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Florida Political Appointees Usage of Social Power Bases After Service First Initiative

Leland Francis Butcher
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Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Leland Butcher

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Walden University
2019

Abstract

Florida Political Appointees Usage of Social Power Bases After Service First Initiative

By

Leland Butcher

MPA, Troy University, 2009

BS, Roger Williams University, 2006

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

March 2019

Abstract

Florida reformed its civil service system with the passage of the Service First Initiative of 2001, resulting in a unique organizational setting by altering the employer-employee relationship, yet little academic research explored the power tactics used by politicians and political appointees in order to gain subordinate compliance in unique organizational environments. Using French and Raven's bases of social power theory and Raven's interpersonal power interaction model as the foundation, the primary purpose of this stratified cross-sectional study of politicians and political appointees in Florida was to explore whether certain demographic factors are predictors of the extent to which French and Raven's "hard" and "soft" power tactics are used. Survey data were collected using the interpersonal power inventory, political predisposition measure, and a self-developed demographic information form from 354 political appointees and state employees and were analyzed using simple multiple linear regression. Findings indicated the usage of the power tactics is consistent Ravens original research with influence agents preferring the soft power tactics over hard. Findings also showed that age and race (notably African American) are statically significant predictors of usage of soft power tactics of expert, referent, informational, the legitimacy of dependency, personal reward and harsh power tactics of personal coercion, legitimacy of reciprocity and equity ($p < .05$). Positive social change implications resulting from this study include recommendations regarding development of leadership programs to reduce the reliance on the use of harsh power tactics in order to increase organizational and personal outcomes within Service First Initiative organizations.

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my wife, George Ann, and my daughters, Natalie and Amanda, who have been my inspiration and a never-ending source of strength in my educational journey. I want to thank you for the sacrifices you have endured throughout my life journey in my pursuit of my education. I can never repay you for the lost time, missed life milestones, and solitude that was a result of the dissertation process. Again, thank you for your unwavering support and encouragement. I love you all more than I could ever put into words.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Background of the Study

The use of power is central to the ability of leaders to gain subordinate compliance to increase organizational outcomes (Pierro, Raven, Amato, & Bélanger, 2013). How power is exercised in organizational settings impacts almost every facet of an organization (Pfeffer, 1981). The concept of power has been the topic of study in a wide variety of organizational settings and academic disciplines. However, existing research suffers from methodological issues (Podsakoff & Schriesheim, 1985). Radically reforming traditional civil service structures changes the employer-employee relationship (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). The changes ultimately impact how leaders exercise power within organizations, and existing the research fails to address how leaders exercise power after radical reforms. The state of Florida instituted radical civil service reforms with the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The ability of leaders to effectively employ power in the employer-employee relationship has a direct bearing on employees' ability to influence and accomplish tasks (French & Raven, 1959). How Florida's politicians and political appointees exercise their bases of power directly affects the delivery of government services.

The Florida legislature passed the Service First Initiative (2001) with the goal of radically reforming its civil service system. The legislature wanted to ensure that state employees were more responsive to executives (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). One of the reforms resulted in the transfer of "16,901 supervisors, managers, directors, administrators, and confidential employees" from the Career Services (CS) to Selected

Exempt Service (SES) employment classification (Summary of Service First, 2001, para. 1). The change effectively made the transferred employees political appointees.

The lack of scholarship on how the changes affected the use of power in organizational settings after radical reforms prevents politicians and executives from accurately determining the positive and negative outcomes of the use of power since the reforms.

The purpose of the quantitative dissertation study was to investigate to what extent Florida's politicians and political appointees have exercised the individual bases of power since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). Hays and Sowa (2006) and Kellough and Nigro (2006) found that reforms to civil service alter the employee-employer relationship. While research into the use of social power has produced consistent results, methodological issues reduced their relevancy to unique organizational factors (Podsakoff & Schriesheim, 1985). Current scholarship has failed to address how the use of power by politicians and political appointees is affected after radical civil service reforms. In this study, I attempted to fill the gap in the literature on how the reforms affected the use of power by Florida's politicians and political appointees after the reforms. Addressing how the bases of power are employed by politicians and political appointees after radical civil service reforms provided a framework to understand what effects the changes to the employer-employee relationship have on government human resources management practices. Using French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory and Raven's (1992) power/interaction model of interpersonal influence (IPIM), I determined whether the usage of the different bases of power by politicians and political appointees are inconsistent with other organizational settings.

The methodology of the study was a quantitative, cross-sectional survey design, which I used to determine how Florida's political appointees and supervisors utilized French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power after the Service First Initiative (2001). I employed a one-time, cross-sectional survey, which is appropriate for data that are not observable (see Liu, 2008). The survey, informed consent, and the cover letter were mailed to participants requesting their participation. The research population included all members of Florida's State Personnel System and politicians elected to statewide offices with executive branch duties. The research population consisted of 88,046 employees. With the sampling population being finite, the population was ideal for inclusion of all sampling units (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). I employed a probability sample design using the stratified random sampling method. The benefit of the design is that it allowed for the separation of the population into different state agencies and departments through proportionate stratification sampling (Hade & Lemeshow, 2008). The sampling design ensured that the sample size for the different state agencies and departments was appropriate.

The theoretical framework for the study that I applied to the altered Florida state government employer-employee relationship was French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory. The bases of social power theory is the most commonly used typology in the study of power (Mintzberg, 1983). Weber (1947) defined power as the ability to overcome the resistance of others to achieved objectives. French and Raven identified the power bases as reward, coercive, expert, legitimate, and referent power. Raven (1965) added informational power as an additional base of power. Politicians and

political appointees employ the bases of power to achieve policy goals and initiatives. The exercise of social power by politicians and political appointees is dependent on a variety of organizational and social factors. The basis of social power theory is the most frequently used theoretical basis involving the use of power in organizational settings (Mintzberg, 1983). The bases of social power theory was the appropriate framework to use to determine whether the altered employer-employee relationship affected the predominate bases of social power used by politicians and political appointees due to the use of the power tactics being unobservable..

I made five assumptions in the study. The assumption was that politicians, political appointees, and state employees answered the survey honestly and free of bias. I assumed that some respondents have dual roles of supervisor and subordinate and that supervisors answered the survey for both roles truthfully and free of bias. I assumed all respondents are full-time employees of the State of Florida. I assumed that the state of Florida employees comply with the directions from supervisors, political appointees, and politicians with executive branch duties. I also assumed politicians and political appointees use all the base of social power to accomplish policy goals and build political support and power bases (French and Raven, 1959). .

The State of Florida Civil Service System underwent radical reform as a result of the Service First Initiative (2001), resulting in a unique organizational setting. To study the changes that take place over an extended period, the use of longitudinal research design is ideal; however, the use of a longitudinal research design was unavailable for this study due to time constraints. The cross-sectional survey design collects data at a

point in time and allows for subgroup comparisons (Liu, 2008). This study was limited in applicability to state and local governments that have radically reformed their civil service systems and have similar organizational settings. This study was dependent on how respondents chose to answer the survey questions and only addressed the use of the bases of power by politicians, political appointees, and state employees in their current positions. The use of the cross-sectional data limited the ability to test causal relationships.

The scope of the study addressed how Florida's politicians and political appointees have utilized the French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory to implement policy goals after the Service First Initiative (2001). The IPIM provides a tool to examine to what extent Florida's politicians and political appointees employ individual bases of social power (see Raven, 1993). Raven (2008) stated the use of the bases of social power and the need for surveillance is dependent on the implementation of social change. Reward and coercive power require social dependency and surveillance to be effective (Raven, 1991, 2008). Informational power, on the other hand, leads to socially independent change when the subordinate, after being provided information as to the need for change, accepts and changes behaviors (Raven, 1991, 2008). Informational, expert, and referent power are dependent on the actions of the influencing agent but do not require surveillance (Raven, 1991, 2008). In this study, I only addressed current, full-time Florida state government employees and excluded former, temporary, and contract employees. Excluding former state employees was necessary because the probability of obtaining valid contact information was problematic in that there was no reliable database

containing their contact information. Temporary and contract employees are difficult populations to survey due to their transient nature. Members of the Florida Senate and the House of Representatives were also excluded because they do not have executive branch duties.

Scholars have explored the use of social power in a wide range of organizational settings but have not addressed the changed employer-employee relationship resulting from radical civil service reforms. Florida's enactment of the Service First Initiative (2001) provided a unique organizational setting to study the effects the changes to the employer-employee relationship had on the use of social power bases by politicians and their political appointees. The results of this study have broader implications for states and local governments that have enacted radical civil service reforms, where evidence suggests the reform objectives have not materialized (see Jordan & Battaglio, 2014). The identification of the usage of the power bases will help in identifying whether the goals of making employees more responsiveness to executive leadership are being achieved (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). Failure to understand the effects of the civil service reforms on the employer-employee relationship limits policymakers from determining whether the stated reform goals are effective in achieving those goals or if those reforms further add to the dysfunction of government. Identifying the power bases used by politicians and political appointees will help leaders discern differences in the uses of power bases compared to other organizational settings. Leaders then can identify and/or develop leadership training programs designed to improve leadership skills, employee loyalty, employee responsiveness, and government efficiency.

In this study, I built on prior research into the usage of the bases of social power in organizations. The Florida Civil Service system was a unique organizational setting after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). One of the goals of the initiative was to increase state employee accountability to executive leadership (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). Existing research into the effects of the Service First Initiative suffered from maturation because not enough time had passed between the passage of the initiative and the time of the studies. In this study, I also answered the question to what degree Florida's politicians and political appointees used harsh or soft power tactics. Additionally, I answered whether they used the harsh power tactics of personal and impersonal coercion and reward, legitimacy of position, equity, and reciprocity, or soft power tactics of expert, referent, informational power, and legitimacy of dependence, in a manner that is consistent with other organizational settings. The exercise of the power tactics by supervisors in an organization has a direct bearing on organizational effectiveness.

Problem Statement

Florida's Service First Initiative (2001) radically reformed Florida's Civil Service System by reducing traditional merit protections and moving 16,901 supervisors from classified to selected exempt service (SES) employment classification (Summary of Service First, 2001). The reforms significantly changed the employer-employee relationship, and existing research did not address what effect the reforms had on the application of the bases of social power by politicians and political appointees. The failure to address the use of the bases of social power after radical civil service reform is

problematic in that the changed employer-employee relationship may reduce the effectiveness of any reforms.

The public has increasingly demanded greater efficiency and accountability from public sector employees and administrators. The Service First Initiative (2001) reforms altered the employer-employee relationship in Florida's Civil Service System (Bowman & West; 2007; Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). The reforms constitute an organizational cultural change, and leaders need to understand that change in culture impacts the success or failure of the change efforts (Mott, 2008). The existing research into the reform objectives of increased public employee accountability and effective governance has shown that it has not produced the desired outcomes (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). Currently, there are calls for additional reforms to achieve the desired outcomes. Research into the past reforms has failed to investigate how the reforms affected how politicians and political appointees employ the bases of power and influence. Research into how leaders exercise the bases of power in a wide variety of organizational settings have been the subject countless studies and have produced generally consistent results; however, methodological shortcomings of field studies prevented those studies to be generalized to unique organizational settings (Podsakoff & Schriesheim, 1985).

The radical reform of the State of Florida's Civil Service System instituted by the Service First Initiative (2001) and the resulting change in the employer-employee relationship make it a unique organizational setting. The exercise of social power and influence by influencing agents affects the organizational commitment of members of an organization (Pierro et al., 2013). Organizations consist of social networks that are

subject to the manner power is projected by influence agents (Friedkin, 2011). Leaders can engage a wide variety of power bases to influence organizational members (French & Raven, 1959). Without understanding what effect the past reforms had on the bases of power employed, further reform effectiveness is questionable.

The passage of the Service First Initiative (2001) resulted in organizational changes to the State of Florida's human resource practices that have taken a long time to reach maturity. Prior research has failed to investigate what effect the changes to the human resources practices had on the exercise of social power and influence by politicians and political appointees in government organizations. Building on French and Raven's (1959) bases of social influence and power and Raven's (1965) addition of information power to the bases, Raven (1992) developed the IPIM to differentiate the original six power bases into harsh and soft bases of power. The main difference between harsh and soft power tactics is the amount of freedom the target has in choosing to what degree to comply (Pierro, Cicero, & Raven, 2008). Information power leads to socially independent change through the dissemination of relevant information and acceptance by the subordinate who internalized the change (Raven, 2008). Reward and coercive power usage by a leader involve socially dependent change and require surveillance resulting from the ability to distribute rewards or administer negative consequences based on the degree of compliance by the subordinate (Raven, 2008). Finally, legitimate, expert, and referent power bases lead to socially dependent change that does not require surveillance (Raven, 2008). Pierro et al. (2013) found that transformational leaders were more likely to employ soft bases of power, while transactional leaders were more likely to lead to

subordinate compliance and organizational commitment. The organizational commitment of employees impacts almost every facet of organizations, including responsiveness to executive leadership, employee retention, and employee and organizational performance. In this study, I built on why the goals of the reforms have not achieved their desired effect through the uses of social influences and power bases.

The demographic characteristics of Florida's politicians, political appointees, and state employees are relevant variables in understanding the extent of usage of each base of social influence and power by politicians and political appointees. The independent variables for this study were the demographic data: age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, the length of service, and political ideology/affiliation. The dependent variables were the 11 delineated power tactics of French and Raven's (1959) and Raven's (1965) seminal work that were collected in Raven's (1992) IPIM. The IPIM items include reward impersonal, coercive impersonal, expert, referent, informational, the legitimacy of position, legitimacy of reciprocity, legitimacy of dependence, legitimacy of equity, personal reward, and personal coercion power (Raven, 1992). My hypothesis was that the demographic characteristics directly influence how politicians and political appointees' view state employees and their choice to employ a particular base of social power and influence.

In this study, I attempted to fill the gap in existing research of radical civil service reform has on how and to what extent leaders employ the individual bases of power. As noted by Hays and Sowa (2006), and Kellough and Nigro (2006), the reforms changed the employer-employee relationship by giving more control to the employer. Researchers

have studied various aspects of civil service reforms over several decades; however, they have failed to research how social power is employed by politicians and political appointees after radical civil service reform. Rubin and Kellough (2012) studied how the reforms affected employee perceptions of procedural justice and found that the reforms initially led to increased complaints but after time the number of complaints decreased. The use of the bases of power is a determinate of an organization's climate (Landells & Albrecht, 2013). The lack of research into the effect the reforms had on the uses of bases of power is somewhat surprising because the use of the bases of power affects almost every facet of an organization. A leader's failure to understand how the usage of the bases of power in organizations that have undergone radical reforms limits organizational effectiveness.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to determine how state politicians and political appointees in Florida utilized the bases of power after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001) through the lens of French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory. The Service First Initiative reduced merit protections, thereby negatively affecting employee rights and job security and changing the employer-employee relationship (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). Podsakoff & Schriesheim (1985) identified methodological issues that were preventing previous studies from being applied to unique organizational settings. The Florida Civil Service System presents a unique organizational setting as a result of the reforms to determine the extent the harsh and soft power tactics are employed by Florida politicians and political employees in carrying out

their executive duties instituted by the Service First Initiative. In this study, I also attempted. Once the extent of the usage of each base of power was determined, I could compare them with results from other organizational settings to determine whether the use of the different bases of social power was consistent or not.

My hope was that this research would provide insight into how extensive the use of each base of social power by Florida's politicians and political appointees was after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). By quantifying the extent each base of social power was used, I made it feasible to determine whether Florida's politicians and political appointees use the bases of power in a manner inconsistent with other organizational settings. Additionally, it provided empirical evidence to support the creation of leadership training programs geared toward developing leadership skills for politicians who have executive branch duties, political appointees, and supervisors. In turn, the improvement of these groups' leadership skills will improve the organizational climate, employee loyalty, employee responsiveness, and government efficiency.

Research Question

I conducted this study to attempt to answer the following:

Research question: What extent do Florida politicians and political appointees use the individual bases of social power in the execution of their leadership duties?

Research subquestion 1: What are the demographic factors that are predictors of the use of the individual bases of social power?

Research subquestion 2: How do state employees rank the use of the

individual bases of social power by politicians and political appointees?

Research subquestion 3: What are the perceptions of politicians and political appointees and their uses of the individual bases of social power?

H₀: Since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001), Florida's politicians and political appointees are more likely to use harsh bases of social power to achieve policy goals.

H₁: Since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001), Florida's politicians and political appointees are more likely to use soft bases of social power to achieve policy goals.

Theoretical Base

The foundational cornerstone guiding this study was the bases of social power theory (French & Raven, 1959). The bases of social power include reward, coercive, expert, legitimate, and referent power (French & Raven, 1959). The definition of social power is the ability of a person, criterion, subgroup, or group to influence another person (French & Raven, 1959). Reward power is the ability of the social agent to give or withhold rewards (French & Raven, 1959). Coercive power differs from reward power in that the expectations of the target of the influence attempt concerning the application of punishment for failure to comply with the influence attempt are applied (French & Raven). Expert power results from the level of knowledge and trust attributed to the target to the social influence agent (French & Raven, 1959). Legitimate power is the most complex power base and results in change as a result of the presence of the social agent that becomes internalized by the influence attempt target (French & Raven, 1959). French

and Raven stated that referent power is the amount of identification the target of the influence attempt has for the social agent. Raven (1965) added informational power as a base of social power in follow-up work to the original bases of social power theory. Information power occurs when the provided necessary information, the target assimilates and internalizes that information and changes independently of the social agent (Raven, 1965). The IPIM provides further clarification of the bases of power from the perspective of both the target of the influence attempt and social agent. Raven (2008) stated that *agents* will use the power strategy that is appropriate for the subordinate's perceptions and will be the most effective in achieving their goals.

The passage of the Service First Initiative (2001) radically reformed the human resource practices by eliminating or reducing traditional merit protections in Florida Civil Service System. The changes involved changing the hiring and promotional rules by removing merit selection to requiring the employing agency ensure the selected candidate meets the minimum qualifications and removing the requirement to maintain documentation (F.S. 110.213). Politicians and political appointees use the bases of social power to accomplish policy goals and build political support. French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory addresses the level of influence and power that a social agent has on an individual. The uses of each base of social power are dependent on how the politician perceive the target of the influence.

The IPIM further defines the bases of power into harsh and soft power bases (Pierro *et al.*, 2008; Pierro, Kruglanski, & Raven, 2012). The difference between harsh and soft power is the degree to which the target of the influence attempt perceives the

option to comply (Pierro *et al.*, 2013). The harsh power bases include coercion, reward, the legitimacy of position, equity, and reciprocity (Pierro *et al.*, 2008). The soft bases of power include expert, referent, informational, and legitimacy of dependence (Pierro *et al.*, 2008). Pierro *et al.*, stated the employment of soft power tactics lead to improved outcomes for organizations and individuals. My major hypothesis in this study was that Florida's politicians and political appointees employ harsh organizational setting resulting from the changes to the human resource practices. A more detailed explanation will be forthcoming in Chapter 2.

One of the goals of the Service First Initiative (2001) was to make government employees more accountable to the leadership of elected officials and administrators (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). According to Elgie (2007), the goal of leadership in a group process to change the current status of public governance. Through the exercise of power, political leaders and their appointees try to influence those they lead (Landau, 2007). French and Raven (1959) described social influence and power as the ability of a person or group to create a change in the views of others. Florida's politicians used their legal authority to pass the Service First Initiative to facilitate changes in the civil service system. Those changes provide expanded opportunities to exercise French and Raven's bases of social power to achieve policy goals. The bases of social power theory relates to the approach and research question of this study in that it provides a framework to understand what are the bases of power predominately used in the changed employer-employee relationship since the passage of the Service First Initiative.

Nature of Study

In this quantitative study, I used a stratified, cross-sectional survey design. The cross-sectional survey design was ideal for surveying Florida state employees because it allowed for the economical collection of a large amount of data. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) stated that variables that are not able to be observed are not appropriate for experimental designs or before and after comparisons. The variables of political ideology/affiliation and the different bases of power were not able to be observed; therefore, my use of the cross-sectional survey design was appropriate for the collection of data that were not able to be observed. The design allowed for flexible data collection methods of a finite study population consisting of elected officials, political appointees, and state employees. The cross-sectional survey design is compatible with conducting survey questionnaires (Creswell, 2009). With expected differences in the results between the various state agencies and departments, a stratified random sampling method was appropriate to determine differences in the use of the power bases in Florida's State Personnel System (SPS) (see Hade & Lemeshow, 2008). The simple random sampling was not an appropriate method because it does not allow for assigning employees to the different groups.

The independent variables consisted of the participants' education, political predisposition, gender, race/ethnicity, pay bands, the length of service, agency, political appointees, and state employees. The dependent variables were derived from French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory and Raven et al.'s (1992) IPIM and included reward impersonal, coercive impersonal, expert, referent, informational, legitimacy of

position, legitimacy of reciprocity, legitimacy of dependence, legitimacy of equity, personal reward, and personal coercion power. In this cross-sectional study, I used a Likert Scale to measure the association between the independent and dependent variables.

The sample population consisted of Florida's elected executive branch politicians, political appointees, and SPS employees. I mailed participants a package consisting of a cover letter, informed consent, and the survey, requesting their participation via the U.S. mail in a business-reply envelope (see Appendix H). The use of the survey method is a common method of collecting data in social science research (Frankfort-Nachmaias & Nachmaias, 2008). The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Software program was the tool I used for data management and analysis. An independent samples *t* test is appropriate to test the mean between the independent variables and was used in this study and used in this study (see Green & Salkind, 2014). With the sample population being finite, the standard error correction needs to be calculated and accounted for (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). The issue of validity in the sampling is due to non-response error rate and is addressed by ensuring there is a large enough sample (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008).

Operational Definitions

Reward impersonal power: Based on the premise of financial or nonfinancial rewards (Raven, 1992).

Coercive impersonal power: Based on the threat of punishment (Raven, 1992).

Expert power: Based on providing knowledge or expertise (Raven, 1992).

Referent power: Enhancing target's identification with influencing agent (Raven, 1992).

Informational power: Based on providing information that overcomes resistance to the influence attempt (Raven, 1992).

Legitimacy position power: Based on the attachment the target of the influence attempt has to the influence agent (Raven, 1992).

Legitimacy reciprocity power: Based on the influence agent having done something for the target of the influence attempt and expect something in return (Raven, 1992).

Legitimacy dependence power: Based on the obligation or need to help others who need assistance (Raven, 1992).

Legitimacy equity power: Based on the target of the influence attempts need to be compensated for work or negative personal outcome(s) resulting from act(s) of the influence agent (Raven, 1992).

Personal reward power: Based on the ability to provided rewards (Raven, 1992).

Personal coercion power: Based on the threat of disapproval or dislike (Raven, 1992).

Politicians: Florida politicians elected to the statewide office that have executive branch duties. The following statewide political offices with executive branch duties are the Office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Chief Financial Officer, and the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (F.S. Ch. 14-19).

Political appointees: Employees in the SES and Senior Management Service employment classifications in Florida's SPS (Florida Department of Management Services).

State government employees: Employees in the Career Service employment classification in Florida's SPS (Florida Department of Management Services).

Assumptions

In this study, I made the following assumptions:

- That responding participants truthfully answered the survey questionnaires.
- When evaluating the power bases, I assumed that responding participants answered free of bias.
- Supervisors who had supervisory and subordinate roles completed the survey questionnaires appropriately for both roles.
- Politicians and political appointees use all bases of social power to accomplish policy goals and to build to gain political support and build power bases. (French and Raven, 1959).
- All respondents are full time employees in the state of Florida SPS.

The assumptions in this study were necessary because they directly related to the context of this study and the role of the participants. The large population required the assumption that the respondents answered the survey truthfully and free of bias.

Scope

The scope of the study involved how Florida's politicians and political appointees utilized the French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory to implement policy

goals after the Service First Initiative (2001). The IPIM provided me with a tool to examine to what extent Florida's politicians and political appointees employ individual bases of social power (see Raven, 2008).

I used the cross-sectional survey data collection methodology to determine the political affiliations/ideologies and the bases of social power used by politicians and political appointees to build political support to achieve policy goals. Scholars have described the concept of power as the ability of an individual to influence another by overcoming the resistance of another person (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981; Weber, 1947). Others defined power as the ability to take actions to accomplish a goal (Bennis & Nanus, 1965; Kanter, 1977). The scholar's (Bennis & Nanus; Emerson; Kanter; Pfeffer; & Weber) definitions were lacking identification of the different bases of power, and therefore not appropriate for the study. French and Raven (1959), in their seminal work titled, "The Bases of Social Power Theory," identified the power bases used to influence the actions or behavior of another person.

Delimitations

In this study, I only addressed current, full-time employees in the state of Florida's SPS and elected politicians who hold statewide offices with executive branch duties. The SPS employees consisted of those employees assigned to the CS, SES, and the Senior Management Service (SMS) classifications. The elected politicians included in this study were the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, CFO, and commissioner of agriculture and consumer services of Florida. Excluded from the study were former, temporary, and contract SPS employees. I also excluded former SPS

employees because the probability of obtaining valid contact information was problematic in that there was no reliable database containing their contact information. Temporary and contract employees are difficult populations to survey as a result of their transient nature. Members of the Florida Senate and the House of Representatives were also excluded because they do not have any executive branch duties. All employees of Florida State University, Justice Administration, Legislature, Florida Lottery, and Other Pay Plans were also excluded from the study.

Limitations

A major limitation of the research was the inability to measure the usage of the bases of social power directly. The sampling strategy involved respondents taking a stratified, cross-sectional survey. I did not believe the respondents would truthfully answer if asked if they benefitted from the uses of harsh power tactics.

There were two areas of concern for potential bias that could have influenced the outcomes of the study. The first area of concern was nonresponse bias. Nonresponse bias occurs as a result of a high failure rate of respondents to respond to the survey. To control for nonresponse bias, I sent participants an introductory letter and a business reply envelope with the survey to increase the response rate. The second area of concern was result bias, which is a result of the wording of the questions because they may be confusing, double-barreled, leading, or threatening type question (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). I addressed result bias by ensuring the survey questions were not confusing, double-barreled, leading, or threatening type question. To reduce the impact of the study limitations, I used measurement instruments that were strong in

regard to content, empirical, and construct validity. The study had a finite research population and used probability sampling that helped the validity of the measurement instruments (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008).

