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Evaluating U.S. Counterterrorism Policy on Domestic Terrorism Using the Global Terrorism Database

Colleen Michelle Kennedy
Walden University

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Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Colleen M. Kennedy

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2019

Abstract

Evaluating U.S. Counterterrorism Policy on Domestic Terrorism Using the Global
Terrorism Database

by

Colleen M. Kennedy

MA, West Virginia University, 1998

BA, Illinois Wesleyan University, 1995

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration – Terrorism, Mediation, and Peace

Walden University

August 2019

Abstract

The United States has a long history of domestic terrorism, yet U.S. counterterrorism policy has focused almost completely on the threat from international terrorism. The gap in the literature was the absence of an empirical evaluation of U.S. counterterrorism policy on domestic terrorism in general. The purpose of this quantitative study was to describe the impact of 21st century U.S. counterterrorism policy on incidence, lethality, and cost of domestic terrorism using data from the Global Terrorism Database. The multiple streams framework and the power elite theory were used. In this longitudinal trend study using secondary data analysis, domestic terrorism data were analyzed from 749 terrorist attacks using descriptive statistics, visual analysis, and the series hazard model to examine any changes in the frequency and hazard of domestic terrorism in relation to the following 5 policies: USA PATRIOT Act, USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and USA FREEDOM Act. The results empirically supported the greater threat of domestic terrorism and showed that domestic terrorism changed in relation to counterterrorism policy. Further, the addition of the series hazard model in the analysis of domestic terrorism following policy implementation added additional depth to the results. This study contributed to positive social change by providing policy makers and counterterrorism agencies with an empirical, evidence-based method for evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy and for a non-partisan, non-political, evidence-based method for quantitatively determining terrorist threat.

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my late grandmother, Stella Petroske. I had hoped you would be present on the day I earned my Ph.D. but I know you are watching over me with pride. Your lifelong encouragement to follow my heart and fight for what I want in life has helped me remain resilient through all of the highs and lows of my life. Your unconditional acceptance for who I am and the choices I made can never be repaid. I am the person I am today in part because of you.

I dedicate this dissertation to all of the victims of terrorism, in the United States and worldwide. I hope that this dissertation and my future research will help in preventing future attacks and contribute towards a more resilient society and a culture of peace.

When facing the terrorist threat and responding with resilience, I am reminded of the following words of the late martial artist, actor, and philosopher, Bruce Lee: “Be like water making its way through cracks. Do not be assertive, but adjust to the object, and you shall find a way around or through it. If nothing within you stays rigid, outward things will disclose themselves. Empty your mind. Be formless, shapeless, like water. If you put water into a cup, it becomes the cup. You put water into a bottle and it becomes the bottle. You put it in a teapot, it becomes the teapot. Now, water can flow or it can crash. Be water, my friend.”

Acknowledgments

To my parents, Pat and Charlotte Kennedy, I can never fully express how much your patience, understanding, and encouragement has helped me as I accomplished my dream. Thank you for understanding when I fell behind in my duties as webmaster, secretary, and board member to our non-profit organization, Sgt. P's Lapghans for Veterans. Five years and over 3,000 complimentary lapghans later, we are still going forward. Thank you for picking up the slack when I was glued to my computer for hours and days on end as I worked on my dissertation.

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To my friends and family, thank you for staying with me and supporting me. I truly appreciate your encouragement and patience.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Terrorism is a ubiquitous problem that has existed since antiquity (Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Domestic terrorism involves terrorism perpetrated by citizens of the nation of which and within which they are targeting. In the United States, the majority of terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by domestic terrorists; however, U.S. counterterrorism policies have focused on threats from international terrorists (Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Elements of these U.S. counterterrorism policies focusing on international terrorism may have impact on the operations of domestic terrorists. In this study, I examined the impact that U.S. counterterrorism policy has had on domestic terrorism in the 21st century by using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). This study contributes to positive social change by providing an empirical model for evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy's impact on domestic terrorism. By relying on empirical data, this study offers an evidence-based approach to evaluating counterterrorism policy.

Beginning with discussion of the background of domestic terrorism and U.S. counterterrorism policy, in Chapter 1 I build up the rationale for this quantitative longitudinal study by stating the problem, identifying the purpose of the study, listing the research questions and hypotheses, and describing the theoretical frameworks that were employed. From these elements, I continue Chapter 1 with a description of the nature of the study, operational definitions for key variables, assumptions of the study, the scope

and delimitations of the study, and the limitations of the study. I conclude Chapter 1 with the significance of the study for creating positive social change.

Background of the Study

Research on terrorism has been increasing as data on terrorism have become more accessible. In addition, as governments globally combat terrorism, counterterrorism policies aimed at preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorism have increased in frequency of implementation (Abrams, 2006; Bassiouni 1988, 2002; Bazan, 2004; Berman, 2016; Bjelopera, 2017; Crenshaw, 2014; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017). What has been missing from these policies, which tend to be costly, is any suggestion of a way to evaluate the effectiveness of such policies. While examinations of the links between government policy and political violence (extremism, terrorism, etc.) have increased, much of the research has focused on the threat from international terrorism rather than domestic terrorism (LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Silva, Duran, Freilich, & Chermak, 2019). The studies that have examined domestic terrorism have not been conducted as frequently for the United States (Avdan & Uzonyi, 2017; Barros, 2003; Enders, Sandler, & Gaibullov, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Shor, 2016). Research that has focused on U.S. domestic terrorism has not included an empirical analysis of domestic terrorist activity in relation to existing U.S. counterterrorism policy, instead focusing on specific terrorist organizations or ideologies (Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Carson, 2014; Carson, LaFree, & Dugan, 2012; Deshpande & Ernst, 2012; Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005; Gonzalez, Freilich, & Chermak, 2014; Hewitt, 2005; Hsu, Vasquez, & McDowall, 2018; Klausen et

al., 2016; Klein, Gruenewald, & Smith, 2017; LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009; Lemanski & Wilson, 2016; Makin & Hoard, 2014; Miller, 2017; Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, 2018; Potter, 2013; Quinn, 2016; Subedi, 2017; Williams, 2018).

The U.S. counterterrorism policies I included in this study are those that have provisions that may impact domestic terrorism either specifically or as an extension of provisions aimed at curbing international terrorism. In addition, these selected policies received major media attention, ensuring that information about these provisions was readily available. These policies listed in chronological order are: the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) of 2006, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, and the Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline over Monitoring (USA FREEDOM) Act of 2015.

The gap in the literature is that changes in domestic terrorism have not been evaluated in relation to the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21st century. This research fills this important gap in the literature by utilizing empirical data to examine the impact that 21st century U.S. counterterrorism policies have had on domestic terrorism. This research provides policy makers with evidence on which to base policy development in addition to making decisions regarding existing counterterrorism policy.

In this study, I used two theoretical approaches. Kingdon (2011) introduced the multiple streams framework (MSF) in 1984 as a method of explaining agenda setting in public policy. Since then, researchers have extended and applied MSF to a range of governments, policies, and levels of governance (Zohlnhofer, Herweg, & Rub, 2015). Birkland (1997, 2004, 2006) has used MSF to explain policy following focusing events including natural disasters and acts of terrorism. However, MSF is unable to adequately explain the inconsistency between U.S. counterterrorism policy's focus on the threat of international terrorism and the actual threat from domestic terrorism. Therefore, from conflict theory in sociology, I used the power elite theory developed by C.W. Mills (1956) and extended by Domhoff (1970, 1990) to assess the role that power plays in U.S. counterterrorism policy. These two theoretical approaches complement each other by compensating for each other's weaknesses.

Terrorism has been a form of political violence globally for centuries. However, identifying and defining what terrorism is has remained a challenge (Berkebile, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Carpenter, 2018; Crenshaw, 1995, [2009] 2012; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Enders, Sandler, & Gaibullov, 2011; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Norris, 2017; Ronczkowski, 2018; Rummel, 1994; Sandler, 2014; Terrorism, 2011). Because the forms that terrorism takes are diverse and have evolved, developing one agreed-upon definition has been challenging. However, there are elements that are present in all definitions of terrorism: premeditation; intentionality; the use or threat of use of fear, terror, and/or violence; ideological, political, economic, religious, and/or social objectives; and its use

as a means to an end. Terrorism may be perpetrated by the State as a method of social control for its population, and it may be perpetrated by sub-national actors against the State, a collection of nations, and/or other sub-national actors (Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Rummel, 1994).

Difficulties in defining terrorism have led to variations in approaches to countering the terrorist threat. In terms of non-State terrorism, a balance must be reached between national security and civil liberties (Abrams, 2006; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). In the United States, counterterrorism policy has focused on the threat from international terrorists even though most of the terrorist activity within and against the United States has been perpetrated by domestic terrorists (Hewitt, 2003; LaFree, 2011; Silva et al., 2019). Furthermore, by its nature, counterterrorism policy and approaches are costly (Brzoska, 2016; R.A. Clarke, 2004; Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Danzell & Zidek, 2013; Enders & Sandler, 2012; McGuire, 2013; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Nash, 2017; Pokalova, 2015; Qvortrup, 2016; Ronczkowski, 2018). As such, it follows that there would be evaluation of such policies to ensure that the money invested is justified; yet, such evaluation has not been written into U.S. counterterrorism policy. Individual agencies that are part of the counterterrorism effort may evaluate their own agency's effectiveness regarding the role they play in counterterrorism efforts, but those evaluations are only part of the larger issue of whether counterterrorism policy is effective.

Attempts at evaluating counterterrorism policy have produced mixed results. Variation in approaches, type of data used, conceptualization and operationalization of

terms, and levels of analyses have complicated the creation of a standardized method of evaluating counterterrorism policy (Brzoska, 2016; Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Danzell & Zidek, 2013; De Lint & Kassa, 2015; Dietrich, 2014; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Enders et al., 2011; Freese, 2014; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Lindahl, 2017; Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2006, 2008; McQuire, 2013; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Pokalova, 2015; Qvortrup, 2016; Safer-Lichtenstein, LaFree, & Loughran, 2017; Sandler, 2014; Schwinn, 2016; Shor, 2016; Van Dongen, 2011; Williams, 2018). With such variability in past attempts at evaluating counterterrorism policy, there is a need for a systematic, evidence-based, empirical method to evaluate counterterrorism policy.

With increased technological capabilities, more data on terrorist activity are available presently than ever before. Some of these databases are open access, while others remain classified. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) has several databases available regarding the issues of conflict, extremism, and terrorism. The GTD is a database of all non-State terrorist events that have occurred around the world from 1970 to 2017 (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007). The database is updated annually and is organized such that researchers can use it in empirical analyses of terrorism.

Researchers have primarily used the GTD to compare terrorism across nations or examine terrorism within a single nation. The GTD can be used to evaluate domestic terrorism within the United States, and Berkebile (2017) has offered a model by which the data from the GTD may be filtered so that only domestic terrorist events are included.

The GTD has been used in temporal analyses of terrorism (Hsu, Vasquez, & McDowell, 2018; LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009) as well as in case study analysis of terrorism (DeLeeuw & Pridemore, 2018). In addition, researchers have proposed the series hazard model as a method of evaluating the impact of interventions on temporal changes in terrorism (Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Dugan & Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). Specifically, LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) used the GTD to examine the effect of specific British counterterrorism interventions on terrorism in Northern Ireland. I applied this model to the United States in this study.

With the costs of counterterrorism policies, the balance of national security versus civil liberties, and the ongoing threat of terrorism, it would be useful for policy makers to have an empirical method of evaluating existing counterterrorism policy. By providing evidence upon which counterterrorism policy can be developed and evaluated, this study fills the gap in the literature regarding evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy with regards to the greater threat, domestic terrorism. The purpose of this study was to examine U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century, focusing only on those policies that have elements that may impact domestic terrorist activities and examining what, if any, impact those policies have had on domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs.

Statement of the Problem

The GTD has logged non-State terrorism incidents from 1970 to 2017 and provides researchers the opportunity to quantitatively analyze terrorism by a range of variables (Berkebile, 2017; LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], 2018b). Although

researchers have used data from the GTD to evaluate counterterrorism policy in other countries (Berkbile, 2012, 2017; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009) and have been applied to assessing international terrorist threats to the United States (Hsu et al., 2018; LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009), the problem is that the GTD has not been used to examine the impact that U.S. counterterrorism policies have had on domestic terrorism in general.

Governments face difficulties in effectively preventing and responding to terrorist attacks. In the United States, terrorism had been treated like other crimes, with no special status or prosecution until 1990 when international terrorism was added to the *United States Code* (Antiterrorist Act, 1990; Federal Courts Administration Act [FCAA], 1992; Hewitt, 2003; Naftali, 2005; Terrorism, 2011). Since then, counterterrorism policy has focused on the threat of international terrorism including State-sponsored terrorism and foreign terrorist organizations attacking the United States and its interests at home and abroad (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [AEDPA], 1996; Antiterrorist Act, 1990; Hewitt, 2003; Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, 2007; Naftali, 2005; Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act, 1986; Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism [USA PATRIOT] Act, 2001; Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline over Monitoring [USA FREEDOM] Act, 2015). It was not until 2001 that domestic terrorism was given special status for investigation (Naftali, 2005; Terrorism, 2011; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). Even though the focus of much of the U.S. counterterrorism policy has been on international terrorism,

elements of the policies passed following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks may affect domestic terrorism.

Previous researchers have attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism policies but have not universally employed evidence-based evaluation using empirical data even though there have been suggestions that such analyses are the future of terrorism and counterterrorism analyses (Brzoska, 2016; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; de Lint & Kassa, 2015; Freese, 2014; Lum et al., 2006, 2008; Sandler, 2014; Van Dongen, 2011). Because of the diversity of approaches to evaluating counterterrorism policy, the results of such evaluations have been mixed. The gap in the literature is that changes in domestic terrorism have not been evaluated in relation to the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21st century. This research fills this important gap in the literature and via my use of empirical data to examine the impact of 21st century U.S. counterterrorism policies on domestic terrorism. Policy makers may use the results from this study to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism policy and offer empirical support for or against the continuance of existing policies or for development of new policies. The social change implications of this study involve providing policymakers with an empirical, evidence-based evaluation and enhancing safety within the United States by identifying effective policies that reduce the threat of domestic terrorism.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this quantitative study was to describe the impact of 21st century U.S. counterterrorism policy on incidence, lethality, and cost of domestic terrorism. The

independent variable was counterterrorism policy. Counterterrorism policy was operationalized as U.S. legislation or policy aimed at preventing, reducing, countering, or responding to acts of terrorism, domestic or international. The dependent variables were incidence of domestic terrorism as measured by number of domestic terrorist incidents, lethality of domestic terrorism as measured by whether there were casualties, fatalities, and hostages taken during domestic terrorist incidents, and the costs of domestic terrorism as measured by the amount of property damage incurred, ransom paid, and monies budgeted and spent by the U.S. government for counterterrorism policy. I operationalized domestic terrorism in the United States as premeditated, intentional acts or threats of acts of violence intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian population and/or the government to achieve some political, religious, economic, ideological, and/or social objective(s) and perpetrated by a U.S. citizen or resident. A key element of the operational definition of US domestic terrorism is the use of terror and fear as a strategy of coercion. I analyzed U.S. domestic terrorism data from the GTD using descriptive statistics and the series hazard model to describe the risk of domestic terrorist activity (incidence, lethality, costs) following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. All data were analyzed using SPSS software.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

This study addressed six central research questions (RQs). For each research question, there are five sub questions (SQs), one for each specific U.S. counterterrorism policy that I evaluated. The null and alternative hypotheses for each RQ and SQ are

included below. The first three RQs were answered using descriptive statistics. The last three RQs were answered using the series hazard model.

RQ1: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

H_01 : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H_11 : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ1A: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H_01A : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

H_11A : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ1B: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

H_01B : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

H_11B : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ1C: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

H_01C : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

H_11C : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ1D: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

H_01D : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

H_11D : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ1E: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

H_01E : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

H_11E : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ2: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

H_02 : Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H_12 : Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ2A: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H_02A : Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

H_12A : Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ2B: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

H_02B : Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

H_12B : Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ2C: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

H_02C : Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

H_12C : Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ2D: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

*H*₀2D: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

*H*₁2D: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ2E: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

*H*₀2E: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

*H*₁2E: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ3: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

*H*₀3: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

*H*₁3: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ3A: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

*H*₀3A: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

*H*₁3A: domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ3B: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

H_0 3B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

H_1 3B: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ3C: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

H_0 3C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

H_1 3C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ3D: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

H_0 3D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

H_{13D} : Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ3E: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

H_{03E} : Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

H_{13E} : Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ4: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

H_{04} : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H_{14} : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ4A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H_{04A} : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

H_{14A} : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ4B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

H_0 4B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

H_1 4B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ4C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

H_0 4C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

H_1 4C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ4D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

H_0 4D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

H_1 4D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ4E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

H₀4E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

H₁4E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ5: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?

H₀5: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event increases following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H₁5: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event decreases following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ5A: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H₀5A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

H₁5A: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ5B: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

H_05B : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

H_15B : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ5C: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

H_05C : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

H_15C : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ5D: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

H_05D : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

H_15D : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ5E: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

H₀5E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

H₁5E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ6: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?

H₀6: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H₁6: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ6A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H₀6A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

H₁6A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ6B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

*H*₀6B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

*H*₁6B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ6C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

*H*₀6C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

*H*₁6C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ6D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

*H*₀6D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

*H*₁6D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ6E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

H₀6E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

H₁6E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

Theoretical Frameworks of the Study

For this study's theoretical frameworks, I employed the MSF from the field of public policy and the power elite theory from conflict theory within sociology. The MSF involves the convergence of three streams (problem, policy, and political) at a particular period of time (policy window) that influence the development and implementation of policy (Birkland, 1997, 2004, 2006, 2009; Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlnhofer, 2018; Kingdon, 2011; Zahariadis, 2007, 2014, 2015; Zohlnhofer, Herweg, & Hub, 2016; Zohlnhofer et al., 2015). Conflict theorist C.W. Mills (1956) introduced his analysis of how power operates at the national level in the United States and described the United States as being under control of the power elite, which is comprised of the corporate elite, the military elite, and the political elite. Domhoff (1970, 1990) extended Mills' power elite in terms of policy development and implementation in the United States, suggesting that U.S. policy is influenced by factors outside of national interest, specifically factors motivated by politics. Both of these theories were useful in examining how U.S. counterterrorism policy is developed and adapted and why there has been an emphasis on international terrorist threats rather than the most urgent of threats, domestic terrorists.

Nature of the Study

I used a quantitative approach in this longitudinal trend study involving secondary data analysis. I compiled a chronology of U.S. counterterrorism policy to use when analyzing incidence, lethality, and costs of U.S. domestic terrorist incidents from the GTD from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 (START, 2018a). The U.S. counterterrorism policies included were those that have provisions that may impact domestic terrorism either specifically or as an extension of provisions aimed at curbing international terrorism. These policies listed in chronological order are: the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, the AETA of 2006, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

My research methodology included a quantitative analysis of existing terrorism data from the GTD in combination with a chronology of U.S. counterterrorism policy. The examined trend data were incidence, lethality, and cost of domestic terrorism in the United States from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017. To establish a baseline of domestic terrorism prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, and because data from 1993 are incomplete in the GTD, I used domestic terrorism data from January 1, 1994 to October 25, 2001 (START, 2018b). Using SPSS software, I organized and analyzed the GTD data in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy by using descriptive statistics and the series hazard model.

Definitions

The independent variables of this study were the following U.S. counterterrorism policies: the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (enacted October 26, 2001), the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (enacted March 9, 2006), the AETA of 2006 (enacted November 27, 2006), Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (enacted August 3, 2007), and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (enacted June 2, 2015). The dependent variables were the following indicators of domestic terrorism: incidence, lethality, and costs.

Definitions of terrorism vary based on the individual or organization defining it (Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Ronczkowski, 2018; Rummel, 1994; Sandler, 2014; Silke, 2019).

Terrorism is operationally defined as the premeditated, intentional use of or threat of use of fear, terror, and/or violence in order to coerce or influence an audience beyond the immediate victims towards a political, economic, religious, and/or social objective (Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Ronczkowski, 2018; Rummel, 1994; Sandler, 2014; Terrorism, 2011).

Domestic terrorism is operationally defined as premeditated, intentional acts or threats of acts of violence intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian population and/or the government to achieve some political, religious, economic, ideological, and/or social objective(s) and perpetrated by a citizen or resident of the country within which the acts or threats are aimed. For U.S. domestic terrorism, the perpetrators must be U.S. citizens or residents, and the attacks must be planned or

executed within the territorial boundaries of the United States (Berkebile, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Carpenter, 2018; Crenshaw, 1995, [2009] 2012; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Enders et al., 2011; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Norris, 2017; Ronczkowski, 2018; Sandler, 2014).

To measure U.S. domestic terrorism, I evaluated three indicators in relation to the independent variables. These indicators are (a) incidence of domestic terrorism; (b) lethality of domestic terrorism as measured by whether there were casualties, fatalities, and hostages taken during domestic terrorist incidents; and (c) the costs of domestic terrorism as measured by whether property damage occurred, the amount of property damage incurred if available, ransom paid if applicable, and monies budgeted and spent by the U.S. government for counterterrorism policy (Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Brzoska, 2016; Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Danzell & Zidek, 2013; De Lint & Kassa, 2015; Dietrich, 2014; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Enders et al., 2011; Freese, 2014; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Lindahl, 2017; Lum et al., 2006, 2008; McQuire, 2013; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Pokalova, 2015; Qvortrup, 2016; Safer-Lichtenstein et al., 2017; Sandler, 2014; Schwinn, 2016; Shor, 2016; Van Dongen, 2011; Williams, 2018).

The GTD ranks property damage from a terrorist attack across four categories: catastrophic (likely equal to or greater than \$1 billion), major (likely equal to or greater than \$1 million but less than \$1 billion), minor (likely less than \$1 million), and unknown (START, 2018b). If there were kidnapping and/or hostage-taking incidents that included

the payment of ransom, I analyzed those expenditures. For ransom data, the GTD provides the confirmed amount paid, if known (START, 2018b).

Prior researchers who have examined lethality have focused on measuring lethality only as the number of fatalities; however, casualties (injuries) and hostage-taking should also be considered when determining lethality (Asal et al., 2015; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Carson & Suppenbach, 2018; Caspi, Freilich, & Chermak, 2012; Edwards et al., 2016; Enders & Sandler, 2000; Nilsson, 2018; Olzak, 2016; Palfy, 2003; Phillips, 2017; Sheehan, 2009; Simon & Benjamin, 2000; Wilson & Lemanski, 2013). The choice to plan and take hostages increases the probability of someone being killed or injured; thus, I coded hostage incidents as lethal. Hsu et al. (2018) specifically noted the importance of utilizing data on injuries and fatalities for future research. Therefore I examined fatalities, casualties, and hostages taken to determine lethality.

Assumptions

My first assumption was that the selected U.S. counterterrorism policies have impacted U.S. domestic terrorist activities without accounting for other factors such as internal dynamics within the terrorist organization, changes in law enforcement practices and policies, availability of materials to execute an attack, and societal changes that addressed the motivating factors of the domestic terrorists. For example, increases in recycling, use of renewable energy sources, development and use of more fuel-efficient vehicles, availability of vegan options at restaurants and in stores may have addressed some of the motivating factors of some of the domestic eco-terrorists. Prior researchers have approached the study of terrorism by utilizing a subset of indicators of terrorist

activity in relation to governmental intervention, either through policy or military use (Avdan & Uzonyi, 2017; Barros, 2003; Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Carson, 2014; Carson et al., 2012; DeLeeuw & Pridemore, 2018; De Lint & Kassa, 2015; Despande & Ernst, 2012; Dietrich, 2014; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Enders et al., 2011; Freese, 2014; Hewitt, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Hsu et al., 2018; Klein et al., 2017; LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009; Lum et al., 2006, 2008; Martin, 2018; McConnell, 2010; Nacos, 2016; Nash, 2017; Quinn, 2016; Reed, 2013; Ronczkowski, 2018; Safer-Lichtenstein et al., 2017; Sandler, 2014; Shor, 2016; Van Dongen, 2011; Williams, 2018).

I made two assumptions regarding use of the GTD. The first was that the GTD contains all U.S. domestic terrorist incidents within the time frame of interest for this study (1994-2017). The second was that the information about these U.S. domestic terrorist incidents are updated with the most recent and accurate information. The START researchers provide transparency in the GTD codebook so that other researchers have confidence in the accuracy of the GTD data as well as a clear understanding of how the variables provided were identified and coded (START, 2018a, 2018b). Furthermore, the GTD has been used in a range of studies examining terrorism either alone or in combination with supplementary data (Avdan & Uzonyi, 2017; Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Carson, 2014; Carson et al., 2012; DeLeeuw & Pridemore, 2018; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Hsu et al., 2018; LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; LaFree, Dugan, &

Korte, 2009; LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009; Safer-Lichtenstein et al., 2017; Sandler, 2014).

Scope and Delimitations

In this study, I examined the entire population of U.S. domestic terrorist incidents identified in the GTD from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017. Using the same model and analysis used by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) to analyze terrorism in Northern Ireland in relation to British government intervention, I used the series hazard model to examine the impact that five U.S. counterterrorism policies have had on domestic terrorism. Berkebile (2017) identified the specific method by which the GTD could be filtered to only include domestic terrorist events. The availability of the GTD, its use by other scholars investigating terrorism, and the transparency with which the database authors communicate their methods were the factors that influenced my decision to use the GTD as the primary data source for this study. The U.S. counterterrorism policies that I selected were a purposive sample of policies that included elements that may impact domestic terrorist activity and those that received media attention. Therefore, applying an established statistical analysis and model for evaluating governmental intervention on terrorist activity to the United States was a logical next step in examining U.S. domestic terrorism.

There has been a recent trend in researchers' attempts to apply criminological theory to terrorism; however terrorism is very different from traditional crime. Terrorism is a strategy for change and thus the factors that motivate terrorists are different than those that motivate most criminals. While there are some criminological theories that

may be appropriate or applicable to terrorism, such as deterrence and rational choice theory, my focus in this study was on the disconnect between the focus of counterterrorism policy and the problem of domestic terrorism (see Decker, 2015; Loughran, Paternoster, & Weiss, 2015; Ruggiero, 2006). Therefore, I did not use criminological theories in this study. The study of terrorism is an interdisciplinary endeavor which allows for a large array of theories to be used in its analysis. Because I focused on counterterrorism policy in the United States, Kingdon's (2011) MSF was an appropriate theoretical framework to employ to address the varying factors that lead to counterterrorism policy development. To address the weaknesses in the MSF for addressing the paradox of U.S. counterterrorism policy and because of my emphasis on social factors leading to terrorism, I employed the power elite theory from sociology's conflict theory. For the scope of this study, these two theoretical perspectives were the best options for explaining the results.

For the statistical analyses of the data, time-series analyses and the use of estimators of data have dominated this area of study; however, these analyses have internal validity concerns (Dugan, 2011). In contrast, the series hazard model, which is intuitively more appropriate to examine changes in risk based on specific policy implementations while accounting for the passage of time, has only more recently been used to examine the impact of policy on terrorism (Carson, 2014; Dugan et al., 2005; Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). Because policy evaluation is an event, the series hazard model may be a more accurate statistical approach to other time series analyses (Dugan, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009).

Limitations

There were several limitations to this study. The GTD does not list perpetrator nationality in its public dataset, which required me to engage in supplementary research on specific terrorist events to attempt to determine if they qualified as domestic terrorism. The GTD does have codes to identify if an event was ideologically international, logistically international, miscellaneous international, and any international (START, 2018b). However, these codes do not allow for clear understanding of what may be considered domestic terrorism or not. For example, Puerto Rican separatist groups are coded as not logistically international but ideologically international, which further leads them to be listed as international under the miscellaneous and any categories (START, 2018a). However, Puerto Rican separatist groups are comprised of U.S. citizens engaging in terrorism against its ruling government, thus it would fit the definition of domestic terrorism. In addition, radical environmental and radical animal rights terrorists (i.e., eco-terrorists) are listed as ideologically international and although technically they are, most do not execute attacks outside of their native country or country of residence. To address this limitation, for terrorist incidents that occurred in the United States but did not have perpetrator information associated with it in the GTD, I reviewed the sources listed by the GTD as well as additional open source data to attempt to uncover more detail as to the perpetrator nationality. Terrorist attacks with unknown perpetrator nationality were labeled as unknown and analyzed separately.

In addition, there are limitations to using a database built on open-source data. Media reports tend to occur in real time with limited and sometimes inaccurate

information provided in initial reporting (Dugan & Distler, 2017). Therefore, there is risk that some of the events may include inaccurate or incomplete information. In addition, because media studies have shown that consumers are disproportionately interested in violent or sensational events, there may be selection bias in terms of which stories media outlets report and publish online or in print (Chermak, Freilich, Parkin, & Lynch, 2012; Dugan & Distler, 2017). However, it is precisely for those reasons that many terrorists seek to gain the attention of the media and use it to spread their message to the larger audience (Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016).

While there is variation in approaches to evaluating counterterrorism policy, policy makers would find an evidence-based approach that involves empirical data to be more useful compared to strictly theoretical assertions or the limited generalizability of qualitative research. While qualitative research would uncover a more in-depth analysis of each event, because of the longitudinal nature of this study, I preferred a quantitative analysis. By using the methods and models employed by other researchers who have used the GTD, I sought to contribute to the growing literature using the GTD for policy analysis via the series hazard model. In addition, because I used public and open-source data, policymakers who may not be affiliated with institutions that allow access to classified or otherwise proprietary information will have an easier time accessing the information that this study was founded on.

There is the possibility that I was biased in how I selected the specific U.S. counterterrorism policies included in this study. I examined all policies related to counterterrorism for the time frame of interest and included only those that contained

elements that may impact domestic terrorist activities. It is possible that my interpretation of what elements may impact domestic terrorist activities may have been too narrow or too broad. In addition, because many pieces of legislation pass and frequently contain provisions and elements unrelated to the main focus of the legislation, the new laws may not be well-known to the general public and to terrorists. To correct for this limitation, I focused on high-profile U.S. counterterrorism policies and examined any challenges to those policies to identify areas of concern that may overlap with citizens' rights and thus would garner greater media attention. This way the media attention that the specific U.S. counterterrorism policy generated would mean that the probability that domestic terrorists have heard of the policy and its provisions are higher than if a counterterrorism provision was added on to a piece of legislation unrelated to counterterrorism.

While this was a quantitative study, my choice to use the methods and models of researchers associated with START and the GTD as well as those who have also used the GTD as a data source may have some bias in terms of approach. While reviewing the literature regarding evaluating counterterrorism policy, I found that there were distinct groups of researchers who were entrenched in their approach while dismissing alternatives. While I did not find any similar acrimonious writings with regards to the GTD or the series hazard model, it is possible that a similar dynamic may exist with regards to utilizing empirical data to study terrorism.

Significance of the Study

This research fills an important gap in the literature by linking empirical data on domestic terrorism to U.S. counterterrorism policy. The results may be used in support of

or in development of more effective counterterrorism policies by evaluating the effectiveness of 21st century counterterrorism policy in the United States with regards to domestic terrorism, thereby contributing to positive social change. Furthermore, the model I employed in this study offers a non-partisan, non-political, evidence-based method of quantifying the terrorist threat.

Domestic terrorism remains an imminent threat to U.S. citizens' and residents' daily lives, one that is not restricted to region, age, or socioeconomic status. Hewitt (2003) observed that in the immediate response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, terrorism was viewed by many Americans as something new and unexperienced, yet the United States had experienced at least 3,000 terrorist incidents between 1954 and 2000. The majority of these incidents were perpetrated by U.S. citizens and not foreign terrorist organizations (Hewitt, 2003; LaFree, 2011; Silva et al., 2019). Building off of LaFree's (2011) examination of myths about terrorism globally by using data from the GTD, Silva, Duran, Freililch, and Chermak (2019) examined empirical data to evaluate the veracity of six beliefs found in popular discourse in the United States (specifically, beliefs that terrorism incidents are increasing, terrorism incidents are becoming more lethal, terrorism attacks are perpetrated by international terrorists, these international terrorists are jihadist-inspired extremists, these terrorists are of Arab descent, and these terrorists are operating in organized groups). Silva et al. found that rather than supporting the popular discourse, according to empirical data analyzed from 1995 to 2017, terrorist attacks in the United States are decreasing in incidence and are decreasing in lethality. In addition, the

terrorists tend to be White, far-right extremists who are not members of an organized group, but rather lone wolves (Silva et al., 2019).

These results, in combination with data from the GTD, show the continuing higher incidence of domestic terrorism, yet the focus of counterterrorism policy and strategy remains on international threats (START, 2018a). The gap in the literature is that changes in domestic terrorism have not been evaluated in relation to the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21st century, specifically in terms of incidence, lethality, and costs of domestic terrorism. Therefore, there was a need to examine domestic terrorism in the United States in relation to existing counterterrorism policy in order to identify policy areas that may be useful in decreasing incidence, lethality, and costs of domestic terrorism.

