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College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Kevin Leonard

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Walden University
2019

Abstract

Drones and American Domestic Policy: An Analysis of Elite and Mass Opinion

by

Kevin Leonard

MA, American Military University 2011

BS, The Ohio State University, 1997

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

August 2019

Abstract

Researchers have primarily focused on the use of drones for military purposes. Yet, understanding how the use of drones influences domestic policymaking from the perspective of mass and elite opinion was generally absent from the academic literature. The purpose of this descriptive study was to explore and describe the perceptions of policy elites and the mass public on the impact of drone use on domestic policy. Guided by Donohue, Tichenor and Olien's theories of media framing and salience, mass opinion was measured through a convenience sample via the Walden Participant Pool, whereas elite opinion was measured through a purposive sampling design that targeted policy elites that are expects on drone policy, including academics and individuals working for the RAND Corporation, American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department of Defense. Sampling produced 108 respondents from the Participant Pool and 5 respondents from the elite survey. Data was analyzed descriptively using SPSS. Results suggested congruence in mass and elite opinion, particularly on the negative impact of drone use on privacy. These findings help advance the academic literature, by providing guidelines on the impact of drone use on domestic policymaking, particularly in the realm of privacy. The small sample size limited the inferences that could be drawn from the results. The study will lead to positive social change, by providing information on the potential impact of drones on society during their widespread adoption. Such data can be used by policymakers to generate rules that properly balance the technological value of drones in society with those rights that make a democratic society possible.

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Dedication

This is for my dad Edward Earl Leonard Sr. Rest in Peace.

Acknowledgments

Thank you Dr Joshua Ozymy for pushing me and helping get this done. I could not have done it without your support.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Introduction

After the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government began exponentially increasing its use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), remote piloted aircraft (RPA), or what are colloquially known as drones, for military purposes. From September 2001 to April 2012, the U.S. military enlarged its drone supply from 50 to 7,500 (Zenko, 2013). This increase in the use of drones continues today with the enhanced interest in drone usage for counterterrorism and other domestic governmental purposes.

Many scholars have investigated the use of and effectiveness of drones for military purposes and as a counterterrorism measure (Hafez & Hatfield, 2006; Jaeger & Siddique, 2011; Johnston, 2012; Jordan, 2009; Wilner, 2010). The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had a shift in the policy regarding the domestic adoption and use of drone technology. As drone technology made its way state-side, the impacts of such technology on U.S. life has changed, especially in terms of the right to privacy. Hobbyists now use personal drones to fly over neighborhoods, and corporations currently use them to deliver packages or take pictures for mapping programs. However, government agencies use drones to survey neighborhoods, peak into offices, conduct surveillance on persons of interest, and many other functions that can impinge on the right to privacy; such events are already taking place on a limited basis.

Although some studies have gauged public opinion towards the use of drones for military purposes (Bowman & Rugg, 2011; Brown & Newport, 2013; Pew Research Center, 2013; Rasmussen Reports, 2013), little academic research has been undertaken to

understand the scope of these implications or public attitudes and opinions towards the adoption of such polices that will impact their lives. The purpose of this descriptive study was to explore and describe the perceptions of policy elites and the mass public on the impact of drone use on domestic policy.

This chapter consists of several sections, where I provided information to justify the value of the study and place it in the context of the academic literature. First, the background section provides an overview of my literature review, as well as the gap my research closed, in addition to why my study was needed. Second, I address my problem statement, which discusses my research problem. I then move to the purpose of my study to identify what the problem was and what I focused on. Fourth, I focus on my research questions and hypotheses. Fifth, I address my theoretical framework, as well as how it relates to my research questions. Sixth, the nature of the study and the key variables are described, the research design, data collection, and data analysis. Seventh, I provide definitions of terms that the reader may not know, as well as my independent and dependent variables. Eighth, I delineate my research assumptions. Ninth, I examine the scope and delimitations the threats to the external and internal validity. Tenth, I discuss the limitations of my study, and then the significance my study may provide to this discipline, and I provide an overall summary of this chapter.

Background

Many scholars have examined drones in the context of military usage (Hafez & Hatfield, 2006; Jaeger & Siddique, 2011; Johnston, 2012; Jordan, 2009; Mannes, 2008; Price, 2012; Smith & Walsh, 2013; Wilner, 2010). For example, Mannes (2008)

investigated the effectiveness of drone warfare as a counterterrorism measure, by examining terror databases to determine if drone strikes successfully depleted terrorists from conducting retaliatory attacks. Additionally, Rasdan and Murphy (2009), McKelvey (2011), Dreyfuss (2011), Farley (2012), and Funk (2013) analyzed the constitutionality of the use of drone strikes on U.S. citizens abroad without due process.

Problem Statement

As the FAA has implemented new rules for drone policy, it was unknown how policy elites and the mass public perceived the impact of drone use on domestic policy. It was important to address this issue for several reasons. First, the public needed to understand how privacy was dealt with in the new regulations. Second, the public needed to understand what punishments and penalties awaited owners of drones if they violated these policies. Third, the public needed to determine how law enforcement could use drones as surveillance tools, as well as their limitations. In 2012, Congress passed the comprehensive FAA Modernization and Reform Act (FMRA). The Reform Act funded the FAA from 2012 to 2015 and provided for, among other things, airport improvement, next generation facial recognition software, and regulations on domestic drones (Olsen, 2017). As dictated in the FAA Reform Act, Part 107 exempted recreational drones from regulation; however, it placed restrictions upon civilian drones (Olsen, 2017). Furthermore, drones could transport cargo for hire, but the combined weight of the drone and payload may not exceed 55 pounds, as well as interstate drone commerce being prohibited (Olsen, 2017).

The regulations prohibited commercial drone operation across state lines; drones may only be operated during daylight and may not fly out of visual range of the remote pilot (Olsen, 2017). In addition, they may not fly faster than 100 miles per hour, they could operate above an altitude of 400, and they cannot fly near airports or over populated areas (Olsen, 2017). However, the FAA failed to address the right to privacy (Olsen, 2017). Considering the cameras that drones could carry, privacy should have been addressed along with the safety issues (Olsen, 2017). Researchers have primarily focused on the use of drones for military purposes, while polling houses have gauged public opinion towards drone usage for those same purposes. Yet, understanding how the domestic use of drones influences domestic policymaking, as well as how the public felt about these effects, were generally absent from the academic literature

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this descriptive study was to explore and describe the perceptions of policy elites and the mass public on the impact of drone use on domestic policy. I used a convenience sampling strategy to survey the mass public via the Walden Participant Pool. Elites were surveyed with a purposive sampling design by identifying scholars, members from the Department of Defense (DoD), the FAA, ACLU, RAND Corporation, legislative attorneys, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to ask questions about drones. In addition, they were offered an opportunity to explain their positions further. Pursuing this avenue helped to understand the public perceptions and concerns of drones (Clothier, Greer, Greer, & Mehta, 2015). Public perception was a driving factor in the acceptance of

drones and in setting safety objectives for safety regulations, as well as privacy concerns, to properly characterize what the public felt about drone use (Clothier et al., 2015).

Research Questions

Research Question 1. What level of political knowledge regarding drone usage do policy elites and the mass public possess in the United States?

Research Question 2. How do policy elites perceive the impact of drone use on domestic policy in the United States?

Research Question 3. How does the mass public perceive the impact of drone use on domestic policy in the United States?

The above research questions assisted me in examining how two different groups of people with varying levels of education, race, age, gender, religion, and political ideology viewed drone use within the United States. In addition, I determined if targeted elites and the mass public shared the same opinions of drones while being administered two separate surveys.

Understanding political knowledge and opinion was essential for several reasons. First, political knowledge determined how much an individual paid attention to the news stories around them as well as how that influenced his or her decision (ie., if a person lacked political knowledge, then he or she was depriving themselves of information that could influence his or her opinion negatively because he or she did not have all the information necessary to make an informed decision; (Somin, 2013). Second, public opinion was important because it was a way to hold people in power accountable. If

drone policy was unpopular, then it was possible, through public opinion, to rewrite policy to better serve the public concerns (Somin, 2013).

Theoretical Framework

Targeted elites and the mass public may have felt differently about drones based on media framing and salience. The participants in the survey had varying attitudes that could have affected the way they felt about drones. For example, educational level may have created differences between the responses of the two groups. A scholar who authored peer-reviewed articles on drones might have more knowledge than someone in the mass public who did not. The research questions were designed to determine which answers to the survey the targeted elites and the mass public answered similarly despite the varying levels of knowledge on the subject, as well as the outside influences of the media, family, and friends. I was able to separate outside and personal influences to arrive at the appropriate responses objectively. I used a theoretical framework involving salience, political knowledge, and framing effects to determine what influences affected respondents' attitudes and opinions.

The salience of an issue assists in determining why public opinion shifts from issue to issue (Manza, & Cook, 2002). Salience defines the importance of certain issues; therefore, it was an essential element, because the lower the salience of certain issues were, the more politicians had the ability to maneuver more highly salient issues (Manza, & Cook, 2002). The more visible, prominent, and contentious a highly salient issue was, the higher the stakes were for why an individual felt the way he or she did.

Democracy within any entity requires the opinions of its people to play a role in determining policy outcomes, varying from domestic issues to foreign policy (Baum & Potter, 2008). However, scholarly literature on public opinion has yet to reach an agreement pertaining to what the citizens thought about U.S. policy on several issues, as well as how the public came to hold those opinions (Baum & Potter, 2008). In addition, scholars also debated whether public opinion does or should influence U.S. policy (Baum & Potter, 2008). Scholars debated how much influence public opinion has on public policy, but all agreed that, in a democratic society, opinions from the public should affect governmental policy (Baum & Potter, 2008). Scholars did not know how strong of an effect public opinion had on the democratic decision-making process (Baum & Potter, 2008). Scholars agreed that public opinion mattered.

Erickson, Wright, and McIver, (1993) concluded that there was a significant correlation between public opinion and policy, while Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson, (1995); Burstein, (2003); Wlezien, (2004); Soroka and Lim, (2003); and Soroka and Wlezien, (2005) also found that public opinion affected policy. In addition, Brooks and Manza, (2007) discovered that public opinion correlated with politicians putting forth proposals that could raise or lower taxes. However, to improve the scholars' estimations involving public opinion's influence on public policy, researchers needed to examine more issues that provided a proper assessment on how measurement decisions affected their conclusions, as well as including financial forces that may be stronger than public opinion (Burstein, 2009). Researchers found that investigating broad issues could force them to alter how they measured how the democratic process worked (Burstein, 2009). In

addition, scholars may also discover some measurement decisions that may underestimate how opinion influences policy, as well as discovering that lobbying and interest groups may manipulate the opinions of the public on policy (Burstein, 2009).

Researchers often speculated how engaged the public was about politics and policy, as well as the level of information needed for an individual to express his or her policy preferences in a meaningful way, and the extent to which the media manipulated the information on policy issues (Burstein, 2009). Most citizens tended to know little about certain policy issues (Burstein, 2009). The public may seem ignorant regarding certain policy issues, but when the time came to make a decision, they could make complicated decisions about governmental policies (Arceneaux, 2005). In addition, citizens did not need to know all available facts to make a sensible decision based on their beliefs; they could solve, understand, and learn about complex policies to make an informed judgment (Brooks, 2006). However, the question remained where the information to make informed decisions on public policy came from.

First, people tend to acquire their knowledge about various topics through exposure (Visser, Holbrook, & Krosnick, 2008). Once an individual encounters a particular political issue, then he or she must conduct several steps. He or she must: devote significant time to it to have it remain in their working memory, actively process the information as it related to his or her private life; then, he or she links the issue with other information he or she acquired in order to formulate an opinion about an issue (Visser, et al., 2008). Prior knowledge of an issue increases the individual's intelligence about an issue, which makes him or her more informative than most when it comes to

public opinion (Visser, et al., 2008). The importance of how the media covered or framed an issue matters in structuring the message people receive, in addition to the amount of time or weight assigned to it (salience) and what the public thought about in terms of policy issues. These theories of salience and framing guided my predictions about why the public and elites possessed certain attitudes and opinions about drones.

Nature of the Study

This descriptive study included a convenience survey of the mass public measured by frequency and a purposive survey of policy elites with expert knowledge on drones. The survey for the mass public consisted of 32 multiple choice questions that began with asking about their level of political knowledge by asking them to identify two political figures. The survey then began to determine where they got their news from (Internet, print media, TV) and that was when the questions about drones, U.S. drone policy, and privacy took over the crux of survey. Finally, demographics questions about the make-up of the participants were identified and explained. The survey was placed in the Walden participant pool where students could easily access it. The data were collected by frequency analysis with SPSS to determine how the participants answered the questions.

Using this type of random surveying has some positive and negatives. The positives included the convenience of having the survey sit in the participant pool, where I did not have to motivate potential participants to take the survey; they did it only if it interested them. Second, it was anonymous, so the respondent did not have to worry about being identified. I used SurevyMonkey.com for the targeted elite survey. My

survey involved a Likert scale, multiple-choice type of format for me to provide descriptive statistics about how my participants correlated to one another. A Likert-scale was appropriate because it allowed my participants to answer questions about drones from choices that ranged from strongly agree, agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree (Adelson & McCoach, 2010). Additionally, the responses from my participants allowed me to quantify their answers and subject them to mathematical analysis, which allowed me to account for any undecided respondents (see Adelson & McCoach, 2010). The reliability of a Likert scale increased with the more multiple survey selections I had, which decreased any measurement errors; therefore, the more questions I provided about drones on my survey, the respondents' answers would mitigate errors and bias, thus making the data from my survey valid (see Camparo & Comparo, 2013). Second, using a Likert scale showed a balance of positive and negative answers from the participants, thus enhancing reliability (Camparo & Comparo, 2013). Last, my survey included some open-ended questions designed to gauge the reasoning from elites on why they felt the way they did about U.S. drone domestic policy and its consequences.

The negatives for this approach included an enormous number of experts not responding. Only five responded out of 53 targeted elites, which decreased the comparisons I could make with the participant pool. There were many possible reasons for the lack of responses. First, the experts I targeted may not have liked to take surveys. Second, there was no incentive for them to take the survey. Third, they did not have the time to take the survey. Lastly, they simply did not want to make the time to take the

survey. However, the information I received from the data helped me to answer my research questions.

I asked both groups about state and federal policy on drones as well as their political and personal implications. In addition, I asked the targeted elites and the mass public about their perceived impact of drones on U.S. domestic policy. Therefore, those responses gave me data to the research questions because they were presented within the surveys.

Definitions

Counterterrorism: Twofold policy that dealt with proactive measures that included destroying terrorist training camps or strongholds and defensive actions that involved hardening targets, as well as augmenting surveillance (Sandler, 2009).

Drones: Unmanned aerial vehicles that were controlled by pilots on the ground that consisted of reconnaissance and surveillance purposes, as well as those armed with missiles (Holmqvist, 2013).

Drone warfare: The United States used drones to fire missiles in other countries to kill terrorists (Holmqvist, 2013).

Elite opinion: People who possessed advanced knowledge about drones through research, operationally, civil liberty organizations, and constitutional experts (Darmofal, 2005).

Mass public: Individuals who did not have advanced knowledge on drones or may not have noticed stories about drones (Gabel & Scheve, 2007).

Terrorism: The premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims (Enders & Sandler, 2012, p. 3).

Assumptions

First, I assumed the participants answered my survey questions honestly, because anonymity and confidentiality protected them, in addition to them volunteering, which gave them the option of withdrawing without any ramifications (see Frankfort-Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2008). Second, I assumed that frequency measured the positive or negative feelings of the participant's accurately at the one moment in time I surveyed them in order for me to determine how their answers related among elite and mass opinion. Third, I assumed that individual observations were mutually independent or the value of one observation must not influence the value of other observations. Fourth, if errors existed in my study, I assumed they were random and were normally distributed (see Frankfort-Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2008). Last, I assumed that the within-group random errors were homogeneous across all participants (see Frankfort-Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2008).

Scope and Delimitations

Threats to internal validity included replicating my study by others, because replication and cross-validation of my theory under different conditions, as well as various times, was the only way to confirm my work with any confidence (Frankfort-Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2008). A second threat to internal validity involved maturation, where an individual's feelings about drones may change depending on when I asked the participant. A third threat involved my survey taking so long that the participants may

just circle any answer in order to finish quickly. A fourth threat involved participants who did not finish the survey, which could deplete my overall sample size and mitigate my data outcome. Last, I choose the right instrumentation that provided valid and reliable data.

Several external threats to validity could have hurt my study. First, timing was a threat because if an unfortunate terror attack occurred prior to me administering my survey, this could severely affect my data due to a significant change in my participants' attitude about drones protecting this country. Second, individuals may have allowed their political bias to dictate their feelings about drones, as well as their dislike of the government as a whole. Third, the elite survey was purposive, and the mass survey was convenience.

Significance

The significance of the social change aspect of my dissertation involved not only analyzing what Americans thought about U.S. drone policy and drones themselves, but also why they tended to think this way. In addition, I analyzed targeted scholars, military officials, and civil liberty organizations for them to provide their expert opinion, and then I conducted a cross-sectional analysis. I then compared expert opinion to mass public opinion to identify correlations, as well as contradictions on how they viewed drones. I analyzed the opinions of people who followed drone policy intently as opposed to those who did not. I used surveys to acquire expert opinion, which was a departure from typical polls conducted by using mainly cell phone and in-person interviews to gather

public opinion. My dissertation provided policymakers the device to make clearer decisions, based on the feelings and attitudes of the mass public, as well as policy elites.

