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# Government and Nongovernmental Collaboration to Build Community Resiliency Against Terrorism in Oklahoma City

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MA, Norwich University, 2005

BS, Regents College, 2003



Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration



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Abstract

The way communities build resiliency and prepare for acts of terrorism is ambiguous in the United States; best practices remain unclear. Due to mobility and advancements in communication technologies, individuals and organizations share information, incite anger, recruit, and act on ideological grievances with ease. Such grievances are bolstered by the political and social exclusion of disparate groups through poorly designed policies and ineffective government structures. Using a combination of social constructivism and systems thinking theories, this case study explored collaboration efforts between government agencies and nongovernment experts in Oklahoma City, OK, identifying best practices as a result of lessons learned following the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. Data were acquired through public records related to the bombing, combined with a qualitative survey of 31 community leaders. These data were inductively coded and subjected to a thematic analysis procedure. Key findings indicate that while open communication with the community and increased coordination were suggested by participants, reports were kept internal to each agency and not widely shared or implemented effectively across the community. Sharing the identified best practices and acknowledging collaboration opportunities promotes positive social change by involving the broader community and building early resiliency to address ideologic grievances and create more effective community counterterrorism plans.

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Dedication

      To my father for telling me I could do anything I dreamed of, to my mother who taught me how, to my sons who sacrificed their time and encouraged me every day, to my dearest husband who helped me over the final hurdles, and finally to my daughter and granddaughter who inspired me to finish and live my dreams. Thank you for believing in me.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

**Introduction**

The way communities build resiliency and prepare for acts of terrorism is relatively ambiguous in the United States and best practices remain unclear. Due to increased mobility and advancements in communication technologies, individuals and organizations have the ability to share grievances, incite anger, recruit followers, and act upon ideological grievances with greater ease (Smith, Burke, de Leiuen, and Jackson, 2016). Many of these grievances are fueled by perceptions of social and ideological isolation from their community (Gewirtz and Baer, 1958; de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Bakker, 2016; Kailemia, 2016). Such grievances are often bolstered through the political and social exclusion of disparate groups due to poorly designed legislative policies and ineffective government structures (Akram, and Karmely, 2005; Levine, Leenman, Gershenson, and Hureau, 2014; Oberman, 2017). Policy makers at the community level often do not have the expertise regarding ideological disparities to understand which policies and structures have been detrimental to different communities.  Furthermore, this lack of expertise can then impact policy makers' abilities to recommend changes within existing public service frameworks.

Collaboration between government and nongovernmental experts improves knowledge bases and helps government agencies create more cohesive policies and more hospitable social structures. In this way, collaboration potentially reduces the level of ideological grievances in disparate communities. Exploring the collaborative efforts between governmental agencies and nongovernment organizations can help researchers

identify best practices and proven solutions to address knowledge deficits within government agencies.

In Chapter 1, I provide a brief background concerning the current terrorism threat in the United States followed by an explanation of why terrorism is a problem worth studying at this time. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how a U.S. community responded to an act of domestic terrorism and how that event influenced collaboration efforts between governmental agencies (emergency responders) and nongovernment organizations (educational institutes, religious institutes, specialty think tanks, and aid organizations) as they design and implement community level counterterrorism strategies. The research questions and theoretical foundations provided a framework for understanding the level of current collaboration and potential gaps in community security planning efforts. I provide definitions in Chapter 1 for concepts, phrases and words that are specific to terrorism research and crisis management practices. Despite assumptions and identified limitations inherent in the narrow scope of the study, the significance of the study is validated by the ongoing threat of terrorist activity and the amount of newly identified data regarding ideological and social grievances that have underpinned motivations to commit acts of terrorism.

## Background

The threat of domestic terrorism is an ongoing national security issue for the United States (U.S.). Traditionally terrorism has been a U.S. Foreign Policy issue, addressed through a combination of diplomacy and military force. In the last few

decades, the U.S. has been forced to change its view and its approach to international and domestic terrorism threats to maintain national security and public safety. With the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York City, Americans were faced with the realization that terrorism was not only a foreign problem. Yet, for most Americans living outside of New York City, the personal safety threat did not seem plausible. The 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, considered at the time to be the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil, changed that view. The attack on a Midwestern, midsized U.S. city, conducted by American citizens, was something new, unexpected, and unimaginable. In the years following the Oklahoma City attack, terrorist's groups continued to target U.S. interests around the world. Once again, such attacks were thought to occur far away from the average American home and had very little impact on Americans' daily lives. Without the immediate threat to personal safety, most Americans went back to their day to day activities without much thought or concern regarding local threats of terrorism.

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were a second terrorism awakening for U.S. citizens, and a defining moment for U.S. counter-terrorism policy. With the assistance of public television and cable news networks, the attacks were broadcast for weeks following the event. Moment by moment coverage of the rescue and recovery efforts captured the attention of viewers worldwide and allowed the emotional build up to influence the national security and foreign policy decisions that were made in the decade following the attack. Between 2001 and 2017, researchers and policy makers worked diligently to find a balance between ensuring national security and maintaining the privacy rights of U.S. citizens. Over the last sixteen years, law

enforcement and policy makers have had some success and some failure in dealing with U.S. terrorist threats and attacks. Recent terrorism events in California, Florida, New York, and Las Vegas reinforce the reality of the existing domestic threat and the fact that ideological grievances and terrorism remains a complicated issue to understand and to address.

Global terrorism has become a hot national security topic receiving a great deal of mass media attention, academic research dollars, and the consideration of global leaders (Lutz, Lutz, and Lutz, 2013). In the wake of multiple terrorist attacks across Europe and Central Asia, the U.S. Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Sarah Sewall, stated "Tackling violent extremism isn't a question of government on the one hand, and people on the other. We need both hands - people and government - working in partnership to meet this challenge. Violent extremists want to sow fear, to divide, and to provoke overreactions that feed the cycle of bloodshed on which they thrive. They see only the lines that separate us and not the profound ties that bind us together" (Speech in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 30 March 2016).

With a rise in terrorist activity in Europe, Central Asia, and Northern Africa, America's attention has been focused overseas and on foreign born terrorist threats. However, the threat of domestic terrorism is a valid concern for U.S. communities. The 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, the 2015 San Bernardino attack, the 2016 attack on a Florida nightclub, the 2017 attack on concert goers in Las Vegas, various attacks on military bases and military recruitment offices, as well as individual attacks on college campuses, movie theaters, and workplaces in the U.S., are all reminders that Americans

must not become complacent with regards to preparing for domestic terrorist events, including addressing the aftermath of a terrorist attack (Sobel, 2014; Bjelopera, 2013, 2014). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) admits there is a lot of work to be done and many communities remain unprepared for the crisis response challenges that New York, Washington DC, Boston, and Orlando experienced during and shortly after the terrorist attacks (DHS, 2016). For many communities in the U.S. the question is not whether they should prepare, but how to prepare.

Terrorism research spans a wide range of topics and academic disciplines, from the psychological impact terrorism has on victims to the economic and social impacts terrorism has on the community (Weinberg, Gil, and Gilbar, 2014; Schneider, Brück and Meierrieks, 2015). Past, present, and the threat of future acts of terrorism have been used indiscriminately by television news programs to increase viewership; by journalists and writers to increase readership; by academics and think tanks to validate research grants; by private companies to sell security equipment or protective services; by film makers to increase box office sales; and by politicians and law enforcement agencies to validate the extension of national security measures. Despite the various ways terrorism has been portrayed, it is the psychological effect, the fear of becoming a victim, which has had the most detrimental impact on American communities (Schmid, 2013; Bjelopera, 2013; 2014; Hewitt, 2014).

This case study presents an in-depth examination of Oklahoma City prior to, during, and in the aftermath of a domestic terrorist attack. I do so to determine how the attack in 1995 has shaped the city's preparation and response planning efforts regarding

the threat of terrorism today. Knowledge gained through this examination promotes positive social change by identifying lessons learned and best practices following a domestic terrorism event. Results of the study promote more detailed planning and encourage a wider range of community collaboration with experts to provide additional training and advice regarding ideological grievances and community level counter-terrorism strategies (Stewart, and Vocino, 2013). For the rest of Chapter 1, I provide a short synopsis of the existing literature surrounding the phenomenon of terrorism and begin to outline why terrorism response strategies need to be addressed at the community level rather than being left to state and national security regimes. I will provide a more detailed review of the current state of terrorism research and the integration of community response research in Chapter 2.

## Problem Statement

Extensive research, unprecedented security measures, ongoing military operations, and an unimaginable amount of money have been invested in addressing ideological violence, yet the threat remains and continues to grow. Identifying and addressing the underlying motivations that drive individuals and organizations to commit acts of terrorism is inherently complex. Due to this complexity and the urgency related to finding a suitable security solution, counterterrorism strategies need to be designed and implemented at the community level.

Social unrest around the world combined with increased access to global communication networks have expanded the recruitment and coordination efforts of terrorist organizations, making it easier to reach potential followers and hide illicit

activities on a global scale (Matusitz, 2013; Milosevska, 2013). Data collected by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), along with recent security warnings issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), indicate that terrorism remains a significant threat to U.S. communities (START, 2015; DHS, 2015). The psychological impact, the potential for social disruption, and the financial burden of increased security measures in response to terrorist threats, has and will continue to impact every American community (Dragu and Polborn, 2014; Moteff, 2015). Despite a long list of terrorist plots and the multitude of terrorist acts that have been carried out around the world, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, (a symbol of U.S. financial strength), and the concurrent attack on the Pentagon in Washington D.C., (a symbol of U.S. military strength), changed the American mindset and renewed awareness regarding the threat of terrorism. The extent of the death toll combined with the significance of the targets, amplified the publicity the attack received around the world and reminded Americans that they were not immune to the growing insurgency of global terror. In the months and years following September 11, 2001, U.S. political leaders commissioned the formation of a centralized department to oversee and coordinate national security resources in what was defined and validated as a War on Terrorism.

On November 25, 2002, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established, bringing 22 government agencies under one centralized authority to address the threat of domestic terrorism (Law, 2002). In the following years, similar counter-terrorism centers were established by U.S. state governments to assist with the

coordination and dissemination of state resources. Although the domestic threat of terrorism seemed new after September 11, 2001, terrorism concerns and counterterrorism planning had been ongoing in many U.S. communities. Since the early 1990s a great deal of time and money has been spent on gathering intelligence and funding law enforcement activities to address the growing threat of domestic terrorism and to maintain a sense of national security (Taylor and Swanson, 2015). The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was a reminder that even small midwestern communities were at risk of becoming victims of terrorism. First responders and emergency personel reacted according to existing emergency plans, however it appeared that government leaders were not prepared for the community anxiety and anger that followed (Tucker, Pfefferbaum, Nitiema, Wendling, and Brown, 2016; Pfefferbaum, Nitiema, Pfefferbaum, Houston, Tuck, Jeon-Slaughter, and North, 2016).

Despite over 20 years of community planning and the construction of a counterterrorism research center in Oklahoma City, fully implementing a strong counterterrorism program has been challenging. In the hours, days, and months following the Oklahoma City Bombing, several organizations came together to provide emergency response services, communications support, search and recovery, medical and mental health services, and food and shelter for the victims. The community leaders and surrounding cities continued their support and collaboration efforts as funds and community interests permitted. Unfortunately as the years passed, community interests and funding for special programs diminished. One example isThe Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism that was created after the bombing in 1995. In the early years

the Memorial Institute was considered the premire U.S. counter terrorism research center, yet the center lost most of its funding and was eventually closed in August of 2014. This trend was not uncommon despite the growing threat of terrorism, public funding and donations have been shown to follow the latest or most prominent event and therefore as new terrorist attacks occurred over the years, counterterrorism funding dollars transfered from community to community, with very few longterm community programs surviving.

Despite the inconsistent flow of counterterrorism funding, building community cohesion, public trust, and longterm resiliency remains a concern for many local community leaders. In response to growing uncertainty surrounding the threat of terrorism, community leaders continue to look for ways to design effective and efficient strategies to prevent, respond and overcome future acts of terrorism (GAO, 2015). Recent research recommends additional collaboration with local nongovernmental organizations, religious organizations, and university research centers (McGinty, Sziarto and Seymour-Jorn 2013; Cheema, Scheyven, Glavovic and Imran, 2014). A large body of research exists regarding the causes of terrorism and what is being done at the national and state level to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks, however a gap remains in the literature regarding what has been and is being done at the local community level.

**Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of the study was to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how U.S. communities respond to an act of domestic terrorism and to determine what collaboration efforts between governmental agencies (leaders, first responders) and nongovernment organizations (educational institutes, religious institutes, specialty think

tanks, and aid organizations) are needed to design and implement community level counterterrorism strategies.

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD), established by START and the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) developed by the Institute for Economics & Peace, both indicate that ideological violence and ideologically based warfare remain a significant threat to U.S. national security and overall global stability. In this case study, I evaluated the effectiveness of such collaborative programs by exploring the personal experiences and perceptions of government and nongovernmental leaders in Oklahoma City who have been commissioned or have volunteered to plan for and address security concerns associated with an emergency event such as an act of terrorism. Oklahoma City was chosen for this study due to its first-hand experience with responding to and recovering from a domestic terrorist attack in 1995. Sharing the identified best practices and acknowledging the potential opportunities for improvement may promote positive social change by assisting other communities as they build resiliency against ideologic grievances and create their own community terrorism response plans.

Outcomes of the study include providing insight regarding which collaboration activities have influenced the effectiveness and efficiency of community-based counterterrorism strategies, and which lessons learned have been used to improved current counterterrorism strategies. The knowledge gained through this study may be used by leaders in other communities as they research, develop, and implement their own counterterrorism strategies. Best practices identified by this study may also encourage expanding collaboration efforts between all sectors of the community to address threats

of domestic terrorism and to promote community resiliency in the hope of reducing the long-term impact of future terrorist acts.

## Research Questions

This study addresses the following question and sub questions.

**Question**

In what ways and to what ends do Oklahoma City, OK government and nongovernmental organizations collaborate with one another to provide joint counter terrorism services?

**Sub questions**

1. What are strengths and weaknesses in having nongovernmental organization provide education, information, and advice to government leaders to address ideologically based security threats?

2. In what ways have collaboration between government and nongovernment agencies influenced community preparedness programs regarding multicultural and multilingual needs?

## Theoretical Framework

The framework chosen for this study was a combination of Berger's and Luckman's social constructivism, and Senge's systems thinking theory. Social constructivism as interpreted by Berger's and Luckman (1966), posits that humans have the ability to create their own systems of meaning in which they are able to understand their world through individual experiences and respond in accordance with their own interpretation of a shared event (Babbie, 2015). Social constructivism was an appropriate

theory to be used within this case study as a framework for explaining interpretations of

an event from the perspective of the individuals who either experienced it first hand or

those who have been tasked to provide services in the aftermath of the event. In addition

to social constructivism, systems thinking theory, based on Senge's interpretation, was

also chosen as a framework for interpreting this case study to address the fact that

communities are comprised of a network of intra and inter dependent systems (people,

organizations, laws, and resources) working together to achieve a specific objective

(Senge, 2006). Systems theory has been used in multiple disciplines to describe the

interactions and dependencies of different agents within the system and helped bring

together the individual interpretations of participants with the networked responsibilities

inherent in comprehensive community counter-terrorism plans.

Yin (2014) recommends using case studies to allow the researcher flexible

collection and interpretation options that assist in developing a broader understanding of

the phenomenon being studied. Conceptual frameworks promote an inductive approach

rather than a narrower formal framework designed explicitly to test an existing theory

(Anfara and Mertz, 2014). Social constructivism has been used by terrorism and

counterterrorism researchers to develop an understanding of an individual's

interpretations and responses to their environment, as well as the social exchanges that

take place within social and cultural experiences (Kayser, 2015; Resnick, Guimond,

Wellman, Resnick, 2015). Combining elements of the two theoretical foundations into a

social systems theoretical framework for research has been used successfully by Cavallo

(2014) to examine community interactions within the context of disaster preparedness

planning and within Carter's (2011) study of human behavior within social environments. Cavallo and Carter used social systems frameworks to describe the social interactions among individuals and others in a community setting similar to the community chosen for the proposed case study on Oklahoma City. The social systems framework successfully explored interactions between individuals and provided insight into the manner in which individuals behave within systems and both Cavallo and Carter concluded that choosing the combined theoretical frameworks provided unique insights into the behaviors that allowed the various members of their chosen communities to coexist. I used a similar framework for this study to shed light on how members of Oklahoma City have coexisted and how service agencies have interacted since the 1995 terrorist event (Cavallo, 2014; Carter, 2011).

In conducting this research, I also considered similar theoretical models such as structural functionalism and conflict theory based on a review of Dale's, Potts' and Vella's (2015) analysis that explored elements of sustainability planning, Friedman's (2014) study examining social class and cultures within global systems, and Bartolucci's and Gallo's (2015) terrorism study, for their similarities to the topic and research questions proposed in this study. However, structural functionalism and conflict theory were both rejected due to complexity in study design and the existence of research methodologies that constrained flexible collection and data interpretation. I constructed the primary and sub research questions within this case study to broadly explore the effectiveness and efficiency within community processes as determined by the participants. A broader social systems thinking approach, similar to processes used by

Alam and Husband (2013) and Barile and Saviano (2011) was needed to allow for the inclusion of individual interpretations, organizational structures and processes, and legal and policy limitations, as well as to explore the impact of available resources and time constraints that have a significant impact on the effectiveness or efficiency of the response and recovery processes chosen.

**Nature of the Study**

The study followed a qualitative model using a case study research process to explore the community response and recovery efforts prior to, during, and following the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing. There are several valid reasons for choosing this approach. Maxwell (2013) describes five goals that qualitative research is used to address: (a.) understanding the meaning of events, situations, experiences, and actions that study participants are involved with or engaged in, (b.) understanding the particular contexts within which the participants act and the influence that this context has on their actions, (c.) understanding the process by which events and actions take place, (d.) identifying unanticipated phenomena and influences, and generating new, "grounded" theories about the later, and (e.) developing causal explanations to tie the research together. Based on Maxwell's description of the qualitative research method, I focused on methods designed to explore the 1995 bombing event and identify strategies used to address threats of terrorism, improve public safety, coordinate response, recover, and build long-term community resiliency in the future.

A qualitative case study is consistent with investigating how government and nongovernmental leaders interpret, interact and engage in the preparation and

implementation of a community's terrorism response and recovery plan. To ensure a rigorous approach to the case study framework, I conducted a process of data triangulation was to ensure data was collected from multiple sources and that such data captured individual interpretations of the event spanning twenty years from 1995 to 2015. I recorded data using a thick description research process to ensure that data were interpreted as closely to the original intent of the information as possible. In addition, I conducted an audit trail to ensure that sources of data were mapped chronologically and could be revisited and reevaluated within the context of new information or contradictory data. Additionally, I implemented a researcher and peer review process periodically throughout the project to maintain my awareness as a researcher and manage my reflexivity to minimize any research biases. (Houghton, Casey, Shaw and Murphy, 2013; Anfara and Mertz, 2014; Almutairi, Gardner and McCarthy, 2014; Yin, 2014).

## Definitions

The study of terrorism and its impact on U.S. communities is dynamic and continuously evolving in response to global research findings. It is necessary to define uncommon words, phrases and concepts that will be referred to within the literature used and the interpretation of the data within this study. The following definitions are not all inclusive; they have been determined to be the most significant concepts within the study as they pertain to U.S. communities, terrorism studies, emergency response and community resiliency planning.

*Community cohesion:* A situation in which various groups work together to enhance the quality of life within a community.  These groups could include governing

bodies, public service agencies, private corporations, nongovernmental organizations (like educational or religious institutes and community services organizations), and private citizens (Cowden and Singh, 2014; Lewis and Craig, 2014; Martin, 2015; Seville, Van Opstal, and Vargo, 2015).

*Cultural assimilation:* The ability of a community to invite, recognize and appreciate the cultural, ethnical, and linguistic diversity of its community members while urging members of the community to assimilate, take ownership of, and become active participants within their community. (Martin, 2015; Basuchoudhary, and Cotting, 2014).

*Ideology:* A system of beliefs, principles and doctrine that provides guidance to an individual, group, social movement, or institution (Johnson, 2015; Bershady, 2014).

*Ideological Violence:* The use, planned use, or threatened use of force or violence by a group or individual to promote the group or individual's political, religious, or social beliefs Adamczyk, Gruenewald, Chermak, and Greilich, 2014).

*Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD):* A psychiatric disorder that can occur in people who have experienced or witnessed a traumatic event such as a natural disaster, a serious accident, a terrorist act, war/combat, rape or other violent personal assault (American Psychiatric Association, 2015).

*Political ideology:* Motivation determined by political drivers or values which have often been defined along a liberal to conservative spectrum with respect to public policy issues (Iyer, Webster, Hornsey, and Vanman, 2014; Feldman and Johnston, 2014; Piazza, 2013).

*Religious ideology:* Motivation determined by religious drivers or values which determines acceptable societal norms and acceptable personal behaviors (Perry and Minteh, 2014; Turner, 2014).

*Resilience:* The ability of a system to return to an equilibrium or steady state after a disturbance, such as a natural disaster (e.g. earthquake or flood) or a social upheaval (e.g. a terrorist attack, war, or revolution) (Vale, 2014; Vos, M. and Ohman, S., 2014; Cote and Nightingale, 2012, Brown and Westaway, 2011).

