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# Neutralizing Boko Haram Resurgency: Power of Targeted Holistic Education Policies

Godwin Chinedu Ukwuani  
*Walden University*

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# Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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2019

Abstract

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by

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MS, University of Bridgeport, 1984

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

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Public Policy and Administration

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April 2019

## Abstract

Boko Haram (BH) insurgency is driven by Islamist ideology and hegemony, nurtured mainly on failed education and sociopolitical policies and less by economic realities in Nigeria. Military counterinsurgency (hard COIN) successes are necessary but not sufficient to neutralize resurgence. The framework for this study was premised on behavior modification by targeted holistic education policy (THEP) over ruminated frustration-aggression of drive theory. The purpose of this cross-sectional study was to conduct a survey of educated participants ( $N = 95$ ), randomly selected from education campuses in Nigeria, to estimate the power (relationship) of THEP over time to neutralize BH resurgence (NBHR). The data from a survey developed for this study were analyzed with descriptive, ANOVA, ANCOVA, and MANCOVA statistics. The powers of THEP applied from nursery through college (age 21) to NBHR or reduce (dry up) the foot soldiers' recruitment pools (FSRP) and correlations were evaluated. All 7 regression models rejected the null hypotheses. THEP and covariables including illiteracy (IL), political conspiracy (PC) or Islamic hegemony (IH), religious extremism (RE), and economic realities (ER) were related to NBHR. PC correlated inversely with THEP and IL inversely with reducing (drying up) FSRP. ER had the least impetus (power) to drive resurgence. The results of this study can be used to promote positive social change by providing information on the prospects (estimated power) of THEP, acting with other COIN measures, to NBHR. The study may contribute to a better understanding of the impetus and solution to BH resurgence, but calls for further investigation into the power of nonmilitary COIN, particularly THEP, in Nigeria.

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## Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to the living legacy of my parents, Papa and Mama Johnson and Dorathy Ukwuani, and my parents-in-law Papa and Mama Justus & Grace Nwogu, and to my wife, Joyce Eziaku Ukwuani, my brothers, Peter and John Ukwuani, and my larger family, lovers of education who have sacrificially nurtured and raised me, paid my school fees, trained me, provided for me, and supported me through my life's journey and work, in joy and in adversity, and above all to the glory and honor of our ever faithful God, Lord, and Savior Jesus Christ, the Almighty Creator and Sustainer of all things from Whom all blessings flow. Amen.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

### **Introduction**

To neutralize and prevent the resurgence of the Nigerian Boko Haram (BH) insurgency, policymakers must understand and address the root causes, motivations, and impetuses to the resurgence power. Scholars have portrayed the BH insurgency as rooted in the global terrorism of ideological Islamist fundamentalism. Forest (2012) noted that ideology is difficult to isolate, defeat, or to eradicate from other contributory causes. It will take years, perhaps generations, to neutralize an ideology. Alkhouri (2014) suggested a counterideology, or counternarrative, that is more peaceful. In Far East Asia, East Europe, Africa, and terrorism in the West, strategies in combating terrorism or fighting counterinsurgency (COIN) wars, and the limitations of military violence, have been learned (Campbell & Bunche, 2011). Counterinsurgency (COIN) has been defined as “the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency” (The US Joint Publication, 2004, p. 1-2). In this study, I focused on what neutralizes the resurgence commonly associated with ideological impetuses for violence (religious, political, ethnological, or economic) and a defeated insurgency. In a treatise on COIN warfare across three continents (Africa, Asia, and Europe), Galula (1964) pointed out that successful insurgency is predicated on welcoming opportunities, such as weak COIN, congenial host, and an outside support before and after the insurgency. Vrooman (2005) and Burke, Few & Prine (2011) challenged Galula’s theories. However, Galula argued that the danger of insurgency will persist as long as the problem that produced it endures.

Taylor (2012) proffered that to defeat an insurgency, the institutional army must use some transformational strategy, or a synergistic approach and radical change in doctrine, training, materiel, organization, and leadership that employs the whole power of government to break the cycle of violence and to achieve stability in the zone of crisis. Drew (1988) suggested more studies on nonlinear warfare, a force structure that integrates military, political, and economic strategies. In this study, I assessed the effectiveness of one component in the structure to neutralize the resurgence of Nigerian BH insurgency. This is a component that offers a soft preventative strategy, reflecting one of Drew's four doctrines: it takes a long time to implement targeted holistic education policy (THEP) through formative years. Lutz (2014) concluded that there are multiple ways that terrorism may end. Terrorism is related but is not the same as insurgency (Underhill, 2014).

The hypothesis of this study was that a composite contextual holistic education model targeted at the roots (incident population) would influence a fundamental de-radicalization of the ideological discipleship that cradle the Islamist insurgency in an agrarian Nigerian religious society. Successful prosecution of military COIN is a quick but reactionary strategy. It rarely yields the capitulation of the ideology; rather, it provides more opportunity for resurgence, like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); it yields no permanent solution to subsequent resurgence (Okeke-Uzodike & Onapajo, 2015). Because terrorism is not synonymous with insurgency (Evans & Bell, 2010), counterterrorism differs from COIN. Terrorism strikes fear on the adversary, whereas an insurgency fights a war to liberate from or defeat a state, an adversarial power, or



government. Nigerian BH has morphed into a mostly Islamist religious ideological insurgency to establish a caliphate in a northern region including parts of Cameroun, Chad, and Niger republics.

Education deficit is high in Northern Nigeria including areas where BH is operated (NBS, 2014). Adio (2016) argued that the lack of quality education (policy) in the North was related to economic realities, and that insecurity was associated with the region, the known operational base of BH insurgency. Nigerian government under President Jonathan approved 400 model (Islamic) Almajiri schools to be built in 18 of 19 Northern states of Nigeria, of which 125 were already built by 2013 (Aghedo & Eke, 2013). This was an attempt at bringing the value of Western education (called *Ilimin Boko*, or *Karatun Boko*) to the Qur'anic school system (called Tsangaya), and on to the advanced theological schools (called madrasahs), Abdurrahman (2012); Orude (2013). They were mostly of Islamic theology (Fowoyo, 2013) and were not able to neutralize the developing culpability of violent and extreme Islamist ideology in Nigeria. Although the Jihadi radicalization strategy extends beyond the Almajiri school system, Orude (2013) argued that the ongoing insecurity and insurgency in the North is the price Nigeria pays for policy failure of the continuation of Almajiri or Tsangaya education system into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which became a radicalization and recruiting hot bed for the BH Islamist insurgency.

In the All Progressives Congress (APC), General Muhammadu Buhari urged the Nigerian government to provide “free and qualitative education in the country” and particularly in the North (Vanguard News, 2014, p. 1). General Muhammadu Buhari

argued that poor education policy is the reason for insecurity and political unrest. The framework of this study reflected General Buhari's argument, a COIN model. Bold, targeted implementation of (free) holistic education policy contextually modeled and applied within Nigerian geo-politics would be effective COIN measure to neutralize the ideological impetus for BH resurgence. It will integrate elements of religious, Western, vocational, and peace education with globalism, shielded by necessary security force options. It will be free and compulsory from early childhood education through high school and up to 2 or 4-year College. The Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Saad Abubakar called for unfettered "unrestricted access to education for youth, to enhance peace, harmony and progress in Nigeria" as a priority for the government (Vanguard, 2014, p. 1). Over 45 years after the end of the Nigeria-Biafra civil war, the call for a separate sovereign state of Biafra has resurged since 2015. The impetuses for the Biafra war/agitation have not been neutralized. They were neither religious nor ideological, compared to those for BH insurgency. Ignorance with respect to Western education may have been costly to the North, but an unbalanced, nonholistic, reformed Islamic education model (the Tsangaya) appears vulnerable to the infusion of Islamist radicalism that is destabilizing the Nigerian state (Soyinka, 2013).

Any formula to preserve the Nigerian State for mutual coexistence of its diverse African ethnicities (over 250) is worth the study. Despite the failures of its British colonial blueprints since the 1914 amalgamation, prospects of developing new functional, progressive, practical, and indigenous Nigerian public policies for a peaceful social order in the sub-Saharan African hemisphere will be enhanced by contribution to scholarship

that this study may provide. The Nigerian Tribune editorial of October 23, 2012 noted that the security problem presented by the Nigerian BH insurgency can be solved by research. In this quantitative, cross-sectional random survey study of knowledgeable participants (sociologically informed) sample field across the geo-political center of Nigeria, I have attempted to determine the levels of expected correlation of the dependent and independent variables by answering six research questions. I assessed the power of targeted holistic education in neutralizing Nigerian BH resurgence.

### **Some Existing Conditions**

Indigenous nationalities north and south of Nigeria shared adjacent precolonial geographical space but in distinct abodes. The challenges of their societies were not the same, although similar. There are still sociocultural and religious differences, but significant equivalents. The sample field was target domains or clusters. The Nigerian BH insurgency has stayed in the far Northeast and the North, in predominantly Islamic zones. Various scholars portrayed some precursors heralding the present insurgency outbreak (Adesoji, 2010; Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Darma, Sani, & Kankara, 2016; Falola, 2015; Huntington, 1990; Rogers, 2012; Salawu, 2010; Ukiwo, 2003). Ukiwo (2003) pointed to the limitations of democratic transitions where the people are usually disappointed upon realizing that nothing has changed, resulting in violent conflicts. Ake (2000) explained that failures of promises of redistribution and equalization of power through democratization attracted violent reactions. However, in comparison, the “un-Islamic” Southern Nigeria has not been immune to typical ethno-political violence resulting from the trouble with Nigeria, Achebe (2000). Ake and Achebe and Ukiwo

vindicated systemic failures that highlighted the change mantra promised by the new President Muhammadu Buhari (2015).

There is a conflict of two dominant religions, the preexisting Islam in the North and the new Christianity dominant in the South and North central regions. Some have implicated a British complicity as a sense of superiority of race and civilization (Bourdon, 1904) so that they protected the preexisting Northern Islamic Fulani Caliphate while thwarting the northward expansion of the Christianity accepted by the Southern aboriginal delta tribes (Taiye, 2013). The new Western-educated Southern Nigeria was growing. A political/cultural polarization was further empowered by the differing religious identities and ethnicities. The postindependence (1960) political progression may have encouraged the Islamic North's attempt of nationalization of the Islamic Sharia Law; evidenced at the 1978 constitutional conference debates (and the Sharia-biased 1999 constitution) that still threatens the unity and secularity of the Nigerian State.

Islamic resurgences have occurred in the decades of religious violence and riots mostly in the North (Falola, 1998). The failure of the 1980s and 1990s was demonstrated in various governmental policies and administration goals. The radicalization of Islamic populations north of Nigeria may correlate with the actions and reactions in recent geopolitics. The global jihadi factors took new life since the 1979 Iranian revolution. There were the Muammar Gaddafi's nationalism and the Islamic exploits in Libya/Africa and the Al Qaeda terrorism on the U.S. soil in 2001. The Somalia Al Shabaab's ongoing terrorism prefaced the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) following the eradication of sovereignties in Iraq. There was a clash of Western civilization and Islamic

fundamentalism cultures. There are suspected factors of Arab-Islamic imperialism or Arab-Muslim expansionism, called out by the Biafran leader General Ojukwu (1969). To some, BH extremism is not Islamic and is contrary to common philosophies. This more liberal perspective is not substantiated in current literature.

### **Nigeria: A Stabilizing Regional Force**

In the sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria has been a stabilizing economic, military, and political force. Nigeria had become the leading economy surpassing South Africa (Sklar, 2015). Nigeria remains the most populous African country with a population of over 170 million people of over 250 diverse ethnic groupings, and home to two major world religions, Christianity and Islam, with a slight Christian majority of about 50.8% overall (Omosho, 2015). The NBS (2010) alleged a Muslim majority of 50 to Christian 40%. Nigeria led the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group forces in stabilizing war-torn Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, and Mali (Hamman & Omojuwa, 2013). Nigeria was a part of the leading intervention force during the Congo 1960 wars (Kisangani, 2012). With the BH insurgency, the disintegration or balkanization of the Nigerian State has become plausible (Omitola, 2012). A failed Nigeria state will lead to chaos in the subregion. This chaos can lead to anarchy, human rights abuses, international terrorism, crime, famine, and disease stemming from internal displacements. In spite of the religious, sociocultural, and current developmental differences in Nigeria, a (secularly) united country where respect for universal human rights would become the rule for coexistence, and it would amount to a global new norm in human social development.

### **Ideology versus Virtue**

Virtue should trump ideology regardless of other social factors. The Universal Human Rights Declarations in 1948 by UN attested to this social norm. The threat of disintegration of its quasi-federation is what BH resurgence portends, like Al Shabaab on Somalia. The multiethnic nationalities prefer a just and equitable One Nigeria where diversity, tolerance, freedom of worship, of movement, and enterprise and where democracy and meritocracy are the rules (Forest, 2012). The majority of Nigerians reject internal colonization or imperialism and the born-to-rule Islamic Caliphate hegemony, systemic corruption, political inequalities, and the infestation of chronic tribalism (Forest, 2012).

BH insurgency has engaged the regional counterinsurgency of the multinational joint task force (MNJTF) of Cameroun, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria and the global partnerships of the United States, France, Israel, Britain, United Nations, and the African Union combined in their Jihad (struggle) to create a purist religious caliphate of a new Islamic State. The insurgency is equipped militarily, and it is motivated psychologically. They have attacked churches, Mosques, and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and other places of noncombatant civilian assembly. They are at war with the Nigerian State. Many Muslim groups and authorities have rejected the beliefs of BH as un-Islamic (Olojo, 2013). The turmoil of the Middle East, the U.S. Iraqi and Afghanistan wars since 9/11 (2001), the Russian-Chechnya wars, and other similar experiences in the history of modern insurgencies, point to the limits of a military counterinsurgency against an ideological terrorism or resurgence war.

Scholars have recommended education, or reeducation in peace education, in new Almajiri schools. These models already existed; they are deployed and have been tested in Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the Niger Delta, and in Northern Nigeria with limited and or mixed results. The higher the literacy rate, the better the economy of the people, Nigerian population (North and South) being a typical example, and the lower the rate of political corruption, as voters become better educated about the issues on the ballots (NBS, 2012). The alleged sponsors of global terrorism are not illiterate. Illiterates do not build powerful suicide bombs (Ali, 2010; Onuoha, 2014a). In this study, targeted holistic education policies were implemented from kindergarten through youth at high school and college. In this study, I tested the relationship between the resurgence attitude or tendency borne out of Nigerian public or sectarian policies of education, Islamization, membership in Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC, 1986), Sharia Law (1999), the alleged politics of born-to-rule by Northern Nigeria Islamic Caliphate (the hegemony), economics, and targeted holistic education. These independent factors mainly tie into religious ideology and may have contributed to the radicalization and the insurgency of the Northern Islamic population over time within the Nigerian polity.

### **Branding**

BH claimed that Western education is sin (Onuoha, 2012a). BH conducted terrorist-style attacks first on Christianity and on any symbols of Westernization, and then on other Muslims who differed or embraced more moderate Islam (Chotia, 2012; Cook, 2011; Forest, 2012; Onuoha, 2012a). BH was ranked the deadliest terror group in 2014 (Vanguard News, 2016), and it was publicly branded a foreign terrorist organization

(FTO) by the US Department of State on November 13, 2013, and by the United Kingdom, India, and other democracies. BH was officially an insurgency against the Nigerian secular state, but has attacked targets across borders in the neighboring Cameroun and pro-Islamic republics of both Chad and Niger. Nigeria and its regional neighbors have mounted a MNJTF of counterinsurgency seeking to defeat the BH insurgency, militarily. Although the BH sect has mainly declared war (or is conducting a civil war) against the Nigerian State, it has spread to these neighbors. The focus is on defeating the insurgency, but there was yet to be any effective strategy to neutralizing its resurgence, or to properly reintegrating the insurgents into normal society after defeat, besides imprisonment and the upgrading of Almajiri education system. Scholars called BH Nigerian Taliban, terrorists, rebels, insurgents, Islamists, the northeast Caliphate, but the sect stated that they are Jihadists fighting to Islamize Nigeria against Western acculturation (Adesoji, 2011; Cook, 2011; Loimeier, 2012; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012). There is an existing Islamic agenda to Islamize not just the Nigerian State but the entire continent of Africa.

### **Signature Attacks, Tolls, and Resurgence**

BH's signature attacks are observable in the patterns and lethality of other terror groups like the Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Shabaab, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic Caliphate insurgency of ISIS (or ISIL). Attacks include suicide bombings and genocides; destruction of Western symbolisms, churches, religious ideological oppositions including Mosques; and the disruption of economic, political, and social order. The death toll has exceeded 23,000 (Vanguard News, 2016). Others claim the toll is over 100,000 casualties



(Africa Check, 2014) and is climbing as the insurgency did not abate after the new Nigerian President Buhari came to power and vowed to defeat the insurgency by end of 2015. Before a temporary cease fire was negotiated with Nigerian and other neighboring countries' governments, the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) noted in 2014 that the BH insurgency had killed over 10,000 people. The number of IDPs run in hundreds of thousands and over 2.6 million (Vanguard News, 2016) or 2.15 million (Vanguard News, 2016).

BH allegedly has attracted regional Islamist fighters to join forces (Karmon, 2014). Global inquiries have increased since the abduction and search for the 276 Chibok Schoolgirls, in April 2014, since they declared the creation of an Islamic Caliphate in their conquered region and stronghold in northeastern Nigeria. In 2012, the French intervened in the neighboring West African state of Mali where a BH counterpart terror group, an Al-Qaeda surrogate, had previously established similar countergovernment insurgency and terror stronghold, threatening a global terrorist safe haven. The killings and the destruction patterns have been similar.

The BH agenda is similar to those of 2014 ISIS's in the Syria-Iraq regions—seeking to establish Islamic States of their purist religious fundamentalist definitions (a Caliphate) to be governed by the strictest Islamic Sharia legal code (Adesoji, 2011; Agbibo, 2013a; Onuoha, 2012a). Although resilient, the insurgency continued to suffer casualties and losses of captured territories against the regional MNJTF, the military working with local militia, or the civilian JTF. In May 2014, the new administration in Nigeria vowed to defeat BH insurgency by December 2015. It claimed BH was

“technically defeated” (Vanguard News, 2015). A defeat would allow reconstruction and the implementation of a targeted holistic education policy (THELP) in the region. However, the Nigerian security, Department of State Services claimed that BH has disguised as Fulani herdsmen attacking defenseless villages in Agatu, Benue state, in Nimbo, Enugu state, in middle belt and southern Nigeria. The BH insurgency is yet to be defeated (Gaffey, 2016). Resurgence and attacks continued. BH continues to attack the military inflicting casualties.

### **Background of Study**

Religious fundamentalism (ie., the rigid adherence, devotion, or orientation towards the [original orthodox views] roots or fundamentals as fixed) cuts across various religions including Christianity (Koopmans, 2015). In Islamism, governance, cultural order, and political decisions are subordinated to the Islamic Sharia Law (Koopmans, 2015). The Islamic fundamentalism predates the arrival of the Fulani, Othman Dan Fodio from Futa Jalon into Northwestern Nigeria inhabited by the ethnic Hausa population. Not all fundamentalists are fanatical and or violent. In its history of wars and conquests, the Islamic jihad has been portrayed as a holy war on the offending, resistant, or unbelieving populations whom they called infidels. The Middle Ages crusaders felt similarly against paganism and heresy (Banner, 2015). The activities of the BH sect bear the violent jihad identity. Invoking both Prophet Mohammed and patriarch Othman Dan Fodio who conquered the syncretistic local populations by jihad to establish a pure worship of one Allah, BH decimates defenseless populations and confronts state military forces. Public statements of their central objectives claim to have the same devotion and historical goals

as their predecessors, despite the shifting turns in their development (Adesoji, 2011; Adenrele, 2012; Agbibo, 2013b). Dan Fodio's jihadi campaign out-maneuvered the preexisting Kanem-Bornu Empire (700-1376) that had converted to Islam in the 11<sup>th</sup> century to establish elite Islam ruled by the northwestern Sokoto Caliphate headquarters (Adam, 2014; Alkali, Monguno, & Mustafa, 2012). A subdued rivalry had been born between the different Islamic views. The departure in 1096 AD of this elite Caliphate from their accepted puritanical Islam, which BH sees as a betrayal caused by the corruption and lures of affluence and compromises to Western education, might represent a precursor for the faithful (nationalistic) reaction or the violence, terrorism, and insurgency against all new systems. It has been fueled by other cofactors that include criminality, politics, economics, radicalization, religious imperialism, and the state action against BH in 2009 (Alozieuwa, 2012; Osumah, 2014). With the spate of high unemployment among the young Nigerian (Muslim) population, especially in the Northeast geo-political region (and generally in the core North), the case for a criminal BH would conform to a sociological consequence.

The former Federal Education Minister, Gbagi, faulted the 1914 amalgamation by the British colonial powers of its Northern and Southern protectorates to create Nigeria. Olaniyan and Asuelime (2014) and Agbibo (2013c) agreed with Gbagi's view. The roots of Nigerian BH insurgency should first be identified and understood. The U.S. experience in the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia serves as examples that terrorism has its culture. Such understanding is critical to finding a lasting solution, including isolation and study of key variables of the philosophy, operations, and aspirations of the group.

In terms of Nigerian national events, the establishment of the Sharia legal system in 12 far-northern states may have been the first enabler in the development of BH antistate activity (Onuoha, 2014a, 2014b). At the time, the Sharia Law adoption was perceived as a political reaction to frustration precipitated by some politicians manipulating the religious sentiments following their losses at the polls, using poor Northern Islamist elements inspired by the vestiges of the religious fundamentalism from the crisis of Maitatsine (Jegede & Olowookere, 2013). However, BH did not fizzle out as predicted in 2000 by President Obasanjo. BH insurgency stems from a religious ideology (David, Asuelime, & Onapajo, 2015).

Nigerian government and the local militia resistance have deployed various measures to counter BH Islamist ideological insurgency since it morphed into an acknowledged national crisis between 2002 and 2011. However, BH and their splinter ally sect Ansaru continue to successfully stage attacks on both the military (hard) and civilian (soft) targets in Northern Nigeria, particularly on churches, schools, villages, market places, motor parks, and mosques.

### **Problem Statement**

It is possible to defeat Nigerian BH insurgency in a military face off, but its ideological roots and impetuses have defied military conquest. Their return after defeats represents resurgence. The problem is neutralizing resurgence and eliminating root causes like the violent Islamic radicalization. COIN in Nigeria (i.e., the multinational military task force, foreign aid and intelligence, extrajudicial killing or decapitation of insurgent leadership, check points, raids, communication block, closed borders, state of


emergency declaration, antiterrorism legislation, dialogue, negotiation, and amnesty) does not address core impetuses like vast youth unemployment, economic poverty, and disillusionment with corruption of the political, judicial, social, and economic systems in Nigeria; loss of moral values; intolerant religious extremism; illiteracy; and jihadism (Cook, 2011; Shaffer, 2016; Vanguard News, 2014).

