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Assessing Governmental Anticorruption Strategies: The Case of the National Anticorruption Commission in Cameroon

Daniel Ketuama Tangumonkem
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Walden University

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Abstract

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Anticorruption Commission in Cameroon

by

Daniel Ketuama Tangumonkem

LLM, Southern Methodist University, 2015

MPA, The University of Texas at Dallas, 2009

LLB, University of Yaoundé II, 2005

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

December 2018

Abstract

Combatting corruption in Cameroon has become a primary policy focus for the government and the civil society; yet, the success on that front has been modest. The literature on anticorruption efforts in the country is scant. Using Rothstein and Santiso's conceptualization of anticorruption strategies as the guide, the purpose of this case study of government's anticorruption policy and practice was to explore and contextualize the anticorruption strategies in Cameroon to fill the gap in the literature and potentially contribute to solving the problem. Data were collected through interviews with 20 government employees working with the government's main anticorruption agency –the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), and through documents obtained from government published archives and expert publications. The data were inductively coded and organized in themes, then an integrated content analysis was conducted on the themes. The key finding of the study is that the government's anticorruption strategies faced major challenges due to their poor design, formulation, and implementation. Potential approaches to addressing these challenges were also identified by participants to include leadership/political solutions such as regime change, institutional reforms such as granting NACC institutional autonomy, and conceptual solutions such as reforming NACC into an organization with judicial status. This study will impact positive social change through the recommendations it makes for good governance, which if implemented by the Cameroon government, would improve systems, institutions, and services to the citizens of the country. Another benefit is the improvement in government revenue, better investment budgets, and greater economic activity to alleviate poverty.

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Dedication

To my parents, Celine and Abraham Lekunze, who taught me the ways of the Lord of diligence and faith and reinforced in me the importance of education and gave me the tools for success from my childhood. To my beloved wife Rachel who stood by me through the process and taught me that all things are possible to those who are willing to learn and never afraid to try. To my brother Eric who has always been a great academic resource. To my only sister Joanna who kept the smile on my face with her entertaining words and hospitable service. And to our wonderful children, Eringo, Ebong, Elame, and Eyome, who gave me the reason and joy to embark on this journey.

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To my family members and friends, especially my wife, Rachel and my good friend, Valery I say thank you for believing in me.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Introduction

Corruption is one of the prevalent work-related and social behaviors that hamper the efficient and effective functioning of governments, organizations, and societies. Practices such as “bribery, fraud, embezzlement, kickbacks, cronyism, and extortion” (Berlinski, 2009, p. 74) represent corruption, which has emerged in recent decades as a critically important issue in developing countries and a major barrier to good governance, especially in Africa. Most developing democracies have been plagued by this phenomenon, while their governments are still aspiring to fully join the contemporary global markets that set high ethical standards for corporate business operations as a deterrent to both domestic and international corrupt practices in business (Kolk & van Tulder, 2005).

The global consequences of corruption are dire because corruption basically inflates the cost of goods and services without added value, thus undermining the microeconomy of nations. It has been argued that corruption serves as a breeding ground for social, economic, and political unrest, undermining democracy and the rule of law while distorting national and international trade. Furthermore, as argued, corruption jeopardizes sound governance and ethics in the private sector, threatens domestic and international security and the sustainability of natural resources, reinforces gender discrimination, and compounds political exclusion (Berlinski, 2009). Corruption also promotes nepotism and misappropriation of funds in the public and private sectors, creates a conflict of formal institutions and informal standards, sustains secrecy and inequality which contradict the creation and existence of democratic institutions,

decreases national productivity and increases inflation, worsens trade deficits, and generally hinders investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation (Shahabuddin, 2002).

Transparency International (TI), a German based and renowned international anticorruption nongovernment organization (NGO), has rated Cameroon more than once as the most corrupt nation in the world (Berlinski, 2009; TI, 2016). The first time Cameroon was rated as the most corrupt country of the world was in 1998 (TI, 1998). Then, Cameroon appeared at the bottom of TI's corruption perception index (CPI) chart, which rates countries from highly clean to highly corrupt, with 10 representing the cleanest nation and 0 representing the most corrupt nation. On this scale, Cameroon scored 1.4 and ranked the worst of the 85 countries that participated in TI's survey for that year (TI, 1998). In the second year (i.e., 1999), Cameroon scored 1.5 on TI's CPI and ranked 99th out of the 99 countries surveyed (TI, 1999). Since then, the country has developed several anticorruption programs and made strides towards combating corruption; yet, much work is still to be done. Presently, Cameroon still ranks with some of the most corrupt countries of the world even though it is no longer at the very bottom. For instance, recently in 2017, TI's CPI ranked Cameroon in 153rd place out of the 180 countries surveyed. And the country's score remained low—at 25 on the scale of 100 (TI, 2017).

Corruption is a global problem. In 2010, TI noted that many governments were committing huge budgets to tackle the world's most pressing problems, ranging from the instability of financial markets to climate change and poverty (TI, 2010). Regardless, corruption remained an obstacle to achieving much needed progress in those areas. TI's CPI for the year 2010 showed that nearly three quarters of the 178 countries surveyed

(mostly developing countries) scored below 5 on a scale of 10, thus indicating a serious worldwide corruption problem, and specifically in developing societies (TI, 2010). To address these challenges, TI (year) held that governments needed to integrate anticorruption measures in all spheres, including the countries' responses to the financial crisis, climate change and commitments by the international community to eradicate poverty. At that time, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) was considered the only global initiative that provides a framework for putting an end to corruption (TI, 2010).

In the effort of combating corruption, Cameroon has developed different anticorruption approaches, which are being implemented and managed by a government agency, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), also known as the CONAC (Commission Nationale Anti-Corruption) in French. Created in March 2006, NACC's activities against corruption in Cameroon are usually paired-up with different presidential policies and mechanisms geared towards the same goal (NACC, 2008). The most recent campaign launched against corruption in Cameroon by the head of state and managed by NACC was named Operation Epervier (French appellation), which means Operation Sparrow Hawk in English (NACC, 2006). This operation led to the incarceration of several government officials in February 2008 (Cameroon Today, 2011; Freedom House, 2011; NACC, n.d; Ndoumbe, 2008).

The people of Cameroon wish that corruption be eradicated from their society, with the government making significant strides toward the goal (Freedom House, 2011).

However, there is a concern as to how soon this goal can be achieved and what it would take to attain such a goal considering the viability of mechanisms put in place to support

government anticorruption policy. Concerns of this nature provide the impetus for this study.

Background

Combating corruption in Cameroon has been among the fundamental governing policies of the current president of the country since his ascension to power in 1982 (Ngomba, 2006). Accordingly, he announced in that year that his guiding philosophy as Cameroon's head of state will be rigor, integrity, and moralization (Ngomba, 2006). By this pronouncement, the president meant that he would not tolerate corruption in the country. But coming back after 3 decades to assess the situation on ground, it seemingly could be said that the president fell short of this vision, as public corruption is still wide spread in the civil service in Cameroon and the country still ranks amongst some of the most corrupt countries of the world (TI, 2017). The outstanding question that continues to linger is, what kind of anticorruption policies has the government agency responsible been implementing and what are their weaknesses? This is one of the background pillars upon which this study was constructed.

The need to combat corruption in Cameroon became more apparent between the late 1990s and early 2000s, the period during which the toll of corruption on the society appeared to have accelerated (Fombad, 2003). Author argued that corruption was prevalent in Cameroon's public services before the 1980s but that it was not widespread, generalized, or as deep-rooted as it became evident in the 2000s (Fombad, 2003). In another study, the author dubbed corruption in Cameroon endemic, explaining that corruption has permeated almost every aspect of Cameroonian daily life, meanwhile, public officials seem to have either severely underestimated, or completely ignored, the

consequences of this epidemic (Fombad, 2000). According to Fombad (2000), high levels and vast scales of corruption remain among the main causes of Cameroon's economic and political problems. In response, the government launched its first open national initiative against corruption in the country in 2006 with the creation of a NACC (NACC, 2008). This agency would now champion government's anticorruption policy across the nation, leading the implementation of such policy, giving feedback to the president and the legislature for the crafting of laws that will enhance the agency's activities, and also mandating and facilitating the prosecution of culprits of corruption in criminal courts (NACC, 2008).

The Cameroon government's anticorruption policy since the beginning of the 2000s was generally marked by complacency (Fombad, 2000). According to author, corruption in Cameroon was officially dismissed as nothing more than occasional acts of dishonesty and indiscretion by civil servants. However, the problem was much more serious, with a gravity that could only be compared to the devastation caused by AIDS on any fragile and depressed economy (Fombad, 2000). Developments in the fight against corruption in Cameroon by January 2018 included the continuation of Operation Sparrow hawk that was launched in the country about 11 years earlier by Biya—head of state (Bechem, 2018).

Although several top-ranked government officials were arrested and incarcerated through this operation, such as the arrest of the former prime minister on April 16, 2012 (Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, 2012), the Cameroonian population still harbored mixed feelings on how successful government anticorruption efforts had been in Cameroon. The approach to prevent corruption in Cameroon was said to be limited to the

application of Article 66 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, which demanded that top-ranking government officials declare their assets before and after serving in a public office (Houmfa, 2012). The strict reliance on the preceding article as the sole major legal measure for curbing public corruption appeared to be insufficient to treat the corruption disease that had been rooted into the culture of the entire society.

The Cameroon head of state created a special criminal court that would try officials accused of embezzling public funds amounting to a minimum value of 50 million CFA francs (Houmfa, 2012). This action was being implemented alongside other anticorruption laws, some of which were dubbed defective by public opinion, especially parliament's decision in December 2011, which stipulated that charges against individuals found guilty of corruption would be dropped if they paid back missing funds to the government (Houmfa, 2012). On the one hand, this measure sent a positive message to the public in the fight against corruption, as it might have entailed that the government wanted by all means to retrieve public funds from citizens who might have embezzled them by reason of the devil's temptation or without premeditation and as such were willing to repent (Houmfa, 2012). On the other hand, this measure could result in serious negative consequences for the anticorruption effort in general, as it incentivized public officials to orchestrate embezzlements through money laundry and other investment schemes granted that their liability was now limited by the legislature to the starting capital misappropriated. The financial gain made from investing embezzled state funds was not censored in a piece of legislation rendered hapless by the absence of a preceding government white paper that would have enabled the public to identify loopholes and closure mechanisms.

Problem Statement

Combating corruption through different anticorruption approaches such as government structural adjustment, systematic strategies, and specific mechanisms put in place by governments and international organizations is an issue of global significance. Cross-national cooperation in the fight against corruption has become a major means for tackling the issue, especially in developing countries (Carr, 2007; Udombana, 2003). Nevertheless, most developing countries, including Cameroon, have not been able to substantially reduce their levels of corruption even after employing universal anticorruption strategies such as structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which are now considered as the way forward for most developing countries engaged in a serious anticorruption fight (Nguemegne, 2011; Udombana, 2003). For example, after being declared the most corrupt country in the world in 1998 and 1999 respectively (TI, 1998, 1999), Cameroon in the most recent CPI results of 2017 still performed poorly, scoring 25/100 and ranking 153 out of 180 participating countries (See Table 1, Appendix A). Doig and Riley (1998) argued that universal anticorruption strategies still needed to be set according to the political, economic, legal, and sociocultural contexts of the developing countries to achieve real success. This is a perspective that is yet to have substantial empirical support in the corruption/anticorruption literature.

The literature on corruption/anticorruption contains different theoretical opinions on the nature of an effective governmental anticorruption strategies. Universalist and particularistic theorists differ in their views on how to curb corruption, especially in developing nations. Universalist and particularistic theorists differ in their views on how to curb corruption, especially in developing nations. Universalists such as Santiso (2001),

for example, see a transplantation of international measures, especially from the Western world, through global cooperation and development programs and institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, into developing nations based on different economic and sociopolitical objectives set for each country. Proponents of particularistic approaches, on the other hand, hold the view that at the root of systemic corruption is a particularistic political culture, which is defined as a system in which the treatment of citizens by government depends on status or position in society, and people do not expect to be treated fairly by the state. What people expect is similar treatment to everybody with the same status. As such, anticorruption strategies must be adapted to address specific contextual differences for real success to be attained (Rothstein, 2007, p. 13).

This study sought to locate a spot in the preceding argument for Cameroon's anticorruption policy in order to achieve a clear understanding of the country's anticorruption practices. The study aimed at gaining a better understanding of the context and the nature of the anticorruption strategies adopted in Cameroon as practiced by NACC. It also probed into the reasons for the weaknesses embedded in these strategies, because this problem needs to be solved, as it is apparent that high levels and vast scales of corruption remain among the main causes of Cameroon's economic and political problems (Fombad, 2000).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to explore the Cameroon government's policy toward combating corruption in Cameroon by examining its anticorruption approaches and their implementation. In this study, I examined the anticorruption strategies in place

and endeavored to expose some of the particular reasons for the government's negligible achievement in its 3-decade combat against corruption in the Cameroonian context.

I examined the circumstances that led to the launch of the different anticorruption campaigns by the current Cameroonian head of state since the mid-1990s until today and explored the underlying context of corruption and the fight against it. I also sought to identify and assess the government's anticorruption policy and mechanisms, measure the extent to which these policies satisfy good governance principles, and look for potential reasons why the policies have not achieved much success over 3 decades.

In the absence of fundamental elements of anticorruption practice, those that satisfy tested and proven good governance principles such as accountability, transparency, rule of law, responsiveness, equitability and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, and participative governance, a government is bound to face drawbacks in its effort to combat corruption. Substantial effort and resources could be spent toward anticorruption projects, but so long as the policies and processes are not properly formulated, effectively debated in a democratic atmosphere, legislated into law, and implemented in the light of the above-mentioned good governance principles, such efforts could achieve less in terms of results. It is evident that little success has been achieved in the country's anticorruption struggle. As such, I first explored how anticorruption strategies and approaches implemented by the government related to universal working concepts of anticorruption which are also integral components of good governance, and secondly how these strategies were adapted to the particular policy context of the country. With this goal in mind, I was able to identify to some tangible

propositions and developed answers connected to the lack of plausible success in anticorruption practice by the NACC since inception.

Research Questions

This study was guided by one overarching question and four subquestions. The main question was: What anticorruption strategies are perceived as effective in helping the government of Cameroon curb systematic public corruption? The subquestions were:

1. What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon's NACC?
2. What can be learned from NACC's experience of working with anticorruption policies and programs?
3. What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to implement effective anticorruption policies?
4. How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improve the development and implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC?

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

The specific theories of *universalism* and *particularism* in anticorruption approaches as constructed in Rothstein (2007) and in Santiso (2001) provided a theoretical framework for this study. Universalists see a transplantation of international measures, especially from the western world into developing nations (Santiso, 2001). Particularistic opinions hold unto specificity and originality of approaches (Rothstein, 2007). I explored these views, while endeavoring to examine the concept of *adaptability* (contextualization) of anticorruption approaches as a middle ground where these existing theories could be retried and settled for improved performance. This conception was based on the premise that imported anticorruption strategies from other examples around

the world, especially from developed and industrialized nations, may not work effectively in the setting of developing countries like Cameroon unless they are adapted to the policy context of the country.

The universal or particularistic theories of anticorruption approaches must build on the foundational theory of good governance, which measures the effectiveness of anticorruption policy and practice. The good governance theory holds the premise that there are certain government practices that if put into place, one would have a more effective, efficient, and successful democratic government (Elahi, 2009). The theory, as expounded in Elahi (2009), projects the control of corruption as one of the indicators of good governance, including practices such as legitimacy and voice; direction; performance; accountability and transparency; fairness (rule of law and equity) (Graham, Amos, & Plumptre, 2003, p. 3). This theory, in explaining the dynamics of the relationship between corruption/anticorruption and the realization of effective governance, receives support from related theories such as that of global governance, and development (Elahi, 2009; Nanda, 2006). If the control of corruption is an indicator of good governance, then good governance principles could be employed to ensure effective anticorruption policy making and practice. Theoretically and conceptually, the study built on universalistic and particularistic competing theories of anticorruption, the foundation of which is the theory of good governance, while endeavoring to explore a possible balance through the concept of adaptability of anticorruption strategies.

Nature of the Study

This section of the study states the design of the study in terms of design paradigm, inquiry approach, and the rationale for the choice of design. Secondly, it states

the methodology in terms of participants, site, role of the researcher in data collection procedures, and sampling. Thirdly, it states potential weaknesses associated with the methods and how they are addressed. And finally, it outlines some of the ethical concerns that may surround the study.

The study sought to gain an in-depth understanding of Cameroon's government anticorruption strategies as implemented by its NACC. This study was conceived and conducted as a qualitative study, making use of the case study approach to scientific inquiry. A research design can either be qualitative or quantitative in nature, or a combination of both (mixed methods). The choice of design usually depends on the nature of the inquiries the researcher intends carrying out. Research design itself is a plan or proposal to conduct research, involving the intersection of philosophy, strategies of inquiry, and specific methods (Creswell, 2009, p. 5). The researcher's philosophical worldview plays a considerable role in determining the suitability of each of the approaches. Positivism, constructivism, advocacy/participatory, and pragmatism are some of the major worldviews espoused in Creswell (2009). Each of these worldviews influences the thinking pattern and design approach adopted in the research. The nature of the research problem, the researcher's personal experiences, and the audience are also determining factors in choosing a specific design (Creswell, 2009).

The primary worldview held in this study is constructivism, which entails interaction between researcher and participants in the study (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). This is one of the main reasons why the study is best suited to a qualitative design. The study was designed to investigate anticorruption which is a behavior that cannot be counted or quantified, but can only be assessed, evaluated, and to some extent valorized depending

on the specificity of analysis conducted. According to Creswell (2007), the qualitative researcher is identified with activities that locate him/her in real world problems that require extensive and thorough exploration, interaction with participants, developing assumptions, collecting pertinent data and inductively analyzing and interpreting them.

With regards to the particular approach to qualitative inquiry that was adopted in the study, the case study method was the research design of choice. Case study is defined as “the study of an issue explored through one or more cases within a bounded system” (Creswell, 2007, p. 73). Yin (2014) characterized it as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) in depth and within its real-world context. The encompassing nature of case study expounded by Yin makes the approach more fitting to study complex phenomena, as it tends to provide the researcher with a more simplistic platform and tools to carry out inquiries. It is on this definition that this study situates its inquiry into Cameroon’s anticorruption strategies as implemented by NACC.

Another reason that accounted for the selection of the case study method was the argument that case study is familiar to social scientists because of its popularity in psychology, law, and political science (Creswell, 2007). Therefore, approaching this study as a public policy analyst was more disciplinary relevant. Perception of sampling unit drew on the conclusions made by Tellis (1997) on unit of analysis for case study research. The unit of analysis is said to be a critical factor in case study, and it is typically a system of action rather than an individual or group of individuals (Tellis, 1997). And case studies tend to be selective, focusing on one or two issues that are fundamental in understanding the system being examined. The population sample for the study primarily

consisted of a group of civil servants (public agents) working within the government agency – NACC. The site was the capital city of Cameroon, Yaoundé, which is the headquarters of all governmental agencies, including the NACC.

I employed purposeful random and critical case sampling strategies as the main sampling method for the study, in line with the established approaches to sampling in qualitative studies (see Patton, 2002). The focus on critical case strategy permits logical generalization and maximum application of information to other cases (Creswell, 2007).

In terms of sample size and data collection procedure, 20 participants (knowledgeable public servants in the area of corruption/anticorruption) working at NACC were interviewed. Additionally, documents from NACC and other applicable sources were consulted.

Interviewing constituted the principal procedure for data collection in this study. However, I also consulted available government documents on the subject so as to enable triangulation of the data collected. The main advantage of interviewing in comparison to other data collection methods is the ability it offers the researcher to enter into other persons' perspectives of what is going on. Qualitative interviewing varies in strategies. Patton (2002) put forth three basic approaches to collecting qualitative data through open-ended interviews: the informal conversational interview, the general interview guide approach, and the standardized open-ended interview. A combination of approaches may be employed to maximize potential feedback (Patton, 2002). However, I focused on the general interview guide approach for logistic reasons. Virtual interviewing by telephone or online chats were the only means of interviewing available at the time due to ongoing

political crisis in Cameroon, which drastically narrowed the window for a field visit due to safety concerns.

In terms of data analysis procedures and strategies, I developed a data collection protocol that established the basis for a comprehensive analysis. Content analysis was operated manually with the help of coding and organization of the patterns of information derived from the data.

For the role of the researcher, potential weaknesses of the methods, and ethical concerns, each preceding the outlined method indicated points of weaknesses but with more focus on the strengths that mitigated and enabled each approach to remain viable for the study. Personal experience played an important role in facilitating data collection and increasing trustworthiness in the judgments and analysis made on data collected. I also avoided biases by balancing data collection techniques and analyses with objectivism and triangulation between applied methods.

Operational Definitions

Anticorruption: This constitutes comprehensive, systematic, and knowledge-based strategies to curb corruption (Czepil, 2016).

Anticorruption Approaches or Strategies: These are measures employed by governments and organizations to discourage, curb, and sanction corruption (Czepil, 2016). These include anticorruption campaigns, administrative or public ethics, legal sanctions, and moral or ethical political rhetoric (Desta, 2004).

BRICS: Acronym for an association of five major emerging economies, which are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (brics.org).

Contextualization: Haleblian (1983) defined the concept of contextualization as the interrelated conditions (environment) in which something exists or occurs. Thus, to contextualize as deemed in this study, is to put an element or an action in a particular environment, taking into consideration the different factors existing in the said environment, that impact the element or action. Contextualizing anticorruption therefore, would refer to putting the elements of anticorruption being studied into a country-specific context.

Corruption: Corruption is defined as any behavior that violates non-discrimination norms governing the access to the political process and the allocation of rights and resources (Kurer, 2005), and as well as behavior that can impair fair treatment in transactions between individuals.

Particularism: Particularism refers to public servants making decisions based on the interests of particular individuals or groups (Melchior and Melchior, 2001).

Political, economic, legal, and sociocultural realities of Cameroon (Policy Context): These are facts concerning the organization and the functioning of the Cameroonian state within its societal contexts (Shahabuddin, 2002).

Public, Systematic, or Political Corruption: This is the misuse of public office for private gain (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000).

Universalism: Universalism is defined as the practice of government remaining open to lessons from elsewhere (Gaylord, 2002). Relying on this background, this study perceives universalism as a range of knowledge, interests, or practices applicable across the globe. As such, universal anticorruption approaches should apply to any country or society and produce similar results irrespective of the settings of these societies.

Assumptions

Assumptions in a study are things that are somewhat out of control, but necessary to be in the study because if they disappear the study would become irrelevant (Simon, 2011). As such, the first assumption held for this study was that anticorruption approaches differ in type, application, and relevance or effectiveness. Therefore, the Cameroon government practiced particular sets of anticorruption strategies that could be identified with its governance policies. Also, it was assumed on the preceding basis that every society fighting corruption could achieve greater outcomes by formulating and applying strategies that specifically address their own socioeconomic and political realities irrespective of all other influences. This is due to the prevailing cultural differences between societies, thus affecting individual and group behavioral patterns and how fundamental institutions are established and how they operate. Secondly, I assumed that low levels of corruption, be it systematic, public, sporadic, petty, or grand is a strong indicator of good governance. Therefore, effective anticorruption strategies should directly signify the presence of good governance principles as identified in the subsequent literature review. Consequently, the absence of anticorruption strategies that tie with good governance principles would mean fundamental weakness of such strategies for the purpose of combating corruption. In addition, I assumed that participants would be helpful in explaining the anticorruption strategies implemented in the society being studied, from which subsequent analyses were made as appertaining to their effectiveness in combating corruption. Lastly, I assumed that the government of Cameroon exercised the full responsibility in matters of combating corruption in the country and that private agencies would follow government policy in this matter.

Scope and Delimitations

Delimitations are characteristics that limit the scope and define the boundaries of the study (Simon, 2011). Considering the role given to NACC as the government agency charged with the task of administering the anticorruption policy in Cameroon, I focused on gaining an understanding of how this agency functions. I therefore looked at perceptions of effective policy implementation in this organizational context. To this end, different notions and theories such as particularistic and universalistic views, the adaptability notion of public policy implementation, and the good governance theory were used as a framework for assessment of specific anticorruption strategies adopted.

Data for the study was gathered from two main sources: publicly available documentation and open-ended interviews with selected participants from NACC.

Limitations

Limitations in a scientific study are potential weaknesses found in the study itself (Simon 2011). These weaknesses should be identified and examined in the light of the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the study so as to strengthen the reliability of the study. The main limitations of this study were those inherent to case studies, especially generalizability. Not all government agencies in Cameroon were studied; instead, inquiries were obtained from one major agency, Cameroon's NACC, from which generalizations were made. Private agencies were not studied. I assumed that the government was fully in charge of anticorruption operations in the country. Therefore, generalizability might be limited.

A scientific assessment of a behavior such as corruption/anticorruption is a task that is liable to scientific errors, since the causes of the act of corruption itself might be

misjudged; discrepancies might exist between the legal connotations of the act and what policy analysts judge to be an act of corruption. The sensitivity (political nature) of the object of this research was considered an element that could also impact the collection of trustworthy information from participants.

Time was also a limiting factor that was addressed before engagement into field work. Collecting data from government participants in this context and making quality analyses demanded a considerable amount of time. The Cameroonian civil service has a problem of accessibility, in terms of collecting information, especially due to the fact that the system is not yet computerized and standardized. It took a considerable length of time to find individuals willing to participate in a sensitive inquiry like this.

Finally, the purposeful sampling method employed in selecting participants for this study could also be seen as a limiting factor to the openness and generality of the study. Following this method, only specific candidates who possessed the knowledge requisite to understand the subject matter of the study were selected. They had to meet specific criteria in order to pass recruitment. This process itself could be perceived as a weakness to the study in terms of the ability to gather the thoughts of the studied population or information that was fully representative of the said population. However, this approach remains a strong qualitative case study tradition (Creswell, 2007), and the deep interviews conducted on the few selected participants revealed a wealth of information that was representative of the population due to the quality of the participants.

Significance

Firstly, this study will add to the information and knowledge resources that could conceivably contribute to the effectiveness of implementing the government's anticorruption policy in Cameroon and potentially in other nations plagued by the same phenomenon. The study will also add to an existing body of literature that describes how different governments tackle corruption, using different or similar tools and strategies, and obtaining results that reflect their applications.

Secondly, effective anticorruption mechanisms entail a reduction in corruption and social challenges to good governance. Such outcome would favor political stability and foster socioeconomic prosperity for the targeted society and those that would draw lessons from this study. According to Elahi (2009), the control of corruption is one of the strong indicators of good governance. If this study succeeds in proposing recommendations that will help in finding a solution to the problem of corruption in Cameroon, the impact will be felt in the society in terms of changed attitudes to governance by public officials and improved political climate.

Thirdly, the study was unique in its timing, as it was conducted at the very time that the government renewed its commitment to pursue greater success in the fight against corruption in Cameroon. The purpose of fighting corruption is to lead the nation on the path of economic prosperity and good governance, hoping that it becomes an emerging democratic and united country in diversity by 2035 (Ministry of the Economy, Planning, and Regional Development, 2009). The study coincided with renewed interest in the battle against corruption in Cameroon. Another significance of the study could be

seen in the different government anticorruption strategies it identified, that might be perceived as effective, and thus would better address the needs of the people.

Additionally, this study explored the basis for understanding anticorruption approaches in Cameroon in terms of their effectiveness in solving the problem of corruption in the country. As such, future research can build on the study, particularly focusing on the progress in achieving anticorruption policy goals and implementing specific policy mechanisms.

Finally, the study will serve as a potential resource for the United Nations, TI, and other international organizations that are involved in corruption mitigation programs around the world. It will become a resource to future studies in this discipline (public policy and administration). It should delineate the strengths and weaknesses in the development, legislation and enforcement of policy by the government to counter corrupt practices, based on different instruments and strategies that can be contextualized. These lessons may be transferable to the situation in other countries, especially those that are willing to consider the experience of Cameroon.

Summary

For the past decade, the government of Cameroon has turned the need to reduce corruption in the country into one of its major policy priorities (NACC, 2008). In this effort, different anticorruption approaches have been developed and have been implemented by NACC. Significant research is yet to be conducted on the successes achieved through this effort. However, this study is one of the steps taken toward addressing the significance and impact of government activity in Cameroon as an effort towards reducing or possibly eradicating the corruption cankerworm from the society.

This chapter laid the foundation for the study by exposing the problem, research questions, purpose, conceptualization, the nature of the study, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance of the study. Chapter 2 will examine pertinent literature that provides the basis of the theoretical framework of the study and examines what previous researchers have discovered thus far on the specific case of anticorruption policies in Cameroon.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter consists of pertinent literature on corruption and anticorruption, focusing on the instruments and strategies with which the problem of corruption can be tackled and curbed, especially for developing democracies. It also underscores some of the current corruption and anticorruption issues faced by researchers and practitioners in the field. Finally, I present identified gaps in the literature for future research. The chapter is organized into four general subject areas: definitions and conceptualizations of corruption and anticorruption, theoretical foundations of anticorruption approaches, instruments for anticorruption practice, and contexts, which include the adaptation of strategies for effective anticorruption practice.

Literature Search Strategy

The main databases I consulted included ProQuest Central, Academic Search Complete/Premier, Political Science Complete, CQ Researcher, ScienceDirect, EBSCOhost, ProQuest Dissertation and Theses, Expanded Academic ASAP, Business Source Complete/Premier, and Sage Premier. The Google Scholar search engine was also a key to access some scholarly information reviewed in this chapter. My search included

the following keywords: *corruption, history of corruption, corruption in Cameroon, corruption in developing countries, corruption in Africa, anticorruption strategies, anticorruption strategies for developing countries, anticorruption in Cameroon, and history of anticorruption campaigns*. Other keywords included *combat against corruption, effective anticorruption measures, global anticorruption, contextualizing anticorruption, leadership and anticorruption, ethics in government, good governance and anticorruption, corruption and the law, corruption and morality, corruption and democratic institutions, transparency, accountability, and corruption, integrity in government, public performance and anticorruption, and public responsibility*.

Theoretical Foundation

Universalist and particularistic theories of anticorruption expressed through operational theories such as good governance, global governance, big-bang, and program theories as expounded in the works of Rothstein (2007), Santiso (2001), Elahi (2009), Graham, Amos, and Plumtre (2003), Nanda (2006) formed the theoretical foundation of this study. These theories shall be discussed subsequently. However, before then, it would be good to explore the definition of corruption and anticorruption, so as to create a comprehensive nexus between the different theories, concepts, and findings of the study.

The common definition of corruption held by researchers across the field of social sciences is the one that perceives corruption as the misuse of public power for private gain (Goldsmith, 1999; Johnston, 1996; Kurer, 2005; Philp, 1997; Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000; Xin & Rudel, 2004). Social science researchers will always face the challenge of establishing a universal consensus on the definition of corruption, as it has been the case in the history of corruption studies. According to Sandholtz (2000), such difficulty is due

to the fact that practices considered by one society as corrupt, are considered harmless or even appropriate in another society or cultural context. However, the difficulty in establishing general concepts and definitions of corruption should not erode the keenness to fight corruption worldwide. Regardless of all definitions and societal contexts, corrupt acts are wrong, improper, and illegitimate (Berlinski, 2009). Settling corrupt acts on this broad base offers three dimensions through which policy studies can identify corrupt behaviors in society: public interest, public opinion, and legal norms (Sandholtz, 2000).

Generally, research on corruption can be conducted at two levels—at the individual level and the national level (Connelly & Ones, 2008). According to Connelly and Ones (2008), research at the individual level should ask the main question, “What characteristics of individuals and situations cause some individuals to behave in corrupt ways?” (p. 354), while research at the national level would ask the question, “What characteristics of nations cause greater rates of corruption at the national aggregate?” (p. 354). For studies focused on the causes of corruption, the variables examined covered a wide spectrum of economic, political, social, cultural, and politico-historical (such as colonialism) causes. Some of the prominent studies published on corruption in Africa, consulted for this study, included the works of Temple (2012), Solima and Cable (2011), Bah (2011), Kiser and Sacks (2011), Pillay and Dorasany (2010), Kusiak (2010), Fraser-Moleketi (2009), and Levi, Sacks, and Tyler (2009). Those specifically addressing the case of Cameroon included the works of Nguemenge (2011), Phe and Drori (2010), and Tanga and Dzemua (2009).

Focusing on the concept of anticorruption, this study analyzed mostly the literature that dealt predominantly with anticorruption measures and their surrounding

dynamics, rather than seeking to discover what the causes of corruption were, as it was the case with most of the published research on corruption issues. Drawing on the definition of corruption, anticorruption was defined in this study as the action and effort by government or any other organization endowed with the required authority to discourage and sanction the misuse of public power for private gain (Nguemenge, 2011). In addition, since corruption is not limited to public corruption, the definition of anticorruption could equally be expanded to include any effort taken by government, groups, and individuals to discourage corruption in all forms (Czepil, 2016).

Research on anticorruption strategies includes the works that discuss anticorruption measures having global application and measures that can only be applicable to specific cultural contexts. However, this position is yet to be widely considered by researchers in this field, most studies settle on the interplay between international and domestic anticorruption efforts (Beblavý, 2009; Moroff & Schmidt-Pfister, 2010; Smilov, 2010). In this regard, the literature on anticorruption efforts generally identifies three levels of anticorruption measures: international level (international legal mechanisms), national level (governmental political machines), and the civil society or community level (domestic social movements) (Moroff & Schmidt-Pfister). Policy makers could develop more contextual strategies by considering the preceding distinction.

Conceptual Foundation

The concept of adaptability of anticorruption strategies derived from the work of Santiso (2001) is the guiding idea that founded the platform upon which the other anticorruption notions were explored. This concept shall be discussed in detail in an

integrated analysis of the major ideas of the study. An account of a general scientific conception of anticorruption helped established the base for scholarly review of the topic.

