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# Political Affiliations and Interagency Collaboration in Emergency Management in Nigeria

Charles Otegbade  
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# Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Charles Dipe Otegbade

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2018

Abstract

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Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

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August 2018

## Abstract

Collaboration has been indispensable in resolving many contemporary problems involved in emergency/disaster management, but it is unclear if key determinants of collaboration established through studies focused on the Western world would apply to countries outside the West. The purpose of this cross-sectional non-experimental study was to examine the effects of political affiliation, an established determinant, on collaboration among emergency management agencies (EMAs) in Nigeria. Barnes's theory of social network and Lévi-Strauss's theory of social exchanges framed the study. Survey data were collected from a sample of 38 EMAs out of the population of 812 EMAs; they were affiliated with 6 political parties in control of different jurisdictions between 2011 and 2015. Data were grouped into 2 categories based on the alignment of political affiliation of the agencies (same party vs. different parties). Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and *t*-tests. Results suggested no significant difference in the perception of the strength of collaboration among the representatives of the EMAs who had similar political party alignment when compared with the perception of the strength of collaboration among EMAs who had different political party alignment ( $p = .15$ ). Implications for positive social change include recommendations for government officials to focus on the other determinants of collaboration, that is, improving management techniques and making resources available regardless of political affiliation. These could ultimately contribute to making emergency management more effective and efficient, thereby reducing the adverse effects of emergencies and disasters on the citizenry.

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## Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to Almighty God, my enabler and the master of my life. To my wonderful wife Florence and to our angels Esther, Elizabeth and Faith I say thank you for your support and understanding. Also, to my extended family and friends, I say thank you for bearing with my seeming absence in your lives this past few years as I concentrated on completing this doctoral programme ... I am back.

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## Table of Contents

List of Tables .....	vi
List of Figures .....	vii
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study.....	1
Introduction.....	1
Organization of Chapter.....	2
Background.....	2
Problem Statement .....	3
Purpose of the Study .....	4
Research Question and Hypotheses .....	4
Theoretical Framework for the Study .....	5
Nature of the Study .....	6
Definitions.....	7
Assumptions.....	8
Scope and Delimitations .....	10
Limitations .....	11
Significance.....	11
Summary and Transition.....	12
Chapter 2: Literature Review.....	14
Introduction.....	14
Organization of Chapter.....	14
Research Strategy.....	15



Theoretical Foundation .....	17
Theory of Social Network.....	17
Theory of Social Exchange.....	19
Relevance of Selected Theories to the Study.....	22
Description and Literature Review of the Constructs of Interest .....	23
Collaboration and Related Concepts (Cooperation, Coordination, and Collaboration) .....	23
Cooperation.....	24
Coordination .....	24
Collaboration.....	25
Dimensions of Collaboration .....	27
Characteristics of Collaboration .....	30
Determinants of Collaboration.....	33
Emergency Management .....	35
Collaboration in Emergency Management .....	39
Emergency Management in Nigeria .....	41
Politics and Public Administration .....	44
Political Affiliation .....	45
Political Affiliation, Collaboration, and Emergency Management .....	45
Summary and Transition.....	46
Chapter 3: Research Method.....	48
Introduction.....	48

Restatement of the Research Question and Hypotheses .....	48
Role of the Researcher .....	49
Research Design and Rationale .....	49
Operationalization of Variables .....	51
Independent Variable .....	51
Dependent Variable .....	51
Measurement.....	52
Measurement Scales.....	53
The Survey Instrument.....	53
Survey Statements.....	54
Population, Sampling, and Sampling Procedures .....	56
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection .....	60
Data Analysis Plan .....	62
Preanalysis Data Screening.....	62
Detailed Analysis Plan.....	62
Threats to Validity .....	64
Threats to External Validity.....	64
Threats to Internal Validity.....	64
Threats to Construct Validity.....	66
Ethical Procedures .....	66
Summary and Transition.....	67
Chapter 4: Results.....	69

Introduction.....	69
Preanalysis Data Screening.....	69
Descriptive and Inferential Statistics .....	70
Reliability of the Likert Scale Questions .....	70
Basic Characteristics of the Agencies in the Sample.....	71
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variable .....	72
Normality Assumptions .....	76
Restatement of the Research Question and Hypotheses .....	78
Statistical Analyses .....	79
Independent Sample t Test.....	79
Summary .....	80
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations.....	82
Introduction.....	82
Summary of the Results .....	82
Limitations of the Study.....	82
Interpretation of Findings .....	83
Culture of Rampant Political Nomadism in Nigeria.....	84
Sample Size.....	84
Timing of the Study .....	85
Nature of Instrument.....	85
Recommendation for Future Research.....	85
Implications for Positive Social Change.....	86

Conclusion .....	87
References.....	89
Appendix A: Survey Instrument .....	112
Appendix B: Raw Scores of the Perception of the Strength of Collaboration– States .....	116
Appendix C: Raw Scores of the Perception of the Strength of Collaboration– Federal.....	117
Appendix D: Raw Scores of the Perception of the Strength of Collaboration– Combined.....	118
Appendix E: Collaboration Scores Grouped into the Five Dimensions .....	119

## List of Tables

Table 1. Survey: 17-Point Collaboration Scale (Perception).....	55
Table 2. Results of the Test of Reliability of the Likert Scale Questions.....	70
Table 3. Characteristics and Distribution of the Participating Agencies .....	72
Table 4. Definition of the Five Dimensions of Collaboration and Corresponding Number of Questions on the Questionnaire .....	74
Table 5. Composite Score of the Perceived Collaboration Strength .....	75
Table 6. Scores of the Five Dimensions of the Perception of Collaboration.....	76
Table 7. Results of Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) Test of Normality of Subgroups .....	76
Table 8. Results of Skewness and Kurtosis Tests of Normality of Subgroups .....	77
Table 9. Results of the Independent Samples <i>t</i> Tests for Collaboration and its Five Dimensions .....	80

## List of Figures

Figure 1. Direct exchange structures .....	20
Figure 2. Generalized (indirect) exchange structure.....	20
Figure 3. Productive exchange structure.....	21
Figure 4. Disaster management cycle depicting the four-phased comprehensive emergency management (CEM) proposed by the National Governors’ Association.....	38
Figure 5. Institutional framework for disaster management in Nigeria depicting horizontal and vertical relationship among institutions involved in emergency management in Nigeria .....	43
Figure 6. Relationship between power and sample size generated using G*Power 3.1.9.2 power analysis software .....	60
Figure 7. Normal Q-Q plot of perception of collaboration among agencies with same political affiliation .....	77
Figure 8. Normal Q-Q plot of perception of collaboration among agencies with different political party affiliation.....	78

## Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

### **Introduction**

The scope and intensity of natural and human-made disasters and emergencies are widening and becoming more intense (Bodeau, Fedorowicz, Markus, & Brooks, 2009). The attendant losses are equally becoming quite astronomical (Topper & Lagadec, 2013; Waugh, 2006). There is therefore an impetus to find ways to better manage these devastating events to minimize losses and the subsequent disruption to social functioning. Several studies aimed at understanding and improving emergency management have been conducted. One major finding from these studies is that collaboration among entities involved in emergency/disaster management is essential (McGuire & Silvia, 2010; Meunier, 2013; Mullin & Daley, 2009; Robinson & Gaddis, 2012; Waugh & Streib, 2006). Studies have equally shown that collaboration is dependent on social structure (Mullin & Daley, 2009). The current study was aimed at exploring the effect(s) political affiliations (one of the indicators of social structure) have on collaboration among governmental organizations involved in managing emergencies in Nigeria. Given the pivotal role governmental organizations play in managing emergencies (Kapucu & Demiroz, 2011, McEntire, Fuller, Johnston, & Weber, 2002; McGuire, 2006), and the multiplier effects collaboration can bring to resolving social problems and challenges (Andrew & Kendra, 2012; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; McGuire, 2006), an understanding of likely inhibitors or promoters of collaboration among these governmental agencies would no doubt help improve service delivery. This study attempted to show in what ways political affiliations inhibit or promote collaboration

among emergency management agencies. An understanding of these dynamics could help to draft policies and the necessary rules of engagement that would guide the indispensable interactions among the agencies. This could ultimately contribute to making emergency management more effective and efficient, thereby reducing the adverse effects of emergencies and disasters on the citizenry.

### **Organization of Chapter**

Chapter 1 covers the introduction to the study and opens with a brief introductory statement describing the topic and the possible positive social change the study can bring about. This is followed by an elaboration of the organization of the chapter and the background to the study, which sets the stage by justifying the need for the study. Thereafter, the problem statement, purpose of the study, and research question and hypotheses are presented. These are then followed by the theoretical framework for the study, the nature of the study, definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance of the study. The chapter is finally closed with a summary and transitional statements to Chapter 2.

### **Background**

Collaboration is essential for resolving difficult, even intractable social problems (Andrew & Kendra, 2012; Bryson et al., 2006; McGuire, 2006). Natural and human-made emergencies and disasters fall into this category of social problems (McGuire & Silvia, 2010). How collaboration works in or its impact on emergency management is yet to be fully understood (Thomson, Perry & Miller, 2007). Based on the established precepts that social structure affects behavior (Barnes, 1954), earlier studies have



identified indicators of social structure as political context, financial capacity, and management techniques (Mullin & Daley, 2009). There have been calls for the exploration of how these indicators affect collaboration (Clay, 2012; Leslie, 2012; Wrobel, 2012). I followed these recommendations by exploring the impact of political context on collaboration among governmental organizations in an emergency management setting. This will promote a better understanding of the dynamics of collaboration among these agencies and encourage the enactment of policies and procedures that would maximize collaboration among the entities for the benefit of the populace.

### **Problem Statement**

Studies have shown that most public policy problems require multilateral, multidisciplinary, and multiagency efforts to be resolved (Engstrand & Ahlander, 2008; Fierlbeck, 2010; Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 2010; Kapucu, Augustin, & Garayev, 2009; Mullin & Daley, 2009). Given its importance in facilitating the required multifaceted interactions in public administration, collaboration has been a focus of scientific inquiry in recent times. Several studies have examined the nature, extent, and effectiveness of collaboration among different types of entities engaged in emergency or disaster management (McGuire & Silvia, 2010; Meunier, 2013; Mullin & Daley, 2009; Robinson & Gaddis, 2012; Waugh & Streib, 2006). The authors of these studies tended to conclude that collaboration is a sine qua non for emergency management.

Studies also showed that such collaboration is dependent on several cultural and social factors (Barjak & Robinson, 2008; Chua, Morris, & Mor, 2012; Stahl, Maznevski,

Voigt, & Jonsen, 2010; Vangen & Winchester, 2013). However, most of these studies on collaboration focused on the Western world and particularly the United States of America. Given the cultural diversity among nations (Vangen & Winchester, 2013), it is not clear if the drivers of collaboration established by these studies would apply to countries outside the Western Hemisphere. This study was therefore aimed at testing one of the established models of the determinants of collaboration in emergency management on a country (Nigeria) outside the Western Hemisphere. The ultimate objective of the study was to identify strategies that would make emergency management more effective and efficient in the country while at the same time contributing to the knowledge about the dynamics of collaboration outside the Western world.

### **Purpose of the Study**

This study was aimed at investigating if the assertion that politics often affect policies (Meier, 2000; Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Mullin & Daley, 2009; Wilson, 1989) held true in the realm of emergency management. The purpose of this quantitative study was therefore to examine the effects political affiliations have on collaboration among emergency management agencies in Nigeria. My objective as a researcher was to assess the influence of political preferences on collaborative behaviors among emergency management agencies in Nigeria.

### **Research Question and Hypotheses**

This quantitative study hinged on the assumption that collaboration would be stronger between same-party agencies than between different-parties agencies. The

research question and hypotheses used to explore the veracity of this assumption among emergency management agencies in Nigeria are presented below.

*Research Question:* Does alignment of political affiliation affect collaboration among emergency management agencies?

*H<sub>0</sub>:* Collaboration level does not vary significantly between emergency management agencies differing in political affiliation and between agencies in the same political affiliation.

*H<sub>a</sub>:* The perceived collaboration strength is significantly higher for emergency management agencies of similar political affiliation than those with different affiliations.

### **Theoretical Framework for the Study**

This study was framed within two related theoretical perspectives. The first was Barnes's (1954) theory of social network, in which the behavior of an entity (an individual, a group, or an organization) is conditioned or influenced by the structure of social relationships around such an entity. For Barnes and Mullin and Daley (2009), structure is related to the way society is organized for decision making and administration. Further applications of Barnes's theory in different fields of study have produced several refinements. Mullin and Daley identified three key drivers or indicators of social structure, namely political context, financial capacity, and management techniques. My research focused on how a particular behavior (interagency collaboration) is conditioned or influenced by one of the identified indicators of social structures (political context) in an emergency management setting. Political context refers to the underlying political dispensation of the environment within which the interaction is

taking place. The second guiding theoretical framework was Lévi-Strauss's (1969) theory of social exchanges, in which the purpose of exchange in a social relationship is to maximize benefits and minimize costs. More details on the theories of social network and social exchange will be presented in Chapter 2. Mullin and Daley argued that similarity in political preferences among agencies encourages collaboration. Based on this theoretical framework, I hypothesized that collaboration would be significantly higher among emergency management agencies of jurisdictions under the control of same political party than among those under different political parties.

### **Nature of the Study**

The study was carried out using quantitative research method with a cross-sectional non-experimental design. The quantitative method was very suitable for a study such as this that would assess the influence of political preferences on collaborative behaviors among emergency management agencies. The dependent variable for the study was the strength of collaboration while the independent variable was political affiliations. Covariate variables considered were the agencies' financial capacity and management techniques. The dependent variable was expressed as a quantitative measure in scores, while the independent variable (political affiliations) was dichotomous (Mertler & Vannatta, 2013, p. 3) based on same party and different parties' alignment. Detailed explanation of the nature of the variables will be presented in Chapter 2. Data were collected from heads of emergency management agencies at the federal and state government levels in Nigeria using a 7-point Likert scale survey instrument. The data generated was analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).

Descriptive statistical analyses were carried out as appropriate to summarize the data. The significance of mean group differences in the perceived strength of collaboration (dependent variable) between the same-party and the different-parties groups (independent variable) was derived using independent sample *t* test to test the hypotheses (Mertler & Vannatta, 2013, p. 15).

### **Definitions**

There were six important concepts that were of relevance to this study. These were emergency management, emergency management agency, collaboration, political affiliation, financial capacity, and management techniques. The adopted definitions of these concepts for this study are presented below:

*Collaboration:* According to Thomson et al. (2007), collaboration is a process in which autonomous or semi-autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions. (p. 3)

The aim of collaboration is to solve problems that a single entity cannot resolve on its own (Bingham, 2008, p. 250).

*Emergency management:* Emergency management is the managerial function responsible for articulating and operationalizing policies and procedures aimed at reducing societal vulnerability to hazards, coping with emergencies/disasters when they

eventually occur, and returning society to normal or better functioning state (Blanchard et al., 2007).

*Emergency management agency:* A governmental organization established either by legislation or by an executive order tasked with the responsibility of coordinating plans, actions, and resources towards the management of all forms of emergencies. The organization may be a unique entity with formalized structure or maybe a committee-styled ensemble of nominated government officials.

*Financial capacity:* Financial capacity is a measure of the ability of a system to meet its financial obligations. The International Risk Management Institute, Inc. (2016) defined financial capacity as “the financial limit of an organization's ability to absorb losses with its own funds or borrowed funds without major disruption” (para. 1).

*Management techniques:* Management techniques are the systematic and analytical methods used by managers to assist in decision making and the improvement of efficiency and effectiveness. These techniques typically have applications in all aspects of planning, organizing, directing and controlling the activities of all types of organizations (Armstrong, 2006).

*Political affiliation:* The adoption or close association of an entity to a political party based on congruency of ideology, policies, programs, or other interests.

