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Strengthening Participatory Democracy through Participatory Budgeting

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Walden University
2016

Abstract

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Babatunde Adesegun Sobanjo

MBA, DeVry University, 2010

Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, 1978

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

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Abstract

Although participatory budgeting (PB) was introduced in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2005, it has yet to be widely adopted. While PB has great potential to enhance citizen participation in the democratic process, little academic research has focused on the utility of PB as a mechanism for citizen empowerment in the region. The purpose of this case study was to gain further understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos State, Nigeria to participate effectively in budgetary decision-making processes. The data were gathered from 15 semi-structured, one-on-one interviews of purposefully selected participants that included adult citizens of Ijede, government officials, politicians, and representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) connected to the budget process, two follow-up focus groups with participants, and analysis of government budgetary documents. Using Avritzer's theory of participatory institutions as the foundation, the study explored stakeholder perceptions of how citizens can be effectively educated and empowered to participate in the PB process. The data revealed the fragility of PB when local government officials suspended the process because other financial demands were considered more expedient than PB, a situation made possible in the absence of a legal framework institutionalizing the process. Another major theme uncovered is that PB must engage community-based organizations to be effective. Positive social change in the form of enhanced citizen participation in the political process can come about in Nigeria if PB is implemented under an institutionalized legal framework that guarantees sustainability.

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to the memory of the following people:

To my father, Gilbert Adejimi Sobanjo, whose dream was for his children to stand on the same stage as those of the rich and famous.

To my mother, Abigail Abiodun Sobanjo whose uncommon love saw me through very challenging times.

To my sister, Olubunmi Somorin, who made possible the opportunity to become an accountant at an age considered at the time as immature.

To my brother, Dr. Adesino Sobanjo, my protector and my confidant whose thirst for knowledge gave me the courage to embark on this journey.

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I am grateful to all my participants at Ijede for their cooperation and the love they showed to me during my fieldwork. I especially thank Dewunmi Ogunbambi, who gave me all the support I needed to succeed before and during fieldwork. To all the members of staff of Ijede Local Development Area, I thank you for honoring me during the short period I spent with you.

The dissertation journey is usually a very lonely trip, but Dr. Samuel Ekong and Agada Elachi agreed to be my companion on the voyage. I thank you both. Tolu, I thank you too. Finally, I give great honor to Him, who molded me, knows me, and keeps me and all that are mine: The Almighty.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

As a political institution in Nigeria, participatory budgeting (PB) has not attracted sufficient interest among the socially disadvantaged who stand to benefit the most from being involved in political discourses (Osmani, 2007). The decision-making processes in the region, most of which are under democratically elected governments, exclude the involvement of several classes of citizens whose lives the decisions affect (Bratton, 2012). The political class appears unconcerned about such excluded citizens. They consider such individuals as commoners and unintelligent, lacking in the sophistication of governance, and unworthy of the power to make public policy decisions (Bratton, 2012; Leduka, 2009).

Participatory democracy has grown in recent times, especially because of the PB experience of Porto Alegre, Brazil. In the 1980s, the opposition of civil society in Brazil to years of military rule was the formation of the formation of political movements, which metamorphosed into political parties such as the Worker's Party, and the Brazilian Democratic Movement. In 1985, democratic governance returned the new parliament passed a constitution guarantying citizen access to health care, education and housing (Avritzer, 2009; Wampler, 2012a). Under the government guaranteed access to social services, federal, state and municipal administrations began experimenting with various processes that permit citizen participation in public policy decision-making. The Worker's Party introduced PB to allocate resources to Brazil's low-income communities and to orientate citizens towards active democratic participation (Avritzer, 2010; Wampler, 2012a).

Participatory democracy redirects power away from the highest level of governance and presents new opportunities for those at the bottom of the social ladder to have a say in governance. It does this because it is a bottom-up approach to democratic governance that places control in the hands of ordinary citizens (Roussopoulos, 2005). Participatory budgeting is an annual process that allows citizens in organized groups to participate voluntarily in decision-making concerning parts of local budgets. It has proven to be the quintessential example of participatory democracy (Pateman, 2012).

The World Bank and the United Nations have promoted PB, which has become a universal phenomenon present in hundreds of cities and local governments around the world (The World Bank, n.d.; United Nations Democracy Fund, 2014). All citizens, especially the grassroots and the poor who are remote from political leadership, should have decision-making opportunities in matters that influence their lives.

The federal government of Nigeria, prompted by the United Nations, encouraged local governments to begin experimenting with PB (DESA, 2005). The experimentation represents an excellent opportunity in the subfield of participatory democracy to explore an emerging research area concerning the factors that best facilitate public involvement and best practices in the PB process (Avritzer, 2010; Goldfrank, 2007; Wampler, 2012a). This study leverages this opportunity by undertaking a case study of PB in Ijede Local Development Area (LCDA) of Lagos State, Nigeria.

The study explored the role of civil society and government in fostering the skills and resources necessary to encourage grassroots participation via PB. Without such skills, citizens are unable to engage the government to negotiate their interests on issues

that affect their lives. This is of particular importance for the relevance of governance to ordinary citizens.

Citizens determine the projects to be executed under PB because they know what they want, being the direct beneficiaries of the decisions in which they participate. The ultimate benefit to the citizenry is that politicians give priority to the desires of the people, as the ruling class does not determine matters for the people. To this end, the people inspire government projects that meet their needs. Having ordinary citizens decide on project priorities makes governance directly relevant to meet the peoples' needs. In Nigeria, there is a gulf between the government and the governed, which could be bridged through a democratic institution such as PB.

In the next section of this introductory chapter, the background of this study on PB, and its roots in participatory democracy as exemplified through PB are examined. Following this, I present the research problem that this study interrogates and follow the examination with the explanation of the research methodology for the study. Next, I present my research questions with the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, which drive this academic analysis. In the final section, I narrate the potential contributions of this study to the body of knowledge in participatory democracy and PB.

Background of the Study

To achieve the overarching objectives of PB, citizens need to play key roles of providing grassroots information emerging from the community and generating native, intuitive ideas to the government for the enactment of public policies in the best interest of the public (Michels & de Graaf, 2010). Thus, the citizens serve as informants to the government on important decisions that affect their daily lives.

In their study of PB in the Netherlands, Michels and de Graaf (2010) suggested that participatory democracy might be less successful in developed economies where representative democracies have been established for several centuries. In contrast with older democracies, Avritzer (2010) posited that because of PB, participatory democracy has recorded impressive success in Brazilian cities, especially Porto Alegre. Michels and de Graaf (2010) and Donaghy (2010) observed that voting pattern and numbers at general elections neither tell the whole story of protestations of citizens nor express judgment they pass on policy issues. After elections, there is the general feeling of apathy among the electorates, causing a gradual erosion of grassroots interest and reduced voter turnouts at elections from year to year. In response to this state of apathy, governments, with the encouragement from the United Nations and the World Bank, have turned to participatory democracy through PB.

Participatory budgeting encourages participation of the electorate at the local level in decision-making on issues of direct concern to their daily economic and social lives (Avritzer, 2010; Dobson, 2005; Michels & de Graaf, 2010). Avritzer observed that with PB, the grassroots of Brazil gained some control of and access to public services. Participatory budgeting provided the forum at which the government and the citizens interacted to undertake significant socio-economic decisions. As Donaghy (2010) observed, the grassroots developed active influence once they had shared points of interest around which they could organize themselves to present their needs to the government. Consequently, the people learned the democratic process by engaging in various purposeful and deliberate actions that constitute their democratic activities and responsibilities. By so doing, the citizens demand transparency and accountability from

the political class, acting as the watchdog against the excesses of government officials. The people reciprocate the ceding of some political space by paying taxes, because they know such government revenues would be put to judicious use for which there would be proper accountability.

In Brazil, civil society, which included NGOs, neighborhood associations, business communities and professional organizations, formed social structures that supported participation (Avritzer, 2010; Donaghy, 2010). Through the social structures, the citizens learned to engage in the social discourses, which provided the springboard for informed participation in decision-making processes. The system of political education by doing and practicing democracy encouraged the people to recognize the importance of their input and the protection of their stake in the government. Through the process of learning, the citizens defied the belief that the grassroots lacked the sophistication to comprehend the rudiments of governance and the confidence to get involved in political processes as participants (Avritzer, 2010; Michels & de Graaf, 2010).

The training provided by NGOs contributed in no small way to the development of novice grassroots organizations, which acquired the necessary skills to become politically perceptive participants (Avritzer, 2010; Michels & de Graaf, 2010). As Acharya, Lavalle, and Houtzager (2004) found, community-based associations are more likely to participate effectively in local issues than advocacy NGOs, most of which fail to empower the people with the skills necessary for participation. As Michels and de Graaf (2010) observed, politicians recognized the knowledge and ideas that the grassroots contribute to public policy discourses, most of which the politicians considered and implemented.

Participatory budgeting has been successful because elected officials yielded some control over political decisions to the grassroots, by providing the necessary legal framework that institutionalized the process (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Furthermore, civil society and community leaders recognized the need to organize the citizens at the lowest levels of human assembly for the opportunity to be part of the decision-making machinery of the government (Avritzer, 2010).

The findings of Acharya et al. (2004) set the backdrop for this postulation but pointed out that civil society organizations (CSOs) such as the NGOs tend to be "institutionally embedded actors" that are closer to the government than with those they are set out to represent (p. 41). Bherer (2010) held that the state could change the status quo and empower the economically disadvantaged by strengthening neighborhood civic groups. Participatory budgeting created avenues for social groups, hitherto excluded from decision-making, to get involved in public decision-making (Acharya, Lavalle, & Houtzager, 2004).

As in any corrupt environment, the poorest people in Nigeria suffer most from the repercussions of corruption. Corruption eliminates, or at best, weakens the social supports for the poor and deprives them of the knowledge, skills, and abilities to confront the ravaging effects of corruption (Essia & Yearoo, 2009). Dobson (2005) posited that without a voice or representation from their socioeconomic groups, the grassroots are an excluded group in most democracies. However, when the grassroots get involved with a participatory process, corrupt practices are noticeable to the grassroots, leaving political officials to submit to embracing governance that is more transparent. Bherer (2010) posited that participatory mechanisms create opportunities for the government and the

civil society to dialog and collaborate, but without excluding the rights of civil society to protest. Civil society organizations could be critical of the state without being confrontational, but they could form partnerships with the state for the benefit of the community as a whole (Essia & Yearoo, 2009). It is possible for average people to learn governance by participation as the educational benefits make for a population with a high sense of civic responsibility (Bherer, 2010). A sign of the link between policymakers and the poor in the society is visible when citizens can hold politicians accountable for public spending and other issues that affect the poor and the vulnerable in the society.

There have been few studies on the educational content of the training civil society provides or should offer grassroots populations to allow them to participate in a meaningful way in PB in sub-Saharan countries (Conyers, 2007; Dobson, 2005; Leduka, 2009; Matovu & Mumvuma, 2008). Furthermore, there are very few published research materials in the professional literature about PB in Nigeria. Adesopo (2011) is one author who has addressed PB in Nigeria. Through the literature on PB, Adesopo identified some difficulties that are likely to confront the process in Nigeria. These inhibitors include the lack of understanding on the part of stakeholders of how democracy works, misunderstanding about the functions and obligations of stakeholders. Other inhibitors include poor oversight and evaluation of projects, transparency and accountability issues, poor communication, and inadequate resources.