Anticorruption is generally conceived in the field of social sciences as an effort toward achieving morality, ethical behavior, public performance, and simply being able to carry on life and engaging in human affairs, respecting legal and moralistic consideration in day to day transactions (Schmidt, 2007). Based on this conception, different labels have been attributed to the anticorruption concept for the purpose of research and practice. Labels such as accountability, transparency, good governance, public service ethics, business ethics, global governance, and ethical globalization are used as the operational terms for anticorruption studies and practice (Carr, 2007). The works of Schmidt (2007), Carr (2007), Benito and Bastida (2009), and Moynihan (2009) were some of the pertinent writings I selected to explain the preceding concepts. Most recently, research in this area have expanded and other authors have explored these topics, explaining government experience with anticorruption policies in developing countries and the challenges that still exist despite considerable efforts that have been made for more than 2 decades now both at domestic and international levels to bring lasting solutions to the problem of corruption in these countries, including Cameroon. Some of these works included those of Majila et al. (2014); Neupane et al. (2014); Ramanujam and Caivano (2016); Spector (2016); Walton (2016); Ocheje (2017); and Fedran et al. (2018).

According to Schmidt (2007), anticorruption debates witnessed an increase, with a historical evolution that can be traced back to pre-1990s. In a study conducted on selected Central Eastern European (CEE) countries, Schmidt distinguished four different

chronological phases in the modern history of the anticorruption debates. The first phase, witnessed during the pre-1990 era, considered a period of “earlier scholarly debates on corruption;” the second phase was the early 1990s which marked the period of “initial anti-corruption debates;” the third occurred in the early-2000s, which is considered the period of “reorientation;” and finally, the mid-2000s marks a period of the “latest anti-corruption debates” (Schmidt, 2007, p. 202). Two major anticorruption conceptions include the transnational anticorruption strategy and the domestic anticorruption strategy (Schmidt, 2007).

Examining the case of the postcommunist world, which refers to the era after 1990 when communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, Schmidt (2007) analyzed the development of the anticorruption practices in the countries of CEE. Revealing that the anticorruption literature in the West has had a more stable development than that in the East, Schmidt examined a situation where the proliferation of the Western ideas of the free market greatly influenced the landscape of anticorruption studies in the communist world. The literature has had that same kind of influence on the developing nations, including Cameroon. According to Schmidt, in the early 1990s corruption emerged as a major problem in the new independent states of the global south. It is this awareness that would give a new impetus to governments, organization, and groups fighting corruption both domestically and internationally.

In another study, Carr (2007) discussed the legal framework of anticorruption efforts at regional and international levels. This framework is defined by legislations and conventions drafted by member-governments and organizations. While Schmidt’s (2007) writings examined the politico-economic and global nature of anticorruption practices

and studies, Carr's study revealed the legal aspect of the concept. Anticorruption cannot be studied or practiced without the understanding that it has legal foundations, support, and instruments. Discussing legislations and conventions as the major legal frameworks for anticorruption practices at regional and international levels, Carr explained how these approaches would likely produce fewer effective results if they lack uniformity in their conception and application, and are not enforced robustly through solid mechanisms set in place (p. 122).

Carr (2007) discussed the use of varied regulations within the legal framework against corruption, including fines, loss of freedom, and incentives. Conventions usually include sanctions, preventive measures, mutual assistance, and cooperation (Carr, 2007). Carr outlined several conventions that have been established worldwide to foster anticorruption, some of which included the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (1996), the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1997), and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (1999). Other conventions include the Southern African Development Protocol Against Corruption (2001), African Union Convention of Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003), and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003) (Carr, 2007). These are some of the legal instruments that are used to encourage anticorruption practices in signatory countries.

The social factor was the third major aspect considered in the literature when conceiving an approach for studying or practicing anticorruption. Anticorruption is perceived as a cure to corruption which is a social problem, needing curative and

preventive measures that are deeply rooted in sociology, anthropology and morality of every society (Carr, 2007). Carr used the term *resocialization* to explain the need to create considerable social awareness about the dangers of corruption as a measure of fighting this endemic disease.

The last theoretical basis for anticorruption studies and practice was revealed in systematic administrative studies of corruption in governments, corporations, and other forms of public organizations. From this theoretical basis came the concepts of good governance, public service ethics, business ethics, accountability, transparency and all the operational concepts that ensure proper and productive system functioning (Benito & Bastida, 2009). The works of Benito and Bastida and Moynihan (2009) discussed some of the recent ideas developed in this area. The work of Benito and Bastida covered a wide array on concepts in systemic public administration, including fiscal procedures, budget performance, budget transparency, and accountability in general within the public sector. The findings of Benito and Bastida related to some of the policy issues resulting from the relationship between budget transparency, fiscal situation, and political turnout, using a comparative international approach, all in the effort to create and run systems that lessen the loopholes for corrupt practices within the public sector.

According to results derived from a comparative budget transparency index developed by Benito and Bastida (2009), encompassing 40 budget features based on international standards for a sample of 41 countries, a positive relationship was found between national government fiscal balance and budget transparency. This implied, according to authors, that the more information the budget disclosed, the less fiscal deficits can be used by politicians to achieve opportunistic goals (Benito & Bastida,

2009). Obscure budgets often set the stage for embezzlement and corruption (Benito & Bastida, 2009). As budget transparency appears to hold politicians and public officials accountable, Benito and Bastida's article can serve as a model for examining the relationship between budget transparency and the fight against fiscal corruption, which is one of the significant areas of corruption witnessed in developing countries, including Cameroon.

Moynihan (2009) discussed performance issues in government as another basis for establishing the practice of anticorruption in the public service system. Moynihan sought to settle the debate on the source of legitimacy for public administration between two schools of thoughts—those who hold that the rule of law should be considered the dominant framework of the field, and those who have said that the study of performance should be considered the dominant source. By referring this argument to the study at hand, one would extract those elements related to government performance—the purpose of public policy administration. In public administration, the citizenry is the bedrock of all policies and what it awaits from the government is service delivery, which has to do with performance (management) (Moynihan, 2009). Improved government performance means the implementation of efficient and effective systems, and thus more accountability and less corruption. Moynihan provided another scholarly resource for studying government performance and how it is linked to the construction of transparent, accountable, responsible, and effective systems. These are the concepts that form the basis and the support system for all studies and practices of anticorruption by governments and other domestic and international anticorruption proponents.

Instruments for Anticorruption Practice

There is no one uniform approach to anticorruption. Several tools and strategies are used to combat corruption, either curatively or preventively. These tools and strategies include the following:

- The policy instrument made applicable through strategies such as anticorruption programs and campaigns and structural and functional administrative adjustments that seek to ensure certain standards for public performance and integrity.
- The legal instrument that utilizes punitive and institutional strategies to curb corruption.
- The role of leadership and society, which calls for transformational leadership and organizational change..
- Citizen participation.

The Policy Instrument

Strategies such as anticorruption programs and campaigns, structural and functional administrative reforms that define standards for public performance and integrity constitute some of the instruments used by government as policy strategy to combat corruption.

Anticorruption Programs and Campaigns

In a recent study conducted on Eastern European Countries (EEC) by Moroff and Schmidt-Pfister (2010), the researchers documented findings on how anticorruption programs, projects, and campaigns became an essential aspect of furthering good governance over the past two decades prior to their study. These campaigns and

programs, Moroff and Schmidt-Pfister explained, are manifested at both domestic and international levels. Thus, the authors differentiate between domestic social movements, governmental political machines, and international legal machines. This separation creates a three-level platform for analyzing anticorruption efforts—the international society, the national government, and the domestic civil society. In the study, the researchers found out and concluded that the interface of the preceding three levels produced coincidental and spontaneous breakthroughs that largely outweighed systematic implementation of appropriate anticorruption strategies.

Moreover, Moroff and Schmidt-Pfister (2010) stressed that broad social support for anticorruption strategies remains essential for the success of any international and governmental initiatives. This analysis might be true in the context of the current study, but the situation might be different in other cases since systematic anticorruption strategies might produce more effective results in these cases than focusing on broad anticorruption programs and campaigns. Programs and campaigns identified by the researchers were classified according to the three groups of analyses listed above, with actors and activities identified at each level. At the international level, Moroff and Schmidt-Pfister found an international society that is made up of actors such as “international organizations, international NGOs, transnational actors such as private foundations, think tanks, multinational business and some very active western governments” (p. 93).

In another study conducted by Beblavý (2009) in Slovakia, the dynamics of anticorruption programs and campaigns are once again witnessed, especially as they interacted with other strategies to bring about an effective effort against corruption and its

consequences. Beblavý's study revealed that government strategies against corruption are usually interwoven, as one form of approach could be used to implement the other. For example, certain structural reforms would require sensitization campaigns and educative programs for effective implementation. Beblavý found that amongst the things policy makers can do to decrease corruption in developing and transition countries, changing norms of behavior through education and public information campaigns is essential.

Beblavý discovered that Slovakia's success in combating corruption started in June 2000 when the first Dzurinda government approved a national program for the fight against corruption, developed by the office of the deputy prime minister of economic policy, Miklos on the basis of a proposal prepared by TI, Slovakia (Beblavý, 2009, p. 181). The principles and reforms held under this program targeted a "multifaceted strategy favoring changes both in formal and informal rule" (Beblavý, 2009, p. 182). The goal was to endorse reduction in administrative budgetary discretion and increase transparency, improve the functioning of the judiciary and prosecution, combat conflict of interest at all levels of government, and above all change norms of behavior through education and public information campaigns (Beblavý, 2009). Although the program and campaigns strategy did not stand alone in the Beblavý's study, its significance is seen in the interface it creates between other strategies and their application in the field. Slovakia's case is one from which other developing countries such as Cameroon can learn.

In concert with Beblavý (2009), David (2010) conducted another study on Hong Kong, explaining how the country transitioned from a corrupt to a clean government, using the strategy of amnesty as one of the major weapons for combating corruption.

Most researchers in social sciences have agreed on the definition of amnesty, as forgiveness or pardon from a crime or other social liability, thus giving the concept different sociological, political, and criminological implications (Klug, 1998; Parker, 2001; Shichor & Ranish, 1980). Some authors have refused to accept a standard definition of amnesty to mean a complete forgetfulness (oblivion) of the past, even though forgiveness might have taken place (Klug, 1998). Other researchers, such as Bennett, Harris, Laskey, Levitch, and Monrad (1976), see the argument as being deeply rooted in symbolic compositions in a political construction of what amnesty means. However, the argument can be settled by an agreement on what the legislation, the courts, and the constitution would stipulate for each society as seen in the following statement in the case of the United States:

The American Constitution makes no mention of amnesties, however, Article II, section 2 grants the president the power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for offenses against the United States except in cases of Impeachment. The Supreme Court has declared that there is no legal distinction between amnesties and pardons, and therefore amnesties are a part of the constitutional fabric of the United States and have also been part of the historical reality as well. (Shichor & Ranish, 1980, p. 443)

Other countries might adopt similar positions to that of the United States concerning the question of amnesty, and some might have the provisions clearly outlined in their constitutions. Using amnesty as an anticorruption tool would depend on the interpretation given to it by the country making the usage.

As significant as the concept of amnesty might be due to its drastic character in changing political culture, certain governments might neglect its usefulness, or may simply lack the right political judgments as to when to employ it and under what circumstances. This paradigm guided David's (2010) study on Hong Kong. In that study, the author argued that mainstream researchers have seldom considered non-conventional triggers of anticorruption efforts such as amnesty (David, 2010).

David argued further that the measures that lead to clean government in Hong Kong are different from those that contribute to its maintenance. In this effort, David challenged an over concentration of policy on formal structures of clean governance, while the actual process of changing the culture of corruption, which is changing the political culture is being overlooked. In the case of Hong Kong, David discovered that the country had failed to combat corruption before the mid-1970s through functional measures that were designed by legislature. However, the irresolvable situation started to change in the mid-1970s when the government started seeing the importance of initiating the programs and campaigns strategy, which took off with the creation of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) as of February 1974 (David, 2010).

Although ICAC was seen as the main structure behind the eradication of corruption in Hong Kong, David (2010) argued that the "granting of amnesty on a collective basis to members of the Royal Police force in 1977 is what actually paved the way to the ICAC's success" (p. 396). This program parallels the position taken by the Cameroonian legislature in December 2011, holding that charges against individuals found guilty of corruption would be dropped if these individuals would return the funds to the government (Houmfa, 2012). This approach appears tactful in policymaking.

However, it creates negative results, where public officials proactively embezzle more government funds with the hope of investing ill-gotten capital, paying back the principal if incidentally caught but keeping proceeds for their private enrichment.

To strengthen anticorruption programs, Spector (2016) in a study conducted with implications for Vietnam, put forth the role of a cost-benefit approach in encouraging a government to set out for effective anticorruption policy planning and action. In this approach that tend to perceive anticorruption strategy and practice different from the traditional perception, author argued that stronger anticorruption initiatives are more beneficial than institutional structures aimed at fighting corruption. Accordingly, Spector held that instead of focusing on negative consequences of corruption, countries should focus on the potential benefits of anticorruption. That the discussion needs to change from the notion that if you act (anticorruption wise) your government will avert that or this particular amount or level of harm, to the perception that if you act (anticorruption wise) your government will benefit in the following ways. This shifting of anticorruption practice from how to fight corruption to how anticorruption can benefit the government and the society at large, could give actors a different kind of motivation to commit to anticorruption practices in societies where corruption is almost normalized, like in Cameroon.

The emphasis on anticorruption programs and campaigns are seen in the preceding studies, especially for the fact that the information pressure exerted by this strategy on the masses and the corporate society in general is the first step that governments should consider in order to change a corrupt political culture and set the pace for maintenance through structural reforms. The effectiveness of campaigns and

programs also depend on the strength of supporting institutions and structures. Thus, one would reiterate, as it is the argument in this study that anticorruption strategies are interwoven. Seemingly, placing emphasis on some strategies at the expense of others can create imbalance and dysfunction. Therefore, starting with public sensitization campaigns and educative programs within the public system, the governments of corrupt societies must also preview long lasting structural reforms designed to curb and discourage corruption at all levels of the society.

Standards for Public Performance and Integrity

This anticorruption strategy directly implicates the public administration in place, touching the core systematic values that define the structural and functional outlook of the government. Corporations usually adopt standards for integrity in business reminiscent of what the government does. A corrupt government therefore corrupts the entire economy. The study conducted by Desta (2006) examined certain strategies that concisely define structural and functional anticorruption reforms. These strategies were grouped into four broad categories, including, “economic/market reforms, administrative/bureaucratic reforms, accountability/transparency enhancing reforms, and political accountability enhancing reforms” (Desta 2006). This categorization enables the government to focus its anticorruption strategies based on needs within particular sectors of the government. And this is what makes policy implementation effective.

In the case of Croatia, anticorruption efforts were guided by the “formulation of a comprehensive anticorruption code that would eliminate the dispersion of anticorruption legislation in numerous acts and redundancy that obfuscated the action of political actors in combating corruption” (Grubiša, 2011, p. 69). In the case of Cameroon, Nguemegne

(2011) evoked structural and functional anticorruption reforms that focused on administrative organization, constitutional provisions, intervention of international conventions, and the creation of specialized institutions, even though they did not create any considerable success in the fight against corruption in the country. It has not been too long a time since Nguemegne conducted the study in Cameroon. Thus, the situation might likely be the same presently, or even if changes have occurred, they may be of minute significance.

Research shows that although diverse approaches reflect a government's strategy in combating corruption, the uniqueness of system reforms in different countries fighting corruption are usually defined within the scope of standards for performance and integrity Grubiša (2011). In addition, institutions participate in a partial manner in the formulation process of the anticorruption policy in most developing countries. Grubiša reiterated that the core policy making usually depends mostly on the decision of the head of state, thus, real transition into democracy has to be achieved for countries such as Cameroon to exhibit this pattern of formulating anticorruption policies. Lack of administrative participation in anticorruption policymaking is the reason why the implementation and monitoring process of such policy usually becomes ineffective in these countries.

Grubiša pointed out that corruption is one of the pathologies in democratic politics, meanwhile totalitarian political systems are corruptive by definition because the misuse of power is built in the very foundations of arbitrary power. Six categories of pathologies of democracy listed by the author included, "political demagoguery, political hypocrisy, political manipulation, political corruption, political paranoia, and political violence" (pp. 70-71). The author pointed out that this situation was prevalent in Central

Eastern Europe after 1989 following the collapse of the soviet communist system and its Easter European variants. According to the author, the above-mentioned forms of pathologies attracted much attention in Croatia at that time, because they became a measure of democracy in a country that is new to democratic policies or a country transitioning into democracy (Grubiša, 2011). The country was transitioning from a communist auto-centric system unto a democratic and more liberal system. Croatia had to take into consideration these dynamics, in order to set an anticorruption machine that could work.

Grubiša also identified six main causes of corruption in Croatia, which included the existence of the old communist mentality system and traditional corruption culture; the influence of the 1990s Balkan Wars; non-transparent privatization process of state-owned enterprises; nationalist revolution; massive bureaucracy founded on spoil system; and hyper-normativism or super-centralization and concentration of government, (pp. 76-78).

In the case of Cameroon, Tiky VI (2010) discussed the three main causes for the high level of corruption in the country. First, the author identified infancy of institutions that reflect the slow modernization, and in turn, the colonial past of the country. Second, Tiky VI discussed the willingness of local elites to loot the country's resources after independence, and third, the extractive economic policies and the collusion between the country's elites and their foreign patrons (p. 58). To these three causes, one can also add four other causes said to be the main causes responsible for corruption in developing countries, especially African countries. These include, "ethnic fragmentations,

persistence of traditional values, weak institutions, and low social capital” (Tiky VI, 2010, p. 55).

To exemplify some of the preceding ideas, Tiky VI documented a case whereby the civil servant in traditional African setting is compelled to share his or her fortune with relatives. In case the former’s salary is not enough to meet these obligations, thoughts of corruption to get sufficient means will begin to spring up (Harsch, 1993, Cited in Tiky VI, 2010, p. 55). This describes how traditional value can create grounds for behavioral traits that end up in corrupt practices when exercised in a modern market-oriented societal setting. African countries need to start facing these realities in order to successfully curb the corruption cankerworm that is eating them up daily.

In an extension of the discussion on the causes of corruption, the demands to mention the existence of different theoretical dimensions on this subject seemed eminent, considering the fact that the solution to the problem (which is the focus of this study) cannot be understood without a full capture of the nature of the problem. Corruption fighters should have knowledge of the broad base of theories that describe why people and nations get involved in corruption in the first place. The main theories discussed in corruption literature include: historical and cultural theories (colonialism and inherited traditional values); economic theories (for example, rent-seeking and natural resources transactions, and cost-benefit analyses); institutional theories (the nature of governing institutions); agency theories (individual-bureaucrat client-principal relationships); and development theories (human development dynamics) (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2008, pp. 249-250; Sims, Gong, & Ruppel, 2012). To these five approaches, it is good to add a moralistic or spiritual tendency that is based on the assumption that naturally, people are

corrupt due to the sinful nature inherent in humankind, and this is where moral philosophers and religious authors make their entry into the discussion on corruption (Gouinlock, 1994).

Human development is the rational perspective held to be at the center of the discussion on the causes of corruption (Sims, Gong, & Ruppel, 2012). Thus, this study suggests that human development should be the most objective factor examined by those who make efforts to combat corruption in the countries infected by this peril. In a contingency theory of corruption conducted in 2012, Sims et al. collected data from 68 countries, accounting for 80% of the world's population. Through this study, the researchers discovered that there was a major effect of human development on corruption. In the study, one of the fundamental postulations of the contingency theory is described, whereby the theory argues, "the effectiveness of a solution depends on the conditions under which the solution is implemented" (Galbraith as cited in Sims, Gong, & Ruppel, 2012, p. 90).

Treating corruption in Cameroon and in other developing countries with the same predicaments as a matter of contingency, as discussed by the preceding authors, would lead to the concept of contextualization, which is the theoretical nexus of this study. Contingency analyses would allow for a holistic assessment of the battle against corruption in Cameroon, and it is these types of approaches that can lead to the discovery of specifics that can in turn engender greater impact overall on reducing corruption. Sims, Gong, and Ruppel, (2012) discussed that linking contingency to human development is an emergent widespread corruption situation. In such a situation, people tend to involve themselves in bribery and all other crooked behaviors because they focus on the social

benefits that they could have had access to by nature and by right. However, because of underdevelopment of different dimensions and magnitudes, they are unable to access these benefits freely and fairly. This is the nature of the predicaments of most African countries, especially the countries of the CEMAC zone (“*Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale*” in French) or (“*the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa*” in English).

CEMAC is a regional development bloc of Central African states, created on March 16, 1994 in N’djamena, Chad and consisting of five other countries—Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and the Central African Republic. CEMAC’s mission is to promote the harmonious development of member states within the framework of establishing a common market (CEMAC, n.d). Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores and rankings for these countries indicate close similar trends in the perception of corruption in these societies. CPI for Cameroon from 1995 which is when the program was first launched to the most recent publication in 2017 is shown on a list of tables under appendix A below. Looking at table 1 on that list, one can notice corruption perception trends for the country for the past 22 years. This is a picture of what is happening in the region. Cameroon as a leading member of this confederation can steer the dynamics of the combat against corruption in the entire region.

Comparatively, looking at the causes of corruption in the case of Croatia discussed above and in the case of Cameroon, one would notice that some causes should be generalized, while some are specific. Massive bureaucracy founded on a centralized and spoiled system was a problem in Croatia’s case (Grubiša, 2011), and it is the same for Cameroon—weak institutions that permit autocratic forms of leadership (Tiky VI,

2010). However, there's a specific situation of the effects of the Balkan Wars on corruption in Croatia (Grubiša, 2011), and in Cameroon, the extraction of natural resources stands out as a specific cause of corruption for the country in contrast to the preceding case (Tiky VI, 2010). This analogy is aimed at distinguishing causes of corruption and thereby suggesting that approaches for combat should also be made specific (or contextualized) when facing specific factors. If the causes of corruption can be understood at a general level, as well as at a specific level, the solutions should also follow such trail, while doors are kept open for possibilities of "adaptation" of solutions, a notion that is also paramount in the conceptualization of this study. The solutions to Croatia's corruption problem started with the passage of the "National Program for the Fight against Corruption" in Croatia in 2002, and fully adopted in 2006 by the Croatian parliament, an action that is marked as the beginning point of the combat against corruption in Croatia Grubiša (2011). Grubiša also saw the intervention of the European Commission's report and recommendations beginning 2001 concerning corruption in Croatia as another major turning point in the fight against corruption in the country. Strategies undertaken by Croatia since then culminated in a "revised action plan" approved on March 18, 2010, by which an announcement was made by the Prime Minister, Kosor, for a "general zero-rate tolerance of corruption" in Croatia (Grubiša, 2011, p. 80).

The five thematic areas identified by Grubiša as Croatia's strategic vision for fighting corruption included the following: a) government focus on legal and institutional framework of the country, b) prevention of corruption, c) legal prosecution and sanctioning corruption, d) international cooperation, and e) dissemination of public

awareness on the damaging effects and harmfulness of corruption (p. 80). Amongst these strategies, structural and functional administrative reforms that could be identified included the monitoring measure, and the conditionality rule that the European Union (EU) made requisite for Croatia and other countries of the Balkans, for their accession into the EU. Monitoring is effectuated with cooperation and verification. Government agencies can implement these strategies amongst themselves.

In another study, Lessmann and Markwardt (2010) examined the impact and usefulness of monitoring in government as a tool to combat corruption. The authors found out that monitoring is made more enforceable when there is free press, and that this is necessary for the success of a decentralized system of government, which is held as a proper governing mechanism that discourages corruption (Lessmann & Markwardt, 2010).

The dynamics of structural and functional reforms in fighting corruption were also examined in the work of Nguemegne (2011) on Cameroon. In that study, Nguemegne documented anticorruption efforts in Cameroon, stating how the country's anticorruption system has failed due to "the numerous structural and functional weaknesses" associated with the system (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 83). Some of the major structural and functional reforms identified by the author included: "administrative regulations, ad hoc committees, and specialized bureaucracy" (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 84). Nguemegne discovered that corruption remained pervasive in the country, despite the existence of a "formidable anticorruption machine" in the country for more than a decade (p. 84).

Nguemegne also documented the abovementioned reforms, and for administrative regulations, author mentioned “bureaucratic hierarchy and administrative oversight” (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 86). This strategy encourages a “rigidly centralized and cumbersome administrative hierarchy that is supposed to shield the Cameroonian government from corruption” (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 86). Nguemegne also stated that the bureaucratic hierarchy and administrative oversight strategy attribute an organizational status to the state, fostering “public-private dichotomy rule, which implies that the public administrator’s bureau is separate from his/her private domicile (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 86).

Government regulations enforcing the public-private dichotomy rule were traced by Nguemegne beginning from a 1974 decree, amended by Decree No. 94/199 of October 7, 1994, right up to the Decree of October 12, 2000, amending the 1994 decree (pp. 86-87). According to Nguemegne, Article 37 of the 2000 Regulation “clearly prohibits ‘functionaries’ (civil servants) from getting involved in any lucrative private activity or business” (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 87). This is also considered a regulatory effort aimed at balancing “bureaucratic paradigm with democratic accountability” (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 87). The 1996 amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon also constituted one of the regulations identified by author for the same purpose (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 87). According to Nguemegne, the preamble of the constitution states that public interest should not be violated by the exercise of the right of private ownership by all citizens (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 87). The same constitution also states the incompatibility of certain top-ranking public offices with other positions (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 88).

The notion of integrity can sometimes be theoretically distinguished from strict ethical standards and enforced by regulation as pointed out by Miller (2010). However, the notions of ethics and integrity are held from a holistic perspective in this study, and the emphasis on integrity is an attempt to get government officials to practice more ethics without having to comply with several complex codes of conduct. Rather, integrity systems introduce the informal dimension of ethical practice, which actually produces greater results when successfully implemented, according to Miller. To understand this dimension, Miller defines an integrity system as “an assemblage of institutional entities, mechanisms, and procedures whose purpose is to ensure compliance with minimum ethical standards and to promote the pursuit of ethical ideals” (Miller, 2010, p. 241). Organizational integrity is paramount to the organization’s success, and this is a strong tool that governments fighting corruption must build for their system if they desire positive and long-lasting results.

Specialized bureaucracies in Cameroon constituted the third strategy discussed by Nguemegne (2011) that falls within the scope of reforms that strictly have to do with changing the administrative practices of the country. Nguemegne reported the creation of three agency approaches: the “National Anticorruption Observatory” (NACO) in 1995, Anticorruption Units (ACUs) within different ministries in 1997, and the Superior State Audit (SSA) – an administrative audit institution that performs a function of oversight and investigation in Cameroon’s administration (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 96). The “National Agency for the Investigation of Financial Crimes (NAIFC) (ANIF in French) was created for the same goal in 2005, and NACC was created the following year (2006) to replace NACO (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 101). The preceding two organs are currently the main

institutions in charge of the day-to-day implementation of the government's anticorruption policy in Cameroon.

Nguemegne explained that the presence of these offices did not grant the government noticeable success in the fight against corruption. Rather, the institutions are said to have failed to meet up to the task due to reasons the author identified as lack of political will; poor administrative coordination and supervision of anticorruption mechanisms; failed legislative oversight; underpowered and dysfunctional judiciary; autocracy, non-merit system; state of impunity; media intimidation and crackdown; weakness of anticorruption bureaus; and the culture of corruption (Nguemegne, 2011, pp. 102-114).

Countries fighting corruption can design licit plans and strategies to ensure success of their efforts, however, lack of adaptation of strategies to the realities of the sociopolitical, economic, legal, and cultural dynamics of the said country hinder this fight. This dimension raises the notion of "contextualization" of anticorruption strategies, as the core argument of this study. Nguemegne (2011) did not examine detailed aspects of the contextualization perspective in the study conducted on Cameroon. In this study, I sought to look into such weaknesses with hopes of reducing the gap as much as possible, especially in the theoretical construct of anticorruption practice in Cameroon.

Open Government Strategy

McDermott (2010) studied the elements of structural and functional administrative reform in the "open government" strategy by studying President Obama's memorandum on transparency and open government, issued on his very first complete day in office (McDermott, 2010, p. 401). McDermott documented an open government

reform as a system made up of “transparency, public participation, and collaboration” (p.401). According to McDermott, such reform emphasizes a transparent government, a participatory government, and a collaborative government. The open government plan was designed to impact all government agencies of the United States, while the task of guiding the policy was made a responsibility of the “Office of Management and Budget” (OMB) (McDermott, 2010, p. 402). McDermott also reported that the open government policy was executed with the help of two instruments—the initialization of an “open government directive and plans” (McDermott, 2010, p. 402), and the ratification of certain “laws and regulations underpinning open government” (McDermott, 2010, p. 404).

The open government directives and plans stipulated the following:

1. Outlining agency responsibilities,
2. Creation and institutionalization of a culture of open government,
3. Requiring components of the open government plans developed by agencies,
4. Fostering transparency through a strategic and detail plan that invigorates and guides the agencies into using technology to make agencies’ information available to the public,
5. Increasing public participation in government, increasing collaboration in government by revising practices within each agency to “further cooperation with other federal and non-federal agencies, the public, and nonprofit and private entities”,
6. Strengthening a “flagship initiative for transparency”, and

7. Instituting an outside evaluation that required “OpenTheGovernment.org” to evaluate open government plans of these agencies. (McDermott, 2010, p. 403-404)

According to McDermott, the laws and regulations underpinning open government, include the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1980, the 1995 PRA reauthorization, the 1985 Circular A-130 implementing the Paperwork Reduction Act, and the 1994 Circular A-130 that significantly changed information policy and practices across the executive branch. Others include the E-government Acts of 2001 and 2002, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and its amendments—original in 1966, and amendments in (1974, 1976, 1978, 1978, 1984, 1986, and 1996), the Open Government Act of 2007 and reiteration in 2009 by President Obama (McDermott, 2010, pp. 404-412). Open government can significantly be explained within the scope of the understanding of the concept of “E-government,” which is currently a strong reformative tool in the hands of administrations fighting corruption. Most developing countries are still lacking the kind of technological manpower and institutionalization that can render e-government effective in their administrations (Dada, 2006; Heeks, 2002; and Ndou, 2004).

Continuing the discussion on the e-government concept as a significant administrative reform for anticorruption practice, Singh, Pathak, Naz, and Belwal’s (2010) study on India, Ethiopia, and Fiji discussed the concept comprehensively, including how it relates to anticorruption. The study was conceived with the aim of examining and analyzing e-government applications in developing countries, and how they can contribute to the improvement of governance and combating corruption.

Employing a mixed method research approach, Singh et al. conducted a survey targeting “over 918 citizens in India, Ethiopia, and Fiji, using convenience random sampling with a structured questionnaire” (Singh, Pathak, Naz, & Belwal’s, 2010, p. 254). In the study, Singh et al. demonstrated that many potential benefits of e-governance remained unexploited by developing countries, due to non-exploitation of what? They concluded that benefits of e-government were the same for both developed and developing countries, even though the latter was said to still have the need of increasing its usage of this method of governance.

Singh et al. (2010) recommended that communication technology should be integrated in development agendas of the countries studied. They discovered that e-government significantly contributed to the reduction of corruption in the countries studied, even though e-governance systems remained underused. Other studies held that the reasons for this limited usage included lack of financial means, technology underdevelopment, managerial shortcomings, and constitutional hindrances (Basu, 2004; Wagner, Cheung, Lee & Ip, 2003; Yildiz, 2007).

The last administrative reform strategy for anticorruption practice reviewed in this study is the setting of ‘ethical codes’ that would guide civic, moral, and corporate behavior and responsibility, and ensure overall transparency, accountability, and integrity in the functioning of the government system of the country combating corruption. The works of Veil (2008), Corvellec and Macheridis (2010), de Arruda (2009), Karren and Zacharias (2007), and Mutula and Wamukoya (2009) were reviewed for detail examination and further illustration of the preceding strategy.

Veil (2008) analyzed public service practice in the United States, especially during emergency management situations, with the focus to demonstrate “how community partnerships and civic responsibility can improve community resilience” (Veil, 2008, p. 387). The enforcement of civic responsibility would improve government, even in the case of fighting corruption. Veil explained that civic responsibility is paramount to the success of democracy. Responsibility is often shown through voting, paying taxes, serving jury duty, and volunteering (Veil, 2008). Adopting an anticorruption culture is both a public and a civic responsibility. Even though Veil discovered that the “community partnerships” discussed in the study demonstrated that engagement and civic responsibility can improve community resilience and government, the society sometimes tends to show complacency in this area.

Civic responsibility has generally been defined across social sciences as a behavior guided by social awareness, and thus it would incorporate all moral, ethical, and other sociopolitical values held and practiced by a given society (Ecklund, 2005; da Silva, Sanson, Smart, & Toumbourou, 2004). But bringing the community of people to act civilly is a difficult task, because laws that guide human behavior in society have their own shortcomings as well as the humans themselves. It is therefore no surprise to notice that societies that exercise greater civic responsibility tend to be less corrupt than those with less or no attention paid to civility.

Close to the concept of civic responsibility is that of morality or moral responsibility. To combat corruption in a society, that society must exercise a certain level of moral awareness that rebuffs acts of corruption. While Corvellec and Macheridis (2010) examined the moral responsibility of “project selectors” in Swedish society, they

discussed the need for managers to be morally responsible for their choices during the process of project selection. The authors defined responsibility as a combination of “attributability—what choices the project manager can ultimately be praised or blamed for, and of accountability—what choices the project manager has to be prepared to answer for” (Corvellec & Macheridis, 2010, p. 212).

Therefore, the morality of project selection goes beyond identifying the best possible project (s) for the parent organization. Selectors have a moral responsibility to design and manage a selection process that combines, in its various stages, openness with correctness and integrity (Corvellec & Macheridis, 2010, p. 218). Corvellec and Macheridis also reported that managers found it problematic to meet the demands of a “formalized view of responsibility” (p. 217), and they concluded that, public and private organizations alike subject managers to structural constraints and reduce managers’ responsibilities to make decisions and act in ways that systematically comply with their individual, moral judgments.