A looming threat of interreligious war remains. The national executive committee of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), a body that claims to unite all Christian (leadership) in Nigeria, in a February 13, 2014 communiqué warned that “The federal government should come up with an efficient and enduring system that can overwhelm the resurgence of Boko Haram” (Vanguard News, 2014, p. 1). Its Secretary General, Rev. Musa Asake, stated that the BH Gunmen and Fulani Herdsmen are slaughtering poor, noncombatant populations, particularly the Christians, in all troubled localities. In Plateau state alone within a month, in 2014, over 100 were killed; their houses and churches were all burnt down (Vanguard News, 2014). The Agatu and Ukpabi Nimbo communities of Benue and Enugu States were slaughtered by Fulani herdsmen, and the Muslim President Muhammadu Buhari will not condemn the act.

BH has no representative face. The U.S. COIN model has not vanquished Iraqi terrorism after surge. The succeeding President Buhari claimed that BH insurgency has been technically defeated, except the resurgence. Few (2011) criticized the successes the model has claimed. The COIN war against BH has yet to address the enabling historical, sociological, economic, or the political issues to effect neutralizing its resurgences. The religious cause is largely denied; yet Islamic jihad tends to fuel the Sharia law impetus

(Bolaji, 2013). BH continues to resurface among a sympathizing population since 2002.

Bolaji (2013) discussed historical and political impetuses of Sharia and Islamic jihad, hypothetically consonant with BH emergence. Figure 1 below shows a BH resurgence cycle



*Figure 1.* Resurgency cycle.

There are remote and more recent contributory factors to the violence, terrorism, ongoing insurgency, and the destruction of human lives and property in Northern Nigeria. The BH resurged in 2009 (Adesoji, 2011; Cook, 2011; Danjibo, 2009; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Onuoha, 2012b). Cook (2011) argued that the frustration for the failure of the Islamic purification movement and the failure of more recent Sharia impositions to yielded the purist Islamic State. The government did not do much after the 1980 crisis to eliminate the religious extremism of Muhammed Marwa (Maitatsine) followership. Marwa is powerfully represented in BH insurgency. Danjibo (2009) posited that President Yar'Adua had trivialized the July 2009 BH resurgence, choosing rather to

travel in Brazil. Yar'Adua ordered the release of the sect's leader Muhammed Yusuf, who was imprisoned with other Islamic fundamentalists by predecessor President Obasanjo in 2005.

General Muhammadu Buhari publicly condemned BH's violent Islamist ideology after BH had repeatedly massacred defenseless secondary school children (Vanguard News, 2014). Taiwo (2013), Danjibo (2009), and Isiaka (2015) showed that educational separatism (Almajiri) has been a contributing factor to the propagation of the insurgency problem through radicalization. The death of Yusuf would usher in the reign of his successor, Abubakar Shekau up until the time the sect attained global notoriety, ranking first in terrorism killings.

Shekau called for more attacks on secondary schools after a series of massacres of children in Western education schools (The Guardian, 2013). The Catholic Archbishop, Ekpu, upbraided the sect over war against Western education (Vanguard News, 2013). Professor Soyinka urged Nigeria to fight BH with Halal ("Boko Halal"), which means that Western education is good, virtuous, and welcome (Soyinka, 2013). Alozieuwa (2012) noted that (pure) Muslims do not support the mixing of the secular state and Islamic Sharia law. They allege that the West brings a corrupting influence on the purity of Islamic culture (Glover, 2015; Mozayyan, 2009). To neutralize BH resurgence, its root cause of (extreme) ideological Islamism (jihadism) can no longer be ignored.

Scholars acknowledge there will not be a permanent military solution to an insurgency (Pham, 2012). BH terrorism and the insurgency continue to resurge against military counterinsurgency successes because it is primarily driven by grassroots,

religious, fundamentalist ideology (Islamism), nourished on political, economic, historical hegemonic impetuses, and criminality. The COIN approach by Nigeria and intervening states is weak, nonholistic, and not targeted to root out the causes of BH. Practitioners have singled out a quality education policy, but there is yet no clear quantitative evidence of what quality education means and how it can address BH. In this study, I sought to address this problem.

### **Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this quantitative study was to measure the power (correlation) of an admixture policy that leverages respect for religion within a holistic educational curriculum. In this study, I assessed the relationship of the past and present key public policies to the development of BH insurgency in Nigeria. The nexus of the religious ideological terrorism informed this study. The covariance of economic poverty impetus for BH insurgency was weak. Poverty is presumed to be uniformly distributed unless, if in BH's case, it is skewed by religious ideology (NBS, 2012). The findings of the study shall provide evidence-based data that can be used to inform Nigerian policymaking authorities, scholar-practitioners, security organizations, and the concerned public (local and global). It will help with closing knowledge gaps on the failings of public policy and strategic planning, in efforts that would begin to reverse the politically and economically destabilizing trend of events in Nigeria following the BH insurgency. A THEP may be used to neutralize the resurgences of the ideological, economic, and political BH.



### **Research Questions and Hypotheses**

The following relationship-based research six questions in the design addressed the correlation of the dependent variable (DV), namely, NBHR, to the key independent variable (IV), THEP over the projected term period.

1. What is the relationship (power) between THEP from nursery to postsecondary (age 21), at the presumed vulnerable incident population, and neutralizing BH resurgence against political conspiracies, Islamic hegemony (IH), Sharia policies (SP), and economic realities (ER) in Nigeria?

[DV<sub>1</sub>=NBHR<sub>1</sub>; IV<sub>1</sub> = THEP<sub>1</sub>; CV<sub>1</sub>=political conspiracies or PC; CV<sub>2</sub>=IH; CV<sub>3</sub>=SP or religious extremism; and CV<sub>4</sub>=ER]

*H*<sub>11</sub>: The effective implementation of THEP designed for the presumed vulnerable population of Nigeria, from nursery through first degree, over time is related to neutralizing BH resurgence, over existing key impetuses.

*H*<sub>01</sub>: There is no significant relationship of THEP applied in the vulnerable areas of Nigeria from nursery to secondary and postsecondary level, to neutralizing the BH resurgence (NBHR).

2. What is the relationship (power) between providing free THEP from nursery to postsecondary (age 21), at the presumed vulnerable incident population, and neutralizing BH resurgence against political conspiracies, IH, SP, and ERs in Nigeria?

[DV<sub>2</sub>=NBHR<sub>2</sub>; IV<sub>2</sub>=free THEP<sub>f</sub>] = DV<sub>1</sub>-stratified

*H*<sub>12</sub>: The effective implementation of free THEP designed for the presumed vulnerable population of Nigeria, from nursery to postsecondary, is related to neutralizing BH resurgence over moderating impetuses.

*H*<sub>02</sub>: There is no significant relationship of free THEP applied to the vulnerable areas of Nigeria, from nursery to postsecondary level, to neutralizing the BH resurgence.

3. What is the relationship of free THEP throughout Nigeria to foot soldier recruitment pools (FSRP) of BH insurgency within the Nigerian Islamic population?

[DV<sub>3</sub> = Dry up FSRP; IV<sub>3</sub> =THEP<sub>3f</sub>]

*H*<sub>13</sub>: THEP implemented throughout Nigeria is related to diminishing (drying up) the recruitment pools of the BH insurgency.

*H*<sub>03</sub>: Diminishing the recruitment pools of the BH insurgency is not significantly related to implementing THEP throughout Nigeria.

4. What is the relationship of BH insurgency recruitment pool to the type, level, and quality of education attained by its foot soldiers in Nigeria?

[DV<sub>3</sub> =Dry up FSRP; CV<sub>3a</sub>=level of Western education or illiteracy factor]

*H*<sub>14</sub>: BH insurgency recruitment may be related to the level of Western education attained by its foot soldiers.

*H*<sub>04</sub>: BH insurgency recruitment is not significantly related to the level of Western education attained by its foot soldiers.

5. What is the relationship of BH insurgency recruitment pools to the employment status (economic realities) of its foot soldiers in Nigeria?

[DV<sub>3</sub> = FSRP; CV<sub>3b</sub> = employment status or economic realities]

$H_{15}$ : Employment status is related to the BH foot soldiers pool.

$H_{05}$ : Employment status is not related to BH foot soldiers pool.

6. What is the relationship of BH insurgency recruitment pool to the Islamic fundamentalist radicalization of its foot soldiers?

[DV3=FSRP; CV3<sub>c</sub>=Islamic fundamentalist radicalism-IFR or religious extremism]

$H_{16}$ : Islamic fundamentalist radicalization is related to the BH foot soldier pool.

$H_{06}$ : Islamic fundamentalist radicalization is not related to the BH foot soldier pool.

The levels of the relationships of the variables were determined using random cross-sectional survey samples (the ordinal level) data of the Nigerian native populations on Likert scales, as detailed in Chapter 3 of this study.

### **Theoretical Framework of the Study**

The theoretical construct of frustration-aggression of the drive theory, written by Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, and Sears (1939), and modified by Berkowitz (1989), was relevant to the study. Dollard et al. implied that frustration leads to aggression. However, in the cognitive model, Berkowitz underscored that not all frustrations lead to aggression. Richardson, Hammock, Smith, Gardner, and Signo (1994) announced four mediating factors that affect the magnitude of frustration: presence of aggressive cues, unexpected or arbitrary frustration, cognitive and emotional process, and rumination. Per catharsis theory, a population that is constantly ruminated by negativism and intolerance against Western education (or its civilization), supported by indoctrination in Islamist

ideology, will become radicalized in frustration against it (Bushman, 2002). However, Alozieuwa (2012) and Adenrele (2012) postulated other theories or the Islamic theocratic state (Islamic fundamentalism, global jihadi) theory. Alozieuwa discussed other relevant contributory theories to the BH aggression, such as the deeply divided society theory, the rational/vengeance theory, the political feud perspective (theory), the conspiracy theory, corruption theory, and the poverty theory. I approached the problem quantitatively, using the cross-sectional survey and questionnaires design. I used the drive theory, capable of providing both the rationale for frustration and vengeance of the Nigerian BH (not against extrajudicial killings), but for the failed opportunities of their demands of the Islamist religious ideology.

### **Nature of the Study**

The research design of this study was the structured method of scientific inquiry or epistemology (to understand, explain, and to predict), especially in the social sciences. In the quantitative method, the research designs are outlines of procedures through which data are collected and analyzed for inferential interpretation preceding any generalization of the results. Creswell (2009) stated that designs are plans and procedures for research, from assumptions or the units of analysis. The data collected through valid surveys and experiments for data analysis are a key to quantitative research design. Furthermore, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) noted that the research design is the blue print or program that guides the investigator in the various stages (data collection, data analysis, and interpretation) of the research. In this study, data were collected from a


randomized sample survey of a cross-sectional research design for members of a properly informed sample field.

The cross-sectional design was appropriate for this study through the random sampling of Nigerian population. Cross-tabulation and bivariate percentage analysis of the outcomes were designed and conducted (Frankfort-Nachmias & Frankfort, 2008). The quasi-experiment does not require assigning cases to a comparison group, in which a case is deemed superior to cross-sectional designs (Frankfort-Nachmias & Frankfort, 2008). This study did not require a comparison group.

Attitudes and behaviors are commonly measured as the response or outcome to social stimuli or questions (Creswell, 2009; Frankfort-Nachmias & Frankfort, 2008). Attitudes or behavior changes was the DV. Causality determines the effect. The causes are IVs. The attitude or behavior was the effect measured in this study, or the resurgence of BH, which was the main DV ( $DV_1$ ). Neutralizing the resurgence of BH was the desired effect. High correlation between the causes, key IVs, was inversely proportional to the degree of the measurable resurgence. The causes were various (the policies or events that occur), but the key cause, the key  $IV_1$  was the  $THEP_f$  subject to four controlling variables ( $CV_1, CV_2, CV_3, CV_4$ ) or covariates—the political conspiracy (PC) or issues with the federal policies to include amalgamation fraud; IH or issues with the born-to-rule mentality of the Islamic North; SP or issues with dualism of religious codes and the national secular constitution legal system or rule of law; the ER or the issue of poverty or wealth distribution on political stability, respectively. This was a multiple

function study, as expected of the root causes or the impetus of the BH phenomenon.

Figure 2 shows the neutralizing resurgence cycle.



*Figure 2.* Neutralizing resurgence cycle.

In this cross-sectional random sampling survey, I targeted the central Abuja Capital mix of the four geographical areas of Nigeria (far-north, east and west; north-central; southeast and south-south; and the southwest), among the respondent population who completed the survey questionnaires that were designed to systematically address all the IVs and CVs, to determine the effect or outcome or the DV. Using the SPSS software, the correlations of variables were analyzed and interpreted for inferential conclusion, ensuring both data validity and reliability of results. Both graphical and digital outputs were examined and evaluated for the degrees of correlations to explain, understand, and predict the neutralization of BH resurgence.

### Definitions of Terms

*Boko Halal*: States that “Western education is good” or lawful, permissible.

Soyinka suggested Nigeria to counter BH ideology with “Halal” so I have made up the term “Boko Halal” for this study.

*Boko Haram (BH)*: BH means “Western education is sin” or unlawful, impermissible. It is the name given to followers of Mohammed Yusuf because they denounced Western education (civilization) for “corrupting” the Islamic culture.

*Frustration-aggression*: Human aggressive behavior is attributable to frustration, the drive reduction theory earlier articulated by Dollard et al. (1939), and modified by the Berkowitz (1969) cognitive neo-association model.

*Holistic education*: Education policy contextually modeled and applicable to Nigerian geo-politics that integrates elements of the religious, Western, the vocational and the peace education, with globalism; “students develop to the highest extent thought possible for a human (Ultimacy) ... a mixture of disciplines involving philosophy, pedagogy, psychology, and theology” (Forbes & Martin, 2004, p. 24-25).

*Islamist*: A person who seeks or the ideology that proffers governance of state by the Islamic Shar’ia law; the political Islam (Islamism).

*Jihadism*: It should mean (positive) religious (spiritual) struggle in Islamic revival, but it is commonly understood (and practiced) as a violent struggle against non-Muslim (to forcefully convert or be harmed). Jihadi is the individual so engaged, but also understood as the adjective.

*Middle-Beltan*: The Middle Belt region of Nigeria (part of the political North pre and postindependence) situated in the middle of Nigeria.

*Monolithic North*: A monolithic north suggests a politically one Northern Nigeria, especially when considering the Nigerian federal character.

*Qur'anic arbitration*: Making an Islamic theological case based on the teachings of Qur'an that the religious ideological grounds of BH is a fallacy, wrong, ignorant, blasphemous, and misguided; therefore, the sect/insurgents should jettison their cause.

*Resurgence*: The returning or resurgence tendency of an apparently suppressed (defeated or controlled) insurgency.

*Targeted holistic education policy (THEP)*: Holistic education applied to areas vulnerable to radicalization and insurgency.

*Terrorism*: Terrorism strikes fear into an adversary or opponent (a state, a group, or individuals), mostly through violence, intimidations, and coercion in the furtherance of an objective. The FBI (called it "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons and property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" (cited in Zeidenstein, 1994, p. 17).

### **Assumptions**

In this study, it was assumed that radicalization of the Islamic population in Nigeria has only happened among the Muslims in the 19 Northern states, which constituted the target area for the implementation of THEP, the main IV<sub>1</sub> measured. This did not limit the survey sampling area for data collection, which focused on the four geopolitical areas of north, middle belt, east, and west, nor did it necessitate the stratification



of data to render the generalization of the results more reliable for the Nigeria public policy application.

It was assumed that THEP was properly incubated, consistently and efficiently applied over an optimal time period for the predicted effect to attain maturity, and it was the best type of education.

I assumed that Western education in Nigeria is correlated to employability and susceptibility to radicalization, which I sought to establish. I assumed significant radicalization has happened only in the north and that BH is militarily contained for THEP to be effectively deployed.

Not all possible causes or impetuses (covariates) for aggression have been taken into consideration contextually; I assumed that these effects have been captured as a function of one or more of the various CVs measured by the study.

The sample field was assumed to be informed socially, knowledgeable of the historical and current geo-political and educational developments, including the subject of global terrorism and insurgency in both the Nigerian and other global communities. It was a necessary assumption that will strengthen the validity of survey data and the measured output of the cross-sectional design.

### **Scope and Delimitations**

COIN has its hard (mostly military) and soft (mostly nonmilitary) components, and there are various approaches of both. Media (Internet, radio, phone, TV or cyber-technologies, publications) broadcasts and propaganda are soft COIN strategies, but to maintain internal validity, this study was limited to formal (holistic) educational COIN

against the ideological basis for aggression of the Islamist BH on target population. The Nigerian BH insurgent foot-soldiers have been allegedly characterized as mainly the illiterate or ignorant (of both Qur'anic and or Western education tenets together).

The size of the cross-sectional survey samples (12) was based on G\*Power calculation. The survey instrument was created referencing PsycTESTS Likert-type Images of Psychiatry Scale (Stuart, Sartorius, & Liinamaa 2014) to address the study research questions. The choice of the sample population and the focus on the frustration-aggression and Islamic state theoretical and conceptual frameworks strengthens the external validity. The Nigerian population North or South is not sociologically well-informed of the evolution and contentions of the BH phenomenon beyond the ordinary subsistence or marketplace concerns and sentiments. I did not consider the status of the BH insurgency in the adjoining nations of the region (Cameroon, Chad, and Niger) in the multinational military taskforce.

### **Limitations**

The limitations of analytical domain, including the covariables that are assumed of little significance and concepts not measured by design in the survey instrument, shall not weaken the reliability of quantitative results or interpretation and generalization of inferences. The recommendations and findings can be used to guide policymakers, scholars, and scholar-practitioners towards more effective preventative security, COIN, and de-radicalization policies. In this study, I targeted the educated class (sociologically informed, not pure clusters) mixed at the capital center Abuja from the various regions or locations of Nigerian society. This was essential to the validity and reliability of this

study that captures the overall trend of the social realities. The survey was administered at approximately the same time (to eliminate maturation issue), and individual responses were recorded as ordinal data. I captured but did not factor in the nominal data.

### **Significance**

In the Nigerian political and social domain, there are a lot of uncertainties, complexities, and denials abound concerning the definition and agenda of the BH insurgency. It is yet to be determined any consensus of the indigenous intellectual (well-informed) minds how to neutralize the resurgence of BH. This study will contribute to spurring the policymaking institutions in Nigeria and equipping them with the knowledge and data to stabilize the population and economic status of Nigeria.

### **Summary**

BH insurgency in Nigeria persists with increasing regional and global consequences. Another failed state in the sub-Saharan hemisphere, especially of Nigeria (Newman, 2009; Omitola, 2012), is bad for global business and stability, with increasing violations of human rights; IDPs' dislocations, starvation, and deaths; and chaos. Nigeria has had many failed leadership and policies. The BH insurgency and resurgence (2002–2016) are attributable to the trouble with Nigerian leadership (Achebe, 1984) and are failed public policies resulting in one civil war and political and religious upheavals.

Scholars have pointed to the influence of the global Islamist jihadi movement as the key ideological basis of BH terrorism and insurgency. This understanding of the background of the Nigerian BH insurgency problem informed the theoretical and

conceptual framework of this study and was borne out by scholarly literature, explaining the Islamist challenge of BH.

In Chapter 2, I present the literature review.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

### Introduction

In Chapter 1, I presented information on the BH insurgency in Nigeria. Peer-reviewed and seminal articles by scholars, including unfolding news articles and reports on BH activities, have been studied. Initial literature on BH has been mostly qualitative-based studies, highlighting economic poverty and frustration, systemic corruption in the political culture, chaos, institutional decay, and high levels of youth unemployment as the problem (Adesoji, 2010; Agbiboa, 2012a; Alozieuwa, 2012; Ogoloma, 2013; Pham, 2012; Zenn, 2012a). Quantitative evaluations on the causative and the symptomatic factors to hypothetical long and short-term solutions to the BH resurgence in Nigeria have yet to be conducted. Some quantitative works have helped to explain the root causes of the BH insurgency and the persistent threats of resurgence (Asogwa & Asogwa, 2015; Isiaka, 2015; Njoku & Abubakar, 2017). In this study, I focused on the relationship of THEP to neutralizing the BH resurgence.

### Search Terms and Strategy

I used Google Scholar and the Walden University library search engines to find sources for the study, along with updates of developments and reports of the unfolding BH phenomenon. I searched other data sources including the CIA, NCTC, World Bank, NBS Nigeria, Library of Congress, Amazon.com, vanguardngr.com, and dictionary.com. I used key words that included *holistic education, ultimacy, insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, counterterrorism, Boko Haram, Islamism, jihad, jihadism, and resurgence* up to 2018.

### **Theoretical Foundation and the Literature**

BH was frustrated with violations of Sharia Law and the political corruption, and they blamed it on Western education. They responded with aggression in the form of terrorism and then insurgency (Richardson et al., 1994; Berkowitz, 1969; Dollard et al., 1939). Scholars have noted that the BH agenda could be traced to the doctrinal rhetoric of Sheikh El-Zakzaky's Muslim Brotherhood since the 1970s (Adesoji, 2010; Agbibo, 2013d; Cook, 2011; Osumah as cited in Suleiman, 2011; Pham, 2012). BH increased in strength, seeking to Islamize the Nigerian State by jihad or holy war, expressed in the insurgency (Adesoji, 2010; Maiangwa, Uzodike, Whetho, & Onapajo, 2012). It became an emergent paradigm shift in Nigeria's enduring insecurity and troubled polity since it became independent from British Rule in 1960 (Omede & Omede, 2015; Osumah, 2013; Vanguard News, 2014). However, BH insurgency was not the first attempt to turn the non-Islamic majority Nigerian State to Islam. There was the Alhaji Ahmadu Bello's vision (first Premier of postindependent Northern region) to rule Nigeria by Sharia Law (Alao, 2009; Vanguard News, 2012). General Ibrahim Babangida registered Nigeria with the OIC in 1986. The institution of the Islamic Sharia Law and governance in 12 of 19 Northern Nigeria states followed despite public and Christian oppositions (Angerbrandt, 2011; Eme & Ibieta, 2012; Loimeier, 2011; Onuoha, 2010; Ushe, 2015). Despite these attempts, Northern Nigeria became more Christian, and the Nigerian population became more secular. By 2002, the control of central political power and defense institutions gradually migrated out of the North. More Muslim elites in the North became rich from the oil money (as they controlled over 80% of all oil blocks) scooped from the south-

south region (Akukwe, 2012; Thompson, 2010). Northern Nigeria elites have been more secular and corrupt, while the burgeoning Northern population has been impoverished and growing in illiteracy (Watts, 2013). They were abandoned to a growing Islamist radicalism, inspired by local and global Islamic terrorism, and facilitated by new technologies (Agbiboa, 2013d).

The confluence of illiteracy, poverty, and unemployed and angry youth had reached an ignition point. This was following the North's loss of central power, and the presidential election in 2011 that was won by another southern Christian, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, after he succeeded a Northern Muslim President Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'ardua. This angered the Islamic hegemony and frustrated their agenda. The defeat of the insurgency would lead to the de-radicalization and normalization of the Muslim Northern Nigeria, to neutralize the resurgence of BH (Kassim, 2015).

