was believed to have emerged is evident in the literature on the group. Ajayi (2012) posited that the group surfaced under several different names, including *Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation*, *Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra*, *Yusufiyya*, *Hijrah Ummah*, *Jamaatul Takfur Wal Hyra*, *Ahlus Sunna*, *Khawaarji* and *Nigerian Taliban*. He further contended that the actual date of inception of the sect, is still subject of controversy, as the years 1995, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2003, have been associated with the emergence of the sect at different times.

In his discussion on the group Osumah (2013) noted that it has been in existence since the 1960s but started drawing focus to itself from 2002. Adegbulu (2013) added that Mohammed Yusuf established Boko Haram in 2001, upon his return from Chad and Sudan, where he studied Qur'an and developed radical views, with no tolerance for westernization and modernization (p. 266) which he estimates as being responsible for the societal ills that have plagued the Nigerian people.

Drawing from the general strain theory of terrorism, it has been contended that an influential element of engaging in terrorism is group membership, which enables expression of individual strains and grievances as collective experiences (Agnew, 2010). The author further stated that when the collective strains experienced by people, include the elements of being high in magnitude with civilians affected, unjust, and affliction by significantly powerful others, among which include complicit civilians with weak ties to the strained collectivity, there is an increase in the likelihood of terrorism for several reasons, although terrorism does not result in all cases (Agnew, 2010).

Mohammed Yusuf's organization of the group and leadership of Boko Haram saw the successful radicalization of the group and a venture into foreign collaboration with the Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb. Mohammed Yusuf fired up the activism by the group, and increased efforts to propagate extreme Islamic doctrine which condemns democracy and western education as corrupt and immoral. His intent was to replace modern state formation with the traditional Islamic state, robust with pure Islamic practices, because of his strong conviction that western values run contrary to Islamic values (Adegbulu, 2013, Amusan & Oyewole, 2014).

A major grievance that the Boko Haram group wants to eliminate is the perceived negative consequences of western education, which has produced many societal ills. Although Mohammed Yusuf held a western education university degree, he encouraged the support of Boko Haram members, for the prohibition of western education, and armed himself with two fundamental economic reasons. One of the reasons, is linked to the growing graduate unemployment in Nigeria after obtaining western education university degrees. The second reason relates to the attendant fact that western educated leaders in Nigeria have evidently been corrupt and unethical (Amusan & Oyewole, 2014). Mohammed Yusuf estimated that replacing western influences with pure Islamic practices, will bring about the ideal society.

### **Attacks by Boko Haram**

Table 1 in Appendix A represents a selection of the killings by Boko Haram. It captures some of the chronology of the deadly attacks by Boko Haram on police stations, army barracks, prisons, churches, public institutions, prominent personalities, and local



branch offices of international organizations. Because attacks by Boko Haram are either grossly under-reported or lacking adequate verification, the chronology of attacks from July 2009 to July 2015 presented on the table below cannot be alleged as exhaustive but presents a sample of the numerous attacks by the group.

Further, as more attacks by Boko Haram continue to be recorded expansively and progressively, the chronology of attacks continues to grow. Ajayi (2012) noted that there has not been appreciable change, notwithstanding a dialog between the federal government and representatives of the group, as well as a clamp down on the group by security forces (p. 104). While the clandestine attacks by Boko Haram presents unique challenges to efforts of control by law enforcement, the introduction of suicide bombings by the perpetrators in the belief of a robust reward in heaven, compounds the challenge even further.

### **Internal Insecurities and Insurgencies**

**Internal insecurities.** Internal insecurities as conceived here denotes an absence of internal security. In the literature, there are two dominant approaches to the conception of internal security management, these are the traditional and modern approaches (Osumah, 2013). Discussing the two fundamental perspectives that have emerged among scholars attempting to define national security, Innocent and Onyishi (2014) offered that one perspective directs focus on strategic definition. This reflects a realist perspective conceptualizing national security in terms of self-defense, and a dependence on the use of arms and military might to deter aggression against a state. The second perspective on the

other hand, indicates a focus on non-strategic definition emphasizing socio-economic factors.

Walt (1991) expanded on the focus of discussions on national security studies centered on the use of military power, which is subject to political control. He noted that military power, which is a more traditional approach, is not the only source of national security, and military threats are not the only dangers that states face although usually the most serious (p. 213). Operating from the military angle, the traditional approach engages physical force in deterring dangers or aggressions, hence emphasizing the establishment of security apparatus in sovereign states (Osumah, 2013).

This notion of security Osumah (2013) asserted, is deficient in covering such nonmilitary threats as human-induced environmental pressures, resource war, migration, displacements or refugee crisis, population explosion and identity crisis, all of which create conditions of insecurity and a blind spot which the modern approach to security has laid emphasis on, since the end of the cold war.

Employing the traditional approach to internal security in dealing with the carnage by Boko Haram, the Nigerian government established a Special Military Taskforce, the JTF made up of the army, navy, air force and the department of state security and as well as the police. The operations of the Special Military Taskforce, and the checkpoints established, as well as curfews imposed did little in stopping the activities of Boko Haram. In view of the inability of the security forces to contain the activities of Boko Haram using militarized force, the situation begs the need for a different approach that is devoid of reactive responses but geared towards stopping the

plans devised by Boko Haram, through counterradicalization policies, before they are implemented by the group.

Innocent and Onyishi (2014) urged a change of approach from the tactics of extrajudicial killings employed by the Nigerian security agencies in dealing with the problem of Boko Haram. The authors added that this approach in its brutality, exacerbates increasing attacks by Boko Haram, hence, is counterproductive. The authors, further urged the need for the Nigerian government to take a cue from the terrorism fighting lessons of 9-11 in the United States and engage the use of intelligence that will unearth plans by Boko Haram, to use improvised explosive devices against targeted establishments, before the group carries out such plans.

**Brief overview of insurgencies in Nigeria.** Examining insurgencies in Nigeria within the social movement theories, Abdullahi, Adekeke, and Balogun (2014) argued that the inherent social structural maladies and/or prevailing sociopolitical environment, have provided impetus for the emergence and sustenance of insurgencies among the youths in Nigeria. Historically, Nigerian youths have been known to initiate and foster campaigns for progressive change in response to the prevalent need for it, in the environment created by the dominant Nigerian polity. It is therefore to be expected that in a Nigerian political climate, riddled with corruption and a widening socio-economic disparity attendant in the communities of Northern Nigeria, it will not take much radicalizing efforts by groups like Boko Haram, to organize the youths to revolt.

Nigerian youths prior to and immediately after independence employed various social movements, political and intellectual platforms to serve as watchdogs to the

formulation and implementation of national policies pertaining to socio-economic and political issues considered by majority of the people as unpopular (Abdullahi et al., 2014). The authors further noted that post-independence, young people in Nigerian have expressed their displeasure over perceived anti-people policy initiatives of the ruling elites, through nationwide protests and demonstrations. The authors however bemoaned the apparent disappearance, among contemporary youths in Nigeria, of the zeal and enthusiasm for mass mobilization and protests of widespread social injustice and human rights abuses (p. 80).

The weakening of the radical but positive elements of youth mobilization, due partly to the infiltration of the youth movement, by the ruling elites for self-serving motives. They achieve this through recruitment among students and political sponsorship of such recruits, to champion the interests of the ruling elites over national interests. This approach creates an environment that enables sectarian mobilization and revolts to thrive. Hence, groups like Boko Haram are made possible by the absence of an organized and unified platform among the youths, to constructively confront *bad* governance, and the resultant corruption and attendant socio-economic disparity of the ruling elites and the mass of the people.

Abdullahi et al. (2014) contended further that what seems to be common among Nigerian youths in the absence of an organized front are polarized interests, championing ethnic-based politics with grave impact on ethnic militia and insurgency. What results from such polarized interests is the alignment of groups like Boko Haram, to ethnic politics to pursue extreme and controversial mission (Abdullahi et al., 2014). It is

therefore not farfetched to imagine that the prevailing socio-economic environment of widening disparity between the ruling elites and the people, provides fertile ground for the sprouting of insurgencies in Nigeria.

The campaign of violent acts of terrorism that Boko Haram staged, drew public notice between 2002 and 2009 in Nigeria following repeated strikes which started at the headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force in Borno State (Maiangwa et al., 2012).

Mohammed Yusuf formed Boko Haram, guided by the philosophy that Western civilization in all its ramifications, runs in conflict with the tenets of the Islamic faith (Maiangwa et al., 2012). Instilling Islamic education in the youth, formed a central goal and means for the group to safeguard Islamic societies of the north and curb the extreme tendencies of globalization (Mu'azu, 2011).

A violent clash between the group and Nigerian Security forces, resulted in the killing of hundreds of Boko Haram members and subsequently the leader of the group Mohammed Youssef, while in the custody of Nigerian Security forces. Boko Haram went underground, reconstructed itself, and then reemerged as a violent extremist organization under a new and fanatical leadership (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015 p. 21). The killing of innocent and unsuspecting people by Boko Haram, drew violent responses from the Nigerian security forces. These responses were thought then to be the best approach to decimate the group and stop further attacks.

Boko Haram engenders in the wake of these attacks, country wide insecurities, and increased tensions among ethno-religious groups. These deadly acts of terror have made Boko Haram the focus of national security concern (Oyewole, 2013). Issues such as

systemic deficiencies in the political environment in Nigeria and failures by the Nigerian government to address the root causes and symptoms of terrorism (Onah, 2014, Umar, 2013) enable the insecurities engendered by the deadly acts of terror by Boko Haram to foster.

The structural reasons such as incompetent and corrupt government, indicated in the research literature as fueling the grievances of individuals and groups to thrive, is exacerbated by extreme poverty, unemployment, and limited political and socioeconomic opportunities (Forrest, 2012), in the community Boko Haram operates from. The poverty and dearth of development in the Northern states of Nigeria can therefore be directly linked to the emergence of Boko Haram (Owolade, 2014). The group blames this situation on the corrupting influence of the West on the governance of the Northern states. Hence for Boko Haram, an armed revolt presents a solution to the widening regional economic disparity (Owolade, 2014), between the ruling elites and the masses.

This does not however suggest that the activities and attacks witnessed from Boko Haram, could have been imagined as likely responses to the attendant socio-economic conditions of the community of Boko Haram. Attempts by the government to gloss over the issues, will most certainly not yield the desired results of ending insurgencies, but rather exacerbate the problems. A genuine effort by the government to reverse this trend, must entail and encompass capacity building, as well as implementing policies that provides for and responds to the underlying issues, and causes that enable terrorism to thrive.

### **Ethno-Religious Tensions in Northern Nigeria**

An increasing Islamic fundamentalism the world over, in addition to several internal factors such as; religious sensitivity of Nigerians, economic displacements prevalent in the Nigerian society, party politics plagued by politicians in desperate search of self-serving political powers, and the ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders in condemning insurrections only feebly if at all, contribute greatly to make the Nigerian society prone to violence as opined by Adesoji (2010). The volatile state of the Nigerian society is more evident in Northern Nigeria due to the paucity of economic and educational opportunities, and a widening regional economic disparity, which fuels the breeding of religious insurrection and ethno-religious conflicts, among various ethnic groups inhabiting Northern Nigeria.

The disenfranchisement of the common people by the Northern elites, affords the commoners the opportunity to initiate uprisings in demand for social justice and to advocate the displacement of the “establishment” with a mode of governance consistent with true Islamic principles and economic prosperity for the people (Owolade, 2014). The problem with initiating such uprisings, however, is the absence of a formal frame of reference, which therefore allows for indiscriminate actions that lead to great losses of lives and properties.

### **Nigerian Government’s Responses to Terrorism**

This subsection was organized in the following areas: defense of national security; and armed responses.

#### **Defense of National Security**

A state is obliged to defend against any actor causing a disruption, in the quest to change the structure and regulating framework (Oyewole, 2013, p. 254) the state has in place. Although Boko Haram is a nonstate actor, nonetheless, the activities of the group in addition to its ideological mission pose increasing threats to the national security of Nigeria and its people. Boko Haram articulates the need to overthrow the Nigerian government, which the group estimates, is marred by Western Civilization. It advocates instead the imposition of a strict Islamic Sharia law, threatening through this ideology, the security of Nigeria.

Thus, this naturally creates an extreme rivalry to the goal of the government to maintain security and stability, creating also a corresponding obligation on the part of the Nigerian government to defend against this threat. However, an admission by the Nigerian Federal Government that the state of insecurity, is worse than what obtained during the Nigerian civil war of 1960 (Osumah, 2013) highlights the diminished ability of the Nigerian government and the security agencies to contain the group.

The activities of Boko Haram amount to an active threat from an adversary armed increasingly with sophisticated weapons, which the Nigerian government needs to deter by a superior, and quality law enforcement capability. Further, Oyewole (2013) argued that those in authority are obliged to come in the defense of a state in view of disruption caused by any actor in their quest to alter the regulating framework and structure of the state (p. 254).

For the efforts of a state to defend against a threat to its national security to be effective however, those efforts must incorporate and consider the context of the terrorist



activities by the perpetrators. It is paramount to note at this juncture the observation by Crenshaw (1991) that the prevailing context of a terrorist activity, is likely to influence different outcomes in the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations. A nonstate violent actor Crenshaw (2014) opined, wants to achieve two outcomes simultaneously, first to win for the cause, and secondly to survive and prosper as an organization and prevail over competitors (p. 559). In the same vein, Krause (2013) noted that in a strategy of violence against the state, groups seek to further long-term ideological goals such as independence, revolution, societal transformation, regime change among others, while seeking simultaneously to promote the success of their own group over any rival group.

### **Joint Task Force**

Oyewole (2013) deemed it appropriate to view counterterrorism as a rival political strategy to the political goal terrorism seeks to achieve. Nigeria's handling of the Islamic fundamentalist uprising has been described as a paradox of terrorism and counterterrorism (Sampson, 2015). The author contends that the counter-terrorism efforts by Nigeria through the JTF are no less abrasive on the residents of Northern Nigerian, than the profoundly agonizing impact of the terrorism by Boko Haram, due to the human right abuses by the JTF. The activities of the JTF Sampson (2015) further stated, run contrary to the fundamental obligation of government, relating to the protection of individuals and the basic human right security guaranteed by articles 3 and 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights per the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

This study aimed to show that the efforts of the Nigerian security agencies in handling fundamentalist insurgencies, reveal not only an apparent inability to protect the territory of the state and the basic human rights of individuals, but also systemic deficiencies in considering alternative measures that could enhance deterrence by the security agencies. Factors such as security sector corruption and mismanagement which leaves Nigerian troops less resourced and not adequately equipped to face the insurgency (Blanchard, 2014) constrain the responses of the Nigerian security forces, to counter the threat posed by Boko Haram. The inability of the Nigerian security agencies to contain the menace of Boko Haram reveals the diminished and degraded nature (Osumah, 2013) of the security agencies, especially if security at the societal level as opined by Osumah (2013) stresses freedom from external aggression or a defense thereof against it, by ensuring the protection and preservation within the territories of the state, of both human and strategic rudiments.

