The Need for De-escalation Techniques in Civil Disturbances

George Raymond McCord Jr

Walden University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations

Part of the Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons
This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by

George Raymond McCord Jr

has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects, and that any and all revisions required by the review committee have been made.

Review Committee
Dr. Howard Henderson, Committee Chairperson, Criminal Justice Faculty
Dr. Kimberley Blackmon, Committee Member, Criminal Justice Faculty
Dr. Darius Cooper, University Reviewer, Criminal Justice Faculty

Chief Academic Officer
Eric Riedel, Ph.D.

Walden University
2018
Abstract

The Need for De-escalation Techniques in Civil Disturbances

by

George Raymond McCord Jr

MS Saint Leo University, 2014
BS, Capella University, 2012

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Criminal Justice

Walden University
November 2018
Abstract

The response to civil disturbances has historically been the aggressive use of force or escalation with tactics such as the use of police dogs, armed federal troops during war protests, and police field forces. These types of tactics can escalate tensions between protestors and police and only add to the violence and destruction of the incident. To reduce the violence between protestors and the police and the destruction often associated with civil disturbances, it is necessary to examine the need to include de-escalation techniques in the responses. This study utilized 3 theoretical frameworks, the chaos theory, the behavioral decision theory and the strain theory, all which complement each other in interpreting the opinions and experiences of participants and civil disturbance responses. The research questions were used to determine the influence of experience, training, personal biases or external influences on decision making and elicit the opinions of respondents in how they would respond to a civil disturbance. Twenty-five respondents responsible for policy or response decisions regarding civil disturbances from southern U.S. state emergency management and law enforcement agencies took part in the survey. The results of a cross-tabulation analysis determined that there is a need for the inclusion of de-escalation techniques and that they would be effective in civil disturbances. The results also showed that an aggressive response was the preferred method to restoring or maintaining order, but there was a need to examine changes in response tactics. This study may be beneficial and provide a social impact through policy changes, which may lead to a lessening of the severity and scope of an incident.
The Need for De-escalation Techniques in Civil Disturbances

by

George Raymond McCord Jr

MS, Saint Leo University, 2014
BS, Capella University, 2012

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Criminal Justice

Walden University
November 2018
Dedication

I would like to dedicate this work to my wonderful wife Diana, my children Jenna and Ryan, his wife Kelsie and my step-children, Alessondra and her husband Mike, Miles and Samantha, my granddaughters, Riley and Emma and my Mom and Dad who raised me to do my best. Never quit or give up on your dreams and nothing is ever too hard. I wish to especially thank my wife Diana, who has supported and encouraged me over the last four years and put up with my working full-time, the off-duty jobs and the missed occasions where school came first. You have no idea how much your support sustained me through the rough periods of this journey.
Acknowledgments

I need to thank my Committee Chairperson, Dr. Howard Henderson, who never gave up on me and provided me with guidance and encouragement to make it through this process.

I would also like to thank my second committee member, Dr. Kimberley Blackmon, who joined my committee late in this process, to keep my progress on track.

To my “brothers and sisters in arms” on the “Charlie Shift” of the Broward Sheriff’s Office Airport District, Deputies; Christy Zugelter, Rob Wallace, Frankie Torres, Scott Feder, Barry Hutchins, Jeff Fromm, Rodrigo Seminario, Ricky Perez, Danny Delgado, my supervisors Sergeants Matthew Buschman and Michael Graham (Ret.), as well as Captain Roy Liddicott for their leadership, support and help during this process.

I hope that this work will inspire those who are contemplating the return to education, especially in their later years, to reach for that brass ring and complete their education, regardless of age. I wish to take the knowledge that I have learned during my studies to pay back my community, state and nation as an Emergency Manager, in the hopes of reducing pain and suffering during states of emergency by preparation, training and solid policy development in the future.
Table of Contents

List of Tables .................................................................................................................. iv

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study ............................................................................. 1

  Background .................................................................................................................. 1

  Problem Statement ...................................................................................................... 2

  Research Purpose ........................................................................................................ 3

  Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................. 4

  Research Questions and Hypothesis ........................................................................... 5

  Methodology .................................................................................................................. 6

  Significance ................................................................................................................... 7

Chapter 2: Literature Review ......................................................................................... 8

  Introduction .................................................................................................................. 8

  Literature Search Strategy ............................................................................................ 9

  Historical Context ........................................................................................................ 12

  Theoretical Frameworks .............................................................................................. 13

    Chaos Theory ............................................................................................................ 14

    Strain Theory ............................................................................................................ 15

    Behavioral Decision Theory .................................................................................... 16

  Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 17

  Variables ..................................................................................................................... 17

    Independent Variables ............................................................................................. 17

    Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 25
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variables</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap in Previous Research</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Research Method</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem Statement</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Design</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of Measurement</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Population and Sample</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampling Procedures</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumentation</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Questions</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validity</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Results</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Collection</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Results</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Survey Data</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent Demographics</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdictional Characteristics</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Respondent Experience ................................................................. 49

Respondent Opinion ........................................................................ 52

Cross-Tabulation Survey Data .......................................................... 56

Respondent Demographics ................................................................ 57

Jurisdictional Characteristics ............................................................. 59

Respondent Experience ..................................................................... 60

Summary ............................................................................................. 67

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations ..................... 70

Discussion ......................................................................................... 70

Interpretation of Findings ................................................................... 71

Summary ............................................................................................. 73

Limitations of the Study ..................................................................... 76

Recommendations .............................................................................. 78

Implications ......................................................................................... 80

References .......................................................................................... 82

Appendix A: Ethics Position Questionnaire EPQ ..................................... 90

Appendix B: Survey Questions .............................................................. 93
List of Tables

Table 1. Respondent Experience.......................................................... 47
Table 2. Has Your Jurisdiction Experienced A Civil Disturbance And How Would It Be Characterized?.......................................................... 48
Table 3. Does Your Agency Have A Plan Or Policies In Place To Address Civil Disturbances?.......................................................... 49
Table 4. Respondent Participation Experience in Civil Disturbances .......................................................... 50
Table 5. Respondent Planning Experience in Civil Disturbances .......................................................... 51
Table 6. Respondent Decision-Making Criteria in Civil Disturbances .......................................................... 52
Table 7. Should There Be Considerations for External Influencers (social and economic conditions or political activity) in the Response to Civil Disturbances?...................................................... 53
Table 8. In Your Opinion, Do The Current Tactics Used In The Response To Civil Disturbances Need Updating?.......................................................... 54
Table 9. How Effective Do You Think De-Escalation Techniques Would Be If They Were Made A Part Of Response Protocols, To Reduce Or Prevent Violence During A Civil Disturbance?.......................................................... 54
Table 10. Which Would You Consider The Proper Type Of Response To A Civil Disturbance In Either Maintaining Or Returning To Normalcy?.......................... 55
Table 11. Is There a Need for De-Escalation Techniques in Civil Disturbances?............................. 56
Table 12. Type of Response by Discipline and Experience .......................................................... 58
Table 13. Respondent Participation Experience in Civil Disturbances and Response Type .......................................................... 62
Table 14. Respondent Planning Experience in Civil Disturbances and Response Type .. 62
Table 15. Respondent Decision-Making Rationale in Civil Disturbances and Response Type ........................................................................................................... 63
Table 16. Respondent Opinion for Response Type in Civil Disturbances .................. 64
Table 17. Respondent Opinion for Considerations Regarding Social and Economic Conditions or Political Activity ............................................................. 65
Table 18. Respondent Opinion for Updating Response Tactics .................................. 65
Table 19. Respondent Opinion on the Effectiveness of De-Escalation Techniques in Civil Disturbances .............................................................................. 66
Table 20. Respondent Opinion on the Need for De-Escalation Techniques in Civil Disturbances ............................................................................................. 67
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Background

Communities exist and flourish when normalcy is in effect; there is no chaos and no need for intervention by the government. On occasion, protests, civil disturbances, or riots occur, disrupting the normalcy of a community and in some cases plunging it into chaos. Farazmand (2003) suggests that, for the field of emergency management, “unpredictable events” such as riots can lead to disastrous results for organizations (p.339). It is then the duty of a jurisdiction to either maintain normalcy or return it from a state of chaos to one of normalcy as quickly as possible. In doing so, jurisdictions rely on the response of their police forces to maintain that order or return a situation, such as a riot, from a state of chaos to normalcy.

Historical as well as current methods of response to civil disturbances or riots have relied on an aggressive show of force by authorities using armed military troops, police dogs, and riot forces to maintain control or regain normalcy. The response of the police may also contribute to whether chaos is avoided, and normalcy is maintained. Myers-Montgomery (2016) suggested that the militaristic appearance of law enforcement in response to a civil disturbance is a factor contributing to escalations in a riot. Newburn (2016) examined three areas of why riots do not occur: Katz’s (2008, 2012) explanation of the social mobility of minorities, Naegler’s (2014) examination of tension reduction between police and minorities, and Myers’s (2000) examination of why riots spread but did not describe any actions or techniques related to establishing de-escalation policies. Variables underlying political, economic, or social conditions of communities, such as
strength (the number of officers versus the number of protestors), the type of protest requested, and a historical record of the groups protesting, could be applied to de-escalation strategies.

It is then logical to suggest that if one wishes to maintain normalcy, then the reduction of tactics (de-escalation) would be desired, versus the increase in tactics (escalation), which may only exacerbate underlying tensions, leading to the creation of chaos, which in this case would be a riot. It can be argued that decision-making is an important element of and contributing factor to, why some peaceful and lawful protests, turn violent and in some cases into riots. Poor decision-making and the reliance on previous tactics or methods of crowd control only add to the amount of escalation. Simonson and Staw (1992) stated “little attention has yet been given to procedures that might help people avoid the escalation trap” (p. 419). If the same old tactics of escalation are considered detrimental to the overall mission of response to a civil disturbance, it is rational to consider de-escalation techniques in these situations.

**Problem Statement**

Historically, responses to civil disturbances or riots have been characterized by aggressive shows and uses of force (i.e., escalation). Since the 1960s, tactics such as the use of police dogs in Birmingham, AL, in 1963 (Maurantino, 2014), armed federal troops during war protests at Kent State University in 1970 (Steidl, 2013) and police field forces, have been utilized to restore order and achieve normalcy in the community (Miller, 2001). The individuals who decide the responses to civil disturbances as a general rule, should always seek ways to de-escalate rather than have a confrontation
between rioters and police. The problem of escalating an event versus de-escalating and avoiding destruction and disruption within the community, is one that can be appreciated across our country and by others around the world. The deployment of resources in response to a civil disturbance is actually an escalation of the situation by the government. Simonson and Staw (1992) suggested that the study of de-escalation techniques could provide a basis for emergency managers from the escalation of situations and the over commitment of resources.

Therefore, the problem is that, although researchers know that current responses by the government towards civil disturbances are considered escalation, it has not been determined whether there a need for de-escalation techniques to be incorporated into policies and response protocols. The study will contribute to the knowledge in this field by addressing whether there is a need to include de-escalation techniques into the responses to civil disturbances or riots. The social benefit of this research is that policymakers can use the findings to inform policy changes which could lessen the severity and scope of an incident.

**Research Purpose**

The purpose of this research is to bridge the gap in literature and explore aspects of de-escalation techniques and whether there is a need to incorporate such techniques into response policies as tactics that could be used to reduce the violence between protestors and the police and the destruction often associated with riots. The goal of law enforcement and the emergency managers who design policy in this area is to maintain
normalcy or return to normalcy from a state of chaos, which is the basis of the chaos theory (Farazmand, 2003).

**Theoretical Framework**

The chaos theory was “founded on the mathematics of nonlinear systems” (Kiel & Elliot, 1996, p. 2). In comparing linear and nonlinear systems in the context of a civil disturbance, a scenario occurs where the police confront a protest and deploy a group of officers to engage the protestors, who then heed warnings and directions from police and conform to those requests being made. This is an example of a linear system where the police expect and get a definitive response, one that they expected. The nonlinear system example, or the unexpected, would be to take in all other possibilities, including nonconformity to lawful requests, the infusion of violence and criminal activity, or an unnecessary need to escalate the situation. With the possibility of chaos erupting from normalcy, or a peaceful event turning violent, there must be an examination of the response and if there was escalation by the government whether intentional or not.

