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Consequences of the Niger Delta Amnesty Program Implementation on Nigeria's Upstream Petroleum Industry

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Walden University

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2016

Abstract

Impacts of the Niger Delta Amnesty Program Implementation on Nigeria's Upstream
Petroleum Industry

by

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MTech, Curtin University, 2012

MBA, Instituto de Empresa, 2010

BEng, Federal University of Technology, 1998

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

December 2016

Abstract

The Niger Delta militancy ravaged the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector between 2004-2009, bringing it to a standstill. In response, the Nigerian state adopted an amnesty policy—a globally recognized tool for conflict resolution and peacebuilding—to protect the sector and the economy from collapse. Little is known, however, about the unintended consequences of the amnesty implementation for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. Thus, the purpose of this study was to fill this gap in the research literature on the Niger Delta amnesty program. Polarity management was the conceptual framework applied; relative deprivation and polarities of democracy constituted the theoretical foundation for this qualitative case study. Face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with 29 purposefully selected participants from the senior ranks of the petroleum industry, sector trade unions, relevant government agencies, and a regional university. Data were inductively coded as part of content analysis, the data analysis strategy. Participants viewed the amnesty policy as being poorly conceived and implemented due to the many unintended negative consequences arising from the policy implementation. The key finding from the study indicates that both the sector and the Niger Delta region are worse off post the amnesty policy implementation. The study concludes that by adopting and implementing the study recommendations, stakeholders may be able to mitigate the identified unintended consequences, position the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector for sustainable growth, address the root causes of the militancy, and deliver a positive social change for the residents of Niger Delta.

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Dedication

To my children: Princess Nesochi, Princess Tobeckukwu, and Prince Chimsomaga (yet unborn). May my greatest accomplishment in life be your starting point, and may you live out the full purpose of your names.

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Special thanks to my committee namely Dr. Moris Bidjerano (chair) and Dr. Benet (member), for their dedicated support, care, and encouragement throughout this dissertation process. With their enthusiastic support and interest, this study was concluded ahead of schedule. I am appreciative of the entire academic, advising, and support staff of Walden University who worked with me at different points on this journey. I am grateful to my family in ways words cannot express. My children; Princesses Nesochi and Tobechukwu were fantastic. They sacrificed their *Daddy Time* for days on end. They provided welcome distraction at the right moments, bringing food from their toy kitchen and insisting that I do my *homework* before going to sleep. Most importantly, they prayed daily for my success. Thank you and may God continue to bless you my Royal Princesses. My siblings were also there cheering from the sidelines through words of encouragement and prayers.

I am very grateful for the contributions and sacrifices made by all my study participants. I owe the success of this work in great parts to your commitment, dedicated and selfless service. You volunteered your time to help provide the data and information that was used to answer the research questions. For confidentiality reasons, I am unable to mention your names here, but my God, who sees in secret will publicly bless you all. Thank you. Special thanks to Mrs. Orode Enadeghe who, on short notice, helped me with proof reading and editing. Special thanks to General Ubong Etuk, Mazi Nnamdi Anowi, Pastor and Mrs. Tunde Tijani; you were variously there from the start and encouraged me all the way like the true friends you are. I am grateful for your enthusiastic interest,

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Finally, and most importantly, the support and encouragement from family and friends notwithstanding, I could never have completed this program were it not for the grace and favor of God. He was my strength when I was weak. He quickened me when I was down and almost out. He is the Treasure that I seek. He is my All in All. All glory, honor, adoration, praise, thanksgiving, and heartfelt gratitude to Him. May His name be praised, worshiped and adored forever and ever, Amen!

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Introduction

The Niger Delta region of Nigeria has not known true peace and hence has not been able to realize its full potential as a major oil and gas producing hub due to ongoing restiveness and insecurity. The Niger Delta people expected that their region would receive special status from the federal government in recognition of its economic contributions. Instead, 57 years of oil and gas production has left the region with little in terms of economic, social and infrastructural development compared to the significant revenue it has generated for the multinational oil companies operating in the region (UNEP Report, 2013). Most Niger Deltans lost their traditional means of livelihood due to environmental pollution associated with oil and gas production activities (Rus, 2010; UNEP Report, 2011). They now languish in abject poverty (Tobor, 2014). The *resource curse* (Mähler, 2010) proved true for the Niger Delta, resulting in a deep feeling of deprivation in the region (Bayertz, 1999; Walker & Smith, 2012).

Successive Nigerian governments neglected the Niger Delta people's campaign for social justice, political emancipation, infrastructural development, resource control, and self-determination over the years (Aghedo, 2012; Egwemi, 2010). The restiveness escalated into the long running armed militancy that disrupted the operations of Nigeria's upstream petroleum sector between 2005-2009 (Aghedo, 2012; Etemike, 2012; Egwemi, 2010; Nwagboso, 2012). The sector generates about 80% of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings and hence the backbone of the Nigerian economy (Odularu, 2008). The militancy had disastrous consequences for the Niger Delta environment and the Nigerian

economy (Aghedo, 2012; Egwemi, 2010). In 2009 Nigerian government officials launched the Niger Delta amnesty policy to halt the militancy and its effects on the general Nigerian economy (Idonor, 2009). The policy provided presidential pardon for all militants who renounce violence and surrender to government forces within 60 days of the amnesty proclamation.

Based on my review of available literature, researchers have not examined the consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty policy implementation for Nigeria's upstream petroleum sector. In conducting this study, I sought to close this gap in the literature. Identifying the consequences of the amnesty policy implementation and understanding their impacts on the oil industry may enable industry stakeholders to develop effective and coordinated response to mitigate any adverse consequences.

In Chapter 1, I examine the history and background of the Niger Delta and the perennial restiveness that morphed into violent militancy. I present the study's research problem, purpose, assumptions, scope, delimitations, limitations, significance, and social change implications. I also provide a brief overview of the theoretical framework through which I addressed the research questions. This chapter also includes contextual definitions of key terms and concepts as used in the study.

Background

There has been more than half a century of oil and gas exploration and production activities in Nigerian. Per the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) website, commercial exploration of oil was started in Nigeria in 1956, by Shell, with the first commercial production taking place in 1958. Shell Petroleum Development Company of

Nigeria, Limited (SPDC) is a joint venture (JV) company: NNPC has a 55% stake, Shell, 30%, Total, 10%, and Agip, 5% (NNPC, 2015). Shell is the operator of this JV.

According to SPDC's 2015 internal memos, the SPDC JV accounts for about 60-80% of Nigerian's total oil and gas outputs, respectively. It also has more than 100 oil and gas concessions (oil mineral licenses) spread across the Niger Delta in on-shore, swamp, and offshore environments. According to internal SPDC intranet (2015), the company operates a network of more than 6,000 kilometers of oil and gas flow and pipelines that evacuate crude oil and gas from some 82 processing facilities to the export terminals. This large footprint meant that SPDC bore the brunt of the militancy's attacks on oil and gas assets in the region. Most of the onshore assets have been or are in the process of being divested by Shell as part of its strategic response to the militancy (Ezeocha, 2014c).

Oil and gas account for about 80% of Nigeria's total export revenue (Odularu, 2008; Ogbonna & Appah, 2012). With a proven crude and gas reserve of approximately 37.14 billion barrels and 5.2 trillion cubic meters respectively, the Niger Delta is one of the biggest oil and gas producing regions in the world (CIA FactBook, 2015; OPEC, 2016). Cumulative revenue from more than five decades of oil exploration and production from the region is estimated to be U.S. \$1.6 trillion (Walker, 2009). With about 95% of Nigeria's export revenue coming from the petroleum sector, the Niger Delta is the mainstay of the Nigeria economy (CIA FactBook, 2015) and source of Nigeria's relevance to the international community.

Due to the apparent government insensitivity to the needs, interests, concerns, and expectations (NICE) of the Niger Delta people (Ebegbulem, Ekpe & Adejumo, 2013;

Obi, 2009; Oviasuyi & Uwadiae, 2010), the security situation in the region and surrounding environs has progressively deteriorated (Egwemi, 2010). The prevailing insecurity reached crisis level when Niger Delta youth (under the umbrella of the Ijaw Youth Congress) issued the Kaiama Declaration, in which they advocated for the use of violence (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, & Okhonmina, 2007; IYC, 1998; HRW, 1999). All Niger Delta militant groups pledged allegiance to IYC.

The consequences of the militancy have been devastating for all stakeholders, including reduced production and associated loss of revenues, higher cost of doing business, destruction of assets, environmental pollution, kidnappings and restriction of movements, general insecurity and uncertainty among others. The militancy also had far-reaching global consequences due to its impact on the price of crude oil (Ekpeyong & Diany, 2010).

“In addition to the implications above, the militancy was fueled by critical enablers. Yang (2010) described the multifaceted causes and incentives that have sustained the Niger Delta militancy, despite the amnesty. He argued that the persisting feeling of deprivation by the Niger Delta people is at the root of the militancy. The sense of deprivation was informed by years of neglect, impoverishment, absence of basic infrastructure, and marginalization at the hands of successive Nigerian governments (Alabi, 2014; Ebegbulem, Ekpe & Adejumo, 2013; Imobighe, 2011; Kumolu, 2013; Myers, 2005; Obi, 2009; Oviasuyi & Uwadiae, 2010; Salami, 2013; Usang & Ikpeme, 2015).

Okpara (2012) reviewed the existing local environmental legislation and the impact of the militancy on the Niger Delta environment. He argued that environmental pollution will continue to be rallying point for militancy.

Many factors have been blamed for the failure of past attempts at resolving the Niger Delta restiveness. The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (2008) lamented that past starting from the Willink Commission to oil minerals producing areas development commission all failed to address the Niger Delta challenge. UNEP Report (2011) blamed corruption, incompetence, top down approach to policy formulation and implementation as some of the reasons why past resolution attempts failed to deliver on their stated goals. In response to local and international pressure, Late Yar' Ardua, on 25 June 2009, unveiled the amnesty policy as the latest strategy to end the militancy (Adebayo, 2015; Idonor, 2009).

Egwemi (2010) called the amnesty policy a political masterstroke meant to end the restiveness and usher in a sustained state of peace and security. Without peace and security, Niger Deltans cannot obtain the infrastructural development, environmental and social justice for which they yearn (Ogege, 2011; Okuyade, 2011). Nwajiaku-Dahou (2014) credited the amnesty with disarming and demobilizing about 30,000 ex-militants, effectively ending the militancy. She also criticized because it “clearly represents a victory for short-term crisis management over resolution or transformation” (p. 5). Akpan and Ering (2010) agreed that the amnesty as implemented does not address any of the socioeconomic and environmental concerns that were at the root of the militancy. They, in agreement with Eke (2014), implied that the amnesty as implemented was a pay for

play proposition to allow oil and gas to once again flow unhindered. Because it set up the amnesty policy as a pay for play, the government sent an unintended message to the public that violence pays (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014; El-Rufai, 2012). Nwajiaku-Dahou (2014) cited Lamido Sanusi, the former governor of Central Bank of Nigeria as saying that the U.S. \$1 billion paid so far for the amnesty between 2009-2012 does not justify the outcome. Ako (2012) agreed and stated that the current state of peace brought about by the implementation of the amnesty is temporary due to absence of justice for victims of the militancy, hence unintended consequences for the upstream petroleum industry.

From the review of available literature, it is clear that the consequences of the amnesty policy implementation on the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector are yet to be studied. The need to contribute to the Niger Delta body of knowledge by closing this identified gap is the reason for undertaking this study.

Problem Statement

There is an ongoing problem in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria that escalated into armed conflicts. This armed conflict continued in the region from 2005-2009, resulting to shutting in more than 40% of Nigeria's crude oil production capacity. Government's resolution strategies such as the use of military force, establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), and creation of Ministry of Niger Delta, to restore peace and secure oil and gas producing infrastructure in the region failed to achieve their stated objective. In a change of strategy, the government of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua announced in 2009 the Niger Delta amnesty policy. The amnesty was an offer of full pardon to all militants who renounce violence, hand in their weapons

and present themselves for rehabilitation and reintegration into the civil society (Egwemi, 2010). Despite the amnesty's recorded short-term success of halting the militancy (Egwemi, 2010), the sense of insecurity and uncertainty in the region persists. Pre-militancy normalcy is yet to be restored. The prevailing state of affairs has negatively impacted the flow of investment and hence development in the region. Little is known, however, about the unintended consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty policy and what they mean for the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry. The absence of social justice for victims of the militancy from the amnesty policy may be responsible for this state of uncertainty in the region (Agbibo, 2014; Ako, 2012; Paki & Ebiefa, 2011; Okuyade, 2011; Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). There is a plethora of existing research on the Niger Delta militancy (Akinwale, 2010; Amaraegbu, 2011; Egwemi, 2010; Ogege, 2011; Oluwaniyi, 2011; Milina, 2010), its impact on the regional, national and even global economy (Amaize, 2009; Fabi, 2010; Paki & Ebiefa, 2011; Omoweh, 2005; Rus, 2010), its effects on the Niger Delta environment (UNEP Report, 2011), and the successes and failures of the amnesty program (Egwemi, 2010; Tonwe & Aghedo 2013; Ubhenin, 2013). Yet, little is known about the unintended consequences of the amnesty policy implementation for the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry. It seemed that the amnesty policy was designed to placate only those that could disrupt the flow of oil from the Niger Delta region. This was the reason many view the policy as merely a short-term measure with the sole aim to restart crude oil production from the region. It does not holistically address the root causes of the militancy in the Niger Delta region (Ako, 2012; Paki & Ebiefa, 2011).

At the center of the Niger Delta question is social and environmental injustice (Agbibo, 2014; Ako, 2012; Paki & Ebiefa, 2011; Okuyade, 2011; Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). Failure by successive governments to reasonably address the Niger Delta question has resulted in untold hardships for those in the region, environmental pollution and degradation, and adverse publicity for the Nigerian nation (Okuyade, 2011). Ubhenin (2013) states that “without peace, there can be no development and without justice, there could be no peace” (p. 12). The foregoing paragraph suggested that justice is the only foundation on which sustainable development can be built in the Niger Delta. The amnesty, as currently implemented, does not address the issue of social justice. There was no provision to address the needs and protect the interests of the victims of human rights abuses during the militancy.

The amnesty policy made no provision for any form of compensation or settlement for victims of the militancy (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). Review of the available literature suggested that there is the need to study the consequences of the amnesty policy implementation for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector due to its social justice deficiency. The primary problem addressed in this study is whether the amnesty policy, due to its inherent deficiencies in formulation and implementation, has adverse consequences for the upstream petroleum sector.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to identify and understand the perceived consequences of the amnesty policy implementation for the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry. This is with a view to providing a comprehensive framework to

effectively manage identified unintended negative consequences emanating from the amnesty implementation. This will help administrators, namely those running the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector, to better leverage opportunities presented by the amnesty implementation, as well as effectively mitigate any emerging risks (Ezeocha, 2014a).

Research Questions

The study will focus on answering the following research questions:

RQ1: What are the short -and long-term consequences of the implementation of the amnesty program for Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector?

RQ2: Going forward, what can the government and the petroleum industry do to manage these consequences?

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Problems and challenges facing humanity exist within a contextual framework. It therefore follows that a comprehensive understanding of a given problem is needed before any meaningful and sustainable solution can be preferred. The accurate definition of any problem within a relevant framework is essential to the articulation of possible solution options. This study was anchored on the polarity management model (Johnson, 1996) as underlying conceptual framework. The theoretical framework was based on the relative deprivation (Bayertz, 1999; Schaefer, 2008; Walker & Smith, 2012), and the polarities of democracy (Benet, 2012, 2013) theories. The optimal equilibrium point for peace and stability in the Niger Delta region keeps changing due to the changing

interests, needs, concerns and expectations of the various stakeholders. This suggests that policy makers should have anchored the Niger Delta amnesty policy on utility (Fishburn, 1968; MacCrimmon & Stig, 1979) and chaos (Lorenzo, 1963) theories to accommodate this reality. Lorenzo (1963) argued that chaotic situation is one in which the present determines the future, but the approximate present does not approximately determine the future. The Niger Delta conflict immediately responded positively to the amnesty policy but the future consequences were unknown; hence the need for this study. The shifting equilibrium point for peace in the Niger Delta indicated that the Niger Delta conflict is not just a problem to solve but a polarity to manage. This makes polarity management (Johnson 1996) a suitable conceptual foundation on which to anchor this study.

The amnesty policy, in addition to being primarily deployed as a conflict resolution strategy, was also seen as a social change effort. This is because the amnesty was thought to be a framework and foundation on which much of the social and economic development of the Niger Delta region will be anchored on. As such, democratic principles can serve as guides for the planning, implementation, and evaluation of a social change effort such as the Niger Delta amnesty program. Benet (2013) argued that democracy is a force for freedom, poverty alleviation and political emancipation. He said that if properly managed, applicable democracy poles may act as catalysts for sustainable positive social change. This is especially true for Niger Delta people, communities, and ethnic nationalities who have suffered marginalization and deprivation, as well as endured violence and denial of basic economic and environmental rights by successive Nigerian federal and state governments. Leveraging the relevant

pairs from the polarities of democracy model will be a good starting point in addressing the call for justice. The model, according to Benet (2012, 2013), may serve as a unifying theory of democracy that can be leveraged to direct positive social change efforts.

Schaefer (2008) stated that relative deprivation is "the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and present actualities" (p. 69). Walker and Smith (2012) contended that a person or a group of people feel deprived if they perceive that they are being denied their legitimate rights and benefits. This causes the affected person(s) to experience a strong feeling of discontent when they realize that their prevailing circumstance is worse than it should be relative to those of others around them (Bayertz, 1999).

The ethnic nationalities of the Niger Delta strongly argue that they are deliberately, systematically, and strategically being marginalized, with their economic, political, and social rights denied and violated by the Nigerian state. This was made clear in the Kaiama declaration (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, & Okhonmina, 2007; IYC, 1998; HRW, 1999) that announced the advent of militancy.

The Niger Delta militancy can also be viewed through justice and equity lens. This neatly ties in to the polarity of democracy model and the critical theory which sees justice and equity as central to sustainable peace and development. The Niger Delta struggle and restiveness is at its root a cry for justice. According to Ubhenin (2013), this cry for justice will continue, in line with the traditions of the Ijaw ancestors and dictates of social and environmental justice, until justice is fully done and seen to have been done. The polarities of democracy model provided a theoretical framework for assessing the

struggle for justice in the context of the Niger Delta amnesty policy and understanding its consequences for the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry.

Research Design

This study was carried out using a qualitative design. The case study methodology (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002; Rudestam & Newton, 2007) was thought to be the most appropriate qualitative methodology because it is aligned with the research questions, purpose and topic. This methodology, according to Baxter and Jack (2008), empowers researchers to study a given phenomenon within its defined context. This study focused on a representative company from the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector, asked questions that led to collection of data, which upon analysis clarified the consequences of the amnesty policy implementation on the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. Findings and conclusions can therefore be generalized across the subject sector. Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) was the focus of the study. SPDC was considered very representative of the Nigerian upstream industry due to its size and footprint across the Niger Delta. SPDC also plays across the entire upstream petroleum sector value chain. The company is of strategic importance to Nigeria because it accounted for more than 50% of the national crude oil output before the militancy and subsequent amnesty. SPDC bore the brunt of the militancy because the militants believed that disrupting the company's operations in the region was the easiest way to get noticed and taken seriously by the government. They reasoned that disrupting SPDC's operations will have an immediate impact on both the national and global economy and draw immediate attention to their political agenda, and put the Nigerian government under

pressure to address their concerns. This line of reasoning was due to the effect of the disruption of oil and gas exports from the Niger Delta region on the price of crude oil and hence on the global economy. It therefore follows that the consequences of the amnesty policy implementation on SPDC may be validly generalized across the Nigerian upstream industry.

The data collection strategies used for this study included face-to-face interviews and virtual focus group discussion on Whatsapp. WhatsApp is a synchronous data texting service between mobile phones over an internet connection. According to WhatsApp Tutorial (n.d), the app and service is available for download from mobile device or phone platforms for Apple, Blackberry, Android, Windows, and Nokia Symbian60. Review of government documents related to the amnesty policy was used to gather data for triangulation (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Maxwell, 2013) purposes. Face-to-face interviews and focus group discussion were conducted at the convenience of study participants.

Informed consent was obtained from all study participants before the commencement of interviews and focus group discussion sessions. Study participants were purposefully selected (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Maxwell, 2013). They included past and serving executive, senior, and middle level leadership/management personnel of SPDC, Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and industry trade unions - Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) and Oil Produces Trade Section (OPTS). Participants were also drawn from staff of Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) and Schlumberger. The data collected from this diverse pool,

covering the entire upstream value chain, was sufficient to fully answer the research questions.

Definitions of Key Terms

Accountability: In the context of this study, this refers to holding people responsible to perform their duties according to the stipulation and requirements the position they occupy and applying consequence management when they do not perform through acts of omission or commission, negligence or dereliction of duty.

Accountability will serve the dual purpose of ensuring retributive and restorative justice as well as bringing closure to the victims of human rights abuse/violation. Not holding people accountable for their actions and inactions fosters a culture of violation with impunity. The code of conducts stipulations in the Nigerian Federal constitution of 1999 require that public officials be held accountable for their actions while in public service.

Amnesty: Amnesty refers to the formal granting of pardon to a person or group for offences committed against the state (Ogege, 2011, p. 250). With a formal amnesty, the past is forgiven and is expunged from the official records. The amnestied suffers no retributive justice. The International Center for Transitional Justice (2004/2005) posited that amnesty can be leveraged as a conflict resolution strategy to bring armed conflicts to an end. According to Morris (2000), amnesty is usually used as a peace building strategy – a mechanism or process that is designed to facilitate sustainable reconciliation, dispute resolution, peace, and good governance to foster good relationship for peaceful coexistence usually preceding an end to armed conflict. In the case of the Niger Delta, the amnesty was implemented as a first step to addressing

the root causes of the restiveness in the region, a precursor to building and sustaining trust based relationships between the host communities and the international oil companies on the one hand, and the host communities and government on the other hand. According to Kilcullen (2004), effective amnesty program rests on the pillars of sustainable security, inclusive politics, economic empowerment and people emancipation.

Conflict Resolution: This refers to a range of strategies deployed to resolve or manage a conflict or unsolvable problem (Johnson 1996). The amnesty initiative was one of the strategies deployed to manage the Niger Delta militancy. With the failure of other initiatives like the creation of the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), NDDC, Ministry of Niger Delta, and 13% Derivation due to a toxic mix of poor conception of policy, lackluster policy implementation, and corruption, and politics (Atedo, 2015), the amnesty program was rightly seen as a last resort to halt the escalating conflict in the region.

Consequences: These are the direct outputs from implementing the amnesty policy. They may be intended or unintended outcomes. The intended outcomes are the desired policy objectives at the point of formulation. The unintended consequences are unanticipated and unplanned for outcomes, which may be positive or negative. Identifying and understanding the nature of these outcomes, especially the unintended ones is the trust of this study.

Corruption: According to Transparency International, this term refers to “abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It hurts everyone who depends on the integrity of

people in a position of authority.” It covers all dishonest or illegal behaviors and abuse of position of trust, by public administrators or business leaders, for illegitimate private gain.

Deprivation: A condition or perception of being less advantaged in a society or group when compared with those at the same level as one/group. It is also the perception of being deprived a right, be it social, political or economic. Ibaba and Ebiede (2009) contend that the Niger Delta people have limited access to basic social amenities like portable water, electricity, and quality healthcare.

Environmental Justice: This refers to the need to restore the Niger Delta environment and mitigate the negative impacts of future operations. Bassey (2012, p. 86) believes that Niger Delta people feel insecure due to the devastating impacts of oil and gas exploration and production activities is having on the traditional lifestyles. Pollution of farmlands and fishing points from oil spills seem to be the norm. The United Nations (UNEP Report, 2011) estimates it will take more than 30 years to restore the environment at a cost of more than \$100 billion. This restoration work need to start immediately to assure these people that full justice is on the way.

Human Rights: Refers to a set equal and inalienable civil, political and economic right of all members of the human family. Maintaining these rights is foundational to sustainable freedom, justice and peace for humans all over the world. The UN believes that willful violation of these rights results in inhuman acts of violence and denies people of basic freedom (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Smith (2003, p.38) contends that Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the ethical and legal basis for all

human rights work at the UN as well as the foundation on which the international system for the protection and promotion of human rights was built on. The African charter on Human and People's rights (1981, p. 2), in its preamble recognized the importance of integrating social and cultural rights into a comprehensive human rights framework. Nigeria, as a signatory to the UN and African Human rights charters, anchored its federal constitution on the protection of citizen's human rights. This study recognizes the individual and collective rights of the peoples and ethnic nationalities that make up the Niger Delta.

Militancy: This refers to violence and use of force as both strategy and tactics to demand that the NICE of the Niger Delta people be respected and met by the Nigerian government and leadership.

Militants: The individuals acting alone or in groups who precipitated and participated in the militancy. The militants used strategies such as intimidation, kidnapping and hostage taking, blackmail, killings, and sabotaging/vandalizing oil and gas producing and processing infrastructure in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria to press their demands (Ogege, 2011, p. 253).

Niger Delta Region: The Niger Delta region is defined by the Federal government of Nigeria to encompass the oil producing states of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers. This should not be confused with the South – South Zone – a geo-political zone that comprise of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers states (Badmus, 2010; Idowu, 2012; Ministry of Niger Delta, 2015; Odoemene, 2011).

Social justice: This has restorative and retributive components. It is justice seen through the lens of equity in terms of distribution of wealth and opportunities within a given. This becomes more pronounced by in the Niger Delta given that the resources that have been used to develop other regions are taken from this region. The Niger Delta region is a classic example of the “resource curse” (Lawson-Remer and Greenstein, 2012; Rosser, 2006).

Sustainable development: This refers to "Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland Commission Report, 1987). Sustainable development is a delicate balancing act between short and long-term social, economic, political, and environmental needs when making policy decisions today (World Bank, 2001).

Upstream Petroleum Sector: The petroleum (oil and gas) industry is usually divided into three major sectors namely upstream, midstream and downstream. The upstream sector, which is the focus of this study, comprises of all companies and institutions that are involved with the exploration (on land, swamp or offshore), production, and sale of crude oil and gas. The Nigerian upstream sector is home to International Oil Companies (IOC), Local Producing companies (LPC) and the associated service companies. Examples include Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, British Gas, Petronas, Petrobras, Agip, Gazprom, CINOPEC, Chevron, Seplat, Oando, Afren, Halliburton, Schlumberger Group, Baker Hughes, NeToXx, OIS, and McXen among others. It excludes all companies and institutions involved with the refining/importation, distribution and sale of refined petroleum products.

Victims: Refers to Niger Deltans or residents who suffered a loss: emotional, psychological, or materials loss including but not limited to loss of property, livelihood or loved ones because of the militancy. It covers all residents whose human rights were violated during the course of the militancy.

Assumptions

Kuhn (1970) defined paradigms as “a set of beliefs, values and techniques which are shared by members of the scientific community, and which act as guide or map, dictating the kinds of problems scientists should address and the types of explanations that are acceptable to them” (p. 175). Philosophical assumptions are criteria used to understand the worldviews or paradigms; and taxonomies are philosophically structured assumptions used to explain worldviews or paradigms (Boateng, 2012). Some of the taxonomies used in this study include ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological (Creswell, 2007; Guba & Lincoln, 1994).

Ontological assumptions related to the form and nature of reality of this study. There are multiple realities for qualitative researchers, hence the inherent subjective nature of qualitative studies. Epistemological assumptions dealt with the nature of the relationship that existed between myself, my participants, and study phenomenon. Creswell (2007) argued that researchers are not independent from the phenomenon under study because knowledge generated from a qualitative study is a function of the study context, time frame and the meaning(s) attached to the study phenomenon by the study participants. Methodological assumptions were concerned with the procedures (how I went about uncovering what need to be known) that I used to explore the study

phenomenon, as well as the rationale behind them. The axiological assumptions questioned how the study outcome was affected by my biases, values and belief system of the researcher.

This study's ontological, epistemological, axiological, and methodological assumptions were embedded in the following assumptions. The first was that the amnesty was necessary to at least halt the escalating violence and attacks and to restart oil and gas production in the short term. The amnesty was also needed to help create the enabling environment required to institute longer lasting peace which is critical to the long-term sustainability of SPDC and by extension the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector.

Another key assumption undergirding this study was that the implementation of any public policy may result in positive or negative unintended consequences. This study sought to identify any unintended consequences of the amnesty policy as well as what they mean for the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry.

It was also assumed that both militants and government forces carried out wide spread human rights abuse during the militancy. That the amnesty program failed to acknowledge or address this fact was taken to be a key shortcoming of the policy.

Furthermore, corruption was assumed to have been accepted as an integral part of the prevailing Nigerian political culture. The influence of corruption was assumed to have contributed to weaken the amnesty policy's formulation and implementation.

Finally, it was assumed that study participants, as experienced industry practitioners, are knowledgeable enough to comment on the implications of the amnesty

program on the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. That participants will truthfully and honestly answer interview questions was taken for granted.

Scope and Delimitations

The data gathering phase of this study was planned to be completed within three months. Working within this timeline will depend on the availability of participants for interview. It was expected that enough data would have been obtained, within this period, to sufficiently answer the research questions and bring the data collection phase to a close. This study was also delimited to the point of views of SPDC personnel regarding the impacts and implications of the amnesty policy for the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry. I fully understand that there is a possibility that personnel from other upstream players may have different views due to differences in organizational size or footprint in the Niger Delta.

Limitations

Due to the chosen methodology, this study was affected by three inter-related limitations namely methodological rigor, researcher subjectivity, and external validity (Crawford, Leybourne & Arnott, 2000; Shenton, 2004). One key limitation was the inherent subjective nature of qualitative studies (Willis, 2014). Managing researcher bias was sufficient to address this limitation. As with every qualitative study, the researcher is the primary instrument for data collection, analysis, and data interpretation (Creswell, 2013; Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2008). To manage my bias, I maintained a high level of self-awareness. I also used strategies such as peer review, triangulation, reflexivity, and member checking to confirm that my interpretation is

consistent with participants' perceptions and opinions (Creswell, 2013; Goulding, 2002; Maxwell, 2013; Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; Patton, 2002).

Another inherent limitation of the qualitative case study method has to do with challenge with generalization (Flyvberg, 2006; Willis, 2014). Findings of this case study were generally limited to the perspective and unique context of just one company among the many players in the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. Hence external validity or generalizability may be an issue. The generalizability concern was mitigated in this study by the strategic selection of the case (Seawright & Gerring, 2008), to ensure that it highly representative of the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector, hence the selection of Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC).

Study participants were purposefully selected (Maxwell, 2013; Patton, 2002). They were selected from a pool of industry experts with knowledge of the formulation and implementation of the amnesty policy. The success of the study depended to a great extent on the recruitment of the right cadre of participants (Singleton & Straits, 2005).

The other limitation to this study had to do with methodological rigor (Fielding & Schreier, 2001; Kohlbacher, 2006). This limitation deals with the potential challenge of not having full access to study participants and time for prolonged interviews with them. Part of my potential research participant pool consisted of senior executives with much demand on their time. Also, due to the evolving nature of the oil and gas production business in the Niger Delta, issues beyond my control or that of participants may arise without warning. These issues may include relocation, retrenchment or even death of potential participants, which might make previously available participants unavailable for

interviews (Salmon, 2012). I mitigated this potential limitation by recruiting twice the minimum number of participants needed to achieve data saturation. The rationale was that in the event that some drop off, the validity and quality of data collection process will not be compromised.

Furthermore, due to the political sensitivities and implications of the study, participants may not be forthcoming with information or data they consider sensitive. Participants may not be fully honest with the answers they provide. I managed this by assuring them of their confidentiality. I also assured that whatever they do not want published will not be published. I assured data quality and validity through triangulation, and listening to the spoken answers and the associated body language.

Significance

This study was unique because it is the first study, to my knowledge, that is seeking to identify and understand the unintended consequences of the amnesty policy on the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry. Existing studies have focused on the impacts of the militancy on the Nigerian economy and on general assessment of the performance of the amnesty policy implementation. It is expected that the findings from this study will help industry strategists, policy makers, and stakeholders to better understand identified unintended consequences and what they mean for the short- and long-term future of the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry. This understanding may position them to design effective strategies to manage the unintended consequences. Because of the centrality of the upstream petroleum industry to the Nigerian economy, the significance of this study cannot be overemphasized.

Additionally, it may be necessary for potential entrants into the upstream petroleum industry to fully understand the implications of the amnesty program implementation and its linkage to the upcoming petroleum industry bill (Olowojaiye, 2014). This will help them to make informed investment decisions.

Furthermore, the study may provide a credible platform for highlighting and advocating the need for governments at federal, state, and local levels to identify, document, and compensate victims of the militancy for their losses. The victims include individuals in the Niger Delta who suffered losses (emotional, psychological, or material) during the militancy. . These losses may include loss of property, loss of freedom through kidnapping, loss of livelihood or loss of loved ones through death. Study findings highlighted the need to redress perceived injustices done to these victims. Egwemi (2010) argued that by compensating the victims will foster sustainable peace and hence development in the region.

Implications for Social Change

The desire for freedom and social justice motivates the clamor for positive social change all over the world. This study, depending on its findings, may advocate the need for the Nigerian federal and state governments to possibly review and update the amnesty policy with elements of social justice. Accomplishing this may both encourage and facilitate trust building among stakeholder groups. Trust building is essential to laying a firm foundation for sustainable peace, security, and development in the Niger Delta region. This will create the enabling conditions for foreign and local investment inflow to drive the economic and infrastructural development of the region. The potential

investment inflow would translate into job creation to alleviate the high unemployment rate in the region.

Another positive social impact of this study could materialize as a result of its potential contribution to the ongoing peacebuilding efforts in the region. An understanding and appreciation of the unintended consequences of the amnesty policy for the upstream petroleum industry will motivate collaboration among stakeholders to craft and implement mitigating policies. In doing so, they will be potentially saving the region and the country from another wave of avoidable violence with its social, economic, political, and environmental consequences for the region.

I also hope to see the outcome from this study become the catalyst for adopting and incorporating polarity management model (Johnson, 1996) as part of public and private sector policy and strategy formulation and implementation process. The inherent positive social change from adopting polarity management concepts includes potential reduction in the lifecycle cost of public policies in Nigeria (Ezeocha, 2014d). By leveraging polarity management, the quality of the decision-making process, and hence the quality of decisions made by responsible public administrators (Cooper, 2012), may be enhanced. Citizens will benefit from improved governance and leadership quality, translating into higher standard of living and emancipation from economic oppression and social injustice (Benet, 2013). The academia can use this study as a launching pad to delve into developing a generalizable model that could be used to manage the unintended negative consequences of public policies.