*Social disruption:* The alteration or breakdown of traditional social life, the disruption of common social activities and community behavioral patterns due to an unexpected event or significant tragedy. (Aijazi, and Panjwani, 2015).

*Terrorism:* An unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015). Additional context regarding how terrorism is defined will be provided within chapter two.

## Assumptions

Determining that this study would be of value to other community, state, and national leaders required that I make a few initial assumptions about the intended audiences and the available data. The first assumption was that community, state, and national leaders perceived that the threat of a terrorist attack on a U.S. city exists. The second assumption was that appointed leaders have determined the threat is significant enough to warrant having community level strategic response plans in place. The third

assumption was that appointed leaders have engaged in an effort to develop a strategy, independently by agency or collectively as a community. The final assumption was that the resources required for a community level plan have been resourced and made available prior to a terrorist attack.

## Scope and Delimitations

This case study was confined to the official boundaries of Oklahoma City, OK and did not include subsidiary communities in the surrounding area. Data related to government participants only included publicly available historic data and information provided through participant surveys and interviews directly related to the actions of city officials, law enforcement, emergency services leaders, and social service agencies within the scope of their official duties. Data related to the actions of nongovernment participants was include for those organizations which provided a critical service within the city's strategic response plan (e.g. medical support, food and shelter, community education, or victim advocacy).

## Limitations

The most significant limitation of this study was that it is focused on a single Midwestern community with a population of approximately 500,000; potentially limiting the transferability of the results to other communities. The case study's qualitative design and structured data collection methodology only focused on publicly accessible data between 1995 and 2015, and on the personal accounts of voluntary study participants, limiting data sources to only information that was adequately recorded, made publicly available, or voluntarily provided. The third limitation was that the available historic

records, personal accounts, and written documentaries may have reflected personal or professional biases driven by the recording methodology (e.g. government reporting requirements, media agenda, book editorial process, or academic purposes). The final limitation of this study, as is the case for all research, was my personal biases and mannerisms as the researcher, which unintentionally influenced how the data was collected, the sources of data chosen for examination, and determined how the data was coded and interpreted.

## Significance of the Study

This research may help fill a gap in our understanding related to how community leaders have used the institutional knowledge and existing resources possessed by government agencies and nongovernment organizations to meet the needs of the community before, during and after a terrorist attack. This research study was unique due to its focus on the personal experiences and perceptions of government and nongovernmental leaders that were directly involved in responding to a domestic terrorist attack. Furthermore, I sought participants' subsequent reflections over the past twenty-two years regarding how the community planned for, implemented their crisis action plan and how the community recovered from a terrorist attack. I used data collected through available public records, existing academic studies, historic media reports, and personal documentaries of the event. Additionally, I surveyed voluntary participants to determine how government leaders have or have not sought nongovernmental assistance and to discern what value collaboration with nongovernmental organizations brought prior to, during, and after a terrorist attack. The results of this study provide insights into the

collaborative processes that government leaders have used to engage across agencies and across nongovernmental organizations and may provide additional feedback to determine if nongovernmental organizations can provide additional resources and specialized assistance prior to, during, and after a terrorist attack. Insights from this study may help appointed leaders determine if similar programs should continue and how much additional resources should be invested in these types of programs based on current terrorism threats.

## Summary

September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City and the Pentagon in Washington DC reinvigorated how Americans viewed terrorism and how they defined, interpreted, and addressed their personal safety concerns. Although foreign terrorism on U.S. soil was somewhat of a new concept in 2001, acts of domestic terrorism frequently touch U.S. communities. Traditionally, domestic terrorism received far less publicity in national and global mass media until recently, the impact on U.S. communities has been devastating. Ongoing global security trends and terrorism research suggests the threat will continue to plague U.S. communities well into the future. In this case, study, I explored one community's preparation and response to the 1995 bombing attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK and examined how the city has reflected on and addressed the aftermath of that event. To develop a basic understanding of terrorism and how other societies have responded to the threat or recovered from acts of terrorism. Chapter 2 is a comprehensive review of the existing research and literature surrounding these topics.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

## Introduction

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. has been investing in extensive counterterrorism research, policy makers have implemented unprecedented security measures, funded continual military operations and spent an unimaginable amount of money addressing terrorism; yet the threat remains and continues to grow (Hoffman, and Strindberg, 2015; and Harmon, 2013). International leaders and scholars have acknowledged that social unrest and weak governance around the world combined with access to global communication networks have expanded the recruitment and coordination efforts of terrorist organizations, making it nearly impossible to track potential followers and stop terrorists' activities completely. Despite this dire state of global affairs, researchers around the world are making a significant effort to not only study the causes of terrorism but a wealth of literature has been dedicated to prevention of terrorism through the implementation of programs designed to build resilient and responsive communities. The knowledge gained through ongoing research will continue to provide insight to government leaders that they can in turn use to create more effective and efficient counter-terrorism strategies at the various levels of government. Chapter 2 provides a review of the existing literature within the field of terrorism and counter terrorism research. In this chapter, I describe the current state of terrorism research, identifies historic patterns related to terrorism and explains how research has changed since the 2001 attacks on New York City and the Pentagon. I organized the literature review using a framework established by McAllister and Schmid in the London:

Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (2013) beginning with agent-based terrorism research and ends with notable counter-terrorism research.

**Literature Search Strategy**

The literature review process began with a brainstorming technique suggested by Creswell (2013) to create a mind map of relevant terms for studying terrorism. Based on previous academic and professional knowledge, I narrowed the themes to those that I believed would be critical for understanding how terrorism and counter-terrorism had been defined and how acts of terrorism and the threat of terrorism are being addressed within counter-terrorism strategies (Tinnes, 2013). I grouped general themes into categories within a literature review database. Focusing on each category, I conducted a comprehensive and systematic search of the following academic databases: ProQuest Central, Homeland Security Digital Library, International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, Academic Search Complete, Thoreau Multi-Database Search through Walden University's library service, EBSCO research database hosted by U.S. Air Force library services, and Google Scholar. In my search, I identified relevant past and current research using the key word *terrorism* and derivatives such as terror, terrorist, ideological violence, religious terrorism, political violence, radicalization, and anarchy. Once I collected a significant amount of data relating to terrorism, a similar search process was conducted for counter-terrorism, community planning and emergency response strategies using a combination of the preceding database resources. Each academic journal article was crosschecked against Ulrich's Periodical Directory to ensure the article met criteria for peer review. The

database searches yielded 253 resources that met the academic standards and relevance to the study. Literature that was discarded included duplicative information, non-peer reviewed research, and literature that had limited relevance to the study based on inconclusive results or poorly defined research methodologies.

Due to the amount and academic range of terrorism research, I chose to follow a categorization framework for the literature review established by McAllister and Schmid in the London:  Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (2013). Although several alternate literature review models were examined for categorical sorting, the model used by McAllister and Schmid provided a comprehensive model for understanding the complexity of current terrorism theories and the interrelationships that exist. Following McAllister and Schmidt's framework, a brief synopsis of popular research trends is provided along with a more detailed review of the theoretical categories determined to be the most relevant to the current study.

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**State of Terrorism Research**

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The scope of terrorism literature ranges from a wide variety of scholarly books to a vast amount of peer reviewed academic studies. Despite the amount of research literature available, terrorism is not a commonly understood phenomenon. The field of terrorism research currently lacks a widely accepted single definition and a does not have a generalized consensus regarding what constitutes an act of terrorism (Blackbourn, Davis, and Taylor, 2013; Schmid, 2013). Finding an appropriately scoped definition was essential for conducting further research.

**Definitional Challenges**

A resounding theme throughout the terrorism and counter-terrorism research

literature is the lack of a comprehensive definition upon which scholars have agreed.

Terrorism research centers and academic leaders in the field identified more than 250

distinct definitions surrounding the concept of terrorism (Stampnitzky, 2013; Blackbourn,

Davis, and Taylor, 2013; Easson and Schmid, 2011, Schmid 2004, Jenkins, 1980). The

lack of a single definition or generalized framework to describe acts of terrorism is

problematic for several reasons. These reasons include, (a) the inability to establish

formal legal parameters and law enforcement measures, (b) validation issues across

academic research and scientific studies, (c)challenges for policy makers as they frame

and implement counter-terrorism and security policies, and (d) issues for international

regimes as they work to implement humanitarian assistance and refugee programs (DHS,

2015; START, 2016; Schmid, 2014; Price, 2012; and Crenshaw, 2007). The definitional

issues grow exponentially when you consider the international nature of terroristic

threats, multinational recruitment, clandestine financing and indiscriminate violence that

are all considered counterterrorism challenges. Despite the lack of consensus on the

parameters of a definition, there does seem to be an overwhelming consensus among

international leaders, legal analysts, researchers and scholars, that the concept of

terrorism needs a definitive framework to effectively identify, criminalize, and punish

acts of terrorism effectively. Creating a workable definition is not as simple as it might

seem; for example, the U.S. Department of State (2016) defines terrorism as

"premeditated, politically motivate violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by

subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."

This seems to be a reasonable working definition yet the U.S. Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) uses a slightly different definition for homeland defense, classifying

terrorism as, "[t]he unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to

intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in

furtherance of political or social objectives." Although the two organizations have

different roles within the U.S. government, the lack of consensus on a working national

definition is exaggerated when the threat crosses international borders.

Global leaders have not come to a consensus on a basic framework to define acts

of terrorism. Alex Schmid, current director of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI),

posited four potential reasons why scholars have a difficult time defining terrorism.

Schmid (2013) explains that definitions of terrorism have been altered for more than 200

years; diverging based on the academic lens and contextual environment through which

the phenomenon is being examined. Additional challenges emerge as definitions of

terrorism are interpreted within the frameworks of the legitimization, de-legitimization,

and the criminalization of certain groups within a specific culture or societal norms. In

addition, several types of terrorism exist, each manifesting itself in a different form and

various levels of intensity that may require different counter-approaches.

The definitional discussion becomes more challenging when one population

defines an act of violence as terrorism, while another defines the same act of violence as

a revolution or an act of heroism directed against a repressive regime (Europol, 2013;

Human Rights Watch, 2012; and United Nations, 2006). The most comprehensive

attempt at a formalized definition to date is that of Alex Schmid. Through his research he identified ten key elements that he determined must be included in a workable definition of terrorism:

1) the demonstrative use of violence against human beings;

2) the (conditional) threat of (more) violence;

3) the deliberate production of terror or fear in a target group;

4) the targeting of civilians, non-combatants and innocents;

5) the purpose of intimidation, coercion and/ or propaganda;

6) the fact that it is a method, tactic or strategy of waging conflict;

7) the importance of communicating the act(s) of violence to larger audiences;

8) the illegal, criminal and immoral nature of the act(s) of violence;

9) the predominantly political character of the act;

10) the use of terrorism as a tool within psychological warfare to mobilize or immobilize sectors of the public.

Focusing on these ten definitional elements, it is possible to explore the history of ideological violence and terrorism research with greater depth and fidelity.

## Historic Patterns

Ideological based violent behaviors have appeared along a spectrum of increasing threat levels from non-violent campaigns and political warnings to coordinated terrorist attacks resulting in mass civilian casualties. Throughout the literature, concepts of ideological violence and terrorism have been given various labels including: anarchy, crusade, jihad, political activism, radicalization, rebellion, revolution, and Zionist

movements. To include peer reviewed research that covers the full spectrum of threat used as a means of achieving a political agenda, the terms *terrorism* and *ideological violence* will be used interchangeably throughout this study. An efficient and effective method for examining the history of terrorism is to begin by categorizing the patterns of terroristic organizations and the tactics that have been used to create public fear with the expressed goal of forcing political change (Rapoport, 2002; Bruce, 2013, Weissman, Busch, and Schouten, 2014; Brannan and Strindberg, 2014).

Conflict and war have been components of social interaction for as long as humans have been keeping records. Founded on a *balance of power* concept, sociologists and political analysts indicate that social stability and peace have resulted when competing powers are in balance. This does not necessarily need to be *real* balance but the *perception* of balance by both parties involved. Without the backing of a nation state, terrorist organizations and individual terrorists do not have the resources to project political or military power effectively against a large state based opposing force. Under these circumstances, terrorist organizations often resort to violence as a means of gaining influence within an unbalanced power struggle. Within the historic literature, power struggles are quite common dating back to the early first century. One of the most relevant and notable power struggles was the rise of the Jewish Sicarii who used asymmetric strategies to defend against a superior Roman Army in Palestine. From the volumes of historic documentation related to ideological violence and religious terrorism, it is notable that violence has been a common tactic chosen by members of various

political and religious movements to include Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, Sikh, and Buddhist organizations.

To focus on the modern age of terror and to gain a better understanding of current trends in terrorism research, David Rapoport (2002) categorized the history of terrorism into four waves or chronological patterns beginning in the late 1800's. Each wave is distinguished by the underlying motivation for violence and the methods used to create public fear and to force political change.

**1870-1920s: Anarchist Wave**

The Anarchist Wave, also known as the Golden Age of Assassination, first appeared within the boundaries of pre-soviet Russia spanning 1870-1880s (Rapoport, 2002). During this time there were very few researchers studying terrorism as an independent field; most of the early terrorism research was being conducted under the disciplines of political science, international studies or psychological studies. As time passed, historians migrated toward the topic of terrorism due to its mystery and intrigue, however, a clear understanding of the motivation behind terroristic acts remains elusive.

The Anarchist Wave, said to be inspired by communism and the technological revolution in the late nineteenth century, provides early evidence of radical groups using telegraphs and the rotary press to mass produce newspapers for spreading their opposition propaganda and to recruit followers. As one example, the Russian term стратегия террора-*strategiya terrora* (English translation: strategy of terror), was first used by Russian newspaper writers in the late 1800s to describe the surge of violence conducted by members of the Revolutionary People's Will. This *strategiya terrora* violence was

specifically directed at the political leadership with the distinct purpose of instilling fear among the masses. Anarchist doctrine leaned heavily on *propaganda of the deed*, relying on ancient traditions of tyrannicide, in which greater levels of violence was desirable and celebrated. This early wave of terror was made more volatile with the emergence of handguns and dynamite.

Although the rash of violence started in Russia with the assassination of Russian Czar Alexander II; it set a new precedence for political opposition globally. The additional technological achievement of steamship railways allowed the Golden Age of Assassination to quickly spread throughout Europe bringing about the assassinations of Elizabeth, the Empress of Austria, Uberto the first King of Italy, and expanded into America with the assassination of U.S. President William McKinley in 1901 (Rapoport, 2002).

**1920s-1960s: Anti-Colonial Wave**

The second wave or Anti-Colonial Wave is assessed to be a direct result of events taking place shortly after the First World War and the signing of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. The forced re-ordering of world powers set the stage for anti-colonial sentiment and national self-determination which were further accelerated by the outcome of the Second World War. Beginning in the early 1900s as peasants and colonists demanded self-determination and independence from formalized governmental repression. Terrorist groups of this time did not consider themselves terrorist at all. Rapoport (2002) indicates that Menachem Begin, the self-proclaimed leader of Irgun terrorist organization, referred to his members as freedom fighters that were protecting

their colonies from government terror by targeting the security forces, police and those responsible for maintaining colonial control. During the anti-colonial wave, opposition groups held unprecedented support from large sympathetic local communities despite their use of guerrilla tactics and the hit and run attacks they used to draw attention to their causes (Rapoport, 2002).

**1960s-1980s: New Left Wave/Marxist**

The New Left Wave refers to the period of terrorism which includes the Red Brigades that rose up across Europe and the left-wing movements that expanded globally throughout the 60s. Rapoport concludes that the Vietnam War became one of the primary catalysts for the rise of Western left-wing terrorism. The withdrawal of American troops without a distinguishable victory gave rise to not only anti-American sentiment, but also to the idea of a weaken imperialist that provided hope for other marginalized groups throughout Europe, Latin American and the United States.

Revolutionary groups during this period were known to use urban guerrilla tactics, hostage taking and hijackings to bring attention to their cause and pressure governments to act on their behalf. Most notable of this period was the attack on the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Germany by the Palestinian organization, Black September. In addition to the theatrical and symbolic attacks, the New Left Wave was a period of domestic revolution that promoted protest rallies advocating political reforms. Some of the more violent rallies were conducted by extreme leftist groups such as the North American Weather Underground, a group of student protestors opposed to the Vietnam War. Although not typically designated as terrorist

movements, the American radical democratic traditions which include the anti-Vietnam movements, the Stonewall Riots, and the African American civil rights movements throughout the 1950s, 60s and 70s, highlight the types of political and social turmoil that was occurring in the United States at that time (Hall, 2011). It was during this period that terrorism research began to have more significance as an independent academic field, focusing primarily on the actual methods terrorist organizations were choosing and the psychology behind prominent terrorist attacks (Wohlstetter, 1959; Schelling, 1963; Janis and Mann, 1977). Today, terrorism researchers continue to look at these historic events to inform our government leaders and help them understand significant social and political patterns as they make and enforce policy decisions (Neumann, 2013; Law, 2015; Chaliand, 2016).

**1970s-2020s: Religious**

The Fourth wave is akin to a religious upheaval starting around 1979. An exploration of the literature reveals that terrorists' activity during this time included uprisings across multiple religious' sects pitting one faith against another or religious leadership against government rule. Most of the terrorism research during this time explored the ideological and political motives that were driving individuals to commit acts of terrorism (Jenkins, 1980; Leary, Shepperd, McNeil, Jenkins and Barnes, 1986; Schmid and Jongman, 1988). Starting in the early 1990s there was a significant drop in academic interest with very few scholars choosing terrorism as a topic of research (Sageman, 2014). Despite the lack of academic interest, terrorism remained a viable tactic for expressing discontent, shifting away from the secular and nationalistic

movements toward more socially and culturally structured insurgencies supported by religion and theological interpretations (Reed, 2013).

**Post 9/11 Security Environment**

With a clearer understanding of the concept of terrorism and a brief discussion regarding the historic trends that have shaped how the global population interprets acts of terrorism, it is important to determine who, and which disciplines have been studying various elements of terrorism and to explore some of the advances being made throughout terrorism and counter-terrorism research. Today terrorism research is a vibrant field of study with thousands of researchers across the globe working diligently to address a multitude of social concerns and related security threats. Similar to psychological and anthropological studies, the preponderance of terrorism research has its foundations in the social sciences, focusing heavily on the study of human behavior and how disruptions in social systems influence violent behavioral outcomes. Like most hot topics where there is a lot of money to be made, terrorism research is expanding rapidly across academic fields and exploring a multitude of new theoretical foundations to not only explain terrorism but to address the growing global security concerns. Given this new security environment and the demand for not only answers but also counter-terrorism solution, many of the early terrorism experts are dusting off their old theories and testing them against this new age of terrorism. Brian Jenkins wrote in his 1975 study, "many of today's terrorist want a lot of people watching but not a lot of people dead". In 2006 he rephrased that statement to state "many of today's terrorists want a lot of people

watching and a lot of people dead". This is a new age of terrorism, one that is vastly misunderstood and critically under researched.

### Theoretical Directions

Similar to the definitional challenges, researchers have had a difficult time establishing a theoretical model that is flexible enough to address the complexities of terrorism research. Early researchers used the more prominent political science, international relations, psychological, and social science theories as foundational frameworks for explaining terrorism as a socio-political phenomenon. Today, researchers are finding that none of the existing theoretical constructs adequately address the complex nature of terrorism or the multiple forms of terrorism that exist. Many scholars and practitioners are choosing to create their own unique theories, allowing them to integrate multiple lines of inquiry and expand the terrorism discussion across disciplines. Some of the more popular theoretical frameworks and research directions include theories traditionally used in international relations, political science, history, military science, psychology, criminology, law, and communications disciplines, however, we are also seeing theories emerging from organizational psychology, marketing and international business models. With the variety of disciplines being used to study terrorism, it is not surprising that the number of terrorism theories is expanding without replication or validation methodologies in place. Popular theoretical foundations include: power-political theories, state sponsored, or regime directed theories, intra-war and asymmetric conflict theories, rational choice and economic theories, ethnic and cultural isolation research, radicalization and suicide studies, communicative and organizational

theories, studies examining group dynamics, as well as research exploring cultural assimilation and globalization theories (Carlton and Schaerf, 2015; Conrad, Conrad, and Young, 2014; Cutter, Richardson, and Wilbanks, 2014). Scholars and practitioners have used a variety of methods to categorize the various terrorism theories into usable groupings that they can in turn assign to various counter-terrorism strategies. The following categorization process is adapted from the work of Bradley McAllister and Alex Schmid in the 2013 version of The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research.

**State/Regime Based Terrorism**

Historically, state sponsored, and regime terrorism produced the most casualties of any form of terrorism. By the existing statistics alone, state terrorism should be a well-funded research topic with high interest. However, as international relations and conflict management scholars will confirm, it is also one of the most difficult forms of violence to define and study. In addition to the definitional challenges, scholars have had limited access to primary data due to linguistic and cultural barriers. This is exacerbated by the restrictions imposed by the same repressive regimes scholars would want to study to conduct validate empirical studies. A few notable studies have been conducted using primarily second-hand data in the aftermath of a regime's fall from power. The central premise relies on identifying and separating legitimate policing actions carried out by the state during peacetime versus repressive actions that have been designed and carried out to control or oppress a population. Well known authors in the study of state terrorism include Dallin's and Breslauer's (1970) exploration of totalitarian regimes and their use of sanctions. In cases in which the regime lacked political influence or material resources,

such regimes resorted to coercive measures to include terroristic tactics. Ted Gurr's 1986

study is also among the foundational literature addressing state terrorism literature in

which he explored the power relationships that take place between the elite and non-elite.