### **Assumptions**

The philosophical assumptions underpinning this quantitative research study with a cross-sectional non-experimental design were rooted in the postpositivist traditions. Ontologically (nature of reality) speaking, postpositivism adopts a critical realism

paradigm in which reality is viewed as imperfect and therefore only probabilistically apprehensible (Gelo, 2012). Epistemologically (nature of knowledge) speaking, the objectivist modified paradigm, in which knowledge is not absolutely but rather probably true, is adopted. These views allow for the “higher degree of indeterminacy” faced in scientific inquiries and “the emphasis placed on theory falsification instead of on theory verification promoted” by postpositivism (Gelo, 2012, p. 120). The postpositivist propositions also support the adoption of quantitative research methods with experimental, quasi-experimental, and correlational (non-experimental) designs as well as probabilistic and purposive (convenience) sampling techniques (Gelo, 2012).

Consequent upon the foregoing, the most critical assumptions relating to the nature of reality and knowledge about the methodological approach to this study were as follows:

- An organization’s political affiliation could be imputed from the political affiliation of the head of the organization.
- All participants in the study would reflect the larger population of the heads of emergency management agencies in Nigeria.
- Responses from the states would be representative of those of the local governments given that the political parties in control of the states also control the local governments within the states (explanation appears in the Procedures for Recruitment section of Chapter 3).

### **Scope and Delimitations**

Studies have shown that there are several phenomena that can affect collaborative behaviors (Mullin & Daley, 2009). This study was, however, restricted to exploring the effects that political affiliations have on collaborative behavior among emergency management agencies in Nigeria. Political affiliation was chosen from among the several drivers of social structure (Mullin & Daley, 2009) given the nascent nature of multiparty democracy in the country and the desire to comprehend how party politics impact social service delivery. Although several governmental organizations as well as private organizations and individuals are often involved in managing emergencies (Waugh & Streib, 2006), this study was restricted to considering political affiliations and collaboration among governmental organizations established either by legislation or executive order and mandated to manage emergencies and disasters within their respective jurisdictions (federal, state, and local government levels). The study was bounded within the broad network theory frameworks of social network and social exchange theories. The study did not extend to the consideration of network analysis. Social network analysis, which is typically used to explain the nature of relations in a network and how that might affect outcomes, is usually carried out by setting out patterns presented in graphs that depicts the social ties among actors (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1994). The findings of the study have the potential to be generalizable to intergovernmental relations across disciplines. Also, because political power configuration in Nigeria changes every 4 years, the study focused on the 4-year period spanning May 2011 to May 2015.



### **Limitations**

One major limitation of the study was the inability of the chosen instrument to measure actual collaborative behavior. Rather, the instrument was only able to measure respondents' perception of collaboration. The attendant self-reporting may have introduced social desirability bias, in which respondents may falsify their responses in order to make themselves look good or to portray themselves in a positive light (Fisher, 1993; Nederhof, 1985; van de Mortel, 2008). Social desirability bias is common in studies centered on socially sensitive issues such as politics, religion, and environment, or personal issues (Grimm, 2010). Another limitation was the possible biases I as the researcher might bring into the study having worked at the federal level emergency management agency at a senior level from June 2012 to June 2016, a period corresponding to most of the period to be covered by the study.

The limitation introduced by the inability to measure actual collaborative behavior was ameliorated by sampling only heads of the organizations who were assumed to be the most knowledgeable about happenings in their respective agencies. The social desirability bias was managed by informing and assuring respondents that their responses were nonattributable. My possible biases were addressed through the maintenance of a state of *heightened self-awareness* (Creswell, 2007) and reliance on quantitative methods to manipulate the data.

### **Significance**

This study contributed to the knowledge on emergency management, especially as it relates to Nigeria. The study highlighted the effects of politics on the collaborative

disposition of emergency management agencies in Nigeria. Given the widening scope and intensity of natural and human-made disasters and emergencies in Nigeria's recent history, the study gave insight into the determinants of collaboration that are germane to the local environment. This has the potential of improving emergency response practices in Nigeria and contributing to saving lives and/or drastically mitigating the effects of disasters and emergencies on the populace.

### **Summary and Transition**

This chapter presented the background and the rationale for the study. The chapter opened with a description of the topic, the necessity of the study, and the possible social change it could engender. These were followed by an articulation of the problem statement and the purpose of the study. The research question and hypotheses as well as the theoretical framework to guide the study were thereafter presented. The nature of the study, pertinent definitions, assumptions, scope, delimitation, limitations, and significance of the study were then presented before concluding with a summary of the chapter.

Chapter 2 contains a review of the literature on the theories of social networks and social exchanges, which were used as frameworks for the study. This is followed by an exhaustive review of the concepts of collaboration and political affiliations, which are the two main variables in the study. The chapter will also present a review of the literature on emergency management especially as it relates to Nigeria, the country of interest. Chapter 3 will present a detailed description of the chosen design and methodology as well as the rationale for choosing the approach. Chapter 4 will present the details of how the data

were generated and manipulated. It will also present the results and conclude with a summary of the answer to the research question. Chapter 5 will present an interpretation of the findings in the context of the theoretical framework. The limitations of the study as well as recommendations for further research followed by implications for positive social change will thereafter be presented.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

### **Introduction**

The ability of the usual many individuals and organizations involved in responding to emergency and disaster situations to work synergistically and harmoniously will no doubt reduce losses (Wittmann, Jurisch, & Krcmar, 2015). Although the *new public management* concept, in which governmental and nongovernmental organizations come together to resolve public issues, has become increasingly popular (Bingham & O'Leary, 2006), emergency management has remained a field largely dominated by governmental organizations (Kapucu & Demiroz, 2011). In a multiparty democracy such as in the United States of America or Nigeria, there exists the possibility of different political parties controlling the different tiers of government (federal, state, local) at any given time. This research study was aimed at addressing the paucity of studies on the effects of political affiliations on collaboration among emergency management agencies. This literature review was therefore aimed at analyzing and synthesizing literature on the two fundamental concepts and variables that underpinned this study: collaboration and political affiliations. The focus of the review was how these two concepts interact in emergency management scenarios.

### **Organization of Chapter**

This literature review opens with an introduction, followed by a description of the strategy for searching for literature, then a review of the extant literature, closing with a summary. The introduction to the study elaborated the problem statement by examining earlier studies that laid the foundation for the problem statement. The research strategy

details the procedure used in sourcing for articles and materials used in the study. The review of extant literature presents the salient characteristics and determinants of collaboration especially among emergency management organizations. The literature review also covers the nexus between politics, public administration, and their probable effects on collaboration. The chapter ends with a summary of the chapter and an appropriate transition to Chapter 3, which deals with research methodology.

### **Research Strategy**

The materials used in this literature review were sourced in two stages. The first stage was aimed at getting a sense of the current knowledge on collaboration in emergency management in general so as to be able to identify discernable gaps in the literature. The second stage was then to focus on the observed gap of interest—in this case, the role political affiliations play in the formation and sustenance of collaboration in emergency management. In both stages, materials were sources from academic and peer-reviewed articles obtained from multiple databases through the Walden University Library. The databases consulted included

- Academic Search Premier/Complete,
- Goggle Scholar,
- Political Science Complete,
- ProQuest Dissertations and Theses,
- ProQuest Central,
- Science Journals,
- Social Science Journals,

- SAGE Premiers,
- Statistics and Data,
- Tests and Measures,
- Thoreau: Search Multiple Databases, and
- Political Sciences Collection.

Searching for articles on collaboration was a little easier as there have been several studies on the subject across many fields. To focus the search, I used keywords such as *collaboration*, *coordination*, and *cooperation* in conjunction with *emergency management* and *disaster management*. *Coordination* and *cooperation* were used as keywords in the search as they were often used interchangeably with *collaboration* in the literature. *Disaster management* was also often used interchangeably with *emergency management*. Finding articles on political affiliations was a little trickier as the notion appeared to still be nebulous in literature. Most studies that broached the subject merely presented it as membership of or preference for a political party or an ideology. To expand the understanding of the concept, related and other useful concepts such as *political context*, *party politics*, *political ideology*, and *political parties* were used as keywords in the search. Searches for collaboration were restricted to the period 2007 to 2016 while the most current articles of interest were picked for review. However, because of the paucity of articles, searches for political affiliation were extended backwards to year 2000.

## **Theoretical Foundation**

This study was framed within two interrelated theoretical perspectives. The first was the theory of social networks as propounded by Barnes (1954), while the second was the theory of social exchanges (Lévi-Strauss, 1969). Both theories are related to the extent that they are anchored on the notion of the existence of interdependency of actors in a social setting.

### **Theory of Social Network**

In the theory of social network, Barnes (1954) contended that the behavior of an entity (an individual, a group, or an organization) is conditioned or influenced by the structure of social relationships around such an entity. The theory of social network is a subset of the general network theory, which hinges on the notion that human behavior is best explained by the relative location of the entity within the social structure it must operate. Network theory itself has its roots in structural sociology as proposed by the likes of Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and Georg Simmel. Structural sociology encompasses an idea that human activities are guided by social structures made up of social institutions and patterns of institutionalized relationships (Durkheim, 1893; Marx, 1959; Simmel, 1950; Spencer, 1876; Wellman & Berkowitz, 1998). Marx (1959) had noted that “it is not the consciousness of [people] that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness” (p. 43). This raises the idea that social structures have a more pronounced effect on human behavior than do cultural norms or other subjective phenomena—an idea that has since been one of the guiding principles of the study of networks. Consequently, network theory, and by

extension social network theory, proposes that social structures are more influential than norms and values in determining and explaining an actor's behavior.

Homophily and propinquity are two important concepts of social network theory (Cook-Craig, 2010). Homophily refers to the assumption that, other factors being the same, actors in a social setting are most likely to seek each other out based on similarity in characteristics such as experiences, backgrounds, and professional philosophies (Cook-Craig, 2010; Kadushin, 2004). Propinquity on the other hand refers to the assumption that, other factors considered, actors are likely to connect with those that are geographically close to them (Cook-Craig, 2010; Kadushin, 2004). Another important concept in social network theory is the concept of strong and weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). Strong ties exist among *similar people* (Granovetter, 1973) or among professional entities that have regular contact with one another (Hansen, 1999; Haythornthwaite & Wellman, 1998; Krackhardt, 1992). Actors with similar characteristics are therefore expected to have strong ties based on shared purpose, common identity, trust, and an efficient source of information and resource sharing (Burt, 2001; Putnam, 2000; Warren, Thompson, & Saegart, 2001; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Weak ties, on the other hand, characterize entities with divergent and heterogeneous attributes (Burt, 2001; Putnam, 2000; Warren et al., 2001; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).


There have been several refinements of Barnes's (1954) theory of social network. One of particular interest was carried out by Mullin and Daley (2009). The authors identified political context, financial capacity, and management techniques as the three key drivers or indicators of social structure. In line with the social network theory




traditions, Mullin and Daley proposed that similarity in political preferences among entities encourages collaboration.

### **Theory of Social Exchange**


The theory of social exchange is focused on the benefits that entities derive from, and contribute to, social interaction, and the structures that guide or within which the exchanges take place (Cook & Rice, 2003). The theory proposes that the purpose of exchange is to maximize benefits and minimize costs. Decision to enter or continue in a social relationship is contingent upon a subjective evaluation of the costs and benefits, which is moderated by the expectations of the actors and a comparison with possible alternatives. Social exchange theory is anchored on the expectation of reciprocity tempered by the level of dependency among actors (Cook & Rice, 2003; Emerson, 1976; Homans, 1961; Rusbult, 1983; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Exchanges can take different forms: they can be direct, generalized, productive, reciprocal, or negotiated (Cook & Rice, 2003; Molm, 1988, 1990, 1994). Direct exchange takes place between two actors with each actor's outcomes depending directly on the other actor's behaviors. That is, provision of value is directly reciprocal between the two parties, A and B (Figure 1). Generalized exchange takes place among three or more actors with indirect reciprocity. Generalized exchange “encompasses those social exchange relations in which one actor [A] gives resources to another [B], but where such resources are reciprocated not by the recipient [B] but rather a third party [C]” (Cook & Rice, 2003, p. 69) within the network (Figure 2). Productive exchange (Figure 3) requires the contributions of both actors in a relationship for any of the actors to derive any benefit (Lawler, Yoon, & Thye, 2000).



*Figure 1.* Direct exchange structures. Adapted from "Theories of Social Exchange and Exchange Network," by L. D. Molm, 2001, in B. Smart and G. Ritzer (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Theory* (p. 4), London: SAGE. Copyright (2001).



*Figure 2.* Generalized (indirect) exchange structure. Adapted from "Theories of Social Exchange and Exchange Network," by L. D. Molm, 2001, in B. Smart and G. Ritzer (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Theory* (p. 4), London: SAGE. Copyright (2001).



*Figure 3.* Productive exchange structure. Adapted from "Theories of Social Exchange and Exchange Network," by L. D. Molm, 2001, in B. Smart and G. Ritzer (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Theory* (p. 4), London: SAGE. Copyright (2001).

All exchanges carry a level of uncertainty and risk that are directly related to the form of exchange (Molm, Peterson, & Takahashi, 2000). Generalized exchanges typically carry the highest risks, followed by reciprocal exchanges, with negotiated exchanges bearing the lowest risks (Cook & Rice, 2003). The level of risk is dependent on the structure of the outcome. Actors typically jointly agree to the terms of exchange in negotiated exchanges. Hence, outcome and costs to all parties are known prior to exchange taking place. Exchange takes place in reciprocal and generalized settings without actors' fore-knowledge of the nature of the returns they will receive or if they will even obtain any return (Cook & Rice, 2003). Generalized exchange is riskier than reciprocal exchange because reciprocity, if it occurs, is indirect.

Risk and uncertainty can be ameliorated by trust, which can develop as exchange expands and partners prove themselves trustworthy (Blau, 1964). In addition to requiring trust to blossom, exchange under risk and uncertainty also promotes trust (Lévi-Strauss, 1969). Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994), however, differentiated between trust

(expectations of positive response based on respondent's personal traits) and assurance (expectations of positive response based on the existence of an incentive). The authors posited that the presence of an assurance incentive structure limits the development of trust. In general, negotiated exchange provides greater assurance than reciprocal exchange, and reciprocal exchange provides greater assurance than generalized exchange (Kollock, 1994; Molm et al., 2000). However, as risk creates opportunities for trust to develop, so it creates avenues for exploitation (Kollock, 1994; Molm et al., 2000). In generalized exchange that is typical in public policy and administration, Yamagishi and Cook (1993) posited that actors must have a relatively high level of general trust in others initially for the system to survive and become sustainable. Takahashi (2000) has, however, shown that pure generalized exchange systems can still form and endure in the absence of high levels of trust or central sanctioning systems, provided actors selectively give to recipients whose behaviors satisfy the givers' criterion of fairness.

### **Relevance of Selected Theories to the Study**

As discussed, the theories of social network and social exchange were apt in guiding this study on the relationship between political affiliation and collaboration among social entities. Both concepts of political affiliation and collaboration can be explained by these two chosen theories of social network and social exchange. The resolution of this study's research question, which was to interrogate the effects of political affiliation on collaboration, contributed to building upon these theories by highlighting some departures.

### **Description and Literature Review of the Constructs of Interest**

In this section, the three related concepts of coordination, cooperation and collaboration will first be considered. Thereafter, literature on the dimensions, general characteristics and determinants of collaboration will be reviewed. This will be followed by a consideration of the concept of emergency management and the nature of collaboration in emergency management. The practice of emergency in Nigeria will also be reviewed before rounding up the section with a consideration of the interface between politics and public administration.