A full template of managerial responsibility should therefore pay a more perceptive consideration, for example, to goal ambiguities, power games, hidden agendas, absurd routines, and other culturally determined behaviors, together with legal requirements, performance imperatives, the incentive system, moral support structures, the organizational ethical history, and the nature of the competition. (Corvellec & Macheridis, 2010, p. 217). These administrative practices should be integrated in governments having the desire of improving performance and eradicating corruption.

Great philosophers such as Kant, Dewey, and Dostoevsky in their writings, have supported morality in government and within the general population as part of the solid

basis for building successful societies having to struggle less with ills such as corruption. Although social science research sometimes tends to deemphasize morality as a fundamental aspect of governance, classical philosophers did not ignore the significance of this concept in the relationship between the governors and the governed.

Kant established morality on “the good will” (Kant, 1785/1964, p. 17). According to Kant, “the only thing that is good without qualification or restriction is goodwill. That is to say, a good will alone is good in all circumstances and in that sense, it is an absolute or unconditioned good” (Kant, 1785/1964, p. 17). The extension of this foundation of governance is seen in “the good will and duty, the motive of duty, the formal principle of duty, reverence for the law, the categorical imperative, ordinary practical reason, and the need for philosophy” (Kant, 1785/1964, pp. 19-23).

Dostoevsky founded morality on God and the different existential stances of human nature, thus criticizing the Russian reformers for “renouncing Christ, and putting themselves in the place of God, and in doing so, they succeeded in undermining the people’s faith and capacity for love” (Guignon, 1993, p. xvi). Dewey’s own opinion of morality was based on the “instrumentalities of thought and conduct which have the most significant bearing on the quality of human life” (Gouinlock, 1994, p. xxi). Dewey’s process of inquiry was fundamentally “naturalistic,” seeing man as he is and as he interacts with the cosmos. Ethical behavior, be it at the individual or corporate level finds its roots in the writings of these philosophers, and such precedents apply to contemporary societal behavior.

Moving to the discussion on structural and functional administrative reform strategies, explained within the framework of standards for public integrity, the works of

Mutula and Wamukoya (2009) and Karren and Zacharias (2007) provided the basis for examining this concept of integrity, as practiced by government and the corporate world. Mutula and Wamukoya examined the role played by information management in enhancing democracy, transparency, accountability, and integrity in government for governments in East and Southern Africa.

It is also important that information custody of government is not only available, but also availed to the public. Therefore, the onus is on governments to put in place effective national and institutional frameworks including adequate capacity to harness, facilitate, and enhance information capture, organizational maintenance, and usage. With this, Mutula and Wamukoya (2009) argued that citizens and civil society organizations would be able to access and use such framework to monitor the public in the areas of administrative efficiency and effectiveness in achieving stated public service objective and target.

In another study, Karren and Zacharias (2007) examined the critical application of integrity requirements in the business world. The researchers discovered that many employers in the United States made use of “paper- and- pencil integrity and personality tests to weed out dishonest, or otherwise suspicious protective employees from their labor pools” (p. 221). However, such approach has never been very effective, as advocates of integrity tests may significantly underestimate the number of false positives, which is the number of honest applicants being labeled as dishonest (Mutula & Wamukoya, 2009, p. 222). This reveals some of the shortcomings of integrity testing.

In the same light, governments usually use integrity-screening techniques to purify their employee pools. However, Karren and Zacharias (2007) argued that testing

for integrity is accompanied by weaknesses including “validity issues such as construction, confusion, false positive problem, faking issues centered around coaching and retaking tests, and privacy and fairness concerns” (Karren & Zacharias, 2007, pp. 222-231). They also indicated that the dramatic increase in the use of paper-and-pencil tests was due to the passage of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA) of 1988, which “barred the use of polygraph or lie detector as pre-employment screening device” (Karren & Zacharias, 2007, p. 221).

Testing for integrity is not common in developing countries as it is for developed countries. Although Karren and Zacharias critically examined the weaknesses associated with this activity, they do not rule out its importance in the improvement of the jobsite and consequently reducing the grounds for corruption and other work-related malpractices. They provide certain recommendations as to how the testing could be improved. These include, reducing the failures of the test, creating tests using the construct-oriented approach, balancing expectations of privacy against employers’ needs to know further research on intercultural and international differences in attitudes toward privacy and fairness of integrity testing, and researching other selection methods and management practices to screen theft (Karren & Zacharias, 2007, pp. 231-232).

Barry and Stephens (1998) conceptualized the definition of integrity in an organization in terms of correspondence between values and behavior, giving the subject a morally neutral approach. Accordingly, they challenge the position held by fundamentalists such as Ayn Rand, according to whom integrity is a morally justifiable system of values and related to what constitutes “an appropriate set or system of ethical principles” (as cited in Barry & Stephens, 1998, p. 163). Alexander (2010) framed

integrity within the context of oligarchic fluxing shadows, which explains visibility in public affairs as an illusionary flux for the invisible (p. 503). Thus, system integrity depends on the ethical values set in place by the organization practicing such values. Integrity is perceived morally and ethically, justified more appropriately when distinguished to address different situations, circumstances, and organizational settings.

Barry and Stephens (1998) reported that the development of integrity systems within governments is one of the most effective efforts for combating corruption in corrupt governments and societies. In addition, Alexander (2010) showed that developing countries have yet to adopt and make advancements in fighting corruption and using all pilot weapons for combating corruption for all societies. Alexander added that governments should ensure the formulation and coordination of all the strategies in legal terms and provide a framework for materializing every vision that leadership and society might conceive as to how corruption should be combated in the given country or society.

Most researchers that have explored the nature of the policy instrument constituting literature that explains the two strategic dimensions of the anti-corruption policy instruments, which are anticorruption programs and campaigns (transformative information), and standards for public performance and integrity (structural and functional reforms) within the administration (Southeast European Legal Development Initiative, & Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002) have tend to propose more of curative measures to the problem of corruption. A more recent study conducted by Fedran, Dobovšek, Ažman, and Bren, (2018) on Slovenia, tends to explore a new dimension by which anticorruption measures should be given a preventive focus instead of a curative perception and concentration.

In discussing ‘integrity plan’ as a preventive measure or tool against corruption, Fedran et al. argued that effective anticorruption approaches should not focus only on making government work better but should also endeavor to make the people more honest. They proposed that each government sector should have an integrity plan and custodians of such plans. According to authors, prevention is not very popular in curbing corruption by government because it is longtime previewed (Fedran, Dobovšek, Ažman, & Bren, 2018), however, this is another innovative perspective by which anticorruption policies could be pursued.

In the effort to reduce, prevent, and if possible eradicate corruption in governments, and consequently society using public policy and administration as a weapon, governments usually pay attention to topics such as sensitization and awareness campaigns, national anticorruption programs, accountability, transparency, public responsibility and performance, ethical and moral codes, collaboration, cooperation, public participation, and system integrity (Southeast European Legal Development Initiative, & Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002). This list might not be exhaustive as to what governments would put into place in terms of policy to curb corruption in a given society, but it covers the fundamental policy strategies exposed in contemporary anticorruption literature.

The Legal Instrument

The legal instrument is comprised of all strategies implemented by the government within the framework of the law to combat corruption. These strategies span from punitive measures taken by the courts and the administration to sanction acts of corruption, to institutionalized anticorruption norms safeguarded and enforced by the law.

Punitive Measures

The anticorruption punitive strategy incorporates the law enforcing sanctions by courts and the administrations. This involves, in one way or the other, all the three branches of government (executive, judiciary, and legislative). Administrative sanctions need legal backing from the legislator and interpretation and custody from the judiciary. The legislator needs administrative public policy proposals to make effective laws and needs feedback from the judiciary to correct nuances in the laws found difficult to interpret. The judiciary needs administrative institutions and oversight for the enforcement, management, and coordination of the sanctions pronounced by the courts, and needs legal backing from the legislature. Punitive sanctions against corrupt acts usually include dismissals from office, imprisonment, suspensions, fines, and other forms of penalties. The application of this measure was examined through the works of Eliason (2009), White (2010), Kubiciel (2009), Peci and Sikkema (2010), Nasrawin (2010), and Majila, Taylor, and Raga (2014).

Eliason (2009) discussed the federal criminal law prohibiting bribery and gratuities, as part of an intricate web of laws and regulations governing the behavior of federal officials. Eliason reveals that the law sanctioning corruption in the United States witnessed complex interpretations and applications at the time the study was conducted (p. 929). Eliason explained this intricacy of the law stating that, court decisions over the past decade have narrowly construed the bribery and gratuities law, making prosecution under that statute more difficult and giving prosecutors of federal corruption an incentive to look for alternative legal theories. Honest service fraud, traditionally used to fight state and local corruption, has stepped into the breach and increasingly appears in federal

corruption cases. But this trend threatens to upset the balance struck in the law between corruption criminal behavior by federal officials and behavior that may be unseemly or unethical but falls short of being criminal. (Eliason, 2009, p. 929)

According to the author, honest service standards did not provide government officials or the public with adequate notice about the requirements of criminal law (Eliason, 2009). On the other hand, the author documented that “potential penalties vastly exceeded the penalties for gratuities or other lesser misconduct that may be repackaged as honest service fraud” (p. 929). As a remedy to this problem, Eliason proposed an amendment of the federal gratuities statute, and that a statutory definition of honest service fraud should be enacted.

Interpreting acts of corruption and attributing them the appropriate sanctions can sometimes raise issues of clarity of the law, especially when administrative errors occur. However, criminal laws on corruption and their acute interpretation occupy an important place in government’s effort toward the combat against corruption. This is the first step in the application of punitive measures against corruption. The centerpiece of the law punishing corruption in the United States is 18 U.S.C § 201, Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses.

Courts usually also develop and use other prosecution theories, like the honest service fraud that was developed out of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes and became the leading prosecution instrument for corruption in the United States, touching even state and local officials that were not mentioned in the provisions of 18 U.S.C § 201 (Eliason, 2009, p. 952). The first law punishes bribery and gratuities involving federal officials, while the second (honest service fraud) “charge state and local corruption, as a

scheme to defraud citizens and taxpayers of their intangible right to the fair and honest services of the government official, using the federal mail and wire fraud statutes” (Eliason, 2009, p. 952).

The complexities raised in the preceding study, indicating the intricate nature of laws on corruption in a developed world country like the United States, reveal how, even advanced democracies can still find it difficult to pinpoint what behavior of the public servant should be labeled corrupt and criminal. It is also difficult determining the gravity and appropriate penalties to be attributed to such acts.

Most developing countries that do not have sufficient structures and competent juridical frameworks would usually avoid taking the pain to detail the definition of acts of public corruption. Until a government official is embezzling huge sums of funds, a case of corruption would not be heard in these countries, even though daily kickbacks, petty bribes, and under-the-table gifts are ravaging the fabrics of meritocracy, justice, democracy, and overall economic prosperity of these countries. As Nguemegne (2011) wrote, “this is typical in the Cameroonian case, corruption has become over the years so rampant in Cameroon that one is afraid that a real culture of corruption entrenched in the fabric of the society exists in the country” (p. 114). Yet, most corruption suspects are seldom arrested and prosecuted, and in general, corrupt officials are more likely to be exempted from a court’s trial, all due to an underpowered and dysfunctional judiciary (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 105).

In Kubiciel (2009), the researcher revealed criminal sanctions embedded in the United Nations’ Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003, which is the principal international law and organization that fights corruption universally. Just as in Eliason

(2009), Kubiciel classified the infraction of corruption into two categories including bribing public officials and actively bribing foreign public officials (Kubiciel, 2009, p. 139). Kubiciel also defined bribery as the act of lending a benefit in order to affect a decision unduly. According to author, the definition for the term bribery is drawn from Article 15 of the UNCAC. The article also criminalizes individuals who promise or give an inducement directly or indirectly to a public official, in order for the public official to restrain from exercising his or her duties (Kubiciel, 2009, p. 142).

Article 15 (b) also criminalizes passive bribery, which refer to public officials who solicits or accept a gift and in return, acts or refrain from acting in accordance with his/her official duties (Kubiciel, 2009, p. 142). Other international legal instruments with similar provisions include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, the Council of Europe (COE) Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, and the European Union Convention on the Fight against Corruption (Kubiciel, 2009, p. 142).

In the African context, more legal instruments include the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003), and the South African Development Protocol Against Corruption (2001). Furthermore, Kubiciel's study argued that the development of the UNCAC in 2003 took international legal development fight against corruption to its highest peak. Kubiciel added that a 'legal transplant' of these instruments alone cannot sufficiently cure the social disease of corruption at national levels because, in order to record a considerable amount of success, expertise of law-makers, law enforcement agents, and courts has to be employed (Kubiciel, 2009, pp.154-155). Even in the case of Cameroon, the difficulty to establish an independent judicial

body with the aptitude of interpreting and punishing corruption infractions is inherent, causing a major handicap to government's efforts of fighting corruption in the country.

Besides conventions, constitutional and legislative stipulations, and general administrative law, the general rule of law theory is in itself a major legal weapon that requires close attention in a study of this nature. The basic and shortest definition of the rule of law would be: respect for the law—a concept that different authors in the social science field have broadly defined (Bufford, 2007). However, this study holds the definition of Bufford, which adopts Justice Anthony Kennedy's position in a 2006 address at the annual meeting of the American Bar Association (ABA)" (Bufford, 2007, p. 2). According to this position, the rule of law states that:

- i. The law is superior to, and thus is binding to all government officials;
- ii. The law must respect and preserve the dignity, equality, and human rights of all persons. The law must establish and safeguard the constitutional structures necessary to build a free society in which all citizens have a meaningful voice in shaping and enacting rules that govern them.
- iii. The law must devise and maintain systems to advise all rights of persons, and it must empower them to fulfill expectations and seek redress of grievances without fear of penalty or retaliation (Bufford, 2007, p. 3).

From the preceding principles, Bufford stated that the ABA drew a working definition for the rule of law, summarized as "a government where the law is superior to, and thus binds, the government and all its officials and citizens" (Bufford, 2007, p. 3). Bufford also argued that the importance of an independent judiciary in the administration of the rule of law contemplates such form of government in which the law will be

superior to all (Bufford, 2007, p. 3). White (2010) examined the dynamics surrounding the rule of law in the legal effort against corruption in some Central Asian and Eastern European countries. According to the author, international donor agencies and development banks invested millions in the various countries, beginning from the mid-1990s, to reform their post-communist judiciaries. With the belief that democracy and economic growth are dependent on the rule of law, these agencies carried out enforcement of institutional reforms concomitant to the approach of institutional building of the judiciary, which was implemented in the West (White, 2010, pp. 307-308).

White further argued that even though such approach concentrated on improving the resources of the judiciary, education and training, and promoting judicial independence will have the corollary effect of eradicating corruption and implanting the rule of law. It is however regrettable that such was not the case in Central Asia and not in Eastern Europe as well (White, 2010, p. 308). Suggestions consisted therefore of the use of the jury method in fostering the rule of law, because such method took into consideration the sociopolitical realities of each country (White, 2010, p. 309). Acts of corruption in each country, based on this proposal, would be examined and condemned in accordance with different intrinsic cultural and political values that are held in each country. Even so, this study argues that such position does not efface a universal similitude for the works of corruption and it has consequences on the prosperity of human societies.

Bufford's (2007) conclusion on the rule of law supports White's (2010) argument, when he stated that the importance of the rule of law lies in the manner in which it is

viewed and practiced by each society, such that the concept appears indispensable for all societies, and inexcusably compelling for all democratic societies:

The rule of law is the bedrock for building a structure of ordered liberty and progress in civil society. It provides the foundation for economic development, the protection of human rights, the provision of self-government, the prevention of crime and corruption, the promotion of basic identity, and the achievement of economic and social rights. At the same time, it is important to recognize that the rule of law is not an international or apolitical matrix that can be imposed on a particular culture in a particular country. Instead, the rule of law must be realized through each country's distinctive political, cultural and historical institutions and traditions. In consequence, the particular realization of the rule of law varies from country to country, both in the developed world and in developing countries.

(Bufford, 2007, p. 1)

The preceding conclusions are some of the pertinent perspectives that corruption fighters in Cameroon and in other developing countries need to uphold in their efforts of reforming and making use of the judiciary as a successful weapon against corruption. The observations made by White (2010) on the case of Central Asian and Eastern European countries are similar to those prevailing in other developing countries. The importation of democratic practices has always faced the problem of either 'adaption' or 'understanding' in the recipient countries. That is why time, education, contextualization, and sometimes rigor are necessary for successful spread and establishment of democratic values and institutions in these societies.

The evidence and impact of the punitive legal instrument usually includes, fines, imprisonment, reprimand, suspension, dismissals, and in extreme cases, execution and forcing into exile. These occur when the said acts of corruption are associated with genocidal killings and political treason of high degree, particularly in emerging democracies. The recent sweeping crackdowns on dictatorial regimes in North Africa (including Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia) by the masses in 2011-2012 can be seen as an example of the extreme measures that can be taken to punish those involved in corruption and abuse of political power.

In another study by Peci and Sikkema (2010), the cost of punitive anticorruption measures on culprits of corruption was examined in Netherlands (a consolidated democracy) and in Albania (a transitional democracy). The research focus was to find out how the rule of law worked in combating corruption in the different democratic experiences. In the study, both countries had a common source of international law—the European Union Criminal Law Convention on Corruption that influenced their criminal laws against corruption. As Peci and Sikkema explained, this commonality stemmed from the recommendation that was made by the Minister of Justice of the Council of Europe in 1994. The Minister said that corruption ought to be addressed at a European level, for nations in the economic block of the EU, due to globalization effects (Peci & Sikkema 2010, p. 101).

Following the recommendation, the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) was set up in 1999, to improve the capacity of its members to fight corruption and ensure compliance with the anticorruption standards of European Council (Peci &

Sikkema, 2010, p. 101). This study suggests that such global approach can benefit regional economic blocks such as the CEMAC zone, with Cameroon as member country.

In the case of Albania, Peci and Sikkema (2010) explained the incorporation of the provisions of the Criminal Law Convention for the European Union in the Albania Criminal Code (ACC) as of July 2002. The authors stated clearly the definitions and offences of corruption, and attributed clear, concise, and appropriate penalties for them (Peci & Sikkema, 2010, p. 107). Penalties prescribed by some of the articles in the ACC include imprisonment and fines—some of the common criminal penalties that are applicable worldwide, although the severity may vary from country to country. The definition of passive corruption offense by public officials and the punishment attributed to it is stipulated in Articles 259, 260, and 319a of the ACC (Peci and Sikkema, 2010, p. 108). Article 259, regarded as the general provision on corruption by public officials, stipulates the following definitions and sanctions:

Soliciting or taking, directly or indirectly, by a person who exercises public functions, of any undue advantage or of any such promise for himself or for a third person, or accepting an offer or promise deriving from an undue advantage, in order to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his duty or function, is punished with a prison term of two to eight years and with a fine of 500,000 to 1 million Lekë. (Peci and Sikkema, 2010, p. 108)

In furthering the discussion on the offenses and punishment of corruption, these researchers distinguished between type of perpetrator and the corresponding severity of penalty. Thus, senior public officials would suffer more severe punishments compared to regular civil servants. The case of the Dutch revealed the same use of the dynamics of

imprisonment and fines to punish the corrupt (Peci & Sikkema, 2010, p. 114). Their study indicates that countries and societies that are serious to curb and eradicate corruption in their governments and amongst their people, have made their anticorruption efforts part of the law, and have out rightly and concretely condemned acts of corruption in their criminal law provisions.

Due to lack of such rigorousness in developing countries, even if the law provisions are made available, the implementation always remains a nightmare. Corruption is punished in Article 134 of the Criminal Code of Cameroon (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 96). Its provisions in Section 1, stipulate five to ten years imprisonment and a fine of 200,000 FCFA to 2 million FCFA for a public official or any functionary who, for himself or for a third party, solicits, accepts, or receives donations, gifts, promises, presents, for doing, not doing or adjourning an act of his duty (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 96). This punitive weapon to combat corruption is recognized by most societies, be it in the developed or developing world. This study suggests that the weakness of this tool might stem from its implementation and therefore countries such as Cameroon that are dedicated to the fight against corruption can focus on enhancing the institutions that will ensure the enforcement of the law against corruption.

International laws dealing with corruption seem to have recorded greater success in Europe, especially because the transplantation of these laws in various EU member countries is being done in the framework of mature institutions and advanced collaborative politics. Participative countries in the EU block are ready to make meaningful reforms in order to meet the requirements stipulated by international conventions on corruption.

An example of such adjustments was examined in Nasrawin (2011) for the case of the United Kingdom (UK), where author explained that the UK needed to introduce a new statutory law to bring members of parliament within the scope of the criminal offense of corruption. Nasrawin also argued that this would also be necessary in order to meet Britain's international obligations to combat corruption in the public sector (Nasrawin, 2011, p. 204). The adjustments affected the British law to as far back as the "Bill of Rights" of 1689 (Article 9 on parliamentary privileges), and the "Prevention of Corruption Acts of 1889-1916" (Nasrawin, 2011, p. 204).

The rigorousness of the law and legal endeavors to combat corruption in the UK and the other countries in the EU block lacks in most developing countries which are struggling in this race. This is so, especially with the current financial missteps resulting from bad and corrupt decisions by public officials. Its achievements in combating widespread corruption in public service and society in general are far more substantial and effective compared to the latter, where setting the platform for real democracy to take off is still a major challenge to most of the countries. Nguemegne (2011) mentioned that a state of impunity existed and persisted in Cameroon as one of the main reasons why the country's anticorruption machinery is not productive (p. 106). As such, the punitive anticorruption weapon remains strategic and significant in the combat against corruption ostensibly on paper.

Lastly in another study by Majila, Taylor, and Raga (2014), authors identified legislation as a punitive tool for anticorruption practice with focus on legislative capability of anticorruption agencies. Authors asked the question whether these anticorruption agencies have enough political muscle or recognition to identify and

punish acts of corruption, or do they only concern themselves with responding to demands by international agreements such as those coming from UNCAC, the SADC protocol against corruption, and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. The study which was conducted on anticorruption legislation in South Africa with focus on Cape Town, revealed that most often, as it is in other developing countries like Cameroon, anticorruption legislation is politicized, and anticorruption agencies are not given significant political leverage that can enable them to execute their functions as they should. Authors therefore argued that for anticorruption legislation to work as a legal instrument to combat corruption, it must be depoliticized, and the agencies granted independence to function.

This section, containing the review of recent works written on the punitive legal instrument for anticorruption, has revealed that punitive measures against corruption vary from country to country in terms of the definition of the corruption infraction and the severity of the penalty attributed to the infraction. The two common criminal penalties seen include imprisonment and fines. Other administrative sanctions might include suspensions, dismissals, layoffs, reduction of pay, and other forms of reprimands. The punitive measure is an effective anticorruption weapon, especially with contemporary contributions from international law and collaborative legal frameworks. The literature also revealed that the main concern surrounding this weapon is the challenges it faces at the level of implementation, especially for developing countries that lack the necessary democratic platforms, sophisticated institutions, and effective procedures to implement this measure productively. This raises the issue of institutionalization, which is the subject of the next section.

Institutionalization of Anticorruption

The main issue here is that of deciding which and how many authorities should take charge of the government's anticorruption machinery, and which institutions should sanction corrupt acts and govern the anticorruption system, and how? For any anticorruption effort and strategy to become effective and produce long-lasting effects, the government must at a certain point make permanent law so as to turn the volume of their message high, to the hearing of all citizens that corruption is a crime that is punishable by the law as all other crimes. The literature in this section contains investigations and analyses recently conducted on the developments that have taken place and are still going on in the anticorruption discourse.

Yusuf (2011) discussed institutionalizing anticorruption against the institutionalization of corruption. To institutionalize an anticorruption effort is to grant it the legal, administrative, and sociopolitical backing that it needs in order to successfully and legitimately install itself in the practices of the system of the country or society taking the initiative (Yusuf, 2011). As such, at the center of institutionalization is the rule of law. In connection with the rule of law, Yusuf investigated and analyzed the role of the judiciary as the overarching factor for institutionalizing anticorruption (Yusuf, 2011).

Yusuf conducted the study on Nigeria, making provisions for the lessons to reflect the experiences of other developing countries, especially those of Sub-Saharan Africa. According to Yusuf, the volatility of anticorruption policy when it interacts with politics is a common phenomenon. This statement stemmed from the findings in the Nigerian case that revealed that political malpractices had meddled with the judiciary system of the country, rendering the judiciary corrupt itself and as such, could not meet its

responsibility toward enforcing anticorruption practices in the country, especially when public officials are involved (Yusuf, 2011). Yusuf documented such deplorable institutional state in the following statement, describing the corruption case of one Governor Ibori, and how the judiciary failed to provide the legal oversight that was needed to sanction the case and make it an example to the other top government officials.

Furthermore, Yusuf concluded that pursuing social reforms through the agency of an unreformed institution, in this case, the judiciary, gives rise to trouble in many post authoritarian contexts. Moreover, that such tendencies result from “common mistrust of courts in post authoritarian transitions, mistrust arising from social misgivings regarding the complicity of these courts in past illiberal governance” (Yusuf, 2011, p. 82).

Therefore, it can be argued as suggested in this study, that if the judiciary performs its role in the fight against corruption in such context (involving developing countries), it must be reformed alongside the reforms that these governments are making to ensure that corruption is checked.

Apart from installing the appropriate judicial system that is apt, grants the necessary independence, and is ready to foster the government’s success in fighting against corruption, the institutionalization of anticorruption is also examined in terms of systemization of anticorruption strategies. Ionescu (2011) pinpointed this factor by stating that “anticorruption initiatives must be viewed in a systemic manner” (p. 118). In discussing the economic dynamics of anticorruption, Ionescu presented the importance of elements such as “networks, the culture of corruption, the economic cost of corruption and cost-benefit analyses of corruption/anticorruption, and the understanding of new models of corruption in developing strategies against corruption” (Ionesu, 2011, p. 116).

Systemic corruption refers to political or bureaucratic corruption, but within the government, it can be described as organized corruption (Alam, 1989; Delacote, 2008; and Philp, 1997). The chronic nature of systemic corruption makes it a pathology that necessitates intensive and quality treatment in order to increase the chances and the hope for the occurrence of healing. Such is the case of most transitional democracies of the developing world. It is as such, suggested in this study that in order to counteract systematic corruption, governments engaged in the fight against corruption must do so in a systematic manner. This is where the notion of ‘political will’ comes into play, and shall be discussed in the subsequent section.

Another aspect of institutionalized anticorruption is culture. Culture is spoken of mostly in terms of the practice of corruption, but the anticorruption culture is a notion that should be instilled into the systems that are stricken with massive tolls of corruption cases and are making serious strides toward changing the status-quo. Barr and Serra (2010) conducted a study on corruption and culture with participants spanning across several countries. The study revealed that “corruption as being examined contemporarily is, in part a cultural phenomenon” (p. 21). The authors arrived at this conclusion by asking certain pertinent questions suggested in this study to represent some of the fundamental questions that should be asked when making findings into the nature, sources, and causes of corruption. In the same way, the anticorruption discourse must visit these roots in order to develop and prescribe appropriate curative and preventive measures, and if possible, develop or manufacture a vaccine for the corruption pathology.

The questions Barr and Serra asked were summed up in the following sentences: why do some people choose corruption over honesty, while others do not? Is it only the

economic cost and benefit associated with a corrupt act that are important or do intrinsic motivations also play a determining role? (Barr & Serra, 2010, p. 3).

They also found out in their study that culture, i.e., the “values and beliefs” transmitted from generation to generation in a given society through socialization, justified and guided the ways that social institutions function, their goals and modes of operation, with social actors drawing on them to select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain or justify their actions and evaluations (Barr & Serra, 2010). Therefore, this is one of the reasons why corruption is more persistent in certain countries than others. (Barr & Serra, 2010). If corruption is a cultural phenomenon as Barr and Serra concluded, this study suggests that anticorruption efforts should be fostered such that they become a cultural behavior so as to see corruption terminated or reduced in a permanent manner in the given society.

Finally, setting aside independent anticorruption bodies to function as the principal government structure responsible for implementing public policy on the combat against corruption is a recent approach that most governments have put into place in their efforts to win the battle against corruption in their various countries and communities. In Cameroon, these bodies include the NACC, the “Ministry under the Presidency of the Republic in charge of Supreme State Audit,” and the “National Agency for the Investigation of Financial Crimes (NAIFC)” (Nguemegne 2011, p. 96, 101).

NAIFC and NACC are currently the specialized bureaus assigned with the daunting task of stopping the pervasiveness of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon (Nguemegne, 2011). Other government departments, programs, and movements of NGOs function as auxiliaries to the special bureaus. In Nigeria, the Independent Corrupt

Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) are the special bureaus principally responsible for issues of corruption and combating it in the country (Yusuf, 2011, p. 58). The trend is the same for all countries adopting this approach of special agencies. Their appellations and constructions may likely differ from one country to another, but their principal mission remains the same—fight corruption with all might, power, and strength.

Literature shows that the strategy of using special anticorruption bureaus has succeeded to some extent in combating corruption in several countries (David, 2010; Grubiša, 2011; Smilov, 2010). This has however worked only in those countries where the bureaus have appropriate expertise and sufficient recourses to carry on with the enormous task of combating corruption. Some examples of these include the “office of combating corruption and organize crime (USKOK)” in Croatia (Grubiša, 2011, p. 78), the “Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)” in Hong Kong (David, 2010, p. 396), the “State Agency for National Security (SANS)” in Bulgaria (Smilov, 2010, p. 69), and the “Anticorruption Monotony Group (ACMG)” in Albania (Smilov, 2010, p. 73). The preceding countries have witnessed large-scale reduction in the trend of corruption in their governments and societies in general thanks to the unrelenting efforts and hard work put forth by their respective special and independent agencies.

Furthermore, some countries like Cameroon and other developing democracies of the Sub-Saharan Africa regions have adopted the strategy of maintaining independent and or special bureaus to combat corruption. However, according to the recent corruption perception indexes (CPI) from TI, these institutions have not recorded much success (TI, 2017).

To ensure the effectiveness of the special bureau approach, Smilov (2010) suggested that political players must enforce these bodies (p. 72). This again raises the issue of ‘political will’, which will be examined in the next section. In a study on anticorruption agencies and their uses and applications in more than three Eastern European Countries (EECs), Smilov made the following assertions about instrumentalizations of these agencies by political players:

It is impossible for key government officials to speak regularly about wide spread corruption, to measure it, and to organize public awareness campaigns, as this will associate the politicians with corruption in the eyes of the public. Therefore, there is a political need for a semiautonomous, semi-independent public body to take upon itself the anticorruption discourse on behalf of the ruling parties. (Smilov, 2010, p. 72)

Smilov also proposed four major structural and functional elements that these bodies need to consider at their creation in order to be successful. First is that their composition should build bridges with civil society and the opposition and second, the powers of these bodies need to be concentrated mainly in the area of institutional reform, legislative drafting, and coordination among other government agencies; investigative powers are not needed. Third, in relation to the media, the commission should be able to supply with media-friendly material and the fourth thing is in relation to business, one could expect that the commission remains discrete and appreciative of two major factors of business support: downsizing of the state and lowering of taxes (Smilov, 2010, p. 72).

Issues of the distribution and separation of powers and effective coordination between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of the government, are usually

hindrances to the effective operation of special government agencies like the anticorruption bureau (Yusuf, 2011). Yusuf pointed in support of this assertion citing the case of Nigeria, that the Due Process Office (DPO), ICPC, and EFCC make the judiciary an unquestionably reputable institution (Yusuf, 2011, p. 58).

Issues of power distribution are due to lack of strategy, vision, and, coordination in the way power is partitioned and managed among the various arms of the government (Smilov 2010). Smilov also rejected the attribution of investigative powers to specialized anticorruption agencies, arguing that they could counteract important groups such as the police and the prosecutor (p. 72). Smilov further added that special anticorruption agencies can in certain cases initiate proceedings that are then transferred to the prosecutor and the police for continuance (Smilov, 2010, p. 72). However, a slightly different situation prevails in the case of Cameroon, where the NACC is invested with greater investigatory powers in cases of corruption. As stated in the agency's organization papers, the action of NACC is based on three fundamental pillars: investigation, prevention, and communication; studies; and cooperation (NACC, 2008). This, in comparison to the recommendations made by Smilov (2010) discussed below, indicates that special anticorruption bureaus function differently in different countries, the reason why some are successful in their missions and some are not.

Smilov's study suggested that fewer specialized bureaus should be created, or even that a single special bureau should be in charge, and the amount of legislation sanctioning corruption should not be overwhelming and ambiguous, rather it should be clear, fair, and concise. Yusuf argued that numerous legislative provisions and institutions can create conflicts between jurisdictions and possibly exacerbate rather than

reduce corruption incidences in a nation (Yusuf, 2011, p. 63). In addition, special agencies can initiate more effective anticorruption policies if they concentrate on the policy part of it and stay away from ground investigations, which belong to the judiciary and the police.

Finally, the review on the institutionalization of anticorruption methods engages policy makers, practitioners, and researchers in a discussion on four major pillars of the institution of anticorruption (Scherer & Palazzo, 2008). These pillars are judicialization, systemization, culturalization, and independence (TI, 2007). These elements have been reviewed in the preceding section, and the different works reviewed indicate that substantial research has been conducted on the different aspects concerning the institutionalization of anticorruption norms, values, and practices in the given society. This might provide comparative lessons for countries still struggling to register a large-scale win against corruption and its consequences. The next section provides a review of literature on leadership and the role played by society in the anticorruption discourse through topics such as political will, leadership style, culture, and other dynamics of the civil society.

The Role of Leadership and Society

The role of leadership and the dynamics of society in the combat against corruption are significant at several levels and worth examining. This study supports the leadership school of thought that upholds the notion that “everything rises and falls on leadership,” as stated by Maxwell (1999, p. xi). On the other hand, people and culture share a strong bond that makes it difficult to separate the two when conducting behavioral studies, as it is in the case at hand. This section therefore examines leadership dynamics

in the fight against corruption in form of the political will for change, usually initiated and guided by the leadership of the particular country or community. Secondly, the normative/cultural applications of societal behavior vis-à-vis corruption and the combat against it is examined to complete the circle of change, which requires both the will for change and the change in behavior itself.