Gurr provided an in-depth look at the use of positive and negative incentives that elite

populations used to maintain their authority. Although a good study to reference within

the context of state terrorism literature, it is difficult to align Gurr's 1986 findings within

the current global environment regarding state terror. However, Gurr is one of the early

experts that have continued to study terrorism and state conflict. His recent work includes

co-authoring a number studies to include a book published in 2013 incorporating and

updating some of his earlier findings (Mincheva, Grigorova, and Gurr, 2013). Despite not

being as robust as expected, there are some newer promising theories that are providing

insight into current state and regime-based terrorism. In a separate study conducted by

Escriba-Folch, (2013) the concept of using state repression as an instrument to maintain

power was examined. Escriba-Folch chose a quantitative method using a simultaneous

equations model measuring the likelihood of autocrat exit in relation to a dictator's use of

repression. Although the study did not address the question in the context of violence that

constitutes the definition of state terror, it did provide insight as to why a leader might

want to use repression and at what level of repression a population might revolt or seek

outside foreign assistance. Hultquist, (2015) followed a similar political repression

framework using a time series research design to explore the use of state repression as a

way of controlling domestic insurgencies. The study provides some generalizable data to

add to the overall literature, however the study methodology does not account for social

variations that are inherent under different regimes as well as the impact of power-political relationships within the global environment over the established time.

New research by Wood, Gibney and Haschke, (2016) demonstrated a growing sophistication in state terrorism research. Wood, Gibney and Haschke used quantitative data drawn from the Political Terror Scale to measure state ordered repression. Using some of their previous work and the Freedom House scale comprised of five distinct levels of state terror. The new study offers some validation to the idea that increasing levels of state repression to the point of violence, increases the likelihood of domestic instability. However, greater understanding of the cultural variables using first person interviews could improve the quality of the results and make them more valid for use by the United Nations and other aid organizations as they examine security options.

In addition to internal domestic terrorism, states have been known to provide financial and material support to foreign terrorist organization for various reasons. In some cases, there is a political agenda for supporting an organization such as gaining or maintaining regional stability; in other cases, the state's leaders may share an ideological belief with the organization they choose to support. Some notable studies focusing on state sponsorship of terrorism include Daniel Byman's (2005) study in which he found that the level of sponsorship ranged from a state providing a high level of state resources to a foreign cause, to cases in which the state provided more passive levels of support. Building on his 2005 study, Byman's (2008) study examined Iran's use of terrorism and sponsorship of terrorism. Although Byman conceded that the results were not promising and indicated that Iran found significant value in using terror tactics and threats as a

political tool, he did provide insight that demonstrated Iran has a threshold by which they determine who and what terroristic activities they are willing to support. The study falls short of first hand empirical data from the actual leadership of Iran, which may prove to be unachievable in the context of terrorism studies. However, a strong representation from subordinate leaders or those who have left Iran under political asylum might be a worthwhile pursuit to improve the validity and add context to the study.

In a similar study using some of Byman's underlying hypotheses, Kirchner (2014) used a qualitative case study model to examine the utility of state sponsored terrorism and at what point a state might determine continued support has lost its utility for the sponsoring state. The study looked at three cases: The Mujahedin al-Khalq organization, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the support offered to arm Palestinian factions by neighboring states. Building on previous work, Kirchner found evidence in which state support achieved political goals, security goals, and financial goals for the sponsoring state. In other cases, support for terrorist organizations and illicit regimes appeared to have no value other than as a response to foreign interference that the sponsoring state not only disagreed with but was willing to use state resources to confront what it deemed as injustices.

Acts of terrorism can also be hidden beneath the cover of war. These breaches of the laws of war may include genocide and ethnic cleansing, or the creation of large refugee populations in the neighboring states. As with state terrorism research, intra-war terrorism is also a very difficult topic to effectively address without physical access or linguistic and cultural knowledge; therefore, many western researchers have looked to

alternate terrorism topics to address. No empirically validated studies regarding intra-war were found within the recent literature. Much of the literature regarding this topic appear to be summarizations of existing terrorism studies within the context of an intra-war theme or in the context of a hypothesis the author would like to draw attention to or put forward for further analysis. A recent study focusing on inter-war terrorism is worth noting based on the underlying theoretical framework that was chosen. Alex Wilner (2013) used deterrence theory to analyze counter-terrorism strategies in the context of an ongoing conflict. I chose this article primarily because deterrence of non-state terrorism has been a highly debated topic in national security professions. Therefore, a basic understanding of the limited literature regarding this topic does have value for this specific study. Wilner follows up on a concept put forward by Marth Crenshaw, in that you cannot have a strategy that is designed to both deter and destroy at the same time. Based on deterrence theory, these two strategies are incompatible. In the case of terrorism in an intra-war context, the end goal often centers on removing obstacles that will impede the achievement of your objectives, thus elimination of threat. Wilner (2013) examined the idea of deterring potential actors from an actual attack which is very different from the elimination of an individual or organization as a military objective. In his review of recent conflicts, Wilner found opportunities in which a deterrence strategy had some potential. This type of strategy is complicated when the goal is elimination but for smaller insurgent groups within a conflict several of the existing deterrence studies show promise and validate the need for further research on this topic. State sponsored terrorism studies provide information to national level leaders to develop national level policies or

to advocate for international response strategies. For this study, a detailed review of insurgent level terrorism studies provides more relevant insight.

**Insurgent Based Terrorism Theories**

An increasingly dangerous extension of state terrorism and state support to terrorism has been the rise of radicalized insurgent groups. Terrorism in relation to insurgencies is a far more popular research topic for both scholars and practitioners due to current global events and the global expansion of Islamic terrorism. Despite increased interest by highly qualified and established terrorism scholars, current terrorism studies focused on insurgencies have not yielded the desired outcome practitioners had hoped for. A surge in the amount of government and private funding available, combined with very narrow timelines, has produced a large pool of self-proclaimed, poorly educated, and inexperienced terrorism experts. Although most seasoned terrorism scholars have good intentions, they are competing with professional think tanks and independent authors who appear to be capitalizing on public fear. Under these circumstances, authors are producing a lot of interesting ideas but very few high quality empirically validated studies. Within the insurgency research, there are several studies worth noting. Using McAllister and Schmidt's (2013) framework, the main theories have been grouped by agent-based analysis, institutional based analysis, and systemic based analysis.

**Agent-based Analysis: Radicalization**

Agent based models are designed to explore a phenomenon by examining the individual participant. In the case of terrorism, these studies focus on the people that act independently (a lone-wolf actor), the people that chose to join a terrorist organization

and participate as a member, the people that lead an organization by providing directions to operatives, or the people that chose to provide various levels of support to a terrorist organization. Focusing on agent-based analysis, three theoretical categories were chosen to capture the underlying premises of the top radicalization theories in use today: social-psychological based theories (Neumann, 2013; and Post, 2015), social identity theories (Brannan and Strindberg, 2014), and rational instrumental approach/cost-benefit analysis frameworks (Crenshaw, 2015).

### *Social-psychological Based Theories*

Social-psychological approaches include both sociological and psychological theories as well as integrated theories that combine attributes of both (Speckhard, 2012, Koomen, and Van der Pligt, 2015). Psychological explanations have traditionally explored ideological violence and terrorist activity through an examination of the terrorist's cognitive capacity and emotional stability, whereas sociological frameworks look at an individual's proclivity and ability to interact within the established norms of their society. Under social psychological disciplines researchers are exploring questions such as: what is going on in the attacker's head, how do they think, how do they behave, is there something that makes this person different from others in similar social circumstances. Traditionally, psychological theories have explained inappropriate behavior as the outcome of disruptive psychopathic personalities, psychological illness, or emotional instability (Post, 2004, 2007; Moskalenko, and McCauley, 2011; Freilich and LaFree, 2015). Many of the top scholars disagree that most terrorists are plagued by some form of psychosis; examination of multiple terrorist events indicate that most actors

demonstrate high levels of cognitive complexity in the planning and execution of these operations (Schmid and Jongman, 1988; Parkes, 2014; Freilich and LaFree, 2015; Creswell, 2014). Other researchers have indicated that violent individuals may display an inability to control aggressive behavior or have a predisposition for using violence as a method of control. (Hogg, Kruglanski, van den Bos, 2013, Kooman and Van der Plight, 2015). However, there are very few studies in which the researcher had first person access to the terrorist in which they would be able to make that level of psychological analysis. Modern social psychological researchers, to include Jerrold Post, have expanded traditional psychological interpretations to include the terrorist's social motivations, exploring destructive urges or emotional disturbances to explain radical behavior in someone who is seemingly normal (Parkes, 2014; Freilich and LaFree, 2015; Gill, 2015; Post, 2015). Others argue that there is evidence to suggest that individuals engaged in ideological violence may be radicalize to an extent in which they begin to demonstrate a lack empathy toward others or show characteristics of possessing dogmatic ideologies or utopian worldviews; yet, this data is also from second hand sources and interpreted through existing generalizations without direct empirical evidence (Kaplan, Loow, and Malkki, 2014; Fatfouta, Gerlach, Schroder-Abe, and Merkl, 2015; De Juan, 2015).

Beyond lone-wolf cases and a few rare examples associated with terrorists who were studied in a prison setting, the psychosis argument for terrorism is difficult to make without additional empirical evidence. However there does appear to be several studies that point to alternate socialization and criminology explanations for terrorism (Simon, 2013; Hallett and McCoy, 2014, Reid Meloy and Yakeley, 2014; Gill, and Corner, 2013).

Based on existing literature and ongoing research, scholars have determined that an individual needs a certain level of cognitive capacity to effectively engage and participate as a member of terrorist organizations. Based on an understanding of various terrorist organizations, psychotic behaviors do not appear to be conducive to the organizational or operational requirements (Silke, 2015). Various social-psychological theories have proven effective in describing why some individuals join terrorist organizations, why they leave, and what psychological impact participating in a terrorist organization and engaging in terrorist acts have had on the individual (Bhui, Everitt, and Jones, 2014; Reid Meloy and Yakeley, 2014; Post 2015). An exploration of the social-psychological literature does indicate that individuals who are joining terrorist organizations tend to be from more risk acceptant populations; according to the data, this population includes males typically between the ages of 18 and 25 (START, 2016). This is an interesting finding due to the connection with traditional developmental psychology theories in which researchers believe that the early 20's is about the age that a personal identity and an awareness of self is adopted (Adams and Marshall, 1996; Kroger, 2014; Carlsson, Wangqvist, and Frisen, 2015). As an extension of developmental psychology theories, one of the more prominent social-psychological theories used today to study ideological violence and religious terrorism is social identity theory. Social identity frameworks appear at both the agent level of analysis and at the institutional level of analysis.

### *Social Identity Theories (SIT)*

Studies exploring religious and ideological violence often start with a social psychological approach, founded on the notion that belief systems play a key role in

motivating an individual to participate in or conduct acts of terror. Social identity theory

posits that an individual's identity and understanding of who they are is largely based on

the groups or social structures they belong to (e.g. social class, family, football team etc.).

This social categorization provides a sense of belonging, pride and self-esteem but it also

allows for social comparisons and prejudices leading to the creation of an in-group and

out-group. Brannan and Strindberg (2014) found that SIT is effective in that it allows for

the *Emic* (indigenous or native point of view) to communicate with the *Etic* (informed

outsider/social scientific point of view) creating a more comprehensive understanding of

the issue at hand. Using the framework of social identity theory has also shown to be an

effective method for analyzing how religion might influence an individual's

interpretation of self and their relationship to others (Brannan and Strindberg, 2014;

Turner, Brown, and Tajfel, 1979). Socialization with others is enhanced if the individual

feels like the group is worthwhile, that they will be accepted and appreciated within the

group. Disassociation with a group occurs when the opposite is at play. The individual

may feel marginalized or unappreciated by a group they are currently in. This

marginalization may result in frustration and feelings of injustice to the point at which the

individual may seek revenge. Silke (2015) indicated that these feelings are real; they do

not have to be in response to a personal injustice but can be directed toward a vicarious

injustice, to include injustices aimed at a group the individual does not currently belong

but may sympathize with. Horgan (2005) explained that the process of becoming a

terrorist is a gradual socialization with the tenants of an extremist ideology. Once an

individual is accepted into the group, there is a level of psychological strength and

discipline that is needed to stay loyal and obedient to the organization. The third phase in Horgan's model is the point at which the individual chooses to or is forced to departure from the group. Departure from the group requires both psychological and physical disengagement to be considered completely outside the group (Horgan, 2005). Ideally, practitioners want to prevent an individual from ever joining a terrorist movement or adopting an extremist ideology but there is explicit value in understanding all three stages in Horgan's model to development counter-terrorism strategies to engage with an individual terrorist member.

At the institution level of analysis, social identity theory focuses on processes that create and maintain the in-group identity and allow for the collective decision to resort to violence. At this level the organization draws a stark contrast between the concepts of us and them, assigning positive attributes to the in-group while simultaneously assigning inferiority and in some cases, evil and sin to the out-group. This process of dehumanization is often necessary to allow members to disregard common moral statutes and willingly victimize out-groups. The most pressing question practitioners are asking is why an individual chooses to identify with a specific terrorist group or extremist ideology. Social identity theory continues to be a valid framework for understanding and analyzing the processes by which ideological socialization takes place. In her 2003 study, Jessica Stern was among some of the first terrorism researchers to gather primary data from individuals who had engaged in terrorist acts or were actively and knowingly supporting terrorist networks. Stern found that each interview provided very different viewpoints about the organization or ideology as well as the level of commitment the

individual gave to the organization. In each case there was a socialization process that transformed the individual from a member of their society (family or community group) to a member of a more extreme ideological group. In some cases, in which the individual was providing funding, training, or supplies, it was a natural transformation based on existing belief systems, the political environment in which they lived and the opportunity to contribute based on personal resources. For others it was a transformation based on new knowledge, altered interpretations of pre-existing ideologies or in response to the displacement from or disenchantment with a previous group to which they belonged. Stern has expanded on her early research with a recent case study involving the reintegration of a Swedish Neo-Nazi member in 2014. Sterns used a qualitative model of analysis to capture the personal narrative regarding radicalization and the participation of her subject in the Swedish Neo-Nazi movement. She indicated that throughout her years interviewing former terrorists, active members of terrorist networks and supporters of terrorism, she saw great value in sitting down and talking to these men and women to understand their motivations and in some cases, gain a better understanding of the paths that led to their de-radicalization (Sterns, 2014).

In addition to Sterns' work, there are a few key authors that stand out as respected experts in the radicalization field. Ehud Sprinzak's 1998 work set the stage for modern radicalization studies, in his study Sprinzak concluded that radicalization appears to be a process of social de-legitimization moving an individual from conventional types of social participation and political activism to more extreme forms of violent social objection. Building upon Sprinzak's work, scholars have created several step models to

describe various levels of radicalization with the intent of creating points at which practitioners might influence or de-radicalize the individual (Pruyt and Kwakkel, 2014; Kruglanski, Gelfand, Bélanger, Sheveland, Hetiarachchi, and Gunaratna, 2014; Victoroff, Adelman, and Matthews, 2012). Many of these foundational concepts have stood the test of time and provide the frameworks by which current researchers are approaching radicalization studies. In a 2012 study by Bartlett and Miller, they concluded that there are two types of radicalization: those who actively support or participate in violence and those who remain non-violent, choosing to actively denounce the violence of other similar ideological organizations. Radicalization is thought to be a slow process of socialization in which the individual develops adversarial political, religious, environmental, economic or other ideological attitudes, values and beliefs. Continued exposure over time to extreme ideologies reinforces the beliefs and moves the individual to become an active participant in a radicalized group or to act as lone-wolf extremist. In many cases the process of radicalization is apparent through progressively anti-social behaviors and supported by existing cultural or socially adopted beliefs (Abbas and Siddique, 2012; Carter, 2013; Victoroff, Adelman, and Matthews, 2012). It is the visible changes in behavior that law enforcement and intelligence agencies are looking for as they attempt to deter and prevent terrorist attacks (Jenkins, Liepman, and Willis, 2014; Jenkins, and Godges, 2011). Carter and Carter (2013) described some of the non-traditional sources of information that law enforcement agencies are using effectively. However, their research indicated that more work needs to be done in collaboration with the community and improvements in community reporting and information sharing

networks (Pruyt and Kwakkel, 2014). Early identification of the anti-social behaviors is key to countering radicalization and preempting a planned attack. A recent study by Dugas and Kruglanski (2014) examined three categories of contributing factors within the process of radicalization: motivational, ideological, and social factors. Dugas and Kruglanski's study is one of few studies that have used first hand data by having access to former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) members detained in Sri Lankan rehabilitation centers. One drawback to using this population is that the study relies on the personal interpretations of the subject's radicalization process and their understanding of what constitutes support for armed conflict. This population may also be problematic due to existing biases or the personal goals of the terrorists based on incentives provided for cooperation with the study and the amount of time they have been incarcerated and separated from the front lines of the violence. The results of Dugas and Kruglanski's study did show positive indicators for participants in the rehabilitation program but there is some question as to what would happen to these individuals if they are released back into their original communities where the radicalization processes started.

Rational choice theories are also a popular research topic at the agent level of analysis. Simon Perry and Badi Hasis (2015) took a slightly different approach to radicalization by examining the phenomena of suicide bombing using a criminological theory of rational choice. Using rational choice, the authors started from the premise that suicide bombers make their choice based on a process of cost/benefit analysis in which they will gain some form of reward through their actions. Perry and Hasis used a case study approach to examine the life of a suicide bomber to determine what type of rewards

or benefits the individual may have been considering. Perry and Hasis support some of the findings in Victoroff, Adelman, and Matthews (2012) study showing that socially identifying with likeminded family members and the greater Muslim community allowed suicide bombers to associate positive rewards with the need for radical actions. Using a similar analytical technique, Cohen (2016) focused on the content of the language used in farewell letters sent shortly before committing a suicide bombing. Using a process of text analysis, Cohen's study demonstrated a higher rate of prosocial motives for choosing suicide bombing. There are significant challenges in both these studies due to the inability to speak with the suicide bomber. However, both studies do show that a rational decision-making process was in place and that in both cases the bomber did consider some benefit or positive motivations which can be very useful for identifying counter-narratives.

A large majority of the radicalization literature focuses on the radicalization process as moving toward violence. However, we cannot discount the value of research that seemingly targets critical points within the radicalization process for de-radicalization (Abbas and Siddique, 2012). Brannan and Strindberg pointed to the work of Floyd Allport and his *Contact Hypothesis* written in 1955. From Allport's work three influence models were created to dispel stereotypes and facilitate dialogue between in and out groups. The first approach focuses on cross categorization using one social category to cancel out another (Allport, 1955). Finding categories that both groups share such as ethnicity, nationality, age, gender, social class or a shared religious affiliation creates a common sense of belonging. By building on those common group identities, a

more in-depth dialogue can be achieved. The second approach is to re-categorize, bringing both groups under an inclusive subordinate group. This re-categorization may be a temporary re-grouping for an alternate purpose. Although the goal in this case is to create dialogue with terrorists, we are seeing this dynamic take place in the global war on terror in which traditional conflicting states are joining together in the fight against extremism. The third approach is to de-categorize; a process of eliminating the conflicting category altogether. In this approach the idea is to bring two opposing groups together, allowing them to interact with the goal of eradicating unfounded stereotypes (Brannan and Strindberg, 2014). There appears to be value in pursuing such approaches, yet as many practitioners will admit, approaching terrorist organization or their members is difficult, if not impossible. Most leaders of these organizations rely on maintaining loyalty among the ranks by isolating their members using distain for the out-group as motivational propaganda.

In some cases, psychological and mental illness hypotheses have proven to be valid, as well as many of the social identification theories and the processes by which individuals radicalize. However, most of modern terrorism researchers agree that very little empirical evidence exist to generalize a psychological or social explanation. Terrorists appear to be psychologically stable and rational in their decision-making capacity, indicating potential external motivators (Eglin and Hester, 2017; Fussey, 2015; Crenshaw, 2015). Several of the studies in radicalization agree that there is some level of personal decision making that takes place and that there is sufficient evidence that lone-wolf terrorists, organized attackers and suicide bombers go through a process of

rationalization prior to committing a terrorist act, however, the research challenge

remains due to the lack of empirical evidence and first-hand data in these cases.