Alao (2013) noted that although Northern Nigeria Islam is reformist and separatist, the Yoruba Muslims in the (more Western-educated) Southwest are not radicalized. The colonial policies in Nigeria (1914-1960) and in Southwestern Yoruba led to more Western-educated population compared to the illiteracy in the North, especially in the northeastern base of BH insurgency (NBS, 2012; Sodipo, 2013). Poverty, although higher in the North, is a common experience of at least 69% of all Nigerians (Edet, 2015). Ogebe (2012, 2014) disputed a solely poverty/socioeconomic argument. At the Hearing, Ogebe established the religious radicalization framework as collaboration between BH and the Fulani herdsmen in a genocidal decimation of the Christian and churches in Benue State, Nigeria (Spero News, 2013). Economics, social crimes and

degradations, and unchallenged religious extremism in Nigeria (1914-2014) may point to a level of culpability for the emergence of BH insurgency.

### **The Economics Argument**

Frustration due to poverty (economic injustice or widespread poverty) is not the sole cause of the violent aggression and insurgency of the BH Islamic sect (Adenrele, 2012; Sulaiman & Ojo, 2013). Economic poverty and frustration, the systemic corruption of the political and social order, and the widening chasm between the few super-rich and the impoverished population is the common experience of most of the Nigerian masses nationwide (NBS, 2014).

Northern Nigeria (Islamic) politicians and dictators have controlled the near-unitary and central political governance of the Nigerian State and the power for the distribution of the cash from the national resources since Independence (Eme & Anyadike, 2012). People in power control the economy and aggrandize their personal and regional wealth by nepotism (Joseph, 2014). The North currently claims dominance with 19 states out of 36. Many of the wealthiest Nigerians, like the Alhajis Dangote and Dantata, and most of the former military dictators who became indigenous capitalists by allotting to themselves oil blocks, hail from the North (Boris, 2015; Fuady, 2015; Ovadia, 2013; Reynolds, 2001). The North has retained a disproportionate political representation at the portals of federal governance in the legislature (the House and the Senate), and they constitute majority of the policy-making powers of the near unitary central government.

Nigerians believe most of the wealthiest citizens got rich using state power, which had resided with Northern leadership for 38 out of 50 years since 1960 (Olaniyan &



Adetoye, 2013). Although restiveness may correlate with economic poverty, it is a secondary factor for why and how the BH insurgency has developed and sustained resurgence in the Northern region of Nigeria. Economics is a factor in an overall holistic approach to counterterrorism, whereas underdevelopment and poverty correlate with illiteracy. Systemic corruption of the polity and youth unemployment are factors that are in all Nigerian sectors in various degrees, that state to state, north to south suffer (NBS, 2010).

### **Educational Separatism**

Soyinka argued that BH insurgents are both religiously and educationally ignorant (Soyinka, 2012). This was in line with the arguments of Tonwe and Eke (2013), Omede (2015), Ogoloma and Sampson (2015), Olaniyan (2015), David et al. (2015), Kassim (2015), Bassiouni (2015), and Higazi (2015). Jegede and Olowookere (2013) argued that fundamentalists deviate from core doctrines in terms of liberty of expression and flexibility in meanings of holy books. Soyinka recalled that 30 years earlier in 1982, the Nigerian minister of education and secretary of the Universities Commission embraced policies favoring educational separatism that created rooms for Islamic fanatical indoctrination of youth and subsequent radicalization of its adherents (as cited in Sodipo, 2013). Adamolekun (2013) agreed that the period 1980-2000 saw the development of Nigerian militant Islamic fundamentalism, post-Iranian revolution, in response to the new federal constitution where opponents rejected a proposal of Sharia Court of Appeal at the federal level.

Agbiboa (2013) showed that 1980-2000, there was an increase in radical Islamic literatures from Iran in the Northern region of Nigeria. Although the Islamic Almajiri schools predated Western education in Nigeria (Fowoyo, 2013; Yusha'u, Tsafe, Babangida, & Lawal, 2013), they flourished in this period aided by federal military rulers who favored Islam and Sharia (Adamolekun, 2013). The succeeding democratic governance (the fourth republic) in 1999 maintained the status quo (Bolaji, 2013). CAN had objected to the federal government of Nigeria becoming beholden to Islamic religion (Agbiboa, 2013a). The Islamic state preferences were in government policies. Fundamentalist groups like BH against Western education and secular governance were emboldened. Nigerian Christians embraced Western education, culture, and civilization, which BH vowed to eradicate and replace with their brand of Islamism (Agbiboa, 2013b; Oyewole, 2015).

English is the Nigerian official language, but the literacy rate by state (NBS, 2010) showed a wide separation between Southern (mostly Christian) and Northern (mostly Islamic) states for youth (ages 15 to 24) and for adults (ages 15 and above). The 12 Sharia states were the most illiterate, including the states of Borno, Gombe, and Yobe. Borno is the birthplace of BH insurgency. These figures have not changed in 2018. The literacy rates are far below national averages for Sharia states. The Education Data (NBS, 2016) provided details of vast illiteracy in the Islamic North of Nigeria, especially in the northeast birthplace of BH. The North has few qualified teachers compared to other zones of the universal basic education (UBE) system, and a prevalence of nonholistic Islamic (Qur'anic-based Almajiri) educational systems. The North has low attendance at

(Western-type) primary and secondary schools. The breeding ground abounds for Islamist radicalization and subsequent contention for an Islamic Sharia state, aided by politicization of religion amidst resultant economic, poverty, and systemic corruption (NBS, 2010).

Boko is Hausa a customized word for book, and Haram is Arabic for sin or taboo. BH spokespersons, Kabiru Sokoto and Abu Qaqa, argued that the Western civilization and culture (taught by the Western education) are haram, sin, or forbidden (Onuoha, 2012b). Their official name “Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad” is in Arabic, and it means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad" (Chotia, 2012; Erdag, 2016; Walker, 2012). Acts of terrorism (e.g., Nyanya Motor Park bombing) and sadism (slitting victims' throats on camera) and their opposition to Western education defined the activities of BH's Jihad expedition in Nigeria. The Muslims in Nigeria had lived at peace with others (Christians and traditionalists) despite past religiously motivated turmoil (Last, 2007). Islam's Prophet Mohammed witnessed Muslims, Jews, and Christians living together in peace (Onuoha, 2014). BH abhors Nigerian pro-Western secular education and the state. The Education Data of Nigeria (NBS, 2016) showed that the states with high BH insurgency and resurgence have lower literacy rates in every measure. Nigerian-targeted (hard) COIN efforts have not been sufficient. Not neutralizing BH resurgence threatens a failed state like Somalia (Bassey, 2014; Ekineh, 1997; Marcus, 2015; Punch News, 2014; Simon, 2014). In this study, THEP was tested as a framework to neutralizing BH resurgence. Western education is embraced and integrated in the Yoruba Western Nigeria that has no Sharia law states;

they are about 25% or more Muslim, not known to be radicalized or connected with the BH insurgency.

### **Theoretical Foundation: Roots and Origin of Boko Haram**

The frustration and aggression (Berkowitz, 1969) of BH were captured in various articles. In 2014 many questions were being asked about how and why a once unknown Muslim cleric Mallam Abubakar Lawan's community of Muslims in 1995 became an Islamic religious revivalism organization around the University of Maiduguri, run by college dropout students in Northeastern Kanuri region of Nigeria. Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad metamorphosed into an organized sect (Forest, 2012) and a well-funded terrorist Islamist insurgency (Agbiboa, 2013c; Chotia, 2012; Cook, 2011; Onuoha, 2012b). Yusuf identified as a Wahabbist scholar, and he built a mosque that equally served as school for poor families (Connell, 2012). BH is more than an insurgency (Cook, 2014). Nigeria and Cameroun, Chad, and Niger republics are fighting a civil war, and Benin Republic to the west has joined the COIN war on BH (Oyewole, 2015).

BH had grown in numbers and in sophistry and spread of their activities. BH established an Islamic Caliphate (Washington Times, 2014) in parts of Northeastern Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in the Gwoza region (Allison, 2014; Azumah, 2014; Cook, 2014). BH has overrun army bases and counterterrorism military forces. Their fighting force was estimated from 10,000 to 50,000 (Cook, 2014). BH absorbed heavy casualties from the MNJTF. In this study, a military shield against BH

resurgence has been assumed (Pham, 2016), to go along the effective implementation of THEP.

BH blamed political corruption and failures of Islam on the ethos of Western education, civilization, and culture, and they held the Muslim oligarchs responsible. They demanded the full-scale Sharia in the polity, motivated by the Al Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and ISIS (Arsenault & Bacon, 2015; Thomson, 2012; Cook, 2012; Forest, 2012; Onuoha, 2012b; Zenn, 2012a). Although Maiangwa (2014) argued the implication of the socioeconomic impetus for the resurgence of BH, scholars also pointed to the religious movement post-Iranian revolution era in late 1970s, Islamic revivalism, radicalization, and religious militancy born of Islamic hegemony and politicization of religion (Adesoji, 2010; Maiangwa, 2014). For BH, the Islamism transcended ethnic hegemony (Sunday & Francis, 2014). They rejected Western ideas. BH's rejection of Western education became the precondition to create the terrorist reactions and insurgency (Forest, 2012).

Beside the economic, the military counterterrorism, and COIN responses, education has been recommended as central to a lasting coexistence model and the neutralization of BH resurgence. However, the literacy framework has yet to be researched, tested, proven, or established by scholars and practitioners for its power in the Nigerian complex context. Fowoyo (2013) pointed out that President Goodluck Jonathan's modern Almajiri school system was conceived to correct the negative impact of Islamic religious indoctrination and manipulation of the Almajiris by radicalized Islamists and to turn out future global leaders and productive professionals in a diverse

society and modern global economy. The goal was a complete reformation of the Qur'anic school (Abubakar & Njoku, 2015; Dahiru, 2011). However, despite THEP, BH radicalism has not abated; it operates in the ideology of apocalyptic Islamism (Celso, 2015; Flannery, 2015).

### **Similarity and Collaboration in Terror and Jihad–Holy War**

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, operatives of Islamist terrorism organizations have proliferated (Analy, 2016). They are in sub-Saharan Africa regions, in the Mali-Nigerian-Congo laterals and Somali-Kenya axis (Dalgaard-Nielsen; 2010; Fair, 2008; Gunaratna & Nielsen, 2008; Hoffman, 2009; Joscelyn, 2013). Like Pakistanization of the Al Qaeda, BH has become the Nigerianization of Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda in Nigeria or AQIN (Chotia, 2012; Fair, 2008; Onuoha, 2012b). BH is a member of Al Qaeda in West Africa (AQWA). BH has pledged alliance to ISIS (Duta, 2016; Karmon, 2015; Nwankpa, 2015; Voll, 2015). By their manifesto, BH is the Islamic State in Nigeria or ISIN (Weeraratne, 2015).

### **Predictions of Disintegration and the BH Problem**

The merger of ethnic nationalities in Nigeria was without the consent of the African natives (Ibiloye, 2016). BH insurgency put Nigeria on course for destabilization (Zenn, 2013a). BH is the JASDJ Group of the Sunni People for the Calling and Jihad or the Nigerian Taliban (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; NCTC, 2014; Onuoha, 2012b; Pham, 2012; Solomon, 2012). The Islamic Jihad is Islam's holy war, although jihad literally means struggling or striving (Kabbani & Hendricks, 2017) or Islam's struggle for truth (Cook, 2015; Wiktorowicz, 2001). The ideological framework of BH insurgency assumes

the violent Islamic jihad against others who differ, and it reflects perceptions of Islam (in the West) due to the scourge of terrorism associated with Islamists. The ideological basis of the insurgency was targeted in this study as a root cause to neutralize the resurgence. Education and reeducation are an antidote to ignorance (Erdag, 2016; Kumo & Abubakar, 2015; Soyinka, 2012). In this study, I tested for correlations and the power of THEP to neutralize BH resurgence, using the cross-sectional survey design.

#### **Four Cardinal Public Policies**

About three or four public policies of Nigeria are associative for the past 100 years. General Yakubu Gowon's renegeing on the Aburi (Confederation) Accord in 1967 led to the Biafra secession, the civil war, and the annulment of the tripod political balance as the outcome of the war. General Ibrahim Babangida also decided to register Nigeria in 1986 as an Islamic country with the OIC. The Sharia Law states (1999-2000) and the Islamic hegemony of the Caliphate North attempted to Islamize Nigeria. The status quo was threatened by the election of another southern Christian, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, to the presidency in 2009, following 8 years of the President Obasanjo regime. It was too long of a period of loss of political power for the Northern Muslim oligarchy. These landmarks defined epochs in Nigerian political history creating the pathway to the escalation of BH terrorism and insurgency (Forest, 2012; Osumah, 2013). With global Islamism and conspiracies, they informed the framework and hypotheses of this study for THEP to neutralize BH resurgence.

### **On the Allegations of Conspiracies**

Conspiracy theory can follow political crises, like in the aftermath of the 1980 Maitatsine Islamic jihad (Isichei, 1987). The alleged educational and economic dearth of the North was related to the conspiracy of amalgamation policies by Lord Lugard from 1914. Some believed that it was a political sell out of the South prior to postindependence Nigeria in 1960-66 and beyond (Agbiboa, 2013a; Dudley, 2013). A confederacy, as determined by the Aburi Accord in 1967 to resolve the threat of secession by the Eastern region might have challenged the North to become more competitive, realizing the benefits of Western education even within a predominantly Islamic society in an emerging global economy. Religious sects like BH might have been mere local grudges. The British created similar European religious controversy in Africa. The Alhaji Ahmadu Bello intention, and General Babangida's action (Alao, 2009; Vanguard News, 2012), were conspiracies that motivated BH's agenda and insurgency campaign for a total Islamic Caliphate in the North (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Campbell, Bunche, & Harwood, 2012; Forest, 2012; Gilbert, 2014; Onuoha, 2012b; Zenn, 2012a).

The military dictatorships in Nigeria left political power brokerage with the North and induced a born-to-rule mentality in the hegemony of the jihadist Islamic Sokoto Caliphate. It has filtered into Northern Islam, Islamism, and the sectarian politics of radicalized groups like Maitatsine (1980), BH, the Ansaru, and their sponsors. They used negative global and local social, cultural, and economic and political developments to justify terrorism and insurgency on Nigeria polity to buttress their rejection of secular governance. The ascension of President Jonathan, who hailed from a minority Southern



Ijaw tribe and was not Muslim, irritated the Northern oligarchy (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Campbell, 2012; Forest, 2012; Gilbert, 2014; Onuoha, 2012; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012a; Zenn, 2012a). The roots of BH went beyond the 1995 or 2002 formations and the 2009 and 2011 explosions of the insurgency. In this study, this political conspiracy was a covariate. Onapajo and Uzodike (2012a) claimed that BH contended that the arts of Western civilization (haram) harmed the pure Islamic culture.

The BH insurgency may be the culmination of the effects of landmark policies and political epochs in the Nigerian history (Forest, 2012; Kukah, 2009; Onuoha, 2012a). The insurgency will reoccur if it is not neutralized (Adesoji, 2010; Aro, 2013; Comolli, 2015; Iyemekpolo, 2016; Osumah, 2013) and threaten a weakened Nigeria (Solomon, 2015). However, neutralizing BH resurgence through THEP is suggested because the Southwest Yoruba tribe in Nigeria is both highly educated (Western education) and a 25% Muslim population, but is not radicalized. There is a correlation between Western education and Islamist radicalism and possibly deradicalization. The Peace Project experiment in Kano State, Northern Nigeria, did not change Islamic radicalism in Kano with the beheading of Agbahime in 2016, but provided precursory experiments of components of holistic education. The Opon Imo (tablet of knowledge) education policy (hoped to help modernize education and instill religious tolerance) in Muslim populated Southwestern Osun State of Nigeria was useful in preventing the conspiratorial born-to-rule hegemony argument in the framework of this study.

### **The New Secession and Failed State Threats**

The Wazirin Bauchi, Alhaji Muhammadu Bello Kirfi leader of the Northeast Forum for Unity and Development, hinted that the North may need to secede from Nigeria (Gundu, 2012). There were threats in 1953 and 1966 of the North seceding from Nigeria (Campbell, 2010). With the escalation of tribal, ethnic, religious, political, economic crisis, and violence in Nigeria, the North may provide an impetus towards state failure. In response to the increasing BH attacks, Lamido of Adamawa repeated Alhaji Kirfi's threat, saying he will lead his Adamawa kingdom to the other side in Cameroun republic. Although the insurgency was increasing in 2012 and centered in the Northeastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency rule in Borno state on May 14, 2013 (Vanguard News, 2013). Abubakar noted that insecurity and violence were all over the land and assured journalists that BH will pass away (Vanguard News, 2012). BH insurgency may succeed in separating an Islamic Sharia State (Caliphate) in their Northeast base, or in the 12 Northern Nigeria states already under the Sharia Law rules, but the Shiite and Sunni Islamic sects in Nigeria do not live peaceably together (Alao, 2013; Osakwe, 2014). The Sunni is the majority sect.

The secular unity of Nigeria has become threatened (Agbiboa, 2013c; Njoku & Hamid, 2014). Pham (2012) argued that the resurgence of the BH sect in 2010 came after it was presumed fractured and defeated when over 700 members were killed and at the killing of its founder Mohammed Yusuf. However, the BH grew in strength and lethality and established links with global terror groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS in the Islamic Maghreb (Forest, 2012). The sect is an emerging threat to the United States (Cooke,

2011). The sect cannot be defeated (neutralized) through an arms struggle (Forest, 2013). Nigerians cannot share common national identity, and the BH ideology may last (Agbibo, 2013c). The secession threat by Biafra failed in 1970, but at Aburi in 1967, the Generals Gowon and Ojukwu agreed that the country would be split into confederated regions. The reneging on that truce by Nigeria tore the nation apart. The agitation for Biafra has resurged 45 years after the war, in response to perceived continuity of oppression by Nigerian public policy. The end of conflict in 1970 created separate peace in regions and subregions of Nigeria similar to the post-Surge Iraq (Hagan, Kaiser, & Hanson, 2015).

### **Scope and Support of BH**

The scope of BH crisis in 2014 extended beyond regional Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and Benin republics to international crisis with kidnappings. The Washington Post of May 20, 2014, called BH an international problem. BH had developed to a threat to the international security. A coalition of America, France, United Kingdom, China, Israel, has rallied to support Nigeria (Ikeji, 2014). A summit of regional heads of states from the republics of Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Benin, and Cameroun, was called by their French counterpart, President Francois Hollande, and attended by representatives of US and UK, with aim to combat the funding, training, and arms supply of BH insurgency, and to help with intelligence (Punch News, 2014; USA Today, 2014). The kidnaps, herdsmen, BH protégé genocides, IDP problem, and deaths from malnutrition and disease are of regional and international concern. BH was forced out of Sambisa forest stronghold but it resurged into other new areas in the region (Aljazeera, 2016; Aning & Amedzrator, 2016).

## **Kidnapping and Hostages**

Abductions, kidnaps and hostage-taking of persons have continued before and after the game-changing global outrage for the alleged abduction and forced conversions to Islam of about 276 teenage girls, almost all Christians, from their dormitory at the Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, in Borno state Nigeria (April 14, 2014), by BH insurgents. A published list of the missing girls had 180 out of which 165 were identified as Christians (Punch News, 2014). In this study, key historical and definitional framework has helped in determining the hypotheses. Terrorism in the world has a long history. The United States of America and the West in general has been the target of groups' and global terror (Crenshaw, 2001; Sharma, 2013). The American people and facilities home and abroad have born about a third of all international terrorist attacks in the past thirty years, Crenshaw (2001). This view which assumes that terrorism is exported from certain global locality bears a bias that is in dispute (David et al., 2015).

Rapoport (2001) stated that in the long and bloody history of terrorism, the attacks on the United States of America on September 11, 2001, represented the most significant landmark and game-changer. For Nigerian BH insurgency, it is the Chibok Girls kidnap saga. The perpetrators (al-Qaeda or BH) may disagree with this view, because they may have a different definition of terrorism which sees the United States or Nigerian secular governance as the aggressor of first cause and therefore the perpetrator of terror, whereas their groups and people are the victims and or freedom fighters, so the difference is relative (Coggins, 2014; McCauley, 1991, 1993).

### **Boko Haram Casualty Tolls**

Similar arguments are proffered by the Islamist sect BH, who is at war against Western education influences and or assault on their Islamic culture and heritage in Nigeria (Maiangwa, 2013). In the twentieth century, Rummel (1996) estimated about 170 million people had died in the attacks by states against the people (state terrorism). This, excluding about 34 million killed in battles (wars); and most killers were German Hitler, Chinese Mao, and Russian Stalin, about 20, 37, and 42 million each, Rummel counted; and in the same period of time, non-state terrorists like Islamists, guerillas and others accounted for about 500,000 killings, he continued. McCauley (2007) concluded based on these figures that state terrorism must be more dangerous (Castro & Martinez, 2016; Feenberg, 2016). BH terrorist attacks have been resurgent since becoming a full scale insurgency in 2011, and over 10 thousand killed (Vanguard News, 2014). By 2016 it had exceeded 20,000 plus destruction of properties, Godefroidt, Langer, and Meuleman (2016). The FBI defined terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons and property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. This definition shall include both state and non-state actors, David et al. (2015) contended, realizing that there are over 100 diplomatic and academic definitions of terrorism, Krueger and Maleckova (2002) noted.

In 2014, daily media, news reports and articles inundated Nigeria and the global readership with the acts of BH terrorism and the insurgency war. Suspected BH suicide bomber attacked the Nyanya public transport terminal in the federal capital territory,

Abuja and killed about 74 people, and injuring many more. Chief Olisa Metuh, who was the Publicity Secretary of the ruling Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) described it as barbaric, monstrous, and extremely wicked. He accused opposition party All Progressives Congress (APC) of conspiracy to make the country ungovernable by inciting and sponsoring terrorism (Vanguard News, 2014). Punch News columnist Bayo Olupohunda (Punch News, 2014) disputed the accusation, but Vanguard News in a statement credited to General Muhammadu Buhari in 2012 corroborated it. The APC was the brainchild of opposition leader General Buhari who won the 12 Islamic Sharia states in the North including the northeastern states where Boko Haram is based, in the 2011 presidential election. After he lost to President Goodluck Jonathan, Buhari went to court and lost, but had reacted publicly promising to make the country ungovernable if he lost again in the 2015 presidential elections. Buhari said that by the grace of God the dog and the baboon will all be soaked in blood if he lost (Ajayi, 2012).

The BH attacks climaxed with the Chibok girls kidnapping on the night of Nyanya blasts on April 14, 2014. BH burned down their school buildings. Alhaji Abubakar Shekau, the alleged BH leader in a recorded video message showed the girls in hijabs reciting the Qur'an. He stated they will be sold into slavery and forced into marriage, He offered exchange for their imprisoned fighters (Nigeriaworld, 2014). Two years later and going the Chibok girls are assumed lost and irretrievable (Obasanjo, 2016). The COIN war assumed new dimension with the hash tag tweeter message #BringBackOurGirls global outrage that fueled international rally against BH insurgency. The US, UK, France and others pledged provision of intelligence and practical assistance

to Nigeria to rescue the girls and to defeat the Islamist sect BH (Ikeji, 2014; Vanguard, 2014). BH has continued to resurge despite defeats (Godefroidt et al., 2016; Vanguard News, 2017).