I did not investigate the motivational factors that influence Florida's politicians and political appointee's use of each the bases of social power in this study because they were not relevant to the study. I did not think the motivations behind the reforms was a issues that would fit the nature of the study. However, I could have legitimately investigated the motivations for the uses of the individual bases of social power.

The cross-sectional survey design was ideal for this study in the extent of the usage of the individual bases of social power by Florida's politicians and political appointees to achieve policy goals. However, the cross-sectional survey design had limitations. The design does not allow for the manipulation of the independent variables that allow for pretest-posttest comparisons (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Additionally, the causation is logically inferred (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008).

Significance of the Study

In this study, I investigated the gap in the literature that has existed as a result of the changed employer-employee relationship caused by the radical civil service reforms in Florida with the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The results of this study provided a framework for organizations to address shortcomings of the radical reforms and the failure to achieve the objectives of the reforms. The findings of this study advanced the knowledge of the use of the bases of social power in unique organizational settings. The results of this study identified the extent politicians and political appointees

use the individual bases of social power tactics as related to the changed employer-employee relationship. The identification of the prominent usage of each power bases will help identify areas where organizations can identify leadership training protocols designed to teach politicians and political appointees the appropriate use of the bases of social power and improve their leadership skills, employee loyalty, employee responsiveness, and government efficiency.

Across the nation, there are additional calls for radically reforming civil service systems at the federal, state, and local levels of government. Research on past reforms has shown that the goals of reforms have largely not achieved the desired outcomes (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). The results of this study benefits the field by identifying the base of power usage by Florida's politicians and political appointees after radical reforms to the human resource practices. Leaders engage in a wide variety of power bases to influence organizational members (French & Raven, 1959). The results of this study can be compared to other organizational settings to differentiate differences in the usage of the bases of power by leaders. Comparing the findings of this study to other types of successful organizational settings that have radically reformed their human resource practices allows leaders to identify areas of the reforms that are not conducive to achieving policy goals and organizational effectiveness. The identification of an overreliance on harsh or soft power tactics provides a framework for leaders to develop leadership training programs that ultimately improve leadership skills, organizational climate, employee loyalty, employee responsiveness, and government efficiency.

The objectives of the radical civil service reform movement that swept across the nation over that last quarter century have largely failed to materialize (Jordan & Battaglio, 2014). Despite this failure, reform advocates, such as political interest groups, politicians, and everyday citizens, are championing additional radical reforms at the federal, state, and local government levels (Bowman, 2002). Without understanding the reason for the failure of the radical reforms to achieve the objectives, policymakers may repeat the same mistakes if they proceed with further reforms. The affect that radical civil service reforms have on the employer-employee relationship and the application of the individual bases of social power by politicians and political appointees provides insight into the causes of the failure to make employees more responsive to organizational leaders. Understanding the extent of each power base used by politicians and political appointees allow leaders to discern differences in the use of power bases compared to other organizational settings that affect employee loyalty, employee responsiveness, and government efficiency. The findings of the study allow for government organizations contemplating radical reforms to their human resources practices to identify leadership training programs designed to improve leadership skills, employee loyalty, employee responsiveness, and government efficiency.

The findings of the study present broader implications for positive social change besides the determination of the extent each social power usage. Not only do the results of this study provide empirical data on the usage of each power base but they also allow policy maker to discern the differences in the usage of power bases when compared to other organizational settings. Using them, policymakers can identify leadership traits that

negatively impact on organizational outcomes. The application of the bases of social power by Florida's politicians and political appointees influences every imaginable organizational outcome (see Pfeffer, 1981). The findings of this study provide a base of knowledge that assists policymakers in determining how the application of the bases of social power influences positive or negative organizational outcomes. By understanding how the application of the different bases of power have on organizational outcomes, policymakers contemplating additional reforms can develop strategies and training procedures that improve leadership skills, employee loyalty, responsiveness, and government efficiency.

Summary and Transition

The Service First Initiative (2001) radically reformed Florida's Civil Service System and its human resources practices. The objectives of the radical reforms in Florida and across the nation have failed to produce the desired results (Jordan & Battaglio, 2014). While there is a plethora of research involving radical reform, scholars have paid scant attention to the issue of how politicians and political appointees employ the bases of social power in the changed employer-employee relationship after the reforms reach maturation. French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory provided me with the theoretical framework used in this study to evaluate the extent to which Florida's politicians and political appointees employ each base of social power after the radical reforms of the Service First Initiative had a chance to mature. The understanding of how and to what extent politicians and political appointees employed the bases of social power is important in that the application of the bases of power affects

almost every aspect of organization and outcomes. French and Raven stated that how leaders employ power affects their ability to influence people and accomplish tasks.

In Chapter 2, I will present a review of the literature involving the use of social influence and power using French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory and related methods. In Chapter 3, I will explain the research methodology and design as well as the researcher's role, sampling strategy, procedure, and data analysis in detail. Chapter 4 will include the results of the study. Finally, in Chapter 5, I will present a review of the findings, limitations of the study, recommendations for further research, and the implications for social change.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The Service First Initiative (2001) reformed Florida's Civil Service System by removing many of the traditional merit protections and transferring "16,901 supervisors, managers, directors, administrators, and confidential employees" from the CS to SES employment classification (Summary of Service First, 2001, p. 1). The initiative effectively made those transferred to the SES classification political appointees. Reforming traditional civil service systems changes the dynamics of the employer-employee relationship (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). Existing research has failed to investigate the effect of the changes to the employer-employee relationship had on how leaders exercise power. Additionally, Podsakoff and Schriesheim (1985) identified methodological issues that prevented the applicability of the study to unique organizational settings such as Florida's Civil System after the passage of the Service First Initiative. How leaders exercise power within their organizations directly affects their ability to influence subordinates and accomplish organizational objectives (French & Raven, 1959). French and Raven's (1959) identified the bases of power as reward, coercive, expert, legitimate, and referent power. The purpose of the study was to determine how the altered dynamics of the employer-employee relations affected how Florida's politicians and political appointees employ the bases of social power.

The literature review for this study involved searches of databases for peer-reviewed articles relating to the bases of social power theory, new public management (NPM), civil service reform, Service First Initiative (2001), patronage, and public

services motivation. The literature review will begin with a review of the theoretical framework of the study, French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory. Raven (1992, 1993) further delineated the bases of social power into hard and soft power tactics with the introduction of the IPIM. Next, I will present the relevance of the study and show civil service reforms in Florida are in keeping with the principles of the NPM doctrine. The NPM doctrine advocates for at-will employment, decentralization of human resource practices, and an elimination or reduction of employees' due process rights (Bowman, 2002; Hayes & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). The literature review will also include evidence of patronage hiring and firings employment practices occurring as a result of the passage of the Service First Initiative (Bowman, 2002, 2006). The reforms gave Florida's politicians and political appointees nearly unbridled power and the ability to make arbitrary and capricious personnel decisions in the execution of their executive branch duties. Lastly, in the literature review I will identify and provide a rationale for the use of the quantitative methodology in the study. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) stated that the quantitative method is the appropriate method for an economical data collection of data that are not observable. Quantitative designs allow for the quantification of certain aspects of a research population (Creswell, 2009). Quantitative, cross-sectional surveys using stratified sampling are appropriate to ensure the representation of all groups from different functional areas and divisions within the organization (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). The study methodology involved a quantitative cross-sectional survey design, with a finite research population.

Related seminal work involving the social exchange theory (Homans, 1958), equity theory (Adams, 1963), expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), social impact theory (Latané, 1981), the need theory (McClelland, 1987), leader-member exchange (LMX) theory (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975), motivation-hygiene theory (Herzberg, 1959), and operant behavior theory (Skinner, 1939) will be reviewed. NPM and the Service First Initiative (2001) reforms were designed to make public employees more responsive to political leaders (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006) and link pay with performance (Whalen & Guy, 2008). In the literature review, I also addressed my rationale for the selection of the dependent and independent variables.

Preview of the Major Sections

I began the introduction of the chapter with a description of the research problem that resulted from the changed employer-employee dynamics brought about by the passage and implementation of the state of Florida's Service First Initiative (2001). The literature search strategy section will contain a detailed explanation of the databases used to find relevant peer-reviewed articles and an identification of the key terms that I used to locate articles for this study. The theoretical framework of the study was French and Raven (1959) bases of social power theory and Raven's (1992) IPIM. I will discuss the theories and provide the rationale for my choice of them as the theoretical framework for the study. The literature review will also include articles related to how radical reforms affect the usage of power by politicians and political appointees and the usage of power in other organizational settings. In the literature review, I reviewed extant research in the field to establish its significance and relevance to the research question and hypotheses of

the study. The literature review was exhaustive, and I turned up only sparse literature involving the use of power in government organizations that have undergone radical human resources practice reforms. While searching for articles to include, I identified and used both seminal and the most relevant current literature related to the variables of the study. Lastly, I will address the research design and methodologies used in the study.

Literature Search Strategy

I conducted an exhaustive search of literature relating to the social power theory, patronage, political corruption, and job satisfaction. The majority of information I gathered was from the Walden University Library, Google Scholar, and JSTOR databases. Through the Walden University Library, I accessed the following databases: Political Science Complete, Business Source Complete, Military and Government Collection, PsycInfo, PsycArticles, PsyCRITIQUES, PsycEXTRA, PsycTests, and Thoreau. The selection of these databases was the result of the relevant content they contained.

I used key terms to search the aforementioned databases. The Political Science Complete, Military and Government Collection, and Thoreau databases were used to find articles related to civil reforms movement, patronage, and political corruption, while the PsycInfo, PsycArticles, PsyCRITIQUES, PsycEXTRA, PsycTests, JSTOR, Google Scholar, and Thoreau databases were used to find articles related to social power and influence. The key terms I used for finding articles related to social power and influence theory included *social power, influence, bases of power, social theory and social*

structure, social influence and power theory, the psychology of social impact, supervisor influence, supervisor power, and interpersonal influence.

When practical, I limited the research reviewed to that published the last 7 years. However, relevant literature involving civil service reforms in Florida and NPM was from the past 25 years. My literature search also yielded articles relating to social influence encompassed by French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory to current articles involving the application of the bases of social power. I used older literature, dating back to 1935, when relevant. Seminal work reviewed involving the social power theory included French and Raven. Related seminal works reviewed included the social exchange theory (Homans, 1958), equity theory (Adams, 1963), expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), social impact theory (Latané, 1981), the need theory (McClelland, 1987), LMX theory (Dansereau et al., 1975), motivation-hygiene theory (Herzberg, 1959), and operant behavior theory (Skinner, 1938).

Theoretical Basis

The theoretical basis of the study was the bases of social power theory (French & Raven, 1959). Social agents use power to create psychological changes in the target of the influence attempt that alters how they perceive the social agent, organization, and beliefs (French & Raven). The psychological changes occur over time and are dependent on overcoming counter forces to achieve the changes (French & Raven, 1959). Over time, the bases of power were differentiated as harsh and soft power tactics (Pierro et al., 2008; Pierro et al., 2012). The difference between harsh and soft tactics is the degree of autonomy the target has in deciding to abide by the social agent's influence attempt

(French & Raven, 1959). Harsh power tactics include “coercion, reward, legitimacy of position, equity, and reciprocity” (Pierro et al., 2012, p. 41). Harsh power tactics are often associated with less favorable organizational and individual outcomes (Pierro et al., 2013). Soft power tactics include “expert, referent, informational, and legitimacy of dependence” power (Pierro et al., 2013, p. 42). The use of soft power tactics is associated with improvements in organizational and individual outcomes (Pierro et al., 2013). My major hypothesis in this study was that since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001), Florida’s politicians and political appointees are more likely to use the harsh power tactics.

Scholars have paid scant attention to how politicians and political appointees in Florida have used power since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The changes to Florida’s Civil Service System amounted to changes to the employee-employer (Bowman & West, 2007; Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). According to Mintzberg (1983), the most commonly employed typology used to study the use of power is the bases of social power theory. French and Raven’s (1959) seminal, bases of social power theory focused on the relationship between the supervisor and employee. French and Raven indicated that the work would need further development through additional research. Their original bases of power included: coercive, expert, legitimate, referent, and reward power. Raven (1965) added informational power as a base of power a few years later. Subsequently, additional research expanded the model to 14 power bases in the IPIM (Raven, 1993). French and Raven’s bases of power theory provided me with a theoretical framework to study the sources of power that Florida’s

politicians and political appointees use in their attempts to influence state employees. The IPIM allowed for the further differentiation of French and Raven's bases of social power.

Organizations do not operate in a vacuum and are dependent on their leaders to employ social power to influence employees in a manner that is conducive to positive organizational and individual outcomes. Pfeffer (1981) stated the manner in which power is exercised impacts nearly all aspects of individual and organizational outcomes. The changes to the human resources practices that are a result of the Service First Initiative (2001) changed the employer-employee relationship and altered the dynamics of how leaders influence others to accomplish tasks (French & Raven, 1959). The study addresses how the changing dynamics of the employer-employee relationship affected the use of different bases of social power. The theory will assist in building on prior research by determining how radical human resources reforms affect the use of the individual bases of social power. French and Raven's bases of social power theory and Raven's (1992) IMIP provides a framework for answering the extent the individual bases of social power usage by politicians and political appointees after the passage of the Service First Initiative. Also, the demographic factors that are predictors of the uses of the different power bases can be accessed. Finally, perceptions of politicians, political appointees, and state employees as to the usage of the various power bases can be measured

The bases of social power theory is one of the most frequently used theoretical basis in research involving the use of power in organizational settings (Mintzberg, 1983). The development of the interpersonal power interaction model expanded the original bases of social power (Raven, 1992, 1993). Bachman, Smith, and Slesinger (1966) used

French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory to measure supervisor's bases of power and investigated the relationship between the amount of control, performance, and satisfaction. Schwarzwald, Koslowsky, and Ochana-Levin (2004) used the framework to determine patterns in the use of social power and the extent of their usage by supervisors in gaining compliance from employees.

Elias (2007) employed a modified IPI model to determine what university students believed was the appropriate uses of the bases of power by college faculty in a classroom setting. Pierro, Raven, Amato, and Bélanger (2013) investigated the role of leadership style has on the extent of usage of the bases of social power had on the organizational commitment of employees. The studies addressed the extent of each base of social power, and they are generally consistent in that harsh power tactics lead to less effective organizational and individual outcomes.

Literature Review

The social exchange theory is related to the basis of social power theory in that the foundation of the theory focuses on the ability of individuals to influences the actions of others through a social exchange process. Emerson (1976, p. 335) stated that "George Homans, John Thibault, Harold Kelley, and Peter Blau" were the main contributors in developing the social exchange theory. Homans (1958) stated the social exchange theory involved an exchange between individuals that can involve material or non-material goods. The major premise of the social exchange theory is that people conduct a cost/benefits analysis to maximize profits or benefits involving individual or group settings (Homans). The theory hinges on the use of reinforcement of behaviors at a level

that is consistent with maintaining or increasing the behaviors at desired levels. Too little or too much reinforcement of behavior results in diminishing returns (Homans). When the cost of social interactions increases and the profits decreases, individuals are more likely to be influenced to change the behaviors (Homans). Homans also stated that individuals within groups attempt to maximize their profit and take actions to ensure others in the group do not receive profits they did not earn.

The equity theory was also a closely related theory that was originally developed to focus on the inequities derived out of the employer-employee relationship. Adams (1963) described the employer-employee relations as a series of exchanges of material and nonmaterial goods. Adams stated individual and social perceptions influence group inputs/outputs and exchanges between individuals. The equity theory is comprised of four major cornerstones that include; (a) individuals look to fulfill their potential of outcomes, (b) groups develop equity among members and work to ensure group acceptance, (c) individuals and groups become distressed from inequity and those who attain more than their equitable share may feel guilt, and, (d) the motivation to restore equity increases as the degree of inequity increases (Adams, 1965). When individuals or groups feel that they do not receive an equitable return on their investments or receive an unfair amount of return for this investment, they become distressed (Adams). Individuals are more likely to take actions that increase outcomes when faced with inequities then reducing outcome to reduce inequities (Adams, 1965 & Nord, 1973).

The expectancy theory focus on how individuals are influenced and motivated in accomplishing tasks. The expectancy theory is also commonly known as the vie theory

(valence, instrumentality, and expectancy). The expectancy theory is a cognitive process theory. Vroom (1964) stated that individuals are influenced and motivated by expectancy, valence, and instrumentality. According to Vroom, $\text{motivation} = \text{valence} \times \text{expectancy}$. Expectancy is the value an individual places on the ability to complete a task and their expectancy of achieving a reward or reducing penalties (Vroom, 1964). Expectancy is subjective and derived from an individual's belief in their competency, organizational support, having the necessary resources, experience, and relevant information needed to accomplish the task (Vroom, 1964). Valence is the value the individual places on the outcome of completing a task (Vroom, 1964). Valence can be either intrinsic or extrinsic. Vroom stated valence could be positive or negative influences on the individuals. Instrumentality involves the probability of achieving the completion of tasks and the belief that higher effort will result in higher rewards (Vroom, 1964). Vroom stated individuals react in a manner that is consistent with their past experiences, belief system, and perceptions of what actions will provide positive or negative outcomes or rewards.

The social impact theory is related to the theoretical framework of the study as it addresses how individuals are influenced and motivated. The social impact theory, developed by Latané (1981), described the theory as having three laws that affected social interactions between individuals. Social interactions involve the activities or experiences that confront individuals on a daily basis (Latané, 1981). The effect of social interactions between individuals can be to some degree predicted through the uses of mathematical equations (Latané, 1981). The first principle, $I = f(SIN)$, holds that as the numerical level of social forces increase it will affect the strength (S), immediacy (I),

and, number (I) of sources (Latané, 1981). The second principle, $I = sN^t$, holds social impact is the result of the multiplicative sum of power (t), by the number of people (N), the scaling constant (s) (Latané, 1981). The third principle, $I = f(1/SIN)$, hold that is the result of multiplication and or division of the impact (Latané, 1981). In other words, the greater the strength and contiguity increases the social impact on the targets (Latané, 1981). The social impact theory helps to explain the how targets of influence attempts will respond in given social situations.

The need theory (three need theory) holds that individuals have three motivational needs of achievement, power, and affiliation (McClelland, 1987). McClelland borrowed from Maslow's (1943) hierarchy of needs theory and applied it to management settings. According to McClelland the need for achievement of leaders manifests itself in their penchant for tasks that are of moderate difficulty and avoid organization jobs that carry a minimal or excessive risk (McClelland, 1987). Leaders who have a high need for affiliation engage in tactics that cultivate social relationships and value collaboration with co-workers and clients (McClelland, 1987). Individuals with high power needs are more disciplined, competitive, and motivated by the need to improve their social and organizational position (McClelland, 1987). McClelland discovered that 86% of the population has a combination of these needs. Leaders in top management positions have a high level of the need for power as witnessed by their need to succeed in their abilities (McClelland, 1987). Individuals that have strong achievement needs are seldom picked for the higher management positions and are more likely to be good middle managers

(McClellan, 1987). Individuals with a need for affiliation are happier in non-leadership roles within organizations settings (McClelland, 1987).

The basis of the leader-member exchange (LMX) theory is the dyadic leader and subordinate relationship. Dansereau, Graen, & Haga (1975) developed the LMX theory and over the year has undergone several revisions since its initial inception. The central premise of the LMX theory is that leaders and subordinates enter into a relationship and the quality of that relationship influences subordinate's work experiences (Damsereau et al., 1975). One major component of the relationship is the emotional attachment that develops resulting from the level of mutual trust and respect developed (Damsereau et al., 1975). The effectiveness of the leader-subordinate relationship is dependent on the development of a satisfactory level of trust and respect level (Damsereau et al., 1975). Damsereau et al., found that there was a differentiated relationship between the superiors and the individual members of their work units, resulting in superiors devoting a disproportionate amount of resources and time cultivating and maintaining a small cadre of individuals to assist in completing organizational goals and priorities. The supervisor is then more likely to use their formal authority in addressing those who are not members of the small cadre of trusted assistants (Damsereau et al., 1975).

The operant behavior theory is related to the theoretical framework of the study in that it explains why individuals behave in a given manner. Skinner (1938) stated respondent behavior resulted from visible stimuli, while operant behavior is the result of stimuli that are not visible. Skinner's (1938, 1963) seminal work involving the operant conditioning of rats through the use of both positive and negative reinforcements and

punishment, instead of reflexes, provided evidence on how organisms react. Over a period, as organisms develop “terminal performance” based on trial and error through the use of reinforcements and punishments (Skinner, 1963). A stimulus is a powerful tool used to control behavior in organisms. The use of positive reinforcements increases the likelihood of the organism achieving the desired behaviors (Skinner, 1938, 1963). Removing the negative also reinforces increases in the likelihood of the organism achieving the desired behaviors (Skinner, 1938, 1963). The uses of punishments are designed to reduce behaviors that are not appropriate (Skinner, 1963). The result of the use of reinforcements and punishments is behavior modification. Leaders used this behavior modification to shape the behavior of employees to meet organizational and policy goals.

The motivation-hygiene theory (Herzberg two-factor theory) holds that two factors influence employees job motivation (Herzberg, 1959). According to Herzberg, employees are motivated by hygiene (extrinsic) and motivational (intrinsic) factors. Herzberg described hygiene or extrinsic factors those factors related to job conditions, such as financial rewards, benefits, policies, organizational culture, and employment conditions. Extrinsic factors are not motivators. However, they could be the cause of or used to prevent employee dissatisfaction (Herzberg, 1959). Herzberg identified hygiene factors as dissatisfiers that are needed to prevent dissatisfaction. Hygiene factors fulfill physiological needs of individuals (Herzberg, 1959). Motivational or intrinsic factors are satisfiers that relate to the nature of an individual job, such as the freedom in their work environment, meaningful work, and ability to advance their professional lives and

personal growth (Herzberg, 1959 & 1974). Herzberg stated that appropriate intrinsic rewards lead to increased employee motivation and satisfaction. Job satisfaction and dissatisfaction are a by-product of the different work factors Herzberg. The motivational or intrinsic factors are psychological needs of individuals for achievement, personal and professional growth, recognition, responsibility, and meaningful work (Herzberg).

Godstadt and Kipnis (1970) used an experimental study, 2 X 2 factorial design, to investigate the use of the bases of power by supervisors, in response to subordinate issues. Burke and Wilcox (1971) conducted surveys of employees to rank their reason for compliance with the supervisor's usage of the bases of social power. Brewer and Wann (1998) used an experimental design, with a Likert scale to determine the effectiveness of a model through the use of the expert, legitimate, and referent bases of power, in observational learning. Mossholder, Bennett, Kemery, and Wesolowski (1998) used surveys to investigate the effect social power has on procedural justice, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment. The major strength of the study is the use of Hinkin and Schriesheim's (1989) measures, which does not involve the use of ipsative scales. Friedkin (1993) conducted a longitudinal case study to determine how social power related to organizational issues resolution. The data collection method involved respondents using rank order measures. Erchul, Raven, and Wilson's (2004) surveyed school using a modified Interpersonal Power Inventory (IPI; Raven et al., 1998) to determine the use of hard or soft power bases by school psychologists. Schwarzward, Koslowsky, and Ochana-Levin (2004) also investigated the use hard or soft power tactics within organizations and surveyed the respondents completed an adapted IPI (Raven et

al.,). Lines (2007) surveyed employees of a telecommunications company to determine the relationship between expert power and position power tactics us to install successful strategies. The authors stated the failure to address all the bases of power limited the research findings. The studies that used ipsative scales suffer from validity and reliability issues.

The dependent variables are the bases of social power; coercive, expert, informational, legitimate, reward, and referent power. Based on the literature review, all or some of the power bases are relevant variables. The independent variables include age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, the length of service, and political ideology/affiliation and they play a role in how social agents view subordinates (Mundate and Bennebroek Gravenhorst, 2003; Erchul, Raven, & Wilson, 2004; Elias, 2007; Getty and Erchul, 2009, Hollibaugh, Horton, & Lewis, 2014).

The current literature review provided evidence that the new public management reforms (NPM) resulted in radically reforming civil service systems government entities to varying degrees at the local, state, and federal levels across America over the last two-plus decades. The reoccurring themes derived from the current literature review showed that the goals of the reforms are to hold public employees more accountable to executive control, decentralize of personnel systems, and the elimination of tradition merit protections Battaglio, 2010, Gertz, 2008; Gertz, 2008; Kellough & Nigro; Kim and Kellough, 2014; & Hays & Sowa, 2006). The reforms altered the employer-employee relationship (Bowman, Gertz, G., Gertz, S.,& Williams, 2003; Bowman & West, 2006; Crowell & Guy, 2010). The reforms that are politically motivated lead to increased levels

of patronage and corruption (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009; Bowman, 2007; Crowell & Guy, 2010; Harvey, 2013; Hollibaugh, 2015; Koven, 2007; Maranto & Johnson, 2008). Lastly, there is a lack of consensus among scholars, and public service practitioners of the effectiveness of the reforms have achieved the objectives (Bowman, et al., 2003; Bowman & West, 2006; Crowell & Guy, 2010).

Holding government employees more accountable to executive control is achieved by the reducing or eliminating traditional merit protections, use of at-will employment practices, and decentralization of personnel systems (Bowman, 2002; Nigro & Kellough, 2008; West & Bowman, 2004). Public service employees' motivations are different than private sector employees and the Service First Initiative (2001) altered employer-employee relationship (Bowman, *et al*, 2003; Bowman & West, 2006; and Crowell & Guy, 2010). Politicians used NPM principles and Service First Initiative reforms to increase executive control over government employees, resulting in the increased usage of patronage practices (Bearfield, 2009; Dahlstrom, Lapuente, & Teorell, 2012).