The Political Will for Change

In the context of combating corruption, the concept of political will is defined in Kpundeh (1998), as the “demonstrated credible intent of political actors (elected or appointed leaders, civil society watch dogs, stakeholder groups, etc.) to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level” (p. 92). Kpundeh also posited, “this will of political actors is a critical starting point for sustainable and effective anticorruption strategies and programs” (Kpundeh, 1998, p. 92). In the absence of a strong, determined, and committed political will, Kpundeh emphasized that the statement of government in reforming civil service, strengthening transparency and accountability and reinventing the association between government and private industry would remain mere rhetoric (Kpundeh, 1998, p. 92). Political will is thus seen as the fuel for change in the engine of government. Such change takes root first at the level of organizations and groups (government, private, civil society), and then spreads across the nation or the community. Thus, the use of leadership and organizational change becomes important for the understanding of the application of political will.

Organizational change can occur with respect to two trends – evolutionary or revolutionary change (Burke, 2008). Evolutionary change is a gradual and steady change process that occurs within a long period, while revolutionary change engenders a major

transformation of significant parts or all of the organization within a short period.

Changing the corruption culture in government and society is a project that can benefit from both types of change. Changing the corruption culture requires revolutionary change in terms of administrative reforms, and evolutionary change in terms of behavioral reforms. It might also implicate multi-level change, which is change at the individual, group, and organizational levels. Change can also be structural, functional, and statutory. Perspectives on organizational change must also take into consideration culture, organizational learning, and possible resistance—factors that will be analyzed further in the next subsection.

The initiation of the kind of leadership that will stimulate the right political will and spark change within a political system is summed up in the good governance concept. This concept is fundamental in the discourse on corruption and the combat against it. To achieve good governance within a system, the right leadership and management should be present. The subsequent discussion in this subsection shall review some of the recent studies conducted on good governance and the combat against corruption and will end with a review of the concept of leadership, including how it influences political will and good governance, and how effective and important public management is in the consolidation of this anticorruption network.

Good governance has been defined in Elahi (2009) as the process and structure that guides political and socio-economic relationships (p. 1170). This concept can sometimes be embedded or misunderstood with that of just ‘governance’ which is the exercise of economic, political and administrative authorities in managing affairs of a country (Elahi, 2009, p. 1170). Thus, the main idea that distinguishes between

governance and good governance decision is the process or structure of implementation of decision. Drawing from the good governance principles enumerated in the United Nations Development Program's "Governance and sustainable Human Development" policy of 1997, Graham, Amos, and Plumptre (2003, p. 3) listed five good governance principles. These principles do not detail exhaustively what can contain good governance in a political system but are largely satisfactory to explain the expectations of good governance for all governments practicing democratic governance.

The first principle concerns legitimacy and voice, which refers to the notions of participation and 'consensus orientation' enforce this principle, which upholds the viewpoint that all men and women should have a voice in decision-making either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their intentions. The principle also adds that "differing interests can be mediated to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the group and, where possible, on policies and procedures" (Graham, Amos, & Plumptre, 2003, p. 3). The second concerns direction. The direction principle is expounded by the ideas of 'strategic vision', which requires that "leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on good governance and human development, along with a sense of what is needed for such development" (Graham, Amos, & Plumptre, 2003, p. 3).

Another one is the performance principle, which is realized through the implementation of the notions of responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency. These three sets of administrative strategies ensure that institutions and processes serve all stakeholders and produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources (Graham, Amos & Plumptre, 2003). There is also accountability: The twin public policy

strategies of accountability and transparency explain what the accountability principle generally means to government. Accountability requires that decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society organizations be accountable to the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. At the same time, transparency is built on the free flow of information, where process, institution, and information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to understand and monitor them (Graham, Amos & Plumptre, 2003, p. 3).

Fairness: The rule of equity and the rule of law guarantee fairness for all in society. These rules hold that all men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their wellbeing, and as such, legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly the laws on human rights (Graham, Amos & Plumptre, 2003). These principles also reflect the stipulations of the United Nations Convention in the universal declaration of human rights.

Elahi (2009) elaborated the preceding principles in a study on the character of UNDP and its take on the notion and policy of good governance. Being at the center of development of the good governance policy and its principles, the UNDP was said to have taken this policy to heart, with the major goal of materializing sustainable human development in the developing world (Elahi 2009). Not forgetting, other pioneers of good governance, including the World Bank, enforced this policy. As stated by the Elahi in the study, the term 'good governance' was first mentioned causally in the World Bank's 1989 report (Elahi, 2009, p. 1167). Just as in Graham et al. (2003), Elahi pointed out participants or players of governance to include the state, private sector, and the civil society. The force that unites these three parties is the concept of "social contract," which

John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau are said to be the originators (Elahi, 2009, p. 1173).

Elahi explained the concept of social contract in the following words:

Social contract is a conceptual watershed that acts as a facilitator in the humankind's transition from the state of nature to civilized life. In order to trace the natural growth of human society, Locke and Rousseau, following Hobbes, postulated that people lived in the state of nature before submitting themselves under the authority of civil government. (Elahi, 2009, p. 1172)

The social contract concept therefore helps to resolve most governance complexities including political powers, individual rights, and general respect for the state. Lessons of this analysis directly apply to those of developing countries that are still learning government and democracy. Combating corruption in these countries will take understanding and commitment to govern, and the principles of good governance for success to be achieved.

When Slovakia saw corruption greatly reduced in the country between the 2000 and 2008, it was because the principles of good governance were put into action by the leadership of the country. As said in Beblavý (2009, p. 180), between 2000 and 2008 Slovakia experienced a major reduction in corruption, particularly in certain sectors. During this period, successive Slovak governments also passed major reforms in almost all areas of policy. Multilateral institutions (EU, World Bank) as well as bilateral donors played a significant role in this endeavor. It is therefore interesting to look at Slovakia's experience in the light of how good governance agenda can be made realistic, as well as improving the aid process in corruption control.

Other countries that have successfully combated corruption using good governance initiatives during the past decade include, Croatia, Hong Kong, Bulgaria, and most of the CEE Countries that came out of communism and embraced democratic governance principles, institutions, and structures beginning from early 1990s (Grubiša, 2011; David, 2010; Smilov, 2010; and Beblavý, 2009). International efforts aid in enforcing and establishing good governance principles in developing countries for reasons such as declaration of poverty, promotion of human rights, and combat against corruption. The end goal of these efforts is to speed up the development process of these countries. However, these efforts have proven to work only for some countries, where others like those of the sub-Saharan African region seem not to be responding very well to this treatment as current and past CPIs by TI would indicate.

The reasons for this slow response are diverse, but literature has pointed strongly to the lack of or absence of leadership, which incorporates the political will necessary to implement good governance and provide quality, sufficient, and stable oversight to the newly created democracies. In Agbibo (2010), the researcher examined the case of Nigeria, looking for connections between corruption and underdevelopment. This eventually stirred up issues like poverty, lawlessness, economic dependence, and high mortality rates due to low standard of living. Agbibo found out that corruption had “penetrated all aspect of Nigerian society and public affairs” (Agbibo, 2010, p. 482). Nigeria, just as other Sub-Saharan countries, is said to be less than successful in combating the corruption ailment due to several reasons, with ‘laissez faire’ leadership and share incompetence being the prime factor (Agbibo, 2010). Another serious reason pointed by Agbibo is the historical and cultural interruption caused by western

colonization in Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2010). This goes the same for most over 90 percent African countries. Other reasons pointed by author included “low public-sector salary, lack of transparent political processes, lack of effective incentives to public officials, ineffectiveness of the judiciary, societal pressures and culture, poor economic policies, and lack of effective media” (Agbiboa, 2010, p. 498).

Concerning the incidence of corruption, in the case of Nigeria, Agbiboa (2010) quoted Maduagwu (1982), who blamed the rising incidence of corruption in the public service on the prevailing culture that condones and even encourages corruption. Agbiboa held the following observations for this pervasiveness of corruption in Nigeria:

Corruption thrives in Nigeria because society sanctions it. No Nigerian official would be ashamed, let alone condemned by his people because he or she is accused of being corrupt. The same applies to outright stealing of government or public money or property. On the contrary, the official will be hailed as being smart. He will be adored as having ‘made it’; ‘he is a successful man’...and any government official or politician who is in a position to enrich himself corruptly but failed to do so will, in fact, be ostracized by his people upon leaving office. He would be regarded as a fool, or selfish, or both. (Maduagwu as cited in Agbiboa, 2010, p. 483-484)

The Nigerian case reflects what nearby countries like Cameroon also experience. Referring to Ngomba (2006), Nguemegne (2011) posited that in Cameroon, corruption is so pervasive that one would think nobody does the right thing. The few honest people are lost in an ocean of corruption. There seems to be a socially established tolerance for corruption. Nguemegne also made the assertion that “corruption has become, over the

years, so rampant in Cameroon that one is afraid that a real culture of corruption entrenched in the fabric of the society exists in the country (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 114). Just to mention some of the dreadful examples of corruption in Africa, in Nigeria, public officials are said to have stolen more than \$440 billion of public money between 1960 and 1999 (Agbiboa, 2010, p. 491).

Agbiboa explained that this is six times the Marshal Plan, the sum total required to reconstruct devastated Europe in the aftershock of the Second World War (Agbiboa, 2010, p. 491). In Cameroon, one of the outstanding cases of corruption is that of Mr. Ondo Ndong, the ex-general manager of Fonds d'entraide Intercommunale (FEICOM) (i.e., National Local Government Support Funds) (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 99). Mr. Ondo Ndong was sacked from office in November (2005), and later arrested in 2006, alongside 32 other officials, charged with embezzlement of a sum of \$104 million (52 billion FCFA) of public money (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 111). While 16 other suspects were acquitted, Justice Noah Ebella found the sum embezzled to be only \$22 million (11 billion FCFA) (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 99). Ondo Ndong was sentenced to 50 years in prison, his properties seized, and his bank accounts frozen (Nguemegne, 2009, p. 99). Other culprits were also sanctioned according to their crimes (Nguemegne, 2011).

Agbiboa's study also documented that African Union (AU) report indicated that corruption drains Africa of US \$140 billion per year. This is about 25 percent of the continent's GDP (Agbiboa, 2010, p. 491). In another study, Haruna (2009) took on the issue of leadership and political will in Africa, and specifically in the Sub-Saharan region, questioning the bases that establish public leadership in those countries. The author claimed that from decolonization, to the second liberation era, Sub-Saharan Africa

has suffered from leadership poverty (Haruna, 2009). Author documented the following thoughts concerning the perception of leadership in Africa, a view that has tend to prevail in the continent until current tendencies in which the need for change is becoming eminent:

Whether in thought or in practice, leadership in Africa has been narrowly circumscribed, defined, and operationalized. The nationalistic leadership in the 1960s, authoritarian leadership spanning the decades of the 1970s, and the managerial leadership proclaiming an "African Renaissance" in the 1990s, all assumed the leader-follower perspective, which places the responsibilities of leadership in the hands of the leader. This dominant theme portrays followers as passive or even subservient and takes the context largely for granted. (Haruna, 2009, p. 941)

Haruna consistently argued that the definition of leadership in African countries, especially those the author studied, have superficially focused on leadership characteristics, styles, and behaviors, hardly reflecting leaderships as practiced in African communities (Haruna, 2009).

In the search for solutions to the above-mentioned leadership deficiency, Haruna proposed that an alternative, pragmatic view based on unique historical and cultural community norms should be held for leadership in Africa: one that fosters social change and institutional transformation (Haruna, 2009). The author referred to such approach as "community-based leadership," which he argued that it has a better chance of succeeding in the sub-Saharan countries because it taps into and builds on the peoples' cultures (Haruna, 2009, pp. 946-947). This approach is said to be both consistent with indigenous

social-cultural value systems of the people and supported by scholarships that makes the society the focal point of this argument, while considering the fact that in public administration, there is growing adherence to communitarian and non-bureaucratic approaches to public service.

Thus, the need for a shifting of emphasis in leadership literature from leadership traits, skills, behaviors, to processes that are relational and context oriented. While Haruna's study suggests a pertinent solution to leadership problem in Africa, this study also propose that community-based leadership should not negate the input that globalization tendencies would bring. The truth is that, things have happened to African history and have affected the leadership of the continent and its life in general. Therefore, the biggest concern of current leaders, scholars, and practitioners should be how to lay hands on what will work. A positivistic approach towards solving some of these problems is going to be rewarding if these countries would consider its adoption.

Furthermore, on the issue of leadership and political will in Africa, Spears (2007) posited that attempts to solve many Africa's challenges through benevolent leadership, democratization, and intervention do not address the fundamental structural issues that are a consequence of the African experience of state-building (p. 345). In a comparative study conducted on state formation in the West and in Africa, the author found out that the state and nation-building process in Europe and North America was a result of specific circumstances and, in particular, a willingness on some levels to tolerate violence and coercion as a means of state consolidation (Spears, 2007). This history of violence is seen as a lamentable, but necessary price to pay for development whose results became the advent of stable prosperous and democratic states (Spears, 2007).

In the case of Africa, Spears explained that the continent earned independence through direct accord (granted) by the colonial powers, rather than through military victory as most of the states in the West and in Europe did in order to consolidate (Spears, 2007). The author concluded that this history left African states in a state weakness legacy (Spears, 2007, p. 350). This history is also said to have left African leaders with the heavy responsibility of concerning themselves with the kind of domestic issues that troubled their colonial predecessors – human rights, democracy, legitimacy, and territorial control, things that the states and the new leaders did not have enough time with which to become acquainted or ensure their institutionalization (Spears, 2007). The dynamics of internal weaknesses and external influences on the history of African leadership constituted the main argument developed (Spears, 2007).

In the study by Spears (2007), the abovementioned historical events may serve as pertinent reasons why leadership in most African states became unstable for several decades after the colonial rule, but it will not serve the same reason why contemporary leadership should not succeed in the same continent as argued in this study. Globalization, human development, technology, and accessibility to resources have placed contemporary governance and state dynamics on a different scale compared to the situation that was prevalent in the 1960s. With strong political will to change, African leadership will perform better than current trends irrespective of the historical challenges. Other transitional states as seen in the preceding examples in this study, demonstrated the strong will for change across the public sector, private, and the civil society, and the results where large-scale reduction in corruption and increase in economic development.

In another leadership study, Wanasika, Howell, Littrell, and Dorfman (2010), documented how cultural heritage has greatly affected leadership style in Africa, creating grounds for difficult adherence to change, and the implementation of contemporary leadership styles that are needed for the market economy and for democratization. The authors observed in their study, that the servant-leadership model practiced by traditional African societies made the leader a disputes' mediator rather than a behavior director (Wanasika, Howell, Littrell, & Dorfman, 2010, p. 235). The contemporary market place necessitates new and advanced leadership approaches that are embedded in leadership styles such as managerial leadership, situational leadership, transactional leadership, and transformational leadership. With each leadership style being developed to suit the ever-changing development in human behavior with respect to time, scholars and practitioners need to learn how to adapt to change.

With leadership being defined as the capability to formulate a vision and garner support for it (Plachy, 2009), current leadership in Africa as well as elsewhere should understand that followers' mentality and behavior changes with time. Events and general human dynamics have changed since the 1960s. More Africans, especially in the case of Cameroon, have attended and are still attending school in greater numbers than was the case two decades ago. Moreover, globalization and technological development of today have diversified the trends of the demand for goods and services. As such, the supply side must be responsive; otherwise, the result will be outburst of national revolution as seen in the recent cases of Tunisia and Egypt in North Africa. Civil wars may also prevail if change is avoided. Nguemegne (2011) pointed out that the absence of a ready political

will for change in Cameroon would be a major hindrance to a successful anticorruption mechanism for the country.

Lastly, the study of Neupane, Soar, Vaidya, and Yong (2014) provided grounds to argue that political will for change must not be exercised solely by the government. The civil society should also exercise such willingness to accept change as they engage the government on different platforms of the economy. The study, conducted on how public e-procurement could help in reducing the risk of corruption in Nepal, revealed that the innovative tool of 'e-procurement' faced several challenges with regard to willingness by economic operators to accept and adopt the tool. This is a common trend with other developing countries such as Cameroon, where citizens cry out for lack of political will for change, but they themselves appear to be allergic to innovations in the way business is conducted since the culture of corruption seems to be benefiting those that are players from both sides.

Leadership is paramount in developing, initiating, and encouraging the kind of political will that considers the eradication of corruption in the public service and in society in general as a political priority. Encouraging the prevalence of anticorruption culture against a corruption culture, is another anticorruption strategy worth reviewing. The next section will reveal some of the pertinent contemporary arguments that have been put forth on this subject so far by authors across different social science disciplines.

Normative/ Cultural Applications of Societal Behavior

The intrinsic nature of corruption is that it is a behavioral issue, thus, it is argued in this study that for such behavior to cease or reduce, it should be replaced by another behavior, which is that of anticorruption. Literature reveals that much has been written on

corruption and culture compared to anticorruption and culture, due to the predominance of corruption. Until the practice of anticorruption or until the decision by people to behave in an uncorrupt manner becomes a norm and social behavior engrafted and deeply rooted into the culture of people, less will likely be achieved in terms of effectiveness, permanency, and durability of anticorruption in a given society.

In a study on Mexico, Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008), using a quantitative analysis, combined with a survey and econometric techniques, examined socio-demographic and institutional factors affecting the behavior of individuals who engage in corrupt acts. Using focus groups, the authors collected some information on how informal institutions and norms promote or block corruption (Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008, p. 357). The authors' findings indicated a trade-off between perceptions, social dynamics, and individual incentives for corrupt behavior in an institutional framework, creating a kind of vicious circle that is difficult to break (Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008).

The vicious circle mentioned by preceding authors is common in most developing countries fighting and struggling with corruption, (e.g., Cameroon). In such vicious circle, individuals see themselves particularly forced to commit corruption because the implicit system of values of the society in which these individuals dwell, have created a reward and incentives platform for corruption, thus rendering the latter a normative activity that can hardly be avoided by all (Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008, p. 359). In a situation where the implicit system of values disfavors corruption, an anticorruption culture could prevail.

Culturally-speaking, original African societal values do not breed corruption. Instead, the basic African culture teaches respect for the elderly, love for the family and community living, speaking the truth, and fear of ancestral curses and ailment if one is caught in an evil act for which he or she refuses the responsibility by telling lies. In the pure African traditional setting, it is believed that “gods” would strike someone dead if he/she lies for an act he or she committed. This kind of norms would not nurture or promoted the kind of corruption that is currently prevalent in most parts of the continent. Crittenden, Hanna, and Peterson (2009) argued that it is the advent of modern government that created the kind of implicit corruption culture currently witnessed in these societies.

In analyzing the cheating culture as a global societal phenomenon, the researchers argued that findings suggest that the cheating culture came and spread globally as a capitalistic phenomenon (Crittenden, Hanna, & Peterson, 2009, p. 337). As such, societies would not have been corrupted without the notion and practice of business. However, this position is disputed in this study, as seen in studies above where communist countries witnessed some of the worst examples of corrupt regimes in recent decades (Grubiša, 2011; David, 2010; Smilov, 2010). It is factual that business culture creates fertile grounds for corruption, but corruption is a behavior that is deeply rooted in human beings just like any other sin. The notion of “everyone is doing it” (Crittenden, Hanna, and Peterson, 2009, p. 338) is an argument that can help to explain the pervasiveness of corrupt behavior in the developing world.

The study of the structure of society and the prevalence of the culture of corruption also indicates that informal relationships have a strong influence in the

formation of the culture of corruption (Kingston, 2008, p. 90). According to the author, although many developing countries have inherited or adopted formal legal, political, and administrative systems similar to those in the developed world, the behavior induced by these rules has often differed from that which is prescribed (Kingston, 2008, p. 90).

Kingston asked the following questions in social constructs and the prevalence of this corruption culture.

First, he queried the reason why countries with similar formal rules experienced different corruption levels, why transplants of formal rules from one country to another often failed to produce the desired patterns of behavior, and why entrenched corruption is often difficult to eliminate (Kingston, 2008). Kingston concluded that different sets of informal rules could interact with various set of formal rules to produce a variety of behaviors and outcomes. These informal rules are different from society to society, and thus different outcomes are likely to be produced when they interact with the formal rules (Kingston, 2008).

Lack of social capital or social trust is said to be at the center of the preceding tendencies for development of corruption cultures (Kingston, 2008). However, Kingston suggested that even though informal rules differentials amongst societies can closely explain the differences that prevail in social construction of behavior in these societies, it is not the only reason why people in the developing world feel compelled to be corrupt more than people in the developed world are. These societies have similar notions of formal institution, but the practice sometimes is different from what it pretends to be.

Most African countries blame formal institutional development and affirmation, which makes them lag behind the developed world (Balafoutas, 2011). Human beings are

the same everywhere (with the original weak moral nature), but environment influences and distinguishes their behaviors based on the kind of behavioral patterns being enforced in that environment (Balafoutas, 2011). Implicit cultural values do not stand alone to influence behavior when it comes to corruption, rather, the role of formal institutions is significant, and it influences the behavior that will slowly turn into a normal practice and consequently become culture.

In a more recent study, Ocheje (2017) reiterated the challenge faced by African countries in curbing corruption, due to the normative context of corruption in these countries. Author argued that if the normative challenges are not removed, the full potential in the rule of law as an effective anticorruption strategy would not be released for such purpose. And that social values and norms must yield to new direction if successful anticorruption practice must be realized in such environments.

Another comprehensive notion that explains cultural and normative tendencies is the notion of “public beliefs” as seen in a psychological study by Balafoutas (2011). Cost-benefit analysis and the principal-agent notion are used to explain how the bureaucrat or government official rationally weighs the chances of gains and losses before deciding whether to be corrupt or not” (Balafoutas, 2011, p. 51). Looking at the emotions that surround the corruption act, the author suggested in the study that the corruption transactions between the lobby and the bureaucrat may depend on the beliefs of the public in the context of a repeated psychological game (Balafoutas, 2011). Therefore, a bureaucrat will receive more bribes in a society where corruption is seen as a normal behavior, than in a society that holds high expectations of the bureaucrat (Balafoutas, 2011, P. 58).

Generally, if social behavior standards are low, both the lobby and the government official feel comfortable to proceed with the corruption transaction. This model is more comprehensive and significant in explaining the implicit sources of the corrupt attitude compared to their socio-cultural explanations such as history, informal styles, and social structure. The model would align strongly with that of implicit systems of values seen above in Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008).

Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008) argued that not all giving is corruption. The intent to corrupt and not to 'bless' must exist in order to rule for corruption. Circumstances and societal definitions are also important in determining what is considered a gift and what is considered as bribe. If not, the tipping culture that is practiced in the West will no longer be regarded as an act of gratitude and remuneration, but as a corrupt behavior that seeks to influence service. The same for a public official that receives an act of "thank you" from the citizens for rendering them a satisfactory service, an act that is not meant to corrupt the official in any way. Consciences of individuals involved in giving, and the socio-political stipulations of such behavior tend to be used as a barometer for corruption across societies. These eventualities should be watched when making an argument on the nature of gifts and bribes in the perpetration of corruption.

To build a culture of anticorruption, researchers and practitioners must look for ways to shape public beliefs and implement systems of values to favor anticorruption behavior just as in the case for corruption as seen in preceding analyses. However, since wrongdoing is common in the human nature, the achievement of anticorruption culture is more of a fight compared to the likely and effortless emergence and flourishing of corruption. Among the few researches that have been considered with the goal to

discover and develop anticorruption models that can become practical societal norms, is the study on e-government conducted by Kim, Kim, and Lee (2009). Kim et al. used the institutional theory of analysis to document and evaluate the development of an anticorruption system which they called OPEN (Online Procedures Enhancement for Civil Application) (Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2009, p. 42). Conducted on the second largest metropolitan government in South Korea, Kim et al. explored three institutionalization dimensions –regulatory/coercive, cognitive/mimetic, and normative, and four anticorruption strategies embedded in the system. The results demonstrated how an e-government anticorruption system in a local government evolved and became a prototype of a national system to be used for the same purpose (Kim et al., 2009, p. 42).

E-government is a worldwide contemporary phenomenon in public administration, and a system like OPEN will work well for societies that have widespread use of the Internet and information technology both for government and the society as a whole. Expectations differ for developing countries like Cameroon, where underdevelopment has rendered internet and other associated technologies scarce resources. The OPEN culture is a future perspective for the country and its advent can be precipitated by the improvement of other institutions and structures that will ensure its installation and sustainability (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011). These include education, governing laws, creation and enhancement of markets, and the installation of modern and effective equipment.

Civil society organizations can also hold and foster the anticorruption culture. The fight against corruption is not a responsibility that left in the hands of the government alone. A study of the Romanian educational system represents a case in which the civil

society decided to stand up and promote an anticorruption practice, not once, but on a continuous basis (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011). In their findings, the authors documented how the Romanian Coalition for Clean Universities (CCU), a grass roots coalition of civil society organizations and education stakeholders created between 2008 and 2009 analytically supervised and examined 42 Romanian state universities during the academic years 2007-2009 to assess their governance, integrity, fairness, and their capability to curb corruption Procedures (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011).

The CCU is a combination of NGOs—professional associations, student, and teacher unions. The perception of Romania as the most corrupt EU member state according to corruption perception index was as a result of the country's educational systems and evaluated the impact of the CCU on the reduction of such levels of corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011, p. 532). Such efforts by civil society are paramount in stamping out the nature of corruption and ministering to an anticorruption culture, especially in developing countries where societal learning in the democratic era necessitates multilateral corporation between government, private, and international actors (Doig & Riley, 1998; Klitgaard, 1998; Everett, Neu, & Rahaman, 2006; Schmidt, 2007). Other anticorruption behaviors can be built and promoted through government incentives initiated in people's social norms.

The review of the role of leadership and societal construct in the fight against corruption has considered different notions and concepts that need to be visited whenever one might want to understand how corruption comes into being and can be combated in the context of contemporary developing societies, especially those still struggling with high levels of public corruption. A strong political will embedded in good governance

principles, an understanding and adherence to the rule of the social contract, the transformation of leadership to reflect contingent leadership needs, the influences of public beliefs, implicit systems of value, e-government practices, and the cultural strength and political civil society organizations are some of the major notions and concepts reviewed. The next and final section of this chapter contains a review of an area that represents the main gaps noticed in the contemporary literature on anticorruption. This area is that of contextualization, which refers to the effectiveness of anticorruption campaigns and strategies in the specific societies in which they are being implemented.

Anticorruption Approaches and the Contextualization Perspective

Having reviewed the instruments for anticorruption practice in the preceding section, this section is concerned with the issue of the contextualization of these instruments in the given societies, with the goal of explaining the different perceptions that govern the approaches or instruments and how they demonstrate the dynamics of applicability and effectiveness of outcomes in the various societies. Anticorruption approaches or strategies are applicable and can be studied with respect to two contextual perspectives—the universal contextual perspective (Santiso, 2001) and the particularistic contextual perspective (Rothstein (2007)). These two perspectives have different implications on the government’s anticorruption policy and mechanism for each country taking initiative to fight corruption. Sometimes, the actors might not be aware of the dynamics of the approaches, and as such, cannot assess their relevance in the fight.

Research on anticorruption is growing and areas like contextualization are new and emerging, and thus appear to lack bulk and depth. Research reviews that discuss the concepts and the need that they present both in theory and in practice, make applications

and possibly recommendations to the case held in this study. However, this section concludes with an introduction of the debate on the application of these concepts, thus raising the question of the need for mixed approaches and adaptations of strategies for effective anticorruption practice.

The Universal Anticorruption Perspective

The theory of universalism as held in the practice of anticorruption refers to a conceptual anticorruption context in which global anticorruption initiatives and approaches are upheld and implemented worldwide, without necessarily considering the specific dynamics of the individual countries implementing such approaches. Universalist theories uphold the transplantation of international measures, especially from the West, through global cooperation and development programs and institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, into developing nations based on different economic and socio-political objectives set for each community (Santiso, 2001). Theoretical perceptions of universally oriented anticorruption movements saw early emergence in the works of Klitgaard in the late 1980s, especially as observed in the author's formula for corruption which is pioneer in the field and was postulated based on a *rational choice* (institutionalist) perspective.

Corruption according to Klitgaard is understood in this context as Monopoly plus Discretion Minus Accountability, which can be represented as $C = M + D - A$ (Klitgaard, 1988, p. 75). The rational choice theory in corruption was also taken up by Alemann (2005), who explained corruption as a problem of political economy that includes "a principle-agent model, according to which each player acts in the interest of his or her own mostly economic utility" (Aleman as cited in Gephart, 2009, p. 8). In other words, the institutionalist perspective sees corruption because of overarching strategies that lead

to monopoly, discretion, and a significant absence of transparency and accountability. This perception for corruption is believed to be the same for all institutions across the globe (Gephart, 2009), and thus if anticorruption strategies would define corruption in the same way, the approaches to combating it would believe that what would work for institutions in the West would also work for institutions in the East and South, especially in the context of democracy.

One of the most developed studies on corruption, among those conducted on the subject of “contextualization” of the corruption/anticorruption concepts, is that of Gephart (2009). The author made a case for the study by highlighting criticisms that scholars have always imputed on the institutions promoting the international concept and movement for anticorruption. Those institutions include the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), various international NGOs, and international law in general seen in the United Nations (UN), EU, AU, and other international organizations, regional blocks and international conventions (Gephart, 2009). Gephart also posited that since corruption exists all over the world, in all societies, sectors, and in various forms; and since corruption is fought in equally manifold ways, anticorruption campaign are subject to the accusation that they do not constitute a sufficiently differentiated perspective (Gephart, 2009).

In this study, I sought to put forth this argument with the precaution of not sounding overarchingly critical and only to realize at the end that those methods are effective and cannot be much neglected when making a case for anticorruption practice. As such, conclusions were only made after the collection of data that revealed the realities on the field. Gephart also took the same guard, stating that the critical voices

reflected in the article are not aimed at generally rejecting the World Bank's anticorruption efforts as well as those of other international organizations. Instead, the critical observation could be seen as points of departure for identifying the preconditions of a successful fight against corruption (Gephart, 2009).

According to Gephart, universalist arguments for a global approach toward the fight against corruption are based on several factors. The first argument is that more cooperation that is international increases transparency even at the national level (Eigen, 2007; Gephart, 2009). Analyzing transparency initiatives in the oil and gas industries under the banner of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an international advisory group (IAG), Eigen examined the contemporary tendency for the fight against corruption, and described the coming together of international organizations, government institutions, the private sector, and civil society organizations to form a network that is aimed at realizing more successful results in the fight, especially for states that are rich in resources as victory for a global approach to anticorruption (Eigen, 2007).

Organizations prominent in this fight globally include, TI that has grown beyond the wildest dream of the international community, with independent TI National Chapters in about 100 countries. Another key actor is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with its outstanding Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Official (1999), signed in Paris in 1997 by 35 exporting countries, enforced after 1999. Other organizations include: The UNCAC of 2003; the Inter-American Convention against Corruption of 1996; the Convention of the Council of Europe of 1998; the African Union Convention of 2003; and other focused groups such as the Global Witness, a United Kingdom based NGO (Eigen, 2007, pp. 331-332).

Even though EITI focuses on countries that are rich with resources, indicated that EITI's ramifications have versions that can affect all countries taking the fight against corruption as a serious matter. The author listed several countries whose governments have made endorsement statements for EITI including: Angola, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Mongolia, Niger, Peru, and Sierra Leon (Eigen, 2007, p. 34). This is an indication of a growing spectrum of tools and structures for collaboration on the part of developing nations to address the corruption nightmare.

Other arguments in favor of universalism in combating corruption are those made for the transplantation of good governance principles into countries lacking such qualities so as to foster sustainable economic and social development (Santiso, 2001). Laver (2010) took up this argument in another study designating the combat against the cancer of corruption as urgency in the international community involving states, multinational companies, and civil society groups. With less attention paid to this struggle by religious organizations, and given corruption's profound moral and social justice dimensions, Laver posited that these religious organizations should be at the forefront of the struggle (Laver, 2010). Initiatives made possible by the international environment toward this fight included seminars that dealt with issues such as effective oversight and constraints among state institutions, participation and oversight by the civil society, the media and communities, improvement of public sector's management, influencing and sustaining a competitive and responsible private sector and strengthening political accountability (Laver, 2010, p. 51). Laver however emphasized the role that can be played by religious values on the enhancement of ethical behavior for many communities (Laver, 2010).

The Particularistic Anticorruption Perspective

Several arguments have been made due to the weaknesses embedded in an overarching universalistic anticorruption approach that sometimes does not consider adaptation exigencies for countries receiving these universal policies. This approach is criticized, thus leading to the argument for a particularistic approach that encourages an adaptation of approaches to specific contexts and promotes originality of anticorruption mechanisms to reflect the socioeconomic, cultural, and political realities of the societies involved in the fight. The particularistic anticorruption perspective is described in Rothstein (2007). In a study on corruption and the “Big Bang” theory, Rothstein argued that the combat against corruption does not need a magic key to an entry point or institutional device as suggested by the World Bank, that “small changes are likely to worsen the problem and make corruption and similar practices even more ingrained” (Rothstein, 2007, p. 5).

Rothstein also put forth several arguments against the nature of the path taken by the World Bank and other prominent international corruption fighters to address the problem of corruption in developing countries. Rothstein concluded that the countries suffering from this ailment must muster forces internally to create a Big Bang change that can hardly come from international actors who believe mostly in a gradualist perspective of change as seen in the work of Johnston (as cited in Rothstein, 2007). Gradualists like Johnson posit that change should be initiated gradually, and that “building a sound framework of social, political, and state institutions is a work of generations (Johnston as cited in Rothstein 2007, p. 24). Rothstein disputed this concept especially when it concerns combating corruption.

Rothstein founded the particularistic public behavior perspective on the premise that:

At the root of systemic corruption in a particular political culture, which is defined as a system in which government treatment of citizens depends on their status or position in society, people do not even expect to be treated fairly by the state; what they expect is similar treatment to everybody with the same status.