### **Brands of Boko Haram**

Senator Khalifa Zanna, representing Borno Central noted there are three brands of BH; Sharia BH, criminal BH, and the political BH (The Sun, 2013). Its evolution in 2002 suggested some international influence, in tandem with rise in global terror awareness, after the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda's terror attack on US (Aghedo, Osumah, 2012). BH phenomenon rose from an obscure Islamic fundamentalist revivalism campus group at the University of Maiduguri, started 1995/97 by Abubakah Lawan as 'Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra', through the time of its first violent disposition in 2002/2003 under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf (d. 2009). The sect attacked police stations at Geidam and Kanamma hometown of Alhaji Yusuf, Yobe state in 2002 but attained a lethal status under Alhaji Abubakar Shekau. This is the sharia and political BH. The Fulani herdsmen have joined the criminal BH, as identified by president Buhari's Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Tukur Buratai (Vanguard, 2016). BH identified with the ISIS in 2014, but has split when ISIS appointed new BH leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi over its West Africa operations. He was rejected by Shekau (AFP World, 2016).

### **A Military Shield**

In the middle of the decade of the US counterterrorism war in Iraq, 2003 to 2013, there was a military surge in 2007 which militarily overwhelmed the Sunni resistance and was touted and referenced as successful stratagem against the insurgency. It provided

some breathing room for the deployment of other neutralizing policies to discourage resurgence (Biddle, Friedman, & Shapiro, 2012; Feaver, 2011). The Shia-majority Iraqi government of President Al Maliki did not follow that script, and there has been a resurgence of new insurgency fighting for an Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Syria (ISIS). BH has become a protégé of ISIS ideology. Hagan, Kaiser & Hanson (2015) argued that Iraqi surge created a separate peace for the two dominant communities or sects, the Sunni and the Shia Muslims. One reason for the surge was to create room at the end to reintegrate, rehabilitate, and reconcile the sectarian divides. However, the reconciliation did not happen according to the Bush agenda (Gabrielsen, 2013; Hagan et al., 2015; Juhasz, 2014). A military shield from BH is necessary to deploy THEP.

There is no known effective postwar THEP model operative in the Iraq region aimed at neutralizing the resurgence. Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh have deployed quasi-educational programs of this nature in containing insurgency. Nigeria employed some amnesty program to suspend the Niger-Delta insurgency for the ills visited on them by oil exploitation. The militants are still around and threatening to come back (The Guardian News, 2015). By April 2016, the Niger Delta Avengers had resumed insurgency in the region. The BH insurgency has similar impetuses, and an ideological goal for an Islamist religious outcome, within a multiethnic and multireligiously complex Nigeria State, where Christianity is about half the population or more and making inroads in the Islamic North (Omosho, 2015; Pew Survey, 2011). Christianity predominates in the South, and it is the first target of Islamist fundamentalism and terrorism in Northern



Nigeria (The Independent, 1995). The impetus of BH Islamism is the religious ideology that enthrones the Sharia Law Islamic State (Kassim, 2015).

The alleged corruption of the Nigerian sociopolitical and economic systems heated the polity. Islamist radicalization motivated apocalyptic resistance by BH, now difficult to extinguish (Kierkegaard, 2016; Swarts, 2014). State terrorism violated Muslims' basic human rights, by stripping, impoverishing, and ignoring the population, culpable under Westernized colonial and postcolonial governance alien to Islam. The socioeconomic root cause of BH (David et al., 2015) is commonplace across Nigeria, but the religious impetus is not, the radicalization and the violence. A military shield may allow THEP intervention that may neutralize ideological resurgence. If the education profile in the Northern region (David, et al, 2015) is the root cause, and education gap the difference between the Southwestern and the Northern Nigeria Muslim, then the effect of THEP needed to be studied.

### **Literature Related to Key Variables**

Ekwueme and Obayi (2012) focused on the role of the media in winning the war against BH insurgency. The media could help to fight the ideological bases to neutralize BH resurgence. Zenn (2012b, 2013b) suggested that AQIM has infiltrated the BH group and that its strategic spread from the Northeast to the Islamic rulers in Northwestern Nigeria has caused dissent among its membership. Northern Nigeria constituted the targeted region for this study. LeVan (2012) argued against BH designation as a FTO, for economic reasons, and because it will potentially limit U.S. policy options to those least likely to work. Although David et al. (2015) argued that socioeconomic and political

indices were concealed in religion, I considered these moderating covariates, but assumed it is the ideological basis of intolerant Islamism that drives the enduring BH frustration-aggression of resurgence, unlike the responses of non-Islamists to the same conditions.

Walker (2012) portrayed BH as an Islamic sect, not in the same global jihadist bracket or status as Algeria's al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or the Somali's al-Shabaab in the Sahel. Walker (2012) suggested that BH will continue to attack soft targets, but questioned government approach as a possible solution. An ideological insurgency could not be neutralized militarily. Campbell and Bunche (2011) argued that diplomacy and democracy, and not hostile fire-power, is the best way to undermine the growing Islamism threat in Nigeria. Campbell et al. (2012) claimed BH includes Islamic revivalist dimension and was connected to the Al-Qaeda insurgency in Northern Mali, but just one aspect of the violence plaguing Nigeria. BH now attacks Muslims associated with the secular agenda of central government, Christians, churches, and mosques, alike.

There is a growing threat by an emerging Islamist sect BH, once unknown but later established in their violent insurgency activities in the Northern region of Nigeria. They have spread into neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, and they are in contact with northern Mali Islamist Al Qaeda sect and ISIS. Their spread as Fulani herdsmen ravaging communities in central and southern Nigeria is unclear (Vanguard, 2016). BH organizational structure and leadership are under study because they have operated underground and conducted violent activities of kidnaps, suicide bombing, and killings of foreign nationals in Nigeria. BH attacks the military. International attention and involvement are helping to stop the group.

Pham (2012) recognized that extremism and violence could not be contained by arbitrariness and mere analytical constructs because BH has grassroots support among the marginalized native population. If the root cause is not neutralized, then the problem will continue to fester, which means resurgence, Gilpin and Giroux (2014) agreed. Johnson (2011) acknowledged that BH draws its following from impoverished Islamic students, clerics, university students, and unemployed professionals, and the sponsors may be the Nigerian elite. Johnson claimed BH insurgency is a result of failed public policies and the unequal establishment of Islamic Sharia that did not punish corrupt public officials who stole millions free but jailed the poor people for minor theft. However, BH reaction might be disproportionate. Manni (2012) recommended elimination of corruption, but did not identify who was corrupt, by how much, and the destination of the stolen wealth by the Nigerian political class.

A chart of poverty by various regions of Nigeria reveals the state of the North (Adenrele, 2012). Factors beside the moral, economic, and political corruption root causes have been identified as relevant IVs in the study of counterterrorism and COIN (Alozieuwa, 2012; Isichei, 1987; Saad, 1988). Maiangwa (2014) emphasized the religious ideology factor. Onuoha (2012a) argued that the battle against insurgency must include the government addressing Northern Nigeria's poverty, unemployment, and perceived social injustice. Over 80% of the estimated 9.5 million Nigerian Islamic Almajiris live in the terrorism-prone Northern region, which makes a case for a targeted COIN program. Fowoyo (2013) pointed out that education at the secondary and tertiary levels is not free for the modern Almajiri school agenda, which is not holistic by design. Sampson (2012)

recommended that a counterterrorism strategy should include some political reform that addresses imbalance in social and economic realities affecting populations in the North. However, all regions in Nigeria face similar political and economic realities but do not incubate terrorism alike, and they are not equally prone to the Islamic terrorism as the predominantly Muslim North experiences.

However, Cobb, McClintock, and Miller (2016) addressed the necessity of a spiritually-based educational curriculum in fighting Islamic terrorism. Forbes (1996, 2004, 2012) outlined the claims of holistic education and holistic schools and of spirituality and the whole child approach. There are many values relevant to addressing the literacy gap for the Islamic population of Northern Nigeria. Although new schools and projects have recognized the necessity to pursue some types of holistic education programs, the Nigerian educational curricula in the North does not provide for THEP designed to address the national education crisis. Nigeria did not anticipate the BH insurgency crisis from its complex and variant constituent regions and ethnic nationalities, with respect to impacts of religious identities (Abubakar & Njoku, 2017; Fowoyo, 2013; Isiaka, 2015).

Ethno-religious values and cultural identities engendered mutual distrust among the Nigerian ethnic nationalities. They were held together by political forces, either the colonial or the military despotism, during and after colonialism (Agbibo, 2013c; Sodipo, 2013). The British colonial masters were aware of the disparities including those of education (Maiangwa, 2014). In expounding the realist theory, Maiangwa (2014) accused the colonialists of Machiavellian and Hobbesian inspiration and named a triad of

conspiracy by the colonial rulers of Nigeria, the military dictators, and the political intrigues that held the disparate units together by force and continued to do so for their own selfish interests.

### **A Gap in Literature**

Most recommendations for resolving the insurgency would cite improving the education of Northern Nigeria, but there was no quantitative study how THEP may neutralize the ideological root causes of BH (David et al., 2015). Scholar commentaries on educational policies in Nigeria and the effect on BH embody nondeterminative references to the importance of quality education in the COIN war. Targeted holistic education and its power to neutralize the scourge of continued resurgence of BH and the ideologically driven social violence have yet to be examined (Abubakar & Njoku, 2017; Isiaka, 2015; Peter & Isaac, 2013; Vanguard News, 2014). However, in this study, the random survey of samples of educated Nigerians (North, Middle, South West, and South East), were assessed to evaluate the degree of relationship of the DVs and IVs. The educational and social needs of the Islamic Northern Nigeria compared to their Southern counterpart in the federation have been studied by several scholars (Agbiboa, 2012b; Alkali et al., 2012; Alozieuwa, 2012; Campbell et al., 2012; Cook, 2014; Effoduh, 2014; Ekwueme & Obayi, 2012; Forest, 2012; Jocselyn, 2013; Johnson, 2011; Ogunrotifa, 2013; Onuoha, 2012a, 2012b; Pham, 2012; Walker, 2012; Zenn, 2012a). Pham (2012) pointed out the grassroots support by the poor and marginalized and that defeating the group will be difficult, making the case for the prospects of BH resurgence. Johnson (2012) supported Pham's view and added that BH draws support from the unemployed

and dropouts. Zenn (2012a, 2013a) claimed that BH works with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), whereas Campbell and Bunche (2012) highlighted BH's hostility to Christianity and to those Muslims who support the corrupt secular governments at the local, state, and national levels. Diplomacy and democracy are better ways than violent force to undermine the BH ideology, but there were no studies that have tested those postulates. Alozieuwa (2012) discussed the terrorism and counterterrorism theories on the security challenge of the Nigerian BH, but not the concept of THEP. This was the gap that informed the hypotheses for this study: the power of THEP to neutralize BH resurgence, when effectively tested on the identified restive population in Nigeria over time.

The results of this study will help to neutralize resurgence of the ideological BH. This was a reversibility-ultimacy model to neutralize BH resurgence. The vulnerable and radicalized Islamic Northern region of Nigeria and areas of the geographical South that are viewed vulnerable were the targets. This study was not about the relationship of continued BH insurgency and the failure or disintegration of Nigeria.

### **Summary and Conclusion**

BH is the emergence of a new Islamic state in Nigeria. Waldek and Jayasekara (2011) argued that BH represented the evolution of Islamist extremism in Nigeria. Nigerian government vacillated on how to deal with the insurgency amidst internal resistance. Subsequent scholarship had established the BH identity, but research on containment, counterinsurgency, and neutralization has continued. In the case of BH, the MNJTF of Nigerian, Cameroun, Chad, and Niger has regained most of territories of their

August 2014 Caliphate that had its headquarters in Gwoza. The insurgency has continued to deploy male and female suicide bombers, lay ambushes on the military, and reorganize and launch attacks in the region.

BH was not defined as a jihadi insurgency or a foreign terrorist organization by the United States until 2013 while sect sustained terror attacks and insurgency war on Nigeria State, vowing to Islamize it. BH's tactics, targets, weaponry, and attack locations continued to evolve, but the ideology has remained constant. CAN in January 2017 sent out an alarm on Southern Kaduna massacres of Christians by the Fulani herdsmen, and claimed that BH was establishing a new stronghold in the Kagoro Forest Foothills following their losses in Sambisa Forest. However, the media emphasis on their main objective, by 2014, had dangled from the Islamization of the Nigeria State, to the establishment of a separate, independent Islamic State in Northern Nigeria. This shifting represented a difference in terms of understanding the sect's goals and the local, national, and international response most appropriate to neutralize their operations. It was important for scholars to clarify the identity and objectives in the course of finding possible resolutions.

Twelve predominantly Muslim states of the political 19 Northern states of Nigeria had adopted the Islamic Sharia law to govern their states between 1999 and 2002. The insurgency increased in strength and spread between 2014 and 2015, and attracted the support of other terrorist organizations, including AQIM and AQAP, Somali al-Shabaab, the defunct Libyan forces, and other Islamic jihadists roaming in the Sahelian region.

Until 2009, the literature on BH was scarce, and its status as a terrorist group was being debated. This ambiguity on the identity of the BH terror group was reflected in literature. Recommendations to address the insurgency were made but did not include THEP. The ambiguity of BH identity and purpose persisted until 2013 when the United States named BH an FTO on November 13, 2013.

The power of THEP to neutralize BH resurgence has not been adequately represented in quantitative studies, as COIN policy for Nigeria. Data-based resources were scarce. The Peace Club Project (Sodipo, 2013) based in Kano, North-central Nigeria and the Opon Imo educational policy in the Southwestern Osun State (Sanusi, Omowale, & Kayode, 2014) were quasi-holistic programs respectively, in the genre of THEP in Nigeria. BH's operational epicenter includes Northeastern Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, which are at the bottom on the literacy scales.

In this study, I sought to establish how the gaps support the conceptual framework of behavior modification by THEP and associated hypotheses of the research questions that the study was designed to test. I considered COIN efforts of the government and others, if they have been successful in dealing with the crisis, providing a military shield enough to create the stability in the polity to permit the introduction and administration of THEP in the Nigerian system.

In Chapter 3, I present the methods of the study.



## Chapter 3: Research Method

### Introduction

This was a nonexperimental, postpositivist study that measured the relationship between THEP over a projected time period and prospects of it neutralizing resurgence of the BH. Key policies that augmented violent Islamism in Nigeria were generally viewed as variable factors propelling insurgency. The education policy was the key IV. This was a reductionist, deterministic study.

By randomly surveying a cross-section of socially informed respondents in Nigeria who were aware of the BH crisis and were knowledgeable of the effects on Nigerian sociological dynamics, data were anonymously collected on simulated survey instruments (questionnaires) developed and valid for this study. Data analysis included use of SPSS for ANOVA, MANCOVA, and or ANCOVA, for the descriptive statistics and the multiple regression analyses of the correlations of variables (the dependent and independent). Assuming a standard normal distribution, a confidence interval of 95% ( $c=0.95$ ), two-tailed test ( $\alpha=0.05$ ),  $Z_c = 1.96$  right tail separation, and moderate degrees of freedom ( $n - 1$ ),  $n$  was the sample size, calculated using the G\*Power analysis program. The hypotheses were tested ( $t$ -tests) analyzing the data with the SPSS software and the results were interpreted to ensure reliability of the inferential claim.

The data collection method satisfied ethical requirements. Confidentiality was ensured for the anonymous respondents, and special permission or protection was not necessary because I only surveyed unrestricted adult respondents in Nigeria. The internal validity and external validity for the Likert scale ordinal measures were verified. The

sample field was randomly distributed in the Nigerian geo-political center. The survey instrument was the same, administered during the same time period, and respondents did not communicate with each other. Completed surveys were collected on the spot.

The holistic education policy was targeted at general incident areas of Nigerian population, effectively administered from the prekindergarten up to high school and college. The hypothesis of the study was conceptually grounded in the transformational power of (holistic) education over ignorance, as suggested by Becker, Nagler, and Woessmann (2014); Franck and Johnson (2016); Hungerman (2014); and Lanas and Zembylas (2015). The religious-based ideological intolerance that is fueling the BH Islamist insurgency may become gradually neutralized if the population is holistically reeducated or educated, deradicalized or nonradicalized, and systematically integrated into the productive Nigerian socioeconomic and political order. This minimizes or eliminates illiteracy as a root cause of the violent resurgence of BH in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **Research Design and Rationale**

The cross-sectional survey design was suited for this study. In the study of the association between social support and depression in the general population or the HUNT study, a typical or similar cross-sectional survey design has been used (Grav, Hellzen, & Stordal, 2012). The rise of BH insurgency in Nigeria reflects unstudied approaches in the past to negotiate peace. The Peace Project of Kano model is a nonholistic training for violence prevention and tolerance focused on the youth population similar to some other work with middle-schoolers (Orpinas et al., 1996). An attempt to establish a liberal peace in Timor-Leste had encountered variations, ending up with a liberal local hybrid

peace instead of a Western constitutional democracy (Wallis, 2012). The failures of the Middle East Liberal Peace Projects over many years are common knowledge. The liberal peace was further explained by Richmond (2005), but the BH was known for refusing such liberal negotiations on the grounds of faith in pure Islamic Sharia law and its Jihadi requirements. BH insurgency has no public identity or contact, which informed both the framework and the cross-sectional survey methodology for this study.

### **The Cross-Sectional Design: Strengths and Limitations**

The cross-sectional design method is commonly identified with survey research and is used in the social science research (Frankfort-Nachmias & Frankfort, 2008). Researchers can describe patterns of relationship between the variables (DV, IV), and they use statistical analysis (cross-tabulation and bivariate percentage analysis) to control operations built into the design. The cross-sectional design was chosen for this study because classic experiments are not suited for social science research. The statistical control in multiple regressions is achieved by controlling covariates. The validity tests for this method are commonly acceptable when the methodology is properly applied.

From Kano Northern Nigeria comes the Peace Project, a nongovernmental organization and nonmilitary experiment for youth in response to growing ethno-social divides and festering politico-religious crises since Muhammed Marwa or Maitatsine Islamist jihad. I included a random survey of informed respondents both male and female with a minimum of a bachelor's degree plus 5 years or master's degree, across Nigerian population. These criteria were necessary to ensure higher data validity. Respondents received the survey instruments hand-delivered, and they returned their responses within

the day. The responses to the Likert scaled (1 to 5) instrument were entered as the raw survey data sets (the values of the IVs, THEP), and the covariate influences ( $CV_n$ ) were coded for the SPSS analysis. The descriptive statistics and correlations result of the ANOVA, MANCOVA, and ANCOVA were interpreted according to the research design. Follow-up contact with respondents was not required after the data were collected and verified. Unexplained variances may yet exist (beyond this study) to explain the BH phenomenon.

### **Streamlining the Scope**

Many factors influence a social phenomenon, of which only the dominant (IV) would need to be measured by methodology and analysis to satisfactorily answer the research questions. Limited resources and constraint on less significant variables in human psychopathology compelled the streamlining of the scope of the study. Data collection cost in Nigeria was relatively affordable.

### **The Variables**

The attitudes were measured (i.e., the state of NBHR) as a function of (depends on) many other (mediating) functions or cofactors. Further studies may account for most of such subfunctions or covariates or unexplained influences (mediating or moderating variables) that were beyond the necessary scope of this research study. Generally, the model was

Equation 1

$NBHR_1 = DV_1 = f(f_n) = f[IV_{1+} (CV_n)]; \quad n = 1, 2, 3, 4, \dots$  (i.e., Neutralizing BH Resurgence was a function of  $IV_1$ , which itself was influenced (moderated) by several  $CV_n$ )

Equation 2

$NBHR_2 = DV_2 = f(f_n) = f[IV_{1f+} (CV_n)]; n = 1, 2, 3, 4;$

Where  $IV_{1f} = IV_2$ , as in B. (Or same as above, except here the  $IV_2 = IV_{1f; f=free}$ ).

$NBHR_2$  may be the most significant measurement in the study.  $DV_1$  measured the effect of not-free THEP; and  $DV_2$ , the free THEP<sub>f</sub>; and  $DV_3$  separately measured the effect of THEP<sub>3f</sub> on BH recruitment pool, BHRP; the  $IV_n$  (accounted for in questionnaires) control the  $DV_n$ , and are IVs and covariates.  $DV_4$  separately measured the relationship of levels of general Western education to the BHRP; where  $IV_n \equiv (IV_1, IV_2, IV_3, IV_4; \text{ and } IV_1 \text{ \& } IV_{1f})$  are covariate influences.

Answers to the research questions from  $DV_4$  to  $DV_6$  were anecdotal or for further research studies.

Further studies shall be contrasted on a framework of simultaneously active independent factors. In this study, it was assumed that Islamist religious fundamentalism was driven by lack or type of education (the dominant IV). The degree or the power of functional dependency of neutralization of a typical (BH) cyclical aggression-frustration induced insurgency or even state counterinsurgency, varies with the factor of THEP on incident population and duration (i.e., the contextualized, designed, diversified, and integrated education policy applied to train the head, the heart for peace and tolerance,

and the hands for employment). In such a model of comprehensive curriculum, it shall encompass elements of the liberal Peace Project and more for the targeted population throughout the pre-K up to undergraduate education. It was assumed that Nigeria would pay for a model to prevent state failure as in the modern Almajiri schools, bearing the character and composition of its federation, despite the global dynamics of Islamic jihadi fundamentalism (IVs and CVs). A survey instrument was designed to measure these variables and covariables to address all the research questions. The main question was the THEP or free THEP effect, and reducing FSRP – how much correlation existed between THEP and NBHR or FSRP over a predictable time period, which may be generations.

### **Instrumentation and Operationalization**

Social scientists use scales (Likert, Guttman, etc.) and scoring techniques to measure attitudes (DV) of respondents on research surveys or questionnaire instruments at the nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio data levels of measurements. Scaling and indexing are the primary methods of ordinal data collection in quantitative research inquiry. The displayed attitudes represented sets of human behavior (thought) indicators. They were the mixtures of interactions of composite (independent) variables or items that possess many empirical values. The BH insurgency phenomenon in Nigeria, for example, indicated a hard-to-measure human behavior (attitude), attributable to a complex mixture of composite variables including history, education, economics, religion, sectarian indoctrination, ethnicity, politics, public policy, hegemony, state of mind, location, communication, and environment (Bernahu, 2016). Scaling and indexing reduce such complex data to single quantitative set of scores (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 etc.), and sometimes even in

measurable intervals amenable to statistical analysis (using SPSS or other), which enhances empirical validity and reliability. In designing the survey questionnaire for this study, similar studies were referenced (HUNT's study, PsycTESTS survey samples, etc.).

In the instrument for this study, questionnaire items 1 to 8 were exploratory and grounding questions of the hypothesis. Questionnaire Item 9 was a measure of the radicalization of BH insurgents, and Items 10 to 15 directly measured the six research questions. Random survey data were collected from knowledgeable participants who had the equivalents of graduate degree in humanities (social science, education, politics, etc.) and were socially informed across the Nigerian population. Inferential interpretations of multiple regression results helped to answer the research questions.

