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Evaluating the Effects of Counterterrorism Strategies on Insurgency in Nigeria

Bowie Sonnie Bowei
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Walden University

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Bowie Bowei

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2019

Abstract

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by

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M.Sc., Lagos State University, 2013

MPA, Lagos State University, 2008

B.Sc., Ambrose Ali University, 2005

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

August 2019

Abstract

With the evolving problems of terrorism in Nigeria and the formation of numerous new terrorist groups, insurgency in Nigeria has escalated, making it one of the most terrorized countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This study looked critically at the effects of the strategies applied in the attempt to fight terrorism and how these strategies have affected insurgency in Nigeria. The background of the study gives an insight on the evolution of terrorist groups in Nigeria, their mode of operation, effects on citizens and the Nigerian economy, as well as the operations of counterterrorist agencies. The qualitative research method was used for this study. Critical theory and resource dependence theory were applied, and data were obtained through face-to-face and telephone interviews with 7 stakeholders. Detailed recommendations are made to aid counterterrorist agencies in developing and applying additional and effective workable strategies in their fight against terrorism. Policies in Nigeria were recommended that may discourage terrorism initiations and center the focus of youth towards nation-building. Social problems were identified connecting young people as the primary causes of terrorism in Nigeria. Solid recommendations in this direction have been provided to ensure youths across the country who form a vulnerable population and are the targets of terrorist sect recruitment are protected and provided with effective tools to prevent their conscription, while engaging them positively in becoming knowledgeable and self-reliant citizens.

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Dedication

This research work is dedicated to God Almighty, for His grace and provision in making my academic dream a reality. It is also dedicated to the memories of my late parents, Cdr. Wilson Denis Okah (Nigerian Navy) and Mrs. Helen Amah Okah whose desire it was to see me reach this academic height. My lovely wife, Ndudi Bowei cannot be left out for all her support and encouragement. Finally, to all who mocked me at the times of my academic challenges, your actions gave me the strength and doggedness to fight on and achieve this, so, I say a big thank you to you as well.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Although various definitions of terrorism exist, the common factor that drives them all is that terrorism is a premeditated, politically motivated action of violence carried out against non-combatant targets, by militant groups or clandestine agents (Mannik, 2007). Terrorism dates back to when humans first began using violence to achieve political ambitions. It evolved through decades to become modern-day terrorism (Zalman, 2018). While the early days of terrorist acts were seen as actions against a state, aimed at improving its system, modern-day terrorism is characterized by violent attacks against particular political orders. The intention is to create fear in a wider audience (in most cases, the civilian population) and to coerce political targets into certain behaviors or actions beneficial to the terrorist groups (Mannik, 2007).

In Nigeria, terrorism is defined as:

An act intended or regarded as having been intended to force a government or an international organization to carry out or abstain from carrying out a certain act such as researching or developing a biological or chemical weapon without lawful authority, dissemination of information (be it true or false) aimed at causing panic, evoke violence or intimidation against government, a person or group of persons (Goitom, 2011.p1).

Acts that may be justified as acts of terrorism following the Nigerian definition have been occurring since 1966. This includes the Nigerian civil war led by Odumegwu Ojukwu, whose plan was to force the Nigerian government to secede a part of the country

to a particular tribe. Other such acts include the military coups in Nigeria and lone ranger and militant group attacks motivated by various justifiable and unjustifiable factors.

In this study, however, I focused on the recent trend of terrorism by groups such as Boko Haram, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, and other recently formed terrorist groups in Nigeria that fit the definition of terrorism, both locally and internationally. It is my goal that this study may help in developing new strategies to combat terrorism and can be used by counterterrorism agencies globally.

In this first chapter, I reveal the background of the study, offer a summary of the relevant literature, and present a problem and purpose statement. This chapter also contains the research question, a theoretical framework for the study, the nature of the study, and details of likely contributions of the study to positive social change. I conclude the first chapter with a summary and transition into the next chapter.

Background of the Study

Terrorism in Nigeria has become famous between 2001 and 2019 with the emergence of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups from the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Some of the Niger Delta militia groups include Niger Delta People's Volunteer Front, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and most recently, Niger Delta Avengers. The alleged motive for Niger Delta terrorists developed as a result of social benefit deprivation and government neglect. The nation's economy depends mainly on oil, a natural resource rooted in the region. Militant groups gained

strength through various tactics such as kidnapping expatriates and oil workers for ransom and attacks on oil facilities forcing the government to negotiate with them (International Criminal Court, 2013).

Some of these negotiations involved cash for arms, which only strengthened the terrorists' arsenal because their old arms were sold to the government and the profits were used to acquire more sophisticated weapons. Terrorists also negotiated for the allocation of huge contracts to leaders of these groups, government appointments to nominees of militant leaders, and the Niger Delta Amnesty program, which granted amnesty to all terrorists from that region and ensured that billions of dollars were allocated to them and their friends and families as monthly stipends and for training (UNOCH, 2004).

Believing that this strategy of negotiation was a solution to the problem, the Nigerian government succumbed and found itself constrained by demands and further threats from these groups. Mismanagement of the resources assigned for the project, lack of professional engagement, and corruption on the part of the handlers led to a reckless waste of over \$40 billion on unprofitable training programs (Okoromadu, 2018). More than 80% of the terrorists were trained in vocations that had no financial viability and others were allocated monthly stipends for merely sitting at home (Wodu, 2014). This faulty strategy aimed at bringing an end to terrorism in the Niger Delta only encouraged terrorists from the region to threaten the government. Other militant groups in that region began to form by people who also wanted to enjoy these personal benefits from the government.

Boko Haram was in existence and had registered scanty and unnoticed attacks prior to the formation of the recent Niger Delta militant groups. When terrorists from the Niger Delta were captured by the Department of State Security and placed in the same cells with Boko Haram members, they gained access to knowledge of more sophisticated tactics from these other terrorists groups. The Department of State Security thought mixing terrorist groups together would break them because of their cultural and religious differences but the terrorists saw it as an opportunity to share ideas, experiences and tactics. As a result Boko Haram began to duplicate of the tactics of the Niger Delta terrorists. Explosives were introduced in the north along with kidnapping, both of which had not been part of Boko Haram's previous tactics for negotiations with the Nigerian government.

Over the years, and especially between 2000 and 2016, Nigeria suffered major casualties from Boko Haram attacks. In this period, as many as 18,914 lives (both civilians and military) were lost, children were kidnapped and deprived of education and parental care, and communities have been destroyed, leaving the nation with colossal damage and economic loss (Global Terrorism Index 2017). The military tactics used to disengage terrorists are the same combat engagement strategies that infuriates terrorists and result in reprisal attacks, which have cost the nation billions of dollars (Global Terrorism Index, 2016).

Data show that the impact of terrorism in Nigeria has reduced recently, likely as a result of factions competing with Boko Haram. This has been a strategy of terrorists in Nigeria: creating an impression they have been subdued by the military only to return

stronger with new strategies. As noted by the current Nigerian president (Muhammadu Buhari), it is necessary that counterterrorist agencies must strengthen their strategies and develop new ones to beat the terrorists at their game (Punch News, 2017). To combat terrorism, the entire nation must work together as a team; all citizens, including the civilian community, must be involved in fighting terrorism, by disseminating reliable information leading to the capture of prominent terrorists and giving information that may thwart the successful operations of terrorists.

The Nigerian state has yet to achieve active civilian participation in counterterrorism, likely because all agents fighting against terrorism in Nigeria appear to be part of those terrorizing civilians. Agencies of anti-terrorism, including vigilante groups, assume that any civilian who may have useful information on terrorists may also be a terrorist, which can lead to dangerous consequences for the civilian. Nonetheless, understanding the tactics of the terrorists is a major tool toward defeating them. Nigerian counterterrorist's lack this skill and need education and training in creative ways to tackle this problem through various results-oriented strategies, rather than mere combat engagement.

Problem Statement

The growing presence of terrorists in Nigeria has affected the educational development of youths in northern and southern Nigeria because they are either recruited and indoctrinated by Boko Haram and Niger Delta terrorist sects (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, the Avengers, and a host of others), or they are kidnapped and kept hostage for part of their lives (Lauderdale & Oliverio, 2018). Social

and economic development has been hampered by this recurring episode; as a huge portion of the nation's wealth is directed toward fighting terrorism rather than funding socioeconomic progression.

As a result, the rate of poverty has increased and most Nigerian youth have no option but to join terrorist groups as a means of livelihood to gain some form of power and benefits: meals, sex with female victims, and stipends. These benefits were far out of reach for them before involvement with the groups and motivate them to join. The negative impact of these terrorist groups in Nigeria has been globally noted and maintains steady growth; Nigeria ranks third highest in terms of worst impact of terrorism, behind only Iraq and Afghanistan (Global Terrorist Index, 2017).

Various agencies in Nigeria and its neighboring countries have been established to fight terrorism, but without success. This is evident in the steady increase in casualties, which include the military and other security agencies, tourists, expatriates, and first responders, despite the heavy presence of counterterrorist agencies. Thus, the strategies applied in counterterrorism operations in Nigeria have not yielded visible effects in reducing or eliminating terrorism there. Previous research in this area of study has focused on the effects of terrorism, rather than the effects of counterterrorist strategies, which may be the solution to tackling terrorism.

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this qualitative study is to develop new and effective strategies for counterterrorism engagement in Nigeria. With the increasing rate of terrorism in Nigeria and its imminent spread across the African continent, the development of operative

approaches to eliminate terrorism is important. Doing so will sustain a peaceful nation through planning and implementation of effective counterterrorism strategies and introduce positive social change among the nation's youth while ensuring peace and stability.

Research Question

Because the focus of this study is the development of effective counterterrorism strategies to affect the nation positively by putting an end to terrorism and ensuring that Nigerian youth are productively engaged in nation-building, several questions aimed at gaining knowledge on how this should be carried out were asked. The central research question is: What strategies are being applied in terrorist neutralization, deradicalization and peace sustenance by counterterrorism agencies in Nigeria, and how effective are they?

Theoretical Framework

Critical theory and resource dependence theory were identified for this study. Nigerians have been enslaved by terrorism and yearn for freedom which may be achieved through the application of critical theory in seeking to liberate them from the confines of terrorism, by stressing the reflective assessment and critique of society and culture through the application of knowledge. For organizations or countries to resist or overcome hardship, there must be a considerable amount of exchange in terms of human and capital resources (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2016). The relevance of critical theory will be found in highlighting the importance of resources and empowerment through education and training.

Resource dependency theory highlights the relationship between organizations and the resources they need to operate, and resources may include training, workforce, infrastructure and funding. If one organization maintains the majority of a resource, then another will become dependent on it to operate, creating a symbiotic relationship. In Nigeria, the security agencies depend on the government to operate and this creates the risk of external control, resulting in uncertainty. External control, such as funding or policies, in Nigeria is enforced by the government and can have a negative effect on tasks of counterterrorist operations (Mc Dowl, 2016).

Nature of the Study

Qualitative research method was used for this ethnographic and observational study where data will not be obtained under controlled circumstances but from archived databases, published sources and direct interviews with voluntary stakeholders.

Definitions

Terrorism: An act of violence resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, with a purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or international organization to do or abstain from doing any act (Bruce, 2018).

Terrorist: A person or group of people involved in the act of terrorism.

Counterterrorism: Measures designed to combat or prevent terrorism.

Counterterrorist agencies: Organizations assigned the responsibility of combating terrorism. They comprise of all the components expected to deliver strategies and well-articulated execution in engaging terrorists.

Counterterrorism strategies: Tactics used in attempting to bring an end to terrorism. These strategies are usually developed by professionals in various fields, who are connected to the issue and work out modalities for practicable ways to apply such ideas.

Niger Delta Amnesty Program: Set up by the government of Nigeria to manage ex militants from the Niger Delta. Their focus was a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program established in August 2015 in an effort to end the violence by providing platforms for self-sustaining vocational training and education.

Combat engagement: A face to face hostile encounter with the use of arms, against warring factions: both factions are not involved in any form of negotiations. Rather, both sides engage themselves in physical and technological warfare.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration: A collection of post-conflict interventions focused on retrieving arms, neutralizing combatants, reintegrating genuine ex-combatants into civilian life, and preventing a reoccurrence (Pugel, 2009).

Assumptions

The initial assumption for the study relates to the personnel of counterterrorist agencies and all agents involved in carrying out a service to curb the menace of insurgency. The assumption holds that; counterterrorism strategies aimed at developing the youths of communities in the terrorist catchment areas and creating positive social change through education, training, and providing social benefits will be more efficient in combating terrorism in Nigeria. In situations where terrorists are not well-disposed to

western strategies as a result of their religion and ideologies, other strategies (culturally induced) that provide the opening toward their acceptance, may be applied.

The second assumption relates to the policymakers in Nigeria who are responsible for ensuring that new strategies are signed into law and are implemented by all players including the heads of organizations responsible for counterterrorist operations. It is assumed that decisive measures will be taken to ensure compliance with the recommended results. The last assumption is that the conduct of investigations in organizations saddled with the responsible for managing terrorists and terrorism in Nigeria may not yield positive results as officials may want to cover errors, omissions, and excesses of their organizations.

Scope and Delimitations

Delimitations arise from scope limitations and decisions made during a research design (Simon & Goes, 2013). This study will not be examined from a non-technical perspective. Rather, the focus of this study is to explore the experiences of counterterrorist operatives as well as the strategies they apply in their attempt to eradicate terrorism in Nigeria and to understand the reasons terrorism appears to be on the rise.

The initial stage in the delimitation process involves the identification of a particular problem notwithstanding the numerous challenges connected to the application of counterterrorist strategies. Transferability is achieved during the research design stage by cautious restriction of the study's population (Rudestam & Newton, 2014). This study will focus on strategies used by security agencies, applied in fighting terrorism in Nigeria and will highlight the Nigerian military. The interest in exploring the military is based on

the position that they are the major fighting force against terrorists in Nigeria, as well as their duty as supervisors for other agencies involved in the same line of responsibility.

Limitations

This research study offered me the opportunity to improve my data collection and data analysis skills, as a greenhorn qualitative researcher. Because the processes of data collection, analysis, and interpretation required proficiency to achieve good study results, I sort guidance from experienced faculty and colleagues. This was intended to address my inexperience with doctoral level research work and any potential weaknesses. A major limitation envisaged during data collection may be getting truthful information from the military sources, as it may seem to tarnish their image as an effective security agency, having failed to meet with expectations to dislodge terrorists over a prolonged period.

Given that the collection of data from the military may be falsified to cover their weaknesses, and because combining multiple data sources, methods, investigators, and theories may enhance the credibility of a study's results and modify integral weaknesses, the design development required me to depend on the proficiency of the dissertation committee members, during the data collection process. The level of researcher interaction with some participants involved with the study may be another limitation. Because interview participants included former and present terrorists in and out detention, their education level, psychological state, and language barrier posed difficulty in gaining exact details or expressions as originally intended by the participant.

I built rapport and trust with participants to ensure detailed and genuine responses during data collection through adequate researcher engagement, active observation

methods, and open auditing processes. I developed a transparent audit stream to show the steps I took in collecting data, ensuring its quality through control measures like committee member and peer review.

Significance of the Study

In looking at the significance of this study, it is important to focus on the positive outcome expected to evolve and provide positive social change by eliminating terrorism (Laureate Education, 2016). I hope that the impact of this study will bring about strategic ways of approaching counterterrorism in Nigeria and address the menace of Boko Haram and other Niger Delta terrorists. This can be achieved through effective counterterrorism training programs in the military and other security institutions, providing new policies that will ensure that the strategies are brought to fruition. This study also provides insight into the necessity of education and youth empowerment as a means of positive engagement to discourage poverty-driven motives for those who become terrorists (Monga, Lin, Elu, & Price, 2015).

Significance to Practice

A number of researchers have studied the causes and effects of terrorism, but little research has been done on the strategies applied to counterterrorism and its effects on insurgency. Udounwa (2015) maintained that adding new strategies to existing ones used by the military is vital in winning the fight against terrorism. Although his strategies were focused on military operations, other strategies emerged from this study that need to be applied to prevent continuous defeat of the military by terrorists. As terrorists continue to

develop new strategies to defeat opposition and achieve their aim, the implementation and continuous development of counterterrorism strategies is essential.

Recent terrorism and counterterrorism research have focused on the motives and causes of terrorism in Nigeria, and have provided the learning opportunities for concerned agencies; this research work will advance the scope of counterterrorism strategy-building and will improve the development of defined roles and responsibilities for engagement by the stakeholders. The results of this study will provide the necessary tools required to enhance cooperation among all stakeholders and a better understanding of their roles and responsibilities in combating insurgency.

Significance to Theory

Notwithstanding the repercussions of terrorism on communities, individuals, the economy, and the image of the country, insurgency in Nigeria is spreading and gaining ground. This study is the first to explore the counterterrorism strategy phenomenon using the critical and resource dependence theories. Critical theory will seek to liberate Nigerians from the confines of terrorism, by stressing the reflective assessment and critique of society and culture through the application of knowledge, in order to overcome hardship, by a considerable amount of exchange of human and capital resources (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2016).

In addition, resource dependency theory highlights the relationship between organizations and the resources they need to operate. Security agencies depend on the government to operate, and the risk of external control is inevitable. External control, such as funding or policies, in Nigeria is enforced by the government and can have a

negative effect on counterterrorist operations (Mc Dowl, 2016). This study is significant to the theory as its relevance will be found in highlighting the importance of resources and empowerment through education and training in the fight against terrorism.

Significance to Social Change

Terrorism has a negative effect on those responsible for perpetrating the act and those affected by the act. The most affected by terrorism are the youths who, rather than being in school are either recruited into terrorist sects or kidnapped. Knowledge and education provide a better society so preventing young people from achieving this is a way of taking society backward. In Nigeria thousands of young terrorists and students that are kept away from school as a result of terrorism (Singne, 2018).

Developing strategies that would ensure citizens regain their position to enjoy these basic benefits would help in creating positive social change. Enabling young people to gain some form of economic empowerment and education will ensure that society improves. Awareness on community counterterrorism involvement will decrease the chances of regular devastating attacks on communities, preventing them from enjoying social benefits as a result of fear or physical damage.

The research outcomes reveal the importance of development and the roles education and training play in a society. This will ensure that the rate of government dependency decreases, and citizens become a productive part of creating social change in and around their communities.

Summary and Transition

This study evaluates the tactics used by counterterrorist agencies in Nigeria. My intention was to see how it has worked for the nation, and improved the security situation while transforming the players of terrorism into useful and productive citizens. I identified lapses of stakeholders in ensuring that Nigeria's security system is stable and provides a good environment for economic development that in turn, will provide social benefits to citizens in order to discourage them from being forced into acts of terrorism as a result of poverty.

The findings from the study helped define the specific role of stakeholders in ensuring that peace and development are achieved through effective counterterrorism strategies. It identified needs and challenges faced within and by anti terrorism agencies, and recommendations for further development of counterterrorism strategies and operations aimed at ending terrorism and bringing about positive social change in Nigeria. In the second chapter, I presented a review highlighting the relevance and justification for the use of critical theory and resource dependence theory before giving details of the role of all stakeholders in the development and implementation of new strategies to combat terrorism.

In the second chapter I established the importance of using workable strategies to counter problems of insurgency. I showed the problems that have mired Nigeria from effectively tackling the problem of terrorism and the reasons terrorism seems to be growing rather than decreasing, from the outcome of military intervention over the last 13 years. Several errors due to mismanagement of terrorists and pure lack of experience in

handling strategic counterterrorism operations were also highlighted as a major problem that has kept terrorism afloat in Nigeria. I reviewed the lack of empirical research available in the area of strategic planning and development in counterterrorism operations and how the use of combat strategy has worsened the situation (security, social and economic) in Nigeria. Finally, I summarized the role of all stakeholders in managing counterterrorism through non-technical strategies.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

Although various strategies have been applied toward the eradication of terrorism globally, it persists and various new reasons for acts of terrorism continue to develop. Likewise, as counterterrorist agencies develop new strategies to fight insurgency, terrorists also develop workable tactics to beat counterterrorists, ensuring that their impact is felt globally and that their demands are met (NATO Review, 2016).

The over-all issue with the inability to curb terrorism in Nigeria is more of an administrative problem where technical and financial resources, as well as policies and their implementation are either not sufficiently applied or are not put in proper sequence. This may be a result of stakeholders' other interests, such as diversion of funds assigned for the purpose of acquiring security equipment or for personal use, political differences among policymakers that result in delays causing grievous security implications, and lack of expertise and execution of counterterrorism strategies and application.

In order to effectively arrest terrorism in Nigeria, all stakeholders need to understand the various roles they play. Citizens must understand and be educated on their roles; the military and other security agencies must also be educated on their roles and the importance of the roles of civilians in combating terrorism; policymakers and heads of security agencies must understand that working as a team toward achieving the same goal of eradicating terrorism in Nigeria is imperative. The aim of this study is to develop this understanding, educate all stakeholders and advance the strategies applied in counterterrorism operations in Nigeria.

This literature review takes account of the various motives of terrorists in Nigeria; the experience, strengths, and weaknesses of counterterrorist agencies; strategies that have been used and their limitations; the reasons for youth vulnerability in being enlisted in terrorist groups; social motivation of young terrorists against the motivation of counterterrorist personnel; and the importance and need for developing new and workable strategies.

In this chapter, I provide the strategy used in searching for reviewed literature. I also outline the assumptions of critical and resource dependence theories and apply them to the Nigerian case. I review 11 articles related to the study from various authors and end the chapter with a summary and transition to the next chapter.

Literature Search Strategy

For this study, my literature search strategy involved the use of recent peer-reviewed articles on counterterrorism operations, strategies, and shortfalls. I used Google Scholar to identify connected articles and the Walden University Library to retrieve them. My search included key scholarly databases such as Business Source Complete, ProQuest Central, Academic Search Complete, Sage Knowledge, and Walden University Dissertations. I made the decision to either use or dispose of articles by classifying and storing relevant articles in a Google Scholar library. I reviewed these articles for significance to identify research methods, validity, reliability, data collection methods, and findings.

The search keywords I used include *acceptable Internet usage policy enforcement, Internet filtering and monitoring, terrorism, counterterrorism, and Boko*

Haram. In addition, keywords such as *terrorist motivation, counterterrorism strategies, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, Nigerian terrorist tactics, terrorist neutralization techniques, social constructivism, critical theory, and resource dependence theory*. Overall, in this literature, I discussed research studies conducted on the terrorist and counterterrorist operations in Nigeria, tactics and strategies applied by terrorists and counterterrorists, and ways to achieve mitigation of this global challenge, using technical strategies and organizational policies.