### **Summary and Conclusions**

A critical review and analysis of literature on the Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria highlights the deliberate and careful choice of targets for deadly attacks by Boko Haram, in furtherance of the group's mission to displace the Nigerian government and its perceived un-Islamic ways (Forest, 2012). Boko Haram constitutes a focus of national security concern (Oyewole, 2013). The literature showed that the deadly activities of Boko Haram have been fostered by such issues as systemic deficiencies (Onah, 2014) as well as the failures to address the root causes and symptoms that enable terrorism to thrive by the Nigerian government (Umar, 2013).

I highlighted and noted the contention that the activities of Boko Haram have been exacerbated by the militarized heavy handedness responses and repressive approaches of the Nigerian government (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012), which did little to contain the expanding and increasing campaign of terror by Boko Haram. Also, the activities of the JTF charged with the responsibility of repelling Boko Haram, have been marred by human rights abuses that worsened the plights of the people rather than alleviate their anxieties and pains from the effects of Boko Haram attacks.

However, there is sparse research on the need to understand the causes of failure in counter-terrorism measures by the Nigerian government and to explore alternate approaches to deter terrorism through the efforts by the government to confront and ameliorate the terroristic threat from Boko Haram in Borno State. This leaves a vacuum that needs to be filled through a research effort. This qualitative case study sought to bridge the gap in the scholarly research leading to a lack of knowledge and understanding about how alternative measures can be explored using Wilner's (2015) construct of contemporary deterrence theory to enhance effective counter-terrorism measures by the Nigerian security forces to deter acts of terrorism by Boko Haram in Borno State.

The theoretical foundation that grounded this study was drawn from Wilner's (2015) construct of contemporary deterrence theory. It posited that there has been an addition to the deterrence agenda of more traditional inter-state security dilemmas, stemming from rogue organizations, nuclear and missile proliferation, and recent advances in missile technology and defense (Wilner, 2015). Strategies like punishment,

denial, de-legitimization, dissuasion, inducements and concepts like extended deterrence and cumulative deterrence are being examined in new and exciting ways (Wilner, 2015).

The suspicion about deterrence that started in the early 1990s through the 2001 al-Qa'eda attack on the United States has started to dissipate (Wilner, 2015), and those efforts have morphed into a community of scholars and practitioners who have partnered to investigate ways to develop and apply deterrence theory as a strategic tool for addressing emerging and evolving security situations (Wilner, 2015). The effort to expand the scholarship and application of deterrence comes with potential risks of the rate at which the theory is evolving and the inevitable consequences of diluting and complicating their implementation (Wilner, 2015).

My review of the scholarly literature showed that the counter-terrorism measures by the Nigerian government to deter terrorist acts by the Boko Haram group characterized by militarized heavy handedness, hard politics, and a repressive state security approach have been counterproductive (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Oyewole, 2013; Solomon, 2012). Scholars have also advanced that the Nigerian government should not replicate the methods employed in containing other militant insurgent groups, in the fight against Boko Haram. The review also found that the response of the government which is focused on addressing the symptoms of terrorism remains inadequate (Akpan et al., 2014; Umar, 2013) hence the need to seek alternate approaches to deal with the underlying causes that led to the failure of past counter-terrorism measures, and thus address the menace of Boko Haram terrorism.

Described in Chapter 2 were the strategies employed for literature search, the theoretical foundation that underpinned this study, an overview of Islamic religious uprisings in Nigeria, internal insecurities in the wake of the Islamic fundamentalist uprisings, Nigerian Government's responses to Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies, ethno-religious tensions in Northern Nigeria. Chapter 3 addresses the research design and the rationale for choosing it, the role of the researcher in the research, as well as the methodology, and issues pertaining to trustworthiness.

### Chapter 3: Research Method

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to fill the gap in knowledge by understanding the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government and exploring alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno State. I collected data for this study from in-depth, semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF. The interviews were approximately 60 minutes long. The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed manually as well as with the use of NVivo to facilitate the generation of initial codes, identification of themes, and collation of codes into potential themes and categories. The research was conducted following the guidelines from Walden University's Institutional Review Board (IRB). In Chapter 3, I explain the rationale for the research design, the researcher's role, methodology, and issues relating to trustworthiness.

#### **Research Design and Rationale**

##### **Research Questions**

This qualitative case study research addressed the following two research questions:

RQ1: What have been the causes of failure in counter-terrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State?

RQ2: What alternative approaches have been considered and not used, or not considered at all?

### **Case Study Design Research Rationale**

The rationale to use a qualitative method for this research was drawn from the following considerations and logic. A quantitative method would not have been appropriate for this research effort because the study involved the subjective perceptions, opinions, and behaviors of government officials to yield insights and an in-depth understanding of the topic (see Braun & Clarke, 2006) that cannot be measured by using standardized instruments commonly associated with quantitative methods to seek empirical generalizations (see Patton, 2002). I decided that the mixed method would not be suitable for this study because it entails the collection and integration of both quantitative and qualitative data in research. A qualitative method was used for this study because it enabled me to develop an in-depth understanding of and provide a thick and rich description of the complex nature of the problem in a holistic manner. Qualitative methods also facilitate exhaustive study of issues (Patton, 2002).

There are five major qualitative research approaches: phenomenology, grounded theory, narrative research, ethnography, and case study; however, upon close review of these approaches, I determined that the case study approach was the best fit for this study. Any given design inevitably reflects some imperfect interplay of resources, capabilities, purposes, possibilities, creativity, and personal judgments by the people involved (Patton, 2002). The case study research is a preferred method in situations where the researcher seeks to answer *why* and *how* questions, has little or no control over behavioral events, and the focus of the study is a contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 2013). The case study

research design was appropriate for this study because I sought to explain the *why* and *how* questions relating to alternative approaches to deter terrorism in Borno State.

In this study, I explored in-depth what caused the failure of past counterterrorism measures and how alternative approaches by security agencies could deter terrorism in Borno State. The case study design enabled me to provide a focused explanation of this complex phenomenon from the responses of senior government officials in the NPF as well as explore reasons behind the failure of government agencies to contain terrorism in Borno State. The design also allowed me to focus on the *case* and retain a holistic and real-world perspective (see Yin, 2013) pertaining to counterterrorism in Nigeria with specific focus on the NPF.

I employed a case study research design in this study to explore the approaches of the NPF by conducting interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF. The purpose was to explore why earlier counterterrorism measures failed and whether alternative measures to deter the terroristic threat from Boko Haram in Borno State have been considered. I employed purposive sampling to select 10 senior government officials from the NPF as participants for data collection through in-depth, semistructured interviews.

Analysis of the data comprised of thematic analysis, which involves a method of identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns and themes found within the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis offers a flexible yet useful research tool capable of providing a complex account of data that are rich and detailed (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In addition, I compared themes from the interviews with secondary data sources. The



thematic analysis of the data resulted in a rich description of the entire data set, enabling the emergence of predominant or important themes that helped to describe how alternative measures can be considered as deterrence strategies for the counterterrorism efforts by the Nigerian government in Borno State. The transcripts of the interviews were analyzed inductively using NVivo as well as manually to facilitate complete immersion into the data and the generation of codes and identification of themes and categories to accurately reflect the entire data set (see Braun & Clarke, 2006).

### **Role of the Researcher**

In qualitative research, the researcher is an integral part of the process rather than taking the detached and objective stance of the researcher in a quantitative research (see Braun & Clarke, 2006). Data collection is key in a qualitative study; therefore, I served as the key instrument in collecting the data by being a participant in the semistructured interview process. I had direct contact with the participants during the process of recruiting and the process of interviewing participants using open-ended questions. The interviews were conducted face-to-face with the participants in Nigeria. All participants were presented with the same questions, and their open-ended responses enabled me to understand the phenomenon as seen by the respondents (see Patton, 2002).

The environment for the face-to-face interviews was made conducive for the participants so that they could respond to the questions in an honest and comprehensive manner. The interviews were audio recorded with a reliable recording device. At the end of data collection, I transcribed, coded, analyzed, and interpreted the data.

No power differential with the participants was expected or existed. I was open to gaining an in-depth knowledge from the experiences of the participants and had no personal link or interest in the NPF or Borno State that might have led to a biased approach to the data collection. The only necessary link for the purposes of this research was the gatekeeper I found through my research who assisted me with access to the senior government officials in the NPF. I also had no bias due to the genuine goal of this study to contribute to the ongoing efforts to devise lasting ways of containing terrorism in Nigeria. I had no personal relationship with the research participants.

### **Methodology**

The following subsections appear in this section: participant selection and sampling strategy, instrumentation and data collection, procedures, and data analysis plan.

#### **Participant Selection and Sampling Strategy**

I used purposive sampling, which is a nonrandom sampling of a larger population, to recruit 10 terrorism officials from the NPF in Nigeria. Random sampling provides the best opportunity for confident generalization of the results from a random and statistically representative sample to a larger population, based on statistical probability theory (Braun & Clarke, 2006). However, it is not the most effective way of developing an understanding of complex issues relating to human behaviors (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This study involved a case study of an agency in Nigeria involved with countering Boko Haram attacks, so generalization was not the goal or expectation; therefore, random sampling was unnecessary.

Studying information-rich cases yields insights and in-depth understanding rather than empirical generalization (Patton, 2002, p. 230). Purposive sampling enables the selection of information-rich cases for in-depth study, allowing the researcher to learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research (Patton, 2002, p. 230). I conducted purposive sampling for this study using a homogeneous sampling strategy to ensure that I drew the participants from similar backgrounds and experiences of being senior government officers in the NPF. The homogenous approach to sampling helped simplify data analysis because of the similar backgrounds of the participants.

There are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry; rather, the size is dependent on the information sought, the purpose, what is useful and credible, and considerations for time and resources (Patton, 2002). The qualitative paradigm states that useful knowledge can be generated by looking at meaning with small samples (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Sample size in qualitative research is distinct from quantitative research, which uses computations of power analysis to determine a priori minimum numbers and kinds of sampling units required to conduct research (Sandelowski, 1995). The goal in qualitative research is saturation by sufficiently understanding the phenomena and learning enough about it, so mere numbers of participants is irrelevant (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

In qualitative research, factors, such as the aim of sampling, type of purposive sampling, and the research method employed, help in the consideration and decisions about the adequacy of data collected (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The factors also help to determine the minimum number and kinds of sampling units required for a research

(Sandelowski, 1995). The quality of information obtained in each sampling unit, as opposed to the number of units, grounds the logic and power behind the purposeful sampling used in a qualitative study (Patton, 1990). An appropriate sample size for a qualitative study is one that adequately answers the research questions.

I based the decision to use 10 participants in this study on the premise that this number of participants was adequate to provide sufficient data to answer my research questions and achieve saturation. Part of qualitative research includes finding and describing patterns, themes, and structures, as well as collecting data until achieving informational saturation. A saturation point involves seeing something repeatedly (Silverman, 2015). The number of participants was also based on the premise that in-depth information from a small number of people giving information-rich data is essential to the case study approach (see Braun & Clarke, 2006). As earlier noted, participants for this study consisted of senior government officials working in the NPF in Nigeria. I contacted approximately 15 potential participants who had been identified by my gatekeeper as senior government officials in the NPF, with the hope of interviewing 10 participants for this study.

I sent invitation letters to recruit potential participants for this study. A copy of this letter is found in Appendix B. The decision to contact 15 potential participants took into consideration the fact that not all potential participants contacted would agree to take part. In addition, it took into consideration the fact that some participants, who may have been willing to participate, may have been restricted from participation by other circumstances.

### **Instrumentation and Data Collection**

I used a self-designed interview protocol to conduct the in-depth, semistructured interviews; this served as the main data collection instrument for this study. The interview questions (see Appendix B) were based on the research questions, which were developed from the research problem to address the complex phenomena and the theoretical framework of the study.

All the participants were in Nigeria. I endeavored to conduct all the interviews in Nigeria within a month. I did not conduct a pilot study to test the interview questions due to practical considerations of cost. Although pilot interviews can be valuable in refining the interview questions, and, hence, advisable, the inability to conduct a pilot interview did not undermine the quality of the interviews or the data collected for the study (see Braun & Clarke, 2006).

### **Procedures for Recruitment**

The protection of research participants is a paramount requirement of any research to ensure the avoidance of risk to the participants (Patton, 2002). Following the need to understand and adhere to this important requirement, I completed the National Institute of Health (NIH), Office of Extramural Research, Protecting Human Research Participants training, which was pertinent for my data collection. I collected data for this study in a manner consistent with all federal and state regulations in Nigeria relating to protecting the identities of participants.

I applied to the Walden IRB for approval to conduct this study and received approval # 11-06-18-0358783. Upon receipt of the IRB's approval for the study, I e-

mailed invitation letters to potential participants who had been identified by the gatekeeper as senior officials in the NPF who met the selection criteria for this study of working in the NPF.

Prior to the start of the face-to-face interview, I reviewed the consent form with each of the participants and they signed the form. The face-to-face interview lasted about 60 minutes and was audio recorded. Before concluding the interview, I asked the participants if they had questions or concerns and, if so, these were addressed. I thanked the participants for taking part in the interviews. Participation in the study was not expected to cause any serious discomfort to the participants.

A summary of the report of findings from the study will be e-mailed to all the participants. The paper transcripts from the interview was scanned and uploaded onto a password protected computer and I am the only person with access to the electronic data. The paper transcripts were shredded after they were scanned. The data will be kept for a period of 5 years in compliance with the requirements of Walden University.

