

2017

The Impact of Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace

Joe Lambongang
Walden University

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Walden University

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Joe Lambongang

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2017

Abstract

The Impact of Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace

by

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MA, University of Ghana, 1990

B. SC, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and technology, 1988

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

August 2017

Abstract

Ethnic conflicts persist in Ghana despite the efforts of governments to resolve them. Governments are increasingly concerned not only about their massive human rights abuses and wide-scale destruction of property that characterize these conflicts, but also the difficulty of resolving them and restoring permanent peace. The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to provide a deeper understanding of the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice implemented in Dagbon after war broke out in 2002 and explore the conditions under which these initiatives can be more effective in resolving the conflict and maintain peace. Data were collected through individual interviews, focus group discussions, and review of documents. Thirteen participants were purposively selected from communities, chiefs, and representatives of civil society organizations. Focus groups consisted of four men and four women. NVivo was used to manage and analyze the data. Data were analyzed using the theory of protracted social conflict as a lens and the concept of transitional justice as the conceptual foundation. The findings showed that a mixture of formal retributive and restorative initiatives was implemented. These were imposed on informal institutions and rules more deeply rooted in Dagbon. The institutions also suffered undue pressure from both government and elite of Dagbon which made peacebuilding difficult. A recommendation was made for government to strengthen the Dagbon Traditional Council to lead the conflict resolution process using traditional approaches, and identify and empower a credible civil society group to facilitate the process. The results could potentially change the way the conflict resolution initiatives have been conceptualized and managed in future.

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my mother, Madam Mokbia Lambongang, who out of nothing, managed to see me through my education. Mother, you ensured I got everything I needed and above all, inspired me to strive to be the best in life. Yet you did not live to enjoy the fruits of your labour. Rest in peace!!

Acknowledgments

Many people have contributed to the success of this study. First, I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Gloria Billingsley, for her patience and encouragement throughout the study. You have not only been patient but also knowledgeable and inspiring throughout the study. I would always remember and appreciate the support of Dr. Anthony Leisner, my committee member for his invaluable comments and support throughout the process. You challenged me to do better and I appreciate the final outcome. I would also like to acknowledge the support of Dr. Richard Box and Dr. George Kieh University Reviewers at various stages, for their tremendous support in getting this study to this level. I will forever remain indebted to both of you for your guidance.

To my wife and children, I say thank you for allowing me to pursue my dream and for using some of the family resources for this study. My wife Mrs Hannah Lambongang has been a pillar of support throughout. Thank you for standing by me and for all the sacrifices you had to go through because of this study. You stayed awake with me, prayed with and for me, and above all empathized with me when things were tough. For these, I say may God bless you!!

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Introduction

West Africa is generally a region characterized by violent and protracted conflicts. Conflicts have become a recurring decimal in West Africa (Tembo, 2012; Annan, 2014; Tonah, 2012) with devastating effects on the economies and lives of the people in the sub-region (Oluwadare, 2014; Stareike, 2013). Choi and Raleigh (2015) have categorized conflicts into three forms: “civil wars, political militia, and riots” (p. 158). According to Tonah (2012), whichever way we classify these conflicts and regardless of their causes, what is clear is that there are ethnic dimensions and undertones in most of them. In some parts of West Africa such as in Mali, Nigeria, and Niger, conflicts have had ethno-political undertones (Annan, 2014). The worrying part of the story of conflicts in West Africa is that countries that have been described as generally peaceful are masked by what Annan (2014, p.1) described as “low intensity conflicts” which are both ethnic and recurrent in nature (Noagah, 2013; Sulemana, 2009; Aikins, 2009). In Ghana, the Dagbon, Konkomba-Nanumba and Kusasi-Manprusi conflicts are examples whilst in Senegal, the conflict in the Cassamance region is another of such low intensity conflicts.

There is growing knowledge about the causes of ethnic conflicts in West Africa. Whereas these differ from one conflict to another, there is agreement in literature that ethnic rivalry introduced into the body politic of Africa is the root cause. These are then aggravated by other causes including conflict over land, chieftaincy succession, politics and disagreement over resources (Lund & Boone, 2013; Noagah, 2013; Tonah, 2012;

Kaye & Beland, 2009). Annan (2014, p.5) identified additional causes to include poverty, ethnic marginalization, corruption and human rights violations. Wherever they occur and in whatever nature they assume, conflicts have devastating effects on national economies and on the lives of citizens of such countries. Ujeke (2008) and Oluwadare (2014) for example reported that in 1990, Heads of State and government in Africa declared that conflicts are hindering the efforts of African governments to effectively deal with the continent's economic development; for which reason the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was established in 1993. Development effort is often sacrificed in favor of conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

The response to conflict situations may take a number of forms depending on its nature and scope. In many countries, following violent conflicts, governments deploy military personnel to stop the arson and killings often associated with them. This initial measure is often accompanied by some arrests and detentions of those thought to be the perpetrators of the conflict. In some cases, Commissions of Enquiries are set up as a next step to investigate the causes and recommend solutions to government. Where massive human rights violations are involved, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission might be established. Whereas government strategies focus mostly on calming down the conflict and resolving them, civil society's focus is on relief and peacebuilding (Kaye, 2011). There is evidence from literature that these measures that are often put in place by government and supported by civil society, do not achieve the intended peace and the conflict keeps recurring (Noagah, 2013; Tonah, 2012; Longi, 2014). These and other studies have been reviewed in chapter 2. Whereas there is increasing knowledge about

the causes and effects of these conflicts, not much has been done in Ghana to understand the conditions under which these measures might work to restore lasting peace. This dissertation aimed to fill this gap.

Background to the Problem

Although Ghana is known among the international community to be a peaceful democratic country, her relative peace is threatened by numerous violent ethnic conflicts which are persistent and protracted in nature (Annan, 2014; Tonah, 2012; Aikins, 2009). Langer (2009) and Lentz (2010) reported that Ghana's post-colonial history is characterized by repeated ethnic tensions especially in the Northern part of the country. The Northern part of Ghana, home to about seventeen ethnic groups (Jonsson, 2009), is the region that has the most of these ethnic conflicts (Aikins, 2009; Kaye, 2010; Kaye & Beland, 2009). Some of the known conflicts in the Northern Region include the Nanumba-Konkomba, Nawuri-Gonja, the Dagbon (intra ethnic involving the Adanis and Abudus) and the Bimoba-Konkomba conflicts (Asefa, 2009; Tonah, 2012).

Ethnic conflicts are of two kinds: inter-ethnic which occurs between two ethnic groups, such as the Nanumbas and the Konkombas, Kusasis and Manprusis; and intra ethnic which is between rival sections of the same ethnic group such as the "Abudus" and "Andanis" of the Dagomba ethnic group (popularly referred to as the Dagbon conflict) in the Dagomba traditional area. One important characteristic of ethnic conflicts in Northern Ghana is that they persist for a long time, recurring after the slight trigger (Aikins, 2009; Tonah, 2012; Annan, 2014). The Dagbon conflict for example has recurred several times

over the last ten years (Kaye & Beland, 2009; Tonah, 2012) but that of 2002 was the most violent.

A review of literature reveals several reasons which explain the causes and frequent recurrence of ethnic conflicts. These include disagreements over land and other natural resources (Lentz, 2010; Jonsson, 2009, Langer, 2009); greed and structural ineptitude (Okoro, 2010, Jonsson, 2009), poverty (Kaye, 2011; Okoro, 2010; Annan, 2014) and conflict of formal and informal institutions exacerbated by party politics (Aikins, 2009; Kaye & Beland, 2009; Tonah, 2012, Azuimah, 2010). A few think that the deliberate policy of the colonial administration to invest in the resource rich southern part of Ghana created horizontal inequalities, and when these coincide with cultural differences, it can lead to tension and provide material for conflict narratives (Langer, 2009; Jonsson, 2009).

The approach to conflict resolution in the region has been mixed. Governments' first reaction to armed ethnic conflict has always been to send the military to enforce peace (Tonah, 2012, Aikins, 2009; Kaye, 2011). In some cases, the detachment of military men stays in the conflict area for as long as one year and is progressively replaced by police men. In the Bawku Traditional area for example, Noagah (2013) reported that there is now a permanent military base there because of the recurrent and violent nature that the Kusasi-Manprusi conflict has become. Whilst these strategies are being implemented, some of the protagonists or "ring leaders" of the conflict are arrested and detained in the regional capital.

In some cases, a Commission of Enquiry is set up to investigate the causes and make recommendations for action (Kaye, 2011; Kaye & Beland, 2009). For large scale conflicts such as the Dagbon one for example, a permanent Peace Negotiation Team was put in place to work out permanent peace (Kaye & Beland, 2009; Tonah, 2012). The focus of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in conflict management has been on providing effective emergency response and peacebuilding (Kaye, 2011; Kaye & Beland, 2009). There is a combination of retributive and restorative processes and strategies at play but these efforts do not yield lasting peace and before long, hostilities resume after a small provocation (Tonah, 2012; Aikins, 2009). The question then is why the transitional justice initiatives fail to achieve lasting peace? Menkel-Meadow (2004) explained that in states that have witnessed large scale conflicts (like Sierra Leone and Liberia), the conventional law, legal and restorative processes are often inadequate to meet the human needs and interests inherent in the conflict situations due to severely weakened and ineffective judicial systems. He therefore argues for the justice system to develop various kinds of processes and institutions which he refers to as “process pluralism” (p.8). In communal conflicts such as those that occur in the Northern part of Ghana often with massive human rights violations, why are the retributive and restorative systems and processes unable to resolve the conflicts and restore permanent peace?

Research conducted so far on conflicts have focused on the causes of conflicts (see Aikins, 2009; Kaye & Beland, 2009; Tonah, 2012) and a few on challenges of reconciliation and peacebuilding (Kaye, 2010; Sowatey, 2005; Nwauche, 2010; Aikins, 2009). To date however, with the noticeable exceptions of Noagah’s (2013) work on the

conflict between Manprusis and Kusasis in the Bawku traditional area in the Upper East Region of Ghana, there is no explanation in literature as to why these ethnic conflicts remain unresolved for generations. Annan (2014) argued that one reason for this may be that administrators fail to understand the fundamental causes of the conflicts in the first place. If the mechanisms for conflict resolution and restoration are effective, we should see the return to normal lasting peace in the warring communities after peace accords have been signed by both groups. A study to understand the conditions under which restorative and retributive mechanisms might be successful in restoring peace might offer some explanations why most of the conflicts persist. This study sought to fill this gap.

Statement of the Problem

There is a problem with the persisting ethnic conflict in the Dagbon Traditional Area. Despite the measures put in place by government and non-governmental organizations after peace accords, the conflict has persisted for over fifty years now (Tonah, 2012; Aikins, 2009; Kaye & Beland, 2009). The resumption of armed conflict in 2002 was the most violent and destructive (Anamzoyah, 2014; Tonah, 2012). In March 2006, a peace agreement was reached between the two feuding gates (the Andanis and the Abudus) and a roadmap for peace signed (Tonah, 2012). Following this, several strategies were put in place to resolve the conflict and restore peace in Dagbon but these have not been successful (Tonah, 2012; Kaye, 2011) in restoring permanent peace.

The conflict has had a negative impact on the governance of the area. The 2002 conflict for example led to the resignation of two ministers and the National Security Advisor (Tonah, 2012). As Sulemana (2009) explained, conflict is development in

reverse and the total impact of conflicts in Northern Region cannot be quantified. The 2002 Dagbon conflict alone claimed the life of the paramount King of Dagbon and over 30 of his elders (Sowatey, 2005; Tonah, 2012) and over 4 billion Ghanaian cedis (approximately \$1.25 billion) was spent in less than a year on peace enforcement (Sowatey, 2005 p.108).

According to Kaye (2011) and Aikins (2009) a combination of retributive and restorative processes may be at play. The central question then is what conditions might respond most favorably to transitional justice strategies in Dagbon? A possible cause of this might be that the nature of transitional justice strategies might not be appropriate. Jonsson (2009) explained that the peacebuilding experience in Northern Ghana in general has not been well studied, so a lot of questions remain unanswered. Some studies mention the Dagbon conflict as part of an historical account of causes of conflicts in Northern Ghana in general (Lentz, 2006; Sowatey, 2005; Annan, 2014) and quite a few focus on some aspects of the Dagbon conflict such as the nature and causes (Aikins, 2009; Jonsson, 2009; Tonah, 2012); whilst others focus on the impact of politics on chieftaincy related conflicts (Tonah, 2012) and the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during conflict and in peacebuilding (Kaye, 2011; Kaye & Beland, 2009). Noagah's (2013) study is the only one that examined the effectiveness of retributive and restorative strategies but its focus is on the Manprusi - Kusasi conflict in the Bawku Traditional Area in a different region in Ghana. The experiences in Noagah's (2013) study is that of an inter-ethnic conflict, different from the Dagbon one which is intra-ethnic. Therefore, whereas these studies document the nature and causes of the persistent Dagbon conflict,

there is a gap in knowledge about the conditions that might respond appropriately to transitional justice strategies. Until these are known and applied, there will be continuous loss of lives and property due to recurring conflicts, and administrators will continue to invest huge sums of money into managing them at the expense of much needed investment in development. Perhaps a qualitative study on this could provide answers to help remedy the situation.

Research Questions

The central research question is: what conditions might respond most favorably to transitional justice strategies in the Dagbon Traditional Area? The sub-questions include:

Sub-Q1. What is the nature of the strategies for transitional justice implemented after the 2006 peace accord?

Sub-Q2. What are the challenges associated with these strategies?

Sub-Q3. What might help to make the strategies more responsive to peacebuilding?

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to provide a deeper understanding of the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice in the Dagbon Traditional Area.

The objective was to examine the nature, effectiveness and appropriateness of the mechanisms for justice and peace building with the view to understanding how these explain the persistence of the conflict in Dagbon.

Significance of the Study

In their contribution to the definition of social change, Callahan *et al* (2012) explained that social change can be looked at in terms of processes and product.

According to them, based on their values or ethical principles, the scholar-practitioner identifies a problem and engages in a scholarly research to find answers to it. Through this process, society is engaged to think critically and in a systematic manner in collaboration with other actors. The process, according to Callahan *et al* (2012), produces knowledge which then becomes the basis for citizen engagement, advocacy, and contributes to positive social change.

In this context, the significance of this study lies in its potential to facilitate an understanding of the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice and how these impact on the resolution of conflicts and the maintenance of peace. The knowledge that might be gained through this study might be helpful to administrators in their quest to deal with conflicts in Ghana.

The Northern Regional Administration might be the first potential beneficiary of this study. Currently, the Regional Administration spends a third of their annual budget to maintain peace in the Dagbon Traditional Area (Sowatey, 2005). The result of this study could potentially be the starting point in the search for a lasting solution to the protracted conflict. Administrators are also always interested in value for money and policy effectiveness (O'Sullivan, Russel & Berner, 2008). This study could help to identify what might be required to put the issue on the agenda of the Northern Regional Administration and the policy options to take. If the feuding gates of Dagbon, civil society and the administrators are well engaged to think and reflect on the issue, employing all the skills they can possibly gather, a solution might be found.

Theoretical Framework

This study was guided by the concept of transitional justice, understood as “an attempt to build a sustainable peace after conflict, mass violence or systemic human rights abuse” (van Zyl, 2005 p.209). As van Zyl (2005) further explained, intra-state conflicts, like the Dagbon conflict, require post-conflict peacekeeping and development effort even though they may not have engulfed the entire nation. This is because of the immense human suffering; massive human rights abuses, destruction and deaths associated with such conflicts. These are in the domain of transitional justice.

A theory that might help enhance our understanding of the impacts of transitional justice on peace is the protracted social conflict (PSC) theory by Edward Azar. Edward Azar’s (1978) theory of protracted social conflict (PSC) was developed to explain conflict situations that exhibit violent and protracted tendencies by communal groups as they compete for recognition, equitable and fair access to resources and power. Azar explained that when identity-driven groups perceive that their identity is threatened and hence feel vulnerable; this perceived vulnerability is exacerbated when state machinery is dominated by a group who deny others basic human rights and needs. Azar put forward four conditions as the predominant sources of protracted social conflict which include communal content, deprivation of basic human needs, governance and the role of the state, and international relations (Azar, 1978).

The utility of PSC in this study lies in its appeal in helping to understand and explain prevalent patterns of the Dagbon conflict as well as its dynamics, whether overt or covert, violent or non-violent. These were essential in this study because it helped in

understanding the appropriateness of the strategies for resolving conflicts and maintaining peace. Interestingly, the Dagbon conflict exhibits characteristics of both overt and covert conflicts (Aikins, 2009; Kaye, 2011; Tonah, 2012) of PSC.

Definition of Terms

Transitional justice-- this is used to refer to “the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented... in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses” (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009 p. 2). Accordingly, transitional justice includes the right to know the truth of what happened, a right to reparations and assurances of non-recurrence (Sandoval, 2014; Tietel, 2015).

Transitional justice strategies-- include arrests, detentions and trials through courts and tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions, commissions of enquiry, reparation programs, and amnesty among others.

Retributive justice-- the practice of using the court system to try and punish violations of human rights abuses where applicable. As van Prooijen and Coffeng (2013) described it, the aim here is for victims to have the sense that “fair and appropriate punishment, commensurate with the severity of the transgression” (p.384). Arrests, trials, detentions and other forms of sanctions are some elements of retributive justice mechanisms.

Conflict settlement—This study adopted the definition of Riemann (2004) that conflict settlement refers to “all outcome oriented strategies for achieving sustainable win-win solutions and/or putting an end to direct violence, without necessarily addressing the underlying causes of conflict” (p.8)

Conflict resolution—involves ways and means through which a disagreement or conflict among feuding parties is facilitated to a peaceful end. It therefore goes beyond settlement to address the root causes of the conflict and the strategies are normally non-coercive.

Peace building—initiatives implemented aimed at preventing conflicts from getting started or resumed.

Ethnic conflict—A conflict between groups of people with different or the same linguistic background or tribe. If it is between two different tribes, it is an inter-ethnic conflict and if it is between groups of people within the same tribe, it is intra-ethnic. The Dagbon conflict is an example of the latter.

Assumptions, Limitations, Scope, and Delimitations

1. The study was limited to the transitional justice processes and tools implemented after the outbreak of hostilities between the Andanis and Abudus in March 2002, for which a peace accord was signed in 2006.
2. The study relied on information from people/organizations with experience from the 2006 Dagbon conflict. Identifying such people to serve as participants in the study was not easy. It was necessary to seek the help of a credible organization that had worked in the study area to help in identifying potential participants.
3. Identifying the truth in a post conflict situation is always challenging. For this reason and in keeping with the constructionist tradition, it was important to explore multiple sources of information and strengthen the confidentiality clause during interviews to make people comfortable enough to disclose information.

4. The results of this study are limited to the Dagbon experience only. Other ethnic conflicts across the region are not within this study.
5. Data was originally planned to be collected from individuals, chiefs, representatives of civil society organizations who worked in the area during the time of the conflict, as well as representatives of security agencies who were in the area at the time of the conflict. However, during the survey, no member of the security agency passed the inclusion criteria. Therefore, no member of the security agencies was interviewed.
6. Results may not be generalized to cover other conflicts in the region. This is because the conditions that might favour the Dagbon conflict might not be appropriate for others. This study focused on filling the knowledge gap about the conditions that might favour the successful implementation of transitional justice strategies. The next chapter focuses on a review of relevant literature which will set the theoretical foundations for the study. Chapter three outlines the design, and methods of the study. Chapters four and five are dedicated to presentation of research results, discussion and conclusion respectively.

Summary of Chapter One

West Africa is a conflict-prone region. Although Ghana is relatively peaceful, ethnic conflicts which are protracted in nature are threatening this peace. Most of these conflicts, ethnic in nature, are violent and involve loss of lives, property and massive human rights violations. Although governments and civil

society groups invest time and resources to resolve these conflicts and maintain peace, their efforts have largely been unsuccessful.

Research has shown that quite a lot of scholarly effort has gone into identifying the causes of conflicts but not on understanding why transitional justice strategies do not seem to yield lasting peace. This qualitative study sought to fill this knowledge gap using the Dagbon conflict in the Northern Region as a case study. In the next chapter, scholarly work on conflicts, and the measures implemented to resolve them are presented and analysed. The extent of knowledge on this subject is examined and the research gap established as well as the appropriate methods of investigation determined and presented.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

Ethnic conflicts in Ghana are both recurring and protracted in nature. According to Tonah (2012) and Annan (2014) these conflicts often defy the measures and resources that government and civil society groups invest in resolving them. As scarce resources continue to be spent on these conflicts, there is pressure on governments to resolve them permanently to free resources for much needed development work. To date, there is no clarity on what measures might work and the conditions under which they would achieve peace in post-conflict environments. The purpose of this study was to provide a deeper understanding of how the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice have impacted the Dagbon peace process after the peace accord was signed in March 2006. The main aim was to understand the conditions under which transitional justice might achieve their stated objectives of resolving the conflict and maintaining lasting peace.

This chapter reviews the concept of transitional justice as well as the theory of protracted social conflict (PSC) both of which form the theoretical and conceptual foundations of this study. The chapter also evaluates scholarly resources on the nature, causes and impacts of ethnic conflicts and the associated transitional justice processes and mechanisms employed to resolve them. The analysis of causes and impacts of ethnic conflicts served as a background to understanding the various responses to these conflicts which are also reviewed in this chapter.

The chapter begins with an analysis of the research strategy employed for the review of literature so as to assist in any future attempts to retrieve resources used during

the review. The review begins with a description of conflicts and the response to resolving them at the level of Africa before the situation in West Africa and Ghana are presented and analyzed. Following this, a review of the concepts of transitional justice and the theory of protracted social conflict (PSC) is done to shed light on their meaning and relevance within the context of this study. This is followed by a presentation of scholarly work on the nature, causes and impacts of conflicts. The responses of government and civil society organizations are then analyzed, synthesized and presented. The chapter ends with a summary of key themes running through literature and their implications for this study.

Research Strategy

Literature was reviewed using Walden University data bases, mostly Thoreau, Academic Search Complete, SAGE Premier, Political Science Complete, Dissertations and Theses. Occasionally, I used Google Scholar to locate resources from which I sorted relevant articles using filters such as “Africa”, “West Africa”, “Ghana”, and “ethnic”. The search for scholarly work was done using the key words: “conflicts”, “transitional justice”, “peacebuilding”, “transformative peacebuilding”, “conflict resolution”, and “conflict settlement”. The Walden Dissertations were particularly used as a source of locating relevant resources. Using Google search engine, I managed to locate some relevant work but accessing most of the peer reviewed articles located through this source was limited as most host libraries required permission (which I did not have) to access their information. Therefore, the content of this literature review is limited to information found in Walden University data base mostly and to a limited extent, open libraries.

Jonsson (2009) wrote that in Ghana, the peacebuilding experience has not been properly studied and documented. This was found to be true as there was very little current scholarly work on the subject. Therefore, I decided to expand the search to include experiences from other African countries on conflicts and the mechanisms that were employed in their resolution. The time frame within which articles were included was 2000. The other inclusion criterion for such scholarly work was that they must have involved multi-country experiences.

Concepts of Transitional Justice

The concept of transitional justice became prominent in the late 1980s and 1990s (Tietel, 2015; Sandoval, 2014) as a response to gross human rights violations committed by mostly government and the security agencies in some parts of the world. Human rights groups and civil society organizations saw the need to fight impunity and demand accountability, and found an answer to this through human rights and other international law (Sandoval, 2014; Tietel, 2015). Tietel (2015, p.389) traced the rise of transitional justice to the demand for accountability resulting from the phenomenon of disappearances in Latin America. Others like Clara Sandoval (2014, p.181) have associated the emergence of transitional justice with the need for social change in societies that have experienced decades of massive human rights violations. They argued that unless the truth about such massive violations were told, some forms of reparations offered to victims and guarantees given that those violations will never recur, there would

be no reconciliation, lasting peace and democracy (Sandoval, 2014; Mendez, 1997; International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009).

Although there are several views that explain the meaning and scope of concept of transitional justice, I find the definition proffered by the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) most appropriate for this study. ICTJ (2009) has defined transitional justice as:

the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to address the legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparation programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms (ICTJ, 2009 p.2).

From this definition, transitional justice is an approach (ICTJ, 2009; Sandoval, 2014) to achieving justice as society transitions from conflict to a stable and more democratic one where the rule of law is supreme. Accordingly, the elements of a comprehensive transitional policy include criminal prosecution, reparations (where society takes steps to recognize the harms that people have suffered and address them), institutional reform, truth and reconciliation commissions (ICTJ, 2009; Tietel, 2015; Okimoto, Wenzel & Feather, 2012).

The contributions of scholars like Okimoto, Wenzel and Feather (2012), Christie (1977) and van Prooijen and Coffeng (2013) have helped in having a clearer understanding of how the concept of transitional justice can be applied in post conflict justice processes and mechanisms to achieve the desired impact of lasting peace. According to Okimoto, Wenzel and Feather (2012), justice can be viewed from two perspectives: from the perspective of what is done to address the harm suffered by the

victim, or retributive justice, and from the perspective of restoration, or restorative justice. Okimoto, Wenzel and Feather (2012) further explained that people who hold the view of justice as being retributive perceive justice as “the unilateral imposition of just deserts against the defender” (p.255). To them, unless an equal measure of punishment is given to offenders, justice cannot be deemed to be served (see Forsythe, 2011; Sirleaf, 2014). Brickhouse’s (2014, p.194) work on corrective justice espoused this view where he argued for the equalization of goods or evils for the parties involved. The restorative school of thought, on the other hand, views justice as “achieving a renewed consensus about shared values violated by the offender” (Okimoto, Wenzel & Feather, 2012 p. 255). This differentiation is important because it helps in understanding and clarifying the expectations and perceptions of victims about the justice system as society tries to resolve conflicts and build peace. As Christie (1977) demonstrated in her work, ignoring the expectations of victims in the transitional justice processes not only robs them of their rights but also jeopardizes the chances of success in such peace building processes. The works of Christie (1977) and Okimoto, Wenzel and Feather (2012) further showed that restorative mechanisms that offer both victims and offenders the opportunity to discuss, explain and collectively resolve issues and perceived violations and arrive at middle grounds, with emphasis on healing and mending relationships, are generally more preferred by crime victims. Van Prooijen and Coffeng (2013) however sounded a caution which is worth considering in transitional justice processes. They posited that in the case where society has negatively stereotyped some ethnic groups, victims tend to expect more severe punishment for offenders who belong to such ethnic groups. Negatively

stereotyping some ethnic groups might also affect how evidence is evaluated in a post-conflict peace process and further influence the way society and security agencies handle potential threats in a conflict situation as demonstrated by the work of Correll, Park, Judd and Wittenbrink (2002). This means that as society seeks to build peace, objectivity, especially in gathering evidence and punishing offenders, is important for there to be acceptance and lasting peace. A holistic approach to transitional justice has been suggested by scholars because to them, in most cases, the scale of human rights violations is too large and complex to be dealt with effectively by one single mechanism (Sirleaf, 2014; Forsythe, 2011).

In a guidance note on transitional justice, the United Nations (2010) explained that the frontiers of transitional justice have been expanded and practitioners are now increasingly interested in issues such as those that characterize ethnic conflicts, including ethnic cleansing, reconciliation among communities, massive human rights violations and reparations among others. Therefore, an understanding of the nature and challenges of transitional justice processes and mechanisms will be relevant in understanding why the Dagbon conflict persists despite the efforts to resolve it since the 2002 outbreak of hostilities. The United Nations (2008) has recommended that to understand the transitional justice needs of a post-conflict environment; the necessary starting point should be an assessment of the causes of the underlying conflict among other measures. The following section is therefore devoted to understanding the causes of conflicts before the responses to them are synthesized and presented.

Theoretical Framework

Theories play an important role in qualitative studies. According to Creswell (2009), theories are used as an “overall lens” (p.62) in several ways including guiding the researcher in determining the issues in the study that are important, how to position oneself in the study, and how to organize and present the final report. In the following sections, Edward Azar’s (1978) theory of Protracted Social Conflict is examined as part of the theoretical foundations of the study.

Protracted Social Conflict Theory

Based on the extensive studies he conducted in Palestine, Edward Azar came up with the theory of protracted social conflict. Edward Azar (1978) theorized that conflicts that are often protracted and violent are a representation of struggles for “basic needs such as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation” (p.93). He attributed persistent conflicts mainly to the need for groups to preserve their identities. He argued that where, by accident of history and colonial policy, some groups are recognized as a source of power, and others alienated from it, it leads to domination and subsequently deprivation if no conscious attempts are made to even out power inequalities. Deprived groups begin to mobilize to not only preserve their identities, but also to fight to improve their collective access to basic needs and power within the community. To Azar, deprivation is caused by a myriad of factors that are related to each other in a complex way, including a weak role played by the state

as well as the pattern of international linkages. Azar (1990) identified three phases that characterize protracted social conflicts. These are the “Genesis, Process dynamics and Outcome analysis” (p.12) phases. The genesis stage is characterized by four variables, and is the stage where otherwise non-conflictual situations develop into violence. One characteristic of this stage is where the state is dominated by one group, with access to power and resources limited to this group. Azar explained that this is usually due to historical and other reasons, but if no attempt is made to reconcile and integrate the other groups in society, strains in relationships result and eventually leads to fragmentation, communal discontent, and protracted social conflicts. Associated with communal content is the need for those deprived communities to access human needs which are seldom evenly or equitably met in such polarized societies. Access to basic needs is both physical and non-physical and includes the access to political institutions and the recognition of existence. The last two characteristics of the first phase is a group’s use of its access to resources to dominate other groups, and the extent to which internal policy in a state is dictated by international linkages.

Given the characteristics of protracted social conflicts mentioned in the first phase, only a trigger is usually enough to generate a violent conflict. Azar categorizes this as the process dynamics stage of PSC. He identifies communal actions and strategies or simple triggers of conflict (for example, a fight over cows leading to the Cow War), and how the state responds to the grievances of aggrieved marginalized communities (such as repression) as key factors in this stage.

The final stage in Azar's typology of PSC is the stage of outcome analysis. At this stage, Azar explained that protracted social conflicts are distinguished by their result—negative outcomes with no end of the conflict in sight, neither is there any winner nor is there a solution. Other distinguishing features of PSC as identified by Azar (1978) include the fact that no clear line can be drawn between internal and external sources and actors involved in the conflict; it is impossible to identify start and end times; and there are usually varied causes and actors.

PSC has been applied in many studies with various levels of scholarly significance. Fisher (2009) for example applied this theory in a study that was aimed at assessing the potential of an intervention progressing from an initial peacekeeping posture to peacebuilding. Using the conflict in Cyprus as a case study, the author analyzed the conflict based on the theory of PSC to understand the root causes and alongside the contingency model of third party intervention, explored the context for peacebuilding that would achieve optimum impact on peace. The author concluded that peacebuilding could be an entry point for resolving protracted conflicts. Further, PSC was applied in a study on the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. The purpose of this study conducted by Bar-Tal (1998) was to understand the appropriate psychological conditions that societies involved in protracted conflicts develop which are conducive and enable them to cope with the conflict situation. Bar-Tal (1998) found that there is a set of beliefs that constitute a form of ideology which support the continuation of conflicts. There is also evidence of the theory being applied in African conflict settings. Miller (2012) applied PSC to the Sierra Leone conflict to test the assumption held in foundational

theories that conflict arises between rival identity groups, and hence to resolve such conflicts, measures should aim to undermine these identities in several ways. Millar's (2012) study used the experience of Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the theory of PSC to test this assumption. Millar (2012) found that in the case of the Sierra Leonean conflict, there were no such clear identities as the combatants described themselves as brothers. Millar's (2012) conclusion was that peacebuilding practices in African post-conflict situations must not necessarily stereotype groups in conflicts as belonging to different identity groups. Interestingly too, PSC has been applied in the Dagbon conflict. The purpose of the qualitative study conducted by Issifu (2015) was to demonstrate the utility of the SPITCEROW model in conflict studies to gain a deeper understanding of their causes. The authors relied on secondary sources of information for the study. They found that the root cause of the Dagbon conflict was the introduction of the primogeniture system of inheritance to the paramountcy of Dagbon. The authors recommended the use of traditional conflict resolution techniques to resolve the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict. Although mentioned as the methodology, it is unclear in this study how PSC was used in the analysis. A study in which PSC was applied thoroughly in a conflict situation was that conducted by Bukari Kadri Noagah (2013) to analyze and understand the challenges and prospects of the peace process in the Bawku inter-ethnic conflict in the Upper East region of Ghana. In this study, Noagah (2013) designed and implemented a mixed methods study and employed the theory of PSC to analyze the qualitative and quantitative data generated from the sample of 220 participants. Noagah (2013) justified the use of PSC in his study because the Bawku inter-ethnic conflict has

the characteristics of a protracted conflict and the main parties involved (the Kusasis and the Manprusis) lay claim to values, identities and cultural contestation like what Azar described in his theory of PSC. The relevance of this theory in management science was also demonstrated in the study of Fil, Pratt, and O'Connor (2009). The authors set out to develop a model for resolving intractable identity conflicts. PSC was applied alongside other models of conflict management and organizational identification. Their study led to the discovery of the Intractable Identity Conflict Resolution Model. This study highlighted not only the utility of PSC, but also the possibility of combining it with other relevant models/concepts to understand conflicts and the conditions under which transitional justice tools might work better.