Theoretical Foundation

For the theoretical foundation of this study, I have identified critical theory and resource dependence theory. Considering the factors responsible for the poor level of victory over terrorism in Nigeria, it is critical to apply these theories with the problem of counterterrorism strategies to promote development.

Critical Theory

Critical theory offers a descriptive and normative foundation for social inquiry and is designed to decrease domination and increase freedom in all forms (Stanford, 2016). It is applied through critiquing and analyzing the social issues that are responsible for the domination of tribes that have emerged as terrorists, using inhumanity as a justification for their actions. Critical theory was developed in response to conventional approaches to uncover the ideological, conceptual, and institutional foundations of terrorism. It is used to critique dominant conventional approaches that link terrorism with technical capitalism, and claims that violent activities used by the state, in a case of state terrorism against its own citizens, have been ignored by traditional terrorism scholars

(Gunning 2007; Silke 2009; Jackson, Smyth, & Gunning 2009; Herring, 2008). Critical theory is concerned with critiquing and changing society in its entirety, as against traditional theory, concerned only with understanding or explaining it. It is aimed at digging into the social life, to reveal the assumptions that keep people from true and complete understanding of how the world works. Critical theory emerged from the Marxist tradition and was advanced by a group of sociologists at the University of Frankfurt in Germany, referred to as Frankfurt School (Crossman, 2019).

Nigerians are being enslaved by terrorism and yearn for freedom, which may be achieved through the application of critical theory, in seeking to liberate them from the confines of terrorism, by stressing the reflective assessment and critique of society and culture through the application of knowledge. Various geographic regions in Nigeria have experienced years of government domination and have attempted to gain their freedom in several ways. This has led to diverse forms of agitation beginning with what resulted in the Nigerian civil war in 1967. The next form of agitation resulting from the same causes gave rise to the formation of various militant sects in the Niger Delta, which gradually but steadily developed into terrorist groups. Through this perspective, counterterrorist's have to take critical steps to review issues and work out modalities to free citizens from oppression, to create the freedom that will enable peace and economic and social development.

Research has shown that the major cause of terrorism in Nigeria is rooted in poverty. This is a form of domination because corrupt governments and leaders of counterterrorist agencies have been involved in siphoning wealth while their subjects

languish in poverty. While terrorists are equipped with modern technology, efficient training, morale, and effective tools to defeat the military, counterterrorists are ill-equipped and caged in a series of issues that discourage and disallow their success.

The Metele terrorist attack in Nigeria in October, 2018, is one example of military forces experiencing a lack of adequate equipment to engage terrorists, as well as lack of good logistic and morale support. A better equipped and motivated terrorist group entered their fortress with ease and over ran them, causing a devastating effect on the nation as a whole. Hundreds of soldiers were killed due to insider involvement and lack of effective defense strategies, logistic support, and fighting tools (Aluko & Adesupo, 2018).

Looking critically at the causes of terrorism in Nigeria and the strategies applied in countering insurgency, state terrorism which encompasses violent action against citizens, neglect, domination, and deprivation has been a leading cause of terrorism in Nigeria and must be addressed as one of the strategies to combat terrorism. Because “a theory is critical to the extent that it seeks human emancipation from slavery, acts as a liberating influence, and works to create a world which satisfies the needs and powers of human beings” (Horkheimer 1972, 246), counterterrorism strategies applied in Nigeria must absorb these considerations in seeking solutions to insurgency.

Resource Dependence Theory

For organizations or countries to resist or overcome hardship, there must be a considerable amount of exchange in terms of human and capital resources (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2016). Its relevance will be found in highlighting the importance of resources and empowerment through education and training, in the fight against terrorism.

As resource dependency theory highlights the relationship between organizations and the resources they need to operate, such resources may include training, workforce, infrastructure, and funding. If one organization maintains the majority of a resource, then another will become dependent on it to operate, creating a symbiotic relationship. In Nigeria, security agencies depend on the government to operate and this creates the risk of external control, resulting in uncertainty. External control, such as funding or policies, in Nigeria is enforced by the government and can have a negative effect on tasks of counterterrorist operations (Mc Dowl, 2016).

Terrorism has been a part of the socio-political scenario in the global society. Since Nigeria's independence in 1960, millions of civilians have been killed for various reasons bordering around agitation against the Nigerian government, for exclusion of their regions from socio-economic benefits. As I examine the impact of increased exclusionist political attitudes toward minority groups and how a revisit of these policies may serve as a counterterrorist strategy to remedy the growing rate of terrorism in Nigeria, it is important that the attention of stakeholders is drawn to this critical factor.

Ethnic exclusionism reveals various forms of social phenomena that indicate that the majority in a particular society wishes to exclude minorities (Coenders and Scheepers 2003). While some researchers argue that exclusionist political attitudes are common and destructive examples of non-democratic practices, Nigeria experiences ethnic exclusionism in all forms of ruling atmospheres, be it non-democratic or democratic. This is largely responsible for the economic deprivation in some ethnic regions, resulting in their aggressive approach to terrorism, as the only way out of a depressed situation.

Exclusionism also affects the government structure in Nigeria, as a number of government agencies or organizations are left to suffer, depending on the relationship between the legislative and executive arms of government. While the military depends on the legislature to approve policies and funding for the fight against terrorism, politics are at play and act as one of the reasons affecting the military and other counterterrorist agencies from effectively fighting terrorism.

Resource dependence is not applied to only policies and finances and does not affect terrorism in only ways where finance or policies by those in power must be exchanged for effective engagement of terrorists. Natural resource dependency also has a way of promoting agitation or motivating the adoption of peace through detailed execution of well-structured strategies. The role that the wealth or hoarding of natural resources plays as either a financing mechanism or promotional tool for agitation by state and non-state actors can be determined by a government, as a strategy for peace and reconciliation. Regarding motivational elements of civil conflict, abundance of natural resources may spur would-be rebels to gain political control of territory they can extract resource wealth from, for economic dependence on the trading of commodities (Wayland, 2017). Since economic motivations trump the grievance motivations in most cases of terrorism in Nigeria as proven by the poorly structured Niger Delta Amnesty Program, practical strategies can be mapped out to use natural resources as means of peace and stability in Nigeria.

Literature Review

History and Dynamics of Terrorism in Nigeria

Terrorism in Nigeria evolved with different dynamics, resulting from various motives, and began after Nigeria gained independence from colonial rule. Chinwoku (2012) traced the history and dynamics of terrorism in Nigeria through a socio-political lens and noted that, though terrorism began just as the nation turned seven, the effects of terrorism at that time cannot be compared with what is being experienced in present-day Nigeria. In his views, the various eras of political presence in Nigeria had their peculiar contributions to the evolution and development of terrorism, beginning with the era that heralded the Nigerian Civil War in 1967.

Terrorism is an act that puts fear in civilians and is targeted at a government to forcefully make it take decisions outside its democratic considerations and policies by an individual or group of individuals (Chinwoku, 2012). Following the various accounts of the political era and their contributions to terrorism his definition of terrorism, Chinwoku implies that the first act of terrorism in Nigeria were carried out by Nigerian soldiers of south eastern descent. These militants, known as the Biafra soldiers, were determined to forcefully break out from Nigeria and take control of their own territory, as seen in the cases of Boko Haram and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta; both groups have the same agenda of breaking out to form a caliphate and to control the wealth of the Niger Delta. Although it classified as a civil war, it had all the trappings of terrorism and would be categorized as such today, as evident by the attempted repeat of the same incident by the Indigenous People of Biafra (Richard, 2016). Thousands of

civilian lives were lost and human rights violations occurred, such as kidnapping, rape, and murder. Cases of indiscriminate assassinations, bombing, arson, human mutilation, and assaults were also recorded, with a death rate of approximately 2 million people (Blackpast, 2017).

Chinwoku (2012) highlighted the various motives and motivations behind the acts of terrorism that have occurred in Nigeria. Between 1970, when the Biafra war ended, and 2017, terrorism in Nigeria shifted with the emergence of religiously motivated terrorist groups. Groups, such as Maitatsine, existed in the 1980's and caused havoc in northern Nigeria with the help of foreign nations that already had terrorism, motivated by religious ideologies. This and other groups that emerged had similar motives, tactics, and levels of impact on the government and civilians. However, up till 2006, when the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and other terrorist groups in the south of Nigeria emerged, it was easy for the government to address these groups. A few units of the Nigerian military were usually invited to engage and contain terrorism threats at that time, and stability was always brought back to the affected areas in a matter of days.

Terrorism in southern Nigeria came with its own tactics, unfamiliar to counterterrorism agencies. The militants from the Niger Delta region were more sophisticated in their strategies and execution. They had territorial advantage over military personnel, who were not trained for combat in the Niger Delta terrain. In addition, they had strong bargaining chips with the government, possessing the power of economic decapitation, as Nigeria's major income generation facilities (oil pipelines) were installed in that region and distributed crude oil and petroleum products to other

parts of the nation from the Niger Delta. This meant that whenever pipelines were destroyed by terrorists in the Delta, the economy of the country was threatened and the GDP and the nation's economy were undercut by the terrorists (Dialoke & Edeja, 2017).

Boko Haram became well known in 2006 when the Nigeria's Department of State Security began arresting, detaining, and prosecuting its members. The founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf was killed under controversial circumstances while in police detention which aggravated members of the sect. The result was reprisal attacks on the Nigeria Police Force Headquarters, the United Nations House, and St Theresa Catholic Church, all in Abuja, in 2011 (Mshelizza, 2011). The terrorist group's motives were identified to include religious extremism, resentment over the killing of their founder and other members, and poverty (Matfess, 2017). Most of the tactics of the Niger Delta militants, such as bombing locations with international interests and kidnapping for ransom and exchange of detained members, were adopted by Boko Haram.

While describing the evolution, Chinwokwu (2012) focused on the general motives of terrorism in Nigeria, which pointed clearly at dissatisfaction, social deprivation, neglect, greed, corruption, nepotism, and poverty. Based on the various terrorist groups that have emerged in Nigeria, one or more of these factors are marked as the motivation for their emergence except Boko Haram. Religious ideology was their stated motive. The evolution and motives of terrorism in Nigeria would be incomplete without mentioning that these dreaded groups all began as local aids and touts to politicians in Nigeria and were either used to protect or do dirty jobs for their principals. Right after elections, the well-armed touts are abandoned by the politicians and have no

choice but to use their weapons to make a living. In Nigeria, especially in the Niger Delta region, terrorism is a viable business venture. Many terrorists who have headed groups such as Niger Delta Volunteer Force, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, and Niger Delta Avengers have used the proceeds from kidnapping and negotiations from the government and oil companies to buy schools, homes, private jets, and hotels abroad. Thus, a new motive and a new form of terrorism may be termed “comfort terrorism.” Although Chinwoku (2012) also looks at the efforts that government has made in mitigating the effects of terrorism, as well as in combating terrorism, he considers the artificial challenges the government has in combating terrorism in Nigeria. Chinwoku recommends that good governance is the solution to terrorism in Nigeria, pointing out that true federalism, meaningful dialogue, youth empowerment, and avoidance of corruption will suppress the development of terrorism in Nigeria.

The Causes and Consequences of Terrorism in Africa

In Africa, one of the major causes of terrorism has been identified as poverty. Though religious ideology has, to an extent, been said to be a cause of terrorism in Africa, the reason recruitment of militants by these religious terrorists appears to be easy is because of poverty. This has largely been attributed to the theory of deprivation, resulting from corrupt or incompetent leaders and mismanagement of resources, and applies to most countries in Africa (Monga et al., 2015). Though relative deprivation theory has been the main explanation for terrorism in Nigeria and Africa as a whole. Brush (1996) explains that this theory may no longer be valid as the primary

reason for violence, though it may function as a weighty contributing factor in a few social circumstances.

Monga et al. (2015) points out with statistics that in sub-Saharan Africa, between 1974 and 2004, over 4,993 terrorism incidences occurred, with 261 terrorist groups claiming responsibility for them. Monga et al. (2015) further revealed that the number of Muslims in Africa far exceed the number in the Middle East, indicating that this may be a reason for a higher level of radical Islamist presence and actions in Africa. In identifying African countries that are mostly hit by terrorism, Monga et al. (2015) revealed that countries governed by democracy are those which are prone to terrorism while those in military rule may have little terrorist impact, probably as a result of the heavy presence of the military and the ruthless measure taken against enemies of the state in such countries.

Monga et al. (2015) identified economic and political factors as also being responsible for terrorism in Africa. In line with the economic situation in Nigeria, and the pressing need for survival, especially by youths who are physically active, it is worthy to note that one of the major causes and motivations for terrorism in Nigeria is poverty. This can be referenced by the Niger Delta Amnesty initiative, which tried to provide economic relief for terrorists from the Niger Delta area. To a large extent, the strategy worked while the supply of financial resources and social benefits were available. With the change of government to the Buhari administration, the release of funds to the Delta militants was stopped and more terrorist groups emerged. Again, funds and benefits were reintroduced to the terrorists, and terrorism in the Delta ceased to exist (Adebowale, 2016).

As this study focuses on Nigeria, it is important to emphasize on the causes and consequences of terrorism in Nigeria, which include illiteracy, poverty, and social deprivation. The Niger Delta region hosts the nation's wealth and main source of revenue because all other revenue generating tool had been grounded as a result of mismanagement. Prior to the complete dependence on oil from the Niger Delta region as the nation's source of revenue, Nigeria generated income from agriculture and other natural resources such as iron ore, tin-ore, limestone, coal, lead, zinc, columbine, marbles, bitumen, and tar sand (Brown & Stephen, 2017). Unfortunately, after the mismanagement of the nation's natural resources, and with resources coming from one source, it became impossible for government to satisfy all the geopolitical regions of Nigeria, especially the Niger Delta region. In addition to the neglect of the Niger Delta region, the people of the Delta were further impoverished by foreign oil companies who pollute the environment, destroying their only source of livelihood which is fishing and farming. As a result of poverty due to neglect and assault by the government and oil companies, the youths of the Niger Delta resorted to unhealthy protests, and subsequently, full-blown terrorism.

The North East where Boko Haram has its fortress is quite different. Though the main motive is religiously inclined, recruitment and sustenance of militants would have been impossible, if not for poverty. Generally, the North is known to have wealthy politicians and poor and uneducated citizens, most of whom are registered as Almajiri. The Almajiri are Islamic scholars and are mostly minors. They grow up begging for alms and engage in any act that may assure them of their next meal. They have been identified

to be involved in all religious riots in the north, and are always eager to participate, as they seize the opportunity to loot homes and shops of their victims, as a means of survival. They form the foot soldiers of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in northern Nigeria, as the promoters of terrorism in this area take advantage of their vulnerability and desperation for survival (Dahiru, 2018).

In summary, the consequences of terrorism in Nigeria and Africa in general, considering the major underlying factors, is a deadly trend of citizens getting enrolled as terrorists and seeing terrorism as a trade or a viable business venture. This appears to be the fastest way out of poverty and social deprivation, as social benefits which were far reaching are achieved in the camps. Insurgents are paid, fed, and have female kidnapped victims at their disposal, for sex. This may mean that as long as the economic and social situation does not improve, and positively affect these actors, terrorism resulting from the three mentioned issues above, will persist and most likely increase (Omale, 2013).

Bad Governance, Corruption, and the Rise of Boko Haram

Nigeria's story of nepotism, neglect and deprivation of its citizens started from the military regimes that governed the country, beginning with General Aguiyi Ironsi's reign as Head of State, between January and July, 1966. This was the beginning of a tribal division in Nigeria when northern military officers overthrew the government headed by a south easterner, presenting allegations of tribal segregation and neglect of the north and west of Nigeria (Obi, 2004).

Nigeria has experienced series of military rules since independence. The reasons for takeover are always the fact that the democratically elected leaders are corrupt.

Unfortunately, the military leaders that take over power are known to have been more corrupt than those whom they accused. This means that Nigeria has had a continuous cycle of leaders and governments that are corrupt, and are all part of the reasons terrorist groups have been formed across the country (Ogbeidi, 2012), following the analysis that corruption gave rise to neglect and deprivation of citizens.

Suleiman & Karim (2015) argue that the poor governance, corruption, and nepotism in Nigeria, through repeated military rule, gave rise to the formation of various militant groups across all the geopolitical regions in Nigeria. This is not far from the truth, as there would have been no agitation if the citizens were satisfied. Once a gap for demonstrations by citizens of a country is created, this may give rise to opposition groups that may turn violent in trying to defend themselves from attacks by authorities, and eventually evolve into becoming terrorist groups (Anfruns, 2018).

Boko Haram developed through politicians from Borno state who armed and used youths as their political thugs, to win elections. It is said that a former governor of Borno state, home of the group, recruited them for his political gains sometime around 2003 (Fabiya & Akasike, 2016). Sulaiman & Karim (2015) also argued that the absence of developmental projects and social amenities led to poverty in the country, and opened up the avenue for politicians to make use of youths as touts. This led to the youths experiencing the use of force in achieving demands, and exposed them to power and greed. In a way to sustain their vices, ideology was used as the motive for their terrorist drive and Boko Haram, as a sect, began to grow due to the appealing social benefits offered to members while recruiting them from the Almajiri pool.

Other than poverty, cultural and religious practices in northern Nigeria stands out as a motivating factor for female enlistment into the Boko Haram sect. Whereas male recruits may be forced into the group or lured through various enticements, most of the female recruits (other than those captured) willingly join the sect. This is as a result of the culture in the North, which interferes with their rights to freedom. Early marriage, lack of education and domestic violence are common among women and girls in the North. To escape from this form of domestic and cultural slavery, women voluntarily get enlisted into the Boko Haram sect, to afford themselves the opportunities to negotiate restricted freedoms in a highly constrained environment. As women in northern Nigeria rely on religion for a space of relative independence, Boko Haram has clearly been seen by many women, to provide such opportunities (Matfess, 2017).

Agitations in the Niger Delta Region

Agriculture was the main source of revenue in Nigeria prior to and immediately after independence in 1960, until after the first military coup in 1966, and then, the period of oil boom between 1971 and 1979 when the international market increased its oil price. These two events above, brought about a change in Nigerian politics and economy as the country experienced a change in its economic focus by dumping agriculture and concentrating its focus on oil export. With the abolishing of regional federalism, marginalization, corruption, and neglect of certain areas of the country set in, and as such, conflicts, especially in the Niger Delta region, began (Adetunberu & Bello, 2018).

Although Adetunberu and Bello (2018) argued that the reason for marginalization of the Niger Delta region by the federal government was as a result of the aggression

exhibited by the dwellers of the region against the government and other tribes in Nigeria, it is my opinion that aggressive agitation should not have been punished with deprivation of the benefits of a region, especially as that region produced the major source of income for the country. This, under normal circumstances would cause an uprising as seen by the formation of various militant groups, and the negative effect it has on the nation's economy resulting from terrorist activities in the Niger Delta region.

Terrorism in the name of agitation began in the Niger Delta in 1966, with Jasper Isaac Adaka Boko involved in the struggle for resource control, resulting from the underdevelopment and neglect of the region by the federal government. Over the years, there has been series of groups that were formed with the same vision to ensure that the region controls its resources (Ikporukpo, 2018). This vision, however, has been accompanied by various attacks on government by groups in the Delta. In most cases, civilians have been directly or indirectly affected by the operations of militants, in ways like kidnapping and reprisal attacks on civilian communities by the Nigerian military.

Ken Saro-Wiwa also led the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in 1990 to revolt against the government on the same issues. Eight years after, in 1998, the Kaiama declaration by Ijaw youths from over 500 communities opened the floodgates for revolution, and various terrorists groups have emerged since then (Ikporukpo, 2018). The most significant of these groups however, is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, whose impact was felt within Nigeria and the global community. They ensured that the economy of the nation was crippled through constant attacks on oil pipelines, military formations, and foreign oil companies. Their major strategies were

kidnapping for ransom, to sustain the group; bombing of pipelines, to negatively affect the nation's economy, and attacks on military formations, to establish their authority and create fear. In this regard, the military and civilians, as well as the international community in Nigeria were all affected.

Corruption and Challenges: A Case of the Nigerian Armed Forces

The Nigerian military is said to be the strongest military in Africa as it has been battle tested at various peace keeping missions. Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan are a few beneficiaries of the Nigerian military's support. The strength of the military, to some extent, is drawn from the level of morale they possess, which contributes to their success in times of war. The morale of a Nigerian soldier is weighed in most cases, by logistic support in terms of the benefits that are given to him during and after the operation, how well he is taken care of at the battle field, and the availability of ideal and efficient tools (weapons) required to give him an upper hand against his enemies.

To combat insurgency, a lot of resources are required. Boko Haram is well equipped with sophisticated weapons acquired from attacks on Nigerian military armories and the international black market (Campbell, 2014). It is therefore required that superior fire power must be acquired for the Nigerian military, to ensure they match up with Boko Haram. Unfortunately, when the engagement of terrorists began, rather than seeing the importance of winning the fight against terrorism, the military authorities were more interested in using the opportunity to make a fortune for themselves. The biggest arms purchase scandal in Nigeria was recorded to have had military authorities involved, along

with top government officials, when two billion dollars were released for the purchase of weapons to fight terrorism, in 2015 (Perlo-Freeman, 2017).

Although Duke, Agbaji & Bassey (2017) argue that the reason for prolonged insurgency in Nigeria, and the lack of effective machinery to engage terrorists is as a result of the diversion of funds assigned for combating security challenges, the purchase of obsolete and poor quality weapons, the formation of phony defense contracts, and the absence of logistical support for soldiers combating insurgency, it is important to note that the training and welfare of counterterrorist agencies as well, is of paramount importance. It therefore means that with the provision of appropriate and effective weapons for the military, without the required morale and logistic support, the military still, will not achieve their aim in defeating terrorists. While they have all they require to fight insurgency, the human resources to be used in fighting will be weak, and therefore will create a gap in the components that are necessary for achieving success in the fight against insurgency.

The Nigerian military, due to corrupt practices, shut their eyes to ethical conducts and weakened its forces by also diverting funds meant for soldiers welfare, in addition to funds they diverted from weapons and equipment. This allowed Boko Haram seize the opportunity to overpower military during many attacks carried out against military formations. In fact, Boko Haram overran military formations, kidnapped wives and children of soldiers and went with large catchments of arms and ammunition. The effect of corruption by the military and their cohorts, especially as regards terrorism, is the strengthening of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in Nigeria and causing colossal

loss of lives and property of the military, civilian citizens, expatriates, and foreign aid workers.

Insurgency and National Security Challenges in Nigeria

The same way Boko Haram gained strength in the north east, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta became formidable in the South, through the incapability of the Nigerian military to contain terrorism in the Delta region, as a result of corruption and unprofessional conducts. Both sects have a common source fueling their motive. Poverty has been the driving force and will continue to motivate Nigerian youths to engage in terrorism, irrespective of their geo-political origin, until the government and military authorities take decisive and strategic steps to end insurgency.