The behavioral decision theory (BDT) as described by Morton and Fasolo (2009) is the method by which people decide a course of action and the biases which influence them. BDT is important in showing that certain methods, which may be tried and true, may no longer be acceptable or practical, such as the continued escalation of an incident versus the consideration of de-escalation techniques. Riots and violent civil disturbances throughout American history have started from small benign incidents or protests and have escalated, mostly because of the responses by police based in what could be considered poor decision-making.
Regardless of the technique used by emergency managers, police chiefs, or politicians, the response to civil disturbances are as Costello (2015) stated, “one of those impossible jobs”. The impossible job framework was first proposed by Glidewell and Hargrove (1990) as a public administration theory, as a mechanism to categorize impossible jobs. Costello (2015) also offered the opinion that tasks within a civil disturbance may be difficult but not impossible. These tasks or committing to courses of action, may result in the escalation of a situation instead of the desired results of diffusion. Jurisdictions, specifically decision-makers, who do not commit to a course of action in the end, may result in a losing proposition, that is, escalating versus de-escalating.

**Research Questions and Hypothesis**

In this study, I examined the premise that current responses by government officials are no longer practical when applied to civil disturbances or riots and that the need for de-escalation techniques or methods exist. I also examined whether decision makers are considering underlying political, economic or social conditions of communities affected by civil disturbances and whether the consideration of those conditions affect which type of response to an incident is made. The research questions (RQs) for this study were as follows:

RQ1. Would the lack of experience versus actual experience influence the type of response action taken?

RQ2. Would training, policies, biases or external stimuli, influence the type of response action taken?
RQ3. Would the influences of politics, economic or social conditions contribute to the decision-making factors such as to respond passively or aggressively?

RQ4. Would the inclusion techniques such as de-escalation contribute positively in maintaining order in a community?

The null hypothesis for each is that no such positive relationship exists.

**Methodology**

Using a quantitative method, I conducted this study by surveying law enforcement and emergency management professionals, including policy group members responsible for policy decisions, as well as officers and mid-level supervisors who may be tasked with carrying out those policies. The chaos, behavioral decision, and strain theories served as a basis to elicit responses to identify if there is a need for de-escalation techniques in response to civil disturbances. Because the aim of the research was only to identify the need for de-escalation versus actual techniques, the quantitative method was best suited for compiling data for evaluation. I conducted a survey of professional law enforcement and emergency management officials through the use of a self-administered questionnaire through the internet survey collection service, *Survey Monkey* (https://www.surveymonkey.com).

The research was conducted throughout the South Florida law enforcement and emergency management population. I chose this sample population due to a long history of riots from the 1960s through the 1980s and civil disturbances in the 1990s and in 2003. The benefit of utilizing this population sampling was that it had a strong pool of participants with extensive experience. Using South Florida and its history of civil
disturbances allows for the replication of the research, if needed, in the future in another community with a similar history to that of South Florida. The research method will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

**Significance**

Civil protests can occur peacefully or may turn violent, resulting in injuries, deaths, and the destruction of communities. In this research, my goal was to identify whether there is a need to implement ideas, techniques, and strategies that can be adopted by a jurisdiction to preempt the possibility of violence from escalating from a peaceful protest to a full-scale riot. The gathering of data from surveys completed by the respondents will have quantifiable data to analyze and interpret. The results of this study could lead to the establishment of new policy directives.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

Throughout the history of the United States, civil disturbances have occurred because of protests to wars, social inequalities and confrontations with police. The conventional methods of responding to such incidents in past decades, have involved the use of aggressive and violent means to restore order. These methods included the use of escalation methods such as deploying federal troops (Steidl, 2013), police field forces (Miller, 2001), militaristic looking equipment (Meyers-Montgomery, 2016) and tactics and police K-9 dogs (Maurantionio, 2014). De-escalation techniques are relatively new ideas being proposed in law enforcement to reduce violent confrontations and uses of force, but none have been applied to civil disturbances. De-escalation techniques are the nonphysical methods of dealing with violent or aggressive behaviors. These de-escalation techniques have been utilized in the mental health field (Price, Baker, Bee, & Lovel, 2015) and for developing use-of-force policies in law enforcement (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2017), but not in civil disturbances or riots. De-escalation techniques with the mentally ill include verbal and nonphysical methods to replace, when possible, the use of physical restraints, which have led to patient deaths from positional asphyxia (Price et al., 2015). Law enforcement agencies across the country must also confront situations involving violent and aggressive persons and are turning more and more to de-escalation techniques to reduce use of force in resolving those incidents until additional resources or options are available (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2017). What is not known is how de-escalation
techniques can be applied to civil disturbances. The basic premise of this study is based on the idea that current responses by government officials are no longer practical when applied to civil disturbances or riots and whether de-escalation techniques or methods are needed.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify gaps in the research, through applicable theoretical framework(s), and review the previous research and methodological approaches to determine whether there is a need to include de-escalation techniques into the responses to civil disturbances or riots.

**Literature Search Strategy**

For this study, I reviewed literature from 2011 through 2017 on the chaos theory, the BDM, de-escalation, and escalation, with the inclusion of seminal works from outside the stated time frame. The strategy used for this literature review included simultaneous searches of numerous databases, using the Walden University Thoreau search tool to identify the relevant literature throughout numerous databases. The following keywords were used: *de-escalation and strategies, emergency management, incident command systems, chaos theory, transformational theory, nonlinear dynamics and chaos, Behavioral Decision Theory (BDT), choice under uncertainty, escalation, evaluation, public administration analysis*, and strain theory.

Research on the dependent variables, which are the response types to the actual civil disturbance, was evaluated to define the construct used for measurement purposes. The dependent variables, which are aggressive and non-aggressive responses, were evaluated to determine the requirements needed to define the construct for measurement based on their application in a civil disturbance and how they could change an event, with respect to the chaos theory’s premise of maintaining normalcy or returning to a state of normalcy.

The independent variables in this study, the influences on the process for deciding whether to use an escalated or de-escalated response, were examined to define the construct for measurement purposes. Several independent variables, the underlying political, economic or social conditions, the influencers of what may be the cause of riots, were examined to measure if they affect the decision-making process of emergency managers, as to what type of response will be deployed to the civil disturbance.

In the first section, I will discuss the historical background of civil disturbances and their responses. The historical background literature is based on the research of Simonson and Staw (1992), Miller (2001), Steidl (2013), Maurantonio (2014), and Meyers-Montgomery (2016).

The second section of this literature review will include a discussion of the theoretical framework, based on the chaos theory, along with contributing frameworks,
the strain theory and the BDT. The chaos theory is being tested to determine if the
dependent variables are influenced by the independent variables, causing the chaos theory
to be affected in not maintaining or returning to a state of normalcy.

In the third section of this literature review, I will discuss the different
independent and dependent variables involved. The independent variables examined will
provide data regarding the political, economic, or social conditions of communities to
define the construct of this study. This political construct definition is based on the
research of Hahn (1970); Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon (2010); White (2013);
McHugh (2015); Baltimore City Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #3 (2015); the
Department of Justice (2015); Meyers-Montgomery (2016); and Pritchard and Pakes
(2016). The economic construct definition is based on the research of the Kerner
Commission (1968); Spilerman (1970); Scacco (2010); Morrell, Scott, McNeish, and
Webster (2011); and Simpkin and Sapsed (2012). The construct of social issues is based
on research by Merton (1967), Corwin, (1993), Olzak and Shanahan, (1996), DiPasqualea
and Glaeser (1998), Marker (2004), the U.S. Department of Justice (2015), and Brown
(2017). The dependent variables of aggressive (escalation) and nonaggressive responses
(de-escalation) provide data defining the construct of the study. The aggressive
(escalation) construct is based on the research of Curseu, Schriijer, and Fodor (2016) and
Simonson and Staw (1992). The nonaggressive (de-escalation) construct is based on the
research of Kesic, Thomas, and Ogloff (2013) and Price et al. (2015).
The last section of this chapter will identify the specific gaps in the literature, specifically the need or not, for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances from the results of the literature review, which supports the need for this research study.

**Historical Context**

Civil disturbances historically, have prompted aggressive uses of force and tactics by authorities in order to regain order where riots or civil unrest were occurring. This included the use of the federalized military troops as seen at Kent State University in 1970 during anti-war protests (Steidl, 2013), the use of police dogs in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963 (Maurantonio, 2014) and police field forces to restore order (Miller, 2001). The use of these tactics has been the same from time of the civil rights protests of the late 1950s, to the antiwar protests of the 1960s, to the current antipolice protests that started in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland in 2014-2015.

Each of the previous examples began as peaceful or nonviolent civil protests or everyday encounters between citizens and the police, which then turned violent and, in some cases, deadly. In examining whether de-escalation techniques are necessary, there must be an examination of the response polices to civil disturbances and ask whether it is necessary for the police to deploy or respond to each protest or act of civil disobedience.

Simonson and Staw (1992) suggested that reductions in the underlying tensions in a situation are made could de-escalate those situations, which may be applicable to events such as a peaceful protest turning violent. Sources of tensions could include the mere presence of the police or a response force or the manner in which they are dressed or equipped (Meyers-Montgomery (2016). Considering that the unnecessary commitment of
resources, which is a standard course of action, may simply be an escalation factor which is the catalyst that leads to the violence often seen in civil disturbances.

Meyers-Montgomery (2016) stated that most blame for the loss of life in civil disturbances, especially those which occur without permits, is the militarization of the police. The police have changed the tactics of using police dogs, batons, and water cannons and replaced them with armored vehicles, rifles, and new technology, such as long-range acoustic crowd dispersal devices. While the point made by Meyers-Montgomery is a tactical one, one de-escalation technique would be to include BDT thus reducing the need for the deployment of resources or escalation of an event in the first place.

**Theoretical Frameworks**

The chaos theory is the theoretical framework that will be used to reinforce this study. The chaos theory is being utilized as the primary framework because the current responses by the government towards civil disturbances are to maintain a state of normalcy or to return to normalcy from chaos and it is the goal of this research to determine if there a need for de-escalation techniques to be incorporated into policies and response protocols. There are two additional theories, the Strain Theory and the BDT which will be utilized to help explain how the independent and dependent variables influence one another. It is important to consider all frameworks as contributing factors to determining the need for de-escalation techniques for the following reasons.

The chaos theory will examine the non-linear aspects of the civil disturbance, that is, what course the event may take versus what is expected by planners and decision
makers. When an event does not progress or evolve as planned, the “linear progression” changes and decisions must be made to keep it from devolving into chaos and trying to maintain normalcy as proposed by Farazmand (2003). The strain theory will be utilized to try and identify underlying political, economic or social conditions, which may be influences as to why riots occur. The BDT, will incorporate the concepts of whether the current standardized and often used response techniques, are no longer valid and if there is now a need to evaluate policies with respect to civil disturbances. Historically, the decision process in the type of response to a civil disturbance has been based on an aggressive use of field forces.

**Chaos Theory**

The chaos theory was developed by Dr. Edward Norton Lorenz in 1963 (Lorenz, 1963) through the experimentation of weather forecasting. Krishnamurthy (2015) states that the theory developed by Lorenz at its essence, is the growth in differences by two separate states, however small, to the larger differences of the two random states. As the theory was developed for weather forecasting, it was based on the inaccuracy of weather predictions over the long-term. The theory became known as the “butterfly effect” with the premise of “does the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil set off a tornado in Texas?” (Krishnamurthy, 2015). This premise is applicable to this research in that small or benign incidents can grow exponentially into a large and unmanageable civil disturbance or riot as the result of a ripple effect, like the analogy of the butterfly wings.

Murphy (1996) suggests that chaos is not random in its development but is the result of systems which do not evolve in a linear fashion or as predicted. Civil
disturbances or riots when examined in their entirety, do have distinctive patterns and structures, but it is not realistic to forecast what may or could happen based on past events either from the same incident or a previous one. Farazmand (2003) in examining the relationships of systems or their segments, suggests that it is important to know why opposing systems or segments change, become unstable and from a new order or stability. The primary focus of any emergency management official is to try and prevent chaos by maintaining a normalcy in the community or returning it from chaos, as quickly as possible. Chaos in the form of a civil disturbance or riot, is a social phenomenon that may be planned for, but is unpredictable and to maintain normalcy in the community, its destructive effects must be controlled.

**Strain Theory**

Merton (1967) hypothesizes in Marker (2004) that individuals who engage in aberrant behavior or activities when structural barriers exist preventing the attainment of goals desired by most in society. Strain theory assumes that members of society adhere to societal values to achieve cultural goals. Additionally, strain theory assumes that socially disadvantaged individuals cannot achieve cultural goals legitimately resulting in the individual abandoning their personal standards and values. Because of the inability of the individual to attain their goals, the possibility of illegal behaviors can manifest themselves as a response to those failures (p. 12).