The PSC's relevance in this study cannot be overemphasized. As Ramsbotham (2005) concluded in his evaluation of the theory in post-conflict peacebuilding, PSC "offers useful pointers for an understanding of the sources of major armed conflict" (p. 110). The Dagbon intra-ethnic conflict offers enough evidence to qualify as a protracted conflict. According to Tonah (2012) and Sulemana (2009) the origins of the conflict can be traced to Ghana's pre-independence era. It is a crisis of identity and of legitimacy and desire for self-preservation between two royal gates of the same ethnic group and the three stages of Azar's theory can well be applied to the Dagbon conflict.

In this study, the impact of transitional justice was analyzed in terms of how the processes and mechanisms address the causes of the conflict seen from the lens of PSC. From this theory, any settlement that does not even up the playing field for both gates in terms of access to resources and power but rather suppresses them or trades them for

other interests might not yield lasting peace. The following diagram summarizes how the concept of transitional justice and the theory of PSC were applied in this study as a framework for analysis




Figure 1 : Analytical Framework

Review of Literature on Africa

In the following sections, scholarly work on the nature, causes and effects of conflicts are reviewed and presented. The section also includes review of literature on the response to African conflicts in general and the challenges therein.

Nature, Causes and Effects of Conflicts

Armed conflicts have been on the ascendancy in Africa since the end of the cold war contrary to general global trends. Africa has suffered and continues to suffer not only challenging economic conditions but also persistent conflicts (Badru, 2010; Branch, 2014; Annan, 2014). Countries such as South Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Mali have suffered violent armed conflicts at one time or the other in their political history. In most cases, these conflicts have not been fully resolved. According to scholars like Badru (2010), Wachira (1997), Zifcak (2015) and Basedau, Vullers and Körner (2013) conflicts in Africa are mostly ethnic in nature and begin in simple ways. There is ample evidence from literature that suggests that colonialism, and the ethnic rivalry that it created, are the basis of most conflicts in West Africa. Colonialism, it is argued, strived by facilitating ethnic animosity.

Badru's (2010) comparative study of ethnic genocide in the Congo, Nigeria, Liberia and Rwanda-Burundi for example gave empirical evidence about the interplay between colonialism and ethnic strife in Africa. Badru's (2010) study was on ethnic conflict and state formation in post-colonial Africa and sought to explain the dynamics of ethnicity in Africa's state formation. Badru (2010) found that colonialism created and

exploited ethnic rivalry which became difficult to manage even during the pre-colonial era, with corruption providing the fuel needed for violent conflict. Zifcak (2015) confirmed this conclusion in a two- country comparative study on South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR). In this study, Zifcak (2015) investigated the nature of conflicts and why the international community failed to respond quickly to the massive human rights abuses when wars broke out in those two countries. Like Badru (2010), Zifcak found that the sources of conflict in both countries were due to the persistent rivalry between political leaders who each exploited existing ethnic tensions which is a colonial legacy. Jegede and Joshua (2015) also agreed on the impact of colonialism but made a further argument that this is usually fueled by political rivalry. Jegede and Joshua's (2015) study was qualitative in nature which used the Niger-Delta conflict as a case study. Relying mostly on the review of documents, they gave a historical account of the conflict in the Niger-Delta and posited that "relational distance between the rulers and the ruled fomented discontent among aggrieved communities and social groups" (Jegede & Joshua, 2015 p.115) who felt they did not have equal access to oil resources. They added that this discontent grew along ethnic lines and provided fuel for armed hostilities in the Niger-Delta area which they characterized as "domestic terrorism" (p. 110). They concluded that where there seems to be a gap between national political leadership and the people they rule; it leads to general discontent. Other pre-existing conditions such as ethnic rivalry, poverty and unequal access to resources could then fuel the discontent and lead to violence. In many ways, these findings are in conformity with earlier ones. Evidence from other studies support this earlier position about the role of colonialism in

Africa's conflicts but with further analysis, one finds other perspectives. In a 22-country quantitative study on regional inequalities and civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa for example, Ostby, Nordas and Rod (2009) provided evidence on the association between inequality and civil war in Africa. Their study was based on Demographic and Health Survey results for 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1986-2004. They found that educational deprivation, horizontal or inter-group and inter-regional inequalities provide the basis for the onset of conflict in these countries. Further evidence from the work of Nancy Annan (2014) also confirmed the findings of other scholars. Annan's (2014) study was on the causes and challenges of violent conflicts and civil strife in West Africa. In this qualitative study, Annan (2014) drew most of her information from secondary material to present and analyze the causes and challenges of conflicts. The article also went further to assess the conflict resolution efforts in West Africa with a view to understanding the challenges such efforts face. Like other scholars, Annan (2014) agreed with the broader causes of conflict in West Africa to be linked to the interplay historical factors such as ethnic rivalries created during colonial rule which were maintained thereafter in post-independent West Africa. Annan (2014) further posited that other factors related to this include socio-economic crisis, human rights violations and poverty all of which re-enforce the findings of other scholars. However, an additional opinion that Annan (2014) shared in this study about the causes of conflicts in West Africa not found in the works of earlier scholars included poor governance and the proliferation of small arms. These factors "act as triggers and drivers of violent conflicts" (Annan, 2014 p. 5) in West Africa. Literature thus suggests that although colonialism has

fostered ethnic contradictions and civil strife in Africa in several ways, the immediate causes of armed conflicts are due to deprivation, acute inequalities in the access to and use of resources and power, poor governance and the proliferation of small arms.

Other scholars have pointed to religion as the immediate cause of armed conflict in Africa. It is easy to tag the ongoing conflict in Northern Mali, the Boko Haram war in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad, and others in Africa as religious conflicts. The separate works of Basedau, Vullers and Körner (2013) and of Beardsley, Gleditsch and Lo (2015) provide evidence that help to clarify this popular view. Basedau, Vullers and Körner (2013) undertook a controlled case study of three sub-Saharan countries: Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire and Tanzania, where they tried to understand the drivers of inter-religious violence. The basis for their comparison was the common population ratios of Christians and Muslims as well as the existence of risk factors responsible for the onset of violence. Based on a comparative analysis of data from the World Bank, they found that where inequalities overlap with religious and ethnic boundaries, a higher level of violence is the likely result. Religion then tends to be the basis for mobilization and rebellion as was demonstrated in the study of Beardsley, Gleditsch and Lo (2015).

Democratic processes, especially national elections, have also been cited a source of violence and armed conflict in Africa. In some African countries including Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, South Sudan and recently Burundi, some form of violence and or disagreements have followed national elections. In the cases of Nigeria, Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire, the disagreements degenerated into violence and destruction of property and even loss of lives. The study of Salehyan and Linebarger (2015) provided

empirical evidence about the association between elections and violence. In a quantitative study based on data drawn from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), the authors examined the relationship between executive elections and social conflict in Africa between 1990 and 2009. Their study tested three hypotheses: the association between election periods and political unrest; mediating factors that exacerbate the effect of elections; and attributes that may contribute to conflict. They found that in some cases, elections sometimes spark violence. However, where they are free, fair and are conducted in an environment with strong institutions, conflict is much less likely.

A new wave of violence in Africa reported in literature is domestic terrorism. This is described as an:

act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or cause or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to intimidate, put fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or create a public emergency; or create general insurrection in a state (Agbibo, 2013 p.432)

With this understanding, Daniel Agbibo (2013) conducted a quantitative study on the causes and effects of domestic terrorism in Africa. In this study, he analyzed the effectiveness of government response to terrorism using Nigeria as a case study. Drawing data from the incidents database of the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), Agbibo (2013) found that between 1997 and 2007, 73 percent of the 522 terrorist attacks that were committed in Africa were engineered from within Africa. He

concluded that terrorist attacks have increased in both number and intensity in Africa since 1997 with severe consequences including loss of lives, destruction of property, fear and psychological trauma and several hundreds of internally displaced people. This position is confirmed by the study of Jegede and Joshua (2013) referred to earlier.

The evidence provided in this review shows that indeed colonialism has played a key role in setting the conditions for social conflict in Africa. However, ethnic animosity alone cannot lead to violent and armed conflict. Conflict in most cases is fueled by poverty, deprivation, politics and political rivalry, various forms of inequalities, including unequal access to resources and power. In some cases, there are early warning signs but if society does not have the right institutions and capacity, violent conflicts are started.

Where ever they occur, conflicts have been destructive and associated with massive loss of lives and human rights abuses, influx of refugees and internally displaced persons with associated outbreak of epidemics in such populations, and the generation of new conflicts. Writing on the conflict in South Sudan and Central African Republic, Zifcak (2015) for example reported that within two days after the conflict broke out in South Sudan, between 400 and 800 people lost their lives, 600-800 people were injured and over 1800 people were internally displaced. The United Nations Secretary General's report of March 2014 on the same conflict also reported massive loss of human lives, destruction of major towns and over a million internally displaced persons. In the CAR, Zifcak (2015) also found that the period after January 2014 was characterized by gruesome murders, public beheadings, ethnic cleansing and massive human rights abuses. Further, in a qualitative study on the causes and impacts of conflicts and the challenges of

government and international responses to conflicts in Africa, George Wachira (1997) found that as of May 1996, Africa had over 8.9 million refugees with widespread starvation in post-conflict communities. He added that an important impact of conflict in Africa is the generation of new conflicts. He concluded that “the events in Rwanda in 1994 created a whole dynamic of strained relations between Zaire and Rwanda; between Uganda and Zaire; between Rwanda and Kenya; and between Uganda and Kenya” (Wachira, 1997 p.112). Elsewhere in Liberia, Sierra Leone and quite recently in Mali and Nigeria, the consequences of protracted conflict and wars are unimaginable. In a qualitative study that employed a combination of approaches including abstraction, comparison, content analysis and collation, Stareike (2013) investigated the effects of conflicts in Africa and how national governments in Africa respond to conflicts between them and community groups. Stareike (2013) agreed with earlier scholars about the creation of new wars and concluded that “the conflicts emerging in Africa hamper economic development of the poor countries, increases the gap between rural and urban areas, causes humanitarian crisis, requires a vast number of human facilities, significant financial and military resources” (p. 634). These negative effects have compelled African governments and the international community to invest in conflict resolution and the maintenance of peace. The next section discusses the various tools and processes that have been applied so far to resolve Africa’s conflicts and the outcomes of these interventions.

Strategies to Resolve Africa's Conflicts and Maintain Peace

Resolving conflicts has been a global priority since the end of the cold war. At the level of the United Nations, the creation of Chapter VI Article 33 which mandates the UN Security Council with the maintenance of international peace is a testimony to this commitment. Article 33 (1) outlines a recommended approach for the resolution of conflicts as follows:

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a resolution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice (United Nations, 1945 p. 8).

This declaration has arguably influenced the approaches used in resolving Africa's conflicts. In 2008, Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens conducted a landmark study on international responses to war-torn societies. Although the focus of this study was global, it provides insights which are relevant in understanding the challenges that African conflicts resolution efforts have had. Call and Cousens' (2008) qualitative study was aimed at understanding the effectiveness of measures and mechanisms that were employed to resolve conflicts and maintain peace after cease-fires were achieved. They reviewed literature on post-war peacebuilding and followed this up with an analysis of the international architecture for addressing post-conflict peacebuilding. Among other things, they found that failed peacebuilding is expensive and can have dire consequences including the development of new wars; that quite a number of the world's conflicts (70 percent) were resolved through negotiations, even though such negotiated settlements were more likely to revert to conflict situations, and also that

failure in conflict resolution can be off-set if a “settlement is comprehensive and if its implementation involves multi-dimensional peace operation” (Call & Cousens, 2008 p.6). They emphasized the need for “context-sensitive peacebuilding” (p.14) which they described as a deliberate effort to understand the context under which the conflict arose and to build the mechanisms for peace around such understanding. They also emphasized the importance of building or establishing minimally functioning institutions where they are found to be weak.

A review of literature on conflict resolution in Africa shows that different but inter-related approaches have been used in different conflict situations. Military interventions have been one of the most frequently used strategies to manage Africa’s conflict situations. In line with Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter, the Organization of African Unity, and later the African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have played critical roles in resolving Africa’s conflicts. In a qualitative case study that drew data from both primary and secondary sources, Colonel Oluwadare (2015) assessed the effectiveness of the conflict resolution mechanisms of these regional institutions as employed in conflict situations. Although based on the Mali conflict, Oluwadare (2015) drew examples from other conflict resolution mechanisms that the OAU/AU and ECOWAS have employed in other conflicts in Africa. Citing Burundi, Darfur, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mali as examples, Oluwadare (2015) noted that military interventions have been employed by both the AU and ECOWAS as a major mechanism to restore calm and create the environment for further tools of transitional justice processes and mechanisms to be used.

These interventions have been aimed largely at protecting civilian populations, restoring democratic government, and keeping peace as a prelude for the implementation of other conflict resolution and peacebuilding mechanisms. Oluwadare (2015) found that these interventions have largely been unsuccessful because the African peacekeeping forces have been small in numbers, ill-equipped, and inadequately funded. In the case of Mali, Oluwadare (2015) reported that the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) had the mandate to rebuild the Malian army after regaining and re-establishing government control of the northern part of Mali which had fallen to the Tuaregs; and to help in stabilizing the country in general (Oluwadare, 2015 p.114). Like other African peacekeeping forces, AFISMA was ill-equipped, outnumbered and poorly funded. He concluded that this was the same situation in Sierra Leone, Burundi and Darfur. Velthuisen (2013) shared this view based on what was found in a qualitative study the author undertook to explore the possibility of African countries having a unique military doctrine to guide their involvement in multi-national military interventions. In this study, Velthuisen (2013) reviewed theoretical assumptions that help to explain military doctrines, examined the challenges of multi-national military interventions and then discussed African military practices that could help to serve as a basis for developing a military doctrine. Velthuisen (2013) supported earlier findings that African military interventions have been moderate in terms of achievements because they have been heavily dependent on foreign funding and have low capacities. The author added another perspective that military interventions are undermined by foreign interests. Citing Mali in 2013 and Libya in 2011, the author argued that Africa's military interventions

can only be successful if Africans develop an African Military doctrine that can serve Africa and its peoples. Peen Rodt (2012) however introduced an unfamiliar perspective about Africa's experience of peacekeeping through military intervention. In a qualitative case study conducted in 2012, Peen Rodt evaluated the African Union's Mission in Burundi in 2003. The study consisted of a historical account of the African Union's experience in Burundi, Comoros, Sudan and Somalia. To get a deeper understanding of the effectiveness of AU's peacekeeping efforts, Peen Rodt (2012) focused on the Burundi experience of 2003 only, and investigated Africa's interest, aspiration and prospects of providing African solutions to its numerous conflicts. The author found that the capability of Africa's deployment forces and the level of understanding of the operational context jointly determined peacekeeping outcomes in an interrelated manner. Peen Rodt's (2012) conclusion was that the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was largely successful in providing peace and security, in creating a favorable environment for the subsequent deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, and in contributing to the general stability and future prosperity of Burundi. The success was due to the dominant role that South Africa played before AMIB. However, the author acknowledged that in terms of implementing the Arusha Agreement which was aimed at disarmament, demobilization initiatives and the advice on re-integration of combatants, AMIB achieved only moderate success. It is however not clear why there was moderate success in this aspect of the AU's mandate. The author concluded that the AU Mission in Burundi is certainly one of Africa's biggest success stories of Military intervention and peacekeeping.

Nancy Annan's (2014) study referred to earlier confirmed most of these positions held by scholars concerning the reason for moderate success in West Africa's history of military interventions and peacekeeping. Whereas Annan (2014) agreed that regional bodies such as the AU and ECOWAS have had relative success in peacekeeping, especially in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, success has been moderate largely because of the poor understanding of the fundamental causes of these conflicts. Citing the Malian conflict of 2012, Annan (2014) posited that the poor understanding that Heads of State and governments have on the causes of the conflict have impacted on the outcomes so far. Annan (2014) however acknowledged the interplay of other factors such language barriers, weak institutional structures, lack of skill and expertise in conflict mediation and dialogue. It would therefore appear from literature that adequate local knowledge of the context within which the intervention forces are expected to operate might have an impact on the outcomes. An epistemological analysis of conflicts in Africa conducted by Boaduo (2010) came out with findings that support this. Relying solely on archival and other secondary sources of information, Boaduo's (2010) qualitative study aimed to understand the root causes of African conflicts and what it might take to make their resolution effective. Boaduo (2010) posited that the successful resolution of conflicts in Africa should begin from looking at conflict and crisis from different perspectives and not stereotyping them. The author recommended a "change in the mind set of African leaders, a surrender of sovereignty to the UN, mediation and military intervention" (Boaduo, 2010 p. 178) as reliable options for the resolution of Africa's conflicts.

Once relative calm has been restored through military intervention, other approaches to resolve conflicts and build peace are employed. One of these has been power-sharing. Ian Spears (2013) studied Africa's informal power-sharing experience and the prospects for peace under this approach. Spears's (2013) reviewed experiences from countries where power-sharing was used as an approach to resolve conflicts and reported that the chances of power sharing are high in conflict environments where there are relatively well developed democratic institutions. Citing Burundi after the 1993 post-election armed conflict, Angola under the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, and the Democratic Republic of Congo after 2006 and 2008, Ian Spears concluded that power-sharing failed because of the weak nature of institutions in those countries, and that inclusion is "a fragile basis on which to build peace" (Spears, 2013 p.48). This view is shared by Annan (2014) who cited the mediation efforts of ECOWAS in Cote d'Ivoire, Mali and Guinea-Bissau. In the study referred to earlier, Annan (2014) recounted that the authority of Heads of State and Government appointed His Excellency Blaise Compaore and Goodluck Jonathan, the Presidents of Burkina Faso and Nigeria respectively, as mediators in these conflicts which yielded moderate results. Annan (2014) also mentioned in her study the mediation role played by civil society and women's groups in West African conflict resolution efforts. The West Africa Network for Peace (WANEP), West Africa Civil Society Institute, and the Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET) and the Women in Peacebuilding contributed in several ways through mediation to bring peace to Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Negotiation and mediation have also come strongly on the agenda of governments and organizations in resolving Africa's conflicts. Richard Jackson (2000) provided a detailed account of these mechanisms in a study where he did a comparative assessment of their effectiveness in conflict situations in Africa for the period 1945 to 1995. His quantitative study drew data from an original data set on cases of negotiation and mediation. The aim in this study was to identify what works and what does not work, and under what conditions they could be used for the resolution of conflicts. He found that bilateral negotiations are more successful than mediation, but that negotiation is difficult where the conflict is intense, intractable and works best in interstate conflicts. He concluded that since Africa's conflicts tend to be very intense and protracted, so improving the effectiveness of mediation in the region should be priority to African peace makers.

The context of African conflicts represents a mix of transitions. Under different post-conflict conditions, several transitional justice mechanisms have been employed to resolve these conflicts and maintain peace. Evidence from literature shows that the outcomes have been mixed. In a cross-national comparative study involving Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia, Sirleaf (2014) assessed how truth commissions contribute to achieving the objectives for which they were established. Sirleaf's (2014) study was based on the author's original data on the same countries in which the author aimed to provide clarity on where truth commissions function optimally. In that study, Sirleaf (2014) described the transitional justice mechanisms used in Ghana after authoritarian rule, South Africa after apartheid, Liberia and Sierra Leone after large scale civil wars. In

Ghana in 2002, Sirleaf (2014) reported that a truth commission alongside a blanket amnesty and reparations were established; in Sierra Leone after parliament passed the TRC-SL Act in February 2000, a truth commission with a partial amnesty, a hybrid court and reparations were established and in Liberia after the TRC-L Act was passed June 2005, a truth commission, amnesty and lustration were established as part of the transitional justice processes (Sirleaf, 2014 p.2283). Based on the results of this study, Sirleaf (2014) argued that practitioners and scholars “may have misplaced their confidence in the ability of truth commissions and trials to contribute to restorative, retributive, expressive, and utilitarian goals” (Sirleaf, 2014 p. 2270). The author concluded that widespread use of truth commissions in post-conflict states has less utility than they might be in post authoritarian or non-transitional states, and recommended that for them to be useful, the number of goals should be limited. Sirleaf (2014) also concluded that “the kind of transition should determine the kind of transitional justice institution utilized” (p. 2269). The conditions under which truth commissions have been applied elsewhere in Africa have been different and the findings made by Sirleaf (2014) resonate with those found elsewhere by other scholars. In Sierra Leone for example, Gerhard Anders’ (2014) study on the performance of the dual mechanisms for transitional justice is interesting. Anders’ (2014) qualitative study gave a historical account of the mechanisms for transitional justice and how they fared in a political transition period which had its own challenges and contradictions. Gerhard Anders (2014) explored the interplay of the transitional justice mechanisms, events and processes during the period 1999 and 2004, and found that the operation of the parallel dual justice mechanisms was

less complimentary to each other. On the one hand, the truth commission was established to create an opportunity for truth-telling and how atrocities were committed which hopefully will contribute to national reconciliation. On the other, a Special Court was established based on the believe that closure to the massive human rights abuses could only be achieved when appropriate punishment is meted out to those who committed the crimes. Aside the contradiction in principle, Gerhard Anders (2014) ascribed the modest achievement of the dual justice mechanisms to the lack of clarity in the roles and responsibilities of the two mechanisms and the fact that both competed for funds from the same sources. The study did not delve into the conditions under which such a dual system of justice could have produced successful outcomes.

Like the Special Court established in Sierra Leone is the use of the International Criminal Tribunals as a means of achieving retributive justice, restorative justice and reconciliation in post-conflict African societies. The study by Janine Natalya Clark (2008) provided evidence about the contribution of this mechanism to conflict resolution and the maintenance of peace. Janine Natalya Clark (2008) conducted a case study of the experience of the International Criminal Tribunal in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The objective of the study was to find out whether war crimes tribunals as the dispensers of retributive justice can contribute to reconciliation in a post-conflict society. This was against a popular claim in literature that tribunals, by seeing to it that justice is done, establish the truth about the past and by ensuring that guilt is individualized, can foster reconciliation. Clark (2008) found that each of these three claims was false, and that although retributive justice is an essential part of the process of peacebuilding, the justice

it delivers is not the most effective means of promoting reconciliation. Clark (2008) argued for restorative justice mechanisms as a complimentary part of the peacebuilding process.

The preceding section shows how African governments have responded to conflict situations. Led by the African Union and other regional bodies such as ECOWAS, one of the first and popular steps of stopping massive human rights abuses and wanton destruction of property is through a military intervention where the aim is to stop further abuses, protect lives and restore calm and the rule of law. Once this is achieved, other transitional justice processes and mechanisms are employed to resolve the conflict and maintain peace. Although these have been varied, the most used include power-sharing arrangements, negotiations, mediation, establishing truth and reconciliation commissions and the use of Special Courts/tribunals. These have always produced mixed results. Call and Cousens (2008) posited that these modest achievements in conflict resolution is partly because of the conflicting roles played by clandestine businesses, both local and international. In West Africa Call and Cousens (2008) acknowledged what they referred to as “the endurance of the Anglophone-Francophone divisions” (p.37) as well as the visible post-colonial presence of France in African conflicts which in turn affects resolution outcomes. The evidence shown in this literature is mostly about transitional justice after large scale post conflict peacebuilding. There is agreement in literature that in general, these measures do not yield the desired results. Annan (2014) for example concluded from her study that “despite the efforts made to prevent and end violent conflicts in West Africa, the region continues to experience

sporadic violence and security challenges” (p.11). Aside the work of Sirleaf (2014) which looks at the conditions under which truth commissions might work, there is no clarity about the conditions under which transitional justice might work in post-ethnic conflict situations such as those experienced in Northern Ghana. In the following sections, the experiences of Ghana on conflicts and their resolution efforts are discussed.

Review of Literature on Conflicts in Ghana

Ghana has been touted as a generally peaceful country. This tag is probably because Ghana finds herself within West Africa which has witnessed several crippling violent conflicts, some of which are still raging in varying degrees of intensity. The Tuareg-led rebellion which erupted in Mali in 2012 for example is still largely unresolved, the Boko Haram conflict which initially started in Northern Nigeria but has now spread to Cameroon and Chad is another, the Cassamance conflict in Senegal is also still not fully resolved and in Ghana, there are several ethnic conflicts which are unresolved. The following section is dedicated to the review of scholarly work on conflicts in Ghana. It includes insights on the nature and causes of conflicts, their impacts and the responses of governments in getting them resolved and the outcomes so far.

The Nature, Causes and Effects of Conflicts

Ghana’s political history has been characterized by conflicts which have threatened the relative peace the country has enjoyed within the sub-region. Just as was reported about conflicts in other African countries, conflicts in Ghana result from ethnic rivalries and are usually triggered by other immediate causes including disputes over

land, chieftaincy, party political activity and poverty. Mohammed Sulemana's (2009) study for example gave an account of the causes and impacts of conflicts in the Northern region of Ghana like what other scholars observed in other African countries. In a qualitative study, Mohammed (2009) interviewed 600 individual participants and representatives of civil society groups. These participants were selected from seven districts purposively based on their previous experience of conflicts, especially those that occurred in 1994 in the Northern region. Through a combination of cluster sampling and systematic random sampling, houses were selected from which one individual in each house was interviewed. The representatives of civil society groups were selected through the same process of purposive sampling. The purpose of the interviews was to find out from the participants their perceptions and understanding of the causes of conflicts in the region. Sulemana (2009) found that across the Northern region of Ghana, there was a clear pattern of struggle for paramountcy and autonomy between and among rival ethnic groups most of which are violent. Citing the Konkomba-Dagomba wars of 1940 (dubbed the cow war) and 1946, the Nanumba-Konkomba war of 1981 fought over pito (a local drink brewed from Guinea corn), the Nawuri-Gonja war of 1989, the Gonja and Nawuri/Konkomba war of 1991 which was also dubbed the Guinea fowl war, Sulemana (2009) posited that although the immediate triggers of these wars were trivial. They were fought between and among ethnic groups because of struggle over land and other resources, perceived discrimination, marginalization and threats of extinction from other groups with subtle support from government. Across the region too, Sulemana (2009) found that conflicts persist and have the tendency of recurring with devastating impacts.

In another qualitative study on how perception as a social infrastructure contributes to escalating conflicts in divided societies, Francis Azuimah (2011) arrived at the same conclusion but added different perspectives and recommendations about how conflicts can be resolved. Using the inter-group theory as a methodological framework and data from both primary and secondary sources, Azuimah's (2011) study was premised around the argument that "a lack of inter-group good leadership, equality, social enablers, shared goods and values, inter-group collaboration through networks, perception will deepen prejudices and biases and therefore might affect the contours of relationship within a select geographical area" (Azuimah, 2011 p.263). Agreeing with previous scholars, Azuimah (2011) described conflicts in most parts of Ghana as ethnic, perennial, violent and protracted. Citing several conflicts across the country, Azuimah (2011) also confirmed the causes of these conflicts to be related to land (for example the Gomoa-Effutu land dispute in the Central region), chieftaincy related (the chieftaincy conflict in Tuobodom in the Brong Ahafo region and the Efiduase-Suhyen chieftaincy conflict in the Eastern region). Azuimah's (2011) study found, and confirmed the findings of earlier scholars, that behind these principal causes were deep resentment based on perceptions of "economic and political inequalities, social and cultural prejudices and competition for limited resources" (Azuimah, 2011 p.265). In the case of the Bawku conflict for example, these resentments were found to be exacerbated by party politics which helped to sustain the conflict. Based on this study, Azuimah (2011) concluded that peace agreements per se are not enough to end hostilities between rival groups. Instead, post-conflict peace efforts

should include a psychological element to deal with the bitterness and grievances inherent in protracted conflicts.

Another study by Aikins (2009) helps to understand why conflicts in Ghana persist from another perspective. Aikins' (2009) study sought to understand and explain the impact of post-independent pluralist institutions on the management of confrontations that escalate into violent situations. The overall goal of this study was to contribute to the understanding why conflicts persist in Ghana. Using the Dagbon conflict as a case study, Aikins (2009) drew data from the 1999 and 2005 Afro barometer data set to examine the nature of formal and informal rules and the extent to which they tend to compete in Dagbon and helping to sustain the conflict. In that study, the author employed the Knights theory as an analytical framework to answer four research questions:

1. Is the violence in Dagbon due to a conflict between formal and informal rules?
2. How does the conflict between formal and informal rules translate into physical violence?
3. What is the contribution of informal rules (chieftaincy) to the genesis and persistence of conflicts in Dagbon?
4. If informal rules influence the creation of formal rules (the state), then which formal rules are included or excluded in the multi-ethnic society? (Aikins, 2009 p. 2)

Aikins (2009) tested the hypothesis that persistent conflicts in the Northern region result from the subjugation of informal rules and the failure of institutions to recognize them. Aside confirming the causes of conflicts in Ghana to be around land, chieftaincy disputes, and political interference, Aikins (2009) found that indeed the subjugation of informal rules in the Dagbon traditional area might explain the persistence of the conflict. Aikins (2009) also found that the use of external traditional rulers to solve what is

believed within Dagbon to be an internal issue was inappropriate. Rather strangely, another reason advanced for the persistence of the Dagbon conflict was the “lack of a third-party enforcer” (Aikins, 2009 p.24). Useful as this study is, it does not explain why the informal rules were subjugated and the conditions under which transitional justice processes and mechanisms might work to achieve the desired peace were also not explored in the study. What, for example, was the process of peacebuilding like such that these informal rules got subjugated? Might there be other reasons why peace in Dagbon is still elusive? Aikins’ (2009) recommendation that African models of post-conflict reconciliation, justice and courts be considered in Dagbon is perhaps a pointer to the fact that a further study might help to understand the impact of transitional justice mechanisms and the conditions under which they might work in such large-scale conflicts.

Yet another study that has helped to provide a deeper understanding of the causes of persistent conflicts in Ghana was the study of Julia Jonsson (2009). The main purpose of Jonsson’s (2009) study was to provide an explanation for inter-ethnic conflicts that were both devastating and persistent in Ghana’s Northern region. Data for this study was from interviews with members of affected ethnic groups in various parts of the region over a two-year period: 2005-2007. This was complimented by an analysis of archival information that helped to provide a historical, legal and political background to conflicts that culminated in the brutal inter-ethnic war of 1994-1995. Jonsson (2009) came out with interesting findings most of which confirm earlier ones but provided deeper insights and explanation to what constitute the remote and immediate causes of conflicts. To Julia

Jonsson (2009), conflicts in the Northern region are the product of historical, legal and political circumstances which started from the colonial period and maintained after independence. Jonsson (2009) established that the Northern region is home to not less than 17 different ethnic groups with clear identities, culture, history and rights and that these groups perceive themselves as indigenes of the region. Further, Jonsson (2009) claimed that when the government of General I.K Acheampong divested land control and administration from the state to the four chiefly ethnic groups of the Northern region, and hence excluded thirteen ethnic groups, the seed for further ethnic rivalry was sewn. Vesting land control and administration in the chiefly groups re-enforced a similar policy where the colonial administration categorized groups into acephalous and chiefly. The policy of vesting land in the institution of chieftaincy was therefore not acceptable to the groups that were not represented in the modern institution of chieftaincy. The minority saw themselves as excluded. Julia Jonsson (2009) further reported that the 1979 and 1992 constitutions of Ghana re-enforced these policies with minor amendments. The author concluded that “historical, modern legal and political circumstances have contributed to violent conflicts being structured around chiefs and tradition” (p.517). Further, Jonsson (2009) added that horizontal inequalities and local rivalries provide material for conflict narratives which in turn interact with national party politics to give rise to violent conflicts at the least provocation. The importance of this study lies in the deeper understanding it provides about the root causes of ethnic rivalries in the region. Evidence so far shows that most of the conflicts that have engulfed the Northern region are ethnic

in nature. This understanding is important for the assessment of the adequacy of transitional justice processes and mechanisms.

Other scholarly works conducted by different researchers have produced largely the same findings. In two separate qualitative studies that relied on data from interviews and the review of archival material, Langer (2009) and Lentz (2010) came to the same conclusions about the causes of conflicts as revolving around chieftaincy disputes, access to land, and that these remote causes are often aggravated by party politics and poverty. The Dagbon conflict is unique in the sense that it is an intra-ethnic conflict. However, findings from scholars support already established views about the causes of ethnic conflicts. The work of Steve Tonah (2012) provided a detailed account of the Dagbon conflict in terms of its causes and complications (Tonah, 2012, p.2) which dates back to the colonial period. Steve Tonah's (2012) study was based on data collected through key informant interviews in which participants were drawn from both royal gates (the Andanis and the Abudus), chiefs and opinion leaders from Yendi, Tamale and Savelugu. Data for this study also included information from the analyses of secondary material such as peer reviewed articles, journals, books, newspapers, party manifestos, and speeches of political aspirants during the 2004 and 2008 general elections. Although not clearly stated, the implied questions that Tonah (2012) sought answers for in his study were around understanding what the probable causes of the conflict might be, and whether and how politics plays any role in making the conflict protracted. Steve Tonah (2012) gave a historical account of the evolution of the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute and how national political and legal developments shaped and fueled the conflict until it

became violent. In March 2002, claiming several lives including that of the overlord of Dagbon, the Ya-Naa. Steve Tonah (2012) found the Dagbon conflict to be one of the most heavily politicized chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana's political history. He claimed in this study that "local, regional and national leaders have been drawn into the conflict by factions, their supporters as well as the elite" (Tonah, 2012 p. 14) and concluded that the conflict has defied all attempts at resolution because of the tendency of losing parties in a judgement to wait for an alternative government to come into power for them to re-state their cases. Steve Tonah (2012) further explained that this tendency is due to the importance of Tamale as an administrative and political capital of the Northern region, and the associated practice of relying on the Dagomba elite (most of whom are royals close to the paramountcy) for leadership in the region. Implicitly, traditional authority is a means of getting access to political power and recognition. Tonah (2012) concluded that the Dagbon conflict cannot be resolved without the active involvement of the Dagbon elite. He argued further that on-going efforts by the Committee of Eminent Chiefs to resolve the conflict "exclusively through mediation" (Tonah, 2012 p.15) will not yield any meaningful results. Tonah's (2012) finding in this study about the politicization of chieftaincy conflicts confirmed what Sowatey (2005) had established in an earlier study.