Civil Service Reform

The article, "A Broader Look at the Accountability Movement, Some Grim Realities in State Civil Service System, reported on research into the impact reforms to civil service had on the management of human resources in all 50 states (Hays & Sowa, 2006). The reforms have redefined the employer-employee relationship (Hays & Sowa, 2006). The study investigated if radical reforms in states like Florida and Georgia were spreading to other state governments as well. The authors used telephone surveys of

human resources management offices of all 50 states and focused on changes involving human resources management practices (Hays & Sowa, 2006). The study found the widespread support that the human resource management practices were being fundamentally changed, through the use of tactics designed to improve accountability, decentralization, eroding employee due process rights, and a movement toward at-will employment (Hays & Sowa, 2006). Hallmarks of traditional civil service systems were falling by the wayside and replaced with more flexible human resource management practices. The movement towards at-will employment allowed politicians and political appointees greater flexibility to hire and appoint individuals who have the same political ideologies. The study was relevant to the current research as the changed employer-employee relationship changes how leaders view employees and can alter the choice of what power base the leaders choose to employ.

The radical civil service reform movement ushered in by the NPM movement s opened Pandora's box and the door to the return of the spoils system, by way of at-will government employment (Condrey & Battaglio, 2007). Condrey and Battaglio reviewed research on the radical civil service reform movement and documented lessons learned from Georgia, Florida, and Texas. They found there was no credible measure of the reform effectiveness due to maturity issues (Condrey & Battaglio, 2007). Some early lessons involving radical civil reforms found that at-will employment was expanding in all states in varying degrees and the projected improvements in employee performance has not been achieved as promised (Condrey & Battaglio, 2007). Approximately half of HR practitioners believed recruitment and retention of employees suffered and failed to

achieve promised improved performance and efficiency (Condrey & Battaglio, 2007). Condrey and Battaglio found that older HR practitioners are more likely to view the reforms negatively, and young HR practitioners tended to view the reforms positively. HR practitioners from larger agencies support the reforms at a higher rate than those from smaller agencies practitioner (Condrey & Battaglio, 2007). Political ideologies did not affect HR practitioners support for the reforms and those who experienced abusive managers being less likely to support at-will employment (Condrey & Battaglio, 2007). The use of at-will employment is at the core of the reforms and politicians and appointees can use to build political support from government employees. The study was relevant to the current research as at-will employment reduces restrictions that prevented politicians and political appointees from engaging in patronage employment practices.

There is a threat of a large-scale return of patronage as a result of the civil service reforms with the movement towards decentralized government HR practices have been sweeping the country over the last 25 years. The reform movement advocated moving to at-will employment and discarding traditional civil service protections (Feeney & Kingsley, 2008). At-will employment has led to disastrous public service outcomes when political supporters, who are not qualified or under qualified for government positions are hired (Feeney & Kingsley, 2008). There is evidence of at-will federal employees during President George Bush administrations attempted or altered government reports to match the political ideology of the administration (Feeney & Kingsley, 2008). Traditional merit protections have proven to be the most effective method to prevent public corruption and patronage (Feeney & Kingsley, 2008). At-will employment practices allow politicians to

appoint political supporters who share the same political ideologies regardless of their qualifications. The study was relevant to the current research as leaders decide which power base to use to influence the target of influence attempt, based on their views of the target of the influence attempt. Whalen and Guy (2008) investigated the trend of broadbanding in the civil service systems in the states of Florida, South Carolina, and Virginia. Broadbanding involves reducing the salary grades and expanding the pay bands within the civil service system (Whalen & Guy, 2008). Proponents of broadbanding argue that it gives managers the ability to promote or reassign workers and move toward pay for the performance-based system, improving government effectiveness (Whalen & Guy, 2008). Broadbanding critics argue the practice leads to favoritism, pay inequity, job dissatisfaction, increased stress, performance issues, and justification for reducing staffing levels (Whalen & Guy, 2008). The majority of states rejected implementing broadbanding policies based on the cost-benefit analysis (Whalen & Guy, 2008). The study surveyed managers in Florida, South Carolina, and Virginia state agencies with low turnover rate. The survey asked the respondents questions centered on how broadbanding had (a) improved flexibility in job assignments and salary administration, (b) enabled pay for performance, and (c) enabled later movement within and across department” (Whalen and Guy, 2008). The study found a common theme of instituting broadbanding practices was to link employee pay with performance (Whalen & Guy, 2008). Whalen and Guy found the pay for performance efforts had not achieved the desired results, as managers with not been given the latitude to reward high performing individuals. The study was

relevant to the current research as the broadbanding efforts in Florida has not proven to be effective in improving employee performance.

Gertz (2008) examined the emergence of at-will employment in public service from its origins. The concept of at-will employment was derived from English common law when employment was contractual and in the absence of defined terms, one year was presumed to be the length of the contract (Gertz, 2008). A New York Court in 1891 ruled it was legal to terminate employees mid-term of employment contract (Gertz, 2008). Before the 1960's, collective bargaining was the primary tool employees used for setting terms and conditions of employment (Gertz, 2008). Abuses of at-will employment practices forced politicians and the courts to place restrictions on the use of at-will employment practices by way of prohibiting firing employees for union activities, anti-discrimination legislation, judicial exceptions, public policy and contract exceptions, and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception (Gertz, 2008). However, over the last 30 years, government leaders expanded the use of at-will employment through reduction or elimination of employee due process rights (Gertz, 2008). Courts have ruled that reclassification of career service employees to at-will classification does not deprive them of any property interest (Gertz, 2008). The article was relevant to the current research as Florida's politicians and political appointees take arbitrary and capricious personnel actions against state employees by firing them without due process.

Kaifeng and Kassekert (2009) investigated a link between civil service reforms and federal government employee jobs satisfaction. The authors noted that high levels of job satisfaction improved employee and organizational outcomes through the reduction of

negative behaviors (Kaifeng & Kassekert, 2009). Over the last two decades, NPM reforms resulted in the reduction or elimination of traditional civil service merit protections by exempting some federal agencies from the Federal Service System (Kaifeng & Kassekert, 2009). The exempted federal agencies engaged in non-traditional strategies of outsourcing work, at-will employment, and managing for results policies. The issues of employee trust in leadership and perceived effectiveness of performance appraisals moderate the NPM reforms effect on job satisfaction (Kaifeng & Kassekert, 2009). The authors examined secondary data from the 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey and 2006 Federal Workforce Information Data to determine the effect NPM reforms had on federal employee job satisfaction (Kaifeng & Kassekert, 2009). The study provided evidence of a negative association between employee job satisfaction and NPM reforms and contracting out (Kaifeng & Kassekert, 2009). Yang & Kassekert (2009) discovered a positive association between individual NPM tenants and employee job satisfaction (Yang & Kassekert, 2009). The findings of the study were relevant to the current research as employee job satisfaction has a bearing on the organizational and individual outcome, and there is a negative association between managing-for-results reforms and jobs satisfaction. The State of Florida's Service First Initiative (2001) incorporates NPR reforms and affects state employees.

Moynihan and Roberts (2010) investigated politicization of the federal executive branch under President George W. Bush's administration. Politicization is used to increase executive control of government bureaucracy and can be traced back to President Andrew Jackson, mainly through the use of patronage appointments (Moynihan

& Roberts 2010). The politicization movement of the executive branch gained strength during the administrations of President's Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan (Moynihan & Roberts, 2010). When President George W. Bush took office, he appointed political supporters who were loyal to his political agenda, disregarding the merit of their qualifications for the position (Moynihan & Roberts, 2010). In one infamous example of President George W. Bush's was the decision to appoint political loyalist over more qualified and competent individuals. Michael Brown and senior agency staff at the Federal Emergency Management Agency during the time of Hurricane Katrina were prior political operatives and loyalist who had no to little emergency management experience and were responsible for the federal government's disastrous response (Moynihan & Roberts, 2010). Other examples included replacing senior U.S. attorneys with political loyalist with little experience in key positions within the justice department, replacing immigration judges with partisan judges, and using political affiliation/ideology in screening job applicants (Moynihan & Roberts 2010). The Coalitional Provisional Authority was the agency responsible for the reconstruction of Iraq, was staffed by mostly "young, inexperienced, unrealistic" political loyalist (Moynihan & Roberts, 2010, p. 573). There also is evidence that political loyalist altered government reports and ignored scientific evidence, to match the administration's political agenda (Moynihan & Roberts, 2010). The study was relevant to the current research concerning the dangers of at-will employment practices by making political appoints based on political affiliation/ideology.

Rubin and Kellough (2012) investigated the effects that civil service reforms impact employee behaviors and the association between alternative personnel systems, procedural justice perceptions, and complaints filed by employees in fifty-one federal government agencies (Rubin & Kellough, 2012). The author's defined alternative personnel systems as those with personnel systems other than traditional civil service systems (Rubin & Kellough, 2012). Rubin and Kellough used Leventhal's (1980) six criteria of voice, correctability, bias suppression, accuracy, ethicality, and consistency. The dependent variable was the number of formal employee complaints filed with an agency. Rubin and Kellough found that there were no significant correlations between alternative personnel systems, procedural justice, or the number of complaints filed. However, complaints in agencies that implemented alternative personnel systems in 2005 had 41.4% fewer complaints in 2006 than comparative agencies (Rubin & Kellough, 2012). Agencies with alternative personnel systems saw an initial increase in the number of complaints, followed by a decrease in the number of complaints filed by employees. (Rubin & Kellough, 2012). There was not a significant association between perceptions of procedural justice and agencies with alternate personnel systems (Rubin & Kellough, 2012). The finding does not account for systematic differences that showed reduced employee complainants in agencies with alternative personnel systems as the highest and lowest rated agencies had alternative personnel systems (Rubin & Kellough, 2012). The study was relevant to the current research on employee perceptions of higher levels of procedural justice within their agency, results in a higher level of compliance.

The decentralizing of human resources practices in civil service has been a central theme of domestic and international government reform movements. Domestic and international reforms efforts have achieved varying degrees of success. Sundell (2014) systematically investigated the effectiveness of reforms in 106 countries. Using data from the Quality of Government (Teorell, et al., 2013), researchers discovered countries with lower merit requirements have higher levels of patronage, and those countries with higher merit requirements have lower levels of patronage appointments (Sundell, 2014). Decentralizing human resources functions increase the likelihood of patronage based on political ideology/affiliation occurring in hiring and promoting government employees. When the risk of patronage appointment is high, there is a potential that politicians and political appointees would use the coercive and reward power bases on potential employees and current employees to punish non-supporters and reward their supporters.

McGrath (2013) investigated factors that led to the adoption of radical civil reform in the U.S. States since 1996. The author presented a summation of the major developments leading to the development of the federal civil service system and significant reform attempts. These developments included from the excess of the spoils system, passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act (1883), Civil Service Reform Act (1978), to the adoption of civil service by state governments (McGrath, 2013). In 1996, the State of Georgia instituted radical reforms to its Civil Service System through decentralization, deregulation, and removal of traditional merit protection for state employees (McGrath, 2013). Other states reformed their civil service systems to some degree since Georgia's reforms of 1996. McGrath found that the degree of civil service

reforms in states was dependent upon factors related to the political strength of the governor, partisan strength and composition of the legislative, special interest group involvement, and electoral dominance of a political party. Florida, with the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001) reformed its Civil Service System through decentralization, deregulation, and removal of traditional merit protection for state employees. The study is relevant to the current research as the Republican Party of Florida have controlled the Office of Governor and held super majorities in the legislative branch of government since 2000. The Service First Initiative allows Florida's politicians and political appointees to reward political supporters with jobs or promotions, as a result of the removal of merit protections and loss of due process rights.

Hausser (2013) questioned McGrath's (2013) narrow conceptualization of merit and the unfavorable views of human resource decentralization. Hausser stated that researchers often overlook the fact that merit requires government employees to be qualified, in addition to providing employee protections. The makeup of the government workforce must change with the dynamic shift in the work design and adopt new human resource management (HRM) practices (Hausser, 2013). Throughout the history of civil service, there have been alterations to HRM systems and employee due process rights, without removing merit principles (Hausser, 2013). As government organizations move forward with HRM reforms, they need to mindful a broader definition of merit and ensure those protections remain in place (Hausser, 2013). The article was relevant to the research as to the design and implementation of the reforms affect employee perceptions and their responses to influence attempts.

Repucci (2014) addressed the failure of civil service reforms to meet the objectives of improving governance due to its ad hoc and misguided approach from an international perspective. Repucci stated that civil service reforms need to be addressed in the context of:]

“...understanding the local context, political will and government ownership, weak governance in the country as a whole, systems of patronage in the civil service, appreciation of the long-term costs nature of civil service reform and the impact of reform costs on the programme’s sustainability” (p. 207).

The ability to sustain civil service reforms require the prioritization of reforms, the participation of a broad range of stakeholders, and the incremental institution of reforms (Repucci, 2014). Repucci insights into designing effective civil service reforms in the international community apply to the civil service reform movement in America. The consensus among scholars and practitioners is that the reforms have not achieved the stated objectives. The study was relevant to the current research as the State of Florida political leaders used their super majorities in the Florida Legislature to pass the Service First Initiative (2001), with the help of Florida Tax Watch, a special interest group. The process cut out key stakeholders out of the process.

Kim and Kellough (2014) investigated the perceptions of human resource directors in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Missouri, and South Carolina about at-will employment in their state. The authors conducted 268 web-based surveys and 12 traditional mail-based surveys of HR directors in the states listed above (Kim & Kellough, 2014). Survey questions concerned aspects of civil service reforms,

demographic and background information involving the HR directors. The survey consisted of 8 statements regarding at-will employment, with four being positive assessments and four being negative assessments of at-will employment (Kim & Kellough, 2014). The authors the variables of sex, race/ethnicity, political/ideology, private sector experience, length of manager's experience in the public sector, degree of belief that at-will employment is used to promote patronage, belief that employees feel they can trust the organization will treat them fairly, and a dummy variable to indicate what state the respondents were from (Kim & Kellough, 2014). The study found that respondents generally agree with the positive statements, but only the statement of "helps ensure employees are responsive to the goals and priorities of agency administrators," found that the majority of respondents agreed on (Kim & Kellough, 2014, p. 228). The variables of female and race/ethnicity were not significantly related to positive statements, and conservative HR directors believed that at-will employment increased employee productivity (Kim & Kellough, 2014). The findings of the study were relevant to the current research as the demographic variables play a role in how individuals perceived the exercise of power within a government organization.

Verkuil (2015) addressed the deprofessionalization of state governments through the move to at-will employment practices. The premise of at-will employment is that it ensures employees are more accountable to organizational outcomes. State governments in just over half of the U.S. states have embraced the concept of at-will employment to varying degrees (Verkuil, 2015). One of the challenges state government must overcome the differences in the goals of private sector organizations and state governments. At-will

government employees, in essence, are political employees and are not afforded traditional merit protections. The reclassification of public employees to at-will classification reduces the career employees and replaces them with political appointees (Verkuil, 2015). As the maturation of reforms grows, the loss of career employees becomes more pronounced, and they take their expertise and corporate knowledge with them. The article was relevant to the current research in that Florida expanded its usage of at-will employment through the Service First Initiative (2001). Florida's governor and political appointees have fewer restrictions to reward political supporters and punish those who do not possess the same political ideology/affiliation, in the execution of their executive duties.

Service First Initiative

The Service First Initiative (2001) literature review revealed reoccurring themes from the civil service reforms known as NPM. The first recurring theme is the desire to make public employees more accountable to executive control and improve performance (West & Bowman, 2004; Nigro & Kellough, 2008). The second theme was a movement towards at-will employment for Florida State employees through the elimination or reductions of traditional merit protections, altering the employee-employer relationship, and decentralization of personnel systems (Bowman, 2002; Nigro & Kellough, 2008; West & Bowman, 2004). The third theme found that the reforms are grounded in political ideology (Bowman, 2002; Crowell & Guy, 2010; Williams & Bowman, 2007). The fourth reoccurring theme is that the Service First Initiative (2001) reforms impacted employees job satisfaction and outcomes (Bowman & West, 2006; Bowman, Gertz, G.,

Gertz, S., & Williams, 2003; Crowell & Guy, 2010). The fifth reoccurring theme is a lack of evidence demonstrating the reforms achieved the stated goals (Bowman & West, 2006; Bowman, et al., 2003; Crowell & Guy, 2010). Finally, the Service First Initiative reforms have resulted in patronage employment practices increasing in Florida State employment (Bowman, 2002; Bowman, et al., 2003; Bowman & West, 2006; Crowell & Guy, 2010).

Bowman (2002) stated that the merit protections found in Florida Civil Service were at risk due to the civil service reform movement. Bowman stated that civil service is not ineffective as described by politicians, who use the civil service reform mantra as a vehicle to achieve political power. At-will government employment fell out of favor as a result of the spoils system that dominated federal government employment until the good government movement ushered in the concepts of modern civil service (Bowman, 2002). The concept of merit was instituted to protect government employees from abuses by politicians (Bowman, 2002). The radical civil service reform movement seeks to eliminate due-process rights of government employees and replace it with "...partisan allegiance, political responsiveness, and personal connections..." (Bowman, 2002, 93). Governor Jeb Bush championed the civil service reform movement in Florida along with a coalition of business special interest groups, culminating in the Service First Initiative (2001). The Service First Initiative passed the Florida Senate and House of Representatives with the partisan support of the dominant political party (Bowman, 2002). Florida was limited in its efforts to move towards at-will employment for all state employees as it was only able to move just over 16,000 supervisory employees to at-will employment classification (Bowman, 2002). Bowman questioned the rationale towards

the use of at-will employment as government, and business employment practices differ, and there is no consensus as to whether civil service or at-will employment practices are the most beneficial. At the time of the publication of the article, there was evidence of political patronage hiring taking place in Florida's employment practices. The article was relevant to the current research as the move to at-will employment in Florida allows politicians to hire state employees based on political affiliation/ideology.

Bowman, Gertz, G., Gertz, S., and Williams (2003) investigated the effects the Service First Initiative (2001) had on Florida government employee attitudes. The authors conducted telephone surveys of 457 SES employee who are at-will employees and responded to thirty eight agree-disagree statements and multiple-choice questions as the data collection instrument (Bowman, et al., 2003). The results of the study provided insight into employee perceptions of the implementation of Service First Initiative, work environment, and the future impact of reforms (Bowman, et al., 2003). In regards to implementation of the Service First, only 42% believed Service First was communicated effectively to state employees, and the majority (57%) thought the goal was to provide flexibility to hire, fire, reward and punish employees (Bowman et al., 2003). Only 50% of respondents believed Service First made employees more responsive while 61% of respondents did not believe the lack of job protections made employees work harder (Bowman et al., 2003). Respondents (49%) would recommend state employment to others, and 65% believed their agency was a good place to work (Bowman et al., 2003). The majority of respondents (55%) were not happy with their compensation, and 72% did not believe financial resources were available to reward high performers (Bowman et al.,

2003). Most employees (80%) did not believe they could do more with less, and 43% believed their agency had inflated senior management ranks (Bowman et al., 2003). As to the future impact of reforms, only 18% of respondents believed that Service First made employees more productive (Bowman et al., 2003). The study was relevant to the current research on the perceptions of SES affect how they employ the bases of social power in influence attempts.

West and Bowman (2004) examined the perspective of Florida's stakeholders in analyzing the Service First Initiative (2001) reforms. Florida reforms are related "(a) power, legitimacy, and issue urgency; (b) immediate, dependent, discretionary, or dormant status; and (c) interest definition" (West & Bowman, 2004, p. 24). Instrumental analysis views government employees as a tool to accomplish organizational goals and is hard HRM (West & Bowman, 2004). Normative analysis (Soft HRM) focused on employee development (West & Bowman, 2004). The instrumental hard HRM approach involved the shifting just over 16,000 employees to at-will employment classification, watered down due process rights, eliminated bumping rights, reformed hiring process, and instituted new training, performance appraisal and classification system (West & Bowman, 2004). The developmental soft HRM approach included the performance appraisal and the pay and classification system (West & Bowman, 2004). The reforms were designed to reduce or eliminate employee rights and protections, increase government efficiency, and to make employees more responsive to executive leadership (West & Bowman, 2004). The hard instrumental HRM reforms removed positive aspects of government employment, as evidenced by 18% of new at-will employees did not

believe the goals of the reforms are achievable (West & Bowman, 2006). The study was relevant to the current research in that perception of employees about politicians and political impact the decision to embrace influence attempts.

Bowman and West (2006) conduct a qualitative study into the Service First Initiative (2001) changes to Florida Civil Service System that transferred over 16, 000 supervisors to the SES from the CS classifications. The authors conducted semistructured telephone interviews with management and supervisory employees from Florida's Department of Transportation, Department of Environmental Protection, and Department of Children and Families (Bowman & West, 2006). The interview questions related to the effects of Service First Initiative had on government human resource practices in Florida (Bowman & West, 2006). Several themes emerged from the study. First, HR managers were more likely to view the reforms positively as they believed the reforms improved recruitment, allowed for greater manager flexibility, increased public service attractiveness while having little effect on pay, loyalty, or productivity (Bowman & West, 2006). SES respondents were divided on whether the reforms are improved recruitment (Bowman & West, 2006). Most SES respondents believed the reforms were a tool to downsize state government (Bowman & West, 2006). The majority of SES respondents agreed the reforms had little to no effect on pay, performance, productivity or service (Bowman & West, 2006). The majority of SES respondents felt patronage increased as a result of the reforms as employees were less likely to report problematic behavior due to the fear of losing their jobs. The study was relevant to the current research regarding the

implementation of the reforms effected employer and employee perceptions of each other and influences the choice to uses the bases of social power in influence attempts.

Williams and Bowman (2007) addressed Florida's civil service reforms and at-will employment from the perspective of late philosopher George Santayana. Modern civil service's origins are rooted in the good government movement that led to the passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Act (1883) and attempted to limit the ability of politicians use of the spoils system in governance (Williams & Bowman, 2007). The current reform movement is not based on the excesses of politician's in the execution of official duties, but in political ideology (Williams & Bowman, 2007). Florida's Service First Initiative (2001) was a way to modernize civil service and place emphasis on employee performance (Williams & Bowman, 2007). Service First Initiative supporters in Florida's Senate and House of Representatives employed tactics to limit debate and stacked legislative committees, placed restrictions on amendments, and partisan hearings (Williams & Bowman, 2007). George Santayana stated "Chaos is the name for any order that produces confusion in our minds." as cited in Williams and Bowman (2007, p. 69). Florida's drive for reform of its merit system did create chaos as it was one of the most efficient civil service systems and the arguments for supporting the reforms was ambiguous (Williams & Bowman, 2007). The reforms of the Service First Initiative have created confusion and have not produced the stated goals. This article was relevant as it shows the Service First Initiative reforms to be politically motivated.

Nigro and Kellough (2008) reviewed progress in the civil service reform movement since the Winter Commission Report (1993), in the United States. The Winter

Commission Report called for the deregulation of personnel policies, reducing job classifications and titles (broadbanding), restricting veterans preference and minority hiring, improve labor relations, align personnel management towards with management and organizational goals, and provide a focus on organizational outcomes (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). The Winter Commission Report also recommended that organizations improve career and training opportunities by increasing training and education by 3 percent of the budget, pay reform based on skills, and provide financial incentives for new skills (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). States engaged in civil service reforms to varying degrees in the ensuing years. Georgia and Florida were two states that radically reformed their civil service system but to different degrees. Georgia moved to total at-will employment for all new hires after 1996, while Florida moved to reduce or eliminate traditional merit protections in 2001 (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). The states have not followed the central components of the Winter Commission's recommended reform, instead, have used the reforms to punish public employees and labor unions. The article was relevant to the current research as civil service reforms altered the employer-employee relationship and allowed politicians and political appointees the ability to reward and punish employees through the remove of traditional merit protections.

Crowell and Guy (2010) investigated the effects of human resources reforms that resulted from the Service First Initiative (2001). Crowell and Gay's (2010) qualitative study used a grounded theory approached and focused on the perceptions of Florida State employees and managers of the implementation of the Service First Initiative and the outsourcing Florida's HR functions. The authors conducted face to face interviews with

state employee and managers to understand their experiences regarding the reforms. The themes that emerged from the interviews centered on performance incentives, recruitment and selection, broadbanding, patronage hiring, and employee morale (Crowell & Guy, 2010). Respondents described performance incentives (bonus) as ineffective as they believe the performance initiative (bonus) program is not fair or objective (Crowell & Guy, 2010). Respondent believed that recruitment and selection suffered as a result of qualifications and experience no longer matter in the selection of employees and hurt the diversity of the workforce (Crowell & Guy, 2010). Broadbanding involved reducing over 4500 employee classifications to 280. Broadband resulted in lower pay ranges and hurt recruitment of employees (Crowell & Guy, 2010). Most respondents believed patronage hiring has returned and hurt their respective agency operational effectiveness and efficiency (Crowell & Guy, 2010). Lastly, employee morale has suffered as a result of the loss of employment security and the negative impact on benefits from the passage of the Service First Initiative. The study was relevant to the current research as politicians, and political appointees have greater flexibility to use rewards and punishments to achieve policy goals.

Public Service Motivation

The literature review of public service motivation (PSM) provided evidence that government employee motivation is different than private sector employee motivation and resulted in the motivators behind PSM. This article was relevant to the current study as the PSM of politicians, political appointees, and state employees play a role in the exercise of social power and willingness of employees to comply with influence attempts.

Caillier (2015) conducted a study to determine the association between public service motivation (PSM and mission valence on “job satisfaction, extra-role behaviors, and turnover intentions”(p. 1228). PSM is the motivation individuals have for public service, and mission valence relates to the degree of importance individuals attach to the mission of an organization (Caillier, 2015). Caillier surveyed local, state, and federal government employees via the web-based survey company SurveyMonkey PMS, mission valence, turnover intentions, and extra-role behaviors were measured using Likert-type scales, 5-item short-scale, Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan’s (2008) 3 item scale, Kuvass’ (2006) 3 items scale, and Balfour and Wechsler (1996) 3 item scale, respectfully (Caillier, 2015). The findings provided evidence of PSM positively affected mission valence ($\beta = 0.352, p < .001$), extra-role behaviours ($\beta = 0,498, p < .001$) (Caillier, 2015). PSM did not have an effect job satisfaction ($p < 0.05$) and job satisfaction negatively affected turnover intentions ($\beta = -0.481, p < .001$), and had a positive effect on extra-role behaviours ($\beta = 0.133, p < .001$ (Caillier, 2015). The results of the study were relevant to the current research as the PSM of politicians, political appointees, and government employees affect how the bases of social power are employed.