Identifying effective policies aimed at reducing the threat of domestic terrorism would be an important step towards positive social change by enhancing safety within the United States. Evaluating the impact of existing counterterrorism policy on domestic terrorism may inform future counterterrorism policy aimed at domestic terrorism. A unified model that can be employed by policy makers and counterterrorism agencies in identifying and measuring the terrorist threat will better guide counterterrorism approaches. Domestic terrorism is an imminent threat in the United States, and research aimed at providing empirical evidence of the effectiveness of policies that may decrease that threat inherently contribute to positive social change.

Summary

Terrorism is a longstanding global problem. In the United States, the primary threat comes from domestic terrorists, but U.S. counterterrorism policy has focused on the rarer threat of international terrorism. Even though this paradox exists, U.S. counterterrorism provisions continue to be developed and renewed without any specific empirical data to support their effectiveness. This study fills the gap in the literature in terms of using empirical data from the GTD to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century. I used two theoretical approaches in this study: the MSF from public policy and the power elite theory as part of conflict theory from sociology. I filtered and analyzed the GTD data by using established measures (Berkebile, 2017; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). I used descriptive statistics and visual analysis to describe domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy. I used the series hazard model to analyze the risk of domestic terrorism following the implementation of five U.S. counterterrorism policies. Chapter 2 will provide a review of the literature I used to (a) understand the MSF and the power elite theory, (b) clarify and conceptualize domestic terrorism, (c) develop an overview of US counterterrorism policy and approaches to evaluating counterterrorism policy, and (d) justify the methods I used for this study.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Terrorism is a ubiquitous problem that has existed since antiquity (Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). The focus of much of the U.S. counterterrorism policy has been on international terrorism; however, elements of the policies passed following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks may have affected domestic terrorism. LaFree and Freilich (2019) noted that scholarly examinations of the link between extremism (including terrorism) and government policy have been increasing recently. However, most of these studies have focused on international terror threats or extremism and terrorism in countries outside of the United States (LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Shor, 2016). The gap in the literature is that changes in domestic terrorism have not been evaluated in relation to the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21st century. The purpose of this study was to examine and describe domestic terrorism in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century. In this research, I worked to fill an important gap in the literature by using empirical data to examine the impact that 21st century U.S. counterterrorism policies have had on domestic terrorism.

Researchers have used many theories to understand the policy process in the United States; however, in the case of counterterrorism policy, the MSF is the most appropriate. To complement the MSF and the aspects that it fails to account for, I also used C.W. Mills' power elite theory from sociology's conflict theory. These theoretical frameworks complement each other in their applicability to the evolution and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

Chapter 2 covers my analysis and synthesis of empirical research on the MSF and power elite theory with regards to how they apply to U.S. policy regarding domestic counterterrorism. The first section contains the foundation, evolution, and application of the MSF and the power elite theory. The first section concludes with a review of the literature examining the MSF and the power elite theory independently in relation to U.S. policy process and counterterrorism policy specifically. In the second section, I describe the problem of domestic terrorism, the controversy regarding how it is defined, and past research approaches to describing this phenomenon. The third section contains information about the GTD regarding its development and usage. Included in the third section is my rationale for its use in this quantitative study. The fourth section covers the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism policy with regards to elements relevant to countering domestic terrorism. The fifth section provides a review of the literature examining approaches to measuring effectiveness of counterterrorism policy as well as the implications of each policy's mandates. The final section covers the quantitative analysis practices I used for this study.

Strategy for Searching the Literature

I reviewed primary sources including books, scholarly, peer-reviewed journal articles, federal government websites, federal government publications, legislation, and authoritative websites and reports. Federal government publications and legislation were accessed from federal government websites, the U.S. Government Publishing Office's govinfo.gov service, and the Digital National Security Archive and HeinOnline research databases. Using the Walden University library, I accessed articles from Google Scholar

and the following research databases: Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, Communication and Mass Media Complete, Criminal Justice Database, GreenFILE, Homeland Security Digital Library, International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, Political Science Complete, Project Muse, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Global, PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, Public Administration Abstracts, SAGE Journals, SAGE Stats, SocINDEX with Full Text, and Taylor and Francis Online.

Database searches involved use of the following key terms and phrases, in isolation and in combination: *9/11 commission, antigovernment, antiterrorism, antiterrorism laws, antiterrorism policy, conflict, counterterrorism, counterterrorism budget, counterterrorism evaluation, counterterrorism laws, counterterrorism policy, counterterrorism spending, department of homeland security budget, department of justice budget, domestic extremism, domestic terrorism, extremism, global terrorism database, hate, homegrown terrorism, homeland security, national security, policy evaluation, political violence, security, terrorism, terrorism data, United States, USA PATRIOT, and USA FREEDOM*. Variations of terms (e.g., terror, terrorism, terrorist) were used to ensure comprehensiveness and exhaustion of search results. I reviewed sources cited in relevant articles to ensure comprehensiveness of this literature review. I established key word alerts through Walden University library to ensure notification of newly published and newly accessed materials that may have been relevant to this study.

Theoretical Frameworks

In this study, I incorporated two theoretical frameworks, the MSF from the field of public policy, and the power elite theory from conflict theory from the field of sociology.

Multiple Streams Framework

The MSF was developed as a framework for better understanding the policy process—specifically, agenda setting. Kingdon (2011) introduced the MSF in 1984 and since then, researchers have applied it to all areas of the policy process beyond agenda setting (Zohlnhofer et al., 2015). Policy formation, from the identification of an issue in need of addressing to the research into various options in addressing that issue to the final development and implementation of policy, does not follow one path as it may appear to. Social problems change in terms of awareness, scope, and priority and are often intertwined with other social problems. Because many social problems are addressed through the formation and implementation of public policy, it follows that the policy process would manifest in a way that reflects the complexity of the social problem it addresses and the complexity of contemporary society within which it is seated.

The MSF offers one approach to creating a model to explain the policy process while remaining flexible enough to address a range of policies across a range of sociohistorical contexts. Additionally, it is robust enough to be applied to a range of systems (Beland & Howlett, 2016; Birkland, 1997, 2004, 2009, 2006; Howlett, McConnell, & Perl, 2016; Herweg, Hub, & Zohlnhofer, 2015; Jones et al., 2016; Mukherjee & Howlett, 2015; Winkel & Leipold, 2016; Zahariadis, 2007, 2015;

Zohlnhofer et al., 2015). At its core, the MSF approach describes the policy process as being informed by three, autonomous streams that converge at a critical time period to influence the creation of public policy (Kingdon, 2011). According to Kingdon (2011), the problem, policy, and political streams follow independent developmental trajectories but do converge at critical junctures. It is out of that convergence of streams that grow the largest policy changes (Kingdon, 2011). In the following subsections, I discuss the various elements of the MSF that I applied to the issue of counterterrorism policy in the United States.

Problem stream. Complex societies face numerous obstacles and social problems that hinder a stable, peaceful equilibrium. Whether a particular problem gains enough attention to warrant the formation of policy to address it depends upon numerous factors including who is affected, how they are affected, and how this social problem impacts other social institutions. While many social problems may be addressed due to regular monitoring of indicators involving budgetary expenses, deaths, and so on, there are times that a single event or string of events push a particular social problem to the forefront (Kingdon, 2011). *Focusing events* are events, crises, disasters, and other incidents that create pressure on policy makers to act and, depending upon the severity of the focusing event, to act swiftly (Birkland, 1996, 2006; Kingdon, 2011). Focusing events may bring attention to an existing social problem (the problem stream), providing an opportunity for policy to be developed and implemented. Figure 1 shows how the three autonomous streams converge to form policy.




Figure 1. Multiple streams framework.

Policy stream. The policy stream is the idea stream where potential solutions to social problems and policy issues are explored. At the heart of the policy stream are policy communities. Policy communities are composed of specialists for a particular policy issue or social problem. These specialists may be academics, researchers, consultants, analysts, political staffers, think tanks, and others whose primary concern or focus is on one specific policy issue or social problem (Kingdon, 2011). The diverse make-up and motivation of the individual members of the policy community allow for a variety of perspectives and an exchange of ideas and analyses regarding the specific policy issue or social problem.

Policy communities may be close-knit social groups or fragmented social aggregates. When greater fragmentation exists within the policy community, different

groups of specialists will operate without the knowledge of what other specialists in the same policy community are doing. When policy communities are close-knit, there runs the risk of groupthink that may hinder alternative perspectives. Depending upon the status of the specialist, different specialists' ideas will gain more attention than others (Kingdon, 2011).

The product of the policy stream is a policy proposal or a short list of policy proposals. There are a range of factors that can impact the policy stream from policy community size, cohesiveness, prevailing paradigms and ideologies, power, status, and available technologies. Consensus for the policy stream is developed through persuasion and diffusion (Kingdon, 2011).

Political stream. The political stream is composed of “public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and changes in administration” (Kingdon, 2011, p.145). With new administrations come new agendas and the tabling or abandonment of prior agendas. The political stream is heavily influenced by the agendas of political parties. The public mood involves how the public demonstrates their agenda priorities, either through social movements, public opinion polls, or direct contact with the media and politicians. According to Kingdon (2011), the ways that the national mood is measured come from communication between elected representatives and their constituents and from the rhetoric from politicians. Public trust in the accuracy of politicians' portrayals and interpretations of the national mood comes from the understanding that the politicians' jobs depend upon how satisfied their constituents are. This electoral accountability, however, does not work in areas where

there are no term limits, where gerrymandering is used, and where politicians run unopposed.

Additional aspects of the political stream are the organized political forces of pressure group campaigns from interest groups, political mobilization movements, and how political elites behave (Kingdon, 2011). For example, heavy pressure campaigns and mobilization from the pharmaceutical and health care industries successfully halted health care reform during the Clinton administration (Kingdon, 2011).

For the political stream, consensus comes from bargaining (Kingdon, 2011). Political coalitions are built and negotiate support for various acts of legislation by bargaining over concessions and amendments or by bargaining for support for other acts of legislation. Broad-based support, depending upon the political make-up of the legislative branch is necessary to move agenda items forward to be enacted into law. Therefore a policy entrepreneur's rank and connection to the decision-making portions of the political stream may impact which policy entrepreneur's agenda is pushed forward (Zahariadis, 2007; Zohlnhofer et al., 2016).

Policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs are individuals who dedicate resources towards the implementation of a policy when the problem stream, policy stream, and political stream converge. The policy entrepreneurs may not necessarily be members of the political system, but will have connections within the political system to get the policy on the agenda for consideration. Policy entrepreneurs may be members of the policy stream community who communicate to the general public and the government about the need for action on a particular problem (McGuire, 2013).

Policy windows. A policy window is the period in time when the three streams come together and create an opportunity for action on a particular policy. During a policy window, a particular policy becomes a priority for action; however, when the window opens and closes cannot be systematically predicted for all policy types. Policy windows tend to be of short duration and only open infrequently (Kingdon, 2011). Some policy windows cycle in a predictive pattern but others follow a more random path.

Focusing events. Birkland (1996, 2006) discussed the role that focusing events played on the policy process, providing a more detailed analysis from when Kingdon introduced the MSF in 1984. Focusing events are unexpected, unpredicted phenomena that can influence public policy (Birkland, 1996, 2006; Kingdon, 2011). A key feature of a focusing event is that it is a rare occurrence. Focusing events simultaneously make a social problem known to the general public and the policy entrepreneurs. However, not all catastrophic events are necessarily focusing events. Catastrophic events, including major terrorist attacks, can become focusing events when there is a rapid reaction to those events that lead to policy development and/or policy change (Birkland, 1996, 2006). For example, the terrorist attack perpetrated by Al Qaeda on the *USS Cole*, a U.S. Navy Destroyer that was anchored in Yemen, was not a focusing event; while the terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 were considered to be focusing events (Birkland, 2006; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Focusing events can impact all of the streams in the MSF leading to the opening of a policy window, which allows for rapid policy development and/or change. Focusing events are an important

area of study because they can be easily identified as the catalysts for policy development and/or change.

Assumptions of the MSF. There are three assumptions that must be articulated when employing the MSF to policy analysis. The first assumption involves the processing of information. From a micro level of analysis, information processing is viewed as occurring serially and with individuals only being able to process one piece of information at a time or attend to only one issue at a time (Zahariadis, 2007). However, the MSF is a macro-level theory and thus it is important to consider how labor is divided within a government. Because of this division of labor, rather than taking the view that information processing occurs serially, it can be argued that the entire system is able to process multiple pieces of information at the same time and attend to multiple issues concurrently. Therefore, when examining the time line for the streams, information processing should be understood as occurring in parallel (Zahariadis, 2007).

The second assumption of the MSF involves the time frame in which policy makers have to act. In many cases, policy makers operate within time constraints and especially in the context of crises must make decisions quickly. As such, they are not able to rationally select which policy areas should receive attention, rather they must act when a policy window opens and particularly after a focusing event (Zahariadis, 2007).

The final assumption of the MSF is the independence of the streams (Kingdon, 2011; Zahariadis, 2007). While the streams converge during policy windows, their individual evolution and development occur independent of the other streams. The political stream is more subject to national mood than the policy stream, which may focus

solely on a particular policy, independent of national mood. For example, the policy stream for counterterrorism had a policy ready for when the focusing events of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks occurred and the policy window opened. That is how the USA PATRIOT Act, a major piece of legislation, was able to be developed and passed within seven weeks (Howell, 2004; Naftali, 2005).

Application of the MSF to U.S. public policy. Kingdon's (2011) original introduction of the MSF involved the application of the framework to public policy issues related to health and transportation. In the most recent edition, Kingdon applied the MSF to the federal budget treatment from January to October of 1981, the tax reform act of 1986, the health care initiative in 1993, and health care reform initiative during the first-term of the Obama administration. Birkland (1996, 2006) provided a more in-depth analysis of focusing events in the MSF, which developed into a theory of focusing events. Birkland applied the theory of focusing events to policy development and change following disasters and other catastrophic events including natural disasters, nuclear power plant leaks, and national security. Ellington (2011) utilized the MSF to examine military policy during the George W. Bush administration in deciding to utilize private military contractors.

According to Herweg, Zahariadis, and Zohlnhofer (2018), since 1984, the MSF had been applied not only to U.S. public policy processes, but to public policy development in other countries operating under different political systems outside of the original purview of the framework. In addition, the MSF has been applied to a wide range of social problems; however, the result has been an increase in disagreement on the

efficacy of the MSF, rather than providing case-study support for the robustness of the MSF (Herweg et al., 2018; Jones et al., 2016). Jones et al. (2016) performed a content analysis on research articles utilizing the MSF from 2000 to 2013 and found that how the MSF was applied across the range of countries, levels of governance, and policy areas was inconsistent, demonstrating that there was no established method of utilizing the MSF.

Application of the MSF to terrorism and counterterrorism. The problem stream of terrorism has a long history in the United States and continues today. Terrorist attacks from Al Qaeda, other foreign terrorist organizations, and from domestic terrorists remain an ongoing issue (L. Clarke, 2006; Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Hewitt (2003) identified at least 3000 terrorist attacks between 1954 and 2000 in the United States. Birkland (2004, 2006, 2009) applied the MSF to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, examining the coordinated attacks as a focusing event and examining the policy change that immediately followed. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, all three streams converged to rapidly produce and pass the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

The policy stream was active prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Birkland, 2004). The national security issue of terrorism was not a new problem and had been addressed with a variety of policy measures; however, none had been as far-reaching as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. Until this point, policy aimed at addressing terrorism was restricted to foreign terrorist organizations and terrorism funding by State sponsors. In addition, terrorism was handled through an intelligence and law enforcement

approach (viz., AEDPA, 1996; Antiterrorism Act, 1990; FCAA, 1992; Federal Civil Defense Act, 1950; Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act [FISA], 1978; International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Amendment to the Trading With The Enemy Act, 1977; National Security Act, 1947; Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act, 1986; TWEA, 1917).

Within the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, drafts of provisions that had been part of the early versions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) were included (Naftali, 2005). In addition, had established policies and procedures been properly followed, it was possible that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks could have been prevented or at least, the damage, fatalities, and casualties minimized (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States [NCTAUS], 2004). Therefore, the problem and policy streams of terrorism were active long before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

The political stream was active before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but was not as visible until the policy window opened following the attacks. Long before these attacks, members of the political stream, namely the National Security Staff, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were focused on the threat from Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda (R.A. Clarke, 2004; Gunaratna, 2003; Naftali, 2005). Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda had officially declared war on the United States on August 23, 1996 and had been connected to the bombing at the World Trade Center in New York City on February 26, 1993, the attack on the *USS Cole* on October 12, 2000, and several embassy attacks prior to the September 11, 2001

terrorist attacks (R.A. Clarke, 2004; Gunaratna, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Naftali, 2005). The political stream was not only focused on the threat from Al Qaeda, but also concerned with the threat from domestic terrorists (R.A. Clarke, 2004; Levitas, 2002; Naftali, 2005). For example, R.A. Clarke (2004) specified his role in 1993 during the development of AEDPA as an update to the Antiterrorism Act of 1990. According to R.A. Clarke, four policy issues dominated the development of AEDPA – (a) was terrorism an intelligence (CIA) issue or a law enforcement (FBI) issue; (b) what was the role of the National Security Council and the White House with regards to domestic terrorism; (c) what role the federal government would have in dealing with victims of terrorism; and (d) was there a connection between weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

Immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the policy window opened for action, all three streams converged, and the political stream focused on passing legislation to prevent further attacks (Birkland, 2004, 2006, 2009). The policy entrepreneurs who had connections to the political stream, along with public pressure to act in response to the attacks, forced the political stream to act quickly. Seven weeks following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 was enacted into law (Birkland, 2006; Howell, 2004; Naftali, 2005; Scahill, 2006; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). The MSF is a sufficient theoretical framework for describing the agenda setting and policy process involved in the development of and passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

Limitations of the MSF. The MSF is not without its detractors. While the MSF has been used to attempt to explain the policy process by incorporating all of the elements involved in the creation and implementation of policy, there are areas that the application of the MSF struggles to explain. One of the primary assumptions of the MSF is the autonomy of the streams, however in practice; there are policy entrepreneurs that may operate across the streams at the same time before the streams officially converge during a policy window (Herweg et al., 2018). Additionally, the majority of the supporting research for the MSF involved qualitative methods and attempts to apply quantitative methods had resulted in greater variation in how elements of the MSF were operationally defined (Jones et al., 2016; Winkel & Leipold, 2016). While Birkland (2004, 2006, 2009) utilized the MSF to explain the creation of the USA PATRIOT Act in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks as a focusing event, the aptness of such an analysis falls apart when one examines the impact and aftermath of the USA PATRIOT Act and subsequent U.S. counterterrorism policies.

Thus as a single approach, the MSF would be insufficient to explain U.S. counterterrorism policy over time. In many cases, the MSF has been combined with other theories on public policy development; however, researchers using those combinations have struggled to explain why some areas of public policy were implemented when they did not fully meet the needs of the country (Beland & Howlett, 2016; Howlett et al., 2016; Mukherjee & Howlett, 2015; Zohlnhofer et al., 2016). One particular key issue is that while members of the policy stream are aware of the increased threat of domestic terrorism, the members of the political stream and the policy entrepreneurs have instead

enacted policy aimed at preventing international terrorism, which is a much smaller threat. The MSF alone was insufficient to explain this paradox. It was with that in mind that I chose to incorporate the power elite theory from conflict theory for this current study.

Conflict Theory–The Power Elite Theory

The origins of conflict theory from sociology can be found in the writings of Marx and Weber, yet it gained more notoriety among the sociological community as a reaction to structural functionalism in the early to mid-20th century (Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2018). Within conflict theory, there are variations in approaches from theorists who demonstrate closer allegiance to Marxian concepts, to those embracing factors outside of Marx's sole focus on economics in the production of class conflict. C.W. Mills was viewed as a radical sociologist within conflict theory at the time of his writings, in particular because of his decision to examine power relations (Domhoff, 1970). C.W. Mills produced several seminal works in sociology from identifying what the purpose and approach to sociology should be in *The Sociological Imagination* to his more critical analysis of power relations in the United States in *The Power Elite*. It is C.W. Mills' examination of power relations in the United States that was most appropriate to apply to this study.

C.W. Mills examined the distribution and use of power in the United States. According to C.W. Mills (1956), there is a three-level power hierarchy that operates within the United States. The top level of this hierarchy is called the power elite. Directly below the power elite is the middle level of power comprised of professional politicians,

pressure groups, and the upper class. The bottom level of power is occupied by the rest of society (C.W. Mills, 1956). The power elite is comprised of three circles of influence: the political elite, the economic elite, and the military elite. Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the distribution of power in the United States as described by C.W. Mills (1956).




Figure 2. The power elite.

Political elite. The political elite are not a form of aristocracy; rather they are the individuals who occupy the influential political positions. These individuals can come from local society. While there are a disproportionate number of members of the political elite that have come from the upper classes; ultimately, it is the authority of the position, not the person that places an individual as a member of the political elite (C.W. Mills, 1956). Because the political elite are elected as representatives of a region, the members of the political elite are not able to operate only in the interests of the upper class members of their region, rather they are held accountable to the members of all strata through the regular election process.

For the members of the political elite who are appointed into their positions, they are held accountable in terms of representing the interests of the constituency of those who elected the person who appointed them (C.W. Mills, 1956). While C.W. Mills (1956) predicted a decline in the professional politician, a person who seeks a range of political office holdings in their career; contemporary society is filled with examples of the professional politician. It may be that the fact that there are so many professional politicians, and that engaging in politics and getting elected requires funding from others, that there is more support for the power elite in contemporary society than not. In particular, there is more support for the relationship between the political and economic elite.

Economic elite. The economic elite include the corporate rich who own the means of production. The economic elite are the wealthiest business owners in the United States. In some cases, the economic elite are also members of the political elite. Mizruchi (2017) examined the corporate or economic elite in the United States using the power elite theory. Mizruchi's historical analysis demonstrated a shift in the economic elite from remaining only marginally invested in politics, to organizing for political action in response to growing globalization and competition beginning in the 1970s. However, Mizruchi concluded that the economic elite of today differed from the economic elite of C.W. Mills' (1956) writing; namely, that the economic elite of today were more prone to short-sighted self-interest rather than working with the other members of the power elite to contribute to their interests as well.

Military elite. The military elite include the leaders within the military. In some cases, there can be overlap between elite memberships of individuals, which also contributes to the convergence of elites into one unified power elite. For example, the U.S. president is commander-in-chief and is the ultimate person in charge of the military; thus he would be a member of the military elite, if he had actual military experience. However, the U.S. president is also a politician and thus would be a member of the political elite regardless of prior military experience or rank. If a U.S. president was a wealthy business owner, he would be a member of the economic elite as well.

Convergence into the power elite. Both C.W. Mills (1959) and Domhoff (1970, 1990) stated that entrance into any powerful position in the United States relies on one having the elite *habitus* (Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017). This *habitus* secures one's access to and inclusion among the power elite, and keeps the power elite as a primarily homogenous and endogenous group, with only a few exceptions. This is the first step in the convergence of the power elite.

While Domhoff (1970) has argued that foreign policy and select social policy are the primary exemplars of the power elite operating in the United States, his initial analysis was dated and completed in a different sociohistorical context. There are other areas that may also serve as more recent exemplars; and thus, more accurately represent the policy process in the United States today. Perhaps the most obvious example of how the three elites have converged to form one power elite comes from the privatized military industry.

There is a billion-dollar industry in security, arms, weapons, and equipment used for military engagements and activities (de Rugy, 2010; Pillar & Preble, 2010; Singer, 2008). The corporations within these industries operate on a for-profit model and provide needed equipment to the U.S. government for use by the military. The owners of these corporations are the economic elite. Because their business depends upon government purchasing, and the government depends upon the research, development, and supply from these industries; the corporation owners can attempt to influence the political elite by raising prices or withholding supplies to the military. The military elite are fully aware of the need for technologically-advanced equipment; and thus, would apply pressure on the political elite to purchase from specific corporations that engage in the most innovative and effective research and development. The military elite would also provide data and encouragement to the corporations to continue research and development.

The interdependent relations among the power elite are not limited solely to supplies and equipment. Because the United States has not instituted the draft since the major protests and backlash following the Vietnam War, the United States depends upon volunteers to serve in the military. As a result of the past protests and backlash from the Vietnam War, the political elite are against re-instituting the draft to maintain their political positions. As a result, there have been times that the number of military personnel is below what is needed to execute its mission. Instead of re-instituting the draft, the U.S. government has engaged in the hiring of private security contractors, often former military, to assist in U.S. military missions. Therefore, the military and economic elites overlap in members and in interests. Because of the close interdependence among

these elites, it is to each's individual benefit to demonstrate that each is looking out for the other. This unifies the power elite despite having different primary objectives; the political elite to govern, the military elite to protect, and the economic elite to increase profit.

In terms of how the power elite operated with regards to counterterrorism policy, Abrams (2006) noted that in the five years following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, all three branches of government engaged in deferral and avoidance regarding challenges to the law, which resulted in a break-down of the checks and balances that the three branches of the government were designed to provide upon the others. Hellmuth (2016) observed the changes in the separation of powers, and specifically, the use of an ongoing war (i.e., the global war on terrorism), as a way to continue the power imbalance in the U.S. government that has been recently described as operating under an imperial presidency. It was in counterterrorism and defense policy areas that the power elite theory was most clearly applicable.

Critique of the power elite. There have been many attempts to refute C.W. Mills' analysis of power in the United States, however, none have produced powerful empirical evidence to counter his analysis. The strong objection that many sociologists of the time had against C.W. Mills may have had more to do with the discipline's reluctance to examine power relations in a similar manner to what C.W. Mills did (Domhoff, 1990). Thus rejection of the power elite theory may have been premature, as it had found support from research conducted by Marxist sociologists, who added a class dimension to the power elite frame (Domhoff, 1990).

Whitfield (2014) examined the power elite theory since C.W. Mills' original publication, and did not find empirical support for the theory. Whitfield argued that the executive branch is accountable to the population because of the election process for the president, regardless of concerns about the Electoral College; and insisted that the president operates in the best interests of the country, not for self-interest or the interests of the economic or military elite. However, Whitfield failed to delve deeper into the decision-making process for decisions, such as going to war, beyond who made the final decision (i.e., Congress). Whitfield rejected the power elite theory as a model, yet Whitfield's analysis was cursory, and can be characterized as buying into the illusion of society, rather than the reality of society (Kinloch, 2004; Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017).

More recent evaluations of the power elite have supported the basic framework that C.W. Mills described, but have criticized C.W. Mills and Domhoff for not including biases based on gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality (see Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017). Therefore, it was appropriate to conduct a renewed analysis of the potential usefulness of C.W. Mills' analysis of power within the framework of counterterrorism policy.

Application of the power elite to U.S. counterterrorism policy. While the power elite theory may seem counterintuitive to democracy; instead, the power elite are able to manipulate the democratic process for their own benefit. Kinloch (2004) examined the role that policy plays for the power elite. Kinloch asserted that the power elite manipulate policy in order to serve itself and its own interests. For example, war is said to be necessary to ensure national security; however, waging wars has benefitted the power elite by (a) helping maintain an atmosphere of fear to ensure continuity in

leadership during elections, (b) allowing for profiteering, and (c) maintaining existing inequalities by restricting civil rights (Kinloch, 2004). Therefore, applying the power elite theory to examine U.S. counterterrorism policy may expose the inconsistencies found between the promise of the policy and the reality of its implementation.

Ledwidge and Parmar (2017) asserted that issues of race and ethnicity need to be considered in the application of the power elite theory to foreign policy. Ledwidge and Parmar argued that much of foreign policy is controlled by the power elite and that the power elite are predominantly male and White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP). Thus, the power elite used foreign policy to ensure their own dominance. The power elite also operated to maintain inequality and to nurture conflict within and among non-White groups, so that these groups could not mobilize to gain power. This began with the anti-miscegenation laws and extended into other areas, even after those laws were repealed. During the FBI's Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), a major approach was infiltrating the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and the Black Panther Party, and to sow dissension from within so that the groups would fragment (Hewitt, 2003; Levitas, 2002). The majority of domestic terrorism has been perpetrated by White men, yet the arrests and successful criminal prosecution has been dominated by perpetrators of color (Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Levitas, 2002; Norris, 2017). The majority of foreign terrorist organizations are non-White or of the lower White races (i.e., Irish), and thus the dominance of concern in U.S. counterterrorism policy being on international versus domestic terrorism could be motivated by racism and ethnocentrism in the United States (Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017). By constructing the main terrorist threat as being non-White and non-Christian, the

power elite continued the practice of marginalizing distinct racial, ethnic, and religious groups, keeping them from mobilizing and uniting, while at the same time, it has empowered White, Christian, domestic terrorists to amass weapons (benefiting the economic and military elite) and keeping the political elite in power.

The AETA of 2006 was implemented to prosecute radical environmental and radical animal rights activists, labeled eco-terrorists, under the category of terrorism. This policy was heavily influenced by the interests of the power elite, namely the economic elite. The economic elite who owned logging businesses, animal research facilities, furriers, and who also purchased furs and other luxury animal products that are targeted by the eco-terrorists, wanted higher penalties for offenses committed by eco-terrorists (Su & Yang, 2017). While the eco-terrorists' actions did not often result in high lethality, they did result in high costs to businesses and insurance companies (Bjelopera, 2017; Su & Yang, 2017).

In addition, the non-violent protests also cost the government in resources spent to monitor and/or end the protests. For example, when members of Earth First! occupied trees near a logging operation, local and state law enforcement as well as emergency responders were dispatched to forcibly remove the occupiers, and disengage the elaborate cable system that was set up to suspend the occupiers in the trees. The impact extended beyond the economic elite to the political elite who were pressured by the economic elite to bring an end to the costly protests. While this specific case did not explicitly involve the military elite, to continue the support from the political and economic elite, the military elite would have supported AETA.

Synthesizing the MSF and Power Elite for Counterterrorism Policy

At the surface, it may seem like selecting theories from different disciplines would be difficult to synthesize; however, because of the interdisciplinary nature of the academic examination of terrorism, the MSF and power elite complement each other. C.W. Mills' (1956) power elite theory can be applied to explain the inconsistencies in strictly applying Kingdon's (2011) MSF to U.S. counterterrorism policy. As will be discussed later in this chapter, while the primary threat of terrorism comes from domestic terrorism, U.S. counterterrorism policy has focused on the threat of international terrorism. This inconsistency was difficult to explain solely using the MSF; however, when considering the distribution of power in the United States using the power elite theory, it was clearer that the relationship between the origin and history of the terrorist threat in the United States, and the subsequent U.S. counterterrorism policies benefit the power elite. Figure 3 graphically shows how MSF, the power elite, and U.S. counterterrorism policy relate to one another.




Figure 3. The MSF and power elite coverage with U.S. counterterrorism policy.

The MSF helped compensate for weaknesses in the power elite theory. If the power elite solely engaged in activities that promoted themselves, and served themselves, then it became difficult to explain why certain policies passed when they did, and why certain social problems got policy attention while others did not. The MSF explained this shortcoming by demonstrating how the different streams converged during a policy window to force policy making, even if such policy did not serve the interests of the power elite. The application of these two theories was useful in helping explain the connection between domestic terrorism and the specific U.S. counterterrorism policies that had been developed and enacted since 2001.

Domestic Terrorism

Terrorism is difficult to define because of the breadth of forms of violence that it encompasses. States may govern through terror which is called State terrorism or democide (Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Rummel, 1994). Examples of State terrorism or

democide include the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under Lenin and Stalin, and Cambodia under the rule of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge (Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Rummel, 1994). States may sponsor terrorism perpetrated by organizations not openly associated with the State sponsor, such as the role that Libya played with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (Coogan, 1994; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Libya provided training, weapons, and financing to the PIRA but did not openly acknowledge its support of the PIRA (Coogan, 1994; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Non-State terrorism, or terror from below, involves any form of terrorism that is perpetrated below the levels of established States. In some cases, these groups may perpetrate violence against other terrorist organizations, as was the case with the PIRA and the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), among others (Coogan, 1994). In other cases, groups may target (a) governments and governmental employees, (b) groups within the population based upon some social category, and (c) groups or corporations surrounding some single issue, such as abortion or non-human animal testing. Furthermore, individuals may engage in terrorism as lone wolves with no official or up-to-date membership or strong association with a terrorist organization (Enders & Sandler, 2012; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016).

Terrorism has also been organized and defined along location of operations, namely domestic or international. Domestic or homegrown terrorism within this realm would consist of terrorism perpetrated by the individuals of a country within which they are a resident and/or citizen (Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). International, foreign,

or transnational terrorism involves terrorism perpetrated by citizens of one country operating and targeting citizens of another country, or the government of another country (Enders & Sandler, 2012; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016).

Terrorism has also been defined and organized according to ideological motivations. The ideologies may involve religious, social, economic, and/or political objectives. Terrorists who engage in terrorism for religious objectives are often engaging in a cosmic war and/or demonstrating intolerance for other religious belief systems (Hoffman, 2006; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). The PIRA had political and economic objectives, seeking the reunification of Ireland and independence from British rule (Coogan, 1994; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). As more ideologies fragmented and evolved, more categories were added to define and classify terrorism along ideological lines. In addition, some groups encompass several ideological orientations making a classification system or definition based on ideology impossible.