Finally, it is my hope that study findings will contribute towards restoring stable peace, sustainable security, and usher in justice as bedrock for steady growth for the regional and national economy.

Summary

The purpose of this study was to identify and understand the unintended consequences of the amnesty policy implementation for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. Case study was chosen as the research methodology. Research participants were drawn from a pool of senior and mid-level leadership staff of SPDC, senior government officials with understanding of the amnesty policy formulation and implementation, senior representatives of industry trade unions, and senior staff of regional universities. Face-to-face interviews and virtual focus group discussion were the primary data collection strategies used to conduct this study. Review of relevant government and SPDC documents was carried out to generate data for triangulation purposes.

The significance of this study is vast and varied: focusing on the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector will help expand the body of knowledge on the Niger Delta militancy and amnesty. The study could potentially contribute to the ongoing peacebuilding efforts in the region, as well as be the starting point for addressing the social justice gaps in the current policy. The study outcome can motivate the government to address the needs and concerns of the victims of the militancy and provide a ready source of pertinent information for potential investors in the sector and region.

Chapter 2 will focus on the review of relevant literature. Chapter 3 provided the rationale for the methodology that was used to collect, analyze, and interpret data. Data

collected and study results were the focus of chapter 4, while chapter 5 provides a summary, analysis and interpretation of the data. Study recommendation and conclusions was also provided in chapter 5.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The inability of successive Nigerian governments to address perceived injustices and a sense of deprivation among the people of the Niger Delta has led to protests, violence, and a militant uprising (Brittain, 2015; Etemike, 2012). In response to escalating violence in the region, the Nigerian government initiated the Niger Delta amnesty measure (Idonor, 2009). Idonor stated that the motivation for the amnesty was to protect the operation of companies in the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector and to create an environment in which the needs and concerns of the Niger Delta people could be addressed.

Scholars have examined the root causes of the Niger Delta militancy and its impact on sociopolitical and socioeconomic dynamics of the Niger Delta region and country at large (Agbibo, 2014; Aghedo, 2012; Egwemi, 2010; Ikelegbe, 2010; Nwagboso, 2012; Ogege, 2011; Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012; Ubhenin, 2013). They have also conducted research on past attempts to solve the crisis and the overall successes and failures of the amnesty policy (see Akanji & Oyitso, 2012; Akpan & Ering, 2010; Bassey, 2012; Egwemi, 2009; Omotola, 2010; Ubhenin, 2013). They agree that past resolution strategies failed to deliver the needed infrastructural development of the Niger Delta due to the absence of a compelling vision and the influence of corruption. According to my review of the literature, little is known, however, about the consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty implementation for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. Also, very little research has been conducted on social justice issues related to implementation of the

amnesty program. My motivation was to identify and understand the factors that can enhance the potential for sustained peace and security in the region. I also wanted to better understand how opportunities created by the amnesty implementation can be maximized and risks associated with it can be minimized.

In this chapter, I will provide an overview of the formulation and implementation of the Niger Delta amnesty program. Topics include resource control, militancy, amnesty, and ongoing peacebuilding initiatives. Regional trends that are related to the amnesty will also be reviewed. Some of these trends include but not limited to increasing insecurity, more pollution, and political violence. The review begins with a historical background of Nigeria and the Niger Delta region. I also discuss the persistent restiveness in the Delta region (Ikelegbe, 2005). In critically analyzing these issues, I hope to provide a more in-depth understanding of the factors fueling and sustaining the militancy and how they relate to the operations of the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector.

Literature Search Strategy

Among other things, a literature review provides in-depth information that places the research work in context, help set the scene that is needed to answer the research questions, contribute to the Niger Delta amnesty body of knowledge, and identify the gap(s) in literature. The search for relevant peer-reviewed literature was carried out on various databases including those contained in the Walden University Library (EBSCO Host, ProQuest Central, Academic Search Complete, Academic Search Complete, Science Direct, and SAGE Premier), Google Scholar, and Google search engine. I used keyword search and the primary search strategy. Using keywords helped me to filter out

unrelated articles and keep focus on only literature related to the Niger Delta region, the Niger Delta militancy and amnesty, and the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. Some of the keywords used include Niger Delta, Niger Delta militancy, Niger Delta Amnesty, are amnesty, militancy, Niger Delta Amnesty, Niger Delta environmental pollution, Oil and gas production in the Niger Delta, Deprivation of Niger Delta, Niger Delta conflict, Niger Delta injustice, among others. This search strategy yielded hundreds of articles. Only those related to the research topic and purpose were selected for review, to provide the needed focus for the study.

Theoretical Foundation

I used relative deprivation (Bayertz, 1999; Bourgignon, 1999; Morrison, 1971; Runciman, 1966; Schaefer, 2008; Walker & Smith, 2012) and polarity of democracy (Benet, 2012, 2013) as theoretical frameworks.

Relative Deprivation

Relative deprivation (Bayertz, 1999; Bourgignon, 1999; Morrison, 1971; Runciman, 1966; Schaefer, 2008; Walker & Smith, 2012) refers to the discontent people feel when they compare their positions to others and realize that they have less than them, no matter how marginal that difference might be. Schaefer (2008) sees relative deprivation as the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and present actualities. Since people believe they have been denied their legitimate right or treated unfairly. It may also motivate a sense of anger, antagonism, or mistrust towards the person or entity believed to be responsible for the deprivation. The deprived person will most likely do everything within his power to try to restore a sense

of social satisfaction (Morrison, 1971). Having tried peaceful protest and agitation without success (Saro-Wiwa, 1992), the Niger Delta people, through militant youth movements embraced violence against the Nigerian state as the only option to achieve justice and equity (Courson, 2009; Ekine, 2013; Kaiama Declaration, 1998; Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, & Okhonmina, 2007).

The opening statement from of the United State declaration of Independence reads:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to affect their Safety and Happiness (The Declaration of Independence, 1776, p. 2).

It is there incumbent on the deprived person or group to, in line with the recommendation of the US Declaration of Independence, take action to restore justice and equity. Morrison (1971) argued that deprived person or group will naturally react in such a way as to regain social satisfaction. Niger Deltans on several occasions used peaceful means to get the Nigeria leadership to do the right to no avail. On 13 March 1962, President Kennedy, as part of speech marking the first anniversary of the Alliance

for Progress, said; “those who make peaceful revolutions impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.” Ken Saro-Wiwa was the face of the Niger Delta non-violent movement (Ikelegbe, 2006). Following his death at the hands of the Nigerian federal government on trump up charges, the Niger Delta youth concluded that it is time to adopt the violent strategy (Ikelegbe 2006; MOSO, 2004; Okonta, 2008). Militant youth movements like Movement for emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force emerged to demand for justice using violent tactics (Courson, 2009; Hanson, 2017, *The Economist*, 2008).

The relative deprivation theory is a well-established theory of “attitude to social inequality (Flynn, 2007; Runciman, 1966; Yitzhaki, 1979). Yitzhaki (1979) argued that the Gini coefficient is directly proportional to feeling of deprivation. This observation was true of the Niger Delta where majority of the population live in abject poverty (Bourgignon, 1999; Ibaba & Ebiede, 2009; Tobor, 2014; UN Report, 2006). There exist a wide gap between the rich and poor across the Niger Delta. Poverty rate is about 74.8% according to United Nations sources. The UN Development Programme Report (2006) stated that one of the key reasons for this unacceptable level of poverty is the inability of locals to participate or “tap into the oil industry benefits, including employment because they lack skills, capital resource or both” (p. 3). Port Harcourt is the biggest city in the Niger Delta. On every social and economic index, Port Harcourt comes last when compared with other cities of similar size and prominence in Nigeria like Lagos, Abuja, and Kano. This magnifies the sense of deprivation because of the perception that these other cities were developed using funds derived mostly from the Niger Delta. By contract

to Lagos, Port Harcourt and by extension, the Niger Delta region's identity is that of being polluted, violent, insecure, and underdeveloped (Courson, 2009). It is in the best interest of all stakeholders that this negative identity be reversed. The amnesty was conceived as the beginning restoring and returning the region to its traditional identity of serenity and peaceful coexistence.

Walker and Pettigrew (1984) were of the opinion that relative deprivation theory provided a useful framework to study and understand the psychology of intergroup process. They said that relative deprivation theory was used to study and understand the dynamics of the 1960s civil rights movements in USA. Walker and Pettigrew (1984) argued that relative deprivation can be used to define a person or people group because it was founded on the categorization – identify – compare theory. They stated that the US Civil Rights movement was defined by the associated civil unrest of the 1960s. The Niger Delta people have been dealt a bad hand by successive Nigerian governments (Ross, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006; Sauper, 2004). For the natural resources taken from the region, they have environmental pollution to show for it. Oil and gas exploration and production activities led to loss of their traditional means of livelihood while their children remain unemployed. In place of quality education, health and social services, they got soldiers who routinely harass and molest them. They expected political and economic significance, but got economic deprivation and political marginalization, making the Niger Delta a classic example of the *resource curse* (Ross, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006; Sauper, 2004). Sauper (2004) seemed to be referring to the Niger Delta when he said that “wherever prime raw material is discovered, the locals die of misery, their sons become

soldiers, and their daughters are turned into servants and whores” (p. 1). Promises of economic and political development were routinely sacrificed on the altar of corruption, lack of visionary leadership, and political expediency. When they protested peacefully, the government released soldiers to disperse them (Courson, 2009). All these further reinforced the feeling of grievance and deprivation, justifying the use of violence to make their voice heard. But Cameron (2015) in drawing parallels with Islamic State Jihadists insisted that grievance justification has no place in modern discuss when it comes to agitation or forcing conflict resolution initiatives. Cameron’s (2015) argument that relative deprivation and grievance justification alone are insufficient to explain the underlying reason behind Islamic violence may be generalized to the Niger Delta militancy. In support of this line of thinking, some scholars have wondered if greed and selfish interests were indeed the primary motivation for the militancy (Courson, 2009). He cited illegal bunkering activities, kidnap of ordinary citizens for ransom, and hired killings as evidence. The Human Right Watch (1999) were partly skeptical but said that role played by the dire socioeconomic situation and deprivation suffered by the people are real motivations for the violence and militancy in the region.

Relative deprivation theory also covered the behavioral effects of the perception or reality of deprivation feelings. This behavioral effect manifests in the actions deprived person or groups may take to demand for their rights in order to achieve social satisfaction. Social satisfaction, according to Morrison (1971), is the polar opposite of relative deprivation. The Niger Deltans feel sufficiently deprived and aggrieved to resort to violence in the wake of the violent deaths of Saro-Wiwa and other peaceful protesters

at the hands of government soldiers (Okonta, 2008). Taking up arms against the Nigerian state, in my opinion, was seen by Niger Deltans as the only remaining viable option for them because they exhausted all open options to restore social satisfaction to themselves. This assumption was supported by Freire (1997) who maintained that persons or groups under real or perceived oppression will do everything within their power, including resorting to violence, to improve their situation. Over the years, peaceful agitation for infrastructural development across the Niger Delta, self-determination (Osaghae, 2001), resource control (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olorinmoye, & Okhonmina, 2007), provision of quality basic amenities (education and health), environmental protection, and social justice for the Niger Delta ethnic nationalities have gone unheeded (Courson, 2009). In some instances, these legitimate demands have been met with brutal repression (Courson, 2009). The foregoing provided the justification and the enabling atmosphere for initiating and propagating violent protest in line with Freire's postulation. Hence the militancy did not come as a surprise for any keen observer.

Due to the non-inclusion of aspects of social justice in the amnesty policy, a pervading sense of injustice persists among the victims of the militancy. The victims argue that the militants got differentially treated while they (victims) were ignored. This perception may motivate them, in line with the theory of relative deprivation and grievance justification (Freire, 1997), to seek revenge or settle scores with ex-militant or worse still start their own militancy.

Polarity of Democracy

Benet's (2012, 2013) POD model built on Johnson's (1996) polarity management conceptual framework. The PoDM was the theoretical lens through which the effectiveness of the amnesty program was evaluated. Benet's (2012, 2013) PoDM consist of 10 elements organized as polarity pairs namely Freedom and Authority, Justice and Due Process, Diversity and Equality, Human Rights and Communal Obligations, and Participation and Representation. Aspects of the model was used to evaluate the amnesty program based on key performance indicators including the program ability to restore peace and security to the region, contribution in creating a just society, and motivating sustainable infrastructural and economic development to the Niger Delta region. Benet posited that the polarity pairs are like the two sides of the same coin because each has both positive and negative aspects. In line with the stated objective of the PoDM to optimally deliver the dividends of democracy, administrators must strive to effectively manage the polarities so that the positive aspects of each element are maximized while the negative aspects are minimized.

Democracy as a political ideology aims to motivate the establishment of a just society where people's rights and liberties are guaranteed, and citizens are delivered from oppression. Freedom and people power are fundamental democratic principles (Atlee & Atlee, 2008). It is said that violence has no place in a democracy. This understanding partly motivated the Nigerian government to opt for the democratic option, namely the amnesty policy, as the only way to lasting peace, security, and development in the Niger Delta region. Anchoring the amnesty policy on democratic principles was in line with

Benet's (2006, 2012, 2013) postulations that democratic principles are universal and can be leveraged to resolve most of the challenges confronting humanity.

According to the Cold War Museum website, the collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology was celebrated by Western powers as “a victory for freedom, a triumph of democracy over totalitarianism, and evidence of the superiority of capitalism over socialism” (p. 1). The demise of the Soviet Union meant that democracy became the unchallenged global political and social ideology. Countries across the world were encouraged to embrace democracy as the only means to economic, social, and political freedoms. The tenets of democracy are now universally taken for granted and globally propagated as catalyst for social and political change (Benet, 2013; US Department of State: Office of the Historian, n.d). The Ukrainian Orange Revolution (Lendman, 2013; Karatnycky, 2005) and the Arab Spring (Anderson, 2011; Botelho, 2015, Simpson, 2014) are some notable examples of nations being encouraged towards democracy with varying degrees of success (Derek & Fishman, 2015; Kuperman, 2015). Exporting and supporting proponents of the American brand democracy is a central anchor of US foreign policy that equates democracy with human rights (Lendman, 2013). Lendman (2013) pointed to revolutions leading to regime changes in Serbia (2000 - 2001), Georgia (2003), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) as examples where the US government successfully introduced democracy. Similar attempts in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine failed leaving these countries in serious crisis.

Benet (2012, 2013) argued that if properly managed as envisaged in the PoDM, democracy may be the silver bullet that addresses all human challenges be they social,

economic, security, environmental, or political. He implied that oppression exist in the absence of democracy. Because oppression and deprivation go hand in hand, the Niger Delta situation may be improved if people oriented democracy can be instituted in line with the positive aspects of the PoDM.

The PoDM (Benet, 2013) appeared to be anchored on critical theory to the extent that it sought "to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them" (Geuss, 1981; Horkheimer, 1982, 244), and therefore promote positive social progress and sustainable change. To the extent that it advocated for social, cultural, economic and political emancipation of the Niger Delta region, the militancy may be said to be a democratic social movement for positive change (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, & Okhonmina, 2007; Tarrow, 1999). The militancy started out with noble ideal of giving voice to the oppressed people of Niger Delta (Agbonifo, 2009). The militancy succeeded in bringing the plight of the Niger Delta people, at the hands of successive Nigerian governments, to both local and international attention. It drew attention to the social and environment injustice perpetrated against Niger Deltan. The case for a change could not have been more clear and forceful. It would appear that the Niger Delta militants drew inspiration from the independence freedom movements that swept across Africa, Asia, and South America in the mid twentieth century and the resistance to Apartheid (United Nations, 1960). Freire (1997) collaborated the Egbesu cultural imperative in asserting that oppressed people will keep resisting with any means available to them until the burden of oppression is lifted or until they perish. This implied that without justice, there

may be no sustainable peace in the Niger Delta. The amnesty was also seen as the first step to delivering justice for Niger Deltans (Egwemi, 2010).

The Niger Delta amnesty offer was conditional (Idonor, 2009). According to the amnesty proclamation, militants must stop all attacks, surrender their weapons to government agents, renounce violence, and present themselves for rehabilitation and reintegration to society before the amnesty could become a legally binding contract. The offer and acceptance of the amnesty indicated that all parties were ready to put differences aside and willing to do everything within their power to ensure lasting peace and security restored to the Niger Delta. Failure by any of the parties to honor the contract can lead to restart of violence in the region. Benet (2013) asserted that democracy is a panacea to oppression and injustice. If this were true, it then follows that the emergence of a visionary leadership that works to embed democratic culture that maximizes the positive aspects of the elements of the PoDM while minimizing the negative aspects is imperative for sustainable peace, security, and social equity in the Niger Delta. While it is desirable that attention be given to all the polarity pairs of the PoDM in an attempt to deliver on the stated objectives of the amnesty policy, it is critically important that special emphasis be placed on the justice and due process, and participation and representation pairs as these hold the key to addressing the Niger Delta question. Doing this will go a long way in establishing trust and reduce the prevailing sense of deprivation and marginalization in the region. Justice may help address issues of deprivation, marginalization, and inequity. Due process may address issues of corruption was blamed as being responsible for the failure of past resolution strategies. Participation

and representation may be the basis for giving Niger Deltans more opportunities to participate in the economic and political development of their regions, especially in the upstream petroleum sector. Tobor (2014) used the PoDM to demonstrate how integrating the cultural heritage of Niger Deltans may increase the efficiency and positive impacts of the amnesty policy implementation process and serve as catalyst for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta region. PoDM also assumed that the Nigerian government will do all within its power to develop Niger Delta infrastructural and create employment opportunities for Niger Deltans. Maximizing the positive aspects of the component pair of PoDM as integral part of implementing the amnesty policy may lead to sustainable improvement in the standard of life for Niger Deltans. Using Benet's (2012, 2013) PoDM as part of the theoretical lens for this study helped me to evaluate the successes, failures, limitations, and omissions of the amnesty policy implementation, as well as the associated unintended consequences for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector.

Conceptual Foundation

Polarity management (Johnson, 1996) was the conceptual framework on which this study was based. Polarity management assumes that some problems are unsolvable in that they defy all strategies or solution options. Johnson (1996) posits that such unsolvable problems are polarities to manage and not problems to be solved. Johnson (1996) said that polarities are opposite pairs that cannot function independently. He argued that public administrators are not at liberty to choose one of the opposite pairs as a solution while ignoring the other pair. The intractable Niger Delta conflict appear to be

one of those situations where the concept of polarities management could be used to understand the nature of the Niger Delta question with a view to designing and implement effective management strategies.

Polarity management requires that administrators be in constant iteration mode until they find the optimal balance where a corrective action when implemented will lead to predictable and controllable outcomes. Maintaining a balance between the conflicting priorities in the Niger Delta remains a delicate balancing act among interdependent and often opposing variables. For example, the amnesty was supposed to bring the militancy to an end. But in declaring the amnesty and paying off the militants, the government also inadvertently validated the perception that violence pays. This study sought to understand what this perception meant for the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry. Johnson's (1996) polarity management model provided the framework for understanding and managing the fallouts of the Niger Delta amnesty policy implementation.

The Niger Delta challenge met the criteria for determining what constitutes a polarity to manage (Johnson, 1996). It is an ongoing challenge, and there are at least two interdependent poles. These include the amnesty policy on one hand and the hostage situation that it created (the perception of rewarding violence and criminality). Johnson (1996) also said that polarities emerge from chaos. The Niger Delta challenge emanated from the chaos of colonialism, the consequences of the Nigerian civil war, and the chaos associated with political and administrative incompetence and corruption that Nigeria have come to be known for in recent history. Johnson (1996) argued that most challenges especially those arising from chaos, are better treated as polarities to be

managed instead of problems to be solved. Looking at the Niger Delta crisis as a polarity may help policy makers get a more comprehensive understanding of the issues at stake. Policy makers may be better prepared to manage the consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty policy in a sustainable manner. If the consequences of the amnesty policy are not properly managed, copycat militants may emerge and foment trouble for all stakeholders in an attempt to get *amnesty*.

Niger Delta Restiveness – A Historical Perspective

A good understanding of the historical context of the Niger Delta restiveness is needed to understanding how it evolved into violent militancy that necessitated the amnesty policy. This historical perspective is also necessary to appreciate the reason why the restiveness persists and seem to have defied all reasonable resolution strategies. The Niger Delta crisis has gradually and steadily deteriorated until it became the albatross that threatened the very existence of Nigeria. It can no longer be treated with levity by stakeholders including the Niger Deltans, scholars, international and local oil companies, government (local, state, and federal), and the international community. This is because of the centrality of the region not only to the well-being of the Nigerian economy but also because of its impact on global economy (influence on crude oil price movement). This informed the local and international pressure on the Nigerian Government to bring the militancy to an immediate and sustainable end. Due to the importance of the region to the Nigerian economy, and the history behind the restiveness, it is not surprising at the diversity of opinion, viewpoints, perspectives, motivations, interpretations and conclusions articulated by diverse scholars and commentators over the years (Adebayo,

2010; Agbonifo, 2009; Amaraegbu, 2011; Anele & Omoro, 2012; Akpan et al., 2012; Badmus, 2010; Chindah, Braide, Amakiri, & Onokurhefe, 2011; Davidheiser and Nyiayaana, 2011; Ifedi & Anyu, 2011; Nwagboso, 2012; Obi, 2009; Odoemene, 2011; Okpo & Eze, 2012; Olankunle, 2010; Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012; Omitola, 2012; Torri & Hermann, 2011; UNDP, 2001; UNEP, 2013). There appears to be unanimity among scholars that the issues of environmental degradation, perception of social injustice, absence of infrastructural development, and perception of economic and political marginalization have been the key issues used by agitators as justification at every stage of the Niger Delta conflict.

The Niger Delta is geographically located in the southern-most parts of Nigeria – see appendix A. The region derived its name from the River Niger. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, River Niger is the third longest river in Africa after Nile and river Congo. It stretches all the way from the Fouta Djallon Mountains and empties into the Gulf of Guinea via Africa's largest delta, the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta is a large expanse delta swamps covering about 36,000 square km. It stretches for about 320 kilometers along the coast of Gulf of Guinea. It is bordered on the south by the Atlantic Ocean and the east by Cameroun. The characteristic landforms - oxbow lakes, river meander belts, levees and intricate network of channels make the region a beauty to behold especially from the air. The Niger Delta people are easy going and welcome strangers with open arms. They love their beautiful environment. They are mostly subsistence farmers, fishers, craftsmen and hunters.

The Niger Delta, formerly called the Oil River (Under early British rule) because of palm oil export from this region, was originally an integral part of Eastern Region of Nigeria (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016). The core Niger Delta consist of the geographical location occupied by present day Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States. In 2000, the Niger Delta region was redefined by the Nigerian federal government to include all oil producing states namely Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River State, Edo, Imo and Ondo (Badmus, 2010; Idowu, 2012; Ministry of Niger Delta, 2015). This should not be confused with the *South-South Zone*; a geo-political zone that comprise of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers states. As presently defined, the Niger Delta extends over an approximate area of 112,110 square kilometers (CIA FactBook, 2015). This is equivalent to about 12% of Nigeria's surface area. With a population of over 31 million people, according to the Nigeria Population Commission, the Niger Delta is the most densely populated region in Nigeria (NPC, 2015). The Niger Delta is diverse in every respect. The region is home to more than 40 ethnic groups with distinct culture and language making it the most diverse in the country (Chigozie, 2013; Ekeh, n.d). The vegetation is a tapestry of mangrove and coastal forest, fresh water swamp and tropical rainforests, derived savannah and montane, providing habitat where a plethora of diverse flora and fauna can thrive (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015). The climate varies from the hot equatorial forest type in the southern lowlands to the humid tropical in the northern highlands and the cool montane type in the Obudu plateau area of Cross River State. There are two seasons, the wet and dry seasons. The wet season lasts from March to October and the dry season from October to March.

The Niger Delta is home to one of the biggest hydrocarbon reserves in the world, and hence the center for the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry. The CIA FactBook (2015) stated that Nigeria's proven crude oil and gas reserve is about 37.14 billion barrels and 5.118 trillion cubic meters respectively. The CIA (2013) estimates puts Nigeria's crude oil output at approximately 2.3 million barrels per day. It also estimated that Nigeria produces an estimated 100 million cubic meters of gas per day. Oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Oloibiri, a village in the Niger Delta in 1956 with commercial production starting in 1958 by Shell-BP and the first LNG shipment in 1999 by NLNG (NNPC, 2015; Walker, 2009). It was estimated that the Nigerian federal government made more than US\$1.6trillion from crude oil export between 1958-2015 (Walker, 2009). Part of this money should have used to develop world class social infrastructure in the region in particular and the country in general. But a mixture of corruption, greed, and gross incompetence has led to this money being squandered (Walker, 2009). The region has little or nothing to show, in terms of social and economic development, for more than 50 years of oil and gas exploration and production. But evidence of environmental pollution and degradation abound across the region. Basic amenities like portable water, sanitation, healthcare, and school are lacking. Hence the ongoing cry for social and economic justice, infrastructural development, and economic emancipation by Niger Deltans. (Agbibo, 2014; Ako, 2012; Paki & Ebienfa, 2011; Okuyade, 2011; Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). With more than 80% of government revenue coming from crude oil export (Anele & Omoro, 2012; Mark, 2015; Odularu, 2007), the Niger Delta is clearly central to the economic well-being Nigeria.

Despite its centrality to the economic well-being of Nigeria, the Niger Delta is yet to receive the attention it deserves from the Federal government. Instead, the region was defined by restiveness, militancy, high youth unemployment, absence of basic infrastructure, environmental pollution, abject poverty, and sociopolitical instability (Amadi & Abdullah, 2012; Anele & Omoro, 2012; Obi, 2010, Paki & Ebiefa, 2011). The Niger Delta is a textbook case of *resource curse* (Paki & Ebiefa 2011). People from the region have seen contemporary cities like Lagos, Abuja, and Kano developed and flourished while Port Harcourt, Owerri, and Warri stagnated and deteriorated. Failure by successive governments to address the Niger Delta question led to untold hardships for Niger Deltans, environmental degradation, and adverse publicity for the Nigerian nation (Okuyade, 2011). Ubhenin (2013) said that “without peace, there can be no development and without justice, there could be no peace” (p. 12). This implies that justice is the only foundation on which sustainable development can be built on in the Niger Delta.

The cry for justice and equity by Niger Deltans pre-dated colonization of Nigeria (Aaron, 2015; Fawole & Ukeje, 2005; Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2012; Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010; Ukeje & Adebani, 2007). It has been on from the time the British conquered and toppled existing leadership structures in the area, and introduced the colonial rule (Cookey, 2005; Moruku, 2012). The Niger Delta crisis is one of the legacies of colonial rule in Nigeria which have lingered to date. The British, through the Willink commission (1958) attempted to resolve it. But with independence on the horizon, the British were more than happy to pass the Willink Commission recommendation on the holistic development of the Niger Delta to the new Nigerian Leadership. The celebration for

attaining independence had hardly settled down before the Niger Delta people began demanding for self-determination from the Nigerian government. The strong desire for self-determination led to the declaration of Niger Delta Republic by Isaac Boro (Allen, 2012; Siollun, 2008). This attempt at secession was quickly put down by the federal government. The outbreak of civil war between 1967-1970 did not help the Niger Delta cause. The Region has undergone political and structural transformation since the days of Eastern Nigeria. In the build-up to the civil war, the federal government by decree abolished the regional structure replacing it with a state structure (Rivers State, 2003). The goal of this strategic move was to polarize the Eastern region and secure the support of the ethnic minority groups for the war against Biafra. Under the new arrangement, the old Eastern region was divided into three states in 1967, namely East Central, South Eastern, and Rivers states (Nigeria Galleria, 2015). The ethnic minority groups were placed in South Eastern and River states with the East Central state reserved for the Igbos – the majority ethnic group. In 1976, the military government headed by General Murtala Mohammed renamed the states as part of his state creation decree (Amzat, Olumide, Wantu, Ogugbuaja, & Akingboye, 2016; OldNaija, 2015). East Central state was carved into two states namely Anambra and Imo, while the South-Eastern state was renamed Cross River state. Another state creation exercise carried out by the administration of General Babangida in 1987 saw Akwa Ibom carved out Cross River state. In 1996, the government of Late General Sani Abacha issued decree leading to the creation of Bayelsa state from Rivers state. Bayelsa is homogeneously populated by the Ijaw ethnic group. As the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria (CIA FactBook, 2015; NPC, 2015), they have

been clamoring for a home state since independence. The state creation exercises at various times in Nigeria's history were partly in response to the agitation for self-determination by various ethnic groups in the country.

The Niger Delta struggle may be broadly categorized into five phases. The first phase covered the years of struggle against British colonial rule in the region. This struggle was defeated by the superior firepower of the British forces. The British sacked the ancient Kingdoms in region, notably the Benin Empire, looted artifacts, humiliated and exiled the Kings (Moruku, 2012). King Jaja of Opobo was exiled to West Indies in 1887 (Cookey, 2005; This is Naija, 2015) and Oba Ovonramwen Nogbaisi (King of Benin Empire) who was exiled to Calabar in 1897 (Egwemi, 2010). The second phase was the agitation that culminated in the establishment of Willink's Commission of 1958 (Barkan, Gboyega & Stevens, 2001). The recommendations of the Commission's report became the reference point for subsequent phases of the struggle. The third phase culminated in the declaration of Niger Delta Republic by Isaac Adaka Boro in 1966 and stretched to the Biafra or Nigerian civil war (Siollun, 2008). The phase of the struggle culminated in the creation of two states for Niger Delta ethnic minorities namely South Eastern state and Rivers state. Creation of home states for the Niger Delta minorities was one of their key demands during the pre-independence phase of the struggle, but was rejected by the Willink commission. During the fourth stage, Ken Saro-Wiwa amplified the cry against marginalization. His demand for environmental justice reinforced the perception of relative deprivation. The Nigerian federal government borrowed a leaf from the British gun boat diplomacy and used military force to put down the agitation and

peaceful protests. Saro-Wiwa and the entire leadership of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) were extra judicially killed in 1995 by Nigerian government under Late General Sani Abacha. The fourth stage brought the Niger Delta struggle to international attention. The fifth stage of the Niger Delta emancipation struggle came on the heels of the Kaiama Declaration by the Ijaw Youth Council on December 11, 1998 (Ekine, 2013). The fifth phase is still ongoing through the militancy and associated amnesty.

The Niger Delta amnesty is the latest in a series of efforts by the government to address the Niger Delta crisis. The government expected that the amnesty will at last bring peace, security and development to the region. All past efforts including the Willink Commission (1958), the Niger Delta Development Board (1962), the Presidential Task Force also called the 1.5% Committee (1978/83), Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (1992), the Niger Delta Environmental Survey (1995), and Niger Delta Development Commission (2000), creation of Ministry of Niger Delta (2008), and a range of corporate social responsibility and sustainable development initiatives by the IOCs operation in the region all failed to address the root causes of the Niger Delta restiveness. Even the Niger Delta Regional development master plan put together by the Federal Government in 2006, in collaboration with all the IOCs, as the overarching development strategy for the region (NDDC, 2006) remains just that, a plan. All past resolution and development strategies failed to deliver the promise due to lack of political will and sincerity, political intrigues, lack of focus, gross incompetence and corruption (Walker, 2009). Another common theme in the failure of all these past

strategies to deliver government promises is due to the inherent lack of clarity of vision, and absence of *SMART* goals. People were not held accountable for their decision, actions or inaction. According to UNDP (2001), top-down approach, limited experience in formulating and implementing a holistic development program, and non-involvement of supposedly beneficiaries in the conception and implementation of the programs were some of the factors that contributed to the failure of past initiatives to aimed at addressing the root causes of the Niger Delta restiveness.

The Niger Delta Militancy: Cost to Sector, Region, and Country

Wars and violent conflicts, no matter the scale or scope, always result in unintended impacts. These are called collateral damages in military parlance. These impacts on passersby, the environment, and economy, social and political structure are mostly unforeseen and hence not fully taken into consideration at the planning stages of the conflict. The Niger Delta militancy was no exception to this rule. The impacts of the Niger Delta conflict had both local and international dimensions. Some of these impacts persist till today and have evolved from problems to be solved to polarities to be managed (Johnson. 1996). The key unintended consequence of the militancy remains the environmental pollution of the Niger Delta eco-system and environment. According to internal SPDC spill data, some spills have resulted from loss of containment during normal production activities. Most of the pollution arose from the vandalism and deliberate attacks on oil and gas infrastructure by militants (BBC News, 2015, Daily Independent, 2007). Due to the prevailing security situation and political sensitivities, oil companies are usually unable to immediately respond to control the spills. Spills have

been known to go on for days or weeks because the company personnel are denied access to the locations by the militants or local communities. These stakeholders assume that the more the spillage, the more compensation they get. During the course of the militancy, several thousand barrels of crude oil have been released into the Niger Delta environment. A joint report by World Wildlife Fund UK, the World Conservation Union, and representatives from the Nigeria Conservation Foundation concluded that the Delta region is one of the five most polluted locations on the planet. Entire ecosystems have been destroyed (Brown, 2006; UNEP Report, 2013), land and water bodies polluted, and means of livelihood lost (Clyde, 2010; Okonta & Oronto, 2001). This exacerbated the already bad poverty situation in the region (Clyde, 2010; UNEP Report, 2006). Some analysts have argued that the pollution of the Niger Delta during the militancy easily compares with the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989 (Brown, 2006; Clyde, 2010; ExxonMobil Website; Nossiter, 2010; Kadafa, 2012). Tolulope (2004) and Kadafa (2012) agreed that the environmental pollution from oil spills have led to predictable decline in the quality and quantity of water bodies and the extermination of mangrove forest and associated biodiversity. Kadafa (2012) argued that the volume of oil spilled and damages done by BP's Gulf of Mexico Horizon spill in 2009 pales into insignificance when compared with the Niger Delta spills. According to Shackle (2010), the Niger Delta spills received little or no local or international media coverage or outrage. The UNEP Report (2013) estimated that it will take at least 30 years to both clean up and restore the Niger Delta, at a cost of more than US\$2 billion. It can be safely concluded that the biggest loser from the Niger Delta militancy is the Niger Delta environment, the rural communities who will

continue to bear the brunt of the environmental pollution and social costs. The cost of environmental pollution of the Niger Delta is yet to be quantified because the pollution due to the ongoing nature of the militancy and associated pollution. It is expected that the present generation of Niger Deltans may not be able to pay off the huge cost of cleaning up and possibly restoring the environment to its pre-militancy grandeur. By creating the environment that motivated and sustained the militancy, the Nigerian political leadership compromised the ability of future generations of Niger Deltans to enjoy the benefits of a safe and clean environment.