#### **Collaboration and Related Concepts (Cooperation, Coordination, and Collaboration)**

Collaboration remains a popular concept of interest to researchers across several disciplines and particularly so in public administration (Bingham & O'Leary, 2006; Robinson & Gaddis, 2012). A cursory search of the keyword *collaboration* carried out on April 10, 2016 using the Thoreau multiple databases returned a total of 119,082 peer-reviewed articles on the subject published between 2010 and 2016. A further analysis of the result showed the currency of the subject as a similar search covering the period January 2014 to April 2016 returned a total of 36,393 articles. The interest in the concept of collaboration is understandable given the desirability of some form of collective action in handling the myriad of challenges (often referred to as *wicked problems*) facing public administration in recent times (Andrew & Kendra, 2012; Bryson et al., 2006; McGuire, 2006), more so when viewed against the backdrop of scarce resources and rapid changes in technology and organizational structure (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Three related

concepts of collective action were identified in literature. These were coordination, cooperation, collaboration (Amirkhanyan, 2008; Thomson & Perry, 2006). The three Cs as they are often called represent different but complementary levels of experience in social interactions (Amici, 2015). A review of the literature suggested a progression in the order of collective action from cooperation to coordination and finally collaboration (Thomson & Perry, 2006).

### **Cooperation**

Cooperation is on the lowest rung of the collective action ladder. Cooperation exists when multiple individuals or organizations decide to pool their resources in the pursuit of an objective. It presupposes a premeditated willingness on the part of the cooperating entities to contribute to the collective efforts of the group (Cienki, 2015). As noted by Amici (2015), cooperative processes involve “social interactions in which actors incur some costs to altruistically provide benefits to a partner” (p. 383). The interaction within the group in a cooperative environment is usually informal and limited to the achievement of the objective that has brought them together with no consideration for the missions or goals of the constituent organizations. Each cooperating entity retains its autonomy and authority, and communication among members is on the basis of necessity (Mattessich & Monsey, 1992).

### **Coordination**

Guo and Kapucu (2015) described coordination as the management of “dependencies among activities” (p. 896). Coordination, as a model of collective action, involves the deliberate and conscious efforts of actors to regulate their activities towards

the achievement of a set objective. It is a process in which multiple organizations jointly design and execute a set of plans and policies aimed at achieving a set objective (Aghajani, Amin & Abasgholipour, 2014). It therefore follows that there must be a level of compatibility among the overarching missions and goals of the interacting organizations (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001a). Coordinating entities must also be willing and must have the ability and capacity to contribute to achieving the objective (Aghajani et al.). Coordinating organizations continue to function as distinct entities while carrying out their unique tasks within the collective action sphere. Consequently, while authority remains with individual organizations, some leadership and control responsibilities are pooled (Mattessich et al., 2001a). Coordination involves the synchronization of the efforts and activities of all contributing entities, hence, one organization (the Coordinator) is typically saddled with the leadership and decisionmaking responsibilities necessary to ensure harmonious working of the constituent parts (Axner, 2015).

### **Collaboration**

There are several definitions of collaboration in the literature. Bingham (2008) for example described collaboration as “the process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations” (p. 250). Roschelle and Teasley (as cited in Baker, 2015) on the other hand defined it as “a coordinated, synchronous activity that is the result of a continued attempt to construct and maintain a shared conception of a problem” (p. 70). Thomson et al. (2007) on their own part defined collaboration

[a]s a process in which autonomous or semi-autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions. (p. 3)

From the foregoing, collaboration is a challenging collective action process in that it involves bringing together parties with different and sometimes conflicting values and purposes, formulating agreeable principles and rules guiding their interactions and proffering solutions to problems that are beyond individual constituent parts (Paquet & Wilson, 2015). Collaboration is a complex process (Thomson et al., 2007) that is iterative and cyclical (Paquet & Wilson, 2015) involving negotiations and renegotiations among collaborating entities. Collaboration has become a necessity given that the power, resources, and information that are required to resolve contemporary *wicked problems* are often widely and unequally distributed (Paquet & Wilson, 2015).

For collaboration to succeed, Paquet and Wilson (2015) posited that four conditions must exist. The first condition is that all parties to the collaboration must first acknowledge that a problem whose resolution is beyond an individual organization's capacity exists. The second condition is that participating agencies must accept that their knowledge of the problem as well as the solutions they may be contemplating are only partial and generally inadequate and must therefore be open to learning and to new ideas. Third condition is that a thorough understanding of the problem must always precede any action and that all collaborators are treated as equals especially as it relates to decision



making. The fourth condition is the presence of a mechanism to monitor and evaluate the group's interactions and provide a guide for determining the necessity for continuing the collaboration.

### **Dimensions of Collaboration**

The processes leading to collaboration occur synergistically rather than incrementally in phases (Thomson et al., 2007). Five notable dimensions of collaboration have been identified in literature. The first relating to *governance* requires participants to develop the ability to jointly decide on rules that will guide their interactions (Thomson et al., 2007). This process typically involves negotiating an equilibrium (Warren, 1967) amidst the conflicting preferences of the collaborating partners (Thomson et al., 2007). The second dimension of collaboration relates to *administration*. Collaborative endeavors just like hierarchical management require the existence of administrative structures that will delineate roles and responsibilities, provide coordination as well as mechanisms for monitoring individual participant's contribution to the collective in line with the jointly agreed terms of the association. Thomson and Perry (2006) refer to these attributes as "administrative capacity" (p. 25). However, given the voluntary and decentralized nature of participation in collaborative endeavors, "social capacity" (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 25) that builds relationships is considered even more essential. Social capacity can be enhanced by the presence of *boundary spanners* (Williams, 2002) with skills such as ability to "build and sustain effective interpersonal relationships" and to "manage interdependency" (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 26). Unlike in traditional hierarchical management where roles are fixed and immutable, collaborating partners often take on

different roles within the collaboration (Thomson & Perry, 2006). A major administrative challenge in collaboration however remains the management of the “inherent tension between [partners’] self-interests and [the] collective interests” (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 26).

The third dimension of collaboration is rooted in the inherent dual identity of collaborators—one as a unique organization with its formal structure and culture, and two as a part of a collaborating entity. This dual identity often create tension between the need to satisfy individual organization’s goals (self-interest) and the requirements to fulfil the objectives of the collaboration (collective interest). Huxham (1996) labelled this tension “autonomy-accountability dilemma” (p. 15), and posited that given the voluntary nature of collaboration, participants need to justify their participation based on the benefits the effort will bring to achieving their individual aims. Collaboration therefore fares better when the problem it is meant to overcome is of sufficient importance and urgency to all partners (Thomson & Perry, 2006).

The fourth dimension of collaboration is the *mutuality dimension*, which has its roots in the interdependencies that exist among collaborating partners (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Collaboration is encouraged when participants are complemented by each other’s unique resources (Powell, 1990), or when the issue at hand transcends individual organization’s mission—for example as in when it concerns the environment or has to do with a humanitarian crisis (Thomson & Perry, 2006). As noted by Chen and Graddy (2005), collaboration is promoted when participants are able to “acquire resources from

other organizations that they need and do not have but are critical for their continuing functioning” (p. 17).

The fifth and final dimension of collaboration is the *trust and reciprocity dimension* (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Collaborating partners are often willing to collaborate if or when they sense a corresponding willingness on the part of others (Axelrod, 1984; Ostrom, 1990; 1998; Powell, 1990; Thomson & Perry, 2006). In addition to reciprocity, trust, which Cummings and Bromiley (as cited in Thomson & Perry, 2006) defined as

a common belief among a group of individuals that another group (1) will make “good-faith efforts to behave in accordance with any commitments both explicit and implicit,” (2) will “be honest in whatever negotiations preceded such commitments,” and (3) will “not take excessive advantage of another even when the opportunity is available” (p. 28),

is a necessity for a successful collaboration (Bardach, 1998; Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Ostrom, 1998; Smith, 1995). Although trust ultimately reduces complexity and transaction costs (Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Ostrom, 1998; Smith, 1995), it nonetheless requires considerable effort and time to be built and nurtured (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). As the level of trust increases, the limiting effects of organizational autonomy reduces while mutuality epitomized by common interests expands and in turn generate support for new governance and administrative initiatives that will enhance the collaborative effort (Thomson & Perry, 2006).

### **Characteristics of Collaboration**

Amirkhanyan (2008), after a review of public management literature (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Bazzoli, et al., 1997; Imperial, 2005; McGuire, 2006; Selden, Sowa, & Sandfort, 2006; Thomson, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006), identified a number of characteristics of collaboration. Firstly, that collaboration involves the formulation and utilization of new rules, procedures, and structures to regulate and guide the interactions among the collaborating entities. Secondly, that decisions regarding resources—both human and material—management are made jointly; and thirdly, that interactions are meant to solve problems that cannot be solved or solved easily by an individual organization. The requirement for joint decision making and joint actions among collaborating entities necessitates a level of trust in the partners' competencies in contributing to finding solutions to the problems under consideration (Entwistle & Martin, 2005).

Collaboration connotes interactions between/among organizations both on the formal and informal levels (Amirkhanyan, 2008). Collaboration in the public sector occur in a variety of formats. Collaboration can be *vertical* through levels of government, or *horizontal* in which several public and private actors with stakes or interests in the particular problem of concern are involved (McGuire, 2006). Collaboration can be highly formalized. Typical formal collaboration is established through networks that are either encouraged (Schneider, Scholz, Lubell, Mindruta, & Edwardsen, 2003) or mandated by law (O'Toole, 1997; Radin et al., 1996). Collaboration in public management can also be informal, emergent, and short-term (Drabek & McEntire, 2002). Although collaborative

structures are typically flat and self-organizing, it is not uncommon to find collaborative networks with a lead organization in the capacity of a “system controller or facilitator” (McGuire, 2006, p. 36).

Mandell and Steelman (2003) had identified five types of collaborative context. The first is when collaboration takes place intermittently as in disaster response. Collaboration in this context often requires the temporary adjustment of policies and procedures by collaborating entities in order to achieve a goal (McGuire, 2006). The second context involves the establishment of a “temporary task force” (Mandell & Steelman, 2003, p. 203) to resolve a particular problem after which the task force is disbanded. The third collaboration context involves permanent or regular interactions among several entities focused on tackling a specific challenge. Typical regular collaborative arrangements include emergency management planning and preparedness (McGuire, 2006). The fourth and fifth levels of collaborative arrangements are “coalitions and network structures” (Mandell & Steelman, 2003, p. 204; McGuire, 2006, p. 35). While both the coalitions and network arrangements involve activities that are preplanned and interrelated, coalitions are typically focused on narrow subjects and activities are restricted to within the contributing agency. Network arrangements on the other hand focus on broad tasks or situations that cannot be resolved by the simultaneous activities of individual collaborating entities. Collaboration often entails resource sharing (McGuire, 2006). While the level of resource sharing may be minimal in the intermittent and temporary task force collaborative contexts, it is more extensive in the permanent/regular and coalition/network contexts (McGuire, 2006).

Chana and Clarke (2014) posited that there are three core issues that determine the direction or health of collaboration. These are the nature of the relationships, the identities of the participating entities, and the established practices. There must be trust and respect in addition to regular interactions among collaborating organizations. The organizations must also possess the capacity to collaborate (Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 2010). Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins (2010) identified some of the attributes of this capacity to include the availability of required human, financial and technological resources to commit to the collective effort.

Collaboration requires certain ingredients to be successful. According to Parung and Bittici (2008), these include the capacity and proficiency of individual members to contribute to achieving the goal of the group; the alignment of the participation and the expected outcome with the strategic objective of the participants; the existence of interdependence among partners; and the ability of partners to contribute substantial resources to the collective effort. Other ingredients include the requirement for participants to consider the collective action as germane to their success; the ability to effectively communicate within the collective; the existence of multiple points of interaction among collaborating entities; the formalization of procedures and practices among participating organizations; and the requirement for collaborating entities to be reliable and dependable. Other important requirements of successful collaboration include effective top management support, strong and focused leadership team, and clear sense of mission and objectives (Parung & Bittici, 2008; Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 2010).

## **Determinants of Collaboration**

One of the hallmark of democratic governance (especially in a federation) is shared policy responsibility across levels of government (Mullin & Daley, 2009). Collaboration across jurisdictions in an environment where power and resources are decentralized provides an opportunity to take advantage of local knowledge, and the expertise and resources available at higher levels of government (Mullin & Daley, 2009). Mullin and Daley (2009) identified four important determinants of collaboration. According to the authors, the most significant determinant of collaboration revolves around management techniques especially one that guarantees “the existence of performance incentives for individual bureaucrats” (p. 759). Other determinants include the political context of the collective action, the availability of resources (especially at lower levels of governance), and “the real and perceived status of local problems” (Mullin & Daley, 2009, p. 759).

According to the theory of institutional rational choice, “individuals respond to both rules and incentives” (Mullin & Daley, 2009, p. 773). Collaboration is encouraged by the presence of performance incentives (Mullin & Daley, 2009). The authors found that collaboration is enhanced and encouraged when it is considered important enough to be a major field in personnel’s annual performance reviews.

Politics have also been shown to influence organizational behavior and performance (Meier, 2000; Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Mullin & Daley, 2009; Wilson, 1989). Although politicians are unable to exert total control over bureaucratic behavior, they can however use incentives and oversight mechanisms to regulate a bureaucratic

organization's actions (Huber & Shipan, 2002; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987). Hence, as noted by Agranoff and McGuire (2004), it is within the realm of possibilities for political authorities to dissuade bureaucrats from working together based on what Mullin and Daley (2009) termed "political incongruity" (p. 769). The political environment therefore plays an important role in determining the disposition of authorities (especially at subnational levels) to vertical collaborative activities as "agencies will invest more time building relationships across sectors and across levels of government if they have support from their communities and political superiors" (Mullin & Daley, 2009, p. 773).

Availability of resources can either be negatively or positively correlated to collaboration. Collaboration typically involves high costs (Vangen & Winchester, 2013). On the one hand, possession of meagre financial and human resources may therefore discourage collaboration (Mullin & Daley, 2009). Collaboration across boundaries must bring additional benefits which outweigh the transaction costs (Barjak & Robinson, 2008). On the other hand, collaboration presents an opportunity for poor subnational agencies to tap from the expertise and other resources available at higher levels of governance. In the same vein, large resource rich local agencies may consider vertical collaboration unnecessary.

The findings in several studies suggested a positive correlation between problem severity and collaboration, especially between government and nongovernmental actors (Bryson et al., 2006; Leach, Pelkey, & Sabatier, 2002; McGuire, 2006; Mullin & Daley, 2009; O'Toole, 1997; Thomson & Perry, 2006). This finding appeared to be inapplicable



to interagency collaboration as Mullin and Daley (2009) also found that “the severity of problem conditions does not appear to motivate increased interagency collaboration” (p. 774). The authors posited that this finding may be the result of a perceived interference rather than assistance with their work on the part of the agencies at the lower levels of governance.

### **Emergency Management**

Emergency and disaster are two related concepts that are often used interchangeably in literature as there is yet no consensus on the boundary between the two (Wittmann et al., 2015). Caruson and MacManus (2011) described emergency as a situation that poses an immediate risk to health, life, property, or environment and thereby requiring urgent intervention to forestall the deterioration of the situation. Disaster on the other hand is considered as a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society resulting from a calamitous event leading to widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts (Perry & Quarantelli, 2005; Quarantelli, 1998). The often-used delineator between the two concepts is the coping capacity of local authorities. An emergency is said to have become a disaster when the event exceeds the coping capabilities of the local authorities (Moss, 2013; Quarantelli, 1998; Schafer, Carroll, Haynes, & Abrams, 2008). However, McGuire and Silvia (2010) had shown that most events in contemporary times fall into the category of *wicked problems* that often require cross-jurisdictional efforts to resolve. Hence, expectedly, the structures, processes, procedures, and systems through which these disruptive or

potentially disruptive events are managed are often described interchangeably in literature as emergency or disaster management.