(Rothstein, 2007, p. 13)

In other words, corruption is rooted in deeply held beliefs about the proper order of exchange in a society – personal-particularistic versus impersonal-universalistic (Rothstein, 2007). According to Rothstein, this implies that to actually curb corruption, there must be a move by the entire social order and political culture from the universalistic equilibrium to the particularistic equilibrium (Rothstein, 2007). Universal anticorruption campaigns fail because they do not realize that corruption is rooted in a particularistic political culture in which almost all public goods are distributed on a nonuniversalist basis (Rothstein, 2007). I took the argument further by evoking the differences that exist in societal dynamics, thus siding with arguments that support an adaptation of measures and practices in each context. Thus, anticorruption in the context of Cameroon is not bound to be the same as in the American or British context in order to produce desired outcomes, even though examples of the latter can inspire the former.

One of the significant arguments made against the nature of universal approaches for fighting corruption is found in the question of democratic legitimacy of such measures posed by Gephart (2009), arguing that many contexts of anticorruption have been developed and diffused by international organizations known for their lack in democratic legitimacy. First of all, the United States has a well-known voting authority

alongside other influential nations of the West for World Bank and IMF programs. This advantage blocks minority nations' opinion even in deciding principles for several programs, including anticorruption endeavors. These programs are subsequently applied to these countries which have had almost no influence in their conceptualization (Gephart, 2009, p. 23). Now how would such measures work, when the people who are supposed to apply and live according to them on daily basis are excluded from the opportunity of understanding their originality and authenticity towards achieving the goals for which they were designed?

Delegitimization of the states, governments, and societies of the global South by international anticorruption approaches (Gephart 2009, p. 24) is another predicament faced by governments of developing countries. This is exemplified through the World Bank's predominant *zero-tolerance* rhetoric on anticorruption that facilitates the legal and political prosecution of politically disagreeable actors and consequently jeopardizing opportunities for reformers, members of the opposition, and the entire society to influence change (Gephart, 2009, pp. 24-25). Therefore, international organizations need to improve on these approaches (Gephart, 2009).

Social values and norms of every society must be at the center of any discussion that seeks to address issues that are embedded in such norms and values. This is the central argument for particularity in the formulation and implementation of anticorruption measures. Other arguments against universalistic tendencies include claims that international actors have used Western-oriented and usually ineffective anticorruption measures to foster neocolonialistic activities in developing countries. Actors like the World Bank have been criticized as opportunistic merchants who use these platforms to

foster their business abroad without a real deep goal of solving the issue of underdevelopment and its associated ills like corruption (Gephart, 2009). In all, particularistic anticorruption tendencies can be enhanced by the notion of adaptation, which is the subject matter of the next discussion.

Adaptation of Strategies for Successful Anticorruption Practice

Adaptation of anticorruption approaches is a continuation of the idea of particularistic anticorruption measures. Adaptation emerges from the critical analysis that examines the dynamics of contemporary universalistic anticorruption movement that have portrayed both strengths and weaknesses in the fight against corruption through considerable initiatives and influences of the world bank, IMF, UNO and other multilateral and bilateral anticorruption conventions. This has hence given opportunity for the rise of a particularistic notion that cautions the universal approaches concerning the different realities every society is experiencing in its daily sociopolitical existence, and the need for such approaches to connect to these realities to bring about an inside-out change and not the reverse. This pattern of ideas was held to make the case for contextualization of anticorruption approaches in Cameroon.

In a study conducted by Quah (2008) on India, the country's policy context was analyzed considering five major elements: "geographical, historical, economic, demographic and political aspects that influence the implementation of the country's anticorruption strategies" (Quah, 2008, p. 55). To these factors, Quah added a cultural aspect and a legal aspect to constitute seven contextualization outstanding factors that were employed in this study to examine the contextualization tendency of the

anticorruption approaches practiced and fostered by the current Cameroonian government.

Quah argued that the gigantic Indian population, complex administration, and coupled with other economic factors, did not create a favorable policy context for the prevalence of an anticorruption strategy (Quah, 2008). Quah however suggested that in a proactive approach to combating corruption, such obstacles should not be examined independently or expected to vanish on their own or even separated from the anticorruption effort in any way. Rather, the anticorruption effort should be designed to not only address such atmosphere but to be sowed into the various contextual aspect of the society so that they will now auto-combat their corruption issues from inside-out and emerge with an authentic level of purity that is lasting and sustainable (Quah, 2008).

In a study on Papua New Guinea (PNG), Walton (2016) revealed how anticorruption measures in the country fell short of producing expected outcomes due to the absence of a strong focus on how such measures needed to address the policy context of the country. Author identified four major policy contextual aspects that anticorruption must pay attention to, which included the opportunities and threats involved in state politics, structural conditions that support citizens' corrupt acts, non-state actors' role in causing corruption, and legal responses to corruption that end up in prosecution. The core lesson from Walton's study is that understanding local, political, cultural, and economic issues of a society is uncontestably necessary for successful anticorruption practice.

Adaptability of approaches combines the advantages associated with international anticorruption strategies with those unique to the policy context of the country in which these strategies are being implemented. Gephart (2009) identified one of the major

positive potentials of intentional anticorruption efforts to include the capability of “transporting and diffusing entire conceptions of the "correct functioning of political systems" (Gephart, 2009, p. 31). In the context of democratization, this assessment is true, because democratic principles and applications are formulated based on universal ideologies, one of which is Weber’s legal-rational theory. Adaptation is seen as a means for contextualization as conceived in this study. In the globalization context, no country or society exists alone. Means and ideas flow from one end of the world to another more rapidly today than was the case 30 years ago.

In a more recent study, Ramanujam and Caivano (2016) emphasized the changing landscape of economic/development studies, stating that this area had recently experienced a shifting of focus from a universal model of practice to a more pluralistic approach that calls for countries to shape their policy prescriptions based on their own sociopolitical contexts. Having the rule of law as a fundamental requirement for economic development, authors suggested that ultra-pluralism of policymaking philosophy could lead to the neglect of the core principle of the rule of law even though authors agreed that the new pluralistic trend that calls for contextualization of policy making strategies was good for the countries.

The study being conducted on BRIC countries suggested therefore that as these countries build their new approach and vision as to how the rule of law should be crafted and implemented to favor economic development in their community, actors should still consider a set of fundamental rule of law principles that would exist alongside current transitional institutions, thus building trust in formal institutions as the economic growth process advances (Ramanujam & Caivano, 2016).

Having in mind the notion of adaptation of strategies which is a developing trend in policy studies for developing countries, anticorruption practices in Cameroon by NACC were examined in the light of the policy context of the country, which incorporates political, economic, legal, and sociocultural contextual aspects. After such examination, conclusions were made on the nature of anticorruption practices in the country, revealing major facts such as how compliant and effective international strategies have been and can be (Gephart, 2009). The extent of global efforts and the specific issues in Cameroon that anticorruption approaches need to address in order to be successful and sustainable were noted together with the policy context of the country.

Summary

Research studies across different social science disciplines were examined in this chapter, and it was discovered that uncurbed corruption is a major barrier to good governance, economic development, and the eradication of certain chronic social problems such as poverty and low standards of living, especially for developing countries. The chapter demonstrated that corruption is combatable through different measures and mechanism employed under the banner of anticorruption, engaging the interplay of efforts of international and domestic actors.

Recent literature on anticorruption identify some of the major strategies used to fight corruption in mostly developing countries to include economic/market reforms, administrative/bureaucratic reforms, accountability/transparency enhancing reforms, democratic accountability enhancing reforms, legislative and judicial reforms, and general influences from the dynamics of globalization. The literature also indicated that most countries, especially those of the southern hemisphere have not been very

successful in their efforts of curbing corruption in their respective societies, due to lack of robust strategies, mechanisms, strong institutions, and political will. In general, the literature on anticorruption tend to focus on administrative and system theories and practices, meanwhile there remains to be void between cultural and behavioral character of populations in relation to anticorruption practice. This study sought to explore this gap, while adopting the concept of adaptation as the bridge with which the other concepts of anticorruption could be connected, and also as an attempt to close the aforementioned gap. Chapter 3 discussed the methods by which data for the study was collected and analyzed to provide pertinent basis for the discussions and the conclusions raised and drawn in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the methods used to conduct the study. The chapter included the following aspects: research questions; a description and justification for the research design of the study; the choice of the population sample; data collection methods and methods of data analysis; ethical issues; and an explanation on how the evidence of quality in the study was ensured.

Research Questions

This study is guided by one overarching question and four sub questions. The main question is: “What anticorruption strategies are perceived as effective in helping the government of Cameroon curb systematic public corruption?” The subquestions are listed below:

1. What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon’s NACC?
2. What can be learned from NACC’s past experience of working with anticorruption policies and programs?
3. What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to implement effective anticorruption policies?
4. How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improve the development and implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC?

Research Design and Rationale

This study was conducted as a qualitative exploratory case study of the current anticorruption approaches the government of Cameroon employs to combat corruption. Creswell (2009) defines qualitative research as “a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem” (p. 4). The qualitative method was selected for this study because of the need to contextualize anticorruption approaches or mechanisms in the case of Cameroon. Such an approach would bring the study into contact with a real-world problem that requires extensive exploration, interaction with participants, collection of potentially sensitive information and inductive analysis and interpretation of it.

The exploratory approach provided a platform upon which I could seek findings about the nature of the government of Cameroon’s anticorruption policy, its scope, strategy, and resources. This allowed a determination to be made as to whether the anticorruption strategies put in place by the government were properly addressing the policy context of the country, in the effort of curbing corruption in the society, especially within the civil service.

The case study method of inquiry was selected as the qualitative tradition of inquiry that suits best the focus of this study. Case study is defined as “the study of an issue explored through one or more cases within a bounded system” (Creswell, 2007, p. 73). Yin (2014) defined case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) in depth and within its real-world context” (p. 16). This means the case cannot be studied in abstraction, the researcher must associate the inquiries with actual happenings or activities in a designated setting. The encompassing

nature of case study expounded by Yin makes the approach more fitting to study most complex phenomena, as it tends to provide the researcher with a more simplistic platform and tools to carry out the inquiries. It is on this definition that this study situated its inquiries into Cameroon's anticorruption strategies as implemented by NACC.

Through this study, I sought to explore anticorruption practice in the context of Cameroon. Trochim (2001) also stated that the case study method is considered as the most suitable approach for studying a phenomenon in a particular context. Designing this study in the same light allowed for an in-depth exploration of the anticorruption phenomenon in the political, legal, economic and sociocultural context of the Cameroonian society.

Role of the Researcher

My role as the researcher in this study was to provide all the knowledge and material resources needed for the successful completion of the study and the realization of its objective. I employed methods and processes to ensure that relevant data was collected. Participant request forms were used to contact participants for the purpose of fixing the date, venue, and time for face-to-face interviewing with the participants. The study also required traveling to the field to meet participants in person for interviewing, but this process was replaced by virtual interviewing due to security reasons on the field.

This study engaged knowledge accumulated in the field of study of public affairs in general. An approval was obtained from the Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB), which served as the permission to conduct research on human subjects. The study also noted the dates and venues where data was collected, and the experts that participated in providing the data. Being in close contact with the data collected and at

the same time being the person that analyzed the data, could create fertile grounds for the occurrence of bias for the qualitative researcher (Goulding, 2002, cited in Apori-Nkansah, 2008). However, I took several measures aimed at dealing with possibilities of subjectivity. The study was subjected to peer review and the use of multiple sources of data and data collection methods, with the aim of curbing and preventing any major biases that could emerge from personal subjectivity.

Methodology

Qualitative case study was employed as the methodology for this study. Yin (2014) recommended the case study method due to the emphases it places on rigor, validity, and reliability. Case study design, according to Yin, is an all-encompassing method that facilitates the study of complex subjects. A research study usually follows either a qualitative or quantitative approach, or both approaches depending on the nature of the inquiries the researcher intends carrying out (Creswell, 2009). Establishing an inquiry continuum enables the researcher to determine an approach that is suitable for the subject being researched (Creswell, 2009). The researcher's philosophical worldview plays a considerable role in determining the suitability of each of the approaches (Creswell, 2009, p. 5). The nature of the research problem, the researcher's personal experiences, and the audiences of the studies are also determining factors in choosing a specific method (Creswell, 2009). I considered the preceding factors to make a choice for design in this study.

The qualitative researcher uses activities to locate real world problems that require extensive and thorough exploration, interaction with participants, developing assumptions that set the base for inquiry, collecting sensitive information and inductively

analyzing them, and establishing a conclusive tone that calls for action from targeted actors (Creswell, 2007). Exploring anticorruption practice in Cameroon fit well into the preceding description, and thus the suitability of the qualitative method. The qualitative case study method itself is held as a practical and readable approach (Yin, 2014).

Selection of Sample Population

According to Marshall (1996), choosing a sample to study is an important step in any research project because it is not practical, efficient, or ethical to study an entire population. As advised by Marshall, participants and other sample forms, including documents, are selected based on their relevance. All sampled sources of data should also possess the potential to contribute accurately and informatively to the understanding of the phenomenon being studied (Marshall 1996). This is the reason why participants for the study had to be public servants that work with an anticorruption agency and as such are familiar with these different strategies of the agency.

I used purposeful sampling to select participants who were considered as key informants to the study. According to Creswell (2007), purposeful sampling occurs when researcher selects individuals and study sites because they can purposefully inform an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study. The study made use of key informants –individuals who could provide important in-depth information about corruption approaches and who were contactable (see Goulding, 2002, as cited in Apori-Nkansah, 2008). The targeted participant population in this study was established based on the premise that these individuals were perceived to be knowledgeable and possessed the necessary experience worthy of inclusion.

The participants were accessible for the acquisition of the information. Key informants included public officials who were knowledgeable about Cameroon's policy on anticorruption. They came from NACC which is the government agency responsible for Cameroon's anticorruption programs and administration. Information about the anticorruption strategies and mechanisms put in place by the Cameroon government was also extracted from government documents, fact books, and archives that held such information.

There are different strategies for conducting a purposeful sampling, which include purposeful criterion sampling, maximum variation sampling, snowball or chain sampling, and others (Patton, 2002). I employed the purposeful criterion, maximum variation, and snowball purposeful sampling strategies to select participants for the research. Purposeful criterion sampling allows for a predetermination of criterion of importance, a strategy common for quality assurance efforts (Patton, 2002). This strategy enabled a preselection process where I could choose participants who could help me answer the research question. In this study, the criterion was that the participant must have direct responsibilities and functions in the government agency in charge of anticorruption programs and administration in Cameroon (NACC). This was to ensure that the participants had the capacity to make insightful contributions to the pool of information concerning government's anticorruption policy for the country.

In addition to criterion sampling, I used maximum variation sampling, which is advantageous in that it allows for the selection of few cases or a case, with which analyses could be made to describe multiple perspectives about the cases or case being studied (see Creswell, 2007). The implication of this method is that, few cases (in this

case 20 participants) from different segments of the sampling population were used to make a representation of the population at large and answer the questions on the subject matter without necessarily analyzing all existing or possible cases available. This was aimed at sampling heterogeneity, which helps capture the different areas of the general population, something that cannot be achieved effectively with random sampling, especially in this case whereby the subject matter is technically specific (Creswell, 2007). In other words, instead of seeking representativeness through equal probabilities, maximum variation sampling seeks it by including a wide range of extremes. The principle is that if a researcher deliberately tries to interview a very different selection of people, their aggregate answers can be close to that of the whole population (List, 2004). Therefore, instead of focusing on government employees who hold higher administrative offices in NACC, or seeking to obtain representation from all facets of the agency and any other source of anticorruption policy in Cameroon, participation I focused on the agency with the most technical aptitude to provide the data needed (NACC), and included some officers from higher levels of the agency and others from the very bottom level for variation purposes.

Sample Size

A sample size of 20 participants was selected for this study. Sample size is said to have no rules in qualitative inquiry, and that it depends on what one wants to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what is at stake, what is useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done with available time and resources (Patton, 2002).

This study employed a realizable sample size. According to Marshall (1996), quantitative researchers have often failed to understand the usefulness of studying small

samples, with the misapprehension that generalizability is the ultimate goal of all good research. This is because the primary goal of a qualitative study is to provide in-depth information about an experience, as opposed to quantitative research in which the focus is representativeness. Marshall held that an appropriate sample size for a qualitative study is one that adequately answers the research questions. As such, flexibility in determining the sample size for a qualitative study is recommended. Thus, the sample size used in this study cannot be described as large or small; rather it is an adequate size that provided room for flexibility in gaining in-depth understanding of the studied phenomenon.

Data Collection Methods

Multiple data collection methods were employed in this study to ensure in-depth and trustworthy analysis. These sources of data included interviews and documents.

Interviews

Interviewing was used as a primary tool for collecting data in this study. This is because interviewing provides the platform upon which one can stand to go beyond observing just the physical and superficial facts of a case and be able to enter into participants' perspectives and obtain deeper information about the nature of the case (Patton, 2002). There are three major variations in interviewing: the informal conversational interview, the general interview guide, and the standardized open-ended interview (Patton, 2002). I used the general interview guide with open-ended questions to collect data information from the interviewees.

The nature of the interview ensured that the interviewer was given enough flexibility to intervene and steer the conversation to any direction that is deemed desirable and could present the interviewee with more precise and systematic questions. I

used the encrypted virtual platform WhatsApp to conduct online chats with participants. This method was chosen because of the current political instability that made it unsafe traveling to Cameroon. Face-to-face interviews and focus groups interviews are other techniques that bring the interviewer and interviewee into close physical contact.

The advantage of individual face-to-face interviewing is that it focuses on the individual, thus making the interview intensive and enabling the interviewer to fetch in-depth and detailed information for the subject matter under study (Patton, 2002). It also allows that informal communication that occurs during face-to-face discussions is noticed, thus providing the study with more in-depth information. The disadvantages of this method however include scenarios in which the interviewee hesitates to provide information, which is a reaction that is not common with a focus group (Krueger, 1994; Morgan, 1988; Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990, cited in Creswell, 2007). The method is also costly and time consuming. However, the richness of detail and quality of information it ensures overshadows any difficulties that may come with it.

I planned to travel from the United States to Cameroon to collect data for this study. However, Cameroon was undergoing intensive political crisis at that time and the territory was unsafe. Telephone communication was as such used to replace the face-to-face interview option. Effective contemporary technology has made it possible to communicate in a situation like this just as if one was physically present with the other party.

Documents

In this study, documents included primary and secondary sources of available data that revealed facts on significant issues in the study, such as the political, economic,

legal, and sociocultural realities of the country, and some of the anticorruption strategies or practices in place. Documents for research might include records, archives, fact books, and also photographs, compact disks and videotapes, which have sometimes been viewed as a fourth category of types of data (Creswell, 2007).

Documents played an important role in this study because they enabled access into certain forms of information such as institutional fact checking which could not be obtained easily through other techniques. Individuals and organizations sometimes might be willing to release public documents concerning operations rather than participating in interviews which could be seen as a time-consuming or sensitive activity like the subject of this study. Therefore, documents were added to interviews to constitute the methods used to collect data for this study.




Figure 1. Multiple sources of data used to answer research questions.

Method of Data Analysis

Data Management, Analysis, and Representation

The process of managing, analyzing, and presenting data in this study covered four essential stages, which included: management (organization) of the data in the first stage; reading and transcription of the data in the second stage; analyzing the data through descriptions, clarifications, and interpretations in the third stage; and, finally packaging and presenting the findings in the fourth stage. The process therefore started and ended with data management ideas, indicating that the organization of data before and after analysis was key in this section of the study. The main purpose of data management is to prepare data for proper analysis and representation. If the tracking and organization of data is done poorly, the analysis and all other activities that follow also fail, since they are all intertwined. Miles and Huberman (1994); and Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014) pointed out that data management is one of the four major issues that are liable to affect the general management of a qualitative study. The three other issues include: computer usage; staffing and time planning; and, agreements with study participants.

In this study, I focused decision making on three main issues: ensuring high quality and accessible data, documentation of the analysis that have been done, and retention of data and associated analysis after the study was completed. Data management issues were handled through formatting, cross-referral, and indexing. Other methods included 'abstracting', which means a condensed summary of longer material, and 'pagination', which is the use of unique numbers/letters to locate specific material in field notes.

I also made use of the following strategies: a) developed and used multiple data storage instruments such as paper notes, computer disc folders, and USB flash drive, and also ensured simplification and clarity of data. Since complex data and words could not be avoided completely, an appendix of definitions and codes was created to facilitate comprehension, and b) made anticipations ahead of time and figured out solutions for prospective field issues. Moreover, no participant was neglected throughout the study, since the participants could be contacted more than once in case of data loss or need for follow up.

At the first stage, the data was organized into files and folders and a system for developing codes using letters and numbers was put into place, then the comprehensive material including interview transcripts, documents, and field notes were read to gain acquaintance with the material and to develop a deep insight and understanding of the data and make sense of it (Apori-Nkansah, 2008). Memos were derived from short phrases, key ideas and concepts that were jotted down in the course of reading and reflecting on the data.

The second stage covered the development of initial codes. According to Saldana (2015), coding in qualitative research is to use words or short phrases to summarize data. A preliminary coding framework was developed for the study, and then full codes were later derived from the data collected as shown in appendix B below. Using the codes, I was able to focus on reducing the data text into smaller, more manageable themes, so that one could easily identify specific or different patterns and trends in the data, and how the data addressed the foundational theories of this study and equally answered the research questions raised. The codes were abstracted from the data through an iterative

process that required reading the data several times for new insights until a level of saturation was reached – when no new insights or meanings were emerging from the data again. Furthermore, the codes were regrouped into categories of similar ideas. The categories and codes were compared and contrasted for new insights and the development of more codes. This activity was done repeatedly until data saturation was attained. Then, the categories were applied to the research questions to provide an understanding of the concept of anticorruption. This approach of comparing and contrasting ideas within data until saturation is reached, for the sake of developing codes and categories, is what Apori-Nkansah (2008) refers to as the “constant comparative” approach (p. 102).

The third stage is the level whereby proper data analysis was done, including describing, classifying, and interpreting the data. Even though this stage called for core analysis of the data, one must mention the fact that data analysis begins right from the moment the data is being collected. This is especially so, due to the huge size and complex nature of data usually collected by the qualitative researcher. Different strategies and techniques are employed from this point onward to assist the analytical procedure.

Codes are useful in this procedure, as they are used to assign units of meaning in a study, and to reduce the size of data as these codes work intricately as paraphrases to sizeable words, phrases, sentences, or even paragraphs (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The coding strategy that this study employed is the pattern coding, which allowed for the examination of frequencies of particular words to indicate the implications of such characteristics to the phenomenon being studied. The study adopted other methods and strategies for in-depth analysis, including an ‘integrated’ approach that proceeded with a contextual analysis that connects all the salient aspects of the case into one main stream

of ideas. This entails detailed description, categorical aggregation, direct interpretation, establishment of patterns, and development of naturalistic generalizations of the interview transcript (Creswell, 2007).

The main thematic tool that was selected to connect the different pieces of the data gathered in addressing the main research question raised in this study is the term “effectiveness”. The operationalization of effectiveness enabled the analysis to explore the relationship between the different themes drawn in the study to depict existing and working anticorruption theories and practices, connecting them to the case at hand to demonstrate what the practice in Cameroon is and how effective it is in an actual combat against corruption. Therefore, good governance theories and practices, which are also deemed identical to anticorruption theories and practices, such as respect for the rule of law, independent judiciary, freedom of speech, accountability, and transparency, were compared with the strategies actually implemented by the Cameroon’s anticorruption agency (NACC). The analytical tool of ‘impact’ (achievement) was used as a first step in this comparison. The results were in turn compared with the actual environmental dynamics of the country, and that’s where the notions of “policy context” and “contextualization” came in as second step to enable the study to understand which strategies could work better for Cameroon’s situation (conclusion – third step).

The fourth and final stage called for the packaging and presentation of the data in a readable and comprehensible format, and also how to represent the data in tables, matrices, and narratives (Creswell, 2007). The study therefore had to build a logical chain of evidence that answered and validated the research questions, reconciling the problem, purpose, and significance of the study. I used tables, matrices, charts, and narratives to

represent data in this study. For tables, an iterative “code mapping” figure was used to show how the codes that were built into categories could now be applied to research questions in order to form themes. In addition, this study made use of “Constas’ documentational table” for the development of categories (Constas, 1995, p. 262, cited in Apori-Nkansah, 2008, p. 104). This table was used to show how categories were developed and how these categories helped in making the analysis an open process (Apori-Nkansah, 2008). Constas argued that the researcher must make the process of analysis of qualitative findings a public event in order to ensure trustworthiness of such findings (Constas, 1995, cited in Apori-Nkansah, 2008, p. 104-105). The table was accompanied by a matrix that represented the different categories developed. The study made use of manual coding and all data management and analysis were done without the employment of any software management tool.

Finally, narratives were provided in a literary format, with the descriptions and interpretations drawn from the findings of the study. The preceding processes worked in conjunction with each other to provide a detailed account on how this research arrived at plausible findings on the dynamics of anticorruption in Cameroon.

Structuring the Narrative Report

Case study research is said to have no standard format for reporting findings (Merriam, 1988). In this study, I provided a detailed description as well as interpretations that were influenced both by research and by intellectual insights on the dynamics of anticorruption practice in Cameroon. The narrative of the case study was opened and closed with sketches in order to draw the reader into the case. This approach employed several different successive stages that were followed in structuring the narrative report.

The first stage consisted of a vignette that introduced the reader to the time and place of the study. The next step identified the issue, the purpose, and the method of the study, in order to expose the background of the writer and the issue surrounding the case. An extensive description of the case and its context, with the aid of uncontested body of data was then presented.

Besides choosing a design for structuring the narrative report, I also struck a balance between the weight of the information accorded to description and that which is allocated for analysis. The study focused on analyzing the case more than describing or narrating its occurrence, thus providing more substantial and solution-driven information concerning the phenomenon studied. In addition, the choice of the balance and the entire structure of the narrative report generally depend on the intent of the study (Creswell, 2007). I maintained the objectivity of the study, which was to guide the structure of the narrative report, thus providing a deeper understanding of the mechanisms and strategies that are being utilized by the government of Cameroon to combat corruption in the country.

Issues of Trustworthiness

The quality of a study is assessed based on its credibility and trustworthiness (Trochim, 2001). These terms are used in the context of qualitative studies for validity and reliability purposes. The process of validating a qualitative study is not rigid, fixed, or strictly measured as might be the case for a quantitative study. Rather, the process comprises of a ‘crystallization’ of different processes within the sphere of collecting, analyzing, interpreting, and applying the bulk of data associated with qualitative research (Trochim, 2001). For the sake of credibility and trustworthiness, I ensured that findings

matched with the beliefs and perspectives of participants. Credibility and trustworthiness is also assessed based on other qualities such as transferability, dependability, and conformability. Transferability allows for external evaluation of the study, to ensure that the findings can be transferred elsewhere, given similar conditions. Dependability requires that the changing contexts of the study be identified and demonstrated as to how such changes impact the findings. Conformability demands that the procedures of the study be documented, to collaborate and confirm the findings (Trochim, 2001)

In this study, I employed certain techniques that aided the overall quality verification and evaluation exercise. These included the techniques of reactivity, reflexivity, and triangulation. Firstly, concerning reactivity, note was taken of the fact that the data collected for the study was sensitive data due to the nature of the research topic. Generally, due to political connotations, it was previewed that participants might be reticent in discussing issues of corruption. Being aware of these dynamics beforehand, precaution concerning “reactivity” was taken before the start of the data collection process and throughout. Reactivity is “the influence of the researcher on the setting or individuals studied” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 108).

On the same note of political sensitivity of the subject being explored, note was taken that participants could speak, but not in detail. However, to succeed in getting the information needed to ensure quality for the study, probes were used, also referred to as “intervention” as discussed in Maxwell (2005, p. 111). These probes are intelligent interventions made during the interview session, which help in bringing out information from the interviewee without violating their rights or confidence. These interventions helped in the retrieval of authentic and quality data, even though quality in qualitative

studies cannot be 100 percent ensured, due to the fact that participants themselves can make voluntary and involuntary errors.

Secondly, “reflexivity” as described in Creswell (2007), refers to the questions such as, “how has the author’s subjectivity been both as a producer and a product of this text? Is there self-awareness and self-exposure? Does the author hold himself or herself accountable to the standards of knowing and telling of the people he or she has studied?” (p. 213). This view is one of the strong points upon which quality assurance in this study was anchored. I respected every one of these steps throughout the study.

Lastly, triangulation requires that multiple data collection tools and sources be compared and aligned with each other (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Analyzing a problem from multiple angles so as to establish validity in such analysis is what is referred to as triangulation in qualitative research. Triangulation could be in relation to data, investigator, theory, methodology, or environment. Data triangulation which means usage of different sources of information; and methodology triangulation which means usage of different data collection tools are the main forms of the triangulation held in this study to increase its validity. Also, peer review, including review from my dissertation committee members served as another form of triangulation for the study. Apart from final reviews from dissertation committee members, the study was submitted to the review of two professionals in the field of public policy and administration who have completed academic studies of this nature, and especially within the most recent decade.

Ethical Considerations

According to Creswell (2007) “a qualitative researcher faces many ethical issues that surface during data collection in the field and during analysis and dissemination of

qualitative reports” (p. 141). The main ethical concern that this study presented was the sensitive nature of its object. Corruption is a topic that is surrounded by strong political sensitivities and tensions, especially in developing countries. Generally, public officials in Cameroon were expected to show a great deal of reticence in discussing anything that has to do with corruption, especially during this time that the subject is a hot spot in the current political dynamics of the country. Several top government officials, including the former minister of territorial administration and decentralization, former secretary general at the presidency of the republic, former minister of finance, former prime minister, and many other senior civil servants have been apprehended and incarcerated by the presidential “Operation Sparrow Hawk” for embezzlement of public funds. Others who have also been apprehended include great business tycoons spanning the civil society and para-public institutions (Cameroon Polls, 2012). The issue is highly complex, and thus had to be approached with much caution and astute strategies that would ensure and ease data collection.

To ensure that the preceding ethical concerns were properly addressed, I put in place several measures that helped optimize the protection of all categories of participants. Such measures included designing the case study to present a composite picture rather than an individual picture, informing the participants of the purpose of the study, and not engaging in deceptions concerning its nature but making it clear to the participants (Creswell, 2007). Other measures included: assuring the participants of the anonymity of their responses during and after the study; explaining the research questions and data collection methods to the participants before seeking their consent to participate

in the study; and informing participants that they can withdraw from the study at any point in time if they wish to do so (Apori-Nkansah, 2008).

In addition, by acknowledging the political sensitivity of the study, data collection strategies that ensured privacy for the participants were employed. Thus, participants were not asked any questions that touched nor revealed any facts connected to their private lives. All questions were based on systematic and procedural facts concerning how the government of Cameroon approaches the combat against corruption in the country. The study did not seek to inquire information on who is or who is not corrupt and/or responsible for the corruption in Cameroon, but rather focused on established public strategies and institutions designed to tackle the problem within the country. The technique of note-taking during interviews was employed and no audio- or video-recording was used, since the current nature of events in the country would have probably scared most public officials from accepting that their contributions to a study of this nature be recorded through media by which they could be identified.

Summary

In this study, I sought to explore and contextualize the current anticorruption mechanisms and strategies employed by the government to combat corruption in Cameroon. Case study research was selected to serve as a theoretical method of inquiry for the study because it provided a platform for performing an in-depth and contextual analysis. Interviews and documents were used as tools for data collection. The interviews were semi-structured, with open-ended questions.

Participants that provided data for the study were 20 in number. They were purposefully selected through criterion, maximum variation, and snowball sampling

strategies. The data collected was coded and analyzed through detailed descriptions, categories and aggregations, objective interpretations, patterns, and naturalistic generalizations. The findings of the study were validated with multiple data sources and data collection methods, thick description, supervisory checks, and peer review. The narrative report was developed through a realist approach.

Participants were protected and assured of the anonymity and confidentiality of the information they provided for the study. Chapter 4 analyzed the findings that emerged from the data that was collected as responses to the research questions raised in the study.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to explore the Cameroon government's anticorruption policy by assessing the government's anticorruption approaches and how they are implemented, so as to provide a deeper understanding of the instruments used by the government to combat corruption in the country. By so doing, I sought to evaluate the extent to which these policies satisfy good governance principles and the reasons why they have not achieved much success since their launch.

The main question addressed by the study was: What anticorruption strategies are perceived as effective in helping the government of Cameroon curb systematic public corruption? The following sub-questions were then asked as a follow up to the main question so as to obtain in-depth information:

1. What have been the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon's NACC?
2. What could be learned from NACC's past experience of working with anticorruption policies and programs?
3. What tools did NACC agents feel were needed from the government to implement effective anticorruption policies?
4. How could the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improve the development and implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC?

This chapter provides an overview of the findings of the study. It explains the processes of data gathering, analysis, and interpretation. The chapter concludes with a presentation of the findings, giving answers to the questions of the research.

Demographics

This study employed 20 participants with different backgrounds and expertise in anticorruption practice. The pool of participants targeted a specific department within the overall NACC agency in order to ensure focus and accessibility to in-depth information.

All participants resided in Cameroon. They were all Cameroonians ranging from 36-60 years of age. All of the participants worked with NACC, and five out of the 20 participants were female.

For the purpose of confidentiality, each of the participants was assigned a particular alpha-numerical identifier. Each participant was assigned the identifier P (participant) and a numerical ranging from one to 20. For example, the first participant was P1 and the final was P20.

Lastly, the term public servant was used instead of civil servant to describe the participants because the former is more generic and covers everyone working with the public sector either as a direct employee or a contractor. But the latter narrowly identifies only those who are direct government employees with civil service status. These ones can be identified with the appellation public servants, but not all public servants have civil service status, especially in the context of public administration and public law. Therefore, generally identifying all categories as public servants is a more fitting appellation.