The article fell short of identifying ways to overcome these shortcomings in the context of the Nigerian space. It is necessary to examine the presence of these gaps in the particular case of Ijede LCDA and investigate ways to reinforce participatory democracy

by strengthening PB. Therefore, this study aims to gain further understanding of the issues to which CSOs need to pay more attention in educating grassroots for effective PB.

Problem Statement

It was not known whether and how civil society empowers citizens to participate in the PB process. Specifically, was is not known whether and how civil society can empower citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria to participate in the PB process. Participatory budgeting is still a practice at the fringes of democratic development in most of Sub-Saharan Africa despite its introduction in the region in 2005, to encourage the attainment of the millennium development goals of the United Nations (Bertucci, 2008).

The failure of PB, a soft introductory process to participatory democracy, has been due primarily to poor implementation that did not embrace local dynamics such as, the complexity of the process of rule-making, the role of women, transportation, cultural values, and perennial violence in the slums (Avritzer, 2010; Avritzer, 2012). In Pateman's (2012) view, citizens soon develop the knowledge, skills, and sophistication of governance if they have the opportunity to participate in the decision-making processes that affect their lives (Osmani, 2007). What stands in the way of democratic participation by the grassroots is the lack of skills and the confidence to engage politicians and professionals that are more knowledgeable. It remains unknown how civil society might better integrate and empower citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria to participate in the PB process. Participatory budgeting designs work best when they are organic, and they are not constrained by foreign ideas that have no bearing on the realities of local idiosyncrasies (Avritzer, 2009). This study extracted information from the

participants to understand from their perspectives the particularities that need to be considered in Ijede for PB to yield its desired objectives.

The Purpose Statement

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to gain further understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in budgetary decision-making processes. The data for this study were collected from 15 semi-structured one-on-one interviews of purposefully selected participants that included adult citizens of Ijede, government officials, politicians, and representatives of NGOs. Participants partook in focus group discussions at the end of the one-on-one interview sessions. For data triangulation, government documents of past budgets were reviewed.

Research Questions

The research questions drive the qualitative methodological approach to gain further understanding of the role of CSOs in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate in PB. Thus, the following research questions probed the subjective understanding of those who have been directly involved in the PB process at the site of inquiry:

RQ1:   What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the PB process at Ijede LCDA?

RQ2: What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at Ijede LCDA?

RQ3: What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business community in the PB process?

RQ4: What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected projects?

These research questions were designed to extract from the participants the necessary components if citizens were to have the ability to engage with the government over budgetary allocations and spending. To answer these questions, I used interview questions to interrogate the roles of NGOs, if any, in empowering citizens to acquire the necessary skills to engage the government effectively.

Research question 1 addressed the problem statement by investigating the roles of NGOs, if any, in working with the government to design a PB process that enabled the citizens to participate in, and benefit from, the objectives of interacting with the government for decision-making purposes. The question also probed the means by which NGOs engaged with the citizens in order to empower them. Research question 2 unraveled, through the intuitive perception of the participants, the activities CSOs needed to embark on in order to empower the citizens to participate in the PB process at Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria.

Financial resources are hardly adequate for local or municipal administrations to fund PB to meet the desires of the citizens. Idemudia (2009) conjectured that some corporate organizations do reinvest in the communities by providing funds, materials, and equipment toward the execution of community projects. Idemudia suggested NGOs, in their advocacy roles, interact with corporations to participate in community projects. Research question 3 explored, through the experiences of the participants, the underlying factors that encouraged corporations to fill the resources gap experienced by governments. Through the intervention of NGOs, corporations should be aware of

community needs. Such intervention is essential to the success of PB. Research question 4 also explored the sustainability strategies the government could consider to ensure citizen-selected projects are completed and maintained. This research question could potentially lead to policy changes requiring NGOs to pressure the government to consider some sustainability strategy for a stronger PB process.

Together, these research questions provided the means to collect relevant data through semi-structured interview questions, follow up questions, and focus group discussions. The data collected allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in budgetary decision-making.

Theoretical Framework

The foundations of this study hang on the two frameworks of participatory institutions, and the conceptual framework of PB. The frameworks serve to explicate the praxis of PB and serve as the prism to stratify the interplay of elements that drive the process.

The Theory of Participatory Institutions

The main theoretical framework of this study is the theory of participatory institutions as posited by Avritzer (2009). The theory connects the tripartite relationship between "civil society, the political society, and institutional design" (p. 1). Avritzer (2009) argued that the three bottom-up approaches to democratic institutions emerging from Brazil's democratic governance did not always create the much touted active public engagement and equitable distribution of public services. Avritzer (2009) posited that the peculiarities of institutional designs influenced successful outcomes in the four Brazilian

cities of Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador, and Sao Paulo. The precondition that permitted these results was the presence and the nexus between civil society, the political society, and institutional design.

The Workers' Party introduced participatory budgeting to Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1989. The party had won the mayoral election on the backdrop of political legacies of corruption and discrimination against the poor (Wampler, 2012c). The party promised the kind of democracy in which the poor could participate and to alter the pattern of public spending to include the development of poor neighborhoods. The Workers' Party met an empty municipal treasury when it took over the administration of Porto Alegre (Acharya, Lavalle, & Houtzager, 2004). In keeping with its electoral manifesto of giving citizens direct involvement in governance and to reverse the pattern of concentrating social programs in middleclass neighborhoods, the concept of PB came into being (Abers, 2001).

Participatory Budgeting

Participatory budgeting is a democratic process that provides the opportunity for the electorates to interact with the government when the constituents actively engage in decision-making on fiscal planning priorities from the perspective of the voters. Electorates can develop political sophistication through regular interaction and contacts in public discourses with the government and bureaucrats (Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 2012). Participatory budgeting programs have the hallmark of transparent governance in that citizens are directly involved in the allocation of resources among competing alternatives (Latendresse, 2005).

For PB to be successful, there must be the willingness on the part of the government to respect the budget priorities of its citizens. The community organizing activities of civil society in educating and informing the electorates on procedural and legal matters need the support and encouragement of the government (Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). Since PB involves fiscal issues, the government must be transparent in providing the citizens with its finance and policy guidelines. In Porto Alegre, the organizers provided transportation and childcare facilities for those who may be inhibited from participating because of the absence of these incentives (Wampler, 2012b).

In participatory spaces, civil society is attentive to the actions and nuances of the political society, as the two have direct exchanges often in the full view of the citizenry (Avritzer, 2009). With legal support for the process, these direct exchanges become institutionalized over time and the citizens develop expectations of positive outcomes from the relationship as civil society introduces broader and pertinent issues into the PB arena. Thus, political society in PB spaces sees the formation of citizen agendas through the activities of civil society actors. Civil society could contribute to the restoration of social interactions among the poor and the middleclass, just as it did in Latin America (Peruzzotti, 2012).

The advancement of citizen participation occurs under purposefully designed institutional arrangements such as PB (Avritzer, 2009). Where there is the nexus between civil society, the political society, and purposeful institutional design, PB is capable of rebalancing power between a disconnected central government and the grassroots. The tripartite network could evolve among the citizenry, the awareness of rights to certain urban services, public goods, and resource contributions by the local business community

to the PB process (Abers, 2001; Baierle, 2005; Wampler, 2012a). Civil society has been responsible for the realignment of social networks among the poor such that the political society could no longer ignore their contributions to public policy decisions (Avritzer, 2009).

The important design feature relevant to PB is the enhancement of the potential benefits of doing away with the top-down approach of the political society and establishing a level or bottom-up approach to decision making. Thus, institutional design would focus on direct communication between the political society and the community (Avritzer, 2009).

Operational Definitions

The following are the operational definitions that are germane to the contextual corpus of this study:

Civil society, or civil society organizations (CSOs): consist of nonpolitical organized social formations, which exist based on the rule of law and civility, representing social movements and civic activism, with all activities outside the ambit of government. Civil society organizations include charitable organizations, professional associations, and voluntary organizations (Kaldor, 2003).

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): are a subset of CSOs that are not politically partisan or private, but their purpose is not to challenge institutions of governance but to cooperate with the government as advocates of the citizens (Clarke, 1998). Their activities are humanitarian without criminal purpose. As the name suggests, they do not make any profit, but they provide voluntary services to communities, groups, and individuals. Nongovernmental organizations include philanthropic organizations,

religious organization, professional, and academic institutions that are not profit making. For the purpose of this study, NGOs include community-based organizations (CBOs) that mobilize and organize communities towards shared goals.

Grassroots: refers to any group of people with limited access to social goods, services, and government institutions (Willie, Ridini, & Willard, 2008). Grassroots includes and is interchangeable with e*xcluded people* who are entrenched in impenetrable existence in a closed network with others of similar characteristics with poverty been the strong connection between them (Catell, 2004). Grassroots also include *the poor* who, according to Gordon (2005), are those who lack opportunities and the economic ability to live a dignified existence. Consequently, the poor lack the capacity to partake in basic societal engagements such as public discourses. They lack adequate means to feed or clothe their families, and they are powerless and insecure without healthcare and educational opportunities (Catell, 2004). Environmentally, the poor live on the fringe of existence without water or sanitation. When they have jobs, the poor are poorly paid and unable to take adequate care of their families (Gordon, 2005). The cause of poverty is not natural phenomenon but structural deficiency of equitable distribution of resources (Pearce, 2006).

Nature of the Study

Design of the Study

The choice of a research method depends on its adequacy and relevance to the research question and the purpose of the study (Yin, 2009; Locke, 1989). Yin (2009) presented the definitional foundation for this case study as the firsthand inquiry into understanding a case rooted in the complexity of its real world situation through the

gathering of multifaceted data at the locus of inquiry. Yin (2009) embraced interviewing, review of documents, direct observations, scrutiny of artifacts, and participant observation as the data collection strategies available to qualitative researchers. The appropriate data collection strategies for this study were in-depth, semi-structured, open-ended one-on-one interviews; focus group discussions; and the review of government records (Seidman, 2006; Yin, 2012).

As a qualitative approach, interviewing is best suited to investigate a process such as PB through the subjective understanding of those who have been directly involved in the process. According to Ferrarotti (1981), the best way to understand a sociopolitical process such as PB is through the first-hand experiences of the organizers of, and the participants in the process. As participants provide answers to interview questions, they ruminate about events to construct realities through their experiences (Yin, 2012).

The lives and professional activities of the organizers of PB and the participants in the programs form the content of the process of PB. Interviewing isolates the individual experiences of the participants from the collective experiences of others thus engendering context and diversity of participant perspectives (Ferrarotti, 1983). Seidman (2006) further asserted that interviewing is as necessary, as it is a sufficient strategy of inquiry. I used interviews as a means to understand the effectiveness of the activities of civil society in the process of PB in Ijede LCDA. The participant selection method was purposive, in an effort to select individuals who could provide specific, relevant, and rich information.