Conflicts have had devastating effects on the local economies and lives of the people where they occur. In addition to being a threat to peace and security, conflicts have caused massive internal displacement of people, led to loss of property and human lives (Sulemana, 2009; Azuimah, 2011; Noagah, 2013). According to Sulemana (2009) the Konkomba-Nanumba conflict which is regarded as the biggest of all conflicts in the

history of Ghana resulted in the murder of at least 200 people in one day, and a total of approximately 160,000 internally displaced people resulting from over 318 villages being burnt. Tonah (2012) also reported that the 2002 Dagbon conflict led to the death of the overlord of Dagbon, the Ya-Naa, and thirty of his elders. In addition to these, several houses and villages were burnt down, schools in the affected areas were closed and public servants deserted the area (p.8). Sowatey (2005) claimed that the 2002 Dagbon conflict led to a loss of property worth more than 4 billion Ghanaian cedis (approximately US \$1.25 billion) in less than one year. Another noticeable effect of these conflicts is the fact that funds otherwise meant for development are diverted to the enforcement of peace (Noagah, 2013; Anamzoyah, 2014; Longi, 2014). Clearly then, conflicts have a negative impact on the governance of the nation, the economy and involve massive human rights abuses. Governments, traditional rulers and civil society groups therefore are keen to getting them permanently resolved. These effects have led them to implementing strategies to resolve the conflicts and maintain peace. However, the successes of these mechanisms are questionable and the conflicts keep raging on. In the following section, literature on the various responses and the challenges associated with them are presented and analyzed.

Responses to Conflict Situations and Challenges

Successive governments of Ghana, traditional institutions and civil society groups have always responded in several ways to deal with conflict situations when they occur. There has been a mixture of strategies to suppress violence, resolve conflicts and attempt to achieve permanent peace. One of the pioneering work on conflict studies in Ghana

was conducted by Emmanuel Addo Sowatey (2005). Sowatey's (2005) study was premised around the assumption that Ghana's peacebuilding processes and mechanisms might explain why the country remains relatively peaceful in a region torn apart by conflicts. As most of these conflicts in Ghana are chieftaincy-related, Sowatey's (2005) study used chieftaincy as a case to test this popular assumption by analyzing the efficiency of the peacebuilding mechanisms in Ghana. Drawing mainly on the review of secondary, archival and legal material, Sowatey (2005) gave a historical account of chieftaincy and the causes of conflicts, before he undertook a detailed analysis of the peacebuilding mechanisms within the institution of chieftaincy. Sowatey (2005) found that partisan politics has provided fuel for most disputes since the colonial period. On the Dagbon conflict, Sowatey (2005) posited that it "has strong political undercurrents" (p. 112). Other factors identified by Sowatey (2005) as contributing to conflicts include access to land and other natural resources to which the institution has strong links; abuse of the traditional system of checks and balances; negative role played by the media in modern democracies and youth unemployment. Sowatey's (2005) understanding of peacebuilding as used in the article was conflict "prevention, management, resolution and peacebuilding" (p.109). Based on this understanding, Sowatey (2005) identified three block of structures which in his view help to explain the nature of peacebuilding within the chieftaincy institution. These included informal, semi-formal and formal structures.

In terms of informal structures, Sowatey (2005) explained that the chieftaincy institution has a strong potential role to play in keeping peace and order, especially in the rural areas where formal structures are either lacking or are inadequate. Explaining

further, Sowatey (2005) argued that the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism which is part of this re-enforces the informal role of the chief and institution. The author however thought that success in this area is limited because in some instances, the chiefs themselves are deeply involved in the conflicts that they are expected to resolve or prevent. This makes them ineligible candidates for the resolution of conflicts in their respective areas. Sowatey (2005) also thought that the role of the chief, formerly shrouded in the secrecy of tradition, is no longer so due to education. The influence that chiefs wielded is therefore now waning.

Sowatey (2005) identified semi-formal structures to include the work that civil society organizations can play in conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding. He argued that there is growing interest and space for civil society to participate in governance and democracy and to contribute to building the capacity of the chieftaincy institution to play its role in peacebuilding. However, except for a few of these organizations such as WANEP, this potential has not been utilized due to lack of capacity to intervene in the chieftaincy institution which is very technical.

Formal structures identified by Sowatey (2005) include constitutional and legal provisions and structures for peacebuilding, including the Presidential Advisory Committee on Chieftaincy Affairs, the National Commission for Civil Education (NCCE), and the judiciary. According to Sowatey (2005), articles 272 and 274; the Chieftaincy Act of 1971 Act 370 (42) and (43) together established a three-tier structure for peacebuilding within the chieftaincy institution. These include National, Regional and local Traditional councils which have the mandate to “hear and determine any case or

matter affecting chieftaincy” (Sowatey, 2005 p. 123). To facilitate this, each tier has a judicial Council, a Research Committee and lawyers of not less than five years standing to support in the adjudication of cases. Sowatey (2005) however claimed that despite these, the structures are ineffective due to lack of adequate funds, delays in dealing with cases/issues before them, lack of full-time researchers to help in legal research to strengthen decision making/judgment processes. Further, Sowatey (2005) analyzed the role of Security and Intelligence institutions created under the Security and Intelligence Act of 1996, Act 526. Like the traditional councils, these also exist at the national, regional and District levels: National, Regional and District Security Councils. Their main mandate is to provide early warning on security at their respective levels for redress. In addition to these security- related institutions, the National Commission for Civil Education and the judiciary in their various capacities can help to avoid conflicts or resolve them before they become protracted. Sowatey (2005) concluded that both the chieftaincy institutions and the Supreme Court are saddled with too many cases and hence might be ineffective in achieving permanent peace. He reported that by 2003, “there were almost 100 chieftaincy disputes pending before two Regional Houses of Chiefs and 60,000 land cases before the Supreme Court” (p. 131). Further, Sowatey (2005) also concluded that Ghana’s peacebuilding mechanisms are weak and recommended that traditional structures and mechanisms for peacebuilding should be identified and strengthened, and that the constitution of Ghana should be amended to give government discretionary powers to intervene in chieftaincy matters when the need arises.

The effectiveness or otherwise of these institutions in a conflict needs to be examined in detail to understand their strengths and weaknesses and their impact on peacebuilding. Some studies that give an indication of the effectiveness of these mechanisms include the work of Kaye and Beland (2009) and that of Steve Tonah (2012). The contribution of Julie Kaye and Daniel Beland (2009) on conflict resolution in Ghana is in post-conflict reconstruction. Kaye and Beland (2009) premised their study around the understanding that ethnic identities in Ghana were constructed and politicized during the colonial period and this continued even after independence. The central thesis of their work therefore was that “post-conflict reconstruction in ethnically fragmented areas is largely about the problem of de-politicizing essentialist discourse of historically constructed ethnic identities” (Kaye & Beland, 2009 p. 177). The authors therefore set out to explore this using the 1994-95 case of inter-ethnic conflict and reconstruction. Data for this study was drawn from 21 participants representing NGOs, religious leaders, traditional leaders, opinion leaders and the state. Their study confirmed the earlier findings of other scholars that colonialism created and maintained structural inequalities and that settlement narratives are highly politicized along ethnic identities, where each group lays claim to be indigenous settlers on the land. These claims correspond to the demands for representation to chiefly structures created and recognized by the colonial policy of indirect rule. Kaye and Beland (2009) claimed that the 1994-95 war was fought along such clear lines of ethnic identities: the acephalous, non-chiefly groups (Nawuri, Nchumburu, and Basare) against the chiefly groups (Gonja, Nanumba and Dagomba).

Kaye and Beland (2009) described the response of government and civil society groups to this conflict to be a combination of conflict settlement and resolution efforts, but that the effort of government was more towards settlement. The settlement initiatives included peacekeeping; setting up of a Permanent Peace Negotiation Team (PPNT) in April 1994 to identify the root causes of the conflict and recommend solutions to government; and the distribution of relief items. As part of the effort to resolve the conflict, the government conducted a needs assessment and tasked the PPNT to work towards permanent peace. However, Kaye and Beland (2009) concluded that the initiatives failed to achieve lasting peace because they were largely focused on the suppression of violence and achieving a cease fire. The process of engagement also mirrored a conflict settlement approach, where the PPNT targeted only specific opinion leaders. In the process, the PPNT failed to establish legitimacy at the local level and to de-politicize identities. Finally, Kaye and Beland (2009) posited that the slow and late intervention of the peacekeeping force in the conflict situation of 1994-95 and the general lack of an institutional mechanism to proactively deal with conflict situations heightens the politicization of conflict narratives and hampers peacebuilding strategies and processes. Questions remain about the set of interventions necessary and sufficient for such a conflict situation, and the conditions they require to make them effective in achieving lasting peace.

Another contribution to understanding the effectiveness of the processes and mechanisms employed in resolving Ghana's conflicts is the work of Steve Tonah (2012). Tonah (2012) conducted a qualitative study on the Dagbon conflict and discussed the

various measures implemented to resolve it. As in other African contexts, the government's first response to the conflict in March 2002 was to send military and police personnel to enforce peace. When things calmed down, the government appointed a Commission of Inquiry led by Justice Wuaku. The Commission later became known and referred to as the Wuaku Commission. The mandate of this Commission of Inquiry was to investigate and determine the causes of the conflict, identify the perpetrators of war and the various human rights abuses, and to recommend action to government for implementation. Tonah (2012) reported further that this Commission identified 15 people as suspects in line with their mandate. These were later tried and discharged by the courts. Another significant measure undertaken to resolve the conflict was the appointment of a Committee of four Eminent Chiefs charged with the responsibility of finding a solution to the conflict in Dagbon. This committee, upon several sittings and deliberations, drew up a roadmap for peace which was presented to government in March 2006. Tonah (2012) again reported in his study that eight years after this roadmap was presented, only a few of these proposals were implemented because of disagreements between the factions. Tonah's (2012) study did not assess the adequacy and effectiveness of these measures. We are not told what led to disagreement between the two rival gates which resulted in the non-implementation of the roadmap in its entirety. Questions therefore remain about the adequacy of these measures, the processes through which they were implemented or meant to be implemented, and the conditions under which they were implemented which led to only moderate success. The study by Bukari Kadri Noagah (2013) on the prospects and challenges of the peace process in the Bawku

conflict is arguably the most recent and relevant account of the effectiveness of transitional justice processes and mechanisms in resolving ethnic conflicts. In a mixed methods case study of the conflict in the Bawku Traditional Area (BTA) in the Upper East region, Noagah (2013) set out to answer three research questions:

1. Why is the Bawku conflict unresolved despite the various approaches that have been used at finding lasting peace?
2. What is militating against the peace process?
3. What alternative measures can be used to bring lasting peace to Bawku?
(Noagah, 2013 p. 1)

Data for this study was collected from a total of 220 participants who were purposively selected based on their lived experiences of the Bawku conflict. The participants were made up of individuals from identifiable groups and organizations such as chiefs, opinion leaders, and security agencies, NGOs who played a part in the resolution of the conflict, assembly members and representatives of the Municipal Assembly. Out of the total 220 participants, 110 of them were selected randomly from 14 communities. These communities were in turn purposively selected because they were locations where conflict had occurred. Data from these respondents were collected through focus group discussions, structured and unstructured interviews. Through these, both qualitative and quantitative data were generated. Data was analyzed under the lens of the theory of protracted social conflict (PSC) because the Bawku conflict had the characteristics of a protracted conflict. Also, the parties involved, the Kusasis and the Manprusis, lay claims to separate identities and cultural orientations as spelt out in the PSC theory. Noagah (2013) found that the main approaches for the resolution of the conflict included peacekeeping (including the imposition of curfews as and when

necessary), mediation, arbitration and reconciliation. The prominent intervention was reported to be mediation. Noagah (2013) recounted mediation teams in the Bawku conflict to include government functionaries, civil society groups who mediated in the conflict at various times. Some of these included former President Kufuor who mediated in 2008, a sitting President and his Vice, JEA Mills and John Mahama respectively, a host of NGOs including World Vision, Action Aid, WANEP, the Inter-Faith Dialogue and the National Peace Council. These are by no means powerful organizations and individuals who have the respect of society and should have been able to make a difference in a conflict situation in Bawku. Although this achieved some success because it helped to calm down tensions, it was not successful in providing lasting peace (Noagah, 2013 p. 6). Noagah (2013) also found that at the Community level, an Inter-ethnic peace committee (BIEPC) was formed to monitor the implementation of peace and provide early warning to higher authorities for redress before they became serious problems.

The outcome of these measures can be described as mixed. In terms of the overall objective of achieving lasting peace in Bawku, it was a failure. Noagah (2013) found the factors that militated against these mechanisms to include ethnic marginalization and lack of trust in the processes, proliferation of arms into the area, thereby encouraging tension and further conflict, lack of neutrality of the security agencies, lack of political will to implement the peace accord and mistrust in the mediation efforts. Consequently, Noagah (2013) recommended the strengthening of security systems, the need to adopt a traditional culturally-sensitive approach since the conflict is a traditional one, the need to set aside a budget for implementing the peace accord, the need to de-emphasize the court

system of arbitration and adjudication, and finally to consider power-sharing between the two principal ethnic groups. The importance of this study to the current one lies in the fact that it sheds some light on the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice which were applied in the Bawku conflict. The study also gives a fair idea of why they did not yield the required results. Some questions however remain to be answered. Could the failure to achieve lasting peace be due to the type of processes and mechanisms and conditions under which they were implemented? What success might the same measures achieve in an intra-ethnic conflict like the Dagbon one? Would these recommendations be valid for the resolution of an intra-ethnic conflict in a different region of Ghana? The Dagbon case is an example of a protracted intra-ethnic conflict and in a different region of Ghana. This study will build on Noagah's (2013) one and provide evidence from a different type of conflict and cultural environment.

Synthesis, Analysis and Implications for this Study

The review of literature showed that the predominant study design used has been the qualitative case study approach. The authors used mostly key informant interviews to supplement information obtained through archival research to explore the causes of conflicts. Sampling techniques were also predominantly purposive and limited to individuals, communities and organizations that lived the experiences of conflicts that the authors were interested in. Several conceptual and analytical approaches were used but the most appealing to this study is the protracted social conflict theory. This was applied in the work of Bukari Kadri Noagah (2013).

The review of literature also showed that indeed the scale of the conflicts in the Northern region in general and Dagbon was massive with huge human rights abuses. A summary of the measures which came through the review is presented below.

Conflict Settlement Initiatives

When conflicts break out, the first response of government is to send military and policemen to enforce peace. The immediate need is to restore order and minimize mayhem. Sulemana (2009) reported that in the 1940 Konkomba-Dagomba conflict, the Konkomba-Nanumba conflict of 1981 and the Nanumba-Konkomba conflict of 1994, military and army personnel were deployed to calm down the warring factions. Similarly, Noagah (2013) and Longi (2014) reported that in the Bawku Traditional Area, the same strategy was deployed by the then government. In this case, the conflict between the Manprusis and the Kusasis became both recurrent and violent that there is now a permanent military detachment in Bawku. In other parts of the Northern, Volta and Brong Ahafo regions, this has been the first option. A related strategy is to impose curfew in the parts affected by the conflict in support of the need to restore order. Tonah (2012) and Kaye and Beland (2009) reported that in the 2002 outbreak of war between the Andanis and Abudus, a dusk-to dawn curfew was imposed on the Dagbon Traditional Area. Similar measures were put in place in the Nawuri and Gonja areas after the 1991 outbreak of conflict, the Nanumba and Konkomba areas after the conflict of 1991, and the Gonja, Nawuri and Konkomba areas after the 1994 conflict (Sulemana, 2009). The conditions and timing of curfews over the years are progressively relaxed based on gains made in restoring peace in the area.

Provision of relief.

Conflicts often involve massive deaths and internally displaced people who either flee from war or are rendered homeless because their houses have been burnt down. There is therefore the need for various forms of support. Governments, supported by civil society organizations, have always responded in most cases but in different intensity and impact. In their respective works, Kaye (2011), Kaye and Beland (2009), Sulemana (2009) and Tonah (2012) recounted how government and civil society groups provided relief to people fleeing conflict or rendered homeless in Dagomba Traditional Area, Nanumba, and Konkomba areas respectively. Relief has been in the form of blankets, food, construction of temporary shelter for internally displaced persons, and in some cases roofing materials (Tonah, 2012; Aikins, 2009; Sulemana, 2009). Just like the imposition of curfews, the impact of this is to bring immediate but temporary relief to victims but does not resolve the main issue for which the conflict broke out in the first place.

Commissions of enquiry.

Another strategy that cuts across all the conflicts in governments' attempt to resolve them is the establishment of Commissions of Enquiry to investigate the causes and make recommendations for the resolution of the conflict to government (Longi, 2014; Noagah, 2013; Tonah, 2012; Kaye & Beland, 2009; Sulemana, 2009). When war broke out between the Andanis and the Abudus in March 2002, the government instituted a commission to investigate, identify perpetrators of the conflict and make recommendations for the resolution of the conflict (Tonah, 2012).

Arrests, detention and prosecution of perpetrators of violence.

As Sandoval (2014) has explained, an essential aspect of transitional justice includes an obligation to investigate and prosecute those who are likely perpetrators of various forms of human rights abuses. This is done with the aim of serving justice to those whose rights have been abused, ensure that the truth is known with adequate reparations for past human rights violations and guarantees that what happened will not recur. Literature relating to this on Ghana shows little evidence of this having happened in most of the conflicts except for a few of the conflicts. In the 2002 conflict in Dagbon, the Justice Wuaku Commission identified and recommended 15 people who were later charged with murder of the Ya-Naa (Tonah, 2012). Noagah (2013) also reported that this was unsuccessful in the Bawku conflict. Most scholars recommend that this be de-emphasized (Tonah, 2012; Noagah, 2013; Issifu and Asante, 2015)

Conflict Resolution and Peace-building Initiatives

According to Tschirgi (2004), peace-building mechanisms are prevention, stabilization and reconstruction measures that aim to consolidate peace in a post-conflict environment. This is done knowing that there is always the possibility of relapse into violence, no matter what might have happened in the initial resolution of the conflict. A review of literature shows that some strategies have included mediation by traditional rulers, use of semi-formal institutions such as civil society organizations, and the use of formal institutions to prevent conflict and build peace in post-conflict environments.

Mediation by traditional rulers.

According to Aikins (2009) and Tonah (2012), Ghanaians have a high regard for their chiefs. There is agreement in literature that in the Northern part of Ghana, a more favored strategy for conflict resolution might be to use of the chieftaincy institution (Sowatey, 2005; Aikins, 2009; Tonah, 2012; Issifu & Asante, 2015). Given that most conflicts in the Northern region are chieftaincy- related, this view might appeal to most people. In several cases, the chief's court is an avenue for settling disputes and restoring peace. Governments have over the years recognized and used this institution a lot, although with variation in some cases. In the Dagbon conflict for example, the government appointed a Committee of Eminent Chiefs led by the King of Ashanti and charged them to work at achieving durable peace in the Dagomba Traditional Area after the outbreak of war in March 2002. Also, after some calm was restored during the war of 1994 between the Nanumbas-Konkombas, government on 30th May appointed a committee known as the Permanent Peace Negotiation Team (PPNT) to negotiate a cease fire and work at permanent peace in the area. Sulemana (2009) reported that this committee was made up of chiefs, the police, army and other opinion leaders. They successfully got the feuding parties to sign a peace accord but could not achieve permanent peace.

Formal structures/ mechanisms.

The 1992 constitution of Ghana recognizes the role of the chieftaincy institution in peacebuilding. Accordingly, it established chieftaincy structures at district, regional and national levels to deal with chieftaincy-related matters. A related constitutional

mechanism is the security set-up made up of National, Regional and District Security Councils, just like the chieftaincy structures. Their mandate is drawn from the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act (526) of 1996. Their role includes providing early warning as a means of either preventing the outbreak of violence or preventing relapse into conflict situations where some level of peace and calm has been achieved. Given the spread of these institutions across the country, it is unclear from literature why conflicts break out even though the needed early warning may have been provided. The interplay of roles between and among these institution during a conflict setting has not been clearly documented.

Civil society efforts.

The role played by some civil society organizations like the West Africa Network for Peace (WANEP) and religious bodies has also been recognized as an important way through which conflicts are resolved and peace-built (Kaye, 2011; Kaye & Beland, 2009; Noagah, 2013). Civil society groups have been active in providing relief and psychosocial support to victims during conflict situations. In addition, they provide useful peacebuilding support to government through serving on committees, facilitating cease fires and restoring peace (Noagah, 2013; Kaye & Beland; Tonah, 2012).

The preceding section shows the depth of strategies that have been employed by government, civil society and other stakeholders over the years in response to conflict situations. There is agreement that these measures largely do not result in lasting peace (Aikins, 2009; Tonah, 2012; Noagah, 2013; Annan, 2014). Whereas Tonah (2012) and Sowatey (2005) point to the politicization of these conflicts thereby making their

resolution complex and difficult, there is no evidence of any work done to understand the conditions that might favor the successful implementation of these strategies. Noagah's (2013) and Longi's (2014) separate works on the Bawku conflict provided insights into the challenges of the strategies. However, neither Noagah (2013) nor Longi (2014) delved into the conditions that might make transitional justice achieve lasting peace. Also, being an inter-ethnic conflict in a different region, the findings might not be appropriate for an intra-ethnic conflict such as the Dagbon one. As the United Nations (2010) explained, there is no one-size fits-all solutions because each transitional justice programme should be designed and implemented uniquely within a specific context. This study seeks to fill this knowledge gap with respect to an intra-ethnic conflict.

Chapter three outlines the methods that were employed to carry out the qualitative study based on the tools that were used after the outbreak of war in Dagbon in March 2002.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

The purpose of the previous two chapters was to review, analyze and present literature on conflicts in Africa and in Ghana and the responses of government and civil society groups to conflict situations. This was done with the view to understanding what is known about the impact of transitional justice on the resolution of conflicts and the maintenance of peace in Ghana and where the research gaps are. The synthesis from the scholarly work was also intended to inform the design and methodology of this study. Evidence from literature demonstrated that whereas a lot of work has been done to understand the causes of conflicts, there is inadequate knowledge to explain the conditions under which the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice might yield lasting peace. In all the studies reviewed, qualitative research approaches were used except the work of Noagah (2013) which employed mixed methods.

The works of Fisher (2009), Bar-Tall (1998), Millar (2012) and Noagah (2013) among others demonstrated the utility of the theory of Protracted Social Conflict in analyzing and understanding conflicts that are protracted in nature. As the Dagbon conflict is one of such protracted conflicts, and the research questions required an exploration to understand what the impacts of transitional justice mechanisms might be, a qualitative study was designed with the Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) theory and the concepts of transitional justice as its theoretical foundation. This helped in understanding the mix of conditions that might make transitional justice processes and mechanisms to

work in a post-conflict situation. This chapter describes the qualitative research methodology and how it was employed to understand the conditions under which transitional justice mechanisms might work to yield lasting peace.

This chapter outlines the research methodology employed including a description of the key concepts and variables used in the study. It also describes the research design, the participants of the study, the instruments used to collect data to answer the research questions and the steps that were employed to protect participants. The chapter ends with a clarification of how other ethical issues were handled and how data and information generated were verified to make them trustworthy.

Research Design and Rationale

The qualitative exploratory study was chosen to help in gaining a deeper understanding of the conditions that might respond most favorably to transitional justice strategies in Dagbon. The guiding questions for this research included:

- Q1. What is the nature of the strategies for transitional justice implemented after the 2006 peace accord?
- Q2. What are the challenges associated with these strategies?
- Q3. What might help to make the strategies more responsive to peacebuilding?

The study was aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of the various transitional justice mechanisms that were implemented in Dagbon, their nature, characteristics, and impact on the three broad elements of the protracted conflict theory (the genesis, process and outcome stages) and why lasting peace has not been achieved. Specifically, at the

genesis stage, the set of conditions that were responsible for the eruption of violence in Dagbon in March 2002 were explored with the view to understanding the situation of communal content, human needs, and the role of the state during and after the peace accord of 2006 and the linkages in all these variables. At the *process* stage, the processes of engagement and implementation of the various strategies for conflict resolution and maintenance of peace and how these initiatives and processes targeted and addressed initial grievances of communities and individuals identified in the earlier stage was investigated. The last stage, is the *outcome analysis*, where the outcomes were explored to understand the results that were attained and why, the factors/conditions which led to those outcomes, and what strategies and/or conditions would have worked better to achieve lasting peace. This stage also included an analysis of the impacts of the transitional justice mechanisms on local leadership, institutions and governance, perception and individual as well as communal satisfaction and improved physical security. As the individual participants of the study were empowered to tell their stories about what worked or did not work and why, it led me to further understand and clarifying the conditions under which transitional justice strategies could be more responsive to peace-building.

The way key concepts are understood is important in explaining what is learnt from the stories that participants shared. In this study, “transitional justice” was used to refer to the combination of judicial and non-judicial processes and tools implemented since the outbreak of hostilities in Dagbon in March 2002, with the aim of addressing the human rights abuses and to restore peace (ICTJ, 2009). It included the measures and

processes that were undertaken to investigate wrong-doing and punish perpetrators of human rights violations (retributive justice) and those that focused on healing, relationship and long-lasting peace-building (restorative peace).

The study was a qualitative exploratory one based on the constructivist paradigm to allow for a deeper understanding of the types and nature of transitional justice strategies (Creswell, 2013; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; O' Sullivan, Russel & Berner, 2008) that were implemented when the conflict broke out in 2002, and after the peace accord was signed in 2006. As the view is held by social constructivists, I understand that answers to research questions can be derived from a variety of sources (Creswell, 2013) so the study was guided by this world view. Yin (1981) and Creswell (2013) have advised that for researches that require a detailed exploration of a phenomenon and drawing information from multiple sources, a qualitative case study research is recommended. Drawing information from multiple sources helped to provide a complete picture of the issue under investigation and improved the quality of research outcomes (O' Sullivan, Russel & Berner, 2008). This study required that individuals were given the space to share their experiences and views about the transitional justice processes and tools that were implemented in Dagbon. Further, the Dagbon traditional area is a "bounded system" (Creswell, 2013 p.97) where a real case was studied. Stake (2005) and Yin (2009) explained that under such conditions, a case study research is recommended. According to O' Sullivan, Russel and Berner (2008), a key strength of the qualitative case study approach is its ability to provide detailed information that meets the needs of the administrator. The contemporary administrator will need trustworthy information on why

the strategies are not achieving the desired peace or why the achievement has only been modest and what can be done differently to ensure that there is lasting peace. The case study approach was deemed to be the only way to generate such information. Some other methods, including narrative, grounded theory, phenomenology, and ethnography, have been put forward by scholars as suitable for approaches for qualitative enquiries (Creswell, 2013; Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). These approaches were however not suitable for this study. A narrative approach for example focuses on the experience of a few people. This study required more than the experience of one person or a few people. The intention was to focus on two identity groups and explore the impact of transitional justice strategies on the conflict resolution outcomes. A narrative will also not provide the level of analysis and deeper understanding of the problem under investigation. Creswell (2013 p.70) has explained that in a narrative, the focus is on the lived experience of one or two individuals about a phenomenon or where the researcher tries to make connections in a chronological manner. This study looked at the perceptions of thirteen individuals and two focus groups (men and women) of four each about the impacts of transitional justice mechanisms. The analysis and conclusions were made by drawing from these varied sources of information which would not have been possible under the narrative approach. Also, although the generation of theory was not ruled out in this study, this was not the main purpose. This study aimed to have an in-depth exploration and understanding of the conditions under which transitional justice processes and mechanisms might work. Therefore, ethnography was not suitable in this case because the focus was not on an “intact culture-sharing group” (Creswell, 2013 p. 123). A

phenomenology was not suitable either because the focus of the research went beyond individuals who lived the 2002 Dagbon conflict (Anderson & Spencer, 2002). The enquiry involved interviewing representatives of organizations and institutions that were involved in implementing the transitional justice strategies during and after the peace accord was signed in 2006 as well as making use of varied information from secondary sources.

The Role of the Researcher

Creswell (2013) has explained that in a qualitative study, researchers “have a personal history that situates them as enquirers” (p.51). As an observer and interviewer in this study, I brought to bear my constructivist world view about research and deep experience about conflicts. Having lived through three different ethnic conflicts in a different part of Ghana, I brought to bear this lived experience. From my experience, I know the value of using multiple sources of information as well as triangulation to be able to arrive at the truth on an issue in a post-conflict environment. My knowledge about conflicts and the key actors involved in one way or the other was helpful in selecting participants for the study, in the design of interview guides and during interviews. As a development worker and change agent, I am passionate about ending conflicts because of their negative impacts on development, society and humanity. These values, beliefs and experiences were brought to bear on the research.

To manage bias, the case study was chosen outside my own area. Using my neutrality, careful selection and training of an interpreter, I ensured a collaborative

interview process as suggested by Kvale and Brinkmann (2009). To allow participants to share information freely without fear, the identity of participants was never a requirement and hence they were protected.

Research Methodology

This section outlines the methods employed in this study. It includes a description of the study population, sample size and sampling strategy, the data collection instruments, how the data was collected, managed and analyzed. It also includes how data was treated (to ensure that the results are trustworthy) as well as how ethical issues were handled.

Study Population and Participants

A clear definition of the bounded area is important in every qualitative case study (Creswell, 2013; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). This study was about the conflict between the Andanis and the Abudus in the Dagbon Traditional Area (DTA). These are the two main gates of the Dagbon ethnic group who both lay claim to the paramountcy of the Dagomba Traditional Area or “Dagbon” as it is traditionally referred to. With an estimated population of more than one million inhabitants (Tonah, 2012), the DTA is home to several ethnic groups dominated by the Dagomba but includes others such as Gonja, Manprusi and Akan (Tonah, 2012). However, as this study concerned an intra-ethnic conflict, information was drawn from only the Dagomba ethnic group. Also, although there are many conflicts in that same area, data for this study was drawn from individuals from these two rival gates as well as representatives of organizations and security

agencies that played a role on the conflict of 2002. The scope of the study was limited to the conflict which occurred in 2002 and the measures that were put in place to resolve it and restore lasting peace after the peace accord was signed in 2006.

The participants of this study were individuals from both the Andani and Abudugates, as well as representatives of non-state actors who were involved in resolving the conflict in one way or the other. Participants were purposively selected based on their knowledge, experience and involvement in implementing or benefiting from the transitional justice strategies between 2006 and 2015 (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994; Creswell, 2013). The rationale behind the use of purposive sampling was to ensure that only individuals, communities and organizations who had information relating to the conflict, and the processes and mechanisms to restore peace were considered for sampling (Creswell, 2013 p.156). Further, as advised by Asmussen and Creswell (1995), I ensured that there was maximum variation, where within the purposive sample population, all likely sources of data variation were identified and considered in the final sample for interview. This ensured that all possible perspectives concerning the research questions were reflected.

Sample Size

Creswell (1995, 2013), Pinnegar and Daynes (2007), and Wertz (2005) have provided useful guidelines about sample size in qualitative research which guided this study. According to them, the sample size in a qualitative study should be small enough to allow for extensive and detailed investigation of the phenomenon from the individual or site. The intention in this study was not to generalize the findings for all intra ethnic

conflicts but to limit it to Dagbon and to the experiences during the 2002 conflict.

Therefore, interviews were conducted within this purposively selected sample, ensuring maximum variation as much as possible. After interviewing thirteen individuals, a focus group of four men and four women, I reached data saturation and stopped the process.

Data Collection Procedures and Instruments

Creswell (2013) has cautioned that data collection in qualitative studies goes beyond consideration around the types of data and the procedures involved in collecting them, to include “gaining permissions, conducting a good sampling strategy, developing means for recording information, ...storing the data, and anticipating the ethical issues that may arise” (p. 145). This sub-section of the study describes how the sites and individuals were located including gaining access to both the individuals and the site, how data was collected and stored, and the ethical issues that arose and how these were handled.

Site selection and sampling strategy.

The sites for this study as well as the first set of potential lists of individuals were identified with the help of a representative of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). Subsequently, other participants were identified and selected through snowball sampling techniques. This is a non-probability sampling technique which relies on referrals from an initial primary respondent or participant until the number of participants required for the study is reached. According to Flint and Atkinson (2004), this technique is useful in studies where the identification of research participants is

difficult for one reason or the other. The technique takes advantage of the social network and experience of the primary contact to locate other potential participants. Therefore, the snowball technique was employed in this study because it was not easy to identify the victims and communities that were worst hit by the war. In the same way, some of the organizations, (including WANEP itself), had changed management or moved out of the area so identifying them was not easy. The West African Network for Peace (WANEP) was used as the primary contact. WANEP is one of the most credible non-governmental organizations in Ghana that has been at the forefront of peacebuilding in Dagbon since 2002 (Tonah, 2012). WANEP supported in community entry and identification of the first set of participants for individual interviews and focus group discussions. The insights of WANEP also facilitated the classification of potential participants as key informants (Goulding, 2002) in such a way that the experiences of participants who are eventually enrolled for the interview represented their sub-populations.