The rural communities are poorer today, thanks to the militancy (Tobor, 2014). The militants may not have set out to bring misery to their own people. But as the saying goes, when two elephants fight, the grass suffers. Due to the impact of the militancy on the environment, people lost their means of livelihood (Nossiter, 2010). Host communities of oil process facilities were routinely attacked both militants (collateral damage) and soldiers who blame them for harboring and aiding militants (Ali-dinar, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Onishi, 1999). Many communities were thus destroyed and thousands displaced during the militancy. Human rights abuses were rife and many were killed by both militants and soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

According to Turner (1998), illegally confinement or transportation of people against their will amounts to kidnapping. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (2003) defined extortion as ransom illegally demanded to influence business decisions or to obtain commercial advantage. Kidnapping for extortion or as part of organized criminal enterprise was unheard of in Nigeria prior to the Niger Delta militancy

(Ngwama, 2014; Okoli & Agada, 2014). Ngwama (2014) stated that the first recorded act of kidnapping for ransom took place in 2006. Ngwama (2014) and Adibe (2010) argued that the combination of an ill equipped, poorly trained, highly unmotivated, inefficient and corrupt Police Force, collusion between kidnapers and politicians, and the prevailing belief system in police circles that a kidnap case is solved once the victim is released (after the victim escape or after ransom is paid) have contributed in making the Niger Delta and surrounding states the “kidnapper’s playground” (Ngwama, 2014, p.133). He contended that little or nothing is done to apprehend kidnapers or bring them to justice, thereby emboldening them to operate with impunity. This scourge led to the pervading sense of insecurity in the region and causing emotional and psychological trauma on all residents (Nwogwugwu, Olatunji & Egwuonwu, 2015). According to Davidson (2010), no one is safe. He stated that businessmen and workers who can afford it have relocated their families and business to safer states like Lagos and Abuja. The immediate economic effect of this social malaise is capital and business flight, rampant unemployment. Only business that may not be ran remotely remain (Nwogwugwu, Olatunji & Egwuonwu, 2015). This further exacerbated the already bad unemployment and poverty situation in the region, creating a virtuous cycle in the process. Ngwama (2014) indicted all levels of leadership in Nigeria when he declared that Nigerians, especially those in the Niger Delta, are paying “the price of poor governance and failures of leadership” (p. 133). Adibe (2010) agreed and stated that kidnapping is a symptom of both failed and failing states. He may be unto something. According to the failed states

index report, Nigerian ranked 19th in 2008, 15th in 2009, and 14th in 2010 among nation states that are most likely to fail.

According to Akpan (2010), kidnapping could be used as a tool for general liberation struggle, as a new habit of crime for economic reasons (Tzanelli, 2006), or as a political tool (Turner, 1998). Akpan (2010) argued that when militants introduced kidnapping into the Niger Delta equation, they intended to use it as a tool for general liberation struggle, before greed and corruption took over. Eziukwu (2014) agreed and stated that the original intent was to use the media awareness generated by the kidnap of foreign nationals, especially Americans and Westerners, to draw international attention to Niger Delta struggle. He argued that militants expected media hysteria to put pressure on the federal government and IOCs to accede to their demands. But things quickly got out of hand when they saw they could also make easy money out of it. Unfortunately, kidnapping for extortion has developed into a multimillion dollar business (Akpan, 2010; Ngwama, 2014). The militants as well as criminal gangs that operate under the guise of militancy initially targeted foreigners due to their high hostage value, but today no one is safe from this scourge, including the poor (Davidson, 2010). Impunity prevails because there is no deterrence from the security forces and the government that is supposed to provide security for citizens (Ngwama, 2014). Few kidnappers have been brought to face justice. Many in the region accuse security forces of complicity. This state of affair has further added to the cost of doing business in the Niger Delta while scaring away would be investors. Most established companies especially the IOCs are looking for a way out

or are opting to run their business from Lagos or Abuja, with reduced revenue implication for the Niger Delta states.

The pervading sense of insecurity and fear led to emotional and psychological trauma for all in the region. Citizens are no longer able to move about freely. Companies that remain due to the nature of their operations have been forced by necessity to introduce draconian security measure that further limits personal freedom and further increases the cost of doing business in the region. And there is a significant reduction in economic activities with attendant loss of employment opportunities has also led to a fall in government revenue. The massive relocation of businesses and people from the region led to a depression that the regions real estate sector is yet to recover from. The militancy introduced kidnapping to the region. Kidnapping is responsible for the pervading sense of insecurity across the Niger Delta. High profile kidnappings in the region have been well documented in literature (Ajiboye & Duru, 2016; Canada, n.d; Ezeibe & Eze, 2012; Ngwama, 2014; Usman, 2015). The overall effect of the kidnapping enterprise is the stifling of economic activities, escalation of unemployment and driving many in the region into poverty.

The stated aim of the militancy was to stop or significantly reduce oil and gas production from the region (Courson, 2009; Kaiama Declaration, 1998). The rationale was that without degrading the oil production capacity, the government will not come to the negotiating table to discuss the Niger Delta challenge. Coordinated attack on strategic oil and gas producing and processing infrastructure in the region brought the upstream petroleum sector to its knees. At the peak of the militancy, more than 85% of SPDC's

daily production capacity was shut in (Paki & Ebienfa, 2011). The company saw its crude oil production decline from one million barrels to one hundred and fifty thousand barrels per day. Nigeria's daily crude oil output declined from about 2.7 million barrels per day to 1 million barrel per day. Illegal oil bunkering activities further reduced the output by an average of 200000 barrels daily with devastating consequences for the environment (Asimiea & Omohkua, 2013; Paki & Ebienfa, 2011; Purefoy, 2010; Ross, 2012). Table 1 presents the trend of production and revenue loss to the country between 2000-2008. This volume of loss was a big indictment on the Nigerian political and military leadership failures as alluded to by Ngwama (2014) and Adibe (2010). Ajaero (2009) estimated the immediate monetary cost of the militancy to the country at approximately 11 trillion naira (equivalent to US\$35 billion – US\$1 = NGN315).

Table 1

Estimated Value of Nigeria's stolen or shut-in oil production. January 2000 - September 2008

Year	Avg price of Bonny Light per Barrel (US\$)	Volume of oil stolen per day (barrel)	Value of oil stolen per annum (US\$ billion)	Volume of oil shut-in (barrels)	Value of shut-in oil per annum (US\$ billion)	Total value of oil stolen/shut-in per annum (US\$ billion)
2000	28.49	140000	1.5	250000	2.6	4.1
2001	24.5	724171	6.5	300000	1.8	8.3
2002	25.15	699763	3.2	370000	3.4	6.6
2003	28.76	200000	3.2	350000	3.4	6.6
2004	38.27	300000	4.2	230000	3.2	7.4
2005	56.67	25000	5.1	180000	3.7	8.8
2006	66.84	100000	2.4	600000	14.6	17
2007	75.14	100000	2.7	600000	16.5	19.2
2008	115.81	150000	6.3	650000	27.5	33.8

Note. From “The potential for peace and reconciliation in the Niger Delta,” by C. Cathedral, 2009, *International Council on Reconciliation*, Coventry.

This amount of money could have been used by a visionary leadership to provide world class infrastructure, like schools, health care, roads and parks, for the Niger Delta in particular and Nigeria in general. The significant loss in revenue meant that the state and federal governments were limited in their capacity to deliver dividends of democracy to citizens. For companies operating in the upstream petroleum sector, the reduced production meant significantly reduced profits and uncertainty, resulting in cancellation or deferment of ongoing projects (Nwogwugwu, Olatunji, & Egwuonwu, 2015). They stated that Niger Delta also lost its status as destination of choice for oil and gas related investments to Iraq, Kazakhstan, and Angola. Service companies that depended on the producers for contracts cut back staff, further compounding the unemployment woes in the region. On the international scene, the reduced production from Nigeria, the uncertainty, and speculation by traders led to increase in the price of crude oil in the international markets (Asuni, 2009). This threatened the fragile economic recovery in America and Europe following the 2008 financial crisis. There was also fear that the militants may link up with international terror organization, with dire consequences for the sub-Saharan Africa. The international community pressured the Nigerian government to find a solution, any solution to this lingering crisis, setting the stage for the Niger Delta Amnesty policy.

It is against the above impacts that the race was on by all stakeholders to find a lasting solution to the militancy. The government of President Yar Ardua recognized that stopping the uprising is critical to the survival of the Nigerian state. He introduced the amnesty policy in June 2009 to stop the militancy, create the enabling environment to

restore oil production from the region to pre-militancy levels, start managing the negative impacts of the militancy, and begin to address the root causes of the militancy (Etemike, 2012; Nwagboso, 2012). Oluduro and Oluduro (2012) explained that the amnesty policy was adopted as a panacea to resolve the militancy. Egwemi (2010) praised the amnesty policy as political master stroke that can bring the militancy to an immediate end. Paki and Ebiefa (2011) stated that the amnesty had immediate impact and credited it with the uptick in Nigeria's crude oil output.

Past Resolution Strategies: A History of Deprivation and Broken Promises

Successive governments had at one point or the other tried to resolve the Niger Delta challenge. This was in recognition of the implications of prolonged absence of peace, security, and stability in the region for the Nigerian economy. A plethora of strategies were deployed to resolve the Niger Delta conflict, dating back to colonial era (Paki & Edoumiekumo, 2011). When they took over as colonial masters, the British deployed their famous divide and rule strategy (England, 2009) to the Niger Delta challenge to the advantage of the British. This was in line with Morrock's (1973) definition of the divide and rule strategy as "conscious effort of an imperialist power to create and/or turn to its advantage the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, tribal, or religious differences within the population of a subjugated colony" (p. 129). Instead of solving the problem, this strategy further complicated matters on ground by creating mistrust and destructive competition among the Niger Delta diverse ethnic nationalities. This threatened British interest in the region and they resorted to gunboat diplomacy to pacify the region and forcefully bring them under the British Crown. Where pockets of

resistance persisted, they resorted to humiliation and exiling non-compliant Kings from their Kingdoms (Egwemi, 2010). The divide and rule strategy failed to usher in lasting peace for the simple reason that they were not designed to address the root causes of the unrest namely injustice, inequity and the absence of self-determination.

The use of force alone has not been known to bring about sustainable reconciliation and peace. This too failed and created more resentment against the British and those who supported them. At independence, Nigeria was structured around three regions. The Niger Deltans found themselves as minorities in the Eastern Region and continued their quest for self-rule and self-determination.

With independence, the agitation for equity for the Niger Delta did not subside because the Nigerian state continued with the British colonial policies in the regions (Paki & Edoumiekumo, 2011). The agitation and clamor for self-determination increased the tension in the region. In 1966, Isaac Adaka Boro launched the first armed insurgency against the federal government in protest of the way the oil revenue is being used. To fulfill his aspiration for self-determination, he declared the Niger Delta Republic and led his kinsmen to fight a 12-day revolution before the insurgency was crushed by federal government soldiers (Siollun, 2008). He was later granted amnesty on the eve of the Nigerian civil war, after he accepted to fight on the side of the federal government. This and the unfolding Nigerian – Biafra civil war raised the stakes for the battle and control of the Niger Delta. Over the years, the military option, high handedness and divide and rule have remained the strategies of choice by successive Nigerian government in dealing with Niger Deltan. Every protest has been quelled or suppressed using military force with

little or no attempt to address the root causes of the agitations. From the Ogoni killings and proscription of MOSOP in 1995 (Ekott, 2012), to the Odi massacres (Ali-Dinar, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Onishi, 1999), and air raids on Gbaramatu and environs (Courson, 2009). At the peak of the militancy, a special military task force – Joint Task Force was set up to curb the Niger Delta militancy. The Joint Task Force (JTF) working under code name operation restore hope was mandated to use all necessary force to safeguard oil and gas facilities in the Niger Delta, and curb communal restiveness and agitation. Niger Delta saw the deployment of JTF to the region as yet another evidence of marginalization as no other ongoing agitation in the country got similar treatment. The JTF took their job seriously and unleashed mayhem on communities suspected of being sympathetic to the militant cause. The invasion of Odi (1999), Odioma (2005), Okerenkoko (2006), Age (2008), Gbaramatu (2009) (Siollun, 2008) are key examples where whole communities were sacked by the Nigerian military in their war against Niger Delta militants. In killing, raping, maiming and burning houses, they violated the human rights of especially the vulnerable in the society including children, women and the aged (Siollun, 2008). The military interventions helped swell the ranks of the militants and cement the militancy. They now believe they are not only fighting for justice and equity but the right to exist. This feeling was reinforced when the details of the 2008 federal budget was made public. While presenting the 2008 budget to the National Assembly, President Yar Ardua proposed sixty-nine billion naira (approximately US\$460 million) for the NDDC, to be used on various developmental projects across the region. He also announced the allocation of four hundred and forty-

four billion (approximately US\$3 billion) for security operations in the Niger Delta.

Niger Deltans read this as a declaration of war by the federal government. They believed the security votes could have been better utilized to develop the region; now it will be used to further oppress or suppress the people.

The Niger Delta militancy once again demonstrated that the use of military force alone is a counterproductive conflict resolution strategy. The military operations reinforced the sense of marginalization, persecution and deprivation that led to the militancy. Nothing can unify a group of people more than the sense of being collectively under siege leading them to believe that their survival is at stake. This understanding and the pressure from the international community was what finally motivated the Nigerian government to finally settle for a political settlement. This political settlement came to be known as the Niger Delta Amnesty.

In its attempt to stop the secession of then Eastern Region and keep the country united, the federal government dissolved the regional structure replacing it with a 12-state federal structure. The Eastern Region was divided into five states namely Anambra, Bendel, Cross River, Imo, and Rivers. Three of the states (Bendel, Cross River, and Rivers) were specifically carved out to encompass Niger Delta ethnic groups. The divide and rule strategy effectively broke the previous unity in the region, and by extension the Igbo influence as dominant ethnic group. The minorities now have their own states. This should have resolved the Niger Delta agitation because Niger Deltans are now politically and administratively in charge of their destiny. But incompetence, corruption and absence of leadership ensured that the issues were not addressed. Basic infrastructure and social

amenities were not provided. The economy was not diversified. Education remained the exclusive preserve of elite. Youth unemployment and economic deprivation continued unabated. And the restiveness continued.

The foregoing move would have given the Niger Delta people control of the resources from their states had the government not promulgated the Land Use Act in 1978 and embedded it in the 1999 constitution (Mabogunje, 2010; Obioha, 2008; Udoekanem, Adoga, & Onwumere, 2014) effectively vesting the ownership rights over all lands, water body, and associated resources in the federal government. This effectively put the oil and gas resource from the Niger Delta under federal control. Since the end of the civil war, the Niger Deltan has been crying foul. Resource control became one of their battle cries going into the 2003 general elections. They argue they have been lied to, used and dumped. They now want to fight to the finish.

Over the years, several administrative policies have been put in place by successive governments to resolve the crisis emanating from the absence of social, political and economic development of the Niger Delta. This was in recognition of the fact that the NICE of Niger Deltans must be addressed before sustainable peace and security can prevail in the region. Enemugwem (2009) reviewed the developmental efforts from 1900-1966; he argued that there were laudable efforts by the colonial administrators especially the establishment of the Willink Commission in 1957. The Willink Commission was mandated to examine the issue of minority's rights and their challenges in the country, with emphasis on the Niger Delta. The commission was asked to identify the NICE of these groups, and propose feasible solution options to addresses

these NICE. In its conclusion, the Willink Report (1958) noted the special needs of the Niger Delta region and called for a coordinated co-operation between the federal, eastern and western government to develop the region. Their argument was based on the fact that the Niger Delta minority ethnic groups are spread across the Eastern and Western regions, are poor, have been neglected and not as educated as the Igbos and Yorubas. The Report stated that the Niger Delta problem is a Nigerian problem hence the strong recommendation that a Federal Board be appointed to consider the problems of the area of the Niger Delta.

The Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) was established in 1961 as part implementation of the recommendations of the Willink Commission Report (1958). The Board was tasked with facilitating the developmental needs of the Niger Delta ethnic minorities to forestall the burgeoning agitation for justice and equity. The board was not well funded; ill equipped and therefore was unable to fulfill its mandate (Enemugwem, 2009). He blamed the lack of political will on both the sides of the British (who were on their way out) and the post-colonial Nigerian leadership for apathy in fully implementing the Commission's recommendations. The outbreak of civil war in 1967 did not particularly help matters.

After the civil war, there was no rush to continue with the implementation of the Willink Commission Report. The federal government wanted to focus attention and resources on its post war 3-R policy - reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction (Gowon, 2007). The NDDDB existed mostly on paper until 1978 when its name was changed to the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA). The NDBDA was

among eleven other river basin development authorities established to champion the development of their capture regions (Egwaikhide, Isumonah & Ayodele, 2009). The focus was no longer solely on the Niger Delta. While this may appear to ensure equity in a diverse country as Nigeria, it removed the special status from the Niger Delta, failing to appreciate its significance and critical importance to the economic survival of the country.

Whenever criticized for the underdevelopment of their states, the governments of Niger Delta states consistently blamed paucity of funds for their inability to meet the developmental needs of their states. These governors called for a return to pre-civil war revenue sharing formula, (where regions had full control over revenue they generated and paid tax to the federal government), the restoration of special status to the Niger Delta region. They lobbied for increased allocation for their states coffers based on increased derivation percentage, and for the federal government to step in and assist with massive development of especially the oil producing regions in the Niger Delta. They argued that a special federal government intervention (similar to the Marshall plan for post WW II Europe) will lead to the region's economic and social emancipation.

In response to the agitation by Niger Deltans, the federal military government under General Ibrahim Babangida through Decree 23 of 1992 created the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission - OMPADEC (Amakievi, 1999; Omotola, 2007). According to Amakievi (1999), OMPADEC was to be the vehicle for achieving the twin purpose of rehabilitating and developing the oil mineral producing areas of Nigeria. The commission was to be funded by the 1.5% (later increased to 3%) of total

government oil revenue in line with the 1981 federal revenue Act (Amakievi, 1999; Egwaikhide, Isumonah & Ayodele, 2009; Omotola, 2007). Amakievi (1999) argued that OMPADEC made some progress in promoting educational development in the communities through the award of scholarships and rehabilitation of infrastructure. But Egwaikhide, Isumonah & Ayodele (2009) had a contrary view. They argued that while the vision and mission of OMPADEC were clear from the outset, the Commission failed in making any significant impact on the Niger Delta due to political intrigue, corruption, incompetence of administrators, absence of visionary and competent leadership, and poor funding. These above were the same factors that hampered the NDDB. Egwaikhide et al (2009) posited that political interference from the President Babangida and his Supreme Military Council was the real reason why the Commission was never focused on delivering on its mandate. The President and his men saw the commission as another avenue for personal enrichment (Kukah, 1999). It therefore follows that OMPADEC would have succeeded if the leadership provided it with a comprehensive Niger Delta-wide development framework, with the right level of funding, competent leadership, political will and right level of political cover. In recognition of OMPADEC's shortcomings, the new civilian government headed by General Obasanjo established NDDC in 2000 through an Act of National Assembly.

NDDC was established to replace the inefficient and ineffective OMPADEC. The new commission was charged with the primary mandate to accelerate the comprehensive development of the Niger Delta region. The NDDC Act called for the establishment of a governing board to be headed by a Chairman. The board membership shall comprise of

one representative from each of the oil producing states namely Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. Other members included a representative each from the federal ministries of finance and environment, and a representative of oil producing companies association, a member director and two executive directors. The Chairmanship of the NDDC board is to rotate among the member states in alphabetical order. This was to ensure stability and equal representation, to keep the commission focused on the task at hand. The NDDC Chairman and Board are to be appointed by the Nigerian President and confirmed by the Senate. Section 7, subsection 1 of the Act (Appendix B) sets out what the NDDC was statutorily empowered to do, while section 14 sets out its funding mechanism (Appendix C). Egwaikhede, Isumonah and Ayodele (2009) argued that issue of poor funding which hampered both the OMPADEC and NDDC seem to have been resolved by the Act establishing NDDC. The challenge now was to see whether or not the government of the day will follow through with finally resolving the root causes of the restiveness in the region.

NDDC and its government sponsors once again failed to learn from the mistakes of predecessor agencies (Nigerian Law Guru, n.d). The Nigerian Law Guru stated that NDDC has been embroiled with leadership tussle. The commission quickly went through 3 managing directors and 2 chairmen in by its second anniversary. These changes introduce instability as each new leader comes with different vision and approach. Furthermore, allegation of corruption and corrupt practices are rife. The Niger Delta militancy also contributed to the failure of the NDDC to perform. Construction workers were routinely kidnapped for large ransom payments, leading contractors to suspend or

abandon ongoing projects. The period between 2002-2012 may be viewed as a lost decade for the Niger Delta because the region has little or nothing to show for the generous funding (13% derivation) that the NDDC got. This does not include higher statutory allocation from the federal government, due to higher oil price, for each Niger Delta states. Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa Ibom, and Rivers states are among the five top recipients of federal allocation. Lagos is the only state richer than these four Niger Delta States. Due to greed, wickedness, self-interest, corruption, and survival mindset (Obomanu, 2014), the huge revenue accrued to the Niger Delta states between 1999-2015 was largely looted by state governors and their cronies. All the suspected looters are all Niger Deltans. Most public officials who served the Niger Delta state governments either have allegations of corruption hanging on their heads or are perceived to be corrupt by the population (Akinloye, 2016; Ibekwe, 2015). A former Niger Delta state governor was extradited to England on allegations of corruption. He along with his wife, sister, and mistress are serving various jail terms in English jail for money laundry offences (Ameh, 2016; Anaba, 2012). Another former state governor jumped bail and escaped back to Nigeria where he received presidential pardon (Edozie, 2013; Ibeh, 2013). Yet another obtained a corrupt court injunction prohibiting anyone from probing his administration (Ekeinde, 2008; Sahara, 2009). Hundreds more are walking free, flaunting their ill-gotten wealth while their brethren languish in abject poverty. This made the need for institutional response to resolve the Niger Delta crisis necessary.

Once again a golden opportunity to develop the Niger Delta was lost. Once again the ugly mix of corruption, political intrigue, and visionless leadership has ensured that

nothing of consequence was accomplished by the NDDC. The Niger Delta remain polluted, undeveloped, and the poorest oil producing regions in the world (Steyn, 2015). And the dream of developing world class cities across the Niger Delta remain just dreams.

Omotola (2007) stated that the establishment of OMPADEC and the NDDC were halfhearted institutional responses to the Niger Delta crisis. He argued that although these two entities have made some positive impacts, they remain ineffective as they grapple with political influences, corruption, and absence of visionary and competent leadership. He asserted that without the resolution of the above underlying structural problems, the Niger Delta crisis will continue to persist. The resurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta lends credence to his assertions. It is therefore imperative that the According to the federal government develop the necessary political will, eliminate corruption, and appoint competent people to lead the development of the Niger Delta (Egwaikhide, Isumonah & Ayodele, 2009; Egwemi, 2011; Omotola, 2007; Siollun, 2008; Ubhenin, 2013; Willink Commission Report, 1958). It will appear that the Federal government took Omotola's (2007) conclusion that "all institutional responses should be closely linked with grassroots organizations, particularly community-development associations and related rural -empowerment nongovernmental organizations, with adequate frameworks for monitoring and evaluation" (p.1) into consideration when it established the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MONDA) in 2008.

President Yar Ardua created MONDA, with NDDC as a parastatal, to both provide leadership and coordinate all efforts aimed at developing the Niger Delta. The

Niger Delta Budget Monitoring Group (NDEBUMOG), an organization that monitors budget implementation in the Niger Delta, asserted that with the creation of MONDA, funding is no longer part of the issues hampering Niger Delta's development.

NDEBUMOG (2014) cited budgetary allocation figures obtained from the Budget office of the Federation as evidence. A quick analysis of the 2009 federal government approved budget proposal show that MONDA's budgetary allocation is greater than the combined allocation for ministries of agriculture and Science and Technology. Even though funding was no longer an issue, corruption, incompetence, absence of visionary leadership and political will still persist. Billions of dollars have been disbursed and spent with little or nothing to show for it. NDEBUMOG (2014) stated that "the reality on ground in the Niger Delta is that of widespread poverty, restiveness, poor healthcare, substandard education and dilapidated infrastructures" (p.1). The NDEBUMOG's 2014 Report details a slew of hyper inflated non-value adding projects; some of which were awarded and executed only on paper. This state of affair is because the administrative and political leadership across the region and at federal level came to view MONDA's creation as yet another vehicle for self-enrichment. No one has yet been brought to book or held accountable. The Niger Delta question remains unanswered, and the violent agitation continued, though at a lesser intensity pre-amnesty.

In addition to the institutional boards and commissions as discussed above, successive Nigeria governments have set up technical committees to review the Niger Delta question and recommend appropriate solutions. Notable among these are the Lt. General Alexander Ogomudia Special Security Committee (2002), General Muhammed

Buhari Presidential Committee on Peace and Reconciliation (2003), General Olusegun Obasanjo Presidential Committee on the Niger Delta (2006), President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua's seven-point agenda including Niger Delta security (2007), and the Niger Delta Technical Committee (2009). My review of literature found that these committees, their reports and recommendations have largely gone the way of the Willink Report (1958) mostly due to lack of political will and absence of strong leadership needed to implement the recommendations. According to Courson (2009) and Omotola (2007), successive leadership at the federal level thought it was not politically expedient and not aligned with their ethnocentric worldview to comprehensively address the Niger Delta crisis.

It seems that the IOCs operating in the Niger Delta may have contributed to perennial crisis. Many scholars, including George et al. (2012) cite the massive trust deficit that exist between the IOCs and their host communities, as basis for their argument. They asserted that the IOCs have not lived up to their corporate social responsibilities (CSR) to their host communities. On the flip side, there seem to be a consensus among scholars that the IOCs have done a good job given the unique Niger Delta context where the government abandoned its responsibility to the citizenry. Amadi and Abdullah (2012) argue that the Niger Delta would have been in worse situation had it not been for the CSR activities of the IOCs in the host communities. They praised SPDC's development and social investment activities in the areas of education (scholarships awards and provision of learning aids to schools), economic empowerment (micro loans to women and entrepreneurial youth), sports development, and healthcare

(portable water, insecticide treated mosquito nets to fight malaria, and building cottage hospitals). They mentioned that SPDC is also facilitating the training of more than 1000 public health workers in the prevention and control of malaria. According to them, this has gone a long way in helping to improve the quality of lives of the Niger Delta people. According to Millennium Development Goals Report (2015), some of the multifaceted sustainable development projects executed or being executed by the IOCs have helped push Nigeria towards meeting at least five out of its eight Millennial Development Goal obligations.). These projects are in the areas of eradication of extreme poverty, universal basic education, improvement of maternal health, reduction in child mortality rate, and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.

SPDC and other IOCs operating in the region have also attempted to bring development to their host communities by the statutory contribution of 5% of their annual operating budget to the NDDC, as mandated by the NDDC Act. They have been at the forefront of infrastructure, social and human capital development in the region. They have provided hospitals, portable water, built/renovated schools and provided books and other teaching aids to the host communities according to Shell sustainability report (2014). In the past SPDC have provided independent power generator sets to its host communities. But this model of providing independent power units to the host communities was replaced with a model that is anchored on interdependency. Under the interdependency model, host communities are directly connected to power and water utilities domiciled at SPDC processing facilities. This is a win-win proposition ensured the communities will not vandalize/disrupt SPDC operation without causing significant

inconvenience for themselves. The communities now depended on SPDC for both electricity and water. The downside of this sustainable development model was that government now abdicated its responsibilities and blamed the IOCs for the lack of development in the Delta Region and by extension the militancy (George et al., 2012; Idowu, 2012; Okpo & Eze, 2012). In most cases, the communities have come to equate SPDC and the other IOCs with the government.

The NNPC-Shell Cup is another key social investment initiative by SPDC to benefit of Niger Delta teens, but has assumed the status of a national tournament with the passage of time. This annual soccer competition provides talented school children with the opportunity to pursue their footballing passion while not missing out on education. According to the Shell Nigeria web page, the Shell Cup (as it is popularly called) is a “social invested initiative that was initiated in 1998 by SPDC) and its JV partners” (p. 1). It has grown to include all secondary schools in Nigeria and serves as one of the reliable talent pipelines for the discovery and recruitment of players for the national U-17 football team.

In furtherance of the CSR initiative, SPDC and other IOCs have awarded both local and international scholarships that facilitated the secondary, undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate education of thousands of students from the Niger Delta (SPDC Website, 2015). The Secondary School Scholarship Scheme, University Scholarship Scheme (the National Merit Award, open to Nigerian undergraduates and Areas of Operation Merit Award, for students from SPDC host communities), and the Niger Delta postgraduate scholarship are the key scholarship schemes by SPDC.

According to Shell Nigeria website, various scholarships grants totaling US\$14.8 million was awarded to mostly Niger Delta indigenous students in 2014 alone. Most of the IOCs including SPDC asserted that human capital development is essential to the development and emancipation of the Niger Delta region. Post scholarship, the scholarship recipients become a veritable human resource pool that further cements the bridge of trust between the host communities and IOCs. . In my experience, I have found that local personnel to be more invested in the companies than non-locals due mostly to the inherent opportunity to contribute to the socioeconomic advancement of their kits and kins. The LiveWire program is another initiative that SPDC has directed at human capital development and economic empowerment of the Niger Delta people. On its webpage, SPDC stated that:

LiveWire Nigeria is a youth enterprise development programme supported by The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC). The programme operates in the Niger Delta region and aims to inspire, encourage and support young people aged 18-30 to start up their own businesses in the Nigerian states of Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Abia, Imo, and Akwa-Ibom (p. 1).

On page 52 of its 2014 sustainability report, Royal Dutch Shell stated that it spent approximately US\$160 million and US\$159 in 2014 and 2013 respectively, on voluntary social investments worldwide, of which 23% was spent in Sub-Saharan Africa which is essentially Nigeria's Niger Delta Region. The IOC CSR initiatives are mostly piecemeal in nature and are driven mostly by business imperative (Thei, 2013). The projects are to support specific communities and not region based. The impacts are therefore not felt outside the target communities; hence Niger Delta remains infrastructural and

socioeconomically backward despite the huge capital outlays by both the government and IOCs operating in the region (Nweke, 2014).

While there seem to be no lack of resolution initiative, corruption, incompetent leadership and political meddling have seen to it that the Niger Delta remain undeveloped, with little or nothing to show for the billions of naira said to have been allocated and spent to develop it. It may be argued that that these monies ended up in the private pockets of public administrators. It is a sad commentary on successive Nigerian governments that the very same issues that led to the failure of the NDDDB are yet to be resolved more than 50 years down the line.

This again is an indictment on leadership at all levels of governance in Nigeria. That continuation of agitation and its escalation into armed militancy with all its devastating impacts on the region in particular and the country in general is a testimony that successive Nigerian governments have failed in their primary duty of ensuring peace and prosperity for all through Justice and equity. Even though the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs is still in existence, it is more of a monument to cronyism and for dispensing favor to party loyalist and has lost the vision of addressing the Niger Delta infrastructure deficit.

The Niger Delta Amnesty

The amnesty policy was launched as a last-ditch peacebuilding initiative to arrest the escalating violence in the Niger Delta (Aghedo, 2012; Etemike, 2012; Egwemi, 2010; Nwagboso, 2012; Ubhenin, 2013). If well implemented, this peacebuilding strategy will prevent the escalation and recurrence of armed conflicts (Aghedo, 2012; Hassan, 2009).

This peacebuilding process was expected to eliminate the conditions that motivated and sustained the Niger Delta militancy (Ikelegbe, 2010). It follows therefore that the success or failure of the amnesty program will be a function of the extent to which it leads to the cessation of the militancy and address the root causes of the militancy.

Among other things, the amnesty initiative was recognition by government that there is no military solution to the Niger Delta militancy; that the use of force alone cannot deliver lasting peace and security to the region. It was also an admission by the government of the high cost of the militancy on the Nigerian economy, environment, and national reputation is not sustainable. Finally, the amnesty is more importantly an admission, by the government, of the failure of past resolution strategies (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012; Thei, 3013).

The signing of the amnesty proclamation by the President Yar Ardua resulted in complete cessation of violence in the region. (Agbibo, 2014; Aghedo, 2012; Egwemi, 2010; Nwagboso, 2012; Ogege, 2011; Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). A state of uneasy peace prevailed across the region as actors waited to see the government's next move (Moruku, 2012). The NDPVF, a key militant group led by Asari Dokubo, rejected outrightly the amnesty offer. They argued that demanding, campaigning and advocating for social and environmental justice for the Niger Delta people, using the only viable means available to them, does not amount to the commission of a crime against the federal government (Moruku, 2012). The group further argued that amnesty is null and void since its member have neither been tried nor found guilty of any crime by any court of law in the country. Their position created uncertainty about the viability and sustainability of

the amnesty program. But with the passage of time and pressure from the Niger Delta political leaders, Asari and his group subsequently came on board. Egwemi (2010) and Paki & Ebienfa (2011) praised the amnesty program; calling it a political masterstroke designed to restore peace to the Niger Delta region. These men argued that with violence ended and peace restored, the government is better positioned to address the issues that led to and sustained the Niger Delta militancy. They are of the opinion that without addressing these foundational issues, the peace will only be short-lived. According to Egwemi (2010), some of these foundational issues that demand urgent and immediate attention and resolution from the federal and state governments include youth unemployment, environmental degradation and pollution from oil and gas exploration and production activities, and infrastructural development of the region. Ogege (2011) supported this view by arguing that the amnesty has achieved what military force alone could not, namely to bring the ongoing vandalism of oil and gas production facilities in the region to a stop. He also said that the amnesty has helped create a relatively safe environment for the IOCs to resume operations in the region. The amnesty policy has right been credited with the restoration of Nigeria's oil and gas output to pre-militancy (Agbibo, 2014; Aghedo, 2012; Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Akpan & Ering, 2010; Courson, 2009; Nwogwugwu, Olatunji & Egwuonwu, 2015; Paki & Ebienfa, 2011; Ubhenin, 2013).