Any definition of terrorism depends upon the type or form of terrorism being defined. Therefore, to attempt to develop one definition to encompass all forms of terrorism would be an exercise in futility. Regardless, there are essential elements to all of the definitions of the different forms of terrorism. These elements include premeditation and terror as a means to an end not the end itself. For State terrorism, terrorism is the premeditated use of terror and fear as the primary method of social control for the State (Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Rummel, 1994). For non-State terrorism, Enders and Sandler (2012) define terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social

objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims” (p. 4). While this definition of non-State terrorism appears to encompass many of the types of non-State terrorism, it is limited by not including religious and economic objectives, which are clear objectives of some terrorists and terrorist organizations.

For this study, domestic terrorism was defined as premeditated, intentional acts, or threats of acts of violence, intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian population and/or the government, to achieve some political, religious, economic, ideological, and/or social objective(s), and perpetrated by a citizen or resident of the country within which the acts or threats are aimed. For this study, only U.S. domestic terrorism was analyzed, therefore, only data of terrorist events that occurred in the United States and were perpetrated by citizens or residents of the United States were included. While this operational definition encompasses the range of types of domestic terrorism that has occurred within the United States, there remain some issues regarding any definition of U.S. domestic terrorism.

Definitional Issues

Domestic terrorism is socially constructed and thus presents challenges in terms of definitions. Depending upon the entity defining the phenomenon, there are differences in terms of what is and what is not considered to be domestic terrorism (Bakker, 2015; Chermak et al., 2012; Freilich & LaFree, 2016; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). For example, the definition that the FBI uses is focused on non-State terrorism against the United States and has a law enforcement perspective. The U.S. Department of State does not limit its definition to non-State terrorism aimed at the United States, but

includes State-sponsored terrorism in the development and implementation of sanctions and restrictions on access to the United States. As a result, the U.S. Department of State maintains a list identifying foreign terrorist organizations on its website (Bjelopera, 2017).

Furthermore, domestic terrorism is not a mutually exclusive category from hate crime, extremism, and cults (Bjelopera, 2017; Freilich & LaFree, 2016; Hewitt, 2003; Martin, 2018). According to Title 18 of the *United States Code*, domestic terrorism is defined as:

activities that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (Terrorism, 2011, §2331).

Hate crimes are defined as crimes committed or crimes attempted against any person “because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin” or “because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability” (Hate Crime Acts, 2009, §249). If a crime that would qualify as a hate crime is perpetrated with the intention of intimidation or coercion of the civilian population and/or with the intention to influence the government through intimidation or coercion, then that hate crime would also qualify as an act of terrorism. If

the perpetrator was a U.S. citizen and the crime occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, then it would qualify as an act of domestic terrorism.

However, even in such cases, there has not been much consistency with pursuing terrorism charges versus hate crime charges. For example, Dylann Roof perpetrated a mass shooting at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, SC on June 17, 2015. Roof admitted White supremacist ideology and motivation for the act that resulted in the deaths of nine African Americans; however, even though this event fit the definition of domestic terrorism, the U.S. government did not label this event as domestic terrorism nor sought enhanced penalties for the federal crime of terrorism, instead choosing to pursue charges for hate crime acts (Bjelopera, 2017; Norris, 2017; USSG, 2018, §3A1.4). Therefore solely relying on cases involving perpetrators charged with terrorism would not include all events that are domestic terrorism.

More recently, a new category called violent extremism has been used to encompass not only international terrorists but domestic terrorists (Bjelopera, 2017; LaFree & Freilich, 2019). This new classification creates controversy in terms of legal action against such actors and creates confusion for data analysis. For example, according to the FBI (2019), “violent extremism is ‘encouraging, condoning, justifying, or supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals’” (para 1). The issue is that this definition of violent extremism can encompass individuals and groups that are otherwise protected against prosecution under freedom of speech (U.S. Const. amend. I). Because violent extremism is not included in the *United States Code*, it is not an offense that is prosecutable at this time;

however, this terminology may interfere with the prosecution of crimes perpetrated by domestic terrorists, who may otherwise be described as violent extremists. Carpenter (2018) suggested that the definition of terrorism in the *United States Code* be expanded to encompass hate crimes and homicides to strengthen its usefulness in prosecuting domestic terrorism. Carpenter noted that as it is currently written, incidents that cross the line between hate crime and domestic terrorism lead to inconsistent treatment under the law.

From the definitional issues for domestic terrorism in the United States comes difficulty in creating baseline data or threat evaluation. Bjelopera (2017) highlighted three areas of difficulty for domestic counterterrorism policymakers. It is difficult to amass a dataset or establish a baseline of the threat of domestic terrorism when different agencies that monitor, interact with, investigate, and prosecute domestic terrorism employ different definitions and terminology. The second area is that there is no official, public, governmental specification for domestic groups or ideologies that are labeled as terrorists or extremists. Agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FBI operate according to different definitions of domestic terrorism, resulting in different lists of groups used internally (Bjelopera, 2017). The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) maintains a database and map of hate incidents in the United States; however, the methodology used to label some groups as extremist or hate groups, while others are not labeled as such, is unclear and appears to be driven by the political agenda of the SPLC administrators. In addition, it is unclear what information was used in the presentation of statistics on their hate map. Thus, such a dataset is neither valid nor

reliable, although it can be useful in identifying areas of concern or groups of concern. The final area for Bjelopera (2017) is that there is no accounting of domestic terrorist plots or attacks that have been investigated. Furthermore, labeling of terrorism changes over time and is heavily influenced by power and politics (Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). It would be to the best interests of the nation if an empirical, evidence-based method was available for determining the terrorist threat, as well as evaluating counterterrorism policy.

Regardless of the form and motivation of terrorism, it is important to remember that at its core, terrorism is a tactic or strategy for social change through violent means (Bakker, 2015; Bjelopera, 2017; Coogan, 1994; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Enders et al., 2011; Forest, 2010; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). When terrorism is conceived of as a tactic or strategy, it allows for a clearer analysis of the impact of counterterrorism policy. It is important to note that the motivations of a terrorist are very different than those of a traditional criminal and therefore, using only a criminal justice approach would not result in the effectiveness that an interdisciplinary approach would (Bakker, 2015; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). While the criminal justice approach has met limited success against domestic terrorists; alone, it is insufficient to break down a well-organized terrorist group (Bakker, 2015; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). This could be part of the impetus for developing policies specific to terrorist offenses.

Because of the complexity of terrorism and the intersection of terrorist offenses with other categories of criminal offenses, the GTD established criteria for inclusion that

allows for all global acts of non-State terrorism to be documented. The criteria for inclusion in the GTD allows for inclusion of events that are characterized as terrorism regardless of criminal proceedings following capture of the perpetrator(s). Thus, the criteria used allow for a more complete source of data on acts of terrorism.

History of Domestic Terrorism

Domestic terrorism was not added as a classification to the *United States Code* until the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Terrorism, 2011; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001); however, it is not because domestic terrorism had not been in existence prior to 2001. Between 1954 and 2004, at least 3,120 terrorism incidents occurred in the United States, the majority of which were perpetrated by U.S. citizens, and thus qualify as domestic terrorism (Hewitt, 2003, 2005).

Scholars who have studied terrorism have attempted to create categories and classifications to ease understanding and empirical analysis of terrorism. While these categories are not mutually exclusive nor do they necessarily encompass all forms that terrorism may take, they can be useful in attempting to identify trends. Some typologies focus on ideological variations, i.e. religious, political, nationalistic, etc., others may focus on group dynamics i.e. lone-wolf, organized group, leaderless resistance, cell-based, hierarchies, etc., and further others may focus on actions, i.e. single-event, protracted conflict, etc. (Bakker, 2015; Crenshaw, 1995, [1998] 2012; Greenberg, 2011; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Naftali, 2005; Sandler, 2014).

Various scholars have attempted to examine commonalities along those dimensions or identify paradigmatic trends to understand terrorism and possibly predict

terrorist threats. Hewitt (2003) examined U.S. domestic terrorism as occurring in waves, comparing active groups with sociohistorical and political contexts. From 1954 to 2000, the majority of terrorism incidents and fatalities were perpetrated by White racist/Rightist terrorist ideologies (31.2% incidents, 51.6% fatalities) (Hewitt, 2003). Revolutionary Leftist terrorist ideologies, which was second to White racist/Rightist, accounted for 21.2% of incidents and 2.0% of fatalities (Hewitt, 2003). Foreign terrorist attacks in the United States accounted for less than that perpetrated by the White racist/Rightist terrorist ideology (20.3% incidents, 11.6% fatalities) from that same time frame (Hewitt, 2003). Before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the majority of terrorism in the United States was perpetrated by domestic terrorists.

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) issued a background report using data from the GTD to show changes in ideological motivations for terrorism occurring in the United States from 1970 to 2016 (Miller, 2017). The breakdown of ideologies differed from those used by Hewitt (2003); however, Miller (2017) found that during 2000 to 2009, the majority of domestic terrorist attacks were perpetrated by Left-wing extremists including eco-terrorists (i.e. ALF, ELF). The number of attacks by Left-wing extremists increased by 80% from the prior decade, but most of those attacks resulted in property damage with no fatalities. During 2000 to 2009 Right-wing extremist terrorism decreased by 40% compared to the previous decade (Miller, 2017).

Compared to the preceding decade, Miller (2017) found that Left-wing extremist terrorism decreased from 64% to 12% during 2010 to 2016. During this six-year time

period, both Right-wing extremism and religious extremism increased dramatically from the previous decade (Right-wing extremists 6% to 35%, religious extremist 9% to 53%). It should be noted that there is overlap in motivations for Right-wing extremism and religious extremism (Miller, 2017). Overall, terrorism in the United States has decreased since 1970 (Miller, 2017).

After September 11, 2001, a debate arose among terrorism scholars over whether there was a new form of terrorism that fundamentally differed from terrorism of the past (Crenshaw, [2009] 2012; Laqueur, 2000). Some scholars argued that new terrorism, which involves religious motivation and greater lethality made historical interpretations, approaches, and understandings of terrorism irrelevant and useless (Crenshaw, [2009] 2012; Laqueur, 2000). The differences between old terrorism and new terrorism involved differences in motivation, goals/aims, methods, organization, and resources. However, it remains to be seen whether this characterization of terrorism involves more than simply adaptation to countering the security environment and increased technology.

It is important to remember that just as terrorism is a social construction, so are these typologies and organizational classifications. Furthermore, terrorist organizations do not exist in stasis rather they evolve over time; some finding greater longevity, some transitioning into legitimacy, and others ending abruptly. In some cases terrorist organizations split up into different organizations, join forces with other terrorist organizations, or work with other terrorist organizations to execute operations or gain training and resources (Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Miller, 2017; Nacos, 2016). There has also been an increasing trend in lone wolf terrorism while official

terrorist organizations in the United States have declined (Bjelopera, 2017; Martin, 2018; Miller, 2017). This has led to Bjelopera (2017) suggesting that terrorism be conceptualized in terms of threat rather than as groups. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the focus was on domestic terrorism and not broken down further by ideological, motivational, or form typologies. Terrorists who are part of larger terrorist organizations as well as lone wolf actors were analyzed in this study.

Empirical Approaches to Studying U.S. Domestic Terrorism

Domestic terrorism has been an area of study for some time but gained renewed interest in recent years. As interest in the field grew from the interdisciplinary “terrorism studies” literature, databases were created to keep track of terrorist events (Bakker, 2015; Crenshaw, 2014). Within terrorism studies, how terrorism was socially constructed and subsequently how it was studied evolved. Predominantly, transnational terrorism and terrorism outside of the United States was the focus of much of the terrorism research. While qualitative studies examined aspects of terrorism were useful in uncovering perceptions of the threat of terrorism, uncovering some of the internal issues within terrorist organizations, uncovering some of the motivations of terrorism, and the social factors that contribute to someone joining, staying, and/or leaving a terrorist organization; there has been a call for more quantitative work, especially in light of the availability of data on terrorism (Bassiouni, 1988, 2002; Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Crenshaw, 2014; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; De Cataldo Neuburger & Valentini, 1996; Dugan & Distler, 2017; Enders & Sandler, 2014; Freilich & LaFree, 2016; Lum et al, 2006; Williams, 2018). Policy makers may use the results from empirical analyses of

terrorism to develop, or continue more effective counterterrorism policy, or discontinue ineffective counterterrorism policy.

Researchers frequently use open source data to build terrorism databases. Open source data are those data taken from unclassified and publicly-available sources, often media sources, but also legal documentation and other unclassified, public reports (Dugan & Distler, 2017; LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). Media sources are especially appropriate sources for information about terrorism because of the special relationship between terrorism and the media (Altheide, 2006, 2007, 2019; Bakker, 2015; Hoffman, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Terrorists want to reach a larger audience to get their message heard, and the media is the ideal vehicle for broadcasting that message. Terrorists thus aim to attract media attention for their attacks, in some cases announcing when an impending attack will approximately occur (Dugan & Distler, 2017; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Furthermore, the media rely on terrorists because their attacks tend to be sensational and violent, thus attracting viewers and keeping the media outlet in business (Altheide, 2006, 2007, 2019; Dugan & Distler, 2017; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Usage of the internet and social media have extended the reach of reports of terrorist attacks, allowing individuals to access local news stories and local personal accounts of terrorist attacks that may not have garnered the attention or been accessible to international media outlets (Altheide, 2019; Dugan & Distler, 2017).

Researchers are concerned with data validity when examining terrorism quantitatively. Safer-Lichtenstein, LaFree, and Loughran (2017) highlighted the

challenges of utilizing empirical data. The primary issue involved the transparency of coding and inclusion criteria for different datasets that were openly available.

Additionally, some data were only available if the researcher(s) had high security clearance or classified access. There is a risk of increasing error in analyses when datasets from different sources are used, because of inconsistencies along definitions, coding strategies, classifications, and information reliability. Even when restricting to one dataset, a researcher must deal with missing data. There are events that are believed to have been perpetrated by terrorists yet have yielded no declaration of responsibility nor prosecution to elucidate which terrorist was responsible. There are events that may be terrorism, but also may fall into other crime categories, such as hate crime. It is for these reasons that solely relying on crime data from legal agents, such as law enforcement, victimization surveys, and perpetrator reports were not reliable in assessing terrorism (Dugan & Distler, 2017).

Safer-Lichtenstein et al. (2017) suggested that the managers of datasets need to be as transparent as possible, and that researchers need to clearly state how missing data was factored into any analysis. For example, Miller (2017) utilized the GTD to examine ideological trends in terrorism in the United States and noted in multiple places that 24% of the data were of unknown ideology and were not included in the analysis. One of the limitations of the GTD is that the data from 1993 were corrupted and lost, and it is only estimated that 15% of the original data on terrorist events that occurred globally during 1993, have been recovered and included (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b).

Some researchers have studied terrorism using only a criminological approach that treats terrorism as another form of crime. Carson, LaFree, and Dugan (2012) utilized mixed methods to examine the activities of radical environmental and radical animal rights activists operating in the United States. In their analysis, Carson et al. (2012) separated activities into two types, terrorist and non-terrorist. As part of this research, Carson et al. (2012) constructed a new database, the Eco-Incidents Database (EID) pulling from two primary sources, the Foundation for Biomedical Research database on criminal cases and the GTD, but also included data from ten additional sources. This study was useful in identifying a process by which to study a specific type of terrorism empirically, as well as the importance of their findings for future research and for public policy.

Quinn (2016) examined terrorist activity in New York City from 1975 to 2015. Using data from START, Quinn (2016) found that terrorist activity in New York City decreased steadily since 1975. Quinn examined the geo-spatial patterns of the attacks and found that the terrorist attacks became less diffuse throughout New York City, with more concentration among the outer boroughs. Quinn identified movement ideologies, number and organization of attacks, and methods used over time. Nash (2017) examined the effectiveness of the Urban Area Security Initiative Program (UASI) in seven urban areas in the United States from 1970 to 2010. Nash used several time-series analyses to evaluate the effectiveness of UASI. These studies offered models by which several variables of terrorism were assessed over time by using open source data.

LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009) examined attack patterns from 1970 to 2004 of foreign terrorist organizations targeting the United States. The authors identified 53 groups as having anti-American sentiment and examined the total number of attacks and total number of fatal attacks against the United States, and attacks against others. In addition, LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw examined the trajectories of terrorist attacks and identified sporadic attacks compared to specific decades. The results provided additional insight to how terrorist organizations operate. Instead of solely looking at waves as Hewitt (2003) did, LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw found that anti-American terrorist organizations operated in either waves or in boom and bust patterns.

Freilich, Adamczyk, Chermak, Boyd, and Parkin (2015) compared homicides committed by terrorists to homicides that were not motivated by terrorism. Freilich et al. applied deprivation theory, backlash theory, and social disorganization theory to explain the differences between homicide motivations at the county level. The limitations of Freilich et al.'s study included that they only examined one ideological perspective, i.e. far-Right extremists, even though there was a vast array of ideological motivations for terrorists in the United States; and they only examined the crime of homicide, even though many U.S. domestic terrorists do not engage in homicide as a tactic. As noted earlier, Hewitt (2003, 2005) found that most U.S. domestic terrorism does not result in fatalities.

Comparing terrorist activity to criminal activity was not the only method employed when researchers investigated terrorism empirically. Time-series analyses have been an important component of the terrorism studies literature. Enders and Sandler

(1993) examined the impact that six specific counterterrorism interventions had on transnational terrorist activity from 1968 to 1988. Enders and Sandler found that terrorist organizations adapted their methods in response to specific types of interventions, such as increased barriers at embassies, increased use of metal detectors at airports, among others. Without the empirical analysis, justification for increasing target hardening strategies as part of a counterterrorism approach would rely solely on anecdotal information. Hsu, Vasquez, and McDowall (2018) used the GTD to examine whether target hardening in the United States resulted in a shift of terrorist activity from the U.S. mainland to abroad. Hsu et al. did not find that terrorism was displaced to interests outside of the United States upon target-hardening interventions implemented within the United States; thus providing empirical data for policy makers in justifying the use of these strategies without fear that displacement would occur.

Some empirical analyses focused on the creation of models of trajectories towards terrorist activity. Klausen, Campion, Needle, Nguyen, and Libretti (2016) examined specific cases of Al Qaeda-inspired homegrown terrorists in the United States. Klausen et al. presented a method for translating qualitative data into quantitative data for statistical analysis to produce a descriptive model for radicalization. Subedi (2017) suggested that empirical data could be used to establish early warning and early response (EWER) systems in countries that deal with radicalization and violent extremism. Models, such as the one used by Klausen et al., are critical to establishing EWERs.

Gonzalez, Freilich, and Chermak (2014) used data from the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) to examine factors that impact women who engaged in U.S. domestic

terrorism. Gonzalez et al. found that regardless of ideology, most women terrorists became involved in terrorism due to relationships they had with terrorists or extremists, and that their activities tended not to produce high casualties, or even intend on killing others. However, Gonzalez et al. found the ECDB to be limited in gaining more demographic information on the women perpetrators, which may provide more information on trends towards radicalization and activity within U.S. domestic terrorist organizations. As such, Gonzalez et al. recommended employing a mixed method approach where qualitative interviewing could be used to supplement the data provided by the ECDB.

Makin and Hoard (2014) used the American Terrorism Study (ATS) to examine the gender gap in U.S. domestic terrorism. The ATS included data on all FBI investigations from 1980 to 2002 (Makin & Hoard, 2014). Through their examination, Makin and Hoard suggested that counterterrorism policy needed to take gender into consideration, and that there needed to be further research into the role that women play in U.S. domestic terrorism.

Examining successful terrorist events was not the only empirical approach to studying terrorism. Comparison of failed plots with successful events provide information regarding how a terrorist organization evolves its methods, as well as provided a trajectory of behaviors for law enforcement to watch for as warnings of potential future terrorist attacks. Utilizing the case of the failed attack by the True Knights of the KKK in 1997, Kollars and Brister (2014) demonstrated that important information about the evolution of terrorist tactics could be gained by examining a failed

mission. While Kollars and Brister only examined a single case study, their methods could inform policymakers on how to implement effective counterterrorism policy aimed at curbing Right-wing extremists operating within the United States. Charles and Maras (2015) examined six case studies to identify how the organizational learning cycles, community institutions, and security institutions impacted the success or failure of a terrorist attack. While useful information that has the potential for use by policymakers was gleaned from these studies, the case study analysis does not lend itself to generalization. Therefore, these case study analyses may lay the foundation for future quantitative research focusing on the evolution of terrorist organization tactics. Klein, Gruenewald, and Smith (2017) used data from ATS to examine the characteristics of Right-wing extremist terrorism in the United States. Klein et al. (2017) found mixed results in attempting to develop a trajectory from precursor activities to incident success.

Researchers focusing on the terrorists was not the only area of interest recently. Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk (2018) examined the use of sting operations for counterterrorism in the United States from 1989 to 2014. Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk were interested in how the Oklahoma City bombing terrorist attack and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks influenced the use of entrapment through sting operations. Through examination of domestic terrorist prosecutions in the United States, Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk uncovered the temporal trends in the use of entrapment against Jihadist terrorists, Right-wing extremists, and all types of domestic terrorism in the United States. Norris and Prokopczyk found that following the Oklahoma City bombing terrorist attack, sting operations targeting Right-wing extremists increased greatly, but entrapment

indicators remained low. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, both sting operations and entrapment indicators increased (Norris and Prokopczyk, 2018).

Thus far, the majority of studies discussed focused on single nations; however, researchers have used comparative studies. DeLeeuw and Pridemore (2018) compared domestic terrorism in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. DeLeeuw and Pridemore used the GTD to compare these nations to identify dominant configurations of characteristics for incidents, perpetrator types, and outcomes. DeLeeuw and Pridemore provided a model for comparing domestic terrorism between nations.

Reed (2013) compared U.S. militia groups to Northern Ireland Ulster Loyalist paramilitary organizations (Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense Association (UDA)) to demonstrate the trajectory that extremism took from ideology to terrorism. Reed specifically focused on the impact that economic conditions had on extremist trajectories. Reed found that economic disruption, especially rapid change, can lead to breaking from mainstream society and entrenching into a specific version of history that will be defended at all costs.

What this review shows is that empirical research on terrorism is possible and preferred in terms of informing counterterrorism policy. As L. Clarke (2003) noted when it comes to learning specific lessons from experience with large-scale terrorist attacks like the September 11, 2001 attacks, “the lessons are *already there* but elites have to pay attention if they are to matter” (p. 2). While several of the studies discussed the policy implications of their results, none specifically examined U.S. counterterrorism policy and its impact on terrorist activity. This study addressed this gap in the literature by using the

GTD to examine changes in domestic terrorist incidents, lethality, and costs following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

The Global Terrorism Database

The GTD is an open source dataset that has logged non-State terrorism incidents from 1970 to 2017 (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). In order for incidents to be included within the GTD, they must satisfy all three attributes of the GTD definition of terrorism, and at least, two of the three inclusion criteria (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). A terrorist attack, as defined by the GTD is “the threatened or actual use of illegal force or violence by a non-State actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START, 2018b, p.10). Each included incident must (a) be intentional, (b) involve some level of use of or threat of use of violence, and (c) be perpetrated by sub-national actors. Furthermore, the three inclusion criteria from which at least two must be fulfilled are:

Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.

Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As

long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.

Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants). (START, 2018b, p.10)

In the original formulation of the GTD, several existing terrorism databases were examined (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). Following the verification and compilation of these sources, beginning in 2011, all data entered into the GTD were from open sources and compiled by START staff. The data included in the GTD came from “publicly available, unclassified source materials” (START, 2018b; p.3). While the origins of the GTD came from pre-existing databases, more recent additions came from media articles and electronic news archives (START, 2018b). Three separate sources for each event were required for an event to be included, and those sources were listed along with the event in the GTD (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018a, 2018b).

There were some methodological issues that came from using databases built on open source data. Freilich and LaFree (2016) highlighted the main issues with reliability of sources, inter-rater reliability issues, failure to include a control group or non-terrorist group in analyses, how missing values are handled, selectivity bias in database development and construction, and defining an event in a binary as either terrorism or not. Ackerman and Pinson (2016) proposed a blueprint for a method for operationalizing

event validity in open source databases. Their “Source Evaluation Schema” method addressed the methodological concerns of source reliability, selectivity bias, and event validity issues. Ackerman and Pinson highly recommended detailed codebooks that were fully transparent. External raters used a scale to measure the degree of confidence for various aspects of open source data including individual source credibility, overall event validity, inherent event uncertainty, and event detail. Two measures were broken down into two indicators. For individual source credibility, the database creator’s objectivity and competence were rated. For event detail evaluation, whether the detail on the event was corroborated and the level of discrepancy between sources were rated (Ackerman & Pinson, 2016). Ackerman and Pinson suggested that their proposed schema operate as a starting point for individuals to adapt and expand upon for use with appropriate open source databases.

Behlendorf, Belur, and Kumar (2016) compared terrorism data across three publicly-available datasets to check for selection bias. The GTD, the Worldwide Incident Terrorism System (WITS), and the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) were compared in their inclusion of incidents from the Maoist insurgency in Andhra Pradesh from 2005 to 2009 (Behlendorf et al., 2016). The data within these terrorism databases were also compared to official police records for the region. Behlendorf et al. found that there were a substantial number of Maoist insurgency attacks missing from the GTD, WITS, and SATP. However, most of the terrorist attacks by the Maoist insurgents were not covered by the English-speaking national or international media, which may have contributed to their exclusion in these datasets. While Behlendorf et al. demonstrated that there was

selection bias for a case of terrorism, because this study was focusing on U.S. domestic terrorism, the media coverage issue and any language-reporting issues would not undermine the validity of the GTD.

The GTD codebook includes detailed descriptions of the history of the GTD, coding methods, and a detailed list of changes made with the release of the updated database. Not only are the changes listed, but the rationale for the changes along with adjustments in methodology are also explicitly presented. For example, when dealing with the issue of whether an incident is terrorism, the GTD has a variable called *doubt terrorism proper*, which is checked if there is some question as to whether the event was an act of terrorism or not (Freilich & LaFree, 2016; START, 2018b). These details are an essential element for transparency and informing researchers who plan to use the GTD in their studies, and help researchers address the methodological concerns of using the GTD, as with any open source database. A detail that was not included in the codebook was the use of a source evaluation scale and the inter-rater reliability results. Those measures are used internally by START and not made public, which would be useful for external researchers using the GTD and in alignment with the recommendations by Ackerman and Pinson (2016).

Filtering the Dataset for U.S. Domestic Terrorist Incidents

The GTD contains global terrorism data for non-State terrorism, therefore I had to filter the data to conduct my analysis of U.S. domestic terrorism. Berkebile (2017) compared several terrorism incident databases in terms of identifying domestic terrorism. For an incident to be considered domestic terrorism, the perpetrator and target (victim

and attack location) must match. Berkebile offered one method to classify events from the GTD as domestic terrorist events. To ensure that only terrorist incidents were included in his analysis, Berkebile filtered the GTD to include only subnational actors, noncombatant targets, audience beyond the immediate victims, and whether the event had a political or social objective. To further filter the GTD for domestic terrorist incidents, Berkebile examined the state/nationality of the incident location, the nationality of the target, and the nationality of the perpetrators.

The first step in filtering the GTD was to only include terrorist incidents that occurred within the territorial boundaries of the United States. Therefore, attack location was filtered for inclusion if the attack location was in the United States or its territories. The next step involved perpetrator identity. The GTD does not offer a category identifying perpetrator nationality in its public dataset. However, the GTD provides variables that identify incidents as logistically and/or ideologically international, in which perpetrator nationality is compared with nationality of target. A third variable that compares location of attack with nationality of victim without information regarding perpetrator nationality is also available. All three of these variables are coded as yes, no, or unknown. However, there were some cases in which a domestic terrorist attack was coded as international, and therefore, I did not use these established variables in the filtering process. Instead, I looked up the perpetrator nationality in the open source citations for the event in the GTD and/or through open source materials online.

When I was unable to identify the nationality of the perpetrator, I coded those events as unknown. By including the unknown incidents in a combined analysis with

known domestic terrorist incidents, an additional source of Type 2 error could have been introduced which is why I decided to analyze unknown events separately (see Berkbile, 2017). Therefore, I analyzed domestic terrorist events, unknown events, and all terrorist events (international, domestic, and unknown) separately.

The GTD is an easily accessible and user-friendly database for terrorism research. The GTD has been used in a range of studies examining various elements of terrorism, transnational and domestic. This study utilized the data from the GTD to examine the impact that U.S. counterterrorism policy had on domestic terrorism.

U.S. Counterterrorism Policy

Domestic terrorism has been a problem for a long time in the United States; however, counterterrorism policy in the United States has focused mainly on the threat from foreign terrorist organizations. There have been policies aimed at regulating and managing identified vulnerabilities and hazards that could be exploited by terrorists, and thus used in an attack, such as regulations on nuclear material (Mitchell, 2003). However, those policies were only from the scope of preventing a catastrophic disaster, and not particularly aimed at deterring or preventing terrorism specifically. The overarching approach to terrorism for the United States has been one of criminalizing activities associated with terrorism, attempting to identify crimes and ideologies that align with known terrorist organizations, and preventing terrorist attacks.

Counterterrorism Policy Before 9/11

Provisions regarding State sponsors of terrorism and acts of international or transnational terrorism had been included in legislation beginning with the Trading With

the Enemy Act (TWEA) of 1917; however, it was the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 that first established terrorism as a crime (Antiterrorism Act, 1990; Levitas, 2002; Naftali, 2005; Trading with the Enemy Act [TWEA], 1917). While the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 addressed the threat of terrorism by authorizing the use of rewards for intelligence related to terrorism, authorizing United States support in antiterrorism activities with allies, prohibition of exporting munitions to countries that sponsor terrorism, established boundaries of U.S. jurisdiction over international terrorism, and provisions regarding financial support for victims of terrorism, there was not specific category of terrorism added to the *United States Code*, but only a recommendation from Congress for the President to negotiate an international convention to combat international terrorism.

The *Posse Comitatus* Act (PSA) of 1878 established a specific limitation on the use of the army or air force as a *posse comitatus*, or in any other capacity, to execute laws without the express approval of Congress (Hewitt, 2003; Levitas, 2002; *Posse Comitatus* Act [PSA], 2011). While it may appear that the PSA prohibits the use of the military against domestic terrorism, there are provisions within the *United States Code* that allow for the use of the military against insurrection (Elsea, 2018; Levitas, 2002; PSA, 2011). The purpose of the PSA was to prohibit the use of the military to execute civilian law, not to interfere with its duties, even when those duties involve cooperation with law enforcement in the execution of their duties, which include executing civilian law (Elsea, 2018). Therefore, the military may be used to combat domestic terrorism without violating the PSA.

The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) was a watered-down version of the proposed Omnibus Counter-Terrorism Act of 1995, which never overcame the opposition within the House of Representatives, even after the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK (Naftali, 2005). In 1992, the criminal code had the category of international terrorism added (FCAA, 1992); however, until AEDPA, terrorism had been handled solely through the criminal code (Hewitt, 2003; Naftali, 2005). While the United States had been dealing with attacks from domestic terrorists for a long time, it was the threat of international terrorist organizations that led to the passage of AEDPA (Hewitt, 2003; Naftali, 2005).

It is important to note that even though AEDPA was passed after the Oklahoma City terrorist attack, its provisions were not motivated by that terrorist attack (cf., Wetherbee, 2007). Rather, the provisions were in the making long before the Oklahoma City terrorist attack occurred, and AEDPA specifically addressed foreign terrorist organizations, not domestic terrorism (R.A. Clarke, 2004; Naftali, 2005).

Even though AEDPA was a watered-down version of the Omnibus Counter-Terrorism act of 1995, it still contained controversial provisions that were challenged as violating the U.S. Constitution. Under AEDPA, governmental powers were expanded such that any individual suspected of being a terrorist, or supporting terrorism, could be denied entry into the United States. In addition, AEDPA allowed for the deportation of non-citizens suspected of supporting terrorism (Hewitt, 2003; AEDPA, 1996). The AEDPA also allowed for terrorism to be addressed outside of the criminal code, and added the ability of the government to prosecute individuals who were identified as

funding foreign terrorist organizations (AEDPA, 1996; Agarwal, 2004; Hewitt, 2003). In the end, AEDPA made it difficult for terrorist organizations to use the United States as a base for financing their activities, while allowing for protections of the civil rights of U.S. citizens and residents loyal to the United States, versus those who knowingly engaged in contributing to foreign terrorist organizations (Agarwal, 2004).

USA PATRIOT Act of 2001

The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 had a primary focus on international terrorism. This policy was passed rapidly in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Despite its international terrorism focus, the USA PATRIOT Act established domestic terrorism as a crime, and thus offered expanded investigative abilities and the opportunity to prosecute acts of domestic terrorism as a separate category from non-terrorist crimes (18 U.S.C. 133B §2331 to 2339D, 2011; Doyle, 2002; Hellmuth, 2016; Hewitt, 2003; Howell, 2004; Naftali, 2005; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).