It was equally important to pre-determine the communities/skins from which individuals will be drawn. These communities were determined based on the advice of WANEP. A deliberate attempt was made to cross-check this with other credible non-governmental organizations that operated in the DTA. Just like individuals, communities were listed based on their experience during the 2002 conflict and the subsequent post-conflict processes and mechanisms put in place during and after the peace accord in 2006. Once a list of potential communities had been drawn, final selection was informed by the population size and status of the chiefs that ruled those communities. The purpose of this was to ensure that there was a fair representation of perspectives from all

communities and to “maximize differences” (Creswell, 2013 p. 157). Individual participants were then selected (this time independently from the influence of WANEP) from these communities and interviews conducted until data saturation point was reached.

Once identified, an initial check by phone was done with potential participants to ascertain their availability, their preliminary consent, location and interview preference before they were physically contacted to give their preliminary consent to participate in the study. Preliminary consent here helped to draw up a tentative list of participants from whom information could be solicited and to help determine interpretation needs during field work.

The participants in this study were adults above the age of 18. No one below this age was contacted for information relating to this study. Each participant was required to voluntarily participate after signing a consent form or consenting verbally. However, during the interview, if people felt they could not continue for any reason, they were free to withdraw. To protect the confidentiality of participants, the interpreter was made to complete confidentiality form. Spouses of females who participated in individual interviews and focus group discussions were also contacted to provide their consent before such women took part. Further, as Creswell (2013) and Lipson (1994) have advised, to protect the anonymity of participants, the information collected did not bear any names of the participants. Numbers were used rather than names for identification, storage and retrieval purposes and only the researcher knew and had access to information collected from the field. A description of how other ethical issues were

addressed is discussed in the subsequent sections. Copies of all forms and tools used can be found in the appendix.

Gaining access.

The process of gaining access to communities and individuals started after obtaining approval from the Institutional Review Board of Walden University. This was necessary to build rapport with these individuals before data collection commenced. I relied on the help of the community partner, WANEP, an organization with long standing relationship with the chiefs and opinion leaders in the Dagbon Traditional Area. Through their help, the gatekeepers were identified and used to help in entering the communities. With each community chief, elder or individual participant, the purpose of the study was explained to them, why their community was chosen, exactly what the study entailed, participant selection criteria as well as the duration of the entire research. They were also educated about their roles, the usefulness of the study to them as individuals and members of their community, and how the results of the study will be utilized. They were informed about the voluntary nature of the study and their liberty to choose to accept to participate or opt out.

Recruiting and training an interpreter.

As I was not totally conversant with the local language, an interpreter was recruited. This person was trained for three days prior to the commencement of field work. The training covered the meanings of terminologies used in the study, understanding the tools, the need for confidentiality, and the importance of saying what the participants said accurately. The dos and don'ts of the research process including the

importance of him not contacting any participant about the research when the investigator is not physically present. The training also covered the following broad areas:

1. Ethical principles in research involving human subjects
2. Walden University's regulations and Ghana's laws and requirements on the protection of human subjects in research
3. The role and importance of informed consent, privacy and confidentiality
4. Anticipated problems in research and reporting requirements

To reduce biases, this person was purposively selected based on his thorough understanding of both the language and study area. I also made sure he was not from the ethnic group under study. After training, the interpreter went through the agreement and confidentiality forms and signed. This agreement form is attached in Appendix C

Data collection procedures and tools.

John Creswell (2013 p.160) and Quinn Patton (2015 p.432) have put forward many approaches for collecting data in qualitative studies. These include observation, review of documents, interviews, and focus group discussions. This study employed a mix of these methods. Observation was used to gather field notes and physical evidence of restorative measures that were put in place after 2002. Also, as some of the information was available in various forms of documents and archival material, a review of these documents was done. In addition to the journals that were kept each day during field work, available public documents on the conflict were collected and analyzed later. Primary data was collected mainly through face-to-face interviews using individual interview guides (Appendix K). This was aimed at ensuring uniformity of enquiry across

all the individuals interviewed and to ensure that during each interview, all possible areas relevant to the study are exhausted (Patton, 2015 p.438). However, conversational techniques of interviewing were used to enable a deeper exploration and probing based on the responses that participants gave (Conrad, 2011; Patton, 2015). The use of interview guides also helped in managing the researcher's time, whilst allowing the participants the flexibility to explain themselves within the limits of the issues. There were no disagreements with time or venues so the alternative option of using Skype did not arise.

The interview process was in two stages. The first part was to build a good rapport with the participant and to get their consent (verbal or written). At this stage, the purpose of the research, uses, relevance to the research participants and the community and how they will be protected from being identified subsequently were explained. If they are happy to participate and sign the consent form or consent verbally, then the interview began. The second part of the interview delved into the questions structured along the objectives of the study using the interview guide in Appendix K.

The interviews were conducted at locations decided by the participants themselves. This was to make them feel as comfortable as possible. As the DTA is predominantly Muslim, the consent of the husbands of female participants was sought, in line with Muslim practice, before the interview proceeded. To create trust, if there was the need for an additional person to stay with the women during the process of the interview, this was permitted but the participant (in this case the spouse) had to sign a confidentiality form. The spousal confidentiality forms for men sitting in interviews of

their spouses during both individual interviews and focus group discussions are respectively found Appendices I and J. Their corresponding spousal consent forms are found in the appendix as G and F for individual interviews and focus group discussions respectively.

In addition to individual interviews, information about the perceptions of groups of men and women regarding the adequacy of interventions or engagements in peacebuilding initiatives, were collected in two separate focus group discussions: one for men and another for women. It was thought that the views of men about the adequacy or otherwise of interventions might differ from those of women based on differences in gender roles. Each group numbered four and were asked questions from an interview guide as found in Appendix L. Like for individual interviews, all participants were informed about their rights to participate or opt out, pull out during the process of the discussion if they felt so and were also assured about the confidentiality and use of the data for only academic purposes. The participant consent forms that were administered for individual interviews and focus group discussions are found in the appendix as D and E respectively.

To ensure that all participants understand clearly what is required of them in terms of both the questions as well as their rights during the interviews, the relevant tools were translated into the local language, Dagbani. These are found in Appendices N to U. These were back translated into English by a separate set of translators as a check for accuracy.

Field data storage and management.

All field data was hand-written and later typed out and stored on two different laptops which were password protected and in OneDrive as well as Dropbox to ensure that there are multiple copies. However, the main working file was stored in NVivo. All these copies are password protected to ensure that no one can access them easily. Hard copy documents have been stored in files. These have been organized by how relevant they are to specific objectives and by date. Any relevant information such as the location and contact persons necessary for retrieval purposes were added before analysis started.

Data analysis.

Creswell (2013) has explained that data analysis in qualitative research involves preparing and organizing data, reducing the data into themes through coding, and representing the data into figures, tables or a discussion. Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2014) also advised that data analysis should go on concurrently with data collection if the researcher is to avoid being frustrated and overwhelmed in the process of analysis. With these in mind, a four-stage process of data analysis was employed with on-site analysis central to my plans for analysis. On-site analysis involved preparing journals on all aspects of the data collected including observations. As I gathered documents too, I made notes on each document so that once I revisit them, I can re-collect the information associated with the documents. This phase also involved building a preliminary coding frame which was developed as the interviews are conducted.

The second phase involved organizing the information collected in such a way as to permit storage. All hard copies were stored in well labelled files. Typed out-scripts

were exported into NVivo ready for the next stage of the analysis. The third stage involved reading through the entire data set thoroughly to get a sense of how the big picture of the data is like. At this stage, the information was re-organized according to research objectives with notes and comments written on the margins of hard copies. This helped in getting an understanding of the level of completeness of information required per objective and in identifying information gaps. Data gaps were immediately addressed through follow-up visits and additional interviews.

The fourth phase of the data analysis process dealt with describing the data. At this phase, the codes that were developed during the data collection process were revised based on the patterns that had started emerging from the data. In addition to this, I reviewed the analytical framework and research questions to refine the codes. This final phase also involved the actual coding of the data generated from the surveys and transforming the codes into themes using NVivo. Once these were done, the patterns that emerged from the data then became the basis for reporting results under each research question. As part of this process, the observed patterns also formed the basis for triangulation from literature as a means of ensuring trustworthiness and reducing bias.

Dealing with Reliability, Trustworthiness and Ethical Issues

According to Vogt (2005 p.74) one limitation of the case study design is the fact that it is cross-sectional. Data for this study was collected over a two-week period. The reliability of information depended on the ability of participants to recall all the events

that happened after the peace accord was signed in 2006. It is also likely that people's perceptions about the impact of these interventions and processes may have changed over time but this cannot be captured in a cross-sectional study such as this one. It therefore has the potential of reducing the trustworthiness of the results. To deal with these I ensured that detailed field notes were kept of each day of field visit. Also, an effort was made to remind participants of critical milestone events that happened around the same time to help them recall. As already stated too, only blind coding was used throughout the study. To ensure consistency of coding and interpretation, only the researcher developed and used codes and coding frames. As no other person was involved in the analysis of data, disagreements over multiple uses and meanings of codes did not arise.

Another relevant issue is the threat to quality. This can arise mainly through interpretation and transcription of data. This is because of my own limitation of the local language; hence I depended on the quality of interpretation. To minimize this, I ensured that the interpreter was well trained in all aspects of the research including ethics. This ensured that all the issues were covered and that he understood what was expected of him as well as how his actions and inactions can affect the quality of the research.

Creswell (2013) and Lincoln and Guba (1985) have recommended a set of strategies to improve the trustworthiness in qualitative research. The most relevant of these strategies which was employed in this study included triangulation, persistent observation, and member-checking and external audits. In line with constructivist tradition, the study relied on information drawn from multiple sources and these were used to support or contradict findings and conclusions of the study. As Yin (1994) has

explained, if researchers use the rigor of natural sciences in their research processes, there is the likelihood that their results will be trustworthy.

Throughout the process, a conscious effort was made to use peers for reviews of mostly the protocols and draft findings and conclusions as an external check on the process. Once the first draft was ready, another external audit in the form of using a leading scholar to review the report was employed. Finally, to improve trustworthiness of the research, I identified some participants who had the capacity and were willing to serve as “member-checkers” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985 p.314).

I was also mindful of other ethical issues in the study. These relate mainly to privacy risks, fairness in the selection of participants, issues of informed consent and what Creswell (2013) referred to as “deception or covert activities” (p.174). Being a conflict prone area, individuals who agreed to participate in the study were protected in such a way that their participation did not negatively affect them in any way in society. Also, those selected for the survey were not based on reasons of their vulnerability status or ease of contact, and all participants were engaged willingly and on their own volition. To prevent deception, I ensured that the purpose of the research was well and accurately reported to participants always before the interviews started. These were also written on all protocols as a reminder. All these ethical issues and my plan to address them were articulated in my application to the Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) and approval obtained before field work commenced.

Summary of Chapter Three

This chapter described the methods that were employed to conduct the study and included a detailed explanation of the rationale for using the qualitative case study approach. The chapter also included a description of the study population, participants, data collection procedures and tools that were used in the study. Data were managed and analysed with the aid of NVivo software. The chapter ended with a description of how ethical issues in the study were handled. In the following chapter, the results of the study are presented and analysed.

Chapter 4. Results

Introduction

There is a problem with persisting ethnic conflicts in Ghana. A review of literature showed that most of them involve wide scale destruction of property and massive human rights violations. Governments and civil society groups have over the years implemented several transitional justice mechanisms but these have largely been ineffective in resolving them and restoring peace. Rather, they persist and are protracted in nature. The Dagbon intra-ethnic conflict is one of these protracted persistent conflicts.

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to provide a deeper understanding of the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice implemented in the Dagbon Traditional Area after war broke out between the Andanis and the Abudus in 2002. The study was conducted with the view to examining the nature, effectiveness and appropriateness of the tools for transitional justice and to understand the conditions under which they can respond most appropriately to resolve conflicts maintain peace in Dagbon. The central research question which guided the study was: what conditions might respond most favorably to the transitional justice strategies in Dagbon? Three sub-questions were asked:

1. What is the nature of the strategies for transitional justice implemented after the 2006 peace accord?
2. What are the challenges associated with these strategies?
3. What might help to make the strategies more responsive to peacebuilding?

This chapter presents the results of the study. It begins with an introduction, describes the research setting followed by a description of the demographics of research participants and how the data were collected. The chapter also describes how the data were analyzed in response to the research questions, and includes a description of how issues of trustworthiness were handled. It ends with a summary of the entire chapter.

Setting

Data collection for this study was done three months after national parliamentary and presidential elections were held (December 7th) and a new government inaugurated on January 7th, 2017. A review of literature had pointed to political influence in the Dagbon dispute (Aikins, 2009; Tonah, 2012). Owing to this and bearing in mind that the election experience would still be fresh in people's minds, the responses of some participants may have been influenced by the immediate past elections and it is important to note this.

Demographics

Data for this study were collected from three broad categories of participants: representatives of civil society groups who were involved in one way or the other in the peace process after 2002, chiefs and individual members of the communities who were affected by the conflict. Individuals, representatives of civil society groups and chiefs were interviewed through key informant interviews using open-ended questions. To make the data representative, three chiefs each were interviewed from each gate. Only representatives of civil society groups who were present in 2002 and participated in the peace process were interviewed. In all, the combined number of chiefs, opinion leaders

and civil society representatives numbered thirteen (eight chiefs and opinion leaders and five representatives of civil society groups). Some individual members of affected communities were also interviewed through focus group discussions of four men and four women. Both men and women were selected from a list of men and women who were affected by the war and were involved in the community peace processes. This list, comprising 23 men and 19 women, was provided the community partner (WANEP). The final list of four men and four women was selected without the knowledge and influence of the community partner. Therefore, the total number of people interviewed was twenty-one (21). The number of participants from each location is shown in table 1.

Table 1

Number of Participants by Source, Location and Frequency

Individual Interviews	Source	Location	Number of Participants
	Chiefs and Opinion Leaders	Baanvim	1
		Yendi	3
		Tolon	1
		Mion	1
		Tamale	2
	Civil Society	Tamale	3
		Accra	2
	Table continues		
Focus Group Discussions	Community Members	Yendi	4 men, 4 women

Data Collection Process

Data were collected through key informant interviews, focus group discussions and review of documents. Before field work started, I sought for and obtained the approval of the Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) with approval number 01-19-17-0466118. The notice of approval was deposited at the Navrongo Institutional Review Board for their information as required. I then identified an interpreter and trained him for one week before I entered the community with the help of my community partner, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, WANEP).

The community partner introduced me to the communities and helped in identifying the first set of potential participants. The potential participants were contacted by phone and those who agreed to participate in the study were listed and appointments made for interviews. The community partner did not know the eventual participants as some others were determined through snowball sampling technique. For focus group discussions, the same method was employed. The community partner helped by providing a list of forty-two (42) men and women. From this list, four men and four women were identified and enrolled for the discussions. This final list was purposively selected based on their knowledge of what happened during the conflict of 2002. A further attempt was made to ensure a balance of representation between the two gates. The final participants (four men and four women) were selected without the knowledge and influence of the community partner. In all cases, the consent of each person was obtained (verbally or in writing) before interviews proceeded. All those husbands who

wanted to sign or thumbprint and keep a copy of the consent form for themselves were given the opportunity to do so. Each of them was given copies of the signed consent forms. On the other hand, those husbands who preferred to simply give a verbal consent could do so. It was explained to them that both verbal and signed consent had the same effect and that it was for them to choose how they wanted to express their consent. Before the commencement of interviews, interview dates, venues and time were confirmed in advance before the actual interviews. All participants were told the purpose and benefits of the research and the fact that it was voluntary and their participation or non-participation would not affect them in any way. I emphasized throughout that the research was for purely academic purposes and the results will not be used for any other purpose other than what was stated. I assured each of them that their names were not required and would not be linked to any information they provided. In the case of female respondents, their spouses consented for their wives' participation before the interviews proceeded. In Dagbon custom, a woman is not allowed to speak to a "stranger" without the consent of their husbands. In the absence of their husband, his immediate relative must consent before she can engage the stranger in such a conversation. Therefore, seeking the consent of husbands before an interview is conducted with women is in keeping with Dagbon customary practices. All interviews were conducted face to face in the houses of the respondents. Focus group discussions were held in the house of a chief where they usually met. Once these individuals agreed to participate and gave their consent, the interviews commenced. Individual interviews took an average of one hour thirty minutes for each participant, while focus group discussions took an hour each for

men and women. In addition to interviews and focus group discussions, I observed the principal streets of Yendi for evidence of any monuments or memorials that might have been built in honor of victims

Besides individual interviews and focus group discussions, further work was done reviewing archives as a means of getting details on some references that were made and to triangulate information obtained through interviews and focus group discussions. During the interviews, reference was made to some legislative instruments and specific Supreme Court rulings on the dispute. These were all verified and information available in hard copies were photocopied and stored separately in files.

All data was recorded in a field note book and later typed and imported into NVivo. Daily journals were also kept for every day of the interview. Through this, all the observations, notes and key issues found were recorded. Some of these included sources of material given by the participants, links to other key informants and appointments.

As a result of frequent changes in police and army personnel stationed in Yendi, none of those present met the inclusion criteria. Therefore, no one from security personnel was interviewed. The data collection process was smooth and no incidence was recorded throughout the two weeks that the interviews lasted. In the following subsection, I present a description of how the data were analyzed.

Data Analysis

In line with the advice of Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2014), I started data analysis on the field by ensuring that the data collected were prepared and organized. This involved ensuring that the information was carefully typed and the interview transcripts for those interviews that the participants agreed to proof-read (member-checking) were proof read and corrected where necessary. The set of interview scripts were then organized according to research question to ensure that there were no data gaps. As data collection was going on too, recurring codes were noted in the daily journal such that by the end of the interview, the first set of codes had already been generated. Once the data was imported into NVivo, further codes were generated and later transformed into categories. The codes and categories generated from individual interviews and focus group discussions are discussed in the following sections.

Data Analysis from Interviews

Question 1. What is the nature of the strategies for transitional justice implemented after the 2006 peace accord?

This question aimed to explore the experience of participants about the initiatives implemented to compensate victims of human rights abuses and to restore peace. Specifically, it sought to know whether there were any trials, punishments and if there were, whether these were deterrent enough to prevent future occurrences? It also sought to find out from participants whether anything was done to restore the dignity of victims, address their needs and create space for perpetrators to make confessions and seek forgiveness, and finally whether anything was done to build confidence in the chieftaincy

institution? The answers to these questions were meant to lead naturally to the next question about challenges of these initiatives.

The codes that emerged were descriptions of various retributive and restorative mechanisms including: “curfew imposed”, “arrests and detentions made”, “false trials”, “trial for the sake of trial”, “no punishments”, “no deterrent”, “committee established”, “rehabilitation farms established”, “no relief”, “no rehabilitation”, “killers not identified”, “no true killers”, “accused acquitted and discharged”, “commission established”, “regent enskinned”, “NGO consortium formed”, “illegal release of accused persons”, “poor trial”, “ineffective investigation of complaints”, “biased security agencies”, “release of accused persons on remand” and “failure of the army”. Most of these responses meant the same thing although they were said differently, similar codes were brought together under one category. A common category that explained other codes was identified to stand for the others. For example: “false trial” and “trial for the sake of trial”, and “fake trial”, were taken to mean the same thing. In this case, the category “false trial” was used to represent “fake trial” and “trial for the sake of trial” codes. Codes that were repeated by several other participants, (for example, “committee of eminent chiefs formed”, “no relief or rehabilitation”, “arrests and detention”, and “no show of remorse”) were taken forward unchanged according to the number of people who mentioned them in their responses. Responses which were outliers (for example, “Biased Security” and “failure of the army”) were transformed into categories as they were given. Table 2 provides a summary of how these categories were obtained

Table 2

An example of how categories and their frequencies were identified for Question 1

Codes	Category	Frequency
False trial (2) Fake trial (2) Trial for the sake of trial (1) No serious trial (1)	False trial	6
Committee of Eminent Chiefs formed (12) Committee of Chiefs set-up (1)	Committee of Eminent Chiefs formed	13
No deterrent (8)	No deterrent	8
Failure of the army	Failure of the army	1
Biased Security	Biased security	1

Using the above example, the responses to question one were summarized as presented in table 3.

Table 3

Summary of Categories from Responses to Research Question 1

Research Question	Category	Frequency
Q1. What is the nature of the strategies for transitional justice implemented after the 2006 peace accord?	Curfew imposed	13
	Arrests and detention	13
	False trials	6
	No honor done to victims	9
	No true killers identified	8
	Committee of Eminent Chiefs formed	13
	Commission of Enquiry established	13
	Rehabilitation farms established	5
	NGO Consortium formed	4
	Reconciliation of families	5
	No relief or rehabilitation	6
	Community farms established	5
	Inappropriate truth telling	7
	Release of accused persons on remand	6
	No deterrent	8
	Regent enskinned	12
	Perpetrators not punished	7
	No show of remorse	6
	Failure of the army	1
Biased security	1	

From the responses, all the participants agreed that a curfew was imposed on Yendi. This was necessary to help calm down tension. All the participants also agreed that some people were arrested and detained by the law enforcement agencies. However, the outcomes of these arrests and detentions were mixed from the perspective of the participants. Six of the participants were not happy with the trial and investigation processes. Another six (6) of the participants claimed that the trial process was faulty to the extent that some of the accused persons were illegally released from custody (6 participants) others felt that the security agencies even failed in their duty (2). Eight (8) felt that the true killers of the Ya-Naa were not identified and punished and hence no deterrent can be said to have been served. All thirteen (13) participants also identified the

fact that a Committee of Eminent Chiefs and the Justice Wuaku Commission which were set up. A review of documents helped to shed more light on both institutions. The Wuaku Commission was set up on 25th April 2002 by President John Kufuor through a constitutional instrument C.136 of 2002. The Commission was to investigate the Yendi disturbances, identify perpetrators and make recommendations to the President. The Committee of Eminent Chiefs (CEC) took over from the Wuaku Commission and was charged to find a traditional solution to the conflict. The Justice Wuaku Commission was therefore a truth-seeking instrument whilst the Committee of Eminent Chiefs was a mechanism for mediation and conflict resolution.

From the responses to question one, one sees a mix of both retributive and restorative strategies which included criminal prosecution, truth seeking, mediation, reparation initiatives, and institutional strengthening. The tools and processes were mostly formal in nature. Apart from the Committee of Eminent Chiefs which was mandated to find traditional solutions to the conflict, the rest of the processes used by law enforcement agencies, the truth-seeking process of the Wuaku Commission were based on formal rules. These initiatives produced mixed outcomes. Eight (8) felt that no true killers were identified and hence justice was not served to the victims. Six (6) participants felt that the perpetrators failed to show remorse and hence there can be no forgiveness. The challenges associated with these initiatives are discussed in question 2.

Question 2: What were the challenges associated with these strategies?

The purpose of this question was to further understand the challenges that were associated with the strategies. In the previous question, participants gave indications that there were issues with the various initiatives. In this question, they were given the opportunity to explain further, what these challenges were which made the achievement of the anticipated results difficult.

The process of identifying categories was the same as was done for question 1. Where some of the codes were similar, a category which represented the rest was chosen and a combined frequency for all similar codes assigned to the emerging category as demonstrated in table 4.

Table 4.

Identification of categories from codes to question 2

Codes	Category	Frequency
Ineffective investigation (3) Failure to accept evidence (3) Poor investigation (1)	Poor investigation	7
Interference from elite (8) Influence on the committee Government pressure (5)	Influence on the committee	13
Inadequate role of civil society (13)	Inadequate role of civil society	13
No interest from government (6) Lack of political will (5)	Lack of political will	11

Some of the codes generated from the responses included: “ineffective investigation”, “failure to accept evidence in court”, “poor handling of some delegates”, “weak role assigned to civil society”, “hasty trials”, “weakened institution of chieftaincy”,

“interference from elite”. Other codes included “inadequate knowledge of Dagbon traditions”, “abandonment of traditional conflict resolution and peacebuilding approaches”, “inappropriate process leadership” and “conflict between traditional institutions and formal structures”. In all, thirty-one (31) codes were identified for this question. These were re-grouped into twelve (12) categories as presented in table 5.

Table 5

Summary of Categories from Responses to Research Question 2

Research Question	Category	Frequency
Q2. What are the challenges associated with these strategies?	Poor investigation	7
	Lack of political will	11
	Influence on the work of the committee	13
	Inappropriate selection of delegates for committees	7
	Poor handling of some delegates	9
	Inadequate role of civil society	13
	Weak traditional institutions	3
	Dependence on elite	5
	Poor consultation and inclusion	7
	Role conflict: formal and informal institutions	10
	Inadequate knowledge of Dagbon culture	9
	Inappropriate truth-seeking approaches	13

From the responses, the challenges related mostly to the processes of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the credibility of the institutions as well as the leadership and ownership of the entire process. Participants from both sides (13) complained of influence on the work of both the Wuaku Commission and that of the Committee of Eminent Chiefs (CEC). Some of the participants (7) complained about the exclusion of some prominent chiefs in the peace process and the inability of the remaining chiefs to make meaningful contribution to the process. Related to this was the feeling of others that the poor treatment/handling of some of the delegates (the older ones) made their

continued active participation impossible. This meant that those delegates could not effectively contribute to the process. In like manner, seven (7) of the participants felt that there wasn't enough consultation and inclusion. All (13) participants particularly felt that civil society groups were not given the right roles to play in the peace process. Therefore, this affected the credibility and independence that was required to make the process successful. Finally, the fact that the process was not led by the Dagbon traditional council affected the fortunes of the process. Some participants (9) mentioned that the CEC lacked adequate knowledge of Dagbon culture and traditions and this, in addition to the inappropriate truth-seeking approaches employed by the Wuaku Commission, made the effective and fast resolution of the conflict difficult. Ten (10) participants cited role conflict between formal and informal rules as the main challenge which affected the outcome of the peace process. The participants explained that some of the practices adopted by both the Wuaku Commission and the CEC (for example truth telling, decision making in times of disagreements, and indeed the entire conflict resolution procedures) conflicted with what they know, believe in and practice in Dagbon. A few (3) of the participants thought that the fact that most skins are occupied by regents makes them lack the authority to take long lasting decisions.

Question 3: What might help to make the strategies more responsive to peacebuilding?

The purpose of this question was to explore the conditions under which the strategies for transitional justice might be more effective in achieving the required outcomes. Codes for this question included: “reduce influence of government”, “no sitting in camera”, “employ traditional methods of truth seeking”, “courage to implement court rulings”, “re-visit traditional approaches of conflict resolution”, “greater involvement of community members”, “ignore chieftaincy contractors”, “avoid delays in performing funerals of chiefs”, “ensure inclusive peacebuilding”, “respect custodians of Dagbon culture”, “enforce peace”, “increase civil society involvement”, “return leadership to Dagbon”, “meet community needs”, “strengthen Dagbon traditional Council first” and “recognize and integrate all efforts”

As was done for previous responses/codes, the similar ones were put together and a common category that most appropriately defines the like codes identified. A summary of these codes and categories for question 3 is shown in table 6.

Table 6.

Summary of how categories were identified for similar codes to question 3

Codes	Category
Reduce government influence (10)	Reduce role of government and chieftaincy contractors
Reduce influence of chieftaincy contractors (3)	
Use traditional methods of truth-seeking (9)	Employ traditional approaches (21)
Re-visit traditional methods of resolving conflicts in within the DTC (12)	
Respect Dagbon traditions and customs	
Give greater representation to community leaders (7)	Ensure inclusion of all stakeholders (13)
Ensure inclusive peacebuilding (3)	
Return process leadership to DTC (7)	Restore leadership role of DTC (13)
Restore leadership role of DTC (6)	

Table 7 shows the categories and their corresponding frequencies as summarized from the codes.

Table 7

Summary of Categories and their Frequencies for Question 3

Research Question	Category	Frequency
What might help to make the strategies more responsive to peacebuilding?	Reduce role of government and chieftaincy contractors	13
	No sitting in camera (11)	11
	Employ traditional approaches (21)	21
	Ensure inclusion of all stakeholders (13)	13
	Restore leadership role of DTC (13)	13
	Strengthen and support DTC	12
	Avoid delays in performing funerals of chiefs	3
	Meet community needs	6
	Greater facilitating role for civil society	5
	Commitment to enforcing court decisions.	7
	Ensure all efforts are coordinated and integrated	7

From the responses, one important condition under which transitional justice initiatives might have a greater chance of achieving peace in Dagbon is where there is reduced influence of government and other stakeholders such as the elite. All the participants were very clear that the role of successive governments in this chieftaincy succession dispute has not helped in resolving the dispute. Another important condition that run through the responses is the need for the initiatives and processes for resolving the conflict and building peace to be grounded in Dagbon culture and traditions. This was given twenty-one (21) times by the participants. Related to this, all thirteen (13) participants felt that the entire process ought to be led by the Dagbon Traditional Council. For this to work, twelve (12) participants suggested that the DTC must be strengthened and civil society given a much stronger role as process facilitators. Part of the reason why the initiatives were less successful was due to delays in performing the funerals of late chiefs. An important condition identified by three (3) participants for the success of

transitional justice was that funerals must be performed promptly to allow the souls of the departed to rest in peace so that the living will have the needed peace to work out how disputes can be settled. The importance of getting everyone involved in the peace process was mentioned by thirteen (13) participants. A final condition that was identified (7 participants) as a potential for the success of the transitional justice initiatives was the need for proper recognition to be given to the complementary initiatives that were implemented by other stakeholders, especially civil society. These they explained should be coordinated and integrated into the entire peace process.

Data Analysis from Focus Group Discussions

The purpose of having focus group discussions was to provide an opportunity to triangulate information on three questions collected through individual interviews. Also, the focus group discussions enabled participants to collectively recall events, their challenges and share opinions on the interventions that were implemented over the period and arrive at conclusions (as much as possible) on these three questions. Three questions were asked during the focus group discussions (FGDs):

1. Looking back, can you mention the strategies of transitional justice that were implemented in Dagbon after the peace accord was signed in March 2006?
2. In your opinion, were these successful in resolving the conflict and restoring peace? Please explain your answer.
3. If these were not successful, what might help to make the strategies more responsive to conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives?

In the following sub-sections, the data are presented and analyzed according to these three questions.

1. Question 1. Looking back, can you mention the strategies of transitional justice that were implemented in Dagbon after the peace accord was signed in March 2006?

The purpose of this question was to explore from participants what they knew about the initiatives that were implemented to resolve the conflict and restore lasting peace in Dagbon. The codes generated from the responses to this question included: “dusk to dawn curfew imposed”, “arrests”, “peacekeeping force established”, “reconciliation of families’ initiative”, “assessment of relief needs”, “state of emergency”, “provision of emergency food and clothing”, “Gbewa Palace rehabilitated”, “murdered Ya-Naa buried”, “two regents enskinned”, “commission of enquiry instituted”, “Committee of Eminent Chiefs formed”, “trial of some perpetrators”, “no punishment”, “and no remorse”. During discussions, as participants shared their views to the questions, the other participants showed their agreements by saying yes to them. Once there was a “yes” to a point made, it was recorded. In some cases, some views were shared but because they were outside the scope of the research, they were dropped. For example, some participants referred to “houses rehabilitated by some NGOs”. These were however found to be related to a different conflict within the DTA. As a result of this process of harmonization and agreement, there was consensus on the responses and categories. All resulting categories that emerged from the discussions of both men and women are presented in table 8. If anyone group member disagreed with any point mentioned, the

frequency was reduced by one and if there was consensus, the maximum response of 4 was entered.

Table 8

Summary of categories and Frequencies for FGDs on Question 1: Men and Women

Men		Women	
Categories	Frequency	Categories	Frequency
Curfew imposed	4	Curfew imposed	4
Arrests	4	Some Arrests made	4
Peacekeeping force established	4	Peacekeeping force established	4
State of emergency declared	4	Reconciliation of families' initiative	4
Provision of emergency relief	4	Provision of emergency relief	4
Wuaku Commission formed	4	Commission of enquiry	4
Otumfuo Committee Formed	4	Committee of Eminent Chiefs	4
Trial of some perpetrators	4	Trial of some perpetrators	4
No punishment	4	No punishment	4
Gbewa palace rehabilitated	4	No deterrent	4
Murdered King buried	4		
Regents enskinned	4		

The responses for both groups were a combination of initiatives that were aimed at restoring calm, keeping peace and ensuring that some form of reparations are given to victims. The group of men identified two categories that the women did not mention. These were the burial of the murdered King and the enskinment of regents to the contested Yendi paramountcy. The women on the other hand identified a community initiative that was implemented to reconcile families of both gates which the men did not talk about. Both groups mentioned the Wuaku Commission of Enquiry and the CEC which were respectively set up to seek truth and mediate peace. Again, both groups were emphatic that no punishments were meted out to perpetrators of human rights abuses. The

women concluded that no deterrent was therefore served. Like the individual interviews, a set of initiatives around criminal prosecution, peacekeeping, truth-seeking, mediation and reparations were identified by both groups.