### **Data Analysis Plan**

Detailed description and direct interpretation formed the basis for analyzing the data in this study. Patton (2002) identified pattern recognition as one of the competencies in thematic analysis. The core elements of qualitative data analysis were employed to analyze the data for this study. Braun and Clarke (2006) identified six phases of data analysis to include the following:

1. Familiarizing myself with the data through transcribing the data, rereading the data and noting down initial ideas.

2. Generating initial codes, which involved the process of coding interesting features of the data systematically across the entire data set, and collating data relevant to each code and pertaining to the research questions.
3. Searching for themes which involved the analytical process of collating codes into potential themes and gathering all data relevant to each potential theme.
4. Data analysis relating to reviewing themes by the process of checking if themes work in relation to the coded extracts and the entire data set. As well as reviewing data to search for additional themes and generating a thematic “map” of the analysis.
5. Defining and naming themes, which involved the ongoing process of analysis to refine the specifics of each theme and the overall story the analysis tells, and generating clear definitions and names for each theme.
6. The final phase of producing the result involved the process of selecting vivid and compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, and relating the analysis back to my research questions, objectives, and previously reviewed literature (see Braun & Clarke, 2006).

I used NVivo data analysis software to facilitate storing and organizing the data in files that I could access easily and quickly for analysis. The NVivo software facilitated the identification of themes and provided annotation for the codes and categories.

### **Issues of Trustworthiness**

In this case study I established validity and reliability by means of credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability and intercoder reliability (see Silverman, 2015).

#### **Credibility**

This is the naturalistic equivalent of internal validity which fosters a congruence of the findings in the study with reality. This will be established using reflexivity. The process of reflexivity will enable me to examine how my subjectivity as a researcher has been both a producer and a product of the study. It will ensure that I am accountable to the standards of knowing and telling of what I studied. Thick description will necessarily be employed to enhance reflexivity and as a way of achieving external validity (see Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

I also employed triangulation, which involved using multiple sources of data to study the issue, comparing, and cross checking the consistency of information derived at different times, and by different means (see Patton, 2002, p. 559). Prior to beginning the analysis of the data, I ensured that I clarified and set aside all biases. I explicitly stated any personal bias that may affect the study and guard against projecting the bias on the study.

#### **Transferability**

I enhanced transferability which refers to the extent the findings in this study can be applied to other situations in other parts of Nigeria, through thick description and a purposeful selection of participants who are knowledgeable in the field of



counterterrorism. My research might apply to other parts of Nigeria such as the Southeast areas, rife with civil and armed unrests. The findings could also be applicable to other agencies responsible for confronting communal crisis across Nigeria.

### **Dependability**

Dependability establishes reliability hence, the processes employed in this study was reported in detail to allow a repeat of the process by future researchers. Audit trail was adhered to as an important step to documenting all aspects of the study. Efforts to enhance reliability included obtaining detailed notes, by employing a good quality tape recording for the interviews, and by transcribing the tape to indicate trivial, but often crucial pauses and overlaps (see Creswell, 2013, p.253). Different forms of data from the audio recordings and transcriptions, were compared for authentication.

### **Confirmability**

Confirmability relates to objectivity, it defines how the participants shape the findings of the study, rather than the bias or motivation of the researcher. Confirmability was enhanced through audit trails and reflexivity, hence any bias I may have, was clarified and addressed. Also, intercoder reliability which is based on multiple coders to analyze transcript data (Creswell, 2013) was established in NVivo through a consistent manner of coding. Many of the same codes were used repeatedly throughout my data set to find repetitive patterns of actions and consistencies in human affairs as documented in the data (see Saldana, 2015).

### **Informed Consent and Ethical Considerations**

The National Institutes of Health Office of Extramural Research Protecting Human Research Participants training is required for data collection. I completed the NIH training in compliance with this requirement. I conducted this study following the IRB parameters of Walden University, which ensures the ethical protection of research participants. I also complied with pertinent federal and state regulations in Nigeria in conducting this study. I inquired about the requirement of a permit to conduct research in Nigeria and obtained the permit as needed.

There was no foreseeable risk to the participants in this study. Before I collected any data for this study, I mailed a consent form to each participant to obtain their permission to take part in this study. Participants' protections were outlined in the consent form, and I adhered to the ethical guidelines for the study, which included such stipulations as the voluntary nature of participation in the study, and the right of participants to withdraw from the study at any time without obligation. The consent form is attached as Appendix C. There was no foreseeable risk to participants because of their participation in this study. There is nothing in the report of the findings in this study that can be linked to any participant to enhance their anonymity.

### **Summary**

To summarize, this qualitative case study bridged the gap in knowledge of NPF through interviews with 10 senior government officials within the NPF, to understand the causes of failure in counter-terrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State and whether alternative approaches by government security agencies have been

considered and not used, or not considered at all to deter the terroristic threat from Boko Haram in Borno State.

I transcribed the data from the in-depth semistructured interviews and analyzed them manually and with the use of NVivo, generated codes, identified and collated themes and developed categories. I identified common words and phrases for their prevalence, grouping and labelling for coding across categories of inquiry. I compared groups of subsets for similarities and differences, to allow for a further search of related codes and inferences to form a connection or pattern.

I conducted the study in compliance with the IRB parameters of Walden University. This ensured adherence to the ethical protection of research participants. I followed up on the receipt of mailed signed consent form from each participant with a phone call or email to each participant, and scheduled appointment for individual face-to-face semistructured interview within the one-month period I spent in Nigeria for data collection. This was at a location and time suitable for the participant.

The face-to-face interview took approximately 60 minutes and I tape recorded the interview. The interview questions are attached as Appendix D. Data from the tape recording were transcribed and securely kept. The data were shared only with members of my dissertation committee. Following Walden University's requirements, I will keep the data for a period of 5 years. I provided my contact information to the participants, as well as the representative at Walden University, with whom they can talk privately about their participant rights. A summary report of the research findings will be e-mailed to the participants after receiving final approval of the dissertation.

## Chapter 4: Results

The extremist Islamist group Boko Haram unleashed a campaign of violence on the Nigerian populace in its target of innocent and unsuspecting individuals considered by the group as engaged in un-Islamic activities (Forest, 2012). Churches, Christians, Muslim clerics, strategic government agencies, and politicians were not spared in the spate of attacks (Forest, 2012). While Boko Haram's rationale for its attacks on these groups may be understandable, its justification for striking at Muslim clerics was confounding, and the failures of the Nigerian government to decisively contain the group was troubling. In Chapter 4, I present the data analysis and findings in response to the research questions.

### **Research Setting**

Upon obtaining approval from the Walden University IRB, I proceeded to contact the participants through e-mail to set up interview dates convenient for the participants. I ensured, however, that the dates were close enough to enable completion of all the interviews within the month I spent in Nigeria for data collection. I conducted face-to-face interviews at a time and place that was convenient for each participant, which was at a private location of their choice in Abuja, known only to the participants and me. The interviews lasted approximately 1 hour. No organizational conditions influenced the participants or their experiences at the time of the study that may have influenced interpretation of the study results.

### **Demographics**

I sought diverse perspectives on the topic of study from the participants who had investigated and worked in the field of counterterrorism. The demographic breakdown of the participants appears in Table 1.

Table 1

#### *Basic Demographics of the Participants in the Study*

Participants	Gender	Education	Field	Location
Participant 1	M	College	Terrorism	Abuja
Participant 2	M	College	Terrorism	Abuja
Participant 3	M	College	Terrorism	Abuja
Participant 4	M	Post College	Terrorism	Abuja
Participant 5	M	College	Terrorism	Abuja
Participant 6	M	College	Terrorism	Abuja
Participant 7	M	Post College	Terrorism	Abuja
Participant 8	M	College	Terrorism	Abuja
Participant 9	M	College	Terrorism	Abuja
Participant 10	M	Post College	Terrorism	Abuja

### **Data Collection**

After receiving IRB approval, I contacted the participants by e-mail and sent them the invitation letters. Out of the 15 participants who were contacted, 10 agreed to

participate in the study. The 10 participants were senior government officials in the NPF with expertise in the fight against terrorism. I collected data from all 10 participants in face-to-face interviews. All the face-to-face interviews were audio recorded and took approximately 60 minutes (see Appendix D for interview questions). I reviewed the consent form with each of the participants and had them sign the form prior to the start of each face-to-face interview.

It is pertinent to provide an explanation of an important change in the agency proposed and approved for use in this research effort. The agency approved in the proposal for data collection was the DIA; however, shortly before applying for IRB approval, in the course of trying to obtain a letter of cooperation from the DIA, I was advised that I would not be able to use the DIA for data collection. Based on this reality, I sought an alternate agency involved in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. I secured the cooperation of the NPF, and this was approved by the IRB for data collection with the knowledge of my committee members.

### **Data Analysis**

In this section, I present relevant information from excerpts of the interviews with study participants. In this case study, the analysis of data collected was crucial to finding meaning within the phenomenon studied. To ensure anonymity of the participants and to ease identification of the participants' responses to the research question, I assigned the codes of P1 through P10 to each of the participants. This eliminated any criticism of nondisclosure of methods used in the study and legitimized the study results.

I used the core elements of qualitative data analysis for this study. Braun and Clarke (2006) identified six phases of data analysis. In the first phase, I transcribed the recorded, face-to-face interviews with each of the 10 participants verbatim, generated unfiltered raw data files, carefully read through the raw data, and noted down initial codes. In the second phase, I reviewed each participant's raw data file; corrected grammatical errors; and eliminated overlapping, repetitive, and vague expressions or presented them in more descriptive terms in order to streamline the content and make them concise and appropriate for the next round of reviews. In the third round, I searched participants' responses, collated codes into themes, and gathered all data including words and meanings projected by the participants that were relevant to each theme. To complete this process, I created a table, in Microsoft Excel, that showed participant codes as columns and the interview questions as rows. This visual approach allowed for easy comparison of the 10 responses provided by each participant, and it enhanced the process of identifying and highlighting a preliminary list of the common themes, factors, and key points for each of the participants. I collated data relevant to each code that pertained to the research questions. In the fourth phase, I imported the participant data into NVivo data analysis software to check if the identified themes worked in relation to the coded extracts and the entire data set. I also used the software to search for additional themes and to generate a thematic map of the analysis. In the fifth phase, I developed a list of the general themes of the study and refined the specifics of each theme as related to the overall story in the analysis. I compiled the general themes into the following list:

Denial of the gravity of the Boko Haram's insurgency during the early stages;

Haphazard, disjointed, ineffective, and uncoordinated response to Boko Haram insurgency;

Overreliance on the application of kinetic force to recover physical territories;

Use of hard power/maximum force;

Use of soft power/deradicalization/reorientation;

Trials of hardened criminals;

Lack of military experience with counterterrorism but skilled in conventional warfare;

Commitment to develop relationships;

Winning hearts and minds/buy-in;

Allow the states to have their own separate police force or community policing;

Introduce a national identification scheme/create a Department of Vital Records (DVR);

Interagency cooperation;

Invest in a massive infrastructural development program;

Resources for the military/military morale;



Cooperation/collaboration with neighbors;

Use of mercenaries;

An all-out military strategy similar to that used in Sri Lanka against the Tamil Tigers;

Government sincerity and transparency;

No negotiating with the terrorists and nonpayment of ransom to kidnapers;

Targeted killings of opposition leaders;

Intelligence to counteract Boko Haram;

Reducing terrorist activities;

Illiteracy/unemployment/poverty/distrust;

Military containment of Boko Haram;

Conspiracy of silence regarding sponsors;

Countering Boko Haram's propaganda using Islamic principles;

Using government security agencies to mount a counternarrative against Boko Haram;

Political will to effectuate difficult political, morale, and ethical decisions;

Ability to block Boko Haram funding sources; and

Constitutional amendment to allow a state of emergency or martial law.

In the sixth and final phase of data analysis, I selected vivid and compelling extract examples facilitated by the juxtaposition of the research questions with the empirical data that emerged from the themes; performed final analysis of selected extracts; and related the analysis back to my research questions, objectives, and previously reviewed literature (see Braun & Clarke, 2006). The NVivo software facilitated the identification of themes and provided annotation for the codes and categories. The combination of the NVivo data analysis software and the Excel spreadsheet were used to organize and store the data in files used for the data analysis.

The analysis of the data from interviews produced six categories of themes that were informed by the responses of the 10 participants interviewed. The themes emerged from the combination of broad or general approaches to narrow or targeted approaches employed by the Nigerian government. The approaches were categorized as: general counterterrorist approaches; counterterrorist approaches considered but not used; counterterrorist approaches not considered at all; targeted approaches, which include threats or punishments, targeted killing as a counterterrorism strategy, and targeting sponsors to undermine Boko Haram; exploitation of cultural values to hinder Boko Haram's activities; and efforts to bring Boko Haram to extinction. The categorized approaches are presented in more details in the following subsections.

## **General Counterterrorism Approaches**

The Nigerian government denied the gravity of the Boko Haram's insurgency during the early stages. The political denial was evidenced in a counterterrorism approach that participants categorized as haphazard, disjointed, ineffective, and uncoordinated in mitigating and addressing the fundamental causes of Boko Haram insurgency. Others referred to the government's efforts as unfocused and lackluster. The government's initial strategy to kill the leader was a key miscalculation because it backfired and incited many people to join Boko Haram instead of the expected outcome, which was to eliminate the group.

The government used a combination of hard and soft counterterrorism measures. The hard measures included a highly militarized approach that depended on kinetic force and an overreliance on the application of maximum force in efforts to recover physical territories occupied by Boko Haram or to obliterate the group altogether. It also included engagement in confrontation to degrade or decimate Boko Haram's weaponry and operational activities in their bases. Confrontation remained the only known approach by the military. The soft measures involved activities broadly aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people to discourage their involvement with Boko Haram, which included engagement, empowerment, deradicalization, building trust, resilience, religious tolerance and community engagements through awareness campaigns, and using security agencies to strategically communicate national values and thereby counter Boko Haram's deceptive narratives. Other soft measures included trials of hardened criminals, military

containment, and addressing the economic and root causes of terrorism through an economic revitalization program.

### **Counterterrorism Approaches Considered But Not Used**

The government was faced with a crisis that it was ill equipped to address from a political and military perspective. The military was skilled in conventional warfare; however, it had no experience with unconventional warfare such as counterterrorism. The political leadership also floundered in its efforts to address this issue, which was fueled by basic socio-economic inequalities that seemed localized and inconspicuous at first. As a result, the government considered a number of counterterrorist approaches but did not use them for a variety of reasons.

One of the approaches considered but not used was to allow the states to have their own separate police force. This approach would give more autonomy to state governors over postings and deployment of the commissioner of police. This approach would be synergized with different quasi-police formations or community policing or the vigilante/area watch groups to report suspicious movements and activities in a timely fashion. Such groups would require a clear strategy to minimize collateral damage.