But there are some downsides to the amnesty policy. Agbibo (2014) and Hinshaw (2012) called the amnesty a gilded pacification of the Niger Delta militants with no plans of addressing the real issues at the heart of the aspirations of the Niger Delta

people. They argued that the amnesty is directed at compensating the militants to enable the uninterrupted resumption of oil and gas production. Aghedo (2012) and Akpan & Ering (2010) were posited that the amnesty cannot deliver lasting peace and prosperity to the Niger Delta region without addressing the root causes of the militancy as identified by Egwemi (2010) and Aaron (2015) among others. These scholars contended that the federal government's primary motivation for the amnesty was to restart and restore oil and gas production to pre-militancy levels and not necessarily to address the perennial injustices against the Niger Delta people. This was in recognition of the fact that the IOCs are unable to operate effectively in an insecure and unsafe Niger Delta environment. Aghedo supported this view. He stated that the amnesty made no provision for rehabilitating victims of the amnesty or bringing those that committed human rights violations to book.

The amnesty was conceptualized to end the militancy, negate future reoccurrence, and create the enabling environment needed to address the amnesty's root causes and impacts (Ubhenin, 2013). It relied heavily on the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) model to achieve its immediate goals, namely immediate cessation of violence and preventing reoccurrence (Aghedo, 2012). Achieving this goal was essential to the government's top priority to revive the upstream petroleum sector and restore and hence the revenue stream which was critical to protecting the Nigerian economy from total collapse (Egwemi, 2011).

The DDR was to ensure that once the conflict ended, it does not start again by mopping up the arms in circulation (Ojeleye, 2011). The amnesty was offered on the

condition that militants renounce all violence and surrender their weapons to government. The amnesty accomplished the disarmament and demobilization objective in its early days. Militants became ex-militants upon surrendering their weapons and registering at the disarmament centres (Nwagboso, 2012; Ogege, 2011; Ojeleye, 2011; Oluwaniyi, 2011). The ex-militants were then sent to vocational institutions locally and internationally (Siollun, 2008) to acquire skills that will help fast track their integration into civil society. The surrendered weapons were secured by relevant government agencies to ensure they never get into the wrong hands or used again to commit acts of violence.

Reintegration is the last and an ongoing phase of the DDR model (Aghedo, 2012; Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012). The sustenance of short and medium term post-militancy peace and security depended very much on the successful implementation of the reintegration component of the DDR model. The reintegration component of the amnesty policy is ensuring that ex-militants are rehabilitated and provided with alternate skills and means of livelihood that makes relapse into militancy unappealing. Long-term sustainable peace and security will be a function of how fast, effective, and successful the government is with the implementation of the post-amnesty infrastructural development within the region and how the social and environmental justice issues are addressed (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012).

Recognizing that ex-militants are a security risk if their need, interests, concerns, and expectations are not taken care of, the government structured the amnesty program to forestall resurgence of militancy. Multimillion dollar pipeline and waterways surveillance

contracts were awarded to ex-militant leaders (Ibekwe, 2015; Nwabughio, 2015; Onukwugha & Okhomina, 2015). This is amounted to getting the dog to guard a piece of juicy bone; a scenario that created dilemma for all stakeholders that empowered the ex-militant leaders and created a sort of hostage situation. The ex-militant warlords can easily resort to violence if the massive economic resource they now control is threatened in any way. Some commentators argue that the special treatment given to the ex-militants was a wrong precedent. They contended that it sent the unintended message to the public that violence pays (Aghedo, 2014; Aghedo & Osumah, 2014; Eke, 2014; El-Rufai, 2012). This position is supported by the ongoing advocacy by a section of the country for the federal government to offer a Niger Delta style amnesty to Boko Haram terrorists. Boko Haram has killed more than 10,000 innocent citizens and kidnapped hundreds of young women as sex slaves (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014; El-Rufai, 2012).

The first two phases of the amnesty, as implemented recorded some notable successes. The program has contributed to a significant reduction in the number of illegal and offensive weapons in circulation and by extension potentially reduced the frequency of violent crimes incidence in the region. More than 30000 ex-militants signed up for the program, surrendering their weapons in the process (Ogege, 2011; Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012; Siollun, 2008). Most of these ex-militants were sent for vocational and professional training within and outside Nigeria (Siollun, 2008). Even with the successes recorded, the jury is still out on the overall success of the amnesty policy.

That the amnesty has been successful in stopping the violent attacks and vandalism of upstream oil sector infrastructure is not in question. But it failed to deliver

both social and environmental justice for the victims of the militancy. Another key failing was in reinforcing the perception that violence pay by generously rewarding ex-militants and set an unsustainable precedent. It was apparent the Federal government relied on the MONDA and NDDC to address challenges of infrastructural and economic development of the Niger Delta. This was not a wise decision, except the MONDA is ready to change its operating model. It has been demonstrated that the ministry, as presently staffed and operated, may not be able to succeed at the important national assignment. The MONDA and NDDC in their respective seven and fifteen-year existence, have failed (even by government's own admission) to make any significant progress in developing the Niger Delta Region despite the huge capital outlay. Until the shortcomings of the amnesty are addressed, the upstream petroleum sector will be at risk of facing a resurgent and more determined militancy in the near future. Aghedo (2012) argued that "until the incentives for violence are identified and checked, the age-long grievance of the region against environmental insecurity, underdevelopment, and distributional injustice in oil rents address, perpetrators of human rights violations – including extra-judicial killings – brought to book, and victims of human rights abuse and the protracted conflict compensated, the current peace of the graveyard in the region is likely to subsist" (p. 267). The amnesty has generously taken care of the militants (Agomuo, 2015; Idowu, 2012; Nwogwugwu, Olatunji & Egwuonwu, 2015; Hinshaw, 2012), but failed to address the needs and expectations of victims of the militancy (Aghedo, 2012). Both pro-government commentators and critics seem to agree that the payout and reward to the ex-militant is unsustainable (Aghedo, 2012; Agomuo, 2015; El-Rufai, 2012; Hinshaw,

2012). Hinshaw (2012) argued that the amnesty a *gilded pacification campaign* that amounting to paying protection money to ex-militant warlords so that oil production may continue. Despite the amnesty and its claimed successes, illegal oil bunkering in the region persists.

Even though oil production has resumed in the Niger Delta, the volume of crude oil stolen on a daily basis through illegal bunkering seem to suggest that the amnesty has failed to resolve the Niger Delta crisis (Etemike, 2012; Idowu, 2012). The amnesty policy was celebrated as being responsible for restoring Nigeria's crude oil output to pre-militancy levels. On the flip side, it was also responsible for the unprecedented pollution of the Niger Delta environment due to increased illegal crude oil bunkering activities. The federal government has its job cut out for it. Hinshaw (2012) quoted Dimieari Von Kemedi, a former government mediator on the amnesty as saying "Everybody seems to believe that the Niger Delta problem is over, it's just on pause. The challenge is to move from pause to stop" (p. 7). Making this important transition will require the federal government to muster the needed political will to do the right things, for example "restructure the country as being demanded by scholars like Etemike (2012). Whatever it does or refuses to do in moving from *pause* to *stop* will have consequences for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector.

Summary and Conclusion

The need for an in-depth understanding of the history and motivation for the Niger Delta militancy is needed to better understand the Niger Delta amnesty policy and its consequences for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. The Niger Delta militancy

brought the Nigerian upstream sector to near collapse. The Niger Delta amnesty was the elixir that was administered to resuscitate the industry. No public policy is perfect. Implementing these imperfect policies usually results in unanticipated positive or negative outcomes. It is therefore important that we understand both the nature and implications of these unanticipated consequences on Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. It was with this view in mind that this literature review was undertaken.

While there is a plethora of literature on the militancy, its impacts on aspects of Nigerian economy, politics, culture, and social interactions, there was nothing on the on how the amnesty policy impacted the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. This was unexpected given the critical importance of this sector to the Nigerian economy and its centrality to the socioeconomic and sociopolitical activities in the Niger Delta. It was expected that this study will add to the existing body of knowledge on the Niger Delta militancy and amnesty, by filling this identified gap. It literature reviewed focused on various subjects ranging from history and motivation for the militancy, its root causes and impacts, perspective on past attempts at resolving the Niger Delta crisis, and finally the amnesty policy implementation.

Literature review led me to conclude that the Niger Delta amnesty policy raised expectations that finally the Niger Delta crisis will be sustainably resolved. The economic imperative and political expediency that underpinned the amnesty policy were well covered in literature. The successes, shortcomings, and failures of the policy with respect to achieving its set objectives have also been exhaustively covered by scholars. But nothing exists on the unintended consequences of the amnesty policy implementation on

the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. This represented a gap that need to be closed given the critical importance of this sector to the socioeconomic wellbeing of Nigeria. One very interesting finding from the review of literature was that though the root causes and associated sustainable recommendations to resolve the Niger Delta challenge have been identified by the pre-independence Willink Commission, the political will and determination to comprehensively address these issues have been lacking. Scholars and commentators have unanimously identified corruption (misappropriation, misapplication, diversion or outright looting of development funds) as a key factor responsible for the failure of all past strategies aimed at resolving the Niger Delta problem. After hundreds of millions of dollars have ostensibly allocated and spent, the Niger Delta remains under developed. Majority of the population live in abject poverty. There is nothing on ground to begin to justify the mind-boggling capital outlays.

Evaluating the impact of the amnesty program on the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector requires a closer and focused examination of the post amnesty state of the industry. This focused study will also help close one of the identified gaps in literature, namely possible adverse consequences of identified deficiency in the amnesty policy on the upstream petroleum sector of the Nigerian economy. Due to the size and sector, a focused examination may only be achieved by studying a representative company within the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. Chapter 3 explained how this was achieved.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

The purpose of this case study was to identify, examine, and understand the consequences of the amnesty policy implementation for the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry. The amnesty policy did not provide for the needs of the victims of the Niger Delta militancy (Agbibo, 2014; Ako, 2012; Paki & Ebiefa, 2011; Okuyade, 2011). Although researchers have examined some aspects of the amnesty program (see Akanji & Oytso, 2012; Akpan & Ering, 2010; Bassey, 2012; Egwemi, 2009; Omotola, 2010; Ubhenin, 2013), they have not examined its consequences for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector

However, a full consideration of this topic is lacking, based on my review of the literature. In conducting my study, I sought to address this gap in the literature. I think that a better understanding of the unintended negative consequences arising from the amnesty policy implementation may help generate possible solution options. When implemented, these solution options may result in sustainable peace, security, and progress in the Niger Delta region and Nigeria, more generally.

The research questions were based on my assumption that the implementation of the amnesty program resulted in both positive and negative unintended consequences for the upstream petroleum sector of the Nigerian economy. The research questions sought to identify and understand the unintended consequences of the amnesty policy implementation as well as understand how stakeholders can collaborate to manage these unintended consequences.

Focal areas of this chapter include my research design and rationale and methodology for carrying out my study. I provide an overview of my research instrument, study population, sampling and data collection strategies, and data analysis strategies.

Research Questions

RQ1: What are the short -and long-term consequences of the implementation of the amnesty program for Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector?

RQ2: Going forward, what can the government and industry do to manage these consequences?

Research Design and Rationale

A qualitative research method was used because it aligned with both my research purpose and questions and the context and nature of my topic. Qazi (2011) contended that qualitative research is entirely interpretive and that qualitative researchers seek to understand the reason behind the actions or inactions of individuals or groups. A qualitative case study methodology involves the study of a specific case or issue within a real-life context (Yin, 2009).

Leveraging qualitative methodology, I sought to understand the implications of the amnesty program implementation for the upstream petroleum sector of the Nigerian economy. The study design was consistent with identifying the consequences of the amnesty policy on the strategic future of the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry; and what the identified consequences mean for the sector. It also helped me to unlock the

possible reasons and motivations behind these consequences. Understanding these motivations is of critical importance for the Nigerian economy as the upstream petroleum sector remains the biggest contributor to government revenue, foreign exchange earner, and national GDP (CIA FactBook, 2015).

Often, a case study method is leveraged to study cases within a context bounded in time, geographical location, or both (Creswell, 2013) to provide a comprehensive understanding of the selected case. A researcher using a case-study design begins by identifying the specific case, which can be a specified individual, a named organization, a small group, a relationship, a process, or a project Creswell (2013). In a qualitative case study, theory may be used to offer a broad explanation for behaviors and attitudes (Creswell, 2009). According to Yin (2008), theory should be used, at the outset, to set the tone and general direction of the research or study. The researcher also uses theory to drive the questions, analysis, interpretation of findings, and conclusions. The case study method, due to its inherent flexibility and in-depth approach, lent itself as the optimal strategy to study the consequences of the amnesty policy for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector, by focusing on SPDC.

Special care was taken to define the scope and context of the selected case study to prevent scope creep which can compromise the purpose or duration of the study. Maintaining and respecting these set boundaries proved challenging but with firm discipline, I was able to maintain the defined boundaries. I determined that a case-study design was most suitable for my study as I wanted to provide the public with critical insight about the Niger Delta amnesty as it affected the Nigerian upstream petroleum

sector. The qualitative case study approach helped me uncover the profound meaning of the amnesty program for stakeholders in the subject sector.

SPDC was selected as the representative case for this study. I choose SPDC as representative of the Nigerian upstream sector due to its footprint across the Niger Delta and its participation across the entire upstream petroleum sector value chain. According to internal memos (2015), SPDC accounts for about 45-65% of Nigeria crude oil and gas output, respectively. Due to its footprint across the Niger Delta, SPDC bore the brunt of the militant attacks. The company plays in the onshore, swamp, and offshore environments. It is involved in crude oil and gas exploration, production and export. The consequences of the amnesty policy implementation on SPDC can be validly generalized across the upstream petroleum sector.

The case study design served as the most suitable lens through which the context of the amnesty was examined and understood; as well as provided the best contextual answer to the research questions (Pinnergar & Dayes, 2007). The case study method was hinged on the constructivist paradigm, which asserted that truth is relative and a function of the participant's perspective (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). A Nigerian proverb posited that "he who wears the shoe knows where it pinches most." The case study therefore enabled me to identify the consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty program from the point of view of industry operators. Crabtree and Miller (1999) said that the constructivist paradigm "recognizes the importance of the subjective human creation of meaning, but doesn't reject outright some notion of objectivity. Pluralism, not relativism, is stressed with focus on the circular dynamic tension of subject and object" (p. 10). A key

advantage of the philosophical underpinning of the case study on constructivism is that it fosters a symbiotic relationship between the researcher and the participants, allowing the participants to tell their stories, giving the researcher the opportunity to make sense of the reality being unfolded by the participants (Crabtree & Miller, 1999; Lather, 1992; Robottom & Hart, 1993). This symbiotic relationship was what I established with my research participants in order to enter their world. This was done through prolonged engagement, using interviews and focus group discussions, in order to make sense of what they perceived to be the consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty policy implementation for the Nigerian upstream sector and what they think are the implications of these consequences. Finally, the case study method provided an opportunity for me to gain excellent insight into the case. The phenomenon being studied here is the Niger Delta amnesty implementation as it affected SPDC and by extension the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector.

Role of the Researcher

A research instrument is a tool used to collect the data. The instrument should facilitate variable observation and measurement, and must be both reliable and valid (Creswell, 2013). The researcher is the primary research instrument for data collection and interpretation in qualitative research (Baxter, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Guba & Lincoln, 1981; Janesick, 2001, 2003; Meloy, 2002; Merriam, 2002; Patton, 2002; Piantanida & Garman, 1999; Shindler & Case, 1996). Piantanida and Garman (1999) while commenting on the concept of researcher being the primary research instrument stated that

...the researcher is as much a part of the inquiry as the intent of the study and the inquiry process. In fact, the researcher's thinking lies at the heart of the inquiry...Ill-conceived dissertation folklore...contribute[s] to "dissertation block" by diverting attention from the very wellspring of knowledge that feeds the dissertation—that is, students' own professional experiences, personal intellectual concerns, and assumptions about knowledge (p. 24).

According to Trondsen and Sandaunet (2009), a key rationale for having the researcher as primary research instrument in a qualitative study is for him to fully explore the social context of the study phenomenon by engaging the research participants in a way that motivates their own analysis of the issues that affected them and how these issues can be addressed. This would be essential to providing high quality information needed to answer the research questions and thus fulfill the research purpose.

According to Barret (2007), qualitative research not only transforms data but more importantly transforms the researcher into the primary data collection and interpretation instrument. The qualitative researcher is, according to Josselson, Lieblich, and McAdams (2003), is "a medium for the discovery and interpretation of meanings" (p. 4). In this role, the researcher makes sense of the phenomenon under study from the sometimes complex and ambiguous data collected (Barret, 2007). Due to the subjective nature of qualitative research, it is important that the researcher understands his or her biases and manage them such that these biases do not corrupt the researcher's interpretation of the experiences and perspectives of the participants (Creswell, 2013;

Marshall & Rossman, 2011). The neutrality of the researcher should be unquestioned if the study findings are to remain valid.

A qualitative researcher must be observant, empathetic and sensitive to the needs of the participants that might influence his/her willingness and readiness to participate effectively in the study. It is the duty of the researcher to create the right atmosphere and environment that motivates the participants to readily provide the information and data whose interpretation will contribute to answering the research questions. Creswell (2013) is of the opinion that it is very important that the qualitative researcher locate and use only participants who can provide information and data relevant to answering the research questions. The personality, style, and approach of the qualitative researcher is critical to eliciting the needed data and information from the study participants. As the primary data collection instrument for this study, I adopted situation appropriate effective communication strategies to elicit the needed data and information, which was used to answer the research questions, from my participants. I created a safe and secure environment where they felt comfortable to participate. Succeeding at creating this enabling environment was critical to the success of the research study. As much as possible, I leveraged data gathering strategies that is convenient for the study participants to collect research data. This motivated them to provide comprehensive and honest answers to the interview and focus group discussion questions. Leveraging the informed consent protocol, I gave the study participants the power and control they need to determine the extent and scope of their voluntary participation in the study. I made them understand that they reserve the right to withdraw at any time as well as demand that any

information or data that they may have contributed be removed from the study data set. Doing this gave them the needed sense of empowerment and control while eliminating any feeling of coercion.

Building a right working relationship with the study participants was an essential ingredient to getting them to freely provide the information and data needed to answer the research questions. I built and established a trust and mutual respect based relationship with the study participants during the data gathering phase. I did my best to remain open, friendly, transparent, and approachable for the participants. In building and maintaining this relationship with my study participants, I maintained the required ethical standards.

Like every other study, there were potential challenges that the researcher needed to overcome in order to successfully complete the study. I was emotionally traumatized by the militancy (I lost two close friends and colleagues to militancy) hence I can easily be seen as an interested insider. This “insider” concept (Naaeke et al, 2011) is well aligned with Piantanida and Garman’s (1999) concept of the researcher as primary instrument for data collection and interpretation. My ability to both empathize with participants and speak the language of the industry was an added advantage that further enriched the breadth and depth of study by eliciting nuances that an outside researcher might not be able to pick (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009). Conclusions were therefore easily aligned with the understanding and perception of participants.

The advantage of being an insider, as a result of previous interaction and collaboration with study participants, can potentially create room for researcher bias. This is in line with Brannick and Coghlan’s (2007) postulation that insider researchers are

prone to bias and fallacies of illicit process. I was acutely aware of this and I made a conscious decision to remain objective by crosschecking and cross referencing with participants to confirm that my conclusions are in line with their perceptions and understanding of the phenomenon under study.

My role as the researcher was to gather data and information on the amnesty policy implementation and its intended and unintended consequences for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector, from the point of view and perspective of the study participants. As an industry insider and with my firsthand experience of the militancy, I have the added advantage of understanding the industry dynamics and language. I also have direct access to some of the people (key stakeholder groups namely government, industry and trade unions) involved with the both the policy formulation and implementation. In the light of the above, I believe that the above advantages made it easier and more enriching as data interpretation is done from the position of better understanding of responses in its intended context. The foregoing is aligned with Graue and Walsh's (1998) postulation that the final research report is a reflection of the primary evidence of the phenomenon of the case interwoven with the researcher's reasoned interpretation (from the perspective of the participants) of the phenomenon under study.

Finally, as the primary data-collection instrument for this study, using situational procedure to collect data in the form of words, images, categories (Burke & Christensen, 2010), I was able to dive deeper and explore the various perspectives and nuances related to the amnesty and its consequences for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. From this I developed new concepts and theoretical perspectives that could be used as

framework for addressing Boko Haram and other intractable challenges confronting the Nigerian nation. With the qualitative approach, the researcher was best positioned to understand the motivation for the actions of different stakeholders and their responses to the amnesty policy. I was also able to assess aspects of the completed phases of the amnesty program to determine their impacts on the upstream petroleum sector, and hence was able to make reasonable projections.

Methodology

Qualitative case study was chosen as the methodology for this study. This methodology was considered the most suitable because it aligned with the research intent and purpose. According to Creswell (2009), this methodology is best suited for "exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem or phenomenon" (p.4). Qualitative case study is both subjective and inductive; with focus on individual meaning, interpretation, and understanding of issues, from the perspective of participants, in their natural environment and settings (Creswell, 2009). As the primary research instrument, this methodology will enable me to both describe and narrate the story of the Niger Delta people, culture, relationships, and their perception of the amnesty policy and its implications for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector.

Establishing Working Relationship

In order to recruit effective, motivated, and enthusiastic study participants who will readily provide high-quality data and information needed to answer the research questions, I needed to establish a trust-based relationship with them. One of my strategies

to initiate and maintain this kind of relationship was to purposely select the participants (Creswell, 2009). The participants will be selected from a pool of people whom I know to be experientially, emotionally, and intellectually capable of providing credible comments based on their personal experience, analysis, perspective, and opinion on the amnesty policy and how it affects the and how they perceive it to have affected the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. I also used the informed consent protocol as a tool to establish mutually respectful relationships with study participants.

The informed consent required that I explain the purpose of the study to the participants and their role in it. I also explained the potential benefits of the study to the Nigerian upstream sector, the people and economy of the Niger Delta in particular and Nigeria in general. I was transparent and honest in all my dealings with the participants. To the extent possible and without breaching the professional code of conduct and ethics, I maintained a level of informal relationship with them. I assured the participants that their confidentiality and privacy is of utmost importance to me and the study; their identities will not be made available to third parties without their written permission.

Finally, I declared my biases up front to the study participants, as a trust building strategy. I did this to assure them that the study outcome is going to be entirely a function of the data they provide and the meanings they ascribe to such information. I operationalized this by subjecting my interpretations and conclusions to peer review and member checking. I used member checking (Harper, 2012) to establish the validity, accuracy, and credibility of conclusions as being the valid and intended meaning the participants ascribed to the phenomenon under study (Barbour, 2001; Byrne, 2001;

Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Doyle, 2007; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). As a bias mitigation strategy, I only asked open-ended questions during the interview and focus group sessions. I successfully refrained from asking any leading question (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008).

Sampling and Research Participants

Morse (2004) defined qualitative sampling as the deliberate selection of the most suitable participants to be included in the study, in agreement with the purpose and theoretical needs of the research. A key assumption in the above definition is that the research needs will be met by the unique characteristics of the selected participants (Morse, 2004; Palinkas et al. 2013). Qualitative sampling is a very important component of the research study. To a great extent, it determines the quality of the study (Gibbs et al., 2007). The selection of prospective participants for a qualitative research should be deliberate and suited to the peculiarities of the given research. This procedure is called purposeful sampling. Purposeful sampling (Byrne, 2001; Creswell, 2013; Marshall, 1996; Mason, 2010; Morse, 2004; Palinkas et al., 2013; Patton, 2002; Pettus-Davis, Grady, Cuddeback & Scheyett, 2011) involves the careful selection of the optimal number of available study participants. These purposefully selected participants should be uniquely positioned to provide the information needed to answer the research questions.

According to Mason (2010), samples in a qualitative study are primarily drawn to reflect the purpose of the study. If the qualitative researcher, as the research instrument, is the most important determinant of the quality and outcome of the study, the next most important key success factor is the research participants. For this case study, I used

purposefully selected the study participants. The sample participants were chosen such that they are representative of the population whose views are necessary and sufficient to answer the research questions (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). With this sample characteristic in mind and as a bias mitigation strategy, I ensured that my participant pool covered all key stakeholder groups who have vested interest in the phenomenon under study. This assured and protected the integrity and validity of the study outcome. I selected participants who I know to be knowledgeable on the Niger Delta militancy as well as its impacts on the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector based on their experience and place of employment. My study sample frame (Denscombe, 2007) included executive leadership, and senior level management staff of SPDC. The frame also included senior staff of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, and key leaders of PENGASSAN and OPTS. Finally, I targeted senior faculty of regional universities, who have written or commented on the amnesty policy, as part of my participant pool.

Once the prospective study participants were identified, I sent individual emails formally inviting them to take part in the study. The invitation letter contained a brief overview of the research purpose as well as the consent. Each participant was required to indicate his or her voluntary participation by signing and returning the consent form to me. An affirmative reply to the invitation to participate email was taken as electronic signing of the informed consent form. All prospective participants who affirmatively responded to the invitation email or those who signed and returned the inform consent were considered part of the participant pool.

Sample Size

The sample size in qualitative research usually reflects the research purpose and intent. Castillo (2009) said that the selection of the sample size also depends on the reliability of the sampling procedures. In qualitative research, a bigger sample size does not necessarily translate to a more relevant or higher quality data due to the law of diminishing return (Crouch & McKenzie, 2006; Ritchie, Lewis, & Elam, 2003). The assertion presumes that as the study progresses, more data does not necessarily lead to new information or perspective.

There is no consensus on a formula to compute an optimal number of participants for qualitative studies among scholars. But there is a plethora of suggestions on the number to use depending on the case, study design, nature, and study context (Bertaux, 1981; Creswell, 1998; Morse, 1994). I sought to collect data from at least 15 purposefully selected participants with diverse points of views on the amnesty policy formulation and implementation. This was the number I assumed will be adequate to achieve saturation within the time limit for my study (Curry, Nembhard, & Bradley, 2009, Green & Thorogood, 2009; Guest et al., 2006; Morse, 2008).

Primary Sources of Data Collection

According to Creswell (2009), data collection among other things involves setting the boundaries for the study, collecting information through unstructured or semi structured strategies, and establishing the protocol for recording collected information. The primary data collection strategies for this case study were in-depth interviews (Patton, 2002; Stakes, 1995) and focus group discussions. I used the “data collection

circle” (Creswell, 2013, p.146) to gather high quality data and information required to answer the research questions.

Interview and focus group discussion were selected as the primary data collection technique for this study because the nature and purpose of the study did not lend itself to direct observation. According to Patton (2002), it is impossible to understand how people organize their worlds and the meaning they attach to what goes on in their world by mere observation. Creswell (2009) suggested that it is only the interview data collection strategy that gives the researcher full control over the line of questioning. Interviews and focus group discussions were conducted at the convenience of study participants and hence resulted in the collection of higher quality data. Furthermore, using virtual focus group discussion techniques served as a cost management strategy, by keeping study associated travels to a minimum.

I collected additional data for triangulation purposes (Denzin, 1970; Flick, 2004; Guion, 2002; Patton, 2002; Wilson, 2014) from documents (government gazette, internal company memos, newspaper articles and peer reviewed literature) reviews.

Interviews

The primary data collection strategy for this case study was in-depth interviews conducted in English. Patton (2002) said that interview is a method of inquiry and recommended that qualitative researchers use a blend of informal conversation and standard open-ended questions during the process of collecting data from study participants. As a data collection technique, the purpose of interview technique is to enable the researcher to enter into the participant’s world (Patton, 2002). The quality of

information collected through the interview process, therefore, depends to a great extent on the researcher, who is the primary data collection instrument. He or she sets the tone and pace of the interview sessions. He or she is also responsible for creating the right environment and atmosphere that maximizes the quality and quantity of information elicited from research participants.

Different interview techniques include face to face, telephone, and email interviews (Creswell, 2009). The face-to-face technique was used as it was best suited to convenience of the participants.

Rubin and Rubin (1995) argued that for effective data collection using the interview technique, the qualitative researcher has to master the “art of listening” (p. 361). I listened carefully to both spoken and unspoken (body language) answers provided by the interviewees. All questions were respectfully asked with conversational tone. This approach was in line with the traditional and cultural values of the Igbos of Eastern Nigeria (my ethnic group), which teaches that the right to ask a question is a responsibility not to be taken lightly, while listening to honest answer is a privilege. My culture sees asking a question as seeking permission to enter into another person’s world, hence questions must be asked respectfully and sincerely. Doing this gives the participants a deep sense of worth and a sense of importance (Carnegie, 1936), and hence motivates them to be more forthcoming with requested information.

Before starting any face-to-face interview session, I set the scene. Setting the scene was part of my strategies to get the study participants to relax and get into the interview mood. Part of setting the stage involved welcoming the participants with a big

smile, engaging them in *small talk*, and letting them know upfront the purpose of the objective and estimated duration of the interview session. I assured them of their strict confidentiality and protection of any information that they may provide, in line with the dictates of informed consent. I sought and obtained their permission to record the proceedings. To ensure that the interview session ran smoothly, I confirmed the functionality of the recording devices through prior testing. I used multiple recording devices to mitigate the risk of loss data in the event of corruption or malfunctioning of a single device. Recording the interview sessions freed me to concentrate more and maintaining a presence with the interviewee. It also enabled me to take focused notes (Patton, 2002) during the interviews, leveraging my reflexive journaling skills (Janesick, 2011).

The focused notes helped me formulate impromptu follow-up questions and probes, facilitated data analysis, data interpretation, as well as served as backup data that could be used in the event that recorded data is corrupted. According to Babbie (2007), the focused notes can also serve as a bias management tool especially during the data interpretation phase of the study.

While taking focused notes, I maintained situational awareness on how the interview is progressing. I responded to the interviewee's body language as appropriate. I played back (rephrase and paraphrase) their responses to them to test my understanding of their perception and views. Finally, I made the interview sessions as interactive as possible by encouraging them to jump in at any time to seek for clarification or volunteer additional information that they may have.

I completed all scheduled interview sessions with the participants within 2 months of obtaining IRB approval to proceed to data gathering.

Interview Questions

The quality of data gathered using the interview technique depended to a large extent on the structure and nature of the interview questions. It is only through answers to well-structured interview questions that the participants can unveil their opinions, perceptions and lived experience to the researcher. By According to Patton (2002), no other data gathering strategy can provide a more valid insight into the thinking process of the participants the way interviews can.

There is a plethora of interview question options available to the researcher. These include experience and behavior type questions, opinion and value type questions, feeling questions, knowledge questions, and sensory questions (Patton, 2002). I made efficient use of an optimal blend of these question types to elicit high-quality information from the interviewees. To be effective with this question type strategy, I asked clear, singular, and open-ended questions. I was also mindful of the choice of words used in structuring the questions because these can significantly influence the kind of response they elicit (Patton, 2002). Patton cited Confucius as saying that “if names are not correct, language will not be in accordance with the truth of things” (p. 361), to emphasize the need for the interview questions to be clear and concise.

The interview questions (see appendix F) were structured such that they do not lead the participants to pre-determined answers. This strategy followed Patton’s (2002) suggestion to keep qualitative interview questions neutral and open-ended. It is best

practice to preface questions with “what”, “why”, and “how” (Patton, 2002; Stake, 1995). By so doing, the participant is given the latitude to freely express their viewpoints, opinion, and perspective.

There is a Nigerian proverb that translates to mean that answers beget questions. I leveraged the opportunity to gather additional data by exploring new lines of thought provided by participants through their responses to the interview questions. I asked unscripted follow-up questions depending on the line of reasoning that the participant's answer opened up. I also made effective use of probes and transitions (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008) to move between exploring new lines of thought and staying focused on original question sequence. To enhance the quality of the interview experience, flexibility and alertness were my watchwords. I relied on effective note-taking and simultaneous listening skills I developed as a trained recruitment assessor to enhance the volume and quality of data collected from study participants.

Virtual Focus Group

This data collection strategy is different from the traditional one-on-one interview. Focus group involves interviewing a small group of participants, with similar or diverse background, on a particular topic (Patton, 2002). Traditionally, the group of participants, usually 6-10 in number is assembled around a table and the research questions put to them. The participants get to hear the other participant's response and can validate it, challenge it, expand on it, or modify it. Through this interaction and by influencing each other, group members influence and enrich each other's perspectives throughout the session (Krueger, 1994; Krueger & Casey, 2000; Stewart & Williams,

2005). This group interaction enhances the quality of data gathered. The focus group discussion improves the chances of identifying major themes and depending on the group synergy, energy level, and enthusiasm can also result in micro-analysis of subtle differences in themes (Krueger, 1994).

With the dispersion of smart mobile devices and social media technologies, focus groups can now be conducted virtually (Krueger & Casey, 2009). Chat rooms, Whatsapp, Skype, Facebook, and other mobile and social media platforms can be used for both synchronous and asynchronous discussions. The virtual focus group can be used for both convenience and flexibility (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008), ease of participation and cost savings. Large numbers of participants can easily be managed. It also provides a sort of anonymity that encourages participants to express themselves freely without reservation that may be associated with face-to-face conversation (Nicholas, et al., 2010). The challenge of simultaneous note taking is eliminated as conversations are automatically stored for content analysis later on. Some of the challenges associated with virtual focus groups have to do with the issue of participant privacy protection, ownership of final output generated from the discussion, authenticity and trust in data collected (James & Busher, 2007).

For this study, I used a virtual focus group, conducted on whatsapp platform to supplement data gathered from face-to-face interviews. The participants were purposefully selected from middle to senior leadership cadre of the SPDC, industry trade unions (PENGASSAN and OPTS) and government departments.

My role in the virtual focus group was essentially that of a moderator as opposed to an interviewer. In this role, I guided and steered the direction of discussions and kept the team focused, so they do not digress from the topic or theme under discussion. In this moderating role, I created the enabling atmosphere for authentic discussion to take place between and among group members. It was also my duty to determine when I thought a topic or theme has been exhaustively discussed, and when to move to the next question. The same set of questions used for face-to-face interview was used for the focus group discussion.

Document Review

Document review involved locating relevant documentation, obtaining applicable permission to use them, and studying or analyzing them to collect data that may be useful to answering the research questions. This involved the review of government gazettes and policy documents related to the formulation and implementation of the amnesty policy. I also reviewed sector specific journals and magazines to gather additional information related to the amnesty policy. Finally, I reviewed SPDC's websites (internal and external), internal bulletins and memos. The review of internal SPDC documents revealed some of the strategic moves made by the company post implementation of the Niger Delta amnesty policy. These moves were pointers to the amnesty policy's impact on the short -and long-term future of SPDC. Data gathered from document review contributed to answering the research questions as well as served triangulation purposes.