### **Sample Size and Data Analysis**

Nunally (1978) recommended 10 times as many respondents as there were variables. Kass and Tinsley (1979) recommended five to 10 per variable up to 300. Considering one variable (THEP), the sample size would be 10, but with other four significant covariates, it was  $(10 \times 5 = 50)$ . Scaling measurement was designed by compiling a list of possible scale items (or questionnaire) administered to a randomly dispersed cross-section of a large population sample of respondents to augment validity. G\*Power analysis yielded a minimum of 12 for this study, which fits the common rule of 10–15 respondents for each variable (Field, 2009). Respondents for this study typically had commonalities of at least 0.6, which validated a sample size less than 100 for a reliable survey study (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999). The larger the population, the greater the scale reliability achieved; for an effect size based on detection

probability (two-tails,  $\alpha=.05$ ,  $c=0.95$ ), the sample size was 54. The minimum sample size,  $n$ , was calculated with the statistics formula

Equation 3

$$n = pq \left\{ \frac{Z_c}{E} \right\}^2$$

where  $p$  was the preliminary probability of success (50% if not known), and  $q = (1 - p)$ ,  $Z_c=1.96$  for 95% confidence, the critical value separating right tail of normal distribution, and  $E =$  margin of error (for this sampling  $E = 5$  to 10% error).

I surveyed 50 to 100 respondents randomly distributed at the mixing point of the four regions of Nigeria (capital area, Abuja) as shown in the Venn diagram. This was the intersection of the North (i.e., far North and North Central), West, and East cells in the Venn diagram, and it represented the cross-sectional data collection sample field randomly dispersed for estimated an Nigerian population of 178.5 million by the World Population Review (Drolet, 2016).

Data analysis using SPSS was used to determine relationships and correlations of the variables to answer all of the research questions. In the data cleaning process, I separated traceable and inconsistent survey answers or unclear coding of responses before analysis. The data were sorted and coded from instruments to SPSS program. A normal frequency distribution was expected (one or two-tailed) for descriptive statistics and regression analysis (ANOVA, MANOVA, and ANCOVA), as required to validate correlations. The survey instrument was delivered to respondents manually, at the same



time period. It was expected that at least 50% of surveys will be returned completed and on time. The statistical hypothesis test of mean was used (one or two-tails,  $\alpha = .05$ , at  $c = 0.95$ ) as stated.

### **Levels of Measurement (Operationalization of Variables)**

Scientific research in social sciences involving the measurement of group or individual attitudes are difficult to operationalize and quantify at the ratio level (i.e., the comparison of intervals referenced to a 0 point). The BH insurgency phenomenon does not have a clear 0 or starting point. There were no clear intervals in the continuum of the insurgency, but good approximations were possible. In definable time and space, BH came to public notice through their activities. Nominal level of measurement allowed for the labeling of discrete entities like male or female and marital status of respondents in a study. Further, I used the ranking of identifiable nominal entities (i.e., all male students are at various levels of exposure to the Western-style education system). This is ordinal level measurement, but did not apply to this study. Ranking of items in survey instruments provided variable indications (as in THEP and free THEP) that were of empirical relevance in this study. Reynolds (1971) noted that most theoretical concepts in social science studies can be measured at the ordinal levels. There could be the possibility of performing some measurements at the interval level. There could be some relevance in the differences of intervals of the impacts of policies of different Nigerian political and or military regimes during which periods (2002, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, etc.) the development of the BH insurgency metamorphosed into a national crisis. However, this

study was operationalized at the ordinal level for the respondents' attitudes (IVs) measured on the Likert-type scale survey questionnaire.

This study may be merged into a full-scale study of the multi-variables that are at play in the scope of social dynamics that may define the violent attitudes of BH insurgency. Such complexity may not significantly enhance the inferential results. The BH phenomenon has developed over time from 1995 or 2002, but the terrorist trajectory has settled so the significant variables (DVs and IVs) defined the problem. They were variables defined by education (THEP) that theoretically leads to some behavior modification and ERs. Politics or PC, IH, and SP were all factors theoretically grounded, and they consisted of the impetus for BH insurgency-resurgence. To measure the effects or DVs, the Likert-type scale with similar or different (agreement) response options was scaled up to 5 points from lowest to highest. There may be a true 0 point depending on a particular test (IV) question but it was assigned 1. The survey questionnaire included questions addressing each of the six IVs for this study. The ordinal data were preceded by nominal data in the questionnaire to assess and factor in existing respondent bias and qualification.

### **Threats to Validity and Reliability**

BH insurgency represents a group dynamics problem in social science: the need to belong, to maintain uniformity, and to nurture emotions (Festinger, 1950). The difficulty of direct contact with BH for observations or survey presents validity and reliability challenge for a study in which such contact is an apparatus. It was not possible to survey BH members directly for what they believe. The conceptual framework hinges on the

effective modification of their behavior through a holistic education (Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). This called for design of the measuring instruments to make sure that the model measured intended dependent variable (NBHR) by the IVs' data, and then that the measurement techniques (methodology) were valid, including a randomized sample field of Nigerian population, people of competent knowledge of the BH phenomenon, and of the society. The measured outcome or data must be properly analyzed with SPSS and the results competently/correctly interpreted to ensure reliability. The survey of respondents directly from BH insurgent community would constitute a different study. In this study, the data represented BH attitude by measuring the attitude and experiences of people knowledgeable and affected by their activities in Nigeria. This transitive property of equality methodology to answer the research questions was grounded in mathematics and ensured the validity of this study.

For internal validity, the extrinsic factors, ethics, and practicality of design selection were controlled by the institutional review board (IRB). Intrinsic factors like history (what happened to respondents during study that would have changed the assumptions), maturation (i.e., respondent physiological change) during study, and possible reactivity of respondent due to sensitization by a pretest or a posttest were controlled by the methodology during data collection. There were no pretests and posttests but only a pilot study. Intrinsic factors including experimental mortality (such as respondents drop out), regression artifact (respondents with extreme bias), and reliability of instrumentation (yielding similar results for similar conditions) were also controlled by the methodology. The study design (sample, timing, method) accounted for these threats

of the psychological and social changes in the respondents. Experimental mortality was not be applicable to the study. The survey was administered only once in a short time (about 1 hour) giving no time for the dropout of respondents. Although a change in instrumentation was possible, and no pretest was given, the instrument design was properly referenced and directly measured the intended variables to ensure internal validity. A regression artifact was controlled by law of averaging or resolved by bulk effect of a larger sample size ( $N = 95$ ).

To minimize external validity issues, the cross-sectional sample field was representative, and the survey was taken in a natural setting at the participants' regular workplace. Control of reactive issues of one variable on the other variables was factored into the CVs and analysis of regression results. Research Questions 1 and 2 narrowed the effect of other IVs on THEP and resolved some reactivity issues, but their respective relationships to the subject NBHR were measured by Questions 3, 4, 5, and 6 that addressed nonmilitary COIN policy in Nigeria.

Finally, content validity was controlled by ensuring that the questionnaire was designed to directly measure the variables (DVs) and ensure face validity issue (i.e., researcher's subjective evaluation of the instrument). The randomization of respondents across the population (sample field) controlled sampling validity. To ensure predictive validity, an external criterion, a correlation of measured responses with related studies, was referenced in the study. Empirical validity is a measure of how the instruments (the survey questionnaire design) were related to the measurement outcome of the instruments (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). To determine that the instrument logically and

empirically related to the theoretical framework of the study (ie., the construct validity), previous and similar types of studies in literature were referenced for the research design, data collection, and analysis. The pilot study led to minor changes in the instrument before conducting the final survey.

### **Reliability**

For the study to be deemed overall reliable and scholarly, the reliability of the measuring instruments must be established. This is the alternative method to ensure validity when the concept, empirical, and construct validities are difficult to establish (Frankfort-Nachmias & Frankfort, 2008). The same instrument should consistently record the same measurements for the same tests and for the same conditions at all times. This means that the same respondent to the same survey questionnaire would always give similar responses to similar questions and at all times during the study. In the social sciences, measurement of feeling or attitude is usually indirect and that invites more error than in physical sciences studies, due to distractions of respondents, poor instructions by researcher, and technical difficulties (Frankfort-Nachmias & Frankfort, 2008). Social behaviors are not static, and new activities in the measuring field are capable of altering the respondent's perception of situations being measured. This may be significant in the resulting measurement. This would be true for measuring BH phenomenon. This threat to reliability can be minimized with the parallel-form technique that correlates two sets of responses from the same respondent to statistically determined similar forms. This calls for a clear definition of the period of study and the comprehensive description of prevailing conditions or assumptions when the surveys were administered. One form is

the true while the other is the error component, and the results will be used to calculate the variance, to be kept on record in the report of the results. This study was postpositivist and did not need to perform a formal pilot study. The methodology for more in-depth studies (outside the scope of this study) with more covariates may need a formal pilot study.

### **Ethical Concerns**

BH was mostly a clandestine terror group that could not be safely approached by a researcher. Data collection and validation for this study did not call for direct contact with the insurgents but constituted reaching appropriate respondents. In the safe areas of the Nigerian society, no permission was needed either from government or from a parent to reach the respondent adults. The adult respondents generally granted their informed consent to me to participate, and they were not under any obligation to respond. The need to minimize the cost of the study limited the depths of the research, which might have constrained both the validity of data and the reliability of results. However, the sample size was adequate. Because Western education had become suspect in parts of Northern Nigeria, the anonymity and confidentiality of respondents was necessary and ensured during data collection. They completed and submitted the surveys the same day at the same location. The responses (or data) were kept confidential, and all respondents were anonymous. The provision of monetary help to respondents to facilitate access to instrument (data collection) and handling, for food and transportation was not necessary.

### **Summary of Design and Methodology**

The cross-sectional survey research design provided the best methodology for this study. The moderate sample size ( $N = 95$ ) was randomly selected from the cross-section of Nigerian population at the point of intersection of the regions in Abuja, the capital city. Participants were educated and sociologically informed. Their response (attitude) about NBHR (DV) by THEP administered from kindergarten through college, age 21 (IV), was measured (data). Four main moderating cofactors (CVs) were measured. A Likert-scale survey instrument questionnaire (Appendix D) was used to collect ordinal and nominal data at the same time. Ethical issues (risks, biases, anonymity) were controlled, and informed consents were granted by the adult respondents. They were properly informed of the purpose of the study. Using SPSS program for descriptive statistics and multiple regressions (ANOVA, ANCOVA, and MANCOVA), data analyses were performed as applicable to determine the relationships and correlations that predict the power of THEP in NBHR, the outcome DV. The design of the instrument and research questions allowed the choice of method of analysis (ANOVA) test for single variable outcome (DV) based on single factor (IV), and for levels of the IV (for not-free and free THEP). The analysis and multiple analyses of covariates (ANCOVA and MANCOVA) were based on the hypothesis that the IV was influenced by covariables (CVs). The descriptive statistics, with the hypothesis test and multiple regression analysis, answered all the research questions. The focus of the study was mainly on the RQ1 or RQ2, and RQ3 (THEP and FSRP). The same basic assumptions applied to all the regression tests, normal

distribution, random sampling, and homogeneity, at  $c=0.95$ , and  $\alpha=.05$ , one or two-tailed and repeated measures.

The validity of data was ensured by instrument design, zero maturation periods in measurement, and basic data cleaning to enhance the reliability of inferential results and possible generalization. To limit the scope of this study, only the tests and analysis necessary to answer the research questions satisfactorily were performed. In further studies of this subject, more complex tests as indicated will be necessary.

In Chapter 4, I present the results of the study.



## Chapter 4: Results

### Introduction

The collection, organization, treatment, and analyses of data are discussed in this chapter. The power of the relationship between THEP in Nigeria from kindergarten to college (age 21), and NBHR, was evaluated. THEP, the key IV, with other significant influential predictors (covariables) were measured with a Likert-type survey instrument. From the descriptive statistics and regression analyses, the research questions RQ1 to RQ6 were answered, and THEP's power (effects) on NBHR (DV1) was evaluated upon testing the postulated directional hypotheses for the relationships. The graphs, tables, and observed correlations of the variables are noted. The research questions were:

1. What is the relationship (power) between THEP from nursery to postsecondary (age 21), at the presumed vulnerable incident population, and neutralizing BH resurgence against political conspiracies, Islamic hegemony (IH), Sharia policies (SP), and economic realities (ER) in Nigeria?

*H<sub>11</sub>*: The effective implementation of THEP designed for the presumed vulnerable population of Nigeria, from nursery through first degree, over time is related to neutralizing BH resurgence, over existing key impetuses.

*H<sub>01</sub>*: There is no significant relationship of THEP applied in the vulnerable areas of Nigeria from nursery to secondary and postsecondary level, to neutralizing the BH resurgence (NBHR).

2. What is the relationship (power) between providing free THEP from nursery to postsecondary (age 21), at the presumed vulnerable incident population, and neutralizing BH resurgence against political conspiracies, IH, SP, and ERs in Nigeria?

*H<sub>12</sub>*: The effective implementation of free THEP designed for the presumed vulnerable population of Nigeria, from nursery to postsecondary, is related to neutralizing BH resurgence over moderating impetuses.

*H<sub>02</sub>*: There is no significant relationship of free THEP applied to the vulnerable areas of Nigeria, from nursery to postsecondary level, to neutralizing the BH resurgence.

3. What is the relationship of free THEP throughout Nigeria to foot soldier recruitment pools (FSRP) of BH insurgency within the Nigerian Islamic population?

*H<sub>13</sub>*: THEP implemented throughout Nigeria is related to diminishing (drying up) the recruitment pools of the BH insurgency.

*H<sub>03</sub>*: Diminishing the recruitment pools of the BH insurgency is not significantly related to implementing THEP throughout Nigeria.

4. What is the relationship of BH insurgency recruitment pool to the type, level, and quality of education attained by its foot soldiers in Nigeria?

*H<sub>14</sub>*: BH insurgency recruitment may be related to the level of Western education attained by its foot soldiers.

*H<sub>04</sub>*: BH insurgency recruitment is not significantly related to the level of Western education attained by its foot soldiers.

5. What is the relationship of BH insurgency recruitment pools to the employment status (economic realities) of its foot soldiers in Nigeria?

*H*<sub>15</sub>: Employment status is related to the BH foot soldiers pool.

*H*<sub>05</sub>: Employment status is not related to BH foot soldiers pool.

6. What is the relationship of BH insurgency recruitment pool to the Islamic fundamentalist radicalization of its foot soldiers?

*H*<sub>16</sub>: Islamic fundamentalist radicalization is related to the BH foot soldier pool.

*H*<sub>06</sub>: Islamic fundamentalist radicalization is not related to the BH foot soldier pool.

Relationships of the variables were determined by analyzing participants' responses to the random cross-sectional survey (at the ordinal level) of native population measured on Likert scales. The descriptive statistics calculated the mean, mode, range, and deviations for each variable predictor.

In the survey instrument (questionnaire), items coded S1 to S15 were ordinal measures, and the letters A, B, C, and D represented more nominal measures. S10 and S12 were research questions RQ1 and RQ3. RQ2 was a stratified RQ1 that measured the free-THEP hypothesis. RQ4, RQ5 and RQ6, corresponded to S13, S14, and S15, respectively, representing the predictors of S12 or RQ3, which was another measure of power of THEP to NBHR hypothesis, by drying up the FSRP. The mean S6 was another measure of drying up FSRP, and it depended on predictor S12 (THEP = IV3) and covariates, CV3a, CV3b, and CV3c. The different associations of the relationships RQ1 to RQ3, and RQ3 to RQ4, RQ4, and RQ6, expanded the dimensions of the study by incorporating more influential factors. The six research questions were preliminarily answered by the analyses of descriptive statistics, and they may inform on the power

(level) of the relationship between NBHR and THEP. Correlations from ANOVA and ANCOVA, MANOVA, and MANCOVA (for DV1, DV3, combined effects) regression analyses based on the models would quantify the amount contributed by each variable to the variability in the outcomes.

The hypotheses focus was that THEP (IV1) effects neutralizing of Nigerian BH resurgence (DV1 or NBHR), or drying up the FSRP (DV3). The outcome DV1 or DV3 was likely influenced by many covariates, beside CV3a, CV3b, and CV3c in the study. The outcomes DV1, DV3, directly (S10) and indirectly (S12) were survey data mean measures 3.65 and 3.49, respectively, and they reflected participants' perception of the effect of THEP to NBHR. The averaging of these two means may better reflect perception or outcome DV1 for  $THEP_{direct}$  (or  $DV1_{thep}$ ), while the averaging of means related to FSRP for S13, S14, and S15 measures DV3 for  $THEP_{indirect}$  (or  $DV3_{fsrp}$ ). The aggregation of DV1 and DV3 was valuable because both measured the same outcome of NBHR in two different ways. DV3 was an outcome to be predicted mainly by S13, S14, and S15, plus other unknown influences assumed to be significant for this study. According to the conceptual framework of this study, illiteracy and type and quality of education borne in ideological impetuses were higher driving root causes of the insurgency than the ERs. It follows from the design and survey results, that it is reasonable in terms of dependent (outcome) and independent variability to simplify these outcomes as

Equation 4

$$DV1 = \left( \frac{MeanIV1 + MeanIV3}{2} \right), \quad \text{and} \quad DV3 = \left( \frac{MeanIV4 + MeanIV5 + MeanIV6}{3} \right)$$

## Equation 3

Where, IV1 = S10; IV3 = S12, *and* IV4 = S13, IV5 = S14, and IV6 = S15, which give the values

$$DV1_{\text{thep}} = (3.65 + 3.49)/2 = \mathbf{3.57}, DV3_{\text{fsrp}} = (3.44 + 3.03 + 3.76)/3 = \mathbf{3.41}.$$

Although these averages of survey means suggested the likelihood of a good relationship, how the predictors are correlated (the effect sizes) and significance was examined by regression analyses. If simplified, the means (data), reflect overall perception of participants, or

## Equation 5

$$DV1 = \text{MeanIV1}; \quad DV3 = \text{MeanIV3}; \text{ i.e. } DV1 = \text{MeanS10}, \text{ and } DV3 = \text{MeanS12}$$

Within the framework, Regressions 1, 2, 3, to 7 analyses, following the tests of hypotheses, were limited to measuring the correlations between, first, the scaled survey Item B, or participant education level, and participants' political region of Nigeria, Item C (ANOVA). Second, DV1 dependent on IV1 and cofactors-existing education policy (CV1) and IH (CV2); and third, DV3 dependent on IV3 and cofactors -level and quality of Western education of foot soldiers (CV3a), their ERs (CV3b), and Islamic fundamentalism and radicalization (CV3c) - (see the SPSS analyses/outputs below).

### Multiple Regression Analyses

Generally, a multiple (linear) regression equation model is represented in the form

## Equation 6

$$y = m_1x_1 + m_2x_2 + m_3x_3 + \dots + m_kx_k + b,$$

Where  $x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_k$  are the IVs,  $b$  is y-intercept (Constant), and  $y$  is the DV;  $m$ -values are the coefficients (or slopes, B or b-values) of linear functional relations, or change in  $y$  for a unit change in  $x$ , holding all other independent variables constant.

In this study, based on the design of the survey instrument (questionnaire), I determined and assigned the outcome  $y = DV1 = S10$ ,  $x_1 = S13$ ,  $x_2 = S14$ ,  $x_3 = S9$ ,  $x_4 = S15$ , and  $x_5 = S6$ , etc. However, DV1<sub>f</sub> or DV2 (measure of free THEP) depended on the same variables as DV1. NBHR was reflected by mean response to S12 (THEP based on drying up the FSRP) or DV3 dependent on the S13, S14, and S15 variables. Rewriting the regression equations in terms of S-values from data

Equation 7

$$DV1 = S10 = m_1S13 + m_2S14 + m_3S9 + m_4S15 + m_5S6 + b$$

and

Equation 8

$$DV3 = S12 = m_1S13 + m_2S14 + m_4S15 + b$$

The analyses of variances (ANOVA) based on Equations 8 and 9 were performed using SPSS, for outcomes dependent on applicable predictor variables. To measure NBHR based on THEP (S10), for example, would be dependent on predictors, illiteracy (S13), ERs (S14), political conspiracy of the IH (S9), religious extremism (S15), and maybe FSRP (S6). The regression analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) involving the covariate influences and predictor variables may be modeled as follows:

Equation 9

$$DV1 = IV1 + CV1 + CV2$$

$$DV3 = IV3 + CV3_1 + CV3_2 + CV3_3$$

### Pilot Study

A preliminary survey (pilot) was conducted in the four subregions of Northern Nigeria about 01 year prior to the final survey of August, 2018. The sample size,  $N = 26$ , was randomly distributed. Fifteen or 58% of respondents had earned at least a bachelor's degree plus 10 years or a master's degree of education (in various disciplines); eight or 31% indicated they had not, while three or 11% did not answer to that survey item. The output data from SPSS analysis was tabulated in the following descriptive statistics and discussed.

Table 1

#### *Descriptive Statistics (Pilot Study)*

	Mean	Median	Mode	Std. Deviation	Variance	Minimum	Maximum
1	4.31	5.00	5	1.258	1.582	1	5
S2	2.77	2.00	1	1.773	3.145	1	5
S3	4.50	5.00	5	0.949	0.900	2	5
S4	2.69	2.00	2	1.436	2.062	1	5
S5	3.88	4.00	5	1.211	1.466	2	5
S6	4.16	5.00	5	1.463	2.140	1	5
S7	3.08	3.00	2	1.412	1.993	1	5
S8	3.58	4.00	5	1.501	2.254	1	5
S9	4.15	5.00	5	1.347	1.815	1	5
S10	3.73	3.50	3	0.919	0.845	2	5
S11	3.69	3.50	3	0.884	0.782	2	5
S12	3.19	3.00	3	0.981	0.962	1	5
S13	3.31	3.00	3	1.050	1.102	2	5
S14	3.19	3.00	3	1.132	1.282	1	5
S15	4.23	4.00	4	0.908	0.825	1	5

Seven respondents indicated that they came from North-Central (NC), five from the Northwest (NW), nine from Northeast (NE), and five from the Middle belt (M). All but three indicated that they were non-Muslim. Those three did not respond to the item on religious identity in the pilot survey—"Are you Muslim?" The survey was anonymous. The results (raw completed survey) were scanned and e-mailed to me by two partners, one was a university professor, and the other a retired senior civil servant (mechanical engineer) with graduate degree. The results of the analysis of the pilot study, with the comments of the dissertation committee, and of the university research reviewer and the Walden University IRB, informed my decision to review and revise elements of the final survey instrument questionnaire items. I moved the survey sample field to the center of Nigeria, capital city, Abuja (the intersection) where all regions and religions of Nigeria and the demographic distributions were more fairly representative and in accordance with the cross-sectional design sample field and framework of the study.