Caillier (2016) conducted a study into the role of public service motivation (PSM) plays in goal clarity, organizational commitment, and extra-role behaviors. The author conducted a survey of government employees on the local, state, and federal levels using the web-based survey company SurveyMonkey (Caillier, 2016). Respondents were asked their level of agreement with four multi-item measures using a Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) (Caillier, 2016). The multiple mediations

used in the study required the use of the single model and structural equation modeling in the data analysis (Caillier, 2016). The study found that PSM and goal clarity are positively associated ($B = .115; p < .001$), goal clarity had a positive relationship with organizational commitment ($B = .449; p < .001$) and extra-role behavior ($B = .115; p < .001$) (Caillier, 2016). The findings indicate that when employees understand the goals of their organization, it increases their PSM (Caillier, 2016). The clarity of goals leads to increased levels of organizational commitment and extra-role behaviors (Caillier, 2016). The finding of the study was relevant to the current research as to the level of PMS of politicians, political appointees, and government employees affect how the bases of social power are employed, and the effectiveness of an influences attempt.

Patronage

Patronage employment practices in America has a long and convoluted history, and some of the patronage tactics have changed over time. One of the recurring themes identified from the literature review on patronage is that civil service reforms are used by politicians to change patronage employment practices and derive greater control over government employees (Bearfield, 2009; and Dahlstrom, Lapuente, and Teorell, 2012). The second theme identified is that reforms increase the likelihood of patronage practices and corruption (Bearfield, 2009; Dahlstrom et al.,2012)

The article “What Is Patronage? A Critical Reexamination”, is a review of the existing scholarship on patronage (Bearfield, 2009). Historically, politicians used patronage as a reward to build and maintain political support. Patronage tactics included appointing supporters to government jobs, boards, commissions, and awarding

government contracts to supporters. The article challenged long-held assumptions that patronage is the study of the political party machinery and evil, which the author believed is outdated in modern society (Bearfield, 2009). Bearfield identified the four types of modern patronage as organizational, democratic, tactical, and reform patronage. Bearfield defined organizational patronage as traditional patronage practices. Tactical patronage involves the use of patronage in overcoming political obstacles through building alliances with others to achieve tactical goals (Bearfield, 2009). Democratic patronage involves equal access to government jobs and promoting representative government workforce (Bearfield, 2009). Reform patronage is the use of the reform refrain to appeal to the voters that they will change the patronages practices of past officeholders (Bearfield, 2009). The use of reforms tactics to reform the workings of government opens a new door for patronage in government employment. Florida's politicians and political appointees can use democratic patronage to build and maintain political support. The article was relevant to the current research as for how leaders view of the target of the influence attempt to determine what base of power the leaders chooses to employ.

The article, *The merit of meritocratization: Politics, bureaucracy, and the institutional deterrents of corruption*, reports the finding of a study into the bureaucratic and political impediments to public service corruption (Dahlstrom, Lapuente, and Teorell, 2012). The study involved surveying 520 experts in public administration from fifty two nations on their perceptions of corruption (Dahlstrom et al., 2012). The study found bureaucratic professionalism was the most efficient method of reducing public corruption (Dahlstrom et al., 2012). Additionally, merit principles applied to the

recruitment of government employees were found to be the most effective corruption deterrent (Dahlstrom et al., 2012). However, the formal recruitment examinations and career protections were found to be not relevant in preventing political corruption (Dahlstrom et al., 2012). The meritocratic bureaucratic recruitment features and removal of political influence provide the best tools for the reduction of government corruption (Dahlstrom et al., 2012). Without merit principles and bureaucratic professionalism, politicians are free to appoint anyone to government positions regardless of competency, which leads to increased levels of corruption. Merit in hiring and employment and promotional practices has been the most effective measure in the prevention of corruption. The study was relevant to the current research as politicians and political appointees who operate in human resources systems having reduced merit protections are susceptible to use increased levels of harsh power tactics. Politicians and political appointees are more likely to use the coercive and reward power bases to punish potential and current employees that are not supportive of the leader's views and reward their supporters.

Application

Patronage employment practices in America has a long and convoluted history, and the tactics of the patronages have changed over time. One recurring theme identified from the literature review on patronage is that civil service reforms are used by politicians to change patronage employment practices and derived greater control over government employees (Bearfield, 2009). The second theme identified is that reforms increase the likelihood of patronage practices and corruption (Bearfield, 2009). The third

theme identified is that NPM reforms are politically motivated (Koven, 2007; Maranto & Johnson, 2008; Battaglio & Condrey, 2009; Harvey, 2013; Hollibaugh, 2015). The fourth theme identified is that there is a lack of consensus on the NPM reforms achieving its goals (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009; Cogburn, et al., 2009; Green, Forbis, Golden, Nelson, & Robinson, 2006). The fifth theme identified is that patronage practices result in negative organizational and individual outcomes (Bowman & West, 2007; Gallo & Lewis, 2012; Hollibaugh, 2015; Lewis, 2009; Lui & Mikesell, 2014; Perry, Engbers, & Jun 2009; Wilson, 2006).

Therriault (2003) investigated the role public pressure has on federal politicians enacting reforms that reduce their power and authority. The author stated the prevailing view of congressional research holds that congressional members main focus is to get reelected and use government institutions and adopt rules that facilitate their reelection (Therriault, 2003). Politicians seldom adopt reforms or implement rules or laws that are contrary to that end (Therriault, 2003). The passage of the Pendleton Act (1883) was an exception to the trend as it eliminated mandatory political contributions and introduced the concept of merit in the hiring and promotions of government employees (Therriault, 2003). The Pendleton Act's (1883) passage was the result of the public's frustration with government inefficiency, political party politics, and public pressure by scholars (Therriault, 2003). The author tested the exploitations for reform using multivariate analysis and provided evidence that senators and congressmen support for the reforms significantly increased as petitions from constituents and the presence of local affiliates of the Civil Service Reform League, post offices, and customs houses in the Senate or

Congressional Districts (Therault, 2003). Republicans and lame duck member of Congress were more likely to support reforms (Therault, 2003). Public pressure played a significant role in forcing politicians to implement reforms that were contrary to their political interests. The study was relevant to the current research in that politicians seldom take actions that limit their ability to exercise power and authority unless public pressures and the threat of rival political parties likely to gain control of patronage appointments.

Green et al. (2006) investigated the at-will employment attraction to government entities in the State of Utah. The exploratory study interviewed 30 appointed and career service employees involved in county, local, and state government in the greater Salt Lake area (Green et al., 2006). The respondents knew about at-will employment practices and were asked questions regarding what influenced their thoughts of at-will employment (Green et al., 2006). The finding of the study indicated that the majority of respondents did not completely understand at-will employment, respondents were confused about their subordinate's status, at-will employment is not their primary concern, and there was a diversion of views on how to implement at-will employment (Green et al., 2006). Politicians expect increased responsiveness from career employees, ignore tension most of the time, are frustrated with resistance from middle-manager, and believe experts should have merit protections (Green et al., 2006). Local government officials disliked the procedures and employee merit protections; politicians disliked executive merit systems (Green et al., 2006). The majority of respondents felt managers lacked courage and lacked training for the positions; managers failed to initiate disciplinary at the

appropriate time, and politicians were concerned with the cost of disciplinary actions (Green et al., 2006). The majority of respondents believed that employees were motivated by merit job protections that fostered trust among politicians, managers, and employees (Green et al., 2006). Lastly, the respondents felt the at-will employment pattern in the state is sporadic and not a well-planned movement within the state (Green et al., 2006). The article was relevant to the current research on the perceptions of politicians, political appointees, and employees of each other affect the bases of social power used in and compliance with influence attempt.

Battaglio and Condrey (2006) conducted a study into the reforms in state and local governments through four models of public service human management reforms. The four models are the traditional, reform, strategic, and the privatization/outsourcing models (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). State and local governments have found it difficult to reform human resource management practices and have taken varied approaches to reform efforts (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). The most efficient approach to achieving reforms is an incremental approach, as it allows stakeholders to build trust, confidence, and respect that human resource departments can administer the functions of human resources systems (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). Georgia approach to reform followed the reform model while Florida used both the reform and privatization/outsourcing model (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). New York approach towards reform employed the traditional and strategic models (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). Louisiana approached involved a combination of the traditional, reform, and strategic models (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). Jefferson County, Alabama used the traditional model and Chapel Hill,

North Carolina, used the strategic model (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). One difficulty involved in implementing reforms is that reforms based on political motivation and more likely to meet resistance and cause employees to leave government jobs. The study was relevant to the current research as the State of Florida approached reforms through the reform model and met with stiff resistance from employees.

Wilson (2006) investigated the consequences of the movement to at-will employment and racial inequality in the public sector. Federal and state governments have actively engaged in promoting economic opportunities for minorities, especially African Americans, to overcome discrimination in the private sector (Wilson, 2006). However, African Americans are underrepresented in managerial ranks in state and local governments and over-represented in lower level jobs (Wilson, 2006). Inequities between Whites and African Americans are less pronounced in the public sector, as African Americans earn “80 to 95%” of what whites earn in the public sector (Wilson, 2006). In the private sector, African Americans earn “68 to 75%” of what whites earn (Wilson, 2006). Traditional benefits of working in the public sector include job security, tenure, and job satisfaction (Wilson, 2006). Moving to at-will employment threatens the benefits of traditional employment (Wilson, 2006). The author argues at-will employment is likely to have a disproportionately negative effect on African Americans, based on evidence of discriminatory at-will employment practices in the private sector (Wilson, 2006). The loss of job satisfaction and organizational commitment disproportionately impact African Americans in at-will employment environments (Wilson, 2006). The article was relevant to the current research, as the ethnic background of employees is a

factor of how individuals perceive each other and their choice of what influence tactic to use.

Koven (2007) conducted a case study of the systemic patronage practices hiring and employment practices in Kentucky under Republican Governor Ernie Fletcher's administration. The case study presents tangible evidence on how politicians and political appointees use patronage to build and maintain political support. Investigating a complaint alleging criminal violations involving the hiring practices by the governor and his political appointees, Kentucky's Democratic attorney general found evidence of abuses involving Kentucky's merit laws (Koven, 2007). The investigation reviewed the governor's administration was using the Local Initiative for a New Kentucky office to review and track civil service job applicants for the state's Transportation Cabinet and developed a list of employees "recommended for transferring, demotion, or firing" (Koven, 2007, p.289). Many of the recommended job candidates were unpaid advisors to Governor Ernie Fletcher. The governor and nine of his current and past political appointees ended up indicted for "twenty-two felony" and "forty-eight misdemeanor" criminal charges (Koven, 2007, p. 290). The governor promptly pardoned everyone, except himself (Koven, 2007). The study shows the danger of at-will employment based on political affiliation or ideologies. The study was relevant to the current research as to the manner to which politicians and their political appointees use the bases of power to build and maintain political support could increase the usage of hard power tactics.

Maranto and Johnson (2008) examined the radical civil service reform movement in the U.S. states and then ranked the best and worst states for radical civil service

reforms. Key concepts of radical civil service include ending employee seniority rights, merit, move state employee to at-will employment positions, to allow managers greater discretion in personnel decisions to remove low performers (Maranto & Johnson, 2008). Radical civil service reforms are risky in that they have the potential to result in patronage employment and corruption of public officials. The authors identified patronage demand variables as political culture and tolerance, corruption, and the state and nature of the state party organizations (Maranto & Johnson, 2008). Political environment variables are the effectiveness of media to report patronage and the presence of a two-party system with a strong minority political party, and the bureaucratic capacity of the state (Maranto & Johnson, 2008). The study showed that state with antiquated political cultures, high levels of tolerance towards corruption, and a weak minority political party, should refrain from implementing radical civil service reform until investments in institutional reforms addressing the weaknesses in the political culture of the state (Maranto & Johnson, 2008). The article was relevant to the current research in that instituted radical civil reform, the full effects of those reforms are just now reaching maturity.

Battaglio and Condrey (2009) investigated the impact of civil service reforms on trust between the State of Georgia's employees and management since the passage of radical civil reform in 1996. The authors conducted mailed surveys to 534 Georgia HR professionals and had 274 respondents from "88 state agencies, authorities, commissions, and boards" (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009, p. 290). The study found HR professionals believed that the change to at-will employment increases the usage of spoils and

negatively affects HR professionals trust in government (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009).

The movement to at-will employment also negatively affected HR professional's views of job security and decrease the incentives to file whistleblower complaints (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009). In regards to procedural justice, HR professionals are less likely to trust in management or organization in HR decisions (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009).

Interestingly, the characteristics of respondents did not have a significant impact on any measure of trust (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009). The study was relevant to the current research as it provides evidence that civil reforms alter the employer-employee relationship and changes the employee perceptions of their supervisors and the organization.

Coggburn et al. (2009) investigated the attitudes of government HR professionals from Georgia, Florida, Texas, and Mississippi on their commitment towards employment at will (EAW). The authors conducted mail surveys of HR professionals and asked respondents to answer questions related to at-will employment practices in their respective states (Coggburn et al., 2009). The authors employed a "5 point Likert-type scale" to measure the level of agreement with the research questions (Coggburn, et al., 2009, p.195). The survey found respondents believed that EAW made employees responsive to agency administrators, provided the motivation to improved employee performance, and respondents believed that EAW makes the HR functions more efficient (Coggburn et al., 2009). The respondents also believed EAW allows for greater flexibility in HR functions and EAW represented essential elements of public service management (Coggburn et al., 2009). The respondents believed to a greater extent that employees have

been terminated as a result of changing objectives, meeting agency shortfalls, and down-sizing (Coggburn et al., 2009). Respondents disagreed to a greater extent that EAW was used for patronage hiring practices and termination of employees because of personality conflicts (Coggburn et al., 2009). The study was relevant to the current research on the perceptions of HR professionals in conflict with government employee's perceptions of EAW.

Liou and Korosec (2009) conducted a study on the strategies used to implement reforms to state governments human resource management practices. The reforms are part of the broader new public management movement over the last two-plus decades. The authors focused their study on the areas of down-sizing government, work design, and changes to the systems of government (Liou & Korosec, 2009). The authors conducted mail surveys of 223 state government administrators in administration, information technology, and acquisition fields and had a response rate of twenty-three percent (Liou & Korosec, 2009). The survey questions related to employee, structural, and system changes and used a Likert Scale to measure the responses. Liou and Korosec's findings indicated there was a wide discrepancy in the level of implementation of the 12 reform strategies between the states. However, the study found that senior public managers tended to take a conservative approach to implement reforms (Liou & Korosec, 2009). Public managers are likely to implement wholesale reforms than piecemeal reforms (Liou & Korosec, 2009). Senior managers are less likely to support reforms that require a long-term commitment (Liou & Korosec, 2009). States with sound capital management processes are less likely to support costly reform strategies (Liou &

Korosec, 2009). States that successfully employ technology to eliminate layers of government have improved the delivery of government services (Liou & Korosec, 2009). The findings of the study were relevant to the current research as state governments use a variety of strategies to implement reforms and politicians, and political appointees can replace senior public managers that are more resistant to change.

Lewis (2009) theorized the use of patronage appointments negatively affects policy implementation and agency competence. The majority of existing scholarship holds the political appointments allow presidents far greater flexibility in controlling federal bureaucracy and implementing policy goals (Lewis, 2009). There is evidence to suggest that politicalizing of the executive branch of government make it more difficult to control the federal bureaucracy and implementing policy goals (Lewis, 2009). Presidents are under intense pressure to engage in patronage appointments and make appointments that are harmful, as witnessed in the Federal Emergency Management Administration's response to Hurricane Katrina (Lewis, 2009). The author stated that there must be a balance of political appointees and career executives as political appointees can infuse the agency with new energy (Lewis, 2009). Political appointees have less government tenure, expertise, and experience in government, which in turn negatively affect the agency's performance (Lewis, 2009). Presidential usage of large numbers of political appointees makes a trade-off between competence and political responsiveness that can lead to disastrous results (Lewis, 2009). As patronage appointments increase in government agencies, top-level career employees leave the agency and take their corporate knowledge with them. The article was relevant to the

current study as the Service First Initiative (2001) moved approximately 16,000 to at-will employment positions, effectively making them politically appointees.

Perry, Engbers, and Jun (2009) investigated the return to pay-for-performance in the federal government after being abandoned by Congress in a decade earlier. Pay-for-performance is a central tenant of the new public management reform movement, a practice that has shown a little demonstrable effect on employee performance (Perry et al., 2009). Perry et al. reviewed studies involving pay-for-performance and discovered that it seldom delivers on its promises. The study found that it did not garner intermediate changes to employee perceptions needed to change employee motivation (Perry et al., 2009). Pay, performance appraisals, and organizational factors affect employee motivations and may negatively affect the validity of pay-for-performance perceptions (Perry et al., 2009). Pay-for-performance strategies are more appropriate for jobs that have concrete and measurable goals, compared to higher level jobs (Perry et al., 2009). The implementation of pay-for-performance systems failure is a result of the failed implementation process and the institutional difference between public and private organizations (Perry et al., 2009). The motivations of public service employees are different the private sector employees and pay-for-performance and could lower public employee motivation (Perry et al., 2009). Leaders must consider contextual, organizational factors to ensure they are compatible with the pay-for-performance system before implementation. The renewed interest in pay-for-performance systems is somewhat surprising as evidence does not support its effectiveness in improving personal or organizational outcomes. The article was relevant to the current research as Florida

instituted a pay-for-performance scheme that has subject to allegations of favoritism and patronage.

Hamilton (2010) investigated the practice of patronage and political influence in the state of Illinois. Patronage in the state of Illinois has persisted since the early 1900s despite court rulings prohibiting patronage, changes in state laws, and court-monitoring of hiring practices (Hamilton, 2010). Patronage practices in Illinois included requiring employees to engage in political work, patronage staffing, forcing employees to make political contributions, creation or reclassification of new positions, temporary appointments, manipulating eligibility and exempt lists, use of appointments, manipulation of the hiring process, and poor record keeping (Hamilton, 2010). Most violations of court-ordered anti-patronage measures are considered civil violations, but violations of state law can be criminal. Patronage was found to be so ingrained in Illinois public service that it raised to the level of criminal wrongdoing and those federal prosecutors using federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act to address corruption in the Illinois Secretary of State's Office (Hamilton, 2010). During the investigation by federal prosecutors discovered widespread corruption involving a trucking scandal relating to pay to play scheme that benefited Chicago Mayor Daley's campaign (Hamilton, 2010). State level corruption was commonplace under the Administrations of Governors Ray and Blagojevich, who also operated pay to play schemes which ultimately led to convictions on corruption charges (Hamilton, 2010). Patronage leads to corrupt and unethical behavior of politicians and their political appointees and causes citizens to lose trust in government (Hamilton, 2010). The article

was relevant to the current study as Florida's HR reforms have the potential for the return of patronage as politicians and political appointees attempt to make more employees more accountable to their policy agenda and goals.

Gallo and Lewis (2012) investigated the consequences of Presidential patronage had on the performance of federal agencies. Gallo and Lewis compared the performance of federal agencies and agencies run by career executives and campaign or political party loyalist during the administration of President George W. Bush. The authors used the Rating Assessment Rating Tool scores; that was used to measure government performance during the Administration of George W. Bush (Gallo & Lewis, 2012). Patronage appointees have less experience in government, possess different backgrounds, experiences, and their tenure was shorter than career executives (Gallo & Lewis, 2012). Government programs run by all types of appointees received lower overall scores than those run by career executives while campaign or political party appointees had even lower scores (Gallo & Lewis, 2012). Agencies run by career executives had the highest government performance scores in the study. The study was relevant to the current research as Florida's governor can make political appointments regardless of qualifications, based on political ideology/affiliation.

Moynihan and Hawes (2012) stated that reforms to government administrative structures are designed by political leaders to instill "behavioral expectations" that employees are expected to follow. The authors examine performance data as a measure of response to the administrative reforms (Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). The performance data included the 2009-2010 Texas Superintendent Survey and Texas Education Survey

(Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). The results of the study showed that as stakeholder influence, involvement in partnerships, increased use of networking, the uses of respondent performance data increases (Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). The environmental complexity of respondent that operated in affected to what degree superintendents use of performance data. As the superintendent's in harmonious districts were less likely to use performance data (Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). Finally, the level of stakeholder conflict increased, usage of performance data increased (Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). The findings were relevant to the current study as the Service First Initiative (2001) reform goal of making employees more responsive, provide employees with guidelines and behaviors they are required to follow.

Devolution of federal government public assistance and workfare program has increased patronage practices in the second-order agencies in the Texas Rio Grande Valley (Harvey, 2013). Harvey (2013) investigated issues involving second-order devaluation programs implementation and the success and failures of the programs. The researcher employed a comparative case study analysis in the investigation of the workfare programs in the poverty-stricken counties of Maverick and Starr, Texas (Harvey). Texas is an at-will employment state, and traditional civil service protections in the hiring and promotion of employees are not available to workfare program employees. Harvey discovered the dominant local political party control's workfare programs resulting in second-order devaluation, and, therefore, control patronage jobs and benefits associated with the programs. Areas with weak political parties receive less federal and

state resources than those with strong political parties. The less centralized control of the workfare program led to increases in the use of level patronage employment practices.

Brewer and Walker (2013) investigated how public service reforms changed the use of reward and punishment and how it impacted organizational performance. The study involved five local English governments and to ensure causality the author's created a time lag of approximately six months between the dependent and independent variables (Brewer & Walker, 2013). The study used the Comprehensive Performance Assessment Core Service performance (CSP) measures of; (a) remove manager, (b) reward manager, (c) developmental culture, (d) internal political climate, (e) deprivation, (f) diversity, (g) population change, (h) CSP 2003, and, (i) CSP 2005 as the dependent variables (Brewer & Walker, 2013). Organizational level results provided evidence that developmental culture was positive and statistically significant, prior performance was statistically significant, and political climate was negative and not significant (Brewer & Walker, 2013). Reward manager was negative and statistically significant and is not affected by the inability to reward top managers with higher pay does not affect performance (Brewer & Walker, 2013). In regards to the intra-organizational variation, the results showed that corporate officers believe the personnel constraints that affect the ability to remove or reward managers are less restrictive than others in lower levels of the government organization (Brewer & Walker, 2013). The findings of the study were relevant to the current research in that the perceptions of individuals of personnel constraints predictors of what bases of social power to employ in influence attempts.

Lui and Mikesell (2014) conducted an empirical study of public corruption and its impact on spending in the U.S. states. The authors used public official conviction data for federal conviction laws violations published by the U.S. Justice Department's Public Integrity Section, in the study (Lui & Mikesell, 2014). Lui and Mikesell hypothesized that states with higher rates of public official corruption convictions would have a higher overall state spending. The study found public officials corruption was a significant factor in higher levels of state spending on capital, highways, construction, wages and salaries, correction, and police protection (Lui & Mikesell, 2014). States with lower levels of official public corruption spent more on education, public welfare, and hospitals than state with higher levels of public corruption (Lui & Mikesell, 2014). Florida ranked in the top 10 of the most corrupt states from 1976 to 2008 (Lui & Mikesell, 2014). The study is relevant to the current research as Florida's passage of the Service First Initiative (2001) removed the merit principle for its human resource practices. The principle of merit has been the most effective measure in the prevention of corruption. Florida's politicians and political appointees can now act unethically in the execution of the duties, with a less chance of being detected.

American presidents build political support and loyalty through the use of patronage appointments since the beginning of this nation. Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis (2014) studied types of presidential appointments and tested a theory involving the placement of different types of appointees within their administration. Hollibaugh et al., found that President Obama appointed less qualified individuals to positions that require less expertise and appoint them to policy and agenda positions. Appointees possessing

campaign and political experience find themselves usually appointed to larger government agencies (Hollibaugh et al., 2014) Appointees with an ideology that aligns with an agency's ideology are more likely appointed to that agency (Hollibaugh et al. (2014). The study was useful in explaining how Florida politicians and political appointees use patronage to build and maintain support based on political ideology/affiliation.

Hijal-Moghrabi, Sabharwal, and Berman (2015) investigated how ethics is related to organizational performance in states with at-will employment (EAW) structures. Hijal-Moghrabi et al, conducted a stratified random sample of supervisors, managers, and long-term employees of government agencies from Florida, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. The author used a 7 point Likert-types scales ranging from “*strongly disagree*” to “*strongly agree*” to measure the dependent variables of “perception of performance” and the independent variable of the ethical environment (Hijal-Moghrabi et al., 2015, p. 11). The author used job satisfaction, age, tenure in government, and job security as control variables in the study (Hijal-Moghrabi et al., 2015). The study showed employees are cognizant of ethical requirements (88.9%), managers act by ethical standards (78.9%), managers comply with ethical guidelines (89.1%), and managers and supervisors follow ethics codes and laws 85.9% (Hijal-Moghrabi et al., 2015). The study revealed that only (40%) of respondents believed that their organization provided appropriate whistleblower protection (Hijal-Moghrabi et al., 2015). The article was relevant to the current research in that the perceptions of managers, supervisors, and employees how politicians, political

appointees, and employees impact what bases of social power to use in influence attempts and compliance with the influence attempt.

Hollibaugh (2015) investigated the trade-offs between cronyism, neutral competence, patronage, and performance in federal executive appointments. American Presidents have long argued they needed to appoint loyalist that are responsive to their policy agenda to be effective in achieving political goals (Hollibaugh, 2015). Neutral competence is considered a hindrance to achieving political goals. One-third of all presidential appointments do not require congressional approval and are more likely to be patronage appointments, without regard to competency, to reward party faithful and accomplish policy goals (Hollibaugh, 2015). When Congressional approval is required, patronage appointees are less likely to have the same degree of political ideology as those who non-patronage appointees (Hollibaugh, 2015). The research suggested that executives are less likely to use patronage appointments when they are required by the confirmation process to choose between patronage and neutral competence (Hollibaugh, 2015). The study was relevant to the current research in that Florida's politicians and political appointees are more likely to choose patronage over neutral competence in hiring or promotion of state employee.

