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# Framing Islamophobia and Civil Liberties: American Political Discourse Post 9/11

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# Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Walden University  
2019

Abstract

Framing Islamophobia and Civil Liberties: American Political Discourse Post 9/11

by

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MEd, Marymount University, 2005

BS, George Mason University, 2000

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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March 2019

## Abstract

Rhetorical frames are used to support political agendas, define problems, diagnose causes, make policy judgments, and suggest solutions. Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, politicians and media pundits used Islamophobia as a fear-mongering tactic to justify public policy formation. The purpose of this study was to analyze public discourse on Islamic terrorism in arguments advocating government surveillance, restrictive immigration policies, and other erosions of U.S. constitutional protections of its citizens. This study drew on the postmodern theories of Lakoff, Lyotard, and Said to critically examine U.S. political discourse on Islam and terrorism. Three conceptual rhetorical frames were examined: Clash of Civilizations, Endangered Constitutional Protections, and Islamophobia. The key research question asked how U.S. politicians and high-profile national news commentators used biased rhetoric to frame discussions of Islam and terrorism. This qualitative study used content analysis of 44 news reports of crimes that framed these incidents as Islam-inspired terrorism. Study findings suggested that defenders of the USA PATRIOT Act used a Clash of Civilizations frame that pitted Western freedom proponents against radical Muslim fanatics in struggles for social change. U.S. policy makers and news commentators described Islamic inspired terrorism as anti-American vengeance, Jihadism, and/or anti-Semitism to control national debates and information flow. Implications of these findings suggest that an alternative *Islamophobic* framing can be deployed to make biases explicit, quell anxieties of and about stigmatized groups, raise the self-esteem of the vilified minorities, and decrease the risk of terrorism.

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## Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my children, Hassan, Zeinab, and Jamal, who have shown overwhelming strength and patience throughout my academic journey.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

This dissertation is about how news agencies and political leaders in the United States framed their communications and used the media to build support for specific public policy agendas following the events of September 11, 2001. In Chapter 1, I address the theoretical framework and the significance of the dissertation. I portray U.S. policymaking as a political process that is affected by various social and economic factors and how the media systems play an integral role in shaping the social context in which policies are developed. Through the media, the public is educated on government policies that affect their daily lives; from the government's perspective, the policymakers gain informative insights on public opinion in reference to their programs and policies. Mass media acts as an intermediary between those who have an interest in influencing policies, such as interest groups, corporations, or political think tanks, and those members of the policymaking process that control the nature and scope of the political conversation and flow of information to the public.

### **Background**

In this study, I provide an analysis of discourses surrounding the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (or Patriot Act). USA PATRIOT is a backronym—an acronym designed to spell out an already existing phrase—that stands for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct The Terrorism Act of 2001.” In the following analysis, I focus on two framing schemata used in discussions of the Patriot Act when it was up for reauthorization in the

U.S. Congress in 2011. For the purpose of this dissertation, the first frame is termed the Clash of Civilizations frame and the second is the Endangered Constitutional Protections frame. In Chapter 2, I present a review the literature associated with the policymaking process in terms of balancing national security and individual liberty. Specifically, I organized this study to examine how the media communications of the members of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate framed the reauthorization of the Patriot Act in 2011 along with the crafting of anti-Islam legislation in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, also known as 9/11.

In Chapter 3, I provide a description of the methodological approach that I used in this dissertation to analyze discourses. I used the content analysis method to reveal underlying themes or frames used to structure political discourses. The analysis contrasted the ways policymakers framed their discourses in support of and in opposition to post-9/11 legislation. Content analysis revealed how these discourses perpetuated Islamophobia, on the one side, or alerted citizens to the loss of constitutional protections on the other, and how both sides claimed to use the political process to protect the life and liberty of all U.S. citizens. In my content analysis, I did not simply rely on word count but rather focused on the conclusions regarding the deep structure of the arguments. Furthermore, I drew inferences from the words and statements announced by members of the policymaking community.

In this study, I also provide an analysis of the degree to which policymakers relied upon religious and cultural stereotyping by soliciting the media to engage in spreading anti-Islamic propaganda. President George W. Bush may have revealed more than his

handlers bargained for in directly addressing the use of media to garner support for the War on Terror when he said, “See, in my line of work you’ve got to keep repeating things over and over and over again for the truth to sink in, to kind of catapult the propaganda” (Froomkin, 2005, para. 6).

### **Problem Statement**

The problem that I addressed in this study was fear mongering around Muslims and Islam in contemporary U.S. political discourse. Specifically, I focused on inflammatory language and exaggeration concerning an Islamic threat to expand government surveillance and intrusion into personal lives in the name of protecting U.S. citizens from terrorism. Few, if any, issues have been as salient a feature of concern to the United States in the post-9/11 period as terrorism. For example, according to a 2010 national poll, 79% of Americans ranked terrorism either as a serious or extremely serious threat to the nation; only the federal debt ranked as high (Gallup, 2010). The high ranking of terrorism as a concern to the U.S. people has been a consistent feature since the 9/11 attacks (Gallup, 2010). Polls further revealed that a significant segment of the U.S. population equated Muslim-Americans with support for Islamic terrorism. A 2011 CBS News/*New York Times* poll showed that one in three Americans believe that Muslim-Americans are sympathetic to Islamic terrorists (CBS, 2011). This statistic was despite the fact that 92% of Muslim-Americans said that they were not sympathetic to terrorists and considered themselves the staunchest opponents of terror attacks on civilians (Gallup, 2011).

Islamophobia in broad context has been defined as a form of racism and an unfounded fear of Islam, Muslim, and Arabs (Taras, 2013). Islamophobic attitudes in Western nations are pervasive in mass media and political life (Heibling, 2013). The United States witnessed an increase in anti-Islamic prejudice in the decade following 9/11, as was demonstrated in the surfeit of special laws and policies adopted to prevent terrorist acts perpetrated by Muslim extremists (Smith, 2013). This trend was evident in the aftermath of 9/11; staff reporters and people interviewed on television began to stereotype Muslims on the basis of imputed religious beliefs rather than bodily or physical characteristics (Taras, 2013). Islamophobia is a by-product of willful political rhetoric; thus, these attacks go right to the heart of two critically important national issues of our democracy and U.S. national security (Tamdgidi, 2012). The U.S. Constitution upholds freedom of religion for all Americans. Contending that some religions are not part of the promise of American freedoms established by the nation's founders directly challenges who the American people are as a nation (Meer & Modood, 2015).

Political framing and the use of media to spread Islamophobic rhetoric informed the methodology that I deployed in this study, in which I aimed to address the root causes of anti-Islamic bias. Domestically, this cause is similar to the American Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, as African Americans fought racial discrimination to access the liberties guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Islamophobia, like the Jim Crow laws that mandated racial segregation between African Americans and white Americans in the Southern United States from 1890 to 1965, threatens to create a subclass of citizens in the United States. This dissection of society has the potential to disrupt the domestic and



international influence of the United States as a democratic nation built on freedom of religion and equality for all.

### **Purpose of the Study**

The problem that I addressed in this study was scare-mongering in U.S. political discourse around the threat of Islamic terrorism to justify expansion of the security state and erosion of citizens' constitutional rights. My focus in this research was on public statements of politicians and pundits that have been reported in the national news media. The research paradigm to be deployed is framing analysis—an examination of language used by the proponent of a certain position to set the context in which a choice is to be made (Goffman, 1975; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). My purpose in this study was to analyze public discourse surrounding Islamic terrorism in terms of frames that have been used to argue for enhanced government surveillance, restrictive immigration policies, and other erosions of U.S. citizens' constitutional protections. My overarching purpose of this study was to explore how policymakers frame their arguments to garner broad public support for a particular political agenda.

### **Research Questions**

In this dissertation, I present a frame analysis of contemporary U.S. political discourse on several themes related to Islam, terrorism, and constitutional freedoms. I explored political discourses to address the following questions:

**Q1.** How do U.S. politicians and high-profile news commentators in the national broadcast media use of Clash of Civilizations rhetoric to frame discussions of the Islam and terrorism?

**Q2.** How does the use of such frames constitute a kind of Islamophobia?

**Q3.** How do these frames influence public opinion, spreading fear and suspicion of Muslims? And more specifically, how are such frames used to garner popular support for extreme, invasive measures by the security state?

**Q4.** How do new security measures that were instituted in the Islamophobic political climates represent a loss of traditional freedoms, such as rights to privacy and equal protection under the law for all citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious identity?

### **Theoretical Conceptual Framework for the Study**

#### **Theoretical Foundation**

The characterization of conflicts between Islamic and Western nations as a Clash of Civilizations is one that was espoused by Huntington (1993, p. 12) as the world of geopolitics experienced a shift from the Cold War mentality leaving a vacuum of uncertainty in reference to allegiance and kinship. Huntington's model may be placed in the evolving history of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. democratic profile, in terms of international relations, has been predicated by a singular ideology, meaning that the nation has adopted a singular political agenda and executed that agenda in all aspects of its interactions. From the presidency of James Monroe to the current administration of Donald Trump, each administration offered a singular vision or doctrine that has dominated the spectrum of the United States' relationship with foreign nations and the notion of domestic and international relations (Meiertöns, 2010). The Monroe Doctrine declared European states should not interfere with the affairs of sovereign nations in the Americas, the Kennedy Doctrine was concerned with the containment and defeat of

communism, and the events of 9/11 ushered in the war on terrorism and the Bush Doctrine of preemptive strikes against potential threats (Jervis, 2003). The latter finds its principles in the notion of an inevitable Clash of Civilizations that warrants the domestic and foreign actions of the United States.

Huntington's Clash of Civilizations model (1993) endeavored to offer a new paradigm of world politics. Hence, the model was primarily a theory of international relations. Huntington primarily focused on cultural-religious-civilization factors in contrast to state-centric realist theory and system-dominated neorealist model. He called forth a paradigmatic shift to understand the post-Cold War global politics arguing that his "civilizational conflict paradigm" was superior to the alternative models that had been developed after the Cold War. Since intercivilizational issues were replacing intersuperpower ones in the new era, his paradigm provided a better model for international relations than any alternative (Huntington, 1993, pp. 187-189).

Huntington (1993) predicted that civilizational differences that stem from divergent cultural and religious values would be primary causes of regional and global conflicts in the post-Cold War epoch. The Clash of Civilizations was to be inevitable although not necessarily violent. The fault lines between civilizations stemmed from differences in social and political values. Core values that differentiated civilizations (Western, Confucian, Islamic, etc.), according to Huntington (1996) included irreconcilable beliefs on the proper relations between genders, parents, and children; individuals and the state; and God and man. Huntington differentiated between seven or eight major civilizations, foreseeing likely conflicts between Islamic and Western

civilizations because Islam was the only civilization that aspired to universal values that posed a significant challenge to the West (Huntington, 1996). On the other hand, Huntington (1996) also discussed an Islamic-Confucian connection against Western civilization. To counter this possible threat to Western hegemony, he recommended that the West should limit expansion of military and economic power of the Islamic-Confucian states, and the West should exploit differences between the two civilizations.

Around the time, Huntington was developing his Clash of Civilizations model, Fukuyama (1989) produced an alternate hypothesis coined “The End of History.” In this model, Fukuyama reasoned that instead of a division of civilizations there would be unification. Fukuyama argued that the end of the Cold War marked a major turning point in the ideological evolution of humankind, and that with the fall of the Soviet Union, Western liberal democracy as the only competing superpower would emerge as the final form of human government in all regions of the world (Fukuyama, 1989). Here Fukuyama was postulating that democracy would become more globally prevalent based upon his assertion that democracy since the French Revolution has proven itself to be a better and more effective system. After the events of 9/11, the notion of a Clash of Civilizations rose to prominence in U.S. national discourse on questions of national security. But where did individual liberty lie in respect to this ideology?

### **Conceptual Framework**

The main conceptual framework for this study was frame analysis of statements made by U.S. politicians, reporters, and news commentators drawn from the national media. Frame analysis has been used as a method for examining and critiquing the

language that politicians and public policy advocates use to persuade the public and promote their political agendas (Lakoff, 2004; Lakoff & Ferguson, 2007). Framing is a rhetorical strategy by which a speaker sets the terms of debate to force opponents into a corner or to make certain conclusions seem reasonable or unreasonable under the terms of the frame. Frames construct a point of view that predisposes a listener to interpret a given situation in such a way as to push them toward a particular conclusion. Frames are also used to define problems, diagnose causes, make policy judgments, and suggest solutions (Kuypers, 2006).

Frame analysis is particularly relevant to the study of political discourses that seek to scapegoat or blame minority groups for perceived problems a nation is facing (Kaya, 2016). Specifically, in this study, I will show how the fear of Islamic terrorism has been used to expand the power of the surveillance state.

### **Nature of the Study**

In the post-9/11 political environment, federal and state policymakers have shaped the public discourse based on a Clash of Civilizations paradigm. By singling out a group for special scrutiny based on religious affiliation, policymakers have violated their promise to uphold the U.S. Constitution. This is what Islamophobic frames have accomplished. In their public pronouncements over reauthorization of the Patriot Act provisions, leading members of Congress including senators Orrin Hatch and Jon Kyl on the Republican side, and senators Dianne Feinstein and Chuck Schumer on the Democratic side, deployed such frames. These frames represented formulations of two diametrically opposed perspectives: one focused on Islamic terrorist threats, and another

focused on concern over encroachment on civil liberties of the U.S. people, including Muslim-Americans.

The problem that I examined in this study arose with regard to the reauthorization of the Patriot Act, media coverage, and the rhetoric associated with Islam and Arab heritage. In a nation built upon the ideas of equality, freedom of religion, and freedom of the press, there have been a limited number of studies that have explored the potential backlash of Islamophobia and the adoption of the *clash of civilization* paradigm as the sole legislative approach for 21st-century United States. I analyzed these topics to understand the various facets of Islamophobia and explore both how the relationship with civil liberties has been affected as well as how the media system could be used to optimize a status quo sentiment.

Insufficient systematic analysis of how framing in political communications has been conducted was manifested in one of the most salient public policy issues before the American people during the past 10 years on an issue with constitutional implications. Furthermore, there has not been scholarly research aimed at discerning the degree to which arguments as framed during discourse over the Patriot Act reauthorization comported with objective facts. This is the problem this dissertation sought to address. It did so by using content analysis as a primary research methodology to examine the nature of the meanings inferred in congressional pronouncements surrounding the 2011 reauthorization of the Patriot Act provisions.

It appeared that politicians framed their arguments so as to satisfy their supporters, including their constituents, campaign contributors, political parties, and

lobbyists. In the context of a representative democracy, the question has remained as to what extent politicians frame particular issues to satisfy the demands of special interest groups over those of the voters. In the case of the Patriot Act, the power ought to have lain in the hands of the constituents or voters, and there was a clear division in public opinion as to the necessity of certain provisions of the act. The use of the media was strategic in that it accomplished several tasks, functioning both as a nexus of influence by providing a platform for voices to broadcast certain frames.

### **Definitions**

**Civil liberties.** Provisions incorporated into the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution that provide protections for the U.S. people and guarantee freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and protection against unreasonable search and seizure (U.S. Const. amendments. I, IV).

**Clash of civilizations frame.** A view based in a post-Cold War theory of the international political order, in which the world is divided into seven or so civilizations; or large, geopolitical complexes united by core values based ultimately in religious traditions. A coalition of countries that make up Western civilization was destined to conflict on this model with groups or nations associated with Islamic civilization (Huntington, 1993).

**Endangered Constitutional Protections frame.** A category of political discourse in which defenders of the U.S. Constitution fight to preserve core constitutional

rights such as freedom of speech and protection against unlawful search and seizure (Miller & Fox, 2007).

**Epiphenomenalism.** A style of political discourse that favors highly charged words, signs and symbols, and self-referential statements over fact-based reporting, thus creating a socially constructed reality (Fox & Miller, 2007).

**Framing.** These are mental structures, mediated by language, that structure the way that people see the world. In politics, frames are both deliberately and unconsciously deployed to shape social policies and advance political agendas (Lakoff, 2004). Frame analysis was used in this dissertation to reveal how political elites manipulated public opinion (Scheufele, 1999).

**Global war on terrorism.** This was an international military campaign headed by the United States in response to the 9/11 attacks. The George W. Bush Administration used this term to make a case for a military response on foreign shores against organizations designated terrorist and regimes accused of supporting them. The campaign made a particular focus on Muslim countries said to harbor Islamic terrorist organizations (Wolfe, 2008).

**Hate crime.** A hate crime is a violent criminal act that has been alternatively categorized as a bias motivated crime that targets a victim based on his or her actual or perceived membership in a social group (FBI, 2016).

**Islamism.** Islamism has been used by Western academics to distinguish political Islam from Islam as simply a variety of religious observance (Wright, 2015). A defining feature of political Islam is to reform government and society in accordance with



*sharia*—Islamic law—either peacefully from the ground up or through revolution or military invasion (Roy, 1994).

**Islamophobia.** Islamophobia refers to policies and practices that discriminate against Muslims or people of Middle-eastern heritage, but also to the underlying bigotry of individuals who author or promote such policies (Love, 2009).

**Islamophobia frame.** A frame that emphasizes the persecution of Muslims as a vilified religious group, often, in the U.S. context, by portraying them as a threat to national security (Kumar, 2011).

**Jihadism.** Jihadist is a term used by Western academics prior to 9/11, and increasingly since, to distinguish violent from nonviolent Sunni Islamists. In this study, I followed the academic convention and used the term when discussing violent extremists (Wright, 2015), although the term is rejected by many Muslims because it associates a spiritual concept jihad—a spiritual struggle within oneself—with violent extremism.

**Mass media.** A complex of communication technologies used to reach mass audiences, including traditional broadcast media such as television, radio, and cinema, and newer electronic media such as Internet search engines, and blogs (Thompson, 1995)

**Patriot Act.** An act of Congress, initially signed into law in 2001 and reauthorized in 2005 and 2011, designed to provide for national security against domestic terror attacks on U.S. soil through a range of provisions that include business records provisions, roving wiretap provisions and the “lone wolf” provisions as described in the text of this dissertation (USA PATRIOT Act of 2001).

**Political elites.** Within the U.S. political context, political elites are those “who

hold office, run for office, [have] access to the media . . . and frame political issues” (Wilson, Dilulio, & Bose, 2010, p. 168). Wilson et al. (2010) indicated that U.S. Congress was the site of ideological consistency among U.S. political elites. Therefore, in this dissertation, I narrowly focus on the subset of U.S. political elites in the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate.

**Postmodernism.** A characterization of the present historical condition, in which ideological assumptions of the previous modern period that began with the Enlightenment, including ideals of objectivity, scientific truth, and rationality, have been displaced by epiphenomenalism, language games, and discourses of power (Fox & Miller, 2007).

**Terrorism.** This dissertation is concerned with the concept of terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives,” following the definition in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. (FBI, 1998, p. i).

### **Assumptions**

In this dissertation, I assumed a postmodernist perspective. Postmodernism is relativistic with regard to truth claims. In this view, language is capable of providing just partial pictures of the world to which it refers, every representation of the world is filtered through discourses of power, and no narrative can be taken at face value as neutral or objective (Best & Kellner, 1991). Postmodernists explore how language, power and history shape human views of reality, truth and knowledge, aiming to uncover multiple

realities, in contrast to the realism of postpositivists.