Yet another approach was to introduce a comprehensive national identification scheme that would identify each individual by name and residence as well as make registration of place of new residence mandatory to monitor new arrivals or relocations. Similarly, the government would create a DVR where births, marriages and death were automatically registered and updated. To ensure the success of the DVR, the government

would promote freedom of information and bring better clarity to government operations to secure buy-in by the citizenry.

Another approach which was considered but not used was for the government to invest in massive infrastructural development program to build schools, roads, hospitals and give incentives to farmers to address poverty, which was the fundamental cause of the Boko Haram insurgency. A similar approach was the deployment of resources to train the youth, encourage dialog among various religions, and to rehabilitate insurgents who have surrendered.

A counterterrorist approach that was considered but not used was the use of mercenaries. The government received offers from South African to fight Boko Haram, but the offer was rejected. An all-out military strategy similar to that used in Sri Lanka against the Tamil Tigers (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and in Columbia against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia rebels was also considered but not used. The all-out military approach was not implemented because of lack of capacity, lack of credible intelligence, lack of political will and lack of honest intentions on the part of the government. Another approach which was not implemented due to lack of political will was the naming of identified sponsors of Boko Haram. The Nigerian office of national security's deradicalization program and policy framework on preventing and countering extremism was not implemented. An approach involving the reorientation of former members who surrendered was also not implemented. Another approach with a similar theme was to establish schools for idle youth and to engage Malaams and Emirs to reorient former members. Experts believe that the government needed to find a long-term

future approach besides using the Malaams and the Emirs to speak to those who were fully involved.

### **Counterterrorist Approaches Not Considered at All**

One of the counterterrorist approaches not considered at all was negotiating with the terrorists at least on the surface. Similarly, the non-payment of ransom poses a serious dilemma for the government, which follows the U.S government that does not pay ransom as a matter of policy even though it was allowed. Next approach was the infiltration of the rank and file of Boko Haram that was extremely dangerous. Boko Haram was able to effectively infiltrate the Nigerian army, while the government hasn't been able to do the same. The government had not optimized the lessons and ideas gained from the multinational workshops regarding leveraging its relationships with neighbors like Cameroon, Niger, Mali, and Niger. The government had done very little to secure better understanding and cooperation of these neighbors regarding insurgency. Additionally, the government had not made any effort to understand Boko Haram's affiliation with ISIS to solicit cooperation on how to target this group.

On the issue of funding, the government failed to identify the sources of funding towards identifying, naming, shaming sponsors and punishing them. Another counterterrorist approaches which was not considered at all was a constitutional amendment to allow a state of emergency or martial law. The government could legitimately declare a state of emergency, impose martial law and do things that it could not do in peace time. The government needed to realize that it was in a state of war and not deny it. Targeted killing as a counterterrorist approach had not been considered. Israel

had done that effectively against Hamas and Hezbollah and the United States had successfully employed this strategy against Al Qaeda. The government was not deploying enough resources to trace the sources of these funding in order to stop the inflow and deal with those sponsoring the terrorist activities. The government was not making any efforts to identify those sponsoring terrorist organizations. The insurgents were being supported by some groups and there were suspicions that some of those were in the country. A lot of funding was coming from outside as well.

### **Threats or Punishments**

The government's use of excessive force had not worked even though the government had used it consistently but had not reevaluated the poor outcomes produced by this approach. The government was unable to maintain its alliances with the local governments because it had failed to acknowledge its ineffective measures of lack of sustained efforts after reclaiming an area from Boko Haram. The threat of force had not worked because it gives Boko Haram the opportunity to video such incidents and use them as propaganda material to incite more violence. Boko Haram was a double-edged sword because it was still holding some of the Chibok girls and the Dapchi girl (Leah). The government agencies lack the training and intelligence to capture Boko Haram leaders as a form of retaliation. The lack of proper training of agencies involved in the fight against Boko Haram, was a major constraint on the Nigerian government.

Instead of using threat or punishment to influence Boko Haram, the Nigerian government had used it as a political weapon either to remove a government or to solidify the power base of the government in power. Similarly, the opposition uses the issue to

attack and criticize the government in power. The threat of force had not worked because the government was not making effective use of the budget provided for that approach. And there was also the reported bias and selective approach in assigning soldiers, and military personnel who go to the war front; there have been reports of getting only those from some particular sections of the country to go to the warfront, while they post those from the center of the warfront (Northeast) to the Southeast and other areas where there was relative peace, and this really affected the morale of the soldiers. "If I know, for instance, that you were sending me to the warfront because I am from a certain area, a particular zone of the country, I would not be committed." This was part of the issue; there was a lack of morale which led to a lack of patriotism or nationalism.

There was no threat of punishment because death was business as usual for Boko Haram soldiers and they looked forward to it, because they have been brainwashed to believe that they would go to heaven and be married to virgins and drink water from them after they died. Boko Haram was completely misguided on this notion of Islam. Consequently, threatening them with punishment was not effective. This notion also weakened the argument that annihilation and assassination were viable strategic options. This also made it difficult for the government to use threats or punishment as a deterrent because Boko Haram soldiers were willing to die for their cause. The Nigerian government's use of threat or punishment to influence, had no effect on Boko Haram's behavior and had escalated its disposition to violence. The killing of the founder Mohammed Yussuf caused his successor, Shekau, to adopt a more brutal approach. For example, after the Yobe state governor gave the police force armored personnel vehicles,



the former IG of police Hafsat Ringin boasted about obliterating Boko Haram within a month. Boko Haram responded to the threat by bombing the police headquarters, the first of such major attacks in Abuja, a clear indication that empty threats embolden Boko Haram to commit even more violence.

### **Targeted Killing as A Counterterrorism Strategy**

Responses from interview participants regarding targeted killing as a counterterrorism strategy were as varied as they were contradictory. One view highlighted the need to consider targeted killing because Israel had done that effectively against Hamas and Hezbollah and the technology was available as a result, the Nigerian government should seek help and leverage this advanced technology. The response from another participant suggested that the Nigerian government had not targeted anybody, because if they did, Shekau would have been eliminated many years ago. Previous incidents of targeted killing seemed to be more by chance or due to wrong information. Targeted killing required credible information and Boko Haram operatives appeared better than the Nigerian officials at collaborating and partnering with the local community. This method was being used substantially through foreign intelligence and also through the Nigerian Air Force. Shekau was wounded in a targeted attack. However, it must be pointed out that Boko Haram members were not located solely in the forest, but they live in the communities. Occasionally, the Nigerian government also took the source of their intelligence into account and factored in the potential for collateral damage.

Targeted killing required the right tools and resources. Boko Haram was still holding hostages, some from Chibok. If the Nigerian government had good intelligence that would facilitate targeted killing, then it should leverage that resource. For example, the Trump government had used the latest tools and intelligence to attack ISIS. The Nigerian government lacked the resources for targeted killing partly because some government officials diverted the funds allocated for weapons, towards their private needs and left the soldiers to die in the battlefields. Targeted killing was nothing new the Air Force had used it on a limited basis. Conversely, Boko Haram employs mercenaries from Libya and other places working with them. They kidnapped the Chibok girls and other victims and used them as human shields in order to discourage any attempts to bomb them in their hideout in the forest. Although the Nigerian government officials made false claims, it was believed that they possessed some intelligence which could not be overlooked. Targeted killing only served to displace Boko Haram but not much else.

The Nigerian fighting force was dispirited, and the government's attack had been random rather than targeted. The morale of the military was low because they were ill equipped. The war had been politicized by the military brass who used strikes to justify the need for funding which they divert to enrich themselves. Targeted killing was effective when the right people were identified and eliminated and this required proper use of intelligence, which was multilateral or bilateral and not unilateral. The Nigerian government needed to have dossiers on commanders. They needed to know the names of Boko Haram's leaders, organizational structure, their sponsors and how they operate. Targeted killing was also impacted by the lack of cooperation with the neighboring

countries where Boko Haram soldiers seek refuge. Effective use of intelligence would stop Boko Haram from crossing the borders into the neighboring countries after committing crimes in Nigeria. A contrasting response from a participant about targeted killings indicated that targeted killing, unlike what the Israel Defense Forces does in Israel was not recommended because Boko Haram soldiers were Nigerian citizens who have gone astray. The government's approach should be towards reorientation and not to kill them. The participant agreed that getting killed in battle was however legal and internationally sanctioned.

### **Targeting Sponsors to Undermine Boko Haram's Funding**

Part of the government's counterterrorism effort to undermine Boko Haram was to cut off the sources of Boko Haram's funding and one of the ways to accomplish this was for the government not to agree to financial negotiations with Boko Haram, since it requires the government to pay substantial sums of money to Boko Haram, even though it had been done quietly in the past. Payouts to Boko Haram were terminated because such transactions enabled the group to acquire more weaponry thereby becoming more forceful and lethal. Payouts were not just a Nigerian phenomenon; the United Nations, Europe and other Western countries were impacted by this because terrorism does not have a border. Another counter-terrorism method used by the government to target sponsors was intelligence, infiltration, monitoring movement of funds, arms, financial institutions and border control. The Nigerian borders were porous; people, arms and ammunition flow through the borders with relative ease and Boko Haram soldiers use these borders because they know that the borders were virtually unmanned. It was

impossible to target sponsors without having any credible information about them. There was a conspiracy of silence about the sponsors. It appears the government officials knew who the sponsors were, but they were reluctant to name them.

The government needed to have intelligence to monitor the whereabouts of Boko Haram and use a people-centered approach by way of informants who could provide leads. As a nation with significant influence, especially in this subregion of Africa, Nigeria needed to leverage its relationships with Cameroon, Chad and Niger and discourage them from providing safe havens for Boko Haram. Another approach was for the government to take decisive actions in publicly naming Boko Haram sponsors, some of whom the government bounced around in the past but nothing ever happened because most of them were politicians. The government needed to determine whether to allow partisan considerations to influence the attitudes of its officials because Boko Haram had sponsors within the political class. The government had to exercise the political will to prosecute these sponsors, so that the public would take note of its actions instead of government officials taking bribes from perpetrators and allowing them to go free and continue with their actions. The government also needed to improve diplomatic ties with Libya and to get more information on Boko Haram's funding sources and strategies through the banks.

Financing of terrorism was a key issue because Boko Haram's operational capacity would be severely limited if the government was able to cut off their sources of supply. If the government was serious about crippling Boko Haram, it must target the supply of ammunition and the supply of funds. The military was not doing a good job of

identifying sponsors. There had been a lot of distraction and a lack of sincere and focused strong will regarding the handling of sponsors and targets. The government needed to emphasize motivation and increase the morale of the military by supplying them with the best equipment. Efforts to gather domestic and external intelligence have to be stepped up. One of the ways to do this was through partnership and collaboration with other foreign intelligence organizations who could tell us about Boko Haram's sponsors and how we could legislatively cut off such funding sources. Boko Haram was believed to have external sponsors in addition to the internal ones. These include Islamic group in West Africa and ISIS, since Boko Haram had pledged allegiance to ISIS.

### **Efforts to Delegitimize Boko Haram in The Current Social System**

The effort to delegitimize Boko Haram was time consuming but ultimately it was one of the best solutions. This counterterrorism effort involves the government partnering with all the preachers, all the Muslim scholars, including those that were genuine and understand the tenets of the Koran and those that were not genuine because they do not understand the real message of the Koran. The government must regulate what was preached and what was taught in the Muslim schools. As a matter of policy, the government must also create a narrative that would counteract those preached by Boko Haram, in order to keep the latter from gaining the upper hand. There was a dissonance between Boko Haram's uncompromising demand for an Islamic state and the legal stipulations of Nigerian law which makes Boko Haram's demands illegitimate.

The government was engaged in an ideological war. It needed to take steps to understand its people and to understand that the level of poverty, corruption and

degradation was caused primarily by western education and the elites. As a result, the government needed to augment its application of soft measures and work with the religious organizations and the private sectors to create jobs for unemployed youths and to lessen their attraction and vulnerability to groups like Boko Haram.

Boko Haram's initial strategy was to attack the symbols that cause hardship to the country and to attack the police and the military. Boko Haram's original leader earned the trust of the people by providing water and some basic needed for them. This explained why his assassination exacerbated the situation. The government must go back to education, not just Western education. The government needed to secure the buy-in of its people by galvanizing society and by having a Nigerian-centric view about the country's security issues. The current government antagonized people in the Northeast against the military and it took a long time to officially brand Boko Haram as a terrorist organization. The current president, who was the head of opposition at the time, equated the declaration of state of emergency to declaring war against the north and ignited protests by the Northern Elders Forum and Borno Elders Forum against then Chief of Army Staff who was Ibo, in the eastern part of Nigeria.

The insurgency polarized the country along pro-government and anti-government factions and resulted in a loss of support for, and detachment from, the Nigerian-centric view of the warfare. The Nigerian citizens became ambivalent about the attacks. The government did not conduct national burials of victims to galvanize public support, national anger or emotion against Boko Haram attacks. The government needed to create public symbols and imagery instead of secret burials. To date, there was no clarity of the

grievances, and the issues that would constitute the framework for negotiation. For example, the government does not know if Boko Haram's objective was to Islamize Nigeria or to abolish western education completely and both sides were facing a case of winner-take-all.

The current government also bears responsibility for promoting the dangerous policy of deradicalization, which allows reabsorbing Boko Haram soldiers into the Nigerian Army and thereby giving Boko Haram the official stamp to act from within the army. On the contrary, excombatants could be turned informants for use against Boko Haram's leadership. Another issue was whether the government was serious enough about confronting Boko Haram. The Nigerian military was overwhelmed and troop morale was low because the terrorists were better equipped militarily. Leaders were playing politics and engaging in grand corruption with the lives of the Nigerian military. Leaders needed to address the issue of diversion of funds meant for fighting against terrorism. The government needed to counter corruption and offer a better alternative.

The Nigerian government could delegitimize Boko Haram in the current social system and bring them to the negotiating table by neutralizing or stopping Boko Haram's strategies for mass recruitment, establishing schemes that empowered people, creating effective administrative structures, developing counter narratives, and countering brainwashing. The government needed to develop counter narratives in a manner that would reduce Boko Haram's recruitment efforts and make it easier for members to leave the group. Developing a counter narrative was important because members do not know any other narrative other than what they were being told. It had been reported that some

of the Chibok girls have said they do not want to come out, that they were happy and even if they were released, they would return to their husbands. For example, a young man who had been told that he could not have sex, suddenly finds a religious group that tells him that he could legitimately have it. Boko Haram uses this approach for mass recruitment of young men. The group also offers interest free loans that allows members to buy two or three local transport vehicles to generate income, thereby affording members the flexibility and motivation to participate in activities. Boko Haram had also created a parallel state and local government structure through which they organize and conduct their activities. The Nigerian government had failed to undermine any of these strategies.