The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) classified disasters (and by extension, emergencies) into 6 categories: Natural; Technological; Civil or political; Hybrid; Humanitarian or complex; and Emerging infectious diseases (Medina, 2015). Early propositions of disaster studies by pioneers such as Prince, Carr, Powell, Fritz and Mathewson, Chapman, and Stoddard suggested the occurrence of disasters in linear, sequential phases (Coetzee & van Niekerk, 2012; De Smet, Schreurs, & Leysen, 2015). The phases were the “preliminary or prodromal phase”; the “dislocation and disorganization phase”; the “readjustment and reorganization phase”; and the intervening “confusion-delay phase... between the onset of the disaster [and] the time the emergency plans begin to operate” (De Smet et al., 2015, p. 323). Focus was therefore on response and relief activities. Subsequent studies (Dynes 1970; Quarantelli, 1982) had revealed “that disasters follow a general temporal sequence regardless of [the category or] the disaster agent” (De Smet et al., 2015, p. 323) and hence the authors canvassed for an all-hazards-approach to the study and management of emergencies and disasters. The result of this campaign was the four-phased comprehensive emergency management (CEM) concept proposed by the National Governors’ Association (1979).

The CEM is comprised of the mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery phases (De Smet et al., 2015; Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014). The mitigation phase is concerned with “reducing societal vulnerability and preventing or stopping disasters before they happen” (De Smet et al., 2015, p. 323). Emergency management

activities carried out during the phase are therefore aimed at eliminating or reducing the probability of occurrence of a disaster (Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014). No amount of mitigation can guarantee the nonoccurrence of disasters. Hence the preparedness phase focuses on developing plans, processes, and procedures that will help save lives, minimize losses, and enhance response operations when the disaster eventually occurs (Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014). The response phase kicks off immediately after the disaster has occurred. Response activities are aimed at assisting the victims of the disruptive event, “reducing the probability of secondary damage” and preparing the ground for “speed[y] recovery operations” (Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014, p. 50). The recovery phase is focused on returning the society to its predisaster normal or better conditions (De Smet et al., 2015; Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014). A cyclical relationship exists among the four phases and activities carried out within one phase typically influence the succeeding phase (De Smet et al., 2015). Emergency management can therefore be described as the managerial function responsible for articulating and operationalizing policies and procedures aimed at reducing societal vulnerability to hazards, coping with emergencies/disasters when they eventually occur, and returning society to normal or better functioning state (Blanchard et al., 2007).



*Figure 4.* Disaster management cycle depicting the four-phased comprehensive emergency management (CEM) proposed by the National Governors' Association. Adapted from "Comprehensive Emergency Management - A Governor's Guide," by National Governors' Association, Washington, DC: Center for Policy Research. Copyright (1979).

Some scholars (McEntire, 2004; McEntire et al., 2002; Neal, 1997; Rubin, 2012; Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014) had however questioned the practical and theoretical reliability of the CEM model. Their contention was that although the four phases connote "groups of activities [that are] performed in sequential order" (Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014, p. 48), Neal had shown that the sequence of activities proposed by the CEM were not sacrosanct in all disasters and suggested that the disaster management cycle was better considered a functional rather than a temporal model. McEntire et al. (2002) agreed. Building on the argument that disaster management is essentially the management of activities required to meet disaster-related objectives (Hayes & Hammons, 2002) and the fact that "functions, in the management context, is a term for groups of activities required to meet a common objective, regardless of when they are performed" (Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, (2014, p. 48), Thorvaldsdóttir and Sigbjörnsson canvassed for the adoption of the *concept of disaster-function management* by substituting the CEM's four disaster phases with eight disaster functions. The eight functions which are based on the eight core objectives of disaster management and the

activities necessary to meet them are: “Disaster-risk analysis; Disaster-risk mitigation; Operational preparedness; Impact operations; Rescue operations; Relief operations; Recovery operations; [and] Systematic learning” (Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014, p. 51).

Despite the novelty of the proposal by Thorvaldsdóttir and Sigbjörnsson (2014), the proposition is yet to fully catch on, and the four-phased CEM model remains the most widely adopted emergency/disaster management framework for now (De Smet et al., 2015).

### **Collaboration in Emergency Management**

The occurrence and effects of emergencies and disasters often extend beyond a single policy or jurisdictional boundary. The ensuing complex and uncertain environment typically requires concerted efforts from multiple stakeholders to manage (Drabek & McEntire, 2002; Drabek, Tamminga, Kilijanek, & Adams, 1981; Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010; Kapucu & Garayev, 2011; McGuire & Silvia, 2010; Waugh & Streib, 2006). With the increase in the number and severity of emergencies and disasters such as 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina in the United States (Bodeau et al., 2009); the massive 2012 nationwide flooding and the fallout of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria (National Emergency Management Agency [NEMA], 2014) in recent times, collaboration in emergency management had become a necessity across governmental boundaries (Bryson et al., 2006; Callahan & Holzer, 1994; McGuire & Silvia, 2010; Moynihan 2005; Vangen & Huxham, 2003; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Wise 2006) and between public and nonpublic organizations (Bingham & O’Leary, 2006; Kapucu & Garayev, 2012;

McGuire, 2006; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Vertical and horizontal collaboration have therefore become an enduring feature of emergency management (McGuire & Silvia, 2010).

There have been contentions if truly the networks formed during emergency or disaster management qualify as collaborations (Robinson & Gadis, 2012). This contention stems from the argument that disaster networks made up of heterogeneous actors (Robinson & Gadis, 2012) are ad-hoc and temporary in nature (Comfort, 1993; Kapucu & Garayev, 2012; Moynihan, 2007) with some of the actors having nothing to do with emergency management in the normal course of their business and only showing up during the emergency to render assistance. However, this argument can only hold true in the restrictive consideration of emergency management as being synonymous to the management of the response phase (Waugh & Streib, 2006). For emergency management to yield a positive outcome, collaboration is essential throughout the life cycle of emergency management and not only during the response phase (Kendra & Wachtendorf 2003; Moynihan 2005; Kiefer & Montjoy, 2006). The effectiveness of emergency management collaborative networks is improved when the relationships are continuously nurtured and maintained (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Kapucu & Garayev, 2012; Milward & Provan, 2003). Emergency management is therefore enhanced by regular and routine interactions among collaborating entities through frequently scheduled planning and training exercises (Bodeau et al., 2009; Meunier, 2013; Waugh & Streib, 2006).

Waugh and Streib (2006) contended that “collaboration [is] much more challenging in emergency management than in other public arenas” (p. 138). Although

collaborative governance requires a shift from the traditional hierarchical model of management (Waugh & Streib, 2006), emergency management in addition to the salient of collaborative governance often functions with some form of hierarchy (Waugh & Streib, 2006; Moynihan, 2005a), what Moynihan (2005b) termed *hierarchical network*. “A hierarchical network uses hierarchical control and rules to help manage a network of multiple organizations” (Moynihan, 2005b, p. 3). The predisposition to embed a hierarchical model in a collaborative environment can be explained by the need to have “somebody to take charge, or possibly someone to be held accountable” during emergencies or disasters (Waugh & Streib, 2006, p. 138). The utility of this hierarchical network in emergency management was also demonstrated by Milward and Provan (2003).

### **Emergency Management in Nigeria**


Formalized disaster/emergency management within the territory called Nigeria can be traced back to the establishment of the Fire Brigade by the colonialists in 1906 (National Emergency Management Agency [NEMA], 2010). The scope of the Fire Brigade’s mandate however extended beyond just fire fighting to safeguarding lives and properties and the provision of humanitarian services during emergencies. The period immediately following independence in 1960 saw a breakdown of the systematic approach to disaster management as disasters were considered security issues and responses were coordinated from the offices of the head of state and the governors on ad-hoc basis (National Emergency Management Agency [NEMA], 2010). The 1972/73 devastating drought experienced by the country led to the establishment of the National

Emergency Relief Agency (NERA) in 1976. NERA's mandate was restricted to only the response and recovery phases of emergency management.

In line with the United Nations International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (UN-IDNDR), the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) commenced the process of expanding the scope of NERA's mandate in 1990. This culminated first in the upgrade of the organization to an independent agency under the Presidency in 1993, and then a transmutation to NEMA in 1999 with the mandate to manage disasters in all its ramifications. The NEMA Act 12 as amended by Act 50 of 1999 equally gave legal backing to the establishment of state emergency management agencies (SEMAs) and the local government emergency management authorities (LEMAs). The three tiers of emergency and disaster management agencies coordinate all activities relating to their mandate at their respective levels of governance.

The national disaster management framework (NDMF), that serves as a regulatory guideline for effective and efficient emergency management, "defines measurable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures, and aligns key roles and responsibilities of disaster management stakeholders across the nation" (National Emergency Management Agency [NEMA], 2010. p. ii). The NDMF provides for both vertical and horizontal coordination. This has led to the establishment of the Institutional Framework for Disaster Management in Nigeria as depicted in Figure 5.





*Figure 5.* Institutional framework for disaster management in Nigeria depicting horizontal and vertical relationship among institutions involved in emergency management in Nigeria. Adapted from *The National Disaster Management Framework* (p. 10), by National Emergency Management Agency [NEMA], 2010, Abuja: NEMA. Copyright (2010) by NEMA. Adapted with permission.

The NDMF also recognized the evolving requirement to pay attention to issues relating to disaster risks and the functionality of disaster management (Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014). The NDMF therefore describes specific authorities and best practices for managing disasters under seven focus areas together with a sufficiency criterion, almost mirroring the *disaster-function management* proposed by Thorvaldsdóttir and Sigbjörnsson (2014). The thematic areas recognized by the NDMF are: institutional capacity; coordination; disaster risk assessment; disaster risk reduction; disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation; disaster response; and disaster recovery;

with facilitators and enablers being the sufficiency criteria (National Emergency Management Agency [NEMA], 2010).

### **Politics and Public Administration**

The conventional thought on the relationship between politics and public administration canvasses a separation of the two fields (Deason, Hammond, & Aka, 2011). This “politics-administration dichotomy” was promoted by Woodrow Wilson in a bid to develop effective administrative services that is not bogged down or unduly influenced by political interference and manipulations from the political establishment (Deason et al., 2011, p. 13). This view was equally supported by White, who in his 1926 seminal work advocated a public service that is nonpolitical and only focused on executing government policies effectively and efficiently (Deason et al., 2011). According to this school of thought, “[t]he bureaucracy was to administer, in an impartial and nonpolitical fashion, the programs created by the legislative branch, subject only to judicial interpretation” (Milakovich & Gordon, as cited in Deason et al., 2011, p. 13).

An alternative view of the relationship between politics and public administration that is fast gaining ground posits that politics and administration “are two parts of the same mechanism” of governance (Woodruff, as cited in Deason et al., 2011, p. 13). The view is encapsulated in the *complementarity* model which according to Svara (1999) is “characterized by interdependency, extensive interaction, distinct but overlapping roles, political supremacy, and administrative subordination coexisting with reciprocity of influence in both policy making and administration” (p. 678). This in essence means that “administrative agencies influence the policy process and are, in turn, influenced by

political factors and external actors” (Deason et al., 2011, p. 14). Recent studies have shown that political party affiliation often drive policy preferences among Americans (Milazzo, Adams, & Green, 2012).

### **Political Affiliation**

In this study, political affiliation was taken to be the adoption or close association of an entity to a political party based on congruency of ideology, policies, programs, or other interests. Party affiliation is a “foundational political identity” (Vraga, 2015, p. 487). Predisposition to align with a political party is often dictated by ideology, worldview, and values (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003; Lakoff, 2002; Tetlock, 1986). Hence, political preferences typically endure (Green, Palmquist & Schickler, 2002). Political affiliations therefore tend to influence attitudes and responses to policies (Peterson, Skov, Serritzlew, & Ramsay, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006).

### **Political Affiliation, Collaboration, and Emergency Management**

There is virtually no prior study on the relationship between political affiliation and collaboration in general, although Henry (2011) posited that shared ideologies tend to be positively correlated to collaborative ties. However, a link had been established between the two concepts in the field of scientific research among Spanish universities (Olmeda-Gómez, Perianes-Rodriguez, Ovalle-Perandones, Guerrero-Bote, & Anegón, 2009). Studies have also suggested that political affiliation can affect the management of emergencies, for example in the distribution of relief materials (Bennett & Carney, 2011; Oteng-Ababio, 2013).

### **Summary and Transition**

The literature review was aimed at exploring available knowledge on the concept of collective action and how it is affected by political affiliation especially in emergency management environments. Collaboration was found to represent a higher-order level of collective action than cooperation or coordination, with cooperation being on the lowest end of the continuum (Alter & Hage, 1993; Golicic, Foggin, & Mentzer, 2003; Mattessich & Monsey, 1992; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Cooperation provides the foundation for coordination by enlisting voluntarily efforts. Although both cooperation and coordination may occur during the formative stages of collaboration, collaboration involves a deeper lever of interaction and integration among partners. It is also a more complex, long term relationship requiring greater commitment from participants (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Collaboration is promoted when participants are willing (Axelrod, 1984; Ostrom, 1990; 1998; Powell, 1990; Thomson & Perry, 2006) and can complement one another resources-wise (Chen & Graddy, 2005; Powell, 1990). Collaboration can occur vertically or horizontally (McGuire, 2006) and typically results in formulation of new rules, joint decision making, and resource sharing (Entwistle & Martin, 2005). The key determinants of collaboration were identified as management techniques, availability of resources, perceived severity of the problem to be solved, and political context (Mullin & Daley, 2009).

For emergency management, the four-phased all-hazards-approach CEM comprising mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery phases remains the most

widely adopted emergency/disaster management framework (De Smet et al., 2015; Thorvaldsdóttir & Sigbjörnsson, 2014).

Collaboration among governmental organizations involved in emergency management (vertical collaboration) has become inescapable given the ‘wicked’ nature of the challenges thrown up by emergencies in recent times (Bryson et al., 2006; Callahan & Holzer, 1994; McGuire & Silvia, 2010; Vangen & Huxham, 2003; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Wise, 2006). While the possibility of politics influencing public policy and administration (and vice-versa) had since been established in the seminal works of Woodruff and Waldo (as cited in Deason et al., 2011) and more recently by Svava (1999), studies on the relationship between political affiliation and collaboration among government agencies are practically nonexistent.

Chapter 3 will outline the cross-sectional study design that was used for the exploration of the relationship between political affiliations and collaboration among government agencies involved in emergency management in Nigeria. The chapter will present a description of the population, sampling and sampling techniques, and instruments used in the study. The operationalization of variables, threats to validity, ethical protection of the participants will also be discussed, and the chapter will close with a summary.

## Chapter 3: Research Method

### **Introduction**

The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the effects of political affiliations on collaboration among emergency management agencies in Nigeria. This chapter opens with a restatement of the research question and hypotheses. This will be followed by the role of the researcher, the research design, and rationale for the choice of the design. Thereafter, the operationalization of the variables, measurements, and the instruments used will be discussed. This will be followed by a discussion of the population, sampling and sampling procedures, and the procedure for recruitment, participation, and data collection. The data analysis plan, threats to validity, and ethical procedures adopted will also be discussed before concluding with a summary and transition to Chapter 4.

### **Restatement of the Research Question and Hypotheses**

This quantitative study hinged on the assumption that collaboration would be stronger between same-party agencies than between different-parties agencies. The research question and hypotheses used to explore the veracity of this assumption among emergency management agencies in Nigeria were the following:

*Research Question:* Does alignment of political affiliation affect collaboration among emergency management agencies.

*H<sub>0</sub>:* Collaboration level does not vary significantly between emergency management agencies differing in political affiliation and between agencies in the same political affiliation.

*H<sub>a</sub>*: The perceived collaboration strength is significantly higher for emergency management agencies of similar political affiliation than those with different affiliations.

Resolving the research question and testing the hypotheses would first require determining the existence of collaboration among emergency management agencies in Nigeria, then verifying the existence of differences in the perceived strength of collaboration between agencies with similar political alignment on one side and agencies with differing political alignment on the other. Finally, I tested the strength of the differences in collaboration between the two groups.