The USA PATRIOT Act included many of the provisions found in the original Omnibus Counter-Terrorism Act of 1995 that had been rejected (R.A. Clarke, 2004; Naftali, 2005). The specific provisions within the USA PATRIOT Act taken from the Omnibus Counter-Terrorism Act of 1995 included the expansion of surveillance powers for law enforcement and a loosening of requirements regarding obtaining warrants for suspected terrorists (Doyle, 2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).

The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 included ten titles: enhancing domestic security against terrorism, enhanced surveillance procedures, International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-terrorism Financing act of 2001, protecting the border, removing

obstacles to investigating terrorism, providing for victims of terrorism, public safety officers, and their families, increased information sharing for critical infrastructure protection, strengthening the criminal laws against terrorism, improved intelligence, and miscellaneous. A sunset clause was included under Title II Enhanced Surveillance Procedures which scheduled this title, with some exceptions, to expire on December 31, 2005 (Doyle, 2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).

The specific provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act which may have impacted domestic terrorism included the increased funding to update and modernize the FBI's technical support center, the enhanced surveillance procedures, increased regulations found within the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-terrorism Financing Act of 2001, the removing obstacles to investigating terrorism, increased information sharing for critical infrastructure protection, strengthening the criminal laws against terrorism, improved intelligence, and under the miscellaneous provision limitations on hazmat license issuance and increased critical infrastructure protection (Doyle, 2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).

One specific provision involved the use of delayed-notice search warrants (Doyle, 2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001; Yeh & Doyle, 2006). A delayed-notice search warrant allowed for law enforcement to execute a search without prior notification to the property owner, as long as law enforcement did not remove any materials (Yeh & Doyle, 2006). The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 had extended the use of delayed-notice search warrants to include any criminal investigation (Doyle, 2002; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001; Yeh & Doyle, 2006).

Many of the provisions within the USA PATRIOT Act were challenged as unconstitutional and in violation of civil liberties. Within three years of its passage, the Supreme Court heard cases involving the rights of detainees to the U.S. legal process (*Rasul v. Bush*), the detention and rights of a U.S. citizen captured as an enemy combatant overseas (*Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*), and the designation of a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant leading to detention under military custody, rather than due process through the criminal justice system (*Rumsfeld v. Padilla*) (Abrams, 2006; Gorham-Oscilowski & Jaeger, 2008; *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 2004; Pious, 2006; *Rasul v. Bush*, 2004; *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 2004; Schwinn, 2016; Wilke, 2005; Wong, 2006). Additional challenges to the USA PATRIOT Act involved the expansion of presidential powers, the extensiveness of the use of surveillance, the use of detention, and the possible violations to the U.S. Constitution, specifically amendments I, IV, V, VI, and XIV (Abrams, 2006; Gorham-Oscilowski & Jaeger, 2008; Pious, 2006; Schwinn, 2016; U.S. Const. amend. I, IV, V, VI, XIV; Wilke, 2005; Wong, 2006).

There is always a delicate balance between national security and civil liberties, and it was the perceived need for the government to do something in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that allowed for these provisions to not only pass, but later be extended. The use of sunset provisions replaced informed debate among legislatures and allowed for the USA PATRIOT Act's rapid passage. Even though there were concerns over the constitutionality of the provisions within the USA PATRIOT Act, when a draft of its successor named the Domestic Security Enhancement Act (DSEA) of

2003 or the PATRIOT Act II was leaked, it showed that governmental powers would be expanded at the expense of civil liberties (Hellmuth, 2016; Scahill, 2006).

The DSEA allowed for prosecution with less burden of proof for terrorism-related charges, expanded criminalization of support for terrorism beyond the provisions enacted by AEDPA, criminalization of association with suspected terrorists, immigration and deportation proceedings would have severe limitations on the use of the writ of *habeas corpus*, and there would not be oversight or checks and balances in place when the government engaged in the use of rendition of suspected terrorists to nations that practiced torture (Hellmuth, 2016; Scahill, 2006). In addition, DSEA included provisions allowing for an expansion of the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) so that surveillance of U.S. citizens who may have associations with domestic terrorist groups would be legally allowed (Hellmuth, 2016; Scahill, 2006). Another noteworthy aspect of the DSEA was the absence of any sunset provision, which would have allowed for the entire act to be implemented permanently (Hellmuth, 2016; Scahill, 2006). The absence of sunset provisions suggested a new era in which terrorism was considered to be a continued threat without any end. The backlash from the release of the draft of the DSEA resulted in it not being submitted to Congress, and allowed for it to be redrafted into the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005

In this first renewal act for the USA PATRIOT Act, 16 of the more controversial provisions were addressed. However, instead of allowing further debate on these provisions by resetting sunset provisions, 14 of the 16 provisions were made permanent

(Abrams, 2006; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 2005; Yeh & Doyle, 2006). The only provisions that were given a new sunset date were those regarding FISA and roving wiretaps authorization (Abrams, 2006; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 2005; Yeh & Doyle, 2006).

The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 more clearly elucidated the use and role of National Security Letters (NSL), such that the NSLs were in closer compliance with the U.S. Constitution (Abrams, 2006; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 2005; Yeh & Doyle, 2006). In the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, NSLs were another method of obtaining information; however, they were not subject to judicial review (Doyle, 2002; Schwinn, 2016; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). Another notable change included the lone wolf extension. The lone wolf amendment was part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, which designated non-U.S. persons as eligible for surveillance, regardless of whether that individual was officially tied to a foreign terrorist organization (Bazan, 2005; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act [IRTPA], 2004; Yeh & Doyle, 2006). In addition, IRTPA amended FISA (1978) to cover lone wolves and did not require probable cause for the issuance of authorization for surveillance (Bazan, 2005; IRTPA, 2004).

Overall, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 addressed some of the civil liberty concerns by more clearly detailing how intelligence could be gathered, loosened restrictions on nondisclosure orders for terrorist investigations and surveillance, clarified vague language, and increased oversight by

adding additional checks and balances to prevent abuse (Schwinn, 2016; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 2005; Yeh & Doyle, 2006).

The provisions of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 that may have impacted domestic terrorism included the changes in what constituted terrorism to include being trained by foreign terrorist organizations and drug trafficking to fund terrorism (Yeh & Doyle, 2006). The extension and expansion of use of roving wiretaps allowed for the incidental surveillance of U.S. citizens who happened to interact with, or be near the surveillance target. Increased penalties for money laundering in association with terrorism may also have impacted domestic terrorist operations.

Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006

Of the 21st century U.S. counterterrorism policies being examined in this study, AETA of 2006 is the only policy that was aimed specifically at a form of domestic terrorism. Eco-terrorism involves terrorist activity motivated by radical environmental and/or radical animal rights ideologies. Among the most active domestic terrorist organizations are those who engaged in eco-terrorism, including organizations such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), and Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) (Bjelopera, 2017; Carson et al., 2012; Miller, 2017; Su & Yang, 2017). While eco-terrorists are prolific in their attacks, the outcomes of their attacks tend to involve property damage, rather than human casualties; although, they will engage in targeting individuals at times. Part of eco-terrorists' motivation involved making it more costly and difficult for enterprises that use animals, or are involved in harming the environment (i.e. logging industry), as a way to coerce those enterprises to stop their

activities (Bjelopera, 2017; Carson et al., 2012; Lemanski & Wilson, 2016; Su & Yang, 2017).

In 2008, the FBI estimated that eco-terrorists were responsible for between 1,800 and 2,000 domestic terrorist incidents, resulting in over \$110 million in damages since 1979 (Bjelopera, 2017; Lemanski & Wilson, 2016). According to the FBI in 2001, as cited by Su and Yang (2017), ELF alone caused \$100 million in damage. According to data from the GTD, eco-terrorist incidents increased steadily since 1980, spiked in 2001, and decreased since 2006 (Carson et al., 2012). Miller (2017) compared terrorism data by decade and found that eco-terrorism had declined from 64% in the 2000 decade to 12% in the first six years of the 2010 decade. Animal-use industry leaders lobbied Congress to take more direct action against eco-terrorism, which led to the passage of AETA (Su & Yang, 2017).

The AETA of 2006 is an amended and expanded version of the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) of 1992, which granted the U.S. government greater legal authority in identifying and prosecuting environmental and animal rights extremists, who engaged in criminal activity (Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act [AETA], 2006; Bjelopera, 2017; Su & Yang, 2017). Compared to AEPA, AETA had a broader scope in coverage of what was considered to be animal enterprises, such that, now animal enterprises included any businesses that were associated with other businesses that engaged in animal enterprises (AETA, 2006; Su & Yang, 2017). In addition, AETA identified harsher penalties for property damage to businesses identified as animal enterprises.

The AETA (2006) amended the *United States Code* to make interstate and foreign travel, or use of mail to perpetrate violence against businesses and other facilities that engaged in the use of animals, a specific form of crime with specific sanctions. A noteworthy aspect of AETA was that successful and attempted actions were prosecutable, as well as threats of harm to individuals (AETA, 2006; Bjelopera, 2017). It was clearly stated in AETA (2006) that nothing within the act may be used to infringe upon a U.S. citizen's constitutional rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.

However, there remains controversy over labeling radical environmental and radical animal rights groups as terrorists, as well as why these specific ideologies and organizations were singled out in legislation, while other domestic terrorist ideologies and organizations do not have specific legislation addressing their activities (Su & Yang, 2017). Some of the reasoning behind the focus on eco-terrorism may come from its prolific activities and costs incurred by its targets, which included the economic elite. Because of their prolific activity, eco-terrorists are also easier to identify than other domestic terrorists motivated by non-environmental or non-animal rights ideologies.

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007

The final report from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (NCTAUUS) was released to the public in 2004, and contained within it, specific recommendations to prevent another terrorist attack similar to the ones that occurred on September 11, 2001 (NCTAUUS, 2004). Many of those recommendations were captured in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 established funding for improvements for homeland security and emergency management and response; established funding to improve and implement inter-agency emergency communication systems; included provisions aimed at improving inter-agency intelligence sharing and cooperation; increased security for border, aviation, maritime, transportation, and critical infrastructure; implemented more secure identification documentation; and increased security for materials that could be used as weapons of mass destruction (Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, 2007). Compared to the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 had a broader reach in impacting domestic terrorism. The overall approach included target hardening, increased security, technological modernization, and improved communication and intelligence sharing. While this act was not specific to domestic terrorism, its provisions were broad enough to impact all forms of terrorism, domestic and international.

USA FREEDOM Act of 2015

The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 was passed in response to concerns over law enforcement and the government's role in surveilling U.S. citizens (Berman, 2016; Hellmuth, 2016; Lyon, 2015; Rubel, 2017; Schwinn, 2016; Yoo, 2014). As the sunset provision to the surveillance provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act approached, it was disclosed that the U.S. government had been amassing metadata on U.S. citizens, which created public uproar and calls for action. While the 14-year time frame of the USA

PATRIOT Act and its subsequent reauthorizations had been filled with a range of lawsuits alleging civil rights violations and government overreach, it was not until this information had been released that action was taken to tighten the surveillance provisions found within the USA PATRIOT Act. It is important to note that the bulk metadata collection was legal under the USA PATRIOT Act and its subsequent reauthorizations (Rubel, 2017). Rather than attempting to amend the USA PATRIOT Act, it was allowed to expire, and was replaced by the USA FREEDOM Act.

The intent of the USA FREEDOM Act was to continue established counterterrorism strategies outlined in the USA PATRIOT Act; however, with strict restrictions regarding intelligence collection and surveillance on U.S. citizens (Berman, 2015; Lyon, 2014; Romero, 2015; Rubel, 2017; Yoo, 2014). The government was no longer permitted to collect information and surveil citizens without warrant (USA FREEDOM Act, 2015). Instead, the companies that own that metadata were required to retain that data, and may only turn the data over to law enforcement when a warrant was served. The restrictions within the USA FREEDOM Act aimed at ceasing the use of the government in bulk metadata surveillance and storage.

Critics argued that the USA FREEDOM Act missed its mark on attempting to add oversight to FISA courts (Berman, 2014; Romero, 2015). Berman (2014) suggested that the USA FREEDOM Act did not adequately address the dual role that the FISA courts served, and by adding oversight, the efficiency and effectiveness of the FISA courts would be compromised. Romero (2015) stated that the USA FREEDOM Act did not go far enough because it only protected phone metadata, while leaving other forms of

metadata available for collection and surveillance. For domestic terrorists, the USA FREEDOM Act may allow for greater communication with other domestic terrorists due to the new restrictions and oversight added, but domestic terrorists may be more vulnerable to other forms of metadata surveillance.

While U.S. counterterrorism policy continues to be developed, challenged, and implemented, how effective the existing and past policies were remained inconsistently explored. In addition, with these counterterrorism policies came greater expense to the U.S. tax payers. The following sections will address how counterterrorism policy has been financed and how counterterrorism has been assessed and evaluated.

Financing Counterterrorism

For many governments, one approach to addressing terrorism involves throwing money at the problem. While it may seem logical that deterrence, prevention, and response to terrorist attacks require a lot of money, how that money is spent and whether that spending is justified remains unclear. Empirical evidence does support the effectiveness in funding counterterrorism operations. In a comparative analysis of 34 countries, including the United States, Danzell and Zidek (2013) found that increased spending on law enforcement and other aspects of the country's security apparatus led to decreased casualties and fatalities due to terrorist attacks, and had a small impact on reducing terrorism incidence.

Wolfendale (2007) challenged the justification for counterterrorism measures by arguing that the actual terrorist threat is minimal to an individual civilian, while the threat of an individual's loss of civil liberties by counterterrorism strategies, was much greater.

Yet the rhetoric for the threat of terrorism continued, thus justifying increased restrictions and narrowed civil liberties for the sake of national security. This rhetoric supported the power elite by ensuring continued support for the existing political elite, because the political elite could point out the infrequency of international terrorist attacks in the United States since the counterterrorism policy was implemented (ignoring the baseline infrequency of international terrorism attacks in the United States). The military elite benefited by ensuring research and development into weapons systems, surveillance, protective equipment, and artificial intelligence for use in the ongoing global war on terror. The economic elite benefited from the profits earned for private security and contractor corporations as well as profits from the sale of protective equipment to a fearful public who have bought into the apocalypse industry and the myths about terrorism in the United States (Altheide, 2006, 2007, 2019; Bakker, 2015; LaFree, 2011; Silva et al., 2019). Combined, the power elite supported the increased federal spending for counterterrorism. The total budget authority for DHS was \$37.7 billion at its inception in 2003 and has steadily increased to the requested \$92 billion for FY2020 (Bush, 2003; Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2017, 2019).

Part of the motivation of allocating a large amount of money to counterterrorism was due to the costs incurred from terrorist attacks. The GTD provided the amount of property damage, when available for individual terrorist attacks (START, 2018a, 2018b). Shellman (2004, 2006) proposed a single model to describe the relationship between dissident terrorists and governments. Shellman proposed several contextual frameworks, but within each framework was the government decision-making formula that included

government costs of action, terrorist dissident costs, and audience/victim costs. While this model was not appropriate for this study, Shellman's identification of the different sources of costs of terrorism was relevant. In addition, J. Mueller and Stewart (2014) conducted a cost-benefit analysis on counterterrorism spending. From a risk management perspective, Kunreuther (2002) questioned how justifiable it was to invest a lot of money into preventing a rare event. While I had originally intended on analyzing the budgetary appropriations for counterterrorism as well the costs of damage from terrorist attacks, inconsistencies and missing data made such an analysis not possible at this time. Because the cost to the victims is not readily available, that element was not included in the analysis.

Counterterrorism Policy Evaluation

While research on terrorism grew and increased its rigor, the same cannot be said for research on counterterrorism policy. Many terrorists rely on repressive responses from governments to their attacks as a way to mobilize the population against the government; and thus, it is imperative to not only acknowledge this relationship, but identify clear evaluation of counterterrorism policies (LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Solely military responses have been criticized as feeding into the aims of the terrorists and resulting in backlash effects, rather than deterrence effects (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019). Legal approaches have had mixed success, but tended not to produce the same form of backlash effect found from strictly military approaches.

Despite ongoing work on counterterrorism, actual policy implementation occurred on a more reactive basis than on a preventative basis, which is consistent with MSF. As such, by rapidly passing legislation, there can be major flaws within the provisions of that legislation which may exacerbate, rather than deter or prevent terrorism. Mitchell (2003) observed that homeland security strategies tended to have sole focus on defense, rather than securing vulnerabilities, and on passing legislation that was similar to previously flawed policies. The focus of the new policies ignored the ineffective nature of the past policies and held on to its defense-focus at the expense of true security and terrorism deterrence and prevention (Mitchell, 2003). Therefore, it is essential that counterterrorism policies are evaluated and that these evaluations be evidence-based and communicated effectively to policy makers to ensure that mistakes are not repeated with future policy.

There were different approaches to evaluating counterterrorism policy, particularly because counterterrorism policy did not include any instructions for evaluation. Individual agencies that are involved in counterterrorism activities may have independent methods of evaluating success and effectiveness, but those are limited to the specific agency. While a layperson may say that because there has not been another terrorist attack exactly like the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, that the policies were effective; however, considering that the majority of terrorism in the United States is perpetrated by domestic terrorists, evaluating a rare event with whether that event has recurred is fraught with error.

The result of having such variation in approaches to evaluating counterterrorism policy is that it leaves policy makers confused as to whether policy works or not. It

becomes difficult to compare results when different methodologies yielded different results. Freese (2014) argued the need for a framework to evaluate counterterrorism policy so that the inconsistency in methods and results are minimized. It has been suggested that there needs to be a shift in research towards evidence-based practice in policy evaluation research to measure the benefit of policy and its effectiveness (Freese, 2017; Lum et al., 2006, 2008).

How one measures effectiveness of a policy is also variable. De Lint and Kassa (2015) examined different theoretical approaches to counterterrorism policy evaluation. Policy was evaluated in terms of its returns-on-investment, its ability to meet its objectives, and its political success (De Lint & Kassa, 2015; McConnell, 2010). At the heart of all policy implementation and maintenance is funding for the provisions within the policy, or basically how much it costs to keep this policy going. For counterterrorism policy, it became difficult to manage the returns of investing in increased security (Brzoska, 2016; Danzell & Zidek, 2013; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014). It became difficult to measure the reasonableness of costs for prevention. In addition, it is unknown whether increased security played a role in thwarting planned attacks, or if there were any planned attacks in the works for a particular area that now has increased security. Brzoska (2016) identified impact, outcome, and output as the indicators for effective counterterrorism financing policy. However, impact is difficult to measure, and while output and outcome are more easily quantifiable, they do not necessarily correlate with impact (Brzoska, 2016). Additionally, there are regional and temporal variations in terms of law enforcement's request for funding for homeland security activities, which may

complicate an evaluation of solely funding for counterterrorism (T.C. Johnson & Hunter, 2017).

It is important to examine more than just frequency of terrorist attacks to address whether counterterrorism policy meets its objectives, namely to prevent future terrorism. An organization may operate frequently using small-scale attacks or amass resources to execute a single, large-scale attack. Therefore, looking at incident data alone is insufficient. Incident data must be paired with other variables such as lethality and extensiveness of damage for a more complete analysis (Danzell & Zidek, 2013). The growth of availability of open source databases on terrorist attacks makes this approach more doable than in the past. However, De Klint and Kassa (2015) and Van Dongen (2011) suggested that attempting to identify indicators of counterterrorism policy effectiveness was too difficult because of the amount of factors that may influence those indicators.

In terms of political success, that can be measured by the re-electability of the politicians who sponsored and supported the policy as well as the general national mood regarding the policy (De Lint & Kassa, 2015). Another aspect of political success is the extent to which a policy aligns with the norms, values, and ideals of the nation. This also can be difficult to measure because how information is socially constructed and presented can impact whether a policy is considered to be consistent with the societal norms, values, and ideals or not. For example, when it came to interrogation practices, rather than calling the practices what they were, torture, the U.S. government called those practices enhanced interrogation, which quelled public anxiety over the use of torture,

which is inherently against U.S. values and ideals (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2003; Dorfman, 2004; Janoff-Bulman, 2007; Martin, 2018; Opotow, 2007; Pious, 2006; Raz, 2013; Vrij et al., 2017). However, this form of measurement does not consider the impact, positive and negative, that a policy may have had. What follows is a review of the more recent literature aimed at evaluating counterterrorism policy.

Shor (2016) examined short and long-term incidence of terrorism following implementation of counterterrorism policy for over 130 countries between 1981 and 2009. The purpose of counterterrorism policy was framed among three alternatives: an effective tool, window dressing, and promoting terrorism. Shor found that in the short-term, the window dressing purpose, which was basically the passage of policy to appease the public and make it appear that the government was acting against terrorism, was the only statistically significant result. In the long-term, Shor found that the promoting terrorism via terrorist backlash against policy was statistically significant. While Shor identified limitations of his study, he suggested future research into the examination between the balance of civil liberties and counterterrorism policies as a way to combat long-term increases in terrorism.

Lindahl (2017) proposed a critical terrorism study to evaluating counterterrorism policy. Lindahl suggested that counterterrorism be viewed as emancipatory, meaning that counterterrorism was an ongoing process that sought to lead towards emancipation, while knowing that achieving full emancipation was not possible. Following Weber's proposals of ideal types, Lindahl proposed an emancipatory counterterrorism that included five components: key assumptions, priorities or aims, basic principles, strategies and tactics,

and evaluation (Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2018). Lindahl's model was offered as an alternative to the more violent constructions of counterterrorism by focusing on nonviolence, freedom, and peace.

Some of the calls for evaluating counterterrorism policy came from concerns that such policies provoked further terrorist attacks, rather than deterred or prevented future terrorist attacks (Avdan & Uzonyi, 2017; Dietrich, 2014; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; Qvortrup, 2016). This led to a policy evaluation approach over time, where specific interventions were assessed using empirical data. Such analyses have thus far been conducted as specific case studies for particular nations, LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) used Northern Ireland, Barros (2003) used Spain, and Sharvit et al. (2013) used the Israel/Palestine conflict. The current quantitative study used the case of the United States. Following the model used by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009), I examined U.S. domestic terrorism data (incidence, lethality, and costs) from the GTD in relation to the implementation of each of the counterterrorism policies.

Summary of Literature Review

Terrorism is a global social problem. In the United States, the primary threat comes from domestic terrorists but U.S. counterterrorism policy has focused on the rarer threat of international terrorism. Even though this paradox exists, U.S. counterterrorism provisions continue to be developed and renewed without any specific empirical data to support their use. In this study, I fill the gap in the literature by using empirical data from the GTD to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century.

Two theoretical approaches were applied to this study, the MSF from public policy and the power elite theory as part of conflict theory from sociology. The MSF provided a model for explaining the policy process, particularly the agenda-setting portions of the policy process, yet remained flexible enough to be applied to a wide range of policies at various levels of governance, and across a range of sociohistorical contexts. Kingdon (2011) proposed that there were three independent streams, a problem stream, a policy stream, and a political stream which operated autonomously, but converged during a policy window when policy implementation occurred. Birkland (1997, 2006) extended Kingdon's analysis by diving deeper into the role that focusing events played in the policy process. While the MSF was robust enough to explain many policy areas, it struggled to address the paradox of why U.S. counterterrorism policy was not addressing the primary threat from domestic terrorists. To complement the MSF, the power elite theory from conflict theory in sociology was used as well. According to C.W. Mills (1956), power in the United States was divided between the power elite and the rest of society. The power elite contained members of the political elite, the economic elite, and the military elite who operated in cooperation with each other to serve their own interests. It is through examining the power relations in the United States and how the power elite function that explained the discrepancy between counterterrorism policy and the terrorist threat in the United States.

Terrorist attacks from domestic terrorists are an ongoing issue in the United States. While the purpose of U.S. counterterrorism policies was to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist attacks regardless of their motivation, many of the policies focused on

threats from international actors. However, there were provisions that had the potential to impact domestic terrorist operations in the United States. The U.S. counterterrorism policies that were included in the analysis were those that had provisions that would impact domestic terrorism, either specifically or as an extension of provisions aimed at curbing international terrorism. These policies listed in chronological order were: the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, AETA of 2006, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission of 2007, and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

Despite the implementation of several counterterrorism policies, a systematic approach to evaluating counterterrorism policy was missing. The gap in the literature was that U.S. counterterrorism policy had not been evaluated for its impact on domestic terrorism in general. Researchers suggested that identifying an evidence-based method of evaluating counterterrorism policy in the United States was needed. Because the infrequency of international terrorist attacks would undermine the validity and reliability of any evaluation solely focusing on international terrorism, this study examined the impact of U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century on incidence, lethality, and costs of domestic terrorism by using the GTD, and following the model used by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009).

The GTD is an open source database and contains a range of variables for analysis and sorting. I filtered and analyzed the data using established measures to only include U.S. domestic terrorist events (Berkebile, 2017; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). I used descriptive statistics and visual analysis to describe domestic terrorism in relation to U.S.

counterterrorism policy. I used the series hazard model to analyze the hazard or risk of domestic terrorism following the implementation of five U.S. counterterrorism policies. In Chapter 3, I will provide a detailed description of the methodology I chose to address the research questions for this study.

Chapter 3: Research Method

The purpose of this longitudinal, quantitative study was to describe U.S. domestic terrorist incidence, lethality, and cost in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy. I analyzed domestic terrorism data to reveal the hazard for domestic terrorism following U.S. counterterrorism policy implementation. Governments around the world and across time have attempted to establish policies to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist attacks within their jurisdiction, and the United States was no different. While most of the terrorist activity in the United States comes from domestic terrorists, U.S. counterterrorism policy has focused on the more rare threat of international terrorism. However, there are elements to U.S. counterterrorism policy that may have impact on domestic terrorist operations.

The gap in the literature was that changes in domestic terrorism have not been evaluated in relation to the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21st century. In this study, I addressed this gap in the literature by utilizing empirical data from the GTD to assess the effectiveness of five U.S. counterterrorism policies (AETA, 2006; Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, 2007; USA FREEDOM Act, 2015; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 2005). Because the entire population of U.S. domestic terrorist incidents was available in the GTD, I did not employ a sampling strategy, rather I analyzed the entire population.

In Chapter 3, I detail the research questions and hypotheses, the research method and design, the data accessed, the data analysis, and the ethical considerations I made in

this study. I also discuss my rationale for selecting a longitudinal trend design using secondary data to address the research questions and to confirm or reject the null hypotheses.

Research Design and Rationale

This was a quantitative, longitudinal study using secondary data. The independent variables were the following U.S. counterterrorism policies: the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (enacted October 26, 2001), the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (enacted March 9, 2006), AETA of 2006 (enacted November 27, 2006), Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (enacted August 3, 2007), and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (enacted June 2, 2015). The dependent variables were the following indicators of domestic terrorism: incidence, lethality, and costs.

I used the following operational definition of domestic terrorism, in which domestic terrorism is the premeditated, intentional acts or threats of acts of violence intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian population and/or the government to achieve some political, religious, economic, ideological, and/or social objective(s) and perpetrated by a citizen or resident of the country within which the acts or threats are aimed. For U.S. domestic terrorism, the perpetrators must be U.S. citizens or residents and the attacks must be planned or executed within the territorial boundaries of the United States (Berkebile, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Carpenter, 2018; Crenshaw, 1995, [2009] 2012; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Enders et al., 2011; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007;

Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Norris, 2017; Ronczkowski, 2018; Sandler, 2014).

To measure U.S. domestic terrorism, I evaluated three indicators in relation to the independent variables. These indicators were (a) incidence of domestic terrorism, (b) lethality of domestic terrorism as measured by whether there were casualties, fatalities, and hostages taken during domestic terrorist incidents, and (c) the costs of domestic terrorism as measured by whether property damage occurred, ransom paid, and monies budgeted and spent by the U.S. government for counterterrorism policy (Berkebile, 2012, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Brzoska, 2016; Crenshaw, 2001; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Danzell & Zidek, 2013; De Lint & Kassa, 2015; Dietrich, 2014; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; Enders & Sandler, 2012; Enders et al., 2011; Freese, 2014; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Lindahl, 2017; Lum et al., 2006, 2008; McQuire, 2013; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Pokalova, 2015; Qvortrup, 2016; Safer-Lichtenstein et al., 2017; Sandler, 2014; Schwinn, 2016; Shor, 2016; Van Dongen, 2011; Williams, 2018).

The GTD ranks property damage from a terrorist attack across four categories: catastrophic (likely equal to or greater than \$1 billion), major (likely equal to or greater than \$1 million but less than \$1 billion), minor (likely less than \$1 million), and unknown (START, 2018b). Additional variables related to property damage in the GTD included whether the incident resulted in property damage and the amount of property damage in U.S. dollars. If there had been kidnapping and/or hostage-taking incidents that included the payment of ransom, those expenditures would have been analyzed. For the time frame

of analysis for this study, there were hostage-taking incidents; however, none resulted in the payment of ransom (START, 2018a).

Prior researchers examining lethality have focused on measuring lethality only as the number of fatalities; however, casualties (injuries) and hostage-taking should also be considered when determining lethality (Asal et al., 2015; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Carson & Suppenbach, 2018; Caspi, Freilich, & Chermak, 2012; Edwards et al., 2016; Enders & Sandler, 2000; Nilsson, 2018; Olzak, 2016; Palfy, 2003; Phillips, 2017; Sheehan, 2009; Simon & Benjamin, 2000; Wilson & Lemanski, 2013). Hsu et al. (2018) specifically noted the importance of utilizing data on injuries and fatalities for future research. Therefore, in this study I examined fatalities, casualties, and hostages taken to determine lethality.

In this descriptive study, I used a quantitative, longitudinal trend study of secondary data. I decided to use secondary data because of the recent research utilizing the GTD; the accessibility, flexibility, and transparency of the GTD; research supporting GTD validity and reliability in its use to analyze terrorism; and by my research questions. Using the procedure developed by Berkebile (2017), I filtered data from the GTD to include only U.S. terrorist events from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017. I examined the sources for each event to determine perpetrator nationality, and coded each event as domestic terrorism, international terrorism, or unknown.

I examined incidence, lethality, and cost data from the filtered GTD data through descriptive statistics, visual analysis, and by using the series hazard model to describe how U.S. domestic terrorism had changed along those variables following the

implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 21st century. The entire population of domestic terrorism events in the United States from the GTD from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 was used in the analysis.

The six central RQs were:

RQ1: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

RQ2: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

RQ3: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

RQ4: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?

RQ5: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?

RQ6: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?

I chose this research design and methodology because it permitted me to provide empirical descriptions of these RQs and the additional SQs, which focused on each selected U.S. counterterrorism policy. I answered the first three RQs using descriptive statistics and visual analysis. I used the series hazard model to answer the last three RQs. My rationale for selecting this research design and methodology was in response to trends in the field seeking more empirical analyses regarding terrorist behavior,

especially U.S. domestic terrorists, and seeking evidence-based methods of evaluating counterterrorism policy.

While the GTD provides terrorism data from 1970 through 2017, I examined only U.S. domestic terrorism data from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017. The terrorism data for 1993 was lost, and while parts of the data for that year were reconstructed, it is estimated that the data for that year only represents 15% of the total global terrorist activity that occurred (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). In addition, domestic terrorism activity in the United States for 1970 was at its highest, thus skewing any baseline data had I included that year and the immediately following years in my analyses (START, 2018a). I used domestic terrorism data for the United States from January 1, 1994 through October 26, 2001 to establish a baseline for comparison of descriptive statistics and visual analysis on incidence, lethality, and costs (see Howell, 2004; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).

My rationale for choosing to examine all forms of U.S. domestic terrorism rather than focusing on a specific ideological or methodological approach was because, with the exception of AETA, among the U.S. counterterrorism policies examined, the goals of the policies were not limited to specific types of terrorism per se, but to deterring, preventing, and responding to any terrorist attack. For example, while the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted out of the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it was the first policy to introduce a definition of domestic terrorism (Naftali, 2005; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001).

My rationale for selecting five U.S. counterterrorism policies was driven by the research focus on U.S. domestic terrorism and time constraints in examining all legislation related to preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorism from 1970 to 2017. I selected the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 as the first policy to examine because that is when domestic terrorism was added to the *United States Code* as a separate category (Naftali, 2005; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). I reviewed U.S. counterterrorism policy since the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, and I identified four additional counterterrorism policies that had the possibility of impacting domestic terrorism activity. While other U.S. counterterrorism policies have been enacted since 2000, I chose these five because they were the most relevant to this study, and have garnered media attention that would allow for its provisions to be more known to the general public.

To assess the impact of U.S. counterterrorism policy, I filtered data from the GTD to include only U.S. domestic terrorist events, and then analyzed those data using the series hazard model. Berkebile (2017) offered a model by which GTD data could be filtered to analyze domestic terrorism data. I used Berkebile's model to filter the GTD. The GTD included the citations for the three media sources used to compile the information on all terrorist events (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018a, 2018b). For unknown perpetrators, I conducted a supplementary analysis to identify if more information had been uncovered since the event's addition to the GTD as a way to identify perpetrator nationality. All unknown attacks were analyzed separately.