Data Storage and Security

To protect all gathered data from unauthorized access and to protect the privacy of the study participants, I stored all collected data in secure locations. Digital text and audio files were stored in password protected folders on my secure computer system. Data was backed up and stored on separate systems, locations and platforms. This helped mitigate the risk of loss of data should data in one storage location be corrupted or compromised.

Informed Consent and Confidentiality

According to the US Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP), the informed consent protocol was put in place to ensure that potential study participants are presented with simple, clear, and adequate information in simple and understandable language about the research. The provided information should be sufficient to help prospective participants make informed and voluntary decision to participate or not participate in the given study. The informed consent is study specific and the amount of information contained is a function of the research complexity and potential risk or opportunity to the participants. The informed consent protocol was also designed to educate study participants of their rights and aspects of the study as it affects them. It contains among other information a brief research overview (research purpose and background), the researcher's name and contact details, and Walden University Representative's contact information. It also contains information on study duration, procedure, risks, and benefits. My informed consent form was clear and precise. In simple language, I explained to prospective participants that their participation in the

study will be voluntary; that signing the form confirms their understanding and voluntary willingness to participate in the research to the extent convenient for them. This form was sent to each prospective participant as an integral part component of the email inviting them to participate in the study.

The informed consent form was signed before any participant was accepted to participate in the study. The signed informed consent form served as documented evidence that the process of consent occurred. It also served as a legal protection for both researcher and participants from potential future liabilities.

Before starting any interview session, at the beginning of the focus group discussion, and as part of setting the stage, I reminded the participants of the informed consent protocol namely that their participation is voluntary and they can always withdraw at their convenience with no obligations. I also reminded them of the purpose of this academic research, and the possibility of making the study findings and conclusions available to key stakeholders. The stakeholders may use the same information as input to formulate policies that may contribute to the economic and social development of the Niger Delta region. As industry practitioners, the participants readily saw the potential benefits for themselves and hence were motivated to participate with more enthusiasm.

Data Organization and Protection Strategies

The volume of data generated by qualitative studies can be overwhelming (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). Given and Olsen (2003) posited that the issue of effective organization of collected data should not be taken lightly because data organization is the

first step in data analysis. In line with Given and Olsen's (2003) recommendations, I set up a system that helped me to effectively organize collected data for easy retrieval when needed. Following the conclusion of the data gathering phase, I selectively transcribed the interview audio data to text. Applicable portions of audio data files were manually transcribed into text files. Each data file was assigned a unique file name for easy identification and retrieval. These data files were organized chronologically (Patton, 2002) before being stored in my personal laptop computer. Back-ups were stored on my home computer system and on secure memory devices.

I adopted security measures including using strong passwords known only to me to protect both data files and folders in secure computers, to prevent unauthorized access to research data. External storage devices containing my backup data files were locked up in a safe in my house. Saving backed up data in different functional and geographical locations mitigated the risk of total loss of data and also served as an effective data management practice (Mack et al., 2005).

All collected data will be kept in secure storage for at least 5 years from the date of successful completion of the research work. Mack et al. (2005) stated that destroying the research data after this holding period is a sound data protection strategy.

Data Analysis

Qualitative data analysis involves coding all of the collected data in an effort to recognize emerging patterns, themes, and categories. In qualitative studies, there is no consensus system for pre-coding; hence each study needs a custom designed coding system. Huberman and Miles (1994) asserted that qualitative data analysis techniques and

procedure should be study specific. They recommended that data collection, data analysis, and report writing should go hand in hand. This was why Creswell (2013) suggested using the “data analysis spiral” (p.183) to integrate these interrelated process steps. Patton (2002) and Agar (1980) argued that researcher should get to know their dataset before delving into the actual data analysis.

There are various data analysis techniques that the qualitative researcher can leverage, including content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Mayring, 2000). Patton (2002) said that content analysis essentially is a “qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings” (p.453). This underlines the centrality of pattern recognition to the success of qualitative data analysis. According to the Surrey University Library (n.d), content analysis calls for the “categorization of verbal or behavioral data, for purposes of classification, summarization and tabulation” (p. 3).

Dataset forming the input for content analysis are usually text, audio, or visual data from interviews, observation, or document reviews. The researcher combs through the data for recurring patterns, words or themes. According to Boyatzis (1998), pattern recognition relies on the inherent ability of the researcher to decipher patterns from seemingly random information.

Content analysis was the data analysis strategy for this study. I used this technique to search for the presence of keywords, themes, and categories within the text data. The possible meanings (inferred or implied) of identified patterns, themes, categories, and concepts, as well as any relationships that may exist among them, was analyzed.

Transcription

Transcription is the process of converting recorded audio or visual data into text data. Transcription can be manual, or the researchers can leverage the power of computer software. During the transcription process, the researcher should safeguard against loss or corruption of data. In manual and software transcription, care should be taken to ensure that transcribed data files are saved with unique identifiers, for ease of identification, categorization, and retrieval. For this study, I manually transcribed pertinent sections of the collected research audio data from the interview sessions.

To facilitate transcription, all interview sessions were conducted in English. The interview sessions were recorded using software applications on my mobile devices (Samsung Note 4 and digital voice recorder). Using these digital recording formats made the transcription process easier due to the ability to time stamp and bookmark the relevant sections.

Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research

Trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1981) in qualitative research in simple terms refers to the ability of the researcher to demonstrate that his research finding and conclusions can be trusted to be what he or she says they are. In qualitative research, trustworthiness is a function of the extent to which the researcher can establish and demonstrate credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability of his research findings and conclusions (Guba, 1981; Lincoln, 1995; Lincoln & Guba, 1981; 2002; Shenton, 2004). Due to the inherent subjective nature of qualitative study, it is critically

important that researchers do everything within their power to both establish and demonstrate trustworthiness through every step of the research process.

I used a variety of strategies to establish trustworthiness for this study. These included adopting a transparent research process, using rich and detailed descriptions, triangulation, managing my biases, member checking, manual crosschecking of transcribed data to confirm accuracy, iterative questioning (to establish truthfulness of participant's response), constant debriefing, and peer review (Creswell, 2007; Merriam, 2008; Morse et al., 2002; Shenton, 2004).

Credibility

Credibility in a qualitative study is the equivalent of internal validity in a quantitative study. This is the process that qualitative researchers use to demonstrate that they have painted a true and accurate picture of the phenomenon under study (Shenton, 2004). Credibility can, therefore, be said to be a measure of the extent to which the research findings are true, factual, believable, and aligned with the reality of the study context. The credibility of any qualitative study is best attested to by the study participants. According to Trochim (2001), being the ones who lived the experience under study, the participants are the ones best positioned to confirm that the research findings are truly a reflection of their perception and understanding of the lived experience.

According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), establishing and demonstrating credibility is the most important factor in enhancing the trust that should be placed on the research outcome. Patton (2002) said that the credibility of qualitative research is anchored on

three pillars. These pillars are the rigor applied in collecting, recording, and storing high-quality field data and analyzing them, the credibility of the researcher and philosophical belief in the value of qualitative research.

To establish and demonstrate the credibility of this study, I used prolonged engagement with participants (during the interview and focus group discussion sessions), and triangulation of data sources (Merriam, 2008; Patton, 2002; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Shenton, 2004). Additionally, I declared my biases upfront, as well as mitigated them to as low as reasonably practicable. This helped ensure that identified biases have little or no impact on the analysis and interpretation of research data. I also adhered strictly to the code of ethics and maintained the highest possible level of integrity in participant selection, framing and structuring interview question, data analysis and interpretation. I remained objective throughout the research process.

Transferability

Transferability refers to the extent to which research findings can be generalized or justifiably transferred to other settings or contexts (Merriam, 2008; Shenton, 2004). Transferability is of critical importance to my research work because the research purpose assumed it. To establish and demonstrate transferability and valid extension of my study findings to the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector, I selected the best possible representative company operating in the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector (SPDC) as the reference case. Furthermore, I ensured that the participant pool is representative of key industry stakeholders and diverse perspectives. This ensured that collected data is

also representative of the wider industry opinion. Finally, I structured the interview and focus group discussion questions to align with the research purpose.

With regards to process, I transparently documented the processes steps, the rationale and assumptions behind every decision, as well as stored all collected data in safe locations. I was also clear and specific with regards to stating the boundaries of my case study (Cole & Gardner, 1979; Marchionini & Teague, 1987).

Dependability (Reliability)

Dependability is predicated on the concept of process and procedure repeatability. According to Shelton (2004), dependability is a challenging concept to be established and demonstrated in a qualitative research. This is due to the often-changing nature of the phenomenon under study as well as the challenges with replicating a lived experience. Shelton asserted that qualitative researchers should, as a minimum, transparently document their research process so other researchers can repeat the study in future if required. Lincoln and Guba (1985) saw a relationship between credibility and dependability. They argued that in demonstrating credibility, the qualitative researcher has also shown dependability to a significant degree.

For this study, all face-to-face interview sessions were recorded in digital audio format. Audio interview data was stored in both digital audio format and transcribed text format. These will be kept for at least 5 years following the publication of this study, and will be available for any interested researchers to use, should the need arise. Furthermore, I recorded all deviations from the data collection and analysis plan, the particular

deviation, and the rationale for such deviations. This will make it possible for any future researchers to walk the exact path I followed to arrive at my conclusions.

Confirmability (Objectivity)

Confirmability is the qualitative equivalent of objectivity. It seeks to establish and demonstrate to the extent possible that research findings and conclusions are a true reflection of participant's lived experience and not merely the researcher's ideas (Shenton, 2004). In agreement with Patton (2002), I recognized that it is impossible to completely eliminate researcher's bias from the research process. Miles and Huberman (1994) argued that the extent and intent to which the researcher acknowledges his biases determines the level of the confirmability of his study.

Ensuring that my biases have as little impact as possible on this study was one of the ways that I used to establish and demonstrate confirmability of this study. I did this by carefully documenting the rationale for every decision taken at every step of the research process. Another strategy that I used to demonstrate confirmability for this study was triangulation technique. I collected and used data from multiple sources, including interviews with participants, focus group discussion, and document reviews. These data were compared and contracted and used to validate themes, categories, findings, results, and conclusions. Finally, I used participant debriefing and peer review to confirm the research findings.

Ethical Considerations

Ethics can be defined as a set of code of conduct, based on morally sound decisions, that guides an organization or an individual (Hickman, 2010). Successful

research work, like every other human endeavor, involves making ethically sound decisions. In making these decisions, the researcher is faced with conflicting interests. These conflicts may be between his non-aligned personal and business values, personal aspirations and business expediency, family commitments and business demands. Effective researchers transparently strike a balance between their conflicting priorities such that they (researchers) are seen as both fair and aligned with the ethical codes of their institution (Baker, 2013).

According to Self (2013), an ethical framework is a necessity for any organization because it ensures consistent practice and quality decision making across all organizational levels. This is one of the reasons for establishing the IRB process for the conduct of research work. The IRB exists to ensure that research studies, involving human participation, comply with stipulated ethical standards and codes of conduct. I completed and passed the mandatory ethics course for researchers as required by the National Institutes of Health Office of Extramural Research. This demonstrated my knowledge with respect to understanding applicable ethical considerations and the need to protect especially any vulnerable persons participating in my research study. I did not use any vulnerable persons as part of research participant pool, and hence encountered limited challenges with securing IRB approval. The data collection phase of the research process did not commence until I obtained the IRB approval. The IRB approval meant that I had put processes and procedures in place to eliminate or manage any potential harm to study participants as a result of their participation in my research study.

As a scholar practitioner, I complied with all the ethical codes of conduct guiding my research work as per Walden University IRB. This implied that I was responsible for the safety, welfare, and security of the study participants throughout the period of their participation in my study. I will also safeguard them from potential post participation harm by taking active measures to protect their identity and confidentiality. I protected participant's identity by using codes to identify each of them during the data collection phase. These codes are only known to me. Participants were never identified by their real names during the report writing. The informed consent protocol was used throughout the data gathering phase to remind participants of their rights, roles, and responsibilities.

I ensured personal integrity by never manipulating the data collection process, data collected from participants or the interpretation of the collected data. In line with Creswell's (2007) suggestion, I ensured that data, evidence, findings, and conclusions were not fabricated, misrepresented, or falsified. I subjected my interpretations and conclusions to member checking and peer review. All these ensured that the final research output that is ethically sound, valid, and credible.

Summary and Transition

The research methodology drives the research process. The chosen research method aligned with the research purpose and enabled the collection of the type and quality of data needed to answer the research questions. In this chapter, I made the case for the selection of qualitative design and the instrumental case study methodology as the optimal methodology for this study. Interviews (face-to-face) and virtual focus group discussion were the primary data collection strategies. Interviews were conducted at the

convenience of the participants. Additional data was collected through document reviews for triangulation and cross-referencing purposes.

The role of the researcher as primary data collection and data analysis instrument was also discussed. I also presented and justified the sampling and data analysis techniques. Wherever possible and practical, technology was used to enhance both the quality and accuracy of data collection, organization and analysis processes. Content analysis was used to analyze collected data for patterns, themes, and concepts prior to data interpretation. Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of the strategies used to establish trustworthiness of the research process, data collection, analysis and interpretation. Chapters 5 and 5 focuses on the presentation of collected data, its analysis, interpretation, findings, conclusions, implications for social change as well as conclusions.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to identify and understand the perceived consequences of the amnesty policy implementation for the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry in both the short and long run. The intent was to provide the industry with a comprehensive framework to effectively manage adverse consequences emanating from the amnesty program implementation. I sought to answer two questions:

RQ1: What are the short -and long-term consequences of the implementation of the amnesty program for Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector?

RQ2: Going forward, what can the government and the petroleum industry do to manage these consequences?

This case study used different interview strategies to collect data from participants. The collected data was used to answer the research questions.

In this chapter, I present the results of the data collection and analysis process and describe the demographics of participants. I provide evidence of trustworthiness as it relates to my research. Then, I present my study results.

Demographics

This study used 29 participants from diverse backgrounds. The participant pool included current and former SPDC personnel, staff of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), and one faculty member from a regional university. They also included representatives of industry

trade unions (namely, Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria [PENGASSAN] and Oil Producers Trade Section [OPTS]) and a former presidential aide. The diversity of participants' backgrounds, opinions, and perspectives led to richer data and more robust data analysis and interpretation.

Participants resided in four different countries (Nigeria, USA, Canada, and Brunei). All participants were Nigerians and ranged from 38-62 years of age. All study participants had work experience in the Niger Delta. Majority of the Nigerian based participants reside in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Two of the 29 participants are female.

For confidentiality purposes, each of the participants was assigned a unique alpha-numerical identifier, Pxxx. In this nomenclature, P stood for participant and xxx, a numerical value ranging from 001 to 029. The numerical value was assigned to participants based on the order in which they signed up for the study. For example, P001 represents the first person who volunteered to participate in this study.

The study participants are educationally diverse in terms of the courses they have taken in their fields and in the level of educational qualification they have attained. At the time of the study, 20 participants had a bachelor degree, 8 had a master's, and 2 had a doctoral degree. Participants' gross annual income ranged from 15-50 million naira, which put them in the top 20% of salary earners in Nigeria. These earnings equate to U.S. \$50,000-166, 667, at an exchange rate of N300 to \$1, which is the rate used by the U.S. embassy in Nigeria for visa processing. Information on participants' salary range was

inferred from the position (in SPDC) of each participant relative to me. Participants' demographic data are shown in Appendix D.

Data Collection

Three data collection strategies were used to collect data: interviews, a virtual focus group, and document review (see Figure 1). These strategies are discussed in detail under this section. Following the Walden IRB approval, I made initial contact with potential participants. These individuals are current and former SPDC personnel who experienced the militancy, amnesty, and post amnesty environment. They could, thus, provide me with necessary information to answer my research questions. Potential participants also included independent commentators and academics who had written on the amnesty measure representatives of industry trade unions, and politicians or political appointees who were involved with the formulation and implementation of the amnesty policy (see Appendix F).

I sent out informal emails to potential participants, whose contact details I already possessed by virtue of their being part of my social media network or professional colleagues. In these emails, I gauged their appetite and level of commitment to participate in this study. I took to social media, especially Facebook, to search out other prospective participants and to make initial contact with those whose contact details were not readily available to me.

Based on the outcome of this informal survey, I sent a formal invitation to participate, along with an informed consent form, to 40 individuals. My initial purposefully selected sample included 55 prospective participants. Potential participants

then had the opportunity to review the informed consent form as well as ask for clarifications and study related questions to help them make an informed decision on whether or not to participate in the study. Purposeful sampling embedded inherent diversity in the study and ensured that different opinions and viewpoints were represented so that I could answer the research questions comprehensively. The diversity of the prospective participant pool served as contributing factor to the generalizability of the study outcome across the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector.

In the invitation letter, I asked potential participants to indicate their voluntary willingness to participate in the study by signing the informed consent form. Those who wanted to take part in a focus group discussion had to sign the informed consent form by responding to the invitation email with their WhatsApp registered mobile telephone numbers and the phrase *I Consent*. I added their phone numbers to the focus group discussion forum on Whatsapp. Participants who opted for a face-to-face interview were asked to sign the informed consent form by replying to the invitation to participate letter with the phrase *I consent*. Face-to-face interviews were at the convenience of the participants. The interviews were scheduled to hold at a time and location convenient to the participants. Once mutually agreeable date, time, and venue was agreed for a given the periodic reminder emails and followed up with phone calls to ensure that the interviews are held as scheduled.

I divided the participants into two broad groups in line with my data collection strategy. The first group comprised those who had expressed a preference to participate in the focus group discussion. The second group included those slated for face-to-face

interviews. This later group consisted mainly of senior company and sector trade union executives and members of academia.

Interviews

The four participants who opted for face-to-face interview include 3 executive staff of SPDC and a senior faculty member from one of the regional universities. After their acceptance to participate in the study, I agreed on a mutually convenient time and venue for each interview session. Due to the resurgence of militancy, the amnesty assumed very sensitive dimensions due to associated security and political implications. I had to constantly reassure the participants of the stringent measures taken to ensure the confidentiality of the study.

In line with the desire of the participants, the interview sessions were conducted at participants' homes or offices. Interview settings were functional, comfortable and free from distractions. Before beginning each interview session, I reminded the participants of the voluntary nature of their participation in the study, their confidentiality, and their right to withdraw from the study at any point without notice or reason. Before starting each interview, I engaged the participant in small talk to help both the participant and myself to relax, get us into the interview mode, and set the tone for the discussion that followed. This made it possible for the interview to be conducted in a casual, conversational, and friendly atmosphere. I asked for and obtained each participant's verbal permission to record the recording the each session on my mobile device. The audio file from each interview session was saved with a unique identification code corresponding to that particular participant. This same identification codes was assigned

to the corresponding handwritten focused notes taken during the course of the interview. This alignment ensured the integrity and credibility of data analysis and interpretation.

A total of 4 interview sessions, using 23 open-ended questions were conducted with the 5-week duration that the data collection lasted. I traveled to 4 Nigerian cities (Abuja, Benin, Lagos, and Port Harcourt) to conduct face-to-face interviews with participants.

At opportune moments during each interview session, I asked follow up questions to either clarify a participant's point of view or to explore a new line of thought being advanced by the participant. I took notes of salient points raised during each interview session. Data gathered through the reflexive guided me in framing the follow up questions and will again prove helpful with data analysis and interpretation phase. The duration for each face-to-face interview varied from one participant to the other, in line with their unique personality, mood, and enthusiasm to answer the original and follow up questions. The longest interview session lasted for one and half hours.

Each interview session was conducted between the participant and me. I recorded the interviews on both a digital voice recorder and Samsung Galaxy Note 4 smart device; to ensure redundancy and protect against the possibility of total loss of collected data arising from the malfunction of a single appliance. After each interview session, the recorded audio data were downloaded and saved on my Apple MacBook. The interview sessions generated approximately 5 hours of audio data. I transcribed selected portions of the audio data into Microsoft Word text data. Both handwritten notes and recorded audio files were stored in secure locations after each interview session. These raw data will be

kept safe for the next 5 years, in line with data protection regulations and IRB stipulations.

Focus Group Discussion

For the focus group discussion, I saved the WhatsApp enabled phone number of each of the 25 participants with the alpha-numerical value corresponding to their names on my phone. This was done for confidentiality purposes. Because some of the participants knew each other and did not take the confidentiality measures that I implemented, they sometimes referred to each other, during the virtual focus group discussion, with their real names. After downloading the focus group discussion, and before commencing data analysis, I changed all references to participant's real names with their assigned identification codes. The other minor modification I made to the raw data before analysis was to correct for minor spelling errors or to write out the long form of the abbreviations or short forms used by some participants; for example, changing "fwd" to "forward," "govt" to government, "ND" to Niger Delta.

The virtual focus group discussion, involving 25 participants, was conducted on WhatsApp platform. Two different focus group discussion forums were set up. One group was made up of 8 current mid-level leadership personnel of SPDC, while the other group consisted of a mix of 16 former and current mid-level management staff of SPDC members of PENGASSAN and OPTS, and 2 personnel each from Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas company and Schlumberger. The same 23 open-ended questions used for the face-to-face interviews were used for the virtual focus group discussions on WhatsApp.

I posted a new questions for discussion by the group when I believed that the previous question has been exhaustively As with the face-to-face interview sessions, I asked follow-up questions to clarify or expound a given viewpoint or new line of thought from the participants. I embedded member checking by clarifying my understanding of the opinion or perspective posted by participants and asking them to confirm that this was indeed what they meant. I provided summaries following the conclusion of the discussion on each question before posting the next question. The beauty of the virtual focus group discussion was that participants vigorously challenged positions or opinions expressed by other participants that they did not agree with. The same enthusiasm was applied in validating resonating positions, perspectives, and opinions. This challenge and affirmation both enriched and enhanced the quality of data collected.

Document Review

In addition to data collected from virtual focus group discussions and face-to-face interviews, I also collected data from review of available and relevant documents. The additional data was collected for triangulation purposes, to validate or otherwise data collected using the primary strategies and the output of data analysis.

According to Singleton and Straits (2005), there are five main sources of data that could be used for document review. These include public documents, mass media (newspapers, magazines, radio, and television programs), personal or private documents, non-verbal, and archival sources. I reviewed data from SPDC sustainability reports, and listened to radio talk shows on the Niger Delta militancy and amnesty. I also reviewed news reports on current affairs and on a new militant group called Niger Delta Avengers

(NDA), as well as statements credited to the Nigerian Presidency on resurgence of militancy and future of the amnesty policy; to understand what the SPDC is doing to manage the consequences of the amnesty policy implementation.

The data collection strategies yielded 118 pages of text data and 5 hours of audio data.




Figure 1. Data Collection Strategies

Description of Data Analysis Process

I used content analysis as to analyze data collected during this study. Content analysis involves strategic and inductive examination of the raw data collected. Content analysis is an iterative process involving several steps including data organization to establish relationships, patterns, themes, and contexts.

I carried out initial data analysis in parallel with data collection because qualitative data analysis can be carried out simultaneously and in parallel with data

collection. I leveraged the ten-step approach to content analysis recommended by Surrey University Library (n.d) to carry out the data analysis (see appendix G). I also incorporated Creswell's (1998) four stage approach namely data management, reading and memoing, description, classification, interpretation, and public data presentation into the content analysis process.

The first stage of detailed data analysis involves data management. I carried out minor edit on the focus group discussion data download. I wrote out the long form of the abbreviations the participants used during the discussion and spelling corrections. I listened to the recorded audio data several times and carried out partial transcription of critical sections to text data. I saved both data files in password protected mode in passworded folders on my laptop.

The second stage of the 10-step process data analysis process involved reading, memoing and immersing myself in the collected data. I read the focus group text data and listened to the audio recording of the interviews over and over until I could make sense of the collected data. At this point, the data gradually began to assume the form of information. While reading and listening, I took reflective notes and made pertinent comments on the digital data files as I come across perspectives or relevant information that could help answer the research questions. I used constant comparative strategy by repeated interaction with the collected data for possible new insights until saturation was reached. I continued with this iterative process, reflected on the notes, listed out the emerging patterns and themes, and began to categorize them.

The third stage of this 10-step content analysis process essentially boiled down to a detailed description, classification, and interpretation of information, categories, and themes that emerged from the second stage. I began to read meanings and perspectives into the emerging themes and consolidated similar themes. These final themes were applied to the research questions to determine their fit and relevance in answering them and commence the process of identifying the unintended consequences of the amnesty policy and what they mean for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. The themes were then sequenced to establish patterns and build a narrative. From these patterns and narratives, I was able to draw conclusions regarding the unintended consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty and what the industry and government may do individually and collaboratively to manage the unintended consequences in order to bring about positive social change.

The fourth and final stage of the content analysis is to present the outcome of the content analysis process. Given that the major criticism of the qualitative research process is the subjective and the private nature of data analysis (Constas, 1995), I used member checking to validate my initial findings and conclusions. I sent the outcome of data analysis to selected participants asking them to confirm whether or not the finding, interpretations, and conclusions align with their views. I incorporated their feedback into the final study results. In presenting the final outcome, I made sure that the written narrative accurately reflected the intent and context in which the participants presented them by using exact quotes or paraphrases, as much as possible, to present the research findings and results.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

Demonstrating trustworthiness in this qualitative study dealt with addressing the issues of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. I used member checking all through the data gathering process and during data analysis to ensure trustworthiness of my process. For example, at critical points during the interview or focus group discussions, I asked participants to clarify a point or to confirm that my understanding of their response was a truthful reflection of what they meant. This real-time confirmation ensured accuracy and validity of data.

Credibility

According to Shenton (2004), qualitative researchers leverage credibility to demonstrate that they have painted a true and accurate picture of the phenomenon under study. Credibility is a measure of the extent to which the research findings are accurate, factual, believable, and aligned with the reality of the study context. Patton (2002) posited that credibility is anchored on three pillars namely the rigor applied in collecting, recording, and storing field data and analyzing them, the credibility of the researcher, and philosophical belief in the value of qualitative research. In addition to using expanded and diverse participant pool, I also used triangulation to demonstrate the credibility of this study.

Transferability

Transferability refers to the extent to which research findings can be generalized or justifiably transferred to other settings or contexts (Merriam, 2008; Shenton, 2004). To demonstrate transferability and extension of my study findings to the Nigerian upstream

petroleum sector, I built in inherent transferability into this study design by selecting a company (SPDC) that is highly representative of the Nigerian upstream sector as my case unit. It therefore stands to reason that what affected SPDC can logically be generalized to other companies operating in the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector.

I also ensured transferability by broadening the participant's pool to cover all key stakeholders including OPTS, PENGASSAN, and participants from both relevant government agencies and academia. This diversity ensured wide spectrum of opinions and perspectives were captured and considered; hence the study outcome is reasonably generalizable.

Dependability

Dependability relates to the concept of process or procedure repeatability. Due to the changing nature of the external environment within which the study was situated, it may be challenging to establish dependability and reliability (Shelton, 2004). But Lincoln and Guba (1985) asserted that by demonstrating credibility, the researcher has also shown dependability to a significant degree because of the direct relationship between the two concepts.

I demonstrated study dependability and reliability by providing detailed descriptions of the research design, methodology and selection of case, participant selection criteria, comprehensive data collection strategies and tactics, the use of analysis, and interpretation processes. Any deviation from stated data collection process (opportunistic data collection) for triangulation purposes were well described and

documented. If these steps described in this study are replicated within similar context, it is highly likely that similar results and conclusions will be reached.

Confirmability

Confirmability, according to Shelton (2004), seeks to demonstrate the extent that research findings and conclusions are true reflection of participants' views and lived experience and not the researcher's ideas. Confirmability helps to ensure that there is a clear linkage between the research data and interpretations thereof.

Miles and Huberman (1994) argued that the extent and intent to which researchers acknowledges their biases determine the level of the confirmability of their study. To ensure confirmability, I carefully documented the rationale and motivation for decisions taken throughout the research process. I also collected data from multiple sources covering a broad spectrum of perspectives other than from participants with SPDC background. I ensured that findings and conclusions emerged only from the raw data gathered from the study participants. Wherever appropriate, I quoted participants verbatim. Directly quoting participants was a conscious effort to ensure that I do not inadvertently modify views and comments expressed by them in any way. I used member checking to validate the accuracy of the transcription of audio data collected during the interviews as well as my findings and conclusions. The member checking provided the participants opportunity to review and clarify the meaning of statements, views, opinion, and comments made by them during the interview sessions.

Results

The results presented in this chapter represent a comprehensive interpretation based on analysis of the data collected from the participants. Content analysis was the data analysis strategy. It was used to identify common and recurrent themes and patterns before interpreting and attaching meanings to them.

The study premise was that the implementation of any public policy may lead to unintended consequences, which may be positive or negative. This informed the design of the study's research questions namely:

RQ1: What are the short and long-term consequences of the implementation of the amnesty program for the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and hence the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector?

RQ2: Going forward, what can the government and the petroleum industry do to manage these consequences?

To answer the above research questions, 23 open ended interview and focus group questions were put to the study participants. These questions were designed such that in answering them, study participants would provide the information required to comprehensively answer the research questions. The research questions sought to identify possible unintended consequences (both positive and negative) arising from the implementation of the amnesty policy. It also sought to understand the wider implications of these unintended consequences for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. Finally, the questions sought to find out on what and how the industry and government can collaborate to manage the unintended consequences. The interview questions were

carefully designed to elicit from the participants the data and information needed to answer the research questions.

Question 1

What are the short and long-term consequences of the implementation of the amnesty program for the SPDC and hence the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector?

Introduction

This question sought to identify the unintended consequences arising from the implementation of the Niger Delta amnesty policy. This question also sought to understand what these unintended consequences mean for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. Questions 1 to 15 of the interview and focus group discussions were designed to collect the data needed to answer research question 1. The study uncovered ten unintended consequences from the amnesty policy implementation. These are categorized as positive and negative consequences. Positive consequences were seen as opportunities while the negative consequences were viewed as risks or threats.

Unintended positive consequences

Two major positive unintended consequences were identified following analysis of the data collected from the participants.

The amnesty lowered the entry barrier for local players in the petroleum sector. This is a fall out of the divestment from onshore and swamp assets by the IOCs who had previously dominated the upstream sector, to reduce their footprint in the Niger Delta. The IOCs used the interim peace period provided by the amnesty implementation to re-strategize and come up with an ordered divestment policy. This made it possible for

local players to take over the divested assets and hence to fully participate in the upstream petroleum sector. Local participation in the upstream petroleum sector is in line with the participation and representation polarity pair of the polarities of democracy model.

In supporting lowering of entry barrier for local players to participate in the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector as an unintended positive consequence of the Niger Delta amnesty implementation, P005 argued that:

It was clear they (international Oil Companies) knew it was going to be short lived. Hence, they seized the opportunity to divest. The whole of land was earmarked by SPDC for divestment. If all had come to fruition, maybe only Soku, Okoloma, and maybe Gbaran would have remained.

P001 agreed with P005 and further expanded the reasoning for this by saying: The amnesty expedited the withdrawal of major oil players from onshore production thus robbing the internal industry of the research, technology and investments that onshore production brings. Heightened security discouraged skilled expats from working in the country, robbing the industry of transferred skills and knowledge. (reduced talents for the industry but this created an opportunity for locals to step up and take over. Short term loss but medium and long term benefit through reduced cost of high cost expat skills, and development of local talents). The amnesty implementation provided human development opportunities to people and expand investments in the region especially in the

areas of expanding the oil and gas industry and creating offshoots from the products etc.

P006 fully agreed that “investment in deep offshore increased and local indigenous players also increased onshore.” P025 grudgingly agreed with this notion as a positive unintended consequence by saying:

There were local operators in the sector before the amnesty. Even though the amnesty lowered the barrier to entry for more local participation, the new entrants are yet to make any profits due to the prevailing security situation in the Niger Delta and the global drop in crude oil price.

Acknowledgment and formal recognition of the critical importance of the Niger Delta to the nation’s economic wellbeing. The amnesty made the Niger Delta question a central theme in Nigerian political discourse for the foreseeable future. Political discourse and policy formulation cannot be started and ended without factoring in Niger Delta as a key stakeholder. This state of affair gave a feeling of importance and some sense of belonging, at least to the political elites and the ex-militant warlords. The amnesty provided a vehicle for some Niger Delta indigenes to secure a place on the table to participate in the corrupt national cake sharing. For example, Tompolo (an ex-militant warlord) and others cornered multi-billion naira Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), cabotage, security, and pipeline surveillance contracts.

P006 captured this sentiment succinctly when he said that “Niger Delta region is now a force to reckon with for now. There is balance of power with the other major

ethnic groups.” Obviously, this was a status they were unable to achieve with years of peaceful protests and dialogue.

Unintended Negative Consequences

Eight key unintended negative consequences were also identified from the content analysis of data collected from the study participants. These include the following:

Violence pays. From the analysis of the data collected, the unintended message that violence pays was identified as the key and most dangerous unintended consequence of the Niger Delta amnesty policy implementation. The perception that violence pays has always been there, but the amnesty policy validated and lent credence to it. All participants were so passionate about this unintended consequence and its dire import for not only the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector but for the entire Nigerian population and generations to come. P01 was quick to confirm this unintended negative consequence by saying that the amnesty:

Established at a very individual level that crime does pay. The amnesty payouts touched every family in the Niger Delta. Every young person has a father or brother or uncle or cousin who took up arms or was sympathetic to taking up arms and now through the amnesty, he gets a stipend or got to go abroad to get an education.

In supporting the position of P001, P012 lamented the wider implication of this unintended message. In his own words:

My understanding Amnesty scholarships/training was for folks that carried guns and not necessarily for good guys that stayed in school. This led to the emergence

of new militant groups out to get their own cut by wreaking violence on the people and upstream sector, the goose that lays the golden egg. Copycat organizations emerged.

P009 lent more credence to the school of thought on the perception that the Federal government had gone out of its way to reward violence handsomely, setting a wrong precedence. This precedence has unwittingly invited more attacks on the oil and gas producing infrastructure in the Niger Delta, citing the example of the most recent attack on an SPDC oil gathering facility. P009 stated that a “New militant group emerges in Imo and claimed responsibility for the attack on an SPDC facility in Awara-Ohaji Egbema local council area of Imo State.” While commenting on a question on the probability of resurgence of militancy post amnesty policy implementation and factors that can motivate it, P008 was emphatic that recent attacks against the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry infrastructure is both strategic and well organized. He alluded to the high technical competence and expertise of the new crop of militants and vandals when he contended that:

Vandalism is better organized from what I can gather. Even those that have been re-tooled and in the workforce are now being used as agents to understand what manifold or valve to use for bunkering purposes. Again, here's the unintended purpose of amnesty, as Mr. Joe Bloc thinks the only way to make as much money as the criminals is to align with them and sell out.