Data Collection

For data collection, two methods were employed, which included interviews, and document review. After receiving approval from Walden's IRB (approval number: 0500), I contacted a pool of potential participants at NACC, including a chief senior officer who was the director that issued a letter of cooperation for data to be collected from that branch of the NACC agency. All participants had experience with anticorruption policies and strategies of the agency and they were working at the branch charged with implementing the agency's policies in the telecommunication sector of the government. NACC is organized in such a way that divisional missions are dispatched to each government sector or department to ensure that the agency's vision and activities cover the entire government operations.

I started by making a general appeal to the NACC department to get a potential participant pool. The management was able to provide me with a pool and then I initiated separate contacts with the individuals and sought their consent for participation. Following this initial survey, I was able to sort out those who exhibited interest in participating in the research. I then sent each person a formal invitation to participate and an informed consent form. About 40 individuals were initially part of the potential participant pool, but 20 candidates signed up for participation and this was my purposeful sampling size determined during the design of the study.

All potential participants were given the opportunity to review the informed consent form and ask questions related to the study and any other clarifications they needed to know in order to make informed decisions about their participation in the study. In order to ensure that I answered the research questions comprehensively and that

the outcome of the study was representative of the government of Cameroon, a purposeful sampling technique was employed, and diversity of participants was considered so that different viewpoints and opinions would be represented.

In the invitation letter, I ensured that potential participants were asked to indicate their voluntary willingness to participate in the study by reading through, understanding the terms of, and signing the informed consent form. They also had to consent to providing me with their WhatsApp registered mobile telephone numbers which were to serve as the secured communication platform for conducting the interviews. All interviews were scheduled based on convenient times and dates for the participants. Since the interviews were conducted virtually, participants also had the choice to determine locations convenient to them at the time of the interviews. After the establishment of a mutual time and date for the interviews, I kept periodic reminders with the participants through secured text-messages as the interviews proceeded.

Interviews

I started interviewing the participants based on availability. Since participants were working, each person was giving time to rest after working hours and thereafter we engaged into the interviewing process. Due to the sensitive nature of the research subject, I always started off by ensuring the participants of the confidentiality of their private information and the anonymity of any data or disclosure they make throughout the process.

Based on convenience to the participants, they chose their location during the interviews, and most indicated that they were at their homes during the virtual interview conversations. On my end, I was in my home office, and I ensured that the environment

was quiet and free from any form of distraction. I also informed each participant to make sure that their environment was conducive to and functional for the interview activity. At the beginning of each session, I reminded each participant of the voluntary nature of their participation in the study, the protection of all of their information and disclosures with confidentiality, and the agreement that they could withdraw from the study at any point without any particular reason or notice. Before delving into interview proper, I ensured that a brief conversation was conducted between myself and the participant to prepare the atmosphere and set a conversational tone and ease that will make the interview process smooth. I always reminded the participants that they should respond to the question to the best of their knowledge and not be compelled to say anything they did not feel like saying. I also told them that they were all identified by coded initials for reasons of confidentiality.

Within a period of three weeks, I conducted 20 interviews using 20 open-ended questions that gave the participants the latitude to express themselves based on knowledge, experience, and available information in and around their agency concerning the topic addressed. I was not able to physically travel to Cameroon for face-to-face interviews due to a political crisis that was going on in the country at that time and posed serious security concerns for my. This challenge was explained to my dissertation chair and committee with a proposed potentially effective alternative of conducting the interviews virtually. The proposal was approved, and I put into place a functional mechanism and equipment that ensured effective and successful interviewing.

During the interviews, I asked different questions, some to redirect the participants toward the topic, and others to ease conversation when a particular question

appeared challenging to the participant. Each of the 10 questions listed on the interview protocol was posed to the participants, and several sub- and diversified questions were asked to facilitate the main questions and the entire process.

All the interviews were conducted between the participants and me. No one else intervened in each of the sessions. Due to network difficulties and security reasons, voice recordings were not obtained; instead, all participants were requested to type their responses on a WhatsApp platform that was equally encrypted for security reasons. A separate platform was used for each participant since each of them had a separate mobile telephone number. I downloaded and printed the separate interviews for coding and analysis. I also kept the digital records of the responses on my Apple iPhone 7 which is also locked with a security code, and then at the end of the interviews, I transferred the original transcripts to a secured flash drive and equally stored them in my private e-mail academic folder to ensure that I do not lose all the data if one storage device malfunctioned. The data shall be stored at these two locations for at least 5 years according to IRB prescription, after which it will be destroyed following IRB directives.

The interviews generated 113 transcribed pages of data. The longest interview lasted for about 3 hours and 13 minutes, the shortest was 1 hour 06 minutes, with an average of 2 hours. Participants were allowed to take breaks when needed, but none took a voluntary break during the interviewing process except for a few instances of network problems and the need to recharge mobile telephones. Overall, the process went smoothly, and the participants expressed contentment at the end to have been given the opportunity to participate in the study. A summative interview table presented below under Appendix E captured the different interview aspects discussed in this section.

Document Review

In addition to data collected through interviews, I also collected data through review of relevant documents that were available at that time. The purpose of this additional source of data was to ensure triangulation of primary data source and to establish a base for trustworthiness in the data analysis output.

Data used for document review could come from public documents, personal or private documents, archival sources, non-verbal information, and from mass media including newspapers, magazines, radio, and television programs (Singleton & Straits, 2005). Bowen (2009) also added that the sources of data for document review vary substantially and could almost include any relevant verbal or nonverbal information. Based on this background, I reviewed data obtained from government published documents, including the presidential decree creating NACC, reports on the state of the fight against corruption in Cameroon by NACC and I followed online news and talk shows on issues of corruption and the fight against it in the country. I also reviewed press briefings of NACC concerning the elaboration of a national strategy to fight against corruption by the agency, and finally, I reviewed publications made by experts based in Cameroon concerning the corruption/anticorruption subject in the country.

Description of Data Analysis Process

Coding

To code qualitative data is to assign unique labels to the text passages of the data that will act as references to specific information derived from the data (Bernard, 1994; Miles & Huberman, 1994). In this study, I had to create and assign codes that corresponded to each of the thoughts held by the respondents, about the nature of the

prevalence of corruption in the Cameroon especially in the civil service, the combat against it, perception on the effectiveness of the NACC, opinions on the influences of international policies in the fight, and proposals on strategies to improvement anticorruption practice by NACC. The codes also encompassed data that was collected in form of document review.

After assigning codes to all the data, a code list was then created inductively and manually based on the responses gathered from the field (see Carey, Morgan, & Oxtoby, 2006). A priori codes were envisaged from the research questions and conceptual framework of the study, but only served as a reference to facilitate actual coding as represented in Appendix B.

As seen in appendix B, coding was done in three different iterative levels. The first iterative level shows the initial codes built from the data; the second level depicts how the initial codes are grouped into categories; and the third iterative level shows how the categories are applied to research questions to develop an understanding of the phenomenon of corruption and the combat against it by NACC using the different mechanisms and strategies of education and sensitization programs, good governance principles, investigations, institutionalization, and international cooperation. The codes were then analyzed with the help of other strategies and methods, which are discussed below. Results were presented in themes and patterns. The categorization of the data to facilitate analysis was done with the help of Constat's (1992) documentational table for the development of categories.

Content Analysis

According to Lacey and Luff (2009), there are no “quick fix” techniques in qualitative analysis (p. 6). Thus, there are several different methods that can be employed for qualitative data analysis. In this study, an integrated approach was employed for the analysis. This approach proceeds with a contextual analysis that connects all the salient aspects of the case into one main stream of ideas (Lacey & Luff, 2009). In this respect, strategies employed to analyze the interview and document transcripts included detailed description, categorical aggregation, direct interpretation, establishment of patterns, and development of naturalistic generalization, as they are said to be the most appropriate strategies for analyzing data in a case study research (Creswell, 2007). The contextual perspectives of the subject discussed were aided by a case study approach, which revealed in-depth information concerning the realities surrounding the phenomenon being studied.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

The trustworthiness of a qualitative study is addressed by examining issues of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (Basis, 2003). These can also be summed up as validity and reliability, which highly depends on the effectiveness of the data collection tool in terms of the nature of the tool, and how it is employed (Basis, 2003). For this study, no computer software was employed to assist either the data collection or analysis process. This was due mostly to technical reasons and other remote considerations. Although the manual approach of preliminary analysis, which included coding and categorization of the data, was tedious and time consuming (see Basis, 2003), it was more acute for a detailed content analysis of the size of data collected for this

study. Interviewing was the tool judged best for this study, but for validity and reliability purposes, the data was triangulated with other data collected through document review (see Miles & Huberman, 1994).

Credibility

Credibility, according to Shenton (2004), measures the congruency of the findings of the research in relation with reality. Shenton also sees credibility as one of the most important factors needed to establish trustworthiness in a study. Credibility guides the qualitative researcher to demonstrate that the research portrays a true picture of the subject being studied (Shenton, 2004). Credibility therefore measures accuracy and how factual and believable the findings of the study may be perceived.

To show credibility, Patton (2002) posited that the researcher must demonstrate rigor in the data collection process, including analyzing the data; must show that the researcher himself is credible; and that the philosophical believe in the value of the research is established. In this study, I used an expanded and knowledgeable interview participant pool. I also triangulated the interview data with document reviews. These steps, together with observance of rigor in analyzing the data demonstrated the credibility of the study.

Transferability

Transferability means the possibility for the research findings to be generalized or transferred to other settings (Shenton, 2004). In this study, I demonstrated transferability by choosing to study the anticorruption within NACC which is renown in the area of anticorruption in Cameroon, and as such representative of other organizations making similar efforts.

To ensure generalizability of the study, I designed the interview protocol to fully capture salient questions surrounding the phenomenon being studied as touching all NACC activities across the national territory. I also made sure that the participant pool contained individuals that have had experience working with several divisions of NACC in different governmental departments according to the organizational and administrative design of NACC.

Dependability

Dependability refers to the stability of the findings of the study over time (Bitsch, 2005). Therefore, the findings should be supported by data received from the informants of the study (Anney, 2014). It also means given same or similar context, the study should be repeatable or replicable (Guba and Lincoln, 1982). Dependability however, could be challenging to establish due to the changing of the environment of the study (Shenton, 2004).

According to Anney (2014), a major approach to ensuring dependability would be to keep an audit trail. This entails carefully tracking and storing raw data, notes, documents, records collected from the field, test scores, and others (Guba and Lincoln, 1982). In this study, I demonstrated dependability by fully describing the research design and methodology, and I ensured that the procedure of data collection and analysis was carefully done, and records kept such that a complete trail of the study could be reached at any time. Also, if such trail is followed (the various steps of the research) and replicated in the same of similar environment, the results obtained would likely be similar to the ones reached in this study.

Confirmability

Confirmability is established by the degree to which the findings of the research could be said to be an accurate representation of participants' views (Shenton, 2004). Confirmability ensures that the interpretations of the findings of the research are not purely from the imagination of the researcher, but rather that they are derived from the data collected (Anney, 2014). Also, the extent to which the researcher intentionally acknowledges his biases determines the level of confirmability of his study (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

Apart from triangulation, I established confirmability in this study by documenting the rationale behind every step of the study, I ensured that the data collected was carefully analyzed and participants' true views of the subject matter represented, I made direct quotes of participants' own words where appropriate, I also ensured that the data collection tool and the storing tools were checked and properly administered and utilized. Finally, I took necessary precaution to ensure that I did not in any way inadvertently modify the views and comments of the research participants.

Results

The results of this study presented in this chapter contain an encompassing analysis and interpretation of the data collected from the research participants and documents. The technique applied to analyze the data collected was content analysis, which was used to sort out recurrent and major themes and patterns emerging from the data. These were then interpreted, and meanings attached to all of them.

The guiding argument of the study was that the adaptation of public policies to fundamental principles of good governance and to specific policy contexts would yield

better results for public administration and to the government and society at large compared to situations whereby public policies are being made without any intentional consideration of these factors. Following this premise, the case of the effectiveness of anticorruption policies in Cameroon as implemented by NACC was raised through four research questions:

RQ1: What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon's NACC?

RQ2: What can be learned from NACC's past experience of working with anticorruption policies and programs?

RQ3: What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to implement effective anticorruption policies?

RQ4: How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improve the development and implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC?

To answer these questions, 20 research participants were asked 10 open ended questions through individual interviews with the intention for the participants, who were professionals, to provide responses that could be used to answer the research questions comprehensively. The questions sought to know the kind of strategies and policies implemented by NACC to combat corruption in Cameroon, especially within the government. Secondly, the questions sought to find out how effective these strategies have been in the agency's and government's overall anticorruption effort. Thirdly, the questions sought to discover whether the anticorruption strategies reflected good governance principles, and whether they were equally influenced by international strategies at large. And finally, the questions sought to understand the policy context of Cameroon and make a case for the adaptation/contextualization of anticorruption

strategies for effective outcomes. The interview protocol and document review were therefore designed with great care to elicit the data needed to answer the preceding questions.

Research Question 1

What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon's NACC?

Introduction

Through this question, I sought to identify the kind of strategies and policies implemented by NACC to combat corruption in Cameroon, especially within the government. I also sought to capture the general prevailing issue of corruption in Cameroon and to know whether government have made serious strides towards its eradication, and how the research participants, who are anticorruption agents, felt about the overall government efforts in combating corruption in the country. Questions 1 to 3 of the interview protocol focused on eliciting information that answered question 1. Documents reviewed concerning this area, including the presidential decree creating NACC and agency reports on the state of the fight against corruption in Cameroon by NACC were also used to answer question 1.

An analysis of the interview questions and documents uncovered seven major anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC through government's effort to fight against corruption in Cameroon. The strategies were sorted in two categories. The first category constituted strategies that are rooted in good governance principles, and the second category identified strategies that are regular public policy. The good governance-based strategies were seen as opportunities to gain even more effective anticorruption results by strengthening their performance through the consideration of contextual

factors, while the regular public policy strategies were seen as challenges, waste, and reasons for governmental reform.

Good Governance Opportunities

In reviewing the interviews and documents, three major good governance principles and opportunities were identified. These are said to be opportunities to develop effective anticorruption strategies because the data indicated that even though these principles present in the practice of anticorruption at NACC, they however needed to be improved upon. These indications could be seen from the emerging themes on figure 1 under appendix B.

The creation and institutionalization of NACC gave the government a sound vision and direction to fight against corruption in Cameroon. All 20 interview participants of this study from P1 to P20 affirmed that the creation of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) was one of the major steps the government took to combat Corruption in Cameroon. Also, information from document review indicated that NACC is a central government agency charged with the state's administrative effort to curb corruption in Cameroon. Accordingly, NACC reports revealed that the vision of the head of states, Biya, since his rise to power in 1982 had been to build a Cameroon that was free of all forms of corruption. Created by a presidential decree on March 11, 2006 NACC represented one of the strongest materializations of the president's vision of a corruption free Cameroon. Although participants were quick to reveal weaknesses they believed were associated with NACC's operations, they were enthusiastic about the overall creation and institutionalization of the agency an anticorruption organ of the government. P1 had this to say about NACC:

Fighting corruption by the government has as first goal the creation of specialized institutions in which we have NACC. But this institution from its creation has witnessed a lot of setbacks by reason of the fact that its members are appointed and are often former agents of public service. Therefore, the fight is slow and inconsistent. NACC has sub-units in all public institutions and representatives. There is also a phone number available to those who have been victims to denounce culprits.

In addition, P3 in his own words said:

The NACC was established to eradicate corruption in the country. Many strategies have been put in place. Apart from “Operation Sparrow Hawk” that tracks and punishes those suspected of corruption, a recent hotline has been instituted and permits victims of corruption to be heard 24/24. This service permitted many corruption cases to be handled promptly.

P5 added that NACC partnered well with other business coalitions and with the public contracts regulatory board to tackle the issue of corruption in the country. P13, P14, and P15 pointed out that NACC as an organization was created with good intentions and that the agency was fervent in its role which was more focused on investigating and reporting corruption cases to the powers that be, and that such lack of autonomy was one of the reasons why they could not achieve much as an institution.

Institutional and legal reforms by the government initiated the rule of law in the fight against corruption in Cameroon. One of the major tenets of good governance is respect of the rule of law by the population and the government. The law makers themselves must respect the laws they make. Having the rule of law and respect for it has

been a challenge for most developing countries. In the case of Cameroon, at least for anticorruption purposes, investigations of this study revealed that the government actually carried out institutional and legal reforms that brought the rule of law to the center of the anticorruption struggle within its institutions and in the country at large.

The data collected from documents and interviews showed that in an effort to curb corruption in Cameroon, the government in addition to creating NACC, created a special criminal court for anticorruption prosecutions, a government department in charge of superior state control, a public contract regulatory board, a national agency for financial investigations, all working together in conjunction with NACC and other public actors in the fight such as the ministry of justice, the audit bench at the supreme court, and the judicial police. Also, the government brought article 66 of the constitution to the lamplight, and enacted other laws that reinforced the fight against corruption in the country. Participants identified and viewed these reforms as opportunities which government could make significant strides in the corruption battle if they were sufficiently supported in terms of funding, enforcement, and overall political will. In his own words, P7 expatiated on this government effort as follows:

First and foremost, the government has created anticorruption units in all public structures like state universities and other higher institutes of learning. In some professions like in the military, there are anticorruption units instituted under the leadership of NACC to denounce some of those uniform men and women who have been sent on the highways to control the safety nature of roads. There is a free call number that has been made known to the road users to denounce any form of corruption by anyone in uniform who instead of being worried about the

state of the car or the car documents as well as speeding nature of the driver, is more concerned with collecting money. All drivers know the fine that awaits them in case of any highway offense but most often they think they will drive without possessing the required documents with the intention of corrupting the controllers. Even though these strategies have been put in place by the government to curb corruption, a lot still needs to be done for this to be a reality.

P8 added that article 66 of the constitution required that all top-level public officials must publicly declare their assets before and after taking up government offices. P2 also identified the preceding act as a good anticorruption strategy. P4 said the government appointed a priest by name Dieudonne Massi Gams, to head NACC as a sign to show government's seriousness in the fight and the need to respect the rule of law.

The implementation of whistleblowing and public denunciations brought legitimacy and voice to NACC's anticorruption effort. One of the fundamental good governance principles is that government should be able to guarantee freedom of speech and allow the voices of the masses to be heard. This study revealed that such opportunity in the anticorruption struggle in Cameroon existed based on the operational strategies of NACC. Almost all the participants stated that NACC had a toll-free number that allowed individuals in all spheres of life to call NACC's officer round the clock to report cases of corruption. Government programs for public sensitization such as "operation sparrow hawk" launched by the president through NACC since its inception in 2006 helped in cultivating a conducive environment for the voices of the people to be made inclusive and thereby making corruption not only a public crime but the fight against it equally a public responsibility.

Participants pointed out several public sensitization and educational efforts carried out by government to inculcate values of civil duty in the communities and get citizen participation active in the corruption fight. P11 pointed that NACC put up notices in public institutions sensitizing the public government services that are free, she also mentioned TV and radio programs that are dedicated to educate the people on the activities of NACC, meanwhile P18 spoke within the same lines recounting government channels opened for whistleblowers, P1 mentioned open public debates organized by NACC to sample student's opinion on the subject matter and equally advise them on the issues, P10 mentioned a website and email address available for the public to report corruption issues (website: www.conac.cm) (email: info@conac.cm). All these efforts are opportunities that government could reap huge policy successes if funded, monitored, and intentionally enforced.

Other NACC Anticorruption Strategies and Challenges

Apart from strategies that were rooted in good governance principles, NACC also implemented several other strategies as part of its “National Anticorruption Strategy” (NAS). But the study revealed that these strategies would probably not offer the same opportunities for effective anticorruption practice as the others discussed above. Rather they posed several challenges to the system and could only benefit NACC's vision if they are totally reformed to reflect certain good governance practices. The four Strategies uncovered under this category revealed that:

Effective decentralization should include structural and service decentralization. Cameroon is a unitary state where government is centralized, making the capital city (Yaounde) where the seat of government is situated, the lone vibrant place for the

origination of significant government decisions and activities. Based in Yaounde, NACC also operates by this centralized trail and would have to control the activities of all other units spread across the national territory. A decentralized system also means decentralization of decision making and as well as structures. The study revealed that even though NACC took significant steps towards decentralization, the efforts were limited to structural decentralization, and service operations were still centralized for the most part. Participants pointed out these dynamics and some of them elaborated on what they thought decentralization meant to NACC as a strategy for anticorruption. P1 stated decentralization as one of NACC's anticorruption strategies whereby NACC's unit are spread across the territory and in all public services to carry out anticorruption activities. Criticizing the layout of this strategy, P17 had this to say of NACC:

It is an observatory commission and it receives complaints from government personnel or citizens and table to the presidency to receive the authorization to go to the field for investigations before submitting its reports to the presidency, N/B it does not have powers to enforce any decisions.

P6 pointed out that the structures were decentralized but the operation of services were still highly centralized as seen in the concentration of decision making in the central organ in Yaounde. P18 blamed such concentration on the lack of autonomy for NACC. He passionately expressed this view in the following words:

To be frank, an organization like CONAC (NACC) ought to be independent and work based on facts discovered and not on political motivations. This greatly hinders work at the agency. We work mostly on public projects which have not been completed. But we work with other ministries such as that of public works,

supreme state control and auditing. We equally work with international organizations for mutual legal assistance. The organization has as function to help in the realization of public projects by preventing embezzlement. It equally has as aim to assist the country towards development

The preceding revelations are the discoveries that we made concerning decentralization as a NACC anticorruption strategy.

Investigation without prosecution might lead to wastage of public resources. This study uncovered that investigation of alleged corruption cases was one of the core functions and approaches of NACC against corruption in the country. However, this strategy was challenging to the organization based on assessments from the data collected. P6 spoke passionately about the nature of these investigations in the following words:

I wonder if NACC members can arrest without the help of the police like in Kenya where anticorruption commission members can arrest even uniform officers in flagrant delicto. There is the so-called sparrow hawk operation by the government working with NACC, which seems to me more like an operation for political score settling rather than a fight against embezzlement.

Additionally, P8 stated that certain investigations were covered up because the investigators were bribed by the suspects. The fact that NACC lacked the police power to make arrests was already a limitation to possible prosecutions. And secondly when these cases were turned over to the law enforcement agents for arrest and prosecution, some ended up not being prosecuted or wrong culprits being punished due to administrative bottlenecks, political score settling, and bribery of the law enforcement/judiciary. NACC

continued to spend substantial amount of resources on this strategy but yielding less effective results.

Checks and audits are as effective as the nature of the political system in place. NACC also used checks and audits as a tool to combat corruption in the several government offices. It worked in cooperation with the inspector general of the supreme state control department to ensure that regular audits were performed in all government departments and major administrative units. These checks however could only be effective if the supervising organ (NACC) was neutral and granted the administrative and political autonomy to carry out this function. Cameroon's political system lacked genuine checks and balances and power weighed significantly in the favor of the executive branch of the government with little capacity left for the legislative and judiciary branches. The political system influenced the way NACC carried out its business. In his own words, P7 explained these dynamics as follows:

In some ministries, especially the ministry in charge of finance, various networks have been mounted to carry out dubious and corrupt practices on the civil servants who come there to follow their files. The issue of middlemen in this activity has been a wonderful experience as someone who has nothing to do with a particular ministry has the power to block the advancement of one's file if he or she does not comply. A case I personally witnessed was one widow who was running after the late husband's allowance. The man was a gendarme officer. When she approached one worker at the central treasury in Yaounde, the person requested a percentage of the money if he should assist her to have the due allowance. The woman accepted and after the deal was done, she went and reported the matter to

the minister of finance and the said civil servant had to use his own networks to survive expulsion from the public service and was only given punitive transfer.

The preceding reports demonstrated the nature of the work culture born out of the country's political system that favors a highly centralized government that makes public administration challenging.

Intergovernmental and International Cooperation without political will yield less results. Information from the data also revealed that the government through NACC took several strides to establish intergovernmental and international cooperation as anticorruption strategy. Data collected from NACC reports on the state of the fight indicated that Cameroon in the international environment of the fight against corruption was charged with several activities including the signing of international conventions and treaties on governance and the combat against corruption. Cameroon was a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and is also a subscriber to pan-African sub-regional norms. NACC also engaged in inclusive governance which brought in private sector entities to partner with the government in the cause. The agency equally cooperated with other government departments to make the fight an encompassing government effort. These relationships demonstrated significant intergovernmental steps taken to ensure public performance and promote transparency and accountability, but they also seemed to portray only an effort to fulfill regular government duty, as the policies lacked real action and intention to eradicate corruption by all cost. P6 expressed his views concerning these findings in the following words:

Generally, I would say that there is a very weak will on the part of the government to see corruption eradicated in Cameroon. This is evident by the fact

that even the main institution created by the government to fight it is ill equipped and ill powered to fight it: the text creating the commission gives it little or no power to do the job and so at the end of the day it is more or less a paper tiger or a toothless bulldog that barks but does not bite.

P15 added that the challenges stemmed from the governance system put in place.

To P13, it was an issue of actual will to cooperate and respect of operational autonomy. He stated that other government policies infringed upon, counteracted, and or watered down useful and potentially productive programs envisaged by NACC.

Need for Governmental Reforms to Improve Strategies

The themes that emerged from the data on the question of the kind of strategies implemented by NACC in its anticorruption effort, revealed from the second part that there was need for system reform so that the strategies could gain traction and thus thrive. Based on the analysis, decentralization, investigations, checks/audits, and intergovernmental and international cooperation were potential policy strategies that could result to great gains in the anticorruption struggle, but NACC and the government needed to review and make system reforms based on the experiences expressed by the participants. More expressions on this need were made by participants as they responded to the other questions. So, the issue of reforms shall come up again as we proceed in the analysis.

Summary of Findings on Research Question 1

In determining what strategies and how NACC combated corruption in Cameroon, especially within the government, this study found out from participants and from document review that NACC implemented strategies that could be categorized in

two sets: First were good governance principles, which gave the agency significant opportunities to record good results in the combat against corruption when they are consistently funded, monitored, and enforced. Second were policy strategies that were adopted under regular government public policy schemes but created less good governance opportunities even though they presented potentials for positive impact if reviewed and shaped through governmental reforms.

Research Question 2

What can be learned from NACC's past experience of working with anticorruption policies and programs?

Introduction

After identifying and categorizing the various anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC in its effort to curb corruption both in government and in the country at large, the second question sought to find out how its agents felt about their interaction with the said strategies on daily basis. This was aimed at having a grasp of the knowledge of participants on the subject matter, understand the dynamics, perceptions, and realities of the effects of NACC's strategies on the system, discover the achievements of the agency, and also uncover criticisms on both its successes and failures. Data from questions 3 to 5 of the interview protocol and information from document review helped to answer this second question.

Through the findings, I uncovered seven major pointers. The first indicated that the participants understood the subject matter and could produce good results as employees of NACC when given the right tools. Two of the pointers revealed major achievements (successes) of NACC, and four of them outlined some of the main

weaknesses of the agency and where it could be said to have failed as an anticorruption machine.

Availability of Qualified Labor

Good systems need good people working with the systems in order to produce good results. Qualified people sometimes are not necessarily good people, especially when the organizational culture does not provide them with opportunities to exhibit good tendencies. This is the trend that was discovered with the review of interview responses and documents collected for this study. The participants indicated a deep understanding of the corruption/anticorruption subject. Writers and reporters from the documents proved similar qualities. However, the findings portrayed serious distortions in civil service hiring procedures and culture that surrounded government employment and even an organ such as NACC that should at least be free of the infection. The issue as such appeared to be that of organizational culture and not lack of qualified labor thereof.

When asked about their experiences at NACC, participants were able to articulate the vision of NACC and all its intended strategies, but they did not show that NACC was producing a lot of results in terms of practical output. P8 said although the agency is meant to serve as an anticorruption machine, it was not equally free from the corruption syndrome. P9 said public officials caught in acts of corruption were ready to bribe their way out and also hide facts from NACC investigators, and because of the high rate of poverty in the country, NACC agents were bound to accept such bribes. This observation revealed an underlying problem of low salaries which further findings shall address. P10 made an experiential expression that portrayed knowledge and understanding of concepts and procedures of the agency. In her own words, she said:

As one who has been working with NACC, it has not been an easy task. It is not easy because most of those who call to report the issues of corruption do not reveal their identities for fear of being harmed. However, we have been carrying out seminars and projects to educate the population about the danger of corruption, especially on the need to denounce corrupt practices.

Within the same lines of expression, P11 articulated his experience at NACC as follows:

I have worked with the agency for 5 years. I have worked on the following projects: “Corruption free Hospitals”, and “Public Funds Safety”. Within the corruption free hospitals project, I was essentially evaluating the efficiency of services provided by medical personnel, investigate and identify types of corruption methods as well as their modus operandi, then design strategies to curb these. With the public fund safety project, I was on this project more for fraud investigation related to high profile administrators of the country like ministers...etc. These projects caused a lot of awareness of the public on how state services operate, thus the corrupter and the corrupted were rendered powerless except there was collusion.

When asked about what anticorruption strategies NACC could employ, participants were rich in their contributions, and this again went to show that quality labor was available for the agency and likely for the government as a whole, and thus it was left for the government to create the right environment in which these individuals could thrive. All 20 participants could articulate at least two fundamental strategies that were linked to either accountability, transparency, integrity, public responsibility, and

good governance as a whole. All responses on this particular question were worth mentioning due to their potencies for a viable anticorruption policy pool.

P1 said culprits should be public shamed, embezzled properties seized, and sever manual labor inflicted on them. He also mentioned education on civic responsibility and issues of corruption/anticorruption beginning from elementary levels.

P2 said gift giving before services are rendered should be discouraged, that public services should be fully decentralized, and that hard work and meritocracy should be encouraged.

P3 said he strongly thought that the proper implementation of Article 66 of the Cameroon constitution would be a positive strategy. This article required public officials to declare their assets before and after assuming public offices. Participant though the strategy served in a great way to create basis for justification of wealth acquisition.

P4 said households and the younger generation should be the target. That moral education should be taught in schools in order to create integrity base for these young ones. That NACC officials should be elected rather than being appointed, and that the judiciary system should be given full independence.

P5 proposed matching government jobs with appropriate qualifications, and that salaries should be increased to dissuade public servants from being tempted into corrupt practices.

P6 mentioned institutional reforms, and reforming the instrument creating NACC to give it more investigative and judicial police powers to do its job.

P7 proposed legal reforms, including naming and shaming, and incarceration of culprits, especially public servants with higher posts of responsibility.

P8 said there should be devolution of administrative and financial resources. That Cameroon should learn from other countries, and that there should be a change in leadership.

P9 proposed the implementation of sever criminal and civil sanctions for those that are guilty of corruption crimes.

P10 said both the corrupted and the corrupter should be punished and inflicted with heavy fines and long-term prison sentences.

P11 proposed equity in governance, creation of a body that is independent of politics to prosecute the anticorruption struggle, and involvement of private sector opinion in public policy making.

P12 said leaders at NACC should not be appointed by presidential decree, and that anticorruption sensitization programs on radio and television should continue and not be limited to city areas but be brought to villages in form of debates that could end with trophies and other prizes.

P13 said civil and public servants should be well remunerated for their labor.

P14 held the same view as P13, stating that the basic minimum wage should be raised, and that this was possible when compared to the funds the government was losing to corruption perpetually.

P15 proposed that private investment should be encouraged by the reduction of taxes for businesses, that the state should put in place a stronger policy for contract negotiations in the private sector to protect individuals, that the state should also set up incentives for public servants and encourage general participation in the fight against corruption, that recruitment into public or civil service should be accompanied by an on

the job training (OJT) on anticorruption practice, that merit based recruiting should be encouraged in government and public service, and that public policy should help give powers more to institutions than to persons.

P16 mentioned public sensitization and annual publication of reports about the state of corruption in the country.

P17 said a strong system of accountability, effective decentralization process, improved human resources management be put in place to enhance good governance.

P18 proposed that government should raise public awareness and inform the public that government alone cannot eradicate the ill of corruption without public participation, that international cooperation in the fight be promoted, and that government should improve the overall economy and social aspects of the country.

P19 suggested that NACC should ensure the protection and compensation of whistle blowers.

Finally, P20 proposed that public servants should be educated on the ills of corruption to the citizens they are called to serve. That they should be encouraged to reject corrupt acts even if they are proposed by their clientele. And that public services be computerized in order to increase accountability. The richness of the preceding responses demonstrated the availability of a resourceful and available labor for a productive anticorruption machinery for NACC, but the assessment of the achievements of the agency indicated that it was challenged by other factors different from personnel issues.

Achievements of NACC

Findings from the study indicated that NACC did not produce the kind of results participants thought should have come from an anticorruption machinery of its caliber.

Their expectations were that after more than a decade in existence, the agency should be able to lay down a groundwork that would significantly curb the amount of corruption present in government and in other sectors of the country. Amidst the different criticisms, the study was able to identify three noticeable projects of NACC that could be regarded as achievements of the agency. These included the following:

Cameroon's position among corrupt countries of the world shifted. The years 1998 and 1999 were the worst for Cameroon regarding its standing on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index list of countries in the world organized according to the least corrupt to the most corrupt from top to bottom. Cameroon found itself at the bottom of the list consecutively for these two years as the most corrupt country of the world. Since then and with the creation of NACC come 2006, the position has shifted and the data indicated that even though the country was still among some of the most corrupt countries of the world by year 2017, it was not at least occupying the bottom position of the list as in previous years.

Changes in Cameroon's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) can be seen on table 1, appendix A under the list of appendixes below. In 2017 CPI reports indicated that the country was still performing considerably poorly, ranking at 153 out of 180 participating countries, and scoring 25 out of 100 points in total. Even with such low performance, some participants regarded the shift from the most corrupt to just one of the most corrupt countries as a positive move achieved by NACC. In this regard, P2 said he thinks the agency was somehow effective due to the slight improvement in the country's CPI.