Summary

This chapter consisted of an introduction to the study, including the problem statement, the background of the problem, and the significance of the study, as well as definitions, assumptions, and limitations. The discussion also included the potential social change aspect of this study. Terrorism experts, government personnel, scholars, and the mass public analyzed this debate to determine the effectiveness of U.S. drone policy.

In Chapter 2, I present reviews of the available literature about the details of current U.S. drone policy. In addition, this chapter includes the examination of the constitutionality of drones, such as due process in killing U.S.-born terror leaders, privacy rights, and surveillance over the United States. Additionally, I outline the polls that examined the attitude of participants towards drones, as well as the media's influence on public opinion, the impact of public opinion, and the sway of elite opinion on the general public.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees Americans a general right to privacy. One of the greatest technological advances that shaped the understanding of this right was the rapid technological advancement and imminent implementation of domestic drone use for a variety of governmental and private purposes. The implications of this technology for civil liberties were vast. Yet, the discussion and study of these implications, including those related to public and elite opinion regarding drone use, was abundant throughout the current literature.

The FAA developed rules for domestic drone use (Olsen, 2017). Advancements in technology have rendered drones smaller, more versatile, quieter, cheaper, and able to escape notice (Stanley & Crump, 2011). This technology has become more inexpensive; therefore, law enforcement, federal agencies, and private companies have opportunities to mount advanced electronic systems that has further affected the privacy of people in the United States (Olsen, 2017). Drones possess high-powered lenses that are capable of zooming in on a person at high elevations, as well as using enhanced photos with high-resolution, night vision, infrared, and ultraviolet imaging (Stanley & Crump, 2011). New technology allows drones to use radar that sees through ceilings and walls, as well as possessing video analytics, which allows a drone to track and recognize people through facial recognition technology (Stanley & Crump, 2011). Additionally, it could also identify movements and patterns of people to determine if any behaviors are out of the ordinary around high value targets (Stanley & Crump, 2011). As these technologies

found their way into government and private use throughout the years, the consequences for privacy was immense.

The literature on drone use and its implications for public opinion drew from a variety of disciplines. In the following sections, I define my research strategy and discuss the evolution of drone use for military purposes overseas. Then, I review the extant literature and polls on public opinion related to drone strikes abroad and generally. This overview leads into the literature on civil liberties and drone strikes and the implications for domestic surveillance over U.S. airspace in regard to privacy issues. Finally, I examine the literature on public opinion as it pertains to gauging and predicting elite and public opinion on issues, followed by the implications for my research.

Search Strategy

I began the literature review search by identifying databases that would assist me in finding scholarly articles; therefore, I started with the Walden University Library. I used the Military and Government collection, the Homeland Security Digital Library, the International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, ProQuest, and SAGE Premier to search for drone warfare and surveillance. However, I did not limit my search to Walden's library; I also used Google Scholar, Scribd, and JSTOR. All databases overlapped to some extent, but it was necessary to examine as many databases as possible to find the relevant and current articles to include in my literature review. For me to use these databases properly, I employed a Boolean search strategy. This strategy allowed me to merge phrases and words using AND, OR, NOT, and NEAR in order to widen, define, or limit my search. I did not limit my search to drones. The essential aspect of my

research involved comparing elite and mass opinions, and I needed to conduct an exhaustive search on public opinion as well.

First, I began by finding polls on the Internet about drones conducted by U.S. polling entities (Pew, Rasmussen, Gallup, etc.) to establish what type of questioning was used prior to my research. Second, I used the Walden Library database to find articles about deliberative democracy, salience, public opinion's influence on policy, as well as influences on public opinion. I limited my search to peer-reviewed articles to ensure nonbiased research. Third, I used Walden's database to identify any dissertations, as well as the previously mentioned databases, to confirm that there were no scholarly articles that involved comparing elite and mass opinion with respect to drones. I also made sure my search parameters remained within 10 years to focus on recent material. Last, I investigated if any scholarly articles used a descriptive study that relied on a convenience survey of the mass public and a purposive survey of policy elites with expert knowledge on drones analyzed with frequencies.

The Evolution of Drone Use

Due to the increased effects of globalization, terrorism, transnational crime, border security, and the traditional facets of public safety, increased emphasis has been placed on how the military and law enforcement mitigated these security threats (Bloss, 2009; Cottam & Marenin, 2005). Increasingly drones have been touted as a technological solution to many of these security issues, as well as many commercial and private applications. In the following sections, I trace the history of drone use, which began with their development for military and counterterrorism measures, followed by

their development for law enforcement, regulatory, and commercial purposes. I end with a discussion of the literature on public opinion on drone use, and how it relates to the development of political knowledge and attitudes.

The Use of Drones for Foreign Policy

The development of drones on a wide scale evolved first for military purposes, and then became an integral part of the U.S. counterterrorism policy. The United States developed its policy on drone strikes after the passage of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force in 2001 by Congress (Foust & Boyle, 2012). Technological advancements allowed the United States to survey terrorists in real-time video to target them accurately, which was an advantage for the United States versus traditional military tactics (Gregory, 2011). The United States successfully targeted and eliminated high-profile al-Qaeda leaders like Nadir Haider Nasser al Shaddadi, Baitullah Mehsud, and Abdel Rehman al-Hussainan in this manner (Foust, 2013). Targeted killing involves an extra judicial, premeditated killing by a country of an individual, where the country cannot detain him or her (McKelvey, 2011). The CIA conducted the majority of U.S. targeted killings using missile strikes from Predator drones (McKelvey, 2011). Drone strikes have now become an integral part of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and have increased exponentially during the Obama Administration (McKelvey, 2011). The U.S. drone policy continued to stir debate internationally, due to the lack of transparency and what constituted conducting a drone strike or not conducting one (Foust & Boyle, 2012).

The literature on drone strikes for foreign policy purposes generally centers on its effectiveness as a counterterrorism measure and its use in targeted killings. Jaeger and

Siddique (2011) examined drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan to analyze if U.S. drone strikes mitigated al-Qaeda and Taliban retaliatory attacks. Jaeger and Siddique discovered that drone strikes effected retaliatory attacks in Pakistan, but not in Afghanistan. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) analyzed whether Israel's targeted killings of Hamas and Hezbollah terror leaders influenced these groups' violent retaliation from September 2000 through June 2004. Hafez and Hatfield determined that Israel's targeted killings did not reduce the number of violent responses but increased them over the short or long term. Smith and Walsh (2013) examined Predator drone usage in the Middle East to determine if the strikes mitigated al-Qaeda's aptitude to espouse their propaganda. Smith and Walsh did not provide any findings that showed a negative correlation between U.S. drone strikes and al-Qaeda's capacity to disburse their propaganda. Johnston (2012) investigated whether leadership decapitation severely harmed or eliminated terror organizations and found that decapitating leaders by drones increased the probability for ending the war, increased the chances of victory for government forces, reduced violence from terror groups, and reduced the frequency of terrorist attacks if it was part of an integrated overall strategy against terror groups.

Price (2012) discussed decapitating tactics as intent to interrupt the routine of terror organizations, as well as deterring anyone else from taking command of the group. Price advised that the following two conditions must be present for capitalization to work: if a group depended on a charismatic leader or if there was no clear line of succession for the organization. Jordan (2009) wanted to determine what conditions were necessary for decapitating a leader that resulted in the termination of a terrorist group and

if decapitation did not lead to collapse, then to what extent did it degrade or mitigate the group from conducting further terror attacks. Jordan discovered that organizational type, size, and age were essential in identifying the susceptibility of a terror group to decapitation. Mannes (2008) examined the effect of removing leaders of terrorist organizations in relation to their activity after removal, as well as comparing the various ways to remove a leader and the effects of removing multiple leaders from the same group. Mannes research found that removing depended on the size of the group, the smaller the group, the loss of its leader affected what the terror group from that point forward. Conversely, the larger the terror group was, losing their leader had little o no effect on their activities. Wilner (2010) suggested that eliminating leaders degraded the Taliban's behavior, diminished the success rates of their retaliatory attacks, influenced their target selection, and diluted their morale. Targeted killings were effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency techniques, because they mitigated the counter-capability of the Taliban. Johnston and Sarbahi (2013) concurred with Wilner about the effectiveness of drone strikes after they examined the effects they had on terrorism in Pakistan.

The U.S. government has argued that using drones for the targeted killing of U.S. citizens living abroad is constitutional. In September 2011, President Obama gave permission to the CIA to use a drone equipped with a Hellfire missile to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen (McKelvey, 2011). The DOJ claimed that Awlaki was a senior leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and that he represented an imminent threat to national security (McKelvey, 2011). Although Awlaki evaded capture by hiding

in Yemen, the U.S. Supreme Court found the Fifth Amendment still protected him (McKelvey, 2011). Some scholars have concluded that if the government properly balances the interests of a U.S. citizen's life against the threat he or she poses to other U.S. citizens, then the government could kill him or her in this manner (Dreyfuss, 2011; Farley, 2012; Funk, 2013). Others have argued that such drone strikes should adhere to at least limited judicial review (Rasdan & Murphy, 2009). This argument would be in line with previous Supreme Court cases supporting due process rights for suspected terrorists, such as Bourmediene v. Bush and cases, such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that helped to establish the legal foundations for drone strikes against U.S. citizens. As the United States has continually pushed the boundaries of drones for foreign policy purposes, such as counterterrorism, the technology has begun making its way state-side for uses in law enforcement, regulatory policy, and commercial applications.

The Use of Drones for Domestic Policy

On February 14, 2012, President Obama signed the FMRA of 2012 into law, which made aerial surveillance capabilities available to police departments and federal agencies (Gogarty & Hagger, 2011). The FMRA required that the FAA develop and implement a plan that created room for drones to fly over U.S. airspace by September 30, 2015 (Gogarty & Hagger, 2011). The federal government has used drones since 2004; however, pending rule changes did allow commercial, private, and military drones to fly over U.S. airspace. The FAA predicted that as many as 30,000 drones would operate over the United States by 2030 (Schniederman, 2012). The FAA did not mention privacy, as well as what made a drone safe for operation within the United States throughout the

entire application process (Schniederman, 2012). As of right now, no law requires a warrant for conducting aerial surveillance above commercial or private property, if the aircraft operated within FAA regulations (Gogarty & Hagger, 2011). The writers of the Constitution could not have imagined the creation of drones; therefore, not much case law was available to challenge warrantless aerial surveillance (Gogarty & Hagger, 2011).

A variety of court cases have already developed the basic structure for using drones for domestic purposes. In California v. Ciraolo, an anonymous tip about someone growing marijuana on his property caused the police to use aerial surveillance without a warrant, in order to overcome the large fence that surrounded the property. The police acquired a small private plane and flew 1,000 feet above his home, where they identified marijuana plants, and took pictures of the plants (Villasenor, 2013). The defendant claimed that the police violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches, as the police failed to get a warrant prior to flying over his home while taking pictures. The Court disagreed by stating that it was unreasonable for the defendant to expect his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from observation by an individual from an altitude of 1,000 feet; at that altitude, the Fourth Amendment did not require the police to obtain a warrant to see the marijuana with their naked eye. That decision from the court's ruling, suggested that the government could use drones to collect information without a warrant, while flying in public airspace, and obtaining data that was visible to the naked eye. This court case was not the only decision that paved the way for the government to use drones over the U.S. airspace.

In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the EPA wanted to make a second inspection of Dow's site, but when the company refused, the EPA did not get a warrant. Instead, they hired a commercial pilot and aerial photographer to fly over the site at 12,000, 3,000 and 1,200 feet, while taking pictures (Villasenor, 2013). The Court ruled that taking aerial photographs from above or near a site did not violate Fourth Amendment protections (Villasenor, 2013). This decision allowed the government to take photographs without a warrant, if the object was seen in legally navigable airspace. However, the courts did not specify which cameras, because drones can possess high-powered lenses, night vision, infrared, and ultraviolet cameras. The government could also equip drones with see-through radar, which allowed them to see through walls and ceilings.

In Kyllo v. United States, an agent with the Department of the Interior thought a suspect was growing marijuana inside his home. The agent knew the suspect needed thermal lamps to grow marijuana indoors; therefore, he acquired a thermal imager to look into the suspect's home, where he discovered the thermal lamps (Villasenor, 2013). The Court determined that thermal imaging was within the protections of the Fourth Amendment, but because the agent did not get a warrant, none of the evidence obtained by the agent was admissible. The Court found that the use of technology not generally used by the public to gain information within someone's home that could not be obtained without going inside the home was inadmissible in court without a warrant (Villasenor, 2013). The evolution of drone use will come rapidly in the United States. Currently the U.S. government has a demand to assist in protecting its 12, 380 miles of coastline, as

well as its numerous urban cities in order to mitigate crime (Vance, 2008). Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was the first agency to use drones for surveillance purposes domestically (Dunlap, 2009)

In 2005, CBP used Predator B drones in Arizona to monitor and secure the border with Mexico with the promise to increase their drone production to 24 by 2016 (Cottam & Marenin, 2005). These drones flew 3 miles in the air while relaying images from infrared cameras attached to their nose to a ground control station (Dunlap, 2009). If illegal immigrants or drug smugglers triggered a seismic sensor on the ground, the Predator could investigate and illuminate them with a laser, as well as, provide GPS coordinates to agents patrolling on the ground (Dunlap, 2009). For example, on January 11, 2008, the Predator observed an illegal border crossing with a pick-up truck, and the drone operator notified agents, who subsequently used a tire deflation system to disable the truck, where they found over 1,000 pounds of marijuana (Dunlap, 2009). Another successful drone operation within the United States that resulted in an arrest occurred on a North Dakota farm in December 2011 (Farber, 2013). The Nelson County Sheriff's Department borrowed a drone from CBP to observe three sons of the owner of a 3,000-acre farm involved in a standoff with police (Farber, 2013). Because of the drone, the police ascertained that the brothers had no weapons and arrested them without firing a shot (Farber, 2013).

The DoD operated drones targeting drug traffickers in order to acquire intelligence (Stanley & Crump, 2011). The FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration have used Predators inside the United States without public knowledge or

debate (Stanley & Crump, 2011). The police department in rural Mesa County, Colorado won FAA permission in early 2011 to operate its Draganflyer drones anywhere in the country (Stanley & Crump, 2011). The FAA granted the Miami police department the permission to test two 18-pound Honeywell drones over the everglades at an altitude of 400 feet (Stanley & Crump, 2011). The Houston police department secretly tested drones in 2007 and the Arlington police received help from drones to secure the Super Bowl in February 2011 (Stanley & Crump, 2011). In addition, the Texas Department of Public Safety used drones for police operations (Stanley & Crump, 2011). For instance, they operated a bird-sized "Wasp" drone for aerial surveillance when they executed a search warrant on private property resulting in an arrest (Stanley & Crump, 2011).

In 2011, the city of Ogden, Utah wanted FAA permission to deploy an unmanned blimp for surveillance, as well as to prevent crime (Stanley & Crump, 2011). Hawaii had a plan under review to fly drones over its harbors for surveillance purposes (Stanley & Crump, 2011). Finally, National Guard units around the country also operated drones to train for their use overseas (Stanley & Crump, 2011). Train properly for overseas drone operations, Brigades in 30 states followed random vehicles on state roads to master their skills (Stanley & Crump, 2011). The nascent use of drones for law enforcement purposes already posed questions for privacy. Whether drones could successfully deploy over the United States without invading the privacy of its citizens was still an open question.

Ohm (2012) wrote that drone technology grew at an unbelievable rate, which changed the way citizens lived their lives and the definition of "privacy" in general. Ohm suggested that the term "power" should substitute for "privacy" about the Fourth

Amendment in order to limit it within police departments, as well as the federal government. Ohm argued that technology made the acquisition of information easier and cheaper. Therefore, he believed drones would eliminate a significant amount of privacy, because police did not need a warrant to fly a drone high above a public street to observe for criminal activity.

Kerr (2011) agreed with Ohm about privacy issues when he expressed his concern for the capacity of drones to record video for long durations, which could lead to intrusive invasions from the government to gather information. Kerr argued that the courts must take charge of the situation to provide strict regulations. Currently, in prior aerial surveillance cases, the Supreme Court held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in spaces viewed from public navigable airspace. Kerr surmised that the courts cannot prohibit all forms of drone surveillance, but if they became too pervasive, the courts must equal the balance of power from tipping in favor of the police by new court rulings. Kerr argued that technology was advancing too quickly for the courts to regulate, unless the omnipresent use of drones became overbearing. Kerr concluded the FAA should wait before allowing the expansion of domestic drone surveillance, so the courts could determine whether they could place reasonable limits on the use of drones by police in order to identify a realistic balance between personal privacy and surveillance.