Marker (2004) suggests that violent action (e.g., rioting) are the result of the breakdown of changing cultural norms when social structures impede an individual from
achieving societal goals (p. 12). The impediments to social achievement by an individual include education, political stature and financial independence.

The strain theory is relevant to this research specifically with respect to the independent variables discussed later in this chapter. The independent variables align in examining the historical look at the underlying political, economic or social conditions of communities who have experienced riots.

**Behavioral Decision Theory**

Experiences have shown that not all decision makers make the correct decisions in times of crisis and sometimes repeat their mistakes which compounds the complexity of the response to an incident. During these crisis events, the decision-making structure may only include a single issue or may be more complex and consist of “multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA)” (Morton & Fasolo, 2009, p.1). During civil disturbances or riots there are often, times of critical decision-making, involving numerous factors which may or may not be related, but none the less, must be dealt with simultaneously.

Morton & Fasolo (2009) suggest that the BDT be utilized for the following reasons. The first is to understand the thought process of those making decisions without assistance and the second is to identify biases which may affect those decisions. The MCDA process consists of structuring, assessing values, weighting criteria and sensitivity analysis. Structuring represents the decision makers goals and objectives during an incident and is important to consider as a part of the de-escalation process. The assessment of values during an incident is important in determining if the course of action to be taken is for example a good one tactically. As an example, would the deployment of
riot control forces exacerbate the situation in a negative way or will the results be a positive result.

**Conclusion**

The theories examined for this research all have contributory aspects into the way responses to civil disturbances are conducted, along with factors which affect the decision-making processes of those responses. The public, those who watch these civil disturbances today, do so from a 24-hour news perspective based on innuendo and non-factual information from reporters and residents who are not privy to the influences of the decision-making process. As such, the time-tested responses to civil disturbances, large field police field forces, less-lethal weapons and militaristic looking equipment, are interpreted by the public as being too harsh or heavy-handed and do not consider the underlying political, economic or social conditions of communities, when trying to maintain or restore order according to the chaos theory. The literature provides ample information regarding the chaos theory and the basis upon which incidents may or may not follow a linear progression, as well as the factors involved in decision-making, but there is a gap in the information regarding de-escalation and its applicability to civil disturbances.

**Variables**

**Independent Variables**

Creswell (2013) defines an independent variable “as those that (probably) cause, influence or affect outcomes” (p. 50). The independent variables to be considered will include a historical look at the underlying political, economic or social conditions of
communities who have experienced riots. These independent variables while not complete in totality, may provide enough rationale as to how civil disturbances devolve from peaceful protests into riots and if the decisions to use either an escalation or de-escalation are influenced by them.

**Political activity.** Politics in America as with most other countries is based upon power and trying to maintain stability or attempting to make changes incrementally or by large power grabs. The structure of the United States’ Constitution guarantees the right of free speech and assembly (within lawful means). As a result, the United States embraces what Dalton et al. (2010) describe as an open “Political Opportunity Structure” (POS), which encourages political activity and protest.

Examples of the POS encouraging political activity and protest became evident during “the Baltimore Riots of 2015” where the Mayor, Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, said her city government “gave those who wished to destroy space to do that,” (McHugh, 2015). In addition, according to the Baltimore City Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #3 After-Action-Report (2015), orders were issued by Police Commissioner, “the Baltimore Police Department would not respond until they [the protestors] burned, looted, and destroyed the city so that it would show that the rioters were forcing our hand.”

In an article by Hahn (1970) conducted in the aftermath of the turbulent decade of the 1960s in which many American cities experienced riots from within their African-American communities, he examined why some incidents provoke outbreaks of violence while others do not. Hahn suggested that while violence may occur in some communities and not in others, may be the inability of those local political structures to resolve issues
on the local level. It is this inability to resolve issues that contributes to the end result, violence in the community. In the same research article in aftermath of the 1967 Detroit riots, Hahn surveyed residents of that city who responded by a total of sixty-three percent, that the threat of violence had significant influence on politicians to respond to the needs of the African-American community (p. 102).

Political correctness must also now be considered when responding to a protest or civil disturbance. The Ferguson, Missouri riots of 2014, which grew from protests against police, in which a black man was killed by a white police officer. The Department of Justice in their After-Action-Report (2015) found that police response measures to the riots were in some cases, improper. In the report, findings were made in which the “optic” of canine units were thought to stir emotions because of racial tensions in those observing the protests and those actually protesting. The “militarization” of the police also was found to be inappropriate because this too, inflamed tensions and created a fear within the protestors. The need to curtail the response actions of police by politicians is consistent with POS in allowing protests.

The motivations of crowds may be the driving force of whether a peaceful protest devolves into a riot or if the crowd provides the “spark” which leads to a loss of control of an event by authorities. In a study by White (2013) crowd types (peaceful, purposeful, or hostile crowds) were examined to isolate violence in crowd behaviors, by observing different types of public events. Observable variables were introduced to try and understand if crowds become violent because of the individual or if the individual is changed by the crowd. White’s research determined that the “crowd” is a very dangerous
entity. Individuals may no longer maintain independence but instead, become the mob, which may have its own motivations and outcomes beyond the control of the individual. The type of crowd present during a peaceful protest or one that evolves into the driving force of a riot may contribute to the decision-making process of emergency managers in whether to use escalation or de-escalation measures.

Meyers-Montgomery (2016) suggested that there is a link between the “militarized” response of police to “unpermitted protests” and an aggressive mindset. Meyers-Montgomery stated that unpermitted protests are a challenge of police authority and control and because of this, police leadership encourages a militaristic response which involves the use of specialized weapons and tactics. Meyers-Montgomery suggests that “unpermitted” protestors have a right to peacefully assemble and that it is the presence of militarized police which is the trigger point or spark that creates the riot situation. Meyers-Montgomery suggests that police intervention in “unpermitted protests” is a social problem where citizens cannot express their “social dissent”. If Meyers-Montgomery is to be considered correct and the mere presence of police is the trigger point of many riots, the deployment of riot control resources would fall within the de-escalation decisions that should be considered by policy officials. The author suggests that the more militaristic looking a police force is in response to an event, the greater the propensity for civil rights violations and police brutality.

Economic conditions. Economic conditions contribute to civil disturbances as an underlying factor in justifying protests and the actions of protestors. The mass migration of African-Americans from the south to the large northern cities after World War II as an
example, has contributed to overcrowded cities with increasing poverty and a lack of jobs for its residents. The literature which has been examined is consistent in the fact the riots of the 1960s and to the present day are exacerbated by the individual, who is lacking in wealth or opportunity and a perpetual feeling of hopelessness.

On July 28, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson established the Kerner Commission after violent riots in numerous cities across America in that summer of 1967, most prominently in Newark, New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan. The commission examined; what happened, why and how could they be prevented in the future. In examining the “why” of the report, several areas were examined, unemployment, family structure, social disorganization and living conditions within the African-American community (Kerner Commission, 1968). The Kerner Commission report was conducted by interviewing the participants of the numerous riots it was investigating. The commission described the rioter as an African-American male, 15-24 years of age, with limited education (some high school), making low wages in menial or low-skilled jobs that may not be steady (not full-time and subject to layoffs) and felt a sense of despair due to the lack of opportunity from a discriminatory employer (p. 75).

Spilerman (1970) examined 341 separate riot events from 1961 to 1968 in the African-American communities across the country to account for disorder-proneness. The variables examined included a lack of social integration, exclusion from the political process and the sense of desperation in achieving goals. Promises from the federal government to improve the African-American community’s economic conditions have been met by indecision, failed initiatives and betrayal only add to their despair (p. 646).
Spilerman concluded that the propensity for violence was not attributed to the community, but to the individual, suggesting the larger the population the greater the likelihood of disorder (p. 645).

Scacco (2010) examined riots in Nigeria and makes the argument that poverty increases the potential for individuals to participate in riots if they are with others of similar standing. It is suggested that an individual poverty and social networks increase the probability of his/her participation once a riot occurs due to their socially vulnerable status.

Morrell et al. (2011) in a report prepared for the Cabinet Office in Great Britain examined the 2011 riots in that country. Like their counterparts in the United States, the rioters across Great Britain blamed their involvement on economic and societal issues. Rioters explained that looting was due to a lack of income, job opportunities which added to a feeling of despair and the lack of belonging to society.

Simpkin and Sapsed (2012) also examined why the English riots of 2011 occurred and that commonalties between the many areas which experienced those events. Among the variables that they examined included crime, unemployment and education and were defined as predictors. Simpkin and Sapsed (2012) research also considered the opportunistic criminals in riots but provided a “liberal” view of riot causes due to socio-economic reasons, such as low standards of living, high unemployment, the disillusionment of young people.

**Social issues.** Social issues in relationship to civil disturbances are often long simmering systemic issues such as race relations, mistreatment of African-Americans by
law enforcement and feelings of hopelessness in African-American communities. Olzak and Shanahan (1996) suggest that deprivation in the African-American community is not found in a growing black underclass but one of competition from local demographics and unemployment which contributes to riots.

Brown (2017) compares the social conditions in the aftermath of the Watts (Los Angeles, California) Riots of 1965 and the Ferguson, Missouri riots of 2014. In each event, a violent encounter with law enforcement is suggested as the trigger point for the subsequent rioting. Brown states that even though each event is fifty years apart, the same social conditions still exist. Brown references *The Clark Report* (1965) in describing conditions after the Watts Riot as hopeless and one of despair among the Los Angeles African-American community resulting from unemployment, poor education, and hostile police-community relations.

In the examination of the Ferguson Riot of 2014, Brown describes the social conditions in the leadup to the shooting of an African-American man by a white police officer. In the immediate aftermath of the shooting, residents began to violently protest and loot local stores, but order was quickly restored by a strong law enforcement presence. Several months after the initial shooting event, a Grand Jury failed to indict the police officer involved based on the evidence in the case, but residents saw this as just another example of law enforcement violence against African-Americans. As a result, a full-blown riot including looting, arson and shootings erupted in Ferguson. Because of the allegations of oppression of the Ferguson African-American community by the
Ferguson Police Department, the United States Department of Justice found that a pattern of constitutional violations (Brown, 2017).

In the intervening years between the Watts Riot of 1965 and the Ferguson Riot of 2014, the United States did not go without rioting. The 1980s were exemplified by Miami, Florida which experienced three riots and in 1992, Los Angeles was once again in the spotlight with the Rodney King Riots.

In the 1980s, Miami experienced numerous riots after incidents involving police officers and African-Americans. In 1980, the McDuffie Riots, occurred after an African-American motorist Arthur McDuffie, died after being beaten by police for a traffic violation. In 1982, an African-American man was killed by a Miami Police Officer in an arcade after being stopped for suspected drug possession. In 1989, a Miami Police Officer shot an African-American man who was fleeing from police on a motorcycle. These events acted as “triggers” for underlying social issues such as race relations, unemployment and immigration in Miami, which exploded into riots. Two factors which are related with respect to Miami are unemployment and the influx of Cuban and Haitian immigrants into the community, which many African-American consider as a major reason for unemployment. The lack of commitment to the African-American community after the 1980 McDuffie Riot was shown by local officials after monies which were promised to the community’s redevelopment, were spent on projects outside the neighborhoods affected by the rioting. These and other factors contribute to a pessimism in the Miami African-American community that there is no hope of success (Corwin, 1993).
The City of Los Angeles experienced more rioting in 1992 after the acquittal of white police officers in the beating of Rodney King which became known as the Rodney King Riots. DiPasquale & Glaeser (1998) examined the 1992 Los Angeles Riots for the variables of unemployment, poverty and social responsibilities. The authors found that most rioters in the 1992 Los Angeles Riots were African-American, between the ages of 16 to 30, and an unemployment rate of twenty-five percent (p. 70). Poverty rates in Los Angeles were found to be lower versus other urban areas across the nation. Lastly, the authors found that a large percentage of households in the African-American community of South Central, Los Angeles, over thirty-five percent, were headed by a female, which was higher than other urban areas across the nation (p. 73). South Central Los Angeles also experienced a shift in population demographics with whites moving out and being replaced with Hispanics and Asians which is similar to Miami’s influx of Cubans and Caribbean immigrants (p. 73).