Question 2: In your opinion, were these successful in resolving the conflict and restoring peace? Please explain your answer

The purpose of this question was to let participants give a more detailed explanation about the outcomes of the initiatives earlier mentioned. Like was done for question 1 before, the categories were reasonably smaller in number. Therefore, there was no need transforming them again. The number of people who agreed as the points were mentioned was noted as frequencies for that category. As to whether the initiatives were successful in yielding peace in Dagbon, all the participants were unanimous in their response: “no” (all participants). The reasons for the lack of success were: “lack of commitment”, “government influence”, “none involvement of key opinion leaders”, “poor consultation with community”, “greed on the part of some chiefs”, “hi-jack of peace process by “foreigners”, “lack of respect for custom and tradition”, “committees did not respect Dagbon traditions”, “inadequate attention to justice”, “disregard for community views” and “ineffective Dagbon Traditional Council due to too many regents”. The outcome for question two by both groups is given in table 9.

Table 9

Summary of categories and Frequencies for FGDs on Question 2: Men and Women

Men		Women	
Categories	Frequency	Categories	Frequency
Lack of commitment	4	Disregard for community	4
Government and politics	4	views	4
Poor consultation with	3	Undue influence on	4
community	2	committees	
Greed on the part of some	2	Weak DTC	3
chiefs		Poor knowledge of Dagbon	3
Hi-jack of peace process by	3	culture and traditions	4
“foreigners”		Inadequate attention to	
Lack of respect for custom and	4	justice	
tradition		Weak role of civil society	
Too many regents			

From the responses, the men focused on process issues which made the attainment of peace challenging. They explained that influence of government and politicians on the institutions, poor consultation with communities, lack of commitment of various stakeholders and putting “foreigners” in charge of the peace process affected the outcomes of the transitional justice initiatives. Whereas both men and women agree that the institutions put in charge of the peace process lacked adequate knowledge of Dagbon customs and traditions, they (the women) were of the view that the institutions did not give adequate attention to the delivery of justice. Like the men, they also agreed that undue influence on the work of the institutions made the resolution of the conflict challenging. There was less consensus on the issues among men than in women. The disagreement among men was around leadership of the peace process, integrity of chiefs

and respect of Dagbon customs and traditions. Some of the women disagreed that not enough attention was given to justice.

Question 3: If these were not successful, what might help to make the strategies more responsive to conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives?

This question sought to ascertain the views of participants about the conditions that might help to make the initiatives more responsive to resolve the conflict and restore peace in Dagbon. As with other questions on FGDs, there few responses from both groups and these were tallied according to the number of people who agreed with them. All the conditions/categories were listed as shown in table 10.

Table 10

Summary of categories and Frequencies for FGDs on Question 3: Men and Women

Men		Women	
Categories	Frequency	Categories	Frequency
Return case to DTC	3	Make room for confessions and forgiveness	4
Build on civil society initiatives	4	Build on civil society initiatives	4
Use traditional ways of resolving disputes	3	Be committed to the administration of justice	4
Enforce Court rulings	4	Stronger role for civil society	4
Stronger role for civil society	4	DTC to lead the process	4
Gbewa Family to lead the process	2	Focus on measures that truly compensate victims	4
		Ensure the true independence of the processes and institutions	4

All the eight men and women agreed that the initiatives were no successful. On the conditions which will make them more successful, there was a sharp difference in opinion between men and women except in a few areas: if the DTC is restored as the

process lead, a stronger role of civil society, and when there is genuine commitment to ensuring that justice is served. The women wanted more. All of them agreed that an important condition for success is where there is room for people to confess and seek forgiveness. All four female participants also felt that if the institutions involved in the peace process are free from all forms of interference, then the chances of the initiatives succeeding will be higher. There was more consensus among women than among men. The men agreed on only the role of civil society but not on all other points mentioned.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

In line with the guidance of Silverman (2005) about ensuring that information recorded is credible and reliable, I took notes as participants were sharing their experiences. Further, I kept daily journals which included the learning and key observations made during the day. These were all aimed at not losing any information. Also, to ensure that people were free to share information, no names were required during the interviews and all information was blind coded. Consistency of coding and interpretation were guaranteed by the fact that I was the only one who developed and used codes and coding frames.

To deal with threats to data quality arising from interpretation and transcription of data, I ensured that a well-trained interpreter was used. As part of his training, the need to say exactly what the participant said was emphasized. The training also ensured that the interpreter understood what was expected of him as well as how his actions and inactions can affect the quality of the research.

In line with constructivist tradition, I relied on information drawn from multiple sources. In addition to information collected through individual interviews, I also conducted focus group discussions, based on a separate set of participants, in which some questions were repeated. In addition, I reviewed documentary sources to get more detailed information and check on facts pertaining to some claims that participants made during interviews. For example, reference was made to court rulings, mandate of the Commission of Enquiry, composition and mandate of the CEC and to specific legislations as well as claims of government interference. All these were checked against what participants said before conclusions were made.

During the data collection process too, I consciously looked for participants who were willing to serve as member-checkers. All those who agreed were given the scripts for their interviews to confirm that indeed, what was written was a true reflection of what they said and meant to say. Once the first draft was ready, I used a colleague to read through the results and confirm that what was written reflected what was in the data set.

Results

This study sought to provide a deeper understanding of the processes and mechanisms for transitional justice implemented in the Dagbon Traditional Area after war broke out between the Andanis and the Abudus in 2002. The study employed the definition of transitional justice given by the International Centre for Transitional Justice (2009) to include “criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparation programs, and

various kinds of institutional reforms” (p.2). The results were analyzed along these main themes.

The study also examined the nature, effectiveness and appropriateness of the tools for transitional justice and explored the conditions under which they might respond most appropriately to resolve conflicts maintain peace in Dagbon. In this section, I discuss the categories of data that emerged from individual interviews and focus group discussions under the lens of the concepts of transitional justice (as themes) and under each research question. Finally, I present the results against the conditions that Edward Azar (1978) identified as the sources of protracted social conflicts (PSC). This was done with the view to understanding the appropriateness of the strategies for resolving the Dagbon conflict.

Question 1. What is the nature of the strategies for transitional justice implemented after the 2006 peace accord?

This question aimed to understand the nature of retributive and restorative strategies that were implemented in Dagbon after the peace accord was signed. After analyzing data from individual interviews and focus group discussions and triangulating this with information from archival studies, the categories that emerged are discussed under the various themes of transitional justice.

Criminal Prosecution

The works of scholars like Okimoto, Wenzel and Feather (2012) and Christie (1977) have helped us to understand the contribution of criminal prosecution or retributive justice, to the outcomes of transitional justice endeavors. To some people, unless an equal measure of punishment is given to offenders, justice cannot be deemed to

be served (see also Forsythe, 2011; Sirleaf, 2014). The analysis of data revealed that the measures under this theme were aimed at calming down tensions to prevent further human rights abuses, and to investigate, identify, prosecute and punish perpetrators of such abuses. Accordingly, the categories that emerged from both individual interviews and focus group discussions included: “curfew imposed” (21 participants), “state of emergency imposed” (8 participants), “peacekeeping force established” (8 participants), “trial/prosecution” (14) and “no punishment” (21 participants). There was agreement among the participants about these measures and their outcomes—the measures to calm down tension worked relatively well but the supporting measures were less successful—“no punishment”, “no justice served”, “no deterrent”. They queried the process in which these measures were initiated and implemented. The participants explained that a dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed over Yendi immediately after the conflict broke out and claimed the lives of the overlord of Dagbon and his elders. According to the final report of the Wuaku Commission of Enquiry recommended for 15 people to be arrested and prosecuted for various crimes. Some of the participants (6) claimed that when the accused persons were arrested and detained, one of them was allowed, without the permission of the courts, to go home and write his exams. Other participants claimed that the investigation was poorly done (7 participants), the trial was false (6 participants) and because of these process weaknesses, no true killers were identified (8 participants), “no punishment (21) and therefore no deterrent (8 participants) and that justice can be deemed to have been served. Here was what one civil society participant had to say:

Although there were arrests, detentions and trials, the process was faulty. The investigation was delayed, rushed when it got started and not well done. During the hearings of the Justice Wuaku Commission for example, some of the delegates made inflammatory statements and bragged about the atrocities they committed and threatened to do the same if they had the opportunity again. Those people were never arrested nor sanctioned in anyway. Instead they were left to go free. Clearly, there was no political will to carry out justice.

A community participant had this to say about how evidence was handled by the same

Justice Wuaku Commission:

People had photographs and video recordings which they were ready to share with the commission. Others who were involved in the fighting and got injured as a result, were also ready to share their experience in court but all these people were not allowed to do so for no reason. This made fact finding difficult.

To them therefore, the commitment to fair trial was absent. A review of documents and records of the civil society groups involved in managing the conflict confirms most of the claims. The arrest and detention of perpetrators took place several months after the conflict broke out and claimed the lives of the King of Dagbon and thirty (30) of his elders. Under such circumstances, both the evidence and witnesses would have either been blurred or destroyed. A claim was further made that the commission set up to investigate the causes “failed to accept evidence” (6 participants). This was one of the reasons why one of the gates (Andanis) declared their lack of confidence in the commission. Eventually too, all the 15-accused people who were arrested were discharged and acquitted on the grounds of lack of evidence. Clearly then, the expectations of people were not met. As Christie (1977) has advised, ignoring the expectations of people robs them of their rights and jeopardizes the chances of success of peacebuilding initiatives.

Truth Seeking Initiatives

It is widely believed that the first casualty of any conflict is the truth. Actively seeking the truth is therefore central to any peacebuilding endeavor. According to Schreiter (2006), peacebuilding essentially involves two related activities: “undoing the mistruths about the past and laying the foundation for a renewed society” (p.49). An analysis of the data showed that two initiatives were established to seek the truth and to recommend actions for the resolution of the conflict. Participants identified “the establishment of the Wuaku Commission of Enquiry” (21 participants) and “setting up a Committee of Eminent Chiefs” (8 participants) to work out permanent peace in Dagbon. The Wuaku Commission of Enquiry was the first to be established on 25th April 2002 and its mandate was to investigate, identify the perpetrators and make recommendations for the consideration of government (Republic of Ghana, 2003). According to the government white paper on the work of the commission, the commission relied on public testimonies, visited burial grounds, and held daily briefings in camera. They also visited Yendi, the capital of Dagbon where the King and his elders were murdered. The commission began sitting on 29th May, 2002 and presented its report to government on 6th November 2002.

Following the completion of the work of the Wuaku Commission, government appointed a Committee of Eminent Chiefs to find traditional ways of resolving the conflict. The views of participants concerning these two institutions are discussed under question 2.

Reparation Programmes

The role of reparations in any conflict resolution process cannot be over emphasized. Initiatives under this category aim to address the suffering of those who were deemed to have suffered from the conflict in one way or the other. This suffering can be in terms of human rights abuses and loss of property. Reparations are then used to support such victims in ways such as rehabilitation, public confession, apologies, forgiveness and memorials. Participants were asked to describe any initiatives that were implemented which were aimed at mitigating the impact of the conflict on those who were affected. To some extent, through the Justice Wuaku Commission of Enquiry, there was an opportunity for public confessions and hence forgiveness. However, according to some of the participants, “hearing was in camera” (9). In addition, other participants (6) claimed that there were some witnesses who were ready to give evidence and to confess but they were not allowed. Further analysis of data from interviews and review of documents identified “no dignified burial of victims” (9 participants). Participants explained that except the Ya-Naa who was buried in the palace after a prolonged period of negotiation, the rest of the victims who were mostly the elders of the king, were buried in a mass grave in Sambu, a village near Yendi. This to such participants was not dignifying enough. Five (5) participants said that after the conflict, a Consortium of NGOs was formed and through this consortium, people were assisted to rehabilitate their houses. All twenty-one (21) participants mentioned the “reconstruction of Chief’s palace”. This was a pre-requisite for the performance of the funeral of the Ya-Naa. Aside the destruction of properties and loss of lives, families broke down. Five (5) participants

also explained the “family reconciliation initiative” implemented after the war. Wives of the Andanis who were Abudus and vice versa left their matrimonial homes. Led by the NGO Consortium, the youth from both gates were mobilized to talk peace and through this initiative, over 60 families were reconciled through a community-community initiative. Other participants (3) explained that of the seventy-four (74) people who died in the conflict, only 3 were elders of the Ya-Naa. The rest were “foreigners”. Under such circumstances, there was no need for any form of reparations for such people. Because of this claim too, members of the Abudu gate did not accept for them to be buried in Yendi, the traditional capital. One (1) participant mentioned the establishment of community farms to support victims with food.

Memories and Memorials

Memories and memorials help to preserve the memories of people and include anything done to honor or respect victims, commemoration activities, monuments and statues. Participants were asked whether anything within this category was done. Nine (9) participants said, “No honor done” victims in any form. Two (2) participants said the family of the murdered king remember the Wednesday he was killed. They claim that the best way to have remembered the murdered king would have been to perform his funeral and enskin a new Ya-Naa. This has not been done yet.

Institutional Strengthening

The work of Menkel-Meadow (2004) on conflicts has brought to the fore, the importance of strong institutions in preventing large scale conflicts and violations of human rights. Two institutions, the security forces and the chieftaincy institution, were

the key institutions that could have prevented the conflict or managed it better. A review of documents and interview data showed significant institutional weaknesses and contradictions which made prevention difficult. Acting on intelligence, the Minister for the Interior imposed a curfew on Yendi and a ban on the celebration of the fire festival on 23rd March 2002 upon receiving intelligence. However, both were revoked by the Regional Minister on 24th March based on alleged “assurances from the Ya-Naa” (13 participants). As observed by almost all the participants (20) and confirmed by the Justice Wuaku Commission report, another indication of institutional weakness was demonstrated by the fact that exchange of gunfire was started in the morning of 25th March and continued for three days without any intervention from the security forces. In the event, thirty-six (36) houses including the Gbewa Palace (the palace of the King of Dagbon) were burnt. It was during this three-day period of intense fighting that the King of Dagbon and 30 of his elders were murdered (21 participants). The Wuaku Commission recommended some measures to strengthen these institutions including: reprimanding all members of the security forces (armed forces and police serve) in command positions in Yendi during that period, upgrading the armed forces stationed in Yendi into a garrison, and resourcing the Yendi Police Station with men and logistics (Republic of Ghana, 2003). For the chieftaincy institution, the commission further recommended that no parallel office holders, apart from those enskinned by the Ya-Naa, must be allowed to exist and that serious steps should be undertaken to revive the Dagomba Traditional Council (DTC). Interestingly, the observations and recommendations of the Wuaku Commission aligned with what some of the participants observed about the nature of the

DTC: “too many regents made the DTC ineffective” (4 participants), “weak traditional institutions” (3 participants) while others maintained that government “deliberately fueled the conflict and prevented the army from intervening” (11 participants).

Summary of Findings for Q1.

A mix of transitional justice measures were implemented in Dagbon after the conflict broke out in 2002. Key transitional justice initiatives implemented included peace-keeping/enforcement, criminal prosecution, truth seeking through the Wuaku Commission, reparations, mediation by the Committee of Eminent Chiefs and limited institutional reforms. These mechanisms and their associated processes were all based on formal rules. Civil society focused on providing relief and on supporting families to rehabilitate their houses and families. However, these initiatives were not coordinated and recognized as part of the same peace process. In the next sub-section, I present data on the challenges of these measures and why they were not effective in resolving the conflict and restore peace in Dagbon.

Question 2: What are the challenges associated with these strategies?

The purpose of this question was to give participants the opportunity to further explain their responses to question one and to have a deeper understanding why the strategies did not achieve the intended results. The question was asked during individual interviews and in focus group discussions. The responses are discussed according to the themes that emerged.

Influence on the work of both the Wuaku Commission and the Committee of Eminent Chiefs

All twenty-one (21) participants agreed that there was undue influence from government and prominent elite on the work of the commission and committee which limited the success that the two institutions achieved. Thirteen (13) participants further explained that it was due to the influence of government that for the three days that the war was fought, no soldiers were released to enforce peace. In the same way, although it was government who set up the commission, it was not interested in finding the truth. This explains the attitude of the Commission in its willingness to accept evidence and confessions from people (7 participants). Some participants (3) argued that when the government of the National Democratic Congress came into power in 2004, the course of decisions within the Committee of Eminent chiefs changed. One clear influence was government's influence on the Committee of Eminent Chiefs never to allow two parallel regents to exist in Dagbon. This claim was cross-checked and found to be linked to the recommendation of the Justice Wuaku Commission never to allow such a situation to ever arise. Another participant traced the influence of government and politics to the government of General Acheampong when the then Ya-Naa Mahamadu was destooled and in his place, Yakubu Abdulai was enskinned the Ya-Naa. It was this intervention that also led to the appointment of several other king makers, most of whom are Andanis (out of the total 230 kingmakers, only 7 are Abudus). Again, three (3) participants claimed that the Chair of the Committee of Eminent Chiefs, the Asantehene, had earlier given a data for the regent of the murdered Ya-Naa to vacate the palace to pave the way for the

funeral of Naa Mahamadu to be performed. However, due to political influence, the Chair of the Committee changed his mind and this never happened.

Lack of Political Will

Nineteen (19) participants explained that the conflict remains unresolved till today because of lack of political will. They explained that since the early 1960s, successive governments have always meddled in the Dagbon succession conflict. Some examples given by one of the participants was that the first President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, threatened to destool the then Ya-Naa and he had to cross carpet to join Nkrumah's party (the Convention People's Party) before the threats stopped. The government of General Acheampong also enskinned Naa Mahamadu but this was later over ruled by the Supreme Court. Again, the participants argued that the rulings of the Supreme Court are not enforced because of lack of political will. A review of documents found the claim of government influence in the Dagbon case to be quite credible. On 29th June 2009 for example, the Vice President of Ghana visited the Asantehene, the Chair of the Committee of Eminent Chiefs (CEC) to announce to him government intension to support the committee to resume the mediation effort which had been suspended because of national elections in 2008. Graphic Online (June 29, 2009) reported that before they went into closed door consultations, the Chair (of the CEC) called on politicians to stay out of the conflict and allow the chiefs to deal with it as it is a chieftaincy succession dispute. He (the Asantehene) lamented the perceived alliance of both gates to the two dominant parties in Ghana: the Andanis to the National Democratic Congress and the Abudus to the New Patriotic Party. Each time a new government came into power, the dynamics of the

conflict changed. In the same way, governments do not have the will to enforce any previous decisions or rulings made under the other government if it was not their party in power.

Inappropriate Selection and Treatment of Delegates

For the Committee of Eminent Chiefs to do its work, some chiefs from both gates were selected to as delegates. Some of the participants (9 participants) felt that some important chiefs of Dagbon: Karaga Naa and Sunson Naa were not part of the delegates. However, these are without doubt very influential chiefs whose opinions matter a lot in Dagbon.

Related to the above was the feeling by some of the participants (9) that the way the Wuaku Commission and the Committee of Eminent Chiefs treated some of the elderly chiefs was unacceptable. They explained that some of the chiefs were quite old and could not withstand the long travels and sittings. This therefore made their active participation difficult. A strong exception was taken by thirteen (13) participants to the request for the Kuga-Naa should travel to Kumasi to attend committee sittings. This was thought to be both inappropriate and disrespectful to the custom and traditions of Dagbon.

Weak Traditional Institution (Dagomba Traditional Council)

The Dagbon Traditional Council has lost some of its paramount chiefs who have not yet been enskinned (for example, the skins of Gukpegu, Tolon, Kworli, Guli, Kpahigu, Male and Mba Dugu are occupied by regents). Therefore, these vacant skins are occupied by regents who act as chiefs. Naturally, their influence and ability to deal

decisively with cases is limited. Some participants (7) mentioned this as one of the reasons for lack of effective decision making on the conflict. This trend of having regents led to “dependence on the elite” (mentioned by 5 participants) for solutions to the conflict.

Role Conflicts in the Peace Process: Formal vs Informal Rules

In Dagbon, chiefs (or the institution of chieftaincy) are held in very high esteem. This has long been recognized by previous researchers. Aikins (2009) for example noted that “commitment to informal rules in the northern region appears to be relatively high” (p.22). In a study on the causes and institutional remedies for recurring conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana with the Dagbon conflict as case study, Aikins concluded that:

Any resolution of the conflict would have to be spearheaded by self-enforcing mechanisms within the traditional system, rather than third party influences, despite the co-existence of the traditional system and the imposed Western-style democracy (Aikins, 2009 p.22).

Data from this study confirmed this claim. In answer to the question “What are the challenges associated with the strategies for transitional justice initiatives”, some participants complained of “conflict of roles between formal and informal institutions” (10 participants). The participants explained that the Gbewa family has always had a procedure for resolving conflicts. Although the use of the Committee of Eminent Chiefs and the accompanying instruction to them to find traditional ways of resolving the conflict was all good, it failed to consider, the long-tested methods of resolving conflicts in Dagbon. The participants who complained about the peace process as being “hi-jacked by strangers” expected the Kuga-Naa, the one recognized as the custodian of Dagbon

culture, to have led the peace process. From the onset, therefore, there was a conflict in the role of the CEC vs. the Dagbon Traditional Council. Other process issues also came up in the explanation of participants (13). Truth-seeking in Dagbon culture, whether during investigation or during the process of interrogating witnesses (which the Wuaku Commission had a responsibility to do), is ineffective if formal rules are used. For instance, asking people to swear by the Quran or Bible, to compel them to speak the truth, is alien in Dagbon. One participant, a traditional ruler, put it clearly that:

When you give a Dagomba man a Quran to swear that what he is going to say is the truth and nothing but the truth, he will swear but after that, he will tell lies with his eyes open. However, if you were to ask him to swear by his late father or ancestors that if he lies, they should come for him, he will think twice before he opens his mouth to speak.

One of the custodians of Dagbon culture (from Yendi) further explained that informal rules in Dagbon are dangerous to break because they have life-long consequences. When an individual breaks informal rules, he is shunned, deprived of certain privileges which might have effects beyond him as a person to include his entire family and descendants. Indeed, another chief asked: “even for you as an outsider, can you understand why some people who were accused of having played some roles in the conflict are suddenly losing their lives? Unless people come back to their senses, some families risk losing access to the Yendi skin”. This group of informal rules was what Aikins (2009) referred to as “self-enforcing mechanisms within the traditional system” (p.22). Similar approaches are used in the selection of chiefs. Through the process of consulting with the oracles (soothsaying) a chief is found and enskinned. Never has Dagbon ever resorted to formal

rules to decide cases or appoint chiefs except in 1948 when the selection of the Ya-Naa was done by a selection committee.

Related to process hi-jack and role conflict, other participants (9 participants) complained of “Inadequate knowledge of Dagbon culture”. In addition to truth-seeking which was done based on formal rules, other things were done which were at variance with Dagbon traditions and culture. For example, the Committee of Eminent Chiefs required the Kuga-Naa to travel to Kumasi to attend mediation meetings. In Dagbon culture however, if the Ya-Naa is dead, until another is enskinned, the Kuga Naa cannot travel beyond a certain kilometer radius from Yendi, the traditional capital. Therefore, to require him to travel to Kumasi amounted to violating and disrespecting Dagbon culture and traditions (4 participants).

Failure to Sustain Civil Society Initiatives

Immediately the war calmed down, civil society groups mobilized the Andani and Abudu youth to talk peace. This also included some opinion leaders who were voices of reason. Through this community initiative, over sixty (60) families were re-united. The consortium of civil society groups therefore had a strong contact with the community and those who were worse affected by the conflict. Unfortunately, this contact with the community was not maintained in the ensuing processes in terms of representation and taking their needs into consideration. Civil Society was weakly represented (13 participants said so) and the need to continue the on-going community-to community reconciliation stopped. This alienated the communities from the chiefs and the few opinion leaders who were involved in the peace processes. The needs of communities

(such as personal security to go about their daily chores, having a secure general environment) were hence not taken care of. Nine (9) participants explained that this led to NGOs like GTZ and Action Aid to leave the area.

Summary of Findings for Q2

From the foregone, the conflict of formal and informal rules weighed heavily on the outcomes of the initiatives. As the people of Dagbon have a high trust and dependence on informal rules and in the chieftaincy institution, the weakened position of the Dagbon Traditional Council, seen through the number of regents who have occupied the skins for decades (in some cases), therefore created a leadership and decision making vacuum. In addition to these, the role assigned to civil society could have been better. Earlier in the process, this group had contributed significantly in providing relief and reconciliation at the community level. They were therefore seen as the mouth piece and representatives of the people. To have relegated their role to the background in the process therefore helped only to stall it and alienate the people from the entire process. Finally, the will of government to religiously and impartially support the process, including leading on the implementation of recommendations, was low. Unlike informal rules, formal institutions and their rules require a third-party enforcer—the state. Therefore, if the state fails as it did, no successful outcomes should be expected.

Question 3. What might help to make the strategies more responsive to peacebuilding?

Based on the responses participants gave to question 2, they were asked this question to help understand the conditions under which the mechanisms and tools for transitional justice might be more effective in resolving the conflict and restore peace. The same question was posed during individual interviews and in focus group discussions. The responses are discussed under the themes that emerged.

Return the Case to the Custodians of Dagbon Customs

Naturally, one of the areas where most of the participants (17) agreed was for the case to be returned to the Kuga-Naa to lead the process of resolving the conflict and building peace. Others put it in a different way by asking for “traditional ways to be used to resolve the conflict” (8 participants). Yet another group of participants claimed that an important condition for success will be when the “Gbewa family is allowed to lead the process” (4 participants). The participants believe that the Kuga-Naa knows what to do but will require support from government and civil society in terms of managing and securing the process and enforcing the decisions of the DTC.

Strengthen Local Conflict Response Capacity among Key Institutions

Participants referred to two key institutions here: The Dagbon Traditional Council and the Security Agencies in Yendi. Participants (12) lamented about the current state of the DTC and asked for immediate support to be given to the Kuga-Naa to enskin and fill out the vacant positions. Perhaps a starting point might be to explore a traditional way of

strengthening the group of king makers of Dagbon since this is a point of controversy. Once this is sorted out, the rest of the skins can be filled with chiefs. A review of documents, especially the Wuaku Commission report, makes an important recommendation that the security agencies (the Police Service and the Army) should be strengthened. Seven (7) participants referred to these recommendations as important in ensuring that there is lasting peace in Dagbon. An improved capacity of the security agencies, they explained, would also be an important source of support to the DTA when they are taking decisions.

Reduce Role and Influence of Government and Chieftaincy Contractors

Put in different ways, all the participants made a strong point about the need for government to step back and only support the process as required by the 1992 republican constitution of Ghana. Twenty-one (21) participants called for the “reduced role of government”, nine (9) participants argued for the role of government to be reduced to “supporting the Kuga-Naa to lead the process” and others requested government to “resource the process only” (5). Participants explained that it is only the Kuga-Naa who understands what is required to be done. However, he needs the support and commitment of government through improved security presence in the area and to the DTC during the process, helping to document the process and financing it where necessary. They believe that if these conditions are met, all that is required to resolve the conflict will be done and peace will return to Dagbon.

Strengthen the Role of Civil Society in the Process

Whilst majority of the participants recognize the DTC and the Kuga-Naa as those responsible for leading the process, all (23) the participants were convinced that if the role of civil society started during the early days of the conflict was recognized and sustained, the outcomes might have been different. The works of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Business Advisory Centre (BADEC), Action Aid, Oxfam and Rural Media Network were specifically mentioned as having played important roles during the initial days of the conflict. This was however not sustained. They felt that if Civil Society had the lead facilitating role with all the resources it required, it would have helped to move the feuding gates together faster. Again, civil society is better positioned to manage the process to avoid the situation where the work of the CEC being suspended because of a change in government as happened after the 2008 general elections. Such an improved role of civil society could also include the coordination of the various initiatives of transitional justice to ensure that they achieve the anticipated combined impacts.

Ensure Better Alignment of the Initiatives and Mechanisms

Civil society participants (5) were quite critical about how the initiatives and mechanisms were neither coordinated nor aligned. They explained that different institutions played separate roles, some of which contradicted each other. For example, the intelligence agencies warned of danger if the fire festival was performed. Based on this intelligence, the Ministry of Interior imposed a dusk to dawn curfew on Yendi as well as a ban on the celebration of the fire festival. In less than twenty-four (24) hours,

the Regional Minister lifted the ban on the festival and this was the beginning of confusion and fighting. Again, the initiatives of civil society groups were not seen as part of the entire effort of restoring peace. Therefore, this run parallel to government's own initiatives. Related to this, the grassroots initiative of reconciling families and communities started by civil society groups was not linked to the other related processes. They explained that if government timed the interventions well, and ensured that all actions were integrated, the outcomes would have been different than what was recorded.

Create Opportunities for Justice, Confessions, Forgiveness and Reconciliation

Nine (9) of the participants reported that there were people who took part in the fighting, got injured in the process but were lucky to have survived. These people were alleged to have been ready to make confessions and seek forgiveness. However, the Commission of Enquiry failed to grant this request. In addition to this was the fact that the same participants (6) claimed people had video recordings which they wanted to share with the Wuaku Commission of enquiry but which was denied. Again, one of the early disputes regarding the work of the Wuaku Commission related to the commission's specific role and whether it should include investigating to determine the causes of the conflict. Civil Society participants (5) reported that from the onset, if the terms of reference of the Commission was clear enough and sufficient provisions made to allow for confessions, perhaps the outcomes would have been different. For example, what was the rationale behind the Commission sitting in camera? Related to this is the inability of the security agencies and indeed the commission to undertake proper investigations. The result of these combined lapses is that to date, the killers of the Ya-Naa and other

perpetrators have not been identified and those who suffered loss of relatives and property are justifiably unsatisfied. It is important for government to have designed the process with very clear milestones and anticipated outcomes. This was however left to the Commission to decide.

Summary of Findings for Q 3.

To ensure that transitional justice initiatives have a better chance of resolving the conflict and restoring peace in Dagbon, participants were strong and united that a reduced role and influence of government on the process will yield better outcomes. They argued that government should only provide the necessary resources (financial and institutional capacity) and allow the DTC to lead the process. They therefore advocated for the return of the process to Dagbon Traditional Council. This should go alongside the strengthening of institutions responsible for response and conflict management. Formal rules and institutions should only support, and not take over, from informal rules. Participants also made a case for a stronger role of Civil Society to include facilitation and process management. One condition that participants thought might help was for the complete set of initiatives and mechanisms to be aligned, timed and better coordinated.

Summary of Chapter Four

The purpose of this chapter was to provide a deeper understanding of the processes and mechanisms of transitional justice mechanisms implemented in Dagbon after the outbreak of hostilities in 2002. The study was based on data collected through

individual interviews, focus group discussions and document reviews. In all, twenty-one (21 participants) were interviewed. An analysis of data showed that transitional justice initiatives implemented included criminal prosecutions, truth-seeking, mediation, reparations and institutional reforms. These were however not coordinated and integrated. Several factors including influence on the work of truth-seeking commission and the committee of eminent chiefs, conflict of formal and informal rules, inappropriate selection and treatment of delegates as well as the weak nature of the DTC all negatively affected the outcomes of the initiatives. Participants argued that for the initiatives to have a greater chance of success in resolving the conflict and restoring peace to Dagbon, government and other stakeholder influences on peace building institutions must stop, the DTC allowed to lead and manage the peace process within the context of Dagomba traditions and customs with civil society playing a facilitating role among other conditions.

In the following chapter, the summary of key findings is presented and interpreted. Then a further examination of the findings in relation to Edward Azar's (1978) theory of Protracted Social Conflict before the study is concluded.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

Transitional justice strategies have always been employed in post conflict situations in Ghana but these have not been successful in fully resolving the conflicts and in restoring peace. This study examined the nature, effectiveness and appropriateness of the strategies for transitional justice which were implemented in Dagbon when war broke out in 2002. It explored the conditions under which transitional justice strategies might respond most appropriately to resolve the Dagbon chieftaincy succession conflict and restore peace. The study was designed to answer three questions around the nature of transitional justice strategies which were implemented, the challenges associated with their implementation and what could have been done differently to ensure that they succeeded. Data was collected through interviews with key informants using open ended questions, focus group discussions and through archival research. In the following subsection, the key findings are discussed under each research objective.

Summary of Key Findings

Research Question1: What is the nature of the strategies for transitional justice implemented after the 2006 peace accord?

The key findings that respond to this question include:

1. A mix of transitional justice measures were implemented including: peace-keeping/enforcement, criminal prosecution, truth seeking through the Wuaku Commission, some reparations, mediation by the Committee of Eminent Chiefs

and limited institutional reforms. Civil society focused on providing relief and on supporting families to rehabilitate their houses and families.

2. The criminal prosecution, truth-seeking and other mechanisms and their associated processes were based on formal rules. The only exception was the mediation process which was done through the CEC. The mandate of this institution was for them to use traditional approaches to find a solution to the dispute.
3. These initiatives were not coordinated and recognized as part of the same peace process.

Research Question 2. What are the challenges associated with these strategies?

The challenges associated with the strategies included:

1. Political influence on the institutions and peace processes. Participants explained that government and powerful individuals exerted undue influence on the institutions and rendered them ineffective.
2. The key role of civil society in the peace process was not given appropriate recognition and hence they were not effectively coordinated and integrated into the entire peace process.
3. Weak Dagomba Traditional Council. Participants complained that at least seven important skins are occupied by regents. As regents only occupy the throne temporarily, their decision-making powers are limited. The process required stronger decision-making powers which the regents do not have.