### **Role of the Researcher**

My role as a researcher in this study was to collect the data necessary for testing the hypotheses set out in the study. I was also responsible for applying appropriate statistical methods to manipulate and analyze the data and determine the relationships between the study variables, that is, political affiliations and collaboration, and to determine the generalizability of the findings. I was equally responsible for interpreting the findings. In all of these, I maintained objectivity by adopting a systematic empirical approach and by remaining detached from the participants so as not to influence their responses in any way.

### **Research Design and Rationale**

This study was aimed at assessing the influence of political preferences on collaborative behaviors among emergency management agencies. Collaboration was the dependent variable for the study while the nature of the alignment of political affiliation of the emergency agencies was the independent variable. Concomitant variables such as

the agencies' financial capacity and management techniques (Mullin & Daley, 2009) were treated as covariates for this study. The study was carried out using quantitative research method with a cross-sectional, non-experimental design. This quantitative method and design was very suitable for a study such as this aimed at exploring the effects of similarity or differences in political affiliations on the perception of the strength of collaboration among emergency management agencies in Nigeria after controlling for the agencies' financial capacities and management techniques.

Cross-sectional studies are typically relatively more time-efficient when compared to longitudinal studies, as data are collected at one point in time. Therefore, I was not faced with any major time constraints in collecting data except in locating prospective participants as some of them had left office since the proposed reference period for the study (2011 to 2015). Some efforts were expended to locate some of the respondents and to get the questionnaire to them. At the end, questionnaires were dispatched and responses returned without any serious resource constraints that could adversely affect the conduct of the study.

Cross-sectional studies are quite popular in public policy studies. They have the advantages of being low cost while allowing for the collection of data on many variables from very many participants that are widely dispersed. Cross-sectional studies also allow for the collection of data on attitudes and behaviors that can become useful for other researchers. The design also helps avoid complications that usually arise from use of longitudinal studies' data, such as serial correlation of residuals (Creswell, 2007). They



are also easily amenable to generalizations, especially if studies are based on a representative sample of the population.

### **Operationalization of Variables**

The two key variables in this quantitative cross-sectional study were (a) the independent variable: the alignment between emergency management agencies in their political affiliation, and (b) the dependent variable: the perceived strength of collaboration between the agencies. These variables were operationalized in this study as follows:

#### **Independent Variable**

The independent variable for this study was the alignment of emergency management agencies in their political affiliation. This was a nominal variable with two categories: same party and different parties alignment. The categorization afforded the comparison of the perceived strength of collaboration between same-party and different-parties groups. Consequently, the independent variable was a dichotomous variable; measurement was useful in determining the different affects on the perceived strength of collaboration between agencies whose political affiliation aligned with their collaborators and the agencies whose political affiliation did not align with their collaborators.

#### **Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable for the study was the perception of the strength of collaboration among the emergency management agencies. It was an ordinal level variable measured by the 17-point multidimensional collaboration scale. The responses to the 17 statements were reduced to a composite variable, which was treated as

interval/quantitative variable indicating the strength of collaboration between the agencies and can be further categorized as *none*, *weak*, or *strong* collaboration (Granovetter, 1973).

### **Measurement**

There are several instruments that can be used to measure the degree/level of collaboration. Some of these include Wilder Survey of Collaboration (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001b) and Collaborative Practice Assessment Tool (Office of Interprofessional Education and Practice, 2009). Most of these instruments, however, are overly specific for the field or group for which they were designed and were therefore unsuitable for this study, although they are considered reliable measures of collaboration. A more suitable instrument for the study was the 17-point collaboration measure instrument proposed by Thomson et al. (2007). The survey questionnaire comprised two sections. The first section was directed at obtaining information on the nature of tenure of the respondents and the nature of the emergency management organization. The second section comprised 17 statements crafted to measure collaboration between the agencies. This section was modelled after the 17-point collaboration measure instrument proposed by Thomson et al. The statements used by the original instrument were maintained with slight adjustments in wordings to reflect the entities being surveyed. The statements were closed-ended questions aimed at gauging respondents' behaviors and attitudes in relation to interactions with other actors in a group. Responses to Questions 1 to 14, which covered the governance, administration, autonomy, and mutuality dimensions of collaboration, were measured on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 meaning *not at all* and 7

meaning *to a great extent*. Questions 15 to 17 covered the norms dimension of collaboration and their responses were also measured on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 meaning *strongly disagree* and 7 meaning *strongly agree*.

A notice was sent to the lead author informing her of my intention to use the instrument and acknowledge the use accordingly in my dissertation report. She replied consenting to my use of the instrument.

### **Measurement Scales**

The independent variable for this study, alignment of political affiliation of emergency management agencies, was measured on a dichotomous (nominal with two categories) scale. The dependent variable, perception of the strength of collaboration among emergency management agencies, was measured on an ordinal scale. The responses to the 17 statements designed to measure the dependent variable were reduced to a composite variable measured on an interval scale.

### **The Survey Instrument**

The collaboration scale proposed by Thomson et al. (2007) was anchored on the theoretically and empirically proven five key collaboration dimensions of governance, administration, autonomy, mutuality, and norm (Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson et al., 2007). The 17-question scale was derived through structural equation modeling followed by “confirmatory and exploratory analysis” to identify the most valid and reliable multidimensional scale of collaboration (Thomson et al., 2007, p. 14). The  $R^2$  values of the 17 indicators derived through structural equation model correspond to the reliability measures of the indicators and are related to the lambda ( $\lambda$ ) estimates that measure the

validity of the indicators (Thomson et al., 2007). Eleven of the 17 indicators have lambda ( $\lambda$ ) coefficients of between .80 and .95. Three others have lambda ( $\lambda$ ) coefficients of between .75 and .80 while the remaining three have coefficients of between .66 and .67. These coefficients are believed to be high enough for the equation and the indicators to be considered to have passed the reliability and validity tests. This is particularly so given that no commonly held rules or standards currently exist that objectively identify a point at which the standardized lambda ( $\lambda$ ) coefficient passes a “validity test” or the  $R^2$  passes a “reliability test” except to assert that the closer to 1, the more valid and reliable (Thomson et al., 2007, p. 20).

The 17 indicators multidimensional scale of collaboration had been validated by Chen (2008). The same survey questions of the 17-indicator collaboration scale were used in the study of interorganizational networks in Los Angeles County’s Family Preservation Program and the findings supported Thomson et al.’s (2007) structural equation model of collaboration.

### **Survey Statements**

The survey statements as shown in Table 1 were aimed at measuring the perception of collaboration among agencies. The 17 statements cover the five dimensions of collaboration: governance, administration, autonomy, mutuality, and norm (trust). The questions measure respondents’ perception of collaboration.

Table 1

*Survey: 17-Point Collaboration Scale (Perception)*

Number	Survey Question	Dimension of Collaboration
1.	The Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above take your organization's opinions seriously when decisions are made about the collaboration.	Governance
2.	Your organization brainstorms with the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above to develop solutions to mission-related problems facing the collaboration.	Governance
3.	You, as a representative of your organization in the collaboration, understand your organization's roles and responsibilities as a member of the collaboration.	Administration
4.	The meetings of your organization with the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above accomplish what is necessary for the collaboration to function well.	Administration
5.	Your organization and the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above agree about the goals of the collaboration.	Administration
6.	Your organization's tasks in the collaboration are well coordinated with those of the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above.	Administration
7.	The collaboration with the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above hinders your organization from meeting its own organizational mission.	Autonomy
8.	Your organization's independence is affected by having to work with the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above on activities related to the collaboration.	Autonomy
9.	You, as a representative of your organization feel pulled between trying to meet both your organization's and the collaboration's expectations.	Autonomy
10.	The Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above and your organization have combined and used each other's resources so all partners benefit from collaborating.	Mutuality
11.	Your organization shares information with the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above to strengthen their operations and programs.	Mutuality

*(table continues)*

Number	Survey Question	Dimension of Collaboration
12.	You feel what your organization brings to the collaboration is appreciated and respected by Emergency Management Agency indicated above.	Mutuality
13.	Your organization achieves its own goals better working with the Emergency Management Agency indicated above than working alone.	Mutuality
14.	Your organization and the Emergency Management Agency indicated above work through differences to arrive at win-win solutions.	Mutuality
15.	The people who represent the Emergency Management Agency indicated above in the collaboration are trustworthy.	Norm (Trust)
16.	Your organization can count on the Emergency Management Agency indicated above to meet its obligations to the collaboration.	Norm (Trust)
17.	Your organization feels it worthwhile to stay and work with the Emergency Management Agency indicated above rather than leave the collaboration.	Norm (Trust)

*Note.* The name of the emergency management agency was indicated on the survey questionnaire. Adapted from “Conceptualizing and Measuring Collaboration,” by A. M. Thomson, J. L. Perry, and T. K. Miller, 2007, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19(1), pp. 18-19.

### **Population, Sampling, and Sampling Procedures**

The units in the target population for this study were governmental agencies responsible for managing emergencies at the three levels of governance in Nigeria. The sampling frame for this study was the list of the 812 heads of governmental emergency management organizations at the federal (1), states (36), federal capital territory (1), and local government areas (774) that were in office during the period May 2011 to May 2015. Three sampling procedure options were considered and the one that is likely to yield the most useful data for the study was selected.

The first option was to ask the state agencies to rate their collaboration with selected local government agencies within their jurisdictions; this could yield data on

same party alignment as the party in control of the state was also in control of all local governments within the state. The second option was to ask each state to rate the collaboration with every other state and the federal agency. This could yield data on both similar and different party alignment of political affiliations. However, this would mean that each state respondent would have to complete 37 questionnaires. This was considered impracticable. A third option was to ask the states to rate their collaboration with the federal agency (hence, every state was to complete only one survey each), while the federal was to rate the collaboration with all the states. This option appeared to be the most feasible in that it will afford the generation of data for both same-party and different-parties collaborations and was therefore adopted. The option nonetheless had some shortcomings, the primary one being the non-inclusion of local government levels in the sample. However, this shortcoming was ameliorated by the assumed representativeness of the data from the states since the states and their constituent local governments typically have same party alignment of political affiliation. The second challenge was the requirement for the federal agency to complete 37 questionnaires (one for each of the 36 states and the federal capital territory). This challenge was, however, surmounted by appeal to the respondent to understand the importance of the study and patience, to give him sufficient time to complete the questionnaires at his own time.

Consequently, the Federal Agency provided data on its perception of the strength of collaboration with each of the 37 State Agencies. Twenty-four of these State Agencies were under the control of the same political party controlling the Federal Agency while the remaining 13 were under the control of other parties. The 37 State Agencies in turn

provided data on their perception of the strength of collaboration with the Federal Agency. These generated 24 same-party and 13 different-parties data sets on the perception of collaboration for comparison and for the testing of the hypothesis that collaboration is significantly higher within the same-party group.

The G\*Power 3.1.9.2 power analysis software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2015) was used to determine the sample size for the study. According to Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, and Buchner (2007), “G\*Power was designed as a general stand-alone power analysis program for statistical tests commonly used in social and behavioral research” (p. 175). Three important parameters were required to derive the sample size. These were the effect size ( $f$ ), the alpha level ( $\alpha$ ), and the Power. Effect size, which is a measure of the magnitude of the difference of some phenomenon between groups (Kelley & Preacher, 2012; Sullivan & Feinn, 2012), can only be computed after data collection and analysis. Hence, it is customary to apply an estimate a priori based on previous findings from similar studies or from convention (Sullivan & Feinn, 2012). Sullivan and Feinn (2012) had reported Cohen’s (1969, 1988) categorization of effect sizes often used in the social sciences as small ( $f = .2$ ), medium ( $f = .5$ ), and large ( $f \geq .8$ ). The magnitude of the differences in the level of collaboration between same-party and different-parties emergency management agencies were expected/assumed to be high hence a large effect size ( $f \geq .8$ ) was used.

The alpha level which is a measure of the Type 1 error (the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) needs to be kept as low as possible. An alpha  $\alpha$ -value of .05 set by Fisher (1925) is usually used in the social sciences (Cowles, &



Davis, 1982). Power, which is a measure of the departure from the null hypotheses or the probability of detecting the existence of a true effect, needs to be sufficiently high (Skelly, 2011). A power value of .80 is conventionally considered as ideal in the social sciences while .70 falls within acceptable range (Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989).

Employing the G\*Power 3.1.9.2 software to carry out a priori power analysis using *t* tests. Means: Difference between two independent means (two groups) and supposing a large effect size ( $f = .8$ ), alpha ( $\alpha$ ) = .05, power = .80, and allocation ratio = .6 (based on the ratio of membership of the sample frame) yielded a total sample size of 44 made up of Group A sample size = 28 and Group B sample size = 16. However, because of the envisaged challenge in generating data from the emergency management agencies at the local government areas and the proposal to limit data collection to the federal and state levels, only 37 useful samples were available. Adjusting the power analysis for this limitation yields a Power of .73 and total sample size of 36 made up of 23 in Group A (same party) and 13 in Group B (different parties). Consequently, a sample size of 36 emergency management agencies with 23 falling under same party alignment of political affiliation and 13 falling under different parties alignment of political affiliation was required to carry out this study on the effects of political affiliation on collaboration. The relationship between Power and the sample size is presented in Figure 6.




Figure 6. Relationship between power and sample size generated using G\*Power 3.1.9.2 power analysis software.

### **Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection**

Proper procedures needed to be followed to ensure that the identification, screening, and recruitment of human subjects for a study yield sufficient number of participants and was carried out in an ethical matter (Treweek et al., 2010).

The name and contact of the prospective participant at the federal level was already known to me, both of us having worked together from June 2012 to June 2016. The names and contacts of prospective participants at the state level were sourced from the state liaison offices at the federal capital, Abuja, where I reside and from contacts at the federal agency. A short telephone text message introducing myself and a notification of intention to speak with the prospects was sent to all. This step was necessary because of the prevailing habit among some Nigerians to refuse to answer calls from unfamiliar numbers. The text messages were followed by phone calls during which I introduced the study to them, explaining why they were chosen and highlighting the benefits and costs

of participating in the study. I then sought their authorization to send the survey questionnaire to them and confirm the address and mode of delivery they would prefer. Appropriate arrangements for returning the surveys were also agreed with individual respondents. A combination of hand delivery, courier service, and e-mail were used to get the questionnaires to respondents. Responses were returned through same means. A few of the respondents elected to send their responses via WhatsApp (indicating only the question number and corresponding score) because of the difficulties they encountered in uploading a scanned copy of the completed questionnaire as an attachment to an e-mail.

The confirmation by the prospective participants of their preferred address and mode of delivery of the questionnaire was considered as informed consent. However, an informed consent form expatiating on the study, the benefits, and my responsibilities especially regarding confidentiality and the participants' privacy as well as the voluntary nature of participation was also included in the questionnaire package for the respondents to sign. A notice was also included stating that while respondents were encouraged to sign the informed consent form, they may decide not to, as their completion and return of the survey would be taken as consent. This step was aimed at enhancing confidentiality of participants' responses.

Demographic information sought included participants' nature of tenure (whether political appointee, elected, or career civil servant), and nature of organization (formal established by law, ad-hoc, or advisory). Data on collaboration was collected using the 17-point collaboration measure instrument proposed by Thomson et al. (2007, pp. 18-19). Data on alignment of political affiliation was imputed from information obtained from

the Independent National Electoral Commission on the political party in control of the various levels of government during the period of interest (May 2011 to May 2015).

I informed the participants that their participation and responses would be kept confidential and that they could exit or withdraw from the study at any time. I also provided them my contact details as well as that of my Dissertation Committee Chair in case they needed clarifications on any aspect of the study. Participants were also informed that they may be contacted after the return of the surveys should a need for clarification arise.

### **Data Analysis Plan**

The International Business Machine (IBM)'s SPSS version 23.0 for Windows was used to analyze the data generated from the survey.

### **Preanalysis Data Screening**

Preanalysis data screening was carried out to ensure that data had been correctly entered and to check for missing data and outliers. Descriptive statistics like frequency distributions were used to find incorrectly entered data and identify missing values. The data were found to be correctly entered and there were no missing data or outliers.