Bowman and West (2007) stated the employee-employer relationship is undergoing a fundamental change in the public sector. The at-will employment has thrown traditional merit protections by the wayside and making employees more responsive to their employer. The movement to at-will employment gives employers unbridle power over employees. Bowman and West hold that the move toward at-will

employment in the public sector removes employee protections from politically motivated adverse actions of their employer and promotes patronage practices to return on a grand scale. At-will employment raises ethical issues in regards to virtues, rules, and at-will employment practices that policymakers must answer (Bowman & West, 2007). Failure to address one or all ethical issues lead to leadership failures and decline of good governance. The article was relevant to the current research as the manner in which politicians and political address the at-will employment ethical issues impact employee perceptions.

The literature review involving civil service revealed demographic characteristics are important variables in determining how supervisors use their bases of power. The independent variables are demographic data of age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, the length of service, and the political ideology/affiliation of Florida's politicians, political appointees, and state employees. The dependent variables include expert, coercive, informational, legitimate, referent, and reward of social power. French and Raven (1959) stated social agents choose to employ the bases of power based on the relationship with the target of the influence attempts. Pfeffer (1981), Kellough and Nigro (2006), and Hays and Sowa (2006) stated civil service reforms alter the employment relationship. Researchers have studied the effect of social power as it relates to its use and status (Magee & Frasier, 2014), political ideology (Hollibaugh, Horton, & Lewis, 2014), effect on leadership styles (Pierro, Raven, Amato, & Bélanger's, 2013), and the group influences tactics have on intergroup and interpersonal power in organizations (Aiello, Pratto, & Pierro, 2013).

The independent variables include age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, the length of service, and political ideology/affiliation, and they all play a role in how social agents view subordinates. French and Raven (1959) stated the relationship between the social agent and the target of the influence attempt are the basis for the influence attempt and the power tactic usage. The demographics of subordinates and supervisors affect how they view each other, choices of power strategies to use, and the level of conformity with the influence attempt (Erchul et al., 2004; Elias, 2007; Getty & Erchul, 2009; Garbel, 2011; Magee & Fraiser, 2014). For the most part, prior research has failed to correlate the usage of the social power tactics and the demographic makeup of the of the influence attempts.

The NPM movement ushered radical reforms to civil service systems across local, state, and federal governments in the United States over the last two and a half plus decades. The goals of the reforms were to make government employees more accountable to executive control, improve employee performance through the practice of at-will employment practices, to eliminate or reduce traditional merit protections, and the decentralization of personnel systems. The reforms alter the employer-employee relationship, affecting how employers and employees perceive each other. The reforms also have an impact on what power tactics politician and political appointees use to influence government employees. The state of Florida instituted radical civil service reform with the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). Government employees' motivations are different than private sector employees in that they have a deep-rooted desire to make a difference and help others, as compared to private sector employees who

more motivated by self-concerns. The reforms impacted employee job satisfaction and employee outcomes. Politicians use the civil service reforms to change the patronage employment practices to their benefit. There is evidence that the reforms are politically motivated and based on political ideologies, and the use of patronage employment practices are increasing as a result of the civil service reform. Patronage increases the likelihood of corruption and results in negative organizational and individual outcomes. Since the inception of the NPM movement and the passage of the Service First Initiative, there is no consensus among scholars and public service practitioners of the reforms achieving the stated goals.

Research Design

The literature review revealed existing research has failed to investigate how the changes to the employer-employee relationship that resulted from the Service First Initiative (2001) affected the use of the bases of power by Florida's politicians and political appointees. The review required reviewing literature related to radical reforms to government human resources practices and the use of power in government and other organizational settings. Condrey and Battaglio (2007) conducted a quantitative study using a survey design to determine the perceptions of individuals with significant human resources duties within the state of Georgia's government agencies, to determine their views on the reforms. The use of a quantitative method was appropriate as it allows for the economical collection of data that cannot be observed (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008).

Erchul, Raven, and Whichard (2001) used a quantitative survey design to determine the effectiveness of Raven's (1993) 11 bases of social power in consulting resistant teachers. The researchers investigated the effectiveness of the power bases from the perspective of teachers and school psychologists (Erchul et al., 2001). The study used the IPI (Raven et al., 1998) as a measurement scale to assess the effectiveness of the 11 of 14 bases of social power. The study provided evidence that gender was a significant factor in how respondents rated the use of harsh and soft power tactics as females psychologists believe soft tactics are more effective than their male counterparts (Erchul et al., 2001). The study addressed Research Subquestion 1 and 3 as to how demographic factors that are predictors bases of power usage and the perceptions of how politicians and political appointees use of the bases of social power in the execution of their duties.

Aiello et al., (2013) used a quantitative survey design in two studies that investigated influence tactics within organizations. In the first study, the researchers had the respondents who had subordinate roles within the organization complete the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Scale and the Italian version of the IPI (Raven et al., 1998). The results of the study showed the respondents perceived they used the soft power tactics more often than they used the harsh power tactics (Aiello et al., 2013). Interestingly, the study also found the level of subordinate compliance to harsh power tactics is related to their SDO, and the compliance with harsh power tactics reinforced the legitimacy and the effectiveness of their usage (Aiello et al., 2013). The second study surveyed supervisors of a different organization and followed the same procedures as the first study. The result of the second study was consistent with the first study. The usage

of the harsh power tactics was dependent on the SDO levels of the supervisor (Aiello et al., 2013). The research was related to the current study's null and alternative hypotheses as to the likelihood of the use of harsh or soft power tactics by politicians and political appointees.

Pierro, et al., (2008) investigated the degree of compliance to hard and soft bases of power tactics that occur as a result of intrinsic and extrinsic motivational orientations of individuals using a quantitative design in four studies. In the first study, the participants completed the Work Preference Inventory (WPI; Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994) to assess intrinsic and extrinsic motivations (Pierro et al., 2008). Participants also completed the IPI (Raven, et al., 1998) to assess the compliance with the bases of power (Pierro et al., 2008). The study discovered a positive correlation between harsh and soft power tactics. The harsh power tactics were positively associated with extrinsic motivation ($b = .42, p < .01$) and negatively association ($b = -.18, p < .01$) with intrinsic motivation (Pierro, et al., 2008). Soft power compliance was positively related to intrinsic motivation ($b = .17, p < .01$) (Pierro et al., 2008). The second study used the same procedures as the first study, the exception being the participants completed the Desirability for Control (DC) instead of the WPI. The study found that hard power tactics were significantly negatively related to DC ($r = -.22, p < .05$), and soft power tactics were significantly positively ($r = .43, p < .001$) related to DC (Pierro, et al., 2008). The third study showed that subordinates were more responsive to soft power tactics ($r = .55, p < .001$) (Pierro et al., 2008). The study also found a positive association between the hard power tactics compliance and getting along scores ($b = .38, p < .001$) of participants

(Pierro et al., 2008). The use of soft power tactics was positively related to the getting along scores ($b = .19, p < .05$) and negatively related to participants getting along ($b = -.25, p < .01$) scores (Pierro et al., 2008). The final study investigated how the self-esteem of subordination affected the power tactics. Again, the study showed subordinates were more responsive to soft power tactics than hard power tactics. Subordinates response to harsh power tactics ($r = -.40, p < .001$) was found to have a negative association with the self-esteem, and soft power tactics ($r = .22, p < .01$) was positively related to their self-esteem (Pierro et al., 2008). The results of the studies directly relate to the research questions and the alternative hypotheses in the current study.

Schwarzwald, Koslowsky, and Ochana-Levin (2004) used a quantitative design to investigate compliance with power tactics in routine and non-routine work settings. The researchers had respondents from four diverse organizational settings completed one of three modified IPI (Raven et al., 1998) that was appropriate for their role in their respective organizations (Schwarzwald et al., 2004). The IPI scales included the IPI usage scale – Worker’s Format, IPI usage scale – Supervisor’s Format, and the IPI compliance scale – Worker’s Format (Schwarzwald et al., 2004). The results of the study provide evidence that use of power tactics and compliance with power tactics usage was related to the type of organization (Schwarzwald et al., 2004). Interestingly, usage and compliance with the harsh power tactics were more frequent in organizational settings that were primarily performed routine tasks, than organizational settings that primarily performed complex tasks. The results of the studies directly relate to the research questions and the alternative hypotheses in the current study, as this researcher expects

there will be differences in the usages of hard and soft power tactics between the various Florida state agencies and departments.

Lines (2007) used a quantitative stratified sampling design to investigate the relationship between the expert and positional power bases and their effect on implementing strategic organizational change in a large European telecom firm. The use of the stratified sampling allowed for the representation groups from different functional areas and divisions within the organization (Lines, 2007). The stratified sampling reduces the cost of conducting the research. Using the quantitative stratified sampling design will ensure that inclusion of all of Florida's state agencies and departments in the study involving the use of the bases of social power by Florida's politicians and political appointees. Also, it will increase the validity of the research.

Methodology

The quantitative methodology is the appropriate method when there is a large finite research population. The use of the qualitative methodology is not conducive to for conducting research involving a large finite population. Studies done by Aiello et al., (2013), Condrey and Battaglio (2007), Erchul et al., (2001), Lines (2007), Pierro et al., (2008), and Schwarzwald et al., 2004) all involved large finite research populations and are appropriate for the uses of a quantitative methodology. The use of a cross-sectional survey and stratified sampling allowed for representation of groups from different functional areas and divisions within the organization (Aiello et al., 2013; Condrey & Battaglio, 2007, Lines, 2007, and Pierro et al., 2008).

Conclusion

The Service First Initiative (2001) radically reformed the State of Florida's human resources practices. The primary goals of the reforms included; making state employees more responsive to executive leadership, improving government efficiency, and improving public service (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). The reforms changed the employer-employee relationship (Hays, 2006; Sowa, 2006). Existing research had failed to investigate the changes to the employer-employee relationship and how it changed the way politicians and political appointees employ the bases of power since the passage of the Service First Initiative. French and Raven (1959) stated that social agents use power to create psychological changes in the target of the influence attempt that alters their perceptions of the organization, social agent, and beliefs over time. How the social agent and target of the influence attempt view each other impacts the choice of a power base to employ and the level of conformity (Erchul et al., 2004; Elias, 2007; Getty & Erchul, 2009). In Florida, evidence of the reforms being effective has failed to materialize (Nigro & Kellough, 2006). The exercise of power within an organization impacts every facet of organizational and individual outcomes (Pierro et al., 2013). There has been no scholarly investigation into Florida's politicians and their political appointees usage of the bases of social power since the passage of the Service First Initiative. The study attempted to determine if Florida's politicians and political appointees use of harsh power tactics in a manner that is inconsistent with other organizational settings.

Social power is used by social agents to influence the target of the influence attempt to produce a psychological change involving their beliefs, values, mindset, and

intentions of the target. The use of social power affects nearly all facets of organizational and individual outcomes. How social agents employ the bases of social power is dependent on how the social agent views the target of the influences attempt. The majority of supervisors and subordinates prefer the use of soft power tactics over the use of hard power tactics in a wide cross-section of organizational settings. The use of soft power tactics are related to positive organizational and individual outcomes, while the use of hard power tactics is related to negative organizational and individual outcomes.

The study of the use of social power has involved a wide range of organizational settings and is rich in content. The studies failed to address how the use of social power changed in government organizations that went through radical civil service reform and the resulting altered employee-employer relationship. The study addressed the predominates bases of social power used by Florida politicians and political appointees and compared those results with the result of studies of other organizational settings to determine if they are disproportionately using harsh power tactics more often the used in other organizational settings.

Chapter 1 introduced the study by explaining the research problem; the purpose of the study, and its significance. Chapter 2 presented the theoretical framework of the bases of social power theory and reviewed existing literature to exam the role the bases of social power impacts organizational and individual outcomes. Chapter 3 explained the quantitative design and the methodology for the study. The methodology was used to fill the gap in the literature on how Florida's politicians and political appointees exercise the base of social power after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). Chapter 4

presents the research results. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the interpretation of the results of the research and the role the results and their social change implications.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

The purpose of this quantitative dissertation study was to determine the extent that Florida's politicians and political appointee's exercise the individual bases of social power (French & Raven, 1959) since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The Service First Initiative civil service reforms have altered the employer-employee relationship (Hays and Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). Existing scholarship has failed to investigate the altered employer-employee relationship resulting from the passage of the Service First Initiative. Understanding to what extent Florida's politicians and political appointees exercise the bases of social power will provide a framework for understanding what effects the changes to the employer-employee relationship have had on government HR practices in the state of Florida. Using French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory, I attempted to determine whether the use of the different bases of power by politicians and political appointees are inconsistent with other organizational settings.

In this chapter, I will present the logic behind the research design and the methodology of the study. In the chapter, I will also address the role of the researcher and provide a description of the research population, setting, summary of data collection procedures, data analysis, trustworthiness, and protections of participant rights. This chapter will also include an explanation of the instrumentation, operational descriptions of the variables, and ethical issues related to this study. I will conclude the chapter by providing a summary of the research, methodology, and transition to Chapter 4.

The Service First Initiative (2001) reforms radically altered the employer-employee relationship. The extant research did not address the effects of the reforms on the application of the bases of social power by Florida's politicians and political appointees. The use of a qualitative design in this study would have been impractical due to the large research population. Use of the quantitative, cross-sectional survey design was ideal for the large finite research population I had in this study. The quantitative, cross-sectional survey design allows for the collection of data at a point in time, subgroup comparisons, and data that are unable to be observed (Liu, 2008). Quantitative, cross-sectional surveys take less time to conduct and are more economical than longitudinal studies (Liu, 2008). French and Raven's (1959) and Raven's (1965) bases of social power and political affiliation/ideology are not physically observable. The use of the quantitative, cross-sectional survey design also aligned with the research question and subquestions in the study.

The role of the researcher in any study is an important consideration that needs to be carefully examined to avoid potential bias. I disseminated the surveys to Florida SPS employees and politicians who held statewide offices. I also collected and analyzed the data from the surveys.

The research population consisted of 88,046 CS, SES, and Senior Management Service employees in Florida's SPS. Florida's governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, CFO, and commissioner of agriculture and consumer services are included in the study population because they held elected statewide offices with executive branch

duties. The population was finite and appropriate for the use of cross-sectional surveys to ensure the inclusion of all sampling units (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008).

The work addresses of Florida's politicians, political appointees, and employees are public record as defined by Florida's Sunshine Laws. I used SPS employees' work addresses to contact and recruit participants. I sent possible participants a package consisting of a cover letter, informed consent, and the survey via the U.S. mail requesting their participation, and a stamped, business reply envelope (see Appendix H).

The IPI (Raven et al., 1998) measures the 33 statements in Raven's (1992) IPIM. I used the IPI (Raven et al., 1998) to measure the usage of the bases of social power by Florida's politicians, political appointees, and the employee's perceptions of the usage of the bases of social power. I used the Political Predisposition Measure (PPM) to identify the political affiliation/ideology of Florida's politicians, political appointees, and SPS employees (Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2005). The PPM (Fredico et al., 2005) is a 2-item, 7-point Likert-type scale that ranges from 1 (*very liberal*) to 7 (*very conservative*). I developed a questionnaire to collect the demographic characteristics of the research population, including gender, age, race or ethnicity, education/job qualifications, pay bands, and department/agency. The data analysis was conducted using the SPSS software program. My analysis included an independent sample *t* test to test the mean between the independent variables (see Green & Salkind, 2014). The standard error correction for the population subsets of the sampling units and nonresponse errors were also accessed.

Kalaian and Kasim (2008) and Creswell (2009) identified the major internal threats to validity as history, maturation, regression, selection, mortality, diffusion of

treatment, compensatory/resentful demoralization, compensatory rivalry, testing, and instrumentation. The internal threats of history, maturation, regression, mortality, diffusion of treatment, compensatory/resentful demoralization, compensatory rivalry, and testing are not major threats to this study because they are related to experimental studies that occur over an extended period (see Creswell, 2009; Kalaian & Kasim, 2008). I used a cross-sectional survey that did not include a pretest. The main threats to the internal validity of this study involved participant selection. I employed a stratified, cross-sectional survey design in which all members of the research population had the same probability of being included in the survey. The members of the research population who opted out or failed to complete the survey were treated as nonresponses.

There were no ethical issues involving the work environment of the researcher, conflict of interest, power differentials, or incentive justification involved in this study. Survey participation was voluntary and anonymous. Vulnerable and protected populations were not targets or participants in the research. Participants' confidentiality was a major concern of the study. I advised the participants that informed consent, data collection, and identities would be anonymous. I obtained Walden University Institutional Review Board approval before conducting the research.

Research Design

I conducted this study to attempt to answer the following:

Research Question. What extent do Florida politicians and political appointees use the individual bases of social power in the execution of their leadership duties?

Research Subquestion 1: What are the demographic factors that are predictors of the use of individual bases of social power?

Research Subquestion 2: How do state employees rank the use of the individual bases of social power by politicians and political appointees?

Research Subquestion 3: What are the perceptions of politicians and political appointees and their uses of the individual bases of social power?

There were 11 independent and 11 dependent variables involved in this study.

The independent variables were the demographic characteristics of Florida's politicians with statewide executive branch duties and political appointees, which included political predisposition; gender; age; education; years of employment; employing department; agency; or autonomous organization; employment classification; pay band; pay level; and race or ethnicity. Demographic characteristics directly influence how politicians and political appointees view state employees and their choice to employ a particular base(s) of social power and influence. The 11 dependent variables were the items of the IPI (see Raven et al., 1998): reward impersonal; coercive impersonal; expert; referent; informational; legitimacy of position; legitimacy of reciprocity; legitimacy of dependence; legitimacy of equity; personal reward; and personal coercion power.

The goal of the research was to determine the extent to which Florida's politicians and political appointees use the individual bases of social power. The research design for the study was a quantitative, cross-sectional survey design. In this study, I used demographic and survey data collected from Florida's politicians, political appointees, and government employees. The research questions were designed to investigate the

relationship between variables and the research population and to determine the extent that Florida's politicians and political appointees used the bases of social power and the predictors of social power base usage. The large research population negated the use of experimental strategies and the longitudinal designs because they would have made the study cost prohibitive. The use of a cross-sectional survey design allows for the measurement of data that is not observable (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). French and Raven's (1959) and Raven's (1965) bases of social power and political affiliation/ideology are not physically observable.

The use of the quantitative cross-sectional survey design allowed for the economical collection of data from a large research population. Kraska (2010) stated the design of a study must take into account the research goals, operational definitions, variables, assumptions, limitation, and data collection procedures in determining the research plan. Survey and experimental strategies are the primary research strategies in quantitative research (Creswell, 2009; Harwell, 2011). Surveys research collects a representative sample from the research population (Kraska, 2010). Creswell (2009) stated that there are two types of survey designs, longitudinal and cross-sectional. Longitudinal research designs are effective in studying changes that take place over an extended period. Longitudinal studies take time to evolve and are not as economical to conduct as cross-sectional surveys. Time constraints involved in this dissertation study precluded the use of a longitudinal design in this study. The cross-sectional survey allowed for the collection of data at a point in time, subgroup comparisons, and data that could not be observed (Liu, 2008). Cross-sectional surveys take less time to conduct and

are more economical than longitudinal studies. Cross-sectional data limits the ability to test causal relationships between variables.

There has not been a large-scale study into the altered employer-employee relationship that is the result of the radical civil service reforms on the usage of the bases of social power by politicians and political appointees (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). The current study attempted to determine if the harsh power tactics are used at a disproportional rate when compared to other organizational settings by politicians and political appointees in the state of Florida, after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The lack of scholarship into the use of the bases of social power after radical civil service reform was mainly a result of maturation issues. Not enough time had passed since the passage of the reforms to understand the full effects the reforms had on the usage of the bases of social power. It has been seventeen years since the passage of the Service First Initiative and maturation issues are not a factor in the current study, as enough time has passed to understand what effect the reforms had on the usage of the bases of social power. The cross-sectional survey design allowed for the use of a large-scale study in a timely and economical manner (Creswell, 2009). The cross-sectional survey design provided the data needed to determine if Florida's politicians and political appointee's use of the bases of social power was consistent with other organizational settings, which have not undergone radical civil service reforms.

The study was a quantitative cross-sectional survey design that used demographic and survey data collected from Florida's politicians, political appointees, and SPS employees. The research questions investigated the relationship between variables and

the research population, to determine the extent Florida's politicians and political appointees use the individual bases of social power and the predictors of social power bases usage. The large research population negated the use of experimental strategies, as it would make the study cost and time prohibitive (Creswell, 2009). The study could not use a longitudinal design as it would require multiple data collections over a period and is impractical for the study. Liu (2008) stated that the use of a cross-sectional survey design allowed for the measurement of data that is not observable, allowed for the collection of data at a point in time, and subgroup comparisons. French and Raven's (1959) and Raven's (1965) bases of social power and political and affiliation/ideology are not physically observable. The use of the quantitative cross-sectional survey design was aligned with the research questions in the study.

The goal of the study was to conduct a large-scale study into the use of the social power bases by Florida's politicians with executive branch duties and their political appointees, and SPS employees after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001) and determine the predictors of the use of the different bases of social power. Creswell (2009) stated that the use of the quantitative cross-sectional survey design allows for the economical collection of data from a large finite research population. The research population consisted of state of Florida employees in the SPS system and elected politicians with executive branch duties. The longitude design is impractical for the use in the current study as it requires multiple data collection periods over an extended time. Researchers use experimental designs when the researchers are trying to determine if a treatment influences the outcomes. The use of the experimental design did not align with

the goals of the study (Creswell, 2009). Qualitative designs are appropriate when researchers are trying to explore and understand the meaning a person or group place of the phenomenon under investigation. The use of the cross-sectional design provided a one-time snapshot of the use of the bases of social power by Florida's politicians and political appointees (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; Creswell, 2009). The cross-sectional survey design answered the research questions on the extent of the bases of power usage, and the predictors of the usage of the bases of social power, by Florida's politicians and political appointees.

Role of the Researcher

The role of the researcher in any study is an important consideration that needs to be carefully examined to avoid the potential pitfall of researcher bias. Researcher bias reduces the validity of the research. In quantitative research, the role of the researcher is limited as the participant's act independent of the researcher. I disseminated the surveys to the state of Florida politicians who hold statewide offices with executive branch duties, political appointees, and SPS employees. I also collected and analyzed the data.

I was an adjunct instructor at Pensacola State College from 2010 to 2017. Pensacola State College is a member of the Florida State College and University System, and its employees are not of Florida's State Personnel System Florida Department of Management Services (DMS, 2015). At the time of the data collection, there were no Pensacola State College students enrolled in courses taught by me. I had no supervisor or instructor relationship involving power over any known participants.

Potential researcher bias may involve my having predisposed assumptions, discretion in participant selection, and data analysis. Potential researcher bias in the current study is limited to the areas of collection, analysis of collected data, and reporting the research findings. To control for potential bias in the current study, I collected, analyzed, and reported the findings in agreement with valid statistical and analytical procedures.

There were no ethical issues involving my work environment, conflict of interest, power differentials, or incentives justification issues involved in this study. Survey participation is voluntary and anonymous. Vulnerable and protected populations were not targets or participants in the research. I advised the participants that informed consent, data collection, and identities would be anonymous. The researcher obtained Walden University IRB approval before conducting the research.

Methodology

The research population was finite and included 88,046 CS, SES, SMS classified employees, and politicians with statewide executive branch duties (Florida DMS, 2015). The politicians with statewide executive branch duties include the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, chief financial officer, and agriculture and consumer services commissioner (F.S. Ch. 14-19). The researcher excluded state employees of Florida's State University System, Justice Administration, Legislature, Florida Lottery, and Other Pay Plans as they are not SPS employees. The researched also excluded contract and temporary employees due to there is no reliable database with their contact information. Elected Florida State Senate and House of Representatives members are excluded from

the study as they do not have any executive branch duties. The research population changed almost on a daily basis due to attrition, new hires, and retirements, therefore, the exact number of the research population was defined after contacting Florida's Department of Management Services. The research population consisted of 88,046 Florida SPS employees.

Sampling and Setting

The finite research population allowed for the inclusion of all the sampling units in the research population to be included in the sampling frame. The sample included members from the State of Florida 31 departments, agencies, and autonomous organizations governed by the State Personnel System (Workforce Report, 2015) and politicians with statewide executive branch duties. The finite research population allowed all members of the research population to have the same probability to be included in the sample (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). I stratified the respondents by their respective departments, agencies, and autonomous organizations. The stratified cross-sectional survey sampling aligned with the goals of the research involving the usage of the bases of social power.

The sample included members from Florida's SPS employees. The employees were sent the survey via their work mail addresses along with an enclosed business reply, self-addressed envelope. Sampling frame errors are a concern in survey research. Probability sampling greatly reduces sampling errors and results in the inclusion of all sampling units (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). The major threat to the study is nonresponse errors.

The sampling frame consisted of all members of Florida's SPS and Florida's elected politicians with statewide executive branch duties. The SPS included all employees of the CS, SES, SMS classification system in Florida 31 departments, agencies, and autonomous organizations (Workforce Report, 2015). Employees in the SES and SMS classifications are political appointees. Politicians with statewide executive branch duties include the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, chief financial officer, and the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services commissioner (F.S. Ch. 14-19). Those Florida State employees excluded from the sampling frame are employees in the State University, Justice Administration, Legislature, Florida Lottery, and Other Pay Plans. Those excluded from the study because they are not members of SPS. The study also excluded contract and temporary employees due to the lack of reliable database(s) with current contact information and their transient nature. Excluded from the study are Florida State Senators and the House of Representatives member, as they do not have any executive branch duties.