**Conclusion**

Politics or political activity for better or worse is intertwined in everything that we do as a society, from political power grabs, to political correctness and social justice. The literature describes the concept of Political Opportunity Structure (POS) which encourages political activity and protest. The literature examined historical riots of 1967 in Detroit, Michigan where residents used the simple threat of violence in pressuring politicians to respond to the needs of the African-American community. The tactics used by police have also been called into question in how a response to a riot is executed. Anti-police rioters have suggested that the police have become too militaristic in their
appearance, tactics and weaponry that they use. The after-action report of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) to the Ferguson, Missouri riots of 2014, found that the police “militaristic look” and use of canine units, when examined through the lens of race, raised tensions between the community and the police (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2015) (United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 2015). Meyers-Montgomery (2016) suggests similar points of contention as that of the DOJ report on the Ferguson, Missouri riots of 2014. The author suggests that the more aggressive the response of police, the more likelihood that civil rights violations and police brutality will occur. POS and its openness may be the perfect avenue of some jurisdictions set on social change, as Hahn (1970) suggested, to address issues locally, which in choosing a de-escalation avenue, allow a riot to go unchallenged to further that social change.

In examining the many reasons for the causes of riots, there are similar if not universal reasons that can be associated with them. In examining the literature of the last half century, researchers have consistently linked the variables associated with low income, unemployment and a feeling of despair as “reasons” for rioting. The literature contained a cross-section of examples from countries in three different continents, all with similar types of causation associated with how riots may have started. While opportunistic individuals are present in many of the different riot locations, the causation for why riots started returns to the socioeconomic levels in each community which experienced a riot, as a way of excusing the behavior.
In the “Political Opportunity Structure” (POS) described by Dalton et al. (2010) political activity and protest is encouraged. The question must be asked of decision makers, would a de-escalation decision be made to not engage protestors, thus allowing protests, similar to what Piven and Cloward (2011) proposed in their strategy to effect social changes, such as collapsing the federal welfare system, forcing all persons to be paid a guaranteed annual income.

The literature provides a constant theme of despair for the African-American community and the ability of those to fulfill any dreams and aspirations they may have. Frustrations build to explosive situations and are “triggered” by events which bring these feelings to the forefront via the violent means of rioting.

**Dependent Variables**

Dependent variables are defined by Creswell (2013) “as those variables which are dependent upon independent variable for influences and outcomes” (p. 50). The dependent variables that will be utilized in this study will include the types of responses, aggressive (escalation) or non-aggressive (de-escalation) to civil disturbances. The type of decision made by emergency managers, may make the difference in an incident such as civil protest turning into a riot or maintaining the normalcy of a community. Law enforcement is allowed, although it may be varied by jurisdiction, to use force to either maintain the peace (normalcy) of a community or return it from a state of chaos. It is the decisions of whether to use non-aggressive actions to deescalate the situation or continue the standard aggressive escalation responses currently in use.
De-escalation. The use of force by law enforcement is legally authorized as a measure of enforcing lawful orders to either maintain or restore order (Price et al., 2015), while de-escalation is the use of nonphysical methods to manage violence or aggression in a person (Kesic, et al., 2013). De-escalation is defined by the Meriam-Webster dictionary (2017); “to decrease in extent, volume, or scope”. Simonson and Staw (1992) define de-escalation as the lessening of the “variables or forces that have been shown previously to underlie escalation tendencies” (p.1). In the mental health field, de-escalation techniques are utilized as non-physical methods of dealing with a violent or aggressive patient (Price et al., 2015).

Escalation. Escalation from a project management point of view, is described by Curseu et al. (2016) as an Escalation of Commitment (EOC), that is, an over investment in one’s resources. This is applicable in understanding the theory of this research and determining if de-escalation is needed in civil disturbances because of an un-needed deployment of resources, to what may be a peaceful protest, to only have it escalate as Simonson and Staw (1992) suggested. Meyers-Montgomery (2016) defines escalation as the “militarization” of the law enforcement response “by masked and heavily armed police officers” (p.1).

Newburn (2015) in a comparison of cities in Great Britain utilizes the “flashpoint model” to examine “why riots don’t happen” in some cities and not in others. The flashpoint model examines the role of police and their tactics and how this can affect a crowd’s motivations, to either behave responsibly or erupt in violence, in accordance with the chaos theory. The response by law enforcement to disturbances which may have
not yet escalated into a full-blown civil disturbance or riot, is also a critical factor which are determined by the dependent variables of escalation or de-escalation. As described by Miller (2001) the decision to escalate or de-escalate have resulted in major incidents such as the “Watts Riots” which occurred in the summer of 1965 in Los Angeles, California. After a minor arrest confrontation between bystanders and members of the California Highway Patrol (CHP), a bystander spat on one of the CHP officers, which resulted in the decision to escalate by the officers, by wading into the crowd and arresting the offenders. The alternative decision involving de-escalation would have been to ignore the incident and simply withdraw and avoid the confrontation. This escalation decision caused the incident to explode into one of the worst riots in American history, resulting in thirty-four deaths, over one-thousand people being injured and damages in excess of forty million dollars

Based on the premise of the chaos theory and the expected linear progression of an incident, the results of the decision process and the selection of escalation or de-escalation methods will determine if chaos emerges or normalcy is maintained.

**Conclusion**

The study utilizes three independent variables, to examine underlying causes of a disturbance and two dependent variables, aggressive (escalation) or non-aggressive (de-escalation) to determine responses. The literature has shown that civil disturbances begin as small benign events which grow into larger more complex disturbances or riots, because of the decisions to use aggressive rather than non-aggressive methods. De-escalation exists in the fields of psychology and the treatment of the mentally ill and
verbal techniques to control aggressive persons. Escalation methods are being examined in the context of not “over committing” to a situation, adjusting responses by law enforcement through not deploying forces to relieve underlying tensions and by demilitarizing response forces. Decisions which are made using the de-escalation and escalation will be important to how the status of a civil disturbance evolves in accordance with chaos theory.

**Gap in Previous Research**

In researching the current literature into de-escalation techniques several examples exist for treating the mentally ill, the use of force by police and verbal de-escalation measures were found, but none which were applicable to civil disturbances. A research project regarding de-escalation methods comes from the medical community and was targeted at the treatment of the mentally ill, but only those involving verbal methods (Kesic, Thomas, & Ogloff, 2013). In a survey conducted by Mills and Ivacko (2016) for the University of Michigan’s Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, civil disturbances that resulted from an act of excessive force by a local law enforcement officer were examined, but there was no correlation with the need for de-escalation techniques in responding to them. As previously mentioned, Simonson and Staw (1992) suggested that de-escalation could be accomplished by simply relieving escalation forces, for research of an economic or logistical context, but once again there was no direct correlation to the whether such techniques had been applied to civil disturbances. Morrell and Curie (2015) use the concept of “impossible jobs” from Hargrove and Glidewell’s *Impossible Jobs in Public Management* (1990) and apply it to riot policing in the United Kingdom, to
examine how officers train for and manage riots. The study while examining the actions (escalations) of police during a riot, does not address the need for the application of de-escalation techniques at the beginning of an incident.

**Conclusion**

The response to civil disturbances in a historical context has been one of an aggressive manner utilizing federal troops, militarized law enforcement, dogs and fire hoses. In trying to find alternatives to aggressive responses by authorities to an incident which has already exploded to a stage which the only possible response is an aggressive one. By examining non-aggressive responses, de-escalating a situation, it is hoped that alternatives can be found to the aggressive response. In order to achieve this, theoretical frameworks such as the chaos theory, the strain theory and BDT, may allow for a comprehensive approach to an incident before it spirals out of control from a harmless protest into a full-scale riot.

Previous research identified in de-escalation, has been limited to the mentally ill, riot response research and riot management. The research concerning escalation measures include poor decision-making, failed courses of action, outdated policies and methods (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). The literature researched in this study unfortunately, does not address whether there is a need for new measures or if there have ever been any attempts to apply them to the phenomenon known as the civil disturbance. Emergency managers should consider the underlying issues (independent variables) when creating a response to a looming civil disturbance event to see if alternative nonaggressive methods may be practical or if current aggressive practices should be employed. Therefore, this
study will examine the potential need for changes in response policies by using de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances.
Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

The following chapter explains the quantitative methodology employed in this study in obtaining the opinions of law enforcement and emergency management officials whether de-escalation techniques are needed in the response to civil disturbances. For this study, a cross-sectional design was used to quantify the opinions and attitudes of emergency management officials about the need for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances. The target population consisted of a sampling frame of law enforcement and emergency management officials who are responsible for the decision-making authority with regards to civil disturbances or riots within their communities. To extract the responses of the target population, a probability sampling method was used; specifically, a random survey of law enforcement and emergency management population at one particular place in time using a survey instrument distributed to the previously mentioned public officials.

Problem Statement

As stated in Chapter 1, historically speaking, the responses to civil disturbances or riots have been aggressive shows and uses of force, or escalation. These aggressive shows of force have included tactics such as the use of police dogs (Maurantonio, 2014), armed federal troops (Steidl, 2013), and police field forces to restore normalcy or prevent chaos (Miller, 2001). The individuals who are responsible for how responses to civil disturbances are decided should, as a general rule, seek de-escalation rather than confrontation.
Decision-makers should always be mindful of the repercussions that their decisions can have on their communities like destruction and chaos, due to escalating an event unnecessarily versus de-escalating it. One such example of inadvertently escalating a situation would be to deploy resources, instead of holding back or staging them away from the situation in the hope of diffusing it. Simonson and Staw (1992) suggest that de-escalation techniques may provide law enforcement and emergency management officials a reference point to avoid the commitment of resources and escalation.

Therefore, in this study, I sought to determine whether there is a need for de-escalation techniques to be incorporated into policies and response protocols or if law enforcement and emergency management officials should maintain current response protocols that may escalate the situation.

The contribution of this study to the current knowledge base is whether changes in civil disturbance response protocols using de-escalation techniques benefit decision makers and provide a social impact to the community through the lessening of destruction and violence during an incident.

**Research Design**

For this research, I used a cross-sectional design to randomly sample law enforcement and emergency management officials who are responsible for the decision-making policies for civil disturbances. A cross-sectional design allows for those being sampled to express their own opinions, attitudes, or beliefs to a survey question based on experiences, and background. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) suggested that the cross-sectional design is the most used in the social sciences and allows for the
identification and description of any patterns between the variables in the study. The survey method used in the collection of data involved a self-administered questionnaire through the internet survey collection service, Survey Monkey (https://www.surveymonkey.com).

Levels of Measurement

The target population was law enforcement and emergency management officials, who operate daily in a high-pressure decision-making and consequence-based results due often to politically charged variables outside of their control. Because of their commitment to the safety of the public, there is also a professional presence that may override political expediency or agendas in their decision-making, which keeps their communities from falling into chaos or helps to quickly return normalcy. The survey questioned decision makers about community conditions such as politics, economics, or social conditions and if they influenced how they would respond to a civil disturbance.

The levels of measurement for this study included nominal and ordinal scale levels. To establish impartiality in the data, I used the nominal level to categorize, job titles, authority, and other characteristics of the emergency management field, whereas the ordinal level was utilized to measure the greater than relation in the data, such as opinions of politics, the degree of external influence and the need for change.

Target Population and Sample

The target population of this research included a homogenous sample of law enforcement and emergency management officials who are responsible for responding to and making policy for a jurisdiction’s decision-making rationale during the time of a civil
emergency. I conducted the research among agencies in the South Florida area, which was selected because of historical rioting and civil disturbances in that area. Past experiences include the Miami Riots of 1980, 1982, and 1989 which were the results of confrontations with police officers (Mohl, 1990), and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas protests of 2003 (Wainwright and Ortiz, 2006), where planned protests were “hijacked” by agitators. The sample reflected a collection of participants who best represent, through experience and knowledge, an understanding of the workings of civil disturbances or riots. The sample size was comprised of 25 participants from among law enforcement and emergency management officials. The survey of these officials was conducted to prompt opinions about the feasibility of the use of de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances. Participants were selected to obtain a varied cross-section of the population (e.g., ages, grades, or years of experience; Mills, Durepos, & Wiebe, 2010).

**Sampling Procedures**

The sampling procedures employed in the collection of data consisted of identifying a homogenous group of law enforcement and emergency managers in a major South Florida county and inviting them to participate in the completion of a survey via Survey Monkey. Because the survey was online, participants remained anonymous throughout the survey process.

**Instrumentation**

The survey instrument I designed and constructed to use in the data collection for was based on the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ), which was developed by Forsyth (1980a). The EPQ is comprised of 20 questions that are based on commonly held
opinions or morals found in the general public. Using the EPQ framework, I developed survey questions based on five statements. The full EPQ is attached in Appendix A. (Forsyth, 1980b). The statements that were the basis for my survey questions are as follows:

1. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity and welfare of another individual.
2. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.
3. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any society.
4. Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is moral or immoral is up to the individual.
5. Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could stand in the way of better human relations and adjustment. (Forsyth, 1980)

The survey and questions were designed to extract the opinions of the need for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances. The survey questions utilized a Yes/No format, along with follow-up questions using a Likert Scale to expand on those questions which are answered in the affirmative.