### **Data Collection**

I traveled to Abuja City in Nigeria early July 2018 to the location of the sample field. I discussed the consent form with the head of the institutions. In a phone conference with the responsible authorities of the various campuses, I took time to answer their questions, and I explained both the confidentiality and the anonymity provided for and required in the process. The authority pledged their full cooperation for randomized data collection from the various education campuses spread out in the city, among their diverse, educated, and experienced academic and administrative staff (for K-12). I did not provide any financial incentive for their cooperation and participation. Upon the IRB



approval of the consent form, August 20, 2018, I returned to the sample site in Abuja. The participants completed the survey on August 21, 2018. The participants who had willingly and freely received the instruments returned them completed or uncompleted the same day to a designated place, anonymously. The authority cooperated with me in the process of the distribution and collection of survey instruments.

Of about 100 survey instruments returned, 95 were fully and properly completed to ensure the validity of the study. This was about a 95% return rate, better than about 50% return expected. The authorities of the various campuses facilitated the completion of the process within 24 hours. In that regard, I was practically limited as planned to personally hand out the surveys to the participants.

The academic and administrative staff of the sample field had earned at least a bachelor's degree. From the frequency distribution and for the ( $N = 95$ ) participants who responded to the Survey Item B, about 50.5% indicated they had earned at least a bachelor's degree plus 5 years working experience or a master's degree (in various fields of study). It was expected, based on the institution's basic requirement, that the 27.4%, besides the 50.5%, may have earned at least a bachelor degree but less than 5 years of experience. The 22.1% who skipped that survey item may have left it blank because they did not meet the specified 5-year minimum experience, but would have earned at least a bachelor degree. It was reasonable, for validity, that I only surveyed a knowledgeable sample who would have understood the framework linking education and insurgency. It is not an elite class.

The sample field was randomly chosen and included male and female participants who were indigenes of various political regions of Nigeria and from various religious backgrounds. The distribution is shown on the chart, Item C of the survey. The representations, East 47.4%, Middle Belt 12.6%, North 4.2%, and West 20%, fairly reflected the city demographics of educated degree holders employed in the private education industry, because the federal character quota system did not apply to private schools. The figures were fairly correlated with national literacy statistics (NBS, 2014). The pilot study did not identify Muslim participants. The final survey was revised to take care of the apparent bias. The demographic distribution of the final survey, based on the sample field, would have included a few Muslim participants, which enhanced the validity of the data. Covariates IL, PC (IH), ER, and RE were identified in the analysis.

#### **Treatment and/or Intervention Fidelity**

I had expected some survey instruments to be returned not meeting the minimum requirement for acceptability into the database. Examination of survey entries resulted in discarding about three returns that had many voids, multiple entries to one item, or combination of errors and voids, especially where the void included Item D on attestation that survey questions were answered honestly and truly. This was part of the data cleaning process. The coding and entry of data were performed manually and processed into an Excel spreadsheet. Variables (S#) were defined for SPSS analysis. I will keep the raw data for at least 5 years.

There was no adverse event requiring intervention. I consulted with experts in statistical analysis before analyzing with the SPSS. I designed the regression models to

ensure good output and measurement and for correct interpretations to enhance the reliability of results.

### **Results**

The means of the participants' responses to research questions, RQ1 (S10), reflected their perception (or the relationship) of THEP in the hypothesis, from nursery to postsecondary or college (age 21), to NBHR, the outcome variable, DV1 from the descriptive statistics. RQ2 (S11) or free THEP was measured. RQ3, RQ4, RQ5, and RQ6 were equally measured, along with other predictor variables in the framework. Their correlations were studied in the regression analyses of the data using SPSS. Drying up the FSRP of BH insurgency using THEP, its relationship to the level of Western education attained by its foot soldiers (IV4), the employment status (or economic realities) of its foot soldiers, and Islamic fundamentalist radicalization were measured. The postulate was that zero foot soldier probably means end of resurgence. The six research questions were constituted in the items for the respondents amidst the 19 survey items that included other predictors and exploratory questions. Four survey items were nominal and 15 ordinals - having no true 0; minimum score was 1, and maximum was 5. Range = 5 - 1 = 4.

The survey was designed so the average (mean) of participants' responses reflected their perception of (or answer to) the research questions RQ1 coded S10, RQ2, a stratified form of RQ1 coded S11; RQ3 was S12; RQ4 = S13; RQ5 = S14; and RQ6 = S15, respectively.

## Descriptive Statistics

Table 2  
*Frequency Distribution*

	Frequency	Percent
A (Should BH end the insurgency ...?)		
N	6	6.3
Y	68	71.6
B (Have you earned at least a bachelor plus 5 years...?)		
N	26	27.4
Y	48	50.5
Not indicated	21	22.1
C (You belong in this old political region of Nigeria).		
E	45	47.4
M	12	12.6
NN	4	4.2
W	19	20.0
D (responded honestly).		
Y	86	90.5

In the survey data, 48 participants (50.5%, for  $N = 95$ ) indicated that they earned at least a bachelor plus 5 years of experience or master's degree (Table 2). In addition, 45 participants (47.4%) belonged in the Eastern region of Nigeria, 68 participants or 71.6% indicated that BH should end the insurgency and live peaceably in a secular Nigeria, 6.3% said no, and 21 (22.1%) did not respond. I found that 86 participants (90.5%) indicated that they had responded to all items honestly and truly, while the rest did not respond to the item D.

Table 3

*Descriptive Statistics*

*												
		Range	Min	Max	Mean		Std	Variance	Skewness	Kurtosis		
	Mode	Stat	Stat	Stat	Stat	S.E.	Stat	Stat	Stat	S.E.	Stat	S.E.
S1	5	4	1	5	3.96	.144	1.406	1.977	-1.214	.247	.104	.490
S2	5	4	1	5	3.40	.147	1.407	1.979	-.485	.251	-.994	.498
S3	5	4	1	5	3.66	.135	1.298	1.685	-.611	.250	-.708	.495
S4	5	4	1	5	4.00	.114	1.111	1.234	-.904	.247	-.179	.490
S5	5	4	1	5	3.81	.126	1.218	1.484	-.910	.250	-.031	.495
S6	5	4	1	5	4.11	.102	.989	.978	-1.036	.249	.411	.493
S7	5	4	1	5	3.84	.125	1.223	1.496	-.760	.247	-.580	.490
S8	5	4	1	5	4.20	.113	1.097	1.204	-1.543	.247	1.68	.490
											6	
S9	5	4	1	5	3.87	.105	1.024	1.048	-.714	.247	-.299	.490
S1	4	4	1	5	3.65	.114	1.100	1.210	-.404	.250	-.589	.495
0												
S1	3 <sup>a</sup>	4	1	5	3.57	.106	1.020	1.040	-.181	.251	-.802	.498
1												
S1	4	4	1	5	3.49	.116	1.114	1.242	-.143	.251	-.803	.498
2												
S1	3	4	1	5	3.44	.098	.953	.909	-.471	.247	.286	.490
3												
S1	3 <sup>a</sup>	4	1	5	3.03	.115	1.112	1.236	.032	.249	-.621	.493
4												
S1	3	4	1	5	3.76	.113	1.074	1.153	-.830	.254	.218	.503
5												

*Note.* a. Multiple modes exist, the smallest value is shown. \*S1, S2, S3 ... S15 are predictor variables

### **Assumptions**

The assumption of normality (normal distribution) shall be satisfied to conduct a multiple regression analysis. A few distribution histograms were not normal, so that a one-tailed analysis was used. Homogeneity of variances or the variance of each variable was constant for all levels. Independence of participants and outcome variables (DV1, DV3) was included, so no participant is influenced by another, and outcome variables come from separate entities (Field, 2009). The skewness and kurtosis for normal variables were within the range of -2 through +2. The sample was random and did not show multicollinearity, or IVs highly correlated with each other (concurrence). I determined no multicollinearity by inspecting tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) values and testing the validity of the assumptions in regression analyses. VIF values (<3) indicate low correlation among variables - required. The VIF values are less than 3. Homoscedasticity was assessed (to test for same or closely the same) variances at levels of predictors (Forced Entry ANOVA & ANCOVA).

### **Findings Basic from Descriptive Statistics**

Survey data analysis showed on stringed nominal items, A, about 72% of respondents wanted BH to stop the insurgency and integrate into Nigerian secular society, and only about 6% said not so. S1 had a high mean of 3.96 (about 74% mostly agreed) with a range from 1 to 5 (median= 5, mode = 5,  $SD = 1.40$ , variance = 1.977). S2 mean was 3.40 (about 60% agreed or partly agreed) same range (median = 4, mode = 5,  $SD=1.40$ , variance = 1.979). S3 mean was 3.66 (66.5% mostly agreed) same range (median = 4, mode = 5,  $SD = 1.29$ , variance = 1.68).

S4 had a high mean of 4.00 (75% agreed) range 1 to 5 (median = 4, mode = 5,  $SD = 1.11$ , variance = 1.23). S5 had a high mean score of 3.81 (70.3% mostly agreed) the same range (median = 4, mode = 5,  $SD = 1.21$ , variance = 1.48). S6 high mean score was 4.11 (77.8% agreed or strongly agreed) same range (median = 4, mode = 5,  $SD = 0.98$ , variance = 0.97).

S7 high mean was 3.84 (71% mostly agreed), range 1 to 5 (median = 4, mode = 5,  $SD = 1.22$ , variance = 1.49). S8 mean was 4.20 (80% agreed or strongly agreed), with same range (median = 5, mode = 5,  $SD = 1.09$ , variance = 1.20). S9 mean was 3.87 (71.8% mostly agreed) with a range of scores from 1 to 5 (median = 4, mode = 4,  $SD = 1.02$ , variance = 1.04).

S10 had a high mean of 3.65 (about 66.3% mostly agreed) with a range 1 to 5 median = 4, mode = 3,  $SD = 1.10$ , variance = 1.21 (i.e.,  $(3.65-1)/(5-1) \times 100\% = 66.3\%$ ). S11 mean was 3.57 (about 64.3% mostly agreed), range 1 to 5 (median = 4, mode = 4,  $SD = 1.02$ , variance = 1.04). S12 mean was 3.49 (about 62.3% agreed or partly agreed) with same range (median = 3, mode = 3,  $SD = 1.11$ , variance = 1.24). S13 mean was 3.44 with range of scores 1 to 5 (median = 3, mode = 3,  $SD = 0.95$ , variance = 0.90). S14 had a high mean score of 3.03 (50.8% disagreed or partly agreed lowest) with a range of scores from 1 to 5 (median = 3, mode = 3,  $SD = 1.11$ , variance = 1.23). S15 had a high mean score of 3.76 (69% mostly agreed) with a range of scores from 1 to 5 (median = 4, mode = 4,  $SD = 1.07$ , variance = 1.15).

### Findings Related to Research Questions

The SPSS analyses assumed normal distribution, no multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, and no skewness and kurtosis. The IV and DV plots were in the normal range of -2 through +2, within the limits of the probability of outputs, so that the findings on the research questions and hypotheses under good validity were deemed reliable.

For RQ1 and  $H_{11}$ : S10 (RQ1) had high mean of 3.65 with a range of scores from 1 to 5 (median = 4, modes = 3, 4;  $SD = 1.10$ , variance = 1.21). Of 93, 25 participants (26.9%) strongly agreed, 27 participants (29%) agreed, 27 participants (29%) partly agreed, 11 disagreed, and only three strongly disagreed. Therefore, considering the limitations of the study, most participants in the survey (85%) thought that effective implementation of THEP on the presumed incident population of Nigeria, from nursery through the first degree (age 21), over (unknown) time (was related to NBHR), over existing key impetuses. The mean (3.65 or the averaged mean 3.57) was the outcome DV1 (NBHR) from the measure of IV1 or average  $(IV1 + IV3)/2$ . This measure of perception may directly reflect the power of THEP in the hypothesis.

The probability (or power) of THEP to NBHR in the sample may be better estimated by the mean-value, 3.65 or 3.57 {[i.e.,  $(3.57-1) \div (5-1) \times 100$ ] % =  $(2.57/4) \times 100 = 64.25\%$ }, if the correlation of outcome to predictor(s) was not significant (at  $p < .05$ ) in the regression model. The  $R$  squared values for the model represented the amount of variation accounted for by the model based on all the assumptions for the test of hypothesis being met, which was case for the model. Several regression models were tested for the hypotheses.



Table 4

*Frequency Distribution–S10*

Valid	Frequency	Percent
1	3	3.2
2	11	11.8
3	27	29.0
4	27	29.0
5	25	26.9

For RQ2 and  $H_{12}$ : S11 (RQ2), the mean was 3.57, range 1 to 5 (median = 4, mode = 4,  $SD = 1.02$ , variance = 1.04). Of 92, 19 participants (20.7%) strongly agreed, 30 (32.6%) agreed, and 28 (30.4%) partly agreed. Most participants (83.7%) thought effective implementation of free THEP is related to NBHR. The difference between THEP and free THEP was not significant.

Table 5

*Frequency Distribution–S11*

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	1	1	1.1
	2	14	15.2
	3	28	30.4
	4	30	32.6
	5	19	20.7

For RQ3 and  $H_{13}$ : S12 mean was 3.49 same range 1 to 5 (median = 3, mode = 3,  $SD = 1.11$ , variance = 1.24). Of 92, 22 participants (23.9%) strongly agreed, 21 (22.8%) agreed, 32 (34.8%) partly agreed on S12. Most participants (about 81.5%) thought that

THEP, if it were effectively targeted and implemented throughout Nigeria, was related to drying up the FSRP for BH.

Table 6

*Frequency Distribution–S12*

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	1	3	2.8
	2	14	13.0
	3	32	29.6
	4	21	19.4
	5	22	20.4

For RQ4 and  $H_{14}$ : S13 mean was 3.44, same range 1 to 5 (median = 3, mode = 3,  $SD = 0.95$ , variance = 0.90). Of 95, 11 participants (11.6%) strongly agreed, 36 (37.9%) agreed, and 36 (37.9%) partly agreed on S13. Most participants (about 87.4%) thought BH recruitment pools was related to the level of Western education attained by its foot soldiers. Illiteracy was likely a significant impetus (a reason) for insurgents to enlist as BH foot soldiers. The regression analysis tested how this correlated with the outcome, neutralizing BH resurgence (NBHR).

Table 7

*Frequency Distribution –S13*

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	1	4	4.2
	2	8	8.4
	3	36	37.9
	4	36	37.9
	5	11	11.6

For RQ5 and  $H_{15}$ : S14 mean was 3.03, same range 1 to 5 (median = 3, mode = 3,  $SD = 1.11$ , variance = 1.23). Of 94, 10 participants (10.6%) strongly agreed, 21 (22.3%) agreed, and 33 (35.1%) partly agreed on S14. A third agreed or strongly agree, a third partly agreed, and a third disagreed or strongly disagreed ERs were the impetus.

Participants were split on the relationship of ERs to BH foot soldiers recruitment pools than on any of the other impetuses. Its lowest mean (3.03) tended towards disagreement, as the study postulated.

Table 8

*Frequency Distribution – S14*


		Frequency	Percent
Valid	1	8	8.5
	2	22	23.4
	3	33	35.1
	4	21	22.3
	5	10	10.6

For RQ6 and  $H_{16}$ : S15 mean was 3.76 same range 1 to 5 (median = 4, mode = 4,  $SD = 1.07$ , variance = 1.15). Of 90, 23 participants (25.6%) strongly agreed, 38 (42.2%) agreed, 17 (18.9%) partly agreed, eight (8.9%) disagreed, and four (4.4%) strongly disagreed. Therefore, 86.7% of the participants thought sustenance of BH FSRP was more related to the Islamic fundamentalism and radicalization. In addition, 13.3% disagreed or strongly disagreed. This result supported the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study on ideology.

Table 9

*Frequency Distribution – S15*

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	1	4	4.4
	2	8	8.9
	3	17	18.9
	4	38	42.2
	5	23	25.6



Slightly skewed left, so 1-tailed test applies. No kurtosis. But normal distribution is illustrated in the P-P plots, page 161, Regression 5.

Figure 3. Distributions graphs.

Because of the sample size and (fairly stratified) sample field, these results were hard to generalize. However, simplifying the statistics (Equation 4), by averaging the means of key predictor (THEP) variables (IVs), the corresponding outcomes (DV = NBHR) based on the data may give better results for participants' perceptions (outcomes or answers to research questions), than the single variable means; until the variables were regressed for specific coefficients/effects:

$$DV1 = \left( \frac{\text{MeanIV1} + \text{MeanIV3}}{2} \right) = \left( \frac{\text{MeanS10} + \text{MeanS12}}{2} \right) = (3.65 + 3.49) / 2 = 3.57;$$

$$DV3 = \left( \frac{\text{MeanIV4} + \text{MeanIV5} + \text{MeanIV6}}{3} \right) = (3.44 + 3.03 + 3.76) / 3 = 3.41 \text{ as previously}$$

noted.

THEP measures (S10 = 3.65, S12 = 3.49) were reflective of the NBHR, per alternative hypotheses,  $H_{11}$ ,  $H_{13}$ ; or the alternative mean values, 3.57, 3.41, provided answers to the research questions RQ1 and RQ3, and estimated power of THEP on NBHR, at 64.25% and 60.25%, respectively for DV1 and DV3. The relationship and effect sizes of the variables were determined by further analyzing various models of regression statistics to test the hypotheses and validity of the assumptions, especially that the null hypothesis was not true.

### **Regression Analyses**

To determine if the outcome could be sufficiently predicted by the descriptive statistical mean, a regression analysis was required to find the best models of measured linear predictors that will provide maximum correlation with the outcomes, based on correct assumptions. These assumptions are verifiable by the test of hypotheses for the

predicted outcome using regression analysis. Correlations of the predictors are determined by the same one or multiple regression analyses. Based on the design and collected data, ANOVA, ANCOVA, and MANCOVA were conducted, following several exploratory (learning) tests, necessitated by the complexity of the social phenomenon under study (i.e., insurgency, COIN, and neutralizing resurgence).

Following the instrument design, the measure of the power (effect) of THEP on NBHR or S10 was the outcome that corresponded to or was dependent on predictor S12 (drying up the recruitment pools), Regression 2, and other models on ANCOVA, MANCOVA, hierarchical and forced entry analyses.

### **Regression 1: Education Level B, and the Old Political Region of Nigeria C**

An exploratory model of multiple regression analysis was conducted to study the correlation between Western education level attained by respondents and their old political region of Nigeria on NBHR. Multiple regression analysis is most appropriate to measuring the impact of two or more IVs on a DV. BH resurgence festered in educationally backward Northern Nigeria. Education level ( $\beta = 0.806, p < 0.001$ ) was related to NBHR. The model accounted for 69.2% of the variance (the variation in *NBHR*). And following the general regression equation (8), then

Equation 11

$$\text{NBHR} = B + C$$

(NBHR = DV, B and C are treated as predictor variables IV<sub>s</sub>, see Tables 9 & 10 below)

Table 10

*Regression 1 Coefficients Education Level*

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.228	.095		2.404	.018
	Education Level	.860	.059	.806	14.653	.000
	Region	.092	.047	.107	1.953	.053

Table 11

*R Square Regression 1*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.832 <sup>a</sup>	.692	.686	.51757

This model did not address the key IVs central to this study. It was imperative to test the hypotheses for the research questions with other regression models.

**Regression 2: Outcome as Function of THEP**

Following the findings of the exploratory regression analyses above, a univariate analysis was conducted (on SPSS) for the outcome S10, dependent on dry up the FSRP, S12, to test the hypothesis of the power of THEP to NBHR, based on the study design and framework, and based on this model (from equation 1):

$$DV1 = f(IV1), \quad \text{or} \quad S10 = S12$$

A hierarchical regression (ANOVA) was conducted. The results are shown partly in Tables 11 through 14 below. The constant B, and the slope (b-value) of the regression model equation, 1.861, and .508 were calculated, so that

Equation 12

DV1 = f(IV1) or generally,  $y = bX + B$ , where predictor  $X = S12$ , i.e.

$$\text{NBHR (DV1 or S10)} = .508(\text{S12}) + 1.861$$

Equation 13

$$\text{Or NBHR (S10mean)} = .508(\text{S12mean}) + 1.861$$

The standardized model (Mean = 0, and  $SD = 1$ ) had a positive slope of .516, and confidence interval [.329, .686],

Equation 14

$$\text{NBHR} = .516(\text{S12})$$

From Table 13, 27% ( $r^2 = .266$ ) of variance of NBHR was likely due to THEP-S12 or THEP effect on FSRP.  $F$ -test gave  $F(1, 88) = 31.97, p < .01$ ,  $t$  test gave  $t(88) = 5.654, p < .01$ . The larger  $t = 5.654$  and smaller significance ( $p < .001$ ), mean a greater contribution of predictor S12 to NBHR. The correlation coefficient ( $r = .516, p < .001$ ) was significant and suggested that drying up FSRP was relatively strongly related to NBHR (large effect). The model was significantly good to predict NBHR. The hypothesis may not hold up at  $p \geq .05$  and the C.I. does not include 0. For this analysis, there was large positive correlation between S10 and S12, significant at  $p < .001$  and no multicollinearity because Pearson correlation  $.516 \leq r < .9$ . Exactly the same variance was seen for residuals at each level, and large eigenvalue to small variance proportion (see Table 14) suggested there were no heteroscedasticity (existence of differences of variances at the levels of predictor measurement). Multicollinearity was not observed, for this model.



Table 12

*Regression 2 Coefficients; Confidence Interval 95%*

Model	UC			t	Sig.
	B	SE	SC Beta		
1 (Constant)	1.861	.329		5.656	.000
S12	.508	.090	.516	5.654	.000

*Note.* UC = Unstandardized coefficient; SC = Standardized coefficients

Table 13

*Correlations: Outcome (S10=NBHR-THEP) and Predictor (S12=THEP-FSRP)*

		S10	S12
Pearson Correlation, R	S10	1.000	.516
	S12	.516	1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)	S10	.	.000
	S12	.000	.

Table 14

*R Square and Change Statistics*

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.516 <sup>a</sup>	.266	.258	.953	.266	31.967	1	88	.000

Table 15

*Collinearity Diagnostics*

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Condition Index	Variance Proportions	
				(Constant)	S12
1	1	1.952	1.000	.02	.02
	2	.048	6.398	.98	.98

Note. a. Dependent Variable: S10

**Regression 3: Univariate Analysis of Covariance Hierarchical Regression**

Equation 15

$$DV (S6) = IV (S12) + CV (S13) + CV (S14) + CV (S15)$$

S12 was a measure of THEP by drying up FSRP; S6 measured that insurgency cannot be sustained without the foot soldiers. S6 is a function of S12, and it may have been influenced by the covariates S13, S14, and S15. An ANCOVA may be conducted if regression slopes are homogeneous, as shown in Table 15. The interaction of the predictor and covariates, S12xS13xS14xS15, in the test of homogeneity for regression slopes below was not significant at  $p < .05$ , showing  $F(5, 72) = .742$ , ( $p = .595$ ), the assumption of homogeneity of slopes is good when this test is not significant at the  $p < .05$  (Field, 2009). ANCOVA can be conducted for the factors (model) specified, and the covariates will help in predicting the outcome (S6) that BH insurgency cannot be sustained without the foot soldiers (fighters, suicide bombers, etc.), the independent factor being THEP (S12).