Postmodernist assumptions are appropriate in a study of the framing effects of political discourses because the subject matter is neither value neutral nor decidable in objective terms (Kangas, Niemelä, & Varjonen, 2014). Although frames may be factually false or include misinformation, the truth or falsity of a frame is not the essential aspect relevant to framing analysis. Frames are a use of language formulated, either consciously or unconsciously by the framer, to lead the listener to a particular conclusion or value judgment. The important aspect of frames is not their factual or not factual nature, rather their directive nature. My focus in this dissertation was how politically motivated frames have been deployed to sway audiences or create consensus on a course of political action. This focus accepted the postmodernist view of language as discourses of power. As this is an examination of words, not of numbers, the methodology will favor critical methods that are intrinsically qualitative (Hollinger, 1994, p.173).

### **Scope and Delimitations**

Several limitations incumbent to this study included questions of accuracy, transferability, and framing effects. The problem that I addressed in this study was fear mongering about Muslims and Islam in contemporary U.S. political discourse since 9/11. I chose this focus as a prominent feature of U.S. political discourse at the start of the 21st century and have continued since then. By analyzing the language used in political discussions of this topic, I have revealed the regarding the deliberate use of fear tactics and exaggeration have been deployed to expand government surveillance and intrusion into personal lives in the name of protecting U.S. citizens from terrorism. I chose my

specific focus because it potentially can have dire consequences for the lives of U.S. Muslims as a targeted group, as well as eroding constitutional protections for all U.S. citizens. Islamophobic discourse in other countries, and the geopolitical consequences of anti-Muslim rhetoric in relation to U.S. foreign policy are beyond the boundaries of this study.

A risk in any content analysis is that the analysis is only as effective as data sources are reliable (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The data in this study included spoken words and written transcripts by prominent politicians and news commentators as collected from online media sources. My assumption was that these media sources accurately portrayed these pronouncements. However, the possibility exists that factors including internal media bias may result in these pronouncements not being accurately reported or being reported in a distorted manner. Should this be the case, coding in content analysis—one of the primary methods used in this study—could mitigate these out of context portrayals. This situation being the challenge, the sources from which content is derived have been independently verified as those from which most Americans receive their news online and it is assumed that these sources portray at least the targeted pronouncements accurately.

### **Limitations**

The data for this study consist of publicly available statements made by prominent U.S. politicians, news commentators, and news reporters at a national level from the time of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, to the completion of the writing of the dissertation in 2018. Because the data are drawn from an immense number of alternative

statements over a large span of time, selection of which quotes to use and how they are relevant reflect the predetermined historical and geopolitical scope of the study. The study is therefore suggestive in nature and does not attempt to assert a final or definitive claim as to how widely the U.S. public in general holds Islamophobic prejudices.

Although the quotes are accurate and appropriately documented, another researcher might select an alternative set of quotes to present a different view of cultural trends in the course of this period. The limitations of the generalizability of the findings of this study are inherent in any study of cultural trends and patterns at a national level, as culture is inherently contested and multivocal (Nash, Kerr-Koch, & Hackett, 2014).

### **Significance of the Study**

The political apparatus in the United States has proven very adept at using the popular or mass media as a mechanism to voice their own unique platforms. Although the U.S. mass media includes dissenting voices that can provide a platform for debate, the constraints of acceptable dissent tend to be narrowly limited by implicit norms of acceptability (Herman & Chomsky, 2011). Among the many voices that constitute the American mass media, politicians use various broadcast platforms as a means to expand their ideas and influence. Meanwhile, the World Wide Web (Web) has expanded the voice and influence of terrorist organizations abroad. The mass media—including news broadcasts, the press, and the Web—serve as tools to spread and market political ideas of corporate funded think tanks and government policymakers, just as this same media is used by commercial entities to sell products and compete for market share.

Specifically, I examined how media messages could affect the domestic and

international climate for the United States. I used a case analysis of the Patriot Act and how members of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate framed media communications amid the development of domestic and international policies. The scope of the work evaluated press conferences, press releases, speeches, and correspondence. The social context of policymaking was shaped and developed by social and economic factors and by mass media—the assortment of information sources that reach large numbers of people, including TV, radio, newspapers, and the Internet. Through the media, citizens learn how government policies could affect them, and governments could also receive feedback on their policies and programs. The relationship between public opinion and framing can demonstrate how media matters when the message flow is one sided.

The prevalence of Islamophobia could be problematic because it could not only harm its Muslim targets but also threaten the wellbeing of U.S. society as a whole. An analysis of hate crime statistics suggests that Islamophobia can lead to an increase of physical attacks on individuals perceived to be Muslim, and on their property (Hate Crime Statistics, 2010). Islamophobia as a form of prejudice also could threaten to damage its targets' "self-image, educational success, occupational attainment, mental health status and health status" (McKown, 2005, p. 177). A 2010 study confirmed some of these effects by revealing that perceived Islamophobia-motivation was associated with abuse and discrimination against those perceived to be Muslim and produced increased psychological distress and greater health risks in those targeted (McKown, 2010).

Islamophobia may also enable extremist groups such as the Taliban and al Qaeda

to recruit and carry out terrorist attacks. There are two reasons for this: (a) Islamophobia can result in the isolation and marginalization of its targets, which can leave them vulnerable and receptive to radicalization; and (b) Islamophobia can perpetuate the notion that the West is at war with Islam. Extremist Muslim groups could use the perception that the West is at war with Islam to recruit vulnerable Muslims to their ranks (Cilluffo, 2007, p. 116).

Since 9/11, Islamophobia has been manifested in a wide range of forms, including Islamophobic sentiments and opinions. In opinion polls of non-Muslim Americans, respondents have generally indicated that American and Islamic values are incompatible, and because of this, these respondents have also expressed their opinions that there is prejudice against Muslims and Islam. These Americans thought there existed general negative opinions of Islam, desires to limit Muslim Americans' civil and legal rights, discomfort with Muslim Americans' participation in the political process, and associations of violence, terrorism, untrustworthiness, extremism and fanaticism with Muslims and Islam (Nisbet, 2009). The statistics were recorded:

- Fifty eight percent of respondents in a 2006 ABC News/*Washington Post* poll associated violent extremism with Islam more than other religions (Nisbet, 2009).
- In a 2014 poll, Americans expressed the most prejudice toward Muslims relative to Christians, Jews and Buddhists (Pew Research Center, 2014).

The nation also witnessed a notable increase in Islamophobic sentiments, rhetoric, and incidents in 2010 (Khera, 2011). According to an ABC News/*Washington Post* poll, 49% of Americans held "an unfavorable view of Islam" in 2010 compared to 39% in

2002 – a 10% increase in eight years (Wajat, 2011, p. 63). Similarly, polls from 2003 to 2010 noted a rapid decline in favorable views on Islam among American non-Muslims of all political leanings (Khera, 2011). During 2010, the nation also experienced the “Ground Zero Mosque” controversy and became aware of Pastor Terry Jones’ plans to burn copies of the Qur’an (Khera, 2011). Finally, the FBI’s 2010 hate crime statistics revealed a 50% increase in anti-Islamic motivated hate crimes since 2009 (Hate Crimes on the Rise in 2011). This is particularly notable given that anti-Islamic motivated hate crimes have been consistently above pre-9/11 levels (Khera, 2011).

The mass media has played a significant role in promoting negative stereotypes of Muslims, Arabs, and Islam that generally fuel fears of terrorism (Public Opinion, 2009). Within the entertainment industry, over 200 post-9/11 movies have portrayed Arabs and Muslims in biased ways (Tutt, 2011). The majority of Arab and Muslim characters in television entertainment from 2001 to about 2006 were in some way connected to violence and featured in storylines connected to terrorism (Nisbet, 2009). Also, coverage of Islam was significantly negative within television news (Coexist Foundation, 2009). Additionally, the negative tone of television coverage of statements about Islam between January and August 2009 were twice as frequent compared to statements about Christianity, according to Media Tenor (2017) - a research organization that monitors and analyzes media content for purposes of applied agenda setting (Tzortzis, Khalaf, & Salam, 2010). Media Tenor (<http://us.mediatenor.com/en/>) also found that two thirds of television coverage of Islam were negative during that same time period (Tzortzis, Khalaf, & Salam, 2010). Among television news sources, Fox News played a prominent



role in promoting Islamophobia (Saylor, 2014).

The Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) found a significant correlation between trust in Fox News and negative attitudes about Muslims. Americans who most trust Fox News were more likely to believe that Muslims wanted to establish Shari'a law, that Muslims have not done enough to oppose extremism, and that investigating Muslim extremism is a good idea. There are even differences among Republicans and white Evangelicals who trust Fox News most and those who trust other media (Public Religion Research Institute, 2011). In contrast to television, newspaper coverage of issues associated with Islam and terrorism has generally been found to present a more nuanced and fairer treatment compared to what is depicted on television, with the print media guilty of less stereotyping of Muslim Americans and increased knowledge and familiarity with Islam (Tzortzis, Khalaf, & Salam, 2010). Researchers have also found that people who received their news through television expressed more negative emotional reactions to terrorist attacks compared to those who received the news through newspapers (Tzortzis, Khalaf, & Salam, 2010).

The mass media in the United States constitutes a kind of filtration system that mediates communication between the public and their representatives in Congress. The media plays a fundamental role in the development of the social context in which policies are developed (Thompson, 2013). It is through mass media, such as television, the Internet, and the press, that citizens learn how government policies will affect them; and it is from these same sources that government officials gain feedback on their policies and programs. The media acts as the primary conduit between those who might want to

influence policy and the policymakers, meaning that the media is the apparatus used by players directly and indirectly involved in the policymaking process to control the manner in which political discourse is framed and disseminated (Candy, 2013).

There is a range of opinions on the reach of media influence, from those who believe the media has no bearing in policy making, to those who believe that the media by its very nature must exert a significant influence on the legislative process. A logical conclusion when considering these opposing views is that mass media has a degree of influence that is related to the issue at hand. Drawing such a conclusion, one ponders the question of which policy issues will be most and least affected by mass media coverage about constitutional parameters associated with civil liberties. In this study, I explored this key question by discussing the process for the reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act.

In a liberal democracy, mass media plays a crucial role as a litmus test for government affairs; to act as the filtration system to ensure that government can be held accountable to the people in which it draws its authority. It was found that the incorporation of mass media worldwide has been diminishing the ability of citizens to participate meaningfully in the policymaking process governing the media (Katz, & Halpern, 2013). This can be seen as many news stations and press channels that have been incorporated into large conglomerates have made programming and content decisions based upon ratings and corporate profits (Bagdikian, 2004; McChesney, 1999). Such corporate concerns present a contradiction in the democratic processes. Huge media corporations come to act in the capacity of a political player. The problem is observed

through the news corporations' strong ties with business. Such ties can serve to compromise their ability to investigate the government in an unbiased manner.

The significance of political framing in the news media for this dissertation is three-fold: (a) the use of framing to direct public opinion to problems and solutions, (b) implications of such framing practices for American civil liberties, and (c) how the practice of framing is interpreted in recent Islamophobia studies. Politicians, activists, and news commentators commonly frame issues in political discourse in a way that sets up their audiences to focus on one set of problems and potential solutions (Druckman, 2001). The manner in which an issue is framed not only biases how an event should be thought about, but also includes an implicit answer to the question of what, if anything, is to be done (Nelson & Kinder, 1996). Policymakers frame issues in order to manipulate public opinion and to gain support for their policy decisions. Deliberate political framing can constitute a process by which the media is manipulated and relied upon to shape mass opinion on important policy issues (Anderson, 2013). The preferred frame need not be supported by facts of comport with reality in framing a political message. Rather, framing may consist of cynical pronouncements that have little connection to accurate reporting of actual events (Schenck-Hamlin & Proctor, 2006).

Framing is not new to American political discourse. The policy process in a democratic society is designed to be fluid, and public policy is developed through argument and the contestation of discourses and ideas from multiple perspectives. This process becomes a matter of public discourse once policymakers engage the media whether via print, television or the Internet. The primary focus for policymakers

oftentimes plays an integral part in determining the policies and issues in which the media elects to focus.

The media has received increased scholarly attention in recent years in light of its influence. Advances in media studies have closely paralleled the emergence of postmodern political theory, social constructivism, and the effects of hyper-reality upon political communications (Fox, 1996; Fox & Miller, 1995; Miller, 2002; Miller & Fox 2007; Scott, 1997). Postmodern theory suggests that contemporary political discourse is based in symbolism and constitutes a kind of simulated politics (Fox & Miller, 1995). Miller and Fox (2007) described a kind of non-referential political language that they characterize as *epiphenomenal*. Words and symbols in this new reality, come to constitute alternate understandings of events, specific to a particular community of discourse. Reality as such is no longer grounded in conventional epistemological notions of objective fact. Instead, competing political discourses come to form socially constructed realities, or information bubbles that reinforce the beliefs of those subsumed in such bubbles.

Burnier (2005) has argued that if the Fox and Miller (1995) constructs are to have much impact on political theory, the incorporation of interpretive methods into investigative research will have to be important for analyzing how meanings are produced and disseminated. Hence, it is important to understand how political discourse over these issues are framed by policymakers and the media in examining important contemporary public policy issues before the American people within the postmodern context. The reauthorization of the Patriot Act in 2011 was a highly salient issue for the

American people and one in which evidence of framing by congressional leaders appeared to be evident as will be demonstrated below. It is important to understand how framing was manifest in the act's reauthorization given the salience of the Patriot Act reauthorization and the central role of framing as a political phenomenon. My review of the literature does not point to any studies to date that have examined the Patriot Act reauthorization within the context of framing and the use of the media in the development of public opinion associated with the generalization of an ethno-religious population. A short investigation into this topic in Chapter 4 will fill that gap and set the stage for the second part of this study.

A second reason why the subject of this dissertation is significant stems from the nature of the U.S. Patriot Act and implications for national defense and American civil liberties. The responsibilities of Congress for both defending the American people and protecting their civil liberties are embodied in the Constitution. The Constitution states that the "United States shall guarantee to every state a republican form of government and shall protect each of them against invasion" (U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4). Article I, section 8 of the Constitution lists congressional powers that deal directly with the national defense including authority to declare war, raise and support armies, provide for a navy, and establish the rules for the operation of American military forces. The Bill of Rights provides the American people the constitutional protection of free speech in the Establishment Clause and against unreasonable search and seizure.

Members of Congress formed a fault line in a debate between national security and civil liberties as they deployed competing frames over reauthorization of the Patriot

Act in 2011. Misleading rhetoric in the context of this political debate raised the issue of personal prejudice that posed an obstacle to the implementation of truly representative government.

The subject of framing within the context of the Patriot Act and constitutional provisions to protect both national security and civil liberties has received little attention in the scholarly literature to date. This dissertation is not about constitutional law. However, understanding how America's policymakers sought to frame their arguments over the reauthorization of the Patriot Act could help to demonstrate the impact of framing upon constitutional issues at the heart of American political discourse.

A third point attesting to the importance of the subject of this dissertation lies in recent academic interest in Islamophobia. In this dissertation, the term Islamophobia has been defined as discriminatory policies and practices directed towards people of Muslim or Middle-Eastern heritage, suggesting racialized bigotry (Love, 2009). The historical period following the terror attacks of 9/11 has been accompanied by increasing scholarly interest in examining how Muslims are portrayed in the Western media. One sign of this lies in the launching of the Islamophobia. *Studies Journal* at the Center for Race and Gender at the University of California at Berkeley. According to the center, the rationale for the new journal was derived from the understanding of Islamophobia as a political tool used to exploit fear and provide a rationale for expansion of the security state (Basin & Leung, 2015).

Recent research has been focused upon Islamophobic framing in the Western media including the United States (Frost, 2008; Gardner, Karakasoglus & Luchtenberg,

2009; Hoskins, Awan & O'Loughlin, 2011; Jackson, 2010; Saeed, 2007; Salim, 2010; Trevino, Kanso, & Nelson, 2010). Kumar (2012) summarized the general findings of this line of research in her book *Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire*, noting that portrayals of Muslims in the mainstream media have been largely negative since the events of 9/11.

Islamophobia also poses a significant threat to civil liberties. The Stockholm International Forum on Combating Intolerance adopted a resolution equating Islamophobia with genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, and anti-Semitism in response to this threat (Stockholm Forum, 2001). The Texas State Board of Education in 2010 acted to curtail reference to Islam in school textbooks in a reactionary move against the perceived Muslim threat. The board justified its policy by indicating a need to prevent infiltration of Middle Eastern influence into national publishing, while critics of the act described this as fear mongering (*New York Times*, 2010).

In December 2011 home improvement chain Lowes cancelled its sponsorship of the cable TV reality show *All-American Muslim* after the Florida Family Association - a conservative advocacy group - criticized the content of the show for not accurately portraying average Muslims who, the group said, are extremists who want to impose *shari'a* law upon the U.S. (Freedman, 2011). Not only has this dissertation contributed to scholarly discourse over the subject of Islamophobia, it has also helped shed light on the degree to which congressional discourse might contribute to the Islamophobic phenomenon.

In summary, the significance of this dissertation lies in the timely articulating and

highlighting the role framing plays in public policy making and the saliency of the Patriot Act given current scholarly interests in the phenomenon of Islamophobia and the gaps this dissertation helped to fill in the literature. This dissertation reconciled the constitutional aspects associated with civil liberties in an intelligible perspective to the public without reproducing the provocative and sensationalistic framework popularized by Islamophobic rhetoric by providing an analysis of the complexity of the relationship between mass media and policymakers.

In the wake of 9/11 the American mass media did not all speak with one voice. There was room for dissent, protests of the treatment of Muslims, and protest against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This study, however, focused on several Islamophobic trends that came to dominate many mainstream political discourses. The items selected for special scrutiny here were chosen because they demonstrated the characteristic problematic Islamophobic stance that was the focus of this dissertation. However, this was not meant to imply that *all* media pronouncements on Islam were of a single mind, or that no alternate or opposing frames surfaced during the historical period of primary interest.

### **Summary**

Using frame analysis, I examined the public record of politicians' pronouncements over the Patriot Act in terms of two dominant frames, or deep narratives (Lakoff, 2008). The guiding research question was: how do American policymakers, news reporters, editorialists and political pundits attempt to construct a broad, social consensus by framing the issues in a particular manner? Three frames of particular



interest in this regard were the (a) Clash of Civilizations, (b) Endangered Constitutional Protections, and (c) Islamophobia, frames. I detail each of these frames below.

Clash of Civilizations frame – This frame posited a national existential threat from an irrational foreign enemy. The West represented by the United States as its central figure and key defender is both hero and victim, and Islamic terrorists are the villains. In this frame, Western civilization stood for science, democracy, progressive values such as women’s rights, and rationality; and Islamic civilization stood in opposition to these core values. As Kumar (2010) summarized it, in terms of the Clash of Civilizations frame, “Islam is a uniquely sexist religion, the ‘Muslim mind’ is incapable of rationality and science, Islam is inherently violent, and the West spreads democracy, while Islam spawns terrorism” (p. 254). In this frame, the West and Islam constituted two opposing civilizations that are natural enemies, and there is little chance at forging alliances across civilizational divides because the actual conflict is between fundamentally incompatible core value systems that have proven historically deep and resilient over the centuries (Huntington, 1993).