### **Detailed Analysis Plan**

Descriptive statistics such as frequencies, means, modes, and percentages were planned to be carried out to expatiate on the characteristics of the alignment of political affiliations and the nature of interactions among the agencies. These were to help illuminate the presence or otherwise of collaboration and the differences in the perception of the strength of collaboration between same-political parties and different-political

parties controlled grouped agencies. For the test of the significance of the differences in the strength of collaboration between the two groups, two options were available. The first was to use nonparametric methods of analysis while the other was to use parametric methods. The data generated was be amenable to nonparametric methods particularly because the dependent variable (perception of the strength of collaboration) was measured on an ordinal (Likert) scale while the independent variable (alignment of political affiliation) was measured on a nominal (dichotomous) scale.

The proposed nonparametric test was the Mann-Whitney U test while the proposed parametric test was the  $t$  test. Both tests are essentially similar as they measure the differences in the means of two samples taken from the same population. They are however different to the extent that  $t$  test is carried out under the assumption that the data are normally distributed while no such assumption is made for Mann-Whitney U test. The two tests were the ideal tests to carry out since the aim was to determine group differences. In the case of this study, the aim was to determine the significance of mean group differences in the perceived strength of collaboration based on the alignment of political affiliations (same-party vs. different-parties) while controlling for financial capacity and management techniques. In addition to screening the data for missing and outlier values, appropriate tests to determine the normality of subgroups and linearity of relationship between the two variables were carried out. The skewness and kurtosis coefficients of the variables were obtained to determine their normality while linearity was determined by examining residuals plots (Mertler & Vannatta, 2013).

## **Threats to Validity**

### **Threats to External Validity**

The hallmark of quantitative studies is to afford generalization to a larger population and/or across populations. This study was conducted in the hope that it will present conclusions on the effects of alignment of political affiliation on collaboration that would be generalizable to the wider population of governmental emergency management agencies in Nigeria on the one hand, and to other governmental agencies outside of emergency management on the other hand. One major way to achieve this was to ensure that the sample share similar characteristics with the population. This study was designed in such a manner as to ensure representativeness of the sample. Another possible threat to validity in this study was selection bias. Although efforts were made to ensure representativeness of the sample, the truth however is that representativeness cannot be perfect as humans are unique. Selection bias was particularly of concern in this study given that selection of units was limited to the federal and states emergency management agencies because of the difficulty in sampling the local government areas as explained in the section on Population, Sampling, and Sampling Procedure. It was however assumed that the responses from the states will be representative of those of the local governments given that the political parties in control of the states also control the local governments within the states.

### **Threats to Internal Validity**

There are number of situations that threatened the internal validity of this study. The first was subject effect or participant reactivity. This typically occurs when or if a

participant's response is affected by the fact that he or she is part of a study. Although participant reactivity is presented as a threat to internal validity here, it equally threatens the external validity of the study as it limits generalization of conclusions. Another threat to the internal validity of the study was history effects. This occurs when events in the environment could account for changes in the outcome of the scores on the variables or the scores of a group. For this study, the intervening event that threatened the internal validity of the study was that the political arena in Nigeria had changed significantly from what it was during the period of interest to the study. At the time of the study, three of the erstwhile parties; the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP), and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) have merged to form a new party, the All Progressives' Congress (APC). The APC was now the ruling party at the federal level and in control of 25 out of the 36 states and 551 out of the 774 local government areas as of the time the study was being carried out. This amounted to a total of 557 (68.59%) out of the 812 jurisdictions in Nigeria. Also, the rate at which politicians changed party affiliations was very high in Nigeria (Ikechukwu, 2015; Opadere & Agbana, 2015). It was not impossible to find a respondent who was in the then ruling party (PDP) during the period of interest to the study (2011 to 2015) but in the ruling party (APC) when the study was being carried out (circa 2017 to 2018). These situations could bias and affect the responses of the participants and thereby threaten the internal validity of the study. The history effects were addressed by emphasizing the period of interest in the questionnaire and encouraging participants to limit their responses to events during that period.

### **Threats to Construct Validity**

Threats to construct validity arise when clear distinctions are not made between or among different constructs that are part of a broader concept. To ensure construct validity, and forestall the measurement of multiple constructs, broad concepts of interests must be narrowed down to constructs that are easily measurable. For this study, the broad concept of interest was 'collective action'. This has been narrowed down to 'collaboration', which after exhaustive literature review was properly defined and operationalize to include its five dimensions as proposed by Thomson et al. (2007).

### **Ethical Procedures**

As the researcher, I took appropriate steps to ensure beneficence and nonmaleficence of this study. This involved seeking and obtaining the Walden University Institutional Review Board approval (09-25-17-0301327) and abiding by all the requirements of the approval. Appropriate informed consent was also extracted from the participants. Since the preferred research method for the study is survey, respondents had access to the survey instrument and other accompanying information regarding the aim of the study and the responsibilities of the respondents. Although the study presented minimal risk of harm to the participants, I nonetheless completed the National Institutes of Health (NIH)'s online course on protecting human subject research participants to better understand the requirements for protecting research subjects. It was difficult to guarantee total anonymity of research participants because of the nature of the population and research design. For example, the respondent at the federal level is well known. However, steps were taken to provide as much anonymity as practicable. These included



substituting identifiers like names of states with codes. In addition, appropriate steps were taken to protect the confidentiality of the participants. Data generated from the survey will be used only for the purpose for which they were collected. The data will be kept secured in a safe location for a period of 7 years before they are destroyed.

### **Summary and Transition**

Chapter 3 on research method presented the details of the design and methodology for the study. The study was proposed to be a quantitative research study with a cross-sectional non-experimental design to examine the effects of political affiliation on collaboration among emergency management agencies. Agencies were grouped into two based on the alignment of their political affiliation. The significance of the differences in the perception of the strength of collaboration between the two groups will then be measured. The target population is comprised of the governmental agencies responsible for managing emergencies at the three levels of governance in Nigeria. The target population size was therefore  $N = 812$ . The required sample size for the study was 36 made up of 23 for same-party group and 13 for different-parties group. Sampling was restricted to the federal and state levels because of the challenges of generating data from the local government level and the congruence of alignment of political affiliation between the states and their respective local government areas. Data on alignment of political affiliation was imputed from information obtained from the Independent National Electoral Commission on the political party in control of the various levels of government during the period of interest (May 2011 to May 2015). Data on the perception of the strength of collaboration was collected using the 17-point collaboration

measure instrument proposed by Thomson et al. (2007). A 7-point Likert scale graduation of the responses to the survey on collaboration was adopted with 1 equating *not at all* and 7 equating *to a great extent*. The International Business Machine (IBM)'s Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23.0 for Windows was used to analyze the data generated from the survey. Preanalysis data screening was carried out to ensure that data have been correctly entered and to check for missing data and outliers. Descriptive statistics, Mann-Whitney U test and *t* test were proposed to be used to resolve the research question. Threats to the validity of the study were identified to include selection bias, participant reactivity, history effects, and the broad nature of the concept of collaboration. Appropriate steps to address the threats were presented. Steps to ensure beneficence and nonmaleficence of this study were also enumerated. The following Chapter 4 will present the results of the statistical analysis carried out to answer the research question. Chapter 5 will present the interpretation of the findings, limitations of the study, recommendations for further research, the potential impact for positive social change, and the study's conclusion.

## Chapter 4: Results

### Introduction

The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the effects of political affiliations on collaboration among emergency management agencies in Nigeria. In Chapter 4 of the study, the demographical data relating to the study are presented first. These are followed by the descriptive statistics of data generated. Thereafter, the hypotheses tested are restated followed by statistical analyses to test the hypotheses. The statistical analyses were carried out using the independent samples *t* test aimed at testing the significance of the difference in the means between two groups. The initially proposed Mann-Whitney test was discarded as the data were found to be normally distributed and hence amenable to the independent samples *t* test. The benchmark for statistical significance was set at the generally accepted alpha level  $\alpha = .05$ . Thirty-eight emergency management agencies in Nigeria constituted the sample for the study. This was made up of one federal agency, one federal capital territory agency (treated as a state), and 36 states agencies. The federal agency presented its perception of the level of collaboration between it and the other 37 emergency management agencies while the other 37 agencies individually presented their perception of collaboration with the federal agency. These yielded a total of 37 peer-perceptions scores that were combined to derive a composite score.

### Preanalysis Data Screening

The data for this study were derived from responses to survey questionnaires sent to the heads of the 38 emergency management agencies. The questionnaire consisted of

17 questions designed by Thomson et al. (2007) to measure perception of collaboration. All the 38 participants responded to the questionnaires. Responses were reviewed for consistencies and completeness and thereafter inputted into SPSS version 24.0 for Windows. Responses were found to be complete and without outliers. On the survey, Questions 7, 8, and 9 that were framed in the negative perspective were also recoded to correspond with the other questions that were framed in the positive perspective.

### **Descriptive and Inferential Statistics**

#### **Reliability of the Likert Scale Questions**

The reliability and internal consistency of the Likert scale questions used were determined using Cronbach's alpha test. Cronbach's alpha typically measures the correlations between different items on the same test. It indicates if several items that propose to measure the same general construct produce similar scores or not (Brace, Kemp & Snelgar, 2006). Following the guidelines proposed by George and Mallery (2010), where  $\alpha > .9$  excellent,  $> .8$  good,  $> .7$  acceptable,  $> .6$  questionable,  $> .5$  poor, and  $< .5$  unacceptable, the results of the reliability analysis for the Likert scale questions measuring the perception of the strength of collaboration ( $\alpha = .88$ ) were excellent. The results of the reliability test are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

#### *Results of the Test of Reliability of the Likert Scale Questions*

Cronbach's alpha	Cronbach's alpha based on standardized items	N of items
.876	.888	17

### **Basic Characteristics of the Agencies in the Sample**

The independent variable for this study, alignment of political affiliation of emergency management agencies, was measured on a dichotomous (nominal with two categories) scale. All agencies ( $n = 38$ , 100%) were formal organization established by law or an executive directive. Analysis also showed that there were more career civil servants ( $n = 21$ , 55%) than political appointees ( $n = 17$ , 45%) heading the emergency agencies. The sample consisted of more *same party affiliation* participants ( $n = 24$ , 65%) than *differing parties affiliations* participants ( $n = 13$ , 35%). Frequencies and percentages for the demographic data representing the characteristics and distribution of the participating agencies are presents in Table 3.

Table 3

*Characteristics and Distribution of the Participating Agencies*

Agency Characteristics	<i>n</i>	%
Nature of the Emergency Management Agency		
Formal organization established by law or executive directive	38	100
Ad-Hoc body	0	0
Advisory	0	0
Nature of tenure of head of agency		
Elected	0	0
Political appointee	17	45
Career civil servant	21	55
Type of political affiliation		
Same party affiliation	24	65
Differing parties affiliations	13	35

**Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable, perceptions of the strength of collaboration among emergency management agencies, was collected from the responses to the 17-question collaboration scale proposed by Thomson et al. (2007). The response to each of the 17 statements was measured on a 7-point Likert scale, an ordinal measure in nature (Appendix A). The responses to the 17 statements/questions on the survey were reduced to a composite score. The composite is an ad hoc score of the perceived strength of collaboration among the emergency agencies. The 17 responses were also grouped into the composites by the five aspects of collaboration—governance, administration, autonomy, mutuality, and norm (trust)—to see how the perceptions differ between the

two groups. The definition of the dimensions of collaboration and the number of questions in the questionnaire they are based on are presented in Table 4. Appendices B to D present the raw scores of the perceived strength of collaboration by the states, the federal, and combined (total score) agencies respectively, while Appendix E presents the collaboration scores of the five groups of responses.

Table 4

*Definition of the Five Dimensions of Collaboration and Corresponding Number of Questions on the Questionnaire*

Collaboration Aspect	Meaning	Number of Questions
Governance	Requirements to jointly make decisions about the rules that will govern partners' behavior and relationships; and, to create structures for reaching agreement on collaborative activities and goals through shared power arrangements.	2
Administration	Requirements to establish an effective operating system for interaction that includes clarity of roles and responsibilities, communication channels that enhance coordination, and mechanisms to monitor each other's activities in relation to roles and responsibilities.	4
Autonomy	Requirements for reconciling self-interest (achieving individual organizational missions and maintaining an identity that is distinct from the collaborative) and a collective interest (achieving collaboration goals and maintaining accountability to collaborative partners).	3
Mutuality	Requirements to forge mutually beneficial relationships that satisfy individual partner's differing interests without loss to themselves through consensus.	5

*(table continues)*



Collaboration Aspect	Meaning	Number of Questions
Norm	Requirement to demonstrate a willingness to interact collaboratively and a belief among a group that partners will behave in good-faith and be honest in their dealings with one-another.	3

*Note.* From Thomson & Perry (2006); Thomson et al. (2007). Derived through structural equation modeling followed by “confirmatory and exploratory analysis” to identify the most valid and reliable multidimensional scale of collaboration (Thomson et al., 2007, p. 14).

**Overall composite score of perception of collaboration.** The overall composite (total) score for the perception of collaboration among emergency management agencies is presented in Table 5.

Table 5

*Composite Score of the Perceived Collaboration Strength*

Agencies Perception	Composite Scores				
	<i>n</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Combined perception of strength of collaboration	37	3.88	6.62	5.62	0.60

**Perceived collaboration strength by five dimensions.** The total scores of the five dimensions of the perception of collaboration are presented in Table 6.

Table 6

*Scores of the Five Dimensions of the Perception of Collaboration*

Determinants of Collaboration	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Governance	2.50	7.00	5.3514	.98682
Administration	4.38	7.00	5.8514	.65672
Autonomy	2.67	7.00	5.3288	1.07259
Mutuality	3.30	7.00	5.6324	.75390
Norm	4.00	7.00	5.7387	.75823

**Normality Assumptions**

Although distribution is usually assumed to be normal in large samples (> 30 or 40) regardless of the shape of the data (Ghasemi & Zahedias, 2012, p. 486), the assumption of normality of subgroups was tested using the Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) test in addition to screening the data for missing and outlier values. The results of the S-W test, skewness, kurtosis, and Q-Q plot supported the normality assumption. The results of the S-W test are presented in Table 7. The skewness and kurtosis statistics are presented in Table 8 while the Q-Q plots are in Figures 7 and 8.

Table 7


*Results of Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) Test of Normality of Subgroups*

Subgroup	<i>n</i>	<i>S-W</i>	<i>p</i>
Same party affiliation	24	.96	.41
Different parties affiliations	13	.94	.44


Table 8

*Results of Skewness and Kurtosis Tests of Normality of Subgroups*

Subgroup	Skewness (SE)	Kurtosis (SE)
Same party affiliation	-.4 (.47)	.26 (.92)
Different parties affiliation	-1.01 (.62)	1.42 (1.19)



*Figure 7.* Normal Q-Q plot of perception of collaboration among agencies with same political affiliation.



*Figure 8.* Normal Q-Q plot of perception of collaboration among agencies with different political party affiliation.

### **Restatement of the Research Question and Hypotheses**

This study was aimed at assessing the influence of political preferences on collaborative behaviors among emergency management agencies. Collaboration was treated as the dependent variable for the study while the nature of the alignment of political affiliation of the emergency agencies was the independent variable. The quantitative study was hinged on the assumption that collaboration will be stronger between same-party alignment than between different-parties alignment agencies. The research question and hypotheses used to explore the veracity of this assumption among emergency management agencies in Nigeria are restated.

*Research Question:* Does alignment of political affiliation affect collaboration among emergency management agencies?

$H_0$ : Collaboration level does not vary significantly between emergency management agencies differing in political affiliation and agencies with the same political affiliation.

$H_a$ : The perceived collaboration strength is significantly higher for emergency management agencies of similar political affiliation than those with different affiliations.

### Statistical Analyses

The independent sample  $t$  test was conducted to determine the significance of the differences in the perceived strength of collaboration between the agencies with similar political affiliation and those with different political affiliations.