**Institutional Analysis: Organizational Management**

Rational instrument theories are listed under a few titles: power-political, strategic

choice, and rational choice; however, the underlying hypotheses are similar. Such

theories focus on the decision-making processes and choices that terrorist actors and

terrorist organizations must make to achieve their objectives. Dave Brannan and Anders

Strindberg (2014) indicated that power-political theories often share traits found within

the realist theories used in the discipline of international relations. In this context,

terrorist groups appear to prioritize self and group interests over ideological or common

moral statutes. Observations of terrorist organization demonstrated that the leaders of

successful groups displayed a keen understanding of the social and political environment,

and made strategic choices based on an understanding of the social boundaries that

allowed or limited their ability to achieve their objectives (Barrett, 2011, Abrahms, and

Potter, 2015). In a similar study Phillips and Pohl (2014) used prospect theory to examine

the economics and psychology of a terrorist's or terrorist organization's decision-making

process regarding the methods and level of violence chosen and whether there appeared

to be copycat behavior based on an assessment of previous terrorist events. Phillips and

Pohl used RAND-MIPT derived data regarding the number of injuries and fatalities

caused by acts of terrorism to determine if a terrorist or terrorist organization might make

choices based on their knowledge of previous attacks or their desire to surpass the actions

of a predecessor. Phillips and Pohl determined that greater insight into terroristic

decisions processes can be gained using a prospect theory framework than by using an expected utility framework (Phillips and Pohl, 2014). Within the field of terrorism research, the work of Martha Crenshaw stands out as exemplary; in nearly every branch of terrorism research you will find reference to a theory developed by or based on the work of Crenshaw. Her most seminal work is in the field of organizational process theory (OPT) as it relates to the managerial dynamics of terrorist organizations. Organizational process theories posit that an organizations ultimate end goal is survival of the organization itself and therefore the individual values and objectives of its leaders and members remain subordinate to the organizational goals. To achieve its objectives, terrorist organizations establish formal operational structures and systematic processes similar to other voluntary organization. The formal structures and systematic processes provide a legitimizing avenue by which organizational decisions are made and orders are given. Crenshaw argued that the leaders of these organizations take on leadership roles out of a desire for prestige, while members of the group are recruited and maintained through a series of incentive-based structures. Crenshaw did not discount the psychological and social theories; they serve as frameworks for understanding some of the drivers that transform an individual or group from espousing a moderate ideology to one that actively pursues an extremist ideology. Leaders of terrorist organizations are keenly aware of the power of the psyche and exploit their members desire to belong to a group. It is through the institutional structures that members gain social status and material benefit, thus Crenshaw concluded that the survival of terrorist organizations is

dependent upon the leadership's ability to maintain a formal structure that is also conducive to the purpose for which they exist.

Historically, ideologically based organizations have had a difficult time with long-term endurance. Crenshaw indicated that membership in these types of organizations is not an easy transition for most individuals to make; it requires a complex set of foundational beliefs that lend to a revolutionary mindset. These beliefs are then solidified through association with other likeminded individuals who also believe that the current system is fundamentally flawed. Through isolation, the leadership relies on members to help solidify the organizational goals to a point at which they become the individual's duty required for personal salvation. At the organizational level these same goals are reduced to the mere survival and longevity of the organizational structure, which may account for some of the irrational behaviors researchers have observed (Crenshaw, 2011).

Recruiting members is often the easiest task, maintaining an active organization is far more difficult. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2013) explored various reasons why a terrorist organization might fail. Using a data set of 586 terrorist groups, Gaibulloev and Sandler determined that such groups had greater survival rates if they were primarily religious based, were large, had multiple home-base locations in democratic states, had limited their reliance on transnational attacks and were able to diversify their methods of attack. Gaibulloev and Sandler's study supports earlier research by Crenshaw which indicated that conducting an effective terrorist operation requires various levels of strategic planning. Successful operations need to be coordinated with logistical support,

funding, specialized skill sets and individuals with specific psychological traits that allow them to participate freely (Crenshaw, 2011). Often acts of terrorism appear to be random or indiscriminate acts of opportunity. Berrebi and Ostwald (2013) indicated that such attacks may not be random but rather a choice to exploit existing chaos. Berrebi and Ostwald examined terrorism data sets and emergency events databases, to determine if terrorism increased after a natural disaster or if terrorist were using natural disasters or emergency events as soft targets to enhance their message and increase the impact of their terrorist activity. Results from Berrebi and Ostwald's study demonstrated that disasters provided more effective opportunities to strike traditionally hard targets such as governments when they are in the midst of recovering from chaos (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2013).

### *Recruiting/Propaganda*

Communication theories are examined through two different terrorism lenses: from the perspective of recruitment using propaganda and from the perspective of being a method of communicating the organizations political demands. In a few studies the authors looked at the propaganda and the political activism aspects of terrorism as methods of achieving behavior modification (Heger, 2015; Schmid, 2013, Carter and Carter, 2013). Schmid argued that the victim is not necessarily the target of a terrorist act, they serve as an instrument used by terrorist organizations to enhance their propaganda message by invoking the emotions of the general population. Through this lens, the act of terrorism serves not only as propaganda for recruiting likeminded individuals; it also intimidates, persuades, and coerces government leaders to adopt the terrorists' demands

(Heger, 2015). Regarding communication, suicide terrorism has been very effective.

Research focusing on suicide terrorism includes both agent-based analyses regarding how

these individuals are recruited for suicide missions and instrumental analyses in the

context of how suicide terror is used as a communication method. Carter and Carter

(2013) posited that although large terrorist organizations exist, homegrown terrorism is of

great concern. Many of the homegrown terrorists lack formal ties with larger organization

yet they have access to a wide variety of propaganda produced by such organizations

drawing inspiration. Building upon the work of Mia Bloom (2005) and Robert Pape

(2006), Pedahzur and Perlinger (2009) examined the phenomena of Palestinian suicide

bomber within an organizational framework model using social network analysis. Using

social network models, they found some interesting organizational patterns that

contradicted previous assumptions. First, they found that terrorist organizations in

Palestine appeared to be local and cross-organizational. These local organizations were

based on pre-existing family ties and friendships with members who had not previously

joined other extremist networks. The smaller family networks gave the Palestinian

organizations a very tribal quality in which members participated out of allegiance to the

family rather than the notion of radicalization. Contrary to traditional views that suicide is

the product of a rational choice made by the organization, Pedahzur and Perlinger found

that the members who became suicide bombers were often local activists that appeared to

be on the fringes of the larger organizations. Since the early 2000's there has been a

significant increase in the literature related to suicide terrorism, a lot of which still uses

the foundational work conducted by Pape, Pedahzur, and Bloom. Santifort-Jordan and

Sandler (2014) recently examined suicide terrorism as a method of obtaining a political or social objective through the intimidation of a larger audience. Using a combination of data from multiple data sets, the researchers studied 2448 unique suicide attacks beginning in 1998 thru 2010. The findings demonstrated significant differences between domestic and transnational suicide attacks and the significance of hardened targets regarding the terrorist organization's choice to use a suicide bomber. The study demonstrated that terrorist organizations might use a variety of tactics against soft targets but often chose a suicide bomber if the target is little more difficult to gain access to. The use of a suicide bomber was deemed more likely to succeed because the attacker could blend in with a crowd and attack when they felt the casualties or messaging value would be the highest. Due to the amount of propaganda and increasingly violent choices terrorist are using to instill fear in the population and recruit new members, researchers have also been focusing on counter narrative strategies (Braddock, Horgan; 2016; and Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). The research on terrorist organizational structure has helped policy makers and law enforcement agencies understand the motivation and tactics of terrorist organizations as they design and assess the types of counter-terrorism strategies within the context of domestic and transnational threats.

**Systemic Analysis: Causes of Ideological Grievances**

The third main academic approach centers on the exploration of the root causes. Multi-causal theories are complex, having no single explanation for why acts of terrorism occur but assume that multiple factors are at play. At the systemic analysis level, scholars look at potential external causes, macro-sociological indicators that have been linked to

various social dysfunctions creating instability. Macro sociological factors may include

harsh climates, political and social infrastructures, geopolitical borders, technological

advancements and increased global mobility (Tilly, 2015). Structural theories include

studies that examine economic systems, political structures, and elements of social

welfare. This area of research is gaining a lot of attention in the field of terrorism and

counter-terrorism for obvious reasons, but it is not necessarily a new field or one that is

exclusive to terrorism. The underlying themes are quite common in political science and

criminology studies. Although some researchers have focused on one of the three

systems, a large portion of the literature includes analysis of multiple systemic causes to

include the impacts of globalization. In the work of Daniel Geller and Alvin Saperstein

(2015) they chose a mathematical model to examine the causes of suicide terrorism

through the interaction of three variables: terrorist, defender, and the population. They

make some basic assumptions in the creation of their model. First, the population will

only join the terrorist bandwagon if they perceive the defenders to be losing. The study

focuses on three cases: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. Although the study was

designed to produce some generalizations for further study, the explanation of the results

is difficult to glean from the mathematical model that was used. The term bandwagon

was also problematic due to various interpretations of what was happening in each

country study. A broad analysis of the study does reveal that the success of counter-terror

operations may increase if the defender maintains the support of the population. In a

similar study by Piazza (2013) terrorism was examined within the context of political

systems and the type of regimes that hold power. Piazza found that democracies

experienced far more terrorist events than states ruled by dictators due to the level of control maintained by the leadership. Within the study, Piazza discovered that while democracies experience a higher rate of terroristic activity, new democracies experienced more terrorism than established democracies. Similar studies that examined political systems support Piazza's findings in that nations that are under political transition often struggle to establish effective government structures and stable social infrastructure (Crenshaw, 2014).

Enders, Hoover, and Sanders (2016) took a different direction in their examination of terrorism and looked specifically at economic factors. In their study they explored the hypothesis that a state's real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) has a correlation with countries that have a high rate of terrorism. Using a non-liner regression model and data from The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) they examined eight terrorism incidents using the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) data regarding casualty events spanning from 1970 to 2010. The results of the study show a strong nonlinear relationship between per capita income and terrorist events. The authors noted that their study distinguishes between domestic and transnational terrorism during the era of leftist prevalence. Although useful for providing historic insight, the study does not address religious or nationalistic motivations that may be critical to security practitioners today. An alternate economic study was conducted by Blomberg, Fernholz and Levin (2013) in which they focused on the economic viability of the target country by looking at economic prosperity and its relationship to a state's national security, acts terrorism within the state, and acts of piracy against foreign vessels

transiting the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The study concluded that there is a

relationship between targets of piracy and affluent countries; however, in relationship to

targets of terrorism, the data demonstrated that there was no relationship between a

country's income and it being targeted by a terrorist attack. Carter (2014) also examined

the relationship between the financial well-being of a state and the prevalence of

terroristic threats and came to a different conclusion. In his study he found that states

with the greatest ability to fight terror experienced higher levels of terrorism than weaker

states. Weaker states placed a higher priority on deterring terror and thus they

experienced less attacks (Carter, 2014).

Choi and Piazza (2016) chose to examine the impact of political exclusion and the

advent of domestic terrorism. The authors noted that some of the motivation behind

conducting the study was to address some of statistical weakness they had found while

conducting previous studies on a similar data set. In addition to validating some of the

hypotheses on this topic they noted the lack of quantitative data examining ethnic

discrimination and rates of terrorism. The study concluded that irrespective of how acts

of terrorism are quantified, there is a significant correlation between ethno-political

exclusion and domestic terrorism. Plumper and Neumayer (2014) supported these

findings, arguing that both domestic and international terrorism stems from multiple

grievances and in most cases terrorism has stemmed from political disagreements

between the terrorists and the ruling government. A study by Ghatack (2016) showed

similar statistical results that linked discrimination of ethnic minority populations to

terroristic behaviors. Ghatack, (2016) examined the impact of discrimination, economic

viability, and political openness as predictors of terrorism. An assessment of 172 countries found that there appeared to be strong support linking countries that had high rates of discrimination against minority groups to higher rates of domestic terrorism under open economic and political systems. Ghatack's chosen methodology and data set provide a robust empirical statistical analysis. The findings of this study support existing research that has linked current economic globalization trends combined with weak democratic structures to the emergence of terrorist activity (Ghatack, 2016; Schmid, 2013).

The impact of culture and social traditions has also been examined in relationship to acts of terrorism within all three models of terrorism research: agent based models looked at the impact of specific cultural traits that place some cultures at higher risk, institutional based models looked at the impact of cultural traditions and family ties on the formation of the organization and the management structures they chose, and system based models have examined the impact of cultural traits on the likelihood of a minority population assimilating into larger social systems. Schmid indicates that structural theories based on culture have not provided a lot of empirical data and may be an area that needs additional study (Schmid, 2014). Within the more recent literature focusing on the impacts of culture, Gelfand, LaFree, Fahey and Feinberg (2013) examined the impact of cultural factors in relation to the number and type of terrorist attacks. Using data pulled from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and controlling for economic and religious variables, their results demonstrated several cultural based correlations such as fatalistic beliefs that appeared to be core values within the culture, strict gender roles, and

communal structure that were linked to greater lethality in the type of attacks. This study provides insight for creating culturally appropriate approaches to counter-terrorism. Yet the study is limited by only focusing on cultural factors that encouraged violence without also looking at how those cultures were integrated or exclude from social and political structures within the state. While there are limited expectations for terrorism studies to cover a wide range of factors that might contribute to terroristic behaviors, there is a more modest expectation that such cultural studies might include primary data from individuals living in these cultures. Such primary data is critical for understanding how members of the culture or ethnic group might interpret their place in the social, economic, and political systems under review. A study conducted by Malik, Sandholzer, Khan, and Akbar (2015) is one study that meets the primary data criteria using structured surveys. Malik et al. explored a variety of risk factors to determine which factors might have the greatest influence on whether a population engages in terrorism. Focusing on existing empirical studies the researchers were able to generalize approximately sixty-five factors determined to be significant within the context of causing terroristic behaviors. Using these sixty-five factors, the researcher created a survey and sent it out to members of a Pakistani community. Analysis of the returned surveys highlighted thirteen factors that the population had identified as high-risk factor for causing social grievances. It is interesting to note that within this study none of the top factors related to economic disparity or educational disparity as several western researchers surmised, but did include factors related to political structures, perceptions of government corruption and cultural/ethnic discrimination that also appeared in the findings of Gelfand, LaFree,

Fahey and Feinberg (2013). Although it appears that culture has a significant role in

terrorism research, Malik, Sandholzer, Khan, and Akbar (2015) study does not support

the idea that terrorism is the result of cultural factors, but rather determined by how

society integrates or isolates a culture. Malik et al. (2015) showed that members of their

target population perceived leadership as dishonest, felt that their legal system was unjust

and unfair in the enforcement of accountability, felt that high-levels of corruption existed

within the government, that the national security forces were poorly trained, and that a

majority of their population was excluded from the creation of government policies. The

use of primary data collected through structured surveys combined with the researchers'

knowledge of the culture and language added validity and credibility to the study.

## Counterterrorism

Counter-terrorism literature is often intermingled within terrorism studies. This is

problematic in many cases in which terrorism researchers have not operated with a view

to understand the phenomenon; rather they examine their topics antagonistically with the

view to facilitate defeat. Using this antagonistic framework there is an increased risk of

biases which may compromise the validity of such research (Brannan and Strindberg,

2014). However, there is also value in examining terrorism with the goal of developing

counter-terrorism strategies. Plumper, and Neumayer (2014) argue that terrorism and

counterterrorism are logically connected. Understanding the type of terrorist or terrorist

organization is foundational for determining effective counterterrorism policies, legal

statutes and law enforcement measures, as well as the development of community

resiliency measures. Plumper and Neumayer indicated that acts are terrorism are often the

result of a disagreement between the radical group and the domestic government. Under these circumstances, they argue for increased political responsiveness and accountability measures. Plumper and Neumayer, also indicated that foreign nations such as the U.S., who offer counterterrorism support to weak governments, will likely experience a rise in transnational terrorist events on their own soil. Foreign support and domestic policies need to be carefully considered because they will likely require the implementation of additional unpopular counterterrorism policies and law enforcement measures at home (Crelinsten, and Schmid, 2012). Because it is likely that the U.S. will continue to support struggling nations and often become involved in counterterrorism efforts in foreign countries, the research on domestic counterterrorism strategies is critical to our understanding of terrorism and the associated research gaps. Recent studies show that despite a lot of work in counterterrorism and counter radicalization policies, it has been very difficult to determine best practices following each successful terrorist event (Birkmann, Cardona, Carreño, Barbat, Pelling, Schneiderbauer, & Welle, 2013, Bossong, 2014; Bigo, Carrera, Guild, Guittet, Jeandesboz, Mitsilegas, & Scherrer, 2015).

### *Policy Implementation/Legal Frameworks*

A majority of the counterterrorism research focuses on the creation of policy and the implementation of policing activities that occur after a community is attacked. Due to the reactive nature of counterterrorism research there is very little consensus on the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies. Wormeli (2014) argued that early national response strategies demonstrated an inability to respond to a crisis in a coherent manner. Critical review of the 9/11 response by community, state, and federal agencies

demonstrated that a lot of work needed to be done. One of the greatest hurdles to a prevention strategy is the need for information sharing across agencies and the implementation of increase community surveillance to identify suspected terroristic behaviors. Although information sharing, and surveillance has become easier with technological advances; increased surveillance is limited by existing civil rights statutes. Findings within the 9/11 Commission Report led to the development of The Department of Homeland Security and considerable funding to address communication issues and improve the interoperability of state and local agencies to respond to catastrophic events (9/11 Commission, 2004; Cook 2009; Donahaue, Robbins, and Simonsen, 2011). However, over the last ten to fifteen years, law enforcement and policy makers have come to the realization that the best counterterrorism strategies are those that work toward prevention rather than crisis response (Carter and Carter, 2012; Wormeli, 2014). One of the greatest hurdles to a prevention strategy is the need for information sharing across agencies and the implementation of increase community surveillance to identify suspected terroristic behaviors. Although information sharing, and surveillance has become easier with technological advances; increased surveillance is limited by existing civil rights statutes.

### *Community Partnerships and Recovery*

Given such challenges, there is a need for community-based policing models that aim to develop strong relationships with members of the higher risk communities (Wormeli, 2014). One framework for addressing this challenge is the concept of omniculturalism as presented by Pelfrey (2014), Omniculturalism is an opportunity for

communities to adopt counterterrorism policies and practices that engage with

communities through superordinate goals connecting the community irrespective of

racial, ethnic, or religious backgrounds. Pelfrey argued for more community integration

allowing for the creation of community advisory councils comprised of a diverse

population of the community to include different religious organizations, ethnic groups,

immigrant populations, public organizations, private business leaders, and government

agencies (Pelfrey, 2014, p. 487). Similar advisory councils and counterterrorism

strategies have been created in the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU)

with questionable results (Bossong, 2014; Rashid, 2014; Choudhury, 2013; and Bonino,

2012). Bossong explained that substantive cooperation across the EU is frustrated by

divergent national interests and limited academic consensus. Such frustrations are also

complicated by the diversity of terrorism threats and the lack of comprehensive strategies

designed to address a wide variety of scenarios resulting in increased levels of fear and

public outrage (Christensen, Laegreid, and Rykkja, 2013). Bossong concedes that some

of the existing policies enacted by the EU, have limited cross-national integration and

accentuated repressive and authoritative policies over policies that should be supporting

early prevention (Bossong, 2014). One of the more prominent studies within the

counterterrorism literature is that of LaFree and Bersani (2014) in which they have used

data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) for 1990 to 2011 to examine the social,

economic and urbanization characteristics of geographic areas where terrorist attacks

have occurred in the United States. The results of their review pointed toward a higher

level of terroristic behavior in counties characterized by higher levels of language

diversity, an increased number of foreign-born residents, high rates of residential

instability and higher proportions of urban residence. The results also demonstrated that

terrorist behavior was less common in counties characterized by concentrated

disadvantage, supporting existing terrorism research that disassociates economic disparity

from higher levels of terrorism (Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor, 2012; and Malik,

Sandholzer, Khan, and Akbar, 2015). Additional community-based research conducted

by McGinty, Sziarto and Seymour-Jorn (2013) examined the connection between

religious belief systems and terroristic behaviors. McGinty et al. (2013) narrowed their

research population to a small Milwaukee Muslim community to determine the impact of

collaboration regarding how Muslim communities are portrayed in research and the

reality of countering Islamophobia. The study outlined the collaborative efforts between

the researchers and local Sunni Islamic organizations and identified some of the

challenges the researchers had regarding limited access to the population, survey biases

as a result of the researchers not being Muslim, exclusion of other Muslim groups within

the survey results due to the discretion and control held by the Muslim leadership they

were working with. However, McGinty, et al. (2013) did find several areas in which

Muslim populations can work with the community to overcome Islamaphobia and create

more viable partnerships with government and community leaders. Bures (2013) and

Berlin, and Carlstrom, (2015) both agreed that there is tremendous value in collaboration

between government agencies and the private sector when it comes to counterterrorism

strategies. Bures focused his study on the role of the banking sector in disrupting terrorist

financial networks. Highlighting national security strategies that include public-private

partnerships, Bures argued that private organizations have a responsibility to assist government agencies to increase security. However, there are several challenges that must be overcome for private organizations to effectively contribute. Bures indicted that some of the challenges are policy based, while others stem from issues surrounding the legality and willingness of both parties to share information. Bures concludes that there may not be a perfect example of a successful public-private partnership but there is evidence that increased collaboration can improve counterterrorism strategies and build community resilience. Additional studies support Bures and the idea of building community resiliency through the extension of community and government partnerships (Buchalter, 2007; Bausch, Faria, and Zeitzoff, 2013; and Berkes & Ross, 2013).

Hewitt (2014) reflects on how law-enforcements use of informers and information provided by the public to helped identify potential terrorist activity and improve law enforcements ability to prevent terrorist actions. Cozine, Joyal and Ors (2014) also indicate that using a network approach between law-enforcement and intelligence agencies improves and accelerates communication and coordinated movement between organizations to identity and address terrorist acts more rapidly.