Time and resource constraints played a role in my selection of using a longitudinal, quantitative design examining secondary data for this study. Policy

evaluation research can be a time-consuming and labor-intensive endeavor. By focusing on one policy area and its impact, this study was in greater alignment with the temporal expectations of a dissertation. In addition, no outside grant monies were sought nor attained to fund this research, thus limiting my ability to collect new or additional data.

To evaluate policy impact, researchers have used correlation or regression; however, when utilizing event data over time, neither correlation nor regression was appropriate. Correlation assumes independence of observations, but terrorist attacks may influence additional terrorist attacks. Therefore, terrorism event data are not independent, and thus would not fulfill the necessary assumptions for a correlation analysis.

Regression analyses assume normality of data. When examining terrorism event data, assumption of normality may not be appropriate, and thus a different form of analysis was called for. Furthermore, this was a descriptive study, and thus using statistics that predicted trajectories did not align with the research questions.

In examining longitudinal data to describe changes in variables and to evaluate policy, researchers have suggested using time-series analyses (O'Sullivan et al, 2017). However, there are several threats to internal validity when using a time-series analysis, and an interrupted time-series analysis is often used to evaluate the impact of a discrete intervention (McDowell, 2011). While there have been many studies that have used the interrupted time-series analysis to analyze event data (viz., Hsu et al., 2018), the interrupted time-series analysis requires the analyst to select a fixed time frame for comparison (Dugan, 2011; McDowell, 2011). Additionally, Shellman (2004, 2006) identified the subjectivity involved in planning time-series analyses, thus resulting in

variation in interpretation of results. Using a time-series analysis introduces the potential for selection bias by the analyst and undermines the validity of the results.

Because of the nature of terrorism, the presentation of the data from the GTD, and more recent studies in specifically examining the relationship between terrorism and counterterrorism policy, I employed the series hazard model for data analysis in this study (Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). The series hazard model was a preferable alternative to time-series analyses because the series hazard model has greater flexibility in providing a more detailed analysis that would otherwise be lost (Carson, 2014; Dugan, 2011). The series hazard model extends Cox's (1972) proportional hazard model to allow for evaluation of policy implementation (Dugan, 2011). The series hazard model allows for use of controls and evaluation of time effects since policy implementation, something that time-series analyses cannot do.

The series hazard model has been used in recent quantitative analyses of terrorism data. Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero (2005) examined airline hijackings from 1931 to 2003. Carson (2014) examined the impact that legal interventions and sanctions had on radical eco-terrorist organizations. Sharvit et al. (2013) examined the types of Israeli intervention on Palestinian terrorism from 2000 to 2006.

The most relevant analysis for this study involved using the series hazard model to examine the impact of British counterterrorism policies on terrorist activity in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1992 (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). Because of the complexity involved in changing counterterrorism policy in the United Kingdom (UK), LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) found the series hazard model to be preferable over other time-

series analyses, because while there were clear start dates for implementation, end dates were not as clear. Counterterrorism policy in the United States was similar in which a key policy was implemented on a specific date, but specific provisions within that policy ended while others continued as part of different policies. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act was allowed to expire on June 1, 2015 and was replaced by the USA FREEDOM Act on June 2, 2015; however, many of the provisions from the USA PATRIOT Act continued as part of the USA FREEDOM Act. The primary change between these two acts involved the provisions regarding governmental surveillance powers and access to data on U.S. citizens. This is similar to Great Britain's criminalization policy that officially ended in 1981 with portions of it remaining in place via the Ulsterization policy (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). This study was modeled after the methodology employed by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009).

Methodology

Population

I analyzed the entire population of data on U.S. domestic terrorism events between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017 found within the GTD. The unit of analysis was the terrorist event. There were a total of 749 terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017. Of those, 500 were identified as being domestic terrorism, 236 were unknown, and 13 were identified as international terrorism (START, 2018a).

I did not use any sampling strategy or procedure for selecting which terrorist data to include in my analysis; rather, I used the entire population of data on U.S. domestic terrorism events between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017 found within the GTD.

Sampling and Sampling Procedures

I used purposive sampling to identify the U.S. counterterrorism policies that were evaluated. The counterterrorism policies examined began with the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, because that was when domestic terrorism was added to the *United States Code* as a separate category (Naftali, 2005). I identified four additional U.S. counterterrorism policies implemented in the 21st century as having the possibility of impacting domestic terrorism activity. While other U.S. counterterrorism policies were enacted since 2000, I chose the five which were the most relevant to this study, and which have garnered media attention that allowed for its provisions to be known to the general public. The five counterterrorism policies I included in this study in chronological order were the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (enacted October 26, 2001), the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (enacted March 9, 2006), AETA of 2006 (enacted November 27, 2006), Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (enacted August 3, 2007), and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (enacted June 2, 2015).

Procedure for Secondary Data

Considering the amount of terrorist attacks that occur in the United States, I used data from an existing database of terrorist attacks in this study. The GTD is an open source dataset that has logged non-State terrorism incidents from 1970 to 2017, and

served as the primary data source for this study (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). In order for incidents to be included within the GTD, they must satisfy three attributes of the GTD definition of terrorism and at least two of the three inclusion criteria (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). A terrorist attack, as defined by the GTD is “the threatened or actual use of illegal force or violence by a non-State actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START, 2018b, p.10). Each included incident must (a) be intentional, (b) involve some level of use of or threat of use of violence, and (c) be perpetrated by sub-national actors. Furthermore, the three inclusion criteria from which at least two must be fulfilled are:

Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.

Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.

Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by

international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants). (START, 2018b, p.10)

These inclusion criteria were consistent with my operational definition of terrorism used in this study, which made this database an appropriate source for my analyses.

The GTD is available to download by request from the START website. I requested access to the GTD which was approved by the authors of the database on July 31, 2018 (see Appendices A and B). Prior to IRB approval, I only accessed the GTD codebook. I accessed the GTD data following IRB approval on June 5, 2019.

I identified budget appropriations for counterterrorism by the U.S. government by reviewing public data and documentation produced by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and DHS. I also examined authoritative reports regarding counterterrorism budgeting by the U.S. government. Initially, I was going to provide counterterrorism spending by the U.S. government by fiscal year from 1994 to 2017; however, after I reviewed the public budget data, it was clear that identifying how much money was allocated towards counterterrorism was not feasible. Aspects of federal budget usage were classified as well as spread across a range of agencies and entities. Therefore, I focused on counterterrorism budget spending for fiscal years 2002 to 2017. Because of issues identified with consistency of reporting and data accuracy, in the end I chose to present the data from an open source, authoritative report published by the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Data (2018).

Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs

Secondary Data Selection and Collection

Once an event fulfilled the inclusion criteria set by the GTD authors, all known details of that event were inputted into the database by START researchers (LaFree, 2010; LaFree and Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). The terrorism data within the GTD include month, day, and year of terrorist incident, an approximate date if the actual date is unknown or unclear, if the incident lasted beyond 24 hours or within 24 hours, incident summary, the GTD inclusion criteria met, whether there is uncertainty regarding if the incident qualifies as terrorism, and if so, additional designation is listed, whether the incident was independent or part of a series of incidents, and what those related incidents were (START, 2018a, 2018b). For location of the incident, the country, region, province/administrative region/state, city, vicinity, location details, latitude and longitude, and geocoding specificity are noted (START, 2018a, 2018b).

Incidents are further labeled with primary, secondary, and tertiary types of attack, attack success, and if it was a suicide attack. Attack success was coded in terms of whether the planned method was executed. It was not coded in relation to the motivation or long-term goals of the perpetrator or perpetrator group (LaFree, 2010; START, 2018b). Weapon information is also provided including the main four weapon types used, along with four weapon sub-types used. The target and victim information include primary, secondary, and tertiary types and subtypes of target, name of target and specific target or victim, and nationality of target. Perpetrator information include primary, secondary, and tertiary group and subgroup names, certainty of perpetrator identity,

unaffiliated individuals, number of perpetrators, number of perpetrators captured, whether there was a claim of responsibility, the mode of such claim, whether there were competing claims for up to three groups, and motive of attack (START, 2018a, 2018b). While perpetrator nationality is not included in the public database as a discrete variable, perpetrator identity, if known is included as well as the citations for the media sources used in compiling the information for each event.

Fatalities and injuries are provided for perpetrator and targets. Total numbers are provided along with the number of U.S. citizens killed or injured. Whether there was property damage, the magnitude of property damage, and the approximate value of property damage in U.S. dollars is provided. If the incident involved kidnapping or hostages, additional data regarding those types of incidents and whether and how much ransom was paid are included (START, 2018a, 2018b).

Incidents are coded as international along ideological, logistical, miscellaneous, or any of the above within the GTD (START, 2018a, 2018b). While initially this seemed like an easy way to filter for domestic terrorist incidents, the method used to code the data may result in an underestimation of domestic terrorism. For example, for domestic terrorists that are motivated by an ideology outside of the United States or for independence, those would be coded as ideologically international, but if the incident occurred on U.S. territory, it may or may not be coded as international logistically. For example, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional Puertorriqueña (FALN), a Puerto Rican Independencistas revolutionary group was labeled as logistically and ideologically international even though the perpetrators were U.S. citizens and the attacks occurred

within the territorial boundaries of the United States (Martin, 2018; START, 2018a, 2018b). Because of how I operationally defined domestic terrorism in this study, FALN was coded as a domestic terrorist organization. Therefore, these coding categories from the GTD were not used in the data filtering process. Instead, I manually coded the events as being domestic terrorism, international terrorism, or unknown.

The GTD codebook includes detailed descriptions of the history of the GTD, coding methods, and a detailed list of changes made with the release of the updated database (START, 2018b). Not only are the changes listed, but the rationale for the changes along with adjustments in methodology are also explicitly presented (START, 2018b). It was this level of detail and transparency that led to my choice to use the GTD in this study.

I reviewed public data and documentation produced by the OMB and DHS to identify U.S. government budget appropriations for counterterrorism. In addition, I reviewed authoritative reports regarding counterterrorism budgeting. Counterterrorism spending by the U.S. government as allocated to the DHS was provided by fiscal year from 2002 to 2017 (Cordesman, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, 2018).

Operationalization

The independent variables of this study were the following U.S. counterterrorism policies: the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (enacted October 26, 2001), the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (enacted March 9, 2006), AETA of 2006 (enacted November 27, 2006), Implementing Recommendations of the

9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (enacted August 3, 2007), and the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (enacted June 2, 2015). The operational definition of U.S. counterterrorism policy was federal legislation enacted to deter, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks against the United States.

The dependent variables were domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs. The operational definition of domestic terrorism was the premeditated, intentional acts or threats of acts of violence intended to intimidate, coerce, or influence the civilian population and/or the government to achieve some political, religious, economic, ideological, and/or social objective(s) and perpetrated by a citizen or resident of the country within which the acts or threats are aimed. For U.S. domestic terrorism, the perpetrators must be U.S. citizens or residents and the attacks must be planned or executed within the territorial boundaries of the United States (Berkebile, 2017; Bjelopera, 2017; Carpenter, 2018; Crenshaw, 1995, [2009] 2012; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017; Enders et al., 2011; Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007; Hewitt, 2003; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 2000; Levitas, 2002; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016; Norris, 2017; Ronczkowski, 2018; Sandler, 2014).

To measure U.S. domestic terrorism, I evaluated three indicators in relation to the independent variables. Incidence of domestic terrorism was the first indicator. Incidence of domestic terrorism was measured by frequency of domestic terrorist events by year and by time lapse between events in days and in months.

The second indicator was lethality of domestic terrorism. Prior research examining lethality focused on measuring lethality only as the number of fatalities;

however, injuries and hostage-taking should also be considered when determining lethality (Asal et al., 2015; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Carson & Suppenbach, 2018; Caspi, Freilich, & Chermak, 2012; Edwards et al., 2016; Enders & Sandler, 2000; Nilsson, 2018; Olzak, 2016; Palfy, 2003; Phillips, 2017; Sheehan, 2009; Simon & Benjamin, 2000; Wilson & Lemanski, 2013). Therefore, in this study, I examined fatalities, casualties, and hostages taken to determine lethality. Originally, I was going to assess the magnitude of lethality; however, low numbers violated the criteria of the series hazard model. Therefore, I coded each event in terms of whether the attack was lethal or not.

The final indicator of domestic terrorism was costs. I intended to measure costs of domestic terrorism by the amount of property damage incurred, ransom paid, and monies budgeted and spent by the U.S. government for counterterrorism. The GTD ranked property damage from a terrorist attack across four categories: catastrophic (likely equal to or greater than \$1 billion), major (likely equal to or greater than \$1 million but less than \$1 billion), minor (likely less than \$1 million), and unknown (START, 2018b). If there were kidnapping and/or hostage-taking incidents that included the payment of ransom, those expenditures would have been analyzed. For ransom data, the GTD provided the confirmed amount paid, if known (START, 2018b). Like the lethality indicator, I had to adjustment how I examined costs after I accessed of the GTD data. As a result, instead of magnitude of property damage, I examined whether an incident resulted in property damage or not. I graphically presented counterterrorism spending by

the U.S. government spending as reported by the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018). I presented all costs in U.S. dollars.

Data Analysis Plan

I used SPSS to analyze all data to describe domestic terrorism in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy using descriptive statistics, visual analysis, and by employing Cox's proportional hazard test for the series hazard model. Because of some limitations with SPSS, I used Excel and manual calculations for the creation of needed variables for the series hazard model. I encrypted, password-protected, and secured the database using Intercrypto Advanced Encryption Package 2017. All analyses and reports were also encrypted, password-protected, and secured using Intercrypto Advanced Encryption Package 2017.

Filtering GTD data. Because the GTD contains all incidents globally from 1970 to 2017, I filtered the dataset to include only events that occurred between 1994 and 2017. Following the procedure proposed by Berkebile (2017), I filtered the data along the following criteria: perpetrators were subnational actors, target included noncombatants, intention of attack was to influence larger audience, motivated by political, social, economic, or religious ideology, the location of the incident was within the jurisdiction of the United States, perpetrator nationality, and target nationality.

The GTD does not provide a code for perpetrator nationality in its public dataset, therefore, I conducted supplemental examination of the sources cited in the GTD for each event and I examined additional open source data to determine perpetrator nationality when that information was not found in cited sources for the event in the GTD. The GTD

does contain references of the three primary sources of information for data inclusion for each event (START, 2018b). I sought out those references first. For cases in which perpetrator nationality was unknown, I coded them as unknown and analyzed them separately. Once the data were filtered to only include events within U.S. jurisdiction, the database was ready for descriptive statistical and visual analyses. Consistent with prior studies utilizing the series hazard model and terrorism event data, I created additional variables, calculated in SPSS, or in Excel or manually if those calculations were not possible in the version of SPSS that I used. I included all U.S. domestic terrorist data in my analyses.

Compilation of US counterterrorism spending. Originally, I planned on compiling the counterterrorism budget data by fiscal year, and present that data graphically along with being analyzed using descriptive statistics. However, several inconsistencies and unexpected challenges arose as I reviewed the data before I started compiling it. Instead of conducting the compilation myself, I decided to present the data from the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018). The Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018) noted the same obstacles that I faced in attempting to compile and present budget data on U.S. government counterterrorism spending, which led me to concur with their recommendations regarding accountability, accuracy, and uniform operationalization and conceptualization of concepts.

Research questions and hypotheses. In this study, there were six central research questions (RQs). For each research question, there were five sub questions (SQs), one for each specific U.S. counterterrorism policy that was evaluated. The null

and alternative hypotheses for each RQ and SQ are included below. I answered the first three RQs using descriptive statistics and visual analysis. I answered the last three RQs using the series hazard model.

RQ1: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

H_01 : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H_11 : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ1A: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H_01A : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

H_11A : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ1B: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

H_01B : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

H_11B : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ1C: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

*H*₀1C: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

*H*₁1C: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ1D: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

*H*₀1D: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

*H*₁1D: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ1E: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

*H*₀1E: Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

*H*₁1E: Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ2: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

H_02 : Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H_12 : Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ2A: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H_02A : Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

H_12A : Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ2B: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

H_02B : Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

H_12B : Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ2C: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

H_02C : Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

H_12C : Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ2D: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

H₀2D: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

H₁2D: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ2E: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

H₀2E: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

H₁2E: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ3: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

H₀3: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H₁3: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ3A: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H₀3A: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

*H*_{13A}: domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ3B: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

*H*_{03B}: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

*H*_{13B}: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ3C: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

*H*_{03C}: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

*H*_{13C}: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ3D: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

*H*₀3D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

*H*₁3D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ3E: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

*H*₀3E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

*H*₁3E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ4: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

*H*₀4: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

*H*₁4: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ4A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

*H*₀4A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

*H*₁4A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ4B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

*H*₀4B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

*H*₁4B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ4C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

*H*₀4C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

*H*₁4C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ4D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

*H*₀4D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

*H*_{14D}: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ4E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

*H*_{04E}: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

*H*_{14E}: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ5: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?

*H*₀₅: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event increases following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

*H*₁₅: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event decreases following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ5A: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

*H*_{05A}: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

*H*_{15A}: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ5B: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

H_05B : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

H_15B : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ5C: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

H_05C : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

H_15C : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ5D: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

H_05D : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

H_15D : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ5E: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

H₀5E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

H₁5E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ6: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?

H₀6: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H₁6: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ6A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H₀6A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

H₁6A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ6B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

*H*₀6B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

*H*₁6B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ6C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

*H*₀6C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

*H*₁6C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ6D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

*H*₀6D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

*H*₁6D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ6E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

H_06E : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

H_16E : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

Statistical analysis plan. I examined the frequency of incidence of domestic terrorist attacks, lethal attacks, and attacks resulting in property damage using descriptive statistics and visual analysis for each policy time frame. I used the series hazard model to examine what the risk or hazard of future U.S. domestic terrorist attacks was following the implementation of each U.S. counterterrorism policy (Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). For this part of the analysis, instead of frequency of domestic terrorist attacks, frequency of lethal attacks, and frequency of costly attacks, the dependent variable was time between terrorist attacks in days for each indicator (Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; Sharvit et al., 2013).

The series hazard model extends Cox's proportional hazard model by replacing the individual with an event (Cox, 1972; Dugan, 2011). Cox's proportional hazard model provides the probability that each unit will experience an event only once; however, this model does not take into account the exact timing of the event, instead examining the order of the events (Cox, 1972; Dugan, 2011; M. Mills, 2012). In addition, the proportional hazards assumption avoids the necessity of imposing any distributional

assumptions that could force structure on data as would be needed for statistical analyses that include the assumption of normality (Cox, 1972; Dugan, 2011). The proportional hazards assumption is that for any two individuals, or events for series hazard, the ratio of hazards is constant (Cox, 1972; Dugan, 2011). The series hazard model builds on Cox's proportional hazard model by adding the element of exact timing in order to measure probability from a specific intervention (Dugan, 2011). Because time-series analyses require equidistant measures of time between events and the implementation of policy as well as the domestic terrorism activities do not occur on such a schedule, time-series analyses was not appropriate for this study.

The present study fulfilled the criteria needed for using the series hazard model. The data that I analyzed were discrete events (terrorist attacks) that were recorded such that duration between events was calculable (see Dugan, 2011). Domestic terrorist attacks do occur with relative frequency within the United States, which meets the second criterion for using the series hazard model.

The following formula was used to analyze the data, where the coefficients associated with the hazard of a new domestic terrorist attack (number of days, Y) was estimated as a function of an unspecified baseline hazard function and other risk or protective factors measured at the time of the current attack represented by vectors U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY and CONTROLS (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009).

$$h(Y) = \lambda_0(Y) \exp(\beta_1 \text{U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY} + \beta_2 \text{CONTROLS}) \quad (1)$$

To measure the impact of U.S. counterterrorism policy, I created a series of dummy variables associated with the specific policy implementation date to the next

policy implementation date where values of “1” were coded as attacks during that time frame (Dugan, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). However, with short durations between some policies and thus small numbers of attacks for that time frame, the counterterrorism policies were coded as a series of dummy variables associated with the specific policy implementation date to its end date, if applicable, or to the end of the time frame of analysis if the policy remained in effect. Therefore, as time passed, there was overlap across multiple U.S. counterterrorism policies, which were in effect concurrently.

I applied the same diagnostics used for Cox’s proportional hazard model, because the series hazard model is an extension of Cox’s proportional hazard model (see Dugan, 2011). I examined Schoenfeld’s residuals as the diagnostic to determine if the proportional hazards assumption was met (Caroni, 2004; M. Mills, 2012; Xue & Schifano, 2017). I used a likelihood ratio test to identify which model, one including policy interaction variables with time and one without, was the best fit for the data.

I included the following control variables: time elapsed from start of analysis in months, success density across three incidents, attack density across three incidents, and number of days since previous attack. For the domestic terrorism models, I included the following additional control variables: days since previous domestic attack, success density across three incidents of only domestic attacks, attack density across three incidents for only domestic attacks, and months elapsed from start of analysis for domestic attacks were added. I ran two models for each RQ and SQ, one with policy interaction variables with time and one without.

Threats to Validity

Research validity refers to the extent to which what a researcher is trying to measure is actually being measured. Internal validity refers to the extent to which the independent variable caused a change in the dependent variable, and that the dependent variable was an appropriate indicator of the concept it was intended to indicate (O'Sullivan, Rassel, Berner, & Taliaferro, 2017). External validity refers to the generalizability of the findings (O'Sullivan et al., 2017).

LaFree (2010) identified challenges with using open source event databases like the GTD with regards to accuracy of source data. Because terrorism is aimed at gaining media attention; however, the GTD may have a higher probability of accuracy than other data involving perpetrators who do not aim for media attention, such as traditional criminological data (LaFree, 2010). Therefore, data accuracy was not as large of a threat to internal validity as it would have been for non-terrorism data.

To ensure the most complete database, the variable called *doubt terrorism proper* was included in the GTD. This variable identified whether there was any question as to that event being an act of terrorism or not. While this variable does add validity to the database, inconsistencies in coding the variable over time undermined its reliability. Therefore, I did not filter the data such that only those events that were not coded as *doubt terrorism proper* were included. I included all events in my analyses, independent of how the *doubt terrorism proper* variable was coded.

The primary threats to internal validity for this study are history and maturation effects. However, the series hazard model allows for considerations involving history and

maturation effects. Because the data are disaggregated, levels of aggregation are not a threat as they would be in a time-series analysis (Dugan, 2011). The series hazard model provides information on the estimated hazard of future attacks based on time since last attack; therefore, the impact that prior attacks have on future attacks is accounted for (Dugan, 2011). In addition, because the series hazard model uses time between events as the dependent variable rather than frequency of events, it is possible to estimate the impact that policies had on the baseline hazard for future terrorist attacks (Dugan, 2011). Finally, because the event being measured is a domestic terrorist attack, it does not have to be assumed that all domestic terrorist attacks are the same; rather, the series hazard model allows for consideration of specific characteristics of each attack (Dugan, 2011).

With regards to external validity, because this study used the entire population of data for U.S. domestic terrorism, I did not have the common concerns regarding generalizability to a larger population. Furthermore, I utilized a model already used in a range of contexts to explore the impact that some intervention had on a specific type of terrorism (see Carson, 2014; Carson et al., 2012; Dugan, 2011; Dugan et al., 2005; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009; LaFree & Freilich, 2019; Sharvit et al., 2013). This study was a descriptive study that utilized the series hazard model for U.S. domestic terrorism in general, and offered insight as to its applicability for future research.

Ethical Issues in the Use of Secondary Data Analysis Research

I received permission to use the GTD and have no relationship with START, nor any workers who have been part of the process of inputting data into the GTD (See Appendices A and B). All information contained within the GTD came from public

source materials and did not contain any confidential information. Regardless, I chose to encrypt, password-protect, and secure the database using Intercrypto Advanced Encryption Package 2017. In addition, I encrypted, password-protected, and secured all subsequent analyses using the same encryption software. Data and analyses will be retained for at least five years. I sought and received IRB approval from the IRB at Walden University before I accessed the GTD and began my analyses.

Summary

The purpose of this study was to describe domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century. In Chapter 3, I discussed how the gap in the literature was filled. This study filled an important gap in the literature because I ~~utilizing~~utilized empirical data and employed the series hazard model to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism policy. This descriptive, quantitative, longitudinal trend study involved secondary data analysis as I described in Chapter 3. I conducted this research only after IRB approval, and in alignment with ethical standards. I secured all data and analyses. There was no conflict of interest between the GTD proprietors and myself. Chapter 4 will include the results of the analyses performed, as well as adjustments and the rationale for adjustments in the analyses in response to the unanticipated issues I encountered once I accessed the GTD.

Chapter 4: Results

The purpose of this quantitative, longitudinal trend study was to describe the U.S. domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century using descriptive statistics and the series hazard model. There were six primary research questions; I answered the first three using descriptive statistics and visual analysis, and addressed domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs separately. I answered the final three research questions using the series hazard model to determine whether there were changes in the hazard of incidence, lethality, and costs in domestic terrorist attacks in the United States. For each research question there were five sub-questions, one for each counterterrorism policy examined: USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, AETA of 2006, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, and USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. The null and alternative hypotheses for each RQ and SQ are included below.

RQ1: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

H_01 : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H_11 : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ1A: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H_01A : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

H_11A : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ1B: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

H_01B : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

H_11B : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ1C: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

H_01C : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

H_11C : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ1D: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

H_01D : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

H_{1D} : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ1E: How does incidence of domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

H_{01E} : Incidence of domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

H_{11E} : Incidence of domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ2: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

H_{02} : Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H_{12} : Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ2A: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H_{02A} : Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

H_{12A} : Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ2B: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

H_0 2B: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

H_1 2B: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ2C: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

H_0 2C: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

H_1 2C: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ2D: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

H_0 2D: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

H_1 2D: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ2E: How does lethal domestic terrorism change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

H_0 2E: Lethal domestic terrorism does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

H_1 2E: Lethal domestic terrorism changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ3: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

*H*₀₃: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

*H*₁₃: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ3A: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

*H*_{03A}: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

*H*_{13A}: domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ3B: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

*H*_{03B}: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

*H*_{13B}: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ3C: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

H₀3C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

H₁3C: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ3D: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

H₀3D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

H₁3D: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ3E: How does domestic terrorism resulting in property damage change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

H₀3E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

H₁3E: Domestic terrorism resulting in property damage changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ4: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

H_04 : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H_14 : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ4A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H_04A : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

H_14A : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ4B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

H_04B : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

H_14B : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ4C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

*H*₀4C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

*H*₁4C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ4D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

*H*₀4D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

*H*₁4D: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ4E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

*H*₀4E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

*H*₁4E: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ5: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?

*H*₀5: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event increases following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H_15 : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event decreases following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ5A: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H_05A : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

H_15A : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ5B: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

H_05B : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

H_15B : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ5C: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

H_05C : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

H_15C : The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ5D: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

H₀5D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

H₁5D: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ5E: How does the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

H₀5E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

H₁5E: The hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist event changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

RQ6: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage occurring change following implementation of US counterterrorism policy?

H₀6: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

H₁6: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

SQ6A: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?

H₀6A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

H₁6A: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.

SQ6B: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005?

H₀6B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

H₁6B: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

SQ6C: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the AETA of 2006?

H₀6C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

H₁6C: The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the AETA of 2006.

SQ6D: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007?

H_06D : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

H_16D : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

SQ6E: How does the hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015?

H_06E : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage does not change following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

H_16E : The hazard of a domestic terrorist event with property damage changes following implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

In Chapter 4, I present the data collection procedures and results of my analyses. Results are broken up by incidence, lethality, and costs, with the presentation of the descriptive statistics and answers to the associated first three RQs, followed by the presentation of the series hazard model results and answers to the associated final three RQs.

Data Collection

Upon receipt of IRB approval (06-05-19-0720342), I accessed the GTD dataset and began the analyses outlined in Chapter 3's data analysis plan. Because perpetrator nationality was not included in the public GTD dataset, once I filtered the dataset to only include terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States and its territories between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017, I manually coded each event as being domestic, international, or unknown. When sources were available for each attack in the GTD, I reviewed those sources first. When the GTD was initially created, it involved the combining of information from other existing databases (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007; START, 2018b). For the events that were imported from another database, only that database was listed as the source (START, 2018a). I did not have access to those databases to check their sources; therefore, I entered each event into a Google search to identify newspaper items covering the event and its consequences. In addition, I reviewed the information provided in Hewitt (2005), which was also listed as a source within the GTD for particular events. I determined perpetrator nationality based on the review of all of these sources. For organizations that were known to be domestic or international and if they claimed responsibility for the attack, the event was coded accordingly based on responsible group. For example, the KKK is a domestic terrorist organization and thus all events claimed by the KKK were coded as domestic. Table 1 shows the list of identified organizations and how they were coded.

Table 1

Terrorist Organizations and Number of Associated Incidents Listed in the GTD

Type of terrorism	Number of incidents	Organization
Domestic	2	Anarchists
	64	Animal Liberation Front (ALF)
	1	Animal rights extremists
	48	Anti-abortion extremists
	1	Anti-Arab extremists
	1	Anti-environmentalists
	32	Anti-government extremists
	2	Anti-government group
	3	Anti-gun control extremists
	1	Anti-Kim Jong-il extremists
	1	Anti-liberal extremists
	20	Anti-Muslim extremists
	6	Anti-police extremists
	1	Anti-Republican extremists
	11	Anti-Semitic extremists
	1	Anti-technology extremists
	6	Anti-White extremists
	6	Army of God
	1	Aryan Nation
	16	Aryan Republican Army
	3	Black Hebrew Israelites
	1	Black Nationalists
	1	Citizens for Constitutional Freedom
	8	Coalition to Save the Preserves (CSP)
	1	Court Reform Extremists
	2	Earth First!
	65	Earth Liberation Front (ELF)
	2	Environmentalists
	2	Farm Animal Revenge Militia (FARM)
	3	Incel extremists
	1	Jewish extremists
	30	Jihadi-inspired extremists
	6	Ku Klux Klan (KKK)
	2	Maccabee Squad and the Shield of David
2	Macheteros	
1	Minutemen American Defense	

(table continues)

Type of terrorism	Number of incidents	Organization
	13	Muslim extremists
	6	Neo-Nazi extremists
	1	Organization 544
	4	Phineas Priesthood
	1	Pro-LGBT rights extremists
	1	Republic of Texas
	1	Revenge of the Trees
	2	Revolutionary Cells-Animal Liberation Brigade
	2	Right-Wing extremists
	4	Sovereign Citizen
	14	The Justice Department
	1	United Aryan Empire
	61	Unknown
	2	Veterans United for Non-Religious Memorials
	24	White extremists
	2	White Rabbit Three Percent Illinois Patriot Freedom Fighters Militia
	6	World Church of the Creator
International	4	Al Qaeda
	1	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
	1	Anti-government extremists
	1	Anti-Israeli extremists
	1	Anti-Trump extremists
	1	Cuban exiles
	1	Iraqi extremists
	2	Palestinians
	1	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Unknown	1	Anarchists
	29	Anti-abortion extremists
	1	Anti-Castro group
	1	Anti-environmentalists
	2	Anti-government group
	4	Anti-LGBT extremists
	6	Anti-Muslim extremists
	1	Anti-police extremists
	1	Anti-Sikh extremists
	1	Anti-technology extremists
	1	Earth Liberation Front (ELF)
	2	Environmentalists

(table continues)

Type of terrorism	Number of incidents	Organization
	1	Islamist extremists
	1	Pro-LGBT rights extremists
	1	Sons of the Gestapo
	1	Students for Insurrection
	182	Unknown

It should be noted that for many of the unknown events, the targets and method of operation were consistent with known domestic terrorist activities. For example, several attacks on abortion clinics were listed as unknown, yet the majority of known attacks on abortion clinics in the United States have been perpetrated by U.S. citizens or residents. As shown in Table 1, 48 domestic incidents involved anti-abortion groups, while none were perpetrated by international terrorists (START, 2018a). The same can be said for attacks on various places of worship. While not as clearly shown in Table 1 as abortion-clinic attacks, there were many attacks on religious figures, religious devotees, and places of worship perpetrated by groups such as the KKK. Therefore, I displayed the breakdown of terrorist attacks by target type, as coded in the GTD, in Table 2.

As shown in Table 2, organizations that restricted attacks for single-issues, such as Army of God targeting abortion clinics, were included in target type analysis. As shown in Table 2, there were 55 abortion-related incidents perpetrated by domestic terrorists while none were perpetrated by international terrorists. Similar results were found for the religious figures and institutions target type, in which 49 incidents were perpetrated by domestic terrorists and none by international terrorists.