The study population consisted of citizens of Ijede LCDA, who were civil servants, elected representatives, and members of NGOs active in the community, all of

whom had previously participated in PB at the local level. The sample size consisted of 15 individuals representing each of the aforementioned groups. The sample size ($n = 15$) was sufficient to take care of attrition, and according to Marshall and Rossman (2011), the diversity of the population group required a large sample, which enhanced transferability. The participants fulfilled the qualitative research paradigm of using narratives to provide meaning and trends of the research phenomenon (Hancock & Algozinne, 2011; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009).

Yin (2009) recommended the use of some theoretical basis to provide a strategy to the design including screening of the case to study, selection of participants data collection, and data analysis and interpretation. This guidance provided the source of data for this study. Data were collected from citizens, government officials, active NGOs, and CBOs. Purposively selecting participants from these groups was appropriate and consistent with the purpose of the research. The theory of participatory institutions and the concept of PB recognize each group as a unit of investigation (Avritzer, 2009; Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994).

The interviews provided thick data that I used to describe and analyze the implementation of PB in Ijede LCDA at the time of the study (Hancock & Algozinne, 2011; Yin, 2009). The design provided the best-fit alignment between the research questions, the methodology, and the conceptual and theoretical frameworks. The design also aligned with the sampling method, sample size, the role of the researcher, and ethical issues (Endicott, 2010). I submit that interviewing provided the best-fit alignment between the research question and the qualitative method to understand the particular case of PB in Ijede LCDA. As a descriptive paradigm, the case study's interviewing

framework sought to provide description and meaning specific to a given population without the intention of applying the results to groups or settings outside the study group (Hancock & Algozinne, 2011).

Assumptions

There were four basic assumptions of this study. First, the study assumed the current process of PB had not sufficiently yielded the desired results the sponsors of the process, that is, the United Nations, anticipated; hence the need to strengthen the process. The 2014 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Reports indicated that despite global improvements in all the seven goals, Nigeria still lagged behind in many of the areas including poverty and infrastructure development (United Nations, 2014). The MDGs included: (a) eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; (b) the achievement of universal primary education; (c) gender equality and empowerment for women; (d) reduction of child mortality; (e) improvement of maternal health; (f) combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (g) ensuring environmental sustainability; and (h) the development of a global partnership for development.

Participant selection was purpursive to capture the perspectives of those who have had prior experiences of PB. This study assumed these individuals had much to contribute to the study because of their prior involvements. This study assumed that the participants had good memory and accurate recall of event sequences, context and contents, such that the information they gave was truthful. The categories of participants were those with sufficient knowledge and understanding of issues involved in PB and that they had good command of English to narrate technical information without the need for translation or interpretation.

Scope and Delimitations

The focus of this study was to identify barriers that might have limited the ability of PB to yield desired results, to determine local solutions to strengthen PB, and improve outcomes. Poor implementation could be symptomatic of poor understanding of the aims and goals of PB. Nongovernmental organizations are in the best position to be neutral educators to improve the people's understanding, and to motive citizens to action.

The scope of this study was limited to the activities of NGOs and the roles they played in creating a common link among the elements and factors that could strengthen the PB process. The inclusion of the political society, civil servants, NGOs, and community representatives in the list of participants ensured that this study collected information from diverse perspectives. The selection strategy limited the information available to this study to the particular space and time of the experiences of the participants. The pool of participants did not include citizens who might have participated in prior PB processes but were unknown to the intermediary who provided access to the participants. Furthermore, residents of the community who could corroborate any claims to success, or point to failures, were not included in the participant pool.

Having provided contextual details of the research paradigm of this study, and having disclosed the assumptions and limitations that are pivotal to the research, the results of this study are potentially transferable to environments with idiosyncratic dynamics that are similar to the locus of this study. The setting of Ijede LCDA is quite similar in several respects to other local governments in Lagos State and several other states in Nigeria. Therefore, the findings of this study have the potential for transferability to other local governments in Nigeria.

Limitations

Following case study design, I used interviewed participants in person. Unlike in a typical ethnographic case study, I did not immerse myself in the participants' lived experiences. Therefore, this study did not involve the observation of an actual PB process. Furthermore, in the absence of any record at the local government of individuals and organizations who participated in prior processes, I relied on an intermediary to identify the participants for this study. It was necessary to adopt snowball sampling when some of the selected participants were considered unable to yield sufficient information. My bias as the researcher is rooted in the passion as a Nigerian citizen who is concerned about the development of the electorates to become sensitive to their environments and be sufficiently enlightened. Such bias could have an impact on data interpretation.

Significance

The significance for social change included the potential to influence how government arrives at public policy decisions, supported by better informed and active electorates, for successful policy implementation, especially when the policies might be unpalatable (Avritzer, 2009; Donaghy, 2010). From a public policy standpoint, by integrating citizens' priorities into budget priorities, there is strong perception of transparency by the citizens who feel the direct impact and relevance of public policy, an elusive situation since independence in 1960.

With the collaboration of the citizenry, government should be able to create strong institutional designs of particular relevance to local dynamics that are inclusive of the poor and marginalized in the community. Early local developmental successes have the potential to encourage the federal and state governments, and the business

community, to direct more resources toward PB. Thus, public policy might become citizen focused, having been instigated by the consensus of the people ab initio. This is also significant for the improvement of a peaceable social environment devoid of incidences of sporadic violence, engendering peaceful coexistence in a society that respects individual liberty and freedom of expression (Hazen, 2009).

Beyond enthusiasm at election times, the citizens of Ijede LCDA, as most of Nigeria's poor, are not actively engaged in the political process in a tangible way. This study could help identify the dynamics CSOs need to consider and to integrate into their activities such that the poor could sit at the table in a PB process to negotiate for resources to provide needed sustainable public goods and services. Subsequently, developing economies across the globe could develop PB designs to attain similar goals.

This study promotes positive social change by informing the government of Lagos State of the need to institutionalize the PB process through a legal framework that prevents the impulsive interruption of the process by political office holders and civil servants. Ijede is in dire need of development programs beyond available resources.

The study also informs the Ijede community, which expressed its desire for developmental evolution, of development strategies through public-private partnerships under the build-operate-transfer agreement, incorporating the Smart Growth Strategies of the United States Environmental Protection Agency. Participatory budgeting makes possible the creation of the type of urban development that the citizens desire and support (Avritzer, 2010; Wampler, 2012a). After all, the adoption of PB should go beyond fulfilling the demand of the World Bank and the United Nations but lead to tangible and meaningful development beyond the millennium development goals.

Summary

Participatory budgeting is a quintessential example of participatory democracy, in which a political institution that has not attracted sufficient interest among the socially disadvantaged who stand to benefit the most from being involved in political discourses. Participatory budgeting gives citizens the opportunity to engage actively with the government in decision making on fiscal planning priorities. It is not known whether and how civil society empowers citizens to participate in the PB process. Specifically, it is not known whether and how civil society can empower citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria to participate in the PB process. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the role of civil society in educating the citizens to participate effectively in the budgetary decision making processes.

The foundations of this study centered on the Avritzer's theory of participatory institutions, and the concept of PB. The case study design with particular emphasis on semi-structured interviewing was of particular relevance to this study. It facilitated the extrication of relevant information from the subjective understanding of the participants.

In Chapter 2, I discuss the historical and current outlines of literature that support the importance of PB and the role of civil society in the praxis of the process. Chapter 3 details the methodological approach, data collection, and the strategy for data analysis. In Chapter 4, I lay out the results of the study. Chapter 5 articulates the detailed discussion on the findings, the conclusion of the study, and recommendations.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

To most Africans on the continent, participatory democracy is defined by the ability to vote in general elections (Adesopo, 2011; Leduka, 2009). Beyond suffrage, the socially disadvantage neither appreciate the need to be involved in decision making, nor the necessity of engaging the political class directly in discourses on matters that affect their daily lives (Bashir & Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008; Donaghy, 2010; Ganuza & Frances, 2012). Consequently, decision making remains firmly within the purview of politicians.

The purpose of this literature review is to gain further understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering citizens to participate effectively in decision making processes through participatory budgeting (PB). This literature review analyzed the concepts of CSOs, participatory democracy, PB, and best budgeting paradigms.

Circa 2007, Nigeria joined a host of developing economies to adopt PB, a process that Brazil introduced to 36 of its municipalities that were under the control of the Worker's Party in 1989 (Adesopo, 2011). Porto Alegre, Brazil emerged as the quintessential example of PB and the socio-political lessons learned from that example continue to be the reference point for studies on PB. However, the actual origin of PB could be traced back to the 1970s, when the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement submitted its budget plans to the citizens for open debate (Avritzer, 2010; Goldfrank, 2007; Wampler, 2007;).

Participatory budgeting was an idea out of Latin American socialist ideology to reduce the widening gap between the rich and the poor (Goldfrank, 2007). Paradoxically,

both the political right and left worldwide have embraced the process as a tool to combat

the menace of poverty and as a strategy to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor

in the jurisdictions that have adopted it. International organizations such as the World

Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union have been responsible for the ubiquity

of PB (Avritzer, 2010; Fung & Wright, 2001; Goldfrank, 2007; Latendresse, 2005).

These institutions have recommended PB as a democratic tool to address the menace of

poverty that continues to ravage portions of developed economies and the developing

world. However, in spite of legal mandates introducing PB to municipalities, the

underlying principle or orientation of PB has nonetheless failed to filter to the majority

poor, the intended target of the process (Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011; Donaghy, 2010).

Efficiency in the administration of scarce resources and transparency are two

principal objectives of PB. However, authors and researchers of PB could not

categorically conclude that these goals have been achievable with PB experiments

(Goldfrank, 2007; Heller, 2012; Peruzzotti, 2012). More often than not, there are

contending local factors and circumstances affecting the ultimate outcomes of PB. It is,

however, by its nature, iterative and open to continuous improvement. The effectiveness

of PB at achieving its primary goals also depends on the presence of active and well-

informed CSOs that partner with the citizens as advocates in the state (Donaghy, 2010;

Ganuza & Frances, 2012).

Some conditions have arguably furthered the success of PB in different

jurisdictions. These include willing heads of governments, the absence of strong right-

wing opposition, and influential elites, all of whom have played some important roles in

recorded successes of PB (Fung, 2006; Goldfrank, 2007). The provision of technical and

financial assistance by national and international agencies, the availability of adequate

budgetary allocations, and the active involvement of CSOs are some of the enabling

dynamics that have contributed to the success of PB (Avritzer, 2009; Baierle, 2009;

Bherer, 2010; Goldfrank, 2007).

Literature Search Strategy

This literature review benefited from a broad spectrum of research from various

databases including the Walden Library linking with Google Scholar and dissertation

databases. Google Scholar was the primary resource for the articles reviewed in this

chapter. Through Google Scholar, I was able to access materials available at Walden

University Online Library. The databases included: ProQuest Central, EBSCOhost, and

Sage Political Science Complete. Although Walden University dissertation database

yielded only a couple of dissertations that had any relevance to PB, a slightly higher

number addressed participatory democracy in the areas of housing, transportation, and

urban planning. The relative unavailability of materials on PB at Walden University

dissertation database makes this study a valuable contribution to scholarship at the

University. Beyond the dissertation, PB is prevalent among the proponents of

participatory democracy and searches on Google Scholar demonstrated the ubiquity of

the process worldwide.