Endangered Constitutional Protections frame – This frame posited a defenders of democracy narrative. Politicians who sought to expand government power at the expense of citizens’ rights in the name of “protecting the homeland” against terrorism are the villains; the American people, especially Muslim-Americans as a targeted ethnic/religious group, but also the Christian majority, are the victims; and critics who oppose the expansion of government power are the heroes. This frame was used by politicians who argued against the Patriot Act in the first place as shown in Chapter 4;

and the larger group who later made a case for letting controversial provisions of the act expire (Concerned Citizens Against the Patriot Act, 2015).

This dissertation also explored a third frame, the Islamophobia frame, which has been used to challenge the Clash of Civilizations frame. The first printed occurrence of the term Islamophobia in English appeared in a 1985 article by Edward Said, in which he defined it as hostility to Islam in the modern West and compared Islamophobia to anti-Semitism, claiming that anti-Islamic and anti-Jewish prejudices derived from the same source (Said, 1985, p. 105). The term was later defined in the British Runnymede Trust Report (1991) as "unfounded hostility towards Muslims, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims" (p. 1). The frame positioned Muslims as a persecuted minority group for interpreting the relations between Muslims and their critics in the post-9/11 political climate. In this frame, Islamophobes are the villains, Muslims the victims, and anyone who condemns Islamophobia is a hero. The *-phobia* suffix also carried associations of psychiatric disorder based in irrational fear or imagined threats (Plummer, 1999). Framing critics of a group as sufferers of a phobia followed the politically effective homophobia frame that shifted implications of mental disorder/deviance from the homosexual to those who condemned or persecuted homosexuals.

I asserted that the *clash of civilization* frames in the American news media immediately following 9/11 were epiphenomenal - a concept developed by Fox and Miller (1995) - in which perceptions were socially constructed through the manipulation of symbols that have been severed from objective reality. This epiphenomenal discourse was not grounded in a realistic assessment of actual terror threats, and it lacked even a

basic understanding of Muslim people and Islam as a religious practice. Anti-Islamic frames were disseminated by foreign policy hawks in the Bush Administration and political punditry in order to play on the general public's fears of terrorism and thereby garner support for a foreign policy that came to be called the Global War on Terror. An unintended consequence of this socially constructed fear was the passing of new laws and law enforcement policies that corroded basic freedoms previously guaranteed by the Constitution.

By explicitly drawing attention to the Islamophobic implications of political frames in group discussions in this study, I sought to demonstrate the readiness of naive respondents to adopt a critical eye in assessing media manipulation and to raise awareness of social injustice that came in the wake of the manipulation. In place of the Islamophobic frames that were deployed to gain public support for the global war on terror in this study, I introduced alternate frames designed to garner sympathy for the plight of Muslims in America.



## Chapter 2: Literature Review

My aim in this literature review was to evaluate contemporary literature on Islamophobia in the United States through the lens of national security, civil liberties, and media influence. Islamophobia as a political frame stands in tension with the democratic government's charge to protect its citizens while securing their equal access to civil liberties. In the post-9/11 United States statute's, justification and credibility has been promulgated by legislative acts, political banter, and mass media coverage that uses national security as a blanket to cover racial politics, making religious discrimination against Muslims an acceptable reality.

U.S. President James Madison and Prussian political philosopher Wilhelm von Humboldt presented the question of balancing national security and individual liberty as the fundamental conundrum of a democratic republic (Hardin, 2004). In this study, I analyzed how this conundrum is addressed in terms of minority populations, specifically Muslim, and its implications for the greater society. Esposito (1992) and Said (1978) provided analyses of the historical context, explaining why Islam and the West have a contentious relationship. As a democratic republic, the United States has the constitutional separation of powers (executive, legislative, and judicial); however, as Poole and Richardson (2006) highlighted, mass media has become an integral fourth power in the 21st century. In this chapter, I explored the theoretical framework of the dissertation, the media influence in the promulgation of Islamophobia, and the theoretical foundation for content analysis methodology.

### **Literature Search Strategy**

I searched the following databases from 2012 to the present for relevant studies in political framing and Islamophobia: Academic Search Complete, Expanded Academic ASAP, Google Scholar, International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Project Muse, ProQuest Central, and SocINDEX with Full Text. I used the following search terms and related synonyms separately and in combination: Islamophobia, jihad, terrorism, war on terror, Patriot Act, framing, propaganda, and news media. I limited the search to English language publications, and I assessed the results in terms of relevance, favoring peer-reviewed studies in academic journals.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The United States as a nation perennially faces the delicate task of balancing and maintaining security with the domestic civility of its citizens. During the debate by the Founding Fathers, there was acknowledgement that this task provided great hope while at the same time angst. In the crux of this debate lies the question for the United States of how can government be structured both to achieve security and to restrain itself from violating individual freedom? This dilemma for Humboldt (1969) “is the unrestricted opportunity to develop one’s own capacities” (p. 39). This same sentiment was a foundational argument for James Madison (1788), as early on in the nation’s history he postulated the central problem of the U.S. Constitution: “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first

enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”

The American Revolution began the long tradition of America’s consideration of how to protect the citizenry against invading armies—in particular the Red Coats. The issue lies in how this ideology in contemporary America has been aligned with the Global War on Terrorism and protection against terrorists. Terrorists are not so readily identified as armies, nor are they easily traceable. This has led to the alternative of protecting the country through the use of value judgments based upon a hypothetical profile that could be false. Relying upon profiling, in turn, courts the risk of pitting peaceful citizens against alien residents.

The rise of international terrorism has put current political theories to the test in part because these theories were devised to deal with domestic issues and institutions (Hardin, 1989). In terms of national security and civil liberties, some policymakers and media pundits would like to present the reality that the trade-off between security and civil liberties is an easy one. For these populations the desire for protection against terrorism is worth having the civil liberties of many people violated to get such protection. One such early champion was Dershowitz (2002), who argued forcefully for trading some civil liberty for protection against terrorism. He supposed even that torture could be justified by a sufficiently dreadful threat. It can be too easy to make such arguments if one focuses on the cases that, in the end, prove to have been genuine (Dershowitz, 2002).

Islamophobia in this context can be aligned to other U.S. historical time periods.

For instance, during the U.S. Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of *habeas corpus*. In the post-Civil War era Jim Crow laws greatly restricted the movement and participation of African Americans in society. In World War II, tens of thousands of Japanese American citizens were interned in the Western deserts. When considering these individual decisions and how they violated civil liberties, how can Islamophobia not be seen and understood as an analogous matter of national concern? In the post-9/11 era it has become less certain that civil liberties will win the political support in a political climate governed by fleeting passions of majorities faced with threats of terrorism – which many take to be interchangeable with Islam.

One should consider the Federalist Papers when observing the U.S. government's post-9/11 stance on terrorism as reinforcing the appeal of Madison's liberal distrust. Pharr and Putnam (2000) have recently observed that U.S. citizens trust their government too little, and that trust in government is in decline. This is disturbing for a nation built on the notion of governing by the people. Pharr and Putnam wish to "restore" trust in government, although it is not at all clear that current levels of deference to and confidence in government are much lower than they were throughout most of U.S. history. Islamophobia provides a conundrum in that its presence is likely to increase the grounds for doubting the quality of government judgment in combating terrorism without grievously undercutting civil liberties.

The United States historically has dealt with the notion of opinions and racial discrimination. Throughout U.S. history, beginning with the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, immigrants and minorities have suffered great legal setbacks in the pursuit of civil



liberties. Islamophobia, which means fear of Islam or Muslims is a new term to describe an old Westernized thought process. If Islamophobia can be considered a form of religious intolerance that can be observed throughout history and has led to various wars; one can consider the Crusades and genocides in this vein as part of the same phenomenon. The rise of Islam and the rate of growth of its reach were seen as a significant danger to other religions. The Western nations viewed this “new” religion as a potential global problem (Crone & Cook 1977; Fahlbusch 2001; Hamilton 1985; Southern 1962). Historically, this view of Islam has led to labeling Islam as immoral and heretical from a Christian perspective (Sardar 1999).

Contemporary literature in reference to hostility toward Islam and Muslims supplements what has been common in the past (Sardar, 1999). Many Westerners view Islam in the 21st century from an Orientalist perspective (Kumar, 2012). *Orientalism* is a term used to refer to the study of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and East Asian art, history, literature, language, and society by European and North American academics. Said (1978) critiqued such scholarship for its implicit support of Western imperialism and patronizing attitudes toward an “Oriental” other assumed to be less rational and intellectually underdeveloped. This vision can be compared to Huntington’s (1994) Clash of Civilizations paradigm where the world is divided in terms of what scholars called the Orient and the Occident. This division is clearly delineated along religious lines as Said (1978) observed and Norman Daniel (1960) affirmed the differences between these opposing forces, primarily is religion or culture. Daniel (1960) remarked on how Islam had been viewed by the Christian orthodoxy over recorded history. Poole (2002), in a

review of Daniel's work, argued that anti-Islam rhetoric from Western commentators depicted Islam as a foreign threat and has served to limit the growth of Islam.

Another scholar that observed this delineation was Esposito (1992), who recognized the religious and ideological differences between Islam and West. This difference was also highlighted by Bhabha (1994) who characterized the division between the West and Islam along such dichotomies as center-margin, civilized-savage, and enlightened-ignorant. Halliday (2003, 1999) summarized the notion of Islam as the other and a threatening presence to the West. Huntington's Clash of Civilizations paradigm asserts that there was a different and new Cold War that would take place. This new Cold War would not be based upon economics or politics but on culture and civilizations that are defined primarily in terms of religious conflicts.

To this end scholars have argued that Islam has been perceived as a political-religious threat to the West. Scholars such as Ahmed (1993), Rodinson (1974), Savory (1980), Djerejian (1997), and Sayyid (1997) have all encapsulated Islam as a viable threat to the West in terms of Islam the religion, and the Western region, This was also the foundational principle of the Runnymede Trust, a left-wing think tank founded in 1968 in order to improve race relations in multi-ethnic Britain. Islamophobic bias has thus surfaced in unexpected places.

The prejudices and stereotypes perceived by the world in reference to Islam and Muslims has historical roots. These roots have become increasingly entrenched as the rise of jihad - holy war and the growing unrest in Islam dominated nations. The term Islamophobia was adopted in response to this new climate.

### **Significance of the Media**

Mass media's impact stems from the images, representation and communication exhorted from its stories and reports. In recent times, the images, representations and communication in reference to Islam and Muslims has been increasingly negative and derogatory, especially in the west (Poole & Richardson 2006). As in any blanket statement there are exceptions to the rules. In this dissertation, I primarily aim to highlight those incidents that directly impact the social and political atmosphere in the United States in a negative way.

The messages displayed and portrayed by the media aids in the development of political discourse and thus helps to shape public opinions. This process continues due to the immediate effects of media on the masses, which eventually results in the construction of a social reality that is based on media framing of a reality "in a predictable and patterned way" (McQuail, 1994, p. 331). However, the framing of political issues in the media is not alone in contributing the building of social reality. Individuals also play a role in the development of their own frames. According to Entman (1995) this is called information processing and plays a vital role in the framing process. In other words, the ultimate opinion or response of an individual is a synthesis of media frames that they are exposed to in addition to their individual frames. The work of Berger & Luckman (1966) and Tuchman (1978) offer highly influential analyses of the social construction of reality debate in this regard.

How does the use of media by politicians influence public opinion? With the use of framing and media, what does American future relationships in the global community

have to lose? The practice of framing involves choices concerning what is salient. A frame selects some aspect of reality or some subset of facts and highlights these as more salient in the text to be communicated. The result of such framing is to produce a narrative that promotes a particular causal interpretation, moral evaluation, or course of action. Frames are used to identify and characterize relevant agents, diagnose causes, and prescribe courses of action in response to reported events. Selection and framing choices typically assume cultural values and are not objective in terms of ethical judgments (Entman, 1993).

When considering the influence of media as an active participant in the formation of Islamophobia, this analysis uses a constructivist media effects model. This model explains how reality is built or framed using personal experiences along with the influence of mass media (Neuman et al., 1992). Here, such a model will provide an interactive approach to the construction of reality in terms of framing and the conceptualization and perception meant or perceived by the audience.

Taking the above into consideration along with the issue of framing, McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (1997) suggested that one should also consider the place of other effects of framing, such as framing as an extension of agenda setting. McCombs, Shaw and Weaver's approach is far too complex for the scope of this work. Rather, the framework I deployed in this dissertation was based upon Luhmann's (2000) argument of theories as realist epistemologies. In his model, external values, such as truthfulness, objectivity or knowledge, are considered when evaluating mass media's function in the policymaking process.

### **Methodology of Theoretical Framework**

The conceptual foundation upon which this dissertation drew came from contemporary theories on framing in political communications and postmodern theoretical constructs of American politics that emerged during the 1990s. How can a democratic government be structured both to protect national security interests and restrain itself from violating individual freedom? This study investigates the vital role played by the media in the United States primarily in the use of *Islamophobic* framing, and its influence on foreign politics, public discourse and/or public opinion.

In 1996, El-Farra reported the U.S. press largely represented Muslims as caricatures or stereotypes in which any reference to a Muslim was almost always made in association with terms such as terrorists, fanatics, or extremists. This process of mischaracterization of Islam and Muslims became a more prevalent political frame after 9/11.

In this dissertation, I analyzed the political reliance on media to instill Islamophobic discrimination within society. The significance of this analysis is the improvement of internal cultural relations along with the development of an international framework that is conducive to the 21<sup>st</sup> century global environment. Academic databases such as EBSCO, JSTOR, Congressional Quarterly, LexisNexis provided major sources for the material presented below. Keywords used in searches included: Islamophobia, civil liberties, racism, terrorist, fanatic, Islam, Muslim, and the USA PATRIOT Act.

### **Postmodern Political Theory and Political Communications**

Postmodern political theory provided analysts such as Charles Fox and Hugh Miller a basis by which to critique American politics in the 1990s (Fox, 2006; Fox & Miller, 1995; Scott, 1997; Miller, 2002; Miller & Fox, 2007). Fox and Miller (1995; 2007) argued that American public policy making had undergone a fundamental transformation. They characterized this transformation in terms of a departure from a period in which policy formulation and implementation were defined by rational neutrality, objectivity, and managerialism to one defined by constructions of public discourse by which journalists, activists, experts, and politicians struggled to produce meanings that influenced policy. This struggle to construct and control public narratives marked a fundamental break with the past, justifying the division of history into modern and postmodern eras (Fox, 1996).

In the postmodern period, political communications increasingly became characterized by the news media as a forum for deception, marked by commercialism, political slur campaigns, and shallow political journalism made up of photo ops, celebrity endorsements, and personal attacks (Miller & Fox, 2007). Political communications – or the means by which political meanings are produced and disseminated – thus play a central role in the postmodernist critique (Burnier, 2005).

Hyper-reality is reflected in the rapidity and velocity with which information is transmitted by contemporary media technology – television, the Internet, smartphones, and other electronic communications devices and forums (Miller & Fox, 2007). However, within the postmodernist critique, the hyper-reality that characterizes contemporary political communications is not held as being conducive to effective public policy

making. According to Miller and Fox (2007), the emergent hyper-reality of the heavily sensationalized and commercialized news media renders the media useless for meaningful policymaking that promotes national interests. Instead, contemporary news reporting and editorializing has devolved into a spectacle or an entertaining diversion, where signs are divorced from reality. In place of fact-based reporting, the media produces a rapid sequence of symbols and images lacking clear referents that create a kind of epiphenomenal experience that displaces genuine political analysis and debate.

Furthermore, Miller and Fox (2007) pointed to a monological quality that has come to imbue hyper-real political communications. This is characterized by pronouncements of questionable truth value that go unchallenged. In sum, a key argument put forth by Fox and Miller in their theory of postmodern discourse is that within the context of hyper-reality, symbolic political messaging has replaced rational political analysis based on realistic assessments (Miller & Fox, 2007).

The postmodernist arguments advanced by Fox and Miller have not been without criticism. Burnie in particular argued that there is little empirical evidence to demonstrate how postmodern constructs are manifest in practice, writing that if postmodernism is to truly effect positive change it must include empirical research into how information is produced and disseminated (Burnier, 2005). Along the subjective-objective spectrum of methodological approaches to public opinion analysis, there are those scholars who take a positivist approach, seeking to base their claims in objective facts. Post-positivists, in contrast, accept the limits of positivism, talk about probability rather than certainty, and consider the limits of objectivity (Crotty, 1998). For them, qualitative research becomes

an important complement to quantitative methods, filling out detail where the latter falls short.

On the opposite end of the continuum is postmodernism, which seeks to replace the decontextualized abstractions of positivism with more subjective inquiries that capture multiple voices and perspectives in local contexts. Postmodernists assume that theories only provide partial views of their objects and that every representation of the world is filtered through history and language, which can never be neutral or entirely objective (Best & Kellner, 1991). In contrast to the realism of post-positivists, postmodernists explore how language, power and history shape human views of reality, truth and knowledge, aiming to uncover multiple realities. Postmodernists also tend to favor critical methods that are intrinsically qualitative (Hollinger, 1994).

Postmodernists have claimed that in a media saturated world, where there is constant immersion in media, the distinction between reality and the media representation of reality becomes blurred (McDougall, 2001). Communication theorists argued that members of the public no longer have any sense of the difference between reality and simulated images; hence media reality is the new reality (Kellner, 1989). Opponents of postmodern theory, such as Strinati (2005), argued that this view was just a new way of thinking about media.

As an intellectual challenge to modernist theoretical approaches, postmodernist theorists aimed to elevate text and language as a method of critique of Western institutions. They applied literary analysis to social problems, while questioning reality and representation. Some postmodern critics assume that value-free objectivity is



impossible, as it requires a separation between moral and objective models. D'Andrade (1995), a cognitive anthropologist, argued that postmodern approaches are counter-productive for discerning how the world works. His critique of postmodern theory offers an alternative view, claiming the impact of media on the development of public opinion in America is better understood as a by-product of the Western emphasis on individualism.

An extremely common move in the debate about the dumbing down of culture and policymaking generally is to accuse the other side of elitism. Thus, proponents of the popularization of media to appeal to a broader audience accuse those who wish to preserve the hierarchies of the past of one type of elitism. Meanwhile, those advocating for a more educative role for mass media accuse their opponents of assuming that the public in general is only interested in "trash," which is an equally elitist perspective. When both sides in a debate launch identical accusations against one another, we can be quite certain that we are in a closed universe of discourse, and that no real understanding will be achieved until we step outside that frame.

One of the most highly developed academic debates of recent times has been the debate concerning the decline of modernity, in this study interpreted as the traditional structures and cultures of liberal democratic nation-state. The institutions of the nation-state were in principle the vehicle for the realization of the Enlightenment project. The goal of this project was the constant march forward of human society under the guiding hand of reason. Under these ideological assumptions, an indefinite, never-ending progress of the species was assured. The emergence of postmodern theory challenges

that view. Postmodernism provided an alternative worldview that challenged the dominant Enlightenment institutions and values (Jameson, 1991).

### **The Concept of Framing**

Scholars have long been interested in how arguments are framed in order to shape public opinion in the context of public policy. Framing theory has been widely accepted by a range of scholars and has become a standard method for studying public policy (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). The study of how citizens' political judgments are influenced by strategic framing of the issues goes back half a century in the social sciences (Druckman, 2001).