The tactics of Boko Haram and the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta were a little different until when the State Security began to keep arrested members of both sects together, between 2005 and 2010. The game changed afterwards and it became evident that the modern techniques used by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta in the South was replicated in the north. This made it more difficult for security agencies to contain Boko Haram, as the military were surprised by their new tactics which included kidnap of students and expatriates. The similarities in operation between both terrorist groups however, may imply that certain counterterrorism strategies that helped to reduce insurgency in the Niger Delta, may also help to reduce insurgency in the north east, if properly executed by morally sound professional handlers that are concerned with the interest of the nation, rather than their selfish concerns.

In looking at the national security challenges resulting from insurgency, one can clearly say that all the challenges were caused by those in political offices, as well as military commanders who diverted funds for their selfish interests, rather than providing training and ideal equipment to curb terrorism at its infant stage, keeping it under control. The security challenges to citizens and foreign nationals has been allowed to spread beyond total control and will need strategic planning and implementation, going forward (Folarin & Oviasogie, 2015).

Strategies to be applied in combating terrorism in Nigeria, according to Folarin and Oviasogie (2015), include suitable funding and training of the security agencies; strengthening of the armed forces with modern and efficient weapons that will effectively outmatch the weapons of the terrorists; and tightening of the Nigerian borders to check the inflow of terrorists into the country. It is important to note at this point however, that all the above recommendations had been in place all along. The question here is what exactly is done with the adequate funds pumped in for funding and training of security agents, the sophisticated weapons, and all other supposed tools for the fortification of security agencies? This funding may only be a continuous cycle of largess for those in positions of authority, whose turns may have emerged to enrich themselves corruptly. As such, in looking forward, the solution may not be to release more funds into corrupt hands but rather to first purge the entire system of corruption before other strategies are applied, and funds injected into the system.

Insecurity and Socioeconomic Development in Nigeria

In their views, Ewatan & Urhie (2014) attribute the lack of socioeconomic development in Nigeria to insecurity challenges. They argue that for Nigeria to enjoy the benefits of development as one geographical entity, the country must be safe and free from insurgency. Insurgency, to a large extent, discourages international investments and local development as potential investors are threatened by insecurity and the danger of losing their investments, and lives, in some cases.

Ewatan & Urhie (2014) further argue that a developmental drive in Nigeria, where the economy is transformed by youth empowerment and development of projects that will enhance the economy, is highly required to engage youths positively, and provide the social benefits that will discourage them from being lured into terrorist groups. This supports earlier theories that poverty is the main factor that has triggered sustained terrorism, in various forms. It also supports the fact that corrupt practice, mismanagement of resources as well as lack of visionary leaders have hindered the economic and social development of the nation, thereby creating a loop hole for vices that have led to grievous consequences such as terrorism. Though the government has, in the past, made efforts to combat the security situation by allocating more resources to the security budget as well as passing a bill on anti-terrorism, the fact still remains that bad governance, lack of well-trained counterterrorists, low morale of troops, corrupt government officials and above all, a country with deteriorating socioeconomic progression will not yield any positive result in fighting terrorism.

Security and development are two different concepts but are closely related, and cannot do without each other. It therefore means that, in any country where there is conflict, it will be difficult or impossible for development to occur (Nwanegbo & Odigbo, 2013). This implies that for development to be established in any nation, steps must be taken to end conflict and put in place various machineries that will ensure the socioeconomic growth of the nation, simultaneously.

While Ematan & Urhie (2014) recommended the introduction of social security as one of the ways to create socioeconomic development in Nigeria, Olajide (2016) argues that the implementation in Nigeria will be difficult. His argument is backed with the fact that Nigeria remains far from that sort of project as issues like sustenance of financing, determination of eligibility, corruption amongst other challenges will arise and may puncture the project. In essence, Nigeria is still not ripe enough for such a project that may even worsen the security situation of the country as vulnerable seniors may be attacked by youths who expect to get some cash off them, after their stipends have been paid. Of course, the stipends paid to youths cannot be sufficient to contain their social vices and general needs. As such crime may increase though the initiative may cushion the effect of poverty in the country.

Terrorism and Nigeria's Industrial Development

Recent research works indicate that Nigeria requires economic development as a way of combating terrorism. In their study, Imhohopi & Urim (2016) suggested that for Nigeria to be free from terrorism, various stakeholders must be involved in its development. Industrial development of the country was specifically suggested and the

authors specified that government, private sector, civil society, faith, and the international community must be involved in this development, to lure foreign investors and enable a conducive environment for investment and business development. This means also that the nation's social and economic deprivation has been identified as the main reason for terrorism.

Indeed, one of the lapses of the Nigerian government in their bid to tackle terrorism is leaving out other important stakeholders from contributing toward peace in the country. The approach toward counterterrorism in Nigeria has been a single dimensional method where the military is assigned to engage terrorists through combat. A holistic approach where civilians in communities affected by terrorism have to be engaged in information gathering, the government, in funding various projects such as education, training and community development, as well as the international society, in rehabilitation and de-radicalization, must be applied, to cover all areas of terrorism eradication and peace impartation (UNODC, 2018).

Industrial development is a modern society's way of progression and is the key to determining the classification of a country. Countries that are placed as underdeveloped, developed or developing, are categorized by their stage of industrial development which results in the provision of jobs at all levels and the improvement of the country's economy. However, there are a number of factors that deter industrial development. They include dependence on imported goods from foreign countries, dependence on mineral resources, poor management, corruption, and lack of foresight. In recent times, terrorism has been a major cause of lack of industrial development,

especially in countries like Nigeria, where the effect of insurgency is high. This adds to the rate of poverty and provides reasons youths become involved in acts of terrorism.

In summary therefore, industrial development may be a solution to eradication of terrorism in Nigeria in the long run, if the right steps are taken in this direction, and the promoters of this strategy focus on positive outcomes rather than their selfish interests, as has always been the case in Nigeria. Iwuagwu (2009) argued that Nigeria has kept drifting from industrialization because of its dependence on oil as the major income earner. Most industries that thrived in Nigeria lost their focus and shut down during and after the country experienced oil boom. The government focused on oil and neglected other income generators, leaving corrupt and incompetent managers to run down the facilities. Today, projects like the Ajaokuta steel rolling mill, the Cocoa plant, Coal mines and the agricultural industries either operate scantily or do not exist. This, of course, has thrown millions of youths to the streets and created unemployment vacuums, leaving a huge number of youths with no choice but to resort to crimes which have eventually led to various levels of terrorism.

Nigeria's Counterinsurgency Strategy against Boko Haram

Felbab-Brown (2018) identified the gap the Nigerian military has in applying its strategy on counterterrorism. He argues that though the military claims superiority over Boko Haram in terms of tactics and victory in the battle against insurgency, the military is not capable of handling the sect, or even holding onto locations that they managed to clear Boko Haram from.

One disturbing fact is that some strategies which originally should have been adopted by counterterrorists is being used successfully by the terrorist group. Rather than incorporating civilians into the fight against terrorism and gain relevant intelligence details that may assist the military, civilians are treated like suspects and are kept at a distance, by the military. Most likely, this is as a result of past experiences that have occurred when terrorists who appear to be innocent civilians infiltrate the ranks of the military, concealing and detonating explosives. This has resulted in devastating effects which when looked at critically, one cannot fault the military for taking precaution.

Boko Haram, however, frequently apply this tactic which has helped them gain valuable intelligence used to increase their victory in ambushing the military and civilians. They are recorded to have used civilians as agents of intelligence gathering at locations where they plan to attack and even have agents within the military, where they get precise information on troop's movement and strategies. Worst of all is the military's involvement in providing arms and ammunition for the sect. In 2014, 15 Nigerian military officers were found guilty of this unthinkable crime (Wiener-Bronner, 2014). Though they were severely punished for this, it will not deter others from committing the same crime, as there must have been some form of benefits derived from this betrayal of their colleagues. With the low morale as well as the likelihood that some military personnel may share the ideologies of the sect, it is not out of place to assume that the military still have such characters within their ranks.

Felbab-Brown (2018) further argues that the huge number of casualties, especially of civilians in Nigeria, resulting from terrorism, should be credited to insurgents as well

as the military. While insurgents attack locations to cause destruction, the military counter attack, unmindful of the safety of civilians around the vicinity. This has resulted in numerous deaths of civilians, by the military, and indicates that some of their strategies against terrorism may also increase the number of casualties, and will add to the victory of terrorists.

Another counterterrorist strategy that has worked against the Nigerian military involves human rights abuse where communal punishment is meted on an entire community that is suspected to harbor terrorists. The community is razed down in flames, and members of the community are physically abused by the military. This leaves civilians with no option but to flee from communities that are being approached by soldiers, in order to be saved from the wrought of the military (Ogundipe, 2018).

In his summary, Felbab-Brown (2018) stated that the only way forward in eradicating terrorism in Nigeria was to dissuade the military and its militia anti- terrorism groups from being terrorists themselves. This statement is attributed to the actions of the military, taken, in extra-judicial killings of citizens suspected to be terrorists. Amnesty international had, at several times, voiced out on the issue of human rights violations by the Nigerian military as this action the military took as one of their strategies in stopping terrorism would only frighten civilians and keep them far away from terrorists as well as the military. This means that the contributions of members of the community in fighting terrorism is missing, and creates a gap in the counterterrorism process in Nigeria.

Community Relations and Conflict Resolution in the Niger Delta

One of the major factors fueling the crisis in the Niger Delta is neglect of the communities by the government as well as foreign industrialists, especially oil companies, who benefit from these communities. The outcry has been that these companies exploit them without giving anything in return, while technically destroying their means of livelihood. Oil spills has caused destruction of farm lands and rivers in these areas where farming and fishing remain the only source of livelihood for the locals.

The communities have therefore, engaged such companies in steady battles for as long as these companies have existed, claiming that little or no consideration is made or given to them. This has resulted in members of these affected communities picking up weapons, and what started as revolution against the government and the companies, degenerated into militancy and full-blown terrorism, going by the definitions of terrorism by the Nigerian government (Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011). The actions of these companies in going to court to fight these communities rather than contributing to the development of the area showed bad faith and resulted in negative actions against them by militant groups.

The Niger Delta militants resorted to kidnapping of expatriate oil workers and destruction of oil facilities belonging to these companies and to the Nigerian government. Of course, the government and the companies have fought back by using the Nigerian military in the past, to show their superiority to the militants. Unfortunately, the military were not trained for battle in the Niger Delta topography and kept falling victims of the militants who understand their terrain and are experts in maneuvering in that region. This

gave the militants constant victory over the military as well as the government, as the nation's economy is always grounded whenever the militants strike, by exploding major pipelines that transport petroleum products for export. The oil companies are not spared in the economic collapse, as militants also evade their locations, kidnap workers, and detonate explosives in the facilities. This leaves these companies with no option but to shut down operations and lose billions of dollars in the process.

Amodu (2012) argued that the reason for the prolonged problems in the Delta region was as a result of the fact that the oil companies did not take part in community development which he believes would have reduced the effect of the losses experienced by these communities. If there was development and some sort of compensations that enhanced the well-being of those affected, there would not be a reason for agitation, and eventually, militancy. While some oil companies execute skeletal projects such as renovation of school buildings, the communities prefer projects that will feed the school children and their families.

In essence, the oil companies and the government indirectly fueled the crisis in the Delta, and can only correct this by developing the area and making the people self-reliant. In realizing this, after creating terrorists in that region, the government of Nigeria attempted to resolve the problems by setting up some mechanism to develop the area and the people. Unfortunately, the structures were faulty and corruption and mismanagement overtook the agencies assigned for this purpose. The Niger Delta Development Commission as well as the Niger Delta Amnesty Program have been put in the spot light

a number of times, for derailing from its original purpose as well as for corrupt practices by their managements.

The result of this wrong structure has been training of militants and other indigenous people in vocations that are of no use to them. An example is the training of 600 Niger Delta pilots in South Africa, by the Niger Delta Amnesty Program. On return to Nigeria, the pilots had no jobs because of inexperience in flying planes available in Nigeria, as well as the limited number of jobs available for pilots. This is an indication that there no planning involved in carrying out this project or the promoters of the project were only thinking of the kick-backs they would receive from the South African flying schools. It is important to note that a lot more of these failed educational projects were carried out in various countries and billions of dollars were assigned to this project with no results. Militants from the Niger Delta region who were trained are back home with no jobs and have begun another revolution, just as it was before embarking on the wasted projects.

New Strategies to Combat Terrorism in Nigeria

The development of strategies in Nigeria is a task that is assigned to individuals or groups of people that are assumed to be professionals in a particular field. There is no doubt that some of these individuals or groups have come up with strategies that they believe are the best, whereas, these strategies may not be practically applicable to the subject. One of these subjects is counterterrorism, and it has been assigned to several counterterrorism “experts”, to provide strategies to combat insurgency in Nigeria.

The general belief about counterterrorism in Nigeria is that the military are well trained and are in the best position to advise government on strategies to be taken in that direction. However, in Nigeria, the section of military trained as counterterrorists are trained to physically combat insurgents and do not have the intellectual strategic knowledge and ability to provide solutions to insurgency, based on their training. The best strategy the military can develop in this regard, are military tactics and options, to further engage insurgents by increasing their strength through the acquisition of more sophisticated weapons, as well as manpower support from within and foreign military pools.

Udounwa (2013) identifies the reasons for insurgency in Nigeria as religious, geopolitical and socioeconomic proclivity. He suggests in his recommendations to develop strategies, that the government should refocus its efforts on counterterrorism by improving border security, enhance the cooperation between all security agencies, improve the physical capability of counterterrorist units and modify the criminal justice system in Nigeria. From his submission, it is therefore obvious that the mindset of the military is focused on engaging insurgents in combat, killing, arresting, and prosecuting them. These have been the strategies that have been in use in Nigeria, and have been modified in that direction, over the years.

The actions of the Nigerian military however, do not conform with modern warfare practices, and has been condemned as human rights violations, by several organizations and governments, including Amnesty International (Amnesty international, 2015). The strategies recommended by the author clearly supports the fact that the

military is trained for combat. While the recommended strategies are merely a part of the entire process, it is important that other strategies that will ensure the prevention, management, and termination of insurgency, must be put in place. There is no doubt that the recommendations of Udounwa (2015) are in order but these are clearly for the use by the military, in ensuring that they become more formidable in carrying out their combat operations in engaging armed and battle-ready insurgents.

Udounwa (2015) omitted the fact that the rank and file of the military require purging. Understandably, troops have complained about poor logistics support to them. This includes poor feeding, no drinking water and inferior fire power to Boko Haram. This has caused several episodes of mutiny amongst soldiers, and must be given urgent attention, in the process of revamping their strategies toward defeating terrorists. The military must also redefine its relationship with the civilian population, especially in communities affected by terrorism. It needs to understand that civilians form a part of the counterterrorism machinery that can be used to the advantage of the military, if managed properly. The relationship in the past has been sour due to the offensive nature of the military toward civilians, causing a wide bridge between them.

Summary and Conclusions

The gap in the strategies used by counterterrorist in Nigeria may be as a result of lack of proper training and understanding of the concept of terrorism and counterterrorism. One vital point in creating strategies to critically understand the concept, bearing in mind, the motives of terrorists, the underlying factors responsible for their choices to become terrorists, the benefits derived from their involvement, and their

level of understanding and intelligence. Based on these, proper assessment of various strategies can be made, with various considerations, and those that best apply may be used, depending on various issues such as religion, level of education, social exposure and of course the fighting strength of the terrorists. In-depth studies on the development of these strategies as it relates to Nigeria, have not been carried out, to provide effective and practicable results.

This study precisely focused on existing strategies being implemented for counterterrorism, and its effects on insurgency in Nigeria. Chapter 2 revealed substantial findings of relevance, connected to the reviewed literature, and created a direct link between the theoretical framework and the problem statement. Despite the persistent issues with terrorism in Nigeria, and the many researches done on counterterrorism, there has been no literature evaluating the effects of counterterrorism in Nigeria and the development of practicable strategies, though some researchers have dealt with topics closely related.

This chapter provided a summary of literature related to counterterrorism and strategies applied in combating terrorism in Nigeria, and the literature review provided detailed information on topics such as; the history and evolution of terrorism in Nigeria, motives of terrorist groups and their operations, the similarities between Boko Haram and the movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, effects of terrorism on socioeconomic development of Nigeria, as well as existing strategies and their challenges. A connection between the research problem, the theoretical foundation, and theoretical framework used in the study was made, and the chapter offered the reasoning

for using a social constructivist-interpretive theoretical framework that draws from critical theory and resource dependence theory. In the third chapter, the research design of the general study will be discussed, and the rationale behind the selected design approach, the role of the researcher, the participant selection process, the data collection, instrumentation, and management processes, and the data analysis plan will be provided.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

This study is interpretive and descriptive research on the effects of counterterrorism strategies on insurgency in Nigeria. My goal is to gain an understanding of why the current strategies in use by counterterrorism agencies against insurgents seem to fail and to provide new and practicable strategies to end insurgency in Nigeria, based on inductive analysis. Counterterrorism strategies and those who apply them appeared to be focused on combat engagement and negotiations, which have led to terrorists gaining more ground. It was therefore important to gain a different worldview on the perceptions and experiences of counterterrorists, with a view at equipping them with better strategies to fight insurgency in Nigeria.

The concern for this research results from the lack of research literature on the effects of counterterrorism strategy and the development of effective strategies to defeat terrorists in Nigeria, as noted in Chapter 2. To achieve the focus of this study, I developed a qualitative research strategy that supports the interpretive and descriptive reason for the research. I adopted a phenomenological approach, allowing for the description of an aspect of human experience, not constrained by time or location, using first person sources. In Chapter 3, I discuss the overall study's research design; the basis for the design, the role of the researcher; the participant selection; the data collection, instrumentation, management processes; and the data analysis plan.

Research Design and Rationale

The attitude of policymakers and administrators and the way operations are carried out regarding applied counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria informed the use of the chosen design. The central research question for this phenomenological research study is: What strategies are being applied in terrorist neutralization, deradicalization and peace sustenance by counterterrorism agencies in Nigeria, and how effective are they? The research question was used to capture the perspectives, experiences, and knowledge of participants associated with the study on the scope of the problem.

Additional sub-questions aimed at establishing the following: First, if there were internal or external forces such as the government, policymakers of administrators within counterterrorist agencies responsible for the failure of the operations; and second, if lack of professionalism or the presence of depravities such as corruption, sabotage, and mismanagement of funds could be attributed to the failure of counterterrorism operatives. Modern-day counterterrorism involves the use of technology, social development, and combat strategies, applied collectively, in order to capture every area of attention.

The central concepts essential to this study focus on the examination of strategies, formation, and implementation of workable outcomes to combat terrorism, and the social premises surrounding the avoidance of terrorism and sustenance of peace in Nigeria. While critical theory seeks to liberate Nigerians from the confines of terrorism, by stressing the reflective assessment and critique of society and culture through the application of knowledge, resource dependency theory highlights the relationship between organizations and the resources they need to operate. A qualitative research

approach was chosen for this study, to explore the central issue surrounding counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria.

Qualitative Approach

The qualitative approach was the key method of the inquiry I used for this study because it provided an effective way for the discovery of the mental impression humans have about certain issues. Qualitative research is a grounded practice in investigations about how groups reflect and understand their roles in a broad range of policy-related issues. Khan (2014) argued that qualitative research methods provide a complete framework that allows for an in-depth survey of complex issues related to human behavior, human perception, and lived experience. The fact that quantitative measures do not permit the researcher to gain a realistic view of participants lived experiences and provide a comprehensive description of the issue under investigation, left out the option for its use in this study.

One of the problems associated with using the quantitative research method for this study was its focus on determining the connection between variables in a population, uncovering the nature of the variables, and making justifications about knowledge. Another problem with the use of a quantitative method was that it depends on the use of structured instrumentation for data collection. This allows for reliance on objective processes rather than subjective methods that permit a better comprehension of the world around us. This study focused on exploring the perceptions and lived experiences of participants with knowledge of counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria and required the use of subtle and non-devious processes for data collection; as the techniques applied in the

validation of knowledge in qualitative research involves the use of logic in making sense of ideas presented or by learning from experiences about factual occurrences (Bendassolli, 2013).

Phenomenological Method

Qualitative research studies apply various data collection methods that can include: in-depth interviews, surveys, focus group interviews, use of social media, direct observation, and document analysis (Patton, 2014). Prior to the selection of the phenomenological method as the most appropriate approach for this study, I carefully considered other research approaches outside the traditional qualitative research methods. Generic qualitative research methods may serve as practicable options, where the research topic does not properly connect with the conventional qualitative research methods (Percy, Kostere, & Kostere, 2015).

While considering the suitability of the phenomenological approach for topics examining attitudes, beliefs, and others, Percy et al. (2015) maintained that the researcher's concerns must be focused on the internal, rather than external, dimensions of reasoning processes surrounding the experience under study; otherwise, a generic qualitative method would be more appropriate for the topic. One challenge with this argument however, is that, a firm focus on the internal dimensions of cognitive processes eases openness and evocation, as a result of the contrast between consciousness and cognition.

Phenomenological inquiry requires sincerity and evocation as it scrutinizes the superiority of intuitive understanding (Küpers, 2014). D'Angelo, Milliken, Jiménez, and

Lupiáñez (2013) listed two classes for human attention as: (a) the slower controlled processing and (b) the fast and spontaneous, automatic processing. The importance of identifying the occurrence of situational processes while humans acquire successive knowledge on a phenomenon was documented by D'Angelo et al. (2013). However, for this study, it is important to note that the situational framework from where potential participants gained knowledge on their experiences could fall into any one of the above categories. The goal of this study was to reveal human experiences derived from consciousness; I did not seek to expose shared experiences resulting from the human interaction of participants, which is one of the strengths of descriptive qualitative research (Willis, Sullivan-Bolyai, Knafl, & Zichi-Cohen, 2016).

The form of a subject in the mind of a person supports the phenomenological approach to qualitative inquiry. Eddles-Hirsch (2015) stressed that preconditions of human experience involve noema (objective knowledge) and noesis (subjective knowledge). I considered an iterative process that reflected the conventional qualitative research methods (e.g., case study, ethnography, and grounded theory). To allow the description of one aspect of human experience, not constrained by time or location using first person sources, I chose the phenomenological approach.

Phenomenological qualitative research is made up of two approaches of inquiry: hermeneutical and transcendental. Hermeneutical phenomenology involves a logical interpretation of participants' individual experiences, to reveal the objective nature of the examined topic (Van Manen, 1990). For this study, I used the transcendental phenomenological method, a form of phenomenology that pursues the discovery of only

described and lived experiences of the participants, adopted to reveal the true meaning attributed by participants to their human experiences (Moustakas, 1994). Through this method, all participants with counterterrorism strategy experience, either on the field or as administrators, provided genuine and individual substance attributed to their participation in evaluating the effects of counterterrorism strategies.