Another approach that the government could use to delegitimize Boko Haram was to engage in the installation of social infrastructure like; schools, hospitals, farm settlements, food subsidy and gainful employment, to uplift the social standard of the people and ensure the safety of people returning to their homes destroyed by Boko Haram. This could also involve creating avenues that could engage the youth in skills acquisition, leisure, and open spaces for recreation, parks, game facilities and programs that could occupy free time of the people and demonstrate to the local people that life without Boko Haram was far better.

Finally, Boko Haram could be delegitimized through the application of a cocktail of measures that include but not limited to the need of the Nigerian government to cut off the supply of funds, supply routes or channels for food and fuel for Boko Haram. Cutting off funds, water, medical attention and food was synonymous with cutting off the oxygen



that feeds the insurgents. It was believed that there would be a lot of defectors if the government was able to effectively squeeze Boko Haram in these areas. Demolishing the habitation of any confirmed member of Boko Haram could be effective if properly implemented to avoid implicating people who might be falsely accused. Another way to delegitimize was to embark on massive military campaigns over a sustained period. To do this the government must wage a sustained war of aerial bombardment that ensures that the band of terrorists never have a resting place.

### **Exploitation of Cultural Values to Hinder Boko Haram's Activities**

The exploitation of cultural values to hinder Boko Haram's activities involves strategies like culture and religion, used as strategies to delegitimize Boko Haram. Religion and ethnicity were major problems for the country. Boko Haram was promoting the notion that western education was haram, dangerous and wants to declare a theocracy. The Islamic religion does not permit the killing of fellow citizens. The government had to challenge the notion of violence in the Koran and highlight the absence of this point in the various sections of the Koran and present it in different languages as part of its propaganda. More importantly, the government needed to focus on the correct interpretation of the Koran and dissemination of Islam, and create better awareness of the positive aspects of Islam that emphasized knowledge, science and technology which proved that Islam was really the historical foundation of modern technology, of algebra and mathematics. Religion should be treated as a personal matter and the government should have no business sponsoring people to go on pilgrimage to pray because of the deleterious effect of religion on the country.

The government could exploit cultural values to hinder Boko Haram's activities through the use of soft power and hard power approaches aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people by providing education, jobs, getting people involved, providing healthcare, job skills, investments, poverty alleviation, and good governance. Another soft measure was to educate people to embrace the notion that human life was sacrosanct and should not be taken away. This needed to be emphasized in the Islamic forum because it was a huge issue. This would foster respect for the dignity of the human person and respect for the independent views of others. Nigeria is a pluralistic, multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious society with different beliefs such as Christianity, Islam, traditional worship, and Atheism. More importantly, Boko Haram members needed to realize that, regardless of their negative tendencies, the society still loved them and would be glad for them to drop their arms and come to the negotiating table, so that this issue could be resolved and the people could continue to live in peace. "On its own, peace was a value; let us live in peace and also let us believe that with what Boko Haram was doing that part of the country could never be developed," said one of the participants.

The love of money had resulted in a significant erosion of values in Nigeria. Parents helped their children to engage in exam malpractice and other dishonest behaviors. Teachers who enforced fairness were threatened when they were in public. These were the root causes of loss of values. To change the Nigerian psyche, the government needed to go back to the family structure, to society and the church. Even in the church, there was a case of a priest whose conduct was undesirable and brought public shame to his church and undermined the values it should uphold. There was also,

an instance of a Nigerian senator who was caught with drugs. The country's values continued to deteriorate that no news could be shocking anymore. People with upright values and morals never succeeded; those involved in shady stuff did. Whatever was previously thought of as taboo was happening. The government needed a fresh start and it needed leadership because there was a complete absence of leadership in Nigeria. The leaders were not leading by example. They were not doing what they said, what they preached in churches, mosques, in schools, the lecturers are not taken seriously, the politicians fail to observe the law that they enacted, the executives contravene the law that they were supposed to observe, consequently, these people could not talk to the citizens about violence or obedience to laws.

Arguably, the love of money and material things was the important socio-economic challenge that the government faced and the issue of poverty was the cause of disaffection. The kind of abject poverty in the north eastern part of the country was the worst in terms of human indexes: low literacy, child mortality, and lack of education. Boko Haram saw elite education as a problem because if most of the elite were the ones that were in power and were not affecting the lives of the less privileged positively, it was simply easy for the people to see it as a problem. The leadership of Boko Haram were people in the community; they saw that the elite suddenly become affluent after they assumed government positions; as a result, when Boko Haram promised impoverished people a better life, they believed the former.

One of the ways for the government to advocate good values within the Nigerian society was to foster a Nigerian spirit such as selflessness and to gain the buy-in from the

people. The value of selflessness makes the society great. In Western countries, people volunteered to go to the warfront “Country first,” “self-second.” Sacrifice was an important value. This was not the case in Nigeria where one questioned the value of sacrifice. The government could use values such as mass public enlightenment, provision of amenities, regular supply of power, social engineering, crop support, financial aid, and other people-oriented measures to exploit Boko Haram’s activities, erode its recruitment base and, over a period of time, enhance a return to normalcy. The massive and quick rebuilding of infrastructure and the restoration of normalcy would trigger a gradual restoration of confidence for the displaced and encourage them to go home.

### **Evidence of Trustworthiness**

#### **Credibility**

In Chapter 3, I explained the need to adequately provide evidence of trustworthiness in the process of a qualitative study. This is predicated on credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability in a qualitative inquiry. I used audiotape recorder to ensure credibility of data recorded for this study. After the interview, I provided the participants with a summary of all the discussions during the interview to confirm that their views were accurately captured.

#### **Transferability**

To ensure transferability, I purposefully selected the participants based on their knowledge of the subject of this inquiry. I was precise and accurate in recording the responses of the participants to each interview question using a tape recorder.

**Dependability**

To achieve dependability, I maintained field notes in my reflective journal to keep a log of dates, times, places, persons and activities. I was the only one who had access to the participants, and secured data collected with the audio recorder in a lock safe and allowed no one else access to it.

**Confirmability**

I engaged the participants in informal interactions at various times after the interview before leaving Nigeria, as a process of member checking, to obtain the accuracy of data collected during the interview.

**Study Results**

Each of the 10 participants provided their assessment of the effectiveness of the various counterterrorism approaches used by the Nigerian government to address the Boko Haram insurgency. They were also asked to provide their assessments of the counterterrorism approaches that were effective or successful, that were ineffective or failed, as well as those that were ongoing, had mixed results or required longer evaluation periods. A summary of the participants' overall assessments of the counterterrorism approaches employed by the Nigerian government is shown in Table 2, which indicated how participants assessed each of the themes that were highlighted under the various counterterrorism approaches employed by the Nigerian government. Even though all the participants were asked the same questions during the interviews, yet their responses were based on their local expertise and their direct or indirect involvement in various aspects of the Boko Haram counterterrorism efforts. Consequently, each participant's

overall assessment addressed the specific themes or approaches that they highlighted in their responses. Not surprisingly, some participants rated some approaches as effective while others rated those same approaches as ineffective or ongoing. A review of the results showed that the counterterrorism approaches used by the Nigerian government were ineffective. The following section provides specific reasons for the failure of the counterterrorism approaches used by the Nigerian government.

### **Political Approach**

The political approach to the Boko Haram issue was ineffective because it failed to address the issues of the Northeast. There was a lack of national approach in addressing the problem of Boko Haram because the military and political leaderships view it as a regional issue and not a national issue.

### **The Hard Measure Approach**

Using maximum or kinetic force by the military did not work because it was applicable to conventional warfare but inappropriate in an insurgency situation. The hard power approach by the Nigerian military had not been effective because the battle with Boko Haram was not a conventional war. The halfhearted approaches have not been effective due to a combination of factors at the national, regional and multilateral levels. At the national level, the military lacked effective equipment; at the regional level, there was a lack of cooperation and collaboration among the neighboring countries and the military. The military recently lost over 100 soldiers in an attack by Boko Haram, which indicated a failure of military containment of Boko Haram. Significant progress or improvement had been realized using a highly militarized approach which depended on

kinetic force; however, the government's estimation of the progress was overestimated and there was far more work to be done. The failures could be attributed to overdependence on the military, a lack of political will and the politicization of counterinsurgency operations which polarized the society that needed to unite behind the government.

There was also a lack of actionable intelligence which put the terrorists ahead of the military efforts. There was a lack of cooperation from the neighboring countries reluctant to sign onto the hot-pursuit agreement thereby providing safe haven for Boko Haram soldiers. The hard measure military approach had not been very effective due to lack of needed intelligence and resources. The military established a regional intelligence fusion unit to collect intelligence from Nigerian agencies as well as intelligence agencies from the neighboring countries, but that had not been employed effectively. Consequently, Boko Haram continued to launch attacks. The failures of these approaches included inadequate provision of educational and employment opportunities for the youth, which made them vulnerable to recruitment efforts by Boko Haram. The influence of international terrorist organizations and the unrestrained movement of ISIS fighters to Mali and Nigeria, coupled with the ease with which Boko Haram was able to acquire arms through Libya all worsened an already volatile situation.

### **Soft Measure Approach**

The deradicalization, building trust, resilience, religious tolerance and community engagements through awareness campaigns, were not particularly successful because of lack of government capacity and transparency in implementing the instituted policies.

The engagement approach had been ineffective because Boko Haram was amorphous and anonymous. The approach of empowerment which addressed the root causes of poverty and unemployment, would require years of implementation to prove its effectiveness in addressing Boko Haram issues. The participants did not address effectiveness of prosecuting hardened criminals. The approach of military containment had shown mixed results. Boko Haram was declared technically defeated and degraded; however, a resurgence of attacks at various villages in Borno and Yobe states against the military, resulted in military casualties and indicated that military containment had not succeeded.

Additionally, Boko Haram continued to occupy largely ungoverned areas in Borno state. The current strategy to win the hearts and minds of the people was an ongoing effort. Another cause of the failures of the approaches related to the lack of inter-agency cooperation among the security agencies. The soft measure approach of empowerment had not been successful to achieve reorientation and deradicalization as evidenced by the suicide bombings involving women and the kidnapping of young girls. Engagement had not been successful because the ransom paid to secure the release of kidnapped victims was recycled by Boko Haram to purchase arms and recruit new members.

### **The Causes of Failures**

These were multifaceted because the government had not been fully committed to implementing its approaches. The lack of commitment by the military to develop relationship with the community was partly responsible for the military's indiscriminate response to attacks which caused the community to turn against them. Another reason for



the failure of the approaches by the government included an unacceptable level of casualties in the counterterrorism efforts. Only recently, the military lost over 100 soldiers in an attack by Boko Haram. This was partly because of Boko Haram's ability to disguise themselves in military uniforms and enter military barracks, an indication of failure of military intelligence. The failures were also due to a lack of sincerity and transparency on the part of the government in truthfully communicating the results of its efforts.

Counterterrorism approaches have been ineffective because of a catalogue of "disjointed incrementalism." One success recorded by the military was followed by multiple failures resulting from successful Boko Haram attacks, due to unfamiliarity with the local terrain, short deployment stays and lack of adequate equipment. The failures of the approaches could be attributed to lack of inter-agency cooperation and collaboration which undermined suggestions for operational and tactical decisions to locate a Home Front Command for coordination and effectiveness. The pervasive graft in the security architecture had contributed to loss of morale among the security rank and file, resulting in the regular evasion of deployment to hotspots and serious lobbying for posting of soldiers to softer and safer areas.

### **Retrieving Land Occupation**

This had been substantially successful. The government may have made an impressionable headway in reducing terrorist activities by Boko Haram using confrontation and military intelligence, but it had not effectively eliminated Boko Haram. The failures of these approaches could be attributed to employing policies that cannot

effectively address the fundamental issues of illiteracy and unemployment. Also, the failures of these approaches relate to the government's inability to consistently pursue reorientation to counter Boko Haram's radical narratives.

### **Containment of Boko Haram**

This had been successful to some extent, however, recent upsurge in attacks indicate that the problem had not been effectively addressed from the root. There was discontentment, poverty, issue of fanaticism, indoctrination, lack of appreciation for the value of life and education. The failures were due to government's inability to combine hard power and soft power in its effort to counter Boko Haram. The government had not sustained its soft power approach of deradicalization and reorientation consistently and effectively. There had been insincerity on the part of the government to honor its election campaign promises of addressing poverty in the community of the insurgents. The government had also failed to effectively address the welfare conditions of the people as well as the approach of reorientation of returning Boko Haram soldiers. Military containment had been ineffective because the Nigerian military was no longer as effective as it used to be. The military was generally viewed as unprofessional, unmotivated, inefficient, and plagued by low morale and high levels of corruption. The regional cooperation and collaboration needed from countries like Cameroon, Niger and Chad that share borders with Nigeria had not been forthcoming.

### **Targeting and Killing**

Responses from interview participants regarding targeted killing as a counterterrorism strategy were mixed but a majority of participants viewed the approach

as ineffective. One of the responses from participants about targeted killings indicated that unlike what the Israel Defense Forces does in Israel, targeted killing was not recommended because Boko Haram soldiers were Nigerian citizens who have gone astray. The government's approach should be to reorient and not to eliminate the targeted soldiers. Participants who had favorable views of targeted killing, argued that it had been effectively used by countries like Israel and the United States and, therefore, needed to be considered as a valid option. To be more effective, the Nigerian government should seek help and leverage this advanced technology. Another view suggested that targeted killing was not being used by the government because Boko Haram's leader Shekau would have been eliminated if it was being used; a contrasting view argued that the Nigerian Air Force used it on a limited basis. For example, Shekau was wounded in a targeted attack. The prevailing view was that the government was not using targeted killing due to lack of credible information and the unavailability of the right tools and resources. The government also lacked the resources for targeted killing partly because government officials diverted the funds allocated for weapons towards their private use and left soldiers who were ill equipped to die in the battlefields.

Furthermore, Boko Haram operatives were better than the Nigerian officials at collaborating and partnering with the local community and it was still holding hostages, including the Chibok girls, who were being used as human shields in order to discourage any attempts to bomb them in the forest. Targeted killing served to displace Boko Haram but not much else. It was only effective when the right people were identified and eliminated, and this required proper use of intelligence which had to be multilateral or

bilateral and not unilateral. The Nigerian government needed to have dossiers on commanders, and this was lacking. The government also needed to know the names of Boko Haram's leaders, organizational structure, their sponsors and how they operate, all of which were lacking. Targeted killing was also impacted by the lack of cooperation with the neighboring countries where Boko Haram soldiers sought refuge. Effective use of intelligence would stop Boko Haram from crossing the borders into the neighboring countries after committing crimes in Nigeria.