Keywords that yielded search results included: *participatory budgeting,*

participatory democracy, civil society, nongovernmental organizations, participatory

budgeting in Brazil, participatory budgeting in Nigeria, participatory budgeting in

Africa, participatory institutions, and *deliberative democracy*. Others included: *budgeting*

best practices, budget transparency, civil society, corporate social responsibility, and

strategic planning. Although the search date range was in the last 5 years, it was often

necessary to widen the scope to accommodate the review of older articles on theory and

classic articles by authorities in the fields covered by this study.

The articles that informed this study contributed through their relevance to

participatory democracy and PB and in many respects suggested ways to strengthen

participation in public discourses. The body of literature contributing to the knowledge

base of participatory democracy uses a variety of research styles and methods. Some

scholarly articles developed frameworks and discussions using existing literature in the

field. Others use the mixed methods research design in which the researchers sought

external validity to their studies. Predominantly, researchers used qualitative

methodology to study various aspects of participatory democracy and PB.

In the remainder of Chapter 2, I will discuss participatory institutions as the

theoretical framework and PB the conceptual framework of the study interrogation.

Following this is the analysis of CSOs and participatory democracy. The review

discussed the review of current literature on participatory democracy, PB, CSOs, and

some best practices in budgeting.

Literature Review: Background

In Lagos State, Nigeria, 100% of the capital budget of local governments is

available for PB. Previous research I conducted via email and telephone interviews into

the practice and implementation of PB in six local governments of Lagos State, Nigeria

revealed weak implementation of PB, skeptical electorates, and unmotivated officials at

the state and local levels. These preliminary findings suggested that there was the general

lack of trust standing as a barrier to citizen involvement in PB. The poor residents who

are the targets of the process declined the call to participate for fear of being labeled tax dodgers. The study also found that rather than encouraging individuals to participate in PB, representatives of neighborhood associations were the invited participants. All the participants in that research identified inadequate funding as a challenge to development. Expectedly, governments have to operate with scarce resources; the efficient and equitable management of resources distinguishes effective governments from inefficient administrations.

The literature on PB indicated only 20 to 30% as the percentage of capital budgets available for PB in most jurisdictions (Abers, 2001; Boulding & Wampler, 2010; Fölscher, 2007; Geissel, 2009; Gollwitzer, 2011; Matovu & Mumvuma, 2008). As good as this may sound for Lagos State, it is common for politicians to intrude into the process by prioritizing participant selected projects for their vested interests, known locally as constituency projects (Adesopo, 2011). Consequently, transparency suffers because the budget documents are not in the public domain, and neither do the participants' involvements go beyond project selection into project monitoring.

Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks

The two frameworks that drive this study are the theory of participatory institutions and the concept of participatory budgeting. The effectiveness of the roles of participatory institutions determines the outcomes of PB as a framework.

The Theory of Participatory Institutions

Avritzer (2009) had set out to discover under what conditions PB could succeed and whether the Brazilian experience of PB could be replicable elsewhere with different sociopolitical dynamics. Avritzer thus proposed the development of some measurements

to determine if participation yielded the presumed outcomes of empowering ordinary citizens and sharing control over decision making.

Civil society had become involved in political movements in Brazil a relationship that blurred the boundary between the state and civil society. The connection between civil society and political party in implementing reforms of participation turned out to be a variable that required some theoretical explanation. The hitherto autonomy of civil society within participatory institutions diminished and a new relationship between civil society and political society developed. Avritzer (2009) propounded a new theory of participatory institutions to explain the emerging relationship between civil society and political society in the participatory space. Avritzer (2009) developed the theory of participatory institutions as a departure from some 20th century democratic theories including Weber's theory of irrationality of popular sovereignty, which posited that participation by the general populace in decision making could not have rational outcomes (Weber, 1947).

Nevado (2010) in agreement with Avritzer (2009) recognized the shortcomings of other theories of participation such as those postulated by Habermas (1994) and Oxhorn (1995), which are offshoots of social movement theories. Avritzer stated that these theories were incapable of capturing the enduring interactions between civil society and state actors.

Theorists of representative democracy such as Berelson (1952), Dahl (1966), and Schumpeter (1976) are contented with representation as a form of political participation. These theorists view collective actions of unelected citizens as irrational (Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 1995). Avritzer (2009) contended that the theory of participatory institutions

connects the tripartite relationship between "civil society, the political society, and institutional design" (p. 1). According to Avritver's (2009) observation, the three institutional design approaches, that is, the bottom-up designs, power-sharing designs, and ratification designs to democratic institutions emerging from Brazil's democratic governance created the much touted active public engagement and equitable distribution of public services. Bottom-up designs are open to all citizens to participate such as in PB programs. Power sharing designs allow for civil society actors and political actors to share decision-making with the citizens. In ratification designs, citizens do not take part in the deliberations over the contents of proposals, but they can vote to accept or reject proposals.

Civil society actors, who were embedded in government institutions in the search for resources, lost some autonomy in their interactions with the political society (Acharya, Lavalle, & Houtzager, 2004). Notwithstanding, the work of civil society in participatory democracy in Brazil shaped a political process in which the poor could contest elective positions. Despite the success of PB, unemployment was high while violence increased but Avritzer (2010) argued that the opportunity to participate in governance enabled the poor to envision the possibility of easing the burden of poverty by increasing access to public goods and services.

In Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia, especially in the 1990s, civil society actors were able to advocate for participation by ordinary citizens in institutionalized public places (Wampler, 2012a). It thus became necessary for these public institutions to gravitate towards the interest of the people in the affairs of state and to open up the participatory spaces in health, environmental issues and urban planning (Nevado, 2010).

Nevado (2010) identified four characteristics of participatory institutions that are necessary for participation. These features are: the interconnectedness between participation and representation; the transformation of volunteerism of civil society into organizing for political actions; the interactions between participatory institutions, the political society and state actors; and the necessity for institutional design for the success of participatory institutions. The ability of civil society to advance from community organizing to visible presence in the conscience of the political society contributed to the success of PB in Brazil (Wampler, 2012c).

Institutional design goes a long way in determining the overall success or failure of participatory institutions; hence, Nevado (2010) advocated regular reviews and variations of participatory designs to ensure their continued relevance and sustainability. In effect, there should be a nexus of relationships between civil society, political society, participation, and representation. Therefore, where civil society understands the actions of the political society, participatory institutions provide the space for the state and civil society actors to collaborate in responding to the needs of society as a whole (Avritzer, 2009).

Since PB permits open participation by individuals and groups, civil society actors can participate in matters in which their program objectives focus. In other cases, they form alliances or loose cooperatives with groups of CSOs, elected representatives, and individuals (Nevado, 2010). Comparing the outcomes of PB, the health councils and municipality planning processes in four of Brazil's major cities, Avritzer (2009) posited that the favorable results were due to the individual peculiarities of each of the cities, which influenced the institutional designs. The precondition that permitted these

outcomes was the presence and the interconnection that existed between civil society, the political society, and institutional design.

Participation. The opportunity for all citizens to contribute to decision-making conversations that affect their daily lives is one of the pillars that give legitimacy to any democratic system (Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010). A democratic society is weak and of little relevance if the poor cannot participate in anti-poverty initiatives (Bowen, 2008). The United States' Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 acknowledged the significance of participation by the beneficiaries of an anti-poverty program when it called for "maximum feasible participation" of the beneficiaries of the program (p. 451). The consequence of this provision was the ubiquity of grassroots community organizing. The idea of maximum feasible participation unsettled the elites who sensed the weakening of their hold on power (Bowen, 2008; Hardina, 2004).

At the signing ceremony of the law, President Lyndon Johnson assured the elites that the aim of the law was to end poverty by helping rural and urban dwellers to re-establish their footing, a scenario that potentially benefited United States, rather than entrench them in poverty, (Johnson, 1964). The political elites were not convinced, but incrementally, the United States congress defunded the program into obscurity (Hardina, 2004). Similar to political leaders in Africa, the elites of the United States did not want to share power with the poor (Mosca, 1939).

Group Strategy versus Individualism. Low-income citizens who operate within social groups are the primary targets of PB because the theory focuses individual participants who are outside group formats and lack the voting block to influence

decisions (Wampler, 2007). Therefore, CSOs with substantial capacity to mobilize tend to thrive well in PB.

Voting methods within PB vary from city to city and from country to country. Some of the voting practices include secret ballots or show of hands with majority carrying the decisions. Cities have tried to be all inclusive by distributing resources according to the proportional representativeness of the population (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Montambeault (2009) hypothesized that when mobilizing efforts for participation is at the individual level, quid-pro-quo arrangements between politicians and political parties, and exploitation the political environment for personal gins are pervasive. Consequently, an autonomous civil society that mobilizes at the individual level produces uncoordinated participation in public discourse. Individuals with self-interests and the inability to negotiate effectively with other persons or groups have no influence over public policy. However, when civil society uses its autonomy to mobilize people into groups for collective purposes, the benefits of participatory democracy are exemplary.

In general, voting practices at PB sessions mirror the pattern with which the citizens are already familiar. Governments have experimented with voting rules to determine alternative strategies to arrive at the optimum outcomes acceptable to all citizens. The process of PB has empowered citizens to learn how to network and negotiate trade-offs by creating the kind of trust environment that unites rather than divide (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Magee (2012) investigated the impact of participation in urban planning in five US cities of Birmingham, Alabama; Dayton, Ohio; Portland, Oregon; Saint Paul, Minnesota; and San Antonio, Texas. The investigation

concluded that when the public participates in decision-making processes on issues that directly concern them, the citizens could build strong communities with a healthy sense of civic responsibility. The participants in the study agreed that their input supported the government in focusing on issues relevant to their communities, assisting government to identify priorities, and in propagating government actions on project implementation among citizens.

Inequality and Social Justice. Political participation is as much a strategy as it is a moral responsibility to ascertain that no interest supplants another and that all citizens have equal access to decision-making (Dalton, 2008; Marien et al., 2010). In other words, citizens may not receive or enjoy public goods equally, but their interests should be given equal consideration along with other contending interests of groups with higher economic or social status. Participation provides the platform for citizens to air their voices (Dalton, 2008). Thus, a structural defect exists in a political arena where poor citizens do not have the resources to undertake their civic obligations (Marien et al., 2010).

However, there are factors creating and encouraging inequality in participation. Marien et al. (2010) identified education, age, and gender as three of the factors that create inequality in participation. The better-educated citizens participate and engage intensely in political activism than do the poorly educated. While gender inequality in participation may have declined in Western politics, it is still prevalent in developing democracies with large rural populations. Marien et al. posited that the lack of political engagement is quite prevalent among youths, but when age is considered along with the use of social media, the situation changes. Social media has encouraged political awareness, and it has stimulated some activism among the youths.