U.S. Public Opinion on Drone Usage

Scholars and professional polling houses have surveyed the mass public about attitudes towards drone strikes. In a 2001 Gallup/CNN/USA today poll, 77% of the

participants said they were willing to allow the assassination of terrorists. In a 2001 PSRA/Newsweek poll, 45% of respondents said it would be very effective. A Pew Research poll conducted in 2002 garnered responses that consisted of 36% participants saying US policy was very effective, 38% said it was somewhat effective, 15% said it was not too effective, and 8% said it was not effective at all. In addition, they asked if the US policy of attacking potential enemies first, if the US thinks the probability was high for them to attack this country. The results consisted of 24% saying it was very effective policy, 39% said it was somewhat effective, 18% said it was not too effective, and 15% said it was not effective at all (Pew Research 2002).

Brown and Newport (2013) conducted a Gallup survey in March, where they discovered that 65% of people in the U.S., supported drone attacks on terrorist suspects internationally. They discovered that 49% followed drone news very or somewhat closely, while 49% did not follow drone news closely or not at all. The Pew Research Center (2013), conducted a survey February 7-10 that discovered continued support for drone strikes. 56% of Americans approved of drone strikes targeting extremists in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, while 26% disapproved. Rasmussen (2013) conducted a national telephone survey on February 10-11, 2012 that found no matter the political persuasion, the majority of most voters' supported drone warfare, where 88% of Republicans, 65% of Democrats, and 74% of Independents supported drone use. Motel (2013) found that 50% of Americans agreed that drones targeting extremists in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Afghanistan made the U.S. safer, while 14% disagreed, and 27% said drones make no difference. The participants' political affiliations also were

significant, where 55% of Republicans and 49% of Democrats said the program has made the country safer. The gender aspect consisted of 43% women doubting drones made the US safer, while 57% of the men said they did. Fox News (2013) conducted a poll on February 25-27, 2013 that discovered several consistent findings with other polls. First, they discovered 74% approved of drones strikes to kill suspected terrorists in foreign countries. Of that approval number, 69% were Democrats, 80% were Republicans, 73% were Independents, 78% were men, and 71% were women. In addition, 76% were whites, 68% were non-whites, 76% had college degrees, and 73% did not.

Gauging Media Influence on Public Opinion: Framing and Salience Effects

Sometimes, people referred to the media as the fourth branch of the government, because it oversees governmental actions to keep the people informed (Donohue, Tichenor & Olien, 2006). In addition, if a democracy was to work, then the people must be able to participate in society; therefore, to do so properly, the public must rely on the objectivity of the media to provide detailed information (Donohue, et al, 2006). The media must honor the power they possess and portray issues without bias for the public to make informed decisions on whether to support a candidate or policy (Giles, 2004). The American media was a profit-based industry, where the importance of acquiring a story and reporting it first can trump accuracy, validity, and perspective of an issue (Payne, 2005). Two theories in the literature referred to as framing and salience effects, helped to explain the influence of the media on public attitudes and opinions.

Framing theory involves measuring the media's influential power over how people understand issues, based on how the media depicted them (Delli Carpini, 2005).

Framing in the media occurred when reporters asserted the consequences and causes within the context of a narrative (Delli Carpini, 2005). The media could shape the opinions of the audience without telling them what to believe or think, but by presenting a narrative based on cues (Stone, 2002). For example, the media could favorably portray individuals who supported a certain policy as a hero, while portraying those who oppose a policy as a villain (Shanahan, McBeth, Hathaway, & Arnell, 2008). Notably, these framing strategies replicated deeply held beliefs in policies that attempted to sway what a reader believes (Shanahan, et al, 2008). Framing effects did not interfere with the public having an enhanced role in setting the agenda, voicing their opinions on public affairs, as well as covering issues and events in a meaningful and useful way for citizens (Shanahan, et al, 2008). In addition, accepting the media as a member of the community, where they operated responsibly in identifying problems, as well as presenting solutions to these problems (Shanahan, et al, 2008).

Two studies by Brewer (2006) and De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) emphasized the influence of framing effects on public opinion. Brewer (2006) investigated whether citizens could reasonably respond to information concerning national interests. Brewer analyzed the conditions needed for national stories of interest in the media to affect the opinions of the citizenry. First, the people must be exposed to a story that draws national attention and could embed itself within the memory of its viewers, which allowed the viewer to make a judgment on the issue. Second, individuals exposed to national issues could make it possible for the viewer to recall all the information on the issues to make an informed decision. Third, exposure to a national

story could cause the public to prioritize each national issue according to them. Brewer analyzed how citizens responded to their image of a foreign country in order to determine if that image conflicted or coincided with their reasoning about world affairs, as well as their opinions about foreign policy issues. Brewer discovered that when media coverage depicted a nation as in competition with US interests, participants held a less-favorable view of that nation; conversely, participants had a favorable view of nations who were depicted as wanting to share or contribute to assisting US interests. This study showed framing theory in practice and illustrated how framing effects by the media structured information in a way that directly influenced public attitudes towards an issue.

De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) examined how much political sophistication an individual needed to possess to allow the media to influence their opinion. TV, print media, and conversations about politics exposed individuals to subjective content that persuaded their attitude about an issue; therefore, both the mass media and personal communications among friends were essential elements of political information, which subsequently formulated and changed political attitudes. De Vreese and Boomgaarden investigated the conditions needed for how mass media and interpersonal communications affected public opinion, by identifying the level of political sophistication that mitigated cues in media messages. De Vreese and Boomgaarden discovered that for the news media to influence individual attitudes and policy beliefs, they only must conjure up a biased report that lacks another point of view, which would affect public opinion. If the media exposed the public to both sides of an issue, then it was a two-sided information flow, which did not affect public opinion. Individuals who

were politically aware, tended to resist change no matter what new information the media provided, because they were more likely to have enough available information to process what any new debate brought in terms of deciding on a particular issue. The effects differed, depending on the amount of opposing opinions and if people already had the available information in their heads. People, who were moderately aware of politics, were susceptible to exposure of new information, while individuals who were the least aware of politics tended to absorb intense new information flows more easily.

In addition to framing effects, research demonstrated that public opinion hinged on the salience or weight given to a policy issue in the mass media (Burstein, 2003). Regarding policymaking, public officials tended to address and consider public opinion to a greater degree when it was consistent, and an issue was highly salient (Burstein, 2003). This gave rise to agenda setting, where the issues individuals discussed and thought about were influenced by what was placed before them in the mass media, as well as how much time was assigned to the issue. Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) discovered that a statistical significance existed where a president's decisions could coalesce with public opinion. Canes-Wrone and Shotts surmised that if the president's popularity was low and his agreement with a popular policy would increase his chance of reelection, he would endorse said policy. In addition, Canes-Wrone and Shotts discovered that policy congruence was 90% on salient issues such as crime, health, and social security, 71% congruence over liberal and conservative ideological issues, and only 32% congruence on foreign policy issues. Canes-Wrone and Shotts suggested presidents were more likely to take popular positions on issues, where a well-informed public voiced their

concern, whereas ignoring public opinion on those issues where the public was less informed. Additionally, they discovered that public opinion affected policy 75% of the time, as well as being substantially effective 33% of the time. Canes-Wrone and Shotts found that salience did affect public opinion's influence on policy, despite interference from interest groups, political parties, and other political organizations.

Summary and Conclusions

Theories of framing and salience helped to explain how the media influenced public opinion. Regarding opinions on drone usage, it suggested themes emphasized by the media would predict public attitudes towards drones. The empirical literature supported the intervening effect of political sophistication in this equation to buttress the pure influence of media framing effects. How the public felt about domestic drone use should be influenced by how the media has portrayed these effects. My assumption in this regard was that policy elites had a higher level of political sophistication and diverged somewhat in opinions from the general public, which suggested that the level of political knowledge or sophistication influenced attitudes towards drones. Salience theory suggested that the strongest and most pervasive themes emphasized by the media tended to have a stronger impact on public opinion towards drone use than those themes that were emphasized less frequently.

Polling data mentioned previously provided some guidance to public attitudes towards drone use overseas and suggested breakdowns of opinions on the issue (Brown & Rugg, 2013; Motel, 2013; Pew research, 2013; Rasmussen, 2013). The amount of polling data on domestic use of drones for issues such as crime or border control was

more limited. Scholars did not know how elite opinion leans when it came to domestic drone surveillance, as well as how it compared to mass opinion; this was where my research filled that void.

My study provided analysis on why there was a need to include elite opinion on salient issues in order to compare them to people who may not follow issues surrounding drones as closely as they did. Previous research has not covered this aspect, but my study enhanced the discipline on several relevant fronts. First, how media framing effected how the mass public perceived the domestic use of drones. Second, it examined salience, or their knowledge of the phenomenon. Third, it examined the impact of political sophistication on attitudes and beliefs. Finally, my study determined the overall public feelings about the domestic use of drones and supplemented this data with elite surveys to determine the potential implications of drones in society.

For a debate to occur on an issue, some people had a predetermination on how they felt, which in turn determined whether outside opinions persuaded their attitude on an issue. For example, a person's overall attitude toward drones may have consisted of both negative and positive examinations of their use on several levels. An individual could have believed that drones would protect this country from terrorism, but were intrusive on privacy rights; therefore, that individual's attitude toward drones depended on the relative magnitude of the weight assigned to each attribute (Chong & Druckman, 2007). I targeted elite opinion as opposed to conducting a randomly selected group of participants that may or not have included them.

Elite opinion was considered expert analysis; thus, I analyzed if they came to the same conclusions as individuals who were not considered experts. The benefit of measuring the opinion of elite individuals who studied certain issues such as drones, helped them offer guidance, statistics, and information to people who were not as astute as others are on this issue (Hochschild, 2013). Once elites made their decision on a certain policy issue, the probability of the mass public adopting a positive or negative view on the same policy issue tended to increase (Hochschild, 2013). However, when elites did not agree based on ideological lines, there was an even flow of information, so the inattentive public drew on the cues of the elites (Hochschild, 2013). If the politically aware took their signals from elite opinion, then that information tended to persuade them in a way that aligned them along party lines (Hochschild, 2013). My data suggested that if such elite agreement existed that may be instructive to suggest where public opinion may evolve overtime on this issue.

My study further advanced why the mass public felt the way they do about drones. For example, did political knowledge of drones influence their feelings, or other factors, such as friends, family, expert opinion, or ideology? People who paid attention to debate issues like drones tended to disagree with expert opinion when one, or both, of the political parties challenged this opinion, then when both parties concurred with this opinion (Darmofal, 2005). Citizen disagreement with expert opinion tended to coincide with those citizens having a predisposition towards a political party (Darmofal, 2005). The public who supported the political elites, who tended to agree with expert opinion on an issue, increased as they increased their level of expertise on a subject (Darmofal,

2005). The public framed their opinion according to preexisting policy preferences, as well as life experiences that entered their reasoning as to forming judgments on policies (Darmofal, 2005). This created a bias on the individual's part, because they may not be willing to allow for other viewpoints on an issue (Darmofal, 2005). Certainly, this was true for people personally affected by an issue, as opposed to those who were not (Darmofal, 2005). People affected by drones in some fashion would not listen to or make room for expert opinion on the benefits of drones for the U.S. This increased the worthwhile investment in investigating mass public attitude towards drones compared to expert opinion.

The literature for drone strikes, framing, drone surveillance and public opinion on drones were conducted several years ago. However, there has been recent updates to the literature that I found important to share here. For example, with reference to media framing and salience, Lee (2017) explored the intermedia agenda-setting relationships and frames in the high-choice media environment, found that media framing was determined by the outlet in which it was delivered. Lee found that late-night comedies mostly gathered news and information from traditional news media and re-packaged it, so they gave it a new interpretation, before they presented the easily digestible information to a different set of audiences (Lee, 2017). In addition, Allwright, (2018) studied media framing of refugees in the United States and Canada, found that the media framing in newspaper articles in Canada and the United States addressed the subject of refugees differently, whereas the newspapers in Canada projected a more positive tone and welcoming frame, than the more negative tone portrayed in articles in the United States,

thus Allwright concluded these opposite tones affected the attitudes of the readers in both countries. With respect to drone surveillance and strikes the literature discovered that the public was still uncomfortable with increased surveillance in the U.S. (Zaia,2018). Surveillance consciousness examining subjective understandings of mobile technology surveillance found that through exploring surveillance consciousness of mobile technology surveillance that people thought that current surveillance technologies came close to making the U.S. an oppressed state, whereas others were willing to accept certain types of surveillance as long as some conditions were met (Maida 2016). The roles of unmanned aircraft systems in civilian, law enforcement, and military environments opined that the continued growth of drones was inevitable in the realms of archaeological surveying, military surveillance and airstrikes, law enforcement, firefighting, farming, photography, and commercial delivery. However, what concerned Maida most was the possibility of low-cost drones available to anyone that could allow criminals and adversaries the ability to conduct malicious activity, in addition to hacking an armed drone in turn which could be unleashed within the U.S. (Maida, 2016; Hernandez, 2018). The effects of surveillance technology on society found that the people in federal and state agencies felt that individuals forfeited their rights to privacy the moment they stepped outside, whereas most of the public felt that despite being in public they were afforded some privacy. Literature that observed the opinion of the public through surveys about drones showed how relevant the issue was.

Davis (2019) found that affective considerations seemed to play a much more significant role than previously thought because respondents who scored high on the

authority/respect dimension were much more likely to accept positive beliefs about drone strikes and reject negative beliefs. Whereas, those who scored high on the harm/care dimension were much more likely to accept negative beliefs and reject the idea that drone strikes were necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attack (Davis, 2019). Shelby (2017) found that the public was more likely to support use because they thought that was riskless because it kept U.S. soldiers from danger, but the public also thought by increased accountability, leaders must carefully choose how they used drones. If leaders disregarded those risks, it could cost them, so they may think twice about using drones in a way that went against established norms (Shelby, 2017).

My study was important because it included much of what the current literature discussed when it came to the public opinion and drone use involving strikes and privacy through increased use as well as improved technology. Also, how the media portrayed this issue affected the attitude of the people still today. In addition, my study investigated the opinions of targeted elites and the mass public; however, recent literature has not researched this type of comparison analysis; therefore, my study has advanced an avenue of approach which helped it fit nicely into the literature today.

Chapter 3 describes the research method, data collection and analysis procedures, design of the study, and method of participant selection. The elite and mass opinion must be measured properly for me to accurately identify, analyze, and illustrate the significance that the data provided. The research method I chose must ensure that I could compare two distinct points of views, in addition to multiple independent variables.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

The purpose of this descriptive study was to explore and describe the perceptions of policy elites and the mass public on the impact of drone use on domestic policy. This allowed me to analyze comparisons and contradictions between the two groups to determine if they drew the same conclusions about drone policy and if it invaded privacy. I conducted a frequency analysis on a convenience survey of the mass public and a purposive survey of policy elites with expert knowledge on drones, so I could comprehend the opinions of two distinct groups of individuals, so I determined if those opinions are the same.

Research Question 1. What level of political knowledge regarding drone usage do policy elites and the mass public possess in the United States?

Research Question 2. How do policy elites perceive the impact of drone use on domestic policy in the United States?

Research Question 3. How does the mass public perceive the impact of drone use on domestic policy in the United States?

The above research questions assisted me in achieving the purpose of this study by examining how two different groups of people with varying levels of education, race, age, gender, religion, and political ideology view drone use within the United States. In addition, I determine if targeted elites and the mass public share the same opinions of drones while being administered two separate surveys.

Sampling Design

I targeted elite opinion (Appendix C) by selecting several distinct individuals. First, all of the scholars I used in my literature review provided insight on drone warfare, because they researched, analyzed, made conclusions, and published their work on the subject. Second, I targeted the ACLU, because of their opposition to drones in general, and because they sued the Obama Administration on its targeted killings of U.S. citizens with drones without due process. In addition, two of their members wrote a paper staking the ACLU's position on domestic drone use, as well as recommendations to minimize privacy and civil liberty concerns. Third, I targeted an Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, who drafted the memo that allowed the president to target U.S. citizen Anwar al-Alaki for a drone strike. Fourth, I targeted the Deputy Director of the Unmanned Warfare Strategic and Tactical Systems, because he was responsible for the U.S. drone program overseas. Fifth, I acquired the assistance of legislative attorneys, because they analyzed legal issues that Congress may encounter and recommend ways to mitigate them when writing laws for drone surveillance within the United States.

Sixth, the RAND Corporation was contracted by all governmental entities to provide an objective look at U.S. policies and operations. This group of people examined the Air Force's current use for their drones and possible uses for the future, as well as concerns for domestic use. In addition, they examined the dangers of armed UAVs gaining operational use among U.S. allies and enemies to determine their effect on U.S. security; therefore, they had to examine what drones were, what they were used for, and their effectiveness overall. Seventh, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association included

pilots who potentially shared the skies over the United States with drones; therefore, I was sure they had some concerns over their proposed altitudes. Eighth, the FAA was in charge of creating the rules, guidelines, and regulations for commercial and federal government drone use over U.S. airspace. Their expertise on monitoring these guidelines was essential to avoid aircraft and drone collisions over populated areas. Their opinion was needed to evaluate where they stood on drones overall, because they were tasked with overseeing them. Lastly, Common Unmanned Aircraft Systems Joint Program Office and Unmanned Aircraft System Executive Committee were two groups that involved joint efforts among the Customs and Border Patrol, Homeland Security, and NASA to determine drone policy in addition to drone operation. The survey included several open-ended questions as well as multiple-choice questions as shown in the second appendix. In order to acquire information on mass opinion, I used the Walden Participant Pool to generate a random sample and subject them to my survey listed in the first appendix.