4. Failure to sustain civil society initiatives. Civil society led in providing relief items to victims of war. Through a coalition of NGOs too, a community level peacebuilding was initiated to reconcile families. Participants explained that about 60 families were reconciled through this initiative. However, this was not sustained and integrated into the processes.
5. Conflict of formal vs. informal rules. The strategies were led by formal institutions using rules that are alien to Dagbon. Formal rules subjugated informal rules and this affected the outcomes of the transitional justice strategies, particularly truth-seeking and mediation work done by the Committee of Eminent Chiefs.

Research Question 3: What might help to make the strategies more responsive to peacebuilding?

1. When the peace process is led by the custodians of the Dagbon culture and initiatives implemented within the context of Dagbon customs and traditions. Participants argued for the return of the case to the custodian of Dagbon culture as one important pre-condition for the initiatives to work.
2. When the local response capacity of key institutions is strengthened, and support the DTC in the peace process. The institutions referred to here are the Dagbon Traditional Council and the security agencies in Yendi. Whereas the process lead is recognized to be the Kuga-Naa and DTC, they require the support of the security agencies throughout the process.

3. When the role and influence of government and other political office holders on the peace process is drastically reduced and the process allowed to operate independently.
4. When the role of civil society is strengthened to facilitate the process as an independent peace broker.
5. When the initiatives are coordinated, and integrated such that they re-enforce each other.

Interpretation of the Findings

Sir Leaf's (2014) cross-national comparative study involving Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone is perhaps one of the exhaustive studies about the conditions under which truth commissions contribute to achieving their stated goals. In this study, Sir Leaf (2014) contended that truth commissions have less utility in post-conflict situations than they might have in post authoritarian non-transitional situations, and that for them to be useful, the number of goals must be limited. The finding in this study does not support this conclusion. The Wuaku Commission functioned more like a truth commission and its mandate was to find the truth about the causes of the conflict and recommend measures for its resolution. The goals were quite limited and precisely because of this, the Commission was unable to utilize opportunities for public confessions, forgiveness and reconciliation. We know from literature that actively seeking the truth is central to any peacebuilding endeavor. According to Schreiter (2006), peacebuilding involves two

related activities: “undoing the mistruths about the past and laying the foundation for a renewed society” (p.49). What this study found, which appears to be relatively unknown in literature, is the impact of a well-coordinated transitional justice programme that limits the operation of parallel initiatives might have on peace outcomes.

Scholars have assumed a linear relationship between retributive justice and peace outcomes. The works of scholars like Okimoto, Wenzel and Feather (2012), Christie (1977), Forsythe (2011) and Sir Leaf (2014) suggest that unless an equal measure of punishment is given to offenders, justice cannot be deemed to be served. However, the recent work of Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2016) suggests otherwise. In a three-country study of cases in Morocco, Iraq and Algeria, Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2016) found that retributive mechanisms appear to have negative effects on transitional justice outcomes, especially under conditions where real political transition has not taken place. The results of this study support the former position. Participants in this felt that unless the perpetrators of the human rights abuses are punished, there can be no forgiveness.

The finding of this study about the conflict between formal and informal institutions corroborates that of an earlier work by Aikins (2009). In the Dagbon Traditional Area, commitment to formal rules is high as noted by Aikins (2009). In a study on the causes and institutional remedies for recurring conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana with the Dagbon conflict as case study, Aikins concluded that the subjugation of informal rules by formal rules partly explains the persistence of the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict.

The position of literature on political influence on the outcomes of transitional justice mechanisms is clear from the works of Aikins (2009), Tonah (2012) and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2016). In all these, political influence plays a de-stabilizing role and renders the work of the institutions suspicious and ineffective. Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2016) concluded that in Iraq, “because of political manipulation, transitional justice has fomented further tension rather than promoting peace” (p.398). Again, in this study, all the participants bemoaned the negative role successive governments and political office holders have played on the peace process. They felt that for the conflict to be resolved, there must be reduced role and influence of government.

Finally, the finding about the key role of civil society organizations in the peace process, and how in the Dagbon peace process this potential was not properly tapped and hence partially accounts for the limited impact of transitional justice strategies, particularly the mediation role played by the CEC), is supported by the findings of study. Ateng and Abazaami (2016), in a very recent mixed methods study on the role of civil society organizations in peacebuilding in the Northern Region of Ghana, found that “the neutrality and impartiality of CSOs have made conflicting parties to trust their work” (p.8). This was the potential that could have been tapped better in the Dagbon conflict. What was required was a strong impartial organization to facilitate the process and ensure that every initiative was properly coordinated and integrated into the entire process to avoid duplication and functional gaps.

The results under the lens of the theory of Protracted Social Conflict

In this section, I present the results of the study to explain the extent to which the conditions which led to the outbreak of violence were addressed through the transitional justice processes. Edward Azar (1978) argued that conflicts that are violent and protracted, like the Dagbon conflict, are often a response to the need for groups to preserve their identities. Azar theorized that protracted violent conflicts are struggles for “basic needs such as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation” (p.93). In the following section, I present the categories that emerged from the data and document reviews under the three stages of Azar’s theory of protracted social conflicts (PSC)—genesis, process and outcome stages. This is done with the view to understanding the outcomes of the transitional justice initiatives in Dagbon.

Genesis Stage

Azar describes this stage as one where a set of conditions make the outbreak of violence possible. Conditions such as the formation of multi-communal identities possibly created through colonial rule and the subsequent domination of one identity group over the other, without a corresponding attempt of meeting the needs of the group so dominated, sets the stage for violent conflict. A review of literature showed that the British colonial government extended its policy of Indirect Rule to the Dagomba Kingdom in the 1930s (Odetei & Awedoba, 2006; Aikins, 2009). This was done through the Ya-Naa, the paramount chief of the Dagomba Traditional Area with Yendi as the capital. The Yendi paramountcy, with time, then became the source of state power and

influence and each of the two gates (the Andanis and the Abudus) vied for ascension to that throne. Although successive British governments attempted to manipulate succession rules (Aikins, 2009 p.8), the Dagomba elite have tried several times (in 1948, 1954, 1969 and 2002) to circumvent and influence succession rules to the Yendi paramountcy. This marks the struggle for identity and domination that Azar referred to. In this study, the chieftaincy succession dispute that has raged over the years and recurred in 2002 is a struggle for identity between two gates: The Andanis and the Abudus. These have struggled over the years for ascension to the Yendi paramountcy.

In terms of communal needs, participants in this study referred to lack of personal safety because the participants explained that the killers of the Ya-Naa had not been identified (8 participants), no punishments were meted out to perpetrators (21 participants), and that some people keep making inflammatory statements (5 participants) without being punished and hence there is no guarantee that the violence will not break out again. Therefore, the conditions that led to the outbreak of hostilities in 2002 are still very much present. Unfortunately, the state appears not to be a trusted partner in terms of its ability to prevent the outbreak of conflict. The recommendations of the Wuaku Commission for the strengthening of the Security Agencies in Yendi have not yet been implemented. The Dagbon Traditional Council itself still has a lot of regents who act as chiefs. As a result of this, the strength and capacity of the DTC at this stage is admittedly weak as the participants noted.

Process Dynamics

Here, Azar refers to the presence of possible triggers for the onset of violence and the ability of institutions to respond to communal grievances. As demonstrated already, most participants (21) are not comfortable that the initial causes of the conflict have not been addressed. As it is now, it might take only a careless remark from someone to ignite the conflict. Both the Andanis and Abudus have had issues with the CEC at one time or the other. If tension heightens, the DTC as it is currently composed cannot effectively deal with it and prevent further escalation. This is because currently, there are two sitting regents in Dagbon representing two former Ya-Naa. There are other skins that are occupied by regents and this further weakens the position of the DTC to react in the event of any conflict. The situation in Dagbon therefore remains fluid and violence can erupt anytime with the slightest trigger.

Outcome Analysis

From the analysis of data, the conflict did not result in the enskinment of a Ya-Naa. In the place of the murdered Ya-Naa, there are now two regents each representing their gates and the funeral of their fathers remain outstanding. There have been difficulties in enskinning chiefs to fill vacant paramountcy's because the funeral of the Ya-Naa has not been performed. The DTC is therefore even weaker than it was before the conflict broke out in 2002. There continuous to be uneasy calm because of continuous inflammatory remarks and the situation gets even more blurred and confused with changes in governments. A better summary of the situation of the Dagbon conflict can be made by how Azar (1978) described the outcome stage of a protracted social conflict as

one which “reinforces and strengthens pessimism throughout the society, demoralizes leaders and immobilizes the search for peaceful solutions” (p.16).

From the analysis, therefore, the impact of transitional justice initiatives on the background causes of the conflict which constitutes stage one of the PSC was minimal. The conditions for a possible trigger to an explosive recurrence of the conflict also remain unchanged despite the interventions. In terms of outcomes, there was no clear winner and the conflict persists, although currently dormant.

Limitations of the Study

One of the limitations envisaged in chapter 1 was that access to some information might be difficult due to the sensitive nature of the study. This was not the case, thanks to the influence of the community partner who made access to the community easy and provided most of the reference material that was needed.

It would have been great to have the views of the security agencies but this was not possible. Those who were around during the conflict had been transferred and it was difficult to trace them. This was an important limitation as none of the security personnel present passed the inclusion criteria.

To improve internal validity, I used triangulation and member-checking. However, member-checking was limited to only reviewing the interview scripts for those who agreed to serve as member-checkers. In chapter one, it was envisaged that one person would review the entire field data. However, for ethical reasons and on the recommendation of the Walden University IRB, this was changed and limited to only what was covered during the interview of the member-checkers.

Finally, the study was limited to only the Dagbon chieftaincy succession conflict. Field work was conducted only two months after a general election had been conducted. Therefore, the responses of most participants may have been influenced by the outcomes of the election.

Recommendations

Studying the impact of transitional justice strategies on conflict resolution and the maintenance of peace is so important for the country, given the nature and number of protracted social conflicts in the country. However, the focus of this study was on an intra-ethnic conflict. Literature on conflicts in Ghana indicates that majority of the conflicts are inter-ethnic in nature. Based on the findings of this research, the following recommendations are made:

1. Government to review of the leadership and mandate of the CEC. The influential role that the CEC is playing cannot be over emphasized. However, the data shows that representatives of both gates and the people have greater trust and respect for their own customs and traditions which the CEC might not have adequate knowledge of. Therefore, it is recommended that government considers reviewing the leadership and mandate of the CEC by recognizing the Kuga-Naa as the process lead. The rest of the members of CEC can then support the Kuga-Naa and the DTC in resolving the succession dispute.
2. Another recommendation for the consideration of government is the need to strengthen the security agencies in Yendi. This recommendation was already made by the Wuaku Commission. Government should implement this and

resource them such that they will be able to support the DTC and CEC to carry out the remaining processes.

3. Finally, there is the need for an independent arbiter and process facilitator. As this research showed, there is concern about government and other stakeholder influence on the peace process, as well as an expectation of a greater role by civil society organizations. As part of the review of the mandate of the CEC, government should, in consultation with the DTC, identify, resource and empower a civil society organization as the process lead and facilitator. This will ensure some independence in the work of institutions responsible for mediation and peacebuilding.
4. In terms of recommendations for future research, it would be good for a similar study to be conducted using an inter-ethnic conflict as case study. This study was based on an intra-ethnic conflict. It will be interesting to see the impact of transitional justice strategies might have in resolving an inter-ethnic conflict. Such a study will enable comparison of results with this one and hopefully improve our understanding of how best conflicts can be resolved.
5. In addition, it will be important to replicate the same study in a different conflict environment to see how the results compare. It would be interesting to find out how formal rules interact with informal rules and what the outcomes of this might be on conflict resolution outcomes. This study also underscored the need for coordination and proper timing of initiatives, possibly facilitated by a strong civil society organization. It would be useful to test this in a different setting.

Implications

Positive Social Change

From the results, I concluded that for transitional justice strategies to respond most effectively to resolve the Dagbon chieftaincy succession conflict, the full set of initiatives implemented by both government and civil society must be well coordinated, well timed and integrated such that they are part and parcel of the entire process. Further, the Dagomba Traditional Council must take the lead in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding process which should be based on the customs and traditions of Dagbon. Government and other interest groups must distance themselves from the process. If civil society plays a more proactive role as process facilitators and coordinators organizations as process facilitators, the outcomes might be better.

Potentially these may have implications at both the community level where the chiefs exist. As observed in this study, the first potential implication might be to ensure that the DTC is strengthened to be able to provide the required leadership. This could be through providing a conducive environment for the enskinment of chiefs where currently regents are acting. This should pave the way for the performance of the funeral of the Ya-Naa and the eventual enskinment of a new one.

At the regional and national level, the potential impact might be the generation of further research interests to fill the knowledge gap highlighted in this study. I also likely as this study confirms the findings of earlier works on the impact of formal rules on informal ones, it might have an impact on the mandates of future truth and reconciliation commissions and the role of government in peace processes.

Conceptual, Methodological Implications

This study was conducted with the assumption that transitional justice strategies will be relevant in the context of the Dagbon chieftaincy succession conflict. The massive destruction and abuse of human rights were assumed to be enough for the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms and processes. The findings of this study showed that indeed transitional justice strategies were implemented to resolve the conflict and restore peace. Also, the conditions of the conflict had all the characteristics of a protracted conflict. Therefore, the use of transitional justice as the conceptual framework was appropriate.

The qualitative case study approach using data drawn from multiple sources was also assumed to be suitable for this kind of study where the issues of transitional justice required to be explored. It was not possible to have stayed on the field for a long time and study all the ethnic conflicts in the Dagbon Traditional Area. Under such circumstances, a case study approach was the most feasible to do. The results of the study confirm that this approach was indeed the right thing to do. The open-ended method of questioning allowed participants to express their opinions without any constraints.

The recommendations made in this study are drawn from the analysis of data. Although this was a purposive sample and cannot be said to be representative of the entire Dagbon residents nor the conflicts in Dagbon, nevertheless, they constitute a useful starting point for further research. The recommendations also might be a useful basis for reflection and decision making to Administrators and decision makers with interest of Dagbon conflict.

Conclusion

Ethnic conflicts in Ghana blur the country's internationally acclaimed peaceful nature. These conflicts are protracted in nature and defy all conflict resolution strategies. This qualitative case study was conducted to examine the nature, effectiveness and appropriateness of the strategies for transitional justice implemented in Dagbon when war broke out in 2002. It explored the conditions under which transitional justice strategies might respond most appropriately to resolve the Dagbon chieftaincy succession conflict and restore peace. The study answered three research questions around the nature of transitional justice strategies, the challenges associated with the implementation of these strategies, and the conditions under which these strategies could have responded more effectively to the transitional justice mechanisms.

Using key informant interviews, focus group discussions and review of archival information, it was revealed that a mixture of retributive and restorative strategies was implemented after the war broke out in 2002. These were implemented by different actors and not properly coordinated and integrated. Also, the process was led and managed by formal institutions which conflicted with informal rules in which most of the people involved in the conflict believe. The subsequent subjugation of informal rules had a negative impact on the peace process and its current outcomes. The role of civil society in the peace process was not adequately recognized and used, despite their potential in conflict resolution.

Based on the results, the study made some recommendations on the conditions which might respond more favorably to transitional justice strategies. Some of these include the need to review the leadership and mandate of the CEC to recognize the DTC (led by the Kuga Naa) as the process lead, the need to strengthen the security agencies so that they can effectively support the DTC in the conflict resolution process, and the need for an independent process facilitator to manage the process and reduce the influence of government. In this way, the DTA can employ the traditional methods of resolving the conflict. The DTC will need support both financial and security throughout the process. Civil society should play a more facilitative and coordinating role in the process.

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List of Appendices

Appendix A: Letter of Cooperation from West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP): Research Partner. **01-19-17-0466118**

The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding

National Head Office

Tamale, Northern Region

Date...

Dear Joe Lambongang,

Based on my review of your research proposal, I give permission for you to conduct the study entitled “The Impact of Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace. A Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region” within the WANEP operational area in the Dagbon Traditional Council. As part of this study, I authorize you to work with our staff to:

- Identify potential participants for both individual interviews and focus group discussions.
- Support in entering the research community by introducing you to the Chief of the King Makers of Dagbon who is the custodian of Dagbon culture.
- Disseminate final research results in the research community.

Individuals’ participation will be voluntary and at their own discretion.

We understand that our organization’s responsibilities include:

- Allocating one member who will serve as your main contact and support to achieve the tasks listed above and
- Make an office vehicle available (at a cost to the researcher) for the days required
- We reserve the right to withdraw from the study at any time if our circumstances change.

I confirm that I am authorized to approve research in this setting and that this plan complies with the organization's policies.

I understand that the data collected will remain entirely confidential and may not be provided to anyone outside of the student's supervising faculty/staff without permission from the Walden University IRB.

Sincerely,

Director of Operations

Head Office

Walden University policy on electronic signatures: An electronic signature is just as valid as a written signature if both parties have agreed to conduct the transaction electronically.

Electronic signatures are regulated by the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.

Electronic signatures are only valid when the signer is either (a) the sender of the email, or (b) copied on the email containing the signed document. Legally an "electronic signature" can be the person's typed name, their email address, or any other identifying marker. Walden University staff verify any electronic signatures that do not originate from a password-protected source (i.e., an email address officially on file with Walden).

Appendix B: Data Use Agreement with West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
(WANEP) and Joe Lambongang. 01-19-17-0466118

This Data Use Agreement (“Agreement”), effective as of November 6th, 2016 (“Effective Date”), is entered into by and between Joe Lambongang (“Data Recipient”) and The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) (“Data Provider”). The purpose of this Agreement is to provide Data Recipient with access to a Limited Data Set (“LDS”) for use in scholarship/research **in accord with laws and regulations of the governing bodies associated with the Data Provider, Data Recipient, and Data Recipient’s educational program.** In the case of a discrepancy among laws, the agreement shall follow whichever law is stricter.

1. Definitions. Due to the project’s affiliation with Laureate, a USA-based company, unless otherwise specified in this Agreement, all capitalized terms used in this Agreement not otherwise defined have the meaning established for purposes of the USA “HIPAA Regulations” and/or “FERPA Regulations” codified in the United States Code of Federal Regulations, as amended from time to time.
2. Preparation of the LDS. Data Provider shall prepare and furnish to Data Recipient a LDS in accord with any applicable laws and regulations of the governing bodies associated with the Data Provider, Data Recipient, and Data Recipient’s educational program.

3. Data Fields in the LDS. **No direct identifiers such as names may be included in the Limited Data Set (LDS).** In preparing the LDS, Data Provider shall include the **data fields specified as follows**, which are the minimum necessary to accomplish the project:
 - a) The Terms of Reference of the Justice Wuaku Commission
 - b) The Terms of reference of the Committee of Eminent Chiefs
 - c) Minutes of community facilitated meetings held between 2002 and October 2016
 - d) Judgements of the Supreme Court on the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict that WANEP might have
4. Responsibilities of Data Recipient. Data Recipient agrees to:
 - a) Use or disclose the LDS only as permitted by this Agreement or as required by law;
 - b) Use appropriate safeguards to prevent use or disclosure of the LDS other than as permitted by this Agreement or required by law;
 - c) Report to Data Provider any use or disclosure of the LDS of which it becomes aware that is not permitted by this Agreement or required by law;

- d) Require any of its subcontractors or agents that receive or have access to the LDS to agree to the same restrictions and conditions on the use and/or disclosure of the LDS that apply to Data Recipient under this Agreement; and
 - a. Not use the information in the LDS to identify or contact the individuals who are data subjects.
5. Permitted Uses and Disclosures of the LDS. Data Recipient may use and/or disclose the LDS **for the present project's activities only.**
6. Term and Termination.
- a. Term. The term of this Agreement shall commence as of the Effective Date and shall continue for so long as Data Recipient retains the LDS, unless sooner terminated as set forth in this Agreement.
 - b. Termination by Data Recipient. Data Recipient may terminate this agreement at any time by notifying the Data Provider and returning or destroying the LDS.
 - c. Termination by Data Provider. Data Provider may terminate this agreement at any time by providing thirty (30) days prior written notice to Data Recipient.

- d. For Breach. Data Provider shall provide written notice to Data Recipient within ten (10) days of any determination that Data Recipient has breached a material term of this Agreement. Data Provider shall afford Data Recipient an opportunity to cure said alleged material breach upon mutually agreeable terms. Failure to agree on mutually agreeable terms for cure within thirty (30) days shall be grounds for the immediate termination of this Agreement by Data Provider.
- e. Effect of Termination. Sections 1, 4, 5, 6(e) and 7 of this Agreement shall survive any termination of this Agreement under subsections c or d.

7. Miscellaneous.

- a. Change in Law. The parties agree to negotiate in good faith to amend this Agreement to comport with changes in federal law that materially alter either or both parties' obligations under this Agreement. Provided however, that if the parties are unable to agree to mutually acceptable amendment(s) by the compliance date of the change in applicable law or regulations, either Party may terminate this Agreement as provided in section 6.
- b. Construction of Terms. The terms of this Agreement shall be construed to give effect to applicable federal interpretative guidance regarding the HIPAA Regulations.

- c. No Third-Party Beneficiaries. Nothing in this Agreement shall confer upon any person other than the parties and their respective successors or assigns, any rights, remedies, obligations, or liabilities whatsoever.
- d. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument.
- e. Headings. The headings and other captions in this Agreement are for convenience and reference only and shall not be used in interpreting, construing or enforcing any of the provisions of this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the undersigned has caused this Agreement to be duly executed in its name and on its behalf.

DATA PROVIDER**DATA RECIPIENT**

Signed: _____

Signed: _____

Print Name: _____

Print Name: _____

Print Title: _____

Print Title: _____

Appendix C: Letter of Cooperation for An Interpreter: **01-19-17-0466118**

November 6th, 2016

Dear Interpreter,

As we discussed earlier, our plan for your involvement in my study involves the following tasks:

- Translate questions asked by the researcher to participants
- Translate responses of the participants into English for the researcher

If you agree to be part of this research project, my university requires that all interpreters maintain complete confidentiality. During your involvement in this study, you will have access to information that is confidential and should not be disclosed. By agreeing to serve as an interpreter, you are agreeing to the following confidentiality standards:

1. The data yielded by participants must be kept confidential during the data collection process, which means that no one is permitted to see or overhear a participant's data, including other participants and family/friends of the participant.
2. Participant identities are confidential. You will not disclose to anyone who participated and who didn't.
3. You will not disclose or discuss any confidential information with others, including your friends or family.

4. You will not in any way divulge, copy, release, sell, loan, alter or destroy any confidential information except as properly authorized by the researcher in this document.
5. You will not discuss confidential information where others can overhear the conversation (such disclosures are inappropriate even if the participant's name is not used).
6. You will not make any unauthorized transmissions, inquiries, modification or purging of confidential information.
7. You will store research data in a secure manner, under lock and key (or password protection, in the case of electronic files).
8. You will keep data in a manner that protects the privacy of participants and ensures that individual participants are not identifiable by outside parties.
9. You agree that any obligations under this agreement will continue after completion of the research tasks.

My university also requires that you uphold the following ethical principles for research outlined:

1. Informed consent must be obtained from all research participants. This means that they must be fully informed about the study before being asked to decide about participation.
2. For example, it is not appropriate for people to be recruited while they are waiting for a health provider appointment (afterward would be less coercive). Further, no

one who is an authority figure or service provider may be involved in participant recruitment because it would be difficult for a person to say no.

3. Potential harms to participants must be minimized. Any time that you suspect a person's participation might result in psychological, physical, social, or professional harm, you should let me know right away so we can terminate their participation in the study in a non-stigmatizing manner.

As the principal investigator in this research project, my responsibilities include the following:

1. I must train you in the ethical principles of informed consent, voluntary research participation, research confidentiality, and protection of human subjects prior to your interaction with research participants.
2. I must report any unexpected or adverse events that occur during data collection to my university's ethics committee (Institutional Review Board) within 1 week.
3. I must coordinate a system that will allow you to report any unexpected or adverse events to me within 24 hours, if I am not physically present with you during participant recruitment or data collection.
4. I must request my university ethics committee's (IRB's) approval before making any modification to the research procedures or forms (this means that you may not implement modifications until I have confirmation of approval).
5. I must maintain complete and accurate records of all research activities (including consent forms and collected data).

- 6. I am liable for your actions within the context of this research study. I must address any grievances or claims that are formally filed against you within the justice system or any other organization’s system.

I will coordinate the exact dates and times of data collection with you later.

If your circumstances change, please contact me via telephone on +233 244 989 372 or +233 266 154 676 or by email at joe.lambongang@waldenu.edu so we can amend this agreement.

I am requesting your signature to document that we have mutually agreed upon our roles and responsibilities within this study. If you agree with these terms and conditions, please sign below.

Sincerely,

Joe Lambongang

Interpreter

Date

Interpreter’s Written Signature

Researcher’s Written Signature

Appendix D: Participant Consent Form for Individual Interviews: 01-19-17-0466118

You are invited to participate in this study which is titled: “The Impact of Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”. The main purpose of this study, which is purely an academic one, is to understand the conditions that might be more responsive to transitional justice processes and mechanisms to promote the achievement of lasting peace in Dagbon. The information from this study will not be used for any other purpose.

The Study

This study is being conducted by Joe Lambongang, a Doctoral Candidate at the Walden University.

Inclusion criteria for this study

Only people who fall in the following category can potentially participate in this study:

1. Must be over 18 years old.
2. Must belong to the Dagbon ethnic group
3. Must have lived in the Dagbon area during the 2002 conflict and familiar with the conflict resolution and peacebuilding interventions that were implemented during and after the conflict
4. Representatives of organizations who worked with those organizations during the 2002 conflict and after and were involved in implementing some of the interventions to resolve the conflict and maintain peace.

Your role in the Study

You have been identified and selected as a potential participant in the study based on your knowledge and experience of the various types of responses from both government and civil society to resolve the conflict and restore peace in Dagbon after the peace

accord was signed in 2006. If you agree to be part of the study, you will be engaged in a face-to face interview.

The Interview Procedure

The interview process will be as follows:

- Confirming the time, venue and mode for the interview (face-to face, telephone or Skype).
- Introduction and re-statement of the purpose and signing of the consent form or opt out of the study.
- Explanation of the documentation process and request for permission to audio-record where necessary. Recording is purely to help to ensure that what is eventually written is exactly what was said. Emphasize the participant's right to opt out anytime during the interview process.
- Interviewing with the option for interpretation if necessary. If not understood, please ask for clarification.
- Explanation of what will happen to the information gathered and re-assuring the participant of confidentiality
- Making follow-up arrangements if necessary
- Appreciation.
- The process might take approximately one hour fifteen minutes.

Nature of the Study

Your participation in this study is purely voluntary. If you choose to participate, you are free to opt out or stop the interview at any time. Your name will not be linked to any

specific information in the final report. If you decide to participate or not to, this decision will not affect your relationship with any individual or organization, including the one you work for.

Risks and Benefits of the study

As some of the questions might require a recall of regrettable and/or bitter experience in the past, there is a likelihood of stress and anxiety among some people during the interview process. If this happens and you need help, you will be sent to the Department of Social Welfare for support. They have been alerted about this and are on stand-by to help.

The potential benefit to your participation in the study is that the information you provide will contribute to improving knowledge about the conditions under which transitional justice mechanisms can be more effective. This can be a starting point from which administrators can build on in subsequent interventions. There is no form of compensation for your participation in this study.

Confidentiality

The information obtained from this study as well as the eventual report will not be linked to any individual and will be kept private. All hard copies of records will be kept in folders and locked up in a cabinet and only the researcher will have access to them. Soft copies will be stored in files which will be password protected and this will be known by only the researcher. All audiotapes used during the interview will be destroyed after completion of the study.

Limits to Confidentiality

Whereas I pledge to protect the confidentiality of participants in this study, the exception to this might be where there are indications that the security of the nation or groups of people is at risk (for example discovery of arms and ammunition not belonging to the security forces of the state, evidence of a possible attack of another group etc.). In that case, I am duty bound to inform the security agencies of such a potential threat.

Contacts and Queries

The main researcher is Joe Lambongang, reachable by phone on +233 244 989 372 and by e-mail on joe.lambongang@waldenu.edu. The Chair of the research Committee is Dr. Gloria Billingsley and can be reached by e-mail on gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu. If you have any queries on this research, you can ask them now or send them to the Chair of the Research Committee. If you have questions about your rights as a participant, you can reach out to a Walden University representative at +1-612-312-1210.

Statement of Consent

I have read the information above/ or the information has been explained to me in the language that I understand. I am clear with the purpose and conditions under which the study will be conducted and I hereby consent to participate in the study.

This consent form should be signed in duplicate. One copy should be left with the participant

Name of

participant.....

.....

Signature/Right Thumb print.....

Date.....

Signature of researcher.....

Date.....

Appendix E: Consent Form for Participants in Focus Group Discussions: **01-19-17-****0466118**

You are invited to participate in this study which is titled: “The Impact of Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”. The main purpose of this study, which is purely an academic one, is to understand the conditions that might be more responsive to transitional justice processes and mechanisms to promote the achievement of lasting peace in Dagbon. The information from this study will not be used for any other purpose.

The Study

This study is being conducted by Joe Lambongang, a Doctoral Candidate at the Walden University.

Inclusion criteria for this study

Only people who fall in the following category can potentially participate in this study:

1. Must be over 18 years old.
2. Must belong to the Dagbon ethnic group
3. Must have lived in the Dagbon area during the 2002 conflict and familiar with the conflict resolution and peacebuilding interventions that were implemented during and after the conflict
4. Representatives of organizations who worked with those organizations during the 2002 conflict and after and were involved in implementing some of the interventions to resolve the conflict and maintain peace.

Your role in the Study

You have been identified and selected as a potential participant in a focus group discussion involving 4-6 women based on your knowledge and experience of the several

types of responses from both government and civil society to resolve the conflict and restore peace in Dagbon after the peace accord was signed in 2006. If you agree to be part of the study, you will be engaged in a focus group discussion.

Focus group Discussion Procedure

The process for the focus group discussion will be as follows:

- Confirming the time, venue for the interview.
- Introduction and re-statement of the purpose and signing of the consent form or opt out of the study.
- Explanation of the documentation process. Emphasize the participant's right to opt out anytime during the interview process.
- If questions are not understood, there will be room for clarifications. The need to respect other people's opinion will be emphasized.
- Explanation of what will happen to the information gathered and re-assuring the participants of confidentiality
- Appreciation.
- The process might take approximately one hour.

Nature of the Study

Your participation in this study is purely voluntary. If you choose to participate, you are free to opt out or stop the discussion at any time. Your name will not be linked to any specific information in the final report. If you decide to participate or not to, this decision

will not affect your relationship with any individual or organization, including the one you work for.

Risks and Benefits of the study

As some of the questions might require a recall of regrettable and/or bitter experience in the past, there is a likelihood of stress and anxiety among some people during the interview process. If this happens and you need help, you will be sent to the Department of Social Welfare for support. They have been alerted about this and are on stand-by to help.

The potential benefit to your participation in the study is that the information you provide will contribute to improving knowledge about the conditions under which transitional justice mechanisms can be more effective. This can be a starting point from which administrators can build on in subsequent interventions. There is no form of compensation for your participation in this study.

Confidentiality

The information obtained from this study as well as the eventual report will not be linked to any individual and will be kept private. All hard copies of records will be kept in folders and locked up in a cabinet and only the researcher will have access to them. Soft copies will be stored in files which will be password protected and this will be known by only the researcher. All audiotapes used during the interview will be destroyed after completion of the study.

As a participant in this study, I acknowledge and agree that I might have access to confidential information. I agree that:

- I will not disclose or discuss any confidential information with others, including friends or family
- I will not discuss confidential information where others can overhear the conversation. I understand that it is not acceptable to discuss confidential information even if the participant's name is not mentioned. By consenting to participate in this study, I agree to this privacy and confidentiality requirements.

Limits to Confidentiality

Whereas I pledge to protect the confidentiality of participants in this study, the exception to this might be where there are indications that the security of the nation or groups of people is at risk (for example discovery of arms and ammunition not belonging to the security forces of the state, evidence of a possible attack of another group etc.). In that case, I am duty bound to inform the security agencies of such a potential threat for further investigation.

Contacts and Queries

The main researcher is Joe Lambongang, reachable by phone on +233 244 989 372 and by e-mail on joe.lambongang@waldenu.edu. The Chair of the research Committee is Dr. Gloria Billingsley and can be reached by e-mail on gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu. If you have any queries on this research, you can ask them now or send them to the Chair of the Research Committee. If you have questions about your rights as a participant, you can reach out to a Walden University representative at +1-612-312-1210.

Statement of Consent

I have read the information above/ or the information has been explained to me in the language that I understand. I am clear with the purpose and conditions under which the study will be conducted and I hereby consent to participate in the study.

This consent form should be signed in duplicate. One copy should be left with the participant

Name of participant.....

Signature/Right Thumb print.....

Date.....

Signature of researcher.....

Date.....

Appendix F: Spousal Consent Form for Female Participants in Focus Group Discussions.

01-19-17-0466118

Your wife has been invited to participate in this study which is titled: “The Impact of Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”. The main purpose of this study, which is purely an academic one, is to understand the conditions that might be more responsive to transitional justice processes and mechanisms to promote the achievement of lasting peace in Dagbon. The information from this study will not be used

The Study

This study is being conducted by Joe Lambongang, a Doctoral Candidate at the Walden University.