Table 2

Breakdown of Type of Terror Attack by GTD Target Type

Target type	International	Domestic	Unknown	Total
Abortion related	0	55	61	116
Airports and aircraft	2	4	3	9
Business	1	141	28	170
Educational institution	1	36	5	42
Food or water supply	0	1	0	1
Government (diplomatic)	0	2	2	4
Government (general)	2	44	29	75
Journalists and media	0	5	13	18
Maritime	0	1	0	1
Military	0	13	2	15
NGO	0	3	2	5
Other	0	0	1	1
Police	1	22	5	28
Private citizens and property	5	111	24	140
Religious figures/institutions	0	49	49	98
Telecommunication	0	2	0	2
Terrorists/non-State militia	0	0	1	1
Tourists	1	1	1	3
Transportation	0	4	3	7
Unknown	0	3	0	3
Utilities	0	3	6	9
Violent political party	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	13	500	236	749

Coding Inconsistencies with the GTD

The GTD includes a variable entitled “doubt terrorism proper.” This variable was introduced into the GTD after the initial compilation and has only been systematically coded for events since 1997 (LaFree, 2010; START, 2018b). When I reviewed the coding for this variable in the dataset, I found some inconsistencies. For the known domestic terrorist attacks, 378 were labeled as *terrorism*, 111 were labeled as *doubt terrorism proper*, and 11 were labeled *unknown* (START, 2018a). When further examining the events that were labeled as doubt terrorism proper, I found many of those that have been

labeled by the media and subsequently prosecuted as hate crimes, were labeled as doubt terrorism proper even if the event met the inclusion criteria of terrorism and met the definition of terrorism from the *United States Code*. In addition, there seemed to be an imbalance of coding where similar incidents perpetrated by persons of color and/or Muslims were coded as terrorism while incidents involving White perpetrators were coded as doubt terrorism proper. Interestingly enough, the attack by Dylann Roof on the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, SC on June 17, 2015 was coded as terrorism. Originally, I had planned on only analyzing events that did not meet the doubt terrorism proper criterion; however, upon noting the coding patterns, I decided to not remove any of the events labeled as doubt terrorism proper from my subsequent analyses. When the updated GTD is released with the terrorism data for 2018, it will be interesting to see how the Tree of Life Synagogue attack in Pittsburgh on October 27, 2018 will be coded.

I encountered some unexpected issues with the GTD data that I had not previously anticipated, and that led to some adjustments in my research questions and procedure. However, none of these adjustments were substantial enough to warrant another review by the IRB. Specifically, in the GTD, there were eight incidents that were labeled with only a month and year, but no specific day. While I had anticipated approximate dates, I had not anticipated the approximation being as open-ended as it was. A total of eight attacks did not have a specifically known date (seven in the pre-USA PATRIOT Act period, and one after the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted but before the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act was enacted). If I removed these

attacks from my analyses, I would have introduced additional error into the analyses, and artificially increased gap times in the series hazard analyses. Therefore, based on procedures used by past researchers using the series hazard model when encountering this issue, I assigned the 15th day of the month to those eight attacks (see Carson, 2014; Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 2012).

In terms of lethality, I originally intended to examine the magnitude of lethality in relation to the selected counterterrorism policies. However, due to the low number of highly lethal attacks, I chose to instead create a dummy variable identifying whether an attack was lethal (had at least one fatality, injury, or hostage), and based the analyses on that criterion. Because of this change I adjusted RQ2 and RQ5, such that the questions asked how lethal domestic terrorism changed rather than how the magnitude of lethality changed.

Another issue I encountered involved the consistency of coding the data for property damage. The GTD provides several variables regarding property damage. One variable identifies whether the event caused property damage, one variable identifies the level of property damage on the following scale: catastrophic (likely equal to or greater than \$1 billion), major (likely equal to or greater than \$1 million but less than \$1 billion), minor (likely less than \$1 million), and unknown, and a third variable provides the amount of property damage if known, in U.S. dollars (START, 2018a, 2018b). The second and third variables were supposed to be coded only for events that had known property damage. However, I immediately noted some inconsistencies. For the first variable of whether the event caused property damage, 522 incidents had known property

damage, 211 had no property damage known, and 16 were unknown as to whether they resulted in property damage (START, 2018a). As I more closely analyzed these specific events, I found that in some cases, the comments or source material specified that property damage occurred; however, those events were coded as unknown regarding property damage. Due to the terms of the EULA, changes in the GTD coding scheme is forbidden, and therefore I was not permitted to change the existing data in the GTD (see Appendix B).

Because the scaled variable of property damage should have been coded for only those events that had known property damage from the first variable, and because that scale included a category for unknown amounts, I expected to find 522 events coded within that variable. Instead only 443 events were coded according to the specified scale (START, 2018a). I do not know why 79 events with known property damage were moved to system missing for this variable, instead of being coded in the unknown category. In addition, when I examined the third variable specifying the amount of property damage in U.S. dollars, I found that only 313 events had an amount listed, and of those, 142 had an unknown amount of property damage (START, 2018a).

Furthermore, in some cases, events were coded as having an unknown amount of property damage, but were simultaneously coded as having minor or major property damage in the second variable. Because specific dollar amounts are used to separate minor from major damage, how those determinations were made is unclear.

As a result of these issues, I created a new dummy variable for property damage where “1” indicated cases of known property damage, “0” had no known property

damage, and the 16 unknown cases were coded as *system missing*. Originally, I had intended on examining magnitude of property damage as coded in the second variable described above, but due to the issues listed, I only ran property damage analyses using the newly-created dummy variable and adjusted RQ3 and RQ6 to reflect that change.

Prior researchers using the series hazard model to examine policy effects on terrorism data restricted their analyses to one year after policy implementation as a way to account for whether policies had specific end dates or if policies occurred in rapid succession, thus eliminating the issues of overlapping policy effects (see Carson, 2014; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). When I examined the incidence of U.S. domestic terrorist attacks within one year of each policy enactment, the number of events were too small to analyze with any confidence. Therefore, even though there may be overlapping effects of policies on terrorism, I analyzed incidence, lethality, and property damage for the entire known period within which each policy was in effect. The USA PATRIOT Act was the only policy examined with a known end date within the scope of this analysis, that being June 1, 2015, the day before the USA FREEDOM Act was enacted.

SPSS Version 25.0.0.2 Limitations

I determined early in my analyses that there were several limitations in using SPSS with the series hazard model. As a result, I had to complete some calculations either by hand or in Excel, and then I had to import or manually entered those calculations and data into SPSS for analyses. Specifically, I was required to complete manual and Excel computations for success densities. I had to manually correct all gap times for events that occurred on the same day. Because the GTD does not list event

order by time of day, the ordering of events listed on the same day needed to be adjusted so that each same-day event had the same gap time for next event and previous event beyond that date (see Dugan, 2011; Dugan and Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). In addition, while the statistical software used by Dugan (2011), Dugan and Yang, (2012), and LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) allowed for use of the exact marginal strategy to resolve tied data or attacks occurring on the same day to account for all possible orderings, that option was not available in the version of SPSS that I used.

To examine Schoenfeld's residuals diagnostic for the series hazard model, I had to create individual graphs of residuals by time for each covariate separately for all iterations of the series hazard models that I ran, and I had to visually analyze those graphs to determine whether the proportional hazard assumption had been met. The proportional hazard assumption was met if the slope of Schoenfeld's residuals was zero. Additionally, to determine which model was the best fit for the data, I had to manually calculate the likelihood ratio tests, and then check with the χ^2 distribution table through SPSS. All of these issues with SPSS introduced additional error into the analyses that could have been avoided if I had used a different statistical software package.

Results

Incidence

Between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017, there were 749 terrorist attacks perpetrated in the United States (START, 2018a). Figure 4 shows the breakdown of domestic, international, and unknown terrorist attacks. As shown in Figure 4, the majority of terrorist attacks in the United States were perpetrated by domestic terrorists. When

examining the features of the unknown attacks, many shared the *modus operandi* of domestic terrorism rather than international terrorism. Considering the dearth of attacks perpetrated by international terrorists and the overarching challenges of conducting terrorist operations in foreign countries; it is reasonable to presume that most, if not all of the unknown attacks were perpetrated by domestic terrorists. However, without verification I did not complete an analysis of attacks using the combined domestic and unknown terrorist attacks, and instead I analyzed the unknown terrorist attacks separately from domestic terrorist attacks and all terrorist attacks regardless of perpetrator nationality.

Terrorist Attacks in the United States 1994-2017 (N=749)




Figure 4. Terrorist attacks in the United States from January 1, 1994 until December 31, 2017 by perpetrator type.

Figure 5 shows the incidence of terrorist attacks for the time frame of analysis and in relation to the counterterrorism policies examined. As shown in Figure 5, there was a general decrease in terrorist attacks in the United States from 1994 until 2006. There has been an increasing trend in terrorist attacks in the United States from 2007 to 2017.




Figure 5. Terrorist attacks in the United States from January 1, 1994 until December 31, 2017 in relation to counterterrorism policy.

To address RQ1, Figure 6 shows the incidence of terrorist attacks in the United States by type: international terrorism, domestic terrorism, and unknown. As shown in Figure 6, international terrorist attacks in the United States occurred rarely with many years of no known international terrorist attacks. Domestic terrorist attacks occurred frequently and at least yearly. For unknown attacks, there have been a few years without any unknown attacks, but like domestic terrorist attacks, they occurred with some regularity.




Figure 6. Terrorist attacks in the United States by type from January 1, 1994 until December 31, 2017 in relation to 21st century counterterrorism policies.

As shown in Figure 6, domestic terrorist attacks spiked in 1999, 2002, and 2017.

Following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the FBI increased investigation into militia groups and anti-government groups. Prior to the Oklahoma City bombing, two sieges with federal law enforcement served as inspiration for retaliatory attacks against the U.S. government. The Ruby Ridge siege in Naples, Idaho began on August 21, 1992 and ended on August 31, 1992 (Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018). The siege in Waco, TX between law enforcement and the Branch Davidian cult members occurred February 28 to April 19, 1993 (Hewitt, 2003, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018). Anti-government groups responded by increasing their activities in retaliation for Ruby Ridge and Waco. It may be the backlash from the increased FBI investigations

following these events that may have led to the spike in domestic terrorist attacks that occurred in 1999.

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks there was a distinct rise in anti-Muslim and anti-Arab terrorism, including attacks against Sikhs and others who were mistakenly identified as Arab or Muslim (Martin, 2018; START, 2018a). After hitting a low in 2011, domestic terrorist attacks have been steadily increasing (see Figure 6). This rise in domestic terrorism may be attributed to two factors, the re-election of President Barack Obama and the rise of the birther conspiracy theory in 2012, and the racist and anti-immigrant presidential campaign announcement by Donald J. Trump on June 16, 2015. The birther conspiracy theory questioned the place of birth and thus eligibility and legitimacy of Barack Obama as president (Pham, 2015; Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014). Trump was one of the major figures who headlined and publicly supported the birther conspiracy theory, which laid the foundation for his later presidential campaign and administration. The rhetoric used by the Trump campaign and subsequent administration has been one in support of White nationalism, nativism, and fear-inducing anti-Muslim sentiment (Montgomery, 2019; Newman, Shah, & Collingwood, 2018). Many White supremacists, White nationalists, and neo-Nazis were given greater legitimacy from the Trump campaign and election, and further fueled by Trump's comments following the violent clash of protesters at the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, VA on August 11-12, 2017, which resulted in one death after one of the Unite the Right protestors drove his car into a crowd of counter-protestors (J. Johnson, 2018; Perry, 2018).

Tables 3 and 4 show the number of terrorist attacks by type for each policy period. Table 3 shows the incidence of terrorism as represented in how I analyzed the data.

Table 3

Incidence of Terrorist Attacks Included in Counterterrorism Policy Analysis

	Domestic terrorism	International terrorism	Unknown	Total
Pre-USA PATRIOT act (January 1, 1994 to October 25, 2001)	218	7	117	342
USA PATRIOT act (October 26, 2001 to June 1, 2015)	186	4	58	248
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act (March 9, 2006 to December 31, 2017)	206	5	93	304
AETA (November 27, 2006 to December 31, 2017)	202	5	93	300
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission act (August 3, 2007 to December 31, 2017)	197	5	92	294
USA FREEDOM act (June 2, 2015 to December 31, 2017)	96	2	61	159

Note. There are overlaps across policies.

Table 4 shows only the number of attacks between policy implementation periods. Only the USA PATRIOT Act had a specified end date. All other policies were in effect through the end of 2017 at least.

As shown in both Tables 3 and 4, 45.7% of terrorist attacks in the United States occurred in the seven years prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. Compared to that baseline, there was a decrease in the frequency of terrorist attacks in the United States since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act (54.3% of attacks occurred over a 16-year time frame). These results supported the acceptance of H_1 that incidence of

domestic terrorism changed following implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy for RQ1.

Table 4

Incidence of Terrorist Attacks Between Counterterrorism Policies

	Domestic terrorism	International terrorism	Unknown	Total
Pre-USA PATRIOT act (January 1, 1994 to October 25, 2001)	218	7	117	342
USA PATRIOT act (October 26, 2001 to March 8, 2006)	76	1	26	103
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act (March 9, 2006 to November 26, 2006)	4	0	0	4
AETA (November 27, 2006 to August 2, 2007)	5	0	1	6
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission act (August 3, 2007 to June 1, 2015)	101	3	31	135
USA FREEDOM act (June 2, 2015 to December 31, 2017)	96	2	61	159

Note. There are no overlaps across policies.

While Tables 3 and 4 show a change in incidence of domestic terrorism following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, those results may have been affected by later policy initiatives. Therefore, I was not able to reject the null hypothesis for SQ1B.

Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the intervention variables. I created dummy variables for each counterterrorism policy, such that “1” indicated that a specific policy was in effect.

Table 5

Descriptive Statistics for Intervention Variables for Incidence

	N	M	SD	Min value	Max value
USA PATRIOT act					
Any attack	749	.33	.471	0	1
Domestic only	500	.37	.484	0	1
International only	13	.31	.480	0	1
Unknown only	236	.25	.431	0	1
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act					
Any attack	749	.41	.491	0	1
Domestic only	500	.41	.493	0	1
International only	13	.38	.506	0	1
Unknown only	236	.39	.490	0	1
AETA					
Any attack	749	.40	.490	0	1
Domestic only	500	.40	.491	0	1
International only	13	.38	.506	0	1
Unknown only	236	.39	.490	0	1
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission act					
Any attack	749	.39	.489	0	1
Domestic only	500	.39	.489	0	1
International only	13	.38	.506	0	1
Unknown only	236	.39	.489	0	1
USA FREEDOM act					
Any attack	749	.21	.409	0	1
Domestic only	500	.19	.394	0	1
International only	13	.15	.376	0	1
Unknown only	236	.26	.439	0	1

Keeping in mind that the policy periods overlap, 33% of any type of terrorist attack occurred during the USA PATRIOT Act, 41% during the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 40% during AETA, 39% during the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and 21% during the USA FREEDOM Act. For domestic terrorism, 37% of attacks occurred during the USA PATRIOT Act, 41% during the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, 40% during AETA, 39% during the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and 19% during the USA FREEDOM Act. Considering that AETA was the only policy specifically aimed at domestic terrorism, it is noteworthy that there was not a greater reduction in domestic terrorism after AETA was enacted.

Within RQ1, there were five SQs, one for each policy. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 was the focus for SQ1A. As discussed, incidence of domestic terrorism did change following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and therefore these results supported the acceptance of H_11A . The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 was assessed in SQ1B. Based on Figure 6 and Table 5, there was no immediate change in domestic terrorism following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.

For SQ1C, AETA of 2006 was evaluated. AETA was enacted eight months after the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act which created some challenges for interpreting whether the policy had an impact independent of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act. There were only four domestic terrorist attacks that occurred between the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement

and Reauthorization Act and AETA and there were only five domestic terrorist attacks that occurred between the passage of AETA and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. Because of the sparse data and possible influence of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and later policy initiatives, I was not able to reject the null hypothesis for SQ1C.

The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 was addressed by SQ1D. As shown in Figure 6, incidence of domestic terrorism did change following the implementation of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. Therefore the null hypothesis was rejected and H_1 1D accepted. The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 was addressed by SQ1E. As shown in Figure 6, the increasing trend in domestic terrorism continued after the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, exceeding the incidence of domestic terrorism in 1999. While the trend in domestic terrorist attacks immediately preceding the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act was increasing, the pattern shows that there would be an increase one year, followed by a slight decrease the next year. The slope of the increasing trend in incidence of domestic terrorism is steeper after the USA FREEDOM Act was passed. That, in combination with the data in Tables 3, 4, and 5 led me to reject the null hypothesis for SQ1E.

I present the results of the series hazard model analysis for RQ4 and its SQs. The series hazard model addressed whether the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack changed following the implementation of counterterrorism policy. I present the results in the same

manner and format as prior researchers using the series hazard model (see Dugan et al., 2005; Dugan, 2011; Dugan & Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009).

The series hazard model required the creation of several variables. The dependent variable was the number of days from the current terrorist event to the next terrorist event. For analysis of domestic terrorist events, the dependent variable was the number of days from the current domestic terrorist event to the next domestic terrorist event. For analysis of unknown terrorist events, the dependent variable was the number of days from the current unknown terrorist event to the next unknown terrorist event. A censor or status variable was needed for the model to identify which cases should be included in the analyses. Utilizing the methods outlined by Dugan (2011) and Dugan and Yang (2012), I created censor variables such that only the last terrorist event was censored out of the analysis (because it is unknown when the next event occurs). I created separate censor variables for analyses of all attacks regardless of perpetrator type, domestic terrorist attacks, and unknown attacks, because the last event for each differed, and thus needed to be coded appropriately.

Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable of days until next attack for all attacks regardless of type, domestic attacks, international attacks, and unknown attacks.

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics on Terrorist Attacks in the United States, 1994 to 2017

	N	M	SD	Min value	Max value
Days until any next attack	748	11.70	19.686	0	188
Days until next domestic attack	498	17.57	27.799	0	252
Days until next international attack	12	712.08	841.806	0	2731
Days until next unknown attack	235	36.81	80.903	0	895

As shown in Table 6, the mean number of days between terrorist attacks in the United States (with standard deviations in parentheses) was 11.70 (19.686) with no more than 188 days passing between attacks. For international terrorist attacks, the mean number of days between attacks was 712.08 (841.806) days or 23.4 (27.7) months with no more than 89.8 months or 7.5 years between attacks. For domestic terrorist attacks, the mean number of days between attacks was 17.57 (27.799) with no more than 252 days or 8.3 months between attacks. Even the unknown attacks have a greater frequency than international attacks, yet U.S. counterterrorism policies continue to focus on the threat from international terrorism.

I created several control variables for the series hazard model analysis (see Table 7). As with the dependent variable and censor variables, I created control variables for each type of attack: any or all, domestic, and unknown. I included the number of days from the previous terrorist event to the current event to control for momentum and backlash, and to account for dependency between events. I created separate control variables for gap time from previous event for domestic attacks and unknown attacks, as

well as any attack. I included the number of months from the start of the analysis to control for the passage of time.

Success density was a variable appeared in all prior terrorism studies utilizing the series hazard model (see Carson, 2014; Dugan et al., 2005; Dugan, 2011; Dugan and Yang, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, and Korte, 2009). I included success density in my analysis because success of immediately preceding attacks may impact future attacks. The formula I used to calculate success density is shown in Equation 2.

$$\frac{P(\text{success for current and two previous attempts})}{(\text{event date}_{\text{current}} - \text{event date}_{\text{2nd previous}})/365} \quad (2)$$

The GTD coded attack success in terms of whether the planned method was executed. It was not coded in relation to the motivation or long-term goals of the perpetrator or perpetrator group (LaFree, 2010; START, 2018b). Of the 749 terrorist attacks, 606 were coded as successful and 143 were coded as unsuccessful (START, 2018a). The values of success density ranged from 0 to 365. A value of 365 indicated 3 consecutive successful attacks executed on the same day. A value of 0 indicated 3 consecutive unsuccessful attacks.

I included a control variable of attack density. I measured attack density as the amount of time between three incidents, the current event and the second preceding event, regardless of attack success (see Dugan, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). I used this variable to determine if there was momentum from successive attacks independent of success. Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics for the control variables I used in the series hazard models examining incidence. International terrorism statistics were not included because its rare occurrence violated one of the criteria of using the

series hazard model. As shown in Table 7, all terrorist attacks occurred with greater frequency, greater success, and less attack density than domestic and unknown attacks.

Table 7

Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables

	N	M	SD	Min value	Max value
Days since any previous attack	748	11.70	19.686	0	188
Days since previous domestic attack	498	17.54	27.782	0	252
Days since previous unknown attack	235	36.81	80.903	0	895
Success density for any attack	747	59.38	96.99	0	365
Success density for domestic-only attacks	498	51.22	95.96	0	365
Success density for unknown-only attacks	234	31.01	67.64	0	365
Attack density for any attack	747	23.43	30.30	0	233
Attack density for domestic-only attacks	498	35.14	43.84	0	314
Attack density for unknown-only attacks	234	73.77	122.06	0	936
Months for any attack	749	135.43	98.24	1	288
Months for domestic-only attacks	500	137.75	95.56	1	288
Months for unknown-only attacks	236	130.72	104.21	3	287

I determined the coefficients for the series hazard model by running Cox's proportional hazard model in SPSS using days until next terrorist attack as the dependent variable. Table 8 shows the results for incidence of terrorism by type for the series hazard model. I ran separate series hazard models for any terrorist attacks, only domestic terrorist attacks, and unknown terrorist attacks with the appropriate dependent and control variables.

Table 8

Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox's Proportional Hazard Model for Incidence of Terrorism in the United States, 1994 to 2017

	All (N=749)	Domestic only (N=500)	Unknown only (N=236)
Counterterrorism policies			
USA PATRIOT act	-0.293 0.169	-0.478* 0.205	-0.503 0.341
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act	-1.151 0.598	-0.920 0.545	-0.732 1.170
AETA	0.718 0.715	0.525 0.690	----
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission act	0.381 0.428	0.153 0.472	1.320 1.221
USA FREEDOM act	0.650* 0.275	0.102 0.330	0.875 0.553
Control variables			
Days since previous attack	0.003 0.003	0.003 0.005	0.008 0.006
Success density	0.001** 0.001	0.001 0.001	0.002 0.001
Attack density	-0.003 0.002	0.004 0.003	-0.006 0.004
Months	-0.001 0.002	0.001 0.002	-0.005 0.003
Days since previous domestic attack		-0.010** 0.004	
Success density domestic only		0.001 0.001	
Attack density domestic only		-0.001 0.002	
Days since previous unknown attack			0.001 0.002
Success density unknown			0.001 0.001
Attack density unknown			0.001 0.001

Note. * $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$. *** $p < 0.001$.

For any terrorist attacks, only the coefficients for the USA FREEDOM Act and success density were statistically significant. Therefore following the implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act, the hazard of another terrorist attack increased ($p=0.018$); however, the start date of the USA FREEDOM Act was confounded with the presidential campaign announcement by Trump, and so it is unclear whether the shift in terrorist attacks are due to the USA FREEDOM Act alone. The statistically significant success density suggests a contagion component whereby prior successful terrorist attacks increased the hazard of another terrorist attack ($p=0.002$).

For only domestic terrorist attacks, the hazard of another terrorist attack decreased following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act ($p=0.020$). As the days since the previous domestic terrorist attack increased, the hazard of another domestic terrorist attack decreased ($p=0.010$). While the overall series hazard model for unknown terrorist attacks was statistically significant from a null model ($p<0.001$), none of the individual coefficients were statistically significant.

I ran another set of series hazard models that included policy interaction variables with time. These interaction variables between policy and number of months can be used to estimate how the baseline hazard changes as a result of time elapsing after policy implementation. The coefficients for these interaction variables can be used to determine whether the policy effect is gradual, immediate, temporary, or permanent (see Dugan, 2011). Table 9 shows the results for the series hazard model for each type of terrorism including these interaction variables.

Table 9

Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox's Proportional Hazard Model with Interaction Variables for Incidence of Terrorism in the United States, 1994 to 2017

	All (N=749)	Domestic only (N=500)	Unknown only (N=236)
Counterterrorism policies			
USA PATRIOT act	1.888*	3.394***	-2.944*
	0.768	0.943	1.498
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act	-4.437***	-6.131***	0.306
	1.118	1.267	2.093
AETA	0.704	0.512	----
	0.717	0.691	
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission act	0.057	-0.259	1.333
	0.457	0.511	1.247
USA FREEDOM act	2.807	3.119	-1.521
	2.796	3.687	4.797
Control variables			
Days since previous attack	0.002	0.001	0.010
	0.003	0.001	0.006
Success density	0.001**	0.001	0.001
	0.001	0.001	0.001
Attack density	-0.002	0.005	-0.007
	0.002	0.004	0.004
Months	-0.002	0.001	-0.010*
	0.002	0.003	0.004
USA PATRIOT act x months interaction	-0.018**	-0.034***	0.023
	0.007	0.009	0.013
USA PATRIOT Improvement x months interaction	0.025***	0.042***	-0.012
	0.007	0.009	0.014
AETA x months interaction	----	----	----
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission x months interaction	----	----	----
USA FREEDOM act x months interaction	-0.019	-0.032*	0.022
	0.012	0.016	0.021
Days since previous domestic attack		-0.008*	
		0.004	
Success density domestic only		0.001	
		0.001	

(table continues)

	All (N=749)	Domestic only (N=500)	Unknown only (N=236)
Attack density domestic only		0.001 0.002	
Days since previous unknown attack			0.001 0.002
Success density unknown			0.001 0.001
Attack density unknown			0.001 0.001

Note. * $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$. *** $p < 0.001$.

For all three types of terrorism, coefficients for AETA x months interaction and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act x months were linearly dependent or constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value reported by SPSS. In the unknown terrorism model, the AETA intervention was also found to be linearly dependent or constant.

By including these interaction variables, the impact of the specific policies changed from the models without these variables. For any terrorist attack, the hazard for another attack increased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act ($p=0.014$). However, the hazard of any terrorist attack decreased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act ($p<0.001$). These two results are mirrored for only domestic terrorist attacks but at a greater magnitude. The hazard of another domestic terrorist attack increased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act ($p<0.001$). The hazard of another domestic terrorist attack decreased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act ($p<0.001$). For unknown terrorist attacks, the hazard of another unknown terrorist attack decreases statistically significantly following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act ($p=0.049$).

Similar results for any terrorist attack and domestic terrorist attacks were found for the interaction variables of the USA PATRIOT Act x month and the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act x month variables. The hazard of a terrorist attack decreased as time since the USA PATRIOT Act had been implemented elapsed ($p=0.008$). The hazard of a terrorist attack increased as the time since the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act had been implemented elapsed ($p=0.001$). While the direction of change was similar from any attack to domestic attacks, the magnitude for domestic attacks was amplified. The hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased as time since the USA PATRIOT Act had been implemented elapsed ($p<0.001$). The hazard of a domestic terrorist attack increased as the time since the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act had been implemented elapsed ($p<0.001$).

Success density was found to increase the hazard of any terrorist attack ($p=0.001$). For domestic terrorist attacks, the interaction between the USA FREEDOM Act x months was statistically significant which showed that as time passed since the USA FREEDOM Act had been implemented, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased ($p=0.041$). In addition, as days from previous domestic terrorist attacks increased, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased ($p=0.043$). For the unknown attacks, the time component was found to be statistically significant indicating that as months pass, the hazard of another unknown terrorist attack decreased ($p=0.021$).

I conducted a likelihood ratio test between the models with and without the interaction variables to determine which model was a better fit to explain the data. For all terrorist attacks and for domestic terrorist attacks, the model with the interaction variables

was the best fit ($p < 0.01$). For the unknown attacks model, the model with the interaction variables was not statistically significant, thus the addition of the interaction variables did not significantly improve the fit of the model; and therefore, the simpler model was the best fit. I analyzed Schoenfeld's residuals to ensure that the covariates fulfilled the proportional hazard assumption and found that the proportional hazard assumption was fulfilled.

As shown in Table 9, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack did change as a function of counterterrorism policies, thus the null hypothesis for RQ4 was rejected. Because the coefficients for the USA PATRIOT Act and the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act were statistically significant, the null hypotheses for SQ4A and SQ4B were rejected. With no statistical significance for AETA, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and the USA FREEDOM Act, the null hypotheses were retained for SQ4C, SQ4D, and SQ4E.

Lethality

To determine if an event was a lethal event, the event needed to have at least one fatality, injury, or hostage. I created a dummy variable to identify events that fulfilled the lethal criteria or not. If an event had missing information for one of the items (fatalities, injuries, or hostages) but had at least one fatality, injury, or hostage in the remaining items, then I coded that event as lethal. Only events that had missing information and zeroes for the remaining items were excluded from the analysis.

From January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 there were 18 incidents involving hostages, 13 perpetrated by domestic terrorists, 4 by international terrorists, and 1 by an

unknown perpetrator (START, 2018a). Ten of the hostage incidents occurred prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, six perpetrated by domestic terrorists and four perpetrated by international terrorists. Three hostage incidents occurred between the passage of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act and the USA FREEDOM Act, two perpetrated by domestic terrorists and one by an unknown perpetrator. Five hostage incidents occurred since the USA FREEDOM Act was implemented and were all perpetrated by domestic terrorists.

Figure 7 shows lethal terrorist attacks in the United States by type and in relation to counterterrorism policies. As shown in Figure 7, there were no lethal attacks in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007. After an initial spike in 2002, lethal domestic terrorist attacks decreased to 0 until the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act. While there was a decrease in lethal domestic terrorist attacks between AETA and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, the numbers were so small as to question whether there was a significant impact from the passage of AETA. Additionally, most eco-terrorism involved property damage over lethality, and thus any impact on lethal domestic terrorism by AETA would be small. Lethal domestic terrorist attacks have been increasing since 2011. From 2014 to 2015, lethal domestic terrorist attacks decreased before resuming an increasing trend.




Figure 7. Lethal terrorist attacks in the United States from January 1, 1994 until December 31, 2017 in relation to 21st century counterterrorism policies and by type of attack.

Table 10 shows the counts and descriptive statistics for lethal terrorist attacks by type. In general, most terrorist attacks in the United States were non-lethal attacks. The trends in lethal attacks are mirrored for any attack type and for domestic attacks. The differences occurred from the baseline period to after the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted. For any attack, there was a decrease in lethal attacks but for domestic attacks, lethal attacks increased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. The number of days to next lethal attack was lowest for any lethal attack and highest for unknown attacks.

Table 10

Descriptive Statistics for Lethal Terrorist Attacks in the United States, 1994 to 2017

	All (Total N=183)	Domestic only (Total N=137)	Unknown only (Total N=36)
Lethal attacks	184	138	37
Non-lethal attacks	563	362	196
System-missing	2		3
Counterterrorism policies			
USA PATRIOT act	61 (12)	51 (9)	7 (2)
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act	105 (1)	91 (1)	11 (0)
AETA	104 (0)	90 (0)	11 (0)
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission act	104 (48)	90 (41)	11 (5)
USA FREEDOM act	56 (56)	49 (49)	6 (6)
Pre-USA PATRIOT act	67	38	24
Mean days to next lethal attack (Standard deviation in parentheses)	47.52 (125.058)	63.48 (158.197)	237.47 (458.676)

Table 11 shows the descriptive statistics for the intervention variables for lethal attacks. As shown in Table 11, for any lethal attack, domestic lethal attacks, and unknown lethal attacks, the means were the same for the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, AETA, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act and higher than the means for types of lethal attacks for the USA PATRIOT Act and the USA FREEDOM Act.

Table 11

Descriptive Statistics for Intervention Variables for Lethal Terrorist Attacks in the United States, 1994 to 2017

	N	M	SD	Min value	Max value
USA PATRIOT act					
Any attack	184	0.33	0.472	0	1
Domestic only	138	0.37	0.484	0	1
Unknown only	37	0.19	0.397	0	1
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act					
Any attack	184	0.57	0.496	0	1
Domestic only	138	0.66	0.476	0	1
Unknown only	37	0.30	0.463	0	1
AETA					
Any attack	184	0.57	0.497	0	1
Domestic only	138	0.65	0.478	0	1
Unknown only	37	0.30	0.463	0	1
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission act					
Any attack	184	0.57	0.497	0	1
Domestic only	138	0.65	0.478	0	1
Unknown only	37	0.30	0.463	0	1
USA FREEDOM act					
Any attack	184	0.30	0.461	0	1
Domestic only	138	0.36	0.480	0	1
Unknown only	37	0.16	0.374	0	1

As shown in Figure 7, Table 10, and Table 11, lethal domestic terrorism changed following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy in general. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected for RQ2. Lethal domestic terrorist attacks increased following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and the USA FREEDOM Act (49 attacks in 2 ½ years compared to 51 attacks in approximately 14 years). Therefore, the null hypotheses for SQ2A, SQ2D, and SQ2E were rejected. Lethal domestic terrorist

attacks did not substantively change following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and AETA; therefore, I retained the null hypotheses for SQ2B and SQ2C.