Questionnaire

I used SurevyMonkey.com to assist me in creating my questionnaire that I used for my research. I used a precontact e-mail (Appendix G), an invitation e-mail (Appendix H), and a follow-up email (Appendix I) in case the targeted elites did not reply. My survey involved a Likert-scale, multiple-choice type of format for me to provide descriptive statistics about how my participants correlated to one another. A Likert-scale was appropriate because it allowed my participants to answer questions about drones from choices that ranged from strongly agree, agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree,

and strongly disagree (Adelson & McCoach, 2010). Additionally, the responses from my participants allowed me to quantify their answers and subject them to mathematical analysis, which allowed me to account for any undecided respondents (see Adelson & McCoach, 2010). The reliability of a Likert-scale increased with the more multiple survey selections I had, which decreased any measurement errors; therefore, the more questions I provided about drones on my survey, the respondents' answers mitigated errors and bias, thus making the data from my survey valid (see Camparo & Comparo, 2013). Second, using a Likert scale showed a balance of positive and negative answers from the participants; thus, its enhanced reliability (see Camparo & Comparo, 2013). Last, my survey included some open-ended questions designed to gauge the reasoning from elites on why they felt the way they did about U.S. drone domestic policy and its consequences.

The Appropriate Number of Participants

I used G*power to establish my appropriate sample size in addition to further pertinent dimensions. I used an F test that involved repeated measures, as well as an examination of interactions MANOVA statistical test, to determine an A priori power analysis. My results illustrated a medium effect size (.25), α err prob= .05, power (1-β err prob = .95; my categorical variables provided me some output parameters for my data. First, noncentrality parameter λ = 17.44, critical F = 2.64, df numerator = 3.0, df denominator = 275, sample size = 279, actual power = .95, and pillai V = .06. My 108 participants in the Walden Participant pool and five targeted elites were smaller than

what the aforementioned power analysis showed in participation by the sampled individuals.

Procedures

I contacted the elite opinion by using Surveymonkey's contact list for those who participated in polls, as well as how I previously stated. I hoped to contact them from an e-mail list, where I asked them to cooperate on my research on drones. I hoped that from their previous research on the subject, they would agree. I planned to administer the survey to them in three steps. First, I e-mailed my pre-contact letter (Appendix E) where I reminded them that the survey was on its way, as well as their right not to fill out the questionnaire in addition to how I would measure their responses against mass opinion. Second, I mailed the survey packet (Appendix F) about a week later for those targeted to fill out. Third, after I received respondents, I mailed a follow-up survey (Appendix G) for those who did not respond to acquire their cooperation. For me to acquire the participation from the Walden Participation pool, I completed the appropriate IRB and institutional procedures to gain access to that population.

Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations

All research is imperfect; therefore, there are issues that could arise that a researcher does not anticipate or cannot control when it came to garnering public opinion. For my dissertation, there were some assumptions that I needed to accept. First, I assumed that my participants would answer all of my survey questions honestly, because their responses were anonymous, confidential, and they could choose not to participate without any ramifications; therefore, they knew that I protected their privacy on all

fronts. Second, I assumed my cross-sectional design accurately measured the attitudes of the participants at a certain point in time. Third, I assumed that my observations were independent and objective in order not to influence the results of the data, as well as providing them to my dissertation committee to confirm my data. Fourth, if errors existed in my research, I assumed then they occurred randomly, as well as being distributed normally (see Frankfort-Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2008). Last, I assumed that the random errors that occurred within each group measurements were homogeneous across my entire sample size (see Frankfort-Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2008). When I conducted my research, I had to be cognizant of external and internal threats to validity.

To confirm my work with any level of confidence, scholars must replicate and cross-validate my research under diverse circumstances, as well as an assortment of times to determine if what I discovered was consistent with other researchers (see Frankfort-Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2008). Maturation was another internal threat to validity, because a participant may change his or her feelings about drones prior to me administering my survey. There was nothing that I can do about that except provide notation that this aspect was possible. Third, I must be cognizant that the attention span of people could diminish the longer a survey was; therefore, I had to make it take less than 15 minutes, so I would not lose their interest. Fourth, people who failed to answer all survey questions could mitigate my data output, because I would have to eliminate that survey response, which meant he or she would have answered less questions than the other participants did. Last, if I chose the incorrect instrumentation for measurement that could prevent my data from being valid and reliable.

However, I still must concern myself with several external threats to the validity of my research. First, the timing of my survey was important because currently there were numerous reports available involving domestic drones, as well as the continued use of drone strikes overseas. These could formulate a bias or reassure individuals of their previously held beliefs about drones. Second, political ideology could dictate a participant's preconceived bias against drones, thus possibly hurting my data overall. I also had some limitations to my research that would not affect the feasibility of my research.

I limited my theoretical perspective to consist of the salience of U.S. drone warfare policy and how it affected public opinion. Additionally, I limited my RQs to determining if participants felt drone surveillance over the United States alleviated their fear of terrorism or increased their fear of losing privacy. In addition, my research was limited, because I targeted members of the elite opinion, as well as the Walden Participant Pool, which excluded a plethora of potential participants.

I wanted to determine how my participants answered my research questions to examine if any significant differences between elite opinion and public opinion from the Walden Participant Pool, by using frequency analysis in SPSS. I wanted to analyze whether the Walden participant pool and targeted elites differed on drones and their domestic capabilities no matter their level of knowledge on them. Therefore, their answers would develop from the media, as well as family and friends, which would differ from those who researched drones, operated them, opposed them based on the Constitution, and those who created this policy. My survey consisted of a Likert scale

with five subscale answers, which would measure the two group's feelings about various questions about drones, as well as open-ended questions to the elites. In addition, I further measured their educational level, political affiliation, religious preference, age, gender, and ethnicity to further make comparisons about their attitude.

Conclusion

The Likert-scale survey questions provided multiple choice answers that made it possible to deliver an accurate account of the feelings of the participants about drones in general and U.S. drone policy with respect to privacy concerns. The 108 participants from the Walden participant pool was enough to get a variety of responses; however, five targeted elites was a small sample. In addition, the open-ended questions for the targeted elites were not answered as in-depth as I wanted. The data, however, did provide similar answers from the two groups and their surveys.

In Chapter 4, I will present the results of the study.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

The primary goal of the study was to examine how policy elites and the mass public perceived the impact of drone use on domestic policy. The first group involved the Walden participant pool, which consisted of non-experts on drone warfare. The Walden participant pool consisted of 108 respondents to a 32- question survey. The hope was to acquire a large enough sample size that represented the population in general to make valid comparisons. The second group was the targeted elites, which consisted of scholars who wrote peer-reviewed articles on drones, people from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), DoD, DOJ, Legislative Attorneys, RAND Corporation, and the FAA

The three primary research questions that the data addressed were

1. Research Question 1. What level of political knowledge regarding drone usage do policy elites and the mass public possess in the United States?
2. Research Question 2. How do policy elites perceive the impact of drone use on domestic policy in the United States?
3. Research Question 3. How does the mass public perceive the impact of drone use on domestic policy in the United States?

The data helped me address RQ1 by showing that both groups possessed knowledge of drone usage overseas and within the United States. Just over half of the participants frequently looked at news reports regarding drones. Because my targeted elites were already well versed in drones, the political knowledge was encompassed in it. With only five participants from the policy elites, the sample size was too small gauge

wider opinion; however, the data did provide enough information to address RQ2 where all five respondents were concerned about drone impact domestic policy. None of the elites thought drone surveillance within the United States was not a valuable tool and should not be available for local, state, and federal law enforcement due to privacy concerns. Finally, I found that the mass public in RQ3 perceived drone impact on domestic policy as intrusive on privacy. I found that 64 of the108 respondents were either very or somewhat concerned. In addition, table showed the potential for governmental abuse of drone use within the United States, and 84 of the 108 participants were either very or somewhat concerned.

Walden Participant Pool

I received IRB approval to place my mass public survey on the Walden participant pool website on April 21st, 2015. I had to ask to keep it being viewed by the pool every 6 months; therefore, I renewed for another 6 months in August 2015, as well as January 2016. My survey was deleted July 7th, 2016, because there were not any new participants for my survey in the previous 3 months; therefore, I decided that no more individuals would take the survey.

Once the survey was completed in the Walden participant pool, I was able to see that my sample size consisted of 108 participants. The survey entailed of 32 questions, which was open to anyone who signed up for the participant pool the university sponsors. Once I received the data, I then imported the data into SPSS for analysis. The survey questions were analyzed separately by frequency, so I saw how each question was answered as well as the percentage of the participants answering those questions. Table 1

shows the breakdown of survey question number 32, which dealt with race. There was good representation of the population, which provided insights from various groups rather than one type of race dominating the entire survey. Of the 108 participants, five declined to answer, while 13 chose to prefer not to answer; therefore, 18 of the 108 participants did not want to answer the question about race. The 18 who did not answer only represented 16.6% of the total participants. The remaining breakdown of the respondents consisted of 38 European Americans, 22 who chose other, 11 African Americans, eight Hispanic Americans, seven Asian -Americans, and three Muslims. The representation of the Walden participant pool was important because there were many racial viewpoints that were being assessed in this survey. However, it was important to point out that this sample was not meant to be representative of the population.

This is an example of a table in APA style (see Table 1).

Table 1

Race/Ethnicity of The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
African American	11	10,2	10.2
Asian American	7	6.5	6.5
European American	38	35.2	35.2
Hispanic American	8	7.4	7.4
Muslim	3	2.8	2.8
Other	22	20.4	20.4
Prefer not to answer	13	12.0	12.0

Declined to answer	5	4.6	4.6
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool.

Table 2 represents the gender breakdown of the survey; there were 79 female respondents compared to only 24 male respondents, as well as four who preferred not to answer.

Table 2

Gender of The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Female	79	73.1	73.1
Male	24	22.2	22.2
Prefer not to answer	4	3.7	3.7
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

Table 3 showed the breakdown of religious preference from the participants. Of the 108 participants, four declined to answer the question at all and nine chose to prefer not to answer. The remaining breakdown was as follows: 15 identified their religious preference as Catholic, three as Islam, two as Jewish, 45 as other, and 29 as Protestant. The number of individuals who chose other, suggested to me that I needed to include more types of religion in to have a clearer assessment of who preferred what type of religion in order to determine how that affected their opinion on drones.

Table 3

Religion of The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Catholic	15	13.9	13.9
Islam	3	2.8	2.8
Jewish	2	1.9	1.9
Other	45	41.7	41.7
Protestant	29	26.9	26.9
Prefer not to answer	9	8.3	8.3
[Decline to Answer]	4	3.7	3.7
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool.

To delve deeper into the demographics of the participants, they were also asked about their political ideology/ affiliation. Three declined to answer the question, which was an insignificant amount that would call into question the validity of the survey. However, 41 people identified themselves as Democrat, which suggested that most of the people in the survey used this ideology in their reasoning behind how they felt about drones. Twenty-nine people identified themselves as independent, which meant the second highest number of people in the survey had no political affiliation and might be open-minded when it came to drones. Twenty people identified themselves as Republicans, while 14 identified themselves as other. There was some overbalance to the respondents, which showed some representation of all political affiliations.

Table 4

Political Ideology of The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**
Democrat	41	38.0	38.0
Independent	29	26.9	26.9
Other	14	13.0	13.0

Republican	20	18.5	18.5
[Decline to Answer]	3	2.8	2.8
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

Table 5 shows age representation, which was more balanced than any other of the demographic questions. Ages 25 through 64 had 98 of the 108 participants, which accounted for 90.7% of the respondents. There were two between the ages of 18-24 and six between the ages of 65-74, with one who preferred not to answer. This suggested that the majority of the participants had a college degree or was currently working on a graduate level degree. Table 6 confirmed this, because of the 108 participants, 98 listed a 4-year college or graduate school as their highest level of education completed. This suggested that the participants were educated, thus possibly were knowledgeable about drones and their use. Although these individuals were not experts on drones, they accessed information about it and were in the very least aware of the US drone program and what it was currently being used for as well as its suggested future uses.

Table 5
Age Group of The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**
18-24	2	1.9	1.9
25-34	23	21.3	21.3
35-44	27	25.0	25.0
45-54	28	25.9	25.9

55-64	20	18.5	18.5
65-74	6	5.6	5.6
Prefer not to answer	1	.9	.9
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

Table 6

Education of The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
2-Year College	4	3.7	3.7
4-Year College	20	18.5	18.5
Graduate School	78	72.2	72.2
High School	3	2.8	2.8
Law School	1	.9	.9
[Decline to Answer]	1	.9	.9
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

Targeted Elites

The targeted elites, consisted of scholars who wrote peer-reviewed articles on drones, people from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), DoD, DOJ, Legislative Attorneys, RAND Corporation, and the FAA. The targeted elite survey had 18 multiple choice questions with six of those questions asking to elaborate on those answers in order to see why they felt the way they did at the time of the survey.

After I received IRB approval on April 14th ,2015, I sent out a precontact notification (Appendix E) to the targeted elites with the help of surveymonkey.com on April 18th2015. This notification introduced myself and explained why I was asking them for their assistance. I then sent out an invitation e-mail (Appendix F) on April 27th, 2015. This invitation explained the survey and what my dissertation was about, as well as my contact information along with my dissertation chair. In addition, this invitation had a link to the survey on it, which was distributed to 73 various individuals from the above groups. In addition, I sent out a permission form from SuveryMonkey.com (Appendix D), that I got their permission to use their website to send out the letters. When I was not getting many responses, I then sent out a follow-up e-mail (Appendix G) that reminded of the invitation e-mail and how I needed their help. This follow-up e-mail also had a link to the survey on it. I sent this e-mail on numerous occasions until April 28th, 2016, when it was apparent that I would not acquire anymore participants. Only five individuals responded to the survey. Although numerous attempts were made to acquire their expertise, 68 people decided not to participate in the survey. Because there were only five respondents, the comparisons to the Walden participant pool were limited. However, five people did provide some insight and it was important to include it. Of the five participants, no one answered the question about race. Four out of the five were male with only one female. All five completed graduate school, which helped explain why they were targeted elites, because of their level of education and work on drones.

When the survey asked about religious preference, one was Jewish, one was Protestant, two preferred not to answer, and one said other. When asked about their

political affiliation, one said Democrat, two skipped the question, and two said other. Lastly, the age breakdown was as follows. Two identified themselves between the ages of 55-64, one between the ages of 45-54, one between 25-34, and one between 35-44. With the small sample size, there was not much to compare within the targeted elite group. The targeted elites were not representative of the population, because they dealt with drones; however, the information and the demographics would have been valuable if more individuals would have decided to participate.

Table 7

Targeted Elite Demographics

	Race	Religion	Politics	Education	Gender	Age
Elite 1	No Answer	Jewish	Democrat	Graduate School	Male	55-64
Elite 2	No Answer	Protestant	No Answer	Graduate School	Male	55-64
Elite 3	No Answer	Other	No Answer	Graduate School	Male	45-54
Elite 4	No Answer	No Answer	Other	Graduate School	Male	25-34
Elite 5	No Answer	No Answer	Other	Graduate School	Female	35-44

Source: Walden Participant Pool

The Data

The next few paragraphs include questions from the Walden participant pool survey only. The assumption was made that the participants did not know a lot about drones, and because of that lack of expertise, their political knowledge needed to be determined as well as where they obtained this information. This was necessary to discover how much attention they paid to politics and current events. The first question asked the level of interest in national politics. The results were as follows.

Table 8
Level of Interest in National Politics by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
High	42	38.9	38.9
Low	19	17.6	17.6
Medium	43	39.8	39.8
None	3	2.8	2.8
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

Of the 108 participants, 85 of them said they had a high to medium interest in national politics, which meant that 78.7% of the participants were well-informed and had a significant understanding of what was happening politically across the country. These were the individuals who seemed to respond to the rest of the questions. Only 22 participants had a low or no interest in national politics, while one did not answer the question at all. This accounted for only 21.3%, but by no means an indication not to expect the rest of the questions for the survey to be answered in a similar fashion. The second and third questions dealt with correctly identifying well-known political members of congress as well as his or political affiliation in order to confirm question 1 and determine if indeed the people who said they had a high or medium level of interest in national politics, truly did. In addition, to determine if the participants who claimed to have little or no interest still had enough interest to identify Mitch McConnell (R) and Nancy Pelosi(D).

Table 9:
Identify Politicians by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Charles Schumer; (D)	2	1.9	1.9
Mitch McConnell; (R)	84	77.8	77.8
[Decline to Answer]	21	19.4	19.4
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

The second question that dealt with Mitch McConnell (R) had the following results; 84 of the 108 participants correctly identified him, which represented 77.8% of the pool. This was close to the 78.7% who said they had a high or medium interest in national politics. This confirmed that their interest and political knowledge was high. 21 declined to answer and one did not put a response, which accounted for 20.3% of the participant pool. The third question dealt with Nancy Pelosi (D) and 67 of the 108 correctly answered the question or 62%. However, 19 answered John Boehner, in addition, 18 declined to answer.