I summarized two types of conclusions drawn from this study in Table 2. It showed that of the 16 themes that emerged from the thematic analysis, three themes or 19% were determined to be effective. These included general counterterrorism approach, hard power/maximum force, and reducing terrorist activities. Three of the themes or 19% were categorized as ongoing, had mixed results or required longer evaluation periods. These comprised of soft power/deradicalization/reorientation, winning hearts and minds/buy-in, and containment of Boko Haram. The remaining 10 themes or 63% were classified as ineffective. The first conclusion from this study indicated that the counterterrorism measures used by the Nigerian government were ineffective and, therefore, the government needed to device other measures in order to achieve better results in its counterterrorist efforts.

The second conclusion reflected important distinctions in the perceptions of the participants. Table 4 showed that the weight of positive responses by participants who classified general counterterrorism approach, hard power/maximum force as effective was negated by the weight of the negative responses by other participants, leaving

reducing terrorist activities as the only theme that was classified as effective. Similarly, the weight of fair responses by participants who classified soft power/deradicalization/reorientation, and containment of Boko Haram as ongoing, had mixed results or required longer evaluation periods was negated by the weight of other participants, leaving winning hearts and minds/buy-in as ongoing, had mixed results or required longer evaluation periods. By making these adjustments, the measures that were classified as ineffective decreased from three themes to one or 6%. Similarly, the measures that were classified as ongoing, mixed results or required longer evaluation periods decreased from three to one or 6% and the measures that were classified as ineffective increased from 10 to 14 or 88%. The second conclusion affirms the overall results which point to a complete failure of the counterterrorism measures employed by the Nigerian government against Boko Haram.

Table 2

*Summary of Approaches/Themes*

Counterterrorism Approach/Theme	Participant Assessment		
	Effective	Ineffective	Ongoing

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General counterterrorism approach	P2	P1, P3,	
Hard power/maximum force	P5, P8,	P1, P2, P9,	
Soft power/deradicalization/reorientation		P5, P7, P9,	P4, P6
Commitment to develop relationships		P1, P3,	
Winning hearts and minds/Buy-in			P2
Interagency cooperation		P2, P4, P10	
Resources for the military/military morale		P3, P9, P10	
Cooperation/collaboration with neighbors		P3, P8,	
Government sincerity and transparency		P6, P9,	
Target killings of opposition leaders		P4	
Intelligence to counteract Boko Haram		P4, P8, P9	
Reducing terrorist activities	P5		
Illiteracy/unemployment/poverty/distrust		P5, P6, P7, P9	
Containment of Boko Haram		P7	P6,
Exercising political will		P8	
Ability to block Boko Haram funding sources		P9,	

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### Summary

In this chapter, I presented the data analysis and findings in response to the research questions, which formed the basis of the 10 interview questions to which the participants responded during the interviews. I developed the preliminary list of themes

and compared the preliminary list of themes to those that I cultivated from the participants' responses to questions most closely related to the research questions and created a summary list of 16 themes. The summary list of themes formed the basis of the results of my data analysis and answered the research questions for this study.

In response to the research question that probed the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State, responses by the participants indicated that the Nigerian government denied the gravity of the Boko Haram's insurgency during the early stages. That the political denial was evidenced in a counterterrorism approach which participants categorized as haphazard, disjointed, ineffective, and uncoordinated in mitigating and addressing the fundamental causes of Boko Haram insurgency. Others referred to the government's efforts as disjointed, unfocused, and lackluster. The participants described the government's initial strategy to kill the leader as a key miscalculation because it backfired and incited many people to join Boko Haram, instead of the expected outcome, which was to eliminate the group, hence the failure of the government's counterterrorism efforts.

Out of the 16 themes that emerged from the thematic analysis, I came to two main conclusions from the summary outlined in Table 2. In the first conclusion, three themes or 19% were determined to be effective. These included general counterterrorism approach, hard power/maximum force, and reducing terrorist activities. Three of the themes or 19% were categorized as ongoing, had mixed results or required longer evaluation periods. These comprised of soft power/deradicalization/reorientation,

winning hearts and minds/buy-in and containment of Boko Haram. The remaining 10 themes or 63% were classified as ineffective.

The first conclusion from this study indicated that the counterterrorism measures used by the Nigerian government were ineffective and, therefore, the government needed to device other measures in order to achieve better results in its counterterrorist efforts. The second conclusion showed important distinctions in the perceptions of the participants. Table 2 showed that the weight of positive responses by participants who classified general counterterrorism approach, hard power/maximum force as effective was negated by the weight of the negative responses by other participants, leaving reducing terrorist activities as the only theme that was classified as effective. Similarly, the weight of fair responses by participants who classified soft power/deradicalization/reorientation and containment of Boko Haram as ongoing, had mixed results or required longer evaluation periods was negated by the weight of other participants, leaving winning hearts and minds/buy-in as ongoing, had mixed results or required longer evaluation periods. By making these adjustments, the measures that were classified as ineffective decreased from three themes to one or 6%.

Similarly, the measures that were classified as ongoing, mixed results or required longer evaluation periods decreased from three to one or 6% and the measures that were classified as ineffective increased from 10 to 14 or 88%. The second conclusion affirmed the overall results, which point to a complete failure of the counterterrorism measures employed by the Nigerian government against Boko Haram.



In answering the research question as to what the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State have been, responses by the participants indicated that these were multifaceted because the government had not been fully committed to implementing its approaches. They outlined the following as constituting some of the causes of failure:

The lack of commitment by the military to develop relationship with the community was partly responsible for the military's indiscriminate response to attacks which caused the community to turn against them.

An unacceptable level of casualties in the counterterrorism efforts, which participants described as an indication of failure of military intelligence. Only recently, the military lost over 100 soldiers in an attack by Boko Haram. This was partly because of Boko Haram's ability to disguise themselves in military uniforms and enter military barracks.

A lack of sincerity and transparency on the part of the government in truthfully communicating the results of its efforts. Participants noted that counterterrorism approaches have been ineffective in this regard because of a catalogue of *disjointed incrementalism*. One success recorded by the military was followed by multiple failures resulting from successful Boko Haram attacks due to unfamiliarity with the local terrain, short deployment stays and lack of adequate equipment.

Lack of interagency cooperation and collaboration which undermined suggestions for operational and tactical decisions to locate a Home Front Command for coordination and effectiveness.

The pervasive graft in the security architecture had contributed to loss of morale among the security rank and file, resulting in the regular evasion of deployment to hotspots and serious lobbying for posting of soldiers to softer and safer areas.

Addressing the research question whether there were alternative approaches considered and not used, the participants noted these to include the following:

To allow the states to have their own separate police force. They opined that this approach would give more autonomy to state governors over postings and deployment of the commissioner of police. This approach would be synergized with different quasi police formations or community policing or the vigilante/area watch groups to report suspicious movements and activities in a timely fashion. Such groups would require a clear strategy to minimize collateral damage.

To introduce a comprehensive national identification scheme that would identify everyone by name and residence, and make registration of place of new residence mandatory to monitor new arrivals or relocations. Similarly, the government would create a department of vital records where births, marriages and death were automatically registered and updated.

On the research question whether there were alternative approaches not considered at all, the participants provided these responses:

One of the counterterrorist approaches which was not considered at all was negotiating with the terrorists, at least on the surface. Similarly, the nonpayment of ransom poses a serious dilemma for the government, which follows the U.S. government that does not pay ransom as a matter of policy even though it was allowed.

The infiltration of the rank and file of Boko Haram which was extremely dangerous. Boko Haram was able to effectively infiltrate the Nigerian army, while the government hasn't been able to do the same.

The government had not optimized the lessons and ideas gained from the multi-national workshops regarding leveraging its relationships with neighbors like Cameroon, Niger, Mali, and Chad. The government had done very little to secure better understanding and cooperation of these neighbors regarding insurgency.

The government had not made any effort to understand Boko Haram's affiliation with ISIS and to solicit cooperation on how to target this group. The government was not making any efforts to identify those sponsoring terrorist organizations. The insurgents were being supported by some groups and there were suspicions that some of those were in the country. A lot of funding was coming from outside as well.

The government failed to identify the sources of funding, towards finding, naming, shaming sponsors and punishing them. The government was not deploying enough resources to trace the sources of these funding in order to stop the inflow and deal with those sponsoring the terrorist activities.

A constitutional amendment to allow a state of emergency, or martial law. The government could legitimately declare a state of emergency, impose martial law and do things that it could not do in peace time. The government needed to realize that it was in a state of war and not deny it.

Targeted killing as a counterterrorist approach had not been considered. Israel had done that effectively against Hamas and Hezbollah and the United States had successfully employed this strategy against Al Qaeda.

In conclusion, I surmise that as the review has indicated, the overall results of the analysis of the responses of participants provided answers to the research question, and indicated that the counterterrorism measures used by the Nigerian government were overwhelmingly ineffective because of the reasons articulated. In consequence therefore, I propose in this exploratory study, the need for the government to revisit the alternative approaches considered but not used, as well as approaches not considered at all, to device other measures in its counterterrorist efforts against Boko Haram.

## Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to fill the gap in knowledge by understanding the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government and exploring alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno State. I employed a qualitative study design to address the research problem and purpose. The counterterrorism approaches employed by the government thus far against Boko Haram have proved ineffective in curbing the menace of the group, averting future attacks, or mitigating the adverse consequences of the attacks on communities in Borno State.

In view of this, I employed a qualitative research method to explore alternative approaches in addressing the identified problems of Boko Haram in Borno State. The results of this study highlighted the need for a paradigm shift by the Nigerian government from the current approaches for meaningful and effective changes to be seen in its fight against Boko Haram. Consequently, the following research questions facilitated the process of this inquiry:

RQ1: What have been the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government in Borno State?

RQ2: Were alternative approaches considered and not used or not considered at all?

In all, I interviewed 10 participants who were selected through the purposeful sampling of senior government officers in the NPF. In the process of data collection and analysis, I relied mainly on interviews, my reflective journal, and my field notes. Each of

the interviews lasted about 60 minutes on average and were conducted at a time and location convenient for the participants. Follow-up questions were asked as appropriate to elicit further clarifying information from the participants.

The theoretical framework that anchored this study was the contemporary deterrence theory by Wilner (2015). In contemporary times, deterring terrorist attacks is still a fundamental challenge to international security, and Nigeria is no exception; hence, this attempt to suggest aspects of the contemporary deterrence theory to apply in solving the problem of terrorism in Nigeria. The findings of this study represent a significantly clear contribution to knowledge of the NPF and other related agencies engaged in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism in Borno State and other parts of Nigeria rife with terrorist violence.

In Chapter 5, I provide an interpretation of the findings by confirming or extending knowledge in the discipline through a discussion of peer-reviewed literature and by analyzing the data outcomes in the context of the conceptual framework. This chapter also includes a description of the limitations to trustworthiness that were addressed in the study and recommendations intrinsic in stimulating further research. Finally, in this chapter I explain the potential impact for positive social change in the context of counterterrorism in Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa.

### **Interpretation of Findings**

The summary Table 2 in Chapter 4 shows that the counterterrorism measures used by the Nigerian government were overwhelmingly ineffective, and therefore, the government needed to devise alternative measures in its counterterrorist efforts against

Boko Haram. The reasons for the failure in the government's approach were consistent with what I found in the peer-reviewed literature described in Chapter 2. Innocent and Onyishi (2014) urged a change of approach from the tactics of extrajudicial killings employed by the Nigerian security agencies in dealing with the problem of Boko Haram. The authors added that in its brutality, this approach exacerbated increasing attacks by Boko Haram; hence, it was counterproductive. The findings from my study confirmed their finding and showed the insincerity of the government's tactics. The government's initial strategy to kill the leader was a key miscalculation because it backfired and incited many people who were sympathetic to the causes advocated by the group to join Boko Haram (see Onyishi, 2014). It also caused Boko Haram to retaliate by carrying out even more attacks against the military as well as innocent people who found themselves at the wrong place and time (Onyishi, 2014).

The findings in this study also extended knowledge in the discipline by providing reasons for the failure in the government's approach to targeted killing, which included the diversion of government funds allocated for weapons towards arming the soldiers in the fight against Boko Haram, while leaving the soldiers to die in the battlefields. This highlighted one of the causes of failure of counterterrorism measures by the government in Borno State. The ineffectiveness of targeted killing was also impacted by the lack of cooperation by Nigeria's neighboring countries where Boko Haram soldiers sought refuge. The Nigerian government lacked good intelligence that would facilitate targeted killing. This finding represents a major barrier towards a collaborative intelligence effort by the Nigerian government with neighboring countries to fight against Boko Haram and

documents another cause of failure of counterterrorism measures by the government in Borno State.

Additionally, Innocent and Onyishi (2014) revealed that targeted killing required credible information and required the right tools and resources, which the Nigerian government lacked. In this study, I found that the Nigerian government's lack of good intelligence gave Boko Haram a significant advantage because Boko Haram operatives appeared better at collaborating and partnering with the local community than the Nigerian officials; hence, they were able to use weapons like improvised explosive devices to cause more damage. Boko Haram soldiers were also able to cross the borders easily into the neighboring countries after committing crimes in Nigeria.

Walt (1991) expanded on the focus of previous discussions on national security studies centered on the use of military power, which is subject to political control. The results of the current study confirmed those of Walt's by indicating that the political approach to the Boko Haram issue was ineffective because it failed to address the issues of the Northeast. There was a lack of national approach to addressing the problem of Boko Haram because the military and political leaderships viewed it as a regional issue and not a national issue. Walt also noted that military power, which was a more traditional approach, was not the only source of national security, and military threats were not the only dangers that states faced although usually the most serious (p. 213). Operating from the military angle, the traditional approach engaged physical force in deterring dangers or aggressions, emphasizing the establishment of security apparatus in sovereign states (Osumah, 2013). The results in this study confirmed those in the



literature by showing that the government's use of military threat employed a traditional approach to the unconventional problems posed by Boko Haram terrorism.