#### Independent Sample $t$ Test

The independent sample  $t$  test was performed to compare the average perceived strength of collaboration between the agencies with similar political affiliation and those with different political affiliations assuming equal variance between the two groups (See result of Levene's test in Table 9).

**Five dimensional-perception scores.** Results showed that none of the five dimensions was significantly different between the two groups (see Table 9).

**Overall perception scores.** The results of the tests indicated that the difference in the overall perceived level of collaboration was not significant between the two groups:  $M_{\text{same}} = 5.72$ ,  $SD = .56$ ;  $M_{\text{different}} = 5.42$ ,  $SD = .65$ ;  $t(35) = 1.49$ ,  $p = .15$ . According to the  $t$  tests, the null hypothesis could not be rejected. The results of the  $t$  tests are presented in Table 9.

Table 9

*Results of the Independent Samples t Tests for Collaboration and its Five Dimensions*

Areas	Mean (SD)		Levene's test for Equality of Variances <sup>a</sup>		t test for Equality of Mean	
	Same Party Affiliation (N = 24)	Different Party Affiliation (N = 13)	F	Sig	t	df
<b>Total collaboration</b>	<b>5.72 (.56)</b>	<b>5.42 (.65)</b>	<b>.375</b>	<b>.544</b>	<b>1.492</b>	<b>35</b>
Governance dimension of collaboration	5.51 (.86)	5.06 (1.16)	1.071	.308	1.347	35
Administration dimension of collaboration	5.96 (.61)	5.65 (.72)	.753	.391	1.362	35
Autonomy dimension of collaboration	5.35 (1.16)	5.30 (.93)	1.209	.279	.140	35
Mutuality dimension of collaboration	5.77 (.59)	5.39 (.96)	2.122	.154	1.497	35
Norm dimension of collaboration	5.85 (.80)	5.53 (.65)	.904	.348	1.269	35

<sup>a</sup> Equal variances assumed

\* Significant at  $\leq .05$

### Summary

This quantitative study examined whether political affiliation alignment of Nigerian emergency management agencies made a difference on their collaboration. The *t*-test results of the data analysis indicated that there was no significant difference

between the average scores of the perceived collaboration level between the two groups of agencies. This study, therefore, failed to reject the null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) that collaboration level does not vary significantly between emergency management agencies differing in political affiliation and between agencies in the same political affiliation. In the ensuing Chapter 5, these findings will be discussed and cross-referenced to propositions in the literature. The Chapter 5 will also present the limitations of the study, recommendations for further research, the potential impact for positive social change, and the study's conclusion.

## Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

### **Introduction**

The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the effects of political affiliation alignment on perceived collaboration strength among emergency management agencies in Nigeria. This chapter includes a review and interpretation of the results, evaluation of the limitations of the study, recommendations for future research, and implications for positive social change.

### **Summary of the Results**

The data for this study were derived from responses to 7-point Likert scale survey questionnaires sent to the heads of 38 emergency management agencies in Nigeria. The questionnaire, aimed at measuring perception of the strength of collaboration between the federal and the states' emergency management agencies, was modelled after the 17-question survey designed by Thomson et al. (2007). All the 38 participants responded to the questionnaires. The sample agencies, on the whole, showed a fairly strong perceived collaboration level. The study showed no significant difference in the level of collaboration among emergency management agencies with similar political affiliation when compared with the level among agencies with nonsimilar political affiliation.

### **Limitations of the Study**

A major design limitation of this study was the inability of the survey to measure actual collaboration. Collaboration is one of those abstract concepts that are difficult if not impossible to measure. Consequently, the study had to settle for a survey that measured the perception of collaboration. Another design limitation had to do with



history effects, which threatened the internal validity of the study. Because the study was set in the period from 2011 to 2015, efforts had to be made during follow-up telephone calls to remind participants to focus their responses on this period. This was even though this instruction was clearly written on the questionnaire. The reminder was particularly useful for participants who were still in office, some of whom indicated during conversation that they would have responded based on current happenings if not for the reminder. A final limitation worthy of mention is a sample/data limitation. The power analysis carried out required an ideal sample size of 44 to provide a Power of .80. However, due to the availability of only 38 useful samples, the study had to settle for a Power of .73, which in any case is still acceptable.

### **Interpretation of Findings**

There were two propositions that this study needed to address. The first was to establish the strength of collaboration among the emergency management agencies while the second was to determine whether there was any significant difference between the level of collaboration among agencies that have similar political affiliation when compared to the level among agencies with differing political affiliations. The results showed that the strength of collaboration among emergency management agencies in Nigeria was perceived to be generally high. The *t*-test results negated the assumption that collaboration will be stronger among agencies with similar political party affiliation by finding that there was no significant difference between the mean of the strength of collaboration between the same-party and different-parties affiliated agencies. This

finding ran contrary to findings in literature (Henry, 2011; Mullin & Daley, 2009). Some of the plausible reasons for this deviation are presented below.

### **Culture of Rampant Political Nomadism in Nigeria**

The deviation of the finding from the trend in literature may be explained by what Ikechukwu (2015) described as rampant political nomadism in Nigeria. Contrary to Vraga's (2015) position that political affiliation is a foundational political identity dictated by ideology, worldview, and values (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Jost et al., 2003; Lakoff, 2002; Tetlock, 1986), political affiliation in Nigeria appeared to be dependent more on ephemeral considerations. Hence, the rate at which people changed their membership of political parties, and by extension their political party affiliation, in Nigeria was very high (Ikechukwu, 2015; Opadere & Agbana, 2015). This could account for the observed absence of significant difference in the strength of collaboration between the same-party and the different-parties groups.

### **Sample Size**

A sample size of 300 to 500 would be considered good to very good for a quantitative study involving a population of 812 (Comrey & Lee, 1992; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Vanvoorhis and Morgan (2007) recommended a sample size of 30 per group when conducting an independent samples *t* test. The power analysis for this study using the G\*Power 3.1.9.2 power analysis software prescribed an ideal sample size of 44. However, useable sample size for the study was 38. This could have contributed to the deviation of the findings from the established norm in literature.

**Timing of the Study**

The retrospective cross-sectional nature of the study meant that participants were required to report on the perception of collaboration they had in time past. This could have introduced bias due to history effects that could have contributed to the departure of the findings from the norm in literature.

**Nature of Instrument**

The instrument used for the study was designed to measure the five determinants of collaboration operationalized with a 17-indicator scale (Thomson et al., 2007). However, given the nebulous nature of the concept of collaboration, only the perception of collaboration could at best be said to be measurable. Even then, the measurement is subjective and could therefore have some effects on the outcome of the study.

**Recommendation for Future Research**

The findings of this study cannot be said to be conclusive. Future studies could ascertain the plausibility of the political nomadism explanation given above. Future studies could therefore investigate the effects or consequences of rampant political nomadism on public administration. The impact of the concept of homophily, that is, similarity in characteristics such as experiences, backgrounds, professional philosophies (Cook-Craig, 2010; Kadushin, 2004) on the findings could also be explored in future studies. It is also not clear if the peculiarity of emergency management being an aspect of public administration that aims to protect lives and properties and return society to normal after an emergency or a disaster contributes to the findings. Consequently, research on the effects of political affiliation on collaboration in other areas of public

administration in Nigeria could be carried out to validate the findings of this study. A focus on the health sector is particularly recommended because the sector shares the mandate of protection of life with emergency management. Another angle that could be explored in future research is to carry out a similar study but set within a different time frame when the political alignment configuration is different. Finally, as this study was conceptualized to test the veracity one of the established models of the determinants of collaboration in emergency management outside the Western Hemisphere, it would be expedient to validate the result of this study with researches set in other non-Western Hemisphere countries outside Nigeria.

### **Implications for Positive Social Change**

This study was carried out to examine how political affiliations inhibit or promote collaboration among emergency management agencies. The findings, however, suggested that political affiliations play little or no role in determining the strength of collaboration among emergency management agencies. This is a good thing and pleasant news that needs to be widely disseminated to further encourage collaboration across party lines. These findings also give credence to and encourage the drafting and implementation of emergency management policies that are party-blind. The implication for positive social change of this is that more energy can be focused on the other determinants of collaboration, that is, improving management techniques and making resources available. These could ultimately contribute to making emergency management more effective and efficient, thereby reducing the adverse effects of emergencies and disasters on the citizenry. Another implication of the findings of this study to positive social change is the

affirmation of the importance of research in public administration. The departure of the findings from the general trend in literature showed the need to continue to conduct research on collaboration and its effects on public administration.

### **Conclusion**

This study was carried out to examine the influence of political affiliation on the level of collaboration among emergency management agencies in Nigeria. To do this, it was first necessary to establish the existence and strength of collaboration among emergency management agencies in the country before investigating the existence of differences based on political affiliations. The study showed that indeed, emergency management agencies in Nigeria do collaborate and the strength of their collaboration is high. Regarding the influence of political affiliation on the level of collaboration, the study found no significant influence as the perception of the strength of collaboration remained the same among agencies that have similar political party alignment as well as among those with different political party alignment.

The finding appeared to be at variance with the trend in literature, which suggested that collaboration should be stronger among agencies with similar political party alignment. It was opined that the variation could be because of the peculiarity of the Nigerian political terrain where political nomadism seemed to be the order of the day. Consequently, it was recommended among others that further studies be carried out on the effects of political affiliation on collaboration in other sectors of public administration in Nigeria and in other countries outside the Western Hemisphere to validate the findings

of this study. It was also recommended that future researches could investigate the consequences of rampant political nomadism on public administration.

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## Appendix A: Survey Instrument

## SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE PERCEPTION OF COLLABORATION

**PEAMBLED**

You are invited to take part in a research study titled **“Political Affiliations and Inter-Agency Collaboration in Emergency Management in Nigeria”** The study is about the effects of political affiliations on the willingness and ability of emergency management agencies to work together in the discharge of their responsibilities. The researcher is inviting heads of Emergency Management Agencies at the Federal and State levels during the period 2011 to 2015 to be in the study.

This study is being conducted by a researcher named **Charles Otegbade**, who is a doctoral student at Walden University. You might already know the researcher when he was serving as the Director of Search and Rescue (DSAR) at the National Emergency Management Agency, but this study is separate from that role.

Kindly review the attached Consent Form detailing the voluntary nature and other obligations regarding the study. If you agree to participate in the research study, kindly complete the survey and return to the researcher.

**PART 1 – DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION**

1. The name of your emergency management agency .....
  
2. Nature of the agency:
  - a. Formal organization established by law or an executive directive.
  - b. Ad-Hoc body.
  - c. Advisory.
  - d. Other (Kindly indicate)  
.....
  
3. Nature of tenure of head of the agency:
  - a. Elected.
  - b. Political appointee.
  - c. Career civil servant.
  - d. Other (Kindly indicate)  
.....

## PART 2 – SURVEY QUESTIONS

The survey statements below are aimed at measuring your perception of the collaboration between your Agency and the .....\* Emergency Management Agency. On the seven-point scales below, circle the number that best indicates your overall assessment of this collaboration:

\* To be indicated by the researcher

1. The Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above\* take your organization's opinions seriously when decisions are made about the collaboration.

**Not at all      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      To a great extent**

2. Your organization brainstorms with the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above\* to develop solutions to mission-related problems facing the collaboration.

**Not at all      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      To a great extent**

3. You, as a representative of your organization in the collaboration, understand your organization's roles and responsibilities as a member of the collaboration.

**Not at all      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      To a great extent**

4. The meetings of your organization with the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above\* accomplish what is necessary for the collaboration to function well.

**Not at all      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      To a great extent**

5. Your organization and the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above\* agree about the goals of the collaboration.

**Not at all      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      To a great extent**

6. Your organization's tasks in the collaboration are well coordinated with those of the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above\*.

**Not at all    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    To a great extent**

7. The collaboration with the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above\* hinders your organization from meeting its own organizational mission.

**Not at all    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    To a great extent**

8. Your organization's independence is affected by having to work with the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above\* on activities related to the collaboration.

**Not at all    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    To a great extent**

9. You, as a representative of your organization, feel pulled between trying to meet both your organization's and the collaboration's expectations.

**Not at all    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    To a great extent**

10. The Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above\* and your organization have combined and used each other's resources so all partners benefit from collaborating.

**Not at all    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    To a great extent**

11. Your organization shares information with the Federal or State Emergency Management Agency indicated above\* to strengthen their operations and programs.

**Not at all    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    To a great extent**

12. You feel what your organization brings to the collaboration is appreciated and respected by Emergency Management Agency indicated above\*.

**Not at all    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    To a great extent**



13. Your organization achieves its own goals better working with the Emergency Management Agency indicated above than working alone.

**Not at all    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    To a great extent**

14. Your organization and the Emergency Management Agency indicated above\* work through differences to arrive at win-win solutions.

**Not at all    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    To a great extent**

15. The people who represent the Emergency Management Agency indicated above\* in the collaboration are trustworthy.

**Strongly disagree    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Strongly agree**

16. Your organization can count on the Emergency Management Agency indicated above\* to meet its obligations to the collaboration.

**Strongly disagree    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Strongly agree**

17. Your organization feels it worthwhile to stay and work with the Emergency Management Agency indicated above\* rather than leave the collaboration.

**Strongly disagree    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Strongly agree**

## Appendix B: Raw Scores of the Perception of the Strength of Collaboration–States

S-AGENCY	NATURE OF AGENCY	NATURE OF TENURE	POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q7REV	Q8REV	Q9REV
1	A	C	0	2	2	6	2	6	2	5	5	5	3	6	3	5	3	2	3	3	3	3	3
2	A	C	0	5	4	6	5	4	5	3	4	6	6	6	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	4	2
3	A	C	0	4	5	6	5	6	5	3	3	3	5	6	5	5	3	5	5	6	5	5	5
4	A	C	0	7	7	7	7	7	7	1	1	1	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
5	A	B	0	2	5	4	6	6	3	4	1	1	5	7	6	7	5	4	7	6	4	7	7
6	A	B	0	7	7	7	7	7	7	1	1	1	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
7	A	C	0	6	5	7	6	5	6	1	1	1	7	7	5	7	1	6	7	7	7	7	7
8	A	C	0	5	5	5	4	6	4	2	2	1	6	6	4	6	6	4	5	5	6	6	7
9	A	B	0	6	5	5	7	6	5	1	2	3	7	7	6	7	3	7	7	6	7	6	5
10	A	B	0	6	6	7	7	7	7	1	1	1	7	7	7	7	6	7	7	7	7	7	7
11	A	B	0	4	3	5	3	4	4	2	2	2	4	5	3	6	5	5	5	7	6	6	6
12	A	B	0	7	7	7	7	7	7	1	1	1	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
13	A	B	0	6	5	5	4	5	4	2	4	4	5	4	4	5	5	7	6	7	6	4	4
14	A	B	0	5	4	7	7	6	6	2	4	6	6	6	6	3	4	6	6	5	6	4	2
15	A	B	0	6	5	5	6	6	7	1	1	5	6	6	7	6	5	6	5	6	7	7	3
16	A	C	0	7	6	7	7	7	6	1	1	5	6	7	6	7	2	7	6	1	7	7	3
17	A	C	0	6	7	7	5	3	5	5	6	4	6	7	6	7	4	3	2	7	3	2	4
18	A	C	0	7	7	7	7	6	6	1	1	1	7	7	7	7	4	7	7	7	7	7	7
19	A	B	0	6	4	7	5	7	5	1	1	2	6	7	6	7	5	7	5	6	7	7	6
20	A	B	0	7	7	7	7	7	7	1	1	1	7	7	7	7	7	6	7	7	7	7	7
21	A	C	0	3	5	7	6	6	6	2	5	2	4	5	5	4	3	5	5	5	6	3	6
22	A	B	0	4	5	7	5	5	7	1	1	1	7	7	7	1	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
23	A	C	0	5	4	5	4	3	4	1	3	2	5	5	5	6	3	3	5	4	7	5	6
24	A	B	0	4	4	7	4	7	7	1	1	1	6	6	4	7	2	7	7	7	7	7	7
25	A	B	1	4	4	4	6	6	5	1	1	1	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	6	7	7	7
26	A	B	1	7	7	6	7	7	7	1	1	1	6	7	7	7	6	7	6	7	7	7	7
27	A	C	1	5	4	4	4	5	2	6	5	5	5	6	6	6	3	6	6	5	2	3	3
28	A	C	1	6	7	7	7	7	7	1	1	1	7	6	6	7	4	7	7	7	7	7	7
29	A	C	1	3	6	4	5	5	4	1	2	2	3	4	4	3	3	7	7	5	7	6	6
30	A	C	1	5	5	7	5	5	5	1	1	1	6	6	6	7	1	5	5	7	7	7	7
31	A	B	1	6	5	6	6	7	6	1	1	4	6	6	7	2	1	5	5	7	7	7	4
32	A	C	1	5	6	6	6	6	6	1	6	3	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	2	5
33	A	C	1	5	5	6	5	4	5	3	1	1	6	7	7	7	6	6	6	7	5	7	7
34	A	C	1	2	2	7	7	7	2	5	4	6	4	3	6	7	1	7	7	7	3	4	2
35	A	C	1	6	7	7	6	7	7	1	1	3	7	7	5	7	6	6	6	6	7	7	5
36	A	C	1	3	2	7	3	3	3	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	1	1	3	2	7	7	7
37	A	C	1	6	5	7	6	6	6	1	2	2	5	7	6	7	7	6	5	7	7	6	6

**Notes:**

Nature of Agency:                    **A** – Established by Law or Executive Directive.  
 Nature of Tenure:                    **A** – Elected; **B** – Political Appointee; **C** – Career Civil Servant.  
 Political Party Affiliation: **0** – Same Party Affiliation; **1** – Different Parties Affiliation.