Participatory democracy theorists believe that for democracy to thrive, citizens must participate beyond exercising suffrage rights (Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 1995). Indeed, by delegating decision-making powers to representatives, citizens are disenfranchised from the political sphere (Michels & de Graaf, 2010). The researchers did not observe any controversy in the legitimacy of public decision where the citizens formulated the decisions. The process of engagement empowers citizens to develop strong civic responsibility and interdependency such that there is a sense of personal ownership towards the decisions. In the course of engaging with peers, there are superior and compelling arguments, cajoling and juxtaposing of interests, all of which culminate in policy decisions acceptable to all (Dobson, 2005; Fung, 2006; Richard, 2013). Contrary to this position, Mutz (2006) posited that such deliberations unduly task citizens with the unrealistic assumption of mutual respect. Michels and de Graaf (2010) on the other hand observed the personal satisfaction of citizens in collective free expression as equals, devoid of superior interests, but conducted with mutual respect.

Engaging the Poor. Some researchers and authors have found that poor citizens are more likely to experience disconnection from, and lack interest in political discourses (Brodie, 2011; Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011; Haynes, 2013; Marien et al., 2010; Pateman, 1995; Richard, 2013). Thus, the lack of active participation by the poor majority limits their access to public goods. In developing nations, such lack of access encourages corruption, waste, fraud, and abuse by elected officials and civil servants (Avritzer, 2012; Verba, 2003; Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Therefore, to participate effectively, poor citizens require education in the form of social and civic training, the mantle of which falls on civil society through NGOs and CBOs. This kind of activism by

civil society creates independent and politically aware citizenry, whose increased awareness encourages transparency, accountability and efficiency (Postigo, 2011).

The Concept of Civil Society

Although there is the lack of consensus on a definition of civil society, some authors agree that civil society is the public space of voluntary actions between the state, the market, and the family (Akpan, 2009; Fowler, 2012; Idemudia, 2011; Obadare, 2011; Powell, 2008). Diamond (1994) defined civil society as the "realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, largely self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules" (p. 5). This definition clarified the distinction between civil society and the society as a whole. Citizens have to act collectively and publicly to make their mutual demands, express their interests, and hold the state accountable for its actions. Walzer (1991) associated civil society with an arena of freedom for "family, faith, interest, and ideology" to exist openly (p. 1).

Other authors described civil society as a dense network of civil associations formed to stabilize the democratic process and to be the public conscience in support or against policies emanating from the government (Foley & Edwards, 1996; Newton, 2001). Diamond (1994) and Newton (2001) rejected the inclusion of family for the simple reason that it is not up to anyone to determine to what biological family they belong. Diamond (1994) went further to reject the inclusion of the individual, recreational, and religious groups for profit entities and political associations in the definition because potentially, these entities exclude those who hold contrary beliefs and ideologies. Therefore, civil society consists of voluntary associations, without restrictive conditions of membership, from the national level through local community

organizations (Diamond, 1994; Newton, 2001; Powell, 2008). One assumption is that citizens and institutional actors outside the government can work together for citizen participation in democratic arrangements (Nevado, 2010).

Another assumption is that CSOs are civic, proclaiming and ensuring equality, equity, and the entrenchment of strong democratic principles (Fowler, 2012). Fowler (2012) and Powell (2008) held that civil society is a community, rather than an aggregation of agitating organizations, which have some common norms as a minimum with the normative purpose for the community. The exclusion of religious and associational life groups from civil society would hold in Africa where society relies on and trusts those formations more than other groups (Orji, 2009). Religion and life associations that connect to collective affinities are the main forces of attraction that give rise to community-level association.

For civil society to have broader application and entrench social roots without unnecessarily excluding major groups, Orji (2009) posited that the dominant powers of such groups are necessary for CSOs to have a meaningful impact in influencing policy processes. Civil society organizations consolidate efforts to highlight societal concerns for the attention of the state and the larger public. In so doing, they also act to provide contrary positions in their areas of expertise and over a broad range of issues (Grajzl & Murrell, 2009).

The premise for the activities of CSOs is the rule of law, freedom of association, and the establishment of civility between governments and citizens (Diamond, 1994; Fowler, 2012; Newton, 2001; Orji, 2009; Powell, 2008). The activities often involve charity, volunteerism, and civisms, all of which are fundamental to participatory

democracy (Heller, 2012; Hilmer, 2010; Powell, 2008). Thus, the rights to associate

freely, socially, politically and economically form the bond on which the concept of civil

society hangs (Dobson, 2005; Donaghy, 2010). With freedom of association emerged the

cooperation between citizens and groups to provide self-help where governments have

failed (Fowler, 2012). Through such self-help, civil society has created a platform of

equality where the poor can demand the attention of the state to address issues that affect

the poor in the society (Powell, 2008).

Civil society organizations have opened up the public sphere such that those who

hitherto were too poor to be part of governance and public decision-making could have a

say through participatory democracy (Orji, 2009). The struggle for equality and

fundamental rights that the intelligentsia spearheaded in defiance against oppressive

states has shifted gradually to communities and individuals for collective social actions

(Powell, 2008). Civil society has thus shown its ability to educate the poor to recognize

public ethics, morality, transparency, and accountability (Fowler, 2012). At the turn of

the century, Brazil led the way in converting the effectiveness of civil society to the

social movement of the poor (Powell, 2008). Civil society organizations in Nigeria have

the additional task of establishing trust between the government and citizens in the effort

to attain the social transformation that restores the people's confidence in their

government (Dobson, 2005).

There is unanimity among some authors that the attainment of heightened

participation by the citizenry requires a vibrant civil society to actively mobilizing the

people (Avritzer, 2007; Avritzer, 2010; Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 2012; Postigo, 2011;

Wampler, 2012a). These authors agreed that institutional designs played a significant role

in the positive outcomes of participatory democracy by identifying best practices that stimulate participation among the poor. Postigo (2011) informed that civil society was able to operate efficiently and thus developed as mobilizing agents because the state opened up the space by sponsoring and encouraging PB. Thus, these authors contended that the enabling environments for successful PB were the presence of a vibrant civil society, and the willingness of the state to cede grounds for citizen participation. Since the poor often lack the confidence, skills, organization, and the education to participate, the state and civil society need to establish some institutional design to stimulate participation (Hilmer, 2010; Wampler, 2012b). In other words, there must be civic mobilization, stable financial and organizational arrangements.

Grassroots democratic participation requires issue-based community organizing that enhances specialized influence rather than addressing all issues, which obviates potential mediocrity on complex issues (Devarajan, Khemani, & Walton, 2011). When communities organize around issues, the electorates gain a better understanding of those interests, thus developing better control over matters of direct interest to the community (Powell, 2008). Poorer communities can attract the attention of the government through the support of civil society when they gain some expertise on contending issues in their communities (Lewis, 2002). In the absence of community, organizing, ordinary citizens lose the opportunity to convince policymakers to provide access to public services and to empower communities economically (Brodie, 2011).

Transparency, Good Governance, and Civil Society

Generally, there is agreement among authors about the need to strengthen democratic accountability and administrative transparency (Bowen, 2008; Donaghy,

2010; Fischer, 2012; Fowler, 2012; Grajzl & Murrell, 2009; Houtzager & Lavalle, 2010; Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010; Pateman, 2012; Peruzzotti, 2012; Postigo, 2011). However, authors have conceptualized the issues from varying perspectives. For instance, Peruzzotti (2012) abstracted accountability and transparency from the standpoint of the three factors that determine these matters. The legal frameworks that institutionalize the reforms that support participation include the specialized CSOs. The CSOs along with the press intervene in the democratic space as watchdogs and to project the visibility and dissemination of sociopolitical agenda.

The globalization of social movements against neoliberalism in Porto Alegre, Brazil showed the world that poor citizens are capable of learning the complexities of democratic paradigms if given the education and the opportunity (Cabannes, 2004). The poor and the uneducated can learn to shift the balance of economic equality by contributing to their social destiny (Powell, 2008). In spite of the progress made by civil society in mobilizing the people, several NGOs would only participate if they have some official relationship with the government or some sponsoring organizations external to the jurisdictions (Donaghy, 2010). Community-based organizations have to engage the state, as they know best, which results in inadequate self-representation and inadvertent legitimization of the acts of the state that might be inimical to the wellbeing of the poor (Grajzl & Murrell, 2009).

Effectiveness of Civil Society Organizations

An advantage of CSOs is that they enjoy unfettered autonomy to engage in organizing citizens for action. With the exit of the Workers' Party in Porto Alegre in 2005, several of the CSOs withdrew from communities because of the new government's

policy to de-emphasize PB (Rodgers, 2010). Consequently, participation in PB became

less organized. Unfortunately, functioning neighborhood associations lacked the required

experience and resources to mobilize, and group membership waned (Montambeault,

2009). Citizens could learn governance by participating in PB, and the experience makes

for a population with a high sense of civic responsibility (Bherer, 2010). As one of the

objectives of budget distribution is to minimize poverty, the decline in the poverty rate

can be noticeable wherever PB succeeds (McGee & Gaventa, 2013).

In Nigeria, as in most of Africa, citizens are rightly skeptical of civil society and

its activists who have defected from championing the peoples' course to join the political

class (Obadare, 2011). According to Obadare, the people see these activists as political

opportunists, whose real ethical and moral legitimacy occurs when they malign elected

officials, and at the right moment, ride on the sentiments of the people for personal

political gains. For several citizens, the disillusionment with civil society has generated

distrust to the point that activists are perceived as economic opportunists that pretend to

do good for the poor, when indeed, all they have is self-interest (Essia & Yearoo, 2009).

After all, the activists are the products of the same harsh economic climate that has driven

the people to poverty. Activism in the civil society realm provides a window of

opportunity to address poverty and inequality, but on its own, it does not provide ways

out of poverty (Bowen, 2008; Postigo, 2011).

Works and Expectations of Civil Society Organizations

The most important function of CSOs is in strengthening democracy and

supporting the interaction between citizens and their governments (Mill, 1909; Weber,

1947). With associational freedom, CSOs bring people with diverse backgrounds and

interests together to engender mutual appreciation and respect. Civil society

organizations strive to relieve unpleasant circumstances and induce societal tolerance

(Newton, 2001). Socially, CSOs use common bonds and ties to resolve conflict without

external interventions. The civic advocacy of CSOs creates a responsible citizenry that

learns to appreciate the necessity of reciprocal empathy. Where CSOs cooperate among

themselves, they achieve greater reach and stronger collaborative efforts (Putnam, 1995).

Such, according to Putnam, presupposes neutrality in political ideology and other divisive

issues that may fragment or factionalize the associations.

The dilemma with Putnam's position is that most of the issues confronting CSOs

have the propensity for factionalizing the public space (Foley & Edwards, 1996). Overall,

civil society can influence policies emerging from reform processes without direct benefit

from the improvements. They serve to reduce the domination of the public space by

wealthy self-interest groups and their political collaborators (Grajzl & Murrell, 2009).

Corporations, Civil Engagement, and the Effect on the Poor

In the West, corporate organizations are directly active with civil society through

their corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs when they address issues such as the

environment, education, health and poverty (Idemudia, 2011). Corporate organizations

engage in CSR programs to enhance their public image of accountability and social

responsibility (Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). These organizations expend considerable

resources to impress on the public that profit is not their sole motivation. In the absence

of legal or regulatory compulsion, they maintain high ethical standards alongside their

commitments to the socio-economic development of the communities in which they

operate (Fowler, 2012; Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). The motivations for CSR range from

corporate strategy to the defense against some anticipated actions, and altruism (Idemudia, 2011; Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010).