The sample included employees from the State of Florida 31 departments, agencies, and autonomous organizations governed by the (Workforce Report, 2015). The study had a large finite population, and members of the population had the same probability of being surveyed. The respondents are stratified by their respective departments, agencies, and autonomous organizations. The sample size of each subunit of the population must be large enough to be representative of the research population (Frankfort-Nachmian & Nachmias, 2008). Cohen (1992) stated that samples must be large enough to support statistical power analysis for the specified power level and effect

size. G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was used to calculate the significant effect size of each stratum, using a confidence level of 95%, Type 1 error rate (α), at 80% power level. It is critical to the validity of the study that the survey data from the sample is sufficient to provide samples that meet the criterion described.

Procedures

The state of Florida maintains active rosters of all SPS employees that include their employment classification, occupation, pay band, and agency, department, or autonomous entities. The rosters are public and were obtained via a public records request. Participants were sent the survey via the U.S. mail requesting their participation alone with business-reply envelope, requesting their participation in the survey. Participants were sent a reminder postcard 10 days after the initial survey mailing. The study used two data collection instruments and a questionnaire to record the participant's answers to the research questions. I developed a questionnaire developed was used to identify demographic characteristics of Florida's politicians, political appointees, and state employees. While not inclusive of all possible demographic characteristics, the demographic characteristics of gender, age, race or ethnicity, education, pay bands, department/agency, the political ideology/affiliation of politicians, political appointees, and state employees, are predictors of the use of individual bases of social power (French & Raven, 1959). The PPM was used to identify the political affiliation/ideology of Florida's politicians, political appointees, and state employees (Federico et al., 2005a). The IPI (Raven et al., 1998) measures the supervisor-subordinate relationship and the use of the bases of social power.

Prospective participants were sent the survey via work mail addresses.

Accompanying the survey was an introductory letter requesting their participation in the survey and the informed consent form. Participants were asked to return the survey, in a business-reply envelope.

The data collection process involved the collection of demographic data via a researcher developed questionnaire and their responses to the IPI (Raven et al., 1998), and the PPM (Federico et al., 2005a). The participant's department or state agency was confidential, and the participating employee responses are anonymous.

The introductory letter requesting SPS employee participation in the survey also advised participants that they could exit the study at any time without penalty. The informed consent form advised participants that participation in the survey was 100% voluntary and no one at that state of Florida or Walden University would treat them differently for deciding not to participate in the survey.

The state of Florida maintains contact information of all state employees, and it is public record. The contact information includes the employee's name, agency, employment location, work address, and employment classification. I submitted a public records request for all SPS employee's names, agency, employment location, work address, and employment classification prior to the collection of data.

Instrumentation

The study used two published data collection instruments. The first instrument used was the IPI (Raven et al., 1998), and was used to measure the of usage of the bases of social power by politicians and political appointees. The second published instrument

used in the study is the PPM (Federico et al, 2005a), and it was used to measure the political affiliation/ideology of SPS members and politicians with statewide executive branch duties.

The bases of social power theory (French and Raven, 1959) was the appropriate framework for the determining if the altered employer-employee relationship had affected the usage of the bases of social power by politicians and political appointees since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). Raven (1992) further delineated the original social power taxonomy by publishing the IPIM. Raven et al., developed the IPI scale in response to methodological and substantive issues involving existing instruments that limited the validity of existing research into the measurement of the use of the base of social power. The IPI instrument includes two scales for measuring subordinate and supervisor's perceptions of the usage and compliance with influence attempts (Raven, 1998). The PPM (Federico et al, 2005) instrument was ideal for determining the political affiliation/ideology of Florida's politicians, political appointees, and state employees. The PPM consists of a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*Very Liberal*) to 7 (*Very Conservative*) (Federico et al., 2005a).

The use of the PPM (Federico et al., 2005a) is allowed for "non-commercial research and education purposes without seeking written permission" (see Appendix A). I received permission to use the IPI from the authors, Dr. Raven, Dr. Schwarzwald, and Dr. Koslowski.

Raven (et al., 1998) established the content validity of the IPI in two different studies. The first study involved calculating the intercorrelations between the four items

hypothesized in each of the 11 power bases, resulting in one factor in each base was dropped from the model (Raven et al., 1998). The researchers conducted a principle component analysis and factor analysis on remaining items. The mean scores of the power bases, resulting in the presence of a two-factor solution, Factor I accounted for 34.6% of “soft or weak” base and Factor II accounted for 24.7% of “hard or strong” base variance (Raven et al., 1998, pp. 316-321). Raven et al. (1998) then conducted a small space analysis of response to the scale items, resulting in the determination of the adequacy of the two-dimensional structure (coefficient of alienation = .14). Discriminant analyses of mean compliance scores indicated that only the total sample met the recommended ratio (Raven et al., 1998). The second study addressed the consistency of the IPI scale between the two studies involving different cultures. The internal consistency within the power tactics had acceptable alpha coefficients (.63 to .88, Raven et al., 1998). The authors of the PPM established content validity by conducting a Cronbach’s alpha (.84) analysis for the measure (Federico et al., 2005a). Cronbach’s alpha scores lower than a critical value than of $< .70$ are not reliable (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008).

The IPI Raven (et al., 1998) was developed using two research populations with diverse cultures. The first study’s research population consisted of 317 university students in the state of California and the second study’s research population consisted of 101 Israeli hospital employees (Raven et al., 1998). The Hebrew version of the IPI (subordinate form) was given to the Israeli research population, instead of the original

version (Raven et al., 1998). PPM (Federico et al., 2005a) was used in a study to determine support for military action against Iraq (Federico et al., 2005b).

Operationalization of Variables

There are 11 independent and 11 dependent variables involved in this study. The independent variables are the demographic characteristics of Florida's politicians, political appointees, and state employees which include political predisposition; gender; age; education; years of employment; employing department; agency; or autonomous organization; employment classification; pay band; pay level; race or ethnicity; and the political ideology/affiliation of the elected officials, political appointees, and state government employees. The demographic characteristics influence how change agents view the target of the influence attempt and the choice of the base of social power to employ. The 11 dependent variables are the 11 dependent variables are the items of the IPI (Raven et al., 1998): reward impersonal; coercive impersonal; expert, referent; informational; legitimacy of position; legitimacy of reciprocity; legitimacy of dependence ; legitimacy of equity; personal reward; and personal coercion power.

The IPI (Raven et al., 1998) measures the 33 items in the 11 delineated power bases of Raven's (1993) IPIM and will be used to measure the dependent covariates. The IPI (Raven et al., 1998) used in this study is the original version of the subordinate and supervisor's formats. PPM will be used to measure the independent variable of political affiliation/ideology of Florida's politicians, political appointees, and SPS employees (Federico et al., 2005a). The PPM is a Likert-type scale that ranges from 1 (*Very Liberal*) to 7 (*Very Conservative*), and responses are averaged. As the score increases, it indicates

the higher level of conservatism (Federico et al, 2005a). The demographic characteristics independent variables are measured by the use of a survey questionnaire I developed. The demographic variables and dependent variables were then correlated.

The means, standard deviation and ranks for the eleven power tactics for the power tactics for Florida's politicians, political appointees, and CS employees was determined independently of each other. The IPI (Raven et al., 1998) provided a rating instead of a ranking and reduced the methodological issues related to ipsative measures used in previous studies. The demographic variables were correlated with the dependent variables to determine significant correlations.

Data Analysis

The study used two different statistical software packages to analyze data from the cross-sectional survey of Florida's elected politicians, political appointees, and state employees in Florida's SPS. G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) was used to determine the proper sample size for each statistical test used and for state agencies and departments needed to ensure a representative sample. The SPSS version 22.0 was used to conduct statistical analysis of data from the stratified cross-sectional survey of Florida's elected politicians, political appointees, and state employees in Florida's SPS.

The data from the cross-sectional survey of Florida's elected politicians, political appointees, and employees in Florida's SPS required careful analysis to ensure the inclusion of only the target populations in the data set. The first issue was to obtain a representative sample from all of Florida's State agencies and departments. The researcher used of G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 2007) to calculate the significant effect

size of each stratum, using a confidence level of 95%, type 1 error rate (α), at 80% power level. The usage of social power tactics and demographic data was correlated. The researcher conducted an independent samples *t*-test to test the mean between the independent variables (Green & Salkind, 2014). Reported independently are the means, standard deviations, and rank of the eleven power tactics for subordinates and supervisors. Factor analysis of the independent variables was conducted to reduce the independent variables as necessary. Multiple regression analysis between the independent and dependent variables was conducted to examine the relationship between the variables.

H₀: Since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001), Florida's politicians and political appointees are more likely to uses harsh bases of social power to achieve policy goals.

H₁: Since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001), Florida's politicians and political appointees are more likely to uses soft bases of social power to achieve policy goals.

I imported the data collected from the stratified cross-sectional survey of Florida's elected politicians, and SPS employees into the SPSS Software program. SPSS was used to perform statistical analysis and testing of the hypothesizes. The type of data collected in the survey include the independent variables of political ideology/affiliation and demographic data consisting of gender, age, race or ethnicity, and education. The researcher also collected data on the usage of the dependent variables of coercive, expert, legitimate, referent, reward and informational power. The independent and dependent

variables data were correlated. Factor analysis was performed to identify clusters within the variables and reduce variables as necessary. I conducted an independent samples *t*-test to test the mean between the independent variables (Green & Salkind, 2014). The correlation, factor analysis, and independent *t* test provides a basis for answering the main research question, what extent do Florida politicians and political appointees use of the individual base of social power employed in the execution of the leadership duties?

Threats to Validity

Creswell (2009) and Kalaian and Kasim (2008) stated that the threats to external validity included the interaction of selection and treatment, the interaction of setting and treatment, and interaction of history and treatment. The interaction of selection and treatment threatens external validity by having a narrowly defined research population. The inability to generalize findings to other organizational settings because the characteristics of participants are different. Interaction of history and treatment internal validity threats arise out of an inability to generalize the results to the past or future events (Creswell, 2009; Kalaian & Kasim, 2008). The current study involves a research population of approximately 90,000 politicians, political appointees, and state of Florida government employees. The research population included state of Florida politicians with executive branch duties, and all members in the CS, SES, and SMS classifications in Florida's SPS. The use of the stratified cross-sectional survey and probability sampling ensured that a representative sample is obtained that can be generalized to other organizational settings that have undergone radical reforms to the civil service system. Stanley and Campbell, 1963; Onwuegbuzie ,2000; and Creswell, 2009 identified the

major internal threats to validity as history, maturation, regression, selection, mortality, diffusion of treatment, compensatory/resentful demoralization, compensatory rivalry, testing, and instrumentation. The internal threats of history; maturation; regression; mortality; diffusion of treatment; compensatory/resentful demoralization; compensatory rivalry; and testing are not major threats to the current study as they are related to experimental studies that occur over an extended period (Stanley & Campbell, 1963; Onwuegbuzie, 2000; Creswell, 2009). The instrumentation used in the current study does not include a retest. The main threats to the internal validity of the study involved selection. The study employed a stratified cross-sectional survey design that included all members of the research population having the same probability of being included in the survey. The members of the research population who opted out or failed to complete the survey, are treated as nonresponses.

Construct validity involves ensuring that the instrument used to measure a concept or construct measures what it intended to measure (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias stated the instrument(s) used in the study must show validity by relating the instrument(s) to the theoretical framework and provide evidence that it is both empirically and logically correlated. Statistical conclusion validity is the result of investigators using inadequate statistical power or violation of statistical assumptions in their studies. The researcher ensured the reliability of the IRI (Raven et al., 1998) and the PPM (Federico et., al. 2005b) by conducting analysis utilizing Cronbach's alpha (α). Field (2013) stated that Cronbach's alpha (α) is the most commonly used measure of scale reliability. The research used Cronbach's alpha (α) to

ensure the reliability of the measurement instruments. The researcher ensured that the alpha coefficients (α) for the scales would be compared to the lower limit of α coefficient $\geq .70$, as prescribed by Cronbach (1951)

Ethical Procedures

Florida State Statute (F.S. 668.6076) states that work addresses of all state of Florida employees and politicians are public records and are available through a public records request. As of this time, there are no other permission requirements need to obtain the work addresses of Florida SPS employees.

Walden University has set strict guidelines for research conducted under its purview. The research must also follow the federal regulations involving human participants, and the researcher must complete ethics training. Researchers must complete the Protecting Human Research Participants ethics training course, provided by the National Institute of Health. I completed the required ethics training and provided a copy of the certificate of completion. Walden University requires that researchers complete the course within the previous 5 years of the research. The next step in the process was the requirement to gain approval from the Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB). No research activity occurred past the proposal stage, without IRB approval.

The protection of human participants during the recruitment of prospective participants is an important consideration in the research process. The major concern in the recruitment of participants involved initial contact via their work addresses. The state employees recruited for the study were mailed a package to the work address requesting the participation in the survey. I mailed the participants a package that contained an

introductory letter, the survey, the informed consent form, a business-reply envelope, and were requested to return the survey in the business-reply envelope (Appendix A & B). The study did not involve at risk or vulnerable populations. No recruitment of participants occurred until approval to conduct the research was received from Walden University's Institutional Review Board. Walden University's approval number for this study is # 03-29-17-0450230, and it expired on March 28, 2018.

The major ethical concerns relating to the data collection involves the collection of demographic data from participants. The demographic data collection includes the; gender, age, race or ethnicity, education/job qualifications, pay bands, department/agency, the political ideology/affiliation of politicians, political appointees, and state employees. The survey results have the potential to be shared with all participants, politicians, and political appointees. Ensuring confidentiality of participants is important in protecting participants from adverse actions in the workplace. The actual names of the participants are not used or published to ensure participant confidentiality. I advised the participants that their participation was voluntary, and they could opt out of the survey at any time without adverse effects. The data collected from the participants will be stored in a password protected database on an external hard drive and locked in a safe in my office.

The data collection process involved the collection of demographic data from participants, their responses to the IPI (Raven et al., 1998), and the PPM (Federico et al., 2005a). The participants were sent the stratified cross-sectional survey via the U.S. mail to their work addresses in a package that contained a business-reply envelope. Upon

collection of data, the participant's department or state agency is confidential, and the participating employee responses will be anonymous.

The data from the study was protected and archived on a password-protected hard drive and a printed copy that is locked in my office safe. I will maintain the data for 5 years at the minimum. Upon approval and acceptance from Walden University, I will make the study available to respective department and agency leaders and the elected politicians in the executive branch. The study will not name or identify individual participants or their department or agency.

I was an adjunct instructor at Pensacola State College and may come into contact with a very limited number of participants in the study, who may become students during the data collection process. I was also on the Board of Directors of the First Judicial Circuit Law Enforcement Association, Inc., a nonprofit organization whose membership consists of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers. State of Florida law enforcement officers are part of the research population and have the potential to be participants in the study. There are 15 members of the First Judicial Circuit Law Enforcement Association, Inc., who are Florida State law enforcement officers. Currently, I have no supervisor or instructor relationships that involve power over any known prospective participants at this time. At the time of the data collection, there were no current state employees or Florida state law enforcement officers in any classes I taught. There are no incentives offered for participation in the study.

Summary

The quantitative cross-sectional survey design was used to determine the extent Florida's politicians and political appointees used the harsh and soft bases of social power since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The research population was finite and consisted of 88,046 employees in Florida's SPS and elected politicians with statewide executive branch duties. The study employed an email cross-sectional survey method. The instrument used to collect data involving the use of the bases of power is the IPI (Raven et al., 1998). The PPM was used to collect data on participant's political affiliation/ideology (Frederico et al, 2005). Statistical analysis included factor analysis, correlation, independent t-test, multiple regression, means, and standard deviations. The study does not involve any at risk or vulnerable groups. The ethical concerns in the study involve the protection of participants. I completed the required National Institutes of Health Protecting Human Research Participants ethics training course and ensured the confidentiality of participants and participants. I obtained Walden University IRB approval before conducting any research.

Chapter 1 provided a detailed introduction to the study. Chapter 2 included a review of the of the literature involving the research methodology, research design, and theoretical framework. Chapter 3 presented the research methodology that was used to collect data, the analysis of the data, and the presentation of the findings. Chapter 4 reported the data analysis, findings of the study, and the acceptance or rejection of the null hypotheses.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine the extent that Florida's politicians and political appointee exercised the individual bases of social power (see French & Raven, 1959) and to determine what the predictors of usage of the bases of social power are. I also attempted to determine whether Florida's politicians and political appointees have used the hard and soft power tactics at a dispositional rate compared to other organizational settings since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The Service First Initiative changed the employer-employee relationship, and existing scholarship neglected to investigate the altered employer-employee relationship. The results of this study provided a framework for understanding the extent that politicians and political appointees exercised the bases of social power and the impact changes had on the employer-employee relationship and HR practice. The research was divided into the following one research question, three subquestions, and hypotheses:

I conducted this study to attempt to answer the following:

Research Question 1. What extent do Florida politicians and political appointees use the individual bases of social power in the execution of their leadership duties?

Research Subquestion 1: What are the demographic factors that are predictors of the use of individual bases of social power?

Research Subquestion 2: How do state employees rank the use of the individual bases of social power by politicians and political appointees?

Research Subquestion 3: What are the perceptions of politicians and political appointees and their uses of the individual bases of social power?

H₀: Since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001), Florida's politicians and political appointees are more likely to use harsh bases of social power to achieve policy goals.

H₁: Since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001), Florida's politicians and political appointees are more likely to use soft bases of social power to achieve policy goals.

The research method unfolded as I described in Chapter 3. The research method used in the study was a quantitative, cross-sectional survey because it allowed for the economical collection data from a large research population. I employed a stratified, random sampling design to ensure all SPS employees of Florida's 31 departments, agencies, and autonomous organizations had the same probability of being represented in the survey. The research population consisted of 88,046 Florida SPS) employees in the CS, SES, Senior Management Service employment classifications and the five elected politicians with statewide executive branch duties that are members of the Florida Cabinet. I submitted a public records request to the state of Florida DMS for the SPS employee's demographic data that included employee's work mailing addresses. Florida Statute 119.0741(4) exempted 4,291 SPS employees from the public records request.

My initial expectation for the study was that there would be participants from all of Florida's 31 agency, department, or autonomous entities and the five elected politicians with statewide executive branch duties. There were only participants from 23

of the 31 agencies, departments, or autonomous entities, and there were no responses from Florida's elected politicians. The low number of responses from the Exempt (53) and Senior (three) employment classifications resulted in the combining of the two employment classifications into an independent variable named political appointees. The low response rates in some of the agencies, departments, and autonomous agencies resulted in combining them into four categories based on their functional areas of responsibilities with: (a) the Agency for Health Care Administration, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, Department of Children and Families, Department of Health, Department of Education, and School for the Deaf and Blind being recoded into an independent variable named social services and education; (b) the Department of Military Affairs, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and Department of Juvenile Justice being recoded into an independent variable named criminal justice/military; (c) the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Department of Economic Opportunity, Public Service Commission, Department of Financial Services, Department of State, Department of Revenue, Department of Legal Affairs, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, and the Department of Veterans Affairs being recoded into an independent variable named administrative; and (d) the Department of Environmental Protection, Department of Emergency Management, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, and the Department of Transportation recoded into an independent variable named other.

I began Chapter 4 with an introduction to the study and problem statement, and this will be followed by an explanation of the data collection and methodology process,

the research population, and sample demographics. The appropriated statistical assumptions related to the study will then be explained, followed by the data analysis. The chapter will end with a summary.

The study did not require a pilot study because it was not applicable. The measurement instruments used in this study, the PPM (Federico et al., 2005a) and the IPI (see Raven, Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky, 1998), have been validated to measure what I sought to measure. The PPM (Federico, 2005a) established content validity by conducting a Cronbach's alpha (.84) analysis of the measure. Raven et al. (1998) established the content validity of the IPI via two studies with internal consistency within the power tactics having acceptable alpha coefficients (.63 to .88).

The data collection for this study involved a cross-sectional survey of 5,000 Florida SPS employees and the five Florida cabinet officials. I sent the informed consent form, invention to participate letter, survey, and a business reply envelope via the U.S. mail to the randomly selected potential participants at their work mailing addresses, requesting their participation in the survey. Reminder postcards were mailed to all participants 10 days after mailing the surveys. The data collection period lasted 30 days. The survey consisted of the IPI (Raven et al., 1998), the PPM (Federico et al., 2005a), and a questionnaire regarding the participant's demographic characteristics. Participation in the study was voluntary.

I found that Florida's political appointees use the social power tactics in a manner that is consistent with other organizational settings because they used the soft power tactics more than the harsh power tactics (Aiello et al., 2013; Erchul et al., 2001; French

& Raven, 1959, Pierro et al., 2008; Pierro, et. al., 2012; Schwarzwald et al., 2004).

Additionally, the independent variables of age and race-African American were significant predictors of the use of the power tactics by Florida's political appointees. SPS employees ranked the use of the social power tactics similar to the political appointees ranking of the use of social power tactics with the use of the soft power tactics over the harsh tactics. The overall goal of the research question 1 was to determine the extent Florida's political appointees and supervisors used the social power tactics in comparison to other organizational settings. With the research question, I focused on the results of the factor analysis, multiple regression, means and standard deviations, and the assumptions of the statistical analysis conducted. Addressing research question 2 provided the results of the multiple regression and assumptions of the statistical analysis of the 11 social power tactics, while addressing Research question 3 provided the results of the career service employee rankings of the social power tactics. Research question 4 was a redundant question because it asked the same question as the research question and was therefore eliminated from the study.

The results of the research question show that Florida's political appointees do use the soft power tactics over the harsh power tactics. The results of subquestion 1 show that legitimacy of reciprocity power tactic was not a statistically significant model while the other 10 power tactics are statistically significant models (see Tables 10-23).

Pilot Study

This study was a quantitative, cross-sectional survey design and did not use any treatment or intervention. I used measurement instruments that previously had contact validity established in previous research. Therefore, there was no need to conduct a pilot study.

Data Collection

In this study, I collected data from a stratified, cross-sectional survey of 5,005 Florida SPS employees and the five elected Florida cabinet officers. I sent a public record request to the Florida DMS and requested the work mailing addresses and demographic information on all Florida SPS employees. Participants were then selected by the use of a representative sampling method. I mailed the informed consent form, an invitation to participate letter, the survey, and a business reply envelope via the U.S. mail to 5,005 SPS employees in the CS, SES, and Senior Management Service classifications and the five Florida cabinet officers at their work mailing addresses. Participants were also sent a reminder postcard requesting the participation in the survey 10 days after the surveys were mailed out. The data collection period lasted 30 days after mailing the surveys. The response rate was 7.07%, resulting in 354 responses from the SPS employees. There were no responses from elected politicians with statewide executive branch duties.

I conducted the data collection as described in Chapter 3 with the following exceptions: 11 SPS employees contacted me via *e-mail* and stated they had received the reminder postcard but had not received the initial survey. I verified the SPS employee's address and sent the SPS employee a new survey at their request. Thirteen SPS

employees contacted me stating they had not received the survey and would like to participate in the survey. The SPS employees that requested to participate in the survey were mailed a survey.

There was a total of 354 respondents to the survey, with 196 males (55.4%) and 154 females (43.5%) respondents to the survey (see Table 1). The overall response rate was 7.07%. The survey contained ten demographic question to determine the demographic characteristics of the sample. The demographic questions were optional and resulted in the demographic variables of pay band and level being dropped from the survey due to low response rates of 46.6 and 24.9 percent respectively.

The major threats to external validity involve the interaction of selection and treatment, the interaction of setting and treatment, and interaction of history and treatment (Creswell, 2009; Kalaian & Kasim, 2008). The research population included 88,046 Florida state personal system employees in the career, exempt, and senior management employment classifications, and the five State of Florida politicians with executive branch duties. To avoid external validity issues the researcher employed a stratified cross-sectional survey with probability sampling to obtain a representative sample. The combination of using a large research population, probability sampling, and the utilization of a stratified cross-sectional survey negated the major threats to external validity.

The mean age of the participants was 41-45 years (see Table 1). The education level of participants with 70 high school or GED (19.9%), 46 associate degree (13.9%), 142 Bachelors degree (40.5%), 91 Masters degree (25.9%), and two Ph.D. or terminal

degree (.6%) (Table 2). The mean of participant's political predisposition is 4.13 (Table 3). The participants functional area grouping included 67 participants in the administrative agencies (18.9%), 97 participants in the criminal justice-military agencies (27.4%), 121 participants in the social service-educational agencies (34.2%), and 63 participants in the other agencies (17.8%) category (Table 4). The race/ethnicity of the respondents was 63 Black or African American participants (18.1%), eight American indian and alaska native participants (2.3%), 19 asian participants (5.5%), two native hawaiian or other pacific islander participants (.6%), 10 hispanic participants (2.9%), 210 white non-hispanic participants (60.3%), and 36 participants who reported more than one race/ethnicity (10.3%)(Table 5). The participants gender with 196 males (55.4%), 154 females (43.5%), and four no responses (1.1%)(Table 6). There are 296 CS employees (83.6%) and 56 political appointees (15.8%) who responded to the survey (Table 7).

Results

There are 296 CS employees (83.6%) and 56 political appointees (15.8%) who responded to the survey (Table 7). The participants are from 23 of 31 Florida state agencies, departments, and autonomous entities (Table 8). Allen (2017) stated there are six assumptions multiple regression: (a) There is a linear relationship between variables, (b) multivariate normality is assumed, (c) errors terms of variable are not correlated, (d) variance of the model is equally distributed and homoscedasticity is assumed, (e) there should be an absence of influential observation, and (f) there should be no or little multicollinearity in the regression model. The central limit theorem states that large samples do not violate normality (Field, 2013). The correlation matrix variables were

minimally correlated, which reduced the issue of multicollinearity. The tolerance levels ranged from .233 for social services and education and a high of .941 for political predisposition and gender-female. The VIF ranged from a high of 4.48 for social services and education and a low of 1.06 for political predisposition. The multicollinearity assumption was not violated. The data were screened for outliers, heteroscedasticity, and non-linearity. Figures 1-22 show the histogram and normal p-plot of regression standardized residuals.

The four basic assumptions involving independent samples *t*-test include: (a) case represent a random sample from a defined population and the score are independent of each other, (b) the independent variables must be nominal, and the dependent variable must be interval, (c) the independent samples *t*-test assumes the scores of the testing variable are normally distributed, and (d) the population variance is equal (Allen, 2017). The assumptions were not violated.