## Summary

If terrorism is among the most challenging security issues today, it is not surprising that a lot of research and academic resources are being directed to the study terrorism from multiple angles. In addition to understanding terrorism as an academic discipline, researchers are tasked to produce actionable recommendations that clients or practitioners can use to inform national security policies, create counter-terrorism

strategies, or develop comprehensive programs to de-radicalize or build community

resiliency. Dave Brannan and Anders Strindberg (2014) indicated that terrorism

researchers are not operating with a view to understand as is traditional to most academic

and scholarly research. In the field of terrorism research, scholars are asked to examine

their topics with a hermeneutic in which researchers approach their subject

antagonistically with the view to facilitate its defeat. Using this approach has shown to

taint and compromise the scholastic validity of the research (Brannan and Strindberg,

2014).

Despite this obvious challenge, terrorism research is also plagued by more

pressing challenges, one being the lack of a common definition providing researchers an

accurate base from which to start formulating research strategies. Additionally, due to the

various forms of terrorism and number of contributing causes, researchers have failed to

come up with a conceptual academic model. In absence of such model, researchers have

attempted to force multiple disciplines into studying the various aspects of terrorism

rather than creating a comprehensive picture. Despite nearly fifty years of academic

research on the topic, the undisciplined process of crossing academic fields of study has

not produced a significant amount of empirical studies for practitioners to draw upon. In

defense of all the academic work and hours of data collection that has taken place, some

of the challenge is created by the topic itself.

Terrorism research is inherently dangerous, access to terrorist organizations or

their membership is nearly impossible for academic researchers (Schuurman, and

Eijkman, 2013). Beyond the security concerns, lack of cultural knowledge and linguistic

skills, combined with physical distance make studying this phenomenon extraordinarily challenging. In addition, Sageman (2014) argued that the surge of money for terrorism studies has been detrimental to the academic pursuit of validated explanations. The field now dominated by laymen, who control funding and prioritize according to their own questions, combined with an increase in self-proclaimed media experts conducting their own research, has distracted from and undermined true academic research efforts (p. 566).

Due to these challenges a lot of critical areas of terrorism research have been untouched. In 2011, one of the most influential authors on terrorism, Alex Schmid provided a list of the 50 top topics he felt had not been studied sufficiently and topics that still needed to be studied in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism. On a promising note, some of the topics have appeared in the recent literature or are currently under study. However, many of the critical topics may never be studied. The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the literature that addresses one of Schmid's under-researched topics examining if there is disconnect between academic research on terrorism and the counter-terrorism practitioners' understanding of terrorism. Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the research methodology that will be used to explore how counterterrorism research has been used in the context of one community's strategic planning.

Chapter 3: Research Method

## Introduction

The purpose of the study was to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how U.S. communities respond to an act of domestic terrorism and to determine what collaboration efforts between governmental agencies (leaders, first responders) and nongovernment organizations (educational institutes, religious institutes, specialty think tanks, and aid organizations) are needed to design and implement community level counter-terrorism strategies. In Chapter 3, I describe the research design and the rational for choosing the topic, the role of the researcher, and the methodology and instruments that were used to collect the data. I provide a detailed description of the analysis process and the measures taken to ensure the credibility of the study's findings. Chapter 3 concludes with an explanation of the ethical considerations and the process by which they were addressed within the study.

## Research Design and Rationale

A synthesis of the existing literature highlights the complexity inherent in identifying and addressing the underlying motivations that drive individuals and organizations to commit acts of terrorism. Without the ability to identify potential terrorists and prevent future attacks, effective counter-terrorism strategies become paramount. The uniqueness of each terrorist attack and the subsequent response sets the conditions for how the community recovers. Understanding which community activities have been effective in the past and which additional support was needed during the initial response and in the aftermath of an actual terrorist attack, may help community leaders

design and implement more effective counter-terrorism strategies. A qualitative case

study design was chosen to explore the community response and recovery efforts prior to,

during, and following the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing. The study addressed the

following question and sub-questions.

Question

In what ways and to what ends do Oklahoma City, OK government and

nongovernmental organizations collaborate with one another to provide joint

counter terrorism services?

Sub-questions

1. What are strengths and weaknesses in having nongovernmental organizations

provide education, information, and advice to government leaders to address

ideologically based security threats?

2. In what ways have collaboration between government and nongovernment

agencies influenced community preparedness programs regarding multi-cultural

and multi-lingual needs?

A qualitative case study is consistent with investigating how government and

nongovernmental leaders interpret, interact and engage in the preparation and

implementation of a community's terrorism response and recovery plan.

I conducted a process of data triangulation to ensure data was collected from

multiple sources and that such data captured individual interpretations of the terrorist

event and the aftermath spanning twenty-two years from January 1995 to 2015. I

recorded data using a thick description research process to ensure that qualitative data

was captured and interpreted as closely to the original intent of the information as possible. In addition, I conducted an audit trail to ensure that sources of data were mapped chronologically and can be revisited and reevaluated within the context of new information or contradictory data. I conducted a peer review process periodically throughout the evaluation process to maintain research awareness and manage reflexivity, minimizing any research biases. (Almutairi, Gardner, and McCarthy, 2014; Houghton, Casey, Shaw, & Murphy, 2013).

## Role of the Researcher

In the context of the case study, I have been the sole researcher for the project and do not have any professional or personal relationships with the volunteer participants. My professional analytical career informing and advising national security leaders provided a broad foundation of knowledge to inform the chosen topic and validate the appropriate methodology. My education and experiences working in national security provided opportunities to collaborate with experts in the nongovernment sector and integrate cultural awareness and diversity of thought in joint projects. These experiences working with leaders in the community have played an important role in how I designed this project and how the data were interpreted. To avoid bias interpretation, I chose a U.S. city that I have not visited and in which I have no personal or professional connections to the leaders, community organizations, or previous knowledge of any community planning efforts. The final analysis and results have been reviewed by two professional colleagues for general grammatical clarity and completeness of thought. To maintain the anonymity

of survey and interview participants, outside reviewers were not permitted to view the

raw data contained in surveys or interview transcripts.

**Methodology**

The framework chosen for this study was a combination of Berger's and

Luckman's social constructivism and Senge's systems thinking theory. Social

constructivism as interpreted by Berger's and Luckman (1966), posits that humans can

create their own systems of meaning in which they are able to understand their world

through individual experiences and respond in accordance with their own interpretation

of a shared event (Babbie, 2015). Social constructivism was an appropriate theory to be

used within this case study as a framework for explaining interpretations of an event from

the perspective of individuals who either experienced it first hand or have been tasked to

provide services in the aftermath of the event.

In addition to social constructivism, systems thinking theory based on Senge's

interpretation, was also chosen as a framework for interpreting this case study to address

that fact that communities are comprised of a network of intra and interdependent

systems (people, organizations, laws, and resources) working together to achieve a

specific objective (Senge, 2006). Systems theory has been used in multiple disciplines to

describe the interactions and dependencies of different agents within the system and

helped bring together the individual interpretations of participants with the networked

responsibilities inherent in comprehensive community counter-terrorism plans. Yin

(2014) recommended a conceptual framework be used for conducting case studies,

allowing the researcher flexible collection and interpretation options to develop a broader

understanding of the phenomenon being studied. Conceptual frameworks promote an inductive approach rather than a narrower formal framework designed explicitly to test an existing theory (Anfara and Mertz, 2014). Social constructivism has been used by terrorism and counter-terrorism researchers to develop an understanding of an individual's interpretations and responses to their environment, as well as, the social exchanges that take place within social and cultural experiences (Pettman, 2000; Kayser, 2015; Barnes, 2015; Resnick, Guimond, Wellman, Resnick, 2015).

Combining elements of the two theoretical foundations into a social systems theoretical framework for research has been used successfully by Cavallo (2014) to examine community interactions within the context of disaster preparedness planning and within Carter's (2011) study of human behavior within social environments. Cavallo and Carter used social systems frameworks within their research projects to describe the social interactions among individuals and others in a community setting similar to the community chosen for the proposed case study on Oklahoma City. The social systems framework was used successfully to explore interactions between individuals and provided insight into the way individuals behave within systems. Cavallo and Carter concluded that choosing the combined theoretical frameworks provided unique insights into the behaviors that allowed the various members of their chosen communities to co-exist. The use of a similar framework for this study helped shed light on how members of Oklahoma City have co-existed and how service agencies have interacted since the 1995 terrorist event (Cavallo, 2014; Carter, 2011).

Similar theoretical models such as structural functionalism and conflict theory were also considered based on a review of Potts' and Vella's (2015) analysis that explored elements of sustainability planning, Friedman's (2014) study examining social class and cultures within global systems, and Bartolucci's and Gallo's (2015) terrorism study, for their similarities to the topic and research questions proposed in this study. However, structural functionalism and conflict theory were both rejected due to complexity in study design and the existence of research methodologies that constrained flexible collection and data interpretation. The primary and sub-research questions within this case study have been designed to broadly explore the effectiveness and efficiency within community processes as determined by the participants. A broader social systems thinking approach, similar to processes used by Alam and Husband (2013) and Barile and Saviano (2011) was needed to allow for the inclusion of individual interpretations, organizational structures and processes, and legal and policy limitations, as well as, to explore the impact of available resources and time constraints that may have a significant impact on the effectiveness or efficiency of the response and recovery processes chosen.

A qualitative case study model was consistent with investigating how government and nongovernmental leaders interact in the preparation and implementation of a community's terrorism response and recovery plans. To ensure a rigorous approach to the case study, a process of data triangulation was conducted, providing multiple sources of data and individual interpretations of the event. Data was recorded using a thick description research process to ensure that qualitative data was captured and interpreted as closely to the original intent of the information as possible. In addition, an audit trail

was conducted to ensure that sources of data were mapped chronologically and can be revisited and reevaluated within the context of new information or contradictory data. A researcher and peer review process were implemented periodically throughout the evaluation process to maintain research awareness and manage reflexivity, minimizing any research biases. (Almutairi, Gardner, and McCarthy, 2014; Houghton, Casey, Shaw, & Murphy, 2013).

The research project consisted of a historic review of the case study using publicly available records, national, state, and local government reports, and scholarly research documents, media reports surrounding the event, journals, and statements made by individuals directly impacted by the event. In addition, structured surveys were administered to participating government and nongovernmental leaders exploring how government and community leaders plan and prepare for a potential terrorist attack. Participants were recruited based on their current positions within selected government agencies and nongovernment organizations. Each volunteer participant was asked to complete a self-paced structured survey via email or participate in two 30-minute phone interviews with the researcher. The initial phone call took approximately 30 minutes to answer the interview questions. Data collected from the initial interviews was deemed sufficient and a second phone call was not used.

To avoid emotional or biased results, I have included a historic analysis process within the case study to draw upon and compare existing historic data with the survey results. Based on Yin's guidance for case studies, a single-case study design was chosen, focusing on the Oklahoma City Bombings of 1995 (Yin, 2014, pp. 51-53). The 1995

Oklahoma City bombing was consistent with a single-case study design in that it

represented a critical terrorism case in American history, was unique in that it was carried

out by two U.S. citizens on a U.S. government building (statistically more likely than the

threat posed by a foreign terrorist organization), it represented a set of common

conditions that reasonably could exist in any U.S. city (a mid-size, mid-western

community with no symbolic significance), and had the potential for revealing

information that might not otherwise be attainable. An in-depth analysis of the Oklahoma

City bombing event also had the potential to reveal information about community

response actions and the subsequent level of community resiliency that resulted in the

aftermath of an actual terrorist attack, representing two primary goals of my research

questions. The final criteria for choosing the Oklahoma City bombing as a single-case

study, was the availability of more than twenty years of historic data and retrospective

analysis which provided an unbiased and comprehensive longitudinal study of a

community's systematic response to a nationally recognized and catastrophic terrorist

event.

**Instrumentation**

A historic narrative analysis process was used to exploit and analyze historic

records surrounding the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and emergency response records

following the event to establish baseline data (Kim and Latta, 2009; Wikman, 2006;

Ospina and Dodge, 2005). A structured survey was also administered to address the

current state of counterterrorism planning by Oklahoma City leaders. Adjustments to

survey questions were made based on the availability of data and the types of data

collected. Official reports, media reporting, academic studies and personal accounts were coded and weighted using Atlas.ti 8.0 software program and pre-determined coding criteria to account for source biases and any limits placed on the provided data.

**Data Collection**

A qualitative model using a case study methodology with structured survey questions was used. The data collection process included historic data and data derived from structured surveys and personal interviews conducted with volunteer participants. Data collected from government agencies included information regarding the roles and activities of city officials, law enforcement, and emergency services leaders, and social service agencies regarding counterterrorism strategies and operations. Data collected regarding nongovernmental participation included information about organizations or individuals which provided a critical service within the city's strategic response plan (e.g. medical support, food and shelter, community education, or victim advocacy).

The research process included a historic review using publicly available records, national, state, and local government reports, and scholarly research documents, media reports surrounding the event, journals, and statements made by individuals directly impacted by the event. In addition, a structured survey was administered to participating government and nongovernmental leaders exploring how government and community leaders plan and prepare for a potential terrorist attack. Participants were recruited based on their current positions within selected government agencies and nongovernment organizations. Each volunteer participant was asked to complete a self-paced structured survey via email or to participate in two 30-minute phone interviews with the researcher.

The first phone call took approximately 30 minutes to answer the interview questions. Participants agreed to a second phone call as needed to clarify information provided, however, the data collected from the first phone call was sufficient and a second phone call was not need.

**Data Analysis Plan**

Historic records, data collected through a structured survey process, and data collected from individual interviews was analyzed using a four step process: 1) initial reading of historic records, surveys, manuscripts, and researcher notes in order to draw out recurrent themes using a constant comparison strategy, 2) a systematic indexing process was used to apply thematic codes to the raw data, 3) coded data was further analyzed and arranged chronologically according a predetermined thematic framework separating government agency and nongovernment organizational trends, 4) the final step in the data analysis process included the cross-referencing of survey data and interview transcripts against selected historic records to identify divergent concepts and time sensitive trends. (Almutairi, Gardner, and McCarthy, 2014; Saldana, 2016). The analysis of data was recorded using a thick description interpretive process drawing upon patterns of behavior, social interactions, and cultural patterns, ensuring that qualitative data was captured and interpreted as closely to the original intent of the information as possible (Finlay, 2012; Mason, 2017). Data was stored, coded and analyzed using Atlas.ti 8.0 software and formal text analysis processing.

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**Issues of Trustworthiness**

</div>

**Credibility**

A qualitative model using a case study methodology was used to conduct the research project. To ensure a rigorous approach to the case study, a process of data triangulation was conducted, providing multiple sources of data and individual interpretations of the 1995 bombing event. Data was recorded using a thick description research process to capture a detailed description of the environment, social setting, community atmosphere, and the personal perceptions expressed as described in the qualitative data. All data was written or relayed in English and interpreted as closely to the original intent of the information as possible. In addition, an audit trail was conducted to ensure that sources of data are mapped chronologically and can be revisited and reevaluated within the context of new information or contradictory evidence. A researcher and peer review process were implemented periodically throughout the evaluation process to maintain research awareness and manage reflexivity, minimizing any research biases. (Houghton, Casey, Shaw, and Murphy, 2013; Almutairi, Gardner and McCarthy, 2014).

**Transferability**

Oklahoma City was chosen based on the 1995 bombing attack on a federal building that has been defined as a domestic terrorist event. The city was also considered a strong case study based on its size, location, and diversity within its population; criteria that remain common in many U.S. communities today. The study findings add to the knowledge base and may provide insight regarding one community's counter-terrorism strategies. The knowledge gained through this study may be used by other community leaders as they develop and implement their own counter-terrorism strategies.

**Dependability**

The collected data was comprised of existing publicly available information produced between 1995 and 2015, including available historic records, media reporting, personal accounts, and written or filmed documentaries surrounding the Oklahoma City bombing. Data was collected from a variety of sources within the twenty-year time span until the researcher and research committee felt that the project had reached data saturation or at a point in which the data analysis began to duplicate research findings.

**Confirmability**

A research journal was used to capture step-by-step processes related to how general themes were chosen, how sources were identified, and data was collected and how the collected data was coded and interpreted. Data records have been mapped and stored chronologically allowing for periodic review and reevaluation within the context of new information or contradictory data. (Almutairi, Gardner and McCarthy, 2014; Houghton, Casey, Shaw, and Murphy, 2013).

**Ethical Concerns and Procedures**

Approval to conduct this research was requested from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Walden University. A complete IRB application with a detailed description of potential sources and data collection methods was included. IRB approval of research plan was provided on 6 March 2017, # 03-07-17-0034795 with an expiration date of March 6, 2018. Care was taken to abide with appropriate copyright laws and requests for public records were conducted in accordance with existing regulations and procedures. Care was taken to ensure the collection and the content of the requested

information meet the intent of the study. Following common research practices, the use of pseudonyms for professional titles and names helped ensure the anonymity of individual participants. The overall reasoning behind the research project was to improve the quality of information available to community leaders and to promote the use of community resources and encourage the inclusion of appropriate cultural expertise in the formation of community response and recovery processes.

All paper forms of notes were transcribed into a digital copy and destroyed. Any collected audio or video recordings were saved, and password protected on an external drive. When not in use the external drive was locked in a filing cabinet with any remaining paper notes. Transcripts of collected data will be held for 5 years for possible academic purposes at which point, they will be destroyed (Walden University, 2014).

**Summary**

An outline and detailed description of the research design is provided within Chapter 3, including the rationale behind choosing the topic and its relevancy to current national security issues and a need for expanded community-based counter-terrorism planning. A case study model using a combination of historic data and survey processes was chosen due to ethical concerns related to the sensitivity of the subject matter and the potential for biased data resulting from an interview, observation, or survey process (Tingley, 2014). The data collection consisted of detailed journaling and data management processes to ensure data was collected and stored according to validated research methods. Validated data collection tools, digital storage hardware and qualitative data coding software were used to collect and analyze the data. Although qualitative

research has historically been more difficult to validate, every attempt was made to

ensure that any credibility and ethical concerns related to the collection of data and the

distribution of the findings were addressed and approved by the Walden IRB and my

dissertation committee prior to collecting and analyzing the data.

Chapter 4: Results

**Introduction**

The rationale for conducting a qualitative case study of the 1995 Oklahoma City

Bombing was to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how a U.S. community

responded to an act of domestic terrorism and how the event influenced collaboration

efforts between governmental agencies (leaders, first responders) and nongovernment

organizations (educational institutes, religious institutes, specialty think tanks, and aid

organizations) as they designed and implemented community level counterterrorism

strategies. To understand the context of the event and explore the experiences of the

individuals present at the time of the bombing and those who have participated in

designing and implementing current counterterrorism plans, the study answered the

following research questions:

Question

> In what ways and to what ends do Oklahoma City, OK government and
>
> nongovernmental organizations collaborate with one another to provide joint
>
> counter terrorism services?

Sub-questions

> 1. What are strengths and weaknesses in having nongovernmental organization
>
> provide education, information, and advice to government leaders to address
>
> ideologically based security threats?

2. In what ways have collaboration between government and nongovernment agencies influenced community preparedness programs regarding multi-cultural and multi-lingual needs?

I begin Chapter 4 with a holistic description of event to provide the scene and atmosphere in which first responders and community leaders worked. The setting is followed by a general description of the historic documents collected, the coding processes used and the subsequent findings. Following the historic review results, the recruitment process and general description of survey and interview participants is presented. The remainder of chapter four describes the collection and coding processes used, the survey and interview finding and a summary of the results as they relate to the original research questions.

**Case Study Setting**

I chose the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for this study due to the community's first-hand experience with responding to and recovering from a domestic terrorist attack. The bombing was considered one of the worst acts of domestic terrorism in U.S. history at that time. The bombing occurred at approximately 09:03 AM, on Wednesday the 19th day of April. The bomber potentially considered that this was the middle of the week and that all the federal offices would have been fully staffed, the childcare center was full of children and customers were filled the waiting rooms. Characterization of the location chosen indicates that the bombing was designed to be particularly brutal. Although domestic threats existed, and less damaging terrorist plots had been carried out in the U.S., the

level of damage and death caused by the bombing presented unique challenges for local

and state level emergency responders, as well as, created a new level of public awareness

regarding terrorism threats within the borders of the U.S. All available information

indicates that the success of the bombing was not due to any failure in intelligence

collection or a lack of adequate security measures at the site. Convicted bomber, Timothy

McVeigh, and his accomplices, were not on the radar of any law enforcement agencies at

the time. Their actions leading up to the bombing did not raise any red flags or warrant

security concerns. In retrospect, authorities believe that McVeigh had been harboring

several ideological and political grievances for years that may have played into his

decision to carry out the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building (Linenthal, 2003;

Wright, 2007; Michel and Herbeck, 2015). Some of those key grievances developed

during his time in the military because of the political atmosphere and personal events

surrounding his discharge. His grievances grew, becoming more volatile in connection

with his interactions with likeminded individuals and adoption of religious ideologies.