To advance the discussion to the African context, Idemudia (2011) highlighted issues such as tax avoidance, tax evasion, unsustainable investment, and poverty reduction agenda of the corporate organizations operating within the continent. These organizations benefit from the inadequacy, gaps, and lapses in administrative exactitudes including corrupt practices. Thankfully, posited Idemudia (2009), through CSR, some of these organizations do reinvest in the communities by providing funds, materials, and equipment towards the execution of community projects.

Perhaps African NGOs need to look to corporations to participate in community projects rather than providing funds to the state, which are often misdirected and misappropriated. Such misdirection of resources, suggested Idemudia (2011), is evident in Nigeria where multinational oil companies fail to focus on the real issues such as corruption, environmental degradation, and declining economic climate in all sectors, all of which confront their host communities. In exploring the ramifications of government inadequacy for CSR, Idemudia (2011) further postulated that the voluntary nature of CSR weakens the effect of the practice on the intended beneficiaries. Idemudia suggested that CSOs should serve as the conduits for CSR efforts. Without a full understanding of cultural nuances and socio-political complexities of communities in Africa, CSR programs do not only fail to address poverty reduction but they also exacerbate the fragile inter-communal tensions that might have pre-existed (Akpan, 2009; Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010).

Idemudia (2009) discovered that when CSR efforts link directly with CBOs, the outcome has more positive impact on the community than when corporate organizations, device strategies and impose policies. Indeed, CBOs can advance CSR initiatives of corporate organizations by helping to identify what message to communicate and other factors unique to the effectiveness of communication in the community (Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). The involvement of civil society in CSR helps to avoid rash and impulsive actions that may yield disruptive and wasteful consequences (Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). Furthermore, as far as the Brazilian PB experience goes, skilled delegates who operated within CSOs realize they have the power to influence decisions; thus. PB highlights the importance of active CSOs, which leads to the formation of competing NGOs in the participatory space (Wampler, 2007).

Civil society organizations are important institutional building partners. They provide the public space for discourses on public policy, debates over matters of importance to communities, and the atmosphere for the expression of individual rights (Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). Citizens need to be wary of individuals and groups with vested interests that sponsor CSOs since such partisan interests are counterproductive for legitimacy in public discourses (Essia & Yearoo, 2009).

Some Observed Weaknesses of Civil Society Organizations

Some significant roles of CSOs are those of advocacy, to be the voice for the voiceless, to ensure social justice and equitable distribution of public goods (Diamond, 1994). Civil society organizations in many countries, including Nigeria, rely on the government to provide substantial resources (Essia & Yearoo, 2009). This dependency weakens the effectiveness of CSOs in challenging the state when the rights of citizens are

under threat. The reliance on state fund has emboldened state officials to diminish the efforts of CSOs at protecting the interest of ordinary citizens. Civil society organizations with multiple ties to political associations lack focus, but they pursue interests other than those of the communities they set out to represent.

The Brazilian experience indicated that although CSO leaders in PB did not have to negotiate with the state secretly for equitable distribution of public goods, political patronage still existed at individual levels (Montambeault, 2009). Institutionally, political patronage and corruption declined as negotiations for new democratic spaces emerged (Baierle, 2008). Thus, CSOs that engage in participatory institutions occupied the traditional domain of control of political parties to eliminate rent seeking (Montambeault, 2009).

One of the challenges confronting CSOs concerning budgets is the timely access to comprehensive government budget documents (Benito & Bastida, 2009). The materials help to facilitate the analysis of budgets for CSOs to target their advocacy efforts at specific areas of concern (Carlitz, de Renzio, Krafchik, & Ramkumar, 2009). Several authors have demonstrated empirically that freedom of information, especially on budgeting and budget performances have a close correlation with good governance. Free flow of information reduces corruption, affects human development positively, and improves socio-economic pointers (Bastida & Benito, 2007; Benito & Bastida, 2009; Peruzzotti, 2012; Sintomer, Allegretti, Herzberg, & Rocke, 2008; de Renzio, Gomez, & Sheppard, 2009).

As far as PB goes, transparency is a precondition for enthusiastic participation by citizens (Goldfrank & Schneider, 2006). However, de Renzio, Gomez, and Sheppard

(2009) argued that resource-dependent nations, like Nigeria, which relies on income from oil and gas, experience transparency gap, but the presence of active CSOs may help to close the gap. Carlitz et al. (2009) posited that transparency should go hand in hand with other factors and expectations. These include deliberate efforts by the government to promote pro-poor policies and agenda, encouraging information freedom and well-informed media, providing prompt budget information, and facilitating a civil society that can interpret and analyze budgets.

With more transparency, civil society gets more opportunities to intervene on behalf of the citizens and by so doing, widen the space for participation in governance. When the public has timely and reliable budget information, citizens can engage meaningfully in budgetary policies and hold the government to its public pronouncements. Carlitz et al. (2009) suggested that civil society could be more efficient by demanding more information under the freedom of information laws that most countries, including Nigeria, have enacted. In which case, civil society could analyze budgets and disseminate the information in more comprehensible language to the public with whom they should engage in advocacy on issues arising.

Participatory Budgeting

Electorates can develop political sophistication through regular interactions and contacts with elected officials and bureaucrats in public discourses (Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 2012). When citizens participate in budgetary policy formulation, they actively engaged in decision making on fiscal planning priorities. Participatory budgeting encourages the transparent environment for resource distribution and selection of choices between priorities (Latendresse, 2005). For PB to be successful, there must be the

willingness on the part of the state to respect the budget priorities of the citizens (Acharya, Lavalle, & Houtzager, 2004; Avritzer, 2012; Fung & Wright, 2001).

The community-organizing activities of civil society in educating and informing the electorates on procedural and legal matters need the support and encouragement of the state (Fung, 2006; Goldfrank, 2007). Since PB involves fiscal issues, the government needs to be transparent in providing the electorates its finance and policy guidelines (Agbude & Egbide, 2012; Bastida & Benito, 2007; Benito & Bastida, 2009). To relieve the poorer electorates of the cost of participation, it is also necessary to address those obstacles that increase the burden of participation such as distance and language (Latendresse, 2005).

Participatory budgeting is a public decision-making arrangement that provides a platform for citizens to negotiate with the government and to negotiate between competing communal interests on the distribution of budgetary allocations. In one yearly cycle, citizens decide what projects to undertake, by whom, and where to locate the projects (Goldfrank, 2007; Wampler, 2012b).

The model of PB practice in Brazil usually begins with plenary sessions of all participants in each district to review budget implementations for the previous year (Postigo, 2011). The assembly then identifies areas of priority while it elects delegates who deliberate over all the proposals presented by different communities (Peruzzotti, 2012). At the second round of plenary meetings, another set of elected delegates consolidates all the requests of the various communities, reviews each proposal, and allocates resources to the projects (Peruzzotti, 2012; Postigo, 2011). At a final stage, the delegates present the approved proposals to the mayor. The mayor lays out the delegates'

proposals for deliberation at a municipal council meeting, which approves the plan for implementation (Peruzzotti, 2012; Postigo, 2011). The primary functions of municipal employees are to provide guidance and technical assistance to the delegates who may not understand the rudiments of governance and the complexity of the process (Wampler, 2007).

Participatory budgeting requires state officials not to have project preferences, and they do not determine or influence the location or the contractor to execute projects (Wampler, 2012b). Rather, the citizens deliberate in open fora among themselves while government officials act as impartial arbiters in cases of deadlock (Wampler, 2012a). Participatory budgeting is open to individuals without affiliations although as Wampler found, group membership increases the chances that their project preferences prevail. As citizens learn to dictate public agenda and negotiate budgetary spending in PB, they can transfer the skills to other participatory spaces to meet civic demands (Wampler, 2012a).

Variations in Participatory Budgeting Processes and Outcomes

Wampler's (2007) described PB as a process that encourages citizens to engage in decision making by voicing their opinions and voting at meetings sponsored by the state. Participants at these meetings vote for important programs they believe the government should implement. They elect representative delegates from among the participants to negotiate on the issues and priorities that are of concern to the citizens. Elected delegates representing different communities negotiate among themselves, with government officials, CSOs and other activists for competing priorities. Figure 1 is a visual representation of a typical PB process, drawn for the purpose of this study from Wampler's (2007) description.

The variation in outcomes between municipalities could be due to differences in cultural, institutional, political, and historical connections of the territories. The successes of PB have occurred not because of any prescriptive best practice paradigm (Avritzer, 2009). Indeed, the outcomes of participatory institutions vary by local political model, the willingness of local officials to advance the process, and the effectiveness of CSOs (Avritzer, 2010; Wampler, 2012a).

As a political institution, PB engendered the environment for citizen involvement in creating the type or urban development that the citizens desired and supported. Consequently, it has enhanced local democracy and strengthened the effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency of local governance. In addressing issues through participation, Sheller (2010) suggested that communities should apply hierarchical order to prioritize the needs of the communities. In other words, concerns such as crime, sanitation, and environmental issues that lend themselves to social solutions should prevail over sidewalks and other esthetics. On the other hand, Geissel (2009) argued that municipalities adopted PB, not necessarily to improve representative democracy, but to address exploding public spending to attain balanced budgets. The assertion could be true of Europe where Geissel (2009) viewed PB as a glorified exercise in consultation.

Postigo (2011) surmised that it would be unrealistic to expect PB to alleviate poverty. Bowen (2008) agreed with this position in Jamaica: citizen participation in decision making on community projects had limited effect on the economic conditions of the citizens. Poverty alleviation is a problem for central governments to address, but PB is a program for local governance (Avritzer, 2010). Participatory budgeting has achieved fairer distribution of resources, the defining public services as civic and social rights, and

the creation of a citizenry that demands responsible and accountable government (Bowen, 2008; Peruzzotti, 2012). Citizens who participate in PB processes understand how to demand transparency and equity in the distribution of public goods for the benefit of all citizens (Avritzer, 2010; Wampler, 2012a).

As citizens learn to engage in participatory democracy, they also recognized the necessity to engage in other participatory processes involving health, education and urban planning (Peruzzotti, 2012; Postigo, 2011). Bowen (2008) submitted that where participation is inadequate, citizen involvement in decision making amounts to tokenism. Citizens need appropriate training and support from CSOs, just as they need opportunities to participate in developing the capacity to address communal issues effectively for meaningful participation in decision making (Bowen, 2008).

Stimulus of the Growth of Participatory Budgeting

The popularity of PB has been incrementally progressive (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). As participation spread among citizens, interest in governance grew and the rate of citizen empowerment expanded to an unexpected level among the poor (Wampler, 2012c). At the early stages of PB in Brazil between 1989 and 2004, districts with little civil society activity lagged behind developmentally (Donaghy, 2010; Goldfrank & Schneider, 2006; Latendresse, 2005; Wampler, 2007). In the absence of civil society activities, municipal employees went to the communities to encourage participation by forming self-help CBOs (Donaghy, 2010; Su, 2012; Wampler, 2007). As the CBOs motivated the excluded poor, participation rapidly spread across all neighborhoods.