P002 firmly supported this line of thought. In his mind, the ex-militants who benefit from oil and gas industry specific vocational and technical training courtesy of the amnesty

policy implementation may have returned to militancy. With no employment after their vocational training, they may have been easily lured back to militancy with promises of getting their own *amnesty* if only they can use their newly acquired skills. P006 further validated the prevailing theme that violence pays by stating:

The Niger Deltas region is now a force (political) to reckon with for now. There is balance of power with the other major ethnic groups. A Nigeria president from Niger Delta extraction emerged. The Niger Delta militancy helped to prop up the compelling case for the election of their son.

P006 was saying in essence that without violent militancy, Niger Delta would not have achieved the political significance and special status that the amnesty conferred on it.

P016 agreed that the perception that violence pays is an unintended consequence of implementing the Niger Delta amnesty policy. He stated that “the gladiators in the first phase (referring to militancy) became very rich, powerful and automatic political voices, it became more attractive to be a warlord than an underdog - hence several splinter groups.”

While commenting on another question that sought to clarify the impact of the amnesty on the Niger Delta economy, P001 spoke for a section of the study participants by stating that the “impact on the economy and the community has been net positive. Without militancy and the amnesty, these programs of education, infrastructure development, stakeholder engagement, political relevance, etc. would not have been implemented.”

With the amnesty validating the perception that violence pays and the influx of weapons, bought with amnesty money, into the region, it is no wonder that the incidence of violent crime kept increasing by the day. It is no longer a question of if but when the militancy will resurface with deadly consequence for the upstream petroleum sector. With ex-militant warlords desirous of being more relevant in mainstream politics, and possibly take over the political leadership, the stage was set to entrench a culture of violence in the region. Appendix I is a chronology of violent militant attacks on the upstream petroleum industry since January 2016. P015 nicely summed up this trend when he said:

The post amnesty elections did produce some winners who were ex militant warlords. It was the amnesty that enabled their attempts to launder their images and make the transition to mainstream politics. So, the amnesty and subsequent election witnessed the entry into mainstream politics persons who were openly known to have been leaders in militancy and criminal activities. The lines between gangsterism and politics while not very clear before now is fast becoming nonexistent.

Embedded a culture of violence. With the message that violence pays firmly embedded in the mindset of the Niger Delta population, the stage was set for the next wave of violent militancy. Greed and the get rich quick syndrome activated a vicious cycle of violence, criminality, and insecurity in the Niger Delta region. Infrastructural deficiency was used as justification for violent agitation. Dialogue was no longer the preferred option to settle grievances. Violence became the proverbial silver bullet that

solved all problems. It was anchored on the prevailing perception that the more violence one can unleash on civil population, and especially against the interests of the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector, the easier and faster it is to attract government *amnesty* and thereby assure one a life of opulence. Given the need to manage amnesty funds, entry into public *service* became a do or die affair, and the political office became the exclusive preserve of the most violent.

P001 spoke for the majority of the participants and most of the people on the Niger Delta streets by concluding that “without militancy and the amnesty, these programs of education, infrastructure development, stakeholder engagement, political relevance, etc. would not have been implemented.” P001 was referring to the ad-hoc and short-term palliative measures that the Federal government put in place in response to the militancy. Violence appeared to have delivered some positive dividends.

P016 strongly supported the thinking that amnesty policy implementation played a pivotal role in entrenching a culture of violence in the Niger Delta region. He said:

The program resulted in return of many arms and ammunition (it did not stop anyone from acquiring new ones nor profiled the people from keeping others). It resulted in a new company and employer of labor: the employees did not work and must be paid else the road will be blocked and media called in. There became too many employees for the employer, such new employers needed to be created hence fresh wave of militancy. The gladiators in the first phase became very rich, powerful and automatic political voices, it became more attractive to be a war lord than an underdog - hence several splinter groups. The military either became

enablers and accessories to crime or plain lazy to defend law abiding people or national asset. The entry criteria to militancy and bunkering as thus considerably lowered – an open invitation to anyone who dare.

P015 also supported the view that the amnesty implementation significantly contributed to embedding a culture of violence in the region. He said the long-term effects of the current state of affairs are dire and does not portend well for the value and belief system of the Niger Delta people. He drew a parallel with the Nigerian civil war:

Armed robbery and violent crimes were unknown in the South East, until after the civil war when boys learned to use the gun. Four decades after, the south East is still battling this social menace and is apparently losing. Militants were issued so called 'peace ambassador' ID cards, which more or less identified them as untouchable. The security agencies simply ignored their excesses. In the Niger Delta, the fact that criminality is even hijacking the state apparatus (aided by the amnesty programme) means that many more decades will be required to reverse the culture of violence and impunity.

Destruction of cultural values and beliefs. Nigerian and African societies hold their cultural values to a high esteem. Elders were highly regarded. Dishonesty, disobedience to established authority, robbery, stealing, and vandalism are alien to the culture and are seriously frowned on. Respect for established social order and authority, loyalty, integrity, honesty, and hard work are traditional values that were inculcated from birth. These positive values are the cultural underpinnings of the Niger Delta communities. The amnesty policy implementation put free and unearned money, running

into millions of dollars, into the hands of ex-militants. With overnight wealth on one hand and the gun on the other hand, the ex-militants and their supporters looked down on, disdained and lost all respect for elders, communal leadership, and age long communal order. With most of the Niger Delta communities in abject poverty and millions in the hands of the militants, it was easy for the money men of the day to usurp leadership and became overnight lords, high chiefs, and kings. Adieu to the old order. Welcome to the new order where money is king.

P001 said that the amnesty “erased the credibility of positive role models in society. Value erosion is complete. Everything is sacrificed on the altar of wealth and the stomach. Now the Niger Delta cannot escape being an integral part of the plutocracy.” P025 agreed, contending that “respect for life is no longer there; today there is no law and order; Social fabric is destroyed and the incentive to work through the normal way is no longer there when you hand out money to people for not working.” P008 agreed and captured the prevailing mood with regards to erosion of beneficial cultural value and beliefs as a negative unintended consequence of the amnesty policy implementation when he said that “get rich quick syndrome is entrenched in the communities, as such, no respect for salaried job. Kings have been beheaded by youths in Niger Delta communities, so Niger Delta have lost a lot of their values, and beliefs.” With the free flow of money facilitated by the amnesty, ex-militants were able to buy political power, in a culture where people increasingly value money, irrespective of how it is made, over the core cultural values of honest hard work and integrity. With political leadership in the hands of gangsters, the future of the Niger Delta is any one's guess. P015 succinctly

captured this sentiment when he stated that “the lines between gangsterism and politics while not very clear before now is fast becoming nonexistent.”

In trying to explain the concept of erosion of cultural values post amnesty policy, P002 was categorical that there indeed was a significant shift in the cultural values of the Niger Delta people. In his words:

the region is awash with money; government trying to settle youth groups or companies trying to buy peace for freedom to operate. Because of that, there is cultural shift. We were taught that there is dignity in labor. That culture of diligence and hard work has been affected. People are no longer ready to work. When they affirmatively get jobs, they sell their position to people from outside the region. There is no longer respect for elders at all. Even the aged are kidnapped for money. And there is no respect for women. Many are raped and prostitution is rife. The culture of bargaining and dialogue is no longer there. The culture of violence prevails. The culture of communal living, being brother's keeper is no longer there. People in the same community now rob each other. The rich and powerful kill the weaker ones at will. Money indeed is king.

Most Niger Delta states are classified by the Federal Ministry of Education as educationally disadvantaged. This realization caused P025 to lament the erosion of the little educational progress made in the region in recent years. He identified greed, money worship, and craze for immediate riches as the motivators that led the young ones to now look up to ex-militants and the criminals, who flaunt their amnesty wealth, as role models instead of accomplished personalities like Saro-Wiwa and Elechi Amadi. Saro-Wiwa was

the internationally acclaimed environmental activist killed by the Nigerian federal government in 1995. Elechi Amadi is a foremost writer and poet from the Niger Delta. The voice of reason is drowned out by the craze for immediate riches as the culture rapidly changes in line with new social reality.

Stagnation of education. The resurgence of militancy, thanks to the NDA, have taken its toll on the Niger Delta formal education programs. Youths who now look up to ex-militants as role models and heroes have joined the resurging militancy in droves in preference to formal education. These young people see militancy, criminality, illegal crude oil bunkering, and kidnapping as an easy and sure path to wealth and fortune. The high unemployment rate in the region is not helping matters. The prospect of remaining unemployed and hence poor after university education is not a very appealing proposition. This ugly trend portends an evil omen for the region in particular and the nation in general unless the drift is quickly arrested and reversed.

P008 asserted that the Niger Delta children and youth are no longer “keen on education, impact will be felt in twenty years down the road.” This led P025 to rhetorically ask; “why do I have to go to school if I can do militancy and get millions from Shell?” He posited that the incentive towards formal education, a proven vehicle for poverty eradication and for passing on a legacy of sustainable human capital development to the youth, ground to a standstill. P002 said that the high unemployment rate in the region plays a significant and credible role in discouraging the Niger Delta youth from education for militancy, bunkering, and criminality. He contends that most ex-militants

who truly renounced violence were left with no other choice than to return to their old lives after finding no employment following successful completion of vocational training.

P001 said that the heightened insecurity in the region “discouraged skilled expats from working in the country, robbing the industry of transferred skills and knowledge.” The dearth of international experts not only robbed the region of a valuable knowledge base that could be tapped into for technology transfer but also of positive role models that can challenge and motivate the youth to aspire for more.

Reduced revenue. The amnesty policy implementation resulted in tremendous loss of revenue and value for the Nigerian government and companies operating within the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. The general perception was that the amnesty implementation legitimized illegal bunkering of crude oil, and by implication expanded the pollution of the Niger Delta environment. Since the resurgence of militancy by the NDA, whom many believe to be counting on another *amnesty*, has resulted in more than 40% reduction in Nigeria’s daily onshore crude oil and gas output. This loss of revenue has taken a severe toll on the Nigerian economy - the economy is in recession, power generation is at a record low due to disruption of gas supply to the power generation plants, and the naira is in free fall.

P001 was categorical in linking the ongoing loss of government revenue and company profitability to the amnesty policy implementation. His rationale was that with the amnesty in place, “more bunkerers emerged, and more sabotage occurred as it is clear there would be no consequences, and there was profit to be made and possibly a future amnesty payout to law breakers.” In support of the identification of loss of revenue as an

unintended negative consequence of the Niger Delta amnesty implementation, P025 shared a personal experience. He said “while I was still with Shell, I can confirm that we were losing about one hundred and fifty thousand barrels of oil a day to illegal bunkering. This was not sustainable for a company that was then producing about six hundred thousand barrels of oil a day.” He further asserted that since the beginning of this year, there had not been a single production from the Western Delta fields since February 2016 when the NDA sabotaged the Forcados Oil Terminal (FOT) export pipeline.

Additional loss of revenue was in terms of higher cost of doing business in the Niger Delta. The participants unanimously agreed that increased insecurity in the Delta, since the implementation of the amnesty, was directly proportional to the higher cost of doing business. For example, P025 said that in his experience, he had seen a fourfold increase in the insurance premiums for rigs coming to operate in the Niger Delta. All onshore production operations are joint ventures with the Federal government, with the government as majority shareholder (55% and above). The government indirectly suffers more revenue loss due to increased cost of production. Therefore, there exists a direct relationship between the cost of production and the money available to be spent on other sectors of the economy.

In addition to the loss of revenue to illegal bunkering, there was also the associated loss of tax income for the Niger Delta states due to the exodus of companies (company profit tax) and personnel (personal income tax) from the region. P010 made this point by saying that “the oil companies reassessed their security plan and ways of

operation. Some left the region and operated through third parties based outside the region.” All these paints a picture of a Niger Delta that is poorer post amnesty.

A more impoverished Niger Delta. The IOCs saw the handwriting on the wall and started the process of divesting from the region. The mass exodus of companies and their personnel from the region led to stagnation of economic activities in the region, as well as limited employment opportunities for the teeming Niger Delta youth.

Governments at all levels in the region now have less money to spend due to loss of tax revenue. The pause in the inflow of new investment into the region and massive capital flight from the region further contributed to impoverishing the region. P010 alluded to the loss of tax revenue when he pointed out that many of the companies operating in the Nigerian upstream sector and their personnel have relocated from the region due to the persisting insecurity.

When challenged that the pause in inward investment could be as a result of the crash in oil price, P025 was adamant. He argued that the dearth of new investment in the Niger Delta is not related to the prevailing low oil price regime but due to the insecurity, instability and seemingly absence of political leadership in the Niger Delta, all thanks to the poor amnesty policy formulation and implementation. To buttress his point, he said that that Shell is currently investing big in Omani oil fields. He stated that these Omani oil fields are less prolific with far lower volumes and value when compared with the potential volumes and value from the Niger Delta. He said that the main attraction of the Omani fields to Shell was that Shell is sure of monetizing whatever volume they are able to produce in Oman to its full value.

P008 said that the upstream petroleum sector operator's self-preservation response to the unfolding unintended negative consequence of the amnesty policy was to, as much as possible, divest from the region. He stated that this was done by "pulling out (from onshore) and going further deep offshore, reducing exposure to hostile communities and reducing long term investment. My suspicion is that Shell is merely using Nigeria as a talent pool to get cheaper labor to manage international locations." P016 and P026 agreed that the Niger Delta is economically worse off today simply because bulk of the amnesty payouts never made its way into the Niger Delta economy. The benefiting ex-militant warlords invested their monies in more stable parts of Nigeria like Lagos and Abuja. A prominent ex-militant was said to have built a world class university in neighboring Benin Republic. These are but a few examples of the prevailing trend of capital flight from the region.

The crash of the real estate sector in places like Warri and Port Harcourt further added to the woes of the stagnating Niger Delta economy. P025 blamed the housing crash on the mass exodus of major oil companies and their personnel from the region due to the emerging culture of violence - kidnapping, armed robbery, and general insecurity caused by the poor implementation of the amnesty policy. The relocations have resulted in the loss of this revenue stream for local landlords, individual investors, real estate companies, and government (tenement tax) and hence further impoverished the people in the region. P002 said that with the toxic mix of mass relocation away from the region, capital flight region, rising unemployment, and a reeling real estate, a lot of people are not going to be coming out of poverty anytime soon.

More corruption. Institutionalized corruption has been one of the primary reasons why all past government interventions aimed at resolving the Niger Delta militancy failed. Sub-optimal formulation and implementation of the Niger Delta amnesty policy is a classic example of corruption on steroids. The amnesty policy implementation was used as a vehicle to siphon money from government coffers. The Federal and Niger Delta state governments appropriated billions of naira as security vote ostensibly to maintain security in the region. These monies were never accounted for. Funds appropriated for developmental projects were outrightly embezzled, misapplied or applied to non-value adding projects. Hundreds of millions of naira were allocated for fictitious pipeline surveillance contracts. These contracts were awarded to ex-militant as part of government strategies to rehabilitate and empower them. Due to this inherent corruption, there is little or nothing on ground in terms of infrastructural development to show for the billions of naira that were appropriated to fund the amnesty programs.

P012 said that the amnesty equated to corruption. He rhetorically asked “how can amnesty ever resolve criminality? How does a band aid resolve cancer? How does road surfacing resolve pot-hole issues on a road without drainage? Amnesty itself was corruption in disguise, just my opinion.”

P026 said that the outsourcing the function of securing and patrolling Nigerian waters, the constitutional responsibility of the Nigerian Navy, to Tompolo, a prominent Niger Delta ex-warlord by the President is the height of corruption and impunity. This singular act greatly demoralized men and women of the Nigerian Navy who stood by while their Commander in Chief rendered them redundant. P002 cited his personal

experience as uncovering, through interview of ex-militants, that corruption and incompetence were so rife that only about 23% of the monthly budgeted stipend allocated per ex-militant actually got to the intended recipients. The remainder was shared by the ex-warlords and government officials responsible for administering the amnesty. To shed more light on the extent of corruption associated with the administration of the amnesty policy, P010 says:

The government is the biggest winner in all this. They now have the ability to appropriate to themselves larger security votes. This money can never be audited and the corruption continues. Which Niger Delta governor and commissioner plus speaker that cannot boast of being a billionaire. How many are currently on trial? That is why the Dasuki gate saga is a worry for politicians. The first attempt to audit a security vote.

Another government program aimed at addressing the Niger Delta challenge has fallen to monster called corruption.

More pollution of the Niger Delta environment. This is a direct consequence of increased illegal bunkering activities across the Niger Delta. From internal SPDC bulletin, the Trans Niger pipeline (TNP) was shut down on more than ten separate occasions between 2013-2015 enable the company safely remove illegal bunkering points and clean up the spill from illegal bunkering activities. About 60% of SPDC daily production from the Eastern Delta flows through this line. A force majeure is declared on crude export from Bonny Terminal each time the TNP is shut down. Five contractor personnel died during the last operation to remove two illegal bunkering points on the

line in 2015 at Oloma. These men died from asphyxiation due to unexpected release of poisonous gas cloud from the pipeline during repair activities. The biggest unintended consequence of the Niger Delta amnesty implementation may well be the unprecedented, irresponsible, and ongoing pollution of the Niger Delta environment. Environmental activists like Saro-Wiwa will be turning in their graves. P002 said that since the resurgence of militancy in January 2016 by NDA, more than four hundred thousand barrels of crude oil has been released into the Niger Delta environment from several attacks on oil processing facilities in the Niger Delta region.

The foregoing led P008 to point out an oft overlooked impact of the ongoing pollution on the especially marine (seabed) ecosystem and the potentially huge clean-up cost implication. He said:

If I might add to the impact on the Environment, it has led to a different kind of pollution. Prior to agitation, the producers flared gas with no consequences and little pollution of the marine habitat, at least hidden only to the creeks. But with agitation from the communities, there have been increase in pipeline vandalism thereby not only are creeks polluted but the river bed might have impacts no one is yet to fully understand. I am not sure the level of clean BP did in Louisiana will ever be done in Niger Delta region. I hope amnesty can address such gaps from the producers.

Implications of the unintended consequences for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector

From data analysis, I was able to decipher what these unintended consequences mean for the Nigerian upstream sector as well as what key stakeholders need to do to address both these short -and long-term consequences. Described in this section is what the participants understand to be what the unintended consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty implementation mean for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector.

The first implication is the continued loss of revenue and reduced profitability from a combination of increasing cost of production and reduced production levels. Due to persistent insecurity, it is increasingly expensive to hire required expertise and talents to work in the Niger Delta. Insurance premium paid for staff and equipment operating in the region will continue to rise until the security is restored. Participants believe that the all stakeholders need to collaborate more effectively to develop strategies that will address especially the immediate motivators for militancy. They should partner to strategically counter the unintended message that violence pays through social re-orientation and social engineering, leveraging social media. Positive role models from the region should be propped up and given airtime in local and national media. The industry, with government support, should be more aggressive with the scholarship schemes targeted at empowering students from the Niger Delta region. P002 said that the Federal government should complete ongoing infrastructure projects as a matter of urgency. He pointed out the East-West road that connects all the Niger Delta states to Lagos as an example of low hanging fruit that when completed will neutralize one of the key

arguments that the NDA puts forward as justification for the restarting violent militant activities in the region. He said that the government should also reverse its decisions to relocate the National Maritime University from the Niger Delta to the Northern state of Kano. According to P002, this is an irresponsible government decision and a slap in the face of the Niger Delta region that lags behind other regions in terms of Federal infrastructure projects. He said that the NDA holds this to be a pre-condition for a cessation of attacks on oil and gas infrastructure. P002 further asserted that the NDA was speaking the mind of the people in declaring its position that "the Niger Delta is the best place to site such university because of the direct access to the high seas and the long history of the Niger Delta people as seafarers."

P026 said the government should change the strategy of palliative measure to institutionalized measures aimed at addressing the root causes of militancy. In his opinion, this is required to bring about long-term sustainable peace in the region. P002 supported this line of thought by saying "what is needed is a vision followed by common sense strategies to deliver the long-term vision."

On the issue of security, P025 said that as much as 45% of the cost of projects in the Niger Delta goes towards providing security. The emotional and psychological impact of this state of siege on the general population will be the focus of another study. For him, the government should immediately live up to its responsibilities to the Niger Delta people. He said addressing the security challenge in both the immediate and long-term is critical to the survival of the Nigerian economy for as long as oil remain the biggest foreign exchange earner. Participants were unanimous in arguing that addressing the root

causes of the perennial insecurity is the silver bullet that can mitigate all the unintended negative consequences.

Another implication of the unintended consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty implementation is that the industry should brace up to bear the cost associated with the cleanup of the Niger Delta environment. The cleanup exercise will run into hundreds of billions of naira, if the UNEP backed Ogoni cleanup is used as a benchmark. This implies increased cost, less profits and unwanted negative international media attention for the sector players. P007 said “If we assume the cleanup will take as long as the Ogoni cleanup to even get started then, we are looking at many years of dislocation of the communities. We have probably lost a generation to the militancy and possibly lost a way of life forever.”

Furthermore, if nothing is urgently done to reverse the culture of corruption and impunity that is rife in the country, it will be increasingly more difficult for the IOCs to continue doing business as they worry more about their brand and corporate reputation. In this era of low oil prices, being caught in a corruption scandal is the last thing they want on their plate.

With a culture of violence firmly in place, and the perception that violence pays big firmly established in the minds of the Niger Delta youths, the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector should brace for wave after wave of violent protests and attacks on oil and gas producing and processing facilities. With youth opting for militancy over education, there may not be Niger Delta indigenes ready for employment in the upstream

sector 10-20 years from now. A whole generation will be lost unless drastic measures are immediately taken to reverse the ugly trend.

With increased local participation in the upstream sector, there is now room for more Nigerians at the executive level. Hopefully, decisions will now better align with national development aspirations and priorities. There will also be increased participation from locals at the senior technical and managerial positions. These positions of responsibility have previously been reserved for foreign experts. Sector operators will compete to attract, develop, and retain talents from their host communities and the Niger Delta in general. License and freedom to operate in the future may depend on the number of local staff on company payroll. Competition will also lead to greater cost efficiency as local and foreign companies compete for scarce joint venture opportunities with the government. The loss of foreign expertise is an opportunity for Nigerians to rise to the challenge and demonstrate that they have finally arrived, after more than 60 years of oil and gas exploration and production in the Niger Delta region.

Question 2

Going forward, what can the government and the petroleum sector operators do to manage these consequences?

Introduction

With the unintended consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty implementation identified and categorized, this question sought to understand what the companies operating in the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector and the Nigerian government can do individually and in collaborative partnership to manage the identified unintended

consequences. This is to ensure that the unintended negative consequences do not adversely affect the strategic short -and long-term future of the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. This question is also sought to understand how management actions can help prevent a repeat of the militancy in the future. Questions 16 - 22 of the interview were designed to collect data needed to answer research question 2. The study uncovered four actions that the government and upstream petroleum sector may take individually and collectively to manage the unintended consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty policy implementation. These recommendations are described below.

Enforcement of law and order. All participants agreed that enforcement of law and order is the first step towards the effective management of the unintended consequences of the amnesty policy implementation. Participants also suggested that this is the primary responsibility of the government. They encouraged the government to urgently and aggressively respond to the resurgent militancy and restore law and order in the region. They believed that resurgent militancy in the Niger Delta is not agitation for positive social change but mere criminality. P028 was convinced that the Niger Delta militancy is primarily a law and order challenge. He said:

you cannot manage law and order problem by paying people. You just cannot because you position people for that payment. That's why you see proliferation of the groups all over the place, even in areas where we did not have such problems in the past – in Imo state, Akwa Ibom, Cross River. People now believe that is the only way you can be called to the table. They feel the ones in Rivers state, Bayelsa, and Delta made a lot of money because they were the ones who were the

focus of the initial discussion, and if there is going to be a fresh discussion, they want to make sure they are also called to the table. My personal view is that you must have law and order as critical part of any solution you want to use. You don't pay people who have done the wrong thing hoping they will become good guys and suddenly go back to being clean.

P002 supported this line of thinking and posited that

The way to solve the Niger Delta issue has to come with sincerity of purpose proven by a clear strategy, structure, milestones, and funding. However, the grandest solution without law enforcement and clamping down on criminals at every level including local leaders and government officials will not work.

P005 linked the idea of law and order enforcement to good governance. He seemed to imply that poor governance is a major contributor to the seeming absence of law and order in the region. He said, "If governance is right, every other thing will fall into place." P002 further supported this line of reasoning by linking the breakdown of law and order in the region to a failure of leadership at all level, especially in the Niger Delta. He said, the "failure of the amnesty is a failure of leadership at all levels of governance in the Niger Delta region and Nigeria." P007 Agreed that failure of governance is what facilitated the breakdown of law and order in the first place. He aligned with literature in advocating for community policing and good governance as effective ways to restore law and order in the region. He blamed lack of accountability in government as the real law and order challenge when he said:

The root of the problem is lack of accountability in government at all levels and that is where we must go to solve the problem. The IOCs are not going to solve the Niger Delta problem, they can be part of the solution, we the people are the ones to solve this problem. The Niger Delta is just a special case of the national problem of lack of accountability.

P028 further advocated a strengthening (mentally, emotionally, and psychologically) of the security agencies and lauded the action of the immediate past governor of River state, Chibuike Amaechi, in sending selected police officers on counter-terrorism training in Israel. He also advocated the use of community policing and strict application of “consequence management on those breaking the law under the guise of Niger Delta agitation, to create the enabling environment for ordinary law abiding citizens to live in peace including long jail terms.”

In supporting the narrative that law and order enforcement is the first step to managing the unintended consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty policy implementation, P007 advocated for shutting down the entire upstream sector to remove and neutralize the militant’s bargaining chip. He said “Shutdown and tackle the criminality. Remove their bargaining power.” P017 thought that shutting down the upstream sectors sounds like a reasonable proposition “because it helps us get to the root of the problem”, but quickly conceded that it is not a practical solution. Furthermore, P005 called for the stick and carrot approach to law and order enforcement. He said “lasting solution will come from wielding the stick and offering the carrot at the same

time. Maybe the big stick first for oil to flow and enabling environment more massive development and industrialization.”

Action backed social orientation. Participants suggested that the government and industry should collaborate and embark on massive social orientation programs. Participants suggested that such social orientation program should target the youth and clearly communicate the long-term consequences militancy and the associated pollution on the Niger Delta economy and environment. Reconstruction of social reality strategies should be leveraged to work at changing mindsets and belief systems from the get rich quick mentality to working for sustainable success through education and vocations training. Creating the right mentality among the youth will also go a long way in addressing the long-term impacts of the unintended consequences on the industry. P012 alluded to this prevailing negative mindset and the need for collaboration between government and industry operators when he said “I think that linkage is there already but people are just self-centered and don't care about the community. The IOCs needs to work more with the state government and not just the federal government to start massive projects that keeps vibrant youths busy and at the same time clamp down heavily on known criminals.” P017 agreed that there seemed to be no viable short-term fix to managing the unintended negative consequences of the amnesty policy. He also suggested the need to change the prevailing politics of exclusion to that of inclusion. He said “I think that one of the triggers (not the root cause in my view) for the present upsurge in violence is political. So for me in the short term, a sense of political inclusiveness will buy us time to show sincerity of purpose.” This implies the need for re-

orientation of the political gladiators to desist from viewing politics as a zero-sum game and motivate them to embrace the politics of inclusion.

P028 advocated the need to focus attention on the chiefs and traditional rulers to begin thinking long term instead of the prevailing “now” mentality. He said that the traditional leadership in the region should be encouraged to “transform from vending machine mentality to thinking long term.” Adopting a long-term thinking mentality will help change attitudes and discourage the people from acts that lead to pollution and erode cultural values.

P029 argued that the Niger Delta militancy is a political issue and hence requires a political solution. He stated that the government should, as part of the social orientation program, communicate to the Niger Delta people the political actions that are being taken to resolve the Niger Delta question. He advocated for the restructuring of the political system to deliver a balanced structure that “does not in any way give overt superiority to one group of people.” He also said that any social orientation program must be built around communicating hope to the Niger Delta people. He said that hope should be communicated “through the provision of physical infrastructure and employment opportunities.” The need to communicate hope is because, in his opinion, “the Niger Delta people has lost hope in the Nigerian political structure, believing they have been losers and will never win in the current political environment.” He said when people have hope for the future, they will think twice before taking any overt or covert actions that will harm the environment. As part of effective law and order enforcement, P002 and P028 said the government should also enforce environmental laws, criminalize attacks on

upstream sector infrastructure, outlaw routine flaring, and mete out stiff penalties on companies whose operations result in environmental pollution.

Development of the Niger Delta region. The absence of substantial social and economic development in the region is one of the primary justifications and that fuels the militancy. The militants always claim to fight for the emancipation and development of the Niger Delta region. This was what informed the name of the foremost Niger Delta militant group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). P025 asserted that the government should “muster the political will and determination to do the right thing.” By the right thing, he was alluding to the development of the Niger Delta. He further advocated for “the creation of productive capacity for job creation and the institutionalizing the intervention initiatives across the Niger Delta.” P002 agreed and said that part of the reasons why the past initiatives failed was because they were “palliative and short term in nature.”

P028 called for a Niger Delta style “Marshall Plan.” He called on the government to “build the east-west road, the east-west rail line, airports, power lines, hotels, factories and manufacturing capacity in the region; infrastructure that will build confidence and encourage the private sector to revive and rev up the regional economy.” He insisted that passing and implementing the PIB would be a right step in the right direction in reviving the Niger Delta economy, give hope, real stake, and sense of belonging to the Niger Delta people in the Nigerian state. P005 agreed with P029. He said that “the government has already planned railway from Calabar to Lagos and refineries. For a start, this should engender some activities.”

P012 chimed in that “the IOCs need to work more with the state governments and not just the federal government to start massive projects that keeps vibrant youths busy and at the same time clamp down heavily on known criminals.” Finally, P010 said the government should spread its investment in proportion to the contribution from each of the regions. He rhetorically asked:

Does it matter where it is sited (talking of major government development projects)? No but why should it not be sited in Niger Delta in our case? I only think the plan from government should be noble. They should invest where the money comes from more than other areas. This should not equate to neglecting any region but invest in value of your contribution.

Collaborative corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. Participants suggested that continuing ongoing corporate social responsibility initiatives and projects, and possibly initiating new ones, by the companies operating within the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry will go a long way to help manage the unintended negative consequences from the amnesty policy implementation. They believed that these initiatives will not only help build and maintain trust with the host communities but also provide a ready pool of potential employees for the companies operating in the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. P008 posited that the IOCs need to collaborate to deliver integrated standard of living improvement projects for the Niger Delta communities where they operate. He believed they would deliver more value by taking this collaborative approach. He said:

the IOCs need to work together to tackle social issues in the community. They need to see it as a collective fight to get ND to a dreamland. Can you imagine what can happen if all producers contribute to a common pot and have an independent organization manage it? Look at the presidential library in US? Obama library will be funded by donations but land provided by city of Chicago. P015 said that this collaborative model among the companies have worked well in Bonny Island. Bonny Island is host to SPDC's crude oil export terminal, NLNG plant (the second biggest in the world), and the ExxonMobil's Natural Gas Liquid (NGL) plants. He contended that the:

Bonny strategy has worked so far, but I am not sure of the feasibility of replicating same across the Niger Delta. The issues in the Niger Delta also far exceed the capacity of IOCs to handle. The starting point should be the reformation of government and governance. History however shows that government is incapable of self-reformation without external pressure from civil society groups. The long-term solution to Niger Delta will come from informed and enlightened citizens, when they realize that they can form pressure groups to demand accountability from government at all levels. When they enlighten and conscientize the masses to stop blaming the IOCs and start standing up to their government at local level, state level, and finally the federal level.

P008 supported this line of thinking saying the industry operators should work with government and take the collaboration to the next level. He admonished the stakeholders to:

create a system that the youth can transition from to greater things. Once IOCs can figure out how to engage the kids to youth, in the communities, no more recruits and u will see people rising up to protect their kids once. A path to self-fulfillment is observed and witnessed. I think when people have a stake in the business...not just some ill-conceived stipend and amnesty...they will think twice before they blow up pipelines.

P017 encouraged the companies to continue with their interdependency power and water projects. He sees this as both short -and long-term collaboration between industry and government. He said:

when the man in the Creek of the Niger Delta sees the health care and education of his family tied to the flow station in his village. When the man in the Creek of the ND sees the health care and education of his family tied to the flow station in his village. For me only then can we begin the see change. And yes, we need govt at all level to live up to the promise of delivering a better Nigeria.

Summary

In this chapter, a brief overview of the purpose of this case study and the questions the research sought to answer were presented. Participants' demographics and details of results from data collection and analysis processes were also provided. Methods used to demonstrate the trustworthiness of the research study were also presented in this chapter.

The collected data were sufficient to answer the research questions, leading to the identification of the unintended consequences emanating from the amnesty policy implementation, and what these mean for the upstream petroleum sector.

In Chapter 5, I will present the interpretation of the research findings, a discussion of the study limitations, implications for social change, as well as recommendations for future studies.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

The purpose of this case study was to identify the consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty policy implementation and its short -and long-term implications for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. This was to provide possible solution options that can be leveraged to maximize opportunities and mitigate the downside risks. According to my review of the literature, no scholarly research study had previously been conducted to identify and understand what the unintended consequences of the amnesty policy implementation mean for the strategic interests of the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. I sought to bridge this gap in the literature.

A qualitative case study design was used because it enabled me to focus on SPDC, which is a typical company within the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. The research questions focused on identifying the unintended consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty policy implementation for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector and clarifying what the industry and government can collaboratively do to manage the adverse effects of the unintended consequences.

In analyzing my findings, I discovered that the amnesty policy was poorly formulated and ineffectively implemented. My findings concurred with most of the literature concerning the impact of the militancy on the sociopolitical, sociocultural, and socioeconomic landscape of the Niger Delta region, in particular, and Nigeria, in general (Akpan, 2010; Ali-dinar, 1999; Bisina, 2003; Brown, 2006; Clyde, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Kadafa, 2012; Ngwama, 2014; Nossiter, 2010; Nwogwugwu, Olatunji &

Egwuonwu, 2015; Obasi, 2002; Onishi, 1999; Tzanelli, 2006). Ten unintended consequences emanating from the poor conception and implementation of the Niger Delta amnesty policy were identified. These include lowering the entry barrier to allow more local participation in the sector, the messaging that violence pays among others.