A multiple-choice survey was used as the measurement instrument for my research. The research surveyed the respondents with such factors as yes/no, agreement, values (relevance and frequency), importance, and likelihood scales. The multiple-choice
survey instrument contained questions answerable through the selection of a response which was coded with symbols to capture the survey answers.

In the following sample question, the respondent is asked a yes/no question which were captured by a multiple-choice survey in Survey Monkey. Prior to the start of the survey participants must first acknowledge the survey consent form. The respondent then answers the questions in order until all are answered.

**Survey Questions**

1. Which discipline do you most closely align your duties?
   a. Emergency Management
   b. Law Enforcement

2. What is your experience (in years) in this position?
   a. 0 - 5 years
   b. 5 - 10 years
   c. 10 - 15 years
   d. 15 – 20 years
   e. More than 20 years

3. Has your jurisdiction experienced a civil disturbance and how would it be characterized? Yes/No
   a. No, my jurisdiction has not experienced a civil disturbance.
   b. Yes, Permitted protests
   c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
   d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
4. Have you ever participated in the response to a civil disturbance? Yes/No
   a. No, I have never participated in the response to a civil disturbance.
   b. Yes, Permitted protests
   c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
   d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
   e. Yes, Full-scale riots

5. Have you ever planned for a response to a civil disturbance? Yes/No
   a. No, I have never participated in the response to a civil disturbance.
   b. Yes, Permitted protests
   c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
   d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
   e. Yes, Full-scale riots

6. Have you ever been in the position of decision making during a civil disturbance? Yes/No
   a. No, I have not been in the position of decision making during a civil disturbance.
   b. Yes, Permitted protests
   c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
   d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
   e. Yes, Full-scale riots
7. Does your agency have a plan or policies in place to address civil
disturbances? Yes/No
   a. No, my agency does not have a plan or policies in place to address civil
disturbances.
   b. Yes, my agency does have a plan or policies in place to address civil
disturbances, but, has not incorporated de-escalation techniques.
   c. Yes, my agency does have a plan or policies in place to address civil
disturbances and has incorporated de-escalation techniques.

8. The Chaos Theory as it applies to emergency management, implies that an
emergency manager should try to maintain normalcy or return to normalcy
from chaos as quickly as possible, in order to reduce or avoid violence and
destruction. Which would you consider the proper type of response to a civil
disturbance in either maintaining or returning to normalcy?
   a. Aggressive
   b. Passive

9. In your opinion do you think that considerations regarding social and
economic conditions or political activity, should be given to a situation when
deciding which type of a response to a civil disturbance is conducted, e.g.
aggressive or passive?
   a. Yes
   b. No
10. In your opinion, do the current tactics used in the response to civil disturbances need updating?
   a. Yes
   b. No

11. How effective do you think de-escalation techniques would be if they were made a part of response protocols, to reduce or prevent violence during a civil disturbance?
   a. Effective
   b. No Difference
   c. Ineffective

12. In your opinion, is there a need for the use of de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances?
   a. Yes
   b. No

The null hypothesis for each is that no such positive relationship exists.

**Reliability**

In determining if any errors in validity have occurred, making sure that the reliability of the survey being completed is crucial to the research. The entire measurement process must be controlled, and its integrity guarded, from the collection of data to its presentation in the report, for a confidence in the measurement instrument and those reading the report (Staron & Meding, 2009). Emergency Management is a unchanging process of functions, preparation, response, recovery and mitigation, which
are learned through training and experience. The Emergency Management field has also had standardization applied within it such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Framework (NRF) which allows for a nationwide approach to restoring order from chaos. By applying the measurement instrument within the emergency management field, reliability and consistency would be ensured, because of national standardization, retain its stability over time when used in future surveys when replicated regardless of where it may be used. By applying the measurement instrument only within the would ensure reliability (Dantzker and Hunter, 2006).

Validity

Validity is measuring what is intended to be measured (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). To establish validity, this research will use a homogeneous group of participants from the public safety field (law enforcement and emergency managers) with actual or preparation experience in civil disturbances. Maxwell (2012) stated, the validity standard requires the testing of data against the real-world (p. 122). It is the belief of this researcher that the data in this research when tested against the real world, would easily achieved validity by the interviewing of another sample of public safety officials with similar experiences in civil disturbances from another jurisdiction in the United States.

The Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) was examined for validity and reliability in a research study by Yazici and Yazici (2010). The study concluded that the EPQ would be satisfactory for social scientists to utilize while examining individuals and the various settings that they can be found in.
Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

Historically, civil disturbances have been responded to in an aggressive manner using military troops, a “militarized” response by police, and aggressive tactics such as police dogs and water cannons. The purpose of this study was to examine the hypothesis of whether current responses by government officials are no longer practical when applied to civil disturbances or riots and if there a need for de-escalation techniques.

I designed the study from four research questions to identify the types of disturbances respondents might have experienced, the presence of plans and policies they may or may not have for responding to them, decision-making factors, and the type of response they would utilize. The four questions were as follows:

RQ1. Would the lack of experience versus actual experience influence the type of response action taken?

RQ2. Would training, policies, biases or external stimuli, influence the type of response action taken?

RQ3. Would the influences of politics, economic or social conditions contribute to the decision-making factors, such as to respond passively or aggressively?

RQ4. Would the inclusion techniques such as de-escalation contribute positively in maintaining order in a community?

In the survey both emergency managers and law enforcement officials were asked about their backgrounds and personal experiences regarding participation, planning, and decision-making for civil disturbances. Participants were also surveyed as to whether
they have or would consider factors such as training, policy, biases, or external influences, such as underlying political, economic or social conditions of communities, in their response to an incident. Participants were also asked their opinions on the type of response they preferred (aggressive or passive), and lastly, the need to update tactics used, the effectiveness of those changes in tactics would be, and need for the use of de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances.

In this chapter, I will present the features of the target population, a comprehensive discussion of each question and the data collected in the survey, the conclusions of the study based on a cross-tabulation analyses, additional comments based on the survey data, and a summary of the key findings.

**Data Collection**

The target population of this study is a homogenous sample of law enforcement and emergency management officials responsible for policy or response decisions regarding civil disturbances, in a major county in the South Florida area with a population of more than 1.5 million people (United States Census Bureau, 2010) and 31 incorporated towns or cities. I chose this population due to South Florida’s historical experiences with rioting and civil disturbances.

The chief law enforcement officers and emergency managers from the 31 incorporated municipalities of the county are the target of the survey population. I identified these participants through open source internet searches at each of the jurisdiction’s websites and/or searches of the desired position (emergency manager and police chief) from the internet. It should be noted that, because of contractual
arrangements, some of the jurisdictions do not have personnel who hold the title of emergency manager and police chief, but who still perform those duties in differently titled positions, in those jurisdictions with whom they contract.

This county and its public safety structure is unique in that Sheriff’s Office and several jurisdictions within the county have entered into contractual agreements to provide law enforcement and fire services from a county level (Sheriff’s Office) and a peer-to-peer level (city to city). The presence of these agreements contributes to a reduction in the number of positions by jurisdictions to reduce costs and duplication of effort, which affected the sample size. The inclusion of fire services is important to this research with regards to the target population, because the function of emergency management is generally located within the fire department.

The following is an example of the county public safety structure. The sheriff’s office contracts and provides a combination of law enforcement and fire rescue services to 14 of the 31 jurisdictions, plus the seaport and airport. Of the 14 jurisdictions in which the sheriff’s office provides services, 10 contracts for both law enforcement and fire services, while the other four either provide their own services or contract with another jurisdiction for their fire services. The remaining 17 jurisdictions are not associated with the sheriff’s office in providing law enforcement or fire services. Regardless of the contractual status of any of the jurisdictions, there are still those who fill the position of chief law enforcement officer and emergency manager, who are the target population of this research.
The original data collection plan for this study called for the data to be collected via an interview process and the completion of a survey. Instead, the collection process was conducted via the internet survey collection service, Survey Monkey (https://www.surveymonkey.com), which allowed for the creation and distribution of the survey to the participants. This process allowed for convenience, timeliness, and anonymity for the participants of the survey. Survey Monkey also provides collection and analysis tools for the data obtained from the respondents. I contacted the respondents selected to participate in the survey via e-mail inviting them to participate with a link to the survey.

When counting each of the 31 jurisdictions and allowing for a participant from each discipline, emergency management and law enforcement, the total number of participants would be 62. The goal of this research was to receive a response from at least 20% of those 62, which would equal 12.4 participants. I rounded that number up to 15 to increase the validity of the survey.

**Study Results**

Data collection occurred over a period of 14 days, from July 20, 2018 through August 2, 2018, at which time the total number of participants sought was achieved. The survey is provided as Appendix B. A total of 26 participants responded to the survey, with one response being incomplete. The incomplete response was discarded.

The study results were divided into two categories, raw data and cross-tabulation data. I used the cross-tabulation analysis to gather the respondents’ opinions based on their respective disciplines and experiences among the different factors contained in the
survey questions. Those factors included training, policies, biases or external stimuli (political, economic, or social conditions), and what type of response they believed would be appropriate for a civil disturbance, aggressive or passive. The raw data is presented in Tables 1 to 11 and the cross-tabulation data is presented in Tables 12 to 19.

Primary Survey Data

Respondent Demographics

This section of the study results will address the respondent demographics, the discipline that they mostly closely align with, emergency management or law enforcement, and the years of experience each has in those disciplines.

The survey received 25 respondents, of whom 18 (72%) were from law enforcement and 7 (28%) were from emergency management. Table 1 shows a cross-tabulation of the disciplines and the years of experience from each respondent. The results show that law enforcement respondents had more overall years of experience versus the respondents of the emergency management discipline.

Table 1

Respondent Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disciplines</th>
<th>&lt; 5 yrs</th>
<th>5 - 10 yrs</th>
<th>10-15 yrs</th>
<th>15-20 yrs</th>
<th>&gt; 20 yrs</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n = 25)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jurisdictional Characteristics

Tables 2 and 3 show the characteristics of the respondents’ jurisdiction with regards to their experiences with various types of civil disturbances and whether the
jurisdiction has plans or policies in place to address them. Table 2 shows the types of civil disturbances that have occurred in a respondent’s jurisdiction and how these disturbances are characterized. Four respondents 16% responded that their jurisdiction had never experienced a civil disturbance, eight respondents (32%) had experienced permitted protests, seven respondents (28%) unpermitted protests, five respondents (20%) spontaneous protests and only one respondent had experienced a full-scale riot.

Table 2.

| Has your jurisdiction experienced a civil disturbance and how would it be characterized? |
|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Categories                                      | Emergency management | %               | Law enforcement | %               | n               | %               |
| No, my jurisdiction has not experienced a civil disturbance | 1               | 4               | 3               | 12              | 4               | 16              |
| Yes, permitted protests                         | 3               | 12              | 5               | 20              | 8               | 32              |
| Yes, unpermitted protests                       | 2               | 8               | 5               | 20              | 7               | 28              |
| Yes, spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team) | 0               | 0               | 5               | 20              | 5               | 20              |
| Yes, full-scale riots                           | 1               | 4               | 0               | 0               | 1               | 4               |
| Total (n = 25)                                  | 7               | 28              | 18              | 72              | 25              | 100             |

Table 3 shows the status of the respondent’s agency and whether it has a plan or policies in place to address civil disturbances. Of the 25 responses received, only 2 (8%) respondents, did not have an agency plan or policies in place to address a civil disturbance, while 3 (12%) did have plans and policies in place, but had not incorporated de-escalation techniques to address civil disturbances. The remaining 20 (80%)
respondents affirmed that they have incorporated de-escalation techniques into their plans and policies to address responses to civil disturbances.

Table 3.

*Does your agency have a plan or policies in place to address civil disturbances?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Emergency management</th>
<th>Law enforcement</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No, my agency does not have a plan or policies in place to address civil disturbances</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, my agency does have a plan/policies to address civil disturbances, but has not incorporated de-escalation techniques</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, my agency does have a plan/policies to address civil disturbances and has incorporated de-escalation techniques</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n = 25)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Respondent Experience**

Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the level of a respondent’s personal and planning experiences and decision-making criterion they would utilize in civil disturbances.