Role of the Researcher

As the researcher, I was the principal tool used for the collection and analysis of data, with a view to understanding the participants' insights on the issue or topic being researched. The role of the researcher involved the identification of assumptions and biases and investigating my perception of the subject, prior to the data collection process. As a researcher, I developed and improved my familiarity with counterterrorism strategy phenomenon having worked extensively with law enforcement and the military on counterterrorism strategy development in Nigeria. In order to provide the research approach for this study with personal, professional, and social values, I will briefly describe my professional background.

I was trained in the Nigerian Army Special Forces as a paratrooper and counterterrorist personnel. I served in military formations that planned counter-insurgency, which at the time, came in the form of attacks from neighboring countries, and I have been involved in operational engagements against insurgents. After leaving the military, I have been involved in the development of strategies to contain domestic terrorism, especially regarding Niger Delta insurgents. I participated in formulating the strategies used to stop insurgency in the Niger Delta region but some of the strategies

were not carried out professionally and resulted in a relapse. My experiences provide increased sensitivity and enhanced objectivity to the topic under investigation. It also helped in setting aside bias and promoting constructive criticism of the perception of others. For this study, I opted for face-to-face interviewing because of the advantage of synchronous communication and social cues (verbal or non-verbal pointers).

The typical nature of synchronous communication enables the advantage of social cues such as facial expressions, body language, voice tone and pitch, and emotional signals (Opdenakker, 2006). These signals from participants enabled me to extract added information from non-verbal communication, on their real perceptions, in cases where verbal communication was insufficient. All details taken from non-verbal communication were documented in a log, during interviews. I conducted semi-structured interviews using recording devices and open-ended questions. To prevent loss of data through device failure, a backup audio tape recorder was made available.

Methodology

Participant Selection Logic

For this study, the population of interest comprised of the Nigerian military and other law enforcement agencies actively involved in counterterrorism operations, military and civilian victims of terrorism, military authorities, legislators, citizens inhabited in camps for internally displaced persons, agencies managing former terrorists, rehabilitated terrorists as well as willing terrorists in detention. Detecting a common trend among qualitative research participants requires the collection of data based on the experiences of between five and 25 participants (Polkinghorne, 1989). The recommended sample size

for qualitative research is 20, but the actual useful data came from about half the sample (Cleary, Horsfall & Hayter, 2014). Nonetheless, I chose to use samples from a minimum of 15 subjects for this study.

During the design stages of this research study, I developed a sampling strategy that includes a possible sampling frame drawing from the criterion-based sampling procedure. I chose a criterion-based sampling method to allow for the selection of cases based on applicable and prearranged criteria. The goal of this study was to develop new and practicable counterterrorism strategies, and it was a predetermined standard for participant selection. As suggested by Patton (2014), criterion sampling allows for the identification of cases having experience on the issue, first using standardized questionnaires and then follow up with in-depth interviews.

Instrumentation

I chose a phenomenological data collection method to induce the participants' accounts of lived experiences of the phenomenon, and for the participants to present the data without making insinuations, generalizing, or bringing in any additional information to the experience. To ensure that data accuracy conforms to the principles of phenomenological inquiry, I avoided all presumptions about the phenomenon. Epoche, which requires the acceptance of a researcher's attitude that avoids any preconception on a phenomenon, is a vital component of the phenomenological inquiry technique. This process involved complete avoidance of suppositions on the phenomenon in order to allow a neutral and receptive mind, aligning with the reasons behind participant experiences (Berdychevsky & Gibson, 2015; Moustakas, 1994).

Qualitative inquiry and the social sciences provide an essential element of data collection methods through interviewing (Patton, 2014) with focus on participants' experiences and the meaning credited to the experiences (Seidman, 2013). I conducted semistructured face to face interviews using open-ended questions and digital recording devices. This aided in capturing the participants' voice as well as other elements of nonverbal communication such as tone, facial expression, and notable signals. The significance of using nonverbal communication data was to support the description and interpretation of the research process (Onwuegbuzie & Byers, 2014). Selected participants who were unable to meet in-person face were given an option for Skype or telephone interviews.

I used an elastic questioning format with a semi-structured interview plan and gave the interviewees freedom to express their perceptions and experiences with the phenomenon (Patton, 2014). During and after the interview, and after obtaining consent from all interviewees. I used a digital audio recording device to capture all discussions; audio recordings capture nonverbal communication and provide precise and useful abstracts of the interview for data analysis (Given, 2008; Gubrium, Holstein, Marvasti, & McKinney, 2012). I used interview journaling to support the interview method and enhance the quality of research analysis. Insightful journaling gives clarity and accountability while reducing the difficulty connected with the examination of recorded answers of a participants' experiences (Janesick, 2011).

Participants for this study comprised of personnel of the military and law enforcement agencies, victims and former and present terrorists with experience in the

operations and strategies applied to counterterrorism in Nigeria. The data collection method involved face to face semi-structured interviews to understand the roles played, and the strategies applied by counterterrorist agencies in alleviating the problems of terrorism in Nigeria. I used number of preset open-ended questions as a guide for the semi-structured interviews, with leeway to probe further, for clarity of responses (Doody & Noonan, 2013; Moustakas, 1994).

Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection

The recruitment strategy I developed for this study involved an initial participant screening process for former insurgents from the Niger Delta via the Niger Delta Amnesty Program database for ex-militants. Other interviewees were recruited by direct sourcing via the internet. After pre-screening potential candidates, I sent an email soliciting participation in the study. For those who preferred telephone interviews to ensure anonymity, audio recordings of their verbal consent were made. Because social media promotes the facilitation of mutuality, information sharing, relationship building, participant engagement, and interview scheduling for qualitative researchers, I used social media platforms to connect identified participants and to build a rapport prior to the actual interviews (Lunnay, Borlagdan, McNaughton, & Ward 2014). To ensure interviewees felt comfortable with the process, I educated participants on the objective of the study and highlighted the steps taken to ensure confidentiality.

Participant eligibility criteria specified that potential participants must have participated in terrorism as either a terrorist or counterterrorist, or must have directly been affected by terrorism. Those directly involved in terrorism or counterterrorism were in

addition, conversant in strategies applied in either terrorism or counterterrorism in Nigeria. After I received responses indicating willingness to participate from participants, I sent, via email or verbally over the phone, a questionnaire and the informed consent form, depending on the option of choice selected by the participant. Before I began data collection, all participants submitted an informed consent form.

Clearly stated options for participants to discontinue the interview at any time was emphasized, to ensure that the researcher felt comfortable with the data collection process. Additionally, after the pre-screening was completed, a follow-up telephone conversation was used to finalize the selection of participants. The sample size for this study depended on the data saturation concept which assisted in identifying the point, during data collection, where no new information surfaced.

Data Analysis Plan

The data analysis plan for this study was aimed at developing analytical outputs on the factors resulting to the failure of technical and operational strategies for combating terrorism in Nigeria, as well as strategies that have yielded some positive outcome, and how this can be improved upon. The process for data analysis for this study draws from the Van Kaam method, outlined in Moustakas (1994) with the researcher applying hand coding for analysis, and the NVivo 11 software for data management and storage. The Van Kaam method proved to be suitable for qualitative phenomenological data analysis, as the technique stressed on revisiting an individual's encounter with the phenomenon before forming descriptions used in representing the essence of the experience (Moustakas, 1994). As the Van Kaam process includes grouping, reducing, thematizing,

and identifying logical units of information, previous researchers have founded their criteria for its use.

Van Kaam's method requires three fundamental processes to aid the unraveling of knowledge. They include: epoche, transcendental phenomenological reduction, and imaginative variation (Moustakas, 1994). Together, these processes involve deliberate acts to avoid judgment about the world, gather true essences about the phenomenon based on participant's descriptions and different thematic variations concerning the phenomenon. The main features of the interpretive analysis process were:

- List and group all relevant responses from participant's
- Identify unchanging features of participant's responses
- Group and label unchanging elements of participant responses
- Validate unchanging elements and theme development
- Develop individual and fused texture descriptions using transcendental phenomenological reduction
- Develop individual structural and fused descriptions of meaning participants attributed to their personal experiences, using imaginative variation
- Form composite description of meaning participants, as one group, ascribe to their experiences.

Making sense of text-rich qualitative research data requires painstaking processes during the manual collation and forming of the data (Hilal & Alabri, 2013). The researcher conducted an original coding scheme that linked different terms and data units, decisively sorted out of the large data. Coding processes connected to qualitative research

involves the use of either a manual hand-coding or software coding techniques. The study made use of the manual hand-coding method through the data reduction process, to screen data and avoid omitting important information. It was of utmost importance to read and understand the different groups of data collected during qualitative data analysis (Maxwell, 2013).

Issues of Trustworthiness

Credibility

Establishing credibility requires getting reliable results in the findings of research participants. Imperfect data collection methods, conceptual frameworks, and description of results negatively affect a study's trustworthiness (Elo, Kääriäinen, Kanste, Pölkki, Utriainen, & Kyngäs, 2014). For this study, focus was made on ensuring credibility through data triangulation, following processes such as employing the use of various data types which include interview transcripts, interview journaling, as well as documented details of the modified Van Kaam method for data analysis. Patton (2014) stressed that credibility in a qualitative study centers on researcher competency, emphasis on detail, and validation of evidence gathered from different sources, with proper observation, engagement, and open auditing.

Participants for this study include military and other law enforcement administrators, counterterrorist personnel active in terrorist engagement, former terrorists and militants of the Niger Delta, victims of terrorism, journalists working with counterterrorist agencies, who have been in close contact with operations locations and members of communities affected by terrorism. This allowed the researcher to gain

multiple views of the issue in focus. The different types of data collected enhanced the researchers' validation of the data for precision, excluding the possibility of false representation. The provision of detailed documentation of all the procedures that aid the unraveling of knowledge, using the modified Van Kaam technique for data analysis indicates transparency and heightens credibility.

Transferability

Modern research on terrorism and counterterrorism in Nigeria has not examined the effects of the strategies applied by agencies combating insurgency. The principal focus of this study therefore centers on the effects of counterterrorism strategies on insurgency in Nigeria, and is a predetermined criterion for participant selection. The population of interest for this study includes individuals and members of agencies that have been involved in counterterrorism and are conversant with the applied strategies used for counter insurgency. Participants were recruited by soliciting individuals identified from the Niger Delta Amnesty program database, members of the military actively involved in counterterrorism operations and inhabitants of Internally Displaced Person's camps, following all legitimate and prescribed ethical procedures.

To ensure transferability, was the researcher's responsibility to provide a detailed description of the context of the research study. In a detailed check of the investigation's transferability, Burchett, Mayhew, Lavis, and Dobrow (2013) discovered that a consideration of results, methodology, and design was insignificant whereas setting, researcher experience, simplicity of application, and adaptation of methods were significant, in considering transferability. Any researcher intending to transfer this

study's results must make a personal judgment decision on how the results apply to the needs of his/her research.

Vulnerability

Since vulnerable people were involved in the population from which the interview was drawn from, it was important to ensure that ethical practices on the interviewing of vulnerable people, was strictly followed. These people consisted of inhabitants of Internally Displaced People's camps, and comprised of men and women, who are all victims of terrorism. As the contributions of these group of participants was vital to this study, it could not be omitted, rather, ethical approaches specific to the study of vulnerable populations were applied.

Vulnerable participants are described as interviewees who are likely to be vulnerable to coercion, undue influence, or lack the capacity to make or take decisions. For this study, some individuals who fall into designated vulnerable groups such as children, prisoners, pregnant women and economically or educationally disadvantaged persons, were interviewed. Others include interviewees classified vulnerable as a result of a psychological or emotional condition, cultural or political factors or other circumstances. Adequate additional safeguards to protect the rights and welfare of these participants following ethical principles and applicable federal regulations, state laws and institutional policies, were carried out in addition to protection of the welfare, safety, privacy, and confidentiality of these participants. Other considerations made for vulnerable participants were the measurement of the degree of risk posed by the research on them, and the prospect of direct benefit the research offered to the participants.

Dependability

For dependability to be established in qualitative research, the researcher was required to ensure the application of reliable and steady processes throughout the entire study. The criterion-based sampling method was chosen, to increase the consistency of measures and offer a suitable selection of respondents. Face to face interviews using a semi-structured interview format, digital audio recording device, and open-ended questions boosted the detailing of real and lived experiences through synchronous communication. The researcher has provided detailed procedures for audit and member checking, and also described methodological rationality for the study. The audit trail recorded the entire research work, from its development stages up to the presentation of investigation outcome. Member checking procedures provided details of the steps taken in data collection, to allow clarification by participants, and to avoid misrepresentation.

Methodological consistency ensures congruity between the research questions, the various components of the data gathering and the analysis process. Examining the seriousness of the participant's responses, the researcher was prompted to check for consistent and credible answers during data collection (Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich, & Musch, 2013). The suitability of sample sizing used in this study enhanced the adequacy and extensiveness of data collected on the phenomenon. To conceptualize the research problem, the researcher applied theoretical balancing to reflect on helpful ways, in order to enhance dependability.

Confirmability

This required satisfactory provision to ensure that the results are confirmable and can be validated by others. Baskerville (2014) defined confirmability as a substantiation process that requires the suitable documentation of the different steps of an inquiry, beginning from the knowledge development phase to the completion of the research. During the inquiry, the researcher provided suitable and correct responses to ensure that all decision-making processes adhere to the research design expectations. Simultaneously collecting data and providing its analysis during the study allowed iterative processes linking the technical steps used in investigating the subject with the fundamental conceptualizations. To ensure uniformity of procedures used for data collection and analysis, using initial and follow-up interviews, as well as a reflective journal, allowed the researcher check and recheck evolving themes and ideas with participants.

Ethical Procedures

It is important to safeguard the data collection process to avoid obstruction of participant's rights, values, and needs. The researcher is aware of his responsibility to ensure that adequate ethical considerations are made during the research processes. This involved the solicitation of participation, developing measures for protection, to prevent harming participants, and treatment of data with strict confidentiality. To ensure the avoidance of legal or ethical issues surrounding the data collection processes, the initial step for ethical guidance provided for the study involved obtaining permission from the Walden University Institutional Review Board to guarantee compliance with institutional and federal regulations.

Agreements to Gain Access to Participants

The barriers and challenges in gaining access to participants and obtaining their consent have some important considerations. Jones (2014) suggested that selection of participants should be made through a well-structured selection strategy via social networks. This study therefore, took sufficient consideration of the ethical concerns with regards to scenarios involving challenges of access based on cultural and religious principles, as expected in some parts of Nigeria. Impersonal email invitations were sent out to potential participants for this study, politely requesting participation and preparedness to honestly share their experiences.

A letter by email, intended to solicit participation in the study was the first step toward gaining access to participants. Provision of consent forms for participants in the study was also made. Steps to document participant access, and discussions about their consents through all stages of the inquiry were also taken. A dedicated email address was generated for all email communications between the researcher and respondents.

Treatment of Participants

Qualitative research requires a significant role for the participant-researcher affiliation and the use of more intrusive and personal methods during the inquiry. Treatment of participants during research studies provides specific responsibilities for the researcher toward their participants. These responsibilities include ensuring voluntary participation, obtaining informed consent, and guaranteeing participant confidentiality and anonymity throughout the study. Since professional conduct is guaranteed from the researcher, emphasis was made on the option for participants experiencing any difficulty

to stop the interview and opt out at any time. A noteworthy characteristic of this study will was fairness, during participant selection and other aspects of the study. Bearing in mind that some participants were not able to meet in person, Skype and telephone interview options were the alternative methods used for the interviews.

Treatment of Data

The professional training, and experience of the researcher as a strategic manager and public administrator, enhanced participants understanding of their personal experiences in relation to the issue being studied. In line with the suggestion of Jones (2014), that the role of a researcher must be grounded in self-regulation concerning setting standards for ethical behavior, the researcher disclosed familiarity with the subject and explained the need to set aside any presuppositions during the data collection process. A combination of manual and electronic data management systems like note cards, binders, audio recorders, computer recording devices were applied. More specifically, the NVivo 11 software program served as the principal depot for data.

Summary

This study was carried out to uncover the challenges that counterterrorism agencies encounter with their strategies, with a view to determining the problems associated with these tactics, and consequently, develop practicable strategies that will hopefully, put an end to terrorism in Nigeria. The direct responsibility for counterterrorism in Nigeria is a collective one, as every citizen, irrespective of religion, culture, educational background, and gender, must take part in the fight against terrorism. Therefore, gaining a different view on the insights and experiences of these stakeholders

was important, as a way forward was to understand the concept of terrorism in Nigeria, and develop workable strategies to combat the menace. To authenticate the choice of qualitative research strategy used for this study, Chapter 3 discussed the research design of the overall study. It contains the rationale for the design, the role of the researcher, participant selection process, data collection, instrumentation, data management processes, and the data analysis plan.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

The focus of this study is on exploring the strategies applied by Nigerian counterterrorism agents and agencies, with a view to creating effective strategies aimed at mitigating the effects and ending acts of terrorism in Nigeria. As a result of the global necessity to manage and eradicate terrorism, understanding the tactics applied by these agents and the counterterrorism agencies in the overall efforts to develop effective strategies to stall terrorism in Nigeria, fills a gap in existing research on counterterrorism. To reveal the mental impressions of participants on the subject, I used a qualitative research approach as the primary method for this inquiry. The central research question for this phenomenological research study is: What strategies are being applied in terrorist neutralization, deradicalization and peace sustenance by counterterrorism agencies in Nigeria, and how effective are they? This chapter contains a description of the research setting, participant demographics, participant recruitment, data collection, process for data analysis, and the approaches for ensuring trustworthiness. I conclude this chapter with a summary of the results and findings, followed by discussions, recommendations, and conclusion, in Chapter 5.

Research Setting

Face-to-face and telephone interviews form the entire data collection methods used for the process of data collection. For convenience, face-to-face interviews were arranged with 10 participants who signified preference to be interviewed at their homes, following initial contact. Due to the risk of traveling to areas with heavy terrorist

activities, I used the telephone to conduct interviews with two participants presently engaged in combat with terrorists in the north eastern region of Nigeria, where there is heavy presence of terrorist activities. By choice, one more participant was interviewed via telephone call. Interviews were conducted at various private or public places to allow convenience and comfort for participants. Various locations, such as private offices and secluded areas in homes were used for these interviews. These individual settings provided much-needed privacy, eliminating all forms of distraction and interruption. Telephone calls, email exchanges, and in-person meetings that enabled participant transcript reviews and data interpretation checking were included as part of my follow-up processes with participants.

Participant Demographics

Security strategy policymakers and commanders of troops in close contact with the fight against terrorism, as well as former leaders of terrorist groups and victims of terrorism in Nigeria were the population of interest for this study. Ten counterterrorist agents, three former terrorists, and two victims of terrorism met the established participant criteria that allowed for a representation of any age group, gender, and experience with counterterrorism strategies. Participants cut across different geographic locations, ethnic groups, and religions, and included commanders of military formations that have fought with terrorists in Northeast and Southern Nigeria, former terrorist sect commanders, counterterrorist agents directly implementing strategies on the field, and former directors of other security agencies in Nigeria.

Except for the victims, the years of experience held by participants ranged from 11 to 30 years. Participants work or have worked as counterterrorists, counterterrorist strategists, terrorists who have fought against the strategies of government forces; other participants were victims of terrorism for whom the strategies may or may not have worked. Prior to the interview, I did not know any of the participants, though I had served in the military and had also consulted for security agencies in Nigeria. All of the participants functioned as a terrorist, terrorist victim, or counterterrorist, and all had experience counterterrorist strategy application. The average interview time was 28 minutes, and the participant demographics are shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Demographic Table of Participants

| Participant | Occupation | Years in role | Gender |
|-------------|-----------------|------------------|--------|
| P1 | Soldier | 29 | Male |
| P2 | Soldier | 23 | Male |
| P3 | Law enforcement | 2 | Male |
| P4 | Victim | 2 | Female |
| P5 | Law enforcement | 9 | Female |
| P6 | Ex- militant | 3 | Male |
| P7 | Ex-militant | 8 | Male |

Participant Recruitment

I received approval from the Walden University Institutional Review Board before initiating the recruitment of participants (approval number 04-16-19-0567365). As detailed in the study design, the process for participant recruitment focused on recruiting participants using Google, LinkedIn, and Facebook search engines. An initial participant

screening process for counterterrorist participants using military postings published online by news agencies in Nigeria, resulted in the identification of 17 potential participants. I contacted all potential participants, using LinkedIn, Facebook, and email, by sending the invitation to participate and did not exert any pressure on individuals to participate. To avoid creating ill feelings from a barrage of emails soliciting participation, I limited my contact to potential participants to only two emails per participant.

I sent follow-up emails 48 hours after sending the initial invitation, and 15 potential participants responded to the invitation. To confirm suitability to participate in the study, I sent a pre-participation email to all potential participants. Participants' eligibility to partake in the study was determined based on the following criteria: service in the military or other security agencies with assignment to locations affected by terrorism; involvement in strategic planning or execution of strategies aimed at defeating terrorism in Nigeria; formerly involved in terrorism with experience in working against counterterrorist's and circumventing their counterterrorism strategies; and victims of counterterrorism with experience in the strategies applied by counterterrorist's and terrorists.

I encountered no major problems during participant selection; volunteers who responded to the eligibility email questions all met the eligibility requirements to participate in the study. Two requested for financial compensation, and were subsequently removed from the selection process. The participants showed enthusiasm and curiosity about the topic, during the phone conversations prior to the interviews, and they looked forward to participating in the interview.

Data Collection

The data collection phase of this study took place in April 2019 and lasted two weeks with daily interviews with one or two participants. The authorized research methods I used included face-to-face interviewing (Englander, 2012) and interviewing by telephone, and I used reflective journaling (Chan, Fung, & Chien, 2013; DeFelice & Janesick, 2015) as a bracketing strategy during interviews. This was a means of reflecting on nonverbal cues during interviews, and to record the research processes from the research design stage to the research conclusion stage. To recall and suspend personal views and increase my sensitivity to the feelings of participants, I practiced bracketing (*epoché*) as prescribed in Moustakas (1994) before proceeding with the data collection process. To clear my thoughts, I focused on recalling meaningful personal experiences I came across during my 1-year engagement with law enforcement in the area of counterterrorism. Though no meaningful experience came to fore, I calibrated my mindset to focus my vision and hearing directly on participants' responses.