Ajayi (2012) noted the lack of progress in the efforts by the Nigeria Security Forces to clamp down on the magnitude and chronology of attacks by Boko Haram (p. 104). The author also commented on the introduction of suicide bombings by Boko Haram in the belief of a robust reward in heaven. One of the findings from this study indicated that the hard measure approach by the military did not work because it was applicable to conventional warfare but inappropriate in an insurgency situation. I found that the failure of this approach was also due to a combination of factors at the national, regional, and multilateral levels as well as the government's inability to effectively combine hard power and soft power in its effort to counter Boko Haram. Ajayi shared a second perspective with a focus on a nonstrategic definition emphasizing socio-economic factors. The findings of the current study showed discontentment, poverty, fanaticism, indoctrination, and lack of appreciation for the value of life and education were the result of the government's inability to consistently and effectively sustain its soft power approach of deradicalization and reorientation.

Osumah (2013) pointed to the two dominant approaches to the conception of internal security management: the traditional and modern approaches. Innocent and Onyishi (2014) offered that one perspective directed focus on strategic definition, which reflects a realist perspective conceptualizing national security in terms of self-defense and a dependence on the use of arms and military might to deter aggression against a state. The results of the current study showed that the Nigerian military relied heavily on the

use of arms and hard power to deter aggression against Boko Haram and that approach was not successful due to a lack of commitment by the military to develop relationships with communities and the military's indiscriminate response to attacks, which caused communities to turn against them.

In this study, I found that there were unacceptable levels of casualties in the counterterrorism efforts due to Boko Haram's ability to disguise themselves in military uniforms and enter military barracks. This was an indication of the failure of military intelligence and a key reason for the failure of this approach. One of the participants described the failure as due to a catalogue of "disjointed incrementalism" where one successful attack by the military was followed by multiple failures resulting from Boko Haram attacks due to the government's unfamiliarity with the local terrain, short deployment stays, and lack of adequate equipment. I found yet another cause of the failure in hard power was attributed to the lack of interagency cooperation and collaboration, which undermined suggestions for operational and tactical decisions to locate a Home Front Command for coordination and effectiveness.

Blanchard (2014) pointed to security sector corruption and mismanagement as factors that left Nigerian troops with less resources and inadequately equipped to face the insurgency. The findings of the current study confirmed those in the literature by showing that these identified factors also constrained the responses of the Nigerian Security Forces to counter the threat posed by Boko Haram. Osumah (2013) commented that the diminished and degraded nature of the security agencies was one of the reasons for the inability of the Nigerian security agencies to contain the menace of Boko Haram. A

prominent finding of my study was that the pervasive graft in the security architecture had contributed to loss of morale among the security rank and file, resulting in the regular evasion of deployment to hotspots and serious lobbying for posting of soldiers to softer and safer areas.

In this study, I found that the military was generally viewed as unprofessional, unmotivated, inefficient, and plagued by low morale and high levels of corruption. I also found that the Nigerian military was overwhelmed, and troop morale was low because the terrorists were better equipped militarily. Leaders in the military were playing politics and engaged in grand corruption and reckless with the lives of the Nigerian military troops. Military leaders need to address the issue of the diversion of funds meant for adequately equipping the troops in the fight against terrorism, thereby charting a new course in the efforts to counter the terrorist threat from Boko Haram. The government needs to address the pervasive issue of corruption if it hopes to offer a better alternative approach to counterterrorism.

Table 3

*Comparison of Findings with Peer-Reviewed Literature*

	Peer reviewed	New Finding
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The hard measure approach by the military applicable to conventional warfare was inappropriate for an insurgency	X	
Targeted killing of Boko Haram leaders exacerbated attacks	X	
Need to change government's tactics of extrajudicial killings	X	
Government's approach of targeted killing of Boko Haram leaders undermined by diversion of funds allotted for arms/weapons		X
Lack of cooperation by Nigeria's neighboring countries where Boko Haram members take refuge, undermined approach of targeted killing		X
The Nigerian government lacked good intelligence to facilitate targeted killings	X	
Boko Haram collaborates with the local community better than the Nigerian government officials		X
Lack of a national approach to addressing the problem of Boko Haram by the military and political leadership	X	
Failure of government to effectively combine hard power and soft power approaches in its efforts to counter Boko Haram		X
Fallout of governments inconsistent and ineffective approach of de-radicalization and re-orientation include discontentment, poverty, issues of fanaticism, indoctrination, lack of appreciation of the value of life and education		X
Low morale of Nigerian troops due to inadequate/ineffective arms and weapons to counter Boko Haram		X

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### **Limitations of the Study**

A few potential limitations to the generalizability and trustworthiness of this study were noted in Chapter 1. One of the possible methodological weakness identified was the technique employed in data collection. The use of the case study research design, a

purposeful sampling of 15 senior government officials in the NPF, and the eventual interviewing of 10 participants was the first of these limitations because the size of the participants may be judged by some to be too small to achieve informational saturation. The fact that the data involved the unique perspectives of the participants working in the NPF implied that there was a limitation to generalizing the results of these unique perspectives beyond participants in this study or similar populations.

A second limitation is linked to the fact that participants were drawn from a specific agency involved in the fight against terrorism. Consequently, their knowledge of terrorism based on their experiences differed from other security agencies and influenced their responses to the questions. A third limitation is drawn from the fact that deterrence was merely one possibility among many within a broader spectrum of counterterrorism policy, and not a comprehensive solution by itself. A fourth limitation related to the location of participants in Nigeria. Thus, I was limited to the few days spent in Nigeria post data collection, to ask follow-on questions to clarify or to probe more deeply into their responses. A fifth limitation related to bias, and the assumption that participants shared their responses by answering the questions honestly and openly. However, I observed carefully and intently that the participants displayed genuine concern and were open and honest in answering the questions.

There were no limitations to trustworthiness in the execution of this study. The absence of any remote or personal coercing relationship with the participants ensured that the findings of this study mirrored genuinely, the views of the 10 participants. I made use of audiotape recorder to ensure the credibility of recorded data. The process of

reflexibility enabled me to examine how my subjectivity as a researcher was to be addressed. Born and raised in in the Eastern part of Nigeria, I have lived outside of Nigeria for close to 20 years, although I have visited regularly. I have relied on local and international news media to keep abreast with the Boko Haram insurgency and I have managed to maintain an objective posture from the distance. During the course of this study, I held myself accountable to the standards of knowing and telling what I studied on this topic and I employed triangulation in studying the issue, compared, and cross checked the consistency of information I captured from my interactions with the participants within the few days of my stay in Nigeria after the data collection. I also set aside biases by asking all the participants the same questions and by carefully following my data collection, data processing and data analysis plan.

I followed a six-step data analysis plan which enhanced my conformability or objectivity and I established audit trails to ensure that the transcriptions of the recorded interviews were done in two steps to allow raw data (direct transliteration) to be reviewed a second time to remove sentence duplications or repetitions. Finally, I used NVivo software to assure consistent coding. There were no risks to the participants in this study. Prior to the interviews, I mailed a consent form to each participant to obtain their permission to take part in this study. Participants' protections were outlined in the consent form, and I adhered to the ethical guidelines for the study, which included stipulations as to the voluntary nature of participation in the study, and the right of participants to withdrawn from the study at any time without obligation. I read each participant their rights, thanked them for agreeing to participate in the study before the

start of the interviews and, I thanked each participant for their time, when the recorded interviews were completed.

### **Recommendations**

The insights obtained from my research, provided the impetus for the recommendations that follow. This study has confirmed some of the findings of other peer-reviewed studies that focused on the various elements of the Boko Haram counterterrorism efforts. However, this study has contributed additional insights on the failed approaches by the Nigerian government. Hence, further research is required to address how these failed strategies could be enhanced to make them more successful. Further research that focuses on addressing a prominent finding in this study, which relates to the underlying issues that caused lack of buy-in by the public, will highlight ways the government can gain the support and cooperation of the public and thereby improve its intelligence capabilities through the willingness of the public to share information with the security agencies. The Nigerian military was generally viewed as unprofessional, unmotivated, inefficient, and plagued by low morale and high levels of corruption. Research on how the Nigerian military can realign itself to be more effective against counterterrorism will be helpful in expanding knowledge in this field and adding knowledge to this area of the discipline. The magnitude of the governments' counterterrorism efforts against Boko Haram issues led to the conclusion that Nigeria is in a state of war that requires bold and innovative solutions to assure success. A comparative study of the counterterrorism efforts of Western nations versus efforts employed in Third World countries would be pertinent in providing insights that Nigeria

could benefit from in its counterterrorism efforts. Nigeria could also benefit from a further study to unearth the underlying reasons behind a lack of buy-in by the public in the Government's efforts to combat Boko Haram.

## **Implications**

### **Implications for Positive Social Change**

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to fill the gap in knowledge by conducting interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF, to understand the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government, and to explore alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno State. My research uncovered the ineffectiveness of the counterterrorism approaches by the Nigerian government due to its reliance on conventional approaches to fight unconventional threat of terrorism by Boko Haram. As shown in the literature review, the use of force against Boko Haram produced only short-term results as a palliative measure and proved very transient given the resurgence of Boko Haram after such attacks as more reinforced and fortified, and their attacks more vicious. This exploratory study about alternative approaches considered and not used or not considered at all, presents a positive conceptual advancement with a scope broader in nature, to ensure that the efforts towards counterterrorism are sustainable and enduring. The results of this study thus have implications at the individual, family, organizational, and societal level. A continuous threat of terrorism offers no benefit at any of the foregoing levels.

Terrorism has the effect of occasioning losses, sorrow, and misery at the individual, family, organizational, and societal levels. The immediate effect at the



individual and family level is the untimely loss of lives which robs individuals the opportunity to attain full life potentials. At the organizational level the resultant effect is the inability of businesses to function and flourish due to the destruction of structure and organizational facilities from the terrorist attacks. This effect extends to the societal level in the form of destruction of scare infrastructures and government facilities.

This study highlighted that attention and priority have not been given to alternative approaches considered but not used, as well as those not considered at all, in the fight against Boko Haram in Borno State. It is pivotal to embark on an urgent review to address this situation. The employment of deradicalization and reorientation measures holds a potent dynamic of an enduring and long-term approach to counterterrorism and addressing the problem of insurgency. This offers potential implication for a positive social change of highlighting the ills of terrorism and making it less attractive for vulnerable youths, thereby enthroning peace in the community, which in turn assures that individuals and families are safe to reach for their goals, organizations can thrive again with social infrastructure securely in place and normalcy can return to the wider society devoid of the destructive tendencies of terrorism.

The impact of the Boko Haram insurgency is palpable at all levels of the Nigerian society. What started as a seemingly insignificant local issue caused primarily by economic inequalities which were exacerbated by Islamic fundamentalists who advocated the ills of Western education and who leveraged inaccurate teachings of the Koran, has steadily evolved into one of the most intractable national security issues facing Nigeria, and to a lesser degree, its neighboring countries. Factors such as the gross under-

estimation of the serious nature of the Boko Haram issue, tactical and strategic mistakes by political and military leaders who have been roundly criticized by international organizations as well as dysfunctional government organizations have contributed to this issue.

The poor leadership by the Nigerian government has also resulted in increased corruption by political and military leaders, an erosion in moral, religious, cultural and ethical values, an explosion in war economy due to diversion of budgeted funds, a general distrust of the government and a lack of buy-in by the Nigerian public. As a result, the potential impact of the positive social change of this study is extensive.

Results of finding in this study displayed in Table 2 show that the participants pointed to 14 of the 16 themes or approaches as ineffective. This determination also meant that the government needed to improve its performance in these areas. Consequently, my recommendations focused on the specific actions that the government needs to take such as increased local, regional, and international professional training of agency personnel in order to realize better counterterrorism outcomes. This will translate to a positive social change in the leadership norms and build positive moral in the personnel of the agencies involved in counterterrorism efforts.

Implementing the recommendations for targeted training proffered to address the issues relating to high levels of corruption will ensure that the Nigerian government can realign itself to be more effective against counterterrorism and create a positive social change in not only the military leadership but in the communities it serves by curbing the menace of terrorism.

The success with offensive strikes will ensure a restoration of peace for the communities impacted by Boko Haram terrorism and create positive social change of restoring normalcy to their daily lives.

### **Methodological, Theoretical, and/or Empirical Implications**

The exploratory case study approach and the purposeful sampling method used in my research to interview senior government officials in the NPF, afforded a positive conceptual implication of understanding the causes of failure of counterterrorism measures against Boko Haram directly from officials involved in the fight to address this phenomena. The theoretical foundation for this research grounded the exploration of alternative approaches more suitable for countering terrorism, unlike the approaches used in fighting conventional wars, thereby providing formidable implication for empirical focus. As a result of the foregoing, no changes to the sampling, data collection, and analysis are recommended.

### **Recommendations for Practice**

I found in this study that lack of intelligence undermined a lot of the government's efforts. Boko Haram is believed to have informants in the higher echelons of the Nigerian government who pass on intelligence to them, while the reverse is not applicable for the government. Consequently, to remedy this intelligence issue, I propose for the government to invest in building trust and fostering human intelligence to address this deficiency and proactively enhance gathering intelligence on plans of attack by Boko Haram. Through this effort, the government can stem the flow of sensitive information to

Boko Haram and be more effective in its efforts to execute preemptive strikes to undermine Boko Haram's aggressive attacks against innocent people.

My research showed that by stepping up its deradicalization and reorientation efforts, the government could reduce religious fundamentalism, reeducate Islamists using positive messages from the Koran, promote the virtues of Western education, minimize illiteracy and promote global citizenship. I propose for the government to initiate this effort with utmost urgency beginning with spreading this message across at the primary school level and at the community level by educating the community leaders who embody the trust and confidence of their people to deliver these deradicalization and reorientation messages to members of their communities.

I found in this study that the Nigerian military was generally viewed as unprofessional, unmotivated, inefficient, and plagued by low morale and high levels of corruption. I propose that the government invest in and increase local, regional, and international professional training for military personnel to expand their knowledge in the field of counterterrorism. This will serve to motivate them to be more efficient in the execution of their duties, as well build their morale and curb high level of corruption.

The government also needs to make cooperation and collaboration with neighboring countries a top priority to ensure that it is getting the right support from these countries. To accomplish this objective, the government needs to enhance and implement more effectively the regional intelligence fusion unit which was established to collect intelligence from Nigerian agencies as well as intelligence agencies from the neighboring countries. Improvement in relations with Nigeria's neighbors will also expand and

improve the intelligence resources and capabilities of the Nigerian military and allow the military to embark on offensive strikes with greater success.