Table 16

*Test of Homogeneity of Regression Slopes*

Variable	Type III Sum of Squares	Mean Square	<i>F</i>	Sig.
Corrected Model	20.037 <sup>a</sup>	1.670	1.780	.068
Intercept	1.539	1.539	1.640	.204
S12(THEP/Foot Soldier)	4.432	1.108	1.181	.326
S13(Illiteracy)	.010	.010	.010	.919
S14(Economic Realities)	.011	.011	.011	.916
S15(Religious Extremism)	1.219	1.219	1.300	.258
S12 * S13 * S14 * S15	3.480	.696	.742	.595

Table 17

*Parameter Estimates: Dependent Variable: S6 = (Foot Soldier Recruitment Pool)*

Parameter	B	Std. Error	t	Sig.	95% C.I.		Partial Eta Squared	Observed Power <sup>b</sup>
					L B	U B		
Intercept	3.246	.708	4.586	.000	1.837	4.655	.215	.995
S13	-.008	.133	-.058	.954	-.273	.257	.000	.050
S14	.119	.117	1.015	.313	-.114	.351	.013	.171
S15	.240	.100	2.404	.019	.041	.438	.070	.661
[S12=1]	.038	.619	.061	.951	-1.195	1.270	.000	.050
[S12=2]	-.893	.383	-2.330	.022	-1.657	-.130	.066	.633
[S12=3]	-.453	.313	-1.450	.151	-1.075	.169	.027	.299
[S12=4]	-.573	.308	-1.859	.067	-1.187	.041	.043	.451
[S12=5]	0 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

*Note.* a. This parameter is redundant, set to 0. b. Power computed using alpha = .05

Based on the *b*-values (B), Table 16, the difference in means from S6 were not significant for S13 and S14, but were for S15. Negative values indicated direction of relationship between S6 and the covariates. Other variables being constant, a unit increase in the outcome S6 means a decrease in covariate S13 by .008, and increases in S14 and S15 by .119 and .240, respectively; S13 may be nonhomogeneous. S14 differed significantly to S12 ( $p = .022$ ), just as S15 to S6. If effect was significant,  $p < .05$  (see Table 15), then the assumption of homogeneity of the regression slopes was untenable, and this was not the case for the covariates, S13, S14, and S15.

In Table 17, the partial eta squared value,  $\eta^2$ , tells that when covariate is constant, what proportion of variance of the factor S6 (DV) is related to S12 (IV), the predictor.  $0 \leq \eta^2 \leq 1$  (.01=small; .06=medium; .14=large, values). Main effect is the  $\eta^2$  associated with the factor. This means variance of S6 may be unrelated to S12 as S13  $\eta^2 = .000$  is neutral, with small power .05, but it was unclear because it was not significant for  $p > .05$  ( $p = .954$ ). For S15, the case was different, and it was fairly related with fairly moderate effect,  $\eta^2 = .07$ . For the corrected model, all the covariates were significant at  $F(1, 77)$ ,  $p < .05$ ,  $p = .02$ , and if controlled, were fairly related to the variance in S6. Of the 87.576 variation, 71.019 of error, was unexplained. The model accounted for 16.56 of variation; for S13 = .003, S14 = .951, S15 = 5.332, and S12 = 6.654.

In Table 18, for  $p > .05$ , effect was not significant, at  $F(4, 77)$ ,  $p = .137$ , and  $\eta^2 = .086$ , assuming homogeneity, and covariates effect for eta = .086. *F*-ratio tests the effect of S12, based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. Pairwise comparison tests in Table 19 showed all factors not significant

at  $p < .05$ , at  $p = .783$ ,  $p = .994$ , and  $p = .979$ , respectively, between predictor and each covariate. CIs included 0; significant differences in the means on the parameter estimates had disappeared in the pairwise adjusted means comparison test. Homogeneity in the model still held, as  $p > .05$ , in all paired relationships. Overall, this was not a good regression model for prediction of the outcome.

Table 18

*Covariates Tests of Between-Subjects Effects*

Dependent Variable: S6.

Variable	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	16.558 <sup>a</sup>	7	2.365	2.565	.020	.189
Intercept	20.461	1	20.461	22.185	.000	.224
S13	.003	1	.003	.003	.954	.000
S14	.951	1	.951	1.031	.313	.013
S15	5.332	1	5.332	5.781	.019	.070
S12	6.654	4	1.663	1.803	.137	.086
Error	71.019	77	.922			

Note. a. R Squared = .189 (Adjusted R Squared = .115)

Table 19

*Effect of Predictor Factor S12*

Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Contrast	6.654	4	1.663	1.803	.137	.086
Error	71.019	77	.922			

The  $F$  tests the effect of S12. This test was based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means.

Table 20  
*Pairwise Comparisons: Mean Difference, and Confidence Interval*

(I) S12	(J) S12	Mean Differ. (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig. <sup>a</sup>	95% Confidence Interval for Difference <sup>a</sup>	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	2	.931	.627	.783	-.876	2.738
	3	.491	.585	.994	-1.195	2.177
	4	.611	.609	.979	-1.144	2.366
	5	.038	.619	1.000	-1.746	1.822
2	1	-.931	.627	.783	-2.738	.876
	3	-.440	.344	.899	-1.432	.552
	4	-.320	.373	.993	-1.395	.754
	5	-.893	.383	.203	-1.998	.212
3	1	-.491	.585	.994	-2.177	1.195
	2	.440	.344	.899	-.552	1.432
	4	.120	.293	1.000	-.724	.964
	5	-.453	.313	.806	-1.354	.448
4	1	-.611	.609	.979	-2.366	1.144
	2	.320	.373	.993	-.754	1.395
	3	-.120	.293	1.000	-.964	.724
	5	-.573	.308	.500	-1.461	.315
5	1	-.038	.619	1.000	-1.822	1.746
	2	.893	.383	.203	-.212	1.998
	3	.453	.313	.806	-.448	1.354
	4	.573	.308	.500	-.315	1.461

*Note.* Based on estimated marginal means a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Sidak.

#### **Regression 4 (Forced Entry)-DV3: THEP-on-FSRP Equation (9) – ANOVA**

Equation 16

$$\text{Outcome (DV3)} = \text{S12} = m_1\text{S13} + m_2\text{S14} + m_4\text{S15} + b$$

The hypothesis of THEP to dry up FSRP was tested as a function of illiteracy (S13), ERs (S14), and religious extremism (S15) of BH foot soldiers. An analysis of variance was conducted to test if the model was significantly better in predicting outcome than the mean of descriptive statistics. In Table 20, correlation of S12 with S13 at ( $r = .287, p = .004$ ), S12 with S14 ( $r = .404, p < .001$ ), and for S12 with S15 ( $r = .181, p = .047$ ), were significant at  $p < .05$ . The contribution of ER to power of THEP to dry up FSRP was moderately higher (.404) than those of S13 (illiteracy) and S15 (religious extremism), in the model. Overall, the model, Table 21 gives ( $r = .452, p < .001$ ) very significant correlations of S12 and predictors, accounted for 20.4% ( $r = .204$ ) variation in the outcome (S12). Correlation coefficient of .452 was high.

Compared to the mean, Table 22, this model was significant ( $F(3, 82), p < .001$ ) to predict outcome. Durbin-Watson = 1.61 was close to 2; this means independent predictors. The positive values of b-coefficients (.131, .325, .178) indicated positive relationships of the predictors, Table 23. The tolerance-values  $> 0.1$ , and  $1 < \text{VIF} < 10$ , mean no multicollinearity.

Table 21

*Correlations: DV3 = Dry Up Foot Soldier Recruitment Pool (S12)*

Variable		S12	S13	S14	S15
Pearson Correlation R	S12	1.000	.287	.404	.181
	S13	.287	1.00	.478	.007
Sig. (1-tailed)			0		
	S14	.404	.478	1.000	.007
	S15	.181	.053	.007	1.000
	S12	.	.004	.000	.047
	S13	.004	.	.000	.314
	S14	.000	.000	.	.474
	S15	.047	.314	.474	.

Table 22

*R Square and Change Statistics*

Model	R	R <sup>2</sup>	Adj R <sup>2</sup>	SE	R <sup>2</sup> Change	Sig. F Change	Durbin- Watson
1	.452 <sup>a</sup>	.204	.175	1.002	.204	.000	1.610
		.04					

*Note.* a. Predictors: (Constant), S15, S14, S13. b. Dependent Variable: S12



Table 23

*Test of Significance to Predict Outcome compared to Mean*

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	21.143	3	7.048	7.018	.000 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	82.346	82	1.004		
	Total	103.488	85			

Note a. Dependent Variable: S12. b. Predictors: (Constant), S15, S14, S13

Table 24

*Parameters of the Model (Coefficients<sup>a</sup>); a. Dependent Variable: S12*

Model	Unstd Coef	Std Coef		t	Sig.	95.0% CI B		Collinearity		
		B	Std. Error			Beta	LB	UB	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Const)	1.279	.571		2.241	.028	.144	2.414		
	S13	.131	.133	.110	.980	.330	-.135	.396	.769	1.301
	S14	.352	.113	.350	3.120	.002	.127	.576	.771	1.297
	S15	.178	.101	.173	1.754	.083	.024	.380	.997	1.003

**Regression 5 (Forced Entry)**

Overall, the test was significant ( $p < .05$  at  $p = .001$ ), so I rejected the null hypothesis.

Equation 17

$$\text{NBHR-THEP} = \text{DV1} = \text{S10} = b_1\text{S6} + b_2\text{S8} + b_3\text{S9} + b_4\text{S13} + b_5\text{S14} + b_6\text{S15} + b_0$$

A forced entry ANOVA showed correlations of all factors to NBHR. Outcome S10 was measured (in survey) as the power of THEP to NBHR. It was calculated that power of THEP was (66.25%) based on mean value 3.65. The effect of each predictor variable was shown in the forced entry regression analysis. The model accounted for

about 24.4% of outcome ( $r^2 = .244$ ), and was significant  $F(6, 79), P = .001$ . It explained 24.4% of variation in the outcome. Regression analysis allows for cross-validation of the model with  $R$ 's,  $R^2$  and adjusted  $R^2$ -values, to assess if and how much the study model represented the entire population (Nigeria) in this case. Although it may be argued that the results of this survey study may not effectively predict the perception of the entirety of Nigerian population, because of the (stratified) though random sample, they represented reliable perception of a sample field more knowledgeable of the subject matter than random street sampling of citizens, hence the validity of the methodology here. The limitations were moderate.

On correlation, one unit increase in THEP to neutralize BH was .320 increase in reducing FSRP (significant,  $p = .001$ ); .052 decrease in political conspiracy (IH, S9) not significant at  $p = .317$  and negative slope b-value =  $-.247$ ; and .274 increase in economic realities (S14) significant at  $p = .005$ . B-values except for S9 increased with increase in THEP. S10 significantly correlated only with S8, S13, and S14. Significant correlations were noted. Beside S8 (low quality education) all confidence intervals ranges included zero and negatives. The test showed  $1.2 \leq \text{VIF} < 2$ , and  $0.1 < \text{Tolerance} < 1$ , which means no multicollinearity.

Table 25

*Correlations: Supplemental Data*

Variable		S10	S6	S8	S9	S13	S14	S15	
Pearson Correlation	S10	1.00	.069	.306	-.052	.320	.274	.101	
	S6	.069	1.000	.129	.224	.079	.211	.279	
	S8	.306	.129	1.000	.381	.094	-.033	.373	
	S9	-.052	.224	.381	1.000	.098	-.019	.468	
	S13	.320	.079	.094	.098	1.000	.503	.094	
	S14	.274	.211	-.033	-.019	.503	1.000	.018	
	S15	.101	.279	.373	.468	.094	.018	1.000	
	Sig. (1- tailed)	S10	.	.265	.002	.317	.001	.005	.177
		S6	.265	.	.118	.019	.233	.025	.005
		S8	.002	.118	.	.000	.193	.380	.000
S9		.317	.019	.000	.	.185	.431	.000	
S13		.001	.233	.193	.185	.	.000	.195	
S14		.005	.025	.380	.431	.000	.	.435	
	S15	.177	.005	.000	.000	.195	.435	.	

Table 26

*Model Summary<sup>b</sup> R Square*

Model	R	R Square	Adj R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Change	F Change	df	Durbin-Watson	Sig. F Change
1	.494 <sup>a</sup>	.244	.186	.987	.244	4.247	6	79	.001

Note. a. Predictors: (Constant), S15, S14, S6, S8, S13, S9

b. Dependent Variable: S10




Figure 4. Regression standardized residual.





Figure 5. Observed cum prob.

The histogram and probability-probability or P-P plots with values on the diagonal provided more illustration of the normal distribution. The observed probability appeared to be directly proportional to the expected or the hypothetical probability of the model S10.



*Figure 6.* Regression standardized predicted value.




Figure 7. Partial regression plot: DV S10.





Figure 8. Partial regression plot: DV S10.



*Figure 9.* Partial regression plot: DV S10.

The negative slope of S10 against S9 was  $-.247$ , and it was illustrated in the plot above.

The increase in THEP to NBHR is proportional to the decrease of the IH.






Figure 10. Partial regression plot. DV S10.





Figure 11. Partial regression plot. DV S10.

Positive slopes imply economic realities of insurgents improve with increase in THEP on NBHR over time.



*Figure 12.* Partial regression plot DV S10.

Negligible outliers were observed between -2 and 2 values. The assumption of normality was tested and verified by the scatter plot for outcome S10, predicted values, and residuals. The partial regression plots between the outcome S10 and predictors held the same for normality of data distribution, as in the plots above. These tests helped to validate methodology and findings.

The partial plots (scatterplots) provided slopes that were the coefficients of the predictor variables (b-values), informed on any nonlinear relationships between outcome and predictor variables and detected collinearity. The variances were mostly equally spaced out at all levels around the slope fits of scatterplots with negligible outliers (one or

two). The plots held true for homoscedasticity, so residuals at each level of the predictor had fairly the same variance. This observation was seen in all the following partial regression plots.

### **Multiple Regression 6: MANCOVA**

A hierarchical multiple regression test of covariance was conducted to study the contributions of IV predictors to THEP in NBHR in Nigeria. The overall test was significant at  $p < .05$  ( $p = .026, p = .002$ ) for S10 and S12, respectively in the MANCOVA, so the null hypothesis was voided. The box's test was nonsignificant at ( $p = .576$ ) meaning the assumption of homogeneity was met but multivariate normality was uncertain. The effects were significant for S14 ( $p = .016$ ) and S13 ( $p = .021$ ) for Roy's largest roots test, but S9, S15 were nonsignificant. The positive values of  $\eta^2$  ( $0 \leq \eta^2 \leq 1$ ) indicated positive effects or contributions to the outcome variables S10 and S12, which agreed with the findings of ANOVA models for the predictor variables on the test. Levene's test was nonsignificant ( $p > .05$ ), so the assumption of homogeneity was met. There was no significant difference between predictors contributions to the outcome except for S14 to S12 ( $p = .004$ ) which was significant ( $p < .05$ ).  $\eta^2 < 1$  for all; means homogeneity test was met, and effect sizes were positive and significant in S14 to S12 ( $p = .004$ ).

The contributions of predictors to joint variable outcome factors S10 and S12 reflected the measure of their positive effects on THEP (S10) direct measure from survey. THEP (S12), a measure of the effects to dry up FSRP, was the same as NBHR. The tables below represent SPSS outputs.

Table 27  
*Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices<sup>a</sup>*

Box's M	8.325
F	.843
df1	9
df2	2514.678
Sig.	.576

Table 28  
*Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances<sup>a</sup>*

Variable	F	df1	df2	Sig.
S10	1.094	4	79	.366
S12	1.356	4	79	.257

- a. *Note.* Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. Design: Intercept + S9 + S14 + S15 + S13

In Levene's test if  $p \geq .05$ , it means normal distribution.

I tested the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the DVs were equal across groups. a. Design: Intercept + S9 + S14 + S15 + S13.

Table 29  
*Tests of Between-Subjects Effects*

Source	Dependent Variable	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared	Noncent. Parameter	Observed Power <sup>c</sup>
Corrected Model	S10	18.257 <sup>a</sup>	7	2.608	2.438	.026	.183	17.067	.838
	S12	25.286 <sup>b</sup>	7	3.612	3.533	.002	.246	24.732	.957
Intercept	S10	17.199	1	17.199	16.078	.000	.175	16.078	.977
	S12	9.562	1	9.562	9.352	.003	.110	9.352	.855
S9	S10	1.910	1	1.910	1.786	.185	.023	1.786	.261
	S12	.818	1	.818	.800	.374	.010	.800	.143
S14	S10	2.291	1	2.291	2.142	.147	.027	2.142	.304
	S12	9.023	1	9.023	8.825	.004	.104	8.825	.835
S15	S10	2.138	1	2.138	1.999	.162	.026	1.999	.287
	S12	3.530	1	3.530	3.452	.067	.043	3.452	.450
S13	S10	8.463	4	2.116	1.978	.106	.094	7.911	.569
	S12	3.372	4	.843	.824	.514	.042	3.298	.252
Error	S10	81.302	76	1.070					
	S12	77.702	76	1.022					
Total	S10	1207.000	84						
	S12	1125.000	84						
Corrected Total	S10	99.560	83						
	S12	102.988	83						

a. R Squared = .183 (Adjusted R Squared = .108)

b. R Squared = .246 (Adjusted R Squared = .176)

c. Computed using alpha = .05

## Regression 7

A hierarchical regression was conducted to find the power (effect) of THEP based on drying up the BH FSRP, the IV, and the measure of the end of insurgency based on end or 0 FSRP (S6). The correlation showed that for every unit of FSRP there was a 0.271 THEP effect, significant at  $p < .05$ . It accounted for 7.3% ( $R^2 = .073$ ,  $p = .009$ )

variability in the outcome. The independence test was met at  $(1.89 \leq \text{Durbin-Watson} < 2)$ , at  $p < .05$ . From ANOVA the table  $F(1, 89) = 7.058$ , at  $p < .05$  is significant, the model was good in predicting the outcome ( $p = .009$ ). Equal variance proportions (VP) of  $(.02 = .02, .98 = .98)$  underscored no heteroscedasticity. Tolerance = 1, and VIF = 1, and 98% VP on 4.6% eigenvalue, means there was no multicollinearity, as shown in the coefficients and collinearity diagnostics tables below. Other factors of the variation were unknown.

This model was significant enough but not sufficient to measure the outcome, a zero FSRP, which was congruent to the measure of NBHR as a function of THEP. The effect size was .271, or about 27.1% power.

Table 30


*Descriptive Statistics*

Variable	Mean	Std. Deviation	<i>N</i>
S6	4.09	.996	91
S12	3.51	1.109	91

Table 31

*Correlations*

Variable		S6	S12
Pearson Correlation	S6	1.000	.271
	S12	.271	1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)	S6	.	.005
	S12	.005	.
<i>N</i>	S6	91	91
	S12	91	91



Model is  
slightly skewed

Figure 13. Histogram DV S6.






Figure 14. Normal P-P plot of regression standardized residual DV S6.

### Summary

About 95 participants were randomly selected and surveyed. The descriptive statistics of the ordinal data collected were analyzed based on means of their categorical responses to outcome and predictor questions. Participants' perceptions indicated positive relationships for all predictors (IVs) to the outcome (NBHR, DV). Analyses of all regression models voided all the null hypotheses and showed significant effects of the predictors on the outcome variables. About 70% of the variations in the outcomes were not explained by the significant contributions of the predictors to the outcome. That pointed to the limitations of the models, and particularly of THEP, the hypothetical main

predictor of the study to completely do NBHR. It appeared THEP was necessary, based on the results, but not sufficient to completely neutralize the resurgence.

Based on survey responses of participants, and by averaging of  $THEP_{NBHR}$  and  $THEP_{FSRP}$  means, up to 64.25% of participants on range of 1 to 5 (1 = *strongly disagree*, and 5 = *strongly agree*), or 66.25% of participants using the mean of  $THEP_{NBHR}$ , agreed that THEP will NBHR over time. This was the hypothetical power of THEP. Not much power can be assigned to analytical result of ordinal data. The best characterization of the power results was based on the perception of the participants and could not be generalized.

By design, questionnaire items (S10 – S15) addressed the six research questions, so that participants' responses were measures of how predictors were related to the outcomes. On the tests of hypotheses, four of the seven regression ANOVA models were notable, Numbers 2, 4, 5, and 7. Regression 2 showed .516 correlation of drying up FSRP with  $THEP_{NBHR}$ , and it accounted for 27% of the variation in outcome. Regression 4 showed a .452 correlation of factors of illiteracy, ERs, and religious extremism with  $THEP_{FSRP}$ . It accounted for 20.4% of variation. Regression 5 (forced entry) showed .494 correlation of factors, of zero-FSRP, for level/type/quality of education, political conspiracy, illiteracy, ERs, and religious extremism, with  $THEP_{NBHR}$ . It accounted for 24.4% of the variation. Regression 7 showed only .271 correlation of  $THEP_{FSRP}$  with zero-FSRP outcome, and it accounted for only 7.3% of the variation. All four models were significant at ( $p < .05$ ). The four models met all assumptions, as illustrated by normal residual histograms, and p-p plot alignment in the diagonal.

By this methodology, based on the frequency distributions in the descriptive statistics (by SPSS), here was exactly how the participants agreed:

For RQ1/*H<sub>11</sub>*: THEP is related to NBHR. About 26.9% of surveyed participants strongly agreed; 29% agreed, and 29% partly agreed.

For RQ2/*H<sub>12</sub>*: free-THEP was related to NBHR. About 20.7% of surveyed participants strongly agreed; 32.6% agreed, and 30.4% partly agreed.

For RQ3/*H<sub>13</sub>*: THEP was related to drying up BH (FSRP). About 23.9% of surveyed participants strongly agreed; 22.8% agreed, and 34.8% partly agreed.

For RQ4/*H<sub>14</sub>*: BH insurgency recruitment (FSRP) might be related to the level of Western education attained by its foot soldiers (Illiteracy factor). About 11.6% of participants surveyed strongly agreed; 37.9% agreed, and 37.9% partly agreed.

For RQ5/*H<sub>15</sub>*: Employment status (ERs factor) was related to the BH-FSRP. About 10.6% of participants strongly agreed; 22.3% agreed, and 35.1% partly agreed.

For RQ6/*H<sub>16</sub>*: BH-FSRP was related to Islamic fundamentalism and radicalization. About 25.6% of participants strongly agreed, 42.2% agreed, and 18.9% partly agreed.

Responses were scaled from lowest point (1) to highest point (5) as follows: *Strongly disagree* (1); *Disagree* (2); *Partly Agree* (3); *Agree* (4); and *Strongly Agree* (5).

The fifth research question RQ5 (Survey Item S14) was the question on if sustenance of the foot soldiers is more related to the ERs than to the type of (Qua'anic, Almajiri, Madrassah) education of the recruits. It had the lowest distribution mean, 3.03, highest percent of strongly disagree and the lowest percent of strongly agree among

participants. This result and those of the other five hypotheses supported the conceptual framework of this study—to focus on ideological impetus fueling fundamentalism and radicalization (Islamic religious extremism) in Nigeria as a byproduct of illiteracy/ignorance, borne of none, or type and level of nonholistic education policy. Nigerian education data and these results showed the significance of THEP.