Research question 1 asked, what extent do Florida politicians and political appointee's use of the individual base of social power employ in the execution of the leadership duties? Before conducting any analysis related to the research questions or hypotheses, a factor analysis utilizing maximum likelihood and varimax rotation was conducted on the responses to the 11 items on the IPI scale. The results for the factor analysis explained 40.48 % of the total variance. The results are consistent with the original research (Raven et al., 1998) with the harsh power statistically significant predictors of the power tactics (impersonal reward, personal coercion, legitimate reciprocity, legitimacy of position, coercive impersonal, and legitimacy equity) and soft

power tactics (expert, informational, referent, the legitimacy of dependence, and personal reward) being identified (Table 9). The overall Kaiser-Meyer-Okin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was .795 and was above the recommended value of 0.50 and is classified on the high side of “middling” (Field, 2013). The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was statistically significant ($p < .001$) and indicated that there was no basis for further reduction.

The political appointees ranked the use of informational power ($M = 5.18$, $SD = 1.13$), legitimacy of position ($M = 5.09$, $SD = 1.04$), legitimacy of dependence ($M = 5.07$, $SD = 0.96$), referent power ($M = 4.83$, $SD = 1.02$), expert power ($M = 4.58$, $SD = 1.42$), personal reward ($M = 4.30$, $SD = 1.20$), impersonal coercive ($M = 4.27$, $SD = 1.69$), legitimacy of reciprocity ($M = 4.04$, $SD = 1.09$), personal coercion ($M = 3.90$, $SD = 1.23$), impersonal reward ($M = 3.54$, $SD = 1.46$), and legitimacy of equity ($M = 2.91$, $SD = 1.52$) (Table 10). Overall, political appointees ranked the usage of the soft power tactics ($M = 4.79$, $SD = .70$) harsh power tactics ($M = 3.54$, $SD = .72$) (Table 23). The rankings of the power tactics are consistent with previous research (see Raven, et al., 1998; Erchul, et al., 2001; Schwarzwald, et al., 2004; Pierro, et al., 2008; Pierro, et al., 2012; and Aiello, et al., 2013).

A standard multiple regression involving the forced entry method was performed to examine the usage of the social power bases by the political appointees. The multiple regression indicated political appointees use of referent ($\beta = .16$, $t(2.82) = p .005$) and legitimacy of dependence ($\beta = .12$, $t(2.06) = p .041$) power tactics are statistically significant overall (Tables 11 -21).

Research Question 2 asked, what are the demographic factors that are predictors of the use of individual bases of social power? Multiple regression analysis was employed to examine the predictors of the use of 11 social power tactics from the independent variables. criminal justice/military was the control variable and the independent variables of age, education, political predisposition, employment classifications of social services and education, administration, and other, race-African American, race-other minority, White non-Hispanic gender, and political appointees.

The overall model for reward Impersonal power was statistically significant ($F(10, 326) = 4.674, p < .001$, with an R^2 of .125. The predictor variable of age ($\beta^1 = -.261, t(326) = -4.69, p < .001$), indicated that as age increases by one-year, political appointees are -.261 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses reward impersonal power. The predictor variable of social services and education ($\beta^4 = .308, t(326) = 2.81, p .005$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are .308 times more likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses reward impersonal power. The predictor variable administrative ($\beta^5 = .216, t(326) = 2.36, p .019$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are .22 times more likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses reward impersonal power. The predictor variable of race – African American ($\beta^7 = -.140, t(326) = -2.53, p .012$) was statistically significant and indicated that political appointees in the functional grouping are -.140

times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses reward informational power. The predictor variables of age, social services and education, administrative, and race – African American are statistically significant predictors of the use of impersonal reward power (Table 11).

The overall model for coercive impersonal power was statistically significant ($F(10, 326) = 1.911, p .043$, with an R^2 of .026. The predictor variable of race – african American ($\beta^7 = -.116, t(326) = -2.02, p .044$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.116 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses coercive impersonal power. Gender-female ($\beta^9 = -.110, t(326) = -1.98, p .049$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.110 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses coercive impersonal power. The predictor variables of race – African American and gender-female are statistically significant predictors of coercive impersonal power (Table 12).

The overall model for Expert power was statistically significant ($F(10, 326) = 3.363, p <.001$, with an R^2 of .066. The predictor variable of age ($\beta^1 = -.214, t(326) = 3.78, p <.001$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.116 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses expert power (Table 13).

The overall model for referent power was statistically significant ($F(10, 326) = 3.713, p .001$, with an R^2 of .075). The predictor variables of age ($\beta^1 = -.186, t(326) = -3.294, p .001$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.186 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses referent power. The predictor variable of race – African American ($\beta^7 = -.126, t(326) = -2.25, p .025$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.126 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses referent power. The predictor variable of race – other minority ($\beta^8 = -.200, t(326) = -3.483, p .001$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.200 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses referent power. The predictor variable of political appointees ($\beta^{10} = .160, t(326) = 2.821, p .005$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are .160 times more likely per standard deviation than in the criminal justice/military function group to use referent power (Table 14).

The overall model for Informational power was statistically significant ($F(10, 326) = 4.724, p <.001$, with an R^2 of .127). The predictor variables of age ($\beta^1 = -.244, t(326) = -4.39, p <.001$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.116 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses

Informational power. The predictor variable of race – African American ($\beta^7 = -.172$, $t(326) = -3.103$, $p .027$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are $-.172$ times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to use Informational power. The predictor variable of gender-female ($\beta^9 = -.108$, $t(326) = -2.033$, $p .043$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are $-.108$ times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to use informational power (Table 15).

The overall model for legitimacy of position power was statistically significant ($F(10, 326) = 3.039$, $p .045$, with an R^2 of $.055$). The predictor variables of political predisposition ($\beta^3 = .123$, $t(326) = 2.217$, $p .027$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are $.123$ times more likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to use legitimacy of position power. The predictor variable of gender-female ($\beta^9 = -.110$, $t(326) = -1.979$, $p .049$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are $-.110$ times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to use legitimacy of position power (Table 16).

The overall model for legitimacy of reciprocity power was not statistically significant ($F(10, 326) = 1.831$, $p .054$, with an R^2 of $.053$). The predictor variables of age ($\beta^1 = -.124$, $t(326) = -2.148$, $p .032$) was statistically significant and indicated that

the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.124 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses legitimacy of reciprocity power. The predictor variable of political predisposition ($\beta^3 = .144, t(326) = 2.593, p .010$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are .114 times more likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses legitimacy of reciprocity power (Table 17).

The overall model for legitimacy of dependence power was statistically significant ($F(10, 326) = 4.634, p < .001$, with an R^2 of .124). The predictor variables of age ($\beta^1 = -.294, t(326) = 5.272, p < .001$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.294 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses legitimacy of dependence power. The predictor variable of race – african American ($\beta^7 = -.127, t(326) = -2.293, p .022$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.127 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses legitimacy of dependence power. The predictor variable of political appointees ($\beta^{10} = .115, t(326) = 2.056, p .041$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are .115 times more likely per standard deviation than in the criminal justice/military function group to use legitimacy of dependence power (Table 18).

The overall model for legitimacy of equity power was statistically significant ($F(10, 326) = 3.188, p .001$, with an R^2 of .089). The predictor variables of age ($\beta^1 = -.123, t(326) = -2.158, p .032$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.123 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses legitimacy of equity power. The predictor variable of social services and education ($\beta^4 = -.291, t(326) = -2.597, p .010$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.291 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses legitimacy of equity power. The predictor variable of administrative ($\beta^5 = -.260, t(326) = -2.768, p .006$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.260 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses legitimacy of equity power. The predictor variable of Other ($\beta^6 = -.230, t(326) = -2.421, p .016$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.230 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses legitimacy of equity power. The predictor variable of race - other minority ($\beta^8 = .177, t(326) = 3.067, p .002$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are .177 times more likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses legitimacy of equity power. The predictor variable of gender-female ($\beta^9 = .109, t(326) = 2.005, p .046$) was statistically significant and

indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.109 times more likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses legitimacy of equity power (Table 19).

The overall model for personal reward power was statistically significant ($F(10, 326) = 2.220, p .016$, with an R^2 of .035 (Table 20). The predictor variables of age ($\beta^1 = -.196, t(326) = -3.407, p .001$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.196 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses personal reward power. The predictor variable of race – African American ($\beta^7 = -.119, t(326) = -2.071, p .039$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.119 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses personal reward power.

The overall model for personal coercion power was statistically significant ($F(10, 326) = 1.896, p .045$, with an R^2 of .055 (Table 21). The predictor variable race – African American ($\beta^7 = -.209, t(326) = <.001, p < .001$) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.209 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses personal coercion power.

Research question 3: How do state employees rank the use of the individual bases of social power by politicians and political appointees? The civil service employees ranked the usage of the power bases by the political appointees as follows: informational power ($M = 5.06, SD = 1.13$), legitimacy of dependence ($M = 5.01, SD = 1.20$),

legitimacy of position ($M = 4.72$, $SD = 1.32$), expert power ($M = 4.65$, $SD = 1.50$), impersonal coercive ($M = 4.35$, $SD = 1.56$), referent power ($M = 4.30$, $SD = 1.45$), personal reward ($M = 4.23$, $SD = 1.42$), legitimacy of reciprocity ($M = 3.95$, $SD = 1.31$), personal coercion ($M = 3.71$, $SD = 1.52$), impersonal reward ($M = 3.62$, $SD = 1.78$), and legitimacy of equity power ($M = 2.85$, $SD = 1.05$) (Table 22). Overall, SPS employees ranked the usage of the soft power tactics ($M = 4.65$, $SD 1.09$) harsh power tactics ($M = 3.31$, $SD .74$) and is constant with previous research (Table 22). State employees slightly differed in their perception of the usage of the bases of social power by political appointees. Notably, state employees ranked the usage of legitimacy of dependence, expert, and impersonal coercive power bases in higher positions than the political employees. Conversely, they ranked the usage of legitimacy of position, referent, and personal reward power bases in lower positions than political appointees. State employees ranked the usage of informational, legitimacy of reciprocity, personal coercion, impersonal reward, and legitimacy of equity the same as political appointees.

Research question 4 question is redundant as research question one asks the same question.

Post-hoc analyses of the multiple logistical regression: Fixed model, R^2 deviation from zero was conducted using G*Power 3.1.9.2 and result in $f^2 = .02$, $\alpha = 0.05$, $\beta = 0.9999005$. The means and standard deviations for the likelihood of usage of the social power tactics by political appointees and SPS civil service employees were calculated and compared. The results are similar with a few minor variations in the ranking and is consistent with prior research

Presentation of the Results

All tables, charts, figures, and descriptions are presented by order presented in the chapter. The tables, charts, figures, and descriptions are cited in the study as there are presented in the chapters for the ease of reading. The tables, charts, figures, and descriptions are found in the List of Tables and List of figures.

Summary

The analysis of research question one shows that political appointees prefer to use the soft power tactics over harsh power tactics and it consistent with studies of other organizational settings. Therefore, the null hypotheses is rejected and the alternate hypotheses is accepted.

The results of research question 2 analysis indicated that political appointees use of Referent ($\beta = .16, t (2.82) = p .005$) and legitimacy of dependence ($\beta = .12, t (2.06) = p .041$) social power bases was significant overall. Within each of the individual power bases there were statistically significant predictors of social power usage. Independent variables of age and race-African American were significant in the power bases. Age was found to be significant predictor in four of the harsh power tactics and four of the soft power tactics. Age was a significant predictor of the use the harsh power tactics of impersonal reward power, expert power, legitimacy of equity, and legitimacy of reciprocity. Age was also a significant predictor in the usage of the soft power tactics of referent power, informational power, legitimacy of dependency power, and personal reward power. The independent variable of race-African American was a significant predictor in significant predictor in four of the harsh power tactics and three of the soft

power tactics. The race-African American independent variable was a significant predictor in the usage of the soft power tactics of referent power, information power, legitimacy of dependence power, and personal reward power. race-African American was a significant predictor in the usage of the hard power tactics of impersonal reward power, impersonal coercive power, and personal coercion power.

The analysis of research question three shows that Florida SPS career service employees rank the usage of the soft power tactics over harsh power tactics and it consistent with the political appointees and studies of other organizational settings (Raven, et al., 1998; Erchul, et al., 2001; Schwarzwald, et al., 2004; Pierro, et al., 2008; Pierro, et. al., 2012, 2004; and Aiello, et al., 2013). However, SPS career service employees did rank soft power tactics lower than the political appointees did (Table 24).

Research Subquestion 3 was a redundant question and eliminated from the study. The question asked the same question as the Research Question. The removal of the question helped clarify the findings of the study..

Conclusion

The study addressed the usage of the bases of social power tactics by Florida's political appointees in the SPS after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The Service First Initiative (2001) radically reformed Florida's Civil Service System by reducing traditional merit protection and reclassified just over 16,000 CS employees to the Selected Exempt employment classification (Summary of Service First, 2001). The reclassification to the Selected Exempt employment classification essentially made those employees political appointees. The stated goal of the Service First Initiative was to make

SPS employees more responsive to government executives (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). The Service First Initiative changed the employee-employer relationship and had not been studied. French and Raven (1959) stated that how one perceives the target of the influence affects the power tactic used to influence the target of the influence. The study also investigated what are the predictors of the usage of the social power tactics. The instrument used to collect the data included the interpersonal power inventory (Raven et al., 1998), political predisposition measure (Federico et al.,) and a questionnaire relating to the participant's demographic characteristics.

The responses to the survey were used to determine that Florida's political appointees use the soft power tactics over the harsh power tactics and is consistent with other organizational settings. The independent variables of age is a significant predictor of the use of the soft power tactics of referent power, informational power, the legitimacy of dependency power, and personal reward power. Age is also a significant predictor of the use of the harsh power tactics of impersonal reward power, expert power, the legitimacy of equity, and legitimacy of reciprocity. Race-African American is a significant predictor in the usage of the soft power tactics of referent power, information power, the legitimacy of dependence power, and personal reward power. Race-African American was a significant predictor in the usage of the hard power tactics of impersonal reward power, impersonal coercive power, and personal coercion power.

Chapter five focused on the study's interpretation of the results that are presented in Chapter four. Chapter five will explain the premise of why the study was conducted

and the findings of each research question and social change implications. Chapter five also present recommendations for both action and additional research.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

The purpose of the study was to examine the usage of the bases of social power (French & Raven, 1959) by Florida's politicians and political appointees to determine whether their harsh and soft power tactics usage is consistent with other organizational settings after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). I also wanted to determine what the predictors of the use of the harsh and soft power tactics are and how state employees ranked the use of the social power tactics by political appointees. The Service First Initiative radically reformed Florida's SPS and changed the employer-employee relationship (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). Previous research has failed to investigate what effect the changes had on the bases of social power usage by Florida's politicians and political appointees. The results of this study provided a framework with which to understand the extent of the usage of the bases of social power after the passage of the Service First Initiative.

The theoretical framework of the study was comprised of French and Raven's (1959) bases of social power theory and the IPIM (Raven, 1992). I used the IPI (Raven et al., 1998) to measure the usage and identify the predictors of the harsh and soft power tactics and how state employees ranked the usage of the power tactics by political appointees. The PPM (Federico et al., 2005a) was used to determine the political predispositions of SPS employees. I developed a questionnaire to collect demographic data from the participants.

I employed a quantitative, stratified, cross-sectional design in this study, and the study population was 5,005 political appointees, civil service employees in Florida's SPS, and Florida cabinet officers. There were 11 dependent variables that consisted of the power tactics of the IPIM. The independent variables were the participant's age; education; political predisposition; employment classifications of social services and education, administration, and other; race; gender, and political appointees. I mailed the informed consent form, invitation to participate letter, survey, business reply envelope, and reminder postcard to participants via their work mailing addresses. The data collection period lasted 30 days with a response rate of 7.07%. The responses to the 11 IPI scale items were subjected to a factor analysis in which I used maximum likelihood and varimax rotation. The means and standard deviations of the 11 items on the IPI scale were calculated to determine the usage of the individual bases of social power. I also performed a standard multiple regression involving the forced entry method to examine the usage of the social power bases by the political appointees, with the criminal justice/military functional group being the control variable.

The findings of the study revealed that political appointees used soft power tactics over harsh power tactics and were consistent with prior research in other organizational settings. CS employees ranked the usage of the power tactics by political appointees in a similar manner as political appointees with some minor ranking differences. Multiple regression indicated political appointees' usage of referent and legitimacy of dependence power tactics is statistically significant overall. Age is a statistically significant predictor of the usage of the soft power tactics of expert, referent, informational, legitimacy of

dependency, and personal reward power and the harsh power tactics of personal coercion, legitimacy of reciprocity, and legitimacy of equity. The social services and education variable is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the harsh power tactics of reward impersonal and legitimacy of equity power. The administrative variable is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the harsh power tactic of legitimacy of equity. Race – African American is a statistically significant predictor of that usage of the soft power tactics of referent, information, legitimacy of dependence, and personal reward power and the harsh power tactics of impersonal reward, expert, legitimacy of equity, and legitimacy of reciprocity power. The race – other minority variable is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the soft power tactic of referent power and the harsh power tactic of legitimacy of equity power. The gender - female variable was a statistically significant predictor of the use of the soft power tactic of information power and the harsh power tactics of legitimacy of reciprocity, coercive impersonal, and legitimacy of equity power. The political appointees variable is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the soft power tactics of referent and legitimacy of dependence power. The political predisposition variable is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the harsh power tactic of legitimacy of reciprocity power. The predictor variable of education is not a statistically significant predictor of any of the 11 power tactics.

The findings of this study indicate that political appointees use soft power tactics over harsh power tactics. The findings are consistent with studies of other organizational settings. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the alternate hypotheses was accepted.

Interpretations of the Findings

The reforms of the Service First Initiative (2001) were in keeping with the NPM doctrine that advocated at-will employment, the decentralization of human resource practices, and the elimination or reduction of employees' due process rights (Bowman, 2002; Hayes & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). The Service First Initiative altered the employee-employer relationship in Florida's SPS (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). Prior research identified evidence of patronage hiring and firings employment practices resulting from the passage of the Service First Initiative (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009; Bowman, 2002; Crowell & Guy, 2010; Harvey, 2013; Hollibaugh, 2015; Koven, 2007; Maranto & Johnson, 2008; Williams & Bowman, 2007). At-will employment practices have resulted in numerous political supporters being rewarded with government positions with questionable qualifications (Feeney & Kingsley, 2008; Moynihan & Roberts, 2010; Sundell, 2014). In this study, I found that the independent variables of political affiliation and political appointees are not statistically significant in the use of impersonal reward, personal reward, personal coercion, and impersonal coercion power. The findings of this study do not align with the results of prior research on the use of reward power in patronage employment practices in Florida's SPS.

Dahlstrom et al. (2012) found that politicians and their political appointees are more likely to use coercive power to punish potential and current employees who are not supportive of their views, while using reward power on their supporters. The findings of this study did not support Dahlstrom et al.'s findings because Florida's political appointees use of coercive and reward power was not statistically significant. My data

analysis showed that political appointees' use of referent ($\beta = .16, t (2.82), p = .005$) and legitimacy of dependence ($\beta = .12, t (2.06), p = .041$) power tactics as statistically significant overall (Tables 11–21). There was no evidence in the data analysis that political appointees or political predisposition were statistically significant predictors of the usage of the soft power tactic of personal reward power or the harsh power tactics of reward impersonal, coercive impersonal, and personal coercion power. The findings of this study do not support the prior research on the use of coercive or reward power in patronage employment practices in Florida's SPS.

As evidenced by the literature review, supervisors tend to prefer the use of soft power tactics over harsh power tactics in their attempts to influence subordinates (Aiello et al., 2013; Erchul et al., 2001; French & Raven, 1959; Pierro et al., 2008, Pierro et al., 2012; Schwarzwald et al., 2004). The results of this study were consistent with previous research in that political appointees prefer the use of soft power tactics over harsh power tactics. I found that the altered employee-employer relationship did not affect the political appointees' use of the soft or harsh power tactics.

French and Raven (1959) stated that social change agents' use of influence method(s) is dependent on how they perceive the target of the influence attempt, the organization, and their beliefs. In this study, I investigated independent variables that have an impact on the change agent's perceptions of the target of the influence attempt. I found that as the independent variable of age increases by 1 year, political appointees were less likely to use the harsh power tactics of reward impersonal, legitimacy of reciprocity, and legitimacy of equity power and the soft power tactics of expert, referent,

informational, legitimacy of dependence, and personal reward. The independent variable of political predisposition showed that criminal justice/military political appointees were less likely to use the legitimacy of position and legitimacy of reciprocity power tactic. The independent variable of social services/education political appointees showed that criminal justice/military political appointees were less likely to use reward impersonal power and more likely to use legitimacy of equity power.

The independent variable of administrative showed that criminal justice/military political appointees were less likely to use reward impersonal power and more likely to use the legitimacy of equity power. The predictor independent variable of the other functional grouping showed that criminal justice/military political appointees are more likely to use legitimacy of equity power. Criminal justice/military political appointees are more likely to use the harsh power tactics of reward impersonal, coercive impersonal, and personal coercion and the soft power tactics of referent, informational, legitimacy of dependence, and personal reward power.

The race-African American independent variable showed that criminal justice/military political appointees were more likely to use the harsh power tactics of reward impersonal, coercive impersonal, and personal coercion. The race-African American variable also showed they are more likely to use the soft power tactics of referent, informational, legitimacy of dependence, and personal reward power in attempts to influence African Americans compared to Whites. The variable is a major predictor of the use of the power tactics.

The race-other minority independent variable showed that criminal justice/military political appointees were more likely to use the harsh power tactics of referent and legitimacy of equity in influence attempts. The race-other minority was not associated with the use of the soft power tactics. The variable was not a major predictor of the uses of the different power tactics.

The gender-female independent variable showed that criminal justice/military political appointees are more likely to use coercive impersonal, informational, legitimacy of position, legitimacy of equity power on female employees when compared to male employees. Criminal justice/military independent appointees are more likely to use referent power and legitimacy of dependence power tactics than CS employees. The results of this study further showed the independent variable of education was not statistically significant predictor of any of the power tactics.

Limitations of the Study

There are several limitations identified in the study. As identified in Chapter 1, the first limitation involved nonresponse bias due to the limited number of research participants. A larger number of responses would most likely provide a better cross-section of career service and political appointees in Florida's SPS. The histograms scores and p-plot of regression standardized residual are nearly identical and may be the result of nonresponse bias (Figures 1-22). It is a matter of question as to what effect a larger response from the research population would significantly change the findings of the study. The second limitation involved the bias that results from the wording of the questions of the survey. Even with utilizing the IPI (Raven et al., 1998) as the survey

instrument, several respondents made handwritten comments on the returned surveys indicating that they did not believe the survey questions to be valid and therefore reducing the response rate. The third limitation involved that the study did not investigate the motivational factors that influence Florida's politicians and political appointee's use of bases of social power and the 11 power tactics. Additional research should be conducted to determine the motivational factors behind the uses of the power tactics. The fourth limitation involved the use of the cross-sectional design did not allow a pretest-post-test comparison (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). The inability to conduct a pretest of the before the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001) results in causation to be logically inferred (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Finally, the fifth limitation involved the low number of independent variables used in the study to predict the usage of the individual power tactics. Additional independent variables would increase the likelihood of the discovery of additional predictors of the usage of the power tactics.

The study showed that Florida's political appointees use the power tactics in a manner that is consistent with other organizational settings, after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). Political appointees used and preferred soft power tactics over the harsh power tactics. French and Raven (1959) stated change agent's usage of the powers tactics is affected by how the change agent perceives the target of the influence attempt. Eleven independent variables were identified as potential factors that might have an effect on the political appointee's perceptions of their subordinates. The study identified predictors of the usage of the eleven power tactics of the IPI (Raven, 1998). The study

determined that the independent variables of age and race – African American are major predictors of the usage of the 11 power tactics.

Future research involving the predictors of the use of the power tactics should attempt to determine the motivations behind the usage of power tactics. Age and race - African American are identified as two major predictors of the use of the power tactics. Motivations can be subliminal, and supervisors may not be aware of possible discriminatory motivations in their choice of power tactic to use. Follow on research should investigate the independent variables of age and race -African American to determine if discrimination is the cause of the usage of the tactics.

Age is a statistically significant predictor of that usage of the soft power tactics of expert, referent, informational, legitimacy of dependency, and personal reward power and the harsh power tactics of personal coercion, legitimacy of reciprocity, and legitimacy of equity. The social services and education variable is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the harsh power tactics of reward impersonal and legitimacy of equity. The administrative variable is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the harsh power tactic is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the harsh power tactic of legitimacy of equity. Race – African American is a statistically significant predictor of that usage of the soft power tactics of referent power, information power, legitimacy of dependence power, and personal reward power and the harsh power tactics of impersonal reward power, expert power, legitimacy of equity, and legitimacy of reciprocity. The race – other minority variable is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the soft power tactic of referent power and the harsh power tactic of legitimacy of equity. The gender -

female variable was a statistically significant predictor of the use of the soft power tactic of information power and the harsh power tactics of legitimacy of reciprocity, coercive impersonal, and legitimacy of equity power. The political appointees variable is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the soft power tactics of referent and legitimacy of dependence. The political predisposition variable is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the harsh power tactic of legitimacy of reciprocity. The predictor variable of education is not a statistically significant predictor of any of the power tactics.

The finding of this study indicate that political appointees use soft power tactics over harsh power tactics. The finding also show political appointees use of social power is consistent with organizational settings. The null hypotheses was rejected, and the Alternate hypotheses was accepted.