Table 12 shows the descriptive statistics for the additional control variables for the series hazard model beyond the values listed in Table 7. The dependent variable for the series hazard models was days until next lethal attack. Table 7 shows the values for the control variables regardless of lethality for days since previous attack, success density, and attack density. Table 12 includes the control variables by type for only lethal attacks. Control variables regardless of lethality were included in case there was a contagion effect based on attacks in general, not just lethal attacks. As shown in Table 12, there were longer gaps between previous lethal attacks to current lethal attacks than incidence of attacks (see Table 7). As with attack incidence regardless of lethality, any lethal attack occurred with less time between attacks than domestic or unknown. Success densities for any lethal attack and lethal domestic attacks were similar, and success densities for unknown lethal attacks were low. Attack density reflected the same pattern shown with days since previous attack.

Table 12

Descriptive Statistics for Additional Control Variables for Lethal Terrorist Attacks in the United States, 1994 to 2017

	N	Mean	SD	Min value	Max value
Days since previous lethal attack	748	47.52	125.058	0	1338
Days since previous lethal domestic attack	137	63.48	158.197	0	1400
Days since previous lethal unknown attack	36	237.47	458.676	0	2445
Success density	182	44.528	98.080	0.25	365
Success density for lethal domestic	136	45.000	103.280	0	365
Success density for lethal unknown	35	10.612	21.329	0.11	91.25
Attack density	182	95.47	184.026	0	1485
Attack density for lethal domestic	136	127.16	232.928	0	1547
Attack density for lethal unknown	35	485.86	717.112	4	3340
Lethal months	184	164.14	103.048	2	287
Lethal months for domestic	138	181.07	100.536	2	287
Lethal months for unknown	37	108.68	98.253	2	286

The series hazard models for lethal attacks were used to answer RQ5. The rare occurrence of unknown lethal attacks violated the criteria for the series hazard model. While statistical significance was found for the full model at $p < 0.01$ and for specific variables, the results were not reliable due to the small number of events. Therefore, the focus of the interpretation that follows will be on any lethal attack and lethal domestic attacks. Table 13 shows the results of the Cox's proportional hazard model for lethal attacks.

Table 13

Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox's Proportional Hazard Model for Lethal Terrorism in the United States, 1994 to 2017

	All (N=138)	Domestic only (N=135)	Unknown only (N=34)
Counterterrorism policies			
USA PATRIOT act	-1.560*** 0.474	-3.966*** 0.873	-3.390* 1.550
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act	-1.314 1.764	1.007 1.948	-0.388 2.786
AETA	0.910 1.748	0.979 1.711	----
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission act	----	----	----
USA FREEDOM act	-1.230* 0.599	-3.599*** 0.982	-3.085 2.393
Control variables			
Days since previous lethal attack	0.001 0.001		
Success density for lethal attacks	0.001 0.001		
Attack density for lethal attacks	0.001 0.001		
Months of lethal attacks	0.010* 0.004	0.011* 0.005	0.015 0.014
Days since any previous attack	0.001 0.008	0.009 0.012	-0.166* 0.066
Success density for any previous attack	0.001 0.001	0.002 0.002	-0.002 0.011
Attack density for any previous attack	0.003 0.004	0.001 0.008	0.077 0.040
Days since previous lethal domestic attack		0.001 0.001	
Success density lethal domestic only		0.001 0.002	
Attack density lethal domestic only		0.001 0.001	
Days since previous domestic attack		-0.008 0.009	

(table continues)

	All (N=138)	Domestic only (N=135)	Unknown only (N=34)
Success density domestic only		-0.002	
		0.002	
Attack density domestic only		0.008	
		0.006	
Days since previous lethal unknown attack			0.001
			0.001
Success density lethal unknown			-0.018
			0.034
Attack density lethal unknown			-0.001
			0.001
Days since previous unknown attack			-0.008
			0.007
Success density unknown			0.030
			0.025
Attack density unknown			0.12
			0.007

Note. * $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$. *** $p < 0.001$.

For all three types of terrorism, coefficients for Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act were linearly dependent or constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value reported by SPSS. For all lethal terrorist attacks and domestic lethal attacks, only the coefficients for the USA PATRIOT Act, the USA FREEDOM Act, and the months of lethal attacks were statistically significant. For any lethal terrorist attack, the hazard of another lethal terrorist attack decreased following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act ($p=0.001$) and following the implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act ($p=0.040$). For lethal domestic terrorist attacks, the hazard of another lethal domestic terrorist attack decreased following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act ($p<0.001$) and following the implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act ($p<0.001$). However, as time passed, the hazard of any lethal terrorist attack ($p=0.012$) and the hazard of lethal domestic terrorist attacks ($p=0.028$) increased.

Considering the differences in magnitude of the coefficients for the USA PATRIOT Act and the USA FREEDOM Act between any lethal attack and domestic lethal attacks, it appeared that domestic lethal attacks were more affected by these policies than any lethal attack in general.

I ran the series hazard model with the inclusion of intervention variables for lethality. Because of the small N, the series hazard model results for unknown lethal attacks, while statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) are unreliable, and thus were not further interpreted. Table 14 shows the results of the Cox's proportional hazard model for lethal terrorist attacks including the policy intervention variables.

For all models, coefficients for Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, the AETA x months interaction and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act x months were linearly dependent or constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value reported by SPSS. The only statistically significant coefficient was found for lethal domestic terrorist attacks after the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted. As shown in Table 14, there were no statistically significant coefficients in the model for any lethal terrorist attack. For lethal domestic terrorist attacks, the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act decreased the hazard of another lethal domestic terrorist attack ($p = 0.024$).

Table 14

Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox's Proportional Hazard Model with Interaction Variables for Lethal Terrorism in the United States, 1994 to 2017

	All (N=749)	Domestic only (N=135)	Unknown only (N=34)
Counterterrorism policies			
USA PATRIOT act	2.426	-10.607*	4.725
	3.845	4.708	8.186
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act	-4.480	6.169	-15.622
	4.948	5.363	11.032
AETA	1.483	1.136	----
	1.849	1.744	----
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission act	----	----	----
USA FREEDOM act	-1.798	-13.055	-17.836
	6.080	6.826	15.309
Control variables			
Days since previous lethal attack	0.001		
	0.001		
Success density for lethal attacks	0.001		
	0.001		
Attack density for lethal attacks	0.001		
	0.001		
Months of lethal attacks	0.006	0.002	0.002
	0.005	0.008	0.017
Days since any previous attack	0.001	0.006	-0.194**
	0.008	0.012	0.070
Success density for any previous attack	0.001	0.002	-0.005
	0.001	0.002	0.011
Attack density for any previous attack	0.002	0.001	0.081
	0.004	0.008	0.042
USA PATRIOT act x lethal months interaction	-0.038	0.066	-0.082
	0.037	0.041	0.086
USA PATRIOT Improvement x lethal months interaction	0.043	-0.52	0.120
	0.039	0.43	0.081
AETA x lethal months interaction	----	----	----
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission x lethal months interaction	----	----	----

(table continues)

	All (N=749)	Domestic only (N=135)	Unknown only (N=34)
USA FREEDOM act x lethal months interaction	-0.021 0.041	0.075 0.045	----
Days since previous lethal domestic attack		-0.001 0.001	
Success density lethal domestic only		0.001 0.002	
Attack density lethal domestic only		0.001 0.001	
Days since previous domestic attack		-0.006 0.009	
Success density domestic only		-0.002 0.002	
Attack density domestic only		0.008 0.006	
Days since previous lethal unknown attack			0.002 0.001
Success density lethal unknown			0.001 0.037
Attack density lethal unknown			-0.001 0.001
Days since previous unknown attack			-0.008 0.007
Success density unknown			0.026 0.025
Attack density unknown			0.014 0.007

Note. * $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$. *** $p < 0.001$.

I conducted a likelihood ratio test between the models with and without the interaction variables to determine which model was a better fit to explain the data for lethality. None of the models with the interaction variables were statistically significant, thus the interaction variables did not significantly improve the fit of the models in explaining lethality. Therefore, the series hazard model in Table 13 was used to answer RQ5 and its SQs. I analyzed Schoenfeld's residuals to ensure that the covariates fulfilled the proportional hazard assumption and found that the proportional hazard assumption

was fulfilled. As shown in Table 13, lethal domestic terrorism changed following the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy, thus I rejected the null hypothesis for RQ5. The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and the USA FREEDOM Act decreased the hazard of another lethal domestic terrorist attack; therefore, I rejected the null hypotheses for SQ5A and SQ5E. However, as time passed in months for lethal terrorist attacks, the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist attack increased. The lack of statistical significance for the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, AETA, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act led to retaining the null hypotheses for SQ5B, SQ5C, and SQ5D.

Costs from Property Damage

Costs of terrorism in the United States include the costs of property damage, ransom paid, and counterterrorism spending. Counterterrorism spending will be elaborated on in the next section. From January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 there were 18 incidents involving hostages (START, 2018a). No incidents resulted in payment of ransom. Therefore, I analyzed costs for whether property damage was sustained in attacks.

Figure 8 shows the terrorist attacks resulting in property damage by type in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy. As shown in Figure 8, domestic terrorist attacks that resulted in property damage decreased in 2004 and then began a slow increasing trend following the passage of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. The increasing trend in domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage became less noisy after the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act.




Figure 8. Terrorist attacks in the United States that resulted in property damage from January 1, 1994 until December 31, 2017 in relation to 21st century counterterrorism policies and by type of attack.

Unlike the results on lethality, the trends for attacks resulting in property damage differed by type of terrorism. For all terrorist attacks resulting in property damage, attacks increased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and then decreased. For domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage, attacks decreased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. For unknown terrorist attacks resulting in property damage, after the initial decrease following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, attacks increased following the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and then decreased.

Table 15 shows the descriptive statistics for terrorist attacks that resulted in property damage. As shown in Table 15, the majority of terrorist attacks for each type had higher incidence of attacks resulting in property damage than attacks that did not

result in property damage. Additionally, attacks resulting in property damage, regardless of type decreased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act.

Table 15

Descriptive Statistics for Terrorist Attacks Resulting in Property Damage

	All (Total N=521)	Domestic only (Total N=329)	Unknown only (Total N=182)
Attacks with property damage	522	330	183
Attacks without property damage	211	155	52
System-missing	16	15	1
Counterterrorism policies			
USA PATRIOT act	153 (69)	112 (54)	39 (15)
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act	190 (1)	111 (1)	77 (0)
AETA	189 (3)	110 (2)	77 (1)
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission act	186 (80)	108 (55)	76 (23)
USA FREEDOM act	106 (106)	53 (53)	53 (53)
Pre-USA PATRIOT act	263	165	91
Mean days to next attack with property damage (Standard deviation in parentheses)	16.78 (28.769)	26.57 (43.354)	47.41 (101.854)

As with lethal attacks, attacks resulting in property damage for all types had a greater number of days to next attack with property damage compared to incidence of another attack regardless of outcome. As with incidence and lethality results, time to next attack with property damage was shortest for any attack with property damage and longest for unknown attacks with property damage. Table 16 shows the descriptive statistics for the intervention variables by type.

Table 16

Descriptive Statistics for Intervention Variables on Terrorist Attacks that Resulted in Property Damage in the United States, 1994 to 2017

	N	M	SD	Min value	Max value
USA PATRIOT act					
Any attack	522	0.29	0.456	0	1
Domestic only	330	0.34	0.474	0	1
Unknown only	183	0.21	0.411	0	1
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act					
Any attack	522	0.36	0.482	0	1
Domestic only	330	0.34	0.473	0	1
Unknown only	183	0.42	0.495	0	1
AETA					
Any attack	522	0.36	0.481	0	1
Domestic only	330	0.33	0.472	0	1
Unknown only	183	0.42	0.495	0	1
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission act					
Any attack	522	0.36	0.479	0	1
Domestic only	330	0.33	0.470	0	1
Unknown only	183	0.42	0.494	0	1
USA FREEDOM act					
Any attack	522	0.20	0.403	0	1
Domestic only	330	0.16	0.368	0	1
Unknown only	183	0.29	0.455	0	1

As shown in Table 16, regardless of attack type, the percentage of attacks for the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, AETA, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act was constant or nearly constant. For domestic terrorist attacks with property damage, the percentage of attacks decreased from 33-34% in prior policy periods to 16% after the USA FREEDOM Act. For any terrorist attack resulting in property damage and unknown attacks resulting in property damage, the percentage of attacks were lower for the USA PATRIOT Act and USA FREEDOM

Act periods. I rejected the null hypotheses for RQ3, SQ3A, SQ3D, and SQ3E based on the results shown in Figure 8, Table 15, and Table 16. Because the change in domestic terrorist attacks that resulted in property damage did not change substantially after the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and AETA, I retained the null hypotheses for SQ3B and SQ3C.

I created additional control variables for the analysis for property damage to account for the influence of previous attacks, success density, and attack density regardless of property damage, the descriptive statistics for which are shown in Table 17.

Table 17

Descriptive Statistics for Additional Control Variables for Terrorist Attacks that Resulted in Property Damage in the United States, 1994 to 2017

	N	Mean	SD	Min value	Max value
Days since previous attack with property damage	521	16.78	28.769	0	237
Days since previous domestic attack with property damage	329	26.57	43.354	0	329
Days since previous unknown attack with property damage	182	47.41	101.854	0	1036
Success density	520	53.348	93.061	0	365
Success density for domestic with property damage	328	45.948	93.531	0.65	365
Success density for unknown with property damage	181	28.098	65.363	0	365
Attack density	520	33.60	45.423	0	427
Attack density for domestic with property damage	328	53.27	66.338	0	427
Attack density for unknown with property damage	181	94.65	154.243	0	1096
Months with property damage	522	125.19	98.878	0	287
Months for domestic with property damage	330	122.21	93.395	2	287
Months for unknown with property damage	183	132.06	108.966	2	286

I ran the series hazard model for each type of terrorism using the days until the next attack with property damage as the dependent variable. Table 18 shows the results of the Cox's proportional hazard model for attacks with property damage. For the unknown attacks with property damage, the coefficient for AETA was linearly dependent or constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value reported by SPSS. For any terrorist attack resulting in property damage the only statistically significant coefficient was for the USA PATRIOT Act ($p=0.012$), which indicated that the hazard for another terrorist attack resulting in property damage decreased following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act. For domestic attacks resulting in property damage, statistical significance was found for the USA PATRIOT Act and the attack density from any previous attack regardless of property damage. These results indicate that the hazard of a domestic attack resulting in property damage decreased after the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted ($p<0.001$), but increased when the attack density from any previous attacks increased ($p=0.040$). For unknown attacks that resulted in property damage, statistical significance was found for the USA FREEDOM Act and months of attacks with property damage. For unknown attacks resulting in property damage, the hazard of another unknown attack resulting in property damage increased following the implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act ($p=0.002$), but decreased as time passed ($p=0.001$).

Table 18

Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox's Proportional Hazard Model for Terrorism Resulting in Property Damage in the United States, 1994 to 2017

	All (N=518)	Domestic only (N=326)	Unknown only (N=180)
Counterterrorism policies			
USA PATRIOT act	-0.519*	-0.887***	0.063
	0.208	0.253	0.468
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act	-1.326	-1.090	1.463
	1.201	1.120	1.374
AETA	0.891	1.091	----
	1.286	1.308	
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission act	0.696	0.033	-0.216
	0.608	0.821	1.437
USA FREEDOM act	0.646	-0.170	2.298**
	0.347	0.425	0.734
Control variables			
Days since previous attack with property damage	0.001		
	0.004		
Success density for attacks with property damage	0.002		
	0.001		
Attack density for attacks with property damage	-0.002		
	0.003		
Months of attacks with property damage	-0.003	0.001	-0.013***
	0.002	0.002	0.004
Days since any previous attack	-0.002	-0.006	0.010
	0.005	0.007	0.007
Success density for any previous attack	-0.001	0.001	0.002
	0.001	0.002	0.001
Attack density for any previous attack	0.001	0.009*	0.001
	0.004	0.005	0.005
Days since previous domestic attack with property damage		0.004	
		0.003	
Success density domestic only with property damage		0.002	
		0.002	
Attack density domestic only with property damage		-0.003	
		0.002	
Days since previous domestic attack		-0.010	
		0.006	

(table continues)

	All (N=518)	Domestic only (N=326)	Unknown only (N=180)
Success density domestic only		-0.001 0.003	
Attack density domestic only		0.001 0.004	
Days since previous unknown attack with property damage			0.001 0.001
Success density unknown with property damage			0.002 0.003
Attack density unknown with property damage			-0.001 0.001
Days since previous unknown attack			-0.004 0.003
Success density unknown			-0.003 0.003
Attack density unknown			0.002 0.001

Note. * $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$. *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 19 shows the coefficients of the series hazard model for attacks with property damage by type including interaction variables. For all three types of attacks resulting in property damage, coefficients for the AETA x months interaction and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act x months were linearly dependent or constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value reported by SPSS. For unknown attacks resulting in property damage, the coefficient for AETA was linearly dependent or constant resulting in a reduction of degrees of freedom to 0 and no value reported by SPSS.

As shown in Table 19, the inclusion of the interaction variables decreased the number of interventions that were statistically significant. For any terrorist attack resulting in property damage, the only coefficient that was statistically significant was the

time component of months of attacks with property damage indicating that the hazard of any attack with property damage decreased over time ($p=0.012$). For domestic attacks with property damage, the only statistically significant coefficient was for attack density for any previous attack regardless of property damage ($p=0.021$). As the attack density for any previous attack decreases, the hazard of a domestic attack with property damage increases.

The model for unknown attacks with property damage was the only model that had multiple coefficients that were statistically significant after the inclusion of the interaction variables. As shown in Table 19, the hazard of an unknown attack resulting in property damage decreased following the USA PATRIOT Act ($p=0.009$) and decreased over time ($p<0.001$), but increased for the interactions of the USA PATRIOT Act with months of attacks with property damage ($p<0.001$) and the USA FREEDOM Act interaction with months of attacks with property damage ($p=0.018$). This indicates that the increase in hazard of an unknown attack resulting in property damage was short-term for the USA PATRIOT Act and USA FREEDOM Act.

Table 19

Coefficients and Standard Errors for Cox's Proportional Hazard Model with Interaction Variables for Terrorism Resulting in Property Damage in the United States, 1994 to 2017

	All (N=518)	Domestic only (N=326)	Unknown only (N=180)
Counterterrorism policies			
USA PATRIOT act	-0.331	-0.289	-6.209**
	1.004	1.212	2.391
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act	-3.012	-2.990	2.733
	1.692	1.826	2.876
AETA	0.942	1.153	----
	1.286	1.303	
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission act	0.303	-0.219	-0.399
	0.642	0.858	1.531
USA FREEDOM act	-0.835	-6.189	-5.916
	3.403	5.201	5.480
Control variables			
Days since previous attack with property damage	0.001		
	0.004		
Success density for attacks with property damage	0.002		
	0.001		
Attack density for attacks with property damage	-0.001		
	0.003		
Months of attacks with property damage	-0.006*	-0.002	-0.031***
	0.002	0.003	0.006
Days since any previous attack	-0.002	-0.008	0.015*
	0.005	0.007	0.006
Success density for any previous attack	-0.001	0.001	0.001
	0.001	0.002	0.001
Attack density for any previous attack	0.001	0.010*	-0.003
	0.004	0.005	0.005
USA PATRIOT act x property damage months interaction	0.001	-0.004	0.060**
	0.009	0.011	0.019
USA PATRIOT Improvement x property damage months interaction	0.011	0.013	-0.21
	0.009	0.011	0.019
AETA x property damage months interaction	----	----	----
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission x property damage months interaction	----	----	----

(table continues)

	All (N=518)	Domestic only (N=326)	Unknown only (N=180)
USA FREEDOM act x property damage months interaction	0.005 0.015	0.019 0.021	0.063* 0.027
Days since previous domestic attack with property damage		0.005 0.003	
Success density domestic only with property damage		0.001 0.002	
Attack density domestic only with property damage		-0.003 0.002	
Days since previous domestic attack		-0.010 0.006	
Success density domestic only		-0.001 0.003	
Attack density domestic only		0.001 0.004	
Days since previous unknown attack with property damage			0.001 0.001
Success density unknown with property damage			0.001 0.003
Attack density unknown with property damage			0.001 0.001
Days since previous unknown attack			-0.005 0.003
Success density unknown			-0.001 0.003
Attack density unknown			0.004* 0.002

Note. * $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$. *** $p < 0.001$.

I conducted a likelihood ratio test between the models with and without the interaction variables to determine which model was a better fit to explain the data for property damage. For the unknown attacks model, the model with the interaction variables was the best fit for property damage ($p < 0.01$). For all terrorist attacks and for domestic terrorist attacks, the model with the interaction variables was not statistically significant, thus the interaction variables did not significantly improve the fit of the model for property damage. Therefore, the series hazard model in Table 18 was used to

answer RQ6 and its SQs. I analyzed Schoenfeld's residuals to ensure that the covariates fulfilled the proportional hazard assumption and found that the proportional hazard assumption was fulfilled.

I rejected the null hypothesis for RQ6 because the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack with property damage changed in relation to the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. As shown in Table 18, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack with property damage decreased following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act; therefore, I rejected the null hypothesis for SQ6A. The only other statistically significant variable for the series hazard model for domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage was the attack density for any previous attack. As the attack density for any previous attack increased, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack resulting in property damage increased. The lack of statistical significance for the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, AETA, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and the USA FREEDOM Act led to retaining the null hypotheses for SQ6B, SQ6C, SQ6D, and SQ6E.

Counterterrorism Spending

Determining U.S. government counterterrorism spending was more complicated than I initially anticipated due to inconsistencies across budget reports by the OMB and DHS. Additionally, before the creation of the DHS, counterterrorism responsibilities were found mainly within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). As such, identifying how much funding was allocated and appropriated by the DOD and DOJ was not possible. Therefore, I focused on U.S. government

counterterrorism spending since the creation of the DHS. While the DOD and DOJ continued to contribute to counterterrorism efforts, the majority of the funding earmarked for counterterrorism was allocated and appropriated to the DHS. Thus the spending displayed was conservative and offered a glimpse into the minimum amount of spending by the U.S. government for counterterrorism efforts.

Because of these difficulties and the fact that several government reports and academic articles refer to the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, the following data on counterterrorism comes from the Stimson Study. It should be noted that the obstacles I faced were the same obstacles that the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending encountered in compiling their report (Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, 2018). The four key findings from the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending were that (a) total counterterrorism spending came to \$2.8 trillion from 2002 to 2017, (b) no clear definition exists for U.S. counterterrorism spending, (c) the trend is that counterterrorism spending is increasing over time, and (d) that “an accurate evaluation of total and programmatic counterterrorism spending requires a reinstatement of governmentwide tracking by OMB, clarity of terms and definitions used, and more rigorous control of what should and should not be included in the CT budget” (p.8).

The Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018) identified four major counterterrorism budget categories: government-wide homeland security budget authority, defense emergency and overseas contingency operations (OCO), war-related state/USAID, and other foreign aid. Government-wide homeland security budget

authority referred to budgetary appropriations to DHS along with other agencies. Defense emergency and OCO were funded primarily by the DOD. War-related state/USAID was funded by the Department of State. Other foreign aid was funded by accounts for specific foreign counterterrorism initiatives (Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, 2018). Figure 9 shows the breakdown of counterterrorism spending by fiscal year for each of these major categories.

Total U.S. Counterterrorism Spending (in billions) FY 2002-2007




Figure 9. Total U.S. counterterrorism spending (in billions) by categories from FY2002 to FY2017. From “Protecting America While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability” by the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, 2018. Open source document retrieved from <https://www.stimson.org/content/counterterrorism-spending-protecting-america-while-promoting-efficiencies-and-accountability>.

Figure 10 shows U.S. counterterrorism spending by fiscal year from 2001 to 2017. The large increase in spending for defense emergency and OCO coincided with the 2007 surge of U.S. forces into Iraq. The decrease in spending for defense emergency and

OCO coincided with troop reductions with the Obama administration. As shown in Figure 8, for DHS and other agencies tasked with counterterrorism duties, there was an increasing trend from FY2002 to FY2017 in budget spending, although there were some years where the budget remained relatively unchanged.




Figure 10. Counterterrorism spending by categories from FY2001 to FY2017. From “Protecting America While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability” by the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, 2018. Open source document retrieved from <https://www.stimson.org/content/counterterrorism-spending-protecting-america-while-promoting-efficiencies-and-accountability>.

These data show that counterterrorism spending, in combination with the property damage data support the expensive nature of counterterrorism operations. However, as the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018) noted, there lacks a systematic evaluation of whether the increased spending was justified.

Summary

From January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017, 66.76% of terrorist attacks in the United States were perpetrated by domestic terrorists. International terrorism accounted for 1.74% of attacks for the same time frame. Many of the unknown attacks shared the same method of operation as domestic terrorism; however, those attacks were analyzed separately and accounted for 31.51% of attacks. The results of the descriptive analyses were not surprising as prior research had also noted the higher incidence of domestic terrorism compared to international terrorism. Considering the contextual factors, the trends seen in domestic terrorism were not wholly unexpected. What was surprising was that AETA had not shown greater impact on reducing domestic terrorism considering that the sole goal of AETA was to target and prosecute domestic eco-terrorists.

The results of the series hazard models were surprising, especially in comparison to the data in Figure 6. While trends appeared to show greater amounts of terrorism, the series hazard model demonstrated that the actual hazard of a domestic terrorist attack did not systematically align with the visual analysis of the frequency of incidence, lethality, and costs over time in relation to the specific U.S. counterterrorism policies. Therefore, including the series hazard analysis to examine the impact that policy has on terrorism should always be included because it adds greater depth in understanding how terrorism is impacted by policy interventions.

I rejected the null hypotheses for all six central RQs. The USA PATRIOT Act was the only policy that resulted in rejection of the null hypothesis for all six SQAs. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act changed the hazard of the

incidence of domestic terrorism (SQ4B), but did not result in changes in domestic terrorism for SQBs for RQs 1-3 and RQs 5-6. I retained the null hypotheses for the impact that AETA had on domestic terrorism for all six RQs. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act changed domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs resulting in my rejection of the null hypotheses for the SQDs for RQs 1-3, but did not change the hazard of domestic terrorist attacks in terms of incidence, lethality, and costs resulting in my retention of the null hypothesis for the SQDs for RQs 4-6. The USA FREEDOM Act changed domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs resulting in my rejection of the null hypotheses for the SQEs for RQs 1-3. The USA FREEDOM Act changed the hazard of lethal domestic terrorist attacks resulting in my rejection of the null hypothesis for SQ5E, but did not change the hazard of domestic terrorist attacks in terms of incidence and costs resulting in retaining the null hypothesis for SQ4E and SQ6E.

In Chapter 5, I will further elaborate on the results of this study. In addition, I will relate the results of this study back to the literature review and theoretical frameworks employed for this study, MSF and the Power Elite. I will discuss the limitations of this study as well as future directions for continued research. Finally, I will explain the positive social change implications of this study.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Terrorism is a ubiquitous problem that has existed since antiquity (Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2018; Nacos, 2016). Domestic terrorism involves terrorism perpetrated by citizens of the nation of which and within which they are targeting. A majority of terrorist attacks against the United States have been perpetrated by domestic terrorists. However, when examining U.S. counterterrorism policy, the policy focus has been on threats from international terrorists. While most of these policies have focused on international terrorism, elements of these policies may have impact on the operations of domestic terrorists in the United States.

Additionally, while researchers have attempted evaluation of U.S. counterterrorism policy, they have not universally employed evidence-based evaluation using empirical data. Because of the diversity of approaches to evaluating counterterrorism policy, the results of such evaluations have been mixed. The gap in the literature was that U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century had not been empirically evaluated in terms of its impact on domestic terrorism in general. In this study, I filled an important gap in the literature and utilized empirical data to examine the impact that 21st century U.S. counterterrorism policies had on domestic terrorism.

To address this gap in the literature, I conducted a quantitative, longitudinal trend study involving the analysis of secondary data. The purpose of this quantitative, longitudinal trend study was to describe the U.S. domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 21st century using the empirical data from the GTD, and using descriptive statistics, visual analysis, and the

series hazard model for data analysis. This study contributed to positive social change by providing an empirical model for evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy's impact on domestic terrorism, and by providing an evidence-based, non-partisan, non-political method for quantifying the terrorist threat.

I analyzed domestic terrorism data for incidence, lethality, and costs for the United States from the GTD from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017 in relation to five U.S. counterterrorism policies: USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, AETA of 2006, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, and USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. The first three RQs addressed how U.S. domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs changed in relation to the selected U.S. counterterrorism policies, and were answered using descriptive statistics and visual analysis. The final three RQs addressed how the implementation of the U.S. counterterrorism policies listed affected the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack occurring, a lethal domestic terrorist attack occurring, and a domestic terrorist attack with property damage occurring. These final three RQs were answered using the series hazard model. Each research question had five SQs, one for each U.S. counterterrorism policy.

Domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs changed as a result of the implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. Specifically, U.S. domestic terrorism incidence, lethality, and costs changed following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, and the USA FREEDOM Act. The hazard of domestic terrorist attacks, lethal domestic

terrorist attacks, and domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage changed as a result of U.S. counterterrorism policy. Specifically, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack and the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist attack, and the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack resulting in property damage changed following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act changed the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack. The USA FREEDOM Act changed the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist attack.

In some cases, the results from the series hazard model did not appear to align with the visual analysis of frequency of domestic terrorist attacks, lethal domestic terrorist attacks, and domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage. This demonstrated that the aggregation of terrorism data may obscure the threat of terrorism. Additionally, when running the series hazard model analyses, I identified and included additional control variables that may impact domestic terrorism, such as the passage of time, the passage of time in relation to specific policies, attack density, and days since prior attacks. Furthermore, because the series hazard model produced an estimate of the hazard of a terrorist attack, the series hazard model results are akin to an empirical model to measure the terrorist threat. From the results of this study, I demonstrated the need to include a series hazard model analysis in combination with descriptive statistics to uncover the depth of impact that policy interventions have, as well as to offer an empirical method to measure the terrorist threat.

In Chapter 5 I provide my interpretation of the findings presented in Chapter 4. I will elaborate on the limitations of this study, as well as provide recommendations for future research. Finally, I discuss the positive social change implications of this study.

Interpretation of Findings

Between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2017 there were 749 terrorist attacks perpetrated in the United States (START, 2018a). Of these, 500 attacks (66.76%) were perpetrated by domestic terrorists, 13 (1.74%) by international terrorists, and 236 (31.51%) had unknown perpetrators (START, 2018a). When examining the features of the unknown attacks, many shared the same *modus operandi* of domestic terrorism rather than international terrorism. Considering the dearth of attacks perpetrated by international terrorists, and the overarching challenges of conducting terrorist operations in foreign countries, it was reasonable to presume that most of the unknown attacks were perpetrated by domestic terrorists. However, I did not combine the unknown with the domestic terrorist attacks in my analyses, rather I analyzed the attacks separately. These data supported earlier studies' identification of the higher incidence of domestic terrorism in the United States compared to international terrorism.

Relative to the incidence of terrorism prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the incidence of terrorism is decreasing. In the 7 years prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the United States had 45.7% of all terrorist attacks from 1994 to 2017; of which 63.7% were perpetrated by domestic terrorists, 2% were perpetrated by international terrorists, and 34.2% had unknown perpetrators. Compared to the 54.3% of terrorist attacks that occurred over the 16-year time frame following the passage of the

USA PATRIOT Act, it was clear that in general, terrorism was decreasing in the United States. Since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, 69.2% of terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by domestic terrorists, 1% by international terrorists, and 29.2% by unknown perpetrators. These data further show that the threat from international terrorism is very low compared to the threat from domestic terrorism and highlight why the MSF on its own was insufficient to explain U.S. counterterrorism policy.

When considering incidence, lethality, and costs, I found that the majority of U.S. domestic terrorist attacks are non-lethal ($N = 362$) and do result in property damage ($N = 330$). These results support prior findings (Bjelopera, 2017; Su & Yang, 2017). When I examined data on domestic terrorism in the United States in relation to U.S. counterterrorism policy, I found that domestic terrorism in general, and lethal domestic terrorist attacks increased in 2002, were at their lowest levels in 2011, steadily increased until 2014, and rapidly increase beginning in 2015 after a brief decrease (see Figures 6 and 7). Domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage showed only slight increase in 2002, but sharply increase in 2003 followed by a sharp decrease and a slow increase beginning in 2011 turning into a sharp increase in 2015 (see Figure 8).

The spikes in domestic terrorism in 2002 and 2003 may be explained in terms of backlash against the September 11, 2001 attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda and the truther conspiracy theory. Following those attacks, there were increased domestic terrorist attacks targeting Muslims, Arabs, and those mistaken for Muslim and/or Arab. In addition, the emergence of the truther conspiracy theory fed into anti-government ideology, and may have led to increases in domestic terrorist attacks perpetrated by anti-

government individuals or groups. The truther conspiracy theory in its most basic form involved the belief that the Bush administration, namely Chaney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz, staged the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and subsequently used those attacks as rationale for invading Iraq, seizing control of oil, and engaging in profiteering from the global war on terror (Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014).