All participants gave consent before interviews commenced, and data collection was completed in compliance with the instrumentation procedures and ethics guidelines discussed in Chapter 3, using a semi-structured interviewing format with open-ended questions, and prompts designed to encourage in-depth answers from participants. I conducted seven interviews; I reached a saturation point after five interviews but went on with two more. I conducted four face-to-face interviews and three telephone interviews. A professional voice recording device was used in all interviews, and the recordings were saved in MP4 file format.

Based on the categories they were in, I interviewed each participant with questions that included various essential questions as well as related probing questions linked to the central research question; they were designed to methodically incite participants' perceptions on the subject (Jamshed, 2014; DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). For the documentation of methodological variations during data collection, I applied reflective journaling and transparency in the research process was amplified through my documentation of stages taken in the process of data collection and analysis (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Peredaryenko & Krauss, 2013).

After the interviews, I gave the participants opportunities to correct imprecision in their transcripts. After I completed my data analysis, participants were offered the opportunity to point out perceived misconceptions of meaning attributed to their roles. All participants responded to the initial review of interview transcripts without corrections and verified and confirmed the accuracy of the meaning each of them ascribed to the issue under investigation after the data analysis was completed. To help in improving the trustworthiness of the research results in any phenomenological research, it is important to obtain interviewee feedback about the validity and extensiveness of summaries reflecting participant experiences (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Sandelowski, 1993).

Data Organization and Management

Having carried out the data collection and analysis myself, I remain accountable for determining the eligibility of participants and their recruitment, obtaining their informed consent, and confirming the accuracy of the interview transcripts. The entire

data collected for the study was securely stored with strong passwords on computers and devices used in filing all digital and text data, as detailed in Chapter 3. Frequently updated anti-virus protections were installed in the computers and devices used to access digital and text data. Access was restricted, and data will be kept for at least 5 years, as required by Walden University.

Data Analysis

For the analysis of textual data collected for this study, the principal focus is to develop analytical outputs on the lived experiences of participants in counterterrorism strategies carried out in operations against terrorists in Nigeria, and identify what helps achieve positive outcomes. Applied data analysis processes relied on the modified Van Kaam data analysis method defined in Moustakas (1994), using transcribed participant responses and a combination of hand-coding and coding using NVivo 11 Pro software to increase validity. The NVivo 11 Pro software program also functioned as the central source for data management and storage. The data analysis processes comprised of two data coding cycles, while triangulating with the modified Van Kaam data analysis method.

Hand Coding

One advantage of applying hand coding for data analysis is the capacity to gain understanding of the data and to process an overall image offered by participants (Basit, 2003; Stuckey, 2015). Because hand coding allows the researcher to directly engage with the data and drive the analysis process (Klenke, 2016), I began with the hand-coding process for the data analysis, to highlight complex details of the interview transcripts. A

careful and intense process involved reading and re-reading transcripts multiple times to gain understanding of the participants' replies on their experience with counterterrorism strategies.

To help in understanding the ideas in the raw data during data analysis, I used an open-coding method to develop codes (DeCuir-Gunby, Marshall, & McCulloch, 2011). I applied horizontalization, using participant interview transcripts to list and group relevant participant answers. I applied a cut-and-paste method (Basit, 2003) for the horizontalization procedure and put a list of significant participant responses in a table to facilitate abstracting and labeling. Identification of static components in participant responses concerning experience required the listing and grouping of significant statements and the reduction and removal of extraneous statements (Moustakas, 1994).

I identified 209 exact substantial participant responses, expressing unchanging elements of participants' experiences. The next step in this process was the cautious examination of noteworthy participant responses to aid in the grouping of the unchanging elements of participants' experiences into themes. The clustering of these responses included a thorough method used to identify and organize ideas and concepts in participant responses. As detailed by Moustakas' (1994) modified Van Kaam method, I identified exact words and phrases to understand participants' feelings and perceptions concerning their role in counterterrorism strategies.

The last phase of the hand-coding method ensures the validation of all static features and themes before creating individual textural images for each participant. I made further development of the individual textural images using creative variations and

structural descriptions for each participant, mixing the unchanging elements and themes. I generated merged descriptions of meaning for participants as a group, based on their experiences and saved the descriptions for appraisal of results from coding using software.

Coding Using NVivo 11 Pro

Using NVivo 11 Pro software program, my first step in the data analysis process included various steps in cleaning and reorganizing the data in preparation for uploading into the software program. The data cleaning process involved removing all extraneous information in the interview transcripts and forming pseudonyms for each participant. As recommended by Adu (2016), it is necessary to clean transcript data when using NVivo 11 for data analysis to assist removing immaterial information, generating new participant identities, and saving the prepared transcripts prior to their introduction into the software program. I reviewed the research question, interview questions, and participant responses prior to saving the cleaned interview data in preparation for importing into the NVivo 11 Pro software program.

The next step in this process involved the introduction of the cleaned interview data into the NVivo 11 Pro software program. I organized the data into two key storage files in the software program: case classifications and case nodes. Case classifications permitted the formation of classification names using pseudonyms allotted to each participant with their demographic attributes. I used case nodes as an observation component to code pertinent information regarding each participant's responses. After importing and reorganizing the data, I conducted simple queries to gain a better

perspective of information contained in the data. For example, I used information from the word frequency query to highlight recurring words or concepts in the interview transcripts (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. Initial word frequency query for participant interview transcripts.

I started the initial coding process by using the values coding method and applying codes to statements reflecting the values, attitudes, and beliefs of participants as recorded in the transcripts. Values coding applies the use of codes to portray the important attributes, thoughts, feelings, and perceptions about individual experiences (Miles et. al., 2013). After the first sequence of coding, unchanging elements from participants' responses were clustered and thematized to develop the core themes of participant experiences.

I applied steps used to examine the codes developed in the first cycle coding process in transitioning to the second data coding cycle using NVivo 11 Pro software program. I started the second data coding process using the Pattern coding method to further drop the data into smaller and more expressive data units, identifying patterns and

relationships, before labeling the emergent themes (Miles et. al., 2013). Pattern coding includes coding procedures aimed at creating major themes, searching for causes or explanations, examining relationships, and forming theoretical constructs (Miles et. al., 2013, p. 87).

After isolating emergent patterns and labeling new emergent themes, I developed an account describing each of the emergent themes. Next was the subsequent data analysis phase. This involved a verification of the data to ensure that it adhered to the modified Van Kaam method of phenomenological data analysis, as defined in Moustakas (1994). The leading cycle coding procedure allowed the horizontalization, reduction, and elimination of changing elements from the complete participant responses regarding their experiences. The next cycle coding process permitted the clustering and thematization of static elements of participant responses regarding their experiences.

I established emergent themes sequel to sorting and synthesizing the data by classifying codes based on relationship, frequency, and meaning. An authentication process was applied to further exclude any irrelevancies to participant experiences based on an absence of clear expression or compatibility. Part of the analysis process applied was comparing descriptions developed using hand coding, with descriptions generated using coding software before developing the finished and merged descriptions of participant experiences.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

Evidence of trustworthiness in qualitative research is necessary, to prove the internal consistencies used to establish precision in research processes, and in the

distribution of the results (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). I developed and applied a documentation strategy to highlight the process for participant selection (a form of triangulation), peer debriefing (working with dissertation committee), employing the use of conventional research methods and a solid description of the subject being investigated. I strengthened the quality of my research instrument through consultation with experienced faculty research committee members, prior to the commencement of data collection.

Using Fusch and Ness's (2015) data saturation guidelines for researchers without robust experience, I used the exact interview questions with probing questions designed to encourage in-depth responses from participants for all questions. I suspended all personal opinions regarding the issue, and I heightened my sensitivity to participant's state of mind about the issue. Also, by applying Brod, Tesler, and Christensen's (2009) data saturation grid, I established data saturation after the first five participant interviews as I identified and recognized the duplication of information not sufficient enough to develop new categorizations. To confirm that no emergence of new information during interviews occurred, I conducted two additional interviews after the first five that indicated no new information.

Bergman & Coxon (2005) emphasized the significance of interviewer sensitivity to internal discrepancies during research interviews demanding the use of probing questions to clarify inconsistencies in interviewee responses. To prevent inconsistencies arising from possible misconception of interview questions, I used probing questions aimed at getting clarification on any inconsistencies identified in participant responses.

As illustrated by Edwards and Holland (2013), using follow-up questions for qualitative interviews permits the researcher to elucidate initial responses or provide further details.

I recorded all face-to-face interviews with an audio recording device prior to transcribing responses from each participant. Though the preliminary interviews provided detailed responses from most participants, certain inconsistent responses during data analysis necessitated additional sessions to clarify meaning. I arranged follow-up sessions with participants immediately after completion of data analysis, to confirm the accuracy of findings. During these follow-up sessions, I challenged inconsistent interpretations arising from the initial interviews by asking more probing questions to enflame further details, and to clarify conflicting statements.

The first step taken in my data collection process involved a bracketing method (epoché) as given by Moustakas (1994), to recollect and dissolve any personal beliefs, and also increase my sensitivity to participant feelings related to the issue. Therefore, I thoroughly recollected evocative personal experiences before consciously disconnecting mental conversations in relation to personal experiences, to help focus directly on participant responses.

Credibility

Researcher transparency on the research processes, and detailed steps that guaranty the quality of results are taken to always ensure credibility in qualitative research. Such steps include the use of well-established research methods, knowledge of the participating research environments, random sampling of participants, triangulation,

ensuring internal uniformity of participant responses, discrepancy case analysis, and peer debriefing (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014; Shenton, 2004).

I provided details of the main processes that enabled the unraveling of knowledge with the use of the modified Van Kaam method for data analysis validating transparency. The data analysis process also involved the use of a blend of two theoretical outlines to interpret and support the data. I took additional steps to ensure that credibility was achieved through a criteria designed to confirm that participants were willing to share honest experiences and prompts during interviews. This aided the clarification of participant responses with inconsistencies. During data collection and analysis, I carried out peer debriefing with counsel from my dissertation committee, experienced faculty members, and peers.

I heightened my decision-making by collaboration with experienced researchers and peers, and improved my research vision through learning from shared experiences and insights on the courses of action, expansion of ideas, and interpretation. Green (2014) suggests that peer debriefing should be used as a means to enhance researcher's critical thinking skills and research credibility in qualitative research. Through careful steps taken to acquaint the researcher with the collected data, I identified cases with discrepancies involving responses that were not explainable by interpretation and member checking while data were being analyzed. I conducted follow-up sessions (member checking) to aid in the elimination of inconsistencies in the responses of participants.

A concluding part of the validation process used for qualitative research involves member-checking to confirm the accuracy of interpretation (Colaizzi, 1978). All the interviewed participants accepted the follow-up member checking sessions and I provided a copy of the interview transcripts to confirm accuracy. Following this, discussions on the interpretations that evolved during data analysis to confirm the accuracy of meaning were made. My earlier training in the military as well as my knowledge on terrorism through various professional courses I have attended helped to establish familiarity with the research setting. I conducted a random selection of participants by reaching out to pre-screened prospective participants using LinkedIn, Facebook and WhatsApp to send invitations to participate. Interestingly, all participants volunteered to participate, and indicated their intentions to contribute to the development of new knowledge, by providing useful data.

Transferability

Indicating how the findings and results of qualitative research are applicable to wider populations presents weighty challenges for the researcher as a result of the small number of participants and research settings. Shenton (2004) proposed avoiding a preoccupation with transferability. He suggested a focus on providing contextual information on peculiarities connected to the research environment and population. This study provides details of the number of participants, period of data collection, lengths of interviews, and the demographics of interviewed participants. This information therefore, allows readers to recognize limits of the study, and regulate transference of results.

Dependability

The use of unswerving research processes that display the possibility of replicating the study in a comparable setting is a determinant for dependability in qualitative research studies. Elo et al. (2014) noted that even in diverse conditions, asserting participant selection criteria and demographics boosts dependability of qualitative research, leading to stable data. This study provided the use of criterion-based sampling method, face-to-face interviews, interview format with open-ended questions, and described methodological consistencies. I provided etailed explanations on components of the research design, data collection, and analysis procedures, data management, and storage procedures to offer future researchers adequate information and permit replication.

Confirmability

In qualitative research, adequate steps regarding confirmability are required to guaranty verifiable results that can be validated by others. Miles et al. (2013) highlighted the fact that an important component for achieving confirmability in qualitative research is the provision of detailed records of methods and procedures that permit scrutiny by others. It must also permit the preservation of data which should be available on request for re-analysis. This study established a resemblance of procedures for data collection and analysis with the documentation process using a reflective journal with analytic memos and the NVivo 11 Pro software program in capturing and recording procedural steps, decision rules, and analysis operations. I provided an audit stream detailing all research procedures; emphasizing on changes that emerged during the iterative research.

Results: Emergent Themes

The deficiency in applied strategies for counterterrorism in Nigeria was the motivation for this phenomenological study focused on gathering the lived experiences of participants involved in counterterrorist strategies, at various levels. The results offered in Chapter 4 agree with the central research question; what strategies are being applied in terrorist neutralization, deradicalization and peace sustenance by counterterrorism agencies in Nigeria, and how effective are they?

Following the comprehensive analysis of participant interview transcripts, development and categorization of nodes, and the development of the main themes summarizing the meaning of participant experience, four major themes and seven subthemes on participant experiences surrounding their roles in counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria were developed (see Table 2).

Table 2

Emergent themes, nodes, sources, and references

| Emergent themes | Nodes | Sources | References |
|--|--|---------|------------|
| Measuring the performance of counterterrorist agents | Measuring counterterrorist's performance | 7 | 19 |
| | Counterterrorism mitigation barriers | 7 | 17 |
| | Stakeholder cooperation | 6 | 23 |
| | Setting clear expectations | 4 | 7 |
| | Understanding roles and obligations | 5 | 18 |
| | Using available resources | 6 | 14 |
| | Working with unclear mitigation policies | 5 | 9 |
| Government interventions | Experience with policymakers and Public administrators | 6 | 13 |
| Corruption Issues | Distortion of effective policies and strategies through corruption | 6 | 14 |
| Understanding Terrorism Framework | Training and development | 6 | 17 |
| | Staying Current with Counterterrorism Advancements | 3 | 8 |

The four major themes include: measuring the performance of counterterrorism agents, government interventions, corruption issues and understanding terrorism framework. Seven subthemes emerged under measuring the performance of counterterrorism agents and understanding terrorism framework. Collectively, the seven subthemes include counterterrorism mitigation barriers, stakeholder cooperation, setting clear expectations, understanding roles and obligations, using available resources, working with unclear mitigation policies, and staying current with counterterrorism advancement.

The applied theoretical framework combined critical and resource dependence theories to aid the provision of answers to the central research questions, by recognizing stakeholder's perspectives in relation to the social and tactical premises surrounding the application of effective counterterrorism strategies against terrorists operating in Nigeria.

Emergent Theme 1: Measuring the Performance of Counterterrorist Agents

Theme 1 *measuring the performance of counterterrorist agents* emerged as the most significant role activity for participants, resulting from their experiences with the counterterrorist strategies. Performance is a vital indicator used in evaluation of employees in any organization (Anitha, 2014). The military and other law enforcement agencies are also part of this work-force community, and also require this form of appraisal in their counterterrorism roles. For performance appraisals related to counterterrorism operations, leadership must align the relationship between the organization and the scope of responsibility, in order to facilitate organizational success (Sorenson, 2013). Amongst other issues, lack of personnel morale, logistic support, and

adequate working tools hinder counterterrorism operatives meeting their expected goals while engaging terrorists, and leads to a reduction in the output of productivity thereby, leading to failure in the ability to defeat insurgents who are better equipped.

Asked to describe their experience in counterterrorism strategies, all participants believed that managing operatives through equipping with effective and adequate tools, boosting their morale and providing relevant logistic support were all important role activities in achieving effective performance. All seven participants gave responses with 19 references, as revealed in table 1. During our interview, one participant (P1) described his feelings about his role in the ensuing way:

My role in terrorism mitigation is to make sure that my operatives are highly motivated to enable them carry out their tasks. Their motivation is expected to come by way of providing sophisticated weapons to beat those being used by insurgents. This is only possible if the government provides us with such equipment.

Another participant (P2) describing his role in curbing terrorism stated that:

My job is to ensure that logistic support is given to troops assigned to fight terrorism. This way, one is sure that the counterterrorist operatives are focused on the task assigned to them. Unfortunately, these supplies have not been regularly made to operatives, leaving them with no choice but to continually revolt.

A third participant (P5) stated:

My job is operations related and I am to ensure that operations are carried out according to the training and briefing given to operatives before and during operations. Unfortunately, this is very difficult to enforce since operatives get unruly in most cases, due to inadequacies resulting from lack of proper care and support.

A fourth participant (P3) recounted his experience with counterterrorist agent's performance when he stated that:

Soldiers are poorly taken care of. Imagine a hungry soldier asked to engage terrorist's in their stronghold. What do you expect will be the outcome? It is either the soldier is killed or captured, with useful information being collected from them without pressure, as such soldiers would be at the mercy of terrorists. The fact that they keep being captured and slaughtered, and their murder is widely publicized is enough reason to demoralize them and reduce their productivity in terms of achieving success in combating terrorism.

As participants described their experiences with counterterrorism strategies, they unanimously stated that their roles required more productive actions aimed at ensuring effective performance by operatives through the provision of essential items that will enhance their performance. The data backs Ryan and Deci's (2000) form of motivation that includes an external monitoring force with persons acting to fulfil the demands of an external source. For participants who are counterterrorist agents, the ability to provide

adequate working conditions to boost the morale of operatives serve as the external stimulus for their performance.

Some participants affirmed that their role activities required active collaboration and engagement with operatives, to drive performance. A fifth participant (P5) described her experience with the performance of counterterrorist operatives through actively engaging with them in the following way:

For myself, I believe that the soldiers are not focused enough in their mission.

They keep complaining about the poor standard of living within operational areas and the lack of care by the military authorities. Most times, the soldiers go on social media to revolt against their authorities. This issue affects their performance in negative ways.

Each participant understood the facts about ensuring operatives are motivated and its importance in counterterrorism operations. This understanding supports Campbell et al.'s (2016) view that leaders have an obligation to protect the interests of their employees and employees that they supervise. In the counterterrorist operational setting, it also follows that commanders must protect the interest of their operatives while guarding the military and the government as their principal employers. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, commanders are careful to do this, so as not to lose their positions. In the past, cases occur where commanders have been tried and sanctioned when they appear to tilt toward the welfare of the operatives, and seemingly question authorities about issues concerning poor morale of soldiers. A participant (P2) stated:

I am very careful with challenging the decisions of my superiors. If you understand the military well, you would know that an order is an order, and that no matter the situation you find yourself, as a soldier you must obey these orders without complaining. The ones who complain are looked at as undisciplined soldiers. Just a few of them complain while others operate under the same conditions they complain about. I do not mean that these conditions are conducive or that they do not negatively affect our operations but soldiers were trained to work under any condition, as such, they have no right to complain.

Participants all agreed that various ways of assessment can be used to identify individuals engaged in the unproductive activity however, in this case, measures to also weigh the performances of authorities must be enforced, to ensure that positive results of operatives are attained. Participant (P1) stated:

The truth is that the operatives cannot perform productively under these terrible conditions. At times, they have no water and no food for days. The weapons they use are old and cannot be compared with what the terrorist have. You can see the number of times that we have had mutiny by operatives in operational locations. Their condition is bad and need to be looked into. I do not understand why they cannot be taken care of with all the resources allocated to the military.

During interviews, probing questions were asked, to further prompt stronger descriptions to aid in providing clear and brief answers to the research question of lived experience about the effects of counterterrorism strategies on insurgency. In a situation, I

asked, ‘can you tell me more about the failed operations you have carried out and why you think they failed?’ To provoke a deeper response, participant (P1) answered:

Without all the needed equipment and logistic support, no Army can function well in any part of the world. Our operatives are victims of circumstances. On paper, we see that a lot of money has been given to authorities to provide all we need, to be effective but we do not get to see these things physically. We still have to operate under these harsh conditions and subject ourselves to the superiority of these terrorists.

Participants expressed a level of conviction as regards their preparedness to engage terrorist’s once logistic support is adequately provided. However, one participant reported that, based on his experience within operational areas for over five years, the terrorists were more sophisticated in their strategies. Participant (P5) stated:

The fact that we have failed in most of our operations is not solely because authorities fail to provide logistic and morale support. The fact is that the military operates with old ideas relating to counterterrorism. We have been using military actions to fight terrorist from the first time we heard of terrorism in Nigeria. While we continue to apply the combat strategy, the terrorists understand our strategies and do all they can to work around them. This implies that they are operating a step above us.

Rahimnia, Mazidi’ & Ahmad’s (2015) findings on monitoring employee activity would have been ideal in checking operatives to ensure that they operate in the best

professional fashion. However, participants discussed how operatives frustrate the efforts of commanders and their superiors. One participant (P2) stated:

Without authorities providing adequate care for soldiers, the authorities are not in a position to monitor performance of operatives. We have had cases where soldiers shot at their commanders for failing to provide logistic support, whereas, the commanders live in luxury. They cannot give instructions and orders from their comfortable homes while soldiers suffer in operational areas, and expect that they will get results.

When asked about daily interactions with operatives during field operations, some participants indicated some concerns about fear of the unknown, coming from friendly forces. Participant (P1) mentioned that:

We have had cases of soldiers turning their weapons to their superiors in the past. Everyone is being careful not to be the next victim of friendly forces attack. If this is the situation, you can imagine that soldiers have gone out of hand. This all comes down to lack of care against operatives. Every day we have the opportunity to interact, it is the same complaints, frustration, and anger.

The results of this study support these statements, as all participants agreed that the essentiality of providing adequate logistic and morale support to counterterrorism agents in the fight against insurgency is unquestionable. During member checking, all participants provided a recap of their feelings about the importance of operative's comfort, adequate kitting and reassurances, to stir up good performances in their role activity, engaging terrorists in Nigeria.

Viewing the data from a resource dependence theoretical perspective, a part of the theoretical framework for this study is shaped by the provision of resources to operatives of supervising organizations involved in counterterrorism. This is required to provide the logistic and technical support as well as all other tools needed to boost operative's morale, for effective performance (Sheffi, 2001). Measuring the performance levels of operatives in combat areas indicates that this role activity is essential for effective building of morale levels and ensuring that counterterrorist's strength is not compromised.

Additionally, drawing from the extrinsic motivation theoretical perspective, operational commanders' interests in mitigating operative's irrational behavior during counterterrorism operations stems from an obligatory function within the organizations, to create a conducive and morale-filled work environment (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagné & Deci, 2005). Though the zeal by these commander's is a vital tool in such operations, unfortunately, it would have no effect as long as the tools to complement the zeal are unavailable.