Findings suggest that the blanket amnesty given to all militants was a mistake. Participants were of the firm opinion that the federal government should have incorporated aspects of retributive justice into the amnesty policy to serve as a deterrence to prevent citizens from resorting to violence in the future. The participants pointed to this significant omission as one of the reasons why the amnesty policy implementation failed in preventing a resurgence of the militancy and ushering in lasting peace in the region. In literature, Doyle (2004) argued that retributive and restorative justice are complementary and reinforce each other to provide and maintain social order. She asserted that striking a balanced mix of retributive and restorative justice is needed to provide justice and closure for victims of the militancy (Doyle, 2004). This mix, she contended, would serve as a framework for sustainable peace, justice, and reconciliation.

Doyle (2004) advocated that, as a minimum, the “the intellectual authors of crimes” (p. 126) should have been prosecuted and convicted by a competent court. Extending Doyle’s thinking to the Niger Delta context, it follows that amnesty or pardon should have been extended to the militant leaders only after they had been pronounced guilty and sentenced (or, had their sentences suspended) by a competent court. Participants agreed that this approach would have served as a strong message against impunity, enhanced (or, reinforced) the rule of law, blunted out the key unintended

message that violence pays, and given the victims and their families a sense of justice and belief in the judicial system.

In my opinion, the absence of any form of deterrence mechanism compounded the amnesty's poor implementation. Findings suggest that the amnesty policy implementation effectively translated to paying off ex-militant warlords. This created a kind of hostage situation due to the unintended messaging that violence pays – thereby, motivating and emboldening copycat groups to fight for their own *amnesty* as is the case with NDA and several emerging cult groups in the region (Campbell, 2016; Musa & Aghedo, 2016; Ruky, 2016). One such group that emerged in 2016 was the NDA. Their attacks on oil and gas producing and processing facilities in the region have been deadly and have resulted in pollution and other adverse environmental consequences (Musa & Aghedo, 2016).

Many participants suggested that the death of President Yar Ardua in 2009, before the amnesty could be implemented, made it easier for corruption to drive the amnesty policy implementation process. The influence of corruption on the implementation process led to the plethora of identified unintended negative consequences. This assertion is in line with researchers' identification of corruption as a key contributing factor to the failure of past initiative aimed at addressing the Niger Delta challenge (Atedo, 2015; Obomanu, 2014; Walker, 2009). Funds disbursed as stipends for ex-militants did not make it to the intended recipients, creating mistrust between ex-militants and government in the process. With the free flow of amnesty money, corrupt practices like hyper-inflation of contracts, awarding contracts for fictitious projects and paying for them, and

influence peddling became the order of the day (Daniel & Nwagbuhiogu,2015; Udo, 2015).

Some of the responses from participants are consistent with the outcome of the review of the literature. According to Rus (2010) and UNEP Report (2011), the environmental pollution from oil production activities contributed to the loss of traditional means of livelihood for the indigenous people of Niger Delta, resulting in poverty. Tobor (2014) agreed and asserted that most Niger Delta residents live in abject poverty. Mähler (2010) used the term *resource curse* to describe the extent of pollution of the once pristine Niger Delta environment due to hydrocarbon exploration and production activities. Ekpeyong and Dianye (2010) identified environmental pollution as one of the most visible consequences of the resurgent militancy.

Study findings also indicated that Niger Delta environment has further been polluted and degraded due to the resurgent militancy. Participants blamed the poor implementation of the amnesty policy for the resurgence of militant activities in the region. Illegal crude oil bunkering and establishment of illegal crude oil refining operation worsened the state of environmental pollution in the region (Odalonu, 2015; Odalonu & Eronmhonsele, 2015; Ufford, 2013). Estimates provided by participants suggested that more than four hundred thousand barrels of crude oil have been released into the Niger Delta environment from multiple attacks, claimed by NDA, on oil and gas producing and processing facilities since January 2016. These findings are aligned with some reviewed literature on the implications of the ongoing pollution of the Niger Delta environment.

The implication here is that with nothing to do, due to loss of traditional means of livelihood, joining up with the militants became the only viable means of livelihood (Agbonifo, 2009; Amaraegbu, 2011). The ultimate result of this is further environmental pollution and loss of hope for the Niger Delta people. Ogbuefin (2007) contended that illegal bunkering activities including pipeline vandalism were responsible for the vast majority of crude oil spills in the Niger Delta. He argued that these spills exacerbated the problem of environmental pollution in the Niger Delta, and impoverished the Niger Delta people in the process. Nwilo and Badejo (2006) listed the effects of the pollution from illegal bunkering activities as including but not limited to destruction of farm lands and forests, destruction of marine habitat with the associated flora and fauna, pollution and contamination of ground water systems, and fast disappearing mangrove forests. He contends that these have led to a significant reduction of arable farm land and portable water.

All these took a toll on the Niger Delta people's way of life. Ground water pollution limited access to portable water for the people. Evidence abounds of visible sheen of oil on water from newly dug boreholes in some oil producing communities (Alawode & Ogunleye, 2013). These have serious cost (from treating the water) and health implications for the people (Alawode & Ogunleye, 2013; Ufford, 2013). The pollution of Niger Delta environment, as a direct consequence of especially the resurgent militancy, is a key factor keeping the Niger Delta people in poverty (Gaskia, 2013). The ongoing pollution has destroyed their traditional means of livelihood namely peasant farming and fishing. It therefore follows that any poverty alleviation measure that does

not include the cleanup and restoration of the Niger Delta environment is bound to fail. Study finding is also aligned with literature with regards to enforcement of environmental laws. Okpara (2012) advocated passing legislation that mandate payment of compensation to host communities and appropriate deterrent sanctions against sector practitioners who violate environmental regulation and policies.

This chapter includes my interpretation of data collected during face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions. I conclude the chapter by offering recommendations for possible further studies on related topics. It is my strong belief that if implemented, some of the recommended solutions can potentially bring about positive social change.

Interpretation of the Findings

Polarity management (Johnson, 1996) is the conceptual framework for this qualitative case study, while Benet's (2013) PoDM and relative deprivation (Bayertz, 1999; Schaefer, 2008; Walker & Smith, 2012) are the underlying theoretical frameworks. The discussions focused mostly on themes that emerged from content analysis of collected data as described in Chapter 4. Twenty-three open ended questions designed to provide information required to answer the research questions were used during face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions. Below is a presentation of detailed discussion and description of key data analysis outcomes. The study concluded that the Niger Delta amnesty policy was ill-conceived and poorly implemented leading to mostly unintended negative consequences. The unintended positive consequences of the amnesty policy implementation tended to maximize the upsides of participation and

representation, justice and due process, and diversity and equality pairs of Benet's (2013) PoDM. The unintended negative consequences tended to maximize the downside of the components of the PoDM.

Identified unintended positive consequence

The study uncovered two unintended positive consequences. These were viewed as opportunities that the industry can leverage to create both short -and long-term value for stakeholders. These two unintended positive consequences are described below.

The amnesty helped lower the entry barrier for more local operators to participate the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. Globally, the entry barrier into the upstream petroleum sector is very high, due to the massive upfront financial, organizational, technological, and political commitments and investment. Response from participants suggested that the Niger Delta amnesty policy contributed towards lowering the entry barrier for local companies to participate in the upstream petroleum sector. Participants viewed this as a most welcome unintended outcome from the amnesty policy implementation. Post amnesty implementation, most international oil companies (IOCs) operating in the region began the process of divesting their onshore assets and concentrate on deep offshore instead. This resulted in dual positive outcome namely facilitating easy access into the industry for more local players and increasing investments towards developing the deep offshore assets.

Lowered entry barrier made it relatively easier for local companies, including those owned by Niger Delta people, to participate in the upstream petroleum sector. This translated to economic empowerment. Leveraging elements of the PoDM will help to

maximize benefits from this particular unintended consequence. Increased participation and representation of Niger Delta people in the upstream petroleum sector activities will naturally translate to more economic empowerment through increasing control of economic resources. This will help neutralize the deep sense of relative deprivation. This is in line with Benet's (2013) thinking that that effective management of the PoDM will result in economic empowerment and hence more freedom for the people. Furthermore, more Nigerians gaining a foothold in the upstream petroleum sector resulted in a more diversified industry's ownership structure.

Lowering of the entry barriers into the upstream petroleum sector is politically good for Nigeria. Nigerians are now positioned to take increasing ownership and control of this critical sector of the economy and shape it for future growth in line with national interest and aspirations. Secondly, PIB, when finally passed into law, the PIB will help to address the pervading sense of deprivation in the Niger Delta. The bill provides for more local participation, especially of host communities, in the upstream petroleum sector. This bill also recommends that host communities be given at least 2% equity in assets and projects located in their domain. Implementing this will ensure joint ownership of assets with host communities, incentivizing them to take ownership protect these assets. Joint ownership with host communities will help reduce the cost of doing business in the region and hence more profit or revenue for all stakeholders. It will also make more money available in-country as less profit or capital is repatriated out of the country by the IOCs. With less capital repatriated out of Nigeria, more funds will be available to both stimulate and diversify the economy. A diversified economy is an essential component of

the strategy to address the high unemployment rate in the Niger Delta and hence further reduce the pervading sense of relative deprivation.

The potential downside from lowering the entry barrier to participating in the upstream petroleum sector is a possible short-term loss of skills as foreign experts (technical and managerial) leave, with the associated potential short-term loss of value for stakeholders. But this short-term setback can be offset by stop-gap measures that ensure critical expertise is retained pending when Nigerians can effectively take over. The short-term setback can be transformed into long-term strategic benefits for the Nigerian upstream sector as locals gradually take over more senior technical and managerial roles. This will translate to lower labor cost and hence increased profitability for all stakeholders.

Benet (2013) stated that the PoDM could be used to direct and guide social change efforts. Since the amnesty policy implementation helped facilitate more local participation in the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector, it follows that effectively managing the PoDM will lead to more Nigerians (especially those of Niger Delta extraction) to participate in the upstream petroleum industry. The associated economic empowerment from this increased participation represents positive social change. This positive social change will help deepen and embed democratic principles leading to greater freedom for the people, give them more voice, pride, and a sense of belonging. The overall result will, therefore, be the reduction of the downside of relative deprivation and maximizing the upside of participation, representation, and justice components of the PoDM.

Acknowledgment of the critical importance of the Niger Delta to the nation's economic wellbeing. Nigeria is a mono-product economy. It derives more than 80% of its foreign exchange earnings from the export of crude oil and gas extracted from the Niger Delta region. Even though the importance of the Niger Delta to the economic wellbeing of Nigeria was obvious, it was yet to be formally and publicly acknowledged by the government. The lack of formal recognition of the critical importance of this region to the Nigerian federation was viewed by participants as a contributing factor to the absence of tangible infrastructural, social, and economic development in this region that lays the golden egg for the country.

Participants suggested that the amnesty proclamation was a formal recognition of the Niger Delta as critical to the economic survival of the country. The amnesty, therefore afforded people from the region a level of participation and representation at the highest level of political governance in Nigeria. The amnesty policy implementation firmly positioned the Niger Delta question as a central theme in Nigerian political discourse. Niger Deltans will now be at the table when policies and decisions affecting the industry are taken, ensuring that their needs, interest, concerns, and expectations are protected. This development gave the Niger Deltans a greater sense of belonging and feeling of importance in line with the musings of Carnegie (1936). Multimillion naira contracts were awarded to Niger Delta indigenes to secure the upstream petroleum sector facilities including pipelines; a Niger Deltan ascended to the presidency, and many from the region were promoted to leading roles among the nation's security forces. Participants argued that the Niger Delta now a political force to be reckoned with. All these resulted in the

deepening of Nigerian democracy as well as maximize the upsides of participation, representation and justice components of the PoDM.

Identified unintended negative consequences

The study uncovered eight unintended negative consequences from the amnesty policy implementation. These were viewed as threats or risks that stakeholders needs to proactively manage to safeguard value. By effective management of the polarities of democracy, these threats can be turned into opportunities that position the industry for long term growth and profitability. These eight unintended negative consequences are described below.

Violence pays. Participants identified this as the key unintended negative consequence of the amnesty policy implementation. They contended that the unintended message that violence pays is the wellspring from which most of the other unintended negative consequences flow. This unintended negative consequence maximizes the negative aspects of all the polarity pairs of the PoDM namely freedom and authority, justice and due process, diversity and equality, human rights and communal obligations, and participation and representation. It limited freedom and had no regards for authority; it circumvented due process and trampled on justice. With violence, diversity of opinion does not count, and equality is just another word because power (of the gun) is always right. Resort to illegal use of violence amounts to human rights violation because it restricts participation and representation. Findings from the study seem to suggest that this unintended message that violence pays motivated the emergence of cypocat militant groups within and outside the region, who have left destruction, pollution, broken homes

and families in their wake. Participants also blamed this unintended message that violence pays for the upsurge in kidnapping, armed robbery, murder, and assassination in the region. With violence and criminality on the rise, and the government seemingly unable to arrest the situation, all late night economic activities have ceased. This automatically transformed the Niger Delta into a twelve-hour economy and further exacerbated the already dire economic and unemployment situation in the region.

Industry stakeholders should collaborate to counter the unintended message from the amnesty policy implementation. They should listen and create an atmosphere that accommodates peaceful protests. More importantly, they should actively *listen* to the people with intention to address issues and concerns raised by peaceful protesters. In so doing, the government will reinforce the positive message that peaceful protests deliver better outcomes than violence. This is in line with maximizing the positive aspects of the PoDM pairs. This may take the shine off the perception that violence pays when peaceful protest is seen to yield at least comparable results, by getting governments to respond and act in the best interests of people. It may then become easier to differentiate between real agitation for positive social change and criminality, thus enabling the government to deliver on its primary responsibility of maintaining law and order in the region. This may be done by leveraging the provisions of authority, justice, and due process components of the PoDM to deal effectively with criminality. Also, public participation will be essential to establish sustainable law and order in the region. Oakley (1989) stated that effective participation requires communities to be reasonably involved in decision making processes, especially on issues that concern them. They should be involved in conceiving,

developing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating community development programs for effectiveness. Participants said they will want to see Niger Delta traditional leadership and opinion leaders openly advocate for the cessation of violence and attacks against upstream petroleum sector infrastructure in word and in deed. They should be the champions of the message of non-violence as the only way to achieving development and peace for the region.

Data collected from participants further suggested that while leveraging violence may have resulted in some short-term gains for the region; the associated long term side effects negates these gains. It is evident that the poisonous mindset that violence pays was a consequence of poor management of Benet's (2012, 2013) polarities of democracy. Meaningful participation and empowerment of local people through economic activities, decision making, advocacy, social re-orientation, social and environmental justice are essential first steps that have to be taken to maximize the positive aspects of components of the PoDM. This will also deliver dividends of democracy to Niger Deltans. In order words, a strategic and ongoing involvement of Niger Delta people in taking decisions that affect them will not only help create a sense of ownership and pride but also contribute to delivering the highest possible value from any policy implemented for their benefit. Some of the fundamental benefits from this strategy include but not limited to dignity, self-fulfillment, social justice, liberty, and an informed and economically empowered population. All these will help to effectively manage Benet's polarities of democracy for the benefit of all.

Embedded a culture of violence. Participants agreed that the amnesty policy implementation helped embed a culture of violence in the region by validating the perception that violence pays. They agreed that even though violence rampant in the region pre-amnesty, law and order still prevailed. People understood that there is a price to be paid when the long arm of justice catches up with them. Participants argued that the amnesty policy neutralized the stabilizing effect of rule of law and created an atmosphere where violence and impunity thrived. This maximized the negative aspect of the authority, justice and due process components of Benet's PoDM. Participants also agreed that prior to the amnesty; violence as first resort was alien to the region. This changed with the amnesty policy implementation.

To counter this unintended consequence and maximize the positive aspects of justice and due process pair of the PoDM, it is required that the government should enforce law and order as well as address the issue of corruption by its officials. Law enforcement should partner with host communities to differentiate between legitimate agitations and criminality. Genuine agitators should be listened to and legitimate issues they raise attended to while criminality should be dealt with in line with extant laws. There should be a sense of urgency in dealing with the emerging culture of violence before it is fully cemented into the polity and becomes the new normal. It is argued that without this, the vicious cycle of violence will persist, the negative aspects of the PoDM will thrive; and the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector, the Niger Delta and Nigerian economy will remain in the doldrums.

The responses from the participants relate to the polarities of democracy (Benet, 2013) and relative deprivation (Bayertz, 1999; Schaefer, 2008; Walker & Smith, 2012) theories that underpinned this study. Participants' responses seem to suggest that strict law and order enforcement, without compromising the rule of law, is required to find and maintain the optimal balance where corrective actions will lead to predictable and controllable outcomes. This balance is needed in order to leverage polarity management (Johnson, 1996) to address the current state of chaos (Lorenzo, 1963), caused by anchoring the amnesty policy on utility (Fishburn, 1968; MacCrimmon & Stig, 1979).

The government should consistently push a positive narrative in line with its vision and aspiration for the region and its people. There should walk the talk by genuinely listening to the people if it must effectively address their NICE. This is a required in order to counter the message that violence pays. A transparent and feasible strategy that holistically addresses the Niger Delta agitation points should be central to the narrative stakeholders should push. Some of these agitation points include economic marginalization, corruption, law and law and order issues, a paucity of infrastructure and social amenities, environmental pollution, and clean-up plans, and general lack of development.

Further destruction of cultural values and beliefs. Niger Deltans have deep respect for elders and authority, believe in the dignity of labor, eschews violence, and frowns on greed. Participants suggested that these beneficial values have been under sustained attack since the inception of the militancy. They suggested that the militancy was a direct challenge to the leadership and authority of the elders as guardians of

traditional values and institutions. Responses from the participants indicated that the Niger Delta people used to have respect for their elders and see them as symbols of authority. The amnesty policy implementation upset this social order and brought in a leadership that is self-serving, power drunk, motivated by greed, and obsessed with materialism. Backed with an almost inexhaustible supply of money and sophisticated weapons, the ex-militant warlords fast-tracked the destruction of traditional institutions and enthroned a value system built on a culture of violence, with disastrous consequences for all stakeholders. Participants also blamed the elders of the land and custodians of traditional cultural values for being complicit in the erosion of cultural values. A participant referred to these chiefs as *vending machines* who demanded to be paid or they will not discharge their obligatory duty of standing up for common good and admonishing the youths for embracing wrong values. This pay for play resulted in the loss of respect for these chiefs, further maximizing the negative aspects of the authority, representation, justice, and due process components of the PoDM.

Participants posited that these same cultural values that are being eroded are the building blocks for lasting peace, trust building, and promotion of harmonious co-existence for all in the region. They stated that the values under attack are values that maximize the positive aspects of the polarities of democracy. It therefore follows that the region will be best served by implementing strategies that may strengthen the cultural values and belief system that has been the bedrock for the survival of Niger Deltans.

Social orientation to change the prevailing mentalities, propping up regional role models, grass root educational awareness programs, and holding the political leadership

to higher standards of accountability and transparency may go a long way in reversing the trend away from embedding a culture of violence. Participants also suggested that effective participation and representation of the Niger Delta people in Niger Delta centric policy formulation and implementation is essential to addressing some root causes of the Niger Delta militancy, help restore the supremacy of traditional cultural values, and maximize the positive aspects of the participation and representation pair of the PoDM. The preceding implies collaboration among all key stakeholders, namely the state and federal governments, Niger Delta communities, and oil sector companies operating in the region. There is also need for coordinated efforts, joint ownership and responsibility to restore and strengthen traditional values and thereby maximize the positive aspects of the polarities of democracy.

More Educational Stagnation. An informed citizenry is the bedrock of flourishing democracy (Glaeser, Ponzetto & Shleifer, 2007). An educated and informed citizenry is therefore a key success factor in the effective management of the polarities of democracy. Participants posited that education is the best vehicle to create an informed, engaged and economically empowered population. The level of economic empowerment of a given community is directly related to their level of education. It, therefore, follows that as the quality and level of education increases; the easier it becomes to lift more people sustainably out of poverty and the better their participation in democracy. The reverse becomes the case when people are denied or deny themselves the opportunity to get education in preference to transient free money.

The amnesty validated the perception that violence pays. This was made evident in the overnight wealth that the amnesty put in the hands of militants thanks to the amnesty. Most youths and teenagers, seeing the money at the disposal of their more violent peers, dropped out of school to get amnesty." The long-term consequences of this trend are obvious. Once law and order is restored and economic activities pick up, majority of Niger Delta youth may not be able to compete for the available jobs in the upstream petroleum industry. These jobs may be taken by their more qualified compatriots from other regions. This is bound to create resentment and strengthen the sense of deprivation. Response from study participants suggested that at this point, another wave of agitation may materialize, in line with relative deprivation theory. The preceding may maximize the negative aspects of participation and representation pair of Benet's (2012) PoDM. The rationale for, according to participants, this is that the inability to participate in economic activities, due to educational deficiency, can result in frustration that may culminate into criminal violence. One participant cited the frustration of ex-militants who have been unable to provide for their families due to inability to secure gainful employment after their vocational training.

Participants argued that, as part of their ongoing CSR initiatives, oil sector companies in the should not only continue with their commitment to educational excellence through their various scholarship schemes, but take the extra step of employing Niger Delta beneficiaries of these schemes. They said this will not only help build trust-based relationship with host communities but also provide a ready pool of qualified potential employees. This will enhance the upside of participation and justice

components of the PoDM. Such participation and social justice will reduce frustration and help overcome the perception of oppression and deprivation amongst Niger Deltans.

When the amnesty policy was conceived, it was expected planned that ex-militants will be trained in various vocations and be subsequently provided with employment upon successful completion of their vocational trainings. However, participants' responses suggested that this was not the case, due mostly to paucity of job opportunities. Unemployment for these ex-militants is a source of ongoing frustration and possible motivation to return to militancy. This plays into maximizing the downside of justice and participation components of the PoDM.

Participants' responses are consistent with my study theoretical framework. Study findings seem to suggest that Benet's (2013) PoDM can be leveraged to revive the interest of youth in education. The model can be used to plan and evaluate the effectiveness of social change initiatives aimed at positioning education as the first step to economic empowerment. But to be effective, the federal government will have to enforce law and order in order to discourage tendencies towards violence, and encourage embracing education as the only sustainable path to success. Law and order enforcement will also create the enabling environment that facilitates the inflow of investment into the region. Investments are necessary to create meaningful employment opportunities and increase the participation of the youth in economic activities thereby empowering and lifting them out of poverty.

Reduced revenue. Participants agreed that the amnesty implementation has significantly contributed to a reduction of revenue for the government and companies

operating in the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. They identified the major contributors to reduced revenue as including lost revenue to illegal bunkering activities, in terms of reduced production, and in terms of reduced tax revenue. Also, reduced revenue was identified in terms of the increased cost of doing business in the region (higher cost of production, cost of repairing vandalized facilities and long-term costs associated with cleaning up and restoring the Niger Delta environment).

Participants unanimously blamed poor implementation of the amnesty policy for the increase in illegal crude oil bunkering activities. They said that the amnesty policy implementation made illegal crude oil bunkering an all comer's game, and opened the door to local and international criminal drugs and arms cartels. A participant asserted that at a time when SPDC's daily crude oil production was about six hundred thousand barrels per day, almost one hundred and fifty thousand barrels per day were lost to illegal bunkering. This represented a massive 25% loss in production revenue. The inability or complicity of the government security agencies, especially the military to stop these illegal bunkering activities pointed to the depth of corruption in the land.

With every attack on oil and gas producing and processing facility, the capacity of the industry to produce at optimum is diminished. This led to further loss of revenue for stakeholders; especially the government owns 85% of the total production from JV arrangements. The 85% revenue (for the government) is made up of royalty payments, government profit share from joint venture participation, and tax on company profits. The February 2016 attack on Forcados oil terminal (FOT) alone has resulted in shutting in about 20% of Nigeria's daily oil and gas production; translating to about N504 billion

(US\$1.7 billion) lost revenue for the six months the terminal was down. It is projected that the export terminal will not be back online for at least the next two months. This is a huge loss for a country that is borrowing to fund its 2016 budget.

The naira (the national currency), has depreciated by more than 150% against the dollar (Komolafe, 2016), and the economy is in recession today due in part to the significantly reduced revenue from the petroleum sector (Eboh, 2016; Kottasova, 2016). Recently released quarterly result by the Royal Dutch Shell indicated a 41% reduction in production and a 51% drop in profits, compared with same period last year. This poor result was blamed in part on the closure of FOT due attacks on its only crude oil export line. This led to the shutdown of all productions in the Western Niger Delta since February 2016 pending completion of repair works on the pipeline. The repair was completed in October 2016. SEPLAT, a local operator who exports its crude oil through FOT, reported a half year loss (for the year 2016) of more than twelve billion naira (about US\$46 million). The shutdown of FOT resulted in significant loss of revenue for both government and the affected companies. It also led to job cuts by those service companies that support FOT and the upstream facilities that supply crude oil to FOT.

The foregoing exacerbated the economic woes of the region which was built solely on the upstream petroleum sector, and further maximized the negative aspects of PoDM. A participant painted the sad picture of what the amnesty implementation has cost the nation and industry, not only in terms of revenue but also in human lives. He cited the rising insecurity that have seen twenty-two upstream petroleum sector personnel killed by

militants within the first seven month of 2016. These militants may be hoping to get amnesty in the not distant future.

The increasing insecurity in the region, caused by the activities of NDA, forced many companies to relocate, while others closed shop because they can no longer support the high cost of doing business. Thousands of indigenous company personnel were rendered redundant due to the suspension of oil production activities. This had a cascade effect on local businesses like hotels, banks, and other support service companies, resulting in rising unemployment, lowered capacity utilization, declining tax revenue, and increasing public frustration with government and its agencies.

Due to increased insecurity, more resources had to be dedicated to providing security coverage for personnel working in the region, and to cater for higher insurance premiums. Participants stated that, based on their experience, the state of insecurity in the region translated to more than 45% increase in the cost of executing projects in the region and more than 400% increase in insurance premiums. These are funds that could have been deployed towards more productive economic activities. Furthermore, the money being used to repair vandalized infrastructure is a further drain on scarce government resources. This is because the government is the majority shareholder in the JVs, the government contributes about 55% (its shareholding) of all operational cost. It is also estimated that it will cost at least \$30 billion to clean up the environmental impacts of the illegal bunkering and attack on oil infrastructure across the Niger Delta, using cost data from the UNEP backed Ogoni restoration as a benchmark. These funds could easily transform the Niger Delta landscape and skyline to world class cities like Dubai, Kuala

Lumpur or Singapore, were it to be invested in developmental projects. This is a real loss for all stakeholders.

The above findings concerning increased loss of revenue align with what was written in literature. Due to reduced revenue, government's ability to meet its obligations to citizens was greatly diminished, thereby maximizing the negative aspects of authority, justice, due process, and participation (in economic activities) components of the PoDM. Also, due to reduced revenue, the government is unable to meet its JV cash call obligations thereby enhancing the decline of economic activities and associated tax revenues. Workers in the upstream petroleum industry and the service companies that support them live in fear of losing their jobs, leading to increased tension and stress in the region.

Participants posited that strict enforcement of law and order is central to restoring normalcy in the Niger Delta region. They all agreed that the government has failed thus far in living up to this primary responsibility of protecting lives and property in the region. Participants advocated that the government should, as a matter of urgency, enforce law and order across the Niger Delta using a balanced carrot and stick approach to rein in the militants. Where this fails, a full blockade of known militant hideouts and apprehension of the kingpins, freezing and confiscating their assets, and destroying these assets where confiscation is not possible should be carried out. Participants posited that this was the exact strategy that was used to bring down Pablo Escobar, the infamous Colombian drug lord. Law and order enforcement will maximize the positive aspects of the justice and due process pair of the PoDM. This is because there can be no peace in the

absence of rule of law. Participants recommended that if needed, any use of force must be strategic and precise and should be executed in a way that either eliminates collateral damages or reduces to as low as reasonably practical. A repeat of Odi massacres (Human Rights Watch, 1999) must be avoided at all cost. This is to avoid inflaming passions in the region, erode community support of government action, and strengthen the perception of militants as freedom fighters. Polarity management (Johnson, 1996) will be a useful tool that the security forces can use to find and maintain that delicate balance between carrying out their legitimate duties and violating citizen's human rights.

Participants also recommended strong collaboration between government and industry (with government leading) in executing coordinated and strategic social orientation programs to sensitize the people on the consequences of vandalism and the associated pollution of the Niger Delta environment. With the right messaging, the sense of deprivation and perception that violence pays which fuels the violence in the region could be neutralized. Such orientation campaigns should seek to delegitimize violence in all its manifestations, using social and traditional media. Graphic imagery should be used to drive home this message. The campaign message should be direct, commonsensical, and use regular street language. Niger Deltans should be made to understand that they are the biggest losers in the cycle of violence and pollution. They have no other place to call home and should therefore join hands with other stakeholders stop all activities that could lead to further pollution of their environment. Prominent local citizens and opinion leaders from all walks of life should be key ambassadors of this message to enhance the

chances of successful outcome. This will significantly optimize positive aspects of the participation and representation pair of the PoDM.

Furthermore, Participants said that corruption was largely to be blamed for the poor implementation of the amnesty policy. They advocated for the government address the issues of corruption within its ranks by institutionalizing transparency and micro-monitoring of projects to ensure that they are delivered as intended. Holding erring officials accountable was also suggested as a corruption mitigation strategy that will deliver justice to Niger Deltans. They also recommended that the government should fast-track efforts to improve community participation in the subject sector by passing the PIB into law. This in the opinion of participants will maximize community participation in economic activities and give a sense of belonging to Niger Deltans. This is well aligned with Benet's (2012; 2013) assertion that participatory democracy is the answer to oppression; be it political, judicial, economic, or social.

Finally, participants agreed that the ongoing loss of revenue represents an opportunity for all stakeholders. They argued that government should diversify the economy instead of continued dependence on crude oil export as sole foreign exchange earner. They also posited that the loss of revenue as described is an opportunity for both government and upstream petroleum industry, entities that are traditionally known to be wasteful, to strive for cost efficiencies and eliminate waste through strategic process optimization. Achieving this will create more value for the Niger Delta, and deliver the benefits of democracy to the people.

A more impoverished Niger Delta. This is one unintended negative consequences that still fuels the prevailing sense of deprivation in the region. The NDA use the worsening poverty level in the region as justification for the restarting the militancy even though very few in the region believe this to be the case. The NDA ignores the fact that their activities further impoverish the people they claim to be fighting for. Study findings suggested that the reduction in government revenue significantly limited government's ability to implement the much-needed economic stimulus required to revive the Niger Delta economy. Private capital flight, paucity of new investments, and relocation of existing companies away from the region in response to the insecurity, and crash in real estate has not helped matters. Unemployment is at an all-time high, and mass abject poverty seems to be the new normal. Also, findings from the study indicated that the bulk of the amnesty payouts did not make it into the Niger Delta economy. Ex-militant warlords invested their windfall outside the region.

With economic participation and empowerment at an all-time low, lower standard of living, and almost a total breakdown of law and order, the Niger Delta is worse off today than it was pre-amnesty policy implementation. It is no wonder that more people have taken to violent crime to make ends meet. Participants stated that the upstream petroleum sector is the only productive industry in the Niger Delta and they lack the capacity to provide employment for most. Participants called on the government to urgently address the security challenges that they blame the declining economic activities in the region on. Law and order enforcement, and upholding rule of law will help maximize the positive aspects of the justice and due process pair of the PoDM.

Participants agreed that law enforcement should be the first step in creating the right environment to woo investors back to the region.

Benet (2013) stated that if properly managed, democracy is the solution to the most social challenges facing humanity. The government can embrace polarity management (Johnson 1996) and leverage the PoDM to create policies that will facilitate economic renaissance in the region. With peace, sustainable security, and adequate law and order management practices in place, Niger Delta states can embark on a coordinated campaign to encourage businesses that left to return, and new ones to invest. They can incentivize firms operating in the upstream petroleum sector to relocate their head offices to the Niger Delta, and possibly attract new diverse businesses. Study participants suggested using tax breaks, lower tax rates, building enabling infrastructure, and professionalizing their civil service to improve ease of doing business as possible business attraction and retention strategies. This will not only help revive the Niger Delta economy, it will also help create more employment opportunities and thereby bring many out of poverty.

Some participants pointed out that the Niger Delta region has tremendous potential for eco-tourism; an economic diversification opportunity that the Niger Delta states can leverage for job creation and economic diversification. They also suggested that the revival of the Niger Delta economy should be private sector driven. Federal and state governments should provide the developmental vision and blueprint and invite the private sector to transform the Niger Delta into *the Nigerian Dubai*. Benet (2013) implies that democracy breeds hope, frees people from oppression, and lift them out of poverty.

If nothing is done to give hope to the teeming unemployed youth across the Niger Delta and improve their living standards, the region will remain a breeding ground for militants and violent criminals. With time, this festering sore will affect other regions in the country.

More corruption. Participants with inside knowledge posited that the Niger Delta amnesty was not implemented as originally conceived hence the plethora of unintended negative consequences. They argued that the death of President Yar Adua (under whose leadership the amnesty was conceived) made it easier for corruption to drive the policy's implementation. This assertion was in line with literature reviewed where corruption was identified as a key contributing factor to the failure of past initiative aimed at addressing the Niger Delta challenge. With the free flow of amnesty money, corrupt practices like hyper-inflation of contracts, awarding and paying for fictitious contracts, and influence peddling became the order of the day. Officials of the amnesty office sent their family members and friends for vocational training in place of demobilized ex-militants. Personal interests trumped public good in violation of codes of conduct and contrary to what is expected of responsible public administrators. All these negated the justice and due process while hindering participation in the economy.

Participants posited that the political will to address the cancer of corruption has been absent all along. They hoped that the present government, with the war on corruption as its primary agenda, would finally tame this virulent cancer in the interest of greater public good. By enforcing law and order, institutionalizing transparency, meeting corrupt practices and violation of rules, regulations, and governing policies with stiff

penalties, the government will maximize the positive aspects of justice and due process components of the PoDM. By fighting and winning the war on corruption, the government would have resolved one of the primary factors responsible for the chronic underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region and hence the militancy. Checkmating corruption will free up resources for development, motivate initiation and execution of more value-adding projects, and motivate optimal decisions being taken in the interest of public good.