The increase in domestic terrorism in 2011 may be explained by Obama's re-election campaign and the growth of the birther conspiracy theory. The birther conspiracy theory, which was spearheaded by Donald Trump, involved the belief that Obama had been born in Kenya, that his birth certificate showing his place of birth in Hawaii was forged, and thus Obama was not eligible to be president (Pham, 2015; Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014).

There were several factors that may explain the sharp increase in domestic terrorism beginning in 2015. The increase in domestic terrorism beginning in 2014 may be due to the additional restrictions found in the USA FREEDOM Act regarding surveilling U.S. citizens, although that impact was confounded by the presidential campaign announcement of Trump 2 weeks following the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act. The rhetoric used by the Trump campaign and subsequent administration has been one in support of White nationalism, nativism, and fear-inducing anti-Muslim sentiment (Montgomery, 2019; Newman et al., 2018). Many White supremacists, White nationalists, and neo-Nazis were given greater legitimacy from the Trump campaign and election, and were further fueled by Trump's comments following the violent clash of protesters at the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, VA on

August 11-12, 2017 that resulted in one death after one of the Unite the Right protestors drove his car into a crowd of counter-protestors (Johnson, 2018; Perry, 2018).

While the descriptive statistics and visual analysis of the aggregated terrorism data tell one story, the results from the series hazard model tell a different story. By examining the temporal occurrence of events and using the series hazard model, I was able to better uncover the role that time played, as well as additional control variables in describing how policy intervention impacted domestic terrorism. With the dependent variable being number of days until the next attack, the series hazard model provides the hazard or risk of another attack occurring based on the data regarding the gap time between attacks. This outcome is akin to measuring the threat of terrorism, as the series hazard model provides the risk of another terrorist attack.

For the central RQs related to the hazard of domestic terrorist attacks, I found that U.S. counterterrorism policy changed the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack, a lethal domestic terrorist attack, and a domestic terrorist attack resulting in property damage. Specifically, the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act increased the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack ($p < 0.001$). The hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act ($p < 0.001$). However, for both of these acts, the change in hazard was temporary. As time passed from when the USA PATRIOT Act had been implemented, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased ($p < 0.001$). As time passed from when the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act had been implemented, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack increased ($p < 0.001$). While there was no statistically significant impact

by the USA FREEDOM Act on the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack, as time passed since the USA FREEDOM Act had been implemented, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased ($p = 0.041$). In addition, as days from previous domestic terrorist attacks increased, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack decreased ($p = 0.043$).

These results indicate that the immediate effects of the USA PATRIOT Act, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, and the USA FREEDOM Act on the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack reverse as time passes. This suggests that domestic terrorism is sensitive to U.S. counterterrorism policy implementation but also to time effects. These results were consistent with the visual analysis of domestic terrorist attacks discussed above (see Figure 6).

For lethal domestic terrorist attacks, the hazard of another lethal domestic terrorist attack decreased following the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act ($p < 0.001$) and following the implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act ($p < 0.001$). However, as time passed, the hazard of lethal domestic terrorist attacks ($p = 0.028$) increased. While similar results were found for all terrorist attacks, considering the differences in magnitude of the coefficients for the USA PATRIOT Act and the USA FREEDOM Act between any lethal attack and lethal domestic attacks, it appears that lethal domestic attacks were more affected by these policies than any lethal attack in general. These results are not consistent with the visual analysis of lethal domestic terrorist attacks (see Figure 7). While the hazard of a lethal domestic terrorist attack decreased following the implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act, Figure 7 shows an increase in incidence of lethal domestic terrorist attacks. One of the complications in comparing the selected

policies involved the short time frame for evaluating the USA FREEDOM Act. While the USA PATRIOT Act had 14 years of data to use to evaluate its impact on domestic terrorism, the USA FREEDOM Act only had two years of data. Therefore, by using the series hazard model, I provided additional detail when considering the impact of policy initiatives.

For domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage, the hazard of a domestic terrorist attack resulting in property damage decreased after the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted ($p < 0.001$), but increased when the attack density from any previous attacks increased ($p = 0.040$). Because of the lack of statistical significance for the policy interaction variables with time and the time variables, these results indicated that domestic terrorists engaging in attacks that result in property damage were more affected by the USA PATRIOT Act than the other U.S. counterterrorism policies. I was particularly surprised by this result because eco-terrorists tended to engage in attacks that predominantly resulted in property damage, yet their activities were not significantly affected by the passage of later U.S. counterterrorism policies, specifically the one aimed at domestic eco-terrorists, AETA. In addition, the series hazard model was able to handle the spike in domestic terrorist attacks in 2003, such that the hazard of domestic terrorist attacks was not overly influenced by this spike in attacks (see Figure 8). Like with the lethality results, the results of the series hazard model for domestic terrorist attacks resulting in property damage were not consistent with the visual presentation of frequency of domestic terrorist attacks involving property damage shown in Figure 8.

Like with lethality, this could be due to the short time frame in assessing the impact of the USA FREEDOM Act compared to the other U.S. counterterrorism policies.

The results of this study support the importance of investigating event data utilizing the series hazard model beyond aggregating data without consideration of the time component. This is glaringly obvious when a visual analysis of aggregated terrorism data by year appear to show one trend, while the series hazard model reports a more sophisticated expectation in terms of the risk of future terrorist attacks. The series hazard model thus provides an empirical, evidence-based method of measuring the threat of terrorism.

Considering that 522 of the 749 terrorist attacks in the United States between 1994 and 2017 resulted in property damage, terrorist attacks are expensive (Bjelopera, 2017; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014; Su & Yang, 2017; START, 2018a). In combination with the results from the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018), it becomes clear that U.S. counterterrorism efforts are costly. The series hazard model in addition to descriptive and visual evaluation of frequency of terrorist attacks was used to provide evidence-based information that may be used to evaluate how justified counterterrorism spending is, and whether the increased spending translated to a safer nation. The results from using the series hazard model can better inform and rationalize the money spent for counterterrorism in relation to the actual threat of terrorism and where that threat originates.

The results of this study support the disconnect between the advertised threat of international terrorism and the subsequent focus of U.S. counterterrorism policy, and the

actual threat of domestic terrorist attacks in the United States. It was excruciatingly clear that international terrorists rarely attack the United States within its territorial boundaries, instead focusing on targets abroad such as embassies and military targets. There were 13 international terrorist attacks from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2017, four of which were the September 11, 2001 attacks. While the NCTAUUS found glaring issues that allowed for the planning and execution of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, issues regarding barriers to safe and efficient response, rescue, and recovery efforts, and offered recommendations, some of which were implemented through the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, these initiatives were aimed at a rare event. As such, attempting to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism policy based on its focus of reducing an already rare event is not possible. Furthermore, this leads to questions as to how much money should be spent to counter a rare event (Kunreuther, 2002).

Meanwhile, domestic terrorism continued to flourish and even increase in recent years. While the statistically significant results for the hazard of lethal domestic terrorist attacks decreased following the USA FREEDOM Act, I would caution the full acceptance of these results, namely due to the short time frame and relatively lower numbers of domestic terrorist attacks involved in its evaluation. Recommendations such as those identified in the REAL ID Act of 2005 would be completely irrelevant for domestic anti-government groups and individuals like Sovereign Citizens who already dismiss the need for official credentials, and refuse to acknowledge and follow the laws established and enforced in the United States at all levels of governance (Martin, 2018;

Nacos, 2016). I recommend that the same careful investigation and analysis needs to be conducted on domestic terrorist attacks.

I was able to explain the policy process using the MSF, while also being able to explain the disconnect between the real terrorist threat and the counterterrorism policies by adding the power elite theory. Consider who benefits from a policy like AETA? It is mainly business owners as AETA expanded the definition for what types of businesses qualified as animal enterprises, including third-party entities, and thus could reap victims of terrorism benefits for any attacks, as well as more severely prosecute those who attack them or threaten them.

In addition, one of the rallying calls of the Trump campaign and administration was to battle against “radical Islamic terrorism,” yet such forms of terrorism rarely occur in the United States (Montgomery, 2019). Of the 500 known cases of domestic terrorism in the United States, only 43 or 8.6% were perpetrated by “radical Islamic terrorists” (see Table 1). Contrast that with 82 or 16.4% White nationalists, White extremists, Neo-Nazi attacks and 56 or 11.2% anti-government attacks. Similar to Miller (2017), these results support the dramatic increase in domestic terrorism by White supremacist groups.

Of the motivation types, eco-terrorism occurred the most (147 or 29.4%) which aligned with the passage of AETA, although I was unable to show a significant decrease in domestic terrorism following the implementation of AETA. It is here where the contribution of the power elite was most appropriate. Bjelopera (2017) noted that public data on eco-terrorism was more readily available in recent years than other forms of domestic terrorism, leading to the possibility of underreporting of the other forms of

domestic terrorism. While Bjelopera noted the lack of conformity in prosecuting domestic terrorism; anecdotally, I noticed that the media were quick to assign the label of terrorist to non-White perpetrators and use other criminal labels for White perpetrators.

Thus, the disconnect between the political and media narrative on the terrorist threat and what the empirical data show may lead to a potential connection with the systemic racism found in U.S. society. Following a cursory examination of recent domestic terrorist attacks, I found that White perpetrators were charged with hate crimes while perpetrators of color, if they survived, were charged with terrorism. That cursory examination may be supported by the coding practices for the doubt terrorism proper variable in the GTD. When further examining the events that were labeled as doubt terrorism proper, I found that many of those were labeled by the media and subsequently prosecuted as hate crimes, even if the event met the inclusion criteria of terrorism and met the definition of terrorism from the *United States Code*. In addition, there seemed to be an imbalance of coding where similar incidents perpetrated by persons of color and/or Muslims were coded as terrorism, while incidents involving White perpetrators were coded as doubt terrorism proper. Interestingly enough the attack by Dylann Roof on the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, SC on June 17, 2015 was coded as terrorism. When the updated GTD is released including the terrorism data for 2018, it will be interesting to see how the Tree of Life Synagogue attack in Pittsburgh on October 27, 2018 will be coded.

These possible racial discrepancies were supported by Hewitt's (2003) examination of domestic terrorism. For U.S. domestic terrorism from 1955 to 2000,

Hewitt noted the discrepancy in treatment of domestic terrorism by ideological category, finding that the ratio of arrests to incidents for the KKK was 0.39 and for Black militants was 0.61. Sentencing also differed for deadly offenses with Black militants getting an average of 37.0 years compared to the average 17.0 years for White racists and KKK (Hewitt, 2003). Conviction rates were also higher for Black militants compared to the KKK, with Black militants being convicted in 51.1% of any offense and 75.4% for deadly offenses, while the KKK were convicted in 47.8% of any offense and 29.7% for deadly offenses (Hewitt, 2003). While Hewitt's analysis cited ideological category differences, when examining the ideology for the KKK, White racists, and Black militants, there was also a clear racial gap.

Alone, MSF was inadequate to explain how policy can be implemented that is in direct contradiction with both the problem and policy streams. The question of influence of the political stream may be what is really connected to the power elite. Kinloch (2004) asserted that the power elite manipulate policy in order to serve itself and its own interests. For example, war is said to be necessary to ensure national security, however waging wars have benefited the power elite by helping maintain an atmosphere of fear to ensure continuity in leadership during elections, allowing for profiteering, and maintaining existing inequalities by restricting civil rights; a perfect trifecta of benefit for the political, economic, and military elites (Kinloch, 2004). Abrams (2006) noted that in the five years following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, all three branches of government engaged in deferral and avoidance regarding challenges to the

law which resulted in a break-down of the checks and balances that the three branches of the government were designed to provide upon the others.

Recent events highlight presidential overreach by Trump declaring a national emergency to provide funding for a border wall along the U.S. border with Mexico once Congress refused to allow for such funding. Hellmuth (2016) observed the changes in the separation of powers and specifically, the use of an ongoing war (the global war on terror) as a way to continue the power imbalance in the U.S. government that has been described as now operating under an imperial presidency. This is especially concerning considering the rhetoric and practices of the current Trump administration.

While troop withdrawals and a shift in approach to the global war on terror were hallmarks of the Obama administration, aggressive rhetoric, troop increases, and framing of the global war on terror to include illegal immigrants, the Trump administration may have had a greater impact on domestic terrorism in the United States beyond what the results of this study provided (Montgomery, 2019; Newman et al., 2018; Pham, 2015; Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014). In addition, while the *Mueller Report* concluded that there was no collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia, had the actions of Trump been those of anyone who was not a currently-serving President of the United States, that person would have faced charges of obstruction of justice (R.S. Mueller, 2019). Regardless of one's political ideology, that behavior is concerning and lends credence to the need for an analysis of how the Trump presidency compares with other presidencies in relation to terrorism, specifically domestic terrorism.

Ledwidge and Parmar (2017) argued that much of foreign policy is controlled by the power elite and that the power elite are predominantly male WASPs, and thus the power elite uses policy to ensure their own dominance. The majority of foreign terrorist organizations are non-White or of the lower White races (i.e. Irish) and thus the dominance of concern in U.S. counterterrorism policy being on international versus domestic terrorism could be motivated by racism and ethnocentrism in the United States (Ledwidge & Parmar, 2017). By constructing the main terrorist threat as being non-White and non-Christian, the power elite continued the practice of marginalizing distinct racial, ethnic, and religious groups keeping them from mobilizing and uniting, while at the same time, it has empowered White, Christian domestic terrorists to amass weapons (benefiting the economic and military elite) and keeping the political elite in power. In addition, by constructing the terrorist threat as being non-White and non-Christian, White supremacists and White nationalists find rationalization for their hatred and intolerance towards non-White and non-Christian people (J. Johnson, 2018).

Therefore, the combination of the MSF and the power elite theory served to explain the discrepancy between the empirical data and the focus of U.S. counterterrorism policy. The MSF explained how different streams converged to create policy and the power elite theory addressed the unequal influence of some in directing the substance of the developed policy, even when not supported by evidence. In addition, by adding the consideration of race and ethnicity, the trends I identified in the results are elucidated further. While these results were compelling, there were limitations to this study which I will elaborate on in the following section.

Limitations of the Study

Following IRB approval, once I accessed the GTD and began working on the data filtering and analysis, I uncovered additional limitations to this study that I had not anticipated. There were four primary limitations that will be elaborated in this section: (a) issues with the GTD data, (b) issues with public reporting of counterterrorism spending, (c) issues with the proximity of counterterrorism policy and paucity of data to evaluate the policy in accordance with past studies, and (d) issues with SPSS version 25.0.0.2. While I addressed some of my assumptions about the GTD in Chapter 1, issues I had not anticipated became apparent as I began working with the data.

One of the primary limitations of the present study involved the selected data source. While the GTD has been shown to be reliable and valid, I found myself questioning that reliability as I uncovered inconsistencies in the coding. Some of these inconsistencies may be explained by changes in practice and in the retro-coding of new variables added; however, others may be related to implicit bias among coders. While the GTD codebook is very detailed, perhaps additional detail addressing these inconsistencies would be useful for future researchers seeking to use the GTD to analyze domestic terrorism. For incidence and for many of the variables that I did not explore in this study, I believe the GTD is an excellent database and it offers compatibility with statistical analysis software packages that increase the efficiency of conducting quantitative analyses with the data. Just because the variables I intended to analyze did not conform with my expectations when planning this study does not mean that the entire dataset is unreliable or invalid.

A second major limitation to this study involved the accuracy and reporting of the U.S. government counterterrorism spending. While there are many public documents available including annual budget by agency and department from the OMB, those data were inconsistent with the budget reports available from DHS. The Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018) noted the same inconsistencies and had more deeply explored how counterterrorism was defined among and within agencies, through which they uncovered inconsistencies that may contribute to the data inconsistencies found in the public documents. As a result of these inconsistencies, my planned analysis of counterterrorism spending was not feasible for the current study.

A third limitation involved the selected U.S. counterterrorism policies. Similar to LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009), four of the interventions did not have an end date. While I attempted to utilize the same procedure to avoid confounding the analyses by having overlapping policy effects by using a one-year time frame following policy implementation, when I filtered the data to that level, the amount of data was too small to analyze with confidence (see Dugan, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). In addition, the rapid passage of counterterrorism policy led to difficulties in identifying whether those policies had any impact (i.e., USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, AETA, and Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act). For the series hazard analyses, there were several cases in which SPSS would not report a value for those policies or their interaction variables with time due to being constant or linearly dependent. However, removing them from the analyses did not seem like it would solve

the problem of their possible influence. I was particularly reluctant to remove AETA as that was the only policy that focused on domestic terrorism.

A fourth limitation involved the introduction of additional error to the analyses. While I had anticipated some additional error due to manually coding events as domestic, international, or unknown, I had not anticipated the challenges in running the series hazard model using SPSS version 25.0.0.2. As such, there were several times the filtered dataset became corrupted as I attempted to add or merge data calculated in Excel with the SPSS data, thus resulting in several occasions in which I had to re-filter the data, and at least one occasion of recoding the entire dataset. As a result, I had to calculate certain variables in Excel, which then I had to manually enter into SPSS. This manual data entry led to additional error because even though I triple-checked the data entry, there is still a possible chance that an error was made. Because of limitations in computing variables in SPSS, I had to conduct some calculations by hand, and while I triple-checked those calculations, there is still a possible chance that I made a mistake. Hopefully future versions of SPSS will offer a more comprehensive and complete method of conducting the variable creation and analysis for the series hazard model that would not require outside calculations either by hand or by using other software packages. The other researchers who have used the series hazard model have used different statistical software packages and did not appear to encounter the same types of additional work and calculation that this version of SPSS required.

While there were these limitations that may add caution to accepting the results, I do not believe that these limitations substantially undermined the purpose of this study

nor its applicability for positive social change. I believe that the strength of the effects found compensated for the additional error due to manual calculation and manual data entry. If anything, these limitations will guide future research and offer a wide range of recommendations for future research.

Recommendations

I have many recommendations for future research from looking at specific aspects of the GTD data coding process to testing additional theories to further modifications in the series hazard model. While working on the data analysis and interpretation, I was able to find several areas that should be explored, the results of which may contribute to positive social change. I will begin with discussing identifying or supplementing data sources for analysis of U.S. domestic terrorism.

One of the first recommendations for future research involves combining multiple data sources for analyses. For example, Carson (2014) utilized both the GTD, the EID, and supplemented the information from those databases with additional, open source chronologies. Another option would be to choose a different dataset such as the Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the United States (TEVUS) database that pulls from information from the GTD along with other databases and studies. Included in TEVUS are biographical and demographic information on perpetrators which would be useful in extending the current analysis to evaluate factors involving race, ethnicity, and religion (START, 2018c).

Another direction for future research involves examining domestic terrorism and counterterrorism policy focusing on race and ethnicity, as well as potentially theories

from the sociology of race and ethnic relations. Those theories may better explain the racial disparity than the power elite theory alone. A global analysis could be done to evaluate racial and ethnic stratification for different countries in relation to domestic terrorism for those countries.

A specific area of study could involve a systematic examination of the coding of the doubt terrorism proper variable in the GTD in relation to racial, ethnic, religious, and other social minorities. It would be interesting to identify if the pattern from my cursory and unsystematic examination of the events coded as doubt terrorism proper are systematically present. This potential research could examine if there is an imbalance of incidents labeled as doubt terrorism proper when perpetrators are among the dominant strata, whereas similar incidents are labeled as terrorism when perpetrators are among the minorities or lower strata. The results could be used to assist START project managers in improving interrater reliability for coding events, as well as perhaps suggest sensitivity to implicit bias among coders.

While Hewitt (2003) examined waves of domestic terrorism in relation to presidential administrations, considering the unusual nature of the Trump administration compared to all previous presidential administrations, an updated analysis would be useful. In particular, it would be useful to conduct an analysis of the impact of the Trump campaign and administration on White supremacists, White extremists, and new-Nazis, as well as on the counter-movement, the Anti-fascists (J. Johnson, 2018; Montgomery, 2019; R.S. Mueller, 2019; Newman et al., 2018; Perry, 2018; Pham, 2015; Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014).

Further research may also seek to employ examining the rational choice, backlash, and deterrence theories with regards to the impact that these specific U.S. counterterrorism policies have had on domestic terrorism broken down into similar ideological/motivational categories, target types, and in relation to opposing groups. For example, it may be useful to identify if a highly-publicized domestic terrorist attack perpetrated by a particular racial, ethnic, and/or religious group is followed by retaliatory attacks by domestic terrorists that oppose those groups (e.g., White supremacist activity following the September 11, 2001 attacks or anti-government activity following the incidents at Waco and Ruby Ridge).

Furthermore, by breaking down domestic terrorism further, the DHS, FBI, and DOD could get a better sense of which groups or ideologies are sensitive to federal counterterrorism policy. Such research may also result in providing policy makers and law enforcement with expectations of potential retaliation in response to attacks, the potential for copycats, areas in need of additional hardening of targets, and areas in need of additional surveillance and/or police presence. If such retaliatory and/or copycat actions occur, such research could be used to better inform the media to report more responsibly about terrorist attacks.

It would be very useful to examine how the series hazard model or another model may be used to evaluate policy when policy periods overlap. It would be useful to identify a control variable for the overlapping impact of multiple policies. While the one-year time frame was possible for LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009), it was not feasible in

the present study. One potential approach to addressing overlapping policy effects could be the use of multilevel models (B.D. Johnson, 2017, LaFree & Bersani, 2014).

Finally, there should be more investigation into how the series hazard model can be used as an evidence-based, non-partisan, non-political, quantitative measure of terrorist threat. As long as the assumptions and criteria for the series hazard model are met (viz., Dugan, 2011), it shows great promise in aiding counterterrorism agencies including the DHS and FBI in identifying, preventing, and responding to threats, as well as to policy makers in justifying costly counterterrorism spending and in the development of future counterterrorism policy. This final recommendation will be elaborated on in the next section.

Implications

The present study offers an evidence-based method for evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy and its impact on domestic terrorism which was the purpose of this study. This is an important step as prior attempts to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism policy have varied greatly in approach, data, and results. In addition, the series hazard model provides a mechanism by which the threat of terrorism can be quantified, which was an unanticipated benefit of this study. By utilizing empirical data, the present study offers a stronger evaluation of U.S. counterterrorism policy than those restricted to theoretical assertions. Not only is this method useful for policy makers, the DHS, and the FBI, but the results themselves inform these stakeholders as to what the counterterrorism priorities should be in relation to the actual terrorist threat.

As U.S. counterterrorism policies that focus on international terrorist threats come up for renewal or challenge, the data from this study can be used as support for the development and enactment of policy focusing on the threat of domestic terrorism. This is especially important considering the costs of countering the terrorist threat and justifying increasing spending to protect against the rare event of international terrorism, rather than the more frequent event of domestic terrorism (Bjelopera, 2017; Kunreuther, 2002; J. Mueller & Stewart, 2014). In addition, the series hazard model allows for the consideration of the impact of a range of other contextual or control variables such as other policy initiatives, time elapse, the impact of successful attacks, the impact of time since the last attack, and others. It is those factors specifically that lend its use to quantifying the threat of terrorism.

Terrorists are comprised of a spectrum of sociodemographic characteristics and by focusing on a foreign threat, while making it easier to profile international terrorists, it does not make the country safer. Creating additional labels that separate and disconnect the breadth of motivations and actions of terrorists undermines the safety of the nation. Terrorism, extremism, hate, cults, and other labels are not mutually exclusive categories and there needs to be a more systematic examination of how these terms are used to frame the threat, and how criminal prosecution follows from terrorist events, planned or executed (Bjelopera, 2017). By establishing an empirical, evidence-based method for evaluating counterterrorism policy and by offering an evidence-based, non-partisan, non-political method of quantifying the terrorist threat, policy makers will have easier access

to the evidence that should inform counterterrorism policy and counterterrorism operations.

Policy makers need to be aware that terrorism is a social construction and a complex social problem that requires a complex analysis. The political stream, policy entrepreneurs, and the media would also benefit from such elucidation. The series hazard model provides a complex analysis for evaluating policy and other interventions that may be aimed at countering the terrorist threat, and it removes the partisan and political influences in defining and prosecuting domestic terrorism.

For the sake of clarity, I would recommend that policy makers draft a new piece of legislation rather than amending existing policies. The new policy should address not only the findings from this study but extend the recommendations from Bjelopera (2017) and the Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending (2018). The following should be addressed in this new policy: (a) establishing one systematic definition of counterterrorism spending to be utilized by all agencies, (b) establishing accuracy and accountability in reporting counterterrorism spending, (c) establishing a public list of domestic terrorist organizations, (d) clearly instructing prosecutors regarding charges of domestic terrorism versus hate crime, (e) providing a statement of the overlap of terrorism, extremism, and hate crime, (f) establishing an evidence-based method of defining the terrorist threat (i.e. use of the series hazard model), (g) establishing clear procedures for evidence-based evaluation of the effectiveness of existing counterterrorism policy along with a reasonable timeline of compliance, and (h) requiring all future counterterrorism policy to include an evidence-based evaluation of the

effectiveness of future counterterrorism policy. By establishing a new policy that specifically addresses issues of accountability and clarity in existing counterterrorism policies and for future counterterrorism policies, the media will be provided with a clear way of communicating the new policy to the general public.

If policy makers intend on making the nation safer, they need to listen to all of the academics, researchers, and others among the policy and problem streams, and take to heart what the empirical evidence show. Since at least 2011, Bjelopera (2017) has been submitting annual reports for members and committees of Congress through the *Congressional Research Service* regarding a range of criminal justice and terrorism issues including overviews of domestic terrorism with updates. In the most recent report, Bjelopera repeated his argument for the need for better access by policy makers to the empirical data, as well as the need for a systematic method for determining the terrorist threat. The question becomes whether the power elite are exerting pressure to ignore the empirical data, and thus Congress is ignoring the threat and data, or is Congress not prioritizing this threat as imminent even though the data show otherwise. We do not need to wait for another catastrophic attack in order to act on creating and implementing effective counterterrorism policy. The data exist, now is the time to use the data to make the nation safer.

Conclusion

The United States faces an ongoing struggle with domestic terrorism, yet counterterrorism policy does not align with the threat. In addition, efforts to characterize domestic terrorism as being mutually exclusive from extremism and hate crime (which it

is not) give the public the illusion that domestic terrorism is not an issue in the United States. Yet, according to my results, on average there is a terrorist attack occurring in the United States every 11.70 (standard deviation: 19.686) days (see Table 6).

Without an accurate understanding of the complexity of the social problem that is domestic terrorism, and without alignment between actual threat and counterterrorism policy, domestic terrorism will continue to thrive and negatively impact lives of U.S. citizens and residents, undermining any prospect of approaching a peaceful society. If counterterrorism budget priorities continue to focus on the rare event of international terrorism, and if those priorities replace other policy initiatives, the United States will continue to struggle with the real threat and continue to remain unsafe. As long as agencies continue to operate with non-public lists and the lack of systematic definitions, U.S. counterterrorism agencies will continue to operate in a reactive rather than proactive fashion against domestic terrorism, and prosecutions against domestic terrorists will continue in a non-uniform manner, undermining public trust in the criminal justice system.

By offering an evidence-based method of evaluating U.S. counterterrorism policy based on empirical data, policy makers may make better use of tax-payer money and provide greater protection from the harm of a domestic terrorist attack. It is essential to note that a complex social problem such as terrorism requires a complex analysis that includes a range of factors at various levels of influence. The series hazard model offers that complexity while remaining feasible to execute using public data.

In addition, the series hazard model allows for an evidence-based, systematic method of characterizing the terrorist threat, as long as all of the criteria and assumptions of the series hazard model are met (viz., Dugan, 2011). Such a method has remained elusive but with this model, those days may be over. This model allows for non-partisan and non-political evaluation of the threat of terrorism. By using such a model, the politics of how certain entities come to be listed as terrorist organizations or as extremist organizations are removed. For example, the Department of State's list of foreign terrorist organizations is a politically-motivated list with notable countries that, while known to support terrorism, remain off of the list. An evidence-based, non-partisan, non-political method of determining the terrorist threat is especially needed when the Trump administration continues to support the ideologies and actions of White supremacists, White nationalists, and Neo-Nazis (J. Johnson, 2018; Newman et al., 2018; Pham, 2015; Perry, 2018; Warner & Neville-Shepard, 2014).

The results from this study and others that show the strength and benefits of using the series hazard model would be especially useful to the DHS and the FBI. Until there is a systematic method of examining U.S. counterterrorism policy, the U.S. government, as well as U.S. citizens and residents remain distracted from the actual threat and run the risk of being surprised by another, catastrophic terrorist attack, this one perpetrated by domestic terrorists. While the balance between national security and civil liberties remain precarious in countering a terrorist threat, ignoring the threat will not make it go away. Action must be sought and that action should be based on empirical data and replicable evidence. If the U.S. government and its citizens and residents truly aspire to living in a

peaceful democracy, then the U.S. government needs to clearly address the significant threat that is domestic terrorism.

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Appendix A: Letter of Permission to Use GTD



July 30, 2018

Per the request you submitted via the GTD website please note that the data download/disc includes the following files:

- GTD 1970-2017 data file, including data on terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2017
- GTD 1970-1995 data file, including data on terrorist attacks between 1970 and 1995
- GTD 1996-2013 data file, including data on terrorist attacks between 1996 and 2013
- GTD 2014-2017 data file, including data on terrorist attacks between 2014 and 2017
- GTD 1993 data file, including cases collected in an effort to reconstruct the missing 1993 data (see below for additional information)
- GTD codebook, explaining the variables and coding schema for the GTD
- Global Terrorism Database *Terms of Use*

Please note that the data in the first file is identical to the data in the second, third, and fourth files. The smaller files are provided for users who require a limited number of rows per file.

Regarding the fifth file, users should be aware that prior to the transfer of the original GTD data from Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS) to START, all records of terrorist attacks during 1993 were lost. Several efforts were made to recover these incidents from original news sources. Unfortunately, due to the challenges of retrospective data collection for events that happened more than fifteen years ago, the number of cases collected for 1993 is only 15% of the number reported by PGIS. As a consequence we exclude all 1993 attacks from the GTD data to prevent users from misinterpreting the low frequency in 1993 as an actual count. However, we provide the reconstructed 1993 cases for those researchers who would find value in exploring these incidents. Together, with the PGIS recorded marginal counts for each country provided in the GTD codebook, analysts can use these data to interpolate values for the missing 1993 cases.

It is the policy of the Department of Homeland Security to protect the privacy of individuals. The information you have requested from the Global Terrorism Database may contain information related to specific individuals. DHS requires that you take every possible precaution to protect this information and that you use it for the purpose of advancing the understanding of terrorism. If you encounter any information that you believe to be inaccurate, please contact me at gtd@start.umd.edu.

A web-based interface for the GTD, including additional information on the data and its usage, is available at www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

Thank you for your interest in the Global Terrorism Database. We hope that you find it to be a useful tool. If you encounter any problems with the enclosed CD or its contents, please contact the GTD team via email at gtd@start.umd.edu. We welcome your feedback on the data and its application to your work.

Sincerely,

Erin Miller
GTD Program Manager, START

Appendix B: GTD End User License Agreement

END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT WITH UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

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 - d. University is under no obligation to update the GTD, the codebook, user interface, or any auxiliary materials.
7. **INDEMNITY.** You hereby agree to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless the University and its employees, agents, directors, and officers from and against any and all claims, proceedings, damages, injuries, liabilities, losses, costs, and expenses (including reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses) relating to or arising out of Your use of the GTD, the codebook, or any auxiliary materials or Your breach of any term in this EULA.
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- a. This EULA and your right to access the GTD website and use the data, the codebook, and any auxiliary materials will take effect when you access the GTD.
 - b. University reserves the right, at any time and without prior notice, to modify, discontinue or suspend, temporarily or permanently, Your access to the GTD website (or any part thereof) without liability to You.
9. **MISCELLANEOUS**
- a. The University may modify this EULA at any time. Check the GTD website for modifications.
 - b. No term of this Agreement can be waived except by the written consent of the party waiving compliance.
 - c. If any provision of this EULA is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be void, invalid, or otherwise unenforceable, such determination shall not affect the remaining provisions of this Agreement.
 - d. This Agreement does not create a joint venture, partnership, employment, or agency relationship between the Parties.
 - e. There are no third party beneficiaries to this agreement. You may not assign this agreement without the University's prior written approval.

- f. This EULA shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with United States copyright law and the laws of the State of Maryland without reference to its conflicts of laws rules. Nothing in this EULA is or shall be deemed to be a waiver by the University of any of its rights or status as an agency and instrumentality of the State of Maryland. The parties mutually agree to opt out of application of the Maryland Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (MUCITA), Maryland Code Annotated [Commercial Law] 21-101 through 21-816 to the greatest extent authorized under MUCITA.
- g. This EULA represents the entire agreement between You and the University regarding the subject matter of paragraphs 1-10. There are no other understandings, written or oral, that are not included in this Agreement.

10. REPRESENTATION. You represent that You are at least 18 years of age.