The roots of framing as a conceptual construct can be traced to the work of Walter Lippmann (1922) in his seminal book *Public Opinion*. Lippmann observed that in a democracy, most citizens spend most of their time and energy involved in family, work, recreation, and other social and religious activities of a personal nature. Lippmann argued that to most people, public policy is remote, complex, and of secondary interest. As a result, the politically unmotivated majority develops only a shallow and unreliable and ill-informed knowledge base upon which to form political preferences (Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 1954). Lippmann pointed to the media – which was largely comprised of newspapers and radio in Lippmann's day – as the primary source through which people derived political information. He noted that the second-hand knowledge people derived from the media was subject to being manipulated by media outlets through rhetoric and persuasion (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2007).

Scholarly Interest in framing and public policy grew during the 1980s when, for

example in a highly influential article, Gamson and Modigliani (1987) utilized content analysis to demonstrate how during the 1980s arguments over affirmative action were transformed from being defined in terms of an underserved advantage frame to a reverse discrimination frame by affirmative action opponents. In his 1992 book *Talking Politics*, Gamson (1992) described how media discourse consisted of interpretative packages giving meaning to an issue or event in the public domain. At the center of these packages was a central organizing idea, or *frame*. By incorporating and condensing a set of metaphors, catch phrases, visual images, moral appeals, and other symbolic devices, frames can be used to supply citizens with a readily comprehensible basis upon which they can think about political issues and determine their political preferences (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004).

Entman (1993) described framing in terms of communication that selects certain aspects of reality so as to promote the perception of a particular problem, sequence of causal events, or moral evaluation. The key character of framing is to thematically convey selected attributes for communication in a materially compelling manner (McCombs, 1997). According to Schuefele and Tewksbury (2007), the point at which framing became truly systematized in American political discourse and of interest to contemporary scholars can be traced to 1997. This was one year after Miller and Fox (2006) published the first edition of their book *Post-Modern Public Administration*, which began to set out in comprehensive form their discourse theory. It was also the year that Republican political pollster Frank Luntz circulated a 222-page memo to Republican members of Congress titled "Language of the 21st century" (Schuefele & Tewksbury,

2007). Luntz's memo analyzed testing and focus groups to identify terms and phrases that resonated with different audiences and helped change people's attitudes. Luntz argued that for effective political messaging how one says something is often more important than what one says (Schuefele & Tewksbury, 2007).

Luntz was followed by Lakoff, who published *Don't Think of an Elephant* - a manual instructing liberals on how to successfully frame their own messages. According to Schuefele and Tewksbury (2007), framing in the political context today manifests exactly the type of hyper-realist, epiphenomenal discourse posited by Fox and Miller (2006).

### **Framing by Politicians**

Within a framing construct of political discourse, how citizens think about an issue depends upon how it is framed. Frames are constructions of issues, and as constructions they convey how an issue should be thought about and what if anything should be done (Nelson & Kinder, 1996). Studies in framing demonstrate that large numbers of people can swing from one side of an issue to the opposite side depending on how the issue is framed (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). According to Druckman (2001), politicians, activists, and the media constantly frame issues and use these frames to manipulate citizens' preferences.

It has long been established that "mediated political communication is carried on by an elite" (Habermas, 2006, para. 18). Framing constitutes a process by which political elites and news media coverage shape mass opinion (Schuefele, 1999). Framing is one of the most important means of elite influence on public opinion (Slothus & de Vreese,

2010). Elites rely on mass media as the instrument with which to shape public opinion in pursuit of their policy agendas.

Thomas Dye (2000), C. Wright Mills (1956), and Simon and Xenos (2000) pointed to political elites as being composed of individuals occupying the top positions of major political, economic, legal, educational, cultural, scientific, and civic institutions. Politicians, who are individuals elected to political office through the democratic process, provide the link between political elites and the citizenry, and politicians point to their policy achievements to appeal to voters (Kitschelt, 2000).

In sum, framing theory posits that politicians play a central role as interlocutors in framing public policy issues before citizens on behalf of political elites. The theory does not posit that how politicians frame issues alone dictates the public policy preferences of citizens. How citizens view issues and policy alternatives also reflects citizen predispositions, schema and other characteristics (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). In practice, politicians can have a difficult time manipulating citizens because their opponents are also engaged in framing.

Faced with divergent frames, an individual's policy preferences are likely to be grounded in his or her own underlying principles (Sniderman & Theriault, 1999). Still, politicians must believe framing is effective given the degree to which it has become a fundamental component of American political discourse. It follows then that by invoking a particular frame in their communications, politicians seek, if not to control, to significantly influence public attitudes in terms of how the public perceives public policy issues. Framing constitutes a "battle over hearts and minds of citizens" involving

attempts to shape the way in which choices are presented and discussed in the media (Carpini, 2004, p. 21).

### **Relevant Studies in Political Framing**

With regard to the subject of this dissertation, a small number of recent studies have examined how discourses concerning Muslims are framed in the Western media in the post-9/11 period. These include Frost (2008) and Saeed (2007), who utilized content analysis to examine such frames in the British media. Closer to home, Trevino, Kanso, and Nelson (2010) analyzed content from three U.S. newspapers – *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Los Angeles Times* – to compare how these papers framed stories on Muslims before and after 9/11. They concluded, “each newspaper had allotted more unfavorable terms than favorable and neutral terms combined for both periods...the dominant negative terms labeled Muslims as terrorists, extremists, fundamentalists, radicals, and fanatics” (para. 1).

Salim (2010) analyzed the content of American media, coding stereotypical words such as radical, conflict, violent, and extremist. Salim (2010) found a general trend of negative messages and unbalanced reporting in the way stories concerning Muslims were framed. Similarly, using content analysis in a study on how the U.S. media portrays Muslims, Jackson (2010) concluded that the media portrays Muslims in negative, stereotypical ways, especially since 9/11. Jackson (2007) concluded that the media has tended to use frameworks centered on violent threats, extremism, and terrorism in its portrayal of Muslims.

It is important to recall that frames need not be accurately rooted in reality. For

example, Jackson (2007) noted that the media portrayals he reviewed misleadingly depicted Muslims and Islam as a uniform monolith. In reality, for a group consisting of over a billion people with majorities in over 50 countries, Muslims as a group are difficult to generalize about (Jackson, 2007). Nor do these frames used to depict Muslims necessarily serve the public good.

The effects of message flows on public opinion and policy preferences have been subject to considerable research. In a study somewhat related to that of this dissertation, Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro (2007) analyzed the content of remarks made by members of the George W. Bush Administration and its War on Terror. Nacos and colleagues concluded that the administration's frames played into the hands of the al-Qaeda leadership by conveying that the organization's goal of striking fear into Americans was succeeding (Nacos et al., 2007). In other words, if the administration's goal was to enhance the sense of security among the American people, its framing of the threat as a Global War on Terrorism was actually working at cross purposes.

Deepa Kumar's (2010, 2012) research into Islamophobia and its consequences is central to this dissertation, as she has done much to develop this concept in relation to the U.S. administration's responses to 9/11. In Kumar's (2010) essay "Framing Islam: The Resurgence of Orientalism During the Bush II Era," she explored how the Clash of Civilizations paradigm became the dominant political logic in the post-9/11 Bush Administration.

Kumar (2010) summarized Islamophobic rhetoric in terms of five false generalizations: (1) Islam is monolithic; (2) Islam is uniquely sexist; (3) Islam is

inherently violent and intolerant; (4) The "Muslim mind" is incapable of reason and science; and (5) the West spreads democracy, while Islam spawns terrorism.

Kumar has exposed each of these generalizations as false. Islam is not monolithic, as it is practiced in dozens of countries and divided into Sunni and Shiite branches. Islam is no more or less sexist than other Abrahamic religions, and many American Christians still believe the Bible teaches that wives should submit to their husbands (Blake, 2014). Those who depict Islam as advocating violence often misinterpret the term jihad to mean waging a holy war, rather than primarily an internal struggle to overcome weakness (BBC, 2009). The characterization of the "Muslim mind" as "irrational" or "pre-scientific" is an old slur rooted in the Orientalism of the colonial period (Said, 1978). Although the claim that America's war efforts in the Middle East and elsewhere were motivated primarily by the desire to spread "democracy" or "freedom," this rationale was contested even domestically (Ignatieff, 2005).

### **Saliency of the Literature**

With regard to this literature review, several salient points emerge. First, recent years have seen a shift in the nature of political discourses surrounding the Middle East and Islam in the United States from those that did not draw upon the Clash of Civilizations narrative and its Islamophobic implications to those that did. Politicians framed their arguments in terms of fear of the Islamic terrorist in order to build public support for their policy agendas. These frames were epiphenomenal in the sense that they were more based in emotionally charged rhetoric and empty symbolism than in any connection to realistic threats and accurate portrayals of Islam.



This review of the literature covered research that examined framing with regard to Muslims in the post-9/11 era. Many examples of discourses on Muslims have been found to be framed in negative terms. However, these studies have been limited in number. There is a significant gap in the academic literature about framing and media manipulation in the context of the Global War on Terrorism. Furthermore, few studies have focused specifically upon the Patriot Act, as discussed in the statement of the problem. The renewal of this law represented one of the most salient and contentious public policy issues before Congress in 2011, with significant implications for the American people as a whole and for Muslim-Americans in particular.

Lastly, the literature review pointed to content analysis as the principal research methodology used in scholarly research on framing. Chapter 3 will describe how content analysis was used as a methodology to address the research questions at the heart of this dissertation.

### Chapter 3: Research Method

In my research, I used qualitative methods for evaluating U.S. political rhetoric concerning Islam and Muslims post-9/11. The concept of framing was used to analyze the language politicians and news commentators when discussing topics such as terrorism, Islam, and Muslims.

#### **Research Design and Rationale**

When designing the current study on Islamophobia and framing, I had to determine whether quantitative or qualitative research methods would be better suited to the subject matter. Quantitative research methods express data in the form of variables while qualitative research methods express data in the form of generalizations (Monette, et al., 2005). Qualitative methods are best used when the research aim is to represent the subject in a specific context, versus the universal or abstract generalizations that result from statistical analysis using quantitative methods (Monette et al., 2005).

To understand the historically specific subject matter of this study, I decided to look at words, images and transcripts representing highly politicized content over a limited time frame and in response to particular historical events. The specificity of the social context of this rhetoric, and its politicized nature, called for a more subjective, interpretive, and evaluative analysis. In contrast, a quantitative model would have been better suited to randomized data collection and hypothesis testing. This study was formulated with the intent of seeking out and evaluating certain kinds of rhetoric used to bolster political positions at a particular point in U.S. history rather than arrive at general

hypotheses. The subject matter therefore seemed more amenable to a more contextualizing rather than generalizing approach, thus favoring quantitative methods.

### **Role of the Researcher**

My role in the research process was as an analyst of media articles intended to communicate to the general public interpretations of news reports in a variety of new media having to do with terrorism following the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon, in Arlington County, Virginia. My role included (a) finding articles written across the U.S. political spectrum; (b) screening these articles using theoretical and conceptual frameworks found in the literature; (c) thematic coding of the content; (d) conducting a qualitative NVivo software analysis sorting and grouping coded portions of the articles into nodal and thematic groupings; and (e) conducting a frame analysis of 10 cases of lethal terrorist attacks since 9/11.

### **Methodology: Content Analysis**

Content analysis is a methodology used for analyzing written, verbal, or visual communication messages. Content analysis is a research technique entailing the specification material of interest in a data set, often consisting of words or texts, then extracting that material for analysis (Smith, 2000). According to Hsieh and Shannon (2005), content analysis offers the researcher a method for coding and identifying themes in text data that allows for subjective interrelation of content. Krippendorf (1989) has referred to content analysis as a context-dependent analysis that enables interpretation of the meanings originally attributed to the material. The content analysis methodology as a research process is one that engenders a degree of originality in its approach because it is

a research method that is inherently dependent on both the interpretation and the creativity of the individual researcher. This is because the content analysis research method allows each researcher to develop his or her own set of thematic categories relative to the topic of the study in question. Thus, both the topic of the research study as well as the approach to analysis is original in their context and approach. However, because the content analysis methodology is also grounded in established research, it is never allowed to stray beyond originality into nonacademically supported areas such as fiction or biography.

Frame analysis is a subset of content analysis. The concept of frames has been identified as a principal qualitative research methodology used to examine political discourse (Tankard, 2001). The linguist Lakoff (2004, 2008) focused on frame analysis to analyze political discourse that flourished during the time frame of this study.

The study involved no live population sampling. Instead, in the first phase of the study, it involved selection of 44 news media articles selected from both conservative and liberal news publications over a period of 15 years from 2001 through 2016—a period following the 9/11 attacks (see Appendix A). The statements surveyed represented a variety of opinions across the political spectrum. The frames discovered represent the institutional interests and political agendas of a range of different institutions, including the press, elected officials, and heads of government agencies. This represents the multivocal nature of contemporary political discourses in the United States. Some of the frames explored represent Islamophobic discourses and attempts to increase the reach of the surveillance state, while others push back against these trends by using alternative

frames.

To collect content for the first phase of this study, I drew on the congressional record, seeking out pronouncements of members of Congress during the study period – beginning on February 1, 2011 and ending on May 26, 2011. These were the months during which discourse revolving around reauthorization of the Patriot Act was most pronounced. It included the period during which hearings by Representative King and Senator Durbin were held and ended with signing of the Patriot Act reauthorization by President George W. Bush. Data consisted of spoken words or text attributed to members of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate during the study period as reported in 10 Internet media news outlets. These are the Internet news portals for *Yahoo News*, *CNN*, *MSNBC*, *Google News*, *New*, *The York Times*, *Huffington Post*, *Fox News*, *Digg*, *The Washington Post* and *The Los Angeles Times*. Selection of these Internet portals as the source of data collection was based upon the following three factors:

First is the rise of the Internet as a primary source from which the American people obtain their news. According to a study released by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press (Pew, 2011, Jan.4), in 2010, 43% of Americans reported that the Internet served as their primary source for obtaining national and international news. The Internet trailed television as a news source – 66% of American pointed to television as their primary source of news coverage. However, between 2007 and 2010, the number of 18 to 29 year-olds citing the Internet as their main source of news nearly doubled, from 34% to 65%. Among those 30 to 49 years old, 48% obtained their news from the Internet compared to 63% from television (only 31% cited newspapers as their primary source of

news). According to Pew (2011), trends point to the Internet overtaking television as the main source of news for the American people in the next few years.

Second, this study was undertaken retroactively. Simply put, Internet news content with which to collect the data from the study period is easily accessible. In contrast, collecting data from television broadcasts that have occurred in the past would be highly complicated under any reasonable assumptions.

The third factor weighing upon selection of these Internet news portals for data collection stemmed from the fact that they are the 10 most heavily trafficked American Internet news sites. This is according to eBizMBA Rank (2011), which monitors and reports on Internet traffic. If news content on the public pronouncements of members of Congress and senators is likely to be reported in the news, it is likely to be reported on these news web portals. In sum, the decision to utilize these Internet sites for data collection reflects the fact that they are a highly trafficked and validated as leading sources of news coverage and provide an easily accessible source of data collection.

Additionally, in order to further explore the implications of anti-Islamic frames and the loss of political freedoms, I conducted a frame analysis survey of 10 high profile deadly attacks reported in the national news media in which the Muslim identity of the killer was highlighted and questions of jihadist terrorism were raised (see Appendix B). This phase of the study addressed the problem of scare-mongering in U.S. political discourse around the threat of Islamic terrorism. I used frame analysis to explore how mass shootings by suspected jihadists have been reported in the national news media.

### **Data Collection**

Data were collected from the texts of published media reports and articles. A complete list of the documents used in this study can be found in Appendix A. There were no other types of instruments prepared for surveys. Despite its widespread use, content analysis involves some inherent limitations in terms of reliability and validity. Validity refers to the degree to which coding judgments are objective and not subjective. Reliability refers to the degree to which coding is consistent. Content analysis also presents limitations in terms of reliability (Bolognesi, Pilgram, & Van Heerik, 2017; Saldaña, 2016).

The data were compiled using QSR International's NVivo (Version 11) computer software and this data was analyzed following constant comparative analysis (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998; Weber, 1990) and coding procedures (Saldaña, 2016) assisted by the NVivo software as follows: (a) collected observations, (b) sought key issues that could become categories of focus, (c) observed what provided elements of the categories of focus, (d) wrote about the categories accounting for all elements of observations, (e) continued working with the observations to present the emerging themes to discover relationships between categories, and (f) connected categorical relationships by recoding and writing to analyze the focal points of the core categories.

Following Saldaña's (2016) qualitative research strategies, the key to producing a reliable content analysis involves proper delineation of categories and a coding instrument that clearly and consistently provides guidelines for data classification. The delineation of categories were arrived at through the steps described by Bogdan and Biklen (1998) and Saldaña (2016). Essential to the reliability of content analysis are clear

and consistent coding rules (Saldaña, 2016). Reliable classification procedures are critical to the task of drawing inferences from a text. Classifications must therefore be consistent, and coding categories exhaustive. Mutually exclusive categories allows the researcher to place relevant themes in one category, so that data does not blur over into alternative categories (Weber, 1990).

The challenges posed in terms of validation stems from the fact that content analysis relies on inference and context to define intent by a speaker or writer and that it is important for the analyst to avoid inserting personal bias into the analysis. Here arises the concern of what questions will emerge when conducting the content analysis.

Whether the information was received from a primary or secondary source, what is the subject's political awareness and the stage of the policy process a given message was transmitted. A well-developed coding instrument can help address reliability and validity concerns. Likewise, use of computerized content software can help reduce these threats.

### **Data Analysis: Categories and Coding**

Data analysis included the systematic coding of key ideas, use of computer software (NVivo, version 11) to seek response patterns, and use of constant comparative analysis of all data sources seeking to identify themes. I pre-coded potential categories (Saldaña, 2016), then entered the codes and the 44 news media articles listed in Appendix A into the software data base. I went through each of the articles applying the precoding to sections of those articles. When that step was completed, I compiled all codes that were similar with each other, merging similar codes, and recoding data into subcategorical themes where possible (Vaismoradi, Jones, Turunen, & Snelgrove, 2016).



The themes were then compared to consider how they might be similar or different and how they may be related to one another (Vaismoradi et al., 2016). If there were enough themes to form into meta-themes, they were further grouped into suggested categories and theoretical constructs. A write-up subsequently described each of the constructs and how they related or integrated with one another (Saldaña, 2016). This was accompanied by construction of frequency distributions on a number of the mega-themes. This is a process known as the constant comparative method where observations can develop step-by-step into a core of emergent conceptualization and theory (Glaser, 1978). The process of constant comparative analysis was then followed described by Kolb (2012) and Glaser (1978), which consisted of six steps:

- (a) Observations were collected of the article descriptions, inferences, and implications;
- (b) The key issues were sought that would later become focal points of the categories;
- (c) Observations were made that provided many elements of the categories of most concern;
- (d) Subcategories were documented and written about, then described and accounted for all things within the observations while new ideas continued to be searched for;
- (e) Observations were worked with to present the emerging themes to discover relationships of categories; and

The relationships of categories were connected through sampling, then coding and finally writing to analyze focal points and core categories.