The lower economic class realized they had a voice in the decision-making process that prioritized needed projects. Perhaps to their surprise, the poor realized they

were able to monitor the government and its actions; there was the rare sense of transparency and accountability (Donaghy, 2010). The early inter-communal disagreements over what projects to execute soon gave way to discussions about projects for the benefit of all, thus underplaying the hitherto self interests of the neighborhoods (Boulding & Wampler, 2010).

Two problems plagued Brazilian polity: clientelism, the quid pro quo arrangement that corrupted the political theatre; and rent seeking, the corrupting influence of individuals and corporations to gain undue advantage without corresponding benefit to the society (Avritzer, 2010; Baierle, 2009; Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012; Peruzzotti, 2012; Schugurensky, 2009). Participatory budgeting opened up the system to be more transparent, and thus, it reduced corruption substantially while governance became more democratic (Peruzzotti, 2012). Consequently, transparency reduced political patronage as it improved the efficient allocation and consumption of resources, the legitimacy of the government and accountability to the people.

Postigo (2010) found that the consultative nature of PB, coupled with its associated limited decision-making powers, discouraged some civil society organization from participating in the process. According to Postigo, the willingness of the local officials encouraged the promotion of PB by pushing for pro-poor policies and redistribution agenda. Thus, local officials settled disputes between competing groups thereby demonstrating the good faith of social justice in the distribution of public services. Postigo gave much credit to the state for opening up the space for PB to succeed, and for CSOs to transform their modus operandi.

Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of a typical participatory budgeting process as described in "Can participatory institutions promote pluralism? Mobilizing low-income citizens in Brazil," by B. Wampler, (2007), *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *41*(4), 57-98.

The intervention of government officials encouraged cooperation between neighborhood associations (Postigo, 2012). When participatory opportunities declined, civil society involvement also declined. However, PB contributed to increased political awareness of the citizens by providing the skills required for engaging in other participatory spaces (Hilmer, 2010; Lavalle, Acharya, & Houtzager, 2005; Leubolt et al., 2008; Michels & De Graaf, 2010).

The political class having yielded some control over political decisions to the citizens, civil society and community leaders recognized the need to organize the citizens for the opportunity to be part of the decision-making machinery of the government (Avritzer, 2010; Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Acharya et al. (2004) observed that CSOs such as the NGOs tend to be "institutionally embedded actors" that are closer to the government than with those they set out to represent (p. 41). Bherer (2010) asserted that the state could change the status quo, and it could empower the economically disadvantaged citizens if it strengthens neighborhood civic groups.

Principles of Good Budget Practices

One important instrument CSOs have used to advocate policy directions has been the budget. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank encourage governments to adopt budget processes that incorporate the participation of citizens, to ensure accountability, and to enhance transparency (Fukuda-Parr, Guyer, & Lawson-Remer, 2011). The United Nations expected that through improved budget instruments, which strive to meet the requirements of the millennium development goals, especially the eradication of poverty and diseases by 2020, its set target would be attainable by most

governments (Simson, 2014). It is thus safe to anticipate encouraging socio-economic development results from countries that give priority to budget accountability.

For PB to yield the desired socio-economic changes, all stakeholders are expected to ensure the process follows best practices in budgeting. The participatory purpose of PB may become meaningless and counterproductive if basic budgeting principles are traded off for participation (Schick, 2003). Best practice in the budgeting process should adhere to five core principles consisting of comprehensiveness, accuracy, annual span, legality, and transparency (Sintomer, Allegretti, Herzberg, & Rocke, 2008). There is a vicious circle of budget transparency leading to efficiency in governance, which gives rise to fiscal discipline, which in turn strengthens the budgeting procedure. This sequence of events produces better accountability and transparency in governance over budget and other fiscal policies (Bastida & Benito, 2007; Benito & Bastida, 2009). As Sintomer et al. (2008) surmised, there is a higher incidence of fiscal responsibility from politicians if the budget process is transparent.

Transparency in a budget process guarantees the disclosure of substantial volume of information to the public and inhibits political office holders from undue opportunism (Sintomer et al., 2008). Benito and Bastida (2009) discovered in their quantitative study of the relationship between budget transparency, fiscal responsibility, and voter turnout that there exists a significantly positive correlation between transparency in budgeting and participation in elections. Therefore, what the budget process sets out to achieve is to enable governments to make informed decisions on what services to provide, what assets to expend in providing services, and how to encourage stakeholders to reach those decisions (Sintomer et al., 2008).

A good budgeting process has specific rules and procedures (Schick, 2003). Setting fiscal rules for the budget process limits government spending, and it avoids an accumulation of debts (Gollwitzer, 2011). Budgets should be medium term, transparent, and comprehensive: the rules should be consistent in their content and application (Gollwitzer, 2011; Schick, 2003; Sintomer et al., 2008). Budget rules serve the purpose of enforcing the implementation of approved budget and for avoiding arbitrary applications of policies. However, according to Schick (2003), fiscal rules have no meaning when the budget spans a single fiscal year because budget monitoring would be weak, and the budget would not have considered sustainability. Additionally, the procedures should include performance evaluation of budgets against specific benchmarks to determine the overall effects of budgeting on the fiscal strategy (Bryson, 2011; Schick, 2003; Sintomer et al., 2008).

Credible budgets are sustainable budgets within the context of macroeconomic dynamics and government strategy (Schick, 2003). The forecasting and planning that produce the budget should consider conceivably known risks that might negatively affect the overall aims of the government. The medium-term strategy set within an efficient strategic planning paradigm ensures sustainability of the budgets derived from the process (Bryson, 2011). Therefore, budgeting should be an integral part of the overall government strategy with measurable outcomes that guide future planning (Bryson, 2011; Gollwitzer, 2011; Schick, 2003). The process must encourage sustained and consistent communication with all stakeholders, especially when budgeting is a product of strategic planning that would have involved these stakeholders earlier in the process (Gollwitzer, 2011).

Legislative oversight over budgets and the budgeting process provide political legitimacy (Gollwitzer, 2011). The supervision ensures compliance with approved budgets since budget expenditures are subject to periodic reviews of the legislature, thus giving credibility to the purpose of the budget process. Fölscher (2007) submitted that the input of citizen stakeholders into the budget process involves setting priorities rather than allocation of resources. Adesopo (2011) observed that linking fiscal and strategic planning to PB process has contributed to the successful outcomes of the process. Fölscher (2007) informed that when there is a gap between the planning process and the PB process, participation by citizens has little visibility, which increases the propensity for corruption to thrive and to impair transparency.

The Benefits of Participatory Budgeting

As with other participatory democratic institutions, citizens who participate in PB learn civic activities and responsibilities through practice and thus improve the quality of the electorates (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006). Citizens learn to think regarding collective goals and benefits rather than personal gains and selfish agitations. Some of the aims of the PB process include the elimination of political patronage, combating corruption through a transparent budget process, and the reversal of socio-political exclusion of low economic status citizens (Baierle, 2009). Thus, PB has become an institution of learning where citizens acquire knowledge about their civic responsibilities and better negotiating tactics with politicians on public policies. Fung (2006) conjectured that if the government is to improve the type and quality of services that meet the needs of the citizens, the contributions of ordinary citizens should be the source of information for government officials. Having contributed to decisions that become policies, citizens are less likely to

resist or oppose such policies. Instead, they tend to support such policies enthusiastically (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006). Effective citizen participation requires a significant time commitment, the benefits of which include the acquisition of both technical and operational knowledge of public policy (Fung, 2006).

Participatory budgeting has also contributed significantly to improved social justice in the equitable distribution of resources among citizens. Poor citizens have the right to determine spending priorities of government and to redirect resources towards the needs of the poor. Participatory budgeting closes the gap between elected representatives and the citizens since PB increases access to elected officials who attend spending prioritization meetings with their constituents (Wampler, 2012a). Therefore, there are opportunities for citizens to engage their representatives at all times and not only during electioneering campaigns.

One of the arguments for participatory democracy is the belief that representative democracy, especially in developing economies, has not provided impactful governance from which ordinary citizens benefit (Wampler, 2012c). Representative democracy has failed to provide the public space for citizens to vote with their voices; it has not created empowering tools such as education and economic independence (Boulding & Wampler, 2010; Dalton, 2008). Unfortunately, it has succeeded in the squandering of scarce public resources while the majority of citizens live in penury (Wampler, 2012c). However, with PB and similar participatory institutions, citizens and CSOs have managed to embrace participatory democracy to reduce tokenism (Gaventa & Barrett, 2012; Leduka, 2009). Thus, participatory institutions contributed to empowering citizens to negotiate resources,

and to promote policies that are of interest to the wellbeing of the citizens (Wampler, 2012c).

Civil society organizations have leveraged their professional usefulness to negotiate pro-poor policies with governments. Therefore, the raison d'être for the adoption of participatory institutions is not to supplant representative democracy, but rather to make it the contributory effort that surmounts obstacles (Wampler, 2012c). Furthermore, participatory institutions have promoted social justice, addressed income inequality, and they have debunked the myth that only the wealthy and the middleclass could participate in the democratic process beyond suffrage rights (Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 1995).

Resources available to participatory institutions are still relatively limited compared to the overall expenditure of governments. In Porto Alegre, the government allocated only about 15% of the available budget to PB (Wampler, 2012c). The limited nature of resources has increased the necessity for participants to compromise, negotiate, lobby, develop the interest in elective political positions, mobilizing for action, and form CBOs (Wampler, 2012c).

The benefits of participatory institutions have also extended to government officials as they have become better at identifying critical issues confronting their jurisdictions (Peruzzotti, 2012; Wampler, 2012a). They could learn of citizens' demands first hand, and they could address potential conflicts before they expand to unmanageable crises. Those seeking elective positions have venues at which they can gain access to active citizens and community leaders (Abers, 2001). The public space of PB provides the materials from which potential political aspirants can formulate electoral manifestos

and programs. Between political office holders and civil servants, governments could connect experts with communities and address their demands for better service delivery and efficient management of resources (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012).

Another benefit of participatory institutions is the establishment of social justice by providing pro-poor rules of engagement to encourage participation (Avritzer, 2010; Bertucci, 2008). In effect, participatory environments have pro-poor affirmative actions (Su, 2012). The establishment of some measure of social justice has been the nature of participatory spaces in developing economies with widening gaps between the rich and the poor (Bratton, 2012; Catell, 2004; Donaghy, 2010). There have been substantial infrastructure investments in affluent communities to the neglect of poorer neighborhoods that contribute little to the state revenue from taxation. However, participatory institutions have helped to address the skewed wealth distribution, and it has engendered development in poor communities (Gaventa & Barrett, 2012; Speer, 2012). A hallmark of good citizenship is the diligent payment of income tax. Citizens who participate in PB experience know, first hand, what their contributions to the revenue pool could provide (Adesopo, 2011; Wampler, 2012b).

The Drivers of Participatory Budgeting

The political system under which PB thrives is policy driven populism, and not personality, political patronage or aggrandizement (Wampler, 2012c). Participatory budgeting thrives under political systems that are fully democratic, with universal suffrage and guaranteed free and fair elections (Wampler, 2012b). Under such political systems, local government administrations have policy independence and fiscal autonomy. In effect, the political arena should be decentralized functionally for local

administrators to operate without undue interference from the central or state
governments (Wampler, 2012a).