From these perspectives, the consequences of ignoring the importance of operative's welfare could be averted by offering the government of Nigeria a useful method of identifying and dealing with individual cases of negligence by supervising authorities, as regards the provision of welfare for security forces involved in counterterrorism operations. Participants showed elements of discouragement, distrust for, and neglect by authorities, as well as a tint of disorganization resulting from the loss of total command of troops as a result of the poor standard of their welfare.

Emergent Theme 2: Government Interventions

Theme 2 government interventions revealed participants belief that the Nigerian government proximity to troops will provide a mechanism for amending the problem of terrorism, and will enhance the effectiveness of their mitigation efforts. In addition to the watchful eyes of commanders on operatives, troops insist on having the government watch over and scrutinize the activities of authorities assigned to disburse funds and working tools to troops, especially regarding the financial transactions covering the welfare of troops. Though Rahimnia and Mazidi (2015) noted that managerial proximity improves the chances of supervisory use of verbal persuasion and manipulation to control employee behavior, the military differs in a way that force may also be introduced in addition to verbal persuasion and manipulation. This creates the opening to revolts by troops, against commanders, and may produce ugly outcomes, such as the recent occurrences of mutinies and open rebellions on social media platforms (Dionne, 2018). For this and other reasons, operatives are of the opinion that it will be to their advantage if the government also enforces a strict supervisory body over authorities charged with the responsibility of operative's welfare.

When asked how government intervention impacted the success in their role combating terrorism, participants highlighted the fact that most of the heads of security agencies take decisions that appear to be personal rather than for the benefit of the nation, and to achieve the purpose for which they are in combat. Participant (P5) said:

If government is not involved directly in the fight against terrorist, things will remain the same. The people in charge of policies in this nation do not have an

idea of what is happening. They get briefs from our bosses who themselves do not know what is happening on the field. At times they do but pretend not to know because their families are not prone to being victims of terrorism. If they were, they would have been more involved with the troops, to ensure that things work properly.

Another participant (P3) said:

Whenever there is an attack by terrorist's at a location, people in government get private jets to move their families out of these locations. What happens in this case is that they have removed people of interest and do not care what happens to others. This is a problem. If they had interests in those locations they would be in touch with troops, get concerned with their welfare and ensure that troops are well equipped in every way to carry out their operations and aim at success.

A third participant expressed concern that policies concerning terrorism are not upgraded. Since the government developed a terrorism act defining terrorism in Nigeria, nothing new has been done. Participant (P5) stated:

We have heard that some State governments have created laws that put terrorists to death but we have never heard of any terrorist put to death when they are caught, except for those killed in battle. That is the reason we do not spare them when we get them. We are helping government put them out since they cannot enforce policies that they create. When you come up with a policy, it is important that you follow up by getting involved directly with those who enforce the policies.

Fitzgerald et al (2016) stated that citizen and government participation in decision making is vital in ensuring effective compliance of policies. A participant was also concerned about neglect of youths who are unemployed and without skills. The participant (P7) stated:

When you ignore unemployed youths and leave them without skills, the next thing they will think of is an easy way out, through any means. These are the kind of people terrorists are looking for. When I joined Boko Haram it was not because I believed in their ideas and struggles. It was because I had no other option. I had to choose between joining them or being an armed robber because I have no education or skill to feed myself and my family.

Similarly, another participant (P5) acknowledged that politicians neglect for youth after using them for political gains is the reason youths are on the loose, thereby suggesting that government intervention in issues that concern youths, should be encouraged. She said:

Politicians use young touts during elections to do dirty jobs for them. During this period, they are exposed to a lot of money. By the time these politicians win and get into office, they abandon the touts. These touts who had been used to an affluent lifestyle are then subjected to poverty and end up choosing another easy and readily available business venture, which is terrorism.

One participant acknowledged the benefits of having government intervention and interaction with the grassroots. By allowing organizational heads handle projects prescribed by the government for youth empowerment and development, a lot of issues

occur within the chain. Certain decisions made by the government are changed at that level, without the government knowing what happens. The participant described a case where he was denied of a promising future as a result of decisions that were changed due to governments' lack of involvement with stakeholders concerned with counterterrorism strategies. The participant (P6) emphatically stated:

After amnesty was granted to us in 2007, a lot of us were happy that we will be trained and have skills, as prescribed by the government. Unfortunately, since the government did not supervise the project, a point came where the managers of the project delisted most of the ex-militants and replaced us with their family members and their girlfriends. It was frustrating to see that most of us who were granted amnesty were kept on a waiting list while people who were at home while we were in combat for many years are the ones travelling abroad for training at our expense. This is enough reason to go back into militancy since we lacked nothing when we were engaged in combat.

During a follow-up session, the participant restated how lack of government monitoring presence heavily impacted a huge percentage of youths that were in the same position as himself because of the project managers who empowered themselves to self-regulate programs and government decisions, clearly violating government and the organization's policies. An explanation for this participant's response relates to certain government employee's high level of unprofessionalism which resulted in a huge number of youths who initially embraced the amnesty initiative, reverting to militancy (Ebiede & Langer, 2017).

Amazingly, no new information was produced during member checking since all participants agreed that the monitoring presence by government would impact their role performance in combating terrorism. Looking at the data from a critical theoretical lens which is a part of the framework for this study, the meaning participants derived about the impact of lack of monitoring presence and government interventions on bothering issues on their role in combating terrorism, is occasioned by the carefree norm in the Nigerian society, and an apparent culture in the government civil service. This aligns with one of the premises put forward by Blumer (1969) which holds that social interaction provides quality to the meaning people have about an issue.

Emergent Theme 3: Corruption

Theme 3 corruption emerged as an offshoot of mental conversations where participants described their experiences with working in a society where corruption is common, and most public officers are involved in one way or the other. Participants are all of the opinion that the entire country would have been a better place if resources allocated to developing the nation are used judiciously. They all refer to the diversion of funds meant to equip counterterrorist agents, to private bank accounts, not minding the implication of this act on those who directly engage terrorists, as well as citizens in locations affected by terrorism (Tufts, 2019). Participants believed that corruption of public officers is one of the main issues directly responsible for the inability of counterterrorist agencies to match up with terrorists in terms of fire power and strategies. They also reported that some soldiers within the ranks have been compromised and form a part of the strength that terrorists rely on to defeat counterterrorism attempts. All the

participants descriptions centered on how various security agencies do not disburse exact funds provided for them from the national budget, for tools to fight terrorism. These tools, according to them include weapons, troop's allowances, portable drinking water and other supplies of necessity, amongst others. As participants reported their experiences, they specified that physical interaction of operatives with the government may eradicate corruption where it relates to projects such as terrorism mitigation.

The data show that participants shared their distinctive sets of experiences about the social culture of amassing wealth from public funds in Nigeria by public officers, and the impact of the rippling effect on the performance of counterterrorist's. Participant (P3) asserted:

Everyone knows what happens in this country. Monies allocated for almost everything reduces as it goes down the channel. When government disburses money, it reduces from the budget. It also reduces when it gets to the supervising ministries. It further reduces when it gets to the Agency and reduces as it trickles down to the end-user of the product. By the time the receiver gets it, it is not sufficient for its purpose, as such they begin to manage the funds and even have to cut off very important items. This leaves the people at the bottom, at the receiving end always, while others at the top who do not understand what goes on in the field enjoy the money allocated for use in combating terrorism. Counterterrorism agencies should be allowed to interact and participate in decisions at the policy level when security matters are concerned.

The perception of the participant suggests the adoption of the supportive situation leadership style that incorporates shared decisions to drive behavioral change (Hersey & Blanchard, 1979). Another participant shared details of newspaper publications pointing at the extent of corruption that affects counterterrorism agencies and their operatives. The participant (P4) stated:

It is so sad to see that those who we are protecting are the same people who are responsible for our not being able to defeat terrorists. I am sure you are aware of all the money that was stolen by the Jonathan government and his National Security Adviser, as exposed and declared by the present Nigerian government. Look at the amount of money the Petroleum Minister in that same government stole. You are aware she is in court in London because of the billions of dollars she stole. Money that is meant to equip operatives and provide sophisticated tools to eradicate terrorists in Nigeria.

The initial response provided by this participant required a follow-up session to clarify meaning. The participant reaffirmed that from his knowledge of the strategies required for terrorism, a huge amount of funds is required for it to be actualized. He confirmed that the amount of money released to these agencies for training and equipment cannot equip them with the required knowledge and tools to win the war against terrorism in Nigeria. This response aligned with resource dependence theory which highlights the relationship between organizations and the resources that they need to operate (Mc Dowl, 2016). If these resources can be assigned to the agencies, and used strictly for the acquisition of tools for the operatives, as well as for developmental

training programs to update them on current strategies and operational standards rather than using control mechanisms and manipulation, positive impacts may emerge. A participant was worried that the practice of corruption in Nigeria is as old as the country itself and will take strict sanctions against perpetrators, to end the practice. The participant (P4) stated:

We can keep talking about money for weapons meant for terrorism combat reaching us. This will continue for another decade as nobody cares what happens as long as they are not directly affected by terrorism. We have had this issue talked about for too long. Cases of corruption and diversion of funds meant for the military have been in court for long, without results. As usual, the cases will end silently and we will still be in the same situation. I believe very strict sanctions should be placed on these public officers who steal, and place lives of thousands of citizens on the line while their families are enjoying affluence abroad. We should borrow a leaf from China and apply their laws for corrupt public officers.

Again, a participant refers to 'production goals' which points to the extrinsic motivation for using superior control to ensure performance as described in (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Participants believed that interventions and sincere injection of funds would provide an opportunity to develop mitigation plans to help encourage productive behavior by operatives. One participant shared an experience involving the risk of operatives using obsolete equipment that could have been upgraded if funds were provided for that purpose. The participant (P1) stated:

We had a case where money was said to have been released to the military for acquisition of new armored personnel carriers as well as tanks for effective performance while engaging terrorists. When they arrived, we realized that they were refurbished vehicles that had been abandoned in Nigeria for a while. They did not last long as the refurbishing itself was poorly done because the contractor wanted to make huge profits. I am sure you saw it in the news. Tanks were being pushed by personnel instead of functioning to move troops around. Why would the government want to place us in such a compromising position? This is the reason military bases in North East Nigeria have been run over by terrorist a number of times.

One participant shared a different perspective highlighting the importance of factoring in a budget for ex-terrorists, to ensure that they are empowered and positively engaged, as a form of encouragement to keep away from terrorism. She however stated that past experience shows that the empowerment program for former terrorists is the center of corruption in Nigeria as politicians and public administrators in charge of the program aimed at rehabilitating former terrorists see this as an opportunity to make wealth off the program. The participant felt that mitigating terrorism should also involve the use of well-funded former terrorists within communities that are prone to terrorism, to manage ex-terrorist's empowerment programs and eliminating direct involvement of government middle men. The participant (P6) stated:

The amnesty programs that involved former militant's rehabilitation would have been a good idea but it was destroyed by corruption. The politicians and their

contractors who also front for them used this as an opportunity to enrich themselves. They now have houses all over the world while some former militants are still here languishing in poverty without any skill. This is a recipe for a return to militancy in the areas where the amnesty programs were established. Some of these politicians won the support of one or two ex-militant leaders who encouraged them to deviate from the original focus of the amnesty program by taking part in the corrupt practice themselves. This is why you see some ex-militant leaders owning universities outside Nigeria.

In sharing practical knowledge about personal experiences of corruption hindering the success of mitigating terrorism in Nigeria, a participant acknowledged that some top performing ex-militants should be engaged by government to manage other former militants rather than placing politicians in positions they see as viably conducive to amass wealth for themselves. The participant (P6) stated:

Some ex-militants are very educated and can run some of the agencies in Nigeria successfully. We have Master's degree holders amongst us who were giving us the strategies that we used in defeating the military, which made the government succumb to negotiations with us. Those are the kind of people that should be managing the development of ex-militants and not politicians with different motives.

Follow up sessions aimed at getting clarification on interpretation did not provide any new information. Participants believed that government interventions should allow ex-militants to take charge of their direct subordinates who are more likely to contribute

positively to the overall national terrorism mitigation effort. This can be achieved once corruption is controlled, by excluding politicians and public officers from being in control of finances meant for the rehabilitation and empowerment of former terrorists. In line with critical theory, participants showed that meaning acquired during the critique of social and cultural norms of public office holders and the Nigerian society, helped them develop functional strategies aimed at driving performance.

Emergent Theme 4: Understanding Terrorism Framework

Theme 4 *understanding terrorism framework* revealed that participants understanding of terrorism framework and the mode of operation of terrorists operating in Nigeria is vague. According to DeAngelis (2009), understanding terrorism framework is the first step toward gaining victory in the fight against terrorism. Participants believed that the training they had in combat engagement is not sufficient to engage terrorists who have foreign training from well experienced fighters from the Middle East and North Africa. Participants recognized the need to increase their knowledge to gain enough experience in terrorism and counterterrorism studies so as to understand the strategies of terrorists, and also understand how to develop new strategies to diffuse the tactics of these insurgents in Nigeria.

Participants also believed that an understanding of the motives of terrorists will determine the way each of the various sects with motives that differ from each will be confronted. As participants recounted their experiences, they indicated that the prevalence of terrorism in Nigeria is on the increase, and more sects with different motives are being developed across the country. One participant (P7) mentioned that:

All the different regions in Nigeria have terrorists that have their peculiar motive for terrorism so once you move from one region to another, you experience a different form of terrorism. It is important to know what the motives are to enable you as a counterterrorist work out a strategy to engage the terrorist, with the aim of stopping it.

Similarly, a participant described how an understanding of various approaches to combat terrorism may work in Nigeria. The participant (P6) stated:

With the different kinds of terrorists we have in Nigeria, one needs to understand each of them to know how to handle them. You cannot face terrorists that need development in their region through combat. I believe the solution to that kind of terrorism will be development of their region through a well-planned structure, to ensure that the plan for development works. In the same way, if a group wants to practice a particular religion I think the government should allow them practice it freely after given some conditions. In this case, dialogue may be the solution rather than combat.

Some participants recognized the fact that technological advancement had changed the process of counterterrorism and new ideas should be sort to solve the problem of terrorism in Nigeria. As an example, one participant (P2) stated:

The same military tactics we were trained in many years ago while we were being recruited into the military is the same that is still being put into use against terrorists at this time. While terrorists apply modern guerilla warfare tactics, our

operatives apply the old obsolete jungle warfare that has been in existence since the British were in Nigeria, before our independence in 1960.

Participant's knowledge about the tactics being used for training and in use by counterterrorists was based on experience at military training centers and mission areas, as well as length of service in the military. One participant (P1) recalled that:

Being around military training facilities for over 25 years, I am experienced with the form of training given to recruits as well as officer cadets being drafted into the military. This is the same tactics that is applied against terrorist now. What we need is more sophisticated ways to approach the problem since the war against terrorism is not being won. We need to be trained on modern counterterrorism and the strategies we can apply in combating terrorism with and without the use of force.

One participant acknowledged that the military had depended on external forces to help combat terrorism, and that the military and the government were prepared to commit millions of dollars to the project. The response aligned with Loayza's (2016) findings that showed how external forces can increase the chances of defeating terrorism in various countries. The participant (P1) stated:

Though it is good for external forces to join us to make us more formidable, it is also good for us to be very well trained. The external forces are obviously coming in with knowledge that we do not have. Why can't we also go and get that knowledge so that in situations like this where external forces backed down from assisting Nigeria, we can at least operate effectively.

In further understanding the framework of terrorism, it is important to note that some forms of present-day terrorism is fueled by greed or the desire to acquire or sustain a particular standard of living. There is no doubt that individuals and groups from Western countries stimulate disputes the same way members of the modern Niger Delta terrorist groups create feud when they need financial gratification from the government. This was one of the strategies used in the Niger Delta region by an individual, to ensure that the sale of weapons which is his major business, is sustained by the disputes created within the region (Duquet, 2009). The increasing number of disputes created around the world that lead to terrorism, especially in Africa and the Middle East, generate from the Western countries. Sales of merchandise used for war is the major reason there must be war, to sustain the business of manufacturing weapons (Ismail, 2004). One participant acknowledged that disputes during the Niger Delta militancy days were mostly generated by businessmen though the motives seemed arguably right. The participant (P6) stated:

I remember the days when the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta was active. The group had solid strategies to hold the government to ransom because they were educated and were also established businessmen with very many years of experience. They put in their business and intellectual experiences in the operation of the group and succeeded because it was operated like a business that needed to generate revenue. They always thought of ways to keep dispute alive so as to keep their business afloat.

No new facts emerged during follow-up sessions aimed at authenticating either interview transcripts or themes development after data analysis. Participants expressed

the view that a proper understanding of the framework of terrorism will facilitate the adoption of more effective coercive strategies to produce expected results in combating terrorism in Nigeria.

Emergent Subtheme 1: Counterterrorism Mitigation Barriers

The subtheme counterterrorism *mitigation barriers* emerged from participant's descriptions of their role performance during counterterrorism operations in Nigeria. Mitigation barriers reported include the inability to control the influx of foreign terrorists to support the local ones, lack of developmental plans for the upgrade of operatives to match up with the skills of terrorists trained in the Middle East by collaborating international terrorist groups, lack of proper strategies to reduce or stop the mass recruitment of young Nigerians into terrorist's sects, adequate funding of military operations targeted at curbing terrorism, and external influences of major actors who benefit from the presence of disputes in Nigeria. A shared perception held by the participants suggested that these barriers negatively impact the role of operatives in combating terrorism in Nigeria.

When asked of their inputs to the general organizational efforts aimed at mitigating terrorism, and incited to give more details on successes and challenges during mitigation, a participant (P5) responded with the following experience:

Our borders are porous and we claim we want to stop terrorism. This is not possible because terrorism bodies have an international network. When the local ones need support, they invite foreign terrorists to come in and give them support. Once our immigration officers cannot stop the inflow of these terrorists, we have

double trouble. We will be fighting more terrorists that we imagine. I believe this is why the Boko Haram was able to overrun three military bases in cities where they operate. Some of the terrorists that were killed in those operations were foreigners.

Another participant acknowledged that the knowledge that operatives have does not match that of the terrorist they are engaging. He gave detailed accounts of how selected inducted terrorists are sent outside Nigeria for specialists training. Some courses undertaken include terrorism strategies and defeating the counterterrorist, combat and guerilla warfare, sourcing funds for operations, and industrial training for the manufacture of weapons and ammunition, locally. The participant (P7) stated:

Boko Haram is more technically, strategically, and logistically equipped than the entire military. While I was with them, we were well trained in foreign countries. There are a lot of former Nigerian military men amongst us who reveal details of the training they receive. Based on this, we are trained to outsmart them with better strategies and combat training. To cap it, we are trained on how to make ammunitions and weapons right there on the field while the military runs out of ammunitions most times. We also source all the money we need to operate while we hear stories of soldiers who have no food and water in the field, and they claim they are chasing after well-fed terrorists.

Two participants described the recruitment of youths as a major tool for developing the strength of terrorist groups. Likening this to Knights (2018), manpower is a strong tool in terrorism operations, especially with the enlistment of terrorists who

apply the same deadly tactics as those from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

One participant (P1) stated:

The numerical strength of terrorists far exceeds that of the operatives put together. Terrorism has been made to appear viable in the eyes of Nigerian youths, and it is now seen as employment for youths that are not engaged and have no means of livelihood. The individual benefit is the primary focus while the ideology comes in as the secondary focus. This means that any side with a more promising bargain is likely to win the youths to its side. This calls for serious thoughts on the Nigerian government to start working on ways to win back the youths. I believe everyone prefers to earn a good living under safe conditions rather than as terrorists with no assurances for living till the next day.

A few participants affirmed that operatives would have done better if they were properly funded with enough resources to take care of their logistic and technical support, as well as their professional development. One participant (P2) stated:

Training and equipment are what we have been talking about since the problem of terrorism started. A professional soldier's morale is boosted when he sees new and sophisticated weapons to fight the enemy with. He is also happy when he is given more professional training, for better performance. The icing on the cake is when, in addition to all these, his welfare is being seen as important, and he is properly compensated for all the risks and efforts he has put in.

While describing barriers, one participant pointed out that terrorism in Nigeria exceeds the struggle for the actualization of ideologies and social rights. He insists that

there are other actors involved, who enjoy the benefits of disputes in Nigeria, and described some individuals, groups, politicians and government employees who fuel disputes because of their personal gains from the disputes. This aligns with Maruyama and Hallahan's (2017) position that resources for terrorist activities are generated through criminal activities or abuse of legitimate undertakings. This means that for the benefits derived from these illegitimate transactions, some individuals get profits and must keep the dispute aflame to ensure their investments keep yielding results. The participant (P6) stated:

This problem is a business venture for some people that is why it cannot stop. The more terrorism exists, the more money some people will make. Recently the president of Nigeria gave 100 billion Nigerian Naira to a new form of terrorist groups (Fulani Herdsmen) as funds for the consideration to quit terrorist acts. Expect that another group that wants theirs will evolve in a short while. Meanwhile, this is also a good opportunity for corrupt public officers to make money from the disbursement of these funds.

Emergent Subtheme 2: Stakeholder Cooperation

Subtheme 2 *stakeholder cooperation* emerged as participants recounted their role in engaging terrorists during operations, giving accounts of the importance of cooperating with other military and civilian stakeholders toward a common goal. When asked the question about how military cooperation with community stakeholders affected counterterrorism operations, participants stated that to achieve good results, there must be cooperation with the community, as the community local security teams have useful

information and strategies to defeat terrorists in their locations. Responses presented captured mental conversations in the minds of participants about their actions as individuals, and their behavior as actors involved in curbing terrorism.

Participant views on their role behaviors support Spalek's (2010) position that partnerships between communities and counterterrorism operatives provide important cultural and verbal insights, vital information and cooperation, and informed observations that can become part of a productive strategy for terror crime prevention and solution. One participant (P7) stated: I tried to make the military understand that without the community support and participation in counterterrorism in my locality, success rate will be poor.

Another participant (P6) mentioned:

We know the in and out of our community and also know those who are not part of us. We know those of us too, who are connected with terrorists so it is easy to deal with such situations if the operatives give us their full support and cooperation.

Another participant (P4) stated:

It will be difficult to cooperate with soldiers. Many people are scared of the military. Some of them are not rational in their behavior so they can kill innocent people before realizing that they are not terrorists. For this reason, a lot of community members who could have been of good use in the fight against terrorism run from soldiers when they approach them.

One participant expressed his worries on the lack of inter-service cooperation amongst the military and security agencies, and the negative impact it has yielded regarding the fight against terrorism. The participant (P3) stated:

Proper orientation should be given to operatives of all the military and security agencies involved in this mission. We all should understand that we are one in this battle. We all need to understand that there is a common goal, and that it is to end terrorism. In this way, we all can identify ways we can contribute to the fight against terrorism, as a collective body. For example, the Immigration Service should work with the Police, Military, Community, and other stakeholders to ensure that terrorists are kept from passing through our borders to help local terrorists gain strength.