Public awareness increased. One of the significant items that was noticed throughout the data was the consistent and overwhelming positive impressions and

testimonies participants shared about NACC's community awareness programs and public sensitization projects and schemes on corruption/anticorruption issues. In his own words, P5 shared the following testimony on this achievement:

Government via NACC has partnered with some institutions (business coalitions against corruption, and the public contracts regulatory board) to tackle corruption. It does investigations to ascertain corrupt practices for the purpose of either administrative sanctions or prosecution. It has also made available a toll-free number for public denunciation of corrupt practices. My personal experience has been enriching, especially by the corruption sensitization programs and training of personnel within the context of partnership with the above-mentioned partners.

P7, P18, and almost all the participants also mentioned the toll-free number, which is 1517, as a significant successful tool and strategy implemented by NACC. This strategy opened up the anticorruption project to the entire public and increased awareness among the masses that corruption is actually a practice that should be shunned among the people. Participants equally mentioned the regular broadcast of corruption/anticorruption issues on national television and radio as another successful move by NACC in raising public awareness on these issues.

Several high-profile public servants incarcerated, and some funds recovered. The news on corruption and anticorruption in Cameroon for the past decade as of 2018 was highly characterized by the incarceration of top-level public servants, especially those who were in charge of managing the day to day business of the government. The study found out that "operation sparrow hawk" which was a landmark anticorruption program launched by the head of state through the NACC machinery led to the conviction and

imprisonment of ministers, heads of departments, and several directors in charge of government agencies and parastatals. The program also led to the recovery of several billions of Francs CFA. Although participants dubbed it a scores-settling tool used by the head of state to get rid of his political enemies, data from documents revealed that indeed several government officials have been incarcerated under this program and some funds embezzled by them were retrieved. From an expert report by a home-based scholar, Bechem (2018), the following cases and statistics were discovered:

Between 2008 and 2018, the supreme state audit indicted numerous state dignitaries who were jailed for embezzlement. In its 2008 report, the agency boasted to have helped save the state a sum of about 35 billion FCFA embezzled by public officials in corruption schemes. Similar efforts were made by the national agency of financial investigation (NAFI) and the supreme court audit bench even though these two institutions regrettably had no powers to press charges on the people indicted by their investigations. Furthermore, the special criminal court was created to hear embezzlement cases that were in the amount equal to or superior to 50 million francs CFA. In 2014, the ministry of justice in its report to the national assembly revealed that the sum of CFA 2.401.235.610 (trillions of francs CFA) was recovered from embezzlers back to the state's coffers. The reimbursement was done in exchange for discontinuance of prosecution proceedings.

The expert report named the following high-profile officials convicted within the past decade under the "operation sparrow hawk" program: Dayas Mounoume, former director general of the Douala Port Authority, Arsene Essomba the former deputy director of the port, and Abel Maguieb, ex administrative and financial director of the

same agency were all sentenced to 15 years in prison each for embezzling 458 million francs CFA. In 2015, former director general of airports was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment by the special criminal court for mismanaging the sum of one billion, six hundred, and forty-two million francs CFA. Other high-profile sentencings included that of Ephraim Inoni, former prime minister of Cameroon, and Marafa Hamidou Yaya, former minister of territorial administration and decentralization of Cameroon (minister of interior) and longtime collaborator of the president of the republic. Reporter indicated that these successful convictions were minimal compared to the vast number of corruption cases that were not yet indicted due to the difficulties posed by a judiciary that's yet to be independent, as it took orders from the president of the republic who is also head of the higher judicial council (HJC).

The preceding achievements were strong points that NACC could hold closely to reflect and be encouraged to improve in its function as the central anticorruption agency of the government of Cameroon. P17 for one gave some minimal credits to NACC by affirming that even though the agency was not effective in its anticorruption mission, it helped in realizing a slight improvement in the fight against corruption in the country.

Weaknesses of NACC

Information from data collected for this study revealed several distress points within NACC as an organization, with challenges coming mostly from the kind of government system in which it found itself. The confessions and perceptions of participants were obvious to the fact that NACC could be termed for the most part, a failed or ineffective project based on the several weaknesses of the agency pinpointed by the participants and were identified by the following four factors:

Lack of ownership and independence. The most frequent and outstanding reason pointed out by most participants to be responsible for the weakness of the NACC organ was the lack of actual ownership and independence of the agency in terms of design and decision making. Participants held that the organization was failing because it was not allowed to design and draft its own policies, rather it had to wait for everything to come from the president of the republic. P17 stated that NACC was attached to the presidency just like any other key institution involved in the corruption fight, as such could not take any enforcement measures of its own. In her own words, P8 made the following passionate expressions regarding the lack of ownership and independence for the agency:

It is not very effective because it was developed by others and just imposed on us, and since it did not come from us, there is lack of ownership. You know when you don't own something, managing it too becomes a problem. Even use of the thing is a problem.

In stronger terms, P7 reverberated similar expressions made by P8 as follows:

The effectiveness of the government in tackling corruption in Cameroon can be graded with an average mark if one were to become a teacher to grade the government. What is problematic here is the efficiency of the working nature of those structures put in place by the government. It is like creating structures without corresponding powers to effectively accomplish their mission. This can be equated to sending a military man to a war front without the basic ammunitions necessary to confront his enemies. There is no doubt that every Cameroonian is aware of the fact that to enter any higher institute of learning, requires one to pay bribe for a place, especially for schools like ENAM, IRIC, EMIA, ENS, INJS etc.

(these are all acronyms in French for prominent public schools in Cameroon responsible to recruit and train for civil service retention). What blocks the government from dismantling this network full of corruption is a million-dollar question that needs a fine mind to reason and come up with the answer. Over 90% civil servants in Cameroon are corrupt in one way or the other, tying with the assertion that ‘impossible is not Cameroon’.

Most participants expressed the view that NACC was not as independent as it should have been, and therefore could not operate flexibly, especially in a highly corruption driven environment in which the main anticorruption agent should be expected to hold some considerable amount of discretionary authority for swift action. This rendered the agency powerless, and often the lack of autonomy caused other government programs to interfere with the agency’s plans and strategies as explained by p13.

Negative Influences of politics. Participants reported that there was outright bias in the way NACC strategies were shaped and implemented, due to the influences of party politics and power politics. P6 said of the actions carried out under the schemes of “operation sparrow hawk” program to be more of a political score-settling tool rather than an anticorruption machine. P9 added that the program was a big fiasco, because the government itself was not sincere, and that sanctions to corruption cases were usually politically oriented. In his own words, P19 equally amplified the issue as follows:

People do not feel the impact of government strategies. Some feel that the struggle has been reduced to the arrest and detention of top government officials who are seen as potential threats to the regime in place. This makes the struggle to be perceived as a political one. Petty corruption is still alive.

According to participants, indictments and convictions were based for the most part on the discretion of the president of the republic, leaving no ample room for institutional procedure in carrying out anticorruption policies.

Defiance of the merit system. Another prevalent factor noticed from the data was the absence of a vibrant merit system that could establish a firm foundation and provide support for the fight against corruption in the country. Participants pointed out that corrupt practices such as bribery, recruitment of unqualified workers into the civil service, duplicity of functions, and abuse of authority were still highly practiced in the government irrespective of the anticorruption effort by NACC. They believed this was partly due to the absence of a merit-based system in place.

Public servants themselves were said to be in regular defiance of the system. P8 said even some NACC workers took bribe to coverup corruption cases. Pay for play and backdoor illegal deals within the public service were identified as threats to a productive anticorruption program by the same government. The system of justice in place did not make things better either, as it was said to favor mostly particular individuals such as the political class. Justice was said to be perverted, as such the state of impunity prevailed and because of this, P10 said most corruption perpetrators either went unpunished or were not effectively punished.

Conceptual and contextual challenges of the agency. The last major weakness of NACC discovered in the study was the issue of conceptualization of the agency and contextualization of its strategies. The study revealed that the agency was not in the first place conceived as a judicial institution that could be seen as the anticorruption police. The agency's key functions as described in the 2011 NACC report on "the state of the

fight against corruption in Cameroon”, constituted mainly 1) prevention and communication measures, 2) studies and cooperation measures, and 3) Investigation measures. The conception of the agency apparently lacked strong law enforcement basis. The agency’s lack of prosecutorial and police authority was frequently raised by the participants as some of the key reasons for its weakness. Expressing a feeling of total consternation due to this situation, P7 exclaimed in the following words:

NACC has failed woefully in the fight against corruption. This is because Cameroonians are still to see where a head master (principal) of a primary school will be punished for receiving bribes before admitting students, likewise the principals of secondary and high schools and rectors (presidents) of state universities. Enough of the denunciations! What Cameroonians expect to see us a structure that will have the competence to arrest and punish officials involved in corruption.

P7 added that NACC has not distinguished itself from other organs of the government that were equally created to combat corruption but apparently failed to realize significant victories. These included the national agency for financial investigation, the public contracts regulatory board, the supreme state audit, the audit bench of the supreme court, the ministry of public contracts, and the ministry of justice. P3 also strongly held the view that the conceptualization of NACC was problematic, as government focused on duplicating structures without giving them practical institutional ability to function as they should. In his own words, he said:

One thing that the government has been good at doing is the multiplication of agencies as well as organizing talks on this issue. This is clearly ineffective

because, more and more mismanagement and misappropriations are recorded in the country.

P6 said she was yet to see a situation in which a NACC agent would arrest a corruption suspect without the help of the police as done in Kenya, where anticorruption agents can arrest even uniform officer in flagrante delicto. On the issue of contextualization, it appeared that the agency did not pay much attention to the policy context of Cameroon in terms of the economy, culture, and political environment that surrounded the agency. It still had to look into the giving culture of the people, the extremely low salaries paid to citizens in relation to devaluation of the Francs CFA, and the political system that pushed powers mostly into the hands of individuals and not institutions. Expert report by Bechem (2018) lamented on the absence of an autonomous judiciary in the country, and most participants perceived corruption as becoming more of a cultural issue in Cameroon that needed solutions that addressed the culture.

Summary of Findings on Research Question 2

Through this question, I examined the experiences of the participants in terms of their interaction with the various anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC and gathered their perceptions on how successful the said strategies were and the factors that influenced either their success or failure. The findings revealed that NACC made a few strides in curbing corruption in the Cameroon public service and in the country as a whole, but it still needed to do much work because its weaknesses and challenges appeared to be more noticeable than its achievements and could lead to a failed institution in the absence of true intervening reforms.

Research Question 3

What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to implement effective anticorruption policies?

Introduction

Following the assessment of the effectiveness of the anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC, the next question that needed to be answered was how possible shortcomings of the system could be improved upon in order to give it the capacity to produce better results. Question 3 was as such asked in order to find out what participants thought government could do differently in order to make NACC more viable as an anticorruption force. It was also asked to gather tools that participants believed could be used to solve the failures of NACC identified in question 2. Question 6 and few more data from questions 7 and 8 from the interview protocol, and data from document review were used to fully cover the subject matter of question 3.

The study revealed several strategies that could be regarded as solutions to the problems raised in question 2. Proposals made by participants projected the need for NACC to overcome barriers and hindrances to good governance by moving into an era where attention is given to good government behavior through the observance of good governance principles, and this would enable the establishment of a more productive national anticorruption strategy. Four major categories of strategies were gathered from the data.

Policy and Political Reforms

These are reforms that referred to the authority and scope of NACC. Since most participants believed that the agency was weak due to lack of autonomy and

independence, these reforms were proposed to have some amount of power shifted to the agency so that it can do the enormous job it was called to do. Policy reforms in this case would be refer to changes in government decision making that would target and improve NACC's anticorruption strategies, meanwhile political reforms would be government changes that would increase NACC's independence, giving it the politico-institutional leverage it needed to thrive amidst corruption forces coming from other powerful government institutions and authorities. Participants that made strong expressions concerning this need were P1, P2, P4, P5, P6, P8, P13, P16, and P18. In his own words, P1 suggested the following:

The government should make NACC an independent committee and institution.

All the other institutions like the special criminal court, the audit bench at the supreme court...etc, should be directly supervised by NACC. The members should hail from an independent electorate of credible moral background.

The propositions made by P1 could only be possible by legislated political reforms, because NACC could not arrogate such authority to itself. Cooperation between the major three branches of the government was need for such reform.

P2 on the other hand proposed a policy reform which required that government should take more rigorous punitive measures against those convicted of corruption.

P4 said government should ensure the election of NACC's members just as P1 suggested, instead of having them being appointed by the president of the republic.

P5 suggested that NACC should be empowered with the capacity to prosecute corrupt persons. P6 supported this position, stating that the agency should be given vast and full powers to investigate corruption offenses, make arrest of offenders irrespective

of their rank or corps, and prosecute them in court. P8 added her voice to the call for autonomy for NACC and added that the judiciary system be made independent. Expert report from Bechem (2018) indicated that the judiciary in Cameroon was still under the total control of the executive, as the president appointed all judges and magistrates without confirmation and also sat as the head of the higher judicial council. P13 supported the request for autonomy and the need for NACC officials to be elected rather than appointed, stating that their appointment made people to see the agency only as a political tool in the hands of the president for scores settling with his enemies.

In addition to supporting the call for autonomy, P16 suggested a policy reform of autonomous budgeting. According to him, NACC should be able to draw up its own budget and table before the national assemble (legislator) for voting. P18 reiterated the points made by the other preceding participants in the following words:

Make the NACC autonomous financially, legally, with competence to launch actions even against high ranking state officials without seeking permission from anyone but the parliament.

Institutional and Operational reforms

These are reforms that would target the reshaping of the internal institution of NACC and the reinvigoration of its working principles. Some of these reforms could be initiated and managed by NACC without necessarily having to run to superior governmental authority for authentication when given proper autonomy. During the examination of the previous question, most participants pointed fingers at NACC and concluded that it was not vibrant in most of its anticorruption processes and principles. They expected NACC to exhibit characteristics of good governance. The proposals made

in this section were aimed at solving this problem. Expressions from P7, P9, P11, P14, and P15 captured these reforms. In his own words, P7 expressed the need for the following operational reforms:

What in my humble opinion Cameroon needs to do is to try to design different strategies to fight the different forms of corruption in the country, starting from “grand corruption”, which can be fought by sending those big fishes to jail for corrupt practices perpetrated by them. As for “petty corruption”, those isolated individuals involved at a negligible scale can be named and shamed in newspapers that have national coverage and even televisions at the end of every year. This should be carried out systematically across the country in all offices.

Distinguishing between types and levels of corruption provided NACC with the opportunity to organize properly and function effectively.

P9 suggested NACC’s processes be digitalized and that NACC should also recommend that government services be computerized. He added that NACC could station undercover agents in different zones across the national territory to track down corruption cases. This could be seen as a great strategic reform but might face implementation challenges if NACC lacked the police power to initiate arrests. NACC was not also going to be able to computerize its activities if it lacked the political will and finances coming from the government.

P11 proposed another operational reform, which required that NACC should make it a strategy to request that surveillance cameras be installed in all public offices, and that these cameras should be reviewed regularly by an independent body and reports

given to NACC. To cut cost, NACC could have a separate division within NACC do the camera reviews.

For institutional reforms, P14 proposed the making of NACC a more objective institution whose findings are interpreted without bias or subjective influences. P15 articulated his own views in the following words:

NACC should be given the possibility to develop anticorruption messages and programs of its own, should be given the opportunity to administer these programs by themselves, given the powers to render evidence on cases public, and be given the opportunity to examine and be present in all public recruitment processes.

Basically, participants wanted the making of NACC an actual anticorruption force with legal basis as an institution vested with both police and prosecutorial authority to find, arrest, and prosecute all defendants of corruption.

Community and Culturally Oriented Measures

This strategy targeted the environment and looked intricately into why the corrupter and the corrupted got involved in corruption in the first place. The study found out that the gift-giving culture and patronage practiced in the Cameroonian communities built up altruistic tendencies for bribery in the people. The laissez-faire civil service culture of the country also bred corruption. As solutions, participants proposed the initiation of reforms such as effective firing of corrupt government employees, discouragement of gift-giving for the purpose of accessing public services, increasing the salaries of civil servants, raising the minimum wage, increasing human resources and financing for areas identified with high levels of corruption, publicly shaming corruption

convicts, reinforcing public sensitizations and educational programs on corruption/anticorruption, and the inclusion into school curriculums of moral and civic education that thought children about the dangers of corruption, anticorruption behaviors, and patriotism for their country.

Most of the participants expressed the need for these community and culturally based reforms. The most prevalent of all the measures was the need to include lessons on corruption into the curriculums of primary and secondary schools. Participants held a strong perception that corruption in Cameroon had become a cultural issue that needed more than institutional solutions. P6, P7, P17, and P20 advocated for these reforms in their suggestions, stating that if government could initiate them, they would stand a better chance to achieve positive results in the fight against corruption in the country.

International Cooperation

Participants expressed different feelings towards the involvement of international organizations and other international entities in the fight against corruption in Cameroon. The perceptions were strictly divided between the question whether international intervening measures were needed to help the fight against corruption in Cameroon or not. Some participants like P7, P11, and P15 believed that the international community, especially international organizations and multinational firms from the West were part of the corruption problem in Cameroon.

P7 said the international community had little or nothing to offer as solution. And that most often, they came to the country for the same cause but came out from the presidency singing the same song being sang by the regime in place. He also emphasized

that Cameroon problems needed Cameroon solution, and that they international community could not change the behavior of Cameroonians overnight.

P11 was more passionate in his expressions against the need of the international community as part of the solution to the problem, and strongly condemned their intervention in the issue through the following statement:

International community has helped in grooming what we have today as corruption vested country spanning back to the time slaves were bought by the bribery of our chiefs. Because Cameroon is a potential land of opportunities, the international community comes in for these huge opportunities by lobbying and bribing, thus rendering the whole system corrupt.

P15 held the same views as P11, stating that he did not think the international community had a significant role to play in terms of solutions to the problem since they focused on publishing results of Cameroon as a highly corrupt country but offered little or nothing to solve the problem. He also believed that some of the corruption practices benefited international corporate business as they exploited the natural resources of the system at low prices due to kickbacks and paying of huge bribes to top level government officials.

Despite the strong rejection of international help expressed by some participants as seen above, others believed that NACC and the government needed to cooperate with international actors in the area of anticorruption for a more viable and successful anticorruption machine for the country. This second view was more popular among the participant P2, P3, P5, P6, P10, P12, P14, P18, and P19 all advocated for and supported cooperation with international forces for effective anticorruption practice by NACC. P2

said international actors could help ensure that embezzlers return stolen money kept in banks in the diaspora. P3 in his own words said:

The international community has a mighty role to play. They set the pace by which many countries function globally. How about them prescribing economic sanctions on these corrupt countries. If they for example reduce or totally end aids to Cameroon, this would be a hard measure, but could serve a productive role to ending corruption.

When asked about some of the international anticorruption strategies that NACC has adopted and is currently implementing, he added:

Yes, I can quickly think of transparency international. They usually require Cameroon to send annual reports from all parts of the country before harmonizing a general report.

According to P5, and P6, the international community could be instrumental in the fight against corruption through bodies like transparency international, and their corruption perception index (CPI) for the country determined interest in the country by foreign investors. Therefore, if foreign investment declined for this reason, the state could be more serious in adjusting its behavior towards corruption in order to attract these investors. They added that the international community could help by repatriating embezzled funds stored abroad, prevent transfer of embezzled funds, and provide assistance in the area of capacity building so that the government and NACC could be strengthened to wage the war against corruption in the country.

To P10, P12, and P14, the international community was helpful through anticorruption conventions, bilateral agreements, and cooperation schemes like the ones

provided by the platforms of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Oxfam, and transparency international.

P18 and P19 added that the international community could help in fact finding, extradition of runaway corrupt officials, and providing expert reports. When asked about existing international strategies, they mentioned expert reports by Amnesty International, cooperation with Interpol for investigations, and implementation of the provisions of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.

Summary of Findings on Research Question 3

Answers to question 3 served as participants' proposals for solutions to the issues raised in the second part of question 2. The issues were essentially that NACC was weak as a government organ charged with the enormous responsibility to eradicate corruption from the Cameroon civil service and from the country at large. In its quest of fulfilling this mission, it recorded some successes, but failed greatly and generally to meet the mark, as corruption was still highly prevalent in the country according to the perceptions of participants and CPI reports by Transparency International. The answers in this section proposed the types of tools and approaches the government could engage both on the domestic and international fronts to improve on NACC's construction and operation as a productive anticorruption machinery for the country.

Research Question 4

How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improved the development and implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC?

Introduction

The premise of this study proceeded with the claim that effective anticorruption strategies are those that were designed based on good governance principles. The question raised from this background was to know whether the anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC reflected these principles, and if they did, what results did they bring to the fight, or if they did not, then how could they be improved in order to give the agency more opportunities to craft strategies that could address the corruption problem with more positive outcomes in view? These questions were answered through participants' responses and data collected from documents as seen in question 1, 2, and 3. Question 4 was an extension of the investigation on effective anticorruption policy making, giving the study the latitude find out how proposed policies could be contextualized for better results, especially policy strategies that came from the international community.

Question 4 therefore sought to find out whether participants understood international dynamics of the anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC, and what their thoughts were concerning how such policies could be engineered to work more effectively with the local systems in place. The question also sought to know participants overall perception on the state of the fight as led by NACC. Investigations from document review, and responses to questions 9 and 10 on the interview protocol were used to answer question 4. Also, it should be noted that part of question 8 on the interview protocol identified the international anticorruption contributions to the fight against corruption in Cameroon, and this was already introduced under question 3. In this section, the focus was more on the effectiveness of these strategies.

Participants were once more divided on the effectiveness of international strategies in the fight, but they all agreed that for these strategies to yield positive results, they must align with the domestic environment. Overall, three major findings were made through this question. The study found out that:

International Influence

Some participants in preceding analyses did not view the intervention of international actors in Cameroon's anticorruption strategy to be positive. They believed that multinational firms and other international organizations were instead part of the problem of corruption in the country, explaining that they paid kickbacks for lower cost in natural resources markets, and that countries of the developed world served as safe havens for embezzlers of public funds.

Other participants asserted that the international community played a positive role in the anticorruption struggle in Cameroon through educational and empowerment programs, cooperation with investigations, expert reports, scientific policies, and strategic aid. Findings revealed that these international influences were well in place and could be felt within the NACC system, but it was left for the agency to properly adapt these contributions to the policy context of the country and make them viable solutions to the problem. P1, P2, P3, P6, P7, and P13 made the following expressions about their experience working with an understanding of the involvement of international strategies in NACC's anticorruption policy. In his own words, P1 said:

In my opinion, the primary actor in this fight is the government. The international community has a limited role to play. In 1998 and 1999, the country was listed by Transparency International as the most corrupt country in the world. This

situation exerted some pressure on the government in the eyes of her international economic partners like IMF and the World Bank. Many top government officials were arrested in this respect. I therefore think that the international community has a lot of influence when the country's economy is at stake.

P2 added that imported policies added value to NACC's strategies. P3 said, the simple fact that there was an "international watch eye" over the system, caused policy makers to remain alerted and aware of the situation either consciously or unconsciously. P6 expatiated her experience as follows:

There is a success story of the fight against corruption in Cameroon which just came to my mind. That is, the activities of an Israeli registered Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) operating in law enforcement in the wildlife sector of Cameroon. This NGO is called the Last Great Ape Organization (LAGA) and works in collaboration with the ministry of forestry and fauna (MINFOF) in wildlife law enforcement. LAGA adopts disguise and undercover strategies to unveil wildlife crime and even motivates law enforcement officers to work with them to combat wildlife crime thereby minimizing possibilities of corruption of law enforcement officers and ministerial officials.

The example by P6 was a clear indication that International intervention was part of the strategy for the fight against corruption in the country. P7 said the interventions of organizations such as the World Bank and Transparency International in domestic policy making often met stiff resistances from officials that were corrupt and were afraid of exposure. However, the continues pressure from these organizations kept the government on alert and increased its resolve in cracking down these corruption foes.

To P13, the world was fast becoming a global village, and therefore states became obligated to involve themselves in transactions with other states as partners for the purpose of surviving in this new advent of global village. This equally applied to anticorruption policy making and implantation. P13 expatiated on his experience of this connection between NACC and international forces in the following words:

All of these bodies have contributed enormously to the fight against corruption in Cameroon. But it has always been a very difficult task when it comes to implementation. This is because these international bodies are most often clear and transparent in their policies. But if corruption is persisting in our country, it is because we have all what it takes to fight corruption, with ideas from these bodies, but we are not willing to depart from the practice. Working with these international initiatives have been wonderful, but the real problem in Cameroon always is the issue of implementation, we do not have good laws.

Neglecting the Need to Contextualize Anticorruption Strategies

The eminent presence of international influences on anticorruption policy making necessitated contextual interpretations in order to adapt these foreign strategies and contributions to domestic realities for better results. However, the study showed that NACC did not do much in converting these policies to properly address local realities. That was participants' reactions, and their views were expressed as follows:

P8 stated that international actors came in with laws and institutions that did not fit sometimes with the Cameroon context, because they did not take into consideration local realities. She gave the example of the creation of NACC and the launching of “operation sparrow hawk”, that they were born from recommendations of international

organizations, with transparency international said to be at the origin of the whole NACC idea. P18 also expressed concerns of contextualization, asserting that policies brought by international actors worked better with advanced democracies, and could be fruitful at the domestic level only when applied with keen consideration of the policy context. In his own words, P19 made the following contributions concerning international anticorruption policy influences on NACC:

Definitely some strategies have been borrowed. An example is the law creating NACC, which is heavily believed to be a response to international pressure. The arrest and detention of corrupt officials is believed to be a necessary evidence to prove to the international community that the system is indeed fighting against corruption. The international community is contributing through pressure mounting.

The believe by some participants that international actors caused minimal or no intervening impact on NACC's strategy also revealed the kind of attention the agency paid to these policies and in extension the rigor with which they treated the need to have these policies interpreted to better address the country's own political, economic, geographical, and sociocultural realities for better results.

Corruption vs Anticorruption Perceptions

The last question of the interview protocol gathered final thoughts of participants, and analysis in this section was done by putting these thoughts together with the rest of the data and looking for participants' perceptions on the major issues of corruption, anticorruption, and NACC. The first set of perceptions that emerged from this analysis reflected the state of corruption in Cameroon according to the participants, and the

second set reflected participants perception on anticorruption and the success of NACC as the main government agency charged with the task of eradicating corruption in the country.




Figure 2. Corruption perception by participants

Most participants believed that Cameroon was still highly corrupted. From the civil service to other public offices and in the private sector, 75 percent (15 out of 20) participants perceived that corruption in the country was still on the high side. 20 percent (4 out of 20) of them believed that corruption was prevalent in the country but not as high as it was during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Only 5 percent (1 out of 20) of the participants was unsure about the state in terms of high corruption or moderate levels of corruption.

When compared with Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI) concerning Cameroon for 2017, the study found out that the country

scored 25 out of 100 points, with scores ranging from 0 = highly corrupt to 100 = low corruption. These results matched almost perfectly with participants perceptions in this study, because $100 - 25 = 75$, which could be interpreted to mean that 75% of CPI for Cameroon in 2017 held that the country was corrupt, with 75 percent indicating very high levels of corruption. Meanwhile 75 percent of the participants in this study believed the same. These findings could then establish the basis for the assessment of solutions, which will be explored in subsequent chapter.

Participants blamed the high levels of corrupt on a plethora of reasons, including the laissez faire nature of government, poor economy, lack of adequate anticorruption enforcement mechanisms, lack of the spirit of public service, absence of political will and bold steps to curb the problem, endemic nature/culture of corruption, state of impunity, defiance of the meritocracy, poor management, poor legal system, administrative inefficiencies, ineffective strategies, tribalism, nepotism, and no regime change.




Figure 3. Perceptions of participants on the success of NACC

The study revealed that most participants perceived NACC as well positioned to bring solutions to the problem of corruption in Cameroon, but that it was limited in scope and in operation by several factors as seen in preceding analyses. About 20 percent out of the 20 participants believed that NACC was successful or had significant hopes for success in its mission as the anticorruption machinery of the country, meanwhile up to 70 percent concluded that NACC considerably fell short of performance and as such needed serious reforms to ensure that the agency survives with any real hopes of registering significant victories in the fight. A negligible 10 percent (1 out of 20) of the participants was not sure about taking a particular stand on the success assessment.

Summary of Findings on Research Question 4

Due to the eminent interaction between domestic and international policies in contemporary global governance arrangement, it was imperative to assess the role played by international actors in the anticorruption effort of Cameroon through NACC. Findings in this section revealed that the international community influenced NACC's policies, but the officials at NACC paid less attention to the dynamics of these strategies and as such did not adapt them properly to serve their purposes. It was also discovered that participants strongly believed corruption in Cameroon was still on the rise, and that NACC was not achieving much in positive results despite the efforts of the agency.

Summary

In this chapter, I presented an overview of the purpose of this study, the questions the research sought to answer, participants' demographics, detail results from data that was collected on the study, analysis processes of the data, and the methods used to demonstrate the trustworthiness of the study.

Data collected on the research topic sufficiently answered the research questions and made it possible for NACC's anticorruption strategies to be identified and its achievements and challenges revealed.

In chapter 5, the interpretations of the research findings will be presented, discussions will be made on the limitations of the study, important policy provisions, implications for social change, and practical and future academic recommendations. And finally, conclusions will be drawn.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to explore the Cameroon government's anticorruption policy by assessing the various anticorruption strategies it implemented through the NACC, which served as the central agency for government anticorruption practice in the country. The aim was to provide a deeper understanding of the instruments used by the government to fight against corruption in the country. As such, in this study, I sought to evaluate the extent to which these strategies reflected good governance principles, as well as the impact of the strategies and their associated challenges in the anticorruption cause.

Through a review of the literature on the topic of corruption, I discovered that no scholarly research had been previously carried out to assess the Cameroon government's anticorruption strategies through NACC. Specifically, there was no clear understanding of what the achievements and the shortcomings of the agency were and what it meant to contextualize these strategies for better anticorruption performance by the agency and the government at large. In this study, I sought to bridge this gap in the literature.

I chose a qualitative case study design for this study because such a design provided the platform upon which I was able to explore governmental anticorruption strategies as practiced by NACC. The research questions for this study identified the anticorruption strategies practiced by NACC as the implementation scheme of the Cameroon government's policy for the fight against corruption and clarified the role of international actors in the fight and what could be done to improve on these strategies.

The analysis of my findings in this study led to the discovery that NACC's anticorruption strategies were greatly challenged due to poor design, formulation, and implementation of the policies. The findings concurred with most of the literature reviewed on anticorruption policy making and implementation, especially regarding the effectiveness of the Cameroon government's efforts and strategies against corruption in the country (Bechem, 2018; Cameroon Today, 2011; Fombad, 2000, 2003; Freedom House, 2011; Houmfa, 2012; NACC, 2006; Ndoumbe, 2008; Ngomba, 2006; Nguemegne, 2011; Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, 2012; Tiky VI, 2010; TI 1998, 1999, 2017).

Seven major anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC emerged from the collected data and were categorized into two groups: (a) strategies that reflected good governance principles and that could be enhanced for effective performance, and (b) strategies that were not properly formulated and, as such, performed poorly and needed complete reform if they were to be effective. The first category created opportunities whereas the second created challenges.

According to the findings, the creation and institutionalization of NACC, with its major strategic objectives to instill respect to the rule of law and to give a legitimate voice to the people through public denunciations and whistleblowing, was a good first step taken in the right direction. Elahi (2009) argued that the materialization of sustainable human development in the developing world, which entails the curbing of corruption, was a byproduct of good governance principles. In a UNDP policy paper, Graham, Amos, and Plumptre (1997) identified five major good governance principles: legitimacy of voice, direction, performance, accountability/transparency, and fairness

(rule of equity and rule of law). The same argument is made in this study, that NACC could develop robust anticorruption strategies when its guiding policies are rooted in good governance principles and practices.

Extending Elahi's (2009) views to the creation of NACC, it could be said that the agency was created with a vision in mind, the population was given legitimacy of voice to participate in the policy of the agency through denunciations and whistle blowing, and the rule of law was envisaged for the system through the creation of special courts and specific institutional support systems to aid the overall NACC system. Participants corroborated Elahi's views as they concurred that the creation of NACC was a positive step in the anticorruption struggle, and also ascertained the existence of the preceding good governance principles around NACC's vision.

The creation of NACC in 2006 was a positive and laudable initiative taken by the government of President Biya to address the chronic levels of corruption that had eaten deep into the roots of both the civil service and the private sector of the country. NACC's signature program was significant in the operations and public identity of the agency. This program became famous among the Cameroonian population because it led to the incarceration of several top-ranking public officials within a short period time from its creation (Freedom House, 2011). Several billions of Francs CFA were equally recovered from the culprits, as seen in the work of Nguemegne (2011). But the momentum with which the fight against corruption was launched through NACC soon diminished, and the agency fell short of fulfilling its purpose (Nguemegne, 2011). This was likely due for the most part to the lack of political will that leadership obviously needed to keep the agency on viable.

Haruna (2009) held the view that from decolonization to the second liberation era, Africa, and specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, suffered from leadership poverty. Cameroon, being one of the countries in this region, suffered from the same predicament (Haruna, 2009). According to Haruna, the predominance of dictatorial leadership in these countries created a leader-follower leadership perspective whereby the responsibilities of leadership are placed in the hands of the leader and then the followers are seen as passive people. NACC eventually suffered the consequences of these shortcomings, as leadership failed to provide a participative environment in which stakeholders and NACC could successfully put up a strong fight against corruption in the country.

Leadership issues usually lead to managerial issues, and that was the case with the leadership of the Cameroon government and NACC. The president of the Republic of Cameroon, having been in power for the past 36 years, depicted the monopolistic leadership discussed by Haruna (2009). Being in power for such a long time without alternans could be one of the reasons why fewer opportunities for democratic principles were created, and consequently fewer good governance tools to combat corruption existed. Some participants in my study suggested a regime change to this effect, arguing that current government lacked the political will to initiate real change in the state of corruption in the country and as such could not furnish NACC with the tools it needed to perform effectively. They expressed the belief that many government officials benefited from the systematic corruption in place and were not ready to allow NACC to operate with success in their midst.