### Appendix C: Raw Scores of the Perception of the Strength of Collaboration–Federal

N-AGENCY	NATURE OF AGENCY	NATURE OF TENURE	POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q7REV	Q8REV	Q9REV	
1	A	C	0	6	5	6	6	6	5	1	1	1	5	4	4	5	4	5	6	5	7	7	7	
2	A	C	0	7	2	7	7	7	7	7	1	1	4	1	7	7	7	5	4	7	7	1	7	4
3	A	C	0	7	7	6	6	7	6	1	1	1	5	6	6	7	6	7	6	7	7	7	7	
4	A	C	0	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	1	1	7	7	7	1	6	6	7	7	1	7	7	
5	A	B	0	6	6	7	5	5	6	2	1	2	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	5	6	7	6	
6	A	B	0	7	6	6	6	6	7	1	2	4	7	6	6	6	4	6	6	7	7	6	4	
7	A	C	0	6	6	7	6	6	6	2	2	2	6	6	7	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	
8	A	C	0	7	6	7	6	7	6	1	1	2	6	6	7	6	7	7	4	6	7	7	6	
9	A	B	0	6	4	4	6	5	6	1	1	1	6	5	5	5	5	5	6	5	7	7	7	
10	A	B	0	6	6	5	5	5	6	1	1	1	4	6	5	4	4	5	5	6	7	7	7	
11	A	B	0	7	7	7	7	7	7	2	1	1	1	7	7	7	6	4	5	7	6	7	7	
12	A	B	0	6	7	7	7	6	7	3	5	4	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	7	5	3	4	
13	A	B	0	5	6	7	7	7	7	6	5	4	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	7	2	3	3	
14	A	B	0	6	6	7	7	7	7	4	4	5	7	7	7	7	6	5	7	7	4	4	3	
15	A	B	0	6	6	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	2	2	2	
16	A	C	0	6	6	7	6	7	6	5	6	5	6	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	3	2	3	
17	A	C	0	5	4	7	4	5	6	4	7	6	3	4	7	5	6	1	5	6	4	1	2	
18	A	C	0	6	6	4	5	4	5	1	2	5	4	6	6	7	6	7	7	7	7	6	3	
19	A	B	0	4	4	5	3	5	2	1	3	6	4	5	6	7	5	7	7	7	7	5	2	
20	A	B	0	7	6	6	6	6	6	1	2	4	6	6	7	6	4	6	6	7	7	6	4	
21	A	C	0	6	5	6	6	5	6	2	2	2	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	
22	A	B	0	6	5	7	7	7	7	6	5	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	2	3	2	
23	A	C	0	4	5	7	7	7	7	7	1	4	1	7	7	7	5	4	7	7	1	7	4	
24	A	B	0	6	5	7	5	6	6	3	5	6	5	6	7	7	5	3	5	3	5	3	2	
25	A	B	1	5	5	5	5	6	6	1	1	1	6	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	7	7	7	
26	A	B	1	7	7	7	7	5	7	1	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	4	5	7	7	1	1	
27	A	C	1	5	5	4	6	6	4	2	1	1	6	6	4	4	6	6	6	4	6	7	7	
28	A	C	1	6	6	6	5	6	6	2	2	3	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	5	
29	A	C	1	5	5	5	5	6	6	1	1	1	6	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	7	7	7	
30	A	C	1	3	3	6	5	4	3	5	5	5	3	6	4	6	3	3	3	6	3	3	3	
31	A	B	1	6	6	7	6	6	7	1	3	5	7	6	6	7	4	6	5	7	7	5	3	
32	A	C	1	6	6	6	5	6	5	2	4	3	5	6	7	6	5	4	6	6	4	5	5	
33	A	C	1	7	5	6	5	5	5	3	4	2	5	5	6	5	6	6	3	5	5	4	6	
34	A	C	1	6	6	6	6	6	5	2	3	2	4	7	7	6	6	6	4	5	6	5	6	
35	A	C	1	4	4	6	5	5	5	3	4	3	4	6	5	5	3	4	5	6	5	4	5	
36	A	C	1	4	1	4	7	7	7	7	7	7	2	7	4	5	6	7	4	7	1	1	1	
37	A	C	1	6	6	7	7	7	7	5	6	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	3	2	2	

**Notes:**

Nature of Agency:                    **A** – Established by Law or Executive Directive.  
 Nature of Tenure:                    **A** – Elected; **B** – Political Appointee; **C** – Career Civil Servant.  
 Political Party Affiliation: **0** – Same Party Affiliation; **1** – Different Parties Affiliation.

### Appendix D: Raw Scores of the Perception of the Strength of Collaboration–Combined

COMBINED	NATURE OF AGENCY	NATURE OF TENURE	POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q7REV	Q8REV	Q9REV
1	A	C	0	4	3.5	6	4	6	3.5	3	3	3	4	5	3.5	5	3.5	3.5	4.5	4	5	5	5
2	A	C	0	6	3	6.5	6	5.5	6	5	2.5	5	3.5	6.5	5.5	5.5	4.5	4	6	6	3	5.5	3
3	A	C	0	5.5	6	6	5.5	6.5	5.5	2	2	2	5	6	5.5	6	4.5	6	5.5	6.5	6	6	6
4	A	C	0	7	7	7	7	7	7	4	1	1	7	7	7	4	6.5	6.5	7	7	4	7	7
5	A	B	0	4	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	4.5	3	1	1.5	5.5	6.5	6	6.5	5.5	5.5	6.5	5.5	5	7	6.5
6	A	B	0	7	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	7	1	1.5	2.5	7	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	7	7	6.5	5.5
7	A	C	0	6	5.5	7	6	5.5	6	1.5	1.5	1.5	6.5	6.5	6	6	3.5	6	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5
8	A	C	0	6	5.5	6	5	6.5	5	1.5	1.5	1.5	6	6	5.5	6	6.5	5.5	4.5	5.5	6.5	6.5	6.5
9	A	B	0	6	4.5	4.5	6.5	5.5	5.5	1	1.5	2	6.5	6	5.5	6	4	6	6.5	5.5	7	6.5	6
10	A	B	0	6	6	6	6	6	6.5	1	1	1	5.5	6.5	6	5.5	5	6	6	6.5	7	7	7
11	A	B	0	5.5	5	6	5	5.5	5.5	2	1.5	1.5	2.5	6	5	6.5	5.5	4.5	5	7	6	6.5	6.5
12	A	B	0	6.5	7	7	7	6.5	7	2	3	2.5	7	7	7	7	7	6.5	6.5	7	6	5	5.5
13	A	B	0	5.5	5.5	6	5.5	6	5.5	4	4.5	4.5	6	5.5	5.5	6	6	6.5	6	7	4	3.5	3.5
14	A	B	0	5.5	5	7	7	6.5	6.5	3	4	5.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	5	5	5.5	6.5	6	5	4	2.5
15	A	B	0	6	5.5	6	6.5	6	6.5	3.5	3.5	5.5	6.5	6.5	7	6	5.5	6	5.5	6	4.5	4.5	2.5
16	A	C	0	6.5	6	7	6.5	7	6	3	3.5	5	6	7	6.5	7	4	6.5	6	3.5	5	4.5	3
17	A	C	0	5.5	5.5	7	4.5	4	5.5	4.5	6.5	5	4.5	5.5	6.5	6	5	2	3.5	6.5	3.5	1.5	3
18	A	C	0	6.5	6.5	5.5	6	5	5.5	1	1.5	3	5.5	6.5	6.5	7	5	7	7	7	7	6.5	5
19	A	B	0	5	4	6	4	6	3.5	1	2	4	5	6	6	7	5	7	6	6.5	7	6	4
20	A	B	0	7	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	1	1.5	2.5	6.5	6.5	7	6.5	5.5	6	6.5	7	7	6.5	5.5
21	A	C	0	4.5	5	6.5	6	5.5	6	2	3.5	2	5	5.5	5.5	5	4.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	6	4.5	6
22	A	B	0	5	5	7	6	6	7	3.5	3	3.5	7	7	7	7	3.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	4.5	5	4.5
23	A	C	0	4.5	4.5	6	5.5	5	5.5	4	2	3	3	6	6	6.5	4	3.5	6	5.5	4	6	5
24	A	B	0	5	4.5	7	4.5	6.5	6.5	2	3	3.5	5.5	6	5.5	7	3.5	5	6	5	6	5	4.5
25	A	B	1	4.5	4.5	4.5	5.5	6	5.5	1	1	1	6	5.5	5.5	5.5	5	6	5.5	5.5	7	7	7
26	A	B	1	7	7	6.5	7	6	7	1	4	4	6.5	7	7	7	6.5	5.5	5.5	7	7	4	4
27	A	C	1	5	4.5	4	5	5.5	3	4	3	3	5.5	6	5	5	4.5	6	6	4.5	4	5	5
28	A	C	1	6	6.5	6.5	6	6.5	6.5	1.5	1.5	2	6	5.5	5	6	4.5	6	6	6.5	6.5	6.5	6
29	A	C	1	4	5.5	4.5	5	5.5	5	1	1.5	1.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4	3.5	6	6	5	7	6.5	6.5
30	A	C	1	4	4	6.5	5	4.5	4	3	3	3	4.5	6	5	6.5	2	4	4	6.5	5	5	5
31	A	B	1	6	5.5	6.5	6	6.5	6.5	1	2	4.5	6.5	6	6.5	4.5	2.5	5.5	5	7	7	6	3.5
32	A	C	1	5.5	6	6	5.5	6	5.5	1.5	5	3	6	6.5	7	6.5	6	6	5.5	6.5	6.5	3	5
33	A	C	1	6	5	6	5	4.5	5	3	2.5	1.5	5.5	6	6.5	6	6	6	4.5	3.5	5	5.5	6.5
34	A	C	1	4	4	6.5	6.5	6.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	4	4	5	6.5	6.5	3.5	6.5	5.5	6	4.5	4.5	4
35	A	C	1	5	5.5	6.5	5.5	6	6	2	2.5	3	5.5	6.5	5	6	4.5	5	5.5	6	6	5.5	5
36	A	C	1	3.5	1.5	5.5	5	5	5	4	4	4	2.5	5	2.5	3	3.5	4	3.5	4.5	4	4	4
37	A	C	1	6	5.5	7	6.5	6.5	6.5	3	4	4	6	7	6.5	7	6.5	6	5.5	6.5	5	4	4

**Notes:**

Nature of Agency:                    **A** – Established by Law or Executive Directive.  
 Nature of Tenure:                    **A** – Elected; **B** – Political Appointee; **C** – Career Civil Servant.  
 Political Party Affiliation: **0** – Same Party Affiliation; **1** – Different Parties Affiliation.

## Appendix E: Collaboration Scores Grouped into the Five Dimensions

AGENCY	NATURE OF AGENCY	NATURE OF TENURE	POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION	DIMENSIONS OF COLLABORATION					TOTAL
				GOVERNANCE	ADMINISTRATION	AUTONOMY	MUTUALITY	NORM (TRUST)	
1	A	C	0	3.75	4.88	5.00	4.20	4.00	4.41
2	A	C	0	4.50	6.00	3.83	5.10	5.33	5.06
3	A	C	0	5.75	5.88	6.00	5.40	6.00	5.76
4	A	C	0	7.00	7.00	6.00	6.30	6.83	6.59
5	A	B	0	4.75	5.25	6.17	6.00	5.83	5.68
6	A	B	0	6.75	6.63	6.33	6.40	6.67	6.53
7	A	C	0	5.75	6.13	6.50	5.70	6.33	6.06
8	A	C	0	5.75	5.63	6.50	6.00	5.17	5.82
9	A	B	0	5.25	5.50	6.50	5.60	6.00	5.76
10	A	B	0	6.00	6.13	7.00	5.70	6.17	6.15
11	A	B	0	5.25	5.50	6.33	5.10	5.50	5.50
12	A	B	0	6.75	6.88	5.50	7.00	6.67	6.62
13	A	B	0	5.50	5.75	3.67	5.80	6.50	5.50
14	A	B	0	5.25	6.75	3.83	5.90	6.00	5.68
15	A	B	0	5.75	6.25	3.83	6.30	5.83	5.71
16	A	C	0	6.25	6.63	4.17	6.10	5.33	5.76
17	A	C	0	5.50	5.25	2.67	5.50	4.00	4.68
18	A	C	0	6.50	5.50	6.17	6.10	7.00	6.18
19	A	B	0	4.50	4.88	5.67	5.80	6.50	5.53
20	A	B	0	6.75	6.50	6.33	6.40	6.50	6.47
21	A	C	0	4.75	6.00	5.50	5.10	5.50	5.41
22	A	B	0	5.00	6.50	4.67	6.30	6.50	5.94
23	A	C	0	4.50	5.50	5.00	5.10	5.00	5.09
24	A	B	0	4.75	6.13	5.17	5.50	5.33	5.47
25	A	B	1	4.50	5.38	7.00	5.50	5.67	5.65
26	A	B	1	7.00	6.63	5.00	6.80	6.00	6.32
27	A	C	1	4.75	4.38	4.67	5.20	5.50	4.91
28	A	C	1	6.25	6.38	6.33	5.40	6.17	6.03
29	A	C	1	4.75	5.00	6.67	4.20	5.67	5.15
30	A	C	1	4.00	5.00	5.00	4.80	4.83	4.79
31	A	B	1	5.75	6.38	5.50	5.20	5.83	5.71
32	A	C	1	5.75	5.75	4.83	6.40	6.00	5.82
33	A	C	1	5.50	5.13	5.67	6.00	4.67	5.44
34	A	C	1	4.00	5.75	4.33	5.10	6.00	5.15
35	A	C	1	5.25	6.00	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.59
36	A	C	1	2.50	5.13	4.00	3.30	4.00	3.88
37	A	C	1	5.75	6.63	4.33	6.60	6.00	6.00

**Notes:**

Nature of Agency:

**A** – Established by Law or Executive Directive.

Nature of Tenure:

**A** – Elected; **B** – Political Appointee; **C** – Career Civil Servant.Political Party Affiliation: **0** – Same Party Affiliation; **1** – Different Parties Affiliation.