Table 4 shows the individual participatory experiences of all the respondents and how they are characterized. Seven (28%) respondents stated that they had never participated a civil disturbance. In examining the remaining characteristics, six or 24% of respondents stated that they had participated in permitted protests, five or 20%,
unpermitted protests, three or 12%, spontaneous protests (e.g. Response to a Championship Win by a Sports Team) and four or 16%, in a full-scale riot.

Table 4.

Respondent Participation Experience in Civil Disturbances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Emergency management</th>
<th>Law enforcement</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No, I have never participated in the response to a civil disturbance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, permitted protests</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, unpermitted protests</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, full-scale riots</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n = 25)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The study results found that law enforcement respondents had five times more people, with at least some civil disturbance participation experience over emergency management respondents. In the four categories excluding “having never participated in the response to a civil disturbance”, 15 (60%) of the law enforcement respondents had some sort of experience versus just three (12%) for emergency management.

Table 5 shows the individual planning experiences of all the respondents and how they are characterized. Seven (28%) respondents stated that they had never planned a civil disturbance. In examining the remaining characteristics, seven (28%) of respondents stated that they had planned for permitted protests, five (20%), for unpermitted protests,
one (4%), for spontaneous protests (e.g. Response to a Championship Win by a Sports Team) and five (20%), for full-scale riots.

Table 5.

Respondent Planning Experience in Civil Disturbances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Emergency management</th>
<th></th>
<th>Law enforcement</th>
<th></th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No, I have never planned for a response to a civil disturbance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, permitted protests</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, unpermitted protests</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, full-scale riots</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n = 25)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results found that law enforcement respondents as with the participation aspect above, had five times more people, with at least some civil disturbance planning experience over emergency management respondents. In the four categories excluding “having never planned for the response to a civil disturbance”, 15 (60%) of law enforcement had some sort of experience versus just three (12%) for emergency management.

Table 6 shows the individual decision-making criterion of all the respondents and how they are characterized. nine (36%) respondents stated that they had never been involved in the decision-making processes of a civil disturbance. In examining the remaining characteristics, nine (36%) of respondents stated that they had been involved in the decision-making processes for a civil disturbance and based those decisions on
training, seven (28%), based their decisions on policies and no respondent made any decisions based on external influences or personal biases.

Table 6.

**Respondent Decision-Making Criteria in Civil Disturbances**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Emergency management</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Law enforcement</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No, I have not been in the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>position of decision making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>during a civil disturbance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, my decisions were based</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, my decisions were based</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, my decisions were based</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on external influences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, my decisions were based</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on personal biases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (n = 25)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results found that law enforcement respondents were almost equal in personnel who had not been in the position of decision-making during a civil disturbance as emergency management respondents, with five and four respectively. In the “training” characteristic law enforcement had seven (28%) versus two (8%) emergency management respondents, the “policy” characteristic showed that there were six (24%) law enforcement versus one (4%) for emergency management. No respondent from either discipline made any decisions based on external influences or personal biases.

**Respondent Opinion**

Tables 7 to 11 show respondent opinions regarding the consideration of external influencers such as social and economic conditions or political activity, the updating of
tactics, the potential effectiveness, type of response and need for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances.

Table 7 describes the opinions of respondents as to whether outside influences such as social and economic conditions or political activity, are considered in their decision-making processes. The results showed that 14 (56%) of all respondents would not allow outside influences to play a part in their decision-making processes and 11 (44%) would consider them. The comparison of disciplines found that eight (32%) of the law enforcement respondents and six (24%) emergency management respondents did not believe that external influences should be considered as a part of their decision-making process. In contrast, 10 (40%) law enforcement and one (4%) emergency management respondents, believed that external influences should be considered as a part of their decision-making process.

Table 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Emergency management</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Law enforcement</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n = 25)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 shows the opinions of respondents regarding the need to update current tactics used in the response to civil disturbances. Of the responses, 11 (44%) did not believe that tactics need to change, while 14 (56%) did believe that current response tactics need to be updated.
In your opinion, do the current tactics used in the response to civil disturbances need updating?

The comparison of disciplines found that nine (36%) law enforcement respondents and two (8%) emergency management respondents did not believe that current tactics used in the response to civil disturbances need to be updated. In contrast, nine (36%) of the law enforcement and five (20%) emergency management respondents, believed that response tactics to civil disturbances need to be updated.

Table 9 shows the opinions of respondents regarding the effectiveness of de-escalation techniques if used in civil disturbances. Most respondents, 14 (56%) believe that de-escalation techniques would be effective in civil disturbances, while eight (32%) believe that they would make no difference and three (12%) believed that they would be ineffective.

Table 9.

How effective do you think de-escalation techniques would be if they were made a part of response protocols, to reduce or prevent violence during a civil disturbance?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Emergency management</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Law enforcement</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n = 25)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A comparison of the two groups found that 50% or nine of the law enforcement respondents, believed that de-escalation techniques would be effective, while the other 50% of law enforcement respondents, believed there would be no difference or ineffective. In the emergency management group, five believed that de-escalation techniques would be effective, while one in each category, believed that de-escalation techniques would either make no difference or be ineffective.

Table 10 shows the opinions of respondents as to which type of response they would take to maintain normalcy or return from a state of chaos to normalcy in their jurisdiction, with either an aggressive or passive response. 17 (68%) of the respondents stated that they would act aggressively, while eight (32%) chose a passive response.

Table 10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Emergency management</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Law enforcement</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n = 25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comparison of the disciplines showed that 13 (52%) law enforcement respondents and four (16%) emergency management respondents would act aggressively in their jurisdiction to maintain normalcy or return from a state of chaos to normalcy. In contrast, five (20%) law enforcement and three (12%) from emergency management respondents would respond in a passive manner in their jurisdiction to maintain normalcy or return from a state of chaos to normalcy.
Table 11 shows the respondent’s opinion for the need of de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances. The results show that 21 (84%) of respondents believe that there is a need to include de-escalation techniques in the response to civil disturbances, while four (16%) do not.

Table 11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is There a Need for De-Escalation Techniques in Civil Disturbances?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n = 25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Law enforcement respondents accounted for 15 (60%) of the 21 affirmative responses while emergency management respondents accounted for the other six (24%) that there is a need for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances. Only four respondents, three (12%) from law enforcement and one (4%) from emergency management did not believe that de-escalation techniques were needed in civil disturbances.

**Cross-Tabulation Survey Data**

This research utilized the experiences of respondents from both the law enforcement and emergency management disciplines to provide their opinions regarding training, policies, biases or external stimuli, (politics, economic or social conditions) and what type of response they believed would be proper to a civil disturbance, aggressive or passive. To capture these factors, a cross-tabulation analysis was made of the
respondent’s discipline in which they work and their amounts of experience in those disciplines, (as shown in Tables 1 and 2) and the remaining survey questions individually. The cross-tabulation results are presented in Tables 12 – 19.

**Respondent Demographics**

As stated previously, Survey Questions 1 and 2, were utilized to capture the respondent demographic information, the discipline each identified with and the amount of experience within it. As described above, there were 18 respondents from the law enforcement discipline and seven from the emergency management discipline, for a 72% to 28% statistical difference. Table 1 described the experience levels of the respondents.

The LE discipline had 18 respondents, all of which had more than 10 years of experience. Sixteen of the eighteen law enforcement respondents had more than 20 years of experience, while one had 10 to 15 years, one with 15 to 20 years of experience, respectively and none in the lower two categories. The emergency management discipline received seven responses in total, with only four respondents having more than 15 years of experience and one in each of the lower experienced categories.

Table 12 describes the type of response by discipline and experience. Survey question #8, asked respondents, what type of response they would take, aggressive or passive, to maintain normalcy or restore normalcy according to the chaos theory. It could be expected that emergency management respondents may not be as aggressive as their law enforcement counterparts, but the results showed that four chose an aggressive response action versus three who chose a passive response. The results were very evenly split on the type of response regardless of years of experience. Contrary to the emergency
management respondents, law enforcement respondents chose an aggressive response most notably in the years of experience they had. 11 of the 13 respondents who would choose an aggressive response to either maintain normalcy or return to a state of normalcy had been in law enforcement more than twenty years, while the other two respondents each had more than ten and fifteen years of experience respectively.

Table 12

Type of Response by Discipline and Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Aggressive</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Passive</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency management</td>
<td>&lt; 5 yrs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 - 10 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10-15 yrs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 - 20 yrs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 20 yrs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total emergency management</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>&lt; 5 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5-10 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10-15 yrs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 - 20 yrs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 20 yrs</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total law enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total (n = 25)</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey results found that as a practical matter, law enforcement, because of their primary role in addressing civil disturbances, were the more experienced respondents versus emergency managers. The data suggests that an aggressive posture while responding to a civil disturbance, based on the years of experience by both law enforcement and emergency management, is the preferred manner of response.
Jurisdictional Characteristics

Survey questions 3 and 7 addressed jurisdictional experiences and the status of planning and policies of a respondent’s jurisdiction. The respondents were asked to describe historically what types of civil disturbances had occurred in their jurisdiction, if their jurisdiction had plans for a civil disturbance and if the those plans included or did not include, de-escalation techniques.

Survey question number 3 examined five categories of jurisdictional experiences, no experience, permitted protests, unpermitted protests, spontaneous protests and full-scale riots. The jurisdictional experience found that four (16%) had never experienced a civil disturbance and one (4%) had experience a full-scale riot for a total of 20% of the population. The remaining 80% of the population’s jurisdictions had experienced permitted, unpermitted and spontaneous protests of some kind. This experience level is constant with the response of survey question 8, regarding the type of response aggressive or passive, in which respondents, 68% of whom, would respond aggressively, while 32% would respond passively.

Survey Question 7 asked respondents if their jurisdiction had plans or policies in place to respond to civil disturbances. Of the 25 respondents, 23 (92%) stated that their jurisdiction has plans for civil disturbances, 20 (80%) of which stated that de-escalation plans had been incorporated into those plans. It is also notable that four (16%) of the respondent’s jurisdictions had not experienced a civil disturbance and two (8%) had no plans or policies in place to respond to them.
Jurisdictional characteristics can contribute to the discussion of the type of response taken by a respondent, as much as their personal experiences. This may be due in part to a lack of different types of civil disturbances in those jurisdictions, which may be directly attributed to a lack of experience on the part of a respondent.

**Respondent Experience**

Respondents were surveyed about their personal experiences participating in, planning for and their decision-making rationale, for civil disturbances. The survey questions were designed to address research questions two and three, which asked if training, policies, biases or external stimuli, such as politics, economic or social conditions, contributed to or influenced decision-making factors, in the type of response action taken. Survey Questions 4, 5, and 6 were utilized to elicit the experience of the respondents.

Survey Question 4 examined respondent personal experience in actual civil disturbances. Seven (28%) of the 25 respondents had no personal experience of actual participation in a civil disturbance of any kind. Fourteen (56%) of the respondents had participated in a permitted, unpermitted and spontaneous disturbance, and four in full-scale riots.

Survey Question 5 examined the planning experience of respondents in civil disturbances. As in the participation category, seven (28%) of respondent did have any experience, in this case, planning for a civil disturbance. Thirteen respondents had planning experience in a permitted, unpermitted and spontaneous disturbance, and five in full-scale riots for a combined experience total of 72%.
Survey Question 6 describes the factors which respondents who have been in the position of authority, utilized in their decision-making processes for civil disturbances. The decision factors that were considered by respondents included, no experience, training, policy, external influences and personal biases. In this question, nine respondents (36%) which is slightly higher than the previous two questions, had no decision-making experiences for civil disturbances. In the other two categories, Training and Policy, nine respondents (36%) based their decision-making on training and seven (28%) on policy, which combined, accounted for a total of sixty-four percent. There were no responses to categories examining external influences or biases for a zero percentage.

In order examine whether respondent experiences would influence the type of response they would take as suggested in the research questions, a cross-tabulation analyzation of the three survey’s experience Survey Questions 4 (participation), 5 (planning) and 6 decision-making, were conducted against Survey Question 8, (the type of response which a respondent would use to maintain or return a jurisdiction to normalcy), with the following results.

Table 13 illustrates the results of the comparisons of the respondents’ participation experience and type of response they would utilize in responding to a civil disturbance. A total of 25 responses were received with 17 (68%) of respondents answering that they would respond to a civil disturbance in an aggressive manner, versus eight (32%) who opted for a passive response. For those who had never participated in a civil disturbance, three respondents opted for the aggressive response, while four would use a passive response. The remaining categories under the aggressive response, each
received either three or four responses, while the passive response categories were
different. In the passive response category, spontaneous events and full-scale riots did not
register any passive responses, but the permitted and un-permitted categories each
received three and one responses respectively.