Inclusion criteria for this study

Only people who fall in the following category can potentially participate in this study:

1. Must be over 18 years old.
2. Must belong to the Dagbon ethnic group
3. Must have lived in the Dagbon area during the 2002 conflict and familiar with the conflict resolution and peacebuilding interventions that were implemented during and after the conflict
4. Representatives of organizations who worked with those organizations during the 2002 conflict and after and were involved in implementing some of the interventions to resolve the conflict and maintain peace.

Your wife’s role in the Study

Your spouse has been identified and selected as a potential participant in the study based on her knowledge and experience of the several types of responses from both government

and civil society to resolve the conflict and restore peace in Dagbon after the peace accord was signed in 2006. If you agree for your spouse to be part of the study, she will be engaged in a focus group discussion with other women who will be between 4 and 6 in number.

The Focus Group Discussion Procedure

The interview process will be as follows:

- Confirming the time, venue for the interview.
- Introduction and re-statement of the purpose and signing of the consent form or opt out of the study.
- Explanation of the documentation process. Emphasize the participant's right to opt out anytime during the interview process.
- If questions are not understood, there will be room for clarifications. The need to respect other people's opinion will be emphasized.
- Explanation of what will happen to the information gathered and re-assuring the participants of confidentiality
- Appreciation.
- The process might take approximately one hour.

Nature of the Study

Your wife's participation in this study is purely voluntary. If she chooses to participate, she will be free to opt out or stop the interview at any time. Her name will not be linked to any specific information in the final report. If she decides to participate or not to, this

decision will not affect her relationship with any individual or organization, including the one you work for.

In the same way, your decision about your wife's participation is equally voluntary and whatever your decision is about her participation, it will not affect your relationship with anyone directly or indirectly involved in this research process.

Risks and Benefits of the study

As some of the questions might require a recall of regrettable and/or bitter experience in the past, there is a likelihood of stress and anxiety among some people during the interview process. If this happens and you need help, you will be sent to the Department of Social Welfare for support. They have been alerted about this and are on stand-by to help.

The potential benefit to your wife's participation in the study is that the information she and other women will provide will contribute to improving knowledge about the conditions under which transitional justice mechanisms can be more effective. This can be a starting point from which administrators can build on in subsequent interventions. There is no form of compensation for your wife's participation in this study.

Confidentiality

The information obtained from this study as well as the eventual report will not be linked to any individual and will be kept private. All hard copies of records will be kept in folders and locked up in a cabinet and only the researcher will have access to them. Soft copies will be stored in files which will be password protected and this will be known by

only the researcher. All audiotapes used during the interview will be destroyed after completion of the study.

Limits to Confidentiality

Whereas I pledge to protect the confidentiality of participants in this study, the exception to this might be where there are indications that the security of the nation or groups of people is at risk (for example discovery of arms and ammunition not belonging to the security forces of the state, evidence of a possible attack of another group etc.). In that case, I am duty bound to inform the security agencies of such a potential threat.

Contacts and Queries

The main researcher is Joe Lambongang, reachable by phone on +233 244 989 372 and by e-mail on joe.lambongang@waldenu.edu. The Chair of the Research Committee is Dr. Gloria Billingsley and can be reached by e-mail on gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu. If you have any queries on this research, you can ask them now or send them to the Chair of the Research Committee. If you have questions about your rights as a participant, you can reach out to a Walden University representative at +1-612-312-1210.

Statement of Consent

I have read the information above/ or the information has been explained to me in the language that I understand. I am clear with the purpose and conditions under which the study will be conducted and I hereby consent for my wife to participate in the study.

This consent form should be signed in duplicate. One copy should be left with the participant

Name

Signature/Right Thumb print.....

Date.....

Signature of researcher.....

Date.....

Appendix G: Spousal Consent Form for Female Participants in Individual Interviews: 01-

19-17-0466118

Your wife has been invited to participate in this study which is titled: “The Impact of Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”. The main purpose of this study, which is purely an academic one, is to understand the conditions that might be more responsive to transitional justice processes and mechanisms to promote the achievement of lasting peace in Dagbon. The information from this study will not be used

The Study

This study is being conducted by Joe Lambongang, a Doctoral Candidate at the Walden University.

Inclusion criteria for this study

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4. Representatives of organizations who worked with those organizations during the 2002 conflict and after and were involved in implementing some of the interventions to resolve the conflict and maintain peace.

Your wife’s role in the Study

Your wife has been identified and selected as a potential participant in the study based on her knowledge and experience of the several types of responses from both government

and civil society to resolve the conflict and restore peace in Dagbon after the peace accord was signed in 2006. If you agree for your spouse to be part of the study, she will be engaged in a focus group discussion with other women who will be between 4 and 6 in number.

The Interview Procedure

The interview process will be as follows:

- Confirming the time, venue and mode for the interview (face-to face, telephone or Skype).
- Introduction and re-statement of the purpose and signing of the consent form or opt out of the study.
- Explanation of the documentation process and request for permission to audio-record where necessary. Recording is purely to help to ensure that what is eventually written is exactly what was said. Emphasize the participant's right to opt out anytime during the interview process.
- Interviewing with the option for interpretation if necessary. If not understood, please ask for clarification.
- Explanation of what will happen to the information gathered and re-assuring the participant of confidentiality
- Making follow-up arrangements if necessary
- Appreciation.
- The process might take approximately one hour fifteen minutes.

Nature of the Study

Your wife's participation in this study is purely voluntary. If she chooses to participate, she will be free to opt out or stop the interview at any time. Her name will not be linked to any specific information in the final report. If she decides to participate or not to, this decision will not affect her relationship with any individual or organization, including the one you work for.

In the same way, your decision about your wife's participation is equally voluntary and whatever your decision is about her participation, it will not affect your relationship with anyone directly or indirectly involved in this research process.

Risks and Benefits of the study

As some of the questions might require a recall of regrettable and/or bitter experience in the past, there is a likelihood of stress and anxiety among some people during the interview process. If this happens and you need help, you will be sent to the Department of Social Welfare for support. They have been alerted about this and are on stand-by to help.

The potential benefit of your wife's participation in the study is that the information she and other women will provide will contribute to improving knowledge about the conditions under which transitional justice mechanisms can be more effective. This can be a starting point from which administrators can build on in subsequent interventions.

There is no form of compensation for your wife's participation in this study.

Confidentiality

The information obtained from this study as well as the eventual report will not be linked to any individual and will be kept private. All hard copies of records will be kept in

folders and locked up in a cabinet and only the researcher will have access to them. Soft copies will be stored in files which will be password protected and this will be known by only the researcher. All audiotapes used during the interview will be destroyed after completion of the study.

Limits to Confidentiality

Whereas I pledge to protect the confidentiality of participants in this study, the exception to this might be where there are indications that the security of the nation or groups of people is at risk (for example discovery of arms and ammunition not belonging to the security forces of the state, evidence of a possible attack of another group etc.). In that case, I am duty bound to inform the security agencies of such a potential threat.

Contacts and Queries

The main researcher is Joe Lambongang, reachable by phone on +233 244 989 372 and by e-mail on joe.lambongang@waldenu.edu. The Chair of the Research Committee is Dr. Gloria Billingsley and can be reached by e-mail on gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu. If you have any queries on this research, you can ask them now or send them to the Chair of the Research Committee. If you have questions about your rights as a participant, you can reach out to a Walden University representative at +1-612-312-1210.

Statement of Consent

I have read the information above/ or the information has been explained to me in the language that I understand. I am clear with the purpose and conditions under which the study will be conducted and I hereby consent for my wife to participate in the study.

This consent form should be signed in duplicate. One copy should be left with the participant

Name

Signature/Right Thumb print.....

Date.....

Signature of researcher.....

Date.....

Appendix H: Confidentiality Agreement for Member-Checker: 01-19-17-0466118

Name of Signer:

During my activity in collecting data for this research Titled: “The Impact of Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”. I will have access to information, which is confidential and should not be disclosed. I acknowledge that the information must remain confidential, and that improper disclosure of confidential information can be damaging to the participant.

By signing this Confidentiality Agreement, I acknowledge and agree that:

1. I will not disclose or discuss any confidential information with others, including friends or family.
2. I will not in any way divulge, copy, release, sell, loan, alter or destroy any confidential information except as properly authorized.
3. I will not discuss confidential information where others can overhear the conversation. I understand that it is not acceptable to discuss confidential information even if the participant’s name is not used.
4. I will not make any unauthorized transmissions, inquiries, modification or purging of confidential information.
5. I agree that my obligations under this agreement will continue after termination of the job that I will perform.
6. I understand that violation of this agreement will have legal implications.

7. I will only access or use systems or devices I'm officially authorized to access and I will not demonstrate the operation or function of systems or devices to unauthorized individuals.

Signing this document, I acknowledge that I have read the agreement and I agree to comply with all the terms and conditions stated above.

Signature:

Date:

Appendix I: Spousal Confidentiality Agreement for Individual Interviews: 01-19-17-

0466118

Name of Signer:

During my activity in collecting data for this research Titled: “The Impact of Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”. I will have access to information, which is confidential and should not be disclosed. I acknowledge that the information must remain confidential, and that improper disclosure of confidential information can be damaging to the participant.

By signing this Confidentiality Agreement, I acknowledge and agree that:

1. I will not disclose or discuss any confidential information with others, including friends or family.
2. I will not in any way divulge any confidential information except as properly authorized.
3. I will not discuss confidential information where others can overhear the conversation. I understand that it is not acceptable to discuss confidential information even if the participant’s name is not used.
4. I understand that violation of this agreement will have legal implications.

Signing this document, I acknowledge that I have read the agreement and I agree to comply with all the terms and conditions stated above.

Signature:**Date:**

Appendix J: Spousal Confidentiality Agreement for Focus Group Discussions with
Women: 01-19-17-0466118

Name of Signer:

During my activity in collecting data for this research Titled: “The Impact of Transitional Justice on Conflict Resolution and the Maintenance of Peace in Ghana. A Case Study of the Dagbon Conflict in the Northern Region”. I will have access to information, which is confidential and should not be disclosed. I acknowledge that the information must remain confidential, and that improper disclosure of confidential information can be damaging to the participant.

By signing this Confidentiality Agreement, I acknowledge and agree that:

1. I will not disclose or discuss any confidential information with others, including friends or family.
2. I will not in any way divulge any confidential information except as properly authorized.
3. I will not discuss confidential information where others can overhear the conversation. I understand that it is not acceptable to discuss confidential information even if the participant’s name is not used.
4. I understand that violation of this agreement will have legal implications.

Signing this document, I acknowledge that I have read the agreement and I agree to comply with all the terms and conditions stated above.

Signature:

Date:

Appendix K: Interview Protocol for Individual Interviews. **01-19-17-0466118**

Date.....

Location.....

Name of Interviewer.....

Name of Interviewee.....

Thanks again for agreeing to participate in this study. The interview will take approximately one hour. If any question is unclear, kindly let me know.

Section A. Retributive Justice

1. Since March 2006 when the peace accord was signed, has anything been done to compensate victims of human rights abuses? If yes, can you please describe these actions as much as you can?
2. Specifically, have there been any trials and/or punishments for human rights abuses since March 2006 when the peace accord was signed?
3. If yes to the question 2, can you please describe the process of identification and trial of these suspects?
4. Are you satisfied with this? Please explain your answer.
5. Have there been any other form of punishment or sanctions of suspects? If yes, kindly describe them.

6. How effective have these been in terms of:
 - a. Deterrence? Please explain your answer.
 - b. Restoring confidence and societal balance? Please explain your answer.

Section B. Restorative Justice

7. Since March 2006, has anything been done to:
 - a. Restore the dignity of victims?
 - b. Address their needs and/or create space for perpetrators to make confessions and seek forgiveness?
 - c. Build confidence in the chieftaincy and state institutions in Dagbon?
8. What in your opinion are the challenges associated with the processes and mechanisms for justice and peacebuilding in Dagbon?
9. What can be done differently to ensure lasting peace in the area?

Thank you for your time

Appendix L: Interview Protocol for Focus Group Discussions. 01-19-17-0466118

Date.....

Location.....

Name of Interviewer.....

Name of Focus Group.....

Thanks again for agreeing to participate in this study. The interview will take approximately one hour. If any question is unclear, kindly let me know. Also, if at any point someone feels, for any reason, that they do not wish to continue, kindly let me know and I will stop the interview.

1. Looking back, can you mention the strategies that were put in place in Dagbon after the peace accord was signed in March 2006 to:
 - a. Restore peace in Dagbon?
 - b. Resolve the conflict?
 - c. Build peace?
2. How effective were these in terms of:
 - a. Deterrence? Please explain your answer.
 - b. Restoring confidence and societal balance? Please explain your answer.
3. In your opinion, were these successful in resolving the Dagbon conflict and restoring peace? Please explain your answer

4. If these were not successful, what might help to make the strategies more responsive to peacebuilding? Please explain your answer.
5. What can be done differently to ensure that lasting peace returns to Dagbon?
Please explain your answer

Thank you for your time!

Appendix M: Observation Protocol. 01-19-17-0466118

The purpose of this observation protocol is to provide a checklist that will help to focus on the data and other details that emerge from the observation session. The focus of the observation is to find/confirm physical evidence of the effects of the war and any physical evidence of restorative peace

Directions: Before you begin, take a few minutes to describe the setting. Using the table on the next page, note the approximate time durations within which specific observations are made (may provide vital information later), along with notes on what you observe, and any other details that you consider to be important. After the observation, review your notes and begin to document possible codes for each observation. You will group the codes into themes at a later point.

Date:**(a) The Background:**

Description of the physical setting (Describe in thick rich detail what it looks like, sounds like, and any other details. Record what you see about the environment—the nature of the palace (both old and new), streets names, names/evidence of statues, memorials, about the participants and their roles, if known).

(b) The People:

How do they interact?

What are they wearing?

What are they saying?

What does their body language tell you?

The environment

What is the nature of houses?

Any physical evidence of the war?

Any physical evidence of security/peacekeeping?

Streets—any names?

Any physical evidence of restoration of dignity of victims (e.g. nature of graves, statues, etc.)

(c) Time:	(d) Observation:	(e) Code:

Appendix N: nun yan pahi vihigu ɔo puni fooro tibu (saɓti) gban zaŋ kpa ninvuɓu

yinoyino bohisi: 01-19-17-0466118

Ti gahiri nuu bolinda (boonda) ni a ti pahi baŋsim vihigu ɔo puni, din vihigu yuli nye: “Adalchi maligu sosheɗa din jandi barina din paai niriba soŋsim ni nye sheli zaŋ kpa zabili goobu ni suhdoo dawama niŋbu Gaana(Ghana) puni. Tudu bobili polo Dagboŋ zabili la n nye baŋsim vihigu ɔo ni yan sabi daliŋ (bee n jandi)”. Vihigu ɔo nye la baŋsim ko vihigu; ka di nufi (niya) nyela ni di baŋ behsheɗa (conditions) din yan tooi soŋ vierɣalinga zaŋ kpa adalichi maligu soya din yan kpɛxi bo faako na ni sosheɗa din tu zaŋ chaŋ suhdoo dawama niŋbu Dagboŋ puli ni. Lahabali din yan yi baŋsim vihigo ɔo nina pala din yan zaŋ ku anfaani sheli paha la ti ni kuli wuhi nufi (niya) shelimaa.

Baŋsim vihigu maa

Joe Lambongang, nun nye booku Dokte karɔŋ bia Walden Yunivesiti karɔŋzoŋ puni la n nye nun vihiri vihigu ɔo.

Sosheɗa din wuhiri nivuɓu shab ban tu ni be vihigu ɔoɔ puni

Ninvuɓu shab ban be pubu din be gbini ɔo n nye ban ni tooi pahi vihigu ɔo puni:

1. Di tuya ni o Yuma nye yuun piiya ni anii (yuunpinaanii) (18).
2. Di tuya ni o nyela Dagbana
3. Di tuya ni o nyela nun daa be Dagbaŋ 2002 zabili la saha, ka nyela nun mi zabili goobu soya (nirbi sunsuni Malibu soya) ni suhdoo bobo sosheɗa bini daa kpɛxi zabilimaa ni daa na zabira ni zabilimaa bahigu (nyaanga).
4. Ban daa zani laɓingunim zaani ka bi mini laɓingunim maa tum tuma 2002 zabilimaa saha ni di nyaanga; ka daa nyela ban pahi zaŋ suhdoo soya maa sheɗa tum ni bi bo maligu zaŋ chaŋ zabilimaa polo ka suhdoo kana.

A tuma ni nye sheli baŋsim vihigu maa puni.

Ti vihiya nya ka piiga pahi vihigu ŋo puni, doomini a baŋsim ni a milinsi zaŋ kpa bohisi labisibu balibu balibu din nyina gomdanti (Government) ni salo sani na ni di ku zabili maa, ka bo suhudoo kana Dagbaŋ puli ni baayan suhudoo alikawli maa ni daa lo 2006 yuuni maa puni. A yi saŋti ni a ni pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni, din ŋuna, ti mina ni zaŋ ti nina kpa taba ka ti boha bohisi.

Bohisi maa ni yan chaŋ shem

Bohisi maa ni ya n chaŋ shem n nye din kana ŋo:

- Di tuya ni di dihitabili saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan bohi, ni luɔu sheli di ni yan bohi n ti tabili di ni yan bohi shem (nina zaŋ kpa taba tohisi, ni tangali mii zuɔu bohisi n ti tabili bini boolindi sheli Sikaipu la {kompita zuɔu video fiila}-skype)
- Tabzaŋbaŋsitaba (introduction) bee (milinsi ni taba) ni niŋ. Daliri din che ka baŋsim vihigu ŋo maa yan niŋ maa nilan lab wuhi; yaha, saŋti gbaŋ maa ni dihi (saani), bee ka a pii ni a ni yi baŋsim vihigu maa puni.
- Neesim (bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa sabibu maa soya ni yaŋ chaŋ shem. Di yi niŋ talahi, soli (yiko) ni bo zaŋ kpa yetɔɔa teepubu zaŋ niŋ kaseeti ni. Teepubu maa pala she pahala di yan sɔŋ mi dihtabili ni bi ni sabi sheli maa nyala din zantuhi a ni yeli shem maa dedee. Dini kpaŋsi, ni ŋun saŋti vihigu_ŋo puni behigu mali yiko ni o yi di puni sahansheli kam o ni bora, di yi ti niŋ ka hohisi maa chana.

- Di yi niŋ talahi, bohisi ni bohi zaŋ chaŋ a ni pii bohisi maa puni yibu maa, din kuya n che ka di baŋ daliri sheli din tahi lala na. di yi niŋ ka a bi niŋ fahimta (bee ka a bi baŋ sheli), ŋ kpamda jaandi, kpaŋmi a maŋa ka bohi ka di nee n taa.
- Neesim (bee bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa lahabali sheŋa din laŋsim maa; ti lahi tiri nyin ŋun be vihigu ŋo puni alikawli zaŋ kpa gbinliribo polo.
- Di yi niŋ talahi shili ni mali zaŋ kpa ti labibu na.
- Paɔbu (nbonbo) ni niŋ.
- Saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan di nyela kamani awa yini ni minti pia ni anu(pinaanu)

Vihigu maa behigu ni nye shem

A vihigu ŋo puni bebu nyela suhuyurilim ko. A yi pii ni a ni pahi di puni, a lan mali yiko ni a yi di puni bee ka a che bohisimaa labisibu sahan sheli kam ani bora. Diyi ti yan sabi bahigu sabu maa, a yuli pala din yan boli zaŋ chaŋ lahabali sheli a ni ti. A yi pii ni a ni pahi vihigu maa puni bee a yi pii ni a ku pahi di puni pala din yan saŋsim a mini niŋvuɔu so sunsuni bee laŋingu sheli kam sunsuni; zaŋ ti tabili a ni tumti so maa.

Vihigu maa barinanima ni di anfaaninima

Bohisi maa yi ti bohira, di ni tooi niŋ ka di sheŋa bori ni di tee yoltem, bee yeltoɔu (yelbierili) din daa paai niribi la; din zuɔu, di zooya ka teha ni suhgarigu paai niŋvuɔu sheba. Di yi ti niŋ ka lala maa paaga, ka a bori soŋsim, din a zaŋa chaŋ salo berizuŋ tuma

shee la ka a ti nya soṅsim. Di pun baṅsiba zaṅ kpa di polo; di zuṣu, bi mali la sheli zaṅ chaṅ di polo. Anfaani sheli din yan yina a vihigu ṅo puni benibu nyemi, ni lahabali sheli kam a ni ya nti nyela din yan sɔṅ kpaṅsi baṅsim(bee di yan che ka baṅsim ti too ni) zaṅ kpa behi sheṅa puni adalichi sosuma din na beni ni yan tooi tum vieṅyalinga pam shem. Do nyela din ni tooi niṅ piligibu shee tuma zuṣlaanim ni yan tooi mentam_(bee ntusi) sohbeṣu, soṅsim(faako) tibu yi ti lan bora. A vihigu ṅo puni benibu ka samyogahindili.

Ashili liribu (Ashiliribo)- confidentiality

Di yi ti yan sabi vihigu ṅo kpaliṅkpaa sabibu, lahabali sheṅa din yina vihigu maa puni pala din yan zaṅ tabili so yuli ka mani ni ṅuni ndaa yeli. Di nyela din yan be amini bohbohri maa sunsuni ko. Gbaṅ sheṅa kam din sabi, nti pahi yetɔṣ sheṅa zaa din teepi, yan pumpumi jillijilli n kpai niṅ adaka puni. Baṅsim vihirovihiro maa ko n nye ṅun mali yiko di zuṣu. Lahabali din sabi be kompita zuṣu nyela din yan be faali (files) sheṅa din mali namba sɔṣrili (password). Namba sɔṣrili ṅo nyela din yan be vihirovihiro maa ko sani (researcher). Lahabali sheṅa zaa din teepi niṅ kasetinimni nyela bi ni ya nsasim labi vihigu maa nyaanga.

Ashil-liribo maa Tarisi

Di mini ṅkuli kpaai alikawli nin ni liri ṅunkam be vihigiṅo puni Ashili (gbini) maa, di bi yan pahi ti yi niṅ ka ti nya ni tingbaṅ, bee ninsalinim suhdoo be barina puni (di ṅmahanli nyela kamani ti yi ti nya bidibi nema (tobnema) ni malfanima ka di pala tingbaṅ

linjimanim n suli; yaha, ti yi ti nya daliri ni shab bori ni bi liri bi taba. Do yi ti niŋ, di niŋ talahi n zuɗu ni n ti suhdoo fukumsinim tibli zaŋ kpa barina ŋo polo.

Adireesinima ni lahabali baŋbu bohsi

Vihigu maa janda(di fukunsilana) yuli n nye: Joe Lambogang. O nyela a ni yan tooi poli taŋgalimii ŋo zuɗu:+233 244989 372 bee ka a sabi too iimiili (Email) ŋo zuɗu: joe.lambogang@waldenu.edu. Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo n nye: Dokte (Dr) Gloria Billingsley; o nyela a ni yan tooi nya so iimiili (Email) ŋo zuɗu: Gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu . A yi mali bohigu zaŋ kpa vihigu ŋo polo, a ni tooi bohiba punpono bee ka a sabi li ti Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo maa. A yi mali pohsi zaŋ kpa a hachi ni nye sheli zaŋ chaŋ vihigu ŋo puni bebu, a ni tooi sabi ti ninvuɗu so ŋun za Walden Yunivesiti zaani taŋgalimii ŋo zuɗu:+612-312-1210

Fooro tibu yetɗɗli(zilinli)

N nyela ŋun karim lahabali sheli din sabi be zuɗsaa ŋo; bee di nye la din lebigi ti ma yetɗɗsheli puni (bee bali sheli puni) ni mi. N nyela ŋun niŋ fahimta zaŋ kpa nufi ni mara sheja puni vihigu maa ni yan niŋ. Din zuɗu n saɗti nin ni pahi bansim vihigu ŋo puni.

Di nye la talahi ni fooro tibu gbaŋ ŋo dihi (saani) buyi zuɗu. Gbaŋyini yan kpalinla nyin ŋun be baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni sani.

Ninvuɗu so ŋun be vihigu ŋo puni

yuli:.....

O nudirigu nubiliyoŝu dihibu/ o siginicha/ o yuli alaama sheli o ko ni

mi:.....

Dabsili (

Taarihi):.....

Vihirovihiro maa siginicha/ o yuli alaama sheli o ko ni mi:

Dabsili (

Taarihi):.....

Appendix O: Ban yan pahi vihigu ɲo puni fooro tibu (saɣti) gbaɲ zaɲ kpa salo (bobgu)

laɣim toɣasi polo. 01-19-17-0466118

Ti gahiri nuu bolinda (boonda) ni a ti pahi baɲsim vihigu ɲo puni, din vihigu yuli nye: “Adalchi maligu sosheɲa din jandi barina din paai niriba soɲsim ni nye sheli zaɲ kpa zabili goobu ni suhdoo dawama niɲbu Gaana(Ghana) puni. Tudu bobili polo Dagboɲ zabili la n nye baɲsim vihigu ɲo ni yan sabi daliɲ (bee n jandi)”. Vihigu ɲo nye la baɲsim ko vihigu; ka di nufi (niya) nyela ni di baɲ behsheɲa (conditions) din yan tooi soɲ vienyalinga zaɲ kpa adalichi maligu soya din yan kpiɣi bo faako na ni sosheɲa din tu zaɲ chaɲ suhdoo dawama niɲbu Dagboɲ puli ni. Lahabali din yan yi baɲsim vihigo ɲo nina pala din yan zaɲ ku anfaani sheli paha la ti ni kuli wuhi nufi (niya) shelimaa.

Baɲsim vihigu maa

Joe Lambongang, ɲun nye booku Dokte karɲɲ bia Walden Yunivesiti karɲɲzoɲ puni la n nye ɲun vihiri vihigu ɲo.

Sosheɲa din wuhiri nivuɣu shab ban tu ni be vihigu ɲoɲ puni

Nivuɣu shab ban be pubu din be gbini ɲo n nye ban ni tooi pahi vihigu ɲo puni:

5. Di tuya ni o Yuma nye yuun piiya ni anii (yuunpinaanii) (18).
6. Di tuya ni o nyela Dagbana
7. Di tuya ni o nyela ɲun daa be Dagbaɲ 2002 zabili la saha, ka nyela ɲun mi zabili goobu soya (nirbi sunsuni Malibu soya) ni suhdoo bobo sosheɲa bini daa kpiɣi zabilimaa ni daa na zabira ni zabilimaa bahigu (nyaanga).
8. Ban daa zani laɣingunim zaani ka bi mini laɣingunim maa tum tuma 2002 zabilimaa saha ni di nyaanga; ka daa nyela ban pahi zaɲ suhdoo soya maa sheɲa tum ni bi bo maligu zaɲ chaɲ zabilimaa polo ka suhdoo kana.

A tuma ni nye sheli baɲsim vihigu maa puni.

Ti vihiya nya ka piiga pahi vihigu ŋo puni, doomini a baŋsim ni a milinsi zaŋ kpa bohisi labisibu balibu balibu din nyina gomdanti (Government) ni salo sani na ni di ku zabili maa, ka bo suhudoo kana Dagbaŋ puli ni baayan suhudoo alikawli maa ni daa lo 2006 yuuni maa puni. A yi saŋti ni a ni pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni, din ŋuna, ti mina ni zaŋ ti nina kpa taba ka ti boha bohisi.

Bohisi maa ni yan chaŋ shem

Bohisi maa ni ya n chaŋ shem n nye din kana ŋo:

- Di tuya ni di dihitabili saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan bohi, ni luɔu sheli di ni yan bohi n ti tabili di ni yan bohi shem (nina zaŋ kpa taba tohisi, ni taŋgali mii zuɔu bohisi n ti tabili bini boolindi sheli Sikaipu la {kompita zuɔu video fiila}-skype)
- Tabzaŋbaŋsitaba (introduction) bee (milinsi ni taba) ni niŋ. Daliri din che ka baŋsim vihigu ŋo maa yan niŋ maa nilan lab wuhi; yaha, saŋti gbaŋ maa ni dihi (saani), bee ka a pii ni a ni yi baŋsim vihigu maa puni.
- Neesim (bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa sabibu maa soya ni yan chaŋ shem. Di yi niŋ talahi, soli (yiko) ni bo zaŋ kpa yetɔsa teepubu zaŋ niŋ kaseeti ni. Teepubu maa pala she pahala di yan sɔŋ mi dihtabili ni bi ni sabi sheli maa nyala din zantuhi a ni yeli shem maa dedee. Dini kpaŋsi, ni ŋun saŋti vihigu ŋo puni behigu mali yiko ni o yi di puni sahansheli kam o ni bora, di yi ti niŋ ka hohisi maa chana.

- Di yi niŋ talahi, bohisi ni bohi zaŋ chaŋ a ni pii bohisi maa puni yibu maa, din kuya n che ka di baŋ daliri sheli din tahi lala na. di yi niŋ ka a bi niŋ fahimta (bee ka a bi baŋ sheli), ŋ kpamda jaandi, kpaŋmi a maŋa ka bohi ka di nee n taa.
- Neesim (bee bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa lahabali sheŋa din laŋim maa; ti lahi tiri nyin ŋun be vihigu ŋo puni alikawli zaŋ kpa gbinliribo polo.
- Di yi niŋ talahi shili ni mali zaŋ kpa ti labibu na.
- Paɔbu (nbonbo) ni niŋ.
- Saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan di nyela kamani awa yini ni minti pia ni anu(pinaanu)

Vihigu maa behigu ni nye shem

A vihigu ŋo puni bebu nyela suhuyurilim ko. A yi pii ni a ni pahi di puni, a lan mali yiko ni a yi di puni bee ka a che bohisimaa labisibu sahan sheli kam ani bora. Diyi ti yan sabi bahigu sabu maa, a yuli pala din yan boli zaŋ chaŋ lahabali sheli a ni ti. A yi pii ni a ni pahi vihigu maa puni bee a yi pii ni a ku pahi di puni pala din yan saŋim a mini niŋvuɔu so sunsuni bee laŋingu sheli kam sunsuni; zaŋ ti tabili a ni tumti so maa.

Vihigu maa barinanima ni di anfaaninima

Bohisi maa yi ti bohira, di ni tooi niŋ ka di sheŋa bori ni di tee yoltem, bee yeltoɔu (yelbierili) din daa paai niribi la; din zuɔu, di zooya ka teha ni suhgarigu paai niŋvuɔu sheba. Di yi ti niŋ ka lala maa paaga, ka a bori soŋsim, din a zaŋa chaŋ salo berizuŋ tuma shee la ka a ti nya soŋsim. Di pun baŋsiba zaŋ kpa di polo; di zuɔu, bi mali la sheli zaŋ

chaŋ di polo. Anfaani sheli din yan yina a vihigu ŋo puni benibu nyemi, ni lahabali sheli kam a ni ya nti nyela din yan sɔŋ kpaŋsi baŋsim(bee di yan che ka baŋsim ti too ni) zaŋ kpa behi sheŋa puni adalichi sosuma din na beni ni yan tooi tum vieŋyalinga pam shem. Do nyela din ni tooi niŋ piligibu shee tuma zuɗlaanim ni yan tooi mentam_(bee ntusi) sohbeɗu, soŋsim(faako) tibu yi ti lan bora. A vihigu ŋo puni benibu ka samyogahindili.

Ashili liribu (Ashiliribo)- confidentiality

Di yi ti yan sabi vihigu ŋo kpaŋkpa sabibu, lahabali sheŋa din yina vihigu maa puni pala din yan zaŋ tabili so yuli ka mani ni ŋuni ndaa yeli. Di nyela din yan be amini bohbohri maa sunsuni ko. Gbaŋ sheŋa kam din sabi, nti pahi yetɔɔ sheŋa zaa din teepi, yan pumpumi jillijilli n kpari niŋ adaka puni. Baŋsim vihirovihiro maa ko n nye ŋun mali yiko di zuɗu. Lahabali din sabi be kompita zuɗu nyela din yan be faali (files) sheŋa din mali namba sɔɔrili (password). Namba sɔɔrili ŋo nyela din yan be vihirovihiro maa ko sani (researcher). Lahabali sheŋa zaa din teepi niŋ kasetinimni nyela bi ni ya nsaɓim labi vihigu maa nyaanga.

Ashil-liribo maa Tarisi

Di mini ŋkuli kpaai alikawli nin ni liri ŋunkam be vihigiŋo puni Ashili (gbini) maa, di bi yan pahi ti yi niŋ ka ti nya ni tingbaŋ, bee ninsalinim suhdoo be barina puni (di ŋmahanli nyela kamani ti yi ti nya bidibi nema (tobnema) ni malfanima ka di pala tingbaŋ linjimanim n suli; yaha, ti yi ti nya daliri ni shab bori ni bi liri bi taba. Do yi ti niŋ, di niŋ talahi n zuɗu ni n ti suhdoo fukumsinim tibli zaŋ kpa barina ŋo polo.