The most prominent influence seemed to be his interpretation of the 1993 FBI siege of

the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, and the government's lack of judicial

responsibility. According to court records, McVeigh chose the second anniversary of the

Waco siege, and targeted a federal building that housed FBI offices, to send a political

message to authorities regarding his disapproval of the way the government handled the

Branch Davidian incident and what he perceived as law enforcements abuse of the ability

to impose on the rights of individuals. There have been extensive studies on the

Oklahoma City Bombing and in-depth evaluations of Timothy McVeigh and Terry

Nichole's patterns of behavior throughout their lives leading up to the event (Michel, and

Herbeck, 2015). Each study has provided additional details, unique perceptions, and

correlated factors that demonstrate the complexity inherent in identifying potential

extremists before they attack and insuring proper response and recover resources are

available to address the aftermath of an event. The Oklahoma City bombing was planned

by a very small group of U.S. citizens using a Ryder rental truck to house the bomb. The

building was a significant target; hosting the offices of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

and Firearms, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Secret Service, Army and Marine

Corps recruitment offices, Veterans Administration, Departments of Defense, Housing

and Urban Development, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, Transportation, The

Social Security Administration, General Accounting Office, Customs Services, and The

General Services Administration. The building also hosted a Federal Employees Credit

Union and the America's Kids Child Care Development Center. The burst of the

explosion and debris extended approximately 48 blocks from the target, severely

damaging surrounding buildings and destroying vehicles in the proximity. The initial

explosion also took out the primary and back-up phone lines needed for first response and

emergency services (FEMA, 1996; Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency

Management, 1996).

To focus on the counterterrorism planning, emergency response, and recovery

efforts, I drew upon the activities performed and challenges experienced by first

responders, government leaders at the local, state, and federal levels, and the individuals

who provided coordination and support activities throughout and following the recovery

efforts. The study started with an examination of historic data beginning in April 1995 through September 2015.

## Historic Data Collection

General themes identified through the initial literature review process were grouped into two categories: government activities and nongovernmental activities. Focusing on each category, a comprehensive and systematic search of academic databases: ProQuest Central, Homeland Security Digital Library, Academic Search Complete, Thoreau Multi-Database Search through Walden University's library service, EBSCO research database and Google Scholar was used to identify historic records and research using the key words Oklahoma City Bombing. Historic data was extracted from public records, research publications, published histories, personal accounts, and media reports relevant to the 1995 bombing event and to the counterterrorism planning and community resiliency efforts over the last 20 years in Oklahoma City, OK. Once a significant amount of data had been collected relating to the primary event, a similar search process was conducted for counterterrorism planning, community planning and emergency response strategies using a combination of the preceding database resources. The database search and evaluation process yielded 84 resources that met the academic standards and relevance to the case study.

## Analysis Process

Historic reports, public records, research publications, published histories, personal accounts, and media reports were analyzed using a four step process: an initial reading of historic records, surveys, manuscripts, and researcher notes to draw out

recurring themes using a constant comparison strategy, next a systematic indexing process was used to apply thematic codes to the raw data, coded data was further analyzed and arranged chronologically according to a predetermined thematic framework which separated government agency and nongovernment organizational trends, a final cross-referencing of survey data and interview transcripts against selected historic records was used to identify divergent concepts and time sensitive trends (Almutairi, Gardner, and McCarthy, 2014; Saldana, 2016). The analysis of data was recorded using a thick description research process to ensure that qualitative data was captured and interpreted as closely to the original intent of the information as possible (Finlay, 2012). Data was stored, coded and analyzed using Atlas.ti 8.0 software and formal text analysis processing.

## Findings of Historic Review

The historic review was focused on local, state, and federal government reports, public records, research publications, published histories, personal accounts, and media reports surrounding the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing event. Data drawn from the historic documents included the response efforts at the time of the event, lessons learned by organizations involved in the crisis response and any changes to the emergency planning efforts that have taken place as a result of the bombing. Through the historic review process several common themes emerged that provide a greater understanding of community level planning, the required resources for an effective response and the critical agencies that need to be included in the planning and coordination efforts. A copy of each document was uploaded to commercially available Atlas-ti 8.0 qualitative data

analysis and management software program and auto coded against pre-determined codes

drawn from the initial literature review process. To determine commonalities and

differences between government and nongovernment roles, the data was also sorted and

coded for government and nongovernment response activities. The most prevalent themes

were included in the following two tables along with generalized perceptions based upon

the context in which the themes appeared in the historic data.

Table 1

*Summary of Government Themes*

*N=84* documents

| Prominent Themes | Perceptions |
| --- | --- |
| Barriers | Most barriers could have been overcome through training. |
| Blame | Blame was directed toward those efforts that took longer than desired due to lack of coordination or limited resources. |
| Collaboration | Working with other agencies was difficult initially but got better over time. |
| Communication | Adequate communication between agencies was critical to recovery efforts and getting the resources to the right place at the right time. |
| Communication systems | Alternative options for communication networks needed to be in the plan. |
| Community response | The community was in shock but came together to take care of the victims and their families. |
| Crime | Most counter-terror incidents have a crime component and need to be addressed through law enforcement. |
| Fear | Different levels of fear were described depending on the role of individuals and the amount of information provided to them. Fear was more apparent after the event when individuals had time to re-evaluate the situation. |
| Federal response | Federal roles had not been clearly outlined in local planning documents. Awareness of federal resources needed to be integrated in the planning process early. |
| Law enforcement | Police and law enforcement agencies played several different roles during the recovery efforts. Multiple agencies had responsibility for securing the site and |

| | gathering evidence. |
| --- | --- |
| Leadership | Local leaders were generally effective at assigning duties and coordinating the initial response. As more agencies became involved organization of efforts became more complicated. Active planning between agencies prior to the event may have helped overcome some of the operational challenges. |
| Media influence | A media plan needed to be in place. Media often overstepped their roles and caused additional recovery challenges due to the release of misinformation. |
| Mental health | Mental health services played a greater role later in the recovery efforts addressing the needs of victims and family members. Mental health organizations continued to provide services to the wider community in the years following. |
| Miscommunication | The high casualty rate, the pace of recovery operations and the poor communication networks became significant factors leading to the initial miscommunication challenges. |
| National reaction | The event was considered a national tragedy. A lot of support services and long-term funding came from outside the state. |
| Official roles | The primary responsibility quoted by government leaders was to provide for the public's safety. Official roles were identified early to accommodate the immediate security needs surrounding the damaged structures. |
| Organizational challenges | Most challenges stemmed from not understanding the special requirements of a terrorist event and the timelines for each recovery activity (e.g. securing structure while preserving the crime scene). There were challenges associated with determining who had the lead authority to make critical decisions. |
| Organizational successes | Oklahoma City Police were identified as performing very well under difficult circumstances. The assistance of state and federal agencies brought in the additional expertise needed to address the special circumstances surround the bombing event. |
| Personal challenges | A lack of appropriate training and initial guidance was cited as the most prominent challenge for individual first responders and the supporting agencies. |
| Personal successes | Successful recovery of victims was cited as the most rewarding. Being able to get victims back to their family members made all the other challenges seem worthwhile. |
| Private business | A local cellular company was able to provide phones and |

| | |
|---|---|
| | cellular assistance when existing systems failed. The outpouring of relief supplies from the private sector was more than expected; although appreciated, the additional supplies caused significant storage and distribution problems. |
| Public health | Community public health services provided long-term care to victims and those in the community who were directly or indirectly impacted. |
| Resiliency | The level of community and national support allowed the city to recover far sooner than expected. |
| Security | The first priority upon arrival at the scene was to ensure the safety of the first responders and local citizens as the damaged structures were secured. |
| State response | State agencies played key roles in the coordination with federal agencies and ensuring that appropriate organizations were performing the roles they were authorized to do. (e.g. support from the National Guard and military units stationed in the area). |
| Unofficial roles | Individuals reported that even after their official roles were complete they stayed involved with the long-term recovery efforts and participated in the various support networks that were created after the event. |

*Note*. Thematic analysis of historic documents using Atlas.ti Qualitative Data Analysis (8.0). software. Coded themes (26) represent the most prominent concepts drawn from the initial literature review process. Perceptions describe the context in which the themes appear in the compiled Oklahoma City Bombing archived data as it relates to government roles.

Table 2

*Summary of Nongovernment Themes*

*N*=84 documents

| Coded Theme | Perception |
|---|---|
| Barriers | Nongovernment organizations had limited authority to provide services early in the recovery efforts. Hospitals and private medical care centers had the most prominent role but were quickly overwhelmed by the magnitude of the injuries. |
| Collaboration | Organization with existing public service relationships had an easier time getting access to the scene and receiving guidance from government leadership. |
| Communication | Accurate information was difficult to get in a timely |

manner. Several organizations worked on the outskirts of the barricaded site and addressed community needs as they arose (e.g. food, water, and shelter for victims and volunteers).

| | |
|---|---|
| Community response | Nongovernment organizations had the primary responsibility for addressing community-based needs and for the long-term recovery programs that followed. |
| Crime | Nongovernmental organizations filled a supporting role to local law enforcement agencies by providing long-term crime prevention programs and community level training. |
| Fear | Religious organizations were often cited as providing comfort to the community and religious counseling to victims and their family members. |
| Leadership | Nongovernment and the private business community provided construction equipment, specialized skill sets and financial resources that allowed first responders and government agencies to do their job quickly and more effectively. |
| Media influence | Media coverage of the event helped maintain public awareness and ensured that all requests for additional resources were communicated at a national level. |
| Mental health | Community organizations filled a large portion of the mental health service roles and provided long-term mental health services to the victims and their families. |
| Miscommunication | Maintaining open lines of communication between government agencies and the nongovernment volunteer staffs was especially challenging. Much of the critical coordination took place at the government level therefore it was difficult to coordinate support services in the early days. |
| National reaction | A great deal of logistic support and funding was provided by large non-profit organizations based outside Oklahoma. |
| Official roles | Each organization provided a very specific support service. Understanding which organization was leading each effort was challenging for government coordinators. |
| Organizational challenges | After action reports and lessons learned reflected the need for intra-agency planning and the coordination of resources. In addition to resource distribution, maintaining staffing needs over the extended recovery period was exceptionally difficult as most organizations had a small permeant staff and relied upon volunteers to deliver some of the services. |
| Organizational successes | As communication networks improved and roles were |

|  | clearly defined, a higher level of coordination and cooperation occurred between the government agencies and the organizations bringing in specialized equipment and skillsets. Within the context of a large-scale emergency, these outside services expanded the capacity of existing government resources. |
|---|---|
| Personal challenges | Many organizations reported that they had hoped to do more for the recovery efforts. The high demand on medical services and the risk of additional injury due to structural damage prevented several medical personnel from addressing minor wounds and providing initial medical triage at the site. |
| Personal successes | Organizations that had not been actively involved in emergency and community planning events made effort after the event to become more involved with the city's government agencies and engage more readily in public service projects. |
| Private business | Nongovernment organizations became the primary conduit for the private sector to get involved in the recovery through the allocation and distribution of resources and financial donations. |
| Public health | Nongovernment agencies provided the bulk of the public health services and continued to provide information resources for the long-term recovery efforts. |
| Resiliency | Community organizations played key roles in rebuilding the city's sense of security by providing community activities and long-term educational programs. |
| Security | Maintaining the safety of staff and volunteers fell upon the individual organizations. Lead government agencies insisted that volunteers and the organizations providing support services remain outside of the barricaded site to ensure first responders and recovery teams had unimpeded access. |
| Unofficial roles | Beyond the recovery efforts, nongovernmental organizations were responsible for assisting the citizens of the larger community overcome the long-term emotional and economic impacts. |

*Note.* Thematic analysis of historic documents using Atlas.ti Qualitative Data Analysis (8.0). software. Coded themes (21) represent the most prominent concepts drawn from the initial literature review process. Perceptions describe the context in which the themes appear in the compiled Oklahoma City Bombing archived data as it relates to nongovernmental roles.

Within the parameters of the case study, media accounts were considered for the potential influence on the emergency response efforts and the distribution of public information. Media trends are represented by common headlines and various public sentiments surrounding acts of terrorism and a connection to the Oklahoma City event.

Table 3

*Summary of Prominent Media Headlines*

| Year | Source | Event | Headlines |
|------|--------|-------|-----------|
| 1995 | *The New York Times* | Oklahoma City, OK | Terror in Oklahoma: The overview; bomb suspect is held… |
| 1996 | *CNN* | 1st Anniversary | Clinton signs anti-terrorism bill. |
| 1997 | *The New York Times* | 2nd Anniversary | Trial begins in the Oklahoma City Bombing case |
| 2000 | *CBS* | 5th Anniversary | Victims of the Murrah Building Bombing |
| 2001 | *CNN* | 9/11 Event | Terror attack hits U.S. |
| 2005 | *New York Times* | 10th Anniversary | 10 Years after bombing, Oklahoma City remembers |
| 2010 | *The Christian Science Monitor* | 15th Anniversary | Oklahoma City Bombing: Is 1995 repeating itself today? |
| 2013 | *Daily News* | Boston, MA Event | Survivors of Oklahoma City Bombing offer hope for Boston Marathon victims. |
| 2014 | *The New York Times* | San Bernardino, CA Event | F.B. I. Treating San Bernardino attack as terrorism case |
| 2015 | *CNN* | 20th Anniversary | Homegrown extremist threat remains 20 years after Oklahoma City Bombing |
| 2016 | *Fox News* | Orlando, FL Event | 49 killed in shooting at Florida nightclub in possible act of Islamic terror |
| 2017 | *CNN/NBC* | Las Vegas, NV Event | Deadliest shooting in modern U.S. history |

*Note*. Headlines represent general media perceptions and tone beginning in April 1995 through each prominent anniversary and subsequent domestic terror events.

Within the parameters of the case study, policy and legislative records were collected but not included in the coding process. Policies and laws were considered within the context of providing legal authorities or government funding to counter-terrorism programs or in support of emergency response efforts. The following laws demonstrate legislative trends surrounding acts of terrorism.

Table 4

*Summary of Policies or Legal Statutes*

| | Created by Policy or Law |
|---|---|
| 1995 | -Executive Order 12947_Prohibits financial transactions with designated terrorist organizations<br>-Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, US Senate Bills S.390 and S.761<br>-Oklahoma Anti-Terrorism Act |
| 1996 | -Public Law 104-132: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 |
| 2001 | -Public Law 107-42: Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act<br>-Public Law 107-71: Aviation and Transportation Security Act<br>-Executive Order 13224_Seizure of assets of anyone accused of committing or supporting acts of terrorism<br>-Public Law 107-56: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001<br>-Public Law 107-134: Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 |
| 2002 | -Public Law 107-296: Homeland Security Act of 2002<br>-Public Law 107-197: Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 2002<br>-The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002<br>-Public Law 107-297: Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002<br>-Public Law 107-173: Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002<br>-Public Health and Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and response Act of 2002. |
| 2003 | -Oklahoma Emergency Management Act of 2003<br>-Public Law 107-306: Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 |
| 2004 | -The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004<br>-Public Law 108-276: Project Bio Shield Act of 2004 |
| 2005 | -Border Protection, Anti-terrorism and illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005<br>-REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109–13, 119 Stat. 302_requires state driver licenses and ID cards accepted for official purposes |

-Public Law 109-177: USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005

-Public Law 109-144: Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005

2006   -Public Law 109-366: Military Commissions Act of 2006

-Public Law 109-347: Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006

-Public Law 109-367: Secure Fence Act of 2006

-Public Law 109-476: Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006

-Public Law 109-374: Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act

2007   -Public Law 110-182: 15-Day Extension of the Protect America Act of 2007

-Public Law 110-53: Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007

-Public Law 110-55: Protect America Act of 2007

2010   -Public Law 111-140: Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act

2011   -Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8: National Preparedness

-Empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States.

2012   -Safe Oklahoma Grant Program Created by Oklahoma Legislature through House Bill 3052

-Public Law 112-265: Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012

-Public Law 112-168: Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act of 2012

-Public Law 113-274: Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014

-Public Law 113-282: National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014

-Public Law 113-254: Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014

2017   -Section 563 of the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Subtitle J, Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate ("Section 563"), Public Law 110–161

*Note*. Table represents only policies or statutes identified. Additional policies may exist to address counter-terrorism efforts but were not specifically identified by researcher.

The qualitative analysis process used presents the data as coded and interpreted by the researcher and therefore reflects the educational background, career experiences, and personal biases of the researcher in the context of the research questions. Future analysis of the historic documents by other researchers may be coded differently and provide alternate or additional insights.

**Results of Historic Review**

Through a historic review of the bombing event, I identified several themes as they related to the original research question and two sub-questions. The predominant

theme focused on official roles and identifying authorities. Many of the challenges and barriers were characterized by the magnitude of the event and the limitations of training as it related to proper protocol. Several planning shortfalls emerged as Oklahoma City leaders responded to the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building. The most prominent shortfall was the lack of an emergency action plan that included considerations and appropriate response guidance for a catastrophic act of terrorism. At the time the local emergency response team included the Oklahoma City Police, Oklahoma City Fire Department, and the Emergency Medical Services (EMS). Their initial response was reactive. First responders knew that they had a responsibility to provide security and emergency recovery services. During chaos, they immediately went to work devoid of guidance or a coordinated plan. Following emergency response procedures designed for traditional emergencies, local officials notified the Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management which triggered a series of crisis response efforts at the local, state, and federal levels (Winthrop, 1997). Representatives from the FBI were asked by the Oklahoma City Police Chief to take over the criminal investigation due to local police being overwhelmed with maintaining area security and controlling traffic in the area (Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, 1996). As the recovery efforts continued throughout the day and following weeks, it was clear more comprehensive planning and coordination of emergency response efforts was needed. The lack of guidance and coordination resulted in a variety of early issues. The triage and transportation of victims was disorganized and chaotic (Maningas, Robison, and Mallonee, 1997). There was early confusion about who and how first responders were to

secure the building's structure while removing victims (Prendergast, 1995; Mlakar, Corley, Sozen, and Thornton, 1998; Osteraas, 2006). Phone services were inadequate to handle the high volume of communications traffic necessary for the coordination of response efforts. The target of the attack was a federal building requiring additional protocols that had to be followed to secure and preserve the crime scene. The additional structural damage and involvement of federal agencies complicated the recovery of victims in a timely manner (FEMA, 1996; Maningas, Robison, and Mallonee, 1997). In addition to the local volunteers who came to offer assistance, the high level of media attention drew volunteers and donations from across the U.S. The additional people and donated resources were difficult to manage and began to overwhelm existing staging areas and storage capacity (Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, 1996).

Organizational successes were characterized by the level of collaboration that occurred between the various government agencies and the level of cooperation that was provided by nongovernmental organizations. The most prominent use of nongovernment services was the coordination between the State Medical Examiner's Office and the First Christian Church; designating the church's property as the Family Assistance Center/Compassion Center to address the information requirements of immediate family members, while the local American Red Cross opened a shelter for individuals displaced by the explosion (The City of Oklahoma City, 1996; Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, 1996; FEMA, 1996; The City of Oklahoma City, 1996). Feed the Children, United Way, The Red Cross, and the Salvation Army were called upon for

logistics support and the distribution of food and disaster supplies. In addition, the Oklahoma Restaurant Association established 24-hour food services to feed emergency response workers (Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, 1996). Critical Incident Stress Debriefings and mental health services were provided by the Oklahoma City Fire and Police Departments, the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services, the FBI, the American Red Cross and additional volunteer private mental health specialists (FEMA, 1996; Bea, 1998).

In the aftermath, the Oklahoma Emergency Management Agency issued a formal report characterizing a list of lessons learned. Among those lessons, leaders indicated that a formalized emergency response planning effort was needed (FEMA, 1996). Resiliency appeared least among the themes and was characterized by the events and relationships that allowed the city to respond and recover. Those in charge of coordinating the recovery efforts indicated that many of the resources and expertise that was needed at the scene and in the early hours of recovery were not resident in or resourced by the government agencies but required resources to be pulled from the community, specifically private business and nongovernment organizations (FEMA, 1996).

### Participant Recruitment

Through the initial literature review process, a list of government agencies that have traditionally had an active role in counter-terrorism strategies and emergency response efforts were identified. These roles were used to find government agencies in Oklahoma City that would reasonably have a similar role in planning and implementing a community level counter-terrorism strategy and any emergency response efforts. An

internet search engine was used to locate Oklahoma City government agencies and to identify key leaders in each agency. Names and contact details were collected for individuals identified as an administrator of a program or as a first responder. The literature review process also provided a list of unique skillsets and resources that have been recommended by counter-terrorism experts. An internet search engine was used to identify local Oklahoma City nongovernment agencies which provided specialized services or resources comparable to those recommended by the counter-terrorism literature. Names and contact details were collected for individuals identified as an administrator of a program or holding a leadership role within nongovernment organizations. Potential participants received an invitational email with instructions for initial consent and how to participate in the study. Participants who chose not to consent were thanked and no further contact was made. Participants who chose to consent were sent a follow-on email with the appropriate survey based on their government or nongovernment affiliation. Participants who completed the survey were thanked with the understanding that they would be re-contacted only if additional information was required for clarification of the initial responses. Email invitations were sent to 179 potential participants with a request to reply with 'consent' or 'decline'; 148 declined while 31 consented to participate. Of those whom declined, 27 indicated that they did not feel that they were a good fit for the study due to not working in an organization or position that addressed terrorism issues. Those who consented included 28 individuals in both government and nongovernment positions who are working directly with emergency planning or have current or past experiences with counter-terrorism efforts. Three of the

nongovernment participants have not had experience with current emergency planning or

counter-terrorism experience, however they expressed interest in having their

organization participate in the study due to the population they serve. Six interviews were

conducted, and 25 surveys were completed and returned.