Another participant (P5) affirmed that:

Actually, there is an on-going battle of supremacy between agencies assigned to combat terrorism. If this continues, the terrorists will keep gaining the upper hand. The Police claims it is not their responsibility to fight terrorists, the Army on the other hand cannot tolerate the Police in joint operations as the Police is known to have professional conduct issues. There has to be a way to bring all these agencies to work together, to achieve the focus of defeating terrorists.

An interesting response was shared by one participant in response to a question on his suggestions on how policymakers can contribute to the counterterrorism drive. He (P1) stated:

There should be laws to form an agency for counterterrorism which will extract agents from various sub-agencies and put together under one umbrella with a great administrative structure. It will be difficult to have the problems that we see now, in this case. I think it would be a better way of putting agents to work together without having issues.

The participant (P1) noted that conversations of this sort are impactful and will help redirect the focus of operatives toward the goal of ending terrorism in Nigeria. Finally, the last response to the probing question on if the government is encouraging the kidnapping of victims by terrorists due to the governments compromise in paying huge ransom to terrorists, the participant (P1) stated:

Compare where we were in 2004 and where we are now. Things have become terrible now because the government has been paying ransoms since then. Things did not get better. Rather, people saw kidnapping as lucrative and thousands of cases of kidnapping for ransom have occurred since 2007. This happens because ransoms are being paid. The most enticing one is from the government as the latest payment of ransom to terrorist by Nigerian government is the highest so far. 100 billion Naira have just been given out to terrorists by the government without a joint consensus by all security forces involved in counterterrorism, to confirm that this was the best approach. Some of us believe that if that money was used to

upgrade the military and initiate other counterterrorism strategies, it would have been a better venture.

During member checking, participants confirmed the accuracy of transcripts and repeated succinct versions of the initial responses, during the follow-up sessions. In summary, participant believed that deep collaborative efforts will positively impact the effectiveness of their roles as counterterrorist agents.

Emergent Subtheme 3: Setting Clear Expectations

The subtheme *setting clear expectations* validates the view that setting clear expectations and monitoring results is an important recipe for success in organizations or in operations (Holguin, 2016). Participants understood the value of communicating instructions that will align with set goals while executing meaningful and effective operational strategies to defeat terrorists. This idea conforms to Hersey and Blanchard's (2000) directing situational leadership style that provides clearly defined followership tasks. This subtheme emerged following participants repeated references to proper and authorized channel of communication, as obtainable within the military and security agencies. Participants mentioned that setting clear expectations and proper supervision in operational field is another component for success, only if those setting these expectations have a clear understanding of the situation, as well as the required knowledge and experience to supervise.

One participant (P2) stated:

I have seen situations where those giving instructions to troops do not know what they want. Young officers who have no experience are brought to operation areas

and are expected to lead soldiers who have gained experience over the years. Such instructions will not be carried out because the soldier knows the officer has no experience. His wrong instructions may lead troops into ambush so there is a problem.

For people to be in a position to give clear instructions with expectations, they must have enough knowledge and experience. Participants agreed therefore that those given the mandate to set expectations should be properly trained in advanced counterterrorism techniques, and allowed to gain some experience that will empower them with enough knowledge for the responsibility. A participant (P1) stated emphatically:

Most times we are given instructions on the expectations of the military, we get the same instructions every day and every time. No new sets of expectations. It is as if we are working with a template. This clearly shows that commanders expect that troops should go into the field and bring back results based on the situation they find themselves. Their instructions are always “ensure you defeat the enemy. In my view, a complete overhaul should be done in terms of training and development of those who lead operations.

Capacity-building interventions help reduce counter-productivity (Manzoor, Arif & Hassan, 2015). This applies also in combat situations. One participant described how he used his own time and money to build himself through online short courses on capacity building strategies. He (P1) stated:

I now understand certain ways to achieve results based on instructions that I give to subordinates. Not everything we do on the field was taught while we were in training. Most of the courses we attend as well, do not give us what we need to achieve results in peculiar cases like terrorism. Not too many operatives like me will want to spend his own money and time to develop himself, so the military has to work out ways to develop us.

Another participant (P2) said:

Setting expectations seem unreal to me because you only expect results when you know you have worked hard towards a certain goal. We are not well trained, we do not have good weapons, we are not treated well, and yet our superiors want results. Some are actually good at giving instructions that do not bring results. We have had commanders that escaped and left their men in distress, resulting from poor instructions.

Participant's responses showed that giving instructions and setting expectations to achieve success is vital but this can only be achieved with proper knowledge and understanding of the situation and sufficient experience to set goals that are enhanced by nurturing productive behavior by operatives.

Emergent Subtheme 4: Understanding Roles and Obligations

The emergence of this subtheme *understanding roles and obligations* developed from responses shared by participants about their role experience as occupants of leadership positions responsible for driving performance during operations, and managing operative's behavior. For those in supervisory roles, their effectiveness

managing troops was linked with the understanding of their responsibility to ensure compliance of team members with acceptable instructions, using operational guidelines.

As one of the participants said: "We are responsible for ensuring that troops get all they require for effective performance, they are in top shape physically and they are in good spirit."

Participants presented a shared commitment on the need for driving performance and a clear understanding of their responsibilities over troops and operational assignments. They appreciate that unclear understanding of their roles and obligations toward their troops as well as operations could potentially adversely impact the behavior and performance of troops they are responsible for. One participant (P1) explained this during our interview:

My role with troops is well understood as I have very clear and direct instructions. Our role basically, is to go on operations to engage terrorists in combat and to neutralize as many as possible, with little or no casualty on our side. It is very important to me that my team is successful, we hit our targets and all my men return with me. The problem is not about understanding my roles or my obligation to my men. The issue is do we get all we need to meet up with the obligations and then, our expectations? Though we know what to do, we do not have the empowerment to be controlling over our troops. This is a huge operational flaw.

Campbell et al. (2016) affirmed that those in supervisory positions have contractual and legal obligations to safeguard the interests of their subordinates, and control personnel under supervision. An operational team leader participant found it

natural to understand and perform his responsibilities in relation to controlling troops' activities and behavior. The participant (P1) described this vividly during our interview:

My role, under normal situations is to take full charge and control over my soldiers while ensuring that they are also protected. In this case, I cannot be sure of either of these obligations. Though I clearly understand my roles, it is difficult to comply with them at this time where soldiers are not taken care of. They are always grumbling, threatening their superiors and being generally rude. You cannot blame them as they have families and rights as humans though they are soldiers. Part of my responsibility is to ensure that the soldiers go into battle with effective weapons and in guarded conditions. We have cases of obsolete vehicles and weapons being supplied to us for operations against terrorists who are better equipped with better weapons and mobility. If other conditions regarding their morale were right, what I should do in this case, knowing my roles and obligations is to reject this equipment and protect my soldiers from operational hazards. However, this will amount to disobeying my superiors, and there are consequences for this.

An interview with another participant described his actions. He (P3) said:

See and act is what I call my action. Though I understand my roles and obligations to my men, all I do is to act on whatever I see. I obey the orders that come from above but use my discretion to avert disaster for my men. That is the best I can do for them at this point where we are handicapped by lack of proper kitting.

Leaders of operations understood that their role in the mitigation of terrorism required equitable enforcement tasks within their teams. As one participant (P2) described it:

Though there are all the issues of troops not being properly taken care of, the fact remains that there cannot be more than one captain on a boat. The military is known for discipline, and superior officers are mandated to enforce tasks with stern instructions. Without this, there will be problems when troops go for operations and superior's instructions are flaunted. The entire team can be thrown into jeopardy, leading to massive casualty. This may actually be the reason for high casualty rates in operational areas but since nobody comes back to tell the story in most cases, it is unknown if this issue should be given serious considerations.

Though participants agreed that having a clear understanding of their responsibilities in counterterrorism operations facilitates effective enforcement and performance, some expressed an aversion toward the approach of superior officers in assigning and supervising tasks during operations. As one participant (P5) stated:

We are all fighting towards the same goal on the field. Why are some people chosen for risky jobs and others are kept back at the headquarters? Nepotism has set it so it will be difficult for superiors to give instructions that will be followed when things are not done the right way. It is only when the right things are done that a leader commands the respect he deserves. Without that we will keep having problems.

There were participants who indicated an understanding of supervisory responsibilities for helping team leaders manage their tasks, and efficiently enhance their performance in counterterrorism operations. One participant stated:

We are different from the military and I believe our kind of training differs from theirs. While theirs is to forcefully achieve tasks in most cases, ours is to professionally apply strategies to ensure that work is done in the best achievable way. I am of the opinion that operational management should be introduced, where trained operatives in an incident command system help team leaders to manage their assignments.

Others noted that as they are held accountable for team members under their command, the position requires that they have a clear understanding of their responsibilities. As one participant (P3) described it:

Having a clear understanding of roles means ideal training, not just in military operations. Operational heads have to be trained in leadership and managerial skills to boost their productivity. The military keeps it within the military. I think Nigerian military and security forces should learn to go outside their comfort zones, to get knowledge that will help them increase their rate of productivity.

Participant's with supervisory roles' descriptions of their lived experiences revealed that having excellent knowledge and understanding of managerial duties and obligations, as well as a commitment to driving performance will enhance their role performance activities. No additional information was provided by participants who also

agreed with the interviews transcripts and themes development, during member-checking.

Emergent Subtheme 5: Using Available Resources

This subtheme *using available resources* emerged from responses participants offered, indicating that the use of resources that are physically available can aid operatives to be more effective in their role performance. Participants expressed feelings of dissatisfaction with the regular complaints of lack of equipment in terms of weapons, vehicles, and ammunition. Some participants indicated that there are weapons and ammunition manufacturing companies in Nigeria, as such, the government should acquire these supplies from them rather than cause long delays through the importation of weapons and ammunitions from other countries. In agreement with UNDG (2017), theory of change provides interventions that are expected to lead to a specific development change. Using the available resources that relate to gaps available in effectively fighting terrorism, the government of Nigeria can take advantage of these resources to fill such breaches.

Participant (P3) described how their jobs can be made much easier by utilizing the resources already available.

We have the Defense Industries Corporation that produces weapons and ammunition, yet we cry of lack of these items during operations. We have vehicle manufacturing companies, natural water, and food in abundance yet these supplies are part of those always being mentioned as lacking. When we ask they talk about importing supplies as if we do not have them in Nigeria. The government should

start from somewhere. Allow us use what we have first, then we can improve on them.

In response to a follow-up question to clarify meaning, a participant (P1) elaborated his point in the following way:

The government does not need to create a separate budgets for weapons for the military when they provide the same budgets to the Defense Industries Corporation (DIC). They already pay for these weapons through the allocation of budgets. They should ask the DIC to supply these items to operatives.

Another participant (P2) described how Nigerian vehicle manufacturing plants could help reduce the problems of mobility during operations.

Mobility in operational areas is a huge problem. We have situations where troops were killed because vehicles carrying troops got bad and troops were ambushed. Rather than spending a lot of money importing bulletproof vehicles, the military can acquire vehicles that are locally made. There are companies that also do bulletproof cars. We should not have problems with mobility of troop

A different opinion came from a participant who felt differently about buying products from Nigerian companies. A participant said: I do not agree that we should compromise standards for issues as serious as this. If we have to spend money, we should buy good products no matter how expensive they are.

Similarly, another participant (P5) stated:

I do not mind if we buy products from countries outside Nigeria if only these items are really bought. The problem here is that government claims they spend a

lot of money whereas we on the field do not receive any item they claim to have bought. I think it is better we spend the money on locally manufactured products. We all know the companies these contracts will be assigned to so, they must deliver or risk being classified as terrorists themselves.

One more participant described using natural resources in exchange for required tools to fight terrorism. The participant (P6) stated:

If this country truly wanted to acquire these items to fight terrorism, it would have been done long ago. Most oil producing countries do not use cash to buy things like weapons. Goods are exchanged with natural resources that the country has. The cash involved in purchases made from Nigeria are never used to buy these weapons. The story always ends with something happening to the transaction, the money not getting back, and attempts to recover the money through court cases that last forever.

Emergent Subtheme 6: Working with Unclear Mitigation Policies

The subtheme *working with unclear mitigation policies* emerged during participant's responses about the effectiveness of the implementation and enforcement of acceptable military and counterterrorist policies in an unfriendly environment. Security agencies continue to struggle with issues relating to balancing operatives rights and needs, for performance and protection against liabilities that create uncertainties in mitigation policies (Cox, Goette, & Young, 2005). Participants expressed feelings of frustration with having ambiguous terrorism mitigation policies within their various security agencies. As one participant (P3) stated:

It appears that we are all confused as to what the policies on counterterrorism are. Various security agencies have different policies that at times, clash with each other. This causes contention between these agencies and of course, when four or more security agencies are put together to achieve one aim with different policies, there will be confusion in that camp.

Other participants reported that within their organizations, terrorism mitigation policies were unclear or unknown. One participant (P2) acknowledged having a policy in place but noted a lack of understanding and seriousness when he stated:

These policies put in by the government are there but nobody emphasizes on them. We do not know what exactly to do with terrorist except to kill them the way they also slaughter soldiers. When we do, some human rights groups make noise all over the media. We have never been told not to kill terrorists. We are aware that there are policies on handling terrorists, as well as on operations regarding terrorism but all we are asked to do is go out and kill the terrorists.

One participant described how an organizations' policies favored a carefully selected group of ex terrorists, and the families and friends of public officers working in that organization. The participant (P6) stated:

It amazes me how people joke with policies set in place by government. As serious and tedious as it is to come up with policies, public officers mess around with them. The policy on the Niger Delta Amnesty Program of 2007 was aimed at rehabilitating former militants who played roles in terrorism activities, from the Niger Delta region. This policy seemed good but became unclear as only a

selected few were made to benefit temporarily from it by participating in vocational training programs that were of no use to them. The militants are back now because they were not rehabilitated rather, their leaders were compensated financially. This whole thing is unclear to everyone who thought it was a good strategy to curb terrorism in the Niger Delta, through youth empowerment.

Another participant noted that the policy on rotation of soldiers to combat areas is also unclear.

A participant (P2) stated:

Some of us are kept in mission fields for many years while others are in peaceful cities enjoying themselves. We all signed for the same military job. While some are in battle areas for two years and moved, others are there for over five years till they get killed. We need to understand the rotation policy so that if we are to fight for two years and leave, our minds would be made up for that period of time.

When we see others leave us in battle areas, we get discouraged. There are thousands of discouraged soldiers in the battle field.

Emergent Subtheme 7: Staying Current with Counterterrorism Advancements

The subtheme *staying current with counterterrorism advancements* emerged as participants described how technological advancement had improved the strategies and combat skills of terrorists, and how the advancement in current counterterrorism studies and experience would enhance better results in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. Some participants felt it was important to keep abreast with advancements to facilitate a better understanding of terrorist's behavior. By this, operatives may understand and

predict the next move of terrorists, just like forensic profilers do with other criminals, helping to prevent or reduce the effects of terrorism.

Participants felt that keeping current with technology, updates and upgrades, operatives would be more proactive with their mitigation strategies. One participant (P1) stated:

Terrorists are ten steps ahead of us in technology and knowledge in terrorism and counterterrorism. It is clear that they understand our next move, through their knowledge of the thoughts of counterterrorist's, and their ability to cajole members of our team to give them useful information on our operations.

Terrorists spend good money to get advanced training abroad while we remain here deceiving ourselves that we are counterterrorist's.

Another participant (P1) stated:

Training on counterterrorism operations and strategies should go beyond chasing terrorists in the forest. We rate our level of success by the number of terrorists we kill in operations. We kill five terrorists and you see it all over the social media with so much fanfare. We should think of better ways to end terrorism by moving with a better trend of counterterrorism strategies. Of course I know that it is important to engage terrorists in combat but that is only one strategy out of many.

I am only speculating now because I do not know the others as I have not received any special training in counterterrorism except for combat engagements.

Other participants acknowledged how technological advancements can aid improvement in individual daily experiences. One participant (P3) stated:

Technological advancement does not necessarily mean we must be sent abroad. The technology can be brought into Nigeria to meet us. I have heard of simulators that can train counterterrorist's and make their experiences appear real. I am sure that a lot of soldiers do not even know the meaning of simulators. Another problem is that when huge budgets are made for these equipment and they are eventually bought, their use may not be guaranteed. I am aware that the Nigerian Air Force has aircraft simulators that have been installed and for many years, but have not been touched. The bottom line however, is to ensure that we are updated to meet up with the current trend in counterterrorism activities.

Discrepant Cases

All participants gladly responded to interview questions, providing useful details on their roles and activities regarding counterterrorism operations and strategies applied. All participants were cooperative, and none of them refused to respond to any of the interview questions. During my interview transcripts reviews, two discrepant cases where participant responses were considerably different from the responses of other participants were identified. The first was where a participant felt that he was enlisted to serve the nation in whatever situation he finds himself. He explained that the military owned him, as such, he cannot find any fault with his organization. Rather he affirmed that he ready to go for any mission wherever he is assigned to, and that he does not care if his return is not guaranteed.

In the second instance, the participant stated that he does not need any more knowledge than that which his superiors already have. He was of the opinion that since

he has more exposed superiors, they should do the reasoning for him and simply send him on missions, with instructions. All participants presented detailed examples of experiences encountered during counterterrorism operations. Responses from the other six participants to the interview question on experiences with the operations, and the impact of the strategies on their performance described their experiences as either dumbfounding, disappointing, or a nightmare.

In contrast, the participant offered no specific experience even after probing further, during the interview. His positions and postings since his enlistment offered him no opportunity to gain any experience in counterterrorism strategies and operations. This explained his inability to share experiences of precise instances relating to counter insurgency operations.

The Essence of Participants' Experiences

The essence of participant's experience is to depict the meanings participants attributed based on actual accounts of their roles with counterterrorist strategies. This description provides a combination of the textural and structural participant descriptions regarding their experiences. Participants comprised of counterterrorist operatives, victims of terrorism, policymakers and former terrorists shared stories related to their role perceptions, role behaviors, and role performance within the perspective of evaluating counterterrorism strategies.

They shared their beliefs, feelings, and thoughts about their role in or with counterterrorism strategies, and suggested that the most important control activity required the development of counterterrorism strategies through training. Counterterrorist

operatives require good knowledge and understanding of their role in counterterrorist operations, to help set clear expectations, recognize unproductive and jeopardizing activities, and ensure intervention is achieved with necessary support (Schalow et al., 2013). Most participants exhibited a low level of confidence with their organization and the government. Sharing their experiences therefore, will highlight most of the flaws that may have been concealed from authorities as a result of fear of being reprimanded by higher authorities. This may be addressed, resulting in positive impacts that would be significantly enhanced by increased levels of operative's performance.

Each participant understood that counterterrorism operations require supervision and leadership by professionals, trained in the act of modern terrorism and counterterrorism studies. Additionally, participants viewed the mitigation of terrorism issues from a performance perspective, and combining observation with verbal persuasion. Having a personal commitment to driving performance and an understanding of the responsibility for controlling the act of terrorism is essential for all operatives assigned to this task.

Finally, participants viewed an understanding developing effective counterterrorism strategies, along with manpower development and the provision of adequate and necessary supplies, as useful enhancers for performance and effectiveness.

Summary

In Chapter 4, a description of the research setting, participant demographics, participant recruitment, data collection, data analysis process, and evidence of measures used to establish trustworthiness were presented. Information about the results of the data

analysis used to uncover the meaning participants ascribed to their role in counterterrorism operations was also provided. In this chapter also, details on the thematic development process used to derive the essences of participant experiences were offered, and discrepant cases identified during data analysis were discussed. In Chapter 5, a description of how the results of the study contribute to the body of knowledge on the development of effective counterterrorism strategies will be offered. The chapter includes information on the study's limitations and its influence on trustworthiness. Chapter 5 ends with recommendations for future research and implications of the study from a social change perspective.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

In this chapter offers, I review the study's purpose, the methods used to aid findings, and an outline of the results. I discuss the theoretical frameworks effect on the interpretation process from a post-data analysis viewpoint and the study's limitations and its influence on trustworthiness. I concluded this chapter with recommendations for further research and a discussion of the impact of the study from a social change standpoint.

Overview

This study was intended to explore the lived experiences of counterterrorist agents, former terrorists, and victims of terrorism with a view to understanding the strategies being applied in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria to ascertain the reasons the problem persists after years of terrorist engagement. I chose to conduct this study because of the persistent nature of this problem and its global spread, despite several and continuous attempts by various stakeholders to curb its menace. The study specifically focuses on the strategies applied by counterterrorist agents, to neutralize terrorists, eradicate and cushion the effects of terrorism.

I used a qualitative research method for this study, and a phenomenological method that involved practices aimed at enabling the unraveling of knowledge. I provided an all-inclusive framework that allows the broad examination of complex issues related to a lived experience (Khan, 2014). The primary focus of this study is to obtain the lived experiences of stakeholders knowledgeable in the application of counterterrorist

strategies used against terrorists in Nigeria. The quantitative method would not provide an accurate view of participants lived experiences and a broad description of the issue (Yilmaz, 2013).

This study is groundbreaking as a leading research effort designed to explore the effects of counterterrorist strategies on insurgency in Nigeria using theoretical frameworks that draw from the critical and resource dependence theories. Existing research on counterterrorism continues to hover around the effects of terrorism on society and the development of military or combat strategies against terrorists. This study stretches the knowledge on counterterrorism engagement by providing insights on the applied strategies used in combating terrorists, and the effects they have on insurgency with a view to developing workable and more effective approaches.

Interpretation of the Findings

The aim of descriptive phenomenology is to recount the significant and meaningful essences of issues that rely mainly on the rich textual data from participant responses (Giorgi, 2012). As discussed in Chapter 2, current research studies have focused largely on the socioeconomic effects of terrorism in Nigeria, emphasizing its effect on education, culture, economy, and the social wellbeing of citizens. In terms of the research question and counterterrorism strategies applied in curbing terrorism in Nigeria and their effects on insurgency, the findings of this study helped outspread knowledge on the roles of all stakeholders involved in the fight against terrorism and the development of effective strategies to be used in this process.

Horkheimer's (1937) critical theory and Pfeffer & Salancik's (1978) resource dependence theory served as tools of engagement guiding the data collection plan, and revealing information during data analysis. The symbolic interactionist worldview helped prompt the multiple realisms of participants through interaction and lived experiences while the symbolic interactionist lens provided the discovery of influences that shaped participants' perceptions about their role in counterterrorism (Blumer, 1969).

Reviewing the effects of counterterrorism strategies involves a continuous process of periodic monitoring of operative performance, the use of functional interventions to support and strengthen the goals of operatives, and various blends of ideas developed in between. The routine of counterterrorist operatives entails daily activities that aid the advancement of a working knowledge of a terrorism framework, as well as knowledge and experience in counterterrorism activities that in turn foster the development of effective measures against insurgents.