The estimation of the power of THEP shall not be limited to the simple statistical means, because the results of the analysis of variances (ANOVA), for example Regression 5 (forced entry) showed the model was significant at  $p < .05$ , ( $p = .001$ ) to predict outcome (S10). Even MANCOVA for outcome of the combined variation (S10 + S12), Regression 6 was significant at  $p < .05$  ( $p = .026$  &  $p = .002$ ), which means there were 2.6% and 0.2% slim chances respectively that the null hypothesis was true, compared to just .1% or less chance for the ANOVA results. The model for Regression 4 was significant and better for predicting outcome at ( $p = .000$ ). The ANCOVA model, Regression 3 at ( $p > .05$ ), was not significant. The Regression 7 model for Zero-FSRP ANOVA although significant at  $p < .05$  ( $p = .009$ ), was not significantly better than simple mean, to predict the outcome.

In Chapter 5, I present a discussion of the findings.

## Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

### Introduction

Insurgency, more especially resurgence, does not operate effectively without foot soldiers, the fighters, suicide bombers, and the local and global collaborators (Cook, 2011; Shaffer, 2016; Taiwo, 2013). If militarily checkmated, they will dissipate and infiltrate the society, temporarily or technically defeated but only to resurge, as is the case for Nigerian (Gilbert, 2014; Karmon, 2014; Pham, 2012; Solomon, 2012), if the impetus driving the insurgency still persisted (Animasaun & Saka, 2013; Gilpin & Giroux, 2014; Gaffey, 2016;). By targeting those root causes earlier, with an ideological, behavior and attitude-changing COIN as this study postulated, the THEP, the FSRP would run dry over time (Isiaka, 2015). In this study, I used evidence-based data and analytics to find the relationship of the power of targeted holistic education policy to neutralizing BH resurgence in Nigeria.

A total of 95 of about 100 completed and returned survey instruments were used. A pilot survey of 26 participants was completed months prior to final study survey. By using the SPSS computer software to analyze the primary data, I found in the descriptive and subsequent regression statistical analytics (ANOVA, ANCOVA, and MANCOVA), positive relationships between the outcome (NBHR) and key predictor variables (THEP, FSRP, and covariates).

At least 72% of the Nigerians surveyed agreed that BH should end insurgency and integrate into the secular Nigerian society. In addition, 6% said no and 22% did not respond. About 85% of 93 respondents mostly agreed (of which 27% strongly agree, 29%

agree, and 29% partly agree, 12% who disagreed, and 3% who strongly disagreed) that the ideological impetus (drive) of BH resurgence may be neutralized by a compulsory THEP at the insurgency incident population, from nursery up to first degree (age 21). This was 81.5% for THEP<sub>FSRP</sub>. Over 83% (averaging 85% and 81.5%) of participants mostly agreed that THEP will neutralize BH resurgence over time. This resulted in a probability based on the average of means, 64.25% likelihood of THEP neutralizing BH resurgence or drying up FSRP. My findings did not represent the estimated power of THEP in the hypothesis to NBHR over time. The THEP may begin to contribute up to about 20% to 64.25% working with other COIN variables towards NBHR, based on the effect sizes from the regression analyses and statistical means average. Education is an effective tool for behavior transformation.

### **Discussion and Interpretation of Findings**

BH insurgency or resurgence phenomenon in Nigeria indicates a hard-to-measure human behavior, attributable to a complex mixture of composite variables including history, education, economics, religion, sectarian indoctrination, ethnicity, politics, public policy, hegemony, state of mind, communication, and the environment (Bernahu, 2016). It takes generations to neutralize an ideologically driven insurgency (Alkhouri, 2014; Auld, 2015; Farrall, 2015; Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015). From the results of the statistical analyses of the power of THEP, it may take a long time (may be at least 2 cycles of kindergarten to college) to effectively neutralize known ideological impetus driving BH resurgence in Nigeria. The THEP's contribution will be steady, maybe from

immediate 20% to 64.25% going by regression (effect sizes) and probability ratio of simple statistical means.

Although it correlated positively with THEP and other predictor variables, I found that respondents' view of the ERs of the insurgents (poverty and unemployment) was lowest on the scale among the concerns or root causes of the BH insurgency. Scholars are divided on this (Carson, 2012; Edet, 2015). Others (Adenrele, 2012; Alozieuwa, 2012; Cook, 2011; David et al. (2015); Forest, 2012; Sulemana, 2014) listed other factors. The same time IH was negative with THEP in this study as ER. An increase in illiteracy and IH reflects some decrease in economic progress and quality or holistic education (Flannery, 2015; Forbes, 1996). ER had most significant correlation with illiteracy factor, which means that illiteracy may be the highest cause of unemployment and poverty, as literature acknowledges (Ajetumobi, 2013; Fowoyo, 2013).

In line with the majority of literature, the participants confirmed that the root cause of insurgency may be low quality or type of education (Qur'anic) and no formal education of the insurgent foot soldiers. This was followed closely by the factor of ignorance and religious intolerance, tailoring the belief of the (patriarchal) insurgency that Western education is sin. This finding was in alignment with Soyinka (2012) and Quranic arbitration solution to insurgency by confronting their ignorance and illiteracy. All of the directional hypotheses were upheld, and all the null hypotheses were voided in the tests. At a confidence interval of 95%, effect sizes, and between-subjects (variable-to-variable/covariates) data analyses have supported the findings.

The incremental nature of behavior change is supported by literature (Crowling, 2011; Csikszentmihalyi, 2014; Drew, 1988; Forbes & Martin, 2004; Lutz, 2014), counteractive to the radicalization and insurgency interactivity through rumination of frustration, which leads to aggression (Richardson et al., 1994; Berkowitz, 1969; Bushman, 2002; Csikszentmihalyi, 2014; Dollard et al., 1939). The conceptual framework of this study was supported by the findings. The proportionality of the numbers on mean values to effect sizes of predictor variables on the regression probability plots will require more studies. The variables were IH (political conspiracy), illiteracy, ERs (poverty and unemployment), and religious extremism, and their correlation levels with THEP as a measure of neutralizing BH resurgence (NBHR), or drying up of FSRP were shown in the regression analyses. This study extended the subject in the social science literature, because of new statistical evidence of how the Nigerian participants thought about BH and holistic education in 2018. The numbers (effect sizes) showed levels of relationships of factors in the study and projected how much holistic education policy may help to neutralize BH resurgence. Policymakers may use the quantitative results to inspire further investigation for implications to social change.

The effect sizes of predictors were moderate. Variations of the variances at all residual levels were not explainable in the analyses/findings of the models, and not even by many normal and post hoc hypothesis tests. However, the assumptions of normal distribution and the independence of predictors, homogeneity of variance and regression slopes, absence of skewness and kurtosis, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity of



residuals were met. The results reflect data validity and attest to the reliability of the analyses and findings.

The literature on qualitative studies has increased, more than for quantitative studies on BH. The continuing resurgence has aggravated social, political, religious, and economic troubles for Nigeria and neighbors. Military COIN success was limited and often reversed by resurgence. Governments scrambled searching for lasting solution with many recommendations and little evidence-based data on BH. The data and conclusion from this study may fill some gaps, although 70% of the variations in THEP on NBHR were not explained. This means further studies are necessary.

THEP (a factor of ultimacy), when combined with other COIN activities, would ultimately neutralize the components that feed the impetus driving resurgence. THEP may account for 20% to 64.25% based on the findings of this study, for positive social change.

### **Limitations of the Study**

The military COIN in Nigeria may temporarily defeat BH, but it has not neutralized the resurgence. BH insurgency is a socioreligious, ideologically inspired, and driven phenomenon. The effectiveness of the military COIN is necessary and was assumed to create the shield for the THEP program to operate. This assumption limits the study because it has not been factored into the survey questionnaire and regression analysis in estimating the power of THEP to NBHR, and it may account for significant part of the 70% unexplained variations of the regression results. THEP is necessary but not sufficient.

Although the statistical assumptions for the models were met, the assumption of a well designed and implemented THEP in Nigeria is an uncertainty difficult to test for this study. This limits any claims of the findings. The hypothesis is limited by what can actually happen with Nigeria. The data collection, treatment, and analysis were done carefully. However, the designs of the regression models were experimental because there was no previous study to follow. I tested combinations of predictor variables that may best predict the outcome. I may have missed some critical factor or details in design that fill the apparent gaps or explains portions of the 70% unknown variations. Results of between-subjects variations call for more studies because many variables correlated at or close to large effects ( $r = .5$ ) range. The answers to the six research questions came by analysis of the descriptive statistics, but survey of participants' perceptions was not the best scientific study to find the power of THEP to NBHR. I think the survey instruments could be designed sharper to measure the variables. This study has been a learning experience for me. The study was theoretical, and practical realities limit results.

Although the trajectory of BH resurgence currently models a well-behaved phenomenon, because its identity and modus operandi have been under study by the scholarly community, the dynamics of border porosity (Onuoha, 2013) at the international boundaries and the vortex in the Sahelian region complicate the mathematics of modeling the BH resurgence. BH insurgency has regionalized, internationalized, and linked with global terrorism and insurgency. The nomadic Fulani Herdsmen were not factored; they are hard to target, and may constitute elements of the BH insurgency. It will take a settled community to plan and implement a THEP. This

study may not be extrapolated, but be started off with the IDPs in their secured camps outside the current unpredictable territories in Northeast Nigeria. The results of this study are more descriptive than prescriptive. Other excluded factors in the study include the impact of climate change in the pastoral Sahelian settlements, the rigid patriarchal traditions of the ethnic peoples of the Sahel, and the neutralization of BH resurgence.

### **Recommendations**

Following the pilot study of participants from Northern Nigeria regions, it became clear that people of the Islamic faith were not well represented. The final study relocated to Abuja, the center to increase representation in the sample. The study calls for efforts necessary to adequately include people of the Islamic faith. The results of a larger and more representative sample will be more suited for generalization. Alternatively, studies may be compartmentalized to various groups or regions in Nigeria and neighbors affected by BH, and the findings will be integrated to find answers. The phenomenon of Fulani herdsmen migrations and their nomadic activities need to be studied because BH is reported to be embedded or are following their trails downward toward the Atlantic, attacking and dislodging other ethnic peoples in their ancestral homes, allegedly in search of new pastoral lands and water because of climate the change effects.

The data collected for this study may deserve further cleaning or analysis as a secondary data to other pertinent studies. Although the six research questions for this study were answered, learning from the data was not exhausted. The education/training of the insurgents, before, and during the insurgency needs to be studied. If they were the illiterate at recruitment, what have they learned since enlistment to sustain the extreme

challenges of the insurgency? That informs any deradicalization or IDDRS program that may interphase with THEP implementation. It is critical to properly rehabilitate and reintegrate the insurgents, so they do not infiltrate the larger population to infest it. How to normalize the radicalized insurgents' group along the incident population in Nigeria while delivering THEP? That calls for a more far-reaching study than this.

This study did not survey the insurgents for the extreme risk and difficulty. A study that actually interacts with, interviews, or surveys the insurgents is essential to better understand if the BH insurgents will be open to participate in a rehabilitation that includes components of Western education which they ideologically rejected as sin (Haram).

How can the unexposed population of southern Nigeria be shielded to prevent the spread and infiltration of the insurgency that seeks to Islamize Nigeria by force?

About 70% power to NBHR beside THEP was unexplained, a subject for further studies. These recommended for further studies are related to NBHR.

### **Implications: For Positive Social Change**

In the study, I surveyed a group deemed knowledgeable of the subject matter and who lived and worked in education at a city threatened by more attacks from BH. I shared the framework of the study with participants in writing. Their informed opinion or perception was the data and it conferred validity. Social activists, scholars, practitioners, and policymakers may want to learn of the results and possibly reference them as limited as they may be for policymaking and further study considerations. The study proffered the power of THEP to NBHR and at the same time empowering other Nigerian

population and the workforce for higher economic prosperity. In the study about 84% of participants agreed that the insurgents are the ignorant, intolerant Muslim perverts; about 87% agreed that the insurgency cannot continue without the foot soldiers; and 78% believed the foot soldiers were predominantly the illiterates with unemployable skills. In addition, 85% blamed ignorance, intolerance, and radicalization on the low quality or type of education, and 72% believed that the insurgency was driven by IH, a type of political conspiracy. I found that 85% agreed on THEP to NBHR. One reason Western Nigeria high Islamic population is not radicalized is its love for ordinary Western education (NBS, 2014).

Nigeria and neighbors were traumatized by the scourge of BH insurgency. Over 2.6 million IDPs became unproductive and dependent, unable to go back to their ancestral homes. It means that the end of BH resurgence (the fourth deadliest terror group in the world) will bring back liveliness, an end to the hopelessness of IDPs in the entire northeastern Nigeria and perhaps the neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

Assuming that the calculated power of THEP to NBHR at 20% to 64.25% over time is attainable, then a better education, more productive workforce, and transformation of ERs means replacing the economic disaster, starvation, poverty, public health disaster, and the political instability in the Northeastern Nigeria, with the advantages of THEP. The new paradigm (educated and tolerant society) is a positive tool for economically strong and peaceful society, in a competitive global economy. The insurgency in the neighboring Cameroun, Chad, Niger, and Mali will be impacted. Nigeria ceases to be a

vassal for BH. Global links with Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorism network will become unattractive compared to the benefits of THEP.

The death toll due to the insurgency has continued to go up from over 26,000 in 2016 and the destruction of properties worth hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars since 2009 when BH activities exploded in Nigerian will come under control if the resurgence was neutralized. Children will live and grow in the holistic schools and playgrounds, and they will receive relevant education that is transforming their life and future, compared to the hopeless cycle of death, displacement and sufferings, in danger of the BH attacks inside and outside the IDP camps.

### **Implications for Methodology, Theory, and Empiricism**

The cross-sectional survey method used in this study was effective. For the validity of data and reliability of the inferential conclusions, the design of this study defined the unit of analysis (measured outcome) and a framework grounded in theory (Rossi, Lipsey, & Freeman, 2018). Randomization of the sample was ensured by choice of sample field to enhance validity of data. Because direct contact with the insurgents was difficult, the effects (the impacts of their activities) were indirectly modeled and measured. The framework (ruminated frustration-aggression, behavior change by education) of the study allowed transitive determination of causality. The design of survey instrument evaluated the unit of analysis, the dependent outcome variable, by measuring the IVs. The survey instrument measured the outcome and the predictor variables causing it. The hypothesis tests of assumptions, if not properly interpreted for the null hypothesis, become scientifically invalid. The transitive paradigm simply states

that if  $a = b$ , and  $b = c$ , then  $a = c$ . Insurgency (c) is measured by its impetus and its effects (b), as in this design. Because the study was based on the primary data, the design of various regression models (7) needed to be sorted and analyzed in tests of hypotheses to compare and study the variable effects and the validity of the assumptions before any reliable conclusion could be reached. In a subsequent study, this learning will inform and improve design. Social sciences use more ordinal data, than pure sciences' ratio.

The empirical numbers in this study were not precise and are subject to further studies. The statistical outputs by SPSS were more representative when several models had been tested than a single test without the effort to cross-validate. I analyzed over seven trial regression models to understand the trend of data. This is recommended, especially if the study is more original than regular. My further studies will look for sharper instrument, based on the findings of this effort.

### **Conclusion**

Based on the analyses of the descriptive statistics and several regression models, about 85% of the participants agreed BH resurgence may be neutralized by a compulsory THEP; from elementary to the college (age 21), free or not free. THEP was related to NBHR and to drying up FSRP, but the effectiveness (power) of THEP may only range between 20% and 64.25%, based on the statistical average of means and effect sizes, over time, assuming other factors causing the variation were operational. THEP may be necessary to NBHR, but is not sufficient.

For survey participants, up to 81.5% partly/mostly agreed free THEP will eventually dry up FSRP, in places vulnerable to Islamic radicalization. Up to 87.4%

partly/mostly agreed that the sustenance of FSRP of BH insurgency was highly related to the type, level, and quality of education attained by recruits. Up to 69% disagreed/partly agreed the sustenance of foot soldier recruitment pools; FSRP of BH is more related to ERs than to type of (Qur'anic, Almajiri, Madrassah) education of the recruits. Up to 78% mostly agreed that the sustenance of FSRP of BH insurgency was more related to the Islamic fundamentalism and radicalization. The survey participants mostly believed that illiteracy, ignorance, and religious ideological ethos were the greater impetus driving BH resurgence, than the economic realities of the insurgents. This conclusion was grounded in literature and helped to clarify the levels of relationships.

I found that the power (effect) of THEP to neutralizing the BH resurgence in Nigeria may be as high as 64.25% for a policy cycle once fully implemented and other COIN factors causing variation operational. A cycle may range from 0 to 15 or 16 years, kindergarten through college (age 21). Going by Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), norm-setting takes time (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015), perhaps so long that practitioners and politicians may not find THEP immediately attractive. It takes generations to deradicalize insurgents (Alkhouri, 2014; Auld, 2015; Farrall, 2015; Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015). The conclusion is supported by literature, but the power estimate was based on the statistical means average of survey participant responses, which is hard to generalize.

THEP was positively correlated to both NBHR and drying up FSRP of BH. The correlation values for the predictor variables and covariates will be scientific proofs that over a period of time THEP would help to neutralize the resurgence of BH, and or to dry



up the recruitment pools of BH foot soldiers. Based on the analyses of the predictors' effects by mean scores, ERs had the least effect (50.8%) of the impetuses contributing to the BH insurgency in Nigeria, the highest being the quality and type of education (Qur'anic or other, up to 80%), followed by Islamist ideology (the SR or the IH, 72%), by the same method that estimated THEP power 66.25%, and average of  $THEP_{NBHR}$  &  $THEP_{FSRP}$ , up to 64.25% to neutralizing the resurgence of BH (NBHR).

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## Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire

**Neutralizing BH Resurgency: A PhD Research Survey-Questionnaire (Anonymous)**

*Resurgency is where an insurgency keeps coming back after apparent defeat. Assume government will compel all children in areas vulnerable to Islamist radicalization to be in school free, from nursery up to first degree (age 21). Schools shall teach holistic curriculum (academic, spiritual, vocational, global-view, peaceful coexistence with other faiths) leading to employable skills. On this premise **please answer ALL, honestly. Indicate your** answer.*

- A.** Should Boko Haram end the insurgency and live peaceably in a secular Nigeria, accept equal rights, freedom of movement, assembly, and practice for others of their own beliefs?      Yes      No
- B.** Have you earned at least a bachelor plus 5 years of experience or master's degree?  
Yes                  No

**Read Through first, then Circle (highlight) only the response that truly describes how you agree with each statement about Boko Haram (BH) insurgency (1 = strongly disagree up to 5 = strongly agree).**

1. Boko Haram (BH) insurgency generally believes Western education is sin (for Muslims).
 

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>partly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>
  
2. BH insurgency spokespersons (like Kabiru Sokoto and Abu Qaqa, 2012) argued it is the anti-Islamic civilization/culture condoned by Western education that is sin (for Muslims)
 

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>partly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>
  
3. BH Islamist insurgents are a devoted Muslim sect who would Islamize Nigeria (by force)
 

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>partly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>
  
4. BH insurgents are ignorant, intolerant Muslims who simply pervert the Islamic religion
 

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>partly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>
  
5. BH insurgency is mainly a jihad (violent struggle) against the perversion of the Islamic Sharia laws and culture by Western civilization, secular governments, and society.
 

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>partly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>

6. BH insurgency cannot be sustained without the foot soldiers (fighters, suicide bombers).
- |                   |          |              |       |                |
|-------------------|----------|--------------|-------|----------------|
| 1                 | 2        | 3            | 4     | 5              |
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | partly agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
7. BH insurgency foot soldiers are predominantly the illiterates with unemployable skills.
- |                   |          |              |       |                |
|-------------------|----------|--------------|-------|----------------|
| 1                 | 2        | 3            | 4     | 5              |
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | partly agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
8. The low quality or type of education (Qur'anic or other), or no formal education of BH insurgents mostly contribute to ignorance, intolerance, and radicalization (extremism).
- |                   |          |              |       |                |
|-------------------|----------|--------------|-------|----------------|
| 1                 | 2        | 3            | 4     | 5              |
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | partly agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
9. BH insurgency is mostly driven by Islamist ideology, Sharia Rule (or Islamic hegemony) despite their economic poverty, angst against corruption; and the political conspiracies.
- |                   |          |              |       |                |
|-------------------|----------|--------------|-------|----------------|
| 1                 | 2        | 3            | 4     | 5              |
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | partly agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
10. The ideological impetus (drive) of BH resurgence **may be neutralized by a compulsory **targeted holistic education policy**** at the insurgency incident population, from nursery up to first degree (age 21), that teaches quality holistic curriculum and competency in various employable skills, peace, global worldview and tolerance of other peoples and faiths. Q1
- |                   |          |              |       |                |
|-------------------|----------|--------------|-------|----------------|
| 1                 | 2        | 3            | 4     | 5              |
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | partly agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
11. The ideological impetus (drive) of BH resurgence **may be neutralized by a compulsory free targeted holistic education policy** at the insurgency incident population, from nursery up to first degree (age 21), that teaches quality holistic curriculum and competency in various employable skills, peace, global worldview and tolerance of other peoples and faiths. Q2
- |                   |          |              |       |                |
|-------------------|----------|--------------|-------|----------------|
| 1                 | 2        | 3            | 4     | 5              |
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | partly agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |
12. A free targeted holistic education policy in places vulnerable to Islamic radicalization will eventually dry up the foot soldier recruitment pools of the BH insurgency. (Q3)
- |                   |          |              |       |                |
|-------------------|----------|--------------|-------|----------------|
| 1                 | 2        | 3            | 4     | 5              |
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | partly agree | Agree | Strongly Agree |

13. Sustenance of foot soldier recruitment pools of BH insurgency is highly related to the type, level, and quality of education attained by recruits. (Q4)

**1**                      **2**                      **3**                      **4**                      **5**  
**Strongly Disagree**      **Disagree**              **partly agree**          **Agree**                  **Strongly Agree**

14. Sustenance of foot soldier recruitment pools of BH is more related to economic realities than to type of (Qur'anic, Almajiri, Madrassah) education of the recruits. (Q5)

**1**                      **2**                      **3**                      **4**                      **5**  
**Strongly Disagree**      **Disagree**              **partly agree**          **Agree**                  **Strongly Agree**

15. Sustenance of foot soldier recruitment pools of BH insurgency is more related to the Islamic fundamentalism and radicalization. (Q6)

**1**                      **2**                      **3**                      **4**                      **5**  
**Strongly Disagree**      **Disagree**              **partly agree**          **Agree**                  **Strongly Agree**

**C.** You belong in this old political region of Nigeria **1.** East **2.** West **3.** North **4.** Middle Belt

**D.** Thank you. I trust you have responded to all items honestly and truly. **Yes**      **No**