Table 5

*Summary of Study Participants Characteristics*

| Participants | $N$ | Organization Type | Role in Organization | Years in Org |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| City Official | 2 | Government | Leadership | 3, 6 |
| City Official | 1 | Government | Staff | 5 |
| First Responder | 1 | Government | Management | 6 |
| First Responder | 3 | Government | Staff | 6, 13, 15 |
| Medical/Hospital | 1 | Nongovernment | Leadership | 3 |
| Medical/Hospital | 2 | Nongovernment | Staff | 2, 16 |
| Mental Health | 1 | Government | Staff | 8 |
| Community Org/Public Service | 5 | Nongovernment | Leadership | 2, 5, 5, 16, 23 |
| Community Org/Public Service | 3 | Nongovernment | Staff | 5, 6, 16 |
| Education/University | 1 | Nongovernment | Leadership | 8 |
| Education/University | 3 | Nongovernment | Staff | 2, 9, 9 |
| Education/Primary/Secondary | 0 | Nongovernment | Leadership | na |
| Community Education/Historic | 3 | Nongovernment | Leadership | 10, 13, 22 |
| Religious Org | 3 | Nongovernment | Leadership | 1, 8, 27 |
| Private Business | 2 | Nongovernment | Leadership | 7, 12 |
| Total Participants | 31 | | | |

*Note*. For confidentiality purposes, generalized roles are listed in lieu of the participants'
names and current professional titles.

**Survey/Interview Data Collection**

Each volunteer participant was sent a copy of the survey questions via email.

Those who had been identified as government employees were sent survey questions

designed to illicit information from the perspective of a government agency (see Annex

B). Those who had been identified as nongovernment employees were sent survey questions designed to illicit information from the perspective of a nongovernment community organization (see Annex C). Each volunteer participant was asked to complete the self-paced structured survey and return completed surveys via email or to participate in two 30-minute phone interviews with the researcher. Completed surveys were returned by 25 participants within two weeks of initial contact. Six volunteers chose to participate in a phone interview and provided a date and time in which they could be available for contact. Each participant was contacted by the researcher according to the date and time that was requested. Participants were provided a short introduction regarding the purpose of the study and the expectations of the researcher. All questions and concerns were addressed and noted prior to the first interview question. The interviews followed the same structure and content as the survey documents. Interviewees were encouraged to answer each question to the extent that they were comfortable with. At the completion of each answer the transcript was read back to the interviewee to ensure that the researcher had captured the information accurately. Each phone interview took an average of 30 minutes to answer the structured survey questions. Participants provided adequate answers that met the research criteria for each survey question. A second call was not utilized due to the sufficiency of initial interview responses.

**Analysis Process**

Data collected through a structured survey process and data collected from individual interviews was compiled and analyzed using a four-step process. The analysis

process started with an initial reading of responses to determine if additional information was needed from the participant. Next a systematic indexing process was used to apply thematic codes to the raw data. Coded data was further analyzed and arranged chronologically according a predetermined thematic framework that separated government agency and nongovernment organizational trends. The final step in the data analysis process included the cross-referencing of survey data and interview transcripts against selected historic records to identify divergent concepts and time sensitive trends. (Almutairi, Gardner, and McCarthy, 2014; Saldana, 2016). The analysis of data was recorded using a thick description research process to ensure that qualitative data was captured and interpreted as closely to the original intent of the information as possible (Finlay, 2012). Survey results were reviewed for accuracy and loaded into Atlas.ti 8.0 qualitative data software management system. Each survey was coded independently allowing statements to be coded inductively without generating cross-relationships to other data in the survey. Generalized themes emerged through the analyses of the coded data. Inter-relationships were examined and assessed across groups of participants.

**Findings and Key Themes**

Results of structured survey and interview data varied slightly between individual participants based on their role within their organizations, personal experiences, and amount of time in the organization, the level of involvement in current emergency planning efforts and their knowledge of existing counter-terrorism efforts in their community at the time of the survey. Each survey response was reviewed, and common words and phrases were highlighted and used to create a simple coding framework.

The number of government volunteers was less than originally planned but those that provided information were happy to help with the research project and provided insight regarding ongoing community outreach efforts in Oklahoma City. Government survey responses reflected a general understanding of counter-terrorism planning within the context of traditional community level emergency response requirements. Awareness of terrorism threats was high among those surveyed, either due to Oklahoma City's history or the abundance of recent events and the level of media attention surrounding global terrorism in the preceding months. The increased public attention may have also positively or negatively, influenced the volunteers' willingness to participate in the survey and the level of details within the responses provided. A copy of each government survey was entered in an Atlas-ti 8.0 software and auto coded against pre-determined codes drawn from the initial survey review. The most prevalent theme for each survey question was included in the following table. Each survey response was analyzed to determine whether the participants felt that the question's topic was important to their community's emergency response planning and long-term resiliency. Responses were further analyzed to determine whether each participant perceived the topic as having a positive or negative impact on their planning processes and the services they provide. Finally, each response was analyzed to determine how much effort and funding each participant felt their organization was willing to invest in addressing the question's topic. The importance of each theme represents knowledge of/or perception of topic rated on a Likert scale with 1=very important, 3= indifferent, 5= not important. Sentiment is similarly measured 1=positive, 3 neutral, 5=negative. Investment represents knowledge of/or perception of

resources allotted (e.g. personnel or funding) 1=high, 3=average, 5=low. The following

table reflects a summary of compiled survey responses with respective ratings.

Table 6

*Survey Results for Government Leaders*

*N*=8 Surveys/Interviews

|  | Dominant Perception | Importance | Sentiment | Investment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RQ1_G | Official role/responsibility | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| RQ2_G | One of many requirements | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| RQ3_G | Underutilized opportunity | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| RQ4_G | Considered but not formalized | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| RQ5_G | Included in normal emergency planning | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| RQ6_G | Equal to other emergency planning efforts | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| RQ7_G | Could be improved | 1 | 1 | 5 |

*Note.* See appendix A for government survey questions.

Nongovernmental survey responses reflected a slightly lower level of

understanding regarding counter-terrorism planning requirements within community

level emergency response plans. However, an awareness of terrorism and the importance

of having a community wide plan was high among those surveyed and may account for a

higher level of willingness among nongovernmental organizations to volunteer for the

study. The participants in the nongovernment group represent a greater level of diversity

in both the types of organizations they work in and the amount of time they have worked

for the organizations. Survey responses for nongovernmental participants were analyzed

using a similar coding process. The importance of each theme represents knowledge of/or

perception of topic rated on a Likert scale with 1=very important, 3= indifferent, 5= not

important. Sentiment is similarly measured 1=positive, 3 neutral, 5=negative. Investment

represents knowledge of/or perception of resources allotted (e.g. personnel or funding)

1=high, 3=average, 5=low. The following table reflects a summary of the compiled

nongovernment survey responses with respective ratings.

Table 7

*Survey Results for Nongovernment Leaders*

*N*=23 Surveys/Interviews

|  | Dominant Perception | Importance | Sentiment | Investment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RQ1_NG | Services provided | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| RQ2_NG | Security/law enforcement related | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| RQ3_NG | Can be increased | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| RQ4_NG | Other areas of community | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| RQ5_NG | Primarily recovery efforts | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| RQ6_NG | Improving over last few years | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| RQ7_NG | Independent programs | 1 | 1 | 3 |

*Note*. See appendix B for nongovernment survey questions.

The following table reflects a summary of themes drawn from a compilation of

both government and nongovernment survey and interview responses. A copy of each

survey was up-loaded in Atlas.ti 8.0 software and auto coded against the pre-determined

criteria drawn from the initial survey review. The most prevalent themes were included in

the following table along with a generalized perception based upon the context in which

the theme appears in the survey data.

Table 8

*Summary of Survey Responses*

*N*=31 Surveys/Interviews

| Coded Theme | Perception |
|---|---|
| Official Roles | Participants indicated a high level of responsibility for providing services designed to improve public safety. |
| Unofficial Roles | Leaders felt that it was important for them to ensure their staff had the proper training and to provide the resources needed within their specific agencies. |
| Organizational Successes | Organizations felt that they were implementing lessons learned from previous events and continued to seek opportunities to prepare their staff for unexpected events. |
| Organizational Challenges | Many of the challenges were the result of poor planning and a lack of funding for the resources they needed. |
| Personal Successes | Several participants indicated that they felt their organization had the knowledge and ability to provide adequate services in times of need. |
| Personal Challenges | When looking specifically at preventing terrorism, leaders felt that they personally lack appropriate training and sufficient guidance from their senior leaders to be effective at their job. |
| Collaboration | Most felt that collaboration with outside agencies and community organizations would be very valuable during planning. Role and responsibilities would need to be clearly communicated and adhered to during an event. |
| Communication | Two-way communication was a high priority for government participants. Most indicated that have good communication lines between agencies and with staff was critical for passing accurate information and executing an effective plan. |
| Miscommunication | Communication barriers were cited as the most frustrating and had the potential to disrupt emergency response efforts or cause additional injury. |
| Barriers | Participants indicated that existing barriers needed to be identified early and addressed in planning so that alternate options would be in place if needed. |

*Note.* Thematic analysis of survey data using Atlas.ti Qualitative Data Analysis (8.0). software. Coded themes (10) represent the most prominent concepts drawn from the

initial literature review process. Perceptions describe the context in which the themes appear in the compiled survey data as it relates to both government and nongovernment roles.

General themes drawn from the survey data demonstrated a high level of personal satisfaction with the official and unofficial roles the participants fill within their agencies and organizations. Despite differences in levels of authority and responsibility, participants' responses indicated a level of personal responsibility for promoting public safety, supporting colleagues and contributing to overall community well-being. Interview participants were enthusiastic about the study topic and provided detailed answers to the survey questions. Coded survey data produced 10 distinct themes relevant to the three research questions. Communication was the most prominent theme that appeared in the survey responses. References to communication included the importance of keeping lines of communication open between various government agencies and nongovernment organizations that the participants had worked with in the past. Two themes, Personal challenges and Barriers, appeared in both sub-questions as they related to the sufficiency of the participants training. Collaboration was a more frequent theme among the nongovernment responses and often was conveyed as a positive activity. There was greater resistance to collaboration within the government responses. Negative perceptions of collaboration where characterized by the need to maintain an official capacity with proper authorities. Barriers that hindered or prevented collaboration with experts were characterized as primarily ethical or legal bounds that participants were uncomfortable with. Organizational success appeared predominately in the main research question, characterized by the degree to which each participant identified their agency or

organization as having a broader community role then the primary service they provided. The survey structure allowed participants to provide additional information as appropriate. Several participants highlighted other community initiatives in Oklahoma City that they were aware of or affiliated with outside of their employment. The following table reflects the projects identified by participants. Additional community projects may exist to address counter-terrorism efforts but were not specifically identified within the survey and interview data.

Table 9

*Summary of Community Projects*

| Project | Focus Area/Target Audience |
|---|---|
| -The Oklahoma City Police Bilingual Unit was formed in 2003 | -Promotes the hiring of multi-lingual officers and provides language translation services for non-English speaking members of community |
| -Oklahoma City Office of Emergency Management (OKC OEM) | -Coordination of government and non-profit relief organizations during an emergency |
| -Family Awareness and Community Teamwork (FACT) | -Gang prevention program for youth ages 10-17 |
| -Police Community Relations (PCR) Unit | -Focuses on building relationships with neighborhood associations, businesses, churches, and other community groups |
| -Strong Neighborhoods Initiative | -Government sponsored initiative to leverage private investment from families, developers and businesses to improve neighborhoods in their own communities |
| -Continuum of Care grants | -Provides services to homeless individuals and families to promote self-sustainment and social stability |

*Note*. Table represents projects identified. Additional details regarding focus area/target audience have been supplemented with publicly available data drawn from the organizations' websites.

Many of the projects identified by participants were not specifically designed to address counter-terrorism issues, however, ongoing terrorism research indicates that community programs addressing some of the underlying social issues can shape an individual's behavior in positive ways and therefore each of the listed programs and others in the community are worth further study for their long-term impact on counter-terrorism efforts and for building community resiliency.

## Results of Case Study

A qualitative case study model provided an opportunity to draw upon 20 years of historic data and identify trending patterns as they relate to counter-terrorism planning and community resiliency efforts (Almutairi, Gardner, and McCarthy, 2014). The availability of data related to the Oklahoma City bombing is extensive and provides an opportunity to examine multiple perspectives from individuals and agencies that were directly impacted by the event or had a role in implementing new process as a result of the 1995 bombing event. The second part to the study drew upon the experiences of 31 voluntary participants associated with government agencies or nongovernment organizations in the Oklahoma City area. Of those who consented to participate, 25 volunteered to fill out a structure survey, while six volunteered to participate in a phone interview with the researcher. Results of the historic review combined with the insights provided by the study participants answered the original research questions and presented several themes regarding lessons learned and opportunities for improvement throughout the planning and execution phases of a counter-terrorism strategy.

### *Research Question*

*In what ways and to what ends do Oklahoma City, OK government and nongovernmental organizations collaborate with one another to provide joint counter terrorism services?*

Data drawn from the records highlighted cross-agency coordination as an area that needed improvement following the 1995 terrorist attack. An analysis of historic records revealed that Oklahoma City government and nongovernment agencies did not collaborate with one another to provide joint counter-terrorism services before the attack or during the early hours of the rescue and recovery efforts. Following the attack, designated government agencies worked with local nongovernment agencies to provide medical and mental health services, but additional counter-terrorism programs were assumed by law enforcement agencies.

Compilation of the historic data generated 26 distinct themes related to the primary research question and two sub-questions. Official roles and communication appeared with the highest frequency within the data sets. Maintaining adequate communication networks and the management of resources, volunteers, and donations were cited as the most problematic coordination challenges. Official roles were noted prominently within the data set and were characterized by the level of authority held as it related to providing security and the recovery of victims. The Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management took the lead on documenting the lessons learned. The most evident barriers were characterized by a lack of training as it related to managing response and recovery efforts after a catastrophic terrorist attack. National and regional integrated training needed to take place between federal, state and local emergency

management services, to include fire and law enforcement services. Managing the

consequences of terrorism incidents was not included in the emergency response plans

and was not well understood across the government agencies prior to the bombing.

(Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, 1996).

   Collaboration was associated with blame within the prominent themes and

characterized by the extended amount of time and effort it took to coordinate basic

communication networks and the management of resources. Government agencies relied

on both nongovernmental organizations and the local business community to provide

specialized services. Cellular phones and dedicated lines for provided by a commercial

company when the emergency communications systems were disrupted by the explosion.

Construction equipment was needed to assist in the removal of debris and to provide

structural support during the recovery process. Medical triage and mental health services

were provided by local nongovernment organizations. Food, water, and temporary

shelters were provided by various nongovernment organizations and private businesses in

the community. City leaders noted, "There were literally thousands of items, ranging

from specialized search and rescue equipment to hard-hats, which appeared in Oklahoma

City from around the world. Numerous problems were experienced with the management

and storage of these resources and donated goods" (The City of Oklahoma City, 1996).

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also noted the need for a formal

management process to be in place prior to an event. "The management of donations was

an overwhelming task which would be improved in the future by implementation of the

FEMA Donations Management System." (FEMA, 1996). In addition to donations, the

management of volunteers put an additional strain on the recovery process. Community response also appeared frequently within the compiled historic data and was characterized by both shock and the subsequent compassion that was provided to the victims. "The Red Cross was overwhelmed by the magnitude of spontaneous volunteers who came to the chapter to help. Some volunteers traveled considerable distances, only to find out their services were not needed" (Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, 1996).

Through the historic review process, 26 distinct themes were generated. Themes were characterized by the resources, official roles and services involved in the emergency response and recovery efforts following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. A survey of current community leaders was also conducted to gain a better understanding of how the lessons learned in 1995 have been adopted over time and if they have been considered within current counter-terrorism strategies. The analysis of data drawn from the survey process generated 10 distinct themes as they related to the initial research question and two sub-questions. A compilation of the survey data indicated that most Oklahoma City leaders were aware of the need to integrate with other government agencies as they conduct emergency management planning. Several participants identified agencies and organizations that they had work with on a regular basis but were more hesitant about reaching out to nongovernment organizations for specialized training or assistance as it related to counter-terrorism strategies. Most of the interagency work was related to traditional emergency response planning for natural disasters but all the government participants agreed that counter-terrorism was a topic frequently discussed in their office.

Government participants were less confident about their agencies' interactions with the local non-profit community during the planning process but indicated that several services needed after an attack would likely come from a nongovernment organization such as the Red Cross or local church organizations. Government employees were less likely to identify mental health services or hospitals as being nongovernment, grouping theses services in with the emergency services provided by local police, fire and ambulance services.

There was greater diversity among the nongovernmental participants, both in occupation and in their understanding of their role within a counter-terrorism strategy. Participants who provided a medical or mental health service were more likely to have coordinated with government agencies. Those who lead or provided services through a religious organization were less likely to collaborate with government agencies on counter-terrorism strategies but more likely to collaborate with government agencies that provided welfare assistance and public health services. Participants leading religious organizations admitted that most of their community work was done within their own congregation or with other nongovernment organizations in the community. Any humanitarian efforts following a disaster were coordinated by individuals within the congregations, but these activities were not something the churches traditionally sponsored or participated in.

Sub-questions were included in the study to explore the types of services nongovernment organization could provide within a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy and to capture any efforts designed to build resilient communities.

*Sub-Question 1*

*What are strengths and weaknesses in having nongovernmental organizations provide education, information, and advice to government leaders to address ideologically based security threats?*

Government participants acknowledged the value in having community experts provide advice and training but demonstrated a level of resistance to having community leaders involved in the actual emergency planning meetings. Official roles were characterized by the potential ethical issues and legal bounds that are involved in coordinating with religious leaders or cultural experts. One government leader indicated that if outside services or training were needed these organizations would be contacted by the appropriate government agency and services would be coordinated at that time.

Nongovernment participants were slightly more open to the idea of outside experts providing training or assistance to government leaders. Several nongovernment participants felt that it would be helpful to be involved in the early stages of counter-terrorism planning so that they had an opportunity to identify their roles and the services that they may be able to provide. Collaboration was paired with themes related to effective communication and characterized by frequent interaction starting at the earliest stages of planning. Organizations that provide medical or mental health services felt that they should be involved at every level of planning and their services should be included in a comprehensive recovery plan.

Government leaders were not as comfortable with expanding their collaboration with additional community organizations. Some felt that outside organizations might

have their own agendas and may not agree with some of the security and counter-terrorism programs being funded in the community. One participant was adamant stating, "These decisions should be made by government leaders with the authority to do so." The compilation of survey responses reflected a consensus regarding a nongovernment organization's ability to provide specialized advice or training regarding ideological security threats but there was not consensus on the level of involvement a nongovernment organization should have within counter-terrorism planning efforts. These sentiments were assigned as barriers and characterized as limitation of policy, funding or staffing.

The second sub-question was designed to address the needs of minority populations in a community; specifically, populations with unique cultural or language needs that may impact a counter-terrorism strategy or any recovery efforts.

### Sub-Question 2

*In what ways have collaboration between government and nongovernment agencies influenced community preparedness programs regarding multi-cultural and multi-lingual needs?*

Organizational success was characterized by a perception that lessons learned had been incorporated in current programs. Government participants readily identified the Oklahoma City Police Department as having a multi-lingual program but indicated that it only met the needs of a few languages and was not as comprehensive as it could be. All government participants indicated that having multi-cultural and multi-lingual training would be useful to their agency but only one participant indicated that they have worked with community leaders to address the cultural needs of their clients. Challenges were

characterized as insufficient training and a lack of funding designated to counter-terrorism requirements. Several participants indicated that they would like to expand their staff training to include more multi-cultural awareness and ensure the needs of these populations are included in their emergency response plans.

Nongovernment organizations provided similar responses, indicating that they often rely on multi-lingual staff to address some of the more diverse populations but also indicated that it was difficult to find staff with adequate translation skills for some of the uncommon languages. Local colleges and universities were identified as having language programs, with one participant indicating that some of the instructors or students might be able to assist with language translation in the event of an emergency. Consensus among both government and nongovernment participants revealed that multi-cultural and multi-lingual training would help leaders understand the needs of non-English speaking members of their community.

The case study was designed to examine one event and a single community's response. The results of the historic review combined with the survey data represent the findings and perceptions as they relate to Oklahoma City and may not be generalizable to other terrorist attacks or other populations. Despite these limitations, the insight gained answered the research questions and provided additional information for community leaders to draw upon. The study also identified elements of counter-terrorism planning that need to be improved indicating that future research at the community level is needed.

**Summary**

A qualitative case study model provided an opportunity to draw upon 20 years of historic data, identifying trending patterns that have shaped counter-terrorism planning and community resiliency efforts in Oklahoma City, OK. Findings from the historic review and survey data helped answer the research questions and presented validate observations and unique perceptions from members of the Oklahoma City community regarding the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building and its impact on the development of counter-terrorism strategies today. The results of the case study as they relate to a broader understanding of counter-terrorism research that supports community level engagement are provided in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Recommendations, and Implications

**Introduction**

Domestic terrorism has placed a tremendous burden on the law enforcement and crisis response services in U.S. communities. Despite years of additional funding and new counterterrorism policies, the threat of domestic terrorism remains. Increased mobility and advancements in communication technologies allows individuals and organizations to share, recruit, and act upon ideological grievances with greater ease. The purpose of conducting a qualitative case study at the community level was to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how U.S. communities are preparing for and responding to acts of domestic terrorism. Exploring collaboration efforts between governmental agencies (leaders, first responders) and nongovernment organizations (educational institutes, religious institutes, specialty think tanks, and aid organizations) in Oklahoma City provided insight on best practices regarding the design and implementation of community level, counterterrorism strategies.