The results provided a window through which other researchers might understand the reasons behind the poor performances of counterterrorist agents, and their inability to end terrorism in Nigeria based on their first-hand experiences with the application of the strategies being used to engage terrorists. Traditional understanding of counterterrorism in Nigeria is the use of military force to engage terrorists in combat. However, this study proves that the approach of engaging terrorists to apply other tactics are weighty with flaws; there are weak strategies in place, complementing combat engagement. The participants shared their perceptions on their roles, experiences, and performances within the context of alleviating terrorism in Nigeria.

The main findings of this study helped identify and highlight the significance of the roles of all stakeholders involved in the war against terrorism and the recognition of necessities required to equip the actors in counterterrorism to aid efforts aimed at ending terrorism. I identified four key components resulting in the failure of the existing strategies being applied by counterterrorist operatives. The themes summarizing the flaws related to the war against terrorism in Nigeria include (a) measuring the performance of counterterrorism agents, (b) government interventions, (c) corruption, and (d) understanding the terrorism framework. Seven subthemes emerged under measuring the performance of counterterrorism agents and understanding terrorism framework.

Subthemes representing the different elements of experiences embraced by participants during their encounters with the application of counterterrorism strategies by operatives include (a) counterterrorism mitigation barriers, (b) stakeholder cooperation, (c) setting clear expectations, (d) understanding roles and obligations, (e) using available resources, (f) working with unclear mitigation policies, and (g) staying current with counterterrorism advancement. The findings support the view that although the combat personnel trained to engage terrorists play a key role in the drive to eliminate terrorism, other vital roles must be added to their efforts by developing effective strategies ensuring stakeholders' intervention and genuine commitment to the fight against insurgency. The key players in the fight against terrorism require a sense of obligation and an understanding of their specific roles and the impact these will cause to the nation.

The first theme, measuring the performance of counterterrorism agents, was the most important because of the need to assess the performance of operatives, and create an understanding that their failure is attributed to a reason.

The results of this study highlighted operatives' experiences and thoughts about their role in the efforts aimed at curbing terrorism. The roles of counterterrorist's involve a stream of responsibilities that require urgent intervention from all arms of government, with an aim of reviewing the conditions of operatives that have resulted in them losing the zeal to engage terrorists, as well as the resulting failure in a greater percentage of operations with the same goal. The results revealed that operatives had a low level of morale due to neglect, shortage or lack of necessary logistic support, and poor equipping of combat operatives with tools and machinery required for effective engagement.

The second theme, government interventions, proved to be an important recipe for the success in the fight against terrorism, as the government is required to pull all its resources (human and material) to intervene in the terrorism situation in Nigeria. Participants complained of neglect and a carefree attitude toward the needs of operatives to ensure the effective engagement of terrorists. The various arms of government have their roles to play in the intervention process. Laws must be passed to ensure that strict measures are taken to provide essential tools for operatives. Additionally, laws must be passed on strict punitive measures for public officers and those in authority who expose operatives to the imminent dangers of engaging a better equipped terrorist force. The executive arm of government also has a role to play by ensuring it meets all obligations to prepare operatives for engagement with terrorists and to enhance their role performance.

The theme, corruption, proved to be an important element negatively impacting the operatives. The theme confirmed Bamidele et al.'s (2013) findings that corruption hinders the development of a nation and destroys its citizens even in the midst of wealth. Data from this study revealed that a large chunk of the blame for poor logistic support and lack of proper equipping of operatives is due to perceived corruption among government officials, where hundreds of millions of dollars allocated for weapons and other support materials are diverted to private bank accounts (Tufts, 2019).

Stringent measures must be taken to provide for operatives, through honest means, while safeguarding the financial resources of the nation. The government must take advantage of their control of the nation's economy and be more effective in their obligated role in ending terrorism.

The theme understanding terrorism framework confirmed the findings of Rihal (2017) suggesting that senior operatives' responsibilities for controlling team members necessitate a clear understanding of terrorism and the counterterrorism framework. The data in this study proved that operatives have little or no clue about terrorism and counterterrorism framework and strategic thinking and development of modern tactics that equate to the knowledge of the terrorists. This knowledge and experience can be obtained through professional training to upgrade the status of operatives to exceed that of terrorists who continuously update their training. The first step in defeating terrorists is understanding the mind of the terrorist and staying a step ahead. Based on the data, it is clear that terrorists change their strategies to throw the military off balance while the military adopts the same obsolete strategy of combat engagement.

The subtheme terrorism mitigation barriers revealed that terrorism mitigation barriers adversely impact the role of operatives in curbing terrorism, and that barriers to the mitigation process must be removed. The refusal to remove these barriers implies that the state of security in Nigeria may worsen. Some actors benefit from crisis periods all over the world; in Nigeria, crisis are generated or fueled to sustain an illegal means of financial benefits.

The subtheme stakeholder cooperation depicts participants' beliefs about the need for all stakeholders to work together towards defeating terrorists. As it stands, various organizations are assigned to fight terrorism from different viewpoints. Some vital stakeholders (the community) are not involved in the strategic planning and execution of counterterrorism projects. A challenge is created when there is disunity in a camp, or when a team is incomplete. Everyone has a role to play and has a strategy that may be effective if it is jointly assessed, refined, and properly executed.

Observation and verbal persuasion are important mechanisms that positively impact the effectiveness of the role of performance driving acceptable terms to work as a team toward achieving the same goal.

The subthemes setting clear expectations indicated that distinct expectations are required to meet specified goals. Data collected proved that some of the commanders are unclear what instructions to give troops regarding what they expect. Without proper tools and a high level of morale, it is difficult to set goals. These subthemes suggest the need for a multi-faceted approach where troop dynamics are overhauled, and troops are

empowered, equipped with strategic goals, and briefed with specific tasks aimed at bringing results.

Using available resources, one of the subthemes that emerged during data analysis, is an important part of equipping operatives with essential tools. A nation's wealth is meant to provide the backing and support it requires for peace and development. Nigeria has natural resources expected to be used as a means of exchange for all the weapons required in fighting terrorism. The government must drive productivity in this area through strategic business deals that will ensure the nation acquires all it needs to maintain.

The subtheme understanding roles and obligations emerged after participant responses suggested they had been disregarded by the government. They had the impression that the government did not avail itself with playing its role in ensuring that all needed to end terrorism in Nigeria was provided. The data collected suggests that the government does not see it as obligated to end terrorism, as such, and the issue is being handled without serious commitment. This implies that government and its officials and agents are responsible for the peace of citizens and must address their responsibilities and be held accountable.

Working with unclear mitigation policies was the next subtheme that emerged during data analysis. Operatives must have a good grasp of their role in the mitigation of terrorism, and policymakers must come up with clear and useful mitigation policies, void of political interferences. Working with unclear terrorism mitigation policies adversely impacts their performance.

The last subtheme, staying current with counterterrorism advancements, impacts the operatives' ability to mitigate terrorism in Nigeria. Professional advancements continue to transform the lives of humans with increasing levels of integration into day-to-day functioning. An understanding of new professional developments enables the practical advancement of new strategies aimed at curbing terrorism. In general, staying current with professional advancement in counterterrorism presents opportunities for a blend of proactive and reactive approaches to mitigation. Professional development in the form of training and capacity building is a necessity for upgrading operatives.

Limitations of the Study

This study addressed only the strategies applied by counterterrorist's and their effects on insurgency. The research setting for this study was confined to the application of strategies against terrorist sects such as Boko Haram and the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta, in Nigeria. Having a wider context with a participant pool drawn from other regions in Nigeria affected by terrorism may have been useful to this study. Another limitation resulted from the use of face-to-face and telephone interviews as the primary method for data collection. I addressed this limitation by triangulating data sources, merging interview data with data from interview notes, and using reflective journals.

Although I had served in the military, it is important to note that all the participants who currently serve in the military had no direct contact with me during my period of service, and as such, there was no undue pressure exerted on them to influence the interviews. In my opinion, they gave true and honest responses; in comparison with

the other participants, their transcripts did not provide more positive information. Additionally, I did not encounter any challenge about undue familiarity that may have influenced the objectivity of responses during the period of my assignment with all participants. One participant who was well known to me and indicated his willingness to participate, was eliminated during the pre-selection process.

Recommendations

The focus for this study was on gaining an understanding of the strategies used in counterterrorism operations in Nigeria and the reasons they have failed to yield positive results, many years after the engagement of terrorists by operatives of the counterterrorist formations of Nigeria, as well as other supporting West African countries. The interest in exploring the strategies used emanated from the failure of counterterrorism operatives to provide effective solutions to terrorism mitigation. The results of this study have provided a number of recommendations that can be used in Nigeria or as a template for counterterrorism strategies in other countries experiencing terrorism.

First, it is important that the welfare of operatives becomes a priority in the fight against terrorism. A proper welfare package should therefore be worked out for operatives, to ensure that their morale level is always in high. To keep them active always, a rotational plan where operatives are left on the battle field for 18 months only should be put in place. This will keep them agile, and renew the momentum of attacks every time a new set of operatives are replaced. The welfare package should also include effective fighting tools, vehicles, and combat kitting to ensure that casualty level is

reduced by a considerable percentage, and that the fire power of the operatives far exceeds that of the terrorists.

It is also required that operatives are brought up to speed with the knowledge of terrorism and counterterrorism, to give them an understanding that there are other strategies that may work better than combat, though physical combat is necessary to protect lives and property of citizens, and to neutralize the attack of terrorists. Through training, knowledge of modern counterterrorism strategies can be acquired so that they can equally be applied by operatives, in situations where they can prevent or de-radicalize terrorists without deadly force. By this, terrorists may reduce their attacks, realizing that a refined approach in counterterrorism is being applied.

Counterterrorism communities should also be created across the nation with teams comprising the military, law enforcement and the community. This way, vital and fast information will be received, and the best local approach will be used in dealing with the situation. For these communities, periodic training programs should be conducted for upgrade, and in turn, terrorism periodic awareness training programs should also be conducted for other members of the community. This have a dual purpose of educating members of the community on how to detect signs of likely terror attacks, and the steps to take to report to authorities immediately. It will also help in educating the youths to give them enough understanding to have reasons to reject manipulation and attempts at recruiting them into terrorist sects.

Because poverty and lack of knowledge seems to play a major role in terrorism development, education for children and youths must be provided by the government, and

vocational training to empower youths should be introduced into schools. Islamic schools should also have vocational training programs introduced into them, and should have a monitoring system with government involvement. Because over 53 percent of children in rural areas only attain a level of education before dropping out to look for trades to learn, this will be a way of providing trades for them early enough for them to become self-reliant (UNICEF, 2013). From the past experience with the Niger Delta Amnesty Program, careful selection of vocations that will be meaningful to these youths, and provide the expected results must be selected.

As a result of the rivalry between the military and other security agencies, a neutral Counterterrorist Force should be set up with its own well-structured administrative system. Operatives from the armed forces, police, all other security and paramilitary organizations, and members of community watch groups should be neutralized from their services and drafted into this independent and strategically created organization. Intense training and education must be given to provide a clearly new orientation to equip them with the complete understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as the modern strategies to prevent, neutralize terrorism, and sustain peace in Nigeria.

Once all these structures are in place, the government must discontinue negotiations with terrorists that lead to the transfer of wealth to them and their agents. One of the terrorists' strategies when they are low on logistic supplies and cash funding is to kidnap innocent victims for ransom. By providing this cash to terrorists, the government is strengthening their operations and allowing it to survive. A strong stance

must therefore be taken by the government to weaken this strategy, and make kidnapping of victims less viable for terrorists.

In strengthening the counterterrorism strategies, the legislature should enact laws that deal decisively with corrupt public officials that divert funds meant for security operations. This will discourage corruption that harms the entire nation. Strict laws like forfeiture of entire wealth and long prison terms will serve as a deterrent to others. Laws that condemn terrorists should also be enforced, to keep them out of the society forever. This will make terrorism less attractive, reduce the population of terrorists, and relegate terrorism to armed banditry which can be handled by law enforcement.

As outlined in Chapter 1, the limitations of this study provide opportunities for further research, using an alternative research approach or research instrument to gain a different perspective of the issue. Future researchers may consider collecting data, using a case study research design to gain deeper understanding of the issue, through interviewing and observation. Inclusion of observation to the researcher's data collection plan could foster the identification of observable elements not contained in this study. The researcher would be allowed an opportunity to challenge the theoretical assumptions of this study, using a case study design.

Another opportunity for future research involves the adoption of a quantitative design to further explore the relationships between maintaining situational awareness as regards the performance of counterterrorism operatives, and the policymakers and authorities directly involved in counterterrorism activity in Nigeria. Quantitative research

methods are focused on determining the link between variables in a population, uncovering the disposition of the variables, and making justifications about knowledge.

The third opportunity for future research involves taking a closer look at the barriers hindering the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies on role performance during terrorism mitigation, to uncover possible ways to resolve them. An ethnographic research design would aid the immersion of the researcher within the target populations' environment, to gain direct insight of the issue. The results of this study revealed adaptation to working with unclear counterterrorism policies. Another opportunity for future research therefore, would involve conducting research to understand the associated peculiarities. Finally, the study also indicated that reasons (such as the effect of climate change, farmers/herdsmen conflicts, boarder disputes and political rivalry) other than poverty and ideology may be responsible for keeping terrorism ablaze in Nigeria. It would be interesting to research into some of the reasons such as economic factors where organizations need to keep the war going, in order to sell weapons to warring factions. Examining the arms trade and its effects on terrorism will be an interesting subject for research.

Implications

This study provides answers to the research question, presenting the wider scope of interest on counterterrorism strategies, the management of terrorists as well as the overall organizational efforts aimed at solving the problem of terrorism in Nigeria. Apparently, the results offer several contributions to the research literature on counterterrorism strategies, emphasizing the need for counterterrorist organizations and

other stakeholders to consider redefining their functions. The results further suggest that all the stakeholders involved in the formulation and implementation of counterterrorism strategies, together, play a significant role in the mitigation of the effects of terrorism on the society.

Significance to Practice

Until recently, the focus of counterterrorism has centered on the effects of terrorism on its targets and the society at large. This study however focused on the effects of counterterrorism strategies on insurgency in Nigeria as a whole, by weighing participant's perceptions about their experiences. The outcomes of this study are therefore important to practice, as they bring to light the various other strategies that can be applied in enhancing a better understanding of their efforts in combating terrorism. Recognizing, distributing, and implementing important roles in terrorism engagement activities could help facilitate the development of clearer definitions of counterterrorism strategic engagement amongst organizations and stakeholders assigned to combat terrorism.

Significance to Theory

This research focused on the effects of counterterrorism strategies on insurgency in Nigeria. Using theoretical framework drawing from the critical and resource dependence theories enhanced the originality of the study. Collectively, the two theories facilitated a deeper understanding of the symbolic meaning players of counterterrorism strategies developed about their role in applying effective strategies in combating terrorism, and the meaning they ascribed to availing constructive criticism and adequate

resources for the human, technological and material development of stakeholders, and how that knowledge impacts their roles.

The target population of the study was agents involved in counterterrorist engagement strategies and operations, policymakers that sponsor policies affecting terrorist's engagement, victims of terrorism and former terrorists. Though some research is available on the effects of counterterrorism (e.g. Ajogbeje, Adeniyi & Folarin, 2017; Akinyetun, 2017; Ramdeen, 2017; Monga et al., 2015), they have been conducted mainly on a perspective of social effects on citizens rather than on the effects of counterterrorism strategies on insurgency as the focus, as is the case in this study.

The outcome of this study provides a window through which other researchers can understand influences, choices, and identities related to development of effective counterterrorism strategies. The study is significant to theory because it offers new knowledge that can help all stakeholders involved in counterterrorism strategy development and implementation.

Significance to Social Change

The participants involved in this study were professional counterterrorist agents, victims of terrorism, policymakers, as well as former terrorists. This study highlights ways through which some of the causes of terrorism in Nigeria can be addressed. Lack of education and intellectual exposure, poverty, and the absence of socioeconomic opportunities for majority of the youths, especially disadvantaged youths from the north and south of Nigeria are reasons for the easy recruitment of vulnerable youths and minors into terrorist sects. The results of this study suggest that educational and empowerment

programs should be taken to these affected areas, to enlighten and educate the youths to understand basic social tenets that will prevent them from being manipulated and cajoled into terrorism. Empowerment programs (skills acquisition and employment) after education and enlightenment will also be recommended, to positively occupy the youths, and make them self-reliant, to discourage them from joining terrorist groups as a means of livelihood. With the implementation of these, the society will be safer, and more investments will be established through local and foreign investors, further improving the country's economic situation, and providing more jobs. This can be a yardstick or template for other countries in similar situations with gross security challenges. Consequently, my results should broaden our knowledge on the role each of the stakeholders play either as a barrier or as an effort aimed at mitigating terrorism in Nigeria.

Conclusion

In January 2015, the media space was occupied with news of Boko Harams' attack on a military base in northern Nigeria. It was not just an attack but a massive invasion of the military base which was overrun by the terrorists. In that attack alone, hundreds of victims including wives and children of soldiers were either killed or kidnapped by the terrorists (Lambert, 2015). It was an overwhelming blow to the nation and the world at large, especially for those who hid in the comfort of the military strength and perceived ability to control terrorists and their acts. Today, terrorism has spread beyond the confines of geographical location, religion, and ethnicity, and has almost become a natural phenomenon across the country. Thousands of people are killed and

kidnapped for ransom across the country as it appears that the nation's counterterrorism forces are getting weaker by the day. There is no doubt that the military has numerical and weaponry strength but in comparison to terrorists that have overtaken Nigeria, they appear to be no match. Reports have it that soldiers flee from the battle field and disengage from military service for fear of terrorists (AlJazeera, 2014). This suggests that the terrorists are more advanced in technique, fire power and numbers, compared to the counterterrorism operatives.

In summarily analyzing the cost of damages and losses to Nigeria's economy, one would say billions of dollars have been lost through the human resources brought down by the terrorists, economic sabotage through the disruption of business activities, monies collected from government as compensations in consideration for discontinuing terrorism or as ransom in exchange for kidnapped victims, and the overall destruction of infrastructure, lives, and properties. It is in this view that the research light points on the counterterrorism agencies assigned to combat terrorism, as well as all stakeholders such as government, policymakers, high authorities of security forces and counterterrorism agencies, and the community, tasked to ensure that the job of effectively fighting terrorism in Nigeria is carried out excellently.

Despite the adoption and deployment of policies and technical mechanisms against its existence, terrorism continues to persist. The results of the effects of existing strategies on performance by counterterrorism operatives require the augmenting of existing strategies with more effective ones to enhance overall performance (Kataria, Rastogi, & Garg, 2013). It was necessary to look deep into the reasons the existing

strategies fail, and follow through with the recommendations made in this study to work out ways by which effective ones may be developed, so as to liberate Nigerians from the chains of terrorism. From the findings of this research, it is clear to admit that most of the problems related to the impact of terrorism on the nation are consciously generated problems imposed on the nation by those who were elected and appointed to govern and administer policies. Among other issues, it has been unraveled that high-level corruption, lack of developmental training of personnel, lack of knowledge of terrorism and counterterrorism framework, lack of an upgrade in combat tactics carried out by the military, and poor level of operatives' morale were reasons for the failure of operations as well as the deterioration of the military might.

The gap between evidence of the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies and the enforcement of counterterrorism policies may be due to poor supervision of bodies assigned to check the activities of policymakers and senior executives of the counterterrorism agencies. Few studies have focused on the adequacy and effectiveness of the strategies used by counterterrorism operatives aimed at mitigating the different typologies of terrorism. This study explored the effects of counterterrorism strategies on insurgency, and the roles as well as the experiences of stakeholders, during the engagement of terrorists.

Seemingly, the results of this study provide several contributions to the research literature on developing counterterrorism strategies, supporting the need for stakeholders to consider redefining their approach to the problem in Nigeria. However, to make this come to fruition, the cooperation of all entities involved, as mentioned above, must come

together as one strong team to work out effective strategies and remedies to end terrorism, eliminating self-interest and putting the nation first.

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Appendix A: Response Email to Prospective Participants with Eligibility Questions

Dear Sir/Ma'am,

Thank you for your email response. To determine your eligibility to participate, please respond via email and answer the following 'yes' or 'no' questions:

1. Did you ever serve in the military or law enforcement as counterterrorist personnel?
2. Were you ever enlisted into a terrorist sect or militant group?
3. Are you a direct victim of terrorism?
4. Are you male or female?
5. Did you work in any agency that managed terrorists in Nigeria?
6. Are you willing to candidly share your experiences and understanding about your role in terrorism/counterterrorism?

I truly appreciate your interest in participating, and look forward to reading your response.

Sincerely,

Bowie Bowei

Doctoral Student

Walden University

Appendix B: Interview Questions

Interview Questions with prompts

Interviews are semi-structured with questions and prompts designed to encourage in-depth responses from participants.

Interview Questions for terrorists/ex militants

Do you have any regrets for participating in insurgency?

What other ways do you think you can pass your message rather than through violence?

If you had a chance to undo what you have done how will you go about it?

How do you think victims of your actions feel?

Do you have suggestions that could stop the act of terrorism?

What ways did the military carry out counterterrorism operations that resulted in more attacks from insurgents?

What better ways should they have approached counterterrorism?

Do you think the government has a role to play in ending terrorism in Nigeria?

Is there a chance of ending terrorism if the government agrees with some of your terms and vice versa?

How do you think government can prevent youths from getting engaged in terrorism?

Do you have any ideas to offer to the government and counterterrorism agencies?

What was your motive in getting involved in terrorism?

Interview Questions for Victims

How has the situation you passed through affected you?

Are there things you think the government did not do to prevent the situation?

How do you think you can recover from the experience?

What ways do you think counterterrorist agencies should have carried out their operations?

Do you have any suggestions for policymakers in Nigeria regarding terrorism?

Do you expect any compensation, and how will that help you to recover?

Interview Questions for Counterterrorist agencies

How do you think you have handled the situation so far?

Do you have all it takes to fight insurgency?

What strategies other than physical combat do you apply in tackling insurgency?

How are the strategies working out?

Are there other ways you think these operations can be handled rather than by physical combat?

What difficulties do you face during operations?

Do you have enough training to handle these operations?

What areas do you think you require improvement?

How can the government help to get you better equipped for this task?

What exactly is your mission toward eradicating terrorism in Nigeria?

Further Probes

Can you tell me more about the failed operations you have carried out and why you think they failed?

Do you think the government is encouraging kidnapping victims by terrorists due to the governments' compromise in paying huge ransom to terrorists?

Is there anything else you would want me to know?