Table 13.

*Respondent Participation Experience in Civil Disturbances and Response Type*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Aggressive</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Passive</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No, I have never participated in the response to a civil disturbance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, permitted protests</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, unpermitted protests</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, full-scale riots</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n = 25)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14 illustrates the results of the comparisons of the respondents’ planning
experience and type of response they would utilize in responding to a civil disturbance.
As in the participation category, total of 25 responses were received with 17 (68%) of
respondents answering that they would respond to a civil disturbance in an aggressive
manner, versus eight (32%) who opted for a passive response.

Table 14.

*Respondent Planning Experience in Civil Disturbances and Response Type*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Aggressive</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Passive</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No, I have never participated in the response to civil disturbance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, permitted protests</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, unpermitted protests</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 15 illustrates the results of the comparisons of the respondents’ planning experience and type of response they would utilize in responding to a civil disturbance. As in the participation category, total of 25 responses were received with 17 (68%) of respondents answering that they would respond to a civil disturbance in an aggressive manner, versus eight (32%) who opted for a passive response.

Table 15.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Aggressive</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Passive</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No, I have not been in the position of decision making during a civil disturbance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, my decisions were based on training</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, my decisions were based on policy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, my decisions were based on external influences</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, my decisions were based on personal biases</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n = 25)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 13, the type of response was broken down by discipline and experience, but the data in Table 16 will be examined for the type of response and the experience level of the respondents only. Respondents by a two to one margin, seventeen aggressive versus eight passives, believed that an aggressive response was the best way to maintain normalcy or return to normalcy during a civil disturbance. Respondents with more than 20 years of experience, 12 (48%) in total, believed that an aggressive response was
proper versus six (24%) who opted for a passive response. The remaining responses to the aggressive category were found in the <5 years, one (4%), two (8%) in 10 to 15 years and two (8%) in the 15 to 20 years of experience categories. The remaining passive responses were associated with respondents with five to ten years and fifteen to twenty years of experience categories.

Table 16.

**Respondent Opinion for Response Type in Civil Disturbances**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Aggressive</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Passive</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 5 yrs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 10 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15 yrs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 20 yrs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 20 yrs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n = 25)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 17 shows, 14 (56%) respondents did not believe that considerations should be given to social, economic or political activity during times of civil disturbance, while 11 (44%) did believe in their inclusion. In trying to answer the question of whether experience was a factor for respondents, those with over 20 years of service, equally stated that they would and would not consider external influencers, with nine (36%) each. The remaining experience categories completed the survey results.
Table 17.

**Respondent Opinion for Considerations Regarding Social and Economic Conditions or Political Activity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent experience</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 5 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 10 yrs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15 yrs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 20 yrs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 20 yrs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (n = 25)</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As illustrated in Table 18, the opinions showed that 11 (44%) of respondents did not believe there was a need to update current tactics used in civil disturbances while 14 (56%) did believe there was a need to update. Once again as observed in the previous question (Table 17) those with more than 20 years of experience accounted for a total of 18 (72%) of the respondents, with 10 (40%) believing there was no need to change tactics and eight (32%) believed there was a need for change.

Table 18.

**Respondent Opinion for Updating Response Tactics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent experience</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 5 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 10 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 20 yrs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 20 yrs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (n = 25)</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As illustrated in Table 19, 14 (56%) of respondents did believe that de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances would be effective, 8 (32%) believed there would be no
difference and three (12%) believed they would be ineffective. Once again as observed in
the previous questions (Tables 16, 17 and 18) those with more than 20 years of
experience accounted for most of the total responses with 18 (72%). 10 (40%) of the
respondents believed de-escalation techniques would be effective, seven (28%) believed
there would be no difference and three (12%) thought they would be ineffective.

Table 19.

*Respondent Opinion on the Effectiveness of De-Escalation Techniques in Civil
Disturbances*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent experience</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No difference</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Ineffective</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 5 yrs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 10 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 20 yrs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 20 yrs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n = 25)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20 provides the results of the Survey question #12 and the respondent’s
opinion, as to whether there is a need for the use of de-escalation techniques in civil
disturbances. Overwhelmingly, 21 (84%) of respondents agreed that there was a need for
de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances, while four (16%) did not. Of the 21
respondents who believed that de-escalation techniques needed to be a part of the
responses to civil disturbances, 16 had 20 or more years of experience, three had 15 – 20
years, one had 5 -10 years and one had less than five years of experience. Of those
respondents which did not believe there was need for de-escalation techniques in civil
disturbances had two respondents with 10 – 15 years of experience and two with more than twenty years.

Table 20.

**Respondent Opinion on the Need for De-Escalation Techniques in Civil Disturbances**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent experience</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 5 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 10 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15 yrs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 20 yrs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 20 yrs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n = 25)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary**

The objective of this study was to examine whether there was a need to include de-escalation techniques in the responses to civil disturbances. The survey was designed to elicit the opinions of respondents on the various aspects of response within a civil disturbance. Respondents were categorized by discipline, law enforcement and emergency management, and by the years of experience in those disciplines. The respondents were asked about the historical experiences of their jurisdictions, as well as their own experiences regarding participation, planning and decision-making with civil disturbances. Lastly, the respondents provided their opinions on the type of response they would use, the consideration of external influences, the need for new tactics, the effectiveness of de-escalation techniques and the need for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances.
The central question in this study was to identify from the respondents whether there was a need for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances. Overwhelmingly, 21 (84%) of respondents agreed that there was a need for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances, while at the same time, suggested that an aggressive response was their choice to either maintain or restoring order, by a two to one margin. These two results provided a sharp contrast in thinking with regards to response, because while the respondents believed that de-escalation techniques should be included in response plans, the aggressive posture was the preferred response option. Additionally, a solid majority of respondents believed the need for de-escalation techniques, 56% believed that they would be effective, while 44% either thought there would be no difference, or they would be ineffective.

The opinions and experiences of respondents were a crucial part of this study to determine the need for changes in policies and responses to civil disturbances. The respondents that did reply to the survey were found to be very experienced in both law enforcement and emergency management disciplines. The results showed that 23 of the 25 respondents (92%) had 10 or more years of experience. But, even with the many of years of experience possessed by the respondents in their respective disciplines, there was a lack of experience in the number of disturbance types they had been involved with. The results showed that the types of disturbances most experienced by the respondents involved either permitted, non-permitted or spontaneous incidents, noticeable lack of experience with full-scale riots from either discipline.
The jurisdictional aspect of each respondent also found that 80% had already established de-escalation techniques in their agencies response policies to civil disturbances. This aligns with the 84% who believed that there was a need for de-escalation techniques in the responses to civil disturbances.

Chapter 5 provides an interpretation of the findings, limitations of the study, recommendations for future research, and discusses the implications of these findings.
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Discussion

For many decades, jurisdictions have used aggressive and violent means to respond to civil disturbances. Methods have included the use of armed military troops, police dogs, and riot forces to maintain control or regain normalcy. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the opinions and experiences of emergency managers and law enforcement officials, on how they would respond to civil disturbances and whether they believe there is a need to incorporate de-escalation techniques into response policies, as tactics, that could be used to reduce the destruction often associated with riots, as well as the violence between protestors and the police.

The goal of this study was to extend the current literature on the subject as described in Chapter 2. Currently, the literature on de-escalation techniques is limited to the treatment of the mentally ill, the use of force by police, and verbal de-escalation measures, but I found nothing regarding the application of de-escalation measures to civil disturbances. It is in the realm of civil disturbances that this study will contribute to the subject matter.

In this study, I incorporated three theoretical frameworks, working in conjunction with each other, to describe and interpret the various stages of a civil disturbance experienced by respondents and how their responses would apply to a disturbance. The chaos theory was the primary framework of the three used in this study because it governs response. The chaos theory suggests that as a society, in most cases, we live in a stable and normal environment and, on occasion, an event occurs that moves the
normalcy of society into chaos. It is the responsibility of emergency managers and law enforcement officials to take steps to either maintain normalcy or return from chaos to normalcy as quickly as possible. In doing so, the decisions being made by emergency managers and law enforcement officials may involve external influencers, biases, or a lack of experience. The second theoretical framework I used is the BDT, to understand the decision-making thought process of emergency managers and law enforcement officials in how they deal with those external influencers, biases or a lack of experience. The third framework being used is the strain theory, which help emergency managers and law enforcement officials to understand what may be causing the external influences that may affect the decisions being made by those emergency managers and law enforcement officials while trying to maintain normalcy or return society from chaos. The strain theory, developed by Merton (as cited in Marker, 2004), suggests that those participating in civil disturbances would normally be law abiding citizens if it weren’t for individual failures of societal goals such as education, political stature, and financial independence. The three frameworks complement each other in that the facets of the strain theory could explain the influences affecting the decision-making process in BDT, which could manifest itself as a decision during a civil disturbance in either a positive or negative way, causing an incident not to be returned to normalcy from a state of chaos or sending normalcy into chaos.

**Interpretation of Findings**

I used the four research questions in this study to examine whether the lack of experience, training, policies, biases, or external stimuli (political, economic, or social
conditions), would influence the type of response taken in a civil disturbance.

Additionally, through the research questions, I sought to determine if the previously mentioned influences would affect the decision to respond either aggressively or passively. Lastly, the respondents provided opinions as to whether de-escalation techniques would be effective either in a positive or negative manner. These factors ultimately contributed to the research in trying to determine whether there was a need for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances.

As described in Chapter 2, there is little research on de-escalation techniques as they are applied to civil disturbances. Because the historical examples of response methods in civil disturbances have been more aggressive rather than passive, I designed the survey questions to elicit opinions from the respondents as to why this was occurring. The respondents were asked about their opinions and decision-making rationale through the survey questions to establish experience levels for themselves and their jurisdictions, the factors on which they based their decisions, and what types of responses they might make during a civil disturbance.

The survey questions targeted the previously mentioned issues to provide quantitative data that either does or does not support the research theories. The survey questions were organized into four parts: demographic information about the respondents, their experience and opinions and jurisdictional characteristics. The questions regarding the respondents’ opinions were based in the chaos theory and what kinds of responses would be used in civil disturbances. The questions in the survey
regarding participation, planning, and external influences contributing to decision-making in civil disturbances were aligned with the BDT and the strain theory.

**Summary**

This study was designed to elicit the opinion of respondents about the need for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances. Because of the lack of literature in this area of de-escalation techniques and civil disturbances, the data could not be compared to previous findings. This study extends the limited research of whether de-escalation techniques are needed in the responses to civil disturbances. It is this lack of literature on this subject which allows this study to extend the knowledge of this subject. The subject of de-escalation techniques is a new concept for civil disturbances and the results of this research confirmed that. Currently, there is no research into the different aspects of experience, decision-making or jurisdictional preparedness with regards to civil disturbances and the need or not, for de-escalation techniques.

The study found that experience was a strong factor among respondents from law enforcement, but in comparison, the emergency management respondents were lacking in that same experience. All 18 law enforcement respondents had 10 years or more of experience, whereas only five emergency management respondents had that same amount of experience. This finding about experience level provides a historical context not only for their opinions based on training and experience, but one aspect of experience that was not surveyed was the point in the respondents’ career that the experience was garnered or how long it had been since they had the experience.
This study also extends the knowledge base with regards to jurisdictional experiences and the status of de-escalation techniques in plans or policies within them. The data results showed that only one respondent’s jurisdiction had experienced a full-scale riot, whereas all other experiences were limited to permitted or unpermitted protests or spontaneous events, like sports celebrations. The study results showed that a large percentage of respondents’ jurisdictions have plans for civil disturbances and did incorporate de-escalation techniques into those plans.

This study also extends knowledge of current policy makers in jurisdictions, on whether there is a need to consider external influencers, such as economic or social conditions. The inclusion of these considerations could affect how training is conducted, the updating of agency policies, and the decision-making aspects in response to civil disturbances. In the three categories surveyed, respondent participation in, planning for, and decision-making abilities for civil disturbances, all responded equally to what course of action each would take. The respondents in all three categories, by an 18 to 7 total, chose an aggressive response over a passive one.

The premise that a lack of experience versus actual experience in civil disturbances could influence the type of response action taken (aggressive versus passive), was supported by a 72 to 28% margin. As illustrated in Table 16, the results showed that experience was indeed a factor with respondents in determining the type of response that they would take. The category representing the most experienced respondents (> 20 years) showed that 12 of the 25 respondents would apply an aggressive style response to a civil disturbance. A further examination of all the respondents with
more than 10 years of experience showed that 16 of 17, would prefer an aggressive response.