Table 10.

Identify Politicians by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
John Boehner; (R)	19	17.6	17.6
Nancy Pelosi;(D)	67	62.0	62.0
Tammy Duckworth; (D)	3	2.8	2.8
[Decline to Answer]	18	16.7	16.7
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

The fourth question asked the participants how closely have you been following news stories about the U.S. government's use of drones?

Table 11.

Following News Stories About Drone Use by the Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not at all	10	9.3	9.3
Not too closely	37	34.3	34.3
Somewhat closely	46	42.6	42.6
Very closely	14	13.0	13.0
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

Most of the participants (46) only followed the governments use of drones somewhat closely, not too closely, or not at all (47). Only 14 answered very closely.

People had three major resources that they could access in order to obtain up-to-date information daily. Table 11 dealt with the frequency the participants acquired their information from the television. 50 of the respondents answered either every day or most days, while 51 answered only occasionally and 6 answered once or twice a day. Table 12 involved the print media and the results did well for the newspaper industry according to the data.

Table 12.

Television as News Source on Drones Followed by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Everyday	26	24.1	24.1
Most days	24	22.2	22.2
Once or twice a day	6	5.6	5.6
Only occasionally	51	47.2	47.2

Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

Only nine people out of 108 got their information from the print media every day, while 81 responded only occasionally. This clearly showed that the contributors to the study did not utilize the print often because of the results of question seven involving the internet.

Table 13.

Print Media as News Source on Drones by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Everyday	9	8.3	8.3
Most days	13	12.0	12.0
Once or twice a day	4	3.7	3.7
Only occasionally	81	75.0	75.0
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

The data in Table 13 showed that 86 of the 108 participants answered the question every day or most days. This was not unusual because of the ease to get connected with any news source at any time of the day. The number of cell phones in the country allowed individuals to find out the news in a by-the-minute-fashion that kept people informed faster than both television and newspapers.

Table 14.

Internet as News Source on Drones by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Everyday	53	49.1	49.1
Most days	33	30.6	30.6
Once or twice a day	8	7.4	7.4
Only occasionally	13	12.0	12.0

Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

The concept of framing fundamentally dealt with the attention the media focused on certain events or topics and then placed them within a field of meaning (Goffman, 1974). This was essential, because the framing served as a big influence on the people reading and/or watching it (Goffman, 1974). Framing theory proposed that how something was presented to the audience influenced the choices people made about how to process that information (Goffman, 1974). The framing of an issue had the potential to not only tell the audience what to think about, but also how to think about that issue (Goffman, 1974).

Thus tables 14 and 15 dealt with the media framing of drones as well as the influence it had over the participants. Question 8 on the survey asked about the way the media portrayed domestic drones' effects their opinion. Of the 108 people 55 said no, while 31 said yes and 21 were not sure. A clear majority of the respondents did not feel that the way the media conducted its reporting on drones, had no effect on their opinion of them overall. The 31 that said yes, placed a lot of weight on the media framing in order to help them form their opinion.

Table 15.

Media Framing of Drones Thought by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**
No	55	50.9	50.9

Not sure	21	19.4	19.4
yes	31	28.7	28.7
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

The question posed for Table 15 dealt with how influential the media was in shaping their opinions on important issues. 80 individuals felt the media was very or somewhat influential. That showed that the media outlets did carry tremendous influence on shaping the opinions of the respondents. The media could portray an issue through an ideological lens, which also could play role in the decision-making process, only 27 felt that media was not influential at all.

Table 16.

Media Influence Affects the Walden Participant Pools Views on Drones

	Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**
Not influential at all	27	25.0	25.0
Somewhat influential	58	53.7	53.7
Very influential	22	20.4	20.4
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

Drones have shown their potential in war and other surveillance operations involving the CIA as well as the military; however, drones were increasingly being used within the United States police departments and federal agencies. In addition, drones were available to any citizen, which increased questions about privacy and 4th Amendment violations. This was the question posed on the mass survey and the results

were seen in table 16. Fifty people answered yes, they felt that drones did violate privacy rights., while 36 said no. Twenty-one were not sure.

Question 11 dealt with whether the participants thought that domestic drone use was necessary to prevent crime, terrorism as well as identify terror suspects. Fifty-four answered yes that this tool was necessary, while thirty-five said no and seventeen were not sure.

Table 17.

Drone Invades Privacy as Seen by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
No	36	33.3	33.3
Not sure	21	19.4	19.4
Yes	50	46.3	46.3
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

Table 18.

Drone use for Fighting Crime as Seen by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
No	35	32.4	32.4
Not sure	17	15.7	15.7
Yes	54	50.0	50.0
[Decline to Answer]	1	.9	.9
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

Question twelve asked what was the participants overall perception of drones? This was the first question that was available to compare to the targeted elites survey.

Most respondents from the mass survey had favorable (25) or somewhat favorable (51) opinion of drones, which was positive outcome for the people backing the use of drones both domestically and internationally. Only twenty-nine had an unfavorable view of drones in the mass survey. However, among the targeted elite survey the opinions were looking at both sides of problem, but primarily being non-committal. For example,

Participant #1 responded “short term effective
long term not convinced”

Participant #2 responded “Like any technology, they can have good or bad effects”

Participant #3 responded “OK with surveillance drones, but I believe targeted killing is unacceptable”

Participant #4 responded “There are clearly many uses - "dangerous, difficult, dull" - to which drones can properly be put (the list grows each day); I know many are concerned at their us by the military, but I think it a major mistake to abstract drones from the wider matrix of violence in which they are embedded: 5-10 per cent of air strike sin Afghanistan were carried out directly from remote platforms, but why does nobody seem to care about the other 90-95%? Many of those strikes will have been mediated by drones, of course”

Participant #5 responded “Drones are a tool. The question is how they are used.”

Their answers seemed more favorable than not, which was genuinely the same feeling of the mass survey participants, which showed that the level of expertise was not important when it came to having a favorable or unfavorable opinion about drones overall.

Table 19.

Perception of Drones by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Favorable	25	23.1	23.1
Not favorable at all	29	26.9	26.9
Somewhat favorable	51	47.2	47.2
[Decline to Answer]	2	1.9	1.9

Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

In order to determine how knowledgeable, the mass survey participants were, question thirteen dealt with the number of news articles or stories they had seen concerning drones in the past year? The majority had only seen a news story or read an article 1 to 5 times, which was unfortunate. Forty-nine people had seen a news story or read an article between 6 and 15 times. The frequency was better and suggested that these participants were more informed and knowledgeable about news reports concerning drones.

Table 20.

News Items Concerning Drones Seen by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**
1 to 5	50	46.3	46.3
6 to 10	29	26.9	26.9
11-15	20	18.5	18.5
None	8	7.4	7.4
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

The reporting of drones also consisted of drone surveillance within the U.S., which understandably has raised concerns for privacy advocates and lawmakers. This justified concern has led to convincing thirteen states to enact laws regulating the use of drones by law enforcement, with eleven of those thirteen states requiring a warrant before the government may use a drone (McNeal, 2014). The first drone-related legislation

appeared in 2013 in Florida, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Texas (McNeal, 2014). As well as Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Utah, and Iowa also passed laws seeking to address the use of drones by law enforcement in 2014 (McNeal, 2014); therefore, it was important to assess whether or not drone surveillance within the U.S. was personally important to the participants, given the efforts to regulate them. The results found that twenty-three participants had drone surveillance rated as high importance. Forty-eight were in the middle, twenty-six rated it of low importance, while nine said it was not of any importance to them personally.

Table 21.

Importance of Drone Surveillance Within the US Among the Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
High	23	21.3	21.3
In the middle	48	44.4	44.4
Low	26	24.1	24.1
Not at all	9	8.3	8.3
[Decline to Answer]	1	.9	.9
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

An unintended consequence of drones was when they were used as weapons to kill terrorist leaders overseas and they caused civilian casualties. There were no definite answers to how many have been killed, but that depended upon who one asked. For example, Pakistan claimed that 700 civilians died due to US drone strikes from 2004-2011, while the US put the figure considerably less (Bergen & Tiedemann, 2011).

Therefore, the question had to be posed to measure the level of concern the participants had for civilian safety during drone strikes. The results showed that sixty-seven of the participants were either "very or somewhat concerned." Forty were either "not too concerned or not at all."

Table 22

Civilian Casualties as A Result of Drone Strikes by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not concerned at all	11	10.2	10.2
Not too concerned	29	26.9	26.9
Somewhat concerned	35	32.4	32.4
Very concerned	32	29.6	29.6
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

Since the US increasingly relied on drone strikes to kill terrorist leaders for the foreseeable future, Table 22 dealt with the participants' approval or disapproval of such strikes.

Table 23.

Drone Strikes to Kill Terrorists Leaders overseas by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Approve	74	68.5	68.5
Disapprove	21	19.4	19.4
Not sure	12	11.1	11.1
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

The results said that seventy-four of the participants approved of drone strikes that killed terrorists, while only twenty-one disapproved and twelve were unsure. In contrast, four out of the five targeted elite participants disapproved of the drone strikes while one neither approved nor disapproved. Here were their responses:

> "Disapprove with OBABA policy/DOJ White Paper suggests violation of international law and immorality"
> "Disapprove. They are not effective and likely violate international law."
> "Disapprove--I do not believe in capital punishment, or in extrajudicial killing."
> "I disapprove of extra-judicial executions and assassinations. Not only are they poor instruments of public policy, such actions violate international law and constitute acts of terrorism themselves."

Again, if more of the targeted elites participated, it would have been interesting to see how many more of them would go along with this type of thinking. Clearly, the four experts shared their disapproval of targeted strikes because of the violation of international law as well as extra-judicial killings. The similarities were uncanny in the words chosen to voice their disapproval. Most of the people in the Walden participant pool had no issues with targeted killings.

The next question in the survey asked whether the participants agreed with the killing of US citizens without due process. At one point, an American was one of the targeted due to his radicalization of some of the Yemeni citizens. Overwhelmingly, the participants in the mass survey disapproved of this action, according to 92 of the 108 respondents, with only six approving and nine unsure. Targeting terrorists was okay, but when one of those terrorists was identified as an American citizen, their opinions changed drastically. The targeted elites agreed with the mass public on this dilemma where all five expressed their disapproval.

Table 24.

Due Process Needed to Kill US Citizens Overseas Among the Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Disapprove	92	85.2	85.2
Not sure	9	8.3	8.3
Approve	6	5.6	5.6
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

"No. For the reasons outlined in my answers to question 2 and question 4. Additionally, given the long history of political repression in this country (such as, the FBI's surveillance of the anti-war and civil rights movements) that has sometimes turned violent (such as the FBI's actions against the Black Panther and Socialist Workers Parties) I fear that such assassinations could be more politically motivated than national security motivated."

"That's a matter for US citizens -- I'm not one -- and to fasten on the killing of Americans as opposed to others is narcissism."

"Disapprove regardless of whether the target is a citizen or not."

"It is a violation of the Constitution and basic human rights"

"disapprove/suspicious of unfettered executive power favor establishment DRONE COURT"

Whether an expert on drones or not, both sides had common ground with the killing of US citizens. Table 24 showed the data from the question that asked whether the constitutionality of the President to order drone strikes on US citizens. The Walden participant pool overwhelmingly thought it was unconstitutional with 82 of the 108 feeling that way. Only eleven believed it was constitutional, while ten were not sure. Again, the targeted elites agreed with the mass opinion.

Table 25.

Constitutionality of Killing US Citizens as Seen by The Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Constitutional	11	10.2	10.2

Not sure	10	9.3	9.3
Unconstitutional	82	75.9	75.9
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

"constitutional with executive power BUT needs to be subject to pre-emptive judicial authorization (per drone court)"

"No. The constitution affords citizens due process. I am not aware of any constitutional exceptions to this."

"Unconstitutional, as it lacks due process"

"That's a matter for US citizens -- I'm not one -- and to fasten on the killing of Americans as opposed to others is narcissism."

"It is unconstitutional as both the 5th and 14th Amendment prohibit the taking of life or fundamental liberties without the due process of law. In our system, people must be convicted of crimes by a court--not murdered because the President merely thinks something."

The next question dealt with the level of concern over drone strikes leading to retaliatory strikes against the US. In table 25, 30 of the respondents were either not concerned at all or not too concerned, while 45 were somewhat concerned and 32 were very concerned. Most of the participants (77) had concerns that the US drone strikes would lead to some type of retaliatory strike against this country. In the targeted elites survey, four were very concerned and only one was a little concerned. Again, the majority here were concerned over drone strikes leading to an attack against the US. Most of the participants in both surveys showed a high level of worry about what US drone strikes could lead to.

Table 26.

Drone Strike Retaliation from Terrorists Among the Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**
Not concerned at all	7	6.5	6.5

Not too concerned	23	21.3	21.3
Somewhat concerned	45	41.7	41.7
Very concerned	32	29.6	29.6
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

I combined the next two questions onto table 26, which asked about the effectiveness that drones would have on protecting US citizens from crime and terrorism. The results showed that 64 contributors felt drones were effective or very effective in protecting its citizens from crime and terrorism while most of the participants were skeptical of the effectiveness of the drones on such acts where 150 believed they were only somewhat effective or not effective at all.

Table 27.
Effectiveness of Drones Protecting the Homeland Among the Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**
Not effective at all	64	59.2	59.2
Somewhat effective	86	79.7	79.7
Very effective	25	23.1	23.1
Total	216	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

The targeted elites responded in the following way:

"There's no single answer to crime or terrorism; unarmed drones MAY be part of the solution, but they are unlikely to be a major part"

"Not the most effective, but might help in some cases"

"Probably not; criminals and terrorists are adaptive"

"enhances but unclear to what degree"

"No. Terrorism and crime are facts of life that cannot be prevented by surveillance, only through tackling their root economic and political causes"

The targeted elites essentially felt the same way as the participant pool, in that they felt drones were not an effective tool in protecting the homeland by preventing terrorists and criminal acts.

Privacy was an issue that often surfaced when it came to drone surveillance over the US, and that was the next question asked in both surveys: Do you think Americans will have to give up some of their personal freedoms in order to make room for drone surveillance over the U.S.? The contributors from the Walden participant pool overwhelming felt that they would, because 2 of the 108 said yes, 25 said no, and 10 were unsure. The five targeted elites answered the same question the following way; three said yes, one unsure, and one no. The majority in both groups felt that some privacy would have to be given up by US citizens, so drone surveillance could and continue to take place to protect them.

Table 28.

Giving Up Some Privacy for Drone Surveillance among the Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**
No	25	23.1	23.1
Not sure	10	9.3	9.3
Yes	72	66.7	66.7
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

The questioning continued with drone surveillance and privacy in table 28, this question revolved around the level of concern about the intrusiveness of drone

surveillance with 64 of the participant pool, was either very concerned or somewhat concerned, whereas 43 were either not too concerned or not concerned at all. The targeted elite's responses ranged from two not too concerned, two somewhat concerned, and one very concerned. Interestingly, the experts were not as concerned as the participant pool was. Thirty-seven of them were very concerned, including one from the targeted elites, a combined 29 were somewhat concerned and 29 not too concerned.

Table 29.

Intrusiveness of Drone Surveillance among the Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not concerned at all	16	14.8	14.8
Not too concerned	27	25.0	25.0
Somewhat concerned	27	25.0	25.0
Very concerned	37	34.3	34.3
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

Any type of surveillance within the US created a situation where the government could abuse its power and authority. Which was exactly the next question asked that dealt with the participants' level of concern. 84 were either very concerned or somewhat concerned, while 22 were either not too concerned or not concerned at all. The responses from the targeted elite consisted of two very concerned and three somewhat concerned.

Table 30.

Governmental Abuse of Power with Drone Surveillance among the Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not concerned at all	4	3.7	3.7

Not too concerned	18	16.7	16.7
Somewhat concerned	33	30.6	30.6
Very concerned	51	47.2	47.2
[Decline to Answer]	1	.9	.9
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

Drones were popular among the US population where drones could be purchased just about anywhere nowadays, which led to this question posed in the survey on whether the participants approved or disapproved of drone use by normal citizens. The Walden participant break down was as follows: 58 of them disapproved, while 35 approved. The targeted elites were split where two approved and two disapproved while one was not sure.

Table 31.

Drone Use by Civilians among the Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**
Approve	35	32.4	32.4
Disapprove	58	53.7	53.7
Not sure	14	13.0	13.0
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

The last question involved policy and privacy, for instance, 15 states have implemented rules and regulations for domestic drones prior to the federal government. Do you think this type of proactive governing will help protect citizens' civil rights? A clear majority of the Walden participant pool thought that creating laws for drones would

assist in protecting the rights of citizens, while only 26 said no, this type of proactive governing would not make a difference. However, 26 of the participants were not sure whether these types of laws would help or hurt. The targeted elites were asked why to the previous question and the best response was as follows:

> "Well, it depends on what the regulations are. If they are like Virginia and Oregon and require a warrant for drone surveillance and ban the use of weaponized drones than there is a decent chance they are helpful. If they are like North Dakota that permits weaponized drones I would say they are less than helpful."

While the other four participants were less forthcoming with responses like yes, not sure, probably not, and one skipped the question. There were not a lot of comparisons that could be drawn; however, the elites were more hesitant about state laws being created that would help with the governing of drone boundaries.