Adireesinima ni lahabali baɗbu bohsi

Vihigu maa janda(di fukunsilana) yuli n nye: Joe Lambongang. O nyela a ni yan tooi poli taɗgalimii ɗo zuɗu:+233 244989 372 bee ka a sabi too iimiili (Email) ɗo zuɗu:

joe.lambogang@waldenu.edu. Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo n nye: Dokte (Dr)

Gloria Billingsley; o nyela a ni yan tooi nya so iimiili (Email) ɗo zuɗu:

Gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu . A yi mali bohigu zaɗ kpa vihigu ɗo polo, a ni tooi

bohiba punpoɗo bee ka a sabi li ti Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo maa. A yi mali pohsi zaɗ kpa a hachi ni nye sheli zaɗ chaɗ vihigu ɗo puni bebu, a ni tooi sabi ti ninvuɗu so ɗun za Walden Yunivesiti zaani taɗgalimii ɗo zuɗu:+-612-312-1210

Fooro tibu yetɗɗi(zilinli)

N nyela ɗun karim lahabali sheli din sabi be zuɗsaa ɗo; bee di nye la din lebigi ti ma yetɗɗsheli puni (bee bali sheli puni) ni mi. N nyela ɗun niɗ fahimta zaɗ kpa nufi ni mara sheɗa puni vihigu maa ni yan niɗ. Din zuɗu n saɗti nin ni pahi bansim vihigu ɗo puni.

Di nye la talahi ni fooro tibu gbaɗ ɗo dihi (saani) buyi zuɗu. Gbaɗyini yan kpalinla nyin ɗun be baɗsim vihigu ɗo puni sani.

Ninvuɗu so ɗun be vihigu ɗo puni

yuli:.....

O nudirigu nubileyoɗu dihibu/ o siginicha/ o yuli alaama sheli o ko ni

mi:.....

Dabsili (

Taarihi):.....

Vihirovihiro maa signicha/ o yuli alaama sheli o ko ni mi:

Dabsili (

Taarihi):.....

Appendix P: Yidaanim saɗti gbaɗ: paɗba ban be salo (bobgu) laɗim-toɗasi polo dini. 01-

19-17-0466118

Ti gahiri nuu bolinda (boonda) a paɗa ni o ti pahi baɗsim vihigu ɗo puni, din vihigu yuli nye: “Adalchi maligu sosheɗa din jandi barina din paai niriba soɗsim ni nye sheli zaɗ kpa zabili goobu ni suhdoo dawama niɗbu Gaana(Ghana) puni. Tudu bobili polo Dagboɗ zabili la n nye baɗsim vihigu ɗo ni yan sabi daliɗ (bee n jandi)”. Vihigu ɗo nye la baɗsim ko vihigu; ka di nufi (niya) nyela ni di baɗ behsheɗa (conditions) din yan tooi soɗ vienyalinga zaɗ kpa adalichi maligu soya din yan kpiɗi bo faako na ni sosheɗa din tu zaɗ chaɗ suhdoo dawama niɗbu Dagboɗ puli ni. Lahabali din yan yi baɗsim vihigo ɗo nina pala din yan zaɗ ku anfaani sheli paha la ti ni kuli wuhi nufi (niya) shelimaa.

Baɗsim vihigu maa

Joe Lambongang, ɗun nye booku Dokte karɗɗ bia Walden Yunivesiti karɗɗzoɗ puni la n nye ɗun vihiri vihigu ɗo.

Sosheɗa din wuhiri nivuɗu shab ban tu ni be vihigu ɗoɗ puni

Nivuɗu shab ban be pubu din be gbini ɗo n nye ban ni tooi pahi vihigu ɗo puni:

1. Di tuya ni o Yuma nye yuun piiya ni anii (yuunpinaanii) (18).
2. Di tuya ni o nyela Dagbana
3. Di tuya ni o nyela ɗun daa be Dagbaɗ 2002 zabili la saha, ka nyela ɗun mi zabili goobu soya (nirbi sunsuni Malibu soya) ni suhdoo bobo sosheɗa bini daa kpiɗi zabilimaa ni daa na zabira ni zabilimaa bahigu (nyaanga).
4. Ban daa zani laɗingunim zaani ka bi mini laɗingunim maa tum tuma 2002 zabilimaa saha ni di nyaanga; ka daa nyela ban pahi zaɗ suhdoo soya maa sheɗa tum ni bi bo maligu zaɗ chaɗ zabilimaa polo ka suhdoo kana.

A paɗa tuma ni nye sheli baɗsim vihigu maa puni.

Ti vihiya nya ka piiga pahi vihigu ɲo puni, doomini a baɲsim ni a milinsi zaɲ kpa bohisi labisibu balibu balibu din nyina gomdanti (Government) ni salo sani na ni di ku zabili maa, ka bo suhudoo kana Dagbaɲ puli ni baayan suhudoo alikawli maa ni daa lo 2006 yuuni maa puni. A yi saɲti ni a ni pahi baɲsim vihigu ɲo puni, din ɲuna, ti mina ni zaɲ ti nina kpa taba ka ti boha bohisi.

Bohisi maa ni yan chaɲ shem

Bohisi maa ni ya n chaɲ shem n nye din kana ɲo:

- Di tuya ni di dihitabili saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan bohi, ni luɓu sheli di ni yan bohi n ti tabili di ni yan bohi shem (nina zaɲ kpa taba tohisi, ni taɲgali mii zuɓu bohisi n ti tabili bini boolindi sheli Sikaipu la {kompita zuɓu video fiila}-skype)
- Tabzaɲbaɲsitaba (introduction) bee (milinsi ni taba) ni niɲ. Daliri din che ka baɲsim vihigu ɲo maa yan niɲ maa nilan lab wuhi; yaha, saɲti gbaɲ maa ni dihi (saani), bee ka a pii ni a ni yi baɲsim vihigu maa puni.
- Neesim (bayaani) ni niɲ zaɲ kpa sabibu maa soya ni yaɲ chaɲ shem. Di yi niɲ talahi, soli (yiko) ni bo zaɲ kpa yetɔɔa teepubu zaɲ niɲ kaseeti ni. Teepubu maa pala she pahala di yan sɔɲ mi dihtabili ni bi ni sabi sheli maa nyala din zantuhi a ni yeli shem maa dedee. Dini kpaɲsi, ni ɲun saɲti vihigu_ɲo puni behigu mali yiko ni o yi di puni sahansheli kam o ni bora, di yi ti niɲ ka hohisi maa chana.
- Di yi niɲ talahi, bohisi ni bohi zaɲ chaɲ a ni pii bohisi maa puni yibu maa, din kuya n che ka di baɲ daliri sheli din tahi lala na. di yi niɲ ka a bi niɲ fahimta (bee ka a bi baɲ sheli), ɲ kpamda jaandi, kpaɲmi a maɲa ka bohi ka di nee n taa.

- Neesim (bee bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa lahabali sheŋa din laɓim maa; ti lahi tiri nyin ŋun be vihigu ŋo puni alikawli zaŋ kpa gbinliribo polo.
- Di yi niŋ talahi shili ni mali zaŋ kpa ti labibu na.
- Paɓbu (nbonbo) ni niŋ.
- Saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan di nyela kamani awa yini ni minti pia ni anu(pinaanu)

Vihigu maa behigu ni nye shem

A vihigu ŋo puni bebu nyela suhuyurilim ko. A yi pii ni a ni pahi di puni, a lan mali yiko ni a yi di puni bee ka a che bohisimaa labisibu sahan sheli kam ani bora. Diyi ti yan sabi bahigu sabu maa, a yuli pala din yan boli zaŋ chaŋ lahabali sheli a ni ti. A yi pii ni a ni pahi vihigu maa puni bee a yi pii ni a ku pahi di puni pala din yan sasim a mini niŋvuɓu so sunsuni bee laŋingu sheli kam sunsuni; zaŋ ti tabili a ni tumti so maa.

Vihigu maa barinanima ni di anfaaninima

Bohisi maa yi ti bohira, di ni tooi niŋ ka di sheŋa bori ni di tee yoltem, bee yeltoɓu (yelbierili) din daa paai niribi la; din zuɓu, di zooya ka teha ni suhgarigu paai niŋvuɓu sheba. Di yi ti niŋ ka lala maa paaga, ka a bori soŋsim, din a zaŋa chaŋ salo berizuŋ tuma shee la ka a ti nya soŋsim. Di pun baŋsiba zaŋ kpa di polo; di zuɓu, bi mali la sheli zaŋ chaŋ di polo. Anfaani sheli din yan yina a vihigu ŋo puni benibu nyemi, ni lahabali sheli kam a ni ya nti nyela din yan soŋ kpaŋsi baŋsim(bee di yan che ka baŋsim ti too ni) zaŋ

kpa behi sheṅa puni adalichi sosuma din na beni ni yan tooi tum vieṅyalinga pam shem. Do nyela din ni tooi niṅ piligibu shee tuma zuṣlaanim ni yan tooi mentam_(bee ntusi) sohbeṣu, soṅsim (faako) tibu yi ti lan bora. A vihigu ṅo puni benibu ka samyogahindili.

Ashili liribu (Ashiliribo)- confidentiality

Di yi ti yan sabi vihigu ṅo kpaliṅkpaa sabibu, lahabali sheṅa din yina vihigu maa puni pala din yan zaṅ tabili so yuli ka mani ni ṅuni ndaa yeli. Di nyela din yan be amini bohbohri maa sunsuni ko. Gbaṅ sheṅa kam din sabi, nti pahi yetṅ sheṅa zaa din teepi, yan pumpumi jillijilli n kpai niṅ adaka puni. Baṅsim vihirovihiro maa ko n nye ṅun mali yiko di zuṣu. Lahabali din sabi be kompita zuṣu nyela din yan be faali (files) sheṅa din mali namba sṅrili (password). Namba sṅrili ṅo nyela din yan be vihirovihiro maa ko sani (researcher). Lahabali sheṅa zaa din teepi niṅ kaseetinimni nyela bi ni ya nsṅsim labi vihigu maa nyaanga.

Ashil-liribo maa Tarisi

Di mini ṅkuli kpaai alikawli nin ni liri ṅunkam be vihigiṅo puni Ashili (gbini) maa, di bi yan pahi ti yi niṅ ka ti nya ni tingbaṅ, bee ninsalinim suhdoo be barina puni (di ṅmahanli nyela kamani ti yi ti nya bidibi nema (tobnema) ni malfanima ka di pala tingbaṅ linjimanim n suli; yaha, ti yi ti nya daliri ni shab bori ni bi liri bi taba. Do yi ti niṅ, di niṅ talahi n zuṣu ni n ti suhdoo fukumsinim tibli zaṅ kpa barina ṅo polo.

Adireesinima ni lahabali baṅbu bohsi

Vihigu maa janda(di fukunsilana) yuli n nye: Joe Lambongang. O nyela a ni yan tooi poli taṅgalimii ṅo zuṣu:+233 244989 372 bee ka a sabi too iimiili (Email) ṅo zuṣu:

joe.lambogang@waldenu.edu. Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo n nye: Dokte (Dr) Gloria Billingsley; o nyela a ni yan tooi nya so iimiili (Email) ɲo zuɽu: Gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu . A yi mali bohigu zaɲ kpa vihigu ɲo polo, a ni tooi bohiba punpoɲo bee ka a sabi li ti Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo maa. A yi mali pohsi zaɲ kpa a hachi ni nye sheli zaɲ chaɲ vihigu ɲo puni bebu, a ni tooi sabi ti ninvuɽu so ɲun za Walden Yunivesiti zaani tangalimii ɲo zuɽu:+-612-312-1210

Fooro tibu yetɽɽli(zilinli)

N nyela ɲun karim lahabali sheli din sabi be zuɽsaa ɲo; bee di nye la din lebigi ti ma yetɽɽsheli puni (bee bali sheli puni) ni mi. N nyela ɲun niɲ fahimta zaɲ kpa nufi ni mara sheɲa puni vihigu maa ni yan niɲ. Din zuɽu n saɽti nin ni pahi bansim vihigu ɲo puni.

Di nye la talahi ni fooro tibu gbaɲ ɲo dihi (saani) buyi zuɽu. Gbaɲyini yan kpalinla nyin ɲun be baɲsim vihigu ɲo puni sani.

Ninvuɽu so ɲun be vihigu ɲo puni

yuli:.....

O nudirigu nubiliyoɽu dihibu/ o siginicha/ o yuli alaama sheli o ko ni

mi:.....

Dabsili (

Taarihi):.....

Vihirovihiro maa siginicha/ o yuli alaama sheli o ko ni mi:

Dabsili (

Taarihi):.....

Appendix Q: Yidaanım saṣti gbaṅ: paṣyinoyino ban be vihigu ḡo puni bohisi. 01-19-17-

0466118

Ti gahiri nuu bolinda (boonda) a paṣa ni o ti paḡi baṅsim vihigu ḡo puni, din vihigu yuli nye: “Adalchi maligu sosheṅa din jandi barina din paai niriba soṅsim ni nye sheli zaṅ kpa zabili goobu ni suhdoo dawama niṅbu Gaana (Ghana) puni. Tudu bobili polo Dagboṅ zabili la n nye baṅsim vihigu ḡo ni yan sabi daliṅ (bee n jandi)”. Vihigu ḡo nye la baṅsim ko vihigu; ka di nufi (niya) nyela ni di baṅ behsheṅa (conditions) din yan tooi soṅ vienyalinga zaṅ kpa adalichi maligu soya din yan kpiṣi bo faako na ni sosheṅa din tu zaṅ chaṅ suhdoo dawama niṅbu Dagboṅ puli ni. Lahabali din yan yi baṅsim vihigu ḡo nina pala din yan zaṅ ku anfaani sheli paha la ti ni kuli wuhi nufi (niya) shelimaa.

Baṅsim vihigu maa

Joe Lambongang, ḡun nye booku Dokte karṅ bia Walden Yunivesiti karṅzoṅ puni la n nye ḡun vihiri vihigu ḡo.

Sosheṅa din wuhiri nivuṣu shab ban tu ni be vihigu ḡoṅ puni

Ninvuṣu shab ban be pubu din be gbini ḡo n nye ban ni tooi paḡi vihigu ḡo puni:

5. Di tuya ni o Yuma nye yuun piiya ni anii (yuunpinaanii) (18).
6. Di tuya ni o nyela Dagbana
7. Di tuya ni o nyela ḡun daa be Dagbaṅ 2002 zabili la saha, ka nyela ḡun mi zabili goobu soya (nirbi sunsuni Malibu soya) ni suhdoo bobo sosheṅa bini daa kpiṣi zabilimaa ni daa na zabira ni zabilimaa bahigu (nyaṅṅa).
8. Ban daa zani laṅingunim zaani ka bi mini laṅingunim maa tum tuma 2002 zabilimaa saha ni di nyaanga; ka daa nyela ban paḡi zaṅ suhdoo soya maa sheṅa tum ni bi bo maligu zaṅ chaṅ zabilimaa polo ka suhdoo kana.

A paṣa tuma ni nye sheli baṅsim vihigu maa puni.

Ti vihiya nya ka piiga pahi vihigu ɗo puni, doomini a baɗsim ni a milinsi zaɗ kpa bohisi labisibu balibu balibu din nyina gomdanti (Government) ni salo sani na ni di ku zabili maa, ka bo suhudoo kana Dagbaɗ puli ni baayan suhudoo alikawli maa ni daa lo 2006 yuuni maa puni. A yi saɗti ni a ni pahi baɗsim vihigu ɗo puni, din ɗuna, ti mina ni zaɗ ti nina kpa taba ka ti boha bohisi.

Bohisi maa ni yan chaɗ shem

Bohisi maa ni ya n chaɗ shem n nye din kana ɗo:

- Di tuya ni di dihitabili saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan bohi, ni luɗu sheli di ni yan bohi n ti tabili di ni yan bohi shem (nina zaɗ kpa taba tohisi, ni taɗgali mii zuɗu bohisi n ti tabili bini boolindi sheli Sikaipu la {kompita zuɗu video fiila}-skype)
- Tabzaɗbaɗsitaba (introduction) bee (milinsi ni taba) ni niɗ. Daliri din che ka baɗsim vihigu ɗo maa yan niɗ maa nilan lab wuhi; yaha, saɗti gbaɗ maa ni dihi (saani), bee ka a pii ni a ni yi baɗsim vihigu maa puni.
- Neesim (bayaani) ni niɗ zaɗ kpa sabibu maa soya ni yaɗ chaɗ shem. Di yi niɗ talahi, soli (yiko) ni bo zaɗ kpa yetɗa teepubu zaɗ niɗ kaseeti ni. Teepubu maa pala she pahala di yan sɗɗ mi dihitabili ni bi ni sabi sheli maa nyala din zantuhi a ni yeli shem maa dedee. Dini kpaɗsi, ni ɗun saɗti vihigu_ɗo puni behigu mali yiko ni o yi di puni sahansheli kam o ni bora, di yi ti niɗ ka hohisi maa chana.
- Di yi niɗ talahi, bohisi ni bohi zaɗ chaɗ a ni pii bohisi maa puni yibu maa, din kuya n che ka di baɗ daliri sheli din tahi lala na. di yi niɗ ka a bi niɗ fahimta (bee ka a bi baɗ sheli), ɗ kpamda jaandi, kpaɗmi a maɗa ka bohi ka di nee n taa.

- Neesim (bee bayaani) ni niŋ zaŋ kpa lahabali sheŋa din laɓim maa; ti lahi tiri nyin ŋun be vihigu ŋo puni alikawli zaŋ kpa gbinliribo polo.
- Di yi niŋ talahi shili ni mali zaŋ kpa ti labibu na.
- Paɓbu (nbonbo) ni niŋ.
- Saha sheli Bohisi maa ni yan di nyela kamani awa yini ni minti pia ni anu(pinaanu)

Vihigu maa behigu ni nye shem

A vihigu ŋo puni bebu nyela suhuyurilim ko. A yi pii ni a ni pahi di puni, a lan mali yiko ni a yi di puni bee ka a che bohisimaa labisibu sahan sheli kam ani bora. Diyi ti yan sabi bahigu sabu maa, a yuli pala din yan boli zaŋ chaŋ lahabali sheli a ni ti. A yi pii ni a ni pahi vihigu maa puni bee a yi pii ni a ku pahi di puni pala din yan saɓim a mini niŋvuɓu so sunsuni bee laɓingu sheli kam sunsuni; zaŋ ti tabili a ni tumti so maa.

Vihigu maa barinanima ni di anfaaninima

Bohisi maa yi ti bohira, di ni tooi niŋ ka di sheŋa bori ni di tee yoltem, bee yeltoɓu (yelbierili) din daa paai niribi la; din zuɓu, di zooya ka teha ni suhgarigu paai niŋvuɓu sheba. Di yi ti niŋ ka lala maa paaga, ka a bori soŋsim, din a zaŋa chaŋ salo berizuŋ tuma shee la ka a ti nya soŋsim. Di pun baŋsiba zaŋ kpa di polo; di zuɓu, bi mali la sheli zaŋ chaŋ di polo. Anfaani sheli din yan yina a vihigu ŋo puni benibu nyemi, ni lahabali sheli kam a ni ya nti nyela din yan soŋ kpaŋsi baŋsim(bee di yan che ka baŋsim ti too ni) zaŋ kpa behi sheŋa puni adalichi sosuma din na beni ni yan tooi tum vieŋyalinga pam shem.

Do nyela din ni tooi niŋ piligibu shee tuma zuɗlaanim ni yan tooi mentam_(bee ntusi) sohbeɗu, soŋsim(faako) tibu yi ti lan bora. A vihigu ŋo puni benibu ka samyogahindili.

Ashili liribu (Ashiliribo)- confidentiality

Di yi ti yan sabi vihigu ŋo kpaliŋkpaa sabibu, lahabali sheŋa din yina vihigu maa puni pala din yan zaŋ tabili so yuli ka mani ni ŋuni ndaa yeli. Di nyela din yan be amini bohbohri maa sunsuni ko. Gbaŋ sheŋa kam din sabi, nti pahi yetɔɔ sheŋa zaa din teepi, yan pumpumi jillijilli n kpari niŋ adaka puni. Baŋsim vihirovihiro maa ko n nye ŋun mali yiko di zuɗu. Lahabali din sabi be kompita zuɗu nyela din yan be faali (files) sheŋa din mali namba sɔɗrili (password). Namba sɔɗrili ŋo nyela din yan be vihirovihiro maa ko sani (researcher). Lahabali sheŋa zaa din teepi niŋ kasetinimni nyela bi ni ya nsasim labi vihigu maa nyaanga.

Ashil-liribo maa Tarisi

Di mini ŋkuli kpaai alikawli nin ni liri ŋunkam be vihigiŋo puni Ashili (gbini) maa, di bi yan pahi ti yi niŋ ka ti nya ni tingbaŋ, bee ninsalinim suhdoo be barina puni (di ŋmahanli nyela kamani ti yi ti nya bidibi nema (tobnema) ni malfanima ka di pala tingbaŋ linjimanim n suli; yaha, ti yi ti nya daliri ni shab bori ni bi liri bi taba. Do yi ti niŋ, di niŋ talahi n zuɗu ni n ti suhdoo fukumsinim tibli zaŋ kpa barina ŋo polo.

Adireesinima ni lahabali baŋbu bohsi

Vihigu maa janda(di fukunsilana) yuli n nye: Joe Lambongang. O nyela a ni yan tooi poli taŋgalimii ŋo zuɗu:+233 244989 372 bee ka a sabi too iimiili (Email) ŋo zuɗu: joe.lambogang@waldenu.edu. Bansiim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo n nye: Dokte (Dr) Gloria Billingsley; o nyela a ni yan tooi nya so iimiili (Email) ŋo zuɗu:

Gloria.billingsley@waldenu.edu . A yi mali bohigu zaŋ kpa vihigu ŋo polo, a ni tooi bohiba punpoŋo bee ka a sabi li ti Bansim vihigu maa komitii daanbulo maa. A yi mali pohsi zaŋ kpa a hachi ni nye sheli zaŋ chaŋ vihigu ŋo puni bebu, a ni tooi sabi ti ninvuɔu so ŋun za Walden Yunivesiti zaani tangalimii ŋo zuɔu:+612-312-1210

Fooro tibu yetɔɔli(zilinli)

N nyela ŋun karim lahabali sheli din sabi be zuɔsaa ŋo; bee di nye la din lebigi ti ma yetɔɔsheli puni (bee bali sheli puni) ni mi. N nyela ŋun niŋ fahimta zaŋ kpa nufi ni mara shega puni vihigu maa ni yan niŋ. Din zuɔu n saɔti nin ni pahi bansim vihigu ŋo puni.

Di nye la talahi ni fooro tibu gbaŋ ŋo dihi (saani) buyi zuɔu. Gbaŋyini yan kpalinla nyin ŋun be baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni sani.

Ninvuɔu so ŋun be vihigu ŋo puni

yuli:.....

O nudirigu nubiliyoɔu dihibu/ o siginicha/ o yuli alaama sheli o ko ni

mi:.....

Dabsili (

Taarihi):.....

Vihirovihiro maa siginicha/ o yuli alaama sheli o ko ni mi:

Dabsili (

Taarihi):.....

Appendix R: Paɔlaanba Ni Ban Mali Yidaanin Ashili Alikawli (Ashili Saɔti):

Ninvuɔyinoyino Boshisi. 01-19-17-0466118

Dun yan saani maa yuli:

Vihigu ɲo yuli n booni: Adalchi sosheɲa bini kpɔxi ni bi bo maligu zaɲ chaɲ barina (suhgarigu) shaɲa din paai nirba. Soya ɲo sonsim ni nye sheli zan chaɲ zabili goobu polo ni suhdoo dawama ninbu gana (Ghana) puni. Vihigu ɲo kpala Dagbaɲ din be Tudu bobli la zabili la (Tudu pobili Dagbaɲ zabili la). Lahbaya ɲo laɔimbu yi ti pili, n nyela ɲun yan nya lahabali sheɲa din nye ashili dini, kan pala ɲun yan viili wuhi so. N saɔti ni lahabaya maa yan kpalinla ashili puni; ka lahi dihi tabili nin yi zaɲ so sheɲa dinɲ bi tu yihi lahabaya maa polo nyela din yan tum nivuɔu so ɲun be vihigu maa puni barina (bee chuuta).

N yi saani (n dihi) ashili alikawli saɔti gbaɲ ɲo, di wuhiri mi nin saɔti ka gbaagi alikawli ni:

1. N ku viili wuhi so bee n di di fiila ni so zaɲ kpa ashili lahabali ɲo polo. Hali n pala ɲun yan viili wuhi n zonima bee n daɲ.
2. N ku vii ashili lahabaya ɲo naɔla n deela fooro din niɲ kamaata.
3. N ku di ashili lahabali alizama luɔsheli polo nirbi ni ni tooi wum di fiila maa. N mi ni bi tu bee n saɔti ni ndi ashili lahabali, hali di yi kuli nyela ɲun paha vihigu ɲo puni maa yuli bi boli.

4. N dihi datili ni birigimsim zaŋ chaŋ alikawli gbaabu ŋo, nyela din mali fukumsi (bee zalikpana) mara

Gbaŋ ŋo saanibu (bee di hibu) wuhirimi, nin saŋiya nin karimi alikawli maa ka lan saŋti nin ni doli di mara maa ni di zalikpana maa zaa Kaman di ni sabi do zuŋsaa ŋo shem maa.

Siginicha: (Date)Dabisili(Taarihi):

Appendix S: PaɗLaanba Aanba Ni Ban Mali Yidaanin Ashili AlikawliLIKAWLI (

Ashilisaɗti): Paɗba Laɗimɓini Alizama. 01-19-17-0466118

Dun yan saani maa yuli:

Vihigu ɗo yuli n booni: Adalchi sosheɗa bini kpisi ni bi bo maligu zaɗ chaɗ barina(suhgarigu) shaɗa din paai nirba. Soya ɗo sonsim ni nye sheli zan chaɗ zabili goobu polo ni suhdoo dawama ninbu gana (Ghana) puni. Vihigu ɗo kpala Dagbaɗ din be Tudu bobli la zabili la (Tudu pobili Dagbaɗ zabili la). Lahbaya ɗo laɗimbu yi ti pili, n nyela ɗun yan nya lahabalshheɗa din nye ashili dini, kan pala ɗun yan viili wuhi so. N saɗti ni lahabaya maa yan kpalinla ashili puni; ka lahi dihi tabili nin yi zaɗ so sheɗa diɗ bi tu yihi lahabaya maa polo nyela din yan tum nivuɗu so ɗun be vihigu maa ni barina (bee chuuta).

N yi saani (n dihi) ashili alikawli saɗti gbaɗ ɗo, di wuhiri mi nin saɗti ka gbaagi alikawli ni:

1. N ku viili wuhi so bee n di di fiila ni so zaɗ kpa ashili lahabali ɗo polo. Hali n pala ɗun yan viili wuhi n zonima bee n daɗ.
2. N ku vii ashili lahabaya ɗo, naɗla n deela fooro din niɗ kamaata.
3. N ku di ashili lahabali alizama luɗsheli polo nirbi ni ni tooi wum di fiila maa. N mi ni bi tu, nin di ashili lahabali, hali di yi kuli nyela ɗun pahi vihigu ɗo puni maa yuli bi boli.

4. N dihi datili ni birigimsim zaŋ chaŋ alikawli gbaabu ŋo polo, nyela din mali fukumsi (bee zalikpana) mara

Gbaŋ ŋo saanibu (bee dihibu) wuħirim, nin saŋiya ni n karimi alikawli maa ka lan saŋti nin ni doli di mara maa ni di zalikpana maa zaa Kaman di ni sabi do zuŋsaa ŋo shem maa.

Siginicha:

(Date) Dabisili(Taarihi):

Appendix T: Vinvũsyiniyini Boshisi Ni Yan Chaŋ Sham (Boshisi Maa Ni Yan Chaŋ
Shem Zaŋ Kpa Vinvũsyiniyini Bshisi Plo). 01-19-17-0466118

Dabsili (Taarihi):.....

Di behigu shee (di ni yan n niŋ luʂsheli):.....

Bohbohiri maa yuli:.....

Bohlabirisi maa yuli:.....

Ɔ lan gmeri nupuʂu zaŋ chaŋ a ni saʂti ni a ni pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni maa. Bohisi
maa ku yan dila Kaman awa yini laasabu. Di yi niŋ ka bohsheli bi nee taa, dim suʂro ka
che kan baŋ.

Prigubu din nye A (Section A): Kootu ni di Sariya sheli

1. Maachi goli, 2006 sohdo alikawli maa ni da gbaai naai maa, di tooi niŋ ka bi bo
samyoo ti ninvuʂsheb ban daa nya barina zaŋ chaŋ bi ninsali tali hachi poloo?
Bohigu ŋo labisibu yi nye ieei, bi daa bonti; a nyela ŋun ni tooi boʂsi li (bee n
niŋ bayaani) zaŋ chaŋ di polo a kpien tatarigaa?
2. Maachi goli,2006 sohdo alikawli maa ni da gbaai naai maa, kootu daa di sheb
sariya ka niŋ ba fukumsi zaŋ chaŋ ninsalinim hachi chuuta ninbu polo?

3. Di yi nye la bohigu din pahiri ayi ɲɔ (2) labsibu nya ieei, sariya daa diya, a ni tooi di suɾo ka buɾsi (bee n niɲ bayaani) zaɲ chaɲ sosheɲa bi ni daa zaɲ baɲ nivuɾsheb bi ni zilisi ni bani n tum barina maa ka diba sariya?
4. A nye la ɲun saɽti lii? Dim suɾo (jaandi) niɲmi bayaani zaɲ kpa abohigu ɲo alabisibu maa polo.
5. Fukumsi sheli bee tibdarigibo sheli dabam daa lan niɲ zaɲ chaɲ nivuɾsheb bi ni zilisi ni bani n tum barina maa? Bohigu maa labsibu nya ieei, dim suɾo ka buɾsi li (bee n niɲ li bayaani).

6. Di vienɲyela nye la dini zaɲ kpa:
 - a. Nirba barina maɲbu (bee nirba zokache barina niɲbu)? Dim suɛro ka niɲ bayaani zaɲ kpa a bohigu maa alabisibu maa polo.
 - b. Tab yada tibu ni adalichi zii puni labsibu na? Dim suɛro ka niɲ bayaani zaɲ kpa a bohigu maa labisibu maa polo.

Prigubu din nye B (Section B): Adalichi sheli din labsiri behigu na kamani di ni daa be shem

(Restorative Justice)

7. Zaɲ kuli chaɲ Maachi goli, 2006; sosheli kpuɛya zaɲ chaɲ:
 - a. Barina maa bee chuuta maa ni daa paai sheb maa jilima(bilchiinsi) labisibu na?
 - b. Bi binbora soya baliginsim ni/bee ban daa tum barina maa nya soli ni bi saɛti ni bani n daa tumli ka bo gaafari (chaɲpaɲ)?
 - c. Tab yada tibu ni Nam polo nimi tingbaɲ tuma duzuɛuri (state Institutions) kpaɲsibu Dagbaɲ puni?

8. A teha puni, din nlee nye yelmussirsheṅa di goli adalichi maa chandi ni soya din yan kpisi bo adalichi ni suhidoo kpansibu Dagboṅ puli ni?
9. Bo nlee tu ni di niṅ ka di be di ko zaṅ chaṅ suhdoo dawama dihtabli tiṅbaṅ ṅo polo?

N paṅya pam ni asahsheli a ni ku maa.

Appendix U: Salo Alizama Dibu Bshisi Ni Yan Chaŋ Shem (Boshisi Maa Ni Yan N
 Chaŋ Shem Zaŋ Kpa Salo (laŋingu) Boshisi). 01-19-17-0466118

(Date) Dabsili (Taarihi):.....

Di behigu shee (di ni yan niŋ luŋsheli) polo:.....

Bohbohiri maa yuli:.....

SALO (laŋingu) maa

yuli:.....

Ɔ lan gmeri nupuŋu zaŋ chaŋ a ni saŋti ni a ni pahi baŋsim vihigu ŋo puni maa. Bohisi maa ku yan dila Kaman awa yini laasabu. Di yi niŋ ka bohsheli bi nee taa, dim suŋro ka che kan baŋ. Yaha, di yi ti niŋ sahansheli kam, ka daliri sheli che ka shab bori ni bi che bohisi maa labisibu; dim suŋro ka che ka n baŋ ka che bohisi maa bohibu.

1. A yi tehi lab nyaaga, a ni tooi tee poli sohibsheŋa(strategies) bini daa zaŋ zali Dagbaŋ puni Maachi goli 2006 suhdoo alikawli maa kpuŋbu maa nyaanga ni bi:
 - a. Bo suhdoo labina Dagbaŋ?
 - b. Mali zabili maa?
 - c. Bo soya sheŋa din yan gu ka zabili ku lan kana(peace building)?
2. Di vieŋyaling daa nye la dini zaŋ kpa:

- a. Nirba barina mɔŋbu (bee nirba zokache barina niŋbu)? Dim suɔro ka niŋ bayaani zaŋ kpa a bohigu maa labisibu polo.
 - b. Tab yada tibu ni adalichi zii puni labsibu na? Dim suɔro ka niŋ bayaani zaŋ kpa a bohigu maa labisibu polo.
3. A teha puni, sochibsi ŋo daa nye la din daa tooi bo maligu ti Dagbaŋ zalibi maa ka lan labisi suhdoo naa? Dim suɔro ka niŋ bayaani zaŋ kpa a bohigu maa labisibu polo.
 4. Di yi daa bi tooi bo maligu na, bo n lee yan tooi che ka sochibsi maa zaɓa be sosheja di yan gu ka zabili ku lan kana. Dim suɔro ka niŋ bayaani zaŋ kpa a bohigu maa labisibu polo.
 5. Bo nlee tu ni di niŋ ka di be di ko zaŋ chaŋ suhdoo dawama labibu na Dagbaŋ? Dim suɔro ka niŋ bayaani zaŋ kpa a bohigu maa labisibu polo.

N paɓya pam ni asahsheli a ni ku maa.