Events can be framed in terms of identifying perpetrators, victims, motives, and calls for action that direct the target audience to respond in a certain manner. Frames

consist of simpler components, or memes, which in turn often conglomerate into sets of symbolic associations, or meme-complexes (Spitzberg, 2014). Memes are units of cultural transmission, analogous to genes, which are the basic units of biological transmission (Dawkins, 1989). Memes are aggregations of symbols that convey identifiable ideas and are transmitted socially through words, images, gestures, melodies, catchphrases, or other imitable phenomena. When a frame, as a complex of associated memes, becomes widely recognized or familiar in a culture, the entire frame may be evoked or activated in the minds of the culturally competent by a few keywords or other kinds of shorthand (Lakoff, 2007). By analyzing the reporting of various mass killings with possible jihadist associations in the national news media in the United States since 9/11, I showed that reporters and editors often selected two dominant frames to explain these events: 1) the *organized terrorism* frame, and 2) the *mental illness* frame.

The *organized terrorism* frame can be identified by certain keywords or memes. This frame makes an association between Islam and terrorism, sometimes implicitly. Specific terms that may evoke the *organized terrorism* frame include: terrorist, radicalized, and anti-American. Since 9/11, the *organized terrorism* frame has often incorporated an Islamic terrorism meme, which can be evoked by mentioning ISIS, Al-Qaeda, or martyrdom. The prominent featuring of a Muslim name or Middle-Eastern family background in the context of a mass murder or killing spree may be sufficient to evoke this larger frame.

The *mental illness* frame is also commonly used to explain seemingly random killings of strangers. Unlike the *organized terrorism* frame, the *mental illness* frame does

not explain the killer's motives in terms of radicalization, martyrdom, or racial or religious outsider categories. The killer's motives are instead described as "senseless" or "inexplicable," and the killer is said to be acting on a breakdown of his<sup>1</sup> mental capacities rather than implementing any ideological or political objectives.

In analyzing the framing of these attacks, I considered five aspects of the reporting: (1) characterization of the event itself, (2) actors involved, (3) instruments deployed, (4) suspected motives, (5) responses. Characterization of the event considers the language used to describe what happened. Descriptive accounts may range from strictly factual to emotionally charged. Specific codes were applied to language characterizing the actors includes how the perpetrator, victims, and heroes (if any). An instance of the *organized terrorism* frame was identified when the perpetrators were identified as terrorists killing for an ideological cause. Reports were coded as examples of the *mental illness* frame when perpetrators were described as mentally unstable with opaque or unknown motives

Once the data for the first phase of the study was collected, I needed a way to organize and process the texts. I used Weber's (1990) approach to units of analysis, seeking out clusters of words with similar meaning or connotations. Coding these clusters involved describing and classifying units in terms of categories of select analytical constructs (Krippendorf, 1989). According to Hsieh and Shannon (2005), categories and a coding scheme for content analysis can be derived from three sources: the data, previous related studies, and theories. When data fitting the parameters stipulated above was

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identified in the Internet sources, discourse was coded for analysis.

For classification of data, content analysis categories were defined as posited per the three schemata referenced above in the statement of the problem – Islamophobia, Clash of Civilizations, and Endangered Constitutional Protections. As noted above, a basis for coding schemes for the Islamophobia frame already existed in prior studies (Frost, 2008; Gardner, Karakasoglus & Luchtenberg, 2009; Jackson, 2010; Saeed, 2007; Salim, 2010).

Themes for coding included the words: *Muslim, Islam, terrorism, violence, and threats*. These terms were used for initial coding the Clash of Civilizations frame. The Clash of Civilizations frame interpreted attacks by Muslims as part of a foreign threat to Western civilization, waging a war along deep historical cultural and value divides between incommensurable religious rifts that go back centuries. Terms referenced above in the statement of problem were useful for initial coding the Endangered Constitutional Protections frame included: *civil rights, civil liberties, law abiding, and patriotic*. These words provided a point of departure for coding.

The content analyses in this study was organized in two ways: 1) by frequency distribution of words, nodes, and themes, and 2) by evaluation the inferences of pronouncements and assertions. Frequency distributions of themes were performed through the use of an NVivo 11 Software database that used precoding and post-coding of terms and concepts found in 44 preselected media articles. Evaluation of the inferences of pronouncement and assertions was performed both by precoding and studying the new words, as well as lengthier pronouncements such as sentences that emerged during

analysis of the content. As additional words and phrases were identified, they were incorporated into the coding process.

Coding involves analyzing spoken or written language in numeric terms (Saldaña, 2016). A coding instrument was developed to classify words and text. For the purpose of this dissertation, the coding instrument consisted of the name of the Internet news source, the name of the congressperson cited, and whether the statement suggested a Clash of Civilizations or Endangered Constitutional Protections frame. In addition, data on the party affiliation and how members of Congress cited voted either aye or nay to reauthorize the Patriot Act provisions. Coding was also assigned to the manner of reporting on instruments, such as firearms or explosive devices, used in carrying out the crimes. Under the framing of motivations, I considered whether the acts were depicted as random, inexplicable events beyond anyone's ability to predict or circumvent, or if they were intentional acts of terrorism or martyrdom. Under the responses category, I considered both how those close to the event responded in the moment and the immediate aftermath, as well as prognoses of the situation and future calls to action.

### **Drawing and Reporting Conclusions**

Formulating meaningful conclusions constitutes the most important phase of a content analysis (Krippendorf, 1989). In this study, textual analysis involved applying the knowledge about how the coded data related to the framing categories and resulting implications with regard to the USA PATRIOT Act reauthorization. Conclusions were analyzed for presentation in Chapter 4 in a systematic form to demonstrate the way congressional discourse was framed in evaluating the hypotheses. The second phase of

the study added an additional level of evaluations and associations that were also be reported below.

## **Trustworthiness**

### **Accuracy of Discourse**

This study follows Guba and Lincoln's (1985) four criteria for judging the soundness of qualitative research. These are credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. Guba and Lincoln explicitly offered these as an alternative to those criteria commonly used to evaluate quantitative research. I discuss each of these criteria in greater detail below.

### **Credibility**

The study met most of the following criteria asserted by Lincoln and Guba (1985) to evaluate and confirm the study credibility as described below:

**Adoption of research methods well established in qualitative investigation in general and in information science in particular.** The research design followed the procedures of an exploratory descriptive qualitative multiple case study research design of data sources that are generally established in qualitative investigation. The exploratory approach allowed exploration circumstances and contexts where there were no clearly expected outcomes at the outset (Yin, 2017). The descriptive case study approach is used to describe a phenomenon within actual contexts where they occurred (Yin, 2017).

**The development of an early familiarity with the culture of participating organizations before the first data collection dialogues take place.** An early familiarity with news organization culture and biases (see Appendix C) was developed

through background research. This research enabled me to understand much of what might be expected in the way of framing and content from media outlets. These sources told me that Islamic terrorism and a foreign threat were common themes in post-9/11 national discourse.

**Triangulation.** Alternative methods of observation and research were pursued in this study to find alternative sources of corroborating evidence. Frame analysis was conducted on 44 articles by analyzing both in depth meaning of the content within articles written by a variety of mass media sources; NVivo 11 database software analysis was conducted using coding schemes combined with frame analysis to generate frequency distributions on key themes and subthemes found in the 44 mass media articles (see Tables 1-9); and multiple case study frame analysis was conducted on mass media reports following 10 violent incidents with U.S. national borders, claiming 95 lives that were investigated for jihadism (see Appendix B).

**Thick description of the phenomenon under scrutiny.** Detailed descriptions of the study phenomenon and context in the literature review Chapter 2 were provided. Detailed descriptions are also provided in Chapter 4. Finally, extensive descriptions of the study meaning, implications, significance, and conclusions are provided in Chapter 5.

### **Transferability**

Transferability of the findings of this research study was intentionally limited to contexts with nearly identical description, characteristics, and likeness as distinguished from broad generalizability (Geertz, 1973; Guba, 1981). This was thought of as a valued tradeoff for potentially rich insights about unknown aspects of jihadism, terrorism,

Islamophobia, and Islam. Qualitative research design was selected to explore a gap in the literature expressed in RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4 in context of the research problem and purpose as described in Chapter 1. What could be transferred by this study are likely to be limited insights and recommendations for future research.

### **Dependability**

This study was admittedly limited by the selection criteria of the documents reviewed and the framing of the research questions. Since qualitative research may sacrifice statistically decisive outcomes in favor of a thick and rich description of the phenomenon under observation, and since qualitative research may incorporate the subjective interpretations of the researcher, replicability depends to a significant extent on the starting assumptions of the researcher. The likelihood of achieving the same results in other studies are possible given that the repetition of this study can be done in the same or similar context achieving a cross-circumstantial equivalence (Steenkamp, & Baumgartner, 1998). By this it is meant that researchers with a similar background as possessed by this researcher using the same methods with a similar dataset, including a similar mix of media reports, similar methods of analysis used, and in a similar time period (Rindfleisch, Malter, Ganesan & Moorman, 2008). However, different interpretations from the same dataset may provide additional insight from a qualitative perspective.

### **Confirmability**

The study provided an objective audit trail for future researchers to follow, thus allowing other researchers to replicate the study by following the methodology provided.



The principal caveat of this assertion is researchers that try to replicate this study should do so within a short time frame of several years from the date of this publication given that the study was a cross-sectional view of reality related to accessible media articles (Rindfleisch et al., 2008; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). Data collected from future studies could very likely lead to formation of the same or very similar recommendations.

### **Ethical Procedures**

Walden University's Institutional Review Board reviewed and granted approval for this study. The approval number is 07-30-13-091988. There were no human participants in this study.

### **Summary**

The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to analyze public discourse surrounding Islamic terrorism in terms of frames that have been used to argue for enhanced government surveillance, restrictive immigration policies, and other erosions of U.S. citizens' constitutional protections. Findings suggested that defenders of the U.S. Patriot Act in 2011 framed justification arguments as a Clash of Civilizations that pitted Western freedom proponents in opposition against radical Muslim fanatics in struggles over social change. In the following chapter the study results are described including in depth content analysis and frequency distributions of study themes.

## Chapter 4: Results

### Introduction

My purpose in this study was to analyze public discourse surrounding Islamic terrorism in terms of frames that are used to argue for enhanced government surveillance, restrictive immigration policies, and other erosions of U.S. citizens' constitutional protections. More specifically, this study was to explore how policymakers frame their arguments to garner broad public support for a particular political agenda. The study fulfilled this purpose through analysis of U.S. public rhetoric about Islam and people of Arab heritage from politicians and high profile national news commentators post-9/11. Using frame analysis, the study interpreted this rhetoric in terms of three frames: (1) Clash of Civilizations, (2) loss of Endangered Constitutional Protections, and (3) Islamophobia.

In this chapter, I used content analysis to interpret narratives on the main topics of interest from two distinct sources: (a) anti-Islamic frames gleaned from the public record surrounding the original passage and later reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, and (b) frames used in national news media when reporting on terrorist attacks associated in some way with Muslims or jihadism since 9/11.

### Setting, Demographics, Data Collection

U.S. media documents constitute the data for this study. A complete list of the documents used in this study can be found in Appendix A. The setting for this study as terrorism has become a threat to national security and safety from coast-to-coast. This has been evidenced by the occurrence of lethal terrorist actions with jihadist implications

throughout the nation since 9/11 that have been highlighted in this qualitative study using discourse analysis in: Boston, MA; Chattanooga, TN; Killeen, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Little Rock, AK; Moore, OK; Orange NJ; Orlando, FL; San Bernardino, CA; and Seattle, WA (See Appendix B). This study did not include any interviews so there were no demographics to report. This was a study of data that was presented in media articles from a variety of media sources and writers from the period 2001-2016 (See Appendices A and B.)

### **Data Analysis**

Given that politicians frame the issues before them to promote an agenda (Lakoff, 2008), I explored common frames that were used to justify the Global War on Terror and to argue for or against the Patriot Act. Media articles from 44 sources characterizing the Post- 9/11 crisis in the United States were analyzed using the three frames of Clash of Civilizations, Endangered Constitutional Protections, and Islamophobia. These are designated as F1, F2, and F3 respectively:

F1: The Clash of Civilizations frame – This frame as interpreted by Huntington (1993) characterized the Global War on Terror as a heroic battle of great historic proportions and based in deep, civilizational divisions about culture , history, and religion among other things, in which Western defenders of freedom confronted an irrational, foreign threat of an Islamic nature.

F2: Endangered Constitutional Protections frame – This frame alerted the public to a corrosion of basic civil rights formerly guaranteed by the United States Constitution that will result if personal liberty is sacrificed in the name of protecting the public against

terrorism.

F3: *Islamophobia* frame – This frame positioned Muslims as a persecuted minority and viewed anti-Islamic rhetoric as based in bigotry.

### **F1: The Clash of Civilization Frame**

The Clash of Civilizations frame pitted an alliance of nations representing the West against five or six non-Western civilizations, coalescing around radically different core value systems, that present a collective threat to Western hegemony (Huntington, 1993). In this narrative, the West in the form of nation states was both hero, world savior, and potential victim, facing a powerful collection of enemies made up of groups of different civilizations acting as Islamic extremists. For example, in a 2016 address on terrorism, presidential candidate Donald Trump (2016) listed enemies to freedom and democracy that the United States defeated in the past, then followed this by the claim that the country was currently under repeated attack from Jihadists, in order to justify an aggressive foreign policy in the Middle East.

In the 20th Century, the United States defeated Fascism, Nazism, and Communism. Now, a different threat challenges the western nations: Radical Islamic Terrorism. In the United States, there has been one brutal attack after another. In its heroic role, Huntington (1993) saw Western civilization standing for science, democracy, progressive values, and rationality. The West faces challenges from competing civilizations, such as Confucian civilization centered in China, or Orthodox civilization centered in Russia that also were seen as heroic by supporters in times past. The non-Western civilizations developed along different historical trajectories and in recent

decades have stood in opposition to core liberal democratic values. According to Huntington (1993), Islamic civilization would pose perhaps the greatest threat to Western liberal democracy in the post-Cold War international order following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Data taken from this study has suggested that there are four major themes associated with the clash of civilization framework: (a) anti-American vengeance, (b) anti-Semitic (anti-Israel) sentiment, (c) jihadism (terrorism, threat, violence), and (d) Western civilization vs. Islamic civilization. The mentions of these themes in 44 articles written and published by major media outlets are shown in Table 1:

Table 1

*Clash of Civilizations Framework Themes*

Clash of civilization framework themes	No. of articles that mentioned theme	No. of CCFT references
Anti-American	14	24
Anti-semitism, anti-Israel	8	11
Jihadism, terrorism threats, violence	14	20
Western civilizations vs. Islamic civilizations	9	10
<b>Totals</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>65</b>

*Note.* Mentions to themes in parenthesis () were merged with the first listed factor to indicate who the clash theme was directed to. Data was collected from the texts of published media reports and articles (see Appendix A). CCFT = Clash of Civilizations framework themes.

The table illustrates both the specific Clash of Civilizations that the media has captured in anti-American, anti-Semitic (anti-Israel) and jihadist rhetoric as well as the rhetoric describing generalizations explaining the clashes of Western civilization vs.

Islamic civilization. Anti-American and vengeance, and well as Jihadist, terrorism, threats, and violence were the most commented upon themes.

In the Clash of Civilizations frame, Islam has been characterized as inherently violent and irrational and show in examples by Kumar (2010) in her descriptions of the historic evolution of Islam from the time of Muhammad to time of the de facto division of religion and secular power, Acharya & Murdock, (2013), in their description of religious warfare, Nisbet, Ostman, & Shanahan (2009), in their descriptions of violence and irrational behavior of Islamic terrorists, and Wright (2015) in her descriptions of the security challenges in the past century. Further, because civilizational divides are deeply historical and undergird radically different core value systems, there is little chance of forging alliances that span these divides. The favored option of those who espouse this frame is to defeat the “enemies of freedom” through military force (CNN, 2001).

Something as grand and momentous as a Clash of Civilizations is evoked by the naming of the international military campaign led by the United States in the global war on terror. This campaign originally focused on Muslim countries associated with Islamic terrorism, even though, according to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Saddam Hussein was distrustful of Al-Qaeda, and Iraq under Hussein aggressively outlawed Wahabism and threatened offenders with execution (Shakir, 2006).

Framing the war as global in nature suggests a collection of enemies, networked around the world, rather than a specific terrorist group or nation (Cronin, 2003). Wellman (2018) suggests that people live in personal communities, not terrorist groups or nations. The only commonality that united these enemies was the tactic of terrorism. The

paradigm of the terrorist organization was Al-Qaeda, but over time the war would shift its focus to other organizations based in Muslim countries as Al-Qaeda was no longer perceived to pose a significant threat (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

The Clash of Civilizations frame was evoked by President George W. Bush soon after the 9/11 attacks, when Americans were still trying to understand what had happened. An example of this frame can be found in President Bush's (CNN, 2001) address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, in which he framed the September 11<sup>th</sup> attack as a war on freedom. This speech incorporated several elements that activated the Clash of Civilizations frame: it pitted Western victims – Americans: Christians, Jews, and Muslim Americans, against Islamic terrorists in which no distinctions were made between military and civilians. It indicated a deep cultural divide in core values claiming that what the villains hated was freedom itself – the freedoms of religions, speech including having disagreements, voting, and assembly. The speech also implied that religious values may be at the heart of the conflict by closing with the suggestion that freedom of *religion* is a key point of contention along with other freedoms instead of a single religion that the Muslim terrorists believed in.

President Bush later drew criticism for referring to the War on Terrorism military campaign as a crusade (Waldman & Pope, 2001). The evocation of the frame of a religious war waged by Christians against Muslims was too transparent, and Bush quickly backed away from this statement in the wake of criticism from the press. However, the president's original statement appeared to be a clear variant of the Clash of Civilizations frame. Apparently, the press reacted to the use of the word crusade,

referencing the Christian Crusades that was a clash between Muslim and Christians to secure control of holy sites considered sacred by both religions (Carroll, 2004; Waldman & Pope, 2001).

Other action-oriented politicians who supported the military efforts picked up on President Bush's (2001, paragraph 62) frame that the terrorists "hate [us for] our freedoms." New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani provided a case in point. In an opinion piece in the *New York Times* arguing for extending the controversial provisions of the Patriot Act, Giuliani (2005).

Giuliani evoked the trope of American freedom when he said the terrorists seek not merely to kill Americans but to "destroy our liberties" (Giuliani, 2006, para. 2). This activates the frame of America as standing for freedom or liberty, against an enemy that opposes liberty itself – a clash of core values.

In an ironic twist, those who pushed for more intrusive laws and less restricted law enforcement policies would be accused of compromising constitutional freedoms in the name of defending American freedom as an abstraction. U.S. Representative Bill Shuster (2005) who provided an example of evoking the Clash of Civilizations frame when arguing for the necessity of controversial provisions in the Patriot Act in an editorial to the *Connellsville Daily Courier*. He called for the discovery, penetration, and infiltration of terrorist cells to be able to keep track of any planned or ongoing activity to preempt action as critical actions for America to pursue on the war on terror.

This position plays on the tropes of an irrational enemy – one who is willing to sacrifice his or her own life for the cause, which includes murdering innocent Americans.



The terrorists' apparent irrationality is further emphasized by the statement that they have no clear end goal – this is an enemy whose motives are opaque and unavailable to innocent Americans. They may simply be evil for evil's sake. The use of the word "homeland" underlines the notion of a threat from the outside, or one posed by a foreign enemy, even though the Patriot Act authorizes surveillance of American citizens within the nation's borders.

Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez also evoked the frame of an evil enemy, biding his time overseas, when arguing to extend some controversial provisions of the Patriot Act. Gonzalez (2005) emphasized in an interview on a Fox News Sunday show that the world needed the enhanced data gathering provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act to protect against a diabolical threat from a patient enemy, and that those who challenge the act were weakening that country. Gonzalez justified the controversial provisions in the act by claiming these will protect America from a "diabolical, very patient enemy" (Gonzalez, 2005, p. 1). Thus, he associated the enemy of America with the devil, or evil itself.

In 2013, President Barack Obama backed away from some elements of the Clash of Civilizations frame when he announced that the United States would no longer pursue a "War on Terror" as a military focus. He made the point that "terrorism" is a tactic, not a specific enemy. He further stated that "We must define our effort not as a boundless 'Global War on Terror,' but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America" (Obama, 2013). Obama later explicitly challenged the Clash of Civilizations frame when he said, "No religion is

responsible for terrorism — people are responsible for violence and terrorism” (Earle, 2015). For this and similar statements distancing American foreign policy from the implications that the country is at war with Islam, the president drew criticism from conservative pundits, perhaps indicating that a segment of the U.S. population continued to favor the Clash of Civilizations frame (Kittel, 2015).

### **All action-oriented frames considered justification for the Patriot Act.**

The action-oriented justification for the USA PATRIOT Act included three framework themes: (a) the *clash of civilization frame* just described (see Table 2), (b) the *organized terrorism* frame, and 3) the *self-radicalized hate crimes* frame. All three action-oriented frames are shown in Table 2.

Table 2

#### *Action-Oriented Frames*

Action-oriented frames	No. of mentions in articles	No. of CCFT references
organized terrorism	25	37
self-radicalized hate crimes	6	8
<b>clash of civilizations</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>110</b>

*Note.* Mentions to themes in parenthesis () were added to the first listed factor. CCFT = clash of civilizations framework themes.

The Clash of Civilizations dominated the media coverage of these three framework themes by a factor of nearly 2:1 in comparison to *organized terrorism* as a framework and a

factor of greater than 8:1 over *self-radicalized hate crimes*. This suggests how powerful the Clash of Civilizations frame could have been in the minds of those in the media; and with that how likely it might be that American politicians and high-profile national news commentators could have relied on Huntington's Clash of Civilizations model to portray rhetoric to frame discussions of Islam and terrorism. Along with this, all three action-oriented themes taken all together closely following in the aftermath of the 9/11 killing spree suggest a response to RQ1 and RQ3 - how legislators could have followed the national broadcast media in using the Clash of Civilizations model to gain popular support to justify authorization and reauthorization of the Patriot Act as a public policy response. A response to RQ2 and RQ3 is also suggested following fears that can generate from terrorism, hate crimes and the radicalized Muslims who practice it.

*Self-radicalized hate crimes* did not have any subthemes as distinguished from the Clash of Civilizations and *organized terrorism* frame coded themes. This frame could have had subthemes coded by demographic categories such as race, religion, ethnicity, cultural preferences, but I judged the quality of the data pool to not be sufficiently consistent or sophisticated to carry sufficient credibility. Only six out of 44 (14%) of the news media articles contained references to *self-radicalization*, and there were only 8 references to *self-radicalization* found in those articles. This finding suggests that *self-radicalization*, while a powerful concept in and of itself, was not a widespread perceived practice at the time of the study.

Organized terrorism contained two powerful sub-thematic codes as shown in Table 3. Mass murder, killing spree dominated the coverage by a factor of 1.5:1 over Isis,

Al-Qaeda, possibly because the articles taken from the media were from domestic U.S. sources.

Table 3

*Organized Terrorism*

Organized terrorism	No. of articles that mentioned this	No. of CCFT references
ISIS, Al-Qaeda	10	15
Mass murder killing spree	15	22
Totals	25	37

*Note:* CCFT = Clash of Civilizations framework themes.

**Proponents of the Patriot Act: The counter terrorism measures.**

The proponents of the Patriot Act and its reauthorization have argued for four major policy themes to protect the nation against the possibility of further attacks such as the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. These four themes are captured in media reports and discussion including the four themes shown in Table 4. The theme that had the most mentions by a margin of more than 2:1 was *communication surveillance* as put forth by the Patriot Act and its reauthorization. The next highest media mention was for the theme of *harsh penalties for terrorists and their supporters* including the seizure of weapons. These findings suggest that *communication surveillance* could be a proxy for what is believed to be the most effective policy of managing domestic terrorist attacks. Widespread *communication surveillance* would lead to a loss of privacy and equal protection and with that a response to RQ4 – how new security measures would represent a loss of traditional freedoms.

Table 4

*Counter-Terrorism Measures*

Counter-terrorism measures	No. of articles that mentioned this	No. of CCFT references
Harsh penalties for terrorists and their supporters	5	11
Immigration controls, warrant simplification, profiling	2	7
Information sharing, vigilance, semantic clarity in press	4	4
Communication surveillance as put forth by the Patriot Act and its reauthorization	7	25
<b>Totals</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>47</b>

*Note:* Mentions to themes in parenthesis () were added to the first listed factor. CCFT = clash of civilizations framework themes.

In the broader perspective of anti-hawk frames in which counter-terrorist measures belong, there are two other major themes that can be discerned in media discussions – Endangered Constitutional Protections and Islamophobia, as can be seen in Table 5. The two anti-hawk themes of greatest concern and discussion of the three themes listed are Endangered Constitutional Protections and Counter-Terrorism Measures. What was unexpected was the lower amount of discussion about Islamophobia relative to the two other themes suggesting that the somewhat subjective Islamophobia theme could be less important to more people than the two other relatively more objective themes.

Table 5.

*Conservative Frames*

Conservative Frames	No. of articles that mentioned this	No. of CCFT references
---------------------	-------------------------------------	------------------------

Counter-Terrorism Measures	18	47
Endangered Constitutional Protections	16	50
Islamophobia	10	13
<b>Totals</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>110</b>

*Note:* Mentions to themes in parenthesis () were added to the first listed factor. CCFT = Clash of Civilizations framework themes.

## **F2: The Endangered Constitutional Protections Frame**

Opponents of the Patriot Act often criticized it for violating basic constitutional protections. Defending the constitution is a powerful frame in American political discourse. This frame pitted the heroes who fight to defend traditional freedoms guaranteed by the nation's founding documents against power-hungry politicians who seek to expand the government reach at the expense of its citizenry. In the case of the Patriot Act, this grab for power was justified by government paternalism, the claim that the government needed to expand its law enforcement activities in order to protecting the public from terrorism (e.g., Goldsmith, 2013).

The victims, according to the Endangered Constitutional Protections narrative, were the American people, who were at risk of losing freedoms and rights they previously took for granted. In criticizing the Patriot Act, all Americans stood to see their freedom encroached upon by such activities as secret government surveillance of their cellphones and electronic communications, but Muslim-Americans might be especially at risk through ethnic profiling by law enforcement agencies. Because this ethnic profiling also had a religious component, critics contended it also ran afoul of the First Amendment of the Constitution. In the Endangered Constitutional Protections frame,

critics who opposed the expansion of government power were positioned as heroes.

This frame was used by politicians who argued against the passing of the Patriot Act in the first place, and later for letting special provisions of the act expire. President Clinton's chief of staff John Podesta was an example of a member of the political establishment who evoked a constitutional freedom frame to argue against the wiretapping provisions of the Patriot Act. In the year following the passage of the act, Podesta (2002) wrote, "The sharing of such a broad range of information raises the specter of intelligence agencies, once again, collecting, profiling and potentially harassing U.S. persons engaged in lawful, First Amendment-protected activities." Podesta thus took a position in defense of a religious minority.

Four themes dominated discussion in the media about Endangered Constitutional Protections as seen in Table 6. *Personal freedoms* – religion, speech, equal protection, and civil liberties; and *unlawful search and seizure*, due process, and notice were the two themes that led the commentary in the media, with the *right to privacy*, a close third. These findings suggest that all of the constitutional themes are thought of as important to preserve as a counterweight to freedoms challenged by the Patriot Act of 2001 and the reauthorized Patriot Act of 2011.

Table 6

*Endangered Constitutional Protections*

Endangered Constitutional Protections	No. of articles that mentioned this	No. of CCFT references
Freedom of the press	6	18
Law Abiding	2	2

<i>Right to privacy</i>	5	13
<u>Unlawful Search and seizure</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>17</u>
<u>Totals</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>50</u>

*Note:* CCFT = Clash of Civilizations framework themes.

Another opponent of the act that raised questions of loss of Endangered Constitutional Protections was the Center for Constitutional Rights. In a report that was critical of the act, the group wrote, “perhaps of greater concern than specific abuses are the ways in which civil liberties have been eroded by the introduction of sweeping new laws, and by the codification of abusive practices through executive order and interim rules” (Ball, 2004, p. 79).

An early vocal opponent of the Patriot Act was Senator Russ Feingold, the only member of the Senate to vote against its passage. In a speech presented on the floor of the Senate before bill passage, Feingold (2001) repeatedly evoked the frame of protecting the Endangered Constitutional Protections:

We must continue to respect our Constitution and protect our civil liberties in the wake of the attacks...Preserving our freedom is one of the main reasons that we are now engaged in this new war on terrorism. We will lose that war without firing a shot if we sacrifice the liberties of the American people...We must maintain our vigilance to preserve our laws and our basic rights...Congress will fulfill its duty only when it protects both the American people and the freedoms at the foundation of American society. So let us preserve our heritage of basic rights. Let us practice as well as preach that liberty. And let us fight to maintain that freedom that we call America.



### F3: The Islamophobia Frame

Islamophobia as an anti-hawk theme contained three partially subjective sub-themes – *bigotry*, *Muslim association* and *self-radicalization* - as can be seen in Table 7. The *self-radicalization* theme garnered a third more media discussion and attention as *bigotry*, and twice as much as *Muslim association*. This finding suggests a response to Q2 - that *self-radicalization* and *bigotry* were more powerful sources or triggers of Islamophobia than *Muslim association*, but might be conflated with these themes as they could be interpreted as being associated with the study themes, even though they are independent. There were five themes in this category that I have called anomalous frames as can be seen in Table 8.

Table 7  
Islamophobia

Islamophobia	No. of articles that mentioned this	No. of CCFT references
Bigotry (racial, religious, sexist)	3	4
Muslim (Islam) <i>association</i>	2	3
Self-Radicalization hate crimes	5	6
Totals	10	

*Note:* Mentions to themes in parenthesis () were added to the first listed factor. There were themes that did not relate to the major themes contained in the study. CCFT = Clash of Civilizations framework themes.

Table 8

## Anomalous Frames

<u>Islamophobia</u>	No. of articles that mentioned this	No. of CCFT references
Common criminal	1	1
Drugs & alcohol abuse	2	6
Mental illness	10	13
Personal grievances	6	9
<u>Undetermined motive</u>	1	1
<u>Totals</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>30</u>

*Note:* CCFT = Clash of Civilizations framework themes.

*Mental illness* stood out among the themes as attracting a third more media attention than *personal grievances* and twice as much as *drugs and alcohol*. *Mental illness* is a more complex theme than the others included in this table as can be seen in Table 9. Inexplicable (senseless) *mental illness* was cited as the most appropriate label for violence that was witnessed or described by a factor of more than 4:1 over the *random killing of strangers* and more than 300% more over *bipolar mental illness*. These findings suggest that those who write about the mentally ill in these situations, know little about these events and perhaps even less about mentally ill behavior in the present day.

Table 9

## Mental Illness

<u>Mental Illness</u>	No. of articles that mentioned this	No. of CCFT references
Bipolar	2	3

<u>Inexplicable, senseless, random killing of strangers</u>	8	10
<u>Totals</u>	10	13

*Note:* Mentions to themes in parenthesis () were added to the first listed factor. CCFT = Clash of Civilizations framework themes.

In order to further explore the implications of anti-Islamic frames and the loss of political freedoms in this study, I selected national and local news reports covering the 10 high profile cases of lethal terrorist attacks since 9/11. These are cases in which the Muslim identity of the killer was highlighted and questions of jihadist terrorism were raised. This phase of the study addressed the problem of scare-mongering in U.S. political discourse around the threat of Islamic terrorism. In this multiple case study, I used frame analysis to explore: (a) how the U.S. news media covers sudden tragic events, and (b) how mass shootings by suspected jihadists have been reported in the national news media. Since 9/11 there have been 10 violent incidents within U.S. national borders, claiming 95 lives, that have been investigated for connections to jihadism. The majority of these attacks met the FBI's definition of terrorism based on statements from the killers or evidence that emerged on investigation (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). Each case included reporting from the first day of the attack (see Appendix B). Early reporting on unexpected events provides an example of news media struggling to contextualize events within existing frames, and the initial reports represent a period when uncertainty of how to interpret the events is highest. These reports therefore provide examples of fitting current events within a standard narrative. The list below provides a number for each case for the purpose of reference in this study and gives the sources used in the framing analysis.

- (a) El Al Ticket Counter Shootings, 2002 (Associated Press, 2002; CNN, 2003; Fox News, 2002; Holguin, 2002)
- (b) Seattle Jewish Federation Shootings, 2006 (Associated Press, 2006; Sullivan, 2010; Yardley & Rudoren, 2006)
- (c) Fort Hood Shootings, 2009 (Browne, & Herridge, 2013; Friedman, Esposito, Nelson, & Kannampilly, 2009; Kenber, 2013)
- (d) Little Rock Military Recruitment Office Shootings, 2009 (Abrams, 2009; CNN, 2009; Serrano, 2011)
- (e) Boston Marathon Bombing, 2015 (Associated Press, 2015, 2016; Nakashima, 2013)
- (f) Vaughan Food Processing Plant, 2014 Beheading (Ellis, Sutton, & Levs, 2014; Silver, 2014; Williams & Schmidt, 2014)
- (g) Washington and New Jersey Spree Killings, 2014 (Crimesider Staff, 2014; Queally, 2014; Stack, 2015)
- (h) Chattanooga Military Facilities Shootings, 2015 (Associated Press, 2015; Fernandez, Blinder, Schmitt, & Pérez-Peña, 2015; Zamost, Khorram, Prokupecz, & Perez, 2015)
- (i) San Bernadino Office Party Shootings, 2015 (Botelho & Ellis, 2015; Medina, Pérez-Peña, Schmidt, & Goldstein, 2015; Ross, Hosenball, Schwartz, & Most, 2015)

- (j) Pulse Nightclub Shootings, 2016 (Alvarez, & Pérez-Peña, 2016; Burke, Otis, & Slattery, 2016; CBS, 2016; Ellis, Fantz, Karimi, & McLaughlin, 2016; Grenell, 2016; Levine, 2016)

The analysis focused on the dominant frames presented in the reporting of the incidents. Frame analysis was used to compare reporting the incidents along several lines of questions:

- (a) How was the incident characterized?
- (b) How were the perpetrators and victims characterized?
- (c) Was the tone of article written in a style to dramatize and alarm, or to calm and reassure?

The association of the attacks with jihadist extremism through culturally salient frames was sometimes used to introduce *Islamophobic* tropes, highlighting the Muslim identities and religious motivations of the killers. This frame served to bolster anti-Islamic sentiment, to portray Muslims as a foreign threat, and to garner support for the idea of a Global War on Terror. *Islamophobic* frames of high-profile incidents are often evoked to explain why such attacks occur and what should be done to prevent them, but alternative frames suggesting opposing interpretations and implied responses also occur.

Reporters, editors, or owners of news outlets need not consciously choose alternate frames that emphasize or deemphasize purported religious motivations or the ethnic identities of the perpetrators. Rather, framing choices represent the prevalent cultural narratives that journalism, as a cultural practice, reproduces and naturalizes (Skinner, Gasher, & Compton, 2001). Following an analysis by Kumar (2010, 2012), I

explored the contributions of news reporting to three claims relating to post-9/11 Islamophobia: (a) that framing terrorist attacks in terms of a Clash of Civilizations incited anti-Muslim prejudice in the American public, (b) that this Clash of Civilizations frame was propagated nationally by broadcast and print news, and (c) that new legislation crafted in the climate of the resulting anti-Islamic panic Endangered Constitutional Protections provided by the Constitution of the United States.

### **Evidence of Trustworthiness**

Implicit to postmodernist theory and framing in communications is that framing may or may not reflect objective reality. An operating assumption of this study was that many implications of the Clash of Civilizations frame were not realistic in their characterization of the Islamic threat. The rhetoric was often epiphenomenal in the sense of pressing emotional buttons with little concern over accurate reporting. In the discussion section below, evidence was cited to support this claim.

The news reporting frame analysis phase of this research explored the editorial decisions of a sample of national news sources. These included *Fox News*, *CNN*, *ABC News*, *USA Today*, *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Post*, *The Los Angeles Times*, and *The Guardian*. The use of these prominent news outlets is not presented here as representative of mainstream cultural trends or somehow generalizable to “the American public.” Frames drawn from these sources are to be considered exploratory findings that will lend themselves to critique and analysis and open up new lines of inquiry. Such exploratory ends are appropriate to the qualitative methodology used, which makes no claims of objectivity or broad generalizability.

Rather than drawing broad conclusions from this data, the semantic and framing analysis of news reporting represents an attempt at contextualizing academic arguments on such topics as a Clash of Civilizations, the spread of anti-Islamic propaganda in the United States news media as a pretext for justifying use of military force overseas, and the discrimination and divisiveness that can be tied to anti-Islamic rhetoric.

### **Credibility**

The purpose of the frame analysis was to investigate examples of Islamophobia in the U.S. media post-9/11. The credibility criteria in qualitative research privileges the perspective of the users of frames over that of any external evaluator. From this perspective, culturally competent consumers of the news sources of interest are the ones who can legitimately judge the credibility of this research (Trochim, 2006a). Should consumers of national news reporting read the completed study, they may then weigh in on its credibility by indicating the extent to which they find the results reported here believable.

### **Transferability**

A different researcher selecting a different sample of news sources may find some frames that were not considered in this study. Such limitations on transferability are inherent in qualitative research involving a non-exhaustive sample of news sources. Should another qualitative researcher wish to obtain similar results to those reported here, it is up to that researcher to follow the research protocol of this study and then to decide which contextual variants are most relevant for obtaining similar or different results.

Newer research on a similar topic will establish the limits of transferability of these findings.

### **Dependability**

Where quantitative research aims at abstracting out the differences among any number of unique situations, qualitative research focuses on ever-changing contexts (Trochim, 2006a). If this study is conducted again in a few years, it will be interesting to learn if the changing political climate and distance from 9/11 and the Islamophobia it spawned will generate different perspective and themes from groups of randomly selected students in America.

### **Confirmability**

Confirmability in qualitative research refers to the degree to which the results could be confirmed or corroborated by others (Trochim, 2006a). Another researcher who wished to show that Islamophobic public discourse in post-9/11 America was insignificant or not transparent to students could survey a different set of news sources that specifically target in on politically liberal or conservative frames (see Appendix C). Disconfirming results arrived at by examining different news sources would invite scrutiny and critique. Readers of a disconfirming study on this topic could compare the data collection procedures and the analysis of the two studies to reach a conclusion about which study best captures the truth, and which distorts it.

## **Results**

Responses to the most recent and most significant attack in terms of fatalities, the Pulse Nightclub Shootings, explicitly highlight how the framing of such incidents in the



news media and by politicians has become an explicitly a contested political issue.

Presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton characterized the attack as a hate crime against sexual minorities, speaking out against the killer's "horrible sense of vengeance and vindictiveness... against LGBT Americans" (Grenell, 2016, para. 2).

Clinton used the terms "madman" and "hate," suggesting two common frames used to report mass killings: the *mental illness* frame and the *hate crime* frame. Clinton's framing of the attack in this manner was denounced by a *Fox News* commentator as disqualifying her for the presidency as "too weak" (Grenell, 2016).

On the other end of the political spectrum, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump commented on the incident as a clear case of "radical Islamic terrorism" and used this incident to justify a proposed ban on Muslims entering the country (Levine, 2016). Donald Trump then went on to criticize President Obama for failing to frame such incidents in these exact terms. A commentator from the *Huffington Post* characterized Trump's response as horrific (Levine, 2016).

Obama directly responded to Trump, arguing that simply using the phrase "radical Islamic terror" would not help anything. What exactly would using this label accomplish? What exactly would it change? Would it make ISIL less committed to try to kill Americans? Would it bring in more allies? Is there a military strategy that is served by this? The answer is none of the above. Calling a threat by a different name does not make it go away (Levine, 2016).

In surveying the news reporting on the 10 deadly attacks, I found three frames to be most commonly used in the initial reports: (a) the *undetermined motive* frame, (b) the

*organized terrorism* frame, and (c) the *mental illness* frame. Other less common frames that were used to interpret the killings were: (d) the *hate crime* frame, (e) the *personal grievances* frame, and (f) the *common criminal* frame. I will discuss how each of these frames were used in the reporting on these incidents in more detail below.

### **Undetermined Motive Frame**

Even when the circumstances of an attack implied jihadist motive – the targeting of Israeli airline passengers by an Egyptian national (a) or statements made by the killer himself (as seen in framing sources: a, c, d, f, j, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85), nearly all the initial reports include statements from F.B.I. officials or other investigators that the motive is “unclear,” the act was “random,” and that no links were found connecting the killer to terrorist groups. Even when the perpetrator explicitly claimed connections to ISIS or other Islamist radical organizations, officials questioned these claims pending further investigation.

### **Organized Terrorism Frame**

Although this frame is often raised as a possibility in the days following the reporting of an attack, the frame will not be officially confirmed by the F.B.I. or the White House until after the completion of an investigation lasting a year or longer. Evidence required for the official confirmation include a history of electronic communication with known terrorist cells (c, h, i, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85), or extensive travel abroad to places where the perpetrator had an opportunity to become radicalized (d, i, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85). While officials are slow to evoke this frame, the perpetrators

themselves often frame their crime in these terms by explicitly claiming ties with jihadist terrorism or claiming anti-American rationales for the attack (c, d, f, h, j, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85). In some cases, these claims of ties to jihadist terrorism are later questioned or found unsupported upon investigation (f, g, j, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85).

### **Mental Illness Frame**

This frame is often evoked by noting that the perpetrator was a loner or misfit who had recently experienced failure in marriage, business, and life in general (a, d, e, f, h, i, j, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85). A history of mental illness, such as depression, bipolar disorder, or brain damage is also mentioned, along with failure to take medications (b, d, h, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85). Former friends, relatives, lovers or close associates with the perpetrators often express surprise at the violent acting out. They found the attack inexplicable and characterize the killer as “a tender person,” “close to his family” (a, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85), “a popular student in high school” who was highly malleable and influenced by his older brother (5), “not a violent person” and “a good kid” f, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85), and “a very sweet guy [who] never showed a violent side, loved to be cuddled... [and] was looking for love” (j, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85).

### **Hate Crime Frame**

Alternately categorized as a “bias motivated crime,” a hate crime is a violent criminal act that targets a victim based on his or her actual or perceived membership in a

social group (FBI, 2016). In contrast, terrorism entails the use of violence in order to “intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population... in furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI, 2005). Reporting on several incidents framed them as hate crimes more than terrorism: against Jews (a, b), white people (f), or the LGBT community (j), although there can be some overlap between the two categories.

### **Personal Grievances Frame**

In two of the incidents, the perpetrator targeted former coworkers at a workplace where the perpetrator had been fired and complained of being harassed (f, i). In a third incident, the perpetrator targeted members of an ethnic and sexual subculture – gay Latinos – from which the killer felt excluded and rejected (j). These Personal Grievance Frames were considered in some reports to better account for the attacks more than the jihadist frames the killers adopted.

### **Common Criminal Frame**

Although the perpetrator of the Washington and New Jersey Spree Killings (7) converted to Islam, changed his name to a Muslim name, shouted “Allahu Akbar” as he killed, and claimed to be making “just kills” to punish the U.S. government for its military action overseas, the murders were done and no ties were found to organized terrorism. The crimes included the targeting of gay men, luring them to private locations using a dating app, and then killing a young college student in the course of a car-jacking. The murders were reported as common street crimes in the reports surveyed here.

### **Discrepant Findings**

I found that many of the frames used in the reporting of mass killings surveyed

above were complex and mutually contradictory. Not all the frames could be readily classified as promoting Islamophobia. Law enforcement official statements by agents tended to be especially cautious when they were asked to categorize an incident as jihadist terrorism, even when the initial reports seemed to indicate that as a real possibility. Some of the data (c, d, f, g, j, see Data Collection and Analysis section above, pp. 84-85), indicate that the perpetrators themselves made deliberate efforts to frame the attacks as jihadist in intent, while later investigations found no ties of these attacks to larger terrorist organizations, and instead found evidence of psychological deterioration, random criminal behavior, and personal vengeance as the primary explanations. Such cases are discrepant with the hypothesis that the news media are consistently motivated to promote Islamophobia and the idea that the United States faces a foreign threat on its own soil.

The notion that Islamophobia is a widespread or dominant media framing of mass killings perpetrated by Muslims or persons of Middle-Eastern heritage was not born out by the data collected in this study. Although the *organized terrorism* frame was common, it was not the dominant frame across all incidents, and was often balanced by competing frames, as was seen in Chapter 4, Table 5.

### **Summary**

Data from this study came from two types of sources: (1) public pronouncements from prominent politicians, lawmakers, and high profile news reporters concerning the nature of America's global war on terror and on the constitutionality of the Patriot Act, and (2) news media reports of deadly attacks within United States national borders in

which the perpetrator was identified as Muslim. The concept of frames was used to analyze the deep structure of the narratives people used when discussing current political issues or promoting their favored agendas.

The content analysis of the first phase of this study generated additional questions about the characterizations of Islam and Muslims in the Western media. These emergent questions contributed to a critique of the media representations. This critique was rooted in framing theory, which claims that the manner in which issues are presented evokes cognitive schemas or culturally salient models that provide a context for interpretation along with an implied course of action or reasonable response that follows from the frame (Lakoff, 2008). Some emergent questions that came out of the content analysis included the following: When Muslims are broadly characterized as terrorists or radical Islamists, how does this influence new legislation and public support for such legislation? If Muslims are so characterized, then what should be done about this?

Following the Endangered Constitutional Protections frame, a different set of questions emerged: How can a democratic society based upon equality for all create legislation that is culturally discriminatory without in effect compromising its national identity? From the perspective of the Islamophobia frame, how can the United States or any other nation productively conduct foreign policy or global diplomacy while harboring prejudice toward a large ethno-religious category? In order to explore these questions among non-pundits and common folk, I arranged to conduct a second phase of the study.

The first dataset found politicians selecting a Clash of Civilizations frame in order

to justify U.S. military campaigns in the Middle East and to argue for increased government surveillance of U.S. citizens. It also found that politicians who challenged government intrusion into private communications would adopt a competing Endangered Constitutional Protections frame to make their case.

The second dataset consisted of a survey of early reports by national press outlets covering mass killings. In these published reports, I found that using the *organized terrorism* frame, with reference to jihadism and radicalization, was a common frame, but that alternative frames were also used. News media reporting of such attacks is ambivalent where it concerns how to frame them. The *organized terrorism* frame may be used to justify the claim that Americans must sacrifice certain freedoms and accept greater government surveillance during a time of national crisis, as when facing an increased threat of terrorism from militant jihadists. Alternative frames, such as the *mental illness* frame or the *common criminal* frame are used instead to argue for tighter gun control laws (Siddiqui, 2016). In the next section, I will further analyze these findings and their implications.

## Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

### **Introduction**

My purpose in this study was to analyze public discourse surrounding Islamic terrorism in terms of frames that have been used to argue for enhanced government surveillance, restrictive immigration policies, and other erosions of U.S. citizens' constitutional protections. The overarching purpose of this study was to explore how media framed their arguments to garner broad public support for a particular political agenda.

The frame analysis of political discourses focused on three dominant frames, or language choices that might lead an audience, in this case policy makers, to adopt a particular stance on an issue. The three frames were:

- Clash of Civilizations frame – A frame that posited a national existential threat to the United States from an irrational foreign enemy in the form of Islamic terrorist organizations (Huntington, 1993).
- Endangered Constitutional Protections frame – A frame that pitted politicians who positioned themselves as defenders of constitutional freedoms against others who would sacrifice these freedoms in the name of protecting the public from a foreign threat (Concerned Citizens Against the Patriot Act, 2015).
- Islamophobia frame – A frame that portrayed Muslims as a persecuted minority group and exposes anti-Islamic rhetoric as a form of bigotry (Kumar, 2010).

### **Key Findings**

For the analysis of politicians' arguments surrounding the Patriot Act and its



reauthorization, it appears that key findings of this study were as follows:

- Politicians arguing in support of the act used Clash of Civilizations frames that emphasized fear and promulgated misleading characterizations of an Islam associated with violence and irrationality.
- Politicians arguing against the act used Endangered Constitutional Protections frames that suggested the new laws sacrificed civil liberties.

The media explaining the mass killings used the Islamophobia frame to suggest that Muslims were a persecuted minority.

### **Interpretation of the Findings**

In this section, I explored the ways that the findings confirm, disconfirm, or extend ideas in the academic literature reviewed in Chapter 2. The main points of reference were Huntington's (1995) Clash of Civilizations thesis, Kumar's (2012) critique of Islamophobic discourses in the American news media, Fox and Miller's (1995) analysis of a "postmodern" media environment characterized by "epiphenomenalism," and Lakoff's (2008) frame analysis.

### **Islamophobic Discourse**

I focused discussion groups that explored the resurgence of Orientalism in early 21st century American public discourse. The research therefore explored topics that came out of the academic tradition founded by Said. Said's (1978) *Orientalism* was an influential founding document in post-colonial cultural studies. Said's critique of the patronizing attitudes of Westerners toward non-Westerns or "Orientals" centered largely

on fictional depictions of Islam and the Muslim “other” of the Middle East and North Africa.

Kumar (2010) extended Said’s thesis to 21st century U.S. political discourse by noting an ideological shift toward Orientalism from the Bush senior and Clinton Administrations, where anti-Islamic rhetoric was not prominent in foreign policy discussions, to the George W. Bush Administration where the “Global War on Terror” was framed as a multination Clash of Civilizations campaign of the liberal West against fundamentalist Islam. Kumar characterized the Orientalist frames of American politicians and prominent spokespersons in the national media as hegemonic and therefore sought to counter these ideologies in her work.

**Response to RQ1: How do U.S. politicians and high-profile news commentators in the national broadcast media use of Clash of Civilizations rhetoric to frame discussions of Islam and terrorism.**

In interpreting the data, I considered five Orientalist stereotypes that I took from Kumar’s (2010) analysis. These stereotypes portrayed Islam vis-à-vis the West as a civilization quite different from the West that was (a) monolithic, (b) uniquely sexist, (c) irrational and unscientific, (d) inherently violent, and (e) undemocratic—clearly a clash with Western civilization, that was oppositional in every one of these key factors. The monolithic stereotype comes into play when the 1.5 billion Muslims in the world, approximately 22% of the world’s making up around 50 Muslim majority countries, including distinct schools of jurisprudence, such as Sunnis, Shi’as, and Kharijites, are reported in the U.S. press as a single, undifferentiated hostile group (Kumar, 2010). The

alternative would be to recognize that subgroups of Muslims in various parts of the world are more likely to be victims rather than perpetrators of terrorism associated with a small sect of radical militants (Kumar, 2010). The sexist stereotype justly raises issues of subordination of women in some Islamic societies, or unjustly framed norms of cultural modesty as a violation of women, while ignoring near parallels in Western society or Judeo-Christian religion (Kumar, 2010). Likewise, the characterization of Islamic nations as violent, undemocratic, or technologically backward is meant to serve as a contrast to the technological democracies of the West, only by glossing over historical contributions to technology and law from the Islamic world (Kumar, 2010).

**Response to RQ2: How does the use of such frames constitute a kind of Islamophobia**

I found that depictions of Islam and Muslims in the U.S. news and entertainment media were often unfair and inaccurate as exemplified and discussed in the results section of Chapter 4. In elaborating possible objections to these images, I argued from the fallacy of composition: the error of assuming that what may be true for members of a group is true for the whole group. The fallacy of composition includes essentializing – an accounting of group differences in terms of stereotypes and overly broad generalizations (Wagner, Ruadsepp, Holz, & Sen, 2016). This leads to simplistic notions of Islam as a monolithic tradition, in which all Muslims speak with one voice, failing to recognize the plurality of identities and beliefs within Islam (Hughes, 2013). Contrary to rhetoric that essentialized Islam and associates it with a foreign threat, Islam is not monolithic, and those who use the fallacy of composition include essentializing – an accounting of group

differences in terms of stereotypes and overly broad generalizations (Wagner et al., 2016). This leads to simplistic notions of Islam as a monolithic tradition, in which all Muslims speak with one voice, failing to recognize the plurality of identities and beliefs within Islam (Hughs, 2013).

**Response to RQ3: How do these frames influence public opinion, spreading fear and suspicion of Muslims? More specifically, how are such frames used to garner popular support for extreme, invasive measures by the security state?**

When these frames were used immediately following 9/11 they did indeed show how public opinion was influenced, spreading fear and suspicion of Muslims, and justifying the garnering of public support for extreme, invasive measures by the security state, thus addressing RQ3.

**Response to RQ4: How do new security measures that were instituted in the Islamophobic political climates represent a loss of traditional freedoms, such as rights to privacy and equal protection under the law for all citizens?**

In a rush to judgment, the use of these frames also showed how new security measures that were instituted in the Islamophobic political climates represent a loss of traditional freedoms, such as rights to privacy and equal protection under the law for all citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious identity, thus addressing RQ4, as shown in Chapter 4, tables 4, 5, 6, and 7.

Countering the mass fear and overreach for political power that characterized legislation in the years following 9/11, many political commentators seemed willing to

portray Islam in a positive light, as a religion of peace, and adopted the Islamophobia frame to reject those who thought the religion was associated with radical terrorism, in sympathy with the idea that Muslims were unjustly maligned. The term Islamophobia itself entered public discourse and did not necessarily seem loaded or biased, as people began generally to understand its implications. This runs counter to critics of the term, who have found it divisive and inflammatory. For example, in the aftermath of the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, while acknowledging the problem of prejudice against Muslims, stated, "I refuse to use this term 'Islamophobia,' because those who use this word are trying to invalidate any criticism at all of Islamist ideology. The charge of 'Islamophobia' is used to silence people" (Goldberg, 2015, p. 1).

Since December 2012 terms like homophobia and Islamophobia have been dropped from the Associated Press Stylebook, a standardized English language usage guide for professional American journalists. The reason given for discouraging such language in news reporting was that calling something a phobia implies an understanding of the mental state of another individual that is not warranted, and also carries the implication of ascribing a mental disability to one so labeled (Blumenfeld, 2012). Critics of the term find it polarizing, and express concern that it constitutes a form of name-calling and may be used to shut down debate over the actual extent to which Islamism is implicated in terrorism.

Another objection to the term is that it ascribes a psychological disorder or irrational fear or hatred to those who fear religious-based militancy. In addition to older

associations of a phobia with a diagnosable mental illness, the Islamophobic frame may forge an unconscious association with the more salient term homophobia. Recent polling of Millennials (the age cohort born between 1981 and 1997) have found this group to be especially concerned over social issues and the victimization of minorities (Tierney, 2014). This age demographic also tends to be the most tolerant of gay marriage. The term homophobia is salient to this group and an accepted descriptor of social injustice targeting gays. It is a small step to empathize with the plight of persecuted Muslims and see their persecutors as Islamophobes and bigots.

### **Postmodern Media Climate**

Another concern that was raised in this research was the disconnection from reality in Islamophobic rhetoric. Opinion polls of Muslim Americans taken in the months following 9/11 showed that they perceived media depictions of Islam and Muslims as distorted and unfair (Nacos, & Torres-Reyna, 2004). Commenting on common stereotypes of Middle-Easterners in an earlier decade, Said (2007) wrote, “Muslims and Arabs are essentially covered, discussed, apprehended as either suppliers of oil or as potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of the Arab-Muslim life has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Islamic world” (p. 189).

Fox and Miller (1995) described a “postmodern” media climate, characterized by a disregard for facts, a blurring of news and entertainment, and unstable fleeting barrage of signs and images that disorients people’s capacity for critical thought and leaves them unable to discern what is real. They characterized this postmodern media climate as

“epiphenomenal,” meaning that the information broadcast over mass media creates its own insular narratives, which may be entirely disconnected from facts.

One would expect Fox and Miller’s (1995) postmodern media consumer to be unable to distinguish reality from propaganda, to be overwhelmed by ever shifting signs and narratives that perpetually distract them, and to be linguistically incapable of forming cogent, critical arguments even if they felt something was wrong. Did the news reporting of subsequent attacks reflect a mindless backlash against Muslims and Islam that might be characteristic of this postmodern media environment? The reticence of the security state to quickly ascribe mass shooting or bombing incidents to “Islamic terrorism” suggested otherwise.

When reading Fox and Miller’s account of the postmodern news consumer, one would not expect the media consumer to be reflective of the effects of the barrage of distracting narratives, nor would one expect the postmodern media consumer to be so quick to distance themselves from dominant media narratives.

### **Framing**

According to Lakoff (2004), a cognitive linguist, frames are constructs that structure the way people understand what happens in the world, affecting our actions, objectives, intended procedures, and results. Political frames structure our the way we organize our social strategies and the organizations we create to implement these strategies. Thus, reorganizing frames changes social outcomes.

Lakoff (2004, 2008) developed the theory of conceptual frames and related this to American political discourse during the decade following 9/11/2001 – the period

relevant to this study. According to Lakoff, frames are created through language to influence other speakers of that language to draw desired conclusions; the choice of words used to tell a story or relate a news item will influence audiences' opinions on what is being reported. Frames have the power to change the way the public sees the world, or what counts as commonsense. Frames also have real consequences for how people will act; if an incident is framed as a foreign attack from a hostile other, as documented in this study, people are prone to react in fear and take aggressive measures.