Table 32.

Policy and Regulation of Drone Use Among the Walden Participant Pool Sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
No	26	24.1	24.1
Not sure	26	24.1	24.1
Yes	55	50.9	50.9
Total	108	100.0	100.0

Source: Walden Participant Pool

The data overall showed how similar in thought the two groups were when it came to privacy and drone use but differed slightly on drone strikes and those used to target American citizens. The two groups also agreed that it was unconstitutional for a President to conduct drone strikes on US citizens. The data also showed on numerous occasions involving drone surveillance within the United States in particular, both sides

agreed on the invasion of privacy. In addition, the data suggested that no matter the level of expertise on drones, both sides agreed on the issues involving drone use within the US.

Conclusions

The data assisted me in answering my research questions. RQ1: What level of political knowledge regarding drone usage do policy elites and the mass public possess in the United States? The data showed that both groups possessed knowledge of drone usage overseas and within the United States. Table 10 showed that just over half of the participants frequently looked at news reports regarding drones. In addition, the data also showed that both groups generally agreed on the survey questions regarding drones and privacy, the constitutionality of drone strikes on US citizens, the ineffectiveness of drones to combat and prevent crime, as well as the effectiveness of drone strikes to eliminate terror leaders overseas. The fact that these two groups came to the same conclusions implied that no matter the level of expertise in drone information, they agreed on several points. The importance of their agreements also suggested that it did not matter where the participants got their information about drones from, the print media, internet, or television it did not affect their views on drones neither negatively nor positively. Since, my targeted elites were already well versed in drones, the political knowledge was encompassed in it.

Research Question 2. How do policy elites perceive the impact of drone use on domestic policy in the United States? Policy elites were not in favor of drone surveillance within the United States due to privacy concerns. It was understandable for any person to expect a reasonable amount of privacy within their own home, and now that civilian

drones were abundantly available, the privacy invasion risk grew. Therefore, whether a targeted elite or not, the loss of privacy was a concern for both groups. Research Question 3. How does the mass public perceive the impact of drone use on domestic policy in the United States? The mass public overwhelmingly found drone impact on domestic policy was very intrusive on privacy. In table 28 for instance, 64 of the108 respondents were either very or somewhat concerned. In addition, table showed the potential for governmental abuse of drone use within the United States and 84 of the 108 participants were either very or somewhat concerned. The mass public not surprisingly did want to place its trust in the government to not find a way to overreach when it came to abusing the technology that drones could possess. Cameras with facial recognition and small drones that were hard to detect worried the public, as well it should.

When trying to conduct a survey about the opinion of people, the number of participants was important. I was fortunate enough to acquire 108 participants from the Walden participant pool; however, when a Likert-scale type questioning the potential existed for certain questions not being answered or the individual checking the 'prefer not to answer box" obviously, there was nothing I could do about that except hope that they main portions of the survey concerning drones was answered. The data was also limited with the lack of targeted elites responding to my survey. Again, it was impossible for me to convince potential participants to take the time to fill out a survey, but the five who did provided important responses that helped me make the comparisons needed.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

The purpose of this descriptive study was to gauge the impact that drones had on U.S. domestic policy and measure the feelings and attitudes towards these impacts. These goals were achieved by surveying mass opinion, while additionally providing targeted surveys of elites who have greater knowledge of these potential impacts than the general public. This allowed me to analyze comparisons and contradictions between the two groups to determine if they drew the same conclusions about drone policy and if it invaded privacy. In order to execute this research, I conducted a frequency analysis on a convenience survey of the mass public and a purposive survey of policy elites with expert knowledge on drones, so I could comprehend the opinions of two distinct groups of individuals.

Guided by theories of media framing and salience, mass opinion was measured with frequency and a cross-sectional design achieved by using the Walden Participant Pool. The survey was administered to a targeted population of elites, which included academics, civil liberties organizations, and government officials (ie., executive agencies, the military, and law enforcement). The instrument gauged what policy areas were likely to be impacted by drone adoption, and elicited attitudes towards these changes, with a focus on how allowing enhanced drone surveillance has impacted the right to privacy.

Summary of findings

The primary goal of the study was to address how policy elites and the mass public perceived the impact of drone use on domestic policy. The first group involved the

Walden Participant Pool, which consisted of non-experts on drone warfare. The Walden participant pool consisted of 108 and respondents to a 32-question survey. The hope was to acquire a large enough sample size that represented the population in general to make valid comparisons. The second group was the targeted elites, which consisted of scholars who wrote peer-reviewed articles on drones, people from the ACLU, DoD, DOJ, Legislative Attorneys, RAND Corporation, and the FAA

Demographics

Of the 108 participants in the Walden participant pool, five declined to answer, while 13 preferred not to answer; therefore, 18 of the 108 participants did not want to answer the question about race. The 18 who did not answer only represented 16.6% of the total participants. The remaining breakdown of the respondents consisted of 38 European Americans, 22 who chose other, 11 African Americans, eight Hispanic Americans, seven Asian Americans, and three Muslims. The representation of the Walden participant pool was important because there were many racial viewpoints that were being assessed in this survey. For the gender breakdown of the survey, there were 79 female respondents compared to only 24 male respondents, as well as four who preferred not to answer. It would be preferable to have the numbers closer to half-and-half instead of having this many more women.

For the breakdown of religious preferences from the participants, four declined to answer the question at all and nine preferred not to answer. The remaining breakdown was as follows: 15 identified their religious preference as Catholic, three as Islam, two as Jewish, 45 as other, and 29 as Protestant. The number of individuals, who chose other,

suggested that I needed to include more types of religion in order to have a clearer assessment of who preferred which type of religion in order to determine how that affected their opinion on drones.

To delve deeper into the demographics of the participants, they were also asked about their political ideology/ affiliation. Three declined to answer the question, which was an insignificant amount that did not call into question the validity of the survey. However, 41 people identified themselves as Democrat, which suggested that most of the people in the survey used this ideology in their reasoning behind how they felt about drones. Twenty-nine people identified themselves as independent, which meant the second highest number of people in the survey claimed to have no political affiliation and were open-minded when it came to drones. Twenty people identified themselves as Republicans, while 14 identified themselves as other. There was some overbalance to the respondents, which showed some representation of all political affiliations.

Age representation was more balanced than any other of the demographic questions. Ages 25 through 64 had 98 of the 108 participants, which accounted for 90.7% of the respondents. There were two between the ages of 18-24 and six between the ages of 65-74, with one who preferred not to answer. Most of the participants had a college degree or were currently working on a graduate level degree. Of the 108 participants, 98 listed a 4-year college or graduate school as their highest level of education completed. The data suggested that the participants were educated, thus possibly knowledgeable about drones and their use. Although these individuals were not experts on drones, they

accessed information about it and were aware of the U.S. drone program and what it was currently being used for as well as its suggested future uses.

The targeted elites only had five participants, where none of them answered the question about race. Four out of the five were male with only one female, but all five completed graduate school, which helped explain why they were targeted elites. When I asked about their religious preference, one was Jewish, one was Protestant, while two preferred not to answer, and one said other. When asked about their political affiliation, one said Democrat, two skipped the question, and two said other. Finally, when asked about their age, two identified themselves between the ages of 55-64, one between the ages of 45-54, one between 25-34, and one between 35-44.

Interpretation of the Findings

The data were collected through two surveys: a Likert-scale 32 question survey for the Walden participant pool and a 16-question Likert-scale survey with an addition of open-ended questions for the targeted elite.

Walden Participant Pool

It was important for me to establish how the participants knew of or heard about drones, which was why I asked questions that determined their knowledge of drones. For example, on Question 12 I asked what was the participants overall perception of drones? Most respondents had favorable (25) or somewhat favorable (51) opinion of drones, while only 29 had an unfavorable view of drones. To determine how knowledgeable, the mass survey participants were, Question 13 dealt with the number of news articles or stories they have seen concerning drones in the past year. The majority had only seen a

news story or read an article one to five times. Forty-nine people had seen a news story or read an article between six and 15 times. A national survey showed that U.S. voters were paying attention to drones, where 65% said they had heard some or a lot about drones and 15% said they had heard nothing (Zenko, 2013).

Media outlets recognized that they could take advantage of the various social media outlets as a means for disseminating news and opinions about any subject (Qayyum, Gilani, Latif, & Qadir, 2018). Through social media, news organizations from all over the world could spread political messages, engage their supporters, drive election campaigns, and challenge their critics about drones (Qayyum et al., 2018). Further, news agencies, many of which aimed to give an impression of balance, often abided by a political ideology that was reflected in the content they produced (Qayyum et al., 2018). Therefore, they had the potential to influence public opinion on the use drones (Qayyum et al., 2018). Two of the questions I posed to the Walden participant pool (8 & 9) dealt with how influential they thought the media was in shaping their opinions on drones and other important issues. Most of the participants felt the media was very or somewhat influential. The media outlets did carry influence on shaping the opinions of the respondents.

The media could portray an issue through an ideological lens, which also could play a role in the decision-making process, only 27 felt that the media was not influential at all. The media performed two functions within a democracy: They published the events of the day in the form of news, and they offered their unique commentary (Habel, 2012). While delivering the news there was a volume of evidence showing that the media

framed issues and primed their audience (Habel, 2012). There were two trains of thought in which people believed that the media should offer an independent, adversarial voice that moved the views of both politicians and the public, and ultimately, changed the course of public policy or on the other hand, viewed the media as reactive, where their views could be influenced by policymakers (Habel, 2012).

Habel, tested the two perspectives by assessing the policy positions of the media through the use of the ADA ratings; a method that could be extended to other media including editorial pages, radio personalities, syndicated columnists, pundits, bloggers, or other media elites in which he modeled together with metrics for policymakers and the public in a dynamic, time series analysis (Habel, 2012). Habel found that the editorials did not provide a whole lot of influence over public opinion overall, thus not affecting policy unless you were of a particular ideology, then the media could use editorials to draw attention to the issues of their choice and to make their views transparent, which in turn could be "surprisingly successful" in influencing the agenda of policymakers or the public (Habel, 2012). In addition, Habel found it plausible that the media outlets were also successful in framing or priming political issues or events, and that these attempts mattered for public policy or opinion which allowed the outlets to act as agenda-setters, for policymakers and the public (Habel, 2012). Shanahan, McBeth, and Hathaway used one policy narrative from the media on their respondents, which indicated that these narrative components could be very powerful in creating and magnifying the meaning of policy issues and their consequences (Shanahan, McBeth, & Hathaway, 2011). Thus, these policy narratives mattered in terms of how people thought concerning policy issues

and influenced their opinion (Shanahan, McBeth, & Hathaway, 2011). In addition, more recent studies concluded similar findings with respect media framing towards the public. For example, a study found that late-night comedies mostly gathered news and information from traditional news media and re-packaged it, so they gave it a new interpretation, before they presented the easily digestible information to a different set of audiences (Lee, 2017). Also, a study found that the US ran ore negative stories about the refugee crisis, thus leading to a negative attitude from the public whereas, the Canadian press was more positive, which lead to the public attitude there being more in favor of the plight of the refugees (Allwright, 2018).

The questions from the survey that dealt with privacy, intrusiveness, and the potential for governmental abuse were combined because of their similarities. When the survey turned to asking about the possibility and probability that drones were increasingly being used within the United States by police departments, federal agencies, and private citizens, which may lead to privacy concerns, fifty people answered yes, they felt that drones did violate privacy rights., while 36 said no. 21 were not sure. In addition, when asked about the potential for domestic drone use to prevent crime, terrorism and identify terror suspects, 54 answered yes that this tool was necessary, while 35 said no and seventeen were not sure. Any type of surveillance within the US created a situation where the government could abuse its power and authority. Which was exactly the next question asked dealing with the participants' level of concern. 84 were either very concerned or somewhat concerned, while 22 were either not too concerned or not concerned at all. The participants were asked about their level of concern about the

intrusiveness of drone surveillance with 64 of the participant pool was either very concerned or somewhat concerned, whereas 43 were either not too concerned or not concerned at all. The current literature seemed to back this up. For example, a study found that through exploring surveillance consciousness of mobile technology surveillance, that people thought that current surveillance technologies came close to making the US an oppressed state, whereas others were willing to accept certain types of surveillance as long as some conditions were met (Zaia, 2018). In addition, some were concerned about the possibility of low-cost drones available to anyone that could allow criminals and adversaries the ability to conduct malicious activity, in addition to hacking an armed drone in turn which could be unleashed within the US (Maida, 2016). One study found that the people in federal and state agencies felt that individuals forfeited their rights to privacy the moment they stepped outside, whereas most of the public felt that despite being in public they were afforded some privacy (Hernandez, 2018). These results from my data were also consisted with polling done by professional polling entities.

A Monmouth University poll done in 2013, they asked a national sample of adults about three possible uses of unmanned drones by U.S. law enforcement, in which, an overwhelming majority of Americans supported the idea of using drones to help with search and rescue missions (83%) (Monmouth, 2013). Six-in-ten also supported using drones to control illegal immigration on the nation's borders (62%), but the public felt that oversight was needed for law enforcement before use of drones, 76% of Americans polled said that law enforcement agencies should be required to obtain a warrant from a

judge before using drones while only 14% said that law enforcement agencies should be able to decide on their own when to use drones (Monmouth, 2013). 47% said they were at least somewhat confident that federal law enforcement agencies would use drones appropriately, but 49% were not confident (Monmouth, 2013). 44% were confident that their local police departments would use drones appropriately, while 51% were not confident (Monmouth, 2013). Lastly, only about 1-in-10 Americans were "very" confident in federal (11%) and local (12%) agencies' potential use of drones (Monmouth, 2013).

When my survey asked the Walden Participant Pool about drone strikes overseas the responses were consistent and heavily in favor of it. For instance, 74 of the participants approved of drone strikes that kill terrorists, while only 21 disapproved and 12 were unsure. These numbers from my data were supported by the national polling places that asked the same question. For example, Pew research showed that most of the public (56%) continued to support missile strikes overseas to target extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia with just 26% of those in the survey who disapproved (Pew Research, 2013). Rasmussen Reports did a national telephone survey that found that 71% of likely U.S. Voters favored the United States' use of drone aircraft to kill al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists overseas, while only 12% opposed the use of drones to kill terrorists in other countries (Rasmussen, 2014). In addition, when the participant pool was asked about airstrikes being used on American citizens without due process the response was overwhelmingly against it with 92 of the 108 participants disapproving. Many of the opinions were consisted with current literature, for example,

those that exuded who scored high on the authority/respect dimension were much more likely to accept positive beliefs about drone strikes, and reject negative beliefs (Davis, 2019). Whereas, those who scored high on the harm/care dimension were much more likely to accept negative beliefs and reject the idea that drone strikes were necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attack (Davis, 2019). In addition, another study found that the public was more likely to support use because they thought that was riskless because it kept our soldiers from danger, but the public also thought by increased accountability, leaders must carefully choose how they used drones (Shelby, 2017). If leaders disregarded those risks, it could cost them, so they may think twice about using drones in a way that went against established norms (Shelby, 2017).

My data was inconsistent with national polling even though the wording was somewhat different. For example, a CBS poll asked in 2011 "Is it ever okay for the United States to authorize the killing of an American citizen in a foreign country if that person is known to be a terrorist, or is that never okay?" (Zenko, 2013). 53% of the respondents said it was ok, 35% said it was never ok, while 12% were unsure (Zenko, 2013). Also, a Pew research poll in 2012 asked "What if those suspected terrorists are American citizens living in other countries? In that case, do you approve or disapprove of the use of drones? (Zenko, 2013)." 79% approved while only 17% disapproved, my participants reacted negatively to the killing of US citizens and did not agree with the national public in those polls; however, my question was not asked during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan so maybe public opinion changed slightly if the questioned was posed again nationally. When the participant pool was asked about the potential danger

for civilian casualties, the responses showed that 67 were very or somewhat concerned while 40 were slightly concerned or not concerned at all. Again, my data was consistent with national polling; a Pew Research poll showed that 53% said they were very concerned about whether drone strikes put the lives of civilians in danger (Pew Research 2013). When the question asked about the constitutionality of the President to order drone strikes on US citizens. The Walden participant pool overwhelmingly thought it was unconstitutional with 82 of the 108 feeling that way. Only eleven believed it is constitutional. according to a recent national survey of registered voters by Fairleigh Dickinson University's PublicMind, 48% of American voters said they thought it was illegal for the U.S. government to target its own citizens living abroad with drone attacks while only 24% said it was legal (Zenko, 2013). Again, the wording was different, because I specifically asked about the President, but the results were similar in that both groups thought the United States cannot do it.

Another question asked about the level of concern over drone strikes in foreign countries leading to retaliatory strikes against the US. Here, 30 of the respondents were either not concerned at all or not too concerned, while 45 were somewhat concerned and 32 were very concerned. In a Pew Research poll found that 31% of its respondents said they were "very" concerned that drone attacks could lead to extremist retaliation. Another 37 percent said they were "somewhat" concerned about retaliation, while 30 percent said they were "not too" or "not at all" concerned (Pew Research, 2013).The Walden participant pool responses were consistent with a national poll, thus making public opinion similar when it came to drone warfare questioning no matter the year.