Implications for Social Change

The study investigated the gap in the literature that existed as a result of the changed employer-employee relationship caused by the radical civil service reforms in Florida with the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). Researchers identified radical reforms to civil service systems as a cause of the changed employer-employee relationship (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). The study provides a framework for organizations to address the shortcomings of the radical reforms and the failure achieve to achieve the objectives of the reforms. The study advances the knowledge of the use of the bases of social power in unique organizational settings that have undertaken radical civil service reforms. The study identified the extent politicians

and political appointee's use the individual bases of social power tactics as related to the changed employer-employee relationship. The identification of the prominent usage of each power base will help identify areas where organizations can identify leadership training protocols designed to teach politicians and political appointees the appropriate use of the bases of social power and improve their leadership skills, employee loyalty, employee responsiveness, and government efficiency.

Across the nation, there are additional calls for radically reforming civil service systems at the federal, state, and local levels of government. Research on past reforms has shown that the goals of reforms have largely not achieved the desired outcomes (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). The study benefits the field by identifying the extent each base of power is used in government organization after the radical reforms to the human resource practices in Florida. Leaders engage in a wide variety of power bases to influence organizational members (French & Raven, 1959). The results of the study can then be compared to other organizational settings to differentiate differences in the usage of the bases of power by leaders. By comparing the result of the study to other types of successful organizational settings that have radically reformed their human resource practices, leaders can identify areas of the reforms that are not conducive to achieve policy goals and organizational effectiveness. The identification of over reliance on harsh or soft power tactics provides a framework for leaders to develop leadership training programs that ultimately improve leadership skills, organizational climate, employee loyalty, employee responsiveness, and government efficiency.

The findings of the study present broader implications for positive social change, besides the determination of the extent each social power usage. Not only does the study provide empirical data on the usage of each power base, but it also allows policy maker to discern the differences in the uses of power bases when compared to other organizational settings. Policy makers are then able to identify leadership traits that have negative influence on organizational and personal outcomes. The application of the social power bases influences almost every imaginable organizational outcome (Pfeffer, 1981). The study provides a base of knowledge that will help policymakers determine how the application of the bases of social power influences positive or negatives organizational outcomes. By understanding the application of the different bases of power on organizational outcomes, policymakers contemplating additional reforms can develop strategies and training procedures that improve leadership skills, employee loyalty, responsiveness, and government efficiency.

Based on the findings of this study, all governmental organizations should identify how the power tactics are employed within-in their organization by political leaders, political appointees, supervisors, and employees to ensure there is not an over reliance with the usage of the harsh power tactics. The over reliance on the usage harsh power tactics have been identified with negative organizational and personal outcomes, while the usage of the soft power tactics has been identified with positive organizational and personal outcome. The finding of the study identified predictors of the use of the eleven power tactics. The findings of provide a framework for the development of targeted leadership training that addresses the negative and positive effects to the usage

of the power tactics and dependent variables that have been identified as statically significant in the usage of harsh and soft power tactics.

The prospect of future research into the use of the application of social power is grounded in what are the predictors of the application of the power tactics across different organizational settings. For example, the criminal justice/military grouping tends to use the harsh power tactics a higher rate than the other political appointee functional groupings. Future research should investigate to determine if the criminal justice/military function grouping's reliance on the use of the harsh power tactic can be reduced and therefore lead to improved organizational and individual outcome. For that matter, all leaders use of the harsh power settings could be reduced and lead to improved organizational and individual outcomes, and the improvement in the delivery of government services. The broader implications for positive change involve the identification of leadership traits that both positively and negatively impact the application of social power and to allow policymakers, executives, political appointees to develop or undertake strategies and training to improve leadership abilities, organizational commitment, employee responsiveness to leaders, and government efficiency.

Conclusion

The study investigated a neglected area of research in the use of the bases of social power in government civil service organizations that had undergone radical civil service reforms know as new public management (NPM), Florida radically altered its civil service with the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The reforms altered the

employee-employer relationship by reclassifying low-level supervisor as at-will employees, decentralization of HR practices, elimination or reduction of the employees' due process rights (Bowman, 2002; Hayes & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). Florida's reclassification of low-level supervisors as at-will employees effectively made them political employees. The literature review found that supervisors and subordinates in other organizational settings that had not radically reformed their HR practices preferred the use of soft power tactics over the harsh power tactics.

The study's findings are consistent with the findings of the previous research as political appointees and career service employees in Florida's SPS rank the use of the soft power tactics over the harsh power tactics. The study also attempted to identify what is the predictors of the different power tactics. Political employees and career service SPS employees were divided into groups based on their agency, department, or autonomous entities primary organizational functions. The main findings of the research indicated the model for referent and legitimacy of dependence was statistically significant in predicting their usage.

The predictors of the usage of the power tactics were measured eleven differentiated power tactics of the IPI (Raven et al., 1998) and demographic factors of the political appointees and career service employees. The most significant findings of the study are that the independent variable of age is a significant predictor of soft power tactics of expert, referent, informational, legitimacy of dependency, and personal reward power and the harsh power tactics of personal coercion, legitimacy of reciprocity, and legitimacy of equity. The independent variable of race-African American is a statistically

significant predictor of that usage of the soft power tactics of referent power, information power, legitimacy of dependence power, and personal reward power and the harsh power tactics of impersonal reward power, expert power, legitimacy of equity, and legitimacy of reciprocity. The independent variable gender-female is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the soft power tactic of information power and the harsh power tactics of legitimacy of reciprocity, coercive impersonal, and legitimacy of equity power. The other variables are not as significant in predicting the use of the hard or soft power tactics. The independent variable education was not statistically significant in predicting any of the power tactics.

The findings of the study suggest future research to investigate the motivations behind the statistically significant predictors of the power tactics. Future research should also investigate additional predictors of the use of the power tactics. Investigating the motivations behind the usage of the different power tactics and additional variables will provide a clearer understanding of the usage of the power tactics.

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Appendix A: Political Predisposition Measure

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very liberal	Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Moderate	Slightly Conservative	Conservative	Very Conservative

Note: Test name created by PsycTESTS

PsycTESTS Citation:

Federico, C. M., Golec, A., & Dial, J. L. (2005). Political Predisposition Measure [Database record]. Retrieved from PsycTESTS. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/t17677-000>

Test Format:

This measure employs a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative). Responses are averaged to form a composite. The higher the score, the greater the level of conservatism.

Source:

Federico, Christopher M., Golec, Agnieszka, & Dial, Jessica L. (2005). The Relationship Between the Need for Closure and Support for Military Action Against Iraq: Moderating Effects of National Attachment. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, Vol 31(5), 621-632. doi: 10.1177/0146167204271588, © 2005 by Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. Reproduced by Permission of Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

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doi: 10.1037/t17677-000

Political Predisposition Measure

1. How would you describe your political outlook with regard to **economic issues** (circle one)?

2. How would you describe your political outlook with regard to **social issues** (circle one)?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very liberal	Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Moderate	Slightly Conservative	Conservative	Very Conservative

Appendix B: Interpersonal Power Inventory

Interpersonal Power Inventory Items (Subordinate Form)

Reward Impersonal

- _ A good evaluation from my supervisor could lead to an increase in pay.
- _ My supervisor could help me receive special benefits.
- _ My supervisor's actions could help me get a promotion.

Coercive Impersonal

- _ My supervisor could make things unpleasant for me.
- _ My supervisor could make it more difficult for me to get a promotion.
- _ My supervisor could make it more difficult for me to get a pay increase.

Expert Power

- _ My supervisor probably knew the best way to do the job.
- _ My supervisor probably knew more about the job than I did.
- _ My supervisor probably had more technical knowledge about this than I did.

Referent Power

- _ I respected my supervisor and thought highly of him/her and did not wish to disagree.
- _ I saw my supervisor as someone I could identify with.
- _ I looked up to my supervisor and generally modeled my work accordingly.

Informational Power

- _ Once it was pointed out, I could see why the change was necessary.
- _ My supervisor gave me good reasons for changing how I did the job.
- _ I could then understand why the recommended change was for the better.

Legitimacy/Position

- _ After all, he/she was my supervisor.
- _ My supervisor had the right to request that I do my work in a particular way.
- _ As a subordinate, I had an obligation to do as my supervisor said.

Legitimacy/Reciprocity

- _ For past considerations I had received, I felt obliged to comply.
- _ My supervisor had previously done some good things that I had requested.
- _ My supervisor had let me have my way earlier so I felt obliged to comply now.

Legitimacy/Dependence

- _ Unless I did so, his/her job would be more difficult.
- _ I understood that my supervisor really needed my help on this.
- _ I realized that a supervisor needs assistance and cooperation from those working with him/her.

Legitimacy/Equity

- _ By doing so, I could make up for some problems I may have caused in the past.
- _ Complying helped make up for things I had not done so well previously.
- _ I had made some mistakes and therefore felt that I owed this to him/her.

Personal Reward

- _ I liked my supervisor and his/her approval was important to me.
- _ My supervisor made me feel more valued when I did as requested.
- _ It made me feel personally accepted when I did as my supervisor asked.

Personal Coercion

- _ It would have been disturbing to know that my supervisor dis- approved of me.
- _ My supervisor may have been cold and distant if did not do as requested.
- _ Just knowing that I was on the bad side of my supervisor would have upset me.

Appendix C: Demographic Information Survey Questions

Please check the response that most accurately describes you. Provide only one answer per question.

Sex?

- Female
- Male

What year did you start working for the State of Florida?

- 2016
- 2015
- 2014
- 2013
- 2012
- 2011
- 2010
- 2009
- 2008
- 2007
- 2006
- 2005
- 2004
- 2003
- 2002
- 2001
- 2000 or before

What is your age?

- 18-20 years
- 21-25 years
- 26-30 years
- 31-35 years
- 36-40 years
- 41-45 years
- 46-50 years
- 51-55 years
- 56-60 years
- 61-65 years
- 66-70 years

71- or over

What is your race/ethnicity?

- Black or African American
- American Indian and Alaska Native
- Asian
- Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander
- Hispanic
- White non-Hispanic

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- High School or GED
- Associate Degree
- Bachelor Degree
- Masters Degree
- Ph.D or Terminal Degree

What is your employment classification?

- Career Service
- Exempt Service
- Senior Management Service
- Elected politician

What State of Florida agency, department, or autonomous entities do you work for?

- Department of Agriculture and Consumer Service
- Commission on Offender Review
- Agency for Health Care Administration
- Department of Economic Opportunity
- Department of Military Affairs
- Public Service Commission
- Department of Financial Service
- Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
- Agency for Persons with Disabilities
- Department of Education
- Department of State
- Department of Legal Affairs
- Department of Law Enforcement
- Agency for State Technology
- Department of Elder Affairs
- Department of Transportation

- _ Department of Revenue
- _ Department of Business and Professional Regulation
- _ Department of Environmental Protection
- _ Division of Emergency Management
- _ Department of Veterans' Affairs
- _ Department of Children and Families
- _ Department of Health
- _ Executive Office of the Governor
- _ Division of Administrative Hearings
- _ Department of Citrus
- _ Department of Juvenile Justice
- _ Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission
- _ Department of Corrections
- _ Department of Management Services
- _ School for the Deaf and the Blind
- _ Florida Cabinet

What is your pay band and level?

<u>Pay Band</u>	<u>Level</u>
_ 001 _ 013	_ 1
_ 002 _ 014	_ 2
_ 003 _ 015	_ 3
_ 004 _ 016	_ 4
_ 005 _ 017	_ 5
_ 006 _ 018	_ 6
_ 007 _ 019	
_ 008 _ 020	
_ 009 _ 021	
_ 010 _ 022	
_ 011 _ 023	
_ 012 _ 024	

List of Tables

Table 1.

Participant Demographics: Age

	Frequency	Percent
2017	27	7.63
2016	39	11.02
2015	12	3.39
2014	19	5.37
2013	14	3.95
2012	13	3.67
2011	8	2.26
2010	7	1.98
2009	12	3.39
2008	18	5.08
2007	21	5.93
2006	6	1.69
2005	14	3.95
2004	16	4.52
2003	10	2.82
2002	3	0.85
2001	14	3.95
2000 or Before	97	27.40
Total	350	98.87
Missing	4	1.13
Total	354	100.00

Table 2.

Participant Demographics: Education

Education	Frequency	Percent
High School or GED	70	19.9
Associate Degree	46	13.1
Bachelor Degree	142	40.5
Masters Degree	91	25.9
Ph.D or Terminal Degree	2	.6
Missing	3	

Note. 3 Participants did not answer the education question ($N = 351$).

Table 3.

Political Predisposition of Participants

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Very Liberal	12	3.39	3.41
1.5	15	4.24	4.26
Liberal	32	9.04	9.09
2.5	33	9.32	9.38
Slightly Liberal	24	6.78	6.82
3.5	30	8.47	8.52
Moderate	47	13.28	13.35
4.5	22	6.21	6.25
Slightly Conservative	35	9.89	9.94
5.5	9	2.54	2.56
Conservative	53	14.97	15.06
6.5	30	8.47	8.52
Very Conservative	10	2.82	2.84
Total	352	99.44	100.00
Missing		2	0.56
Total		354	100

Note. Mean = 4.13

Table 4.

Participants Demographics: Functional Areas

	<i>N</i>	Percent
Administrative Agencies	67	18.9
Criminal Justice-Military Agencies	97	27.4
Social Services-Education Agencies	121	34.2
Other Agencies	63	17.8
Total	348	98.3
<u>Missing</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>1.7</u>

Note. *N* = 348

Table 5.

Participant Demographics: Race/Ethnicity

Race/Ethnicity	Frequency	Percent
Black or African American	63	18.1
American Indian and Alaska Native	8	2.3
Asian	19	5.5
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander	2	.6
Hispanic	10	2.9
White non-Hispanic	210	60.3
More than 1	36	10.3
Total	348	
Missing	6	100.00

Note. *N* = 346

Table 6

Gender Demographics

<i>Gender</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Male	196	55.4
Female	154	43.5
Total	350	98.9
Missing	4	1.1

Note. 4 Participants did not answer the gender question ($N = 350$)

Table 7.

Participants Demographics: Employments Classification

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Career Service	296	83.6
Political Appointees	56	15.8
Total	352	99.4
Missing	2	.6

Table 8.

Participants Demographics: Agency, Department, or Autonomous Entities (

	Frequency	Percent
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Service	23	6.6
Agency for Health Care Administration	4	1.1
Department of Economic Opportunity	4	1.1
Department of Military Affairs	2	.6
Public Service Commission	4	1.1
Department of Financial Services	13	3.7
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles	19	5.5
Agency for Persons with Disabilities	4	1.1
Department of Education	21	6.0
Department of State	5	1.4
Department of Law Enforcement	15	4.3
Department of Transportation	38	10.9
Department of Revenue	8	2.3
Department of Business and Professional Regulation	7	2.0
Department of Environmental Protection	13	3.7
Department of Emergency Management	2	.6
Department of Veteran's Affairs	3	.9
Department of Children and Families	33	9.5
Department of Health	46	13.2
Department of Juvenile Justice	17	4.9
Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission	12	3.4
Department of Corrections	51	14.7
School for the Deaf and the Blind	4	1.1
Missing	6	

Note. 7 Participants did not answer the agency, department, or autonomous entities Question ($N = 348$)

Table 9.

Factor Loading for SPS Employees Responses on the IPI Form

Power Base Indexes	Factor I	Factor II	Coefficient Alphas for Primary Factor
Soft Bases			
Expert Power	0.80	0.05	0.91
Informational Power	0.78	0.04	0.91
Referent Power	0.67	0.27	0.82
Legitimacy of Dependence	0.59	0.07	0.71
Personal Reward	0.43	0.65	0.82
Harsh Bases			
Reward Impersonal	0.22	0.79	0.84
Personal Coercion	0.07	0.72	0.74
Legitimacy of Reciprocity	0.18	0.61	0.65
Legitimacy of Position	0.2	0.54	0.79
Coercive Impersonal	0.25	0.48	0.74
Legitimacy of Equity	0.17	0.33	0.91

Table 10.

Political Appointees Ranking of Social Power Bases

Bases of Social Power	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
		5.18	
Information Power	56	1.13	5.09
Legitimacy of Position	56	1.04	5.07
Legitimacy of Dependence	56	0.96	4.83
Referent Power	56	1.02	4.58
Expert Power	56	1.42	4.30
Personal Reward	56	1.20	4.27
Impersonal Coercive	56	1.69	4.04
Legitimacy of Reciprocity	56	1.09	3.90
Personal Coercion	56	1.23	3.54
Impersonal Reward	56	1.46	2.91
Legitimacy of Equity	56	1.52	

Table 11.

Regression Coefficients for Reward Impersonal

Model 1	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i> <i>B</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
(Constant)	3.198	.551		5.808	.000
Age	-.166	.035	-.261	-4.692	.000
Education	.106	.092	.064	1.156	.248
Political Predisposition	.104	.055	.101	1.887	.060
Social services Education	1.084	.385	.308	2.813	.005
Administrative	.955	.405	.216	2.355	.019
Other	.387	.416	.087	.931	.353
Race – African American	-.627	.247	-.140	-2.534	.012
Race – Other Minority	-.042	.237	-.010	-.178	.859
Gender Female	-.012	.187	-.003	-.064	.949
Political Appointees	.157	.260	.034	.605	.546

Table 12

Regression Coefficients for Coercive Impersonal Power

Model	<i>SE</i>		β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>			
(Constant)	4.707	.522		9.013	.000
Age	.007	.033	.012	.205	.838
Education	-.083	.087	-.056	-.961	.337
Political Predisposition	.037	.052	.039	.710	.478
Social Services Education	.161	.366	.050	.440	.660
Administrative	-.415	.385	-.103	-1.079	.281
Other	-.443	.394	-.109	-1.123	.262
Race African American	-.475	.235	-.116	-2.023	.044
Race Other Minority	.036	.225	.009	.160	.873
Gender Female	-.350	.177	-.110	-1.970	.049
Political Appointees	-.110	.246	-.026	-.445	.657

Table 13.

Regression Coefficients for Expert Power

Model	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
(Constant)	5.197	.485		10.705	.000
Age	-.118	.031	-.214	-3.776	.000
Education	.056	.081	.039	.693	.489
Political Predisposition	.015	.048	.017	.319	.750
Social Services Education	-.046	.340	-.015	-.136	.892
Administrative	.122	.357	.032	.341	.733
Other	-.619	.367	-.160	-1.689	.092
Race African American	-.231	.218	-.060	-1.061	.290
Race Other Minority	.339	.209	.094	1.621	.106
Gender Female	.005	.165	.002	.032	.974
Political Appointees	.241	.229	.060	14.051	.294

Table 14

Regression Coefficients for Referent Power

Model 1	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
(Constant)	5.756	.452		12.729	.000
Age	-.095	.029	-.186	-3.294	.001
Education	.003	.075	.002	.038	.970
Political Predisposition	-.064	.045	-.077	-1.426	.155
Social Services Education	-.323	.317	-.113	-1.019	.309
Administrative	-.486	.333	-.136	-1.460	.145
Other	-.312	.341	-.086	-.914	.362
Race African American	-.456	.203	-.126	-2.246	.025
Race Other Minority	-.678	.195	-.200	-3.483	.001
Gender Female	-.090	.153	-.032	-.585	.559
Political Appointees	.602	.213	.160	2.821	.005

Table 15

Regression Coefficients for Informational Power

Model		<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
1	(Constant)	6.017	.456		13.20	.000
	Age	-.128	.029	-.244	-4.391	.000
	Education	.109	.076	.080	1.432	.153
	Political Predisposition	-.019	.045	-.022	-.407	.684
	Social Services Education	-.222	.319	-.076	-.696	.487
	Administrative Other	-.192	.336	-.052	-.571	.569
	Other	-.195	.344	-.053	-.567	.571
	Race - African American	-.635	.205	-.172	-3.103	.002
	Race - Other Minority	.231	.196	.067	1.176	.241
	Gender Female	-.314	.155	-.108	-2.033	.043
	Political Appointees	.310	.215	.081	1.442	.150

Table 16.

Regression Coefficients for Legitimacy Position Power

Model 1	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
(Constant)	4.079	.424		9.629	.000
Age	.022	.027	.047	.805	.421
Education	.095	.070	.078	1.355	.177
Political Predisposition	.094	.042	.123	2.217	.027
Social Services Education	-.055	.296	-.021	-.184	.854
Administrative Other	-.234	.312	-.072	-.751	.453
Other	-.137	.320	-.041	-.428	.669
Race African American	.148	.190	.045	.780	.436
Race Other Minority	.241	.182	.078	1.324	.186
Gender Female	-.284	.144	-.110	-1.979	.049
Political Appointees	.274	.200	.080	1.372	.171

Table 17.

Regression Coefficients for Legitimacy of Reciprocity

Model 1	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
(Constant)	4.095	.426		9.619	.000
Age	-.059	.027	-.124	-2.148	.032
Education	.016	.071	.013	.225	.822
Political Predisposition	.110	.042	.144	2.593	.010
Social Services Education	-.358	.298	-.137	-1.203	.230
Administrative	-.541	.313	-.165	-1.726	.085
Other	-.076	.321	-.023	-.237	.813
Race African American	-.142	.191	-.043	-.744	.457
Race Other Minority	.129	.183	.041	.702	.483
Gender Female	.041	.144	.016	.285	.775
Political Appointees	.202	.201	.058	1.003	.316

Table 18.

Regression Coefficients for Legitimacy of Dependence

Model 1	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
(Constant)	6.027	.371		16.223	.000
Age	-.126	.024	-.294	-5.272	.000
Education	-.024	.062	-.022	-.388	.698
Political Predisposition	.038	.037	.055	1.035	.301
Social Services Education	-.339	.260	-.143	-1.303	.193
Administrative	-.367	.274	-.123	-1.342	.181
Other	-.318	.280	-.106	-1.135	.257
Race African American	-.383	.167	-.127	-2.293	.022
Race Other Minority	.234	.160	.083	1.464	.144
Gender Female	-.067	.126	-.029	-.536	.592
Political Appointees	.360	.175	.115	2.056	.041

Table 19.

Regression Coefficients for Legitimacy of Equity

Model 1	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
		<i>B</i>	β		
(Constant)	3.873	.479		8.094	.000
Age	-.066	.031	-.123	-2.158	.032
Education	-.067	.080	-.048	-.842	.400
Political Predisposition	.003	.048	.004	.072	.942
Social Services Education	-.870	.335	-.291	-2.597	.010
Administrative	-.975	.352	-.260	-2.768	.006
Other	-.875	.361	-.230	-2.421	.016
Race African American	.302	.215	.079	1.403	.162
Race Other Minority	.631	.206	.177	3.067	.002
Gender Female	.325	.162	.109	2.005	.046
Political Appointees	.402	.226	.102	1.780	.076

Table 20.

Regression Coefficients for Personal Reward

Model 1	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
		<i>B</i>	β		
(Constant)	4.775	.459		10.404	.000
Age	-.100	.029	-.196	-3.407	.001
Education	.092	.076	.070	1.210	.227
Political Predisposition	.074	.046	.089	1.609	.109
Social Services Education	-.280	.321	-.099	-.873	.383
Administrative	-.623	.338	-.175	-1.843	.066
Other	-.133	.347	-.037	-.383	.702
Race African American	-.427	.206	-.119	-2.071	.039
Race Other Minority	-.254	.197	-.075	-1.285	.200
Gender Female	-.102	.156	-.036	-.656	.512
Political Appointees	.127	.217	.034	.587	.558

Table 21.

Regression Coefficients for personal Coercion Power

Model 1	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
(Constant)	4.063	.488		8.330	.000
Age	.000	.031	.000	.008	.993
Education	.073	.081	.052	.896	.371
Political Predisposition	.006	.049	.007	.123	.902
Social Services Education	-.438	.341	-.146	-1.284	.200
Administrative	-.344	.359	-.091	-.957	.339
Other	-.128	.368	-.034	-.349	.727
Race African American	-.797	.219	-.209	-3.636	.000
Race Other Minority	-.220	.210	-.062	-1.050	.295
Gender Female	-.083	.165	-.028	-.503	.615
Political Appointees	.076	.230	.019	.330	.742

Table 22.

Civil Service Employees Ranking of Social Power Bases Usage; Means and Standard Deviations for the Likelihood of the Use of Social Power Bases

Power Base	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Information Power	296	5.06	1.48
Legitimacy of Dependence	296	5.01	1.20
Legitimacy of Position	296	4.72	1.32
Expert Power	296	4.48	1.50
Impersonal Coercive	296	4.35	1.56
Referent Power	296	4.30	1.45
Personal Reward	296	4.23	1.42
Legitimacy of Reciprocity	296	3.95	1.31
Personal Coercion	296	3.71	1.52
Impersonal Reward	296	3.62	1.78
Legitimacy of Equity	296	2.85	1.50

Table 23.

Means and Standard Deviations for the Likelihood of Harsh and Soft Power Tactics

		Harsh Power Tactics	Soft Power Tactics
Career Service	Mean	3.31	4.65
	N	296.00	296.00
	Std. Deviation	0.74	1.09
Political Appointees	Mean	3.54	4.79
	N	56.00	56.00
	Std. Deviation	0.72	0.70

List of Figures


Figure 1. Histogram reward impersonal power.

Figure 2: P-Plot of regression standardized residual reward impersonal power.




Figure 3: Histogram coercive impersonal power.




Figure 4: P-Plot of regression standardized residual coercive impersonal power.




Figure 5: Histogram expert power.




Figure 6: P-Plot of regression standardized residual expert power.




Figure 7: Histogram referent power.




Figure 8: P-Plot of regression standardized residual referent power.




Figure 9: Histogram information power.




Figure 10: P-Plot of regression standardized residual informational power.




Figure 11: Histogram legitimacy of position power.




Figure 12: P-Plot of regression standardized residual legitimacy of position power.




Figure 13: Histogram legitimacy of reciprocity power.




Figure 14: P-Plot of regression standardized residual legitimacy of reciprocity power.




Figure 15: Histogram legitimacy of dependence power.




Figure 16: P-Plot of regression standardized residual legitimacy of dependence power.




Figure 17: Histogram legitimacy of equity power.




Figure 18: P-Plot of regression standardized residual legitimacy of equity power.




Figure 19: Histogram personal reward power.




Figure 20: P-Plot of regression standardized residual personal reward power.




Figure 21: Histogram personal coercion power.




Figure 22: P-Plot of regression standardized residual personal coercion power.