Law enforcement and emergency managers must decide on a course of action in formulating response plans in times of civil disturbances. Morton and Fasolo (2009) in the BDT suggested that courses of action taken by people may be influenced by biases and other factors. BDT may be applied in a response scenario by escalating a scenario versus considering external influences such as social and economic conditions or political activity. The respondents did not believe that external influencers should be considered when deciding which type of response to a civil disturbance is conducted (e.g., aggressive or passive) by a 56 to 44% margin.

Historically, civil disturbances or riots have been responded to aggressively with the use of police dogs, armed federal troops, and police field forces. Respondents did believe that updating tactics used during civil disturbances should be implemented, by a 56 to 44% margin. Fifty-six percent of respondents believed that de-escalation techniques, if incorporated into the response to a civil disturbance, would be effective, 32% believed they would have no difference, and 12% believed de-escalation techniques would be ineffective. If the categories of *no difference* and *ineffective* were combined, they would have a total percentage of 44%, versus the 56% effective respondents. The categories of updating tactics and the effectiveness of de-escalation techniques (if the categories of *no difference* and *ineffective* were combined) were statistically equal, but contradictory. The contradiction comes from a perceived necessity to improve tactics but at the same time without trying, admitting that they would not be effective.
When asked, if there was a need for de-escalation techniques to be incorporated into policies and response protocols, 84% of respondents answered in the affirmative with 16% negative. This question summarizes the entire survey with a resounding affirmation for the need to include de-escalation techniques into the response protocols and policies currently in place with regards to civil disturbances.

In conclusion, the results of this study have some contradictory instances between the need to include de-escalation techniques and the type of response favored by most respondents. The respondents while identifying a need for de-escalation, also overwhelmingly found that an aggressive response is best in response to civil disturbances.

**Limitations of the Study**

In this study, limitations were observed, acknowledged and addressed. A limitation of quantitative studies by their nature require very large samples, in most cases in the thousands of respondents. Additionally, most organizations, jurisdictions and the public sector, do not have the resources or skills required to conduct a large-scale quantitative study. The positive aspects of quantitative studies include the ability to be administered and assessed quickly, as well as allow for comparisons between organizations and groups, in this case, emergency managers and law enforcement officials (Choy, 2014).

An additional limitation of this study is the cross-sectional design which does not allow for researchers to randomly control their intrinsic and extrinsic variables or control the causation of independent variables (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008).
Concerns regarding extrinsic variables should be minimal since this study used participants that currently work in the fields of emergency managers and law enforcement. Since the participants were selected from a specific geographic area, it is then assumed that the same disciplines could be identified and surveyed from a larger jurisdiction such as a state, multiple states or even nationally to replicate the survey on a larger scale. Intrinsic variable changes to survey would include factors such as the changing experiences of participants or changes in the population due to retirements, promotion or reassignment to other duties (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008).

A generic representative sample of the emergency managers and law enforcement positions was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The purpose of this data was to calculate a percentage of emergency managers and law enforcement chiefs in the United States and then compare that percentage against the study’s results. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017) there are 9,560 professionals classified as emergency management Directors, and Banks, Hendrix, Hickman, and Kyckelhahn (2016) estimate there are approximately 18,000 federal, state, county, and local law enforcement agencies. If the stipulation is made that each of these law enforcement agencies had a chief officer (Sheriff, Police Chief or Director), the number of the population would include the 9,560 emergency management directors, plus the 18,000 Chief law enforcement officers, creating a control group totaling 27,560. When calculated for percentages, the combined Labor Department statistics, emergency management directors accounted for 35% of the population and law enforcement executive officers for 65%. In comparison, the results from the study showed a response
rate of 28% for emergency management respondents and 72% for law enforcement respondents. It is suggested that the differences between the emergency management study group and the statistical group is a -7 percent, while the law enforcement study group had a +7 percent over the statistical group.

**Recommendations**

De-escalation techniques while a part of most jurisdictional policy, still need to be incorporated into the response tactics of jurisdictions, to help reduce confrontation between protestors and law enforcement. The study showed that by a 2:1 ratio, that the respondents believed that an aggressive posture during a response was the best way of quelling a civil disturbance, while a 5:1 ratio believed that there is a need for de-escalation techniques. This shows a possible issue regarding how policies may not be keeping pace with societal norms and progress.

Government entities of any size can utilize the results of this study to aid in determining if their agency is need of policy adoptions or revisions, regarding the need for the inclusion of de-escalation techniques. Agency decision-makers can adopt some or all the strategies provided in this study, by examining the potential risks brought on by civil disturbances and the effects on their jurisdictions, with the training of their personnel and incorporating de-escalation techniques into response protocols and policy.

The results of this study showed that a majority of respondents, had many years of experience in their respective disciplines. While the study did gather basic data on personal and jurisdictional experiences, the research did not address the specifics of how that experience was gathered over individual careers. One very important aspect of
individual experience is training and while the research found that a large number of respondents were very experienced within their disciplines, it did not examine at what point in their careers that they received their training which could make it irrelevant, due to outdated response protocols. Determining the relevance of training is important to future research because it may have become outdated by advances in technology, legal precedence or changes in tactics by protestors. Based on these criterion, the training that a person may have received in the first one or two years of their careers may, twenty years later, no longer be viable options for a response to a civil disturbance. It is recommended that future research examine the levels or types of training taken by respondents, whether that training was standardized or ongoing over the course of a career.

The results of the study showed an overwhelming consensus that there is a need for de-escalation techniques. A further recommendation is to include de-escalation techniques as a part of an agency’s policies. This would include a complete review by agencies of their emergency operations plans, specifically their annex regarding civil disturbances (if an agency has one), training, equipment and mutual aid agreements, all of which contribute to the way an agency responds to civil disturbances.

Many law enforcement and emergency management agencies are now accredited by national and international bodies to provide standardization in areas such as organization, use of force and mutual aid. It is also recommended that accrediting organizations with oversight over law enforcement and emergency management disciplines, incorporate de-escalation techniques into their standards. It is also suggested that a national standard be developed with the help of these accreditation organizations at
a federal level to establish a consistency across both the law enforcement and emergency management disciplines for using de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances.

My recommendations would be for agencies to review their policies and protocols, the way they train and the social, economic and political landscapes of their jurisdictions to see if there is a method to reduce confrontations and violence. While eliminating confrontation and violence may not be practical in every situation, the development of de-escalation techniques may prove to be beneficial in some instances.

Implications

The benefit of this research will provide a social impact by policy changes which could create a positive impact in lessening the severity and scope of an incident. As discussed previously, historical response tactics have included armed federal troops, dogs, water cannons and currently, “militarized field forces” from law enforcement. The data from this study showed that 56% of respondents believed there was a need to update response tactics. A change in response tactics could lead to a reduction in confrontations between law enforcement and protestors and ultimately a reduction of violence and destruction. Several factors that could prove beneficial and impactful towards achieving social change need to include changes in tactics, training and standardization.

The changes in tactics could include new technologies which may allow for the use of less personnel in responding to a civil disturbance. According to Simonson and Staw (1992) the mere appearance of a deployment of a “field force” unit, could be interpreted as an “escalation” factor by protestors. New technologies may be useful in
accomplishing the desired result of force multiplication without deploying the actual resources as previously used.

Training could prove to be one of the most important factors considered in the response to civil disturbances. The standardization of training would be most beneficial as impact on social change. When there is no standardization in training, responses can vary as much as an incident. Standardized training allows for emergency managers to establish policy and protocols based on the training being conducted at a current moment and time. As changes occur, the standard is changed and then taught to personnel to maintain a level of proficiency. Standardization also allows for the seamless integration of agencies during mutual aid incidents because all personnel have been trained to the same standard.

The results of this study have determined that there is a need for the inclusion of de-escalation techniques and they would effective in civil disturbances. While respondents believe that an aggressive response is the preferred method to restoring or maintaining order, they also believe that there is a need for a change in tactics. Jurisdictions need to address their policies and protocols to determine how they can include de-escalation techniques, to try and deter confrontations and violence, which may occur unnecessarily and could have been easily avoided by changes in the way responses are made in civil disturbances.
References


https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.00169


Mills, S. B., & Ivacko, T. M. (2016). Local leaders say police-community relations are good throughout Michigan, but those in large cities are concerned about potential unrest over police use-of-force. *Michigan Public Policy Survey*.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2737454


http://dx.doi.org.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/10.1037/0021-9010.77.4.419


https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05415-0_1

https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122413500273


https://search.proquest.com/openview/aae16d9b5cafce0bf60e3607b518994f/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y

Retrieved from
Appendix A: Ethics Position Questionnaire EPQ

Instructions. You will find a series of general statements listed below. Each represents a commonly held opinion and there are no right or wrong answers. You will probably disagree with some items and agree with others. We are interested in the extent to which you agree or disagree with such matters of opinion. Please read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree by placing in front of the statement the number corresponding to your feelings, where:

1 = Completely disagree  4 = Slightly disagree  1 = Moderately agree
2 = Largely disagree  5 = Neither agree nor disagree  8 = Largely agree
3 = Moderately disagree  6 - Slightly agree  9 = Completely agree

1. A person should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another even to a small degree.

2. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might be.

3. The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be gained.

4. One should never psychologically or physically harm another person.

5. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity and welfare of another individual.

6. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.
7. Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences of the act against the negative consequences of the act is immoral.

8. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any society.

9. It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others.

10. Moral actions are those which closely match ideals of the most "perfect" action.

11. There are no ethical principles that are so important that they should be a part of any code of ethics.

12. What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another.

13. Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one person considers to be moral may be judged to be immoral by another person.

14. Different types of moralities cannot be compared as to "rightness."

15. Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is moral or immoral is up to the individual.

16. Moral standards are simply personal rules which indicate how a person should behave and are not to be applied in making judgments of others.

17. Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes.

18. Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could stand in the way of better human relations and adjustment.

19. No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is permissible or not permissible totally depends upon the situation.
20. Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action.
Appendix B: Survey Questions

1. Which discipline do you most closely align your duties?
   a. Emergency Management
   b. Law Enforcement

2. What is your experience (in years) in this position?
   a. Less than 5 Years
   b. 5 - 10 Years
   c. 10 - 15 Years
   d. 15 - 20 Years
   e. More than 20 years

3. Has your jurisdiction experienced a civil disturbance?
   a. No, my jurisdiction has not experienced a civil disturbance.
   b. Yes, Permitted protests
   c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
   d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
   e. Yes, Full-scale riots

4. Have you ever participated in the response to a civil disturbance?
   a. No, I have never participated in the response to a civil disturbance
   b. Yes, Permitted protests
   c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
   d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
   e. Yes, Full-scale riots
5. Have you ever planned for a response to a civil disturbance?
   a. No, I have not planned a response to a civil disturbance.
   b. Yes, Permitted protests
   c. Yes, Unpermitted protests
   d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)
   e. Yes, Full-scale riots

6. Have you ever been in the position of decision making during a civil disturbance?
   a. No, I have not been in the position of decision making during a civil disturbance.
   b. Yes, my decisions were based on Training.
   c. Yes, my decisions were based on Policy.
   d. Yes, my decisions were based on External Influences.
   e. Yes, my decisions were based on Personal Biases.

7. Does your agency have a plan or policies in place to address civil disturbances?
   a. No, my agency does not have a plan or policies in place to address civil disturbances.
   b. Yes, my agency does have a plan or policies in place to address civil disturbances but has not incorporated de-escalation techniques.
   c. Yes, my agency does have a plan or policies in place to address civil disturbances and has incorporated de-escalation techniques.
8. The Chaos Theory as it applies to emergency management, implies that an emergency manager should try to maintain normalcy or return to normalcy from chaos as quickly as possible, in order to reduce or avoid violence and destruction. In your opinion, which would you consider the proper type of response to a civil disturbance in either maintaining or returning to normalcy?
   a. Aggressive
   b. Passive

9. In your opinion, do you think that considerations regarding social and economic conditions or political activity, should be given to a situation when deciding which type of a response to a civil disturbance is conducted, e.g. aggressive or passive?
   a. Yes
   b. No

10. In your opinion, do the current tactics used in the response to civil disturbances need updating?
    a. Yes
    b. No

11. In your opinion, how effective do you think de-escalation techniques would be if they were made a part of response protocols, to reduce or prevent violence during a civil disturbance?
    a. Effective
    b. No Difference
c. Ineffective

12. In your opinion, is there a need for the use of de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances?

a. Yes

b. No