Targeted Elites

There was an increasing reliance on experts for guidance in various aspects of decision making involving any number of social issues (Chan, 1998). Expert opinion was commonly used in solutions that the country was facing in order to persuade the public that they had finite conclusions that could solve problems (Chan, 1998). Expert opinion was important because of the widening gap that existed between those who had specialized knowledge in modern technology and those who did not (Chan, 1998). As a result, most of the public had become more dependent than ever on experts to formulate judgments on policy issues that affected their lives (Campbell, 1991). Expert influence on people's social and political attitudes could assist in determining how an individual could feel on an issue, because of the way that expertise was portrayed to be accompanied by their professional knowledge and experience (Chan, 1998). Expert sources had been given an increasing amount of precious news space and airtime to explain any myriad of economic problems, interpret policy issues, decipher health statistics, and predict society's future (Chan, 1998). I intentionally used sources from over 30 years ago in order to show, that no matter the era, expert opinion was utilized often and was highly regarded. Therefore, when one fast-forwards to today and when the discussions turned to drones, experts on the subject used their knowledge and their capabilities and brought the issue to light, but was there opinion any different than that of the lay publics on drones? My data suggested they did not on certain survey questions. For example, in the survey that I sent to the targeted elites, they were asked if they approved of drone strikes to kill terrorists, their answers differed from the Walden participant pool:

Participant #1 responded “short term effective long term not convinced”

Participant #2 responded “Like any technology, they can have good or bad effects”

Participant #3 responded “OK with surveillance drones, but I believe targeted killing is unacceptable”

Participant #4 responded “There are clearly many uses - "dangerous, difficult, dull" - to which drones can properly be put (the list grows each day); I know many are concerned at their us by the military, but I think it a major mistake to abstract drones from the wider matrix of violence in which they are embedded: 5-10 per cent of air strike sin Afghanistan were carried out directly from remote platforms, but why does nobody seem to care about the other 90-95%? Many of those strikes will have been mediated by drones, of course”

Participant #5 responded “Drones are a tool. The question is how they are used.”

It was important to note again, that there were national polls conducted on drones, but none that involved “expert” opinion which did not allow me to compare my targeted elites with other polling institutions. However, a qualitative study was done that used ten expert participants that were selected from academic institutions, think tanks, private organizations, and Department of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence who was involved in teaching, researching, publishing, and speaking on the topic of terrorism (Johnson, 2013). Johnson’s case study employed open-ended questions to explore participants’ perceptions and opinions of the killing of US citizens by drone strikes (Johnson, 2013). Two of the questions I asked dealt with the constitutionality of killing a US citizen suspected of terrorism and what were their thoughts on killing a US citizen without due process. My targeted elite were against both:

Participant 1: “constitutional with executive power BUT needs to be subject to pre-emptive judicial authorization (per drone court)” “No. For the reasons outlined in my answers to question 2 and question 4.Additionally, given the long history of political repression in this country (such as, the FBI's surveillance of the anti-war and civil rights movements) that has sometimes turned violent (such as the FBI's actions against the Black Panther and Socialist Workers Parties) I fear that such assassinations could be more politically motivated than national security motivated.”

Participant 2: No. The constitution affords citizens due process. I am not aware of any constitutional exceptions to this." "That's a matter for US citizens -- I'm not one -- and to fasten on the killing of Americans as opposed to others is narcissism."

Participant 3: "Unconstitutional, as it lacks due process" "Disapprove regardless of whether the target is a citizen or not."

Participant 4: "That's a matter for US citizens -- I'm not one -- and to fasten on the killing of Americans as opposed to others is narcissism." "It is a violation of the Constitution and basic human rights"

Participant 5: "It is unconstitutional as both the 5th and 14th Amendment prohibit the taking of life or fundamental liberties without the due process of law. In our system, people must be convicted of crimes by a court--not murdered because the President merely thinks something." "disapprove/suspicious of unfettered executive power favor establishment DRONE COURT"

In Johnson's study, he asked about the killing of two US citizens by a drone strike, his participants overall were consistent in their opinion that the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki was both necessary and desirable but most expressed a general feeling that the killing was problematic for effective counterterrorism policies because the killings targeted American citizens, and there was a continuing question over whether they were granted constitutionally guaranteed due process of law prior to being targeted for killing (Johnson, 2013). Two of his participants responded this way (identified as T001 and T002):

T001: Well, I have mixed feelings and I guess I would describe it as a slippery slope. I would also use; I guess a statement about the law, bad cases made bad law. Obviously, this is a very bad case and you're dealing with a very bad situation and a bad person. You understand why the killing would occur and you may be able to not object. You may be able to say I understand that and that was necessary under the circumstances if that was the only way to proceed, and perhaps it was the only way to proceed. However, because they are American citizens, I'm concerned again about the slippery slope. Now one particular case where it may be necessary meaning there aren't any alternatives, which make it necessary. Maybe followed by the stare decision and legal reasoning where you then proceed from that premise to a similar situation of killing another American citizen in different circumstances may be not exactly the same and it's justified under the precedent previous case, and where that becomes very, very dangerous. My opinion, my perception is it may have been necessary in those cases if no

other options were available. I don't know if other options were available or not. But if that may have been the case and then in which case, I would say it may have been necessary. But my opinion about it is it's a very dangerous slippery slope. And I'm very wary of its further application (Johnson, 2013, p.57).

T002: Well, on the one hand, I'm glad he's dead. I think he was pretty clearly guilty, pretty clearly a threat. I do have serious reservations with the fact that he was an American citizen. I think there needs to be a whole other level of scrutiny and I don't trust a White House that just says there was, that "Well, we have some rules," you know. Well, you know, I think that in a democracy those need to be shared and taking the step of killing an American citizen a huge one. I'm a little bit afraid at this point it is now a small step to killing an American citizen on American soil. And that I have huge problems with as well. There needs to be a lot more thorough vetting and I think, for example, the use of drone strikes in particular is a decidedly bad idea and it will-- and it can be effective in very limited senses. But we've killed too many innocent people and we've been wrong too many times. And I think we've gone after too many low level targets. We've apparently prostituted our program to the Pakistanis in order to get agreements with them about using their airspace and things. And I would be a lot more comfortable if there was a drone strike five times a year hitting a high-value target and if there was a couple of civilian causalities that were unavoidable then you pay off the families pretty handsomely and hope for the best. (Johnson, 2013, p.58).

The most glaring difference was the lengthy answers his participants gave, most likely because he was able to sit across from them and interview them face-to-face. They were for the killings, but expressed their concerns of what it could lead to in the future, whereas my targeted elite were against it and concerned about the abuse of power. Regardless, both targeted elites knew of the danger these targeted killings posed, but most importantly, it also suggested to me that more information on the details of the policies and procedures was needed for the public to intelligently debate the process in connection with some type of judicial oversight along with Congressional oversight (Johnson, 2013). The elites in both studies clearly needed more than the insufficient words of whomever sat in the White House alone in order to determine the legality and if constitutional due process was guaranteed in such drone measures (Johnson, 2013).

The data overall in my study showed how similar in thought the two groups were when it came to privacy and drone use but differed slightly on drone strikes and those used to target American citizens. The two groups also agreed that it was unconstitutional for a President to conduct drone strikes on US citizens. The data also showed on numerous occasions involving drone surveillance within the United States in particular, both sides agreed on the invasion of privacy. In addition, this data suggested that no matter the level of expertise on drones, both sides agreed on the issues involving drone use within the US. Thus, the results of the data assisted me in answering my three primary research questions.

Research Question 1

What level of political knowledge regarding drone usage do policy elites and the mass public possess in the United States? The data exhibited that both groups of participants had knowledge of drone usage overseas which were used for targeted killings of terror leaders to include American citizens, as well as surveillance within the United States. Table 10 showed that more than half of the participants consistently looked at news reports regarding drones, whether it was the print, media, or internet. So, the participants were able to answer the questionnaire with an informed opinion. In addition, the data also showed that both groups generally agreed on the survey questions regarding drones and privacy, the constitutionality of drone strikes on US citizens, the ineffectiveness of drones to combat and prevent crime, as well as the effectiveness of drone strikes to eliminate terror leaders overseas. The fact that these two groups came to the same conclusions implied that no matter the level of expertise in drone information,

they agreed on several points. The importance of their agreements also suggested that it did not matter where the participants got their information about drones from, the print media, internet, or television it did not affect their views on drones neither negatively nor positively. Since, my targeted elites were already well versed in drones, the political knowledge was encompassed within it.

Research Question 2

How do policy elites perceive the impact of drone use on domestic policy in the United States? Targeted elites were not in favor of drone surveillance within the United States due to privacy concerns, which was understandable due to the increased presence of civilian drones. Therefore, whether a targeted elite or not, the loss of privacy was a concern for both groups.

Research Question 3

How does the mass public perceive the impact of drone use on domestic policy in the United States? The mass public opinion overwhelmingly found drone impact on domestic policy as very intrusive on privacy. Table 28 showed that 64 of the108 respondents were either very or somewhat concerned. In addition, table 29 showed the potential for governmental abuse of drone use within the United States and 84 of the 108 participants were either very or somewhat concerned. It was no surprise that the mass public had reservations about the potential of governmental overreach when it came to the technological advances that drones could possess. For example, cameras with facial recognition and small drones that could be hard to detect worried the public, as well it should. This poll data was on par with other professional polling done on the subject. In

a Monmouth University poll conducted in 2013, the routine deployment of law enforcement drones could raise privacy issues, where 2-in-3 Americans expressed concern in this area. Specifically, 49% of Americans would be very concerned and 20% would be somewhat concerned about their own privacy if U.S. law enforcement started using unmanned drones with high tech surveillance cameras and recording equipment (Monmouth, 2013). In addition, a Rasmussen poll done in the same year showed that 52% of voters opposed, while only 30% were in favor the use of unmanned drones for domestic surveillance (Rasmussen, 2013). As stated before, my data involving the Walden participant pool was consistent with national polling entities.

Implications: Literature

The literature involved with drones was extensive; however, the research combined with public opinion was less so in recent studies. For example, research had investigated the use of drones by police with the focus on the effectiveness and efficiency in crime control, especially with respect to community policing in recent years (Sakiyama, et al., 2017). In their research, she used participants recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (Sakiyama, et al.,2017). The authors asked participants about their involvement with police etc., in order to gauge their attitudes, whether positive or negative towards police and their use of UAVs in their communities (Sakiyama, et al., 2017). They found that the more negative attitude toward the police significantly increased the chances of them being less supportive of drone use (Sakiyama, et al.,2017).

In addition, Big hover or big brother? public attitudes about drone usage in domestic policing activities (Sakiyama, M., Miethe, T. D., Lieberman, J. D., Heen, M. S.

J., & Tuttle, O. 2017) also researched the relationship between police use of drones as an aid with community policing, which similarly found through a national survey that there were privacy and surveillance concerns based on several socio-economic characteristics on whether they accepted drone use, except for search and rescue and border patrol operations (Sakiyama, et al,. 2017). Police UAV use: Institutional realities and public perceptions examined the relationship of police use of drones and people's perceptions which could lead to misconceptions and concerns specifically in Canada (Saulnier, et al., 2016).

Big data from the sky: Popular perceptions of private drones in Switzerland explored the attitude of the people in Switzerland about drones used only for private citizens and organizations used for recreational and commercial purposes in order to determine their understandings, fears, hopes, and expectations (Klauser, F., & Pedrozo, S. 2017). My dissertation advanced the literature twofold: first, I provided an examination of two different types of individuals, those who understood research, and argued against drones, the targeted-elites and those who did not, the everyday citizen. This to my knowledge had not been done; therefore, it allowed the comparison of two types of people in order to determine if the same conclusions were drawn. Second, I designed two types of surveys that reflected the expertise of the elites and the mass opinion. This was important because the open-ended survey allowed for the elites to elaborate on their answers in order to further examine their reasoning behind them. The survey for the mass opinion was established to gauge their knowledge of drones because I assumed, they were not the experts as well as determining where they acquired their information on

drones from, in addition, discovering if they could form an opinion independent of the bias from those media sources. My dissertation took the literature a little further because I compared and analyzed two groups of people in order to see if they thought the same when it came to drone surveillance, privacy, and targeted drone strikes.

Implications: Public Policy

My study contributed to learning about the targeted elites and the mass public and how they thought alike with respect to their attitudes towards drones could directly help force lawmakers to change or at least include them in public policy through transparency. My data showed that the targeted elites were not in favor of drone surveillance within the United States due to privacy concerns and the mass public saw drone surveillance as intrusive on privacy. The current literature seemed back the attitudes of my respondents with their concerns for drone surveillance within the US. For example, a study that 636 participants nationwide discovered only 47% of participants were in favor of drone used for 'detecting criminal activities' or 'crowd management' which involved more proactive surveillance activities where police initiated actions based on their discretion (Sakiyama, et al., 2017). The authors found the low approval because there was no immediate victim that existed to justify police presence, lead to their participants concerned about being watched by 'big brother' or personal safety issues in this physical environment underlined this lower support for drone usage for crowd management purposes (Sakiyama, et al., 2017).

In addition, a study done in Switzerland that was in direct contrast to my findings with the targeted elite and mass public found that most respondents were supportive of

the use of unarmed military and police drones (65 and 72% respectively), the approval numbers decreased to 23 and 32% when it came to commercial and hobby drones (Klauser & Pedrozo, 2017). A similar picture emerged when the privacy issue was brought up, while only 28 and 36% of the respondents associated privacy issues with military and police drones, 60 and 62% were worried about privacy in connection with commercial and hobby drones (Klauser & Pedrozo, 2017). My survey asked if they approved of civilians having drones and 58 of them disapproved while only 35 approved; my data results were similar with current research and where it has gone since I conducted my research. Also, another study conducted about the public's comfort with police surveillance showed that support fell below 50 percent when the subject dealt with the monitoring of protests (42 percent) and for general surveillance over public spaces (35 percent) (Saulnier & Thompson, 2016). The study also found a link between privacy concerns and comfort with police use of UAVs where 75 percent of individuals polled felt that law enforcement services should be required to obtain a court issued warrant before they use a drone, and the majority (69 percent) of respondents reported that they would be very concerned (49 percent) or somewhat concerned (20 percent) about their privacy if law enforcement adopted the use of drones with high-tech surveillance cameras and recording equipment (Saulnier & Thompson, 2016). Saulnier and Thompson found that the respondents' lacked confidence in the ability of federal (47 percent) and local (44 percent) law enforcement services to use drone technology "appropriately" and in accordance with governing laws and regulations (Saulnier & Thompson, 2016). These studies continued the belief that the public did not have the trust

in the government to conduct surveillance without abusing their position; therefore, a constant theme in the studies done after mine showed a need for the government to not only have some type of oversight needed in order to curb abuse and maintain some privacy protections.

It would behoove policymakers (since they are in a voted position) to include the public on drone surveillance and private drone hobbyists on the specific rules and regulations governing them. Specifically, letting the public know when surveillance would be used, for example, large protests, natural disasters and so on. In addition, they would be transparent about the technology that was available to be attached to drones. For example, infrared cameras that could look through walls, facial recognition, and recording capabilities to name a few. The people could force policymakers to be transparent about any public policy involving drones for debate to be established before any type of drone surveillance could be utilized.

Implications: Social Change

My data suggested that the biggest social change implication my research showed was education. By that I meant people educating themselves and others on drones and their capabilities because the more one knows, the better prepared they are. Drones are here and will continue to be used by private civilians, the government, police, and emergency services for the foreseeable future. It is important to be educated because 43.3% of the Walden participant pool did not follow stories about drones. In addition, education can and to some degree has shined light on the potential for infringement on individuals' privacy, civil, and political rights with the large-scale deployments of drones.

For example, many did not know the type of ability a drone has to process data (such as images and sound) and knowing which data processing equipment are on-board, for what purposes personal data are being collected and by whom (Finn & Wright, 2016). Furthermore, drones could possess the dexterity to have a wireless connection with other drones in order to create unique vantage points (Finn & Wright, 2016). This could allow drones to avoid obstacles such as barriers, walls or fences, enabling them to gather wide varieties of information without needing a direct line of sight, for long periods of time and across large area without stopping (Finn & Wright, 2016). Education will also help in safety, because of all the drones in the sky, which are not visible to the naked eye, there should be a real concern about collisions with other aircraft (Finn & Wright, 2016). Knowing this was impossible without educating yourself, hopefully my dissertation will go a long way in encouraging that.

I plan to continue researching and educating others on the capabilities of drones by keeping up with these technological advancements in order to inform the public the possibility of the intrusiveness drones can provide on privacy. I think it's important for them to be aware of the potential for eyes in the sky. Due my research, I educated myself on drones to the point where I found about drone races and drone conferences. I cannot think of a better way for people to find about drones than seeing them firsthand. I can assist in informing the public of these conferences for them to get a better understanding of what drones can do. I intend to maintain a focus on what future rules and regulations the FAA plans to introduce because these recommendations will come without consultation with the public; therefore, it is important to me to make sure to address these

rules and regulations with the public in order to determine if they feel that they go far enough as well as being specific to protecting the public. Governmental rules and regulations can be difficult to sift through and understand, I plan to read these laws and update the public as more are created in order to get a handle of increased number of private drone users. In addition, I plan to also keep up and inform about the number of drone incidents that occur, because that puts public safety at risk for example, hobbyists flying their drone too close to airports.