I recommend that the government adapt to local and regional cultural influences, by setting up panels of investigation that will identify specific issues that are unique to specific areas, to help the government develop more effective approaches in addressing those issues. The government explored the idea of establishing schools for idle youth where Malaams and Emirs would reorient former members of Boko Haram as a temporary soft power/deradicalization/reorientation approach. I propose that the government put plans in place to implement this initiative of engaging idle youth through positive local efforts as a temporary approach to address the problem and pursue a plan of creating employment for the youth as a long-term solution, thereby minimizing the likelihood of the youth to be enticed and lured by Boko Haram recruits.

**Hard power/maximum force.** I recommend that the government modify its military approach of fighting conventional warfare to an approach that is best suited for counterterrorism. To do this, it needs to seek help from countries like the United States and Israel that have had better success with fighting Al Qaeda and Hamas terrorist groups. Specifically, the government needs to send special force to train with counterterrorism experts in Israel or the United States or request experts from the United States and Israel to train Nigerian troops in Nigeria. Lack of proper equipment and resources for the military is a political and military issue that may require better leadership approaches. Boko Haram has leveraged its extensive alliances with ISIS and other terrorist groups to gain access to funding and superior military equipment and this

puts the Nigerian military with inadequate equipment at a disadvantage and translates into very low morale.

The government received offers from South African mercenaries to fight Boko Haram, but the offer was rejected. The government also considered an all-out military strategy like that used in Sri Lanka against the Tamil Tigers (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and in Columbia against the Revolutionary Armed Forces rebels. I recommend a serious national debate about the extent to which these two approaches can bring about more lasting solutions to the Boko Haram counterterrorism challenges. Similarly, I recommend a national debate on the merits of a constitutional amendment to allow a state of emergency, or martial law. A consensus would allow the government to legitimately declare a state of emergency, impose martial law and pursue actions that would not be permissible in peace time.

**Soft power/de-radicalization/reorientation.** The lack of government capacity and transparency in implementing instituted policies is predicated by failures in leadership and lack of accountability. The approach of empowerment which addressed the root causes of poverty and unemployment, would require years of implementation to prove its effectiveness. However, the deradicalization and reorientation approach although requires years of implementation, potentially offers a more sustainable and enduring solution to the intractable problem of luring new recruits by Boko Haram. The magnitude of the Boko Haram attacks and the governments' counterterrorism efforts against Boko Haram issue leads to the conclusion that Nigeria is in a state of war that requires bold and innovative solutions to assure success.

## **Conclusions**

This qualitative case study bridged the gap in knowledge by conducting interviews with 10 senior government officials in the NPF, to understand the causes of failure in counterterrorism measures by the Nigerian government, and to explore alternate approaches to the counterterrorism efforts in Borno State.

This research was significant because it recommended strategies to achieve deterrence more effectively by the Nigerian security agencies. These strategies may reverse the trend of ineffectiveness which characterized the government efforts so far. I came to two main conclusions from my analysis. My first conclusion was that the government needed to consider engaging in the alternative measures identified in order to achieve better results in its counterterrorism efforts. My second conclusion affirmed a complete failure of the counterterrorism measures employed by the Nigerian government against Boko Haram therefore the government could not continue to employ more of the same ineffective approaches.

My research compared to peer-reviewed literature on Table 3, also highlighted several key issues which the Nigerian political and military leaders needed to address. I identified systemic and cultural issues of leadership, accountability and transparency from my research which would require tremendous will power and discipline on the part of the Nigerian government to address. The experts also presented a collective roadmap which, if followed, could yield remarkable dividends.

There are four key takeaways from this study, the first of which is that the hard measure approach by the military did not work because it was applicable to conventional

warfare but inappropriate for an insurgency. This study showed that the Nigerian military relied heavily on the use of arms and hard power to deter aggression against Boko Haram and that approach was not successful because of a lack of commitment by the military to develop relationships with the communities, coupled with the military's indiscriminate response to attacks which caused communities to turn against them. Therefore, the military should rebuild trust by developing close relationship with the communities and engage in more careful and targeted use of arms and hard power to minimize indiscriminate responses that harm innocent community members.

The lack of community support, which represents the second takeaway from this study was caused by a lack of trust and transparency by a government which was perceived as insensitive to the basic welfare of its citizenry. This undermined the government's efforts at gathering intelligence, which the communities seem willing to share with Boko Haram. On the other hand, Boko Haram was quick to exploit the government's weaknesses and to gain the trust of the people. Boko Haram is also believed to have informants in the higher echelons of the Nigerian government who pass on intelligence to them. I propose that the government resolve through a firm and honest will, to address the intelligence issue, by identifying and prosecuting Boko Haram informants among government agencies, to stem the flow of sensitive information to Boko Haram and enhance efforts to execute preemptive strikes to undermine Boko Harams aggressive attacks against innocent people.

The third takeaway from this study is that by stepping up its deradicalization and reorientation efforts, the government could reduce religious fundamentalism, reeducate



Islamists using positive messages from the Koran, promote the virtues of Western education, minimize illiteracy, create employment opportunities, and promote global citizenship. The fourth takeaway is that the pervasive graft in the security architecture has contributed to loss of morale among the security rank and file, resulting in the regular evasion of deployment to hotspots and serious lobbying for posting of soldiers to softer and safer areas. The government should address this situation by implementing heavy discipline of senior officials found culpable, to rebuild morale and credibility of the security personnel.

The view of the military as unprofessional, unmotivated, inefficient, and plagued by low morale and high levels of corruption, translated into devaluing the lives of the Nigerian military, the government cannot allow this to continue or the risk of negatively impacting every facet of the Nigerian society continues. In this exploratory study, I propose the adoption and implementation of deradicalization and reorientation as important practical and enduring approaches to the counterterrorism challenges in Nigeria, which could serve as important blueprint for such activities within the African or Third World context. However, this exploratory study leads me to conclude that not much will change unless the government is willing and resolved to make the paradigm shift necessary to confront all the enterprises benefiting from the ineffective system. More remains to be done to assure better comprehensive and lasting successes.

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## Appendix A: Boko Haram Killings

Serial No.	Date	Location	Incident	Fatality
	July 26-29, 2009	Bauchi, Maiduguri, Potiskum, Wudil	Boko Haram uprising	1000+ killed
	July 30, 2009	Maiduguri	Capture of Mohammed Yusuf	Mohammed Yusuf executed
	September 7, 2010	Bauchi	Prison break by suspected Boko Haram gunmen	5 killed, 721 inmates released
	December 31, 2010	Abuja	Bomb attack outside a barracks	4 killed
	May 29, 2011	Abuja, Bauchi	Bomb explosions during swearing in of President Goodluck Jonathan	15 killed

Serial No.	Date	Location	Incident	Fatality
	June 16, 2011	Nigerian Police Headquarters Abuja	First suicide bombing in Nigeria	Failed attempt, 2 killed
	August 26, 2011	United Nations Compound Abuja	Bombing attack	21 killed
	November 4, 2011	Damaturu: Police station, churches, banks	Car bombing, shootings, suicide bombings	100-150 killed
	December 22-23, 2011	Maiduguri, Damaturu	Clash between Nigerian security forces and Boko Haram	7 soldiers and 50 militants killed
	December 25, 2011	Madalla, Jos, Gadaka, Damaturu	Suicide bombings, bombings, shootings at churches.	41+ Christians killed

Serial No.	Date	Location	Incident	Fatality
	January 5-6, 2012	Mubi, Yola, Gombi, Maiduguri	Shootings at Christian churches and businesses, Police stations, Immigration offices and State Security local branch office	37+ killed
	January 20, 2012	Kano State	Shootings at Christian churches and business	32 Police officers and 150 civilians killed
	April 8, 2012	Kaduna	Suicide car bombing at Christian church on Easter day	38 killed
	June 17, 2012	Kaduna	Bomb attacks at Christian churches	12-19 killed
	August 7, 2012	Kogi State	Mass shooting at Deeper Life Bible Church	19 killed
	December 25, 2012	Maiduguri, Potiskum	Spree shooting, arson on Christian churches	27 killed

Serial No.	Date	Location	Incident	Fatality
	March 18, 2013	Kano	Suicide attacks, car bombings of Christian civilians at bus station	22-65 killed
	April 16, 2013	Borno State	Mass killing, spree killing, petrol bombing	200+ killed
	July 6, 2013	Yobe State	School shooting, terrorism, mass murder	42 killed
	August 12, 2013	Maiduguri	Attack at Mosque	56 killed
	September 12, 2013	Borno State	Ambush	40 soldiers killed
	September 12-18	Borno State	Offensive by Nigerian Army	150 Islamist and 16 soldiers killed
	September 18, 2013	Borno State	Massacre	159 killed
	September 29, 2013	Yobe State	Gunmen at College of Agriculture	44 students and teachers killed

Serial No.	Date	Location	Incident	Fatality
	October 29, 2013	Damaturu	Raid	128 killed
	January 14, 2014	Maiduguri	Bombing	30 killed
	January 26, 2014	Borno State, Adamawa State	Slaying and shooting in a village in Borno and Catholic church in Adamawa	138 killed
	February 14, 2014	Borno State	Massacre against Christian villagers	121 killed
	February 15, 2014	Izghe, Borno State	Massacre against villagers	105 killed
	February 25, 2014	Yobe State	School massacre	59 killed
	April 14, 2014	Abuja	Twin bombing at Nyanya motor park bus station	88+ killed
	April 14-15, 2014	Borno State	Abduction of female students at a Government Secondary School Chibok	276 missing
	May 1, 2014	Abuja	Car bomb	19 killed



Serial No.	Date	Location	Incident	Fatality
	May 5, 2014	Borno State	Shooting and arson in twin towns of Gamboru and Ngala	300 killed
	May 20, 2014	Jos	Car bomb in the city of Jos	180 killed
	May 27, 2014	Yobe State	Attack at Police and Military bases	49 security personnel and 9 civilians killed
	May 30, 2014	Borno State	Ambush in Gwoza	3 <sup>rd</sup> Emir of Gwoza killed
	June 1, 2014	Adamawa State	Bomb in Mubi	40 killed
	June 2, 2014	Borno State	Slaughtering massacre of mostly Christians in several villages	200+ killed
	June 20-30, 2014	Borno State	Attacks and Kidnap	70 killed, 91 women and children kidnapped

Serial No.	Date	Location	Incident	Fatality
	June 23-25, 2014	Abuja, Kaduna State	Shooting, bombing	171 killed
	July 22, 2014	Borno State	Massacre in Chibok	51 killed
	September 19, 2014	Borno State	Massacre in the market	30 killed
	November 3-10, 2014	Yobe State	Suicide bombing	15 Shiites and 46 students killed
	November 25, 2014	Borno State	Suicide bombing	45+ killed
	November 28, 2014	Kano State	Suicide bombing	120 Muslim followers of the Emir of Kano killed
	December 1, 2014	Borno State	Female suicide bomber at a crowded market	5 killed
	December 10, 2014	Kano State	Female suicide bomber near a market	4 killed

Serial No.	Date	Location	Incident	Fatality
	December 13, 2014	Borno State	Kidnapping in Gumsuri village	32-35 killed, 172-185 women and children kidnapped
	December 22, 2014	Gombe State	Bombing at bus station in Gombe city	27 killed
	December 28-29, 2014	Cameroon	Attacks on civilian and military positions	84 killed
	January 3-7, 2015	Borno State	Attacks on military base and Baga village, mass killing and petrol bombing	150+ killed, over 2000 uncounted for
	January 10, 2015	Maiduguri	10-year old female suicide bomber at a market	19 killed plus bomber
	January 11, 2015	Yobe State	2 female bombers 10-years old, at a market in Potiskum	3 killed plus bombers
	January 24, 2015	Maiduguri	Gunmen attempted to burn Kambari village	15 killed
	January 28, 2015	Adamawa State	Attacks and rampage	40 killed

Serial No.	Date	Location	Incident	Fatality
	February 6, 2015	Niger	Raids in Bosso and Diffa towns, first attacks in the country	5 killed
	February 15, 2015	Yobe	Suicide bomber in city of Damaturu	16 killed
	February 20, 2015	Borno State	Attacks across the state and Chibok town	34 killed, 21 in Chibok
	February 24, 2015	Yobe & Kano States	Suicide bomber in Potiskum and Kano	27 killed
	February 25, 2015	Biu and Jos	Attacks	35 killed
	March 7, 2015	Maiduguri	Five suicide bomb blasts	54 killed, Boko Haram formally declares allegiance to Islamic State

Serial No.	Date	Location	Incident	Fatality
	March 28, 2015	Gombe State	Attacks by gunmen at polling center of Nigerian's general election	15 killed including House of Assembly candidate
	April 5, 2015	Borno State	Attacks Kwafaja village by militants dressed like preachers	24 killed
	April 9, 2015	Borno State	Attacks in Dile village	20 killed
	April 17, 2015	Borno State	Attacks during military evacuation of Gwoza town	12 killed by slitting throat
	April 21, 2015	Borna State	Mines and fire rocket attacks during military evacuation of Baga town	8 soldiers and 1 civilian killed
	June 16, 2015	Chad	Twin suicide bomb attacks in capital city N'Djamena, first in the city	24 killed
	June 22, 2015	Bauchi	2 young female suicide bombers	30 killed

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Serial No.	Date	Location	Incident	Fatality
	July 1-2, 2015	Bornu State	Attacks at multiple Mosques in Kukawa	48 men and boys killed on the 1 <sup>st</sup> , 97 men killed on the 2 <sup>nd</sup> .
	July 5, 2015	Yobe State	Suicide attack at a church in Potiskum	5 killed
	July 6, 2015	Jos	2 bomb attacks	44 killed

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## Appendix B: Interview Protocol

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Location: \_\_\_\_\_

Name of

Interviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

Name of

Interviewee: \_\_\_\_\_

Interview Questions:

1. How would you describe the current counter-terrorism approaches by the Nigerian government against Boko Haram?
2. How effective have these approaches been in combating terrorist acts by Boko Haram, if not, what are the causes of failure of these measures?
3. What other alternative approaches have been considered and not used?
4. What other possible alternative measures have not been considered at all?
5. How has the Nigerian government used threats of punishment to influence Boko Haram?
6. What ways can the Nigerian government delegitimize Boko Haram in the Nigerian sociocultural system to bring them to the negotiating table?
7. What are your thoughts about targeted killings as a strategy that the Nigerian government can use against Boko Haram?
8. How can the Nigerian government target sponsors of Boko Haram to undermine terrorist activities by the group?

9. What are the most important values that the Nigerian government can exploit as tools to hinder Boko Haram's activities?
10. How can the Nigerian government thwart efforts by Boko Haram to regroup and intensify future attacks after a counter-terrorism effort against the group?