Frames are essential to coherent thought. We can shift from one frame to another by selecting different words to describe a phenomenon, but we cannot opt out of having any frame whatsoever (Goffman, 1974). Also, facts are subsidiary to frames for arriving at accepted views of the world. People think primarily in frames, not facts. For a fact to be accepted, it must fit the frame. When the facts do not fit the frame, the frame stays, and the facts go (Entman, 1993). Subjects also selectively seek out facts that support their favored frames (van der Pas, 2014). Without any frames to hang them on, facts make no sense in and of themselves (Lakoff, 2008, p. 16). The tables in Chapter 4 indicate the frequency of themes used in the American press in the early 21st century to frame acts of violence as organized terrorist attacks by Islamists. These break down into finer categories, such as the recent manifestations of a centuries-old clash between fundamentally different value systems (Table 1), or an alien psychology of evil people who inexplicably hate us for what we most prize about our national character (Tables 5, 8, and 9). There are also tensions within the U.S. national discourse suggesting that the state may have overreached its powers of surveillance in protecting the citizens (Table 6),



or that the tarring of Muslims represents an unjustified fear or othering (Table 7). The action-oriented frames in Table 2 and the conservative frames Table 5 call for enhanced policing, greater restrictions on travel, and fewer protections of privacy. These illustrate the capacity of frames using coding and NVivo software to clarify patterns existing in the 44 news media articles that were analyzed in this study. The predominance of action-oriented Clash of Civilizations framing seen in Table 2 and relative lack of predominance of Islamophobia conservative counter-terrorism measures seen in Table 5 was demonstrably clear in these tables and played a key role in addressing the four research questions in this study. The action oriented frames in Table 2 show that the Clash of Civilization frame unexpectedly dominated media coverage for all four measures by a factor of more than 2:1 over the Organized Terrorism frame that followed, and the Self-Radicalized hate crimes was hardly mentioned as a frame. In Table 5, there was another unexpected finding in that the Islamophobia frame was the least covered frame by the media as compared with Counter-Terrorism Measures and Endangered Constitutional Protections, which dominated the coverage. All other tables showed close relationships between the item with the exception of the Anomalous frames shown in Table 8 in which the dominance of Mental Illness was shown as the most common type of motive for Islamophobia by almost 2:1 over personal grievances and nearly negligible for the other options – common criminal, drugs and alcohol abuse and undetermined motive.

Common frames that have been used to discredit Muslims are the “potential terrorist” frame discussed by Said (2007) and the sexist, violent, irrational, and undemocratic frames elaborated by Kumar (2010). Kumar deployed Islamophobia as an

alternate frame that characterizes Muslim haters as bigots and possibly suffering from irrational delusions. The Islamophobia frame may also work for American Millennials who are prepared to defend Muslim Americans as a persecuted minority.

### **Accuracy of Political Framing**

As noted above, frames constitute a basis for political messaging that need not comport with reality (Fox & Miller, 1995). There is in fact reason to believe that in framing their arguments in support of a Global War on Terrorism, members of Congress were not wholly accurate in their portrayals and engaged in propagandizing. For example, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, between 1980 and 2005, Muslim extremists accounted for only 6% of terror acts committed on U.S. soil. Latino, left wing, Jewish, and other groups including right wing and neo-Nazi extremists all accounted for a larger number of acts of terror in the U.S. during this period.

That there was national defense as well as civil rights implications intrinsic to reauthorization of the Patriot Act seems clear, particularly from the perspective of Muslim-Americans. In a poll released by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press in summer 2011, 55% of Muslim-Americans reported that it had become more difficult being a Muslim since 9/11, 28% reported that people had acted suspiciously toward them, and 21% reported that they believed they had been singled out by airport security. Overall, 52% of Muslim-Americans reported they believed that government anti-terrorism policies singled out Muslims in the U.S. for increased surveillance and monitoring. In an updated poll by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press in the summer 2017, 75% reported there was a lot of discrimination against Muslims in the

U. S., 62% did not see Islam as part of mainstream society, 50% reported that in recent years being a Muslim in the U. S. has gotten more difficult. So, although opinions did not appear to have changed very much, they have improved over the six year period between the summer of 2011 and the summer of 2017.

Reauthorization of the three Patriot Act provisions was approved by Congress and signed into law by President Obama on May 26, 2011. In the House of Representatives, the vote largely divided along party lines. The House voted 250-153 to renew the law's controversial provisions. Thirty-one House Republicans joined most Democrats in opposing the extension, while 54 Democrats supported it. In the Senate, reauthorization passed 72-23, with most of those in opposition being Democrats (Fox News.com, 2011, May 27). Representative King and Senators McConnell and Kyle, who depicted the need to renew these provisions as a matter of fighting Islamic terrorism, voted to renew the provisions. Republican Senator Paul joined Democrat Senators Wyden, Durbin and Democrat Representative Ellison who depicted renewal as a threat to civil liberties, voted against. Clearly affiliation alone did not define how members of the Congress framed the debate over Patriot Act reauthorization.

### **The Mass Media and Terrorism**

While traditional broadcast media was centralized in terms of a few powerful media corporations and largely unidirectional in its dissemination of information, the mass media throughout the West and certainly in the US has been steadily shifting from centralized corporate controlled broadcast media to the Internet (or the Web). The Internet represents not just an alternative delivery platform but a new media form in

itself. In this respect, the Web has certainly contributed to the perception of Muslims in general as being terrorists not through its structure but in how it has been manipulated by both the traditional mass media as well as actual terrorist organizations. A recent research study by Silkworks, Schmuck Matthes, & Binder (2017), has confirmed how this is possible by demonstrating that news coverage connecting Islam to terrorism by the Islamic State can initiate fears in non-Muslims. By contrast, differentiation of news coverage between Muslims and Muslim terrorists can tamp down fears. The ease with which this can be done shows how perceptions can be easily manipulated. Participants in this study read biased articles produced for this study to measure framing effects about fear of Muslims. This phenomenon has been born out in numerous ways. In a Gallup Poll, Americans have identified terrorism as the most significant problem facing the U.S. (Riffkin, 2015). The rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State or the Islamic-Caliphate on June 28, 2014, has elevated media coverage worldwide (Satti, 2015; Zhang & Hellmuelle, 2016). Previous research has uncovered that Muslim prejudice in the West is regularly framed negatively in numerous studies (Ahmed & Matthes, 2016; Bowe, Fahmy, & Wanta, 2013).

The Internet has substantially enhanced the recruiting, funding and propaganda capacities of virtually all terrorist groups throughout the world (Dornbierer, 2011). This has occurred at such a pace that it has been noted that by the new millennium all of the terrorist organizations that the State Department in the U.S. had migrated their recruiting, funding and propaganda operations to the Web in one form or another. This has been somewhat overlooked by the general population that is constantly subjected to the threat

of terrorist attacks across the Web and Internet by the mass media. The mass media carry a constant refrain of the threats that important institutions in the U.S. – such as financial markets, government networks and military databases – face due to cyber terrorism (Broadwater, 2011). Seemingly under the radar for the average news watcher is while these threats do exist, the usurpation of the Web and its functionality by terrorist organizations seems to be a more prevalent and worrying threat.

In this regard, while the actual number of terrorists and terrorist organizations that align themselves with Islam is small, the Internet gives these individuals and organizations an outsized voice (Zhang & Hellmuelle, 2016). The Web acts to amplify these organizations' beliefs and doctrine so much so that what they espouse is often reported in the mass media as applying to all Muslims or Islamic countries in general. The result is that the average individual in the West may have difficulty in discerning between legitimate Muslim and Islamic websites and those that espouse a doctrine of hate and terror.

Terrorist organizations typically utilize the Internet to enhance their ability to communicate with their members, develop recruitment networks, engage in some level of psychological types of warfare and to generate revenue channels to fund terrorist activities (Whittaker, 2004). For example, on August 19, 2014, the Salafi jihadist extremist militant group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) broadcast a video on YouTube titled "A Message to America." (Lister, 2015). The video began with President Obama's announcement of U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq, then showed James Foley, an

American freelance video reporter covering the Syrian war, reading a confession of regret, followed by Foley's beheading at the hands of a black-clad ISIS fighter (Carter, 2014). Although YouTube deleted the video, a copy of it continued to be hosted on the shock site BestGore.com, and was tracked and made available for personal download through the Bittorrent site Pirate Bay (Halliday, 2014). ISIS, unlike earlier terrorist organizations that used electronic media mainly for internal communications, has been noted for its use of open platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, and for the enhanced production values it put into English language videos targeting American audiences (Siegel, 2014).

The overall structure of the Web facilitates these activities because of its decentralized character. This type of highly decentralized infrastructure is one that suits terrorism and terrorist organizational structure very well. Terrorist groups typically operate in cells that act independently of each other and that maintain a veil of secrecy in terms of who manages them and what they are tasked with accomplishing (Cragin & Daly, 2004). Likewise, the Web consists of literally millions upon millions of independent websites, and by some early accounts there are more than several million unique networks throughout the world across which billions of users regularly navigate daily (Cragin & Daly, 2004). Since this structure of the Web suited the purposes of the typical terrorist organization these entities acted quickly to migrate over to Web-enhanced operations.

Especially alarming for many in the West has been the capacity for the Web to be subverted for uses related to psychological warfare and various related applications. In

fact, many of those individuals that are actually targets of this type of Web-based terrorism are Muslims themselves, who reside both in Islamic countries and abroad. Those terrorist organizations that are actually inspired by their Islamic ideals often target their own populations in order to obtain broader support, although this support remains extremely small (Mauro, 2013). Many of these terrorist entities design legitimate webpages that publish their objectives to the general public and which tend to avoid any of the atrocities for which they are known but they also put up on the Web various web pages that host images and videos of their more brutal acts of violence as a means to intimidate and instill fear in others (Cragin & Daly, 2004). For instance, video images of numerous beheadings can be found throughout the Web. These types of acts are attributed to a relatively insignificant portion of the Islamic population but which gain an unprecedented platform by being published across the Web.

These types of images and videos result in an extremely effective environment of mistrust and fear between various groups, cultures and countries. These images and videos are designed to elicit fear and to affect change in the behavior of those who view them. In this regard, the Web has been a boon for terror groups that seek to instill this fear in other groups as well as to control their own populations from which they originate. Therefore, terrorist groups that are broadly associated with Islam such as al-Qaeda and ISIS have been very successful at cultivating their image and influence within the general public and within the Western media. Cultivating such influence within the Western media allows these terrorist organizations to influence U.S. foreign policy, affect voting patterns by influencing which candidates are most relevant and affect how U.S. business

interests are conducted internationally (Gamson, 1992).

This power and influence that is amplified by the Internet has been extremely effective for terrorist organizations in general and not just for those Islamic oriented terrorist groups. Thus, this has worked to enhance the influence that these groups actually have as well as to contribute to the negative association of Muslims and Islam with being terrorists and terrorist supporting entities. Reviewing these materials in a comparative and small group analysis provided an understanding of the social impact of the material.

### **Limitations of the Study**

The data for this study was limited to publicly available statements by politicians, news reporters, and news commentators at the national level. The time frame of the study covers a 15-year period from 2001 to 2016. The statements surveyed represent a variety of opinions across the political spectrum. The frames discovered represent the institutional interests and political agendas of a range of different institutions, including the press, elected officials, and heads of government agencies. This represents the multivocal nature of contemporary political discourses in the United States. Some of the frames explored represent Islamophobic discourses and attempts to increase the reach of the surveillance state, while others push back against these trends by using alternative frames.

Since the subject matter of the research was public statements concerning politically charged issues, the claims of representativeness of national public opinion only extends to the material surveyed. A replication of this research might expand the number of frames by looking at different cases or present a different picture of anti-Muslim



prejudice and the nature of U.S. foreign policy by sampling a different set of representatives. The accuracy of quotations used in this research is only as good as the reporting of statements available through news outlets.

### **Recommendations**

In light of the above limitations, future research might include a direct comparison of media reporting of non-jihadist terrorist attacks since 9/11 to contrast the frames used when reporting on plots with no connection to Muslims or Islam. Adding a comparative perspective to this phase of the study might provide evidence for unequal treatment of similar threats from homegrown terrorists when they are perceived as being tied to Islam.

Future research could also be helpful in investigating frames, themes, speculative claims, media reports, assertions, and premature conclusions about the classification of criminal, terrorist, and potential radical actions, behavior, motivation, and communication that are complex and currently difficult to discern patterns about. Opportunities to do so could be possible to embark on this kind of research using social media and emergent technologies in big data analytics in such nascent fields as “computational criminology” and established fields such as operations research (Watson, 2014; Williams, Burnap, & Sloan, 2016). Opportunities are currently being studied, for example, in analyzing online social media together with offline data, log files, video, image, Radio Frequency ID (RFID), and GPS, merging data that has not been previously statistically related and connected. Research over time could also clarify the previously opaque activities and patterns of Al Qaeda, ISIS, Taliban and other terrorist networks and their ties to Islam

and other groups, providing greater clarity, enabling the elimination of erroneous speculation and spurious generalizations.

### **Implications**

This dissertation explored expressions of Islamophobia in American political discourse and the damaging effects of such fear-mongering. To this end, the study included an analysis of anti-Islamic frames as expressed by the political elite, and a meta-analysis of such frames by laypersons outside the political elite.

Although the mass media may be implicated in a reflexive social construction - in which official voices broadcast their policies, and an independent press provides feedback on how these policies affect the citizenry - those elites who have privileged access to the microphones wield great power, and when the public does not press back, the conversation becomes one-sided. A potential positive impact of research into how discourses are framed is to raise awareness of the epiphenomenal world of false and manipulative frames so that common citizens can see them for what they are. This research also provides a basis for formulating and promoting alternative, counter frames.

Distortions and fear-mongering over the Muslim threat in post-9/11 America raises questions of religious intolerance that go right to the heart of America's claims to be a liberal democracy. To single out one group of Americans for special scrutiny based only on their religious affiliation runs up against the First Amendment, which was established by the nation's founders to protect religious minorities from government persecution.

Separation of American society into a dominant, mainstream religious group and

a vilified religious minority has tarnished America's image internationally as a democratic nation built on freedom of religion and equality for all. In this way Islamophobia not only harms its Muslim targets but also comes back to hurt Islamophobes and American society as a whole.

The American public's fears over Islamic terrorism are not of mere academic interest. Policy makers have exploited these fears by framing their political pronouncements so as to activate them. Research into framing shows that citizens form opinions based on narratives that activate familiar storylines that resonate with their preformed cognitive models of how the world works. Research that raises awareness of this form of social construction provides appropriate tools to counter it.

### **Conclusions**

Policymaking in the United States is a political process that is influenced by the frames that politicians use to advance their agendas. The news and entertainment media play an integral role in broadcasting these frames and swaying public opinion. The mass media thus serves as a public platform for those political and corporate interest groups that have a stake in influencing policies. By choosing the right frames, government spokespersons and newspaper columnists control the nature and scope of national debates and the flow of information to the public.

Since the 9/11 attacks, the trope of Islamic inspired terrorism has been a central concern in guiding U.S. foreign policy. Action-oriented politicians seized upon fear in order to advance their agendas. By approaching this topic from several angles, this dissertation has argued that Islamophobia is a by-product of deliberate political framing.

The impact of Islamophobia on Islamophobes is similar to the impact of racism on racists. Islamophobia could ultimately hinder Islamophobes' ability to work effectively in pluralistic settings and could lead to "lower self-esteem and higher levels of anxiety" (McKown, 2005, 177). As for society as a whole, Islamophobia could erode national unity, signal a departure from the nation's core value of *E pluribus unum* - out of many, one - have the potential, as a form of prejudice, to antagonize people and to therefore inadvertently promote the very terrorism it claims to revile (Khera, 2011, 343), and thus confound the management of orderly social change such as acculturation of middle eastern immigrants into American society.

By raising awareness of media manipulation and framing effects, discourse analysis provides the tools to counter false and destructive frames and to invent more productive alternatives. This dissertation has attempted a small contribution in the direction of exposing malicious rhetoric that compromises American freedoms without increasing security. Future research along this line will further engender understanding and mutual respect among peoples of the world and challenge those "civilizational" lines said to divide us.

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## Appendix A: Documents Used in Data Analysis

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## Appendix B: Lethal Terrorist Attacks With Jihadist Implications on U.S. Soil

Since 9/11

<b>Incident name</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Citizenship/ ethnicity</b>
El Al Ticket Counter Shootings	July 4, 2002	Los Angeles International Airport	Anti-Israeli views	Egyptian national
Seattle Jewish Federation Shootings	July 28, 2006	Seattle, Washington	Protest U.S. foreign policy	Pakistani-American
Fort Hood Shootings	November 5, 2009	Killeen, Texas	Protest U.S. foreign policy	Palestinian-American
Little Rock Military Recruitment Office Shootings	June 1, 2009	Little Rock, Arkansas	Protest U.S. foreign policy	African-American, convert to Islam
Boston Marathon Bombing	April 15, 2013	Boston, Massachusetts	Protest U.S. foreign policy	Naturalized U.S. Citizens from Chechnya

Vaughan Food Processing Plant Beheading	September 25, 2014	Moore, Oklahoma	Hatred of white people	African-American, convert to Islam
Washington and New Jersey Spree Killings	July 1, 2014*	Seattle, Washington and West Orange, New Jersey	Protest U.S. foreign policy	African-American, convert to Islam
Chattanooga Military Facilities Shootings	July 16, 2015	Chattanooga, Tennessee	Unclear – suicide and drug use suggested	Naturalized U.S. Citizen from Kuwait
San Bernadino Office Party Shootings	December 2, 2015	San Bernadino, California	Implied jihadism**; possible workplace disputes	Pakistani-American and recent Pakistani immigrant
Pulse Nightclub Shootings	June 12, 2016	Orlando, Florida	Claimed allegiance to ISIS; revenge against gay community***	Afghani-American

**Total killed:**

### Appendix C: Preferred News Sources of Self-Identified Liberals and Conservatives

News source	Consistently liberal	Mostly liberal	Mixed	Mostly conservative	Consistently conservative	Overall
NPR	53%	23%	12%	10%	8%	20%
CNN	52%	48%	49%	32%	20%	44%
MSNBC	38%	32%	25%	23%	13%	27%
NBC News	37%	44%	40%	29%	21%	37%
PBS	37%	18%	12%	10%	7%	17%
BBC	34%	21%	12%	8%	10%	17%
Daily Show	34%	14%	7%	4%	1%	12%
ABC News	33%	38%	42%	32%	26%	37%

New York Times	33%	15%	8%	7%	5%	13%
CBS News	30%	32%	32%	24%	22%	29%

Note. Adapted from American Trends Panel Survey conducted March 19-April 29, 2014 (Pew Research Center, 2014).

(Continued)

### Appendix C: Preferred News Sources of Self-Identified Liberals and Conservatives

(continued)

	Consistently conservative	Mostly conservative	Mixed	Mostly liberal	Consistently liberal	Overall
Fox News	84%	61%	39%	24%	10%	39%
Sean Hannity Show	45%	19%	3%	0%	1%	9%
Rush Limbaugh Show	43%	17%	3%	0%	1%	8%
Glenn Beck Program	34%	13%	2%	0%	1%	6%
The Blaze	29%	10%	1%	1%	1%	5%
ABC News	26%	32%	42%	38%	33%	37%
CBS News	22%	24%	32%	32%	30%	29%

NBC News	21 %	29 %	40 %	44 %	37 %	37 %
CNN	20 %	32 %	49 %	48 %	52 %	44 %
Drudge Report	20 %	10 %	2% %	1% %	1% %	5% %
Yahoo News	17 %	25 %	27 %	25 %	16 %	24 %
Breitbart	16 %	5% %	1% %	1% %	1% %	3% %
Wall Street Journal	16 %	13 %	7% %	10 %	12 %	10 %

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Note. Adapted from American Trends Panel Survey conducted March 19-April 29, 20