The number of drones is not only increasing with private citizens, law enforcement has also increased its drone fleet. For instance, according to the Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College between 2009 and 2015, at least 148 agencies appeared to have started a drone program. In 2016, 258 agencies appeared to have started a drone program and in 2017, 334 agencies and in 2018 120 agencies (Center for the Study of the Drone, 2018). I think it is important to keep the public aware because I am sure they do not know just what agencies use drones and for what purpose. I will continue to push for more public debate on drones.

Limitations

Walden Participant Pool

Surveys could be a way for the public to make their opinion known; however, a survey could also pose major challenges for researchers like me using them in their work. As evidenced from my survey experiments accumulated, one issue that arose was the fact that surveys usually proceeded issue-by-issue and rarely addressed issue characteristics (Guisinger& Saunders, 2017). In addition, surveys may result in bad timing, for

example, some issues may be more politically polarized at the time of a survey, while others may simply have received less attention (Guisinger& Saunders, 2017). Also, it was difficult to determine if and when an attitude on a particular issue was formed, thus the researcher did not know if that feeling was predetermined or not (Guisinger& Saunders, 2017). I used a Likert scale survey for the mass opinion on drones. Unfortunately, this provided weaknesses for my research. First, the attitude of the participant. For example, the participant may have changed his or her feelings about drone while taking the survey which may have provided a less than accurate account of how they felt. Second, their attention span. The survey was 32 questions in length, but they may have lost focus and just started answering questions without reading them properly in order to finish. In addition, the potential was there for respondents to skip answers, which happened a lot in my demographics questioning. Third, the wording of the questioning could be a weakness because they may not best describe the attitude of the participant (Copeland, 2017). For example, the way the question was posed may prove some confusion, then that leads them to picking an appropriate response. *Very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned,* or *not concerned at all*

There were four possible responses here, but if the participant did not see a response that did not pertain to how he or she felt at the moment then the answer would then be inaccurate, or the question skipped altogether. Lastly, drones are a serious issue, especially when it comes to privacy and safety; therefore, by using Likert-scale questioning, the issue was really simplified (Copeland, 2017).

Targeted Elites

My goal was to get the targeted elites to expand on their answers with open ended questions because they were the experts in the field. However, I did not get much explanation beyond a sentence or two. This was disappointing because I needed more information elaborating on their opinion in order to provide more data on how my targeted elites opinion shaped their responses. In addition, with open-ended questions a greater amount of response time, thought, and effort was necessary which meant their answers could take more time (Copeland, 2017). Maybe that was why they did not respond the way I needed them too and that was my data's downfall, but that lack of responses hurt my research. The second weakness was trying to acquire the elites themselves. The elites consisted of scholars who wrote peer-reviewed articles on drones, people from the ACLU, DoD, DOJ, Legislative Attorneys, RAND Corporation, and the FAA (Appendix C). There were 44 names targeted, however, I was only able to garner five responses. My disappointment in the lack of responses was a setback for my research and data because I did not have anywhere near enough participants to offset the 108, I garnered in the Walden Participant Pool. Therefore, the comparisons could not happen on the scale that I was hoping for, but I had to use the responses that I received.

Conclusions

Drone technology develops so quickly that it rends much of the literature quickly out of date, including this one. Table 29 showed the potential for governmental abuse of drone use within the United States and 84 of the 108 participants were either very or somewhat concerned. These results suggested the importance of continuing to acquire public perceptions of drones and drone surveillance with respect to privacy because

public opinion has the power to persuade and send lingering messages for public policy within the US with respect to its pursuits of future drone applications. In addition, the data also emphasized the importance of communication and transparency about the government's use of drone as well as the technology that was available with these drones for the government to show the potential benefits of drones. If future literature continued to address these issues, then the support for drones could increase just if the people were kept informed as well as being able to add their input into decisions around how drones are used.

Descriptive results from my data suggested that the mass opinion and the targeted elites are closely aligned when it came to drone surveillance invading privacy, as well as concern for governmental abuse. The practical implications suggested that no matter the level of information on drone policy both had common ground, this could lead to positive social change by helping the government gauge the potential impact of drones on society prior to their widespread adoption. Such data could be used by policymakers to generate rules that properly balance the technological value of drones in society with those moral values and constitutional rights that made our democratic society possible. Additionally, drones could be affected by social change, which coincided with public policy in that public acceptance was an important key factor in alleviating the publics fears and showing the benefits of drone adaptation.

This gave the policy makers the opportunity to take advantage of where they could improve the perceptions of drones by informing them on the possibilities of the good drones could do with emergency response in natural disasters by searching for

survivors for example. In addition, the government could also use surveys like mine to gauge what type of safety, security and privacy safeguards they wanted to see in place to prevent citizens and government overreach. RQ1 asked what level of political knowledge regarding drone usage do policy elites and the mass public possess in the United States? Through my discussion on theories of media framing and salience, my survey indicated that the more familiar people are with the technological advancement's drones possessed, along with their potential governmental, private and commercial uses they then could become more comfortable with their capabilities and applications.

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Appendix A: Survey for Mass Opinion

1. What is your level of interest in national politics?

- High
- Medium
- Low
- None

2. Who is this person and what is his political affiliation?

- Mitch McConnell; Republican
- John Boenher; Republican
- Adam Schiff; Democrat
- Charles Schumer; Democrat

3. Who is she and what is her political affiliation?

- John Boehner; Republican
- Nancy Pelosi; Democrat
- Elizabeth Warren; Democrat
- Kelly Ayote; Republican

4. How closely have you been following news stories about the U.S. government's use of drones?

- Very closely
- Somewhat closely
- Not too closely
- Not at all

5. How often do you get your news from the television?

- Everyday
- Most days
- Once or twice a day
- Only occasionally

6. How often do you get your news from the print media?

- Everyday
- Most days
- Once or twice a day
- Only occasionally

7. How often do you get your news from the internet?

- Everyday
- Most days
- Once or twice a day
- Only occasionally

8. Does the way the media frames reports on domestic drones effect your opinion?

- Yes
- No
- Not sure

9. How influential do you think the media is at shaping your opinion on important issues?

- Very influential
- Somewhat influential
- Not influential at all

10. Some people in the media think that domestic drone surveillance violates privacy and other 4th Amendment rights? Do you agree with this statement?

- Yes
- No
- Not sure

11. Some people in the media think that domestic drone surveillance is necessary to prevent crime, terror attacks, and identify terror suspects? Do you agree or disagree?

- Yes
- No
- Not sure

12. What is your overall perception of drones?

- Favorable
- Somewhat favorable
- Not favorable at all

13. How many times have you read an article or watched a news story involving drones in the past year?

- 1-5

- 6-10
- 11-15
- None

14. How would you personally rank the importance of drone surveillance in the US?

- High
- In the middle
- Low
- Not at all

15. How concerned are you that drone strikes endanger civilian lives?

- Very concerned
- Somewhat concerned
- Not too concerned
- Not concerned at all

16. Do you approve or disapprove of the United States using drones to kill terrorists?

- Approve
- Disapprove
- Not sure

17. Do you approve or disapprove of the United States using drones to kill a U.S. citizen without due process?

- Approve
- Disapprove
- Not Sure

18. Do you think it is constitutional or unconstitutional for the president of the United States to order the killing of American citizens who are suspected of being terrorists?

- Constitutional
- Unconstitutional
- Not sure

19. How concerned are you that drone strikes will lead to retaliatory terrorist attacks?

- Very concerned
- Somewhat concerned
- Not too concerned
- Not concerned at all

20. How effective do you think surveillance drones over US airspace will protect its citizens from crime?

- Very effective
- Effective
- Somewhat effective
- Not effective at all

21. How effective do you think surveillance drones over US airspace will protect its citizens from terrorism?

- Very effective
- Somewhat effective
- Not effective at all

22. Do you think Americans will have to give up some of their personal freedoms in order to make room for drone surveillance over the U.S.?

- Yes
- No
- Not sure

23. How concerned are you that drone surveillance will be too intrusive on your privacy?

- Very concerned
- Somewhat concerned
- Not too concerned
- Not concerned at all

24. When it comes to drone surveillance within the US, how concerned are you that the government may abuse its power?

- Very concerned
- Somewhat concerned
- Not too concerned
- Not concerned at all

25. Do you approve or disapprove of drones being available to regular citizens?

- Approve
- Disapprove
- Not sure

26. So far, 15 states have implemented rules and regulations for domestic drones prior to the federal government. Do you think this type of proactive governing will help protect citizens' civil rights?

- Yes
- No
- Not sure

27. What is your age?

- 18-24
- 25-34
- 35-44
- 45-54
- 55-64
- 65-74
- 75+
- Prefer not to answer

28. What is your gender?

- Male

Female

Prefer not to answer

29. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

GED

High School

2-Year College

4-Year College

Graduate School

Law School

30. Do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or something else?

Democrat

Republican

Independent

Other

31. What religion do you generally affiliate yourself with?

Catholic

Protestant

Jewish

Islam

Other

- Prefer not to answer

32. What is your race?

- African-American
- Caucasian
- Hispanic
- Asian-American
- Muslim
- Other
- Prefer not to answer

Appendix B: Survey for Targeted Elites.

1. Do you approve or disapprove of the United States using drones to kill terrorists? Why or why not?

2. Do you approve or disapprove of the United States using drones to kill a U.S. citizen without due process? Why or why not?

3. Do you think it is constitutional or unconstitutional for the president of the United States to order the killing of American citizens who are suspected of being terrorists? Why or why not?

4. How do you personally feel about domestic drone surveillance?

5. Do you think the media is objective when reporting on domestic drone surveillance? Why or

Why not?



6. So far, 15 states have implemented rules and regulations for domestic drones prior to the federal government. Do you think this type of proactive governing will help protect citizens' civil rights? Why or why not?

7. How concerned are you that drone strikes will lead to retaliatory terrorist attacks?

- Very concerned
- A little concerned
- Somewhat concerned
- Not too concerned
- Not concerned at all

8. Do you think surveillance drones over US airspace will effectively protect its citizens from crime and terrorism? Why or why not?

9. Do you think Americans will have to give up some of their personal freedoms in order to make room for drone surveillance over the U.S.?

- Yes
- No
- Not sure

10. How concerned are you that drone surveillance will be too intrusive on your privacy?

- Very concerned
- Somewhat concerned
- Not too concerned
- Not concerned at all

9. When it comes to drone surveillance within the US, how concerned are you that the government may abuse its power?

- Very Concerned
- Somewhat concerned
- Not too concerned
- Not concerned at all

11. Do you approve or disapprove of drones being available to regular citizens?

- Approve
- Disapprove
- Not sure

12. How important is the issue of drone surveillance to you?

- Very important
- Somewhat important
- Not too important
- Not important at all

13. What is your gender?

- Female
- Male
- Prefer not to answer

14. What is your age?

- 18 to 24

- 25 to 34
- 35 to 44
- 45 to 54
- 55 to 64
- 65 to 74
- 75 or older

15. What is your ethnicity?

- African-American
- Hispanic
- Caucasian
- Other
- Prefer not to answer

16. What political affiliation do you most associate with?

- Democrat

- Republican
- Independent
- Other

17. What religion do you generally affiliate yourself with?

- Catholic
- Protestant
- Jewish
- Islam
- Other
- Prefer not to answer

18. What is the highest level of education you completed?

- 4-year college
- Masters
- PhD
- Law school
- Other

Prefer not to answer

Appendix C: Targeted Elites

Scholars	ACLU	DOJ	DOD
Bergen, Peter	Jaffer, Jameel	Thompson, Karl	Weatherington, Dyke
Hafez, Mohammed M.	Manes, Jonathan		
Hatfield, Joseph M.	Spitzer, Arthur B.		
Jaeger, David A.	Wizner, Ben		
Johnston, Patrick	Crump, Catherine		
Jordan, Jenna	Stanley, Jay		
Mannes, Aaron			
Price, Bryan			
Sarbahi, Anoop			
Siddique, Zahra			
Smith, Megan			
Tiedemann, Kathleen			
Walsh, Joseph I.			
Wilner, Alex			

Legislative Attorneys	RAND Corporation	FAA
Dolan, Alissa	Lingel, Sherrill	Bolton, Edward
Thompson II, R.M.	Menthe, Lance	Shellabarger, Nan
	Alkire, Brien	Swayze, Rich
	Gibson, John	
	Grossman, Scott A.	
	Guffey, Robert A.	
	Henry, Keith	
	Millard, Lindsay D.	
	Mouton, Christopher	
	Byman, Daniel	
	Harting, Sarah	
	Hamilton, Thomas	
	Chow, James	
	McNerney, Michael J.	
	Davis, Lynn E	
	Wu, Edward	
	Nacouzi, George	

Note: Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association as well as Common Unmanned Aircraft Systems Joint Program Office and Unmanned Aircraft System Executive Committee do not have individual members' names available.

Appendix D: Permission to Conduct Research Using SurveyMonkey.com

SurveyMonkey Inc.

www.surveymonkey.com

For questions, visit our Help

Centerhelp.surveymonkey.com

To whom it may concern:

This letter is being produced in response to a request by a student at your institution who wishes to conduct a survey using SurveyMonkey in order to support their research. The student has indicated that they require a letter from SurveyMonkey granting them permission to do this. Please accept this letter as evidence of such permission. Students are permitted to conduct research via the

SurveyMonkey platform provided that they abide by our Terms of Use, a copy of which is available on our website. SurveyMonkey is a self-serve survey platform on which our users can, by themselves, create, deploy and analyze surveys through an online interface. We have users in many different industries who use surveys for many different purposes. One of our most common use cases is students and other types of researchers using our online tools to conduct academic research.

If you have any questions about this letter, please contact us through our Help Center at help.surveymonkey.com.

Sincerely,

SurveyMonkey Inc..

Appendix E: Pre-Contact Notification (targeted elites)

Date

Dear Prospective Participant,

My name is Kevin Leonard and I am a graduate student at Walden University. For my dissertation, I am examining United States drone policy overseas, as well as the potential use for drone surveillance within the United States, in order to determine your opinion on the potential impacts of adopting these surveillance techniques over US soil has on civil liberties and its effectiveness as a means to protect this county from crime and terrorism. I am inviting you to participate in this research study by completing my survey.

You will be receiving an email in the coming days that will provide more detail about the survey itself, which will include a link to where you can access my survey. The questionnaire will require approximately 20 minutes of your time to complete. There will be no compensation for responding to my survey nor is there any known risk. You name will be kept confidential throughout the entire process. I hope you will choose to participate in my research project.

Sincerely,

Kevin Leonard

Committee Chair

Dr. Joshua Ozymy

Appendix F: Invitation E-mail (Targeted Elites)

Date

Dear Prospective Participant,

My name is Kevin Leonard and I am a graduate student at Walden University. I sent you a pre-contact notification about my dissertation, which examines United States drone policy overseas, as well as the potential use for drone surveillance within the United States, in order to determine your opinion on the potential impacts of adopting these surveillance techniques over US soil has on civil liberties. In addition, the effectiveness of surveillance drones as a means to protect this county from crime and terrorism. I am inviting you to participate in this research study by completing my survey.

The following questionnaire will require approximately 20 minutes to complete and can be accessed by the link below. There is no compensation for responding nor is there any known risk. In order to ensure that all information will remain confidential, I will not include your name, I will just generically describe your position. For example, a scholar who wrote articles concerning US drone policy. My committee chair Dr. Ozymy and my other committee member Dr. Lum will have access to my data. If you choose to participate in this project, please answer all questions as honestly as possible at the link provided. Again, your identity is confidential and will be protected at all times. Participation in this study is on a voluntary basis and you may refuse to participate at any time. Thank you for taking the time to assist me in pursuing my dissertation. The data collected will provide useful information regarding your input on drones and how you

think they will affect this country's abilities to protect civil liberties, in which I will then compare them to mass public opinion who may not be as knowledgeable on the subject as you are. In addition, if you would like a summary of this study please let me know in the space provided on the consent letter. If you require additional information or have questions, please contact me at the number listed below.

If you have any questions about your rights as a participant that you want to discuss privately, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 612-312-1210. Walden University's approval number for this study is 04-14-15-0303561 and it expires on April 13, 2016.

Sincerely,

SURVEY LINK

Kevin Leonard

Committee Chair

Dr. Joshua Ozymy

Appendix G: Follow-up (Targeted Elites)

Date:

Dear Prospective Participant,

My name is Kevin Leonard, a graduate student at Walden University conducting a survey on US drone policy overseas and within this country. I sent you an invitation letter asking for your participation in my survey and the survey itself. If you have completed the survey already when you received this follow-up, please accept my sincere thanks and ignore this email. However, if you have not completed the survey, please do so in order to help me complete my research project with the link provided below. I greatly appreciate your participation. If you have any questions at all, please feel free to call me at [redacted]. Your opinion on drones is extremely valuable to me gaining insight on how you view this issue, as well as helping me fulfill my educational endeavors. Thanks again for your help.

SURVEY LINK

Sincerely,

Kevin Leonard