The findings of the study also indicated that NACC fell short of major success in the fight against corruption in Cameroon because most of its strategies lacked the

institutional, structural, and interpretative instruments needed in order to assume the kind of authority, force, and meaning that would have helped enforce its values, principles, and findings in the system. The lack of independence and autonomy, absence of actual service decentralization, lack of police authority, negative influences of politics, and contextual challenges rendered NACC powerless (Fombad, 2000; Nguemegne, 2011; Tiky VI, 2010). Participants confessed that the agency was controlled from the presidency and usually could not carry out programs and projects freely without authorization from the presidency. The agency as such became limited as to the scope and means of what it could do. According to participants, the agency also investigated cases but could not initiate arrests on the spot for individuals caught committing corruption. Regular police officers who should enforce the laws were themselves often corrupt according to participants. But participants also believed that NACC would have been able to arrest culprits across all government departments without administrative impediments if it had been given the necessary autonomy and police authority.

The significance is that because NACC lacked the administrative tools and political atmosphere needed to operate effectively from a neutral standpoint, it became a tool in the hands of politicians to settle their political scores. As posited by many participants, while those who were seen as opponents to the regime in place were being handcuffed and sent to maximum security prisons for embezzlement, their colleagues who found favor with the regime were left untouched even though they stole even more from government coffers and from the people. In the end, citizens of Cameroon were the ones who suffered from this broken system, as evidenced by the poor economic and social standards of the country and the overall poverty of the citizenry because a few

individuals decided to loot the country's resources for their own private gain to the detriment of a great share of the population.

This chapter contains my interpretation of data collected through interviews conducted on participants from NACC and information gathered through document review. In the conclusion of the chapter, I make recommendations on possible future studies on topics related to the subject matter of this study, and I strongly believe that some of the solutions recommended in this study would promote positive social change when implemented.

Interpretation of the Findings

Adaptation to policy context (Quah, 2008) established the conceptual framework for this study, whereas Santiso's (2001), Rothstein's (2007), and Elahi's (2009) theories of universality of policy approaches, particularity of policy contexts, and good governance provided the underlying theoretical frameworks for the study. The discussions in this chapter focus on themes and patterns that emerged from data analysis conducted and described in Chapter 4. Twenty interviews were conducted with the help of 10 open-ended questions to gather information that was used to answer the research questions for this study. A detailed discussion and description of key outcomes of the data analysis is presented below. The findings of the study led to the conclusion that the creation of NACC as the central government organ to fight against corruption in Cameroon was well intended and received by the population, but fell short of achieving major success because some of its strategies were rooted in good governance principles and could be enhanced for better performance (findings for the first part of Question 1), but some were poorly formulated and implemented and, as such, needed complete

reformation for better performance (findings for the second part of Question 1; Questions 2, 3, and 4) as analyzed with the help of the conceptual and theoretical frameworks stated above.

NACC Strategies Rooted in Good Governance Principles

This section covers discussions on findings for the first part of Question 1.

Through this study, I uncovered three major strategies of NACC rooted in good governance principles. These strategies were seen as opportunities that the government could leverage through NACC to enhance the effectiveness of the anticorruption struggle. These strategies are described hereinbelow.

The creation and institutionalization of NACC

Generally, most countries that have emerged successfully from chronic systemic and public corruption have designated specific government organs charged with carrying out the anticorruption policy of the government, ensuring that corrupt officials are contested with all the tools possible and available. Examples seen in this study include Croatia, Hong Kong, Bulgaria, and most of the CEE countries that came out of communism and embraced democratic governance principles, institutions, and structures from the early 1990s (Beblavý, 2009; David, 2010; Grubiša, 2011; Smilov, 2010;). In Croatia, the government anticorruption agency was known as the Office of Combating Corruption and Organized Crime (Grubiša, 2011). In Hong Kong it was known as IACC (David, 2010). In Bulgaria, the agency was known as the State Agency for National Security and in Albania, it was known as the Anticorruption Monitoring Group (Smilov, 2010). By creating NACC, the government in Cameroon attempted to address corruption issues.

Creating a clear vision and direction for government is one of the principles identified by Elahi (2009) as a good governance principle. This study held the premise that if anticorruption strategies were formulated by NACC about good governance processes, they would stand a better chance to address the corruption issues plaguing the government. In this line of thought, actual work needed to be done after NACC was created to conceive a good vision and formulate effective to implement to obtain good results.

Institutional and legal reforms by the government

Institutional and legal reforms by the government introduced respect for the rule of law in the system. This was another initiative by government through NACC to formulate anticorruption strategies based on good governance principles. Firstly, the government recognized the role of the judicial system in the anticorruption process and promoted cooperation between NACC and the legal system (Nguemegne, 2011). This policy ensured that anticorruption strategies were built on the rule of law (Elahi, 2009). Secondly, the observance of the law by public officials, especially Article 66 of the constitution which required public disclosure of private assets before and after taking up any government office, was part of NACC's strategic recommendations to facilitate personal audits (Nguemegne, 2011).

This was an attempt at good governance as described by some of the literature reviewed for this study, including Elahi (2009) and Graham, et al. (2003). Even though NACC intended to abide by the rule of law, it faced the challenge of enforcement as participants pointed out that corruption perpetrators were not ignorant of the law but were intentionally inspired to break it by the culture of systemic corruption which had been

established and practiced in the country for several decades. Good governance approaches require that NACC does not give up on these attempts but continues to press on the government to provide more effective legal tools, environment to formulate good anticorruption laws and sensitization of the people about lawful conduct. Countries of CEE that have emerged from corruption using good governance approaches, including the enforcement of the rule of law, could serve as good examples in public education.

The implementation of whistleblowing and public denunciation

This strategy brought legitimacy and voice to NACC's anticorruption effort. Another significant good governance principle is giving the people legitimacy and voice, which entails freedom of speech and expression. Almost all participants identified the toll-free calling system instituted by NACC to enable whistle blowing and reporting of corruption cases as a plausible and effective strategy to enforce lawful conduct. It was thought that integrating a toll free calling system and whistle blowers against illegal conduct would enable NACC to develop a comprehensive monitoring system which is an example of good governance as seen in Elahi (2009).

Giving the people a voice in the anticorruption process with protections is effective, as most participants indicated. This is particularly relevant when the perpetrators are managers and the whistle blowers are subordinates. Most participants pointed out that subordinates are normally intimidated in the work environment to remain silent or share in the proceeds of illegal acts. Participants suggested that NACC could work on ensuring a security system for individuals who made such denunciations, and this will encourage more people to testify against misappropriators and deter bad

conduct. These are some of the groundworks upon which NACC could continue to improve by adapting procedures learned from other systems.

NACC Strategies with Less Success: Challenges and the Need for Reforms

This section covers discussions on findings for the second part of Question 1, discussions on findings for Questions 2, 3, and 4. The second category of NACC's strategies is considered to have provided less opportunities for a thriving anticorruption practice, and as such needed thorough reform which could also mean complete transformation or replacement. According to participants, these strategies were either poorly formulated or implemented. Four strategies were identified under this category, including decentralization, investigations, checks and audits, and intergovernmental or international cooperation. In order to capture the different sections of information derived from the analysis of data to the answers that emerged from further questions, the discussion in this section is organized under three major topics that capture these strategies, their challenges, and their corresponding reforms as proposed by participants.

Political strategies, challenges, and reforms

NACC strategies that had to do with reshaping the institution and giving it the legal scope and authority to perform could be seen as those directly linked to governmental politics. These included the politics of decentralization, intergovernmental or international cooperation, autonomy and independence, and the political will to change. NACC made few strides in these areas, especially by aligning itself to international anticorruption conventions and agreements and working in collaboration with other government departments that took part in the fight against corruption. NACC also decentralized its units into almost all government departments and agencies and

carried out probing activities under an “operation sparrow hawk” program that incarnated the government’s anticorruption mission in Cameroon. These attempts however, did not realize considerable success due to challenges within the system as pointed out by participants who also suggested reforms.

The political strategies being discussed in this section, tie with the literature on the role of leadership as an instrument for anticorruption practice (Maxwell, 1999; Kpundeh, 1998; Burke, 2008; Elahi, 2009). The data reveals that the efforts made in this area failed the good governance test as postulated by Elahi (2009). Participants complained of government refusal to ensure that service decentralization occurred alongside structural decentralization. While NACC personnel were distributed to various departments, the services were still highly controlled and concentrated under a centralized power structure operated by fewer people with connections to the presidency of Cameroon. This made it easier for justice to be perverted along the chain of command as corruption cases initiated at the bottom, were usually dropped out by dishonest intermediaries before reaching the top state managers answerable to the .

Participants confessed that the lack of honesty, autonomy and independence, absence of governmental will to change, incompetence in top-ranking government officials, lack of rigor were some of the challenges against NACC’s assignment. They therefore advocated for new legislation to free NACC from direct control by the presidency of the republic of Cameroon. The advocacy included a call for NACC to be independent of the executive and accorded police powers to pursue corruption suspects, arrest and file charges for prosecution in court.

According to Maxwell (1999), everything rises and falls on leadership. The president of the republic of Cameroon in his leadership capacity can initiate these political changes and give NACC the authority required to investigate and bring to justice all officials involved in corrupt acts. However, if the all-powerful president fails to empower this agency then it will continue to face challenges in fulfilling its role freely and confidently. The legislature could also pick up these signals and bring up appropriate changes through bills in parliament. Even though the day to day management of government agencies falls within the jurisdiction of the executive branch, policy changes for the same agencies could originate from the legislative branch. Kpundeh (1998) attributed the task to bring about political will for change to not only presidential leadership, but also to other elected or appointed leaders, civil society watch dogs, stakeholder groups and others.

Institutional strategies, challenges, and reforms

NACC put into place institutional strategies that also fell short of operational vigor, and thus could not create the expected impact. These are strategies that had to do with NACC's daily operations and functional policies as an anticorruption agency. They included investigations, checks and audits, anticorruption campaigns and sensitization of the masses to create greater public awareness, identification of suspects to law enforcement and ensuring that they are prosecuted according to the law, setting up transparency, accountability, and integrity systems, and proposing public service reforms. These strategies tie with the literature on policy and legal instruments of anticorruption practice (Moroff & Schmidt-Pfister, 2010; Beblavý, 2009; Spector, 2016; Desta, 2006;

Nguemegne, 2011; McDermott, 2010; Barry and Stephens, 1998; Eliason, 2009; Kubiciel, 2009; Majila, Taylor, & Raga, 2014).

Findings revealed that NACC carried out extensive sensitization campaigns on television, radio, and also made use of anticorruption posters posted on government and public offices, and billboards stationed in different cities and towns across the country. Participants identified this strategy but complained that the implementation was not done effectively due to lack of resources by NACC and poor educational methodology. Participants suggested that the communication of anticorruption ideals would yield better results if they were developed and added to school curriculum.

The effectiveness of public policy depends on its formulation and implementation. When Moroff and Schmidt-Pfister (2010) conducted a study on the effectiveness of anticorruption campaigns, they found out that broad social support for anticorruption strategies remained essential for the success of any international and governmental initiative. NACC seems to comply with this strategy but for the fact that it lacks resources to multiply educative sessions across the country and in different governmental offices. Slovakia's case was successful, as public sensitization and educational programs contributed significantly in transforming behavioral norms and corruption. The effect deterred people from corrupt practice (Beblavý, 2009).

Findings also revealed that NACC was not sophisticated in its institutional strategies to build integrity systems and establish strong public performance standards. However, strides were being made in information technology to computerize services and processes for open government even though no major accomplishments were recorded. The legal department was ready to punish culprits through special and newly created

criminal courts to prosecute perpetrators of corruption, but participants argued that even with the measures in place, justice itself was corrupt due to the absence of an independent judiciary system. They therefore suggested that NACC advocates for institutional reforms if it were to function effectively and achieve meaningful results in its mission. The foundation of good governance as laid by Elahi (2009) is yet needed at this level to strengthen administrative procedures and give public managers at NACC the right policy tools to formulate strategies that will improve the performance of the institution.

Conceptual and contextual strategies, challenges, and reforms

The concept behind the idea of NACC is what gave the organization form and focus. The concept determined the agency's founding principles and shaped its projects, programs and other strategies. Participants stated that NACC was an idea copied from other countries following the recommendations of TI. Nevertheless, the important question that should be asked is how the agency was conceptually established to address Cameroon's problems in a Cameroonian way. It is by answering this question that contextual dynamics were visited through studies on the notion of policy context (Gephart, 2009; Quah, 2008; Rothstein, 2007; Santiso, 2001; Walton, 2016).

Participants stated that NACC was not conceived as a judicial institution endowed with police authority compared to its counterparts in countries like Egypt and Kenya. Review of documents pointed out that the agency's main functions included preventing corruption, research and as well as communication, cooperation and investigation measures. Essentially, it was conceived as a research and reporting agency under the executive branch of the government without any special privileges regarding autonomy and function. This kind of conceptualization gave the organization a weak base in law

enforcement and emasculated its prosecutorial abilities. Participants therefore suggested that the agency be reformed and given a judicial police status so that it could arrest suspects, especially those caught red-handed.

Findings also revealed that NACC carried out strategies that were influenced by international actors. Participants expressed different feelings on the influence of the international community. Some stated that international cooperation and transplantation of strategies from foreign experiences to Cameroon had a positive impact on NACC's efforts, meanwhile others saw the contrary, asserting that foreign actors did not do much to help apart from monitoring and reporting corruption perceptions just like TI did.

These findings are tied to literature in this study through the works of the authors mentioned at the beginning of this section, and their works were used to establish the conceptual and theoretical frameworks that guided this study. For conceptualization of anticorruption strategies, authors held different perspectives. There were those who posited for a universal approach, which holds that the same anticorruption strategies could be implemented in different countries and would yield similar results (Santiso, 2001). But others believe in a particularistic approach, where strategies should be conceived based on the specific characteristics of the policy context (Rothstein, 2007). It is this second dimension that gave birth to the concept of adaption to policy context (contextualization of anticorruption) (Gephart, 2009; Quah, 2008; Walton, 2016).

According to Quah, 2008, when government policies are formulated based on the country's policy context, they stand a greater chance to succeed when implemented. Having conducted a study on India, author identified key features of the policy context of a country to include geography, history, economic, demography, culture, politics, and

law, making up seven features of policy context. To the historical element, one could add religion as subsets. In the case of India, author explained that the country's large population was not closely taken into account in implementing a broad base anticorruption program, reason why the program fell short of expected outcomes. In a similar case of Papua New Guinea, Walton (2016) found out that the country's anticorruption measures also fell short of success due to the lack of a strong focus on how the measures addressed the country's policy context. It therefore becomes imperative for NACC to look into the concept of adaptation of strategies to Cameroon's policy context, irrespective of whether the strategies were formulated originally by the agency according to particularistic theories or were copied from other countries based on universalist theories.

A typical example of contextualization of strategies would be the case for the computerization of all government services based on modern information technology to enhance accountability and transparency in the government. This strategy stands a greater chance of not succeeding in Cameroon with the same speed as it would in countries with populations that are advanced in information technology literacy. Therefore, if it were to be introduced, the process should preferably be gradual and monitored closely alongside traditional working procedures so that the system should not crash. Also, computer literacy must be taught in schools beginning at infancy level in preparation for improved services for future generations. Those already in service could be given special training to enable advancement and facilitate change.

If the government indeed concerns itself with public performance, which equally satisfies good governance requirements according to Elahi (2009), these factors of

contextualizing anticorruption strategies would be considered in the process of conceiving and enacting policies that will impact and improve NACC's performance.

Limitations of the Study

In addition to the limitations outlined in chapter 1 of this study, which are inherent to the study itself and tied to its generalizability, my inability to interview the main director of NACC and equally recruit participants from the presidency who oversaw all policies concerning the agency were additional limitations. Serving as critical stakeholders of the organization, their views could have helped provide clearer insights about the conceptual mindset of those who created the agency, explaining the original intent of NACC at creation. This would help understanding the successes and challenges of the agency from a stakeholder viewpoint.

Recommendations for Further Research

Findings of the study revealed that since its creation in 2006, NACC have not succeeded in achieving outstanding results in the fight against corruption in Cameroon. Corruption is still perceived to be on the rise in the country. Feedback from participants indicated that this was not totally the fault of the agency, rather several factors ranging from political to institutional and to conceptual challenges undercut the ability of the agency to curb corruption. Most strategies that the agency implemented as attempts to curb corruption in the country lacked good governance basis. As a result, strategies lacked the impetus to thrive. As such, another study that could focus on determining the importance of an institution like NACC in the fight against corruption in the country might be needed. This could foster or redirect government's choice for this method.

Literature reviewed for this study revealed that in the past two decades, some Central Eastern European countries were able to curb corruption problems by employing some of the techniques and policies that NACC also implemented. I would recommend that a comparative study of systems and anticorruption models be conducted on NACC's case vis-à-vis some of these countries that have recorded plausible successes in this area. Such a study will help NACC and the government of Cameroon identify the deeper features driving success in these models, and how to better design and implement in Cameroon for more successful outcomes.

It is also recommended that a quantitative study be carried to calibrate the understanding of anticorruption appreciation by the population. Chronic corruption usually births a complacent culture in the population especially through systematic behavior. Participants pointed out the example of traffic police officers on the road. These officers collect bribes from motorists instead of issuing tickets for violations of traffic rules. Most often, the plunder is shared with police supervisors at remote offices. If anticorruption strategies must cure this corrupt practice, such strategies must be absorbed by the population transforming the people to act honestly. Feedback from a study that would focus on finding out how much the people understood and were involved in anticorruption practices, would help NACC improve on different methods to foster anticorruption awareness among the population.

The need for contextualization of anticorruption strategies was also identified within the findings as a strategic approach that NACC could employ to adapt strategies learned from elsewhere, especially through interaction with the international community. It would be beneficial for future research and policy making in another study to

determine how NACC's strategies interact with the policy context of Cameroon. For example, determining the relationship between poverty, corruption, and anticorruption. Such contextual studies might result in the discovery of other factors that need to be addressed in order to calibrate strategies to impact the anticorruption struggle.

I further suggest that future researchers wishing to add to NACC and the fight against corruption in Cameroon, take into consideration factors such as access to potential participants and assurance of their security before embarking on related studies, so as to increase the chance of successfully carrying out the studies. Corruption is a highly politicized and security sensitive issue in the country, and public servants at lower levels hesitate to provide information that could implicate their superiors. This is pertinent especially if the researcher cannot guarantee the anonymity of personal identity. Trust building, clarifications, and assurance of the strict academic nature of the research are some of the tactics that the researcher employs to retain the confidence of participants.

The findings of this study shall be disseminated through journal publications, seminars, workshops, presentation at conferences, and at NACC head office. I might further seek to carry out a phenomenological study on the dynamics of the concepts of corruption and anticorruption, to discover and define any specificities in the Cameroonian society. It is also an objective, to have the findings introduced in different curricula on corruption/anticorruption studies across the country in the form of pointers and simple definitions that could be understood even by the youths.

Implications for positive social change

This study has several positive social change implications which I believe will increase the quest and attention paid to good governance by the government. The result would improve systems and institutions, democratic processes of governance, and government services to citizens. An improvement in NACC strategies would lead to effective anticorruption practice and reduced corruption levels in the public service and across the country. Another benefit is the improvement in government revenue, better investment budgets and greater economic activity to alleviate poverty.

To deliver positive social change to the people, NACC would have to work in concert with the government and its other agencies, NGOs in place, and the international community. The concept of good governance is the cord that binds society and the government in a productive synergy. As posited by Elahi (2009) and supported in Graham, Amos, & Plumptre (2003), the control of corruption remains a significant indicator of good governance. As such, to curb corruption, good governance principles must be in play. If a government desires to see levels of corruption reduced in society, but negates transparency and honesty public services, the rule of law, freedom of speech (which means people being empowered to freely denounce corruption), public officers held accountable for bad acts, and building strong institutions in the place of strong individuals, then such a government would be making a serious mistake. This study like others, emphasizes the need for good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa (Agbiboa, 2010; Haruna, 2009; Spears, 2007; Wanasika, Howell, Littrell, & Dorfman, 2010; Plachy, 2009).

Social change generally means the improvement of lives and the wellbeing of people in a place, and it is the utmost intention of public policy to fulfill social change. Improvement in public policy would therefore imply improvement in social change. This study is aimed at assessing public policy that surrounds anticorruption practice in Cameroon, with the hope that policy makers and other stakeholders would consult the findings to better understand how government anticorruption strategies in the country perform, and the areas in which reforms are needed.

This study will also contribute to positive social change in the area of education and training, by recommending that further studies be conducted on the phenomena of corruption and anticorruption in Cameroon, with simple pointers and definitions developed and integrated in educational curricula across the country. If corruption is a habit that is learned by society (Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008; Crittenden, Hanna, & Peterson, 2009; Kingston, 2008; Balafoutas, 2011; Ocheje, 2017), then anticorruption would also be a habit that can be learned by society.

Lastly the study potentially contributes to positive social change in infrastructural development. The recommendations from the findings of the study that government services be computerized could increase the need for government to build new infrastructure, to enhance new information technology systems and hardware that will accommodate the innovation.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to explore government anticorruption strategies in Cameroon as implemented by the government's central anticorruption agency known as the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), and to understand how the said

strategies reflected fundamental good governance principles. Furthermore, this study addressed the policy context of the country as a quest for effectiveness in curbing systematic public corruption in the country.

The study was guided by one overarching question and four sub-questions. The findings of the study added to the NACC anticorruption body of knowledge in the specific areas of good governance and contextualization of policies. Existing studies on anticorruption practice in Cameroon do not explore or focus on NACC as the anticorruption machinery of the government and the idea of good governance principles guiding strategy formulation and implementation, and as well as strategies being adapted to the policy context in place.

Also, most past studies on corruption issues in Cameroon tend to focus on the causes of the problem, hoping that if all the causes are diagnosed properly, solutions could easily be attained. But this study took a different route, which was that of exploring the different solutions that are already out there, to see which ones best addressed the problem that has already been identified. It is like a doctor spending more time to test the efficacy of different drugs developed to cure a particular disease, rather than concentrating only on investigating the different manifestations of the same disease and failing to dedicate time to develop the medication for that disease.

Systemic and public corruption in Cameroon is not a speculative phenomenon, rather it is a reality that's common to the population. It would also take conscious systemic approaches to develop and administer cures to the problem. But the motivation to ignite change within the system must come from the people through some sort of a big-bang intervention as seen in Rothstein's (2007) Big Bang theory of change. I do

subscribe to the author's approach of mustering forces from within to address the system. The people must desire change and engage in the change process. Such desire would then correspond with any government anticorruption effort to bring about positive results. The people make up the government. The same people work in public offices. Therefore, partnership between the government and the civil society becomes a necessity in the anticorruption struggle.

To ensure credibility of the findings of this study, data collected for the study through interviews were triangulated with data from documents collected from NACC online information pool and from other professionals in this discipline who are based physically in the country. During the interviews, I used open-ended questions and gave the participants the opportunity to express themselves on the issues raised by the questions in the interview protocol. All facts and expressions gathered were paraphrased and reported accurately to ensure that the findings reflect the true perceptions of the participants. Not surprisingly, some aspects of the analysis of the study concurred with the findings of other previous studies on the subject. For example, the study revealed that some of the shortcomings of NACC as an anticorruption machine for the country came from institutional and operational weaknesses. On the same note, Nguemegne (2011) in a study on anticorruption in Cameroon, posited that the country's anticorruption system failed because of numerous structural and functional weaknesses in the governance system.

It will be in the best interest of the government and the population at large if NACC looks into these assessments and take further steps to conduct studies on how to develop solutions based on recommendations made in this study, in order to improve

anticorruption strategies. Senior level administration and the entire government system (legislative, executive, and judiciary) should collaborate to make the recommended reforms possible. Anticorruption laws, policies, and processes are connected to all government branches, and the executive alone cannot possibly initiate and lead an anticorruption system that will succeed significantly. In chronic and devastating corruption levels like that of Cameroon, the anticorruption slogan should be “all hands on deck”.

Finally, I do hope and expect that NACC and other governmental authorities and institutions will welcome and embrace the good governance and contextualization bases for formulating and implementing anticorruption policies and strategies as a public policy and administration tool for approaching new policies moving forward. By so doing, anticorruption practice in the country will improve, corruption will reduce, money will be redirected to the right accounts, government will have more to invest thereby creating a thriving economy for more citizens.

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Appendix A: Corruption Perception for Cameroon

Table A1: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): scores and ranking for Cameroon (1995-2017)

YEAR	RANK	SCORE	LAST RANK OF PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES (WORLDWIDE)
1995	-	-	37
1996	-	-	54
1997	-	-	52
1998	85	1.4	85
1999	99	1.5	99
2000	84	2.0	90
2001	84	2.0	91
2002	89	2.2	102
2003	124	1.8	133
2004	129	2.1	145
2005	137	2.2	158
2006	138	2.3	163
2007	138	2.1	179
2008	141	2.3	80
2009	146	2.2	180
2010	146	2.2	178
2011	134	2.5	182
2012	144	26	174
2013	144	25	175
2014	136	27	174
2015	130	27	167
2016	145	26	176
2017	153	25	180

Note. Scores range from 0-10 (from 1995 to 2011) and from 0-100 (from 2012 to 2017), with 10 and 100 being the cleanest from corruption, while 0 is the most corrupt according to respective eras of scoring methods as seen above. Last rank of participating countries indicates the position occupied by the most corrupt country for that year globally, even though more than one participant occupied some of the ranks. (*Source* – Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index (1995-2017)).

Appendix B: Codes Represented in Iterations, Category Label, and Meanings

Figure B1

Iteration Level 1; Surface Content Analysis revealing Initial Codes			
1a Central	2a Bribery	3a Tribalism, Language barrier,	4a Cultural influences
1a Centralized	2a Recruiting	Nepotism, Low salaries, Favoritism	4a Loose government
1a Unique	unqualified	3a Disequilibrium – Victims as	4a Weak structures
1a Established	workers	Fighters	
1a Institutionalized	2a Abuse of	3b Openness to the public	
1a Controlled	authority	3b Patriotism	4b National dimensions
	2b Top	3b Financial propriety	4b Lack of knowledge and skill
1b Displeased	ranking public	3b Service loyalty	4b Weak sensitization instrument
1b Problematic	officials	3b Respect of rule of law	4b Collaborative corruption
1b Disease	perpetrate	3b Collaborative governments	4b Porous recruitment system
1b Sad	bribery	3b Checks and balances	4b Inefficient and ineffective government
1b Adverse consequences	2b Illegal	3c Lack of cordial relationship between government and the public	4b Recurrent nature of corruption
	‘cumulation’ of functions	3c Lack of fairness	
1c Need for cure	2b defiance of the merit system	3c Lack of meritocracy	
1c Need for change		3d Setting good examples at top levels	
1c System failure	2c	3d Severe sanctioning of culprits	
1c Impunity	Imprisonment	3d Purposeful investigation	
	2c Layoffs	3d Salary checks	
1d Insufficient efforts	2c	3d Decentralization	4c Political climate
1dLaxity	Anticorruption campaigns	3d Communication	4c Lack of rigor
1d Controversy on the fight		3e Willingness to change	
1d Leadership		3e System reform	4d International dynamics
		3e Incompetence in government	4d Adaptation of strategies
1e Cultural inertia		3e Corruption of bottom level workers by top level workers	4d Contextualization
1e System centralization			

Figure B2.

Iteration Level 2; Pattern Variables			
1a Central Anticorruption Organ	2a Unqualified workers	3a Barriers	4a Inertia
1b Problematic and Displeasing	2b Legality and meritocracy	3b Elements of Good Governance	4b Impact
1c Change	2c Instruments for combat	3c Hindrances to Good Governance	4c Conceptual and managerial mechanisms
1d Insufficient efforts		3d Establishing the National Anticorruption Strategy	4d External influences
1e Role of leadership		3e Government behavior	

Figure B3.

Iteration Level 3; Application to Data Set	
1. What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon's NACC? Themes: 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e	
2. What can be learned from NACC's past experience of working with anticorruption policies and programs? Themes: 2a, 2b, 2c	
3. What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to implement effective anticorruption policies? Themes: 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e	
4. How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improve the development and implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC? Themes: 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d	

Table B1: Category Labeling of Codes

Category Label Key			
1a Central Anticorruption Organ (CAO)	2a Unqualified workers (UW)	3a Barriers (BR)	4a Inertia (IN)
1b Problematic and Displeasing (PD)	2b Legality and meritocracy (LM)	3b Elements of Good Governance (EGG)	4b Impact (IP)
1c Change (CH)	2c Instruments of combat (IC)	3c Hindrances to Good Governance (HGG)	4c Conceptual and Managerial mechanisms (CMM)
1d Insufficient effort (IE)		3d Establishing National Anticorruption Strategy (ENAS)	4d External influences (EXTL)
1e Role of Leadership (RL)		3e Government behavior (GB)	

Table B2: Central Codes and Meanings

Code	Meaning
Central Anticorruption Organ	NACC as central anticorruption agency for government strategy including institutional and policy strategies
Problematic and Displeasing	Public officials recognize corruption as a severe problem and are not pleased with the situation
Change	The need for a cure to the problem of corruption
Insufficient Effort	Government is not putting in the amount of effort needed to combat and curb corruption
Leadership	Thoughts about what the role of leadership should be in this fight
Inertia	Resistance to change; an attitude of government workers accepting the status-quo of things as the established rule
Unqualified	Civil servants/public officials accessing and occupying offices without respecting proper recruitment measures and the possession of required skills
Legality and Meritocracy	Measures that ensure respect of the rule of law both for access into the civil service and stay in it
Barriers	Hindrances and obstacles to anticorruption efforts
Mechanism	Government organizational and functional machinery of transparency, accountability, and public responsibility, believed to be the right setting in which corruption is curbed
Elements	Constitutive elements of Good Governance (respect of rule of law, financial propriety, openness to public, public-private collaboration, checks and balances, patriotism, morality, collaborative governments,...etc.
Hindrances	Difficulties in establishing and observing principles of good governance for effective anticorruption effort
Government Behavior	How government reacts generally to the pervasive state of corruption in the system
Structure	The institutions in place and the organizational form of government and how they related to the problem of corruption
Impact	The effects (achievements) of NACC in its anticorruption effort

Conceptual	How the government and public service has being conceived administratively and politically, and its relationship to corruption in terms of inhibition and/or habitation
Managerial Issues	Probing technical aspects of NACC as the government's main organ for the combat against corruption
Instruments	Steps and strategies taken and can be taken to combat corruption
Loyalty	Work-consciousness for civil/public servants
Propriety	Proper handling of public finances and other responsibilities
Collaborative Governments	Effective communication and support among different levels and departments of government
International Cooperation	Government collaboration with international partners and organizations on issues of corruption and the fight against it
Victims as Fighters	The prevailing situation whereby those who supposedly should be fighting against corruption in the civil service and government at large, are corrupters themselves
Cultural Influences	The link between the Cameroonian culture and the prevalence of corruption in the system
System Reform	Proposed solutions to the problem of corruption in the government of Cameroon and in the country at large
Tribalism, Language Barrier, Nepotism, Low Salaries, Favoritism	Causes of corruption easily identified, different from those that are latent
Impunity	Government's attitude of not punishing culprits of corruption
Centralization	Explains the concentration of government structures and activities in one specific location – capital city of the country
Disequilibrium	Natural dysfunction of the system, in terms of effort toward the combat of corruption compared to the toll of corruption
Checks and Balances	A governance technique of ensuring transparency, accountability, and public responsibility.
Anticorruption programs and Campaigns	Government's anticorruption sensitization techniques
Incompetency	Civil servants/public officials not being able to do their job properly, due to lack of skills and means
International Influence	Contributions from the international community, either in the fight against corruption, or in its prevalence

Appendix C: Interview Protocol

Assessing Governmental Anticorruption Strategies: The Case of the National
Anticorruption Commission in Cameroon

Date: _____

Time of Interview: _____

Location: _____

Name of Interviewer:
_____Name of Interviewee:
_____Brief Description of Study:

Questions:

1. Please describe what you feel about corruption in Cameroon and the fight against it, especially by the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC)?
2. What are some of the anticorruption strategies and mechanisms you think government employs to combat corruption in Cameroon through NACC?
3. What has been your experience working with NACC on different anticorruption programs and projects for the past years that you have been working with the agency?
4. As a public servant working with the anticorruption commission, what do you think are some of the effective strategies to combat corruption in the context of Cameroon?
5. How effective do you think the government's strategies in combating corruption in the country have been?
6. What are some of the things you think government could do to ensure effective anticorruption practice by NACC?
7. What is your opinion about the role of the international community in the fight against corruption in Cameroon?
8. What are some of the international anticorruption strategies adopted by your agency since you started working with them?
9. What is your experience with working with any imported policy strategies, in terms of effective anticorruption practice and sustainability of positive results?
10. In your opinion, why is Cameroon still ranking poorly on Transparency International's list of countries according to corruption perception index (CPI)

Appendix D: Summative Interview Table

PA#	Category	Status	Source	Saturati- on	Format	Length	Recording	Transcript
P1	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	3 hrs. 12 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 5 pages
P2	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	1 hr. 53 min.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 5 pages
P3	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	1 hr. 44 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 6 pages
P4	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	1 hr. 47 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 5 pages
P5	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	2 hrs. 4 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 6 pages
P6	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	3 hrs. 13 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 7 pages
P7	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	2 hrs. 58 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 9 pages
P8	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	1 hr. 39 mins	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 9 pages
P9	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	1 hr. 15 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 4 pages
P10	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	1 hr. 50 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 5 pages
P11	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	2 hrs. 3 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 6 pages
P12	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	2 hrs. 53 mins	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 5 pages
P13	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	1 hr. 57 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 6 pages
P14	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	1 hr. 6 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 5 pages
P15	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	2 hrs. 50 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 5 pages
P16	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	1 hr. 11 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 5 pages
P17	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	1 hr. 29 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 5 pages
P18	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	1 hr. 14 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 5 pages
P19	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	1 hr. 49 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 5 pages
P20	None	Conducted via Virtual Media	Public Servant at NACC	Yes	Semi-structured interview	2 hrs. 59 mins.	Word Messaging	Transcribed/ 5 pages