On the flip side, Benet (2013) argued that inability to effectively manage the polarities of democracy would only enhance the downsides of justice, due process, authority, participation and effective representation. Some of these downsides include pervasive poverty, culture of violence, insecurity, and abuses of office; all of which have kept the Niger Delta underdeveloped and its people oppressed for generations.

More pollution of Niger Delta environment. Participants argued that this by far is the most devastating unintended negative consequence of the amnesty policy implementation. This particular consequence has generational impacts. Its implications transcend the upstream petroleum sector and s beyond the political, environmental, social, economic and cultural dimensions.

Research outcome indicated that the amnesty opened the floodgate of illegal crude oil bunkering in the region. The crude oil thieves care less about the impacts of their illegal activities on the environment. Participants blamed illegal crude oil bunkering activities for more than 95% of recorded oil spills in the region between 2009-2014. Bushfire often follow in the wake of these illegal bunkering initiated spills. The

sprawling pristine green mangroves of the Niger Delta of yore look more like desolated deserts today. The pervasive pollution is a nightmare for the upstream petroleum industry operators, not only in terms of possible cleanup costs but also in terms of reputational and brand management. Managing company reputation will become increasingly challenging in this instance because environmental activists and NGOs by default blame the IOCs for incidences of environmental pollutions in their areas of operation irrespective of the real cause.

The pollution of the Niger Delta environment maximizes the downside of the components of PoDM and reinforces the perception of deprivation.

In order to maximize the upsides of the polarities of democracy, government (state and federal) have to take definite steps to enforce law and order, stamp out illegal bunkering, and flush out and severely discipline conniving security officers. As the United Nations backed Ogoni cleanup progresses, lessons learnt should be carefully documented and adopted in cleaning up the larger Niger Delta environment. Participants also suggested that stakeholders set up and contribute a given percentage of their annual revenue into a dedicated fund for the future Niger Delta clean up. This fund should be ring-fenced. Transparent actions like this will demonstrate the sincerity and commitment of government and the industry towards restoring the Niger Delta environment. This will further maximize the upside of justice, due process, and authority components of the PoDM.

Furthermore, participants suggested that the government immortalize the pollution of the Niger Delta by establishing an environmental or pollution museum. This

memorial should be patterned after the Jewish Holocaust museum and should serve as both a reminder and commitment of Niger Deltans to safeguard their environment at all cost. The museum should be operated such that visitors will always leave with a *never again* mindset. Never again will they allow their actions or inactions, to harm their environment. To drive traffic to this recommended environmental museum, policies and legislation that promote eco-tourism should be put in place. This will enhance the upsides of the environmental justice and community participation components of the PoDM.

Finally, existing environmental legislations should be strengthened, to align with international best practices, and enforced. Routine flaring should be outlawed. Companies should be made to pay steep fines for incidences of operational spills. Acts of vandalism against oil and gas producing and processing infrastructure should be criminalized under the law. All these will enhance the upsides of the justice, authority, due process and participation components of the polarities of democracy model.

What the unintended consequences mean for upstream petroleum sector.

The unintended consequences represent mixed fortune for Nigerian petroleum industry stakeholders. On one hand, the unintended positive consequences are good news for stakeholders namely the Niger Deltans, companies operating in the sector, the state and federal governments. The entrance of more local operators into the sector will lead to more competition among sector players. This will translate to more profits and hence increased government revenue. Passing a balanced PIB into law will serve as catalyst to take the industry to the next level. More competition within the industry will result in cost

efficiencies, optimize business processes, and unleash homegrown creativity and innovation which will ultimately deliver more value to stakeholders.

More Niger Deltans will participate in the upstream petroleum sector. This will result in a greater sense of ownership for employees and help neutralize the pervading sense of deprivation that participants recognized as a key factor that fueled and sustained the Niger Delta militancy.

With the unintended consequences in play, it will no longer be business as usual for the upstream petroleum sector stakeholders, if the industry must both survive and thrive. The factors that led to the militancy need to be addressed with a sense of utmost urgency. This is the responsibility of federal, state, and local governments. To this end, it is very commendable that government and their industry partners have flagged off the one billion dollar Ogoni clean up and restoration project. As with the Ogoni clean up and restoration project, the government can no longer afford to pay lip service to the issue of Niger Delta development but must take concrete steps to start the process of developing world class social and economic infrastructure in the Niger Delta region. To this end, the government must enforce law and order in the Niger Delta and across the country. Following on the heels of peace and security, the government should launch massive infrastructure development projects across the region, with firm timelines and ring-fenced resources. These projects will create much needed employment opportunities for the teeming youths in the region and beyond. This will enhance the upsides of the components of the PoDM and negate the downsides of relative deprivation.

As with the enforcement of law and order, careful attention should be paid to the enforcement of environmental legislations and regulations. Companies or individuals found to have violated environmental laws and regulations should be held accountable and appropriate sanctions given. As part of business unusual mindset, participants argued that it is in the best interest of upstream petroleum sector companies to self-regulate and adopt international standards where local regulations are deficient. This may require process or business model changes in the short-term, but will position the companies for sustained compliance and profitability in the long-term.

The unintended consequences of the amnesty policy implementation also require the Niger Delta populace to adopt the business unusual mindset in their relationship with both industry and government. They must learn to hold their public administrators and elected or appointed office holders to account for their actions and inactions. It is my opinion that instead of blowing up oil pipelines and polluting their environment, they should be out on the streets demanding to know what the governments (federal and state) and their agencies did with the billions of naira appropriated for Niger Delta development. Citizen policing strategy should extend beyond the apprehension of petty criminals to include citizen arrest of corrupt public office holders. Participants suggested that the Niger Deltans need to be at the forefront of the fight to replace corruption with rule of law at all levels of society and government. Citizen participation at this level will motivate public administrators to develop competencies in the effective management of the polarities of democracy, deepen democracy, improve justice delivery, due process, and deliver the dividends of democracy to the people. This level of citizen participation

in governance will greatly maximize the upsides of participation, justice, and due process components of the PoDM, sustain the rule of law, and by extension usher in an era of sustained peace and security in the Niger Delta region. Lasting peace and security is crucial to the short-term survival and long-term prosperity of the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector.

In the short-term, it is expected that the security challenges will persist, with all its negative consequence including loss of revenue and increased cost of doing business. The Industry and the government need to introduce cost saving and waste reduction strategies. While managing the adverse impact of reduced revenue and the escalating cost of doing business in the regions, both government and industry will also have to contend with the need to save money for a future Niger Delta clean-up as well as proactively manage the potential reputational fallouts. All these are compounded by factors outside the control of government and industry, including the low oil price regime. It seems that the industry may not be returning to pre-amnesty profitability levels anytime soon.

Managing the unintended consequences

The unintended consequences of the amnesty policy implementation may be managed by formulating new policies that when implemented will maximize the opportunities (unintended positive consequences) and mitigate the risks (unintended negative consequences) and possible convert them into opportunities. Participants suggested that all stakeholders work together to develop policies, program, and strategies to manage the short- and long-term impacts of these consequences. This will ensure they do not negatively influence the strategic future of the upstream petroleum sector.

Findings from the study suggest that these policies should include community policing law enforcement strategies and policies, Niger Delta environmental cleanup policy, and job creation programs and policies. Others include corruption fighting strategies and policies, social orientation policies, a compelling vision to develop the Niger Delta region and the associated implementation roadmap, back to school programs, and community empowerment strategies and initiatives among others. These policies and strategies should be collaboratively developed and implemented by key stakeholders including the government, the upstream petroleum sector operators, and the Niger Delta community representatives.

Stakeholders should collaborate on law and order enforcement to bring about lasting peace and mass orientation to counter the unintended negative message that violence pays. They should also collaborate on educational programs to change the prevailing mindset, and the continuation of ongoing CSR initiatives. Finally, participants said that stakeholders should collaborate on developing holistic strategies to address the agitation points and narratives include environmental protection and overall development of the Niger Delta region. The government should work towards a balanced political structure by way of practicing true federalism. More political and economic power need to be devolved to the states and local governments. Details of these recommended public policy initiatives and strategies are contained in the implication for positive social change section of this chapter.

Limitations of the Study

The key limitation of this study was my inability to recruit participants from the Nigerian government (immediate past or present) to get their perspective on the amnesty policy implementation. Getting the views of this critical stakeholder group would have provided clearer insight into their assessment of the successes and failures of the Niger Delta amnesty policy, as well as what they think the government should do to manage the unintended consequences. The resurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta made the amnesty a politically sensitive topic. Participation from the presidency may have clarified the rationale behind some of the controversial decisions that the participants blamed for the unintended negative consequences.

Recommendations for Further Study

Based on participants' feedback, it would appear that the Niger Delta amnesty implementation resulted in more harm than good; leaving the Niger Delta worse off. There may be a need for a study to determine the effectiveness and efficacy of the Niger Delta amnesty policy formulation and implementation.

Based on literature reviewed, there is a need for a focused study to understand how the Niger Delta amnesty policy implementation has shaped or is influencing the sociocultural and sociopolitical landscape of the Niger Delta. Such a study should have the upcoming 2019 general elections as its primary focus. The outcome from such study will help governments at all level to formulate and implement policies to influence the emerging sociocultural and sociopolitical landscape in a direction that supports the

Nigerian upstream petroleum sector to continue adding greater value to the Niger Delta and Nigerian economy.

Furthermore, it is recommended that a study to determine the effects of the militancy and the associated amnesty policy on the psyche and psychology of ex-militants and their victims will be most desirable. The possible outcome of such a study will help stakeholders (government, NGOs and industry operators) to come up with effective strategies to fully restore and reintegrate them as productive members of civil society.

One of the findings from this study is that the amnesty policy implementation validated the perception that violence pays. A study to understand the extent to which the amnesty policy set a negative strategic precedent or otherwise for managing existing or new security challenges (Boko Haram, Fulani Herdsmen, Indigenous People of Biafra, Movement for the Actualization of Biafra, Odua People Congress) confronting the Nigerian state will also be beneficial to society.

I suggest that future researchers looking to add to the Niger Delta militancy and amnesty body of knowledge take factors such as ease of access to potential participants, availability of resources (time and money) into consideration before embarking on similar studies to enhance their chances for success. Researchers who do not speak the local languages, or who have no strong ties to the Niger Delta communities other than their research work, may be viewed with distrust. The researcher may have to make a significant investment in trust building or use assistants or middlemen with local

connections to facilitate access to participants. This is especially applicable if the topic under study has political or security implications or sensitivities.

I will disseminate the finding of this research through radio and television talk shows, journal publications, presentation at conferences, seminars, workshops, and presentation to executives of companies operating in the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. I may also seek to develop a case study from the findings. Such a case study may be used in business schools to train the next generation of Nigerian political and business leaders. Disseminating the results of this research study using the above strategies will create greater and impactful awareness, motivate a sense of urgency amongst key stakeholders, create a buzz and trigger actions that may result in positive social changes. It is my expectation that these efforts will generate enough discussion and awareness that will spur on the political leadership of Nigeria to muster the political will, deploy the needed resources, along with an encompassing vision that will transform the Niger Delta into the economic powerhouse that it is destined to be. The Niger Delta, Nigeria, and Africa will be better off for it.

Implications for positive social change

This study has many implications for positive social change which will deepen democratic principles and lift many people from the region out of poverty in line with postulations of the PoDM. Delivering positive social change will require strategic collaboration between the Nigerian government, upstream petroleum sector, and the Niger Delta communities; with NGOs and the international community providing support and holding the stakeholders accountable. Effective management of the components of

the PoDM will be the glue holding it all together. Benet (2012, 2013) implied that sub-optimal management of the PoDM will most likely heighten the sense of deprivation which in turn will manifest in continued agitation and militancy. It is expected that effective management of the polarities of democracy will help reduce tension in the region and build trust among stakeholders. It will also help usher in peace and security, and thereby help create the enabling environment needed to holistically address the short- and long-term impacts of the unintended consequences from the amnesty policy implementation on the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector and the Niger Delta region. Aspects of the model may be used to evaluate the effects of implementing the strategies for managing the unintended consequences of the amnesty policy implementation based on key performance indicators. Some of these indicators may include the capacity of recommended solutions to help restore peace and security to the region, contribution in creating a just society, prevent further environmental pollution, and motivate sustainable infrastructural and economic development of the Niger Delta region.

The PoDM was chosen as part of the theoretical frameworks for this study to serve as basis for formulating, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating actions taken to manage the unintended consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty implementation. Anchoring the study recommendations on democratic principles is in line with Benet's (2013) assertion that democratic principles are universal and can be leveraged to solve the challenges confronting humanity and bring about positive social change. The PoDM was also chosen because of the potential multiplier effect because model's polarity pairs are interrelated and strengthen or negate each other. This study contributes to positive

social change by proposing recommendations that when implemented may neutralize the negative impacts of the unintended consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty implementation as well as maximize positive outcomes from the identified unintended consequences. For example, the study results provided unique insights into how the unintended consequences of the amnesty policy implementation can be leveraged to encourage more participation by Niger Deltans in the industry and the associated economic activities leading to increased economic empowerment that translates to improved standards of living, and offer a sort of economic justice hence positive social change.

The following recommended positive social change initiatives are based on the assumption that improving the lot of the Niger Delta people will translate to peace, more economic activities and empowerment, and improved standard of living. All these will combine to create a safe environment for the companies in the Nigerian upstream sector to operate, leading to improved economic and social activities (more revenue for the government), woo new long-term investments and encourage the clean-up of the Niger Delta environment. All these are positive social change outcomes for the Niger Delta communities in particular and Nigeria in general.

Findings from the study also indicated that enthroneing the rule of law through aggressive law and order enforcement and leveraging the justice and due process pair of the polarity of democracy, is the needed first step in peace building in the Niger Delta. Enthusiastic community participation will be a key success factor in restoring sustainable peace and security in the region. The sustainable law and order enforcement based on

community policing (The Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994) may result in significantly reduced cost of doing business in the region (by eliminating the security threats that escalate the cost of projects). It may also contribute to eliminating some of the anti-social behaviors that contributed to reduced production and hence reduced revenue for industry practitioners and the government. Not enforcing the rule of law will have disastrous consequences for the wider Nigerian economy. The Nigerian economy is already in recession today partly due to reduced revenue from the upstream petroleum sector. Furthermore, there can be no significant development or new long-term investment inflow to the Niger Delta in the absence of peace and security. The location of the recently announced multi-billion naira Dangote Refinery in Lagos state (Onyekakeyah, 2016) is an obvious example. The refinery project, with a multiplier effect on the economy including reducing youth unemployment (Ajasa, 2016), should have been located in the Niger Delta had there been peace and security. Dangote Industries obviously believed that cost of security in the Niger Delta far outstrips the costs associated with crude transportation from the Niger Delta to Lagos.

Benet (2013) said that democracy is a force for social justice and freedom, development, and poverty alleviation. This formed the basis for choosing rule of law, cessation of attacks on the upstream petroleum sector infrastructure, and establishing a secure environment where social vices and violent crimes are in constant decline as indicators for the successful implementation of law and order enforcement policies incorporating community policing strategies.

Another key highlight from this study is that a coordinated social reorientation program may result in positive social change in the Niger Delta. Such a program should be a collaborative effort among the key stakeholders namely the governments, the upstream petroleum sector, and the Niger Delta communities. The objective of this orientation program should be to counter the negative message that violence pays, counter the prevailing get rich quick and pay without work syndromes, push the narrative that there can be no development in the absence of peace and security, and the need for all hands to be on deck to preserve the Niger Delta environment for posterity. This social orientation campaign should be carried out on traditional (radio, TV, newspapers) and social media, town-hall sessions, and sponsored sports events and festivals. The various global memoranda of understanding (GMOU) between the oil companies and the host communities should be used as special purpose vehicles to disseminate the message of this social orientation program. The Niger Delta communities should be involved every step of the of the social orientation programs to ensure that they are the ones driving the integration of their peculiar needs, interests, concerns, and expectations into the programs. The social orientation programs may include educational outreaches, radio and television talk shows, public debates, essay competitions for students, and the appointment of community environmental and peace ambassadors among others. The social orientation programs targeted at primary and secondary school pupils should seek to stigmatize anti-social behaviors, de-emphasize wealth at all cost mentality, and celebrate educational accomplishments. Promoting agriculture as wealth creation component of the social orientation programs will serve the dual purpose of providing

employment opportunities for the youth as well as contribute towards ensuring food security for the region in particular and country in general.

These programs should, among other things, provide vital information to community members on the short- and long-term health implications of environmental pollution while countering the violence pays mentality. Making this valuable information available to Niger Deltans will not only enhance participation and representation but also help strengthen the diversity and equality polarity pairs.

Because the orientation programs are targeted primarily at Niger Deltans, they are critical stakeholders and should be involved at every stage: from planning, development, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of project successes. Local opinion leaders, influencers, credible youth leaders, teachers, pastors, traditional rulers, actors, and musicians from the region should be the visible faces of the social orientation programs. This level of community engagement and participation is a key success factor because it ensures that Niger Deltans take both ownership and a level of responsibility for these social change initiatives. It, therefore, follows that the effective management of the participation and representation polarity within the amnesty program may also enhance justice, due process, human rights, and communal obligations components of the PoDM.

An informed population that embraces dialogue and peaceful protests as the most effective conflict resolution strategies, and a listening and responsive government are the indicators that the social orientation program has delivered positive social change.

Another implication for positive social change from this study is that when properly disseminated, the study results may motivate the relevant authorities to embark

on the journey towards the infrastructural development of the Niger Delta region. Infrastructural development should also be seen as employment creation and economic empowerment strategy. Initiating massive infrastructural development projects along with investment in education, health, and entertainment sector, with specific timelines and deliverables, will not only stimulate the Niger Delta economy but also have a multiplier effect on job creation (reducing the rate of unemployment) and hence economic empowerment of more people in the region. This will help lift many in the region out of poverty. Going forward, the federal government should be more just in its distribution of economic projects across the states of the federation. In line with Benet's (2006, 2012, 2013) postulations, equitable distribution of economic projects will maximize the upside of diversity and equality, as well as strengthen the justice and due process pairs of the polarity of democracy model. Increased economic activities will see more people directly empowered through access and participation in the economy and thus maximize the upside of the participation and representation polarity pair of the PoDM.

This study also found that it is in the best interest of the companies operating in the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector to continue with CSR projects. Special mention was made of the community interdependency projects. The interdependency projects were premised on establishing symbiotic relationships between the companies and their host communities. They are designed to prevent disruption of operations at the oil and gas processing facilities by tying availability of critical community social infrastructure like electricity and portable water to the uptime of company owned processing facilities.

The companies either directly supply electricity and water to the communities from their facilities or supply the gas that drives the power generators that provide electricity to power community economy and lifestyle. It, therefore, follows that by disrupting company operations, the communities will also disrupt their normal way of life. These interdependency projects not only help build trust with the Niger Delta host communities but also provide portable water and clean and stable energy to them and thereby enhance their standard of living. Portable water helps reduce the cost of healthcare by eliminating water borne diseases in the beneficial communities.

Portable water is one key deliverables of the United Nation's millennium development goals. Stable electric power serves as a catalyst for increased economic activities in the communities. These two basic necessities are aligned with United Nations initiative to make access to portable water and clean energy fundamental human rights. Study outcome further suggested that it is also in the best interest of the oil companies to continue with and strengthen other ongoing CSR initiatives like educational scholarships, internship placements, and establishing research chairs at especially Niger Delta regional universities. These initiatives will serve the dual purpose of enhancing trust-based relationship with the Niger Delta communities and provision of potential employee pool for the companies. All these will maximize the upsides of the human rights and community obligations component of the PoDM.

Research findings also indicated that there is an urgent need to pass and sign a balanced PIB into law. This will go a long way to forestall attacks on the industry infrastructure and therefore enhance revenue generation capacity for both the government

and companies operating in the upstream petroleum sector. The bill is expected to mandate increased local participation in the sector even further, make more resources available to the host communities in the Niger Delta through improved derivation rate, as well as give them ownership stake in the industry. When signed into law and if properly managed, the bill will give a sense of ownership to the local communities, diminish the sense of deprivation, as well as enhance the upsides of justice and participation components of the PoDM.

Finally, findings of the study may contribute to positive social change by serving as motivation for embedding polarity management and using the PoDM as the foundation for public policy formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. One such policy that could benefit from leveraging the polarity of democracy model is the Niger Delta environmental cleanup policy that this study advocated for. This policy should also mandate the establishment of a Niger Delta Environmental Museum. Proper management of the polarities will influence the extent to which the Niger Delta environment is restored. It will also be the determining factor in preventing the materialization of those conditions that facilitated the environmental pollution in the first place. Ironically, the same militants that use the Niger Delta environmental pollution to justify their actions ended up being responsible for unprecedented pollution of the regional environment. There is a direct link between environmental pollution in the Niger Delta and the prevailing perception of injustice and deprivation because pollution is directly responsible for destroying people's traditional means of livelihood. It follows that addressing environmental pollution issues will enhance the upsides of the justice

component of the PoDM. Advocating for the cleanup and restoration of the Niger Delta environment and preventing recurrence will be the greatest positive social change implications from this study.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to identify the unintended consequences emanating from the implementation of the Niger Delta amnesty policy and to understand what these consequences mean for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. The study was designed to answer two overarching research questions. The findings of the study added to the Niger Delta militancy and amnesty body of knowledge with emphasis on the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. Existing research studies on the Niger Delta militancy and the associated amnesty did not explore the unintended consequences of the amnesty policy. None of the studies examined the impacts of the amnesty policy with the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector as its primary focus. Finally, past studies have looked at the Niger Delta as a problem to be solved instead of viewing it as polarity to be managed. The research findings indicated that polarity management principles and the PoDM can serve as the basis for formulating, planning, implementing, and evaluating the outcomes of strategies and policies designed to manage the unintended consequences of the amnesty policy implementation. This will contribute to creating a secure, peaceful, more developed, prosperous, economically empowered, and just Niger Delta region.

To establish credibility of the collected data, I used open-ended questions to conduct face-to-face interviews virtual focus group discussions. I paraphrased responses from participants during both focus group and interviews, and requested that they

confirm that understanding accurately reflects their perception, expressed viewpoints and opinions. I allowed participants to express themselves fully as well as avoided asking leading follow up questions. Following data analysis and interpretation, aspects of the result were found to be consistent with findings from previous studies as per literature review. For example, this study concluded that the Niger Delta amnesty policy was ill-conceived, poorly implemented, and failed to address the intended goals, in agreement with Akpan and Ering (2010) and Agbiboa (2014). This study also found that the implementation of the Niger Delta amnesty policy has left both the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector and the Niger Delta in a worse state than it was pre-amnesty implementation.

The poor conception, suboptimal implementation, and the influence of corruption led to the plethora of unintended negative consequences with both short- and long-term implications for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. The short-term adverse effects, including resurgence of militancy, rise in anti-social behaviors like armed robbery and kidnapping, capital flight from the Niger Delta, more pollution of the Niger Delta environment have already materialized with devastating consequences for the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector and the Niger Delta region. This has further maximized the downside of the polarities of democracy. The long-term impacts will shape the education, cultural orientation, and political leadership, environmental, economic and infrastructural development of the Niger Delta region. These long-term impacts will influence the strategic future of the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. As the cost of doing business increases and revenue declines, and new local entrants come into the industry, companies

in the upstream petroleum sector will have to re-invent themselves and seek for cost efficiencies. Companies operating in the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector will have to evolve smart strategies to remain competitive if they must survive in the Niger Delta security challenged environment, and still deliver value to stakeholders. The competition for opportunity to partner with government will be more intense. The stakes are made even higher as existing oil mineral exploration and production licenses are due for renewal in 2018.

It is therefore in the best interest of all stakeholders to collaborate and ensure that the short-term negative impacts of the unintended consequences do not define the strategic future of the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector, and the Niger Delta by extension. All hands should be on deck to turn the short-term threats into long-term opportunities and maximize benefits from the unintended positive consequences. Some potential positive social changes from the study include increased economic participation, a secure and peaceful Niger Delta, increased youth employment, higher quality education, better informed and engaged citizenry, improved standard of living among others. These positive social changes when delivered may not only empower the Niger Delta people but also assuage the sense of deprivation.

Finally, it is my hope and expectation that the various levels of government will embrace the polarities of democracy model as a tool to formulate, implement, monitor, and evaluate new policies. Doing this will help maximize the value from such public policies as well as help limit possible unintended negative consequences of implementing such policies to a minimum.

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Appendix A: Maps of Nigeria Showing the Niger Delta Region




Figure A1. Political map of Niger Delta Regional areas and cities by NASRD and Tomas Malina.

Appendix B: Section 7(1) of the NDDC Act – NDDC Goals/Objectives

The NDDC was conceived as a vehicle that the federal government will use to transform the Niger Delta. It was one of the institutional responses that aimed at addressing the infrastructure deficit of the region. This appendix details out the stated goals, objectives, and deliverables of the NDDC namely:

- a.** Formulate polices and guidelines for the development of the Niger Delta area:
- b.** Conceive, plan and implement, in accordance with set rules and regulations, projects and programmes for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta area in the field of transportation including roads, jetties and waterways, health, education, employment, industrialization, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban development, water supply, electricity and telecommunications:
- c.** Cause the Niger-Delta area to be surveyed in order to ascertain measures which are necessary to promote its physical and socioeconomic development.
- d.** Prepare master plans and schemes designed to promote the physical development of the Niger Delta area and the estimates of the costs of implementing such master plans and schemes;
- e.** Implement all the measures approved for the development of the Niger-Delta area by the Federal Government and the member States of the Commission;
- f.** Identify factors inhibiting the development of the Niger- Delta area and assist the member States in the formulation and implementation of policies to ensure sound and efficient management of the resources of the Niger- Delta area;

- g.** Assess and report on any project being funded or carried out in the Niger Delta area by oil and gas producing companies and any other company including non-governmental organizations and ensure that funds released for such projects are properly utilized; 22 No. 6 of 2000. 23 S. 2 (1) of the Act. 24 S. 2 (2). 25 S. 4.
- h.** Tackle ecological and environmental problems that arise from the exploration of oil mineral in the Niger-Delta and advise the Federal Government and the member states on the prevention and control of oil spillages, gas flaring and environmental pollution.
- i.** Liaise with the various oil mineral and gas prospecting and producing companies on all matters of pollution prevention and control; and execute such other works and perform such other functions which, in the opinion of the Commission, are required for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta and its people.

Appendix C: Section 14 of the NDDC Act – Funding Mechanism

Sustainable funding was thought to be one of the contributing factors to the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region. The NDDC Act made mandatory allocation of fund to the Commission. Appendix D provides a detail of the sources of funding for the NDDC.

- a.** From the Federal Government, the equivalent of 15 percent of the total monthly statutory allocations due to member States of the Commission from Federation Account; this being the contribution of the Federal Government to the Commission.
- b.** 3 percent of the total annual budget of any oil producing company operating onshore and offshore, in the Niger-Delta area; including gas processing companies.
- c.** 50 percent of monies due to member States of the Commission from the Ecological Fund.
- d.** Such monies as may from time to time, be granted or lent to or deposited with the Commission by the Federal or a State Government, any other body or institution whether local or foreign.
- e.** all moneys raised for the purposes of the Commission by way of gifts, loan, grants-in- aid, testamentary disposition or otherwise; and
- f.** Proceeds from all other assets that may, from time to time, accrue to the Commission.

- g.** The fund shall be managed in accordance with the rules made by the Board, and without prejudice to the generality of the power to make rules under this subsection, the rule shall in particular contain provisions:
- (a) specifying the manner in which the assets or the fund of the Commission are to be held, and regulating the making of payments into and out of the fund; and
 - (b) requiring the keeping of proper accounts and records for the purpose of the fund in such form as may be specified in the rules.

Appendix D: Participant Demographics

Table D1

Participants' Age Distribution

Age Range	Frequency
38 – 45	9
46 – 50	12
51 – 55	4
56 - 60	2
61 – 65	2

Table D2

Participants' Educational Qualifications

Degree	Frequency
BSc	19
MSc	8
Dr.	2
Total	29

Table D3

Participants' Geographical Spread

Frequency	Country	Continent
18	Nigeria	Africa
9	Brunei	Asia
1	Canada	North America
1	USA	North America

Appendix E: Interview and Focus Group Questions

1. What in your opinion are the factors that are responsible for the Niger Delta militancy between 2004 and 2009?
2. What is the impact of the militancy on Niger Delta communities (social, economic, culture)?
3. What was the impact of the militancy on the Niger Delta environment?
4. What was the impact of the militancy on upstream companies?
5. What have the government done to resolve contain and resolve the perennial restiveness in the Niger Delta region?
6. What is your understanding of the Niger Delta amnesty program/policy implementation?
7. What was the state of the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector (SPDC) before the implementation of the amnesty program?
8. What is the immediate impact of the policy implementation on SPDC (Nigerian petroleum upstream sector)?
9. Seven years down the line, will you say that the Niger Delta amnesty has delivered on stated objectives and goals?
10. How effective has the Niger Delta amnesty been in addressing the root causes of the militancy?
11. What is the security situation in the Niger Delta today?
12. What are the shortcomings (areas for improvement) of the Niger Delta amnesty program implementation?

13. What kind of development (+ve or -ve) has the amnesty program brought to the Niger Delta?
14. What are the +ve and –ve unintended consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty policy implementation?
15. What are the implications of these unintended consequences for SPDC (Nigerian petroleum upstream sector) and by extension the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector? Or what do these unintended consequences mean for the Nigerian petroleum upstream sector?
16. What is the impact of the Niger Delta amnesty implementation on Niger Delta and National politics and economy? Any global impacts?
17. What is the effect of the Niger Delta amnesty implementation on the relationship between upstream petroleum sector (SPDC) and its host communities?
18. What is the cost (financial, reputation, operational) of these unintended consequences on upstream petroleum sector's (SPDC's) operations in the Niger Delta?
19. With the amnesty in place, has the vandalism of (SPDC) upstream petroleum sector infrastructure in the region stopped?
20. How has (SPDC) the upstream petroleum sector, responded and is responding to these unintended consequences of the Niger Delta amnesty policy implementation?

21. How has the government (Niger Delta states and the Federal) responded (are responding) to these unintended consequences?
22. I assume you consulted widely before and during the formulation of the Niger Delta amnesty policy. If you were to do it all over again, what will you (Government/the industry) do differently; what will you see included/excluded from the policy?
23. What are the chances of resurgence of militancy against the upstream petroleum sector in the Niger Delta and what can the sector do to forestall it?

Appendix F: Diverse Participant Pool




Figure F1. Diverse participant pool.

Appendix G: 10 Steps for Conducting a Content Analysis

Content analysis was adopted as the data analysis strategy for this study. The Surrey University Library (n.d) stated that the process of content analysis is lengthy and may require the researcher to review data several times to ensure that a thorough analysis has been performed. The Library recommended that following steps be followed in carrying out content analysis.

1. Copy and read through the transcript - make brief notes in the margin when interesting or relevant information is found.
2. Go through the notes made in the margins and list the different types of information found.
3. Read through the list and categorized each item in a way that offers a description of what it is about.
4. Identify whether or not the categories can be linked any way and list them as major categories (or themes) and / or minor categories (or themes).
5. Compare and contrast the various major and minor categories.
6. If there is more than one transcript, repeat the first five stages again for each transcript.
7. When you have done the above with all of the transcripts, collect all of the categories or themes and examine each in detail and consider if it fits and its relevance.

8. Once all the transcript data is categorized into minor and major categories/themes, review in order to ensure that the information is categorised as it should be.
9. Review all of the categories and ascertain whether some categories can be merged or if some need to them be sub-categorised.
10. Return to the original transcripts and ensure that all the information that needs to be categorised has been so.

Appendix H: Timeline of Niger Delta Avengers' Bomb Attacks, January – July 2016

Table H1

Resurgence of Militancy: Attacks Credited to NDA Between January – July 2016

S/N	Date	Location	Target
1	14-Jan	Warri South, Delta State	Escravos-Warri-Abuja-Lagos crude oil and gas pipelines
2	15-Jan	Warri South, Delta State	Chevron Nigeria Limited Utunama-Makaraba crude line
3	16-Jan	Warri South, Delta State	Olero gas pipeline
4	10-Feb	Bayelsa State	Bonny Soku Gas Export Line which supplies natural gas to the Nigeria Liquefied Gas and the Independent Power Plant at Gbaran
5	14-Feb	Forcados, delta State	Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) Underwater Forcados 48-inch Export Pipeline at Forcados Export Terminal
6	19-Feb	Bayelsa State	Clough Creek Tebidaba Agip Pipeline Manifold
7	4-May	Abitaye, Delta State	Chevron Value platform which is the connection point for all other platforms and a fulcrum to Chevron BOP and Tank Farm
8	5-May	Bayelsa State	Chevron Well D25 and all connecting pipelines
9	13-May	Delta State	Chevron Pipelines bombed at two spots
10	20-May	Bayelsa State	Escravos Gas Pipeline managed by Nigeria National Petroleum Company (NNPC)
11	27-May	Warri, Delta State	Nembe 1, 2 and 3 Brass to Bonny trunk lines operated by the Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) and SPDC
12	27-May	Bayelsa State	NNPC Gas and Crude trunk lines
13	31-May	Dibi, Delta State	Chevron Oil Well RMP 23 and RMP 24 believed to be company's highest swamp oil wells
14	2-Jun	Bayelsa State	Ogboinbiri to Tebidaba and Clough Creek to Tebidaba crude oil pipelines
15	3-Jun	Ughelli, Delta	SPDC Forcados 48 Export Line
16	3-Jun	Bayelsa State	Brass to Tebidaba crude oil line
17	8-Jun	Sapele, Delta State	Well RMP 20 operated by Chevron Nigeria Limited 20 kilometers from Dibi flow station in Warri North local council.
18	10-Jun	Bayelsa State	Obi-Obi Brass Trunkline operated by Agip ENI
19	16-Jun	Akwa Ibom State	NNPC pipeline at Oruk Anam Local Government Area
20	1-Jul	Warri, Delta State	NNPC crude oil trunk line to Warri Refinery
21	2-Jul	Sapele, Delta State	Two trunk lines operated by the Nigerian Petroleum 7 Development Company near Batan flow station
22	3-Jul	Sapele, Delta State	Two oil wells (Wells 7& 8) operated by Chevron near Abiteye flow station
23	7-Jul	Warri, Delta State	Three Chevron manifolds bombed at Diagbolo, Dibi Oil Field
24	8-Jul	Bayelsa State	Nembe 1, 2 and 3 crude oil trunk lines blew up

Note. Table adapted from Musa and Aghedo (2016).