In Chapter 5, I discuss how the study results answer the initial research questions and what contributions these finding add to the existing counter-terrorism literature. Based on this new understanding, recommendations are provided regarding how the research might be used by government agencies and nongovernmental organizations as they address counter-terrorism issues in their communities and build upon existing programs to increase community resiliency.

**Interpretation of Findings**

Through the literature review process, several unique insights were identified that have emerged within the last few years as terrorism and counterterrorism research has matured. Despite the increased focus on studying terrorism, it remains one of the most challenging security issues today. Unlike traditional academic topics, counterterrorism researchers are tasked to produce actionable recommendations used to inform national security policies, create counter-terrorism strategies, and develop comprehensive programs to deradicalize or build community resiliency (Brannan and Strindberg, 2014). Complicated by a lack of a common definition, terrorism research spans multiple disciplines creating various levels of understanding and disjointed recommended solutions. Despite nearly 50 years of academic research on the topic, the undisciplined process of crossing academic fields of study has not produced a significant amount of empirical studies for practitioners to draw upon. Most of terrorism research is based on secondhand data and sociological trends. Berger's and Luckman (1966), posited that humans create their own systems of meaning in which they begin to understand their world through their individual experiences and respond in accordance with their own interpretation of what may be a shared event within a social setting (Babbie, 2015). Based on this research many experts in the field of counter-terrorism believe that human behaviors can be shaped by positive social influencers (Abbas and Siddique, 2012; Alam and Husband, 2013; Bhui, Everitt, and Jones, 2014). With this understanding, addressing the underlying causes of terroristic behavior may be a very long process that may need to

include a variety of community level programs (White House, 2011a; United States Department of State, 2013; DHS, 2017).

With a case study design, combining social constructivism theory with systems thinking theory, I created a flexible research framework to explore the individual experiences and interpretations of a shared domestic terrorist event (Thomas, 2015; Van Mane, 2015). Participating leaders demonstrated an understanding of the challenges they face in their own community and agreed that preventing terrorism and creating counter-terrorism strategies is very difficult. For these reasons, many communities have not invested the time or money in counter-terrorism planning efforts or in comprehensive long-term programs. For others it is a matter of priority due to budget shortfalls. The threat of terrorism may remain a low priority in the mind of leaders until they are required to deal with the aftermath. Communities that have experienced terrorism first hand seem to place a slightly higher priority on their counter-terrorism and law enforcement programs and have made an effort to seek federal assistance and grant funding to increase their community's security measures (DHS, 2015a; 2015b). Understanding which resources are needed, what funding is available and which resources already exist in their community, remains a challenge for those charged with planning counterterrorism strategies and providing for emergency response services. To increase awareness regarding ongoing counterterrorism efforts at the community level, the research focused on three questions designed to illicit best practices and lessons learned from the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing.

*Research Question*

In what ways and to what ends do Oklahoma City, OK government and nongovernmental organizations collaborate with one another to provide joint counter-terrorism services?

To address this question, I analyzed historical records associated with the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing and revealed that Oklahoma City government and nongovernment agencies did not collaborate with one another to provide joint counterterrorism services before the attack or during the early hours of the rescue and recovery efforts. Following the attack, designated government agencies worked with local nongovernment agencies to provide medical and mental health services, but additional counterterrorism programs were assumed by law enforcement agencies rather than creating joint collaborative counterterrorism services.

Terrorism and counterterrorism research indicates that there are several underlying factors that contribute to the recruitment, development, and participation of individuals who engage in terrorism (Abbas, and Siddique, 2012; Speckhard, 2012). To create effective counterterrorism strategies, prevention and de-radicalization programs must be included. Many of the psychological and social factors that have been identified as potential drivers of terrorist behavior need to be addressed in an integrated and systematic manner. Several agencies and organizations with specialized services will be required over an extended period (e.g. mental health, educational institutes, language and cultural experts, family services, etc.) (White House, 2011a, 2011b).

Analysis of themes drawn from the historical data set indicate that the initial emergency response plan was insufficient for responding to a terrorist attack. As first

responders arrived on the scene, they proceeded to rescue the victims without fully evaluating the situation or determining if a second attack was imminent. The Oklahoma City Police Department assumed the initial coordination authority, securing the area until a further evaluation could take place. Over the course of the first several hours more formalized roles and cooperative relationships between rescue services developed. Government agencies began to identify their individual authorities and coordinate the recovery of victims in an organized and timely manner. Assigning the primary security and coordination role to the Oklahoma City Police Department provided a central coordinating body in early hours but this arrangement was not specified in existing emergency plans and did cause some early confusion as additional first response teams arrived on the scene. As the city, state and federal agencies arrived at the scene a more formalized recovery plan was needed to address a variety of issue including, (a) the structural damage, (b) protect the crime scene, (c) coordinate the triage and transportation of multiple victims, (d) recover the bodies, (e)manage the media, (f) coordinate the resources, (g) manage the donations and volunteers, (h) provide food and shelter for the displaced, and (i) maintain the safety and security of the community.

The historic data associated with the Oklahoma City Bombing demonstrated that a significant amount of coordination between government agencies and various community organizations took place throughout the recovery efforts but very few of those efforts were categorized as part of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy or emergency response plan (Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, 1996). In the aftermath as individuals returned to their day jobs, the lessons learned

regarding emergency response were adequately documented but there were very few recommendations regarding the establishment of long-term counter-terrorism programs or designed to build community resiliency against future terrorist threats. The only references to long-term resiliency were included in data regarding the continuation of mental health services for victims and first responders (Tucker, Pfefferbaum, Nitiéma, Wendling, and Brown, 2016).

Research indicates that there are several underlying factors that contribute to the recruitment, development, and participation of individuals when it comes to terrorism (Spalek, and Davies, 2012; Speckhard, 2012). Many of these factors need to be addressed in an integrated and systematic manner by several different agencies and organizations with expertise and special skill sets (e.g. mental health, educational institutes, language and cultural experts, family services, etc.) (White House, 2011a, 2011b) Two examples of current research include O'Sullivan, Kuziemsky, Toal-Sullivan and Corneil (2013) which found that the development of several interdependent connections in a community, promotes greater health resiliency throughout a disaster, in the period of recovery, and after a traumatic event. Their research suggests that these community networks are more effective if they are created and maintained prior to an emergency event (O'Sullivan, Kuziemsky, Toal-Sullivan and Corneil, 2013). In a second study, Robinson, Murphy, and Bies, (2014) found that early collaborative relationships between schools and nonprofit organizations such as the Red Cross can be effective in preparing for disasters and help schools address any concerns prior to an emergency event ensuring that school staff are aware of emergency management resources.

Despite all the historic knowledge and academic research available to Oklahoma City leaders, the survey findings indicate that the counter-terrorism planning efforts in Oklahoma City have not fully engaged the nongovernment organizations within the community to provide joint services. Among the 10 themes generated by a compilation of survey data, personal perceptions regarding official roles and potential legal barriers prevented government agencies from fully engaging nongovernment services within a counter-terrorism strategy to provide joint services. Communication was also cited as a barrier for nongovernment organizations. Many of the organizations who participated lacked an understanding of how they might engage in a counter-terrorism planning process. Survey data did not identify any collaborative efforts between government agencies and nongovernment agencies regarding the implementation of counter-terrorism joint services.

### Sub-Question 1

*What are strengths and weaknesses in having nongovernmental organizations provide education, information, and advice to government leaders to address ideologically based security threats?*

A compilation and analysis of historic records did not provide adequate data to answer sub-question 1. Analysis of survey data generated 10 themes that captured generalized perceptions regarding the research questions. Organization success was characterized as implementing lessons learned. Within the data set, "increased staff knowledge regarding ideological threats" was represented as a strength and ethical or

legal concerns was presented as weaknesses or impediments to inviting nongovernment organizations provide education, information or advice to government leaders. Reaching out to nongovernmental organizations to provide education, information, and advice was difficult for the study's government participants to fully embrace. There was consensus regarding nongovernment organizations having the right expertise but there was also hesitancy and disagreement as to how outside experts would engage within a counter-terrorism strategy. Some of the participants indicated that there may be political or legal ramification that needed to be considered prior to reaching out to experts. These concerns were not unfounded; the creation of counter-terrorism strategies can create ethical concerns and test the boundaries of legislation designed to protect human rights (DOJ, 2010; Vale, 2014; Whittaker, 2014). Rather than avoiding interaction with various nongovernment experts or religious leaders, government agencies have an opportunity to learn about diverse populations and create more inclusive community programs (Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2014).

Nongovernment data demonstrated a clear understanding of the significance of collaboration, however, a few of the responses also indicated that the participant was not confident about how they or their organization would participate in community emergency planning efforts or how their organization could support local government leaders in the event of a terrorist threat or an actual terrorist event. Individuals working in educational positions focused more heavily on sharing information and the learning aspects of a collaborative relationship. Individuals working in private business or

working in a non-profit that provided a specialized service were more willing to reach out to government leaders if they felt that the service could help in recovery efforts.

Organizations who focused specifically on community programs such as youth leaders or religious organizations were more likely to say they did not feel their organization should be involved in counter-terrorism planning or did not see a role in such planning for their organizations. These perceptions were consistent with some of the feelings expressed by government leaders as they related to religious organizations, however, counter-terrorism literature disagrees. Several recent studies support and encourage the use of experts or religious leaders to provide ideological and cultural training or to provide advice and inform community level counter-terrorism strategies (DOJ, 2010, Bures, 2013; Cheema, Scheyvens, Glavovic, and Imran, 2014). Due to the complexity involved in understanding the motivation behind terrorist acts, seeking the advice of experts becomes critical. A study by Thomsen, Obaidi, Sheehy-Skeffington, Kteily, & Sidanius (2014) found that differences in social constructs and belief systems allow individuals and groups to be more or less supportive of terrorism. By understanding how a specific culture or ethnic group interprets their place in a community and how they interpret terrorism as a viable method for shaping political outcomes, leaders may be able to adjust policies or create programs to address the needs of these communities. The creation of a counter-narrative has also been identified as an effective strategy for addressing radicalization (Braddock and Horgan, 2016). To be effective, counter-narratives and the communication plans used to distribute counter-narratives should be informed by experts to ensure the proper message is relayed.

Review of the study results identified several self-imposed constraints in which Oklahoma City leaders were not comfortable in seeking expert advice regarding ideological threats. The historic data regarding the Oklahoma City attack, did not provide an adequate amount of detailed information about government engagement with experts or nongovernmental organizations to fully answer sub-question 1. Survey data provided a few examples of ongoing community outreach that indicate the community is working to address informational shortfalls regarding ideological differences and partially answered sub-question 1. However, the analysis of data did not demonstrate a high level of engagement between government and nongovernment experts in the local community regarding the exchange of information, training, or advice related to ideologically based security threats.

### Sub-Research Question 2

*In what ways have collaboration between government and nongovernment agencies influenced community preparedness programs regarding multi-cultural and multi-lingual needs?*

A compilation and analysis of historic records did not provide adequate data to answer sub-question 2. Analysis of survey data generated 10 themes capturing generalized perceptions regarding the research questions. Organization success was characterized as implementing lessons learned as they relate to sub-question 2. Within the data set, the Oklahoma City Police Department was identified as having a multi-lingual recruitment and training program to address the multi-lingual needs in the community. Only meeting the needs of a few languages and not being comprehensive or widespread

were identified as barriers. A review of the survey data indicated that having multi-cultural and multi-lingual training would be useful but only one participant indicated that they have worked with community leaders to address the cultural needs of their clients. Unofficial roles were characterized by statements regarding the care and training of colleagues and staff. Several participants indicated that they would like to expand their staff training to include more multi-cultural awareness and ensure the needs of diverse populations are included in their emergency response plans. Analysis of nongovernment data also indicated that organizations often rely on multi-lingual staff to address some of the more diverse populations but also indicated that it was difficult to find staff with adequate translation skills for some of the uncommon languages.

Addressing cultural needs and language barriers in counter-terrorism planning is recommended throughout the terrorism and counter-terrorism literature Wickes, R., Zahnow, White, and Mazerolle (2014) found that ethnic differences influence how individuals interact and engage with their community. To assimilate fully in a community, individuals need to feel valued as a community member (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012; Basuchoudhary and Cotting, 2014). Including ethnically diverse populations in the planning stages and addressing their needs during an emergency event improves their ability to integrate and become a productive member of the community (DHS, 2015b; Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2014). Compiled survey data indicated support for nongovernment and private organizations providing specialized knowledge, unique language skillsets or additional cultural resources within community counter-terrorism plans. Several of the participants also indicated that their own

organizations would benefit from language assistance and cultural training with the leaders of non-English speaking populations in their community. Analysis of nongovernment data identified local colleges and universities as having language programs, with one participant indicating that some of the instructors or students might be able to assist with language translation in the event of an emergency. Consensus among both government and non-government participants revealed that multi-cultural and multi-lingual training would help leaders understand the needs of non-English speaking members of their community.

The study results answered sub-question 2, identifying the Oklahoma Police Department's multi-linguistic recruitment and training effort as a best practice in the community as it relates to addressing the needs of multi-cultural and multi-lingual members of the community. Additional language training programs were identified but were not directly connected to a counter-terrorism strategy.

Since the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the threat and cost of domestic terroristic attacks continues to grow (Giesecke, Burns, Barrett, Bayrak, rose, Slovic, and Suher, 2012). Several U.S. communities still hold to the mistaken conviction that it will never happen in their back yard. For these communities, preparing for a terrorist attack seems unpalatable and excessively expensive. Today communities no longer have the options to ignore terrorism threats. Federal and state laws have mandated community level planning and counter-terrorism training in support of national security and homeland defense plans (DHS, 2017). Unfortunately, many state and local city budgets have not accounted for the additional requirements. Communities that have received

counter-terrorism funding, tend to invest in increased law enforcement and security measures rather than viewing the problem systematically and investing in the educational and community resiliency programs that have been identified in the current counter-terrorism research. Since 2003 DHS has provided $36 billion in funding for state and local counter-terrorism efforts. The State of Oklahoma's Office of Homeland Security has received approximately $217 million in grant funding between the years of 1999 and 2012. A large majority of that money has been spent to support various emergency response and law enforcement enhancements, while a very limited amount (approx. $2 million) has been allocated to social and community-based programs that target the underlying behavioral issues and the social grievances that have been cited in the court records of convicted terrorists (State of Oklahoma, 2017)

## Limitations

Terrorism and counter-terrorism is a very difficult topic for community leaders to discuss for various reasons. The most significant limitation of this study was that it is focused on a single mid-western community with a population of approximately 500,000; potentially limiting the transferability of the results to other communities. Despite sending 179 invitations to potential participants, a small percentage of the Oklahoma City community was willing to participate in the study and provide information about their organizations' role in counter-terrorism planning. Without a larger portion of the community willing to participate in counter-terrorism research or willing to incorporate best practices in their own community planning efforts, the topic will remain under researched. The case study's qualitative design and structured data collection

methodology only focused on publicly accessible data between 1995 and 2015, and on

the personal accounts of voluntary study participants, limiting data sources to only

information that was adequately recorded, made publicly available, or voluntarily

provided. The results of the study provided a lot of historic data but due to the amount of

time that had passed between the 1995 event and current counter-terrorism planning

efforts, the initial lessons learned had all but fade into the archives. The final limitations

of this study reflect the boundaries set by my personal biases as a result of my

educational and professional career. These biases unintentionally influenced how the data

was collected, which sources of data were chosen for inclusion and examination, and how

the data was coded and interpreted in relation to the study questions.

## Recommendations

Due to the persistent threat of terrorist activity at the local level, additional

research and ongoing community level planning is essential. Much of the current research

and lessons learned reside on government and university databases or have been buried

within the local file systems owned by the respective emergency management agencies. It

is critical for counter-terrorism research and lessons learned information to be shared

with community leaders who create local policies, maintain community security, enforce

existing laws and provide emergency response services (Ursano, Fullerton, and Norwood,

2003; Fedorowicz, Sawyer, Williams, Markus, Dias, Tyworth, and Schrier, 2014; Valcik,

and Tracy, 2017). In addition to having access to research and after-action information,

there is a need to ensure that both government and nongovernment leaders understand

which organizations in their communities have the resources and the special skill sets

needed to address counter-terrorism in a comprehensive and collaborative manner; to include meeting the needs of unique or underserved populations (Wickes, Zahnow, White, and Mazerolle, 2014; Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2014).

Since September 11, 2001 there have been additional high-level terrorist attacks around the world. Protecting communities from future attacks requires extensive intelligence collection capabilities, additional law enforcement resources, and additional emergency response personnel and equipment to prevent and address each threat or event (White House, 2011b). In addition, nations are expending a tremendous amount of resources on securing their borders and fighting terrorist networks with military operations in foreign lands all to keep these networks in their home countries and prevent domestic terrorist events. Although these efforts are having an impact they are not a systematic solution. We must continue to prepare and strengthen our communities (White House, 2011a; Egli, 2013). Continuing to study these events through the lens of multiple disciplines will create a more comprehensive understanding of factors that have been shown to increase terroristic behavior (Wormeli, 2014). In addition, we need to expand our understanding of social programs that may address those factors at an early stage before individuals become disaffected and lash out at their community or before they become volunteers or recruitment targets for violent terrorist cells (Bergen, Hoffman, and Tiedemann, 2011; White House, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c).

**Implications for Social Change**

Results of the study provide an opportunity for Oklahoma City to reflect on historic and current best practices as they relate to emergency management planning and

community resiliency. The choice to use a combination of social constructivism and systems thinking theories provided a flexible and comprehensive framework to collect and interpret the data. Using a thick description collection process also allowed the researcher to explore the historical records through the individual experiences and perceptions as they related to a shared community experience. This provided the researcher with an opportunity to gain a clearer picture of how each member of the community was initially impacted by the event and how they moved from victim to volunteer as the city recovered. The insight provided by each survey participant and the compiled observations identified best practices and some gaps in current collaborative relationships that will inform other communities that are dealing with their own terrorist event or those beginning the initial counter-terrorism planning stages. Promoting more dialogue at the community level and encouraging the community to get involved in a comprehensive plan that focuses on prevention, response, and healing will improve community resiliency and develop a sense of shared responsibility among the community's citizens. Sharing the identified best practices and acknowledging the potential opportunities for improvement may also promote positive social change by assisting other communities as they build resiliency against ideological grievances and create their own community terrorism response plans.

**Conclusions**

After the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing the citizens came together to rescue and heal each other. Since that time, several terroristic events have occurred in various communities in the U.S. and around the world. Increased mobility and advancements in

communication technologies will continue to allow individuals and organizations to share grievances, insight anger, recruit followers, and act upon ideological grievances (Smith, Burke, de Leiuen, and Jackson, 2016). Such grievances are bolstered by political and social exclusion through poorly designed policies and ineffective government structures (Akram, and Karmely, 2005; Levine, Leenman, Gershenson, and Hureau, 2014; Oberman, 2017).

Sharing the identified best practices and acknowledging potential opportunities for improvement assists other communities as they build resiliency and create their community response plans. Government leaders need the knowledge provided by nongovernmental experts and broad community engagement to create early intervention programs and establish effective terrorism response strategies.

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Appendix A: Structured Survey Questions for Government Leaders

1.) How and why has your organization collaborated with other government agencies or the local community to provide joint services?

2.) How have domestic terrorism and the threat of future acts of terrorism influenced or changed how Oklahoma City provides for public safety and builds long-term community resiliency?

3.) Do you feel that nongovernment organizations are appropriate for providing education, information, and advice to government leaders to address ideologically based security threats? Why?

4.) How has collaboration between government and nongovernment agencies influenced community preparedness programs regarding multi-cultural and multi-lingual needs?

5.) What have city government officials done to develop strategic plans for responding to and recovering from terrorist threats or terrorist activities?

6.) What has been the level of collaboration across or within government agencies to develop strategic plans and maintain community resiliency in response to terrorist threats or activities in their communities?

7.) What has been the level of government collaboration with nongovernmental organizations, private businesses and community leaders to develop strategic plans and maintain community resiliency in response to terrorist threats or activities in their communities?

Appendix B: Structured Survey for Nongovernment Leaders

1.) How and why has your organization collaborated with other government agencies or the local community to provide joint services?

2.) How have domestic terrorism and the threat of future acts of terrorism influenced or changed how Oklahoma City provides for public safety and builds long-term community resiliency?

3.) Do you feel that nongovernment organizations are appropriate for providing education, information, and advice to government leaders to address ideologically based security threats? Why?

4.) How has collaboration between government and nongovernment agencies influenced community preparedness programs regarding multi-cultural and multi-lingual needs?

5.) What have nongovernment leaders done to assist with the development of strategic plans for responding to and recovering from terrorist threats or terrorist activities?

6.) What has been the level of collaboration across or within nongovernment agencies to develop strategic plans and maintain community resiliency in response to terrorist threats or activities in their communities?

7.) What has been the level of government collaboration with nongovernmental organizations, private businesses and community leaders to develop strategic plans and maintain community resiliency in response to terrorist threats or activities in their communities?