Researchers in the area of participatory democracy and PB have made some
recommendations. Baierle (2008) suggested local administrations should access and
control the resources they generate such that they would develop the capacity for long-
term planning and investment strategies. Without access to funds and adequate resources
for inclusion in the budget, the process of PB becomes meaningless to the participants
who might not witness the implementation of their desired projects and agenda (Avritzer,
2012; Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Adesopo (2011) identified the need for local
administrations to develop the institution, human resources, and networking capacity to
interface with CSOs to prepare citizens for interactive decision making. For democracy in
Nigeria and other developing countries to experience the institutional reawakening, the
citizens need civic engagement, which would involve the active participation of CSOs
and activists (Adesopo, 2011; Avritzer, 2012).

The decentralization of the local administration in Brazil facilitated the success of
PB. Decision making was taken away from the hands of a few influential politicians and
state officials (Wampler, 2012b). Information necessary for decision making and policy
formulation was available to the citizens who participated in the budget process (Abers,
2001). The relationship between the state and the stakeholders became transparent, and
the atmosphere of trust prevailed.

Success Factors in the Brazilian Experience

In Porto Alegre, the social movement was vocal, particularly where restive
residents were at the government's throat for wanton neglect of their plight in the

indigent and forgotten neighborhoods (Leubolt et al., 2008). Perhaps the most important

element that paved the way for PB was, as earlier stated, the political will of the state to

cede some decision-making powers to the restive poor. Where PB succeeded, as in the

case of Brazil, the government demonstrated its political will by establishing a legal

framework to institutionalize and support PB (Rodgers, 2010). Thus, the decisions that

emanated from the process were binding on all parties, including the government, and

those decisions became public policies (Wampler, 2012b). The political will of the

elected officials encouraged CSOs to engage state officials who worked along with CSOs

to mobilize the citizens (Rodgers, 2010).

An essential prerequisite for PB is that the organizers, usually the government,

must guarantee equality of all participants in the process (Rodgers, 2010). It is common

to find that elected delegates have had previous involvement with NGOs, especially

community, and religious organizations. As Montambeault (2009) observed, religious

organizations were able to form alliances with other groups and political parties. The

general perception, therefore, was that CSOs were equal partners with the state in

mobilizing the citizens to participate in decision-making processes, to learn negotiating

skills, and by so doing, strengthened participatory institutions (Acharya, Lavalle, &

Houtzager, 2004). The process should not give any privilege to the wealthy or influential

participants, and neither should any class dominate activities within the process (Rodgers,

2010). Except through the voting system, there should be no attempt to subvert decisions

on what to include or exclude in the course of deliberations. The people of Porto Alegre

and its environs demanded equality, justice, and wealth redistribution, and to some

extent, they succeeded (Leubolt et al., 2008).

In spite of legal mandates introducing PB to municipalities, PB failed to spread to the poor at whom the process was targeted (Fung & Wright, 2001). Efficiency in the administration of scarce resources and transparency are two principal objectives of PB. However, authors and researchers in PB could not categorically conclude that these goals have been achievable with PB experiments (Fung, 2006). More often than not, there are contending local factors and circumstances affecting the outcome of PB, in spite of its iterative and continuous improvement nature (Goldfrank & Schneider, 2006; Goldfrank, 2007). The effectiveness of PB at achieving its goals also depends on the presence of active and well-informed CSOs serving the citizens as advocates before the state (Leubolt et al., 2008).

Some conditions have arguably furthered the success of PB in various jurisdictions. Factors that have contributed to recorded successes include willing heads of governments, the absence of strong Right-wing opposition, and weak, or nonexistence of influential elites (Leubolt et al., 2008). The provision of technical and financial assistance by national and international agencies, the availability of adequate budgetary allocations, and the active involvement of CSOs are some of the enabling dynamics that contribute to the success of PB (Osmani, 2007; Richard, 2013; Schneider & Baquero, 2006; Schugurensky, 2009).

Systemic Weaknesses in Participatory Budgeting

Magee (2012) identified some weaknesses with participatory democracy. Participants in public decision making have the propensity of bloated expectations of lofty achievements within specific budget constraints. These grand expectations lead to disappointment in the process. Magee also observed that where the public has shown

considerable interest in participation, the process could become unwieldy and time consuming. In spite of the ubiquity of success stories of PB, some localities were only able to sustain the process for a short period. In their study of PB in Portugal, Alves and Allegretti (2012) used the concepts of fragility and volatility to identify reasons for the failure to sustain the process. The researchers found that in spite of formal rules guaranteeing participation by all citizens, and notwithstanding the special political offices established to implement PB, the process was not sustainable. The focus was the establishment of a perfect PB process rather than a system that was amenable to changes and modifications.

Another obstacle to the sustainability of PB was the change of government and political alliances. Election years tend to create disruption to PB sustainability as Alves and Allegretti (2012) discovered, through either fund reduction or outright suspension of the process. Some localities reduced and modified the process to accommodate consultations with stakeholders, but the outcome of such consultations was not necessarily binding on the government. The authors advanced the warning that in such situations where decision-making power failed to transfer to the citizens, the government could abandon the process ultimately. On the other hand, where the scope of PB expanded to include other spaces such as social justice, health, administrative reforms, social accountability, and redistribution of resources, PB has experienced sustainability. Sheller (2010) recognized the disparity between the needs of the middleclass and affluent communities on one hand, and the needs of the poorer neighborhoods on the other, a situation that calls for a balanced approach and empathy on the part of the well off.

Participatory Budgeting De-emphasized in Porto Alegre, Brazil

Changes in government in Brazil, particularly at the local level, have introduced various changes to PB. Opposing parties to the Workers' Party (PT) became hostile to PB (Leubolt et al., 2008). The opposition blocked tax increases that would have made additional funds available, and in 2005, the PT lost control of the government (Leubolt et al., 2008). The new government, however, did not scrap PB. As Leubolt et al. informed, the government set up a parallel process tagged Local Solidarity Governance (LSG) while government officials boycotted PB sessions.

Three of the grouses against PB were that parochial interests of participants overrode citywide strategy, that its one-year-span did not support sustainable development, and that the demand for state funds did not marry such demands with private-public partnership (PPP) investments (Leubolt et al., 2008; Sintomer et al., 2008). Those who promoted LSG called for the mobilization of private sector investors to supplement the scarce resources of government. The drawback with PPP, as observed by Leubolt et al., was that it focused on larger projects such as mass transportation systems and business district development rather than small projects to improve the immediate locale of the poor.

In Brazil, the focus of PB has shifted since its introduction in 1989. Participatory budgeting now has its attention on good governance, transparency, and access to information on performance rather than robust negotiations between and among contending interests (Alves & Allegretti, 2012; Avritzer, 2012; Leubolt et al., 2008; Sintomer et al. 2008). Sadly, a major drawback of PPP is its lack of transparency (Hadjimichalis & Hudson, 2006). Transparency is a hallmark of PB, but municipal

governments' LSG has used PPP arrangements as conduits to transfer funds earmarked for PB to contracts awarded to private sector sponsors. Thus, municipal governments have relinquished their obligations to PB to pursue strategies that are antithetical to PB (Hadjimichalis & Hudson, 2006).

The motivation to participate in a participatory democratic process such as PB differs between economic groups. The motivation for poor citizens to participate is in direct access to public goods that would provide material benefits, whereas, the attraction of affluent citizens to PB is the potential for good governing characteristics such as transparency and anticorruption (Schneider & Baquero, 2006). In Porto Alegre, Schneider and Baquero (2006) observed that the government demanded taxation from the middleclass while it required support for the political process for material gratification from the poor citizens. In both cases, the government expected good citizenship with a strong sense of civic responsibility. The business sector prefers long-term fiscal planning as opposed to the rather anti sustainability single year span of PB (Schneider & Baquero, 2006).

The North American Mega City Experiences

Lagos, Nigeria, is a mega city like New York City, Chicago, and Toronto. It is thus, informative to examine the PB experiences of these cities. Lerner and Secondo (2012) reported on PB in three North American megacities where the available funds went to the three main areas that were of concern to the low-income citizens of the cities. Participatory budgeting funds targeted schools, housing and jobs as opposed to public parks or street improvements such as sidewalks.

Targeted funding was possible because the majority of the participants were low-income earners, and as Lerner and Secondo (2012) observed in New York City, the citizens decided the rules of PB while the poor assumed leadership roles in the process. Volunteers from various associations and committees had responsibility for the local administration of PB in conjunction with local officials who provided guidance. Thus, the space opened up for the usually excluded group to experience leadership (Lerner & Secondo, 2012). In each of the three cities, postmortem meetings served to review what worked and what did not work during previous rounds of the process. From the feedback, the CSOs involved in the process started work immediately to address whatever lessons emerged from the just concluded process.

To boost the interest of low-income citizens in participation, Lerner and Secondo (2012) discovered that holding meetings in diverse locations reduced obstacles caused by distance. Evening and weekend schedules enabled workers and youths to attend meetings at which they participated in the discussions and voted on projects. Venues such as local schools were popular places for holding meetings. Skilled facilitators directed the meetings and encouraged those who might feel timid or intimidated by vociferous and better-educated participants to speak up rather than remain passive. Recruiting professional facilitators may require funding where a district does not have volunteers for the job. Lerner and Secondo also discovered that the low-income citizens of Chicago, New York, and Toronto required repeated invitations before they eventually attended PB meetings. Teams of volunteer recruiters went around the districts canvassing for attendance and highlighting the benefits of participation.

Su (2012) observed PB in New York City and commented that New Yorkers, mostly the poor who were not engaged in community activities because they distrusted the government, became the proposers of ideas. The poor discovered the satisfaction in volunteering as delegates for the budget process and voted without any inhibition. The organizers of New York's PB undertook outreach efforts targeted at the poor, and predictably, those whom the outreach failed to capture remained excluded from the process. Sixteen-year-old youths were also actively engaged in New York City PB process.

In spite of the fact that youths under the age of 18 could not vote during national elections, the 16-year-old participants were able to participate in the budget process and voted. Participating youths learned to form interest groups to support their project ideas, and they soon understood the need to form alliances with adult groups. The adults expressed surprise at the contributions of the youths and soon embraced the youths as important stakeholders in community affairs. In confirming that there is no best practice in PB, Su posited that there is no fixed modus operandi, but the process should evolve to take account of local dynamics for the maximum benefits of all stakeholders. Su went further to suggest the need for the long-term engagement of participants to ensure effective implementation and monitoring of projects.

Summarizing Participatory Budgeting

Participatory budget is by no means a panacea for resolving socio-economic issues. Expectations should be within the bounds of its definition. Participatory budgeting is an annual process that allows citizens as individuals or in organized groups to participate voluntarily in decision making on the part of local budgets earmarked for the

process. Unless deliberate good budgeting strategies co-exist and blend with PB, the result could be similar to what obtained in Porto Alegre between 1995 and 1999 when the rate of unemployment increased to nearly 80%, and consequently, the number of poor people grew by 20% (Baierle, 2009). Lamentably, in the same period, income disparity broadened by as much as 16%.

With good intentions at the local level, the best PB practices cannot create jobs, or reduce poverty where the macroeconomic policies of the central government do not promote economic growth (Goldfrank, 2007). In spite of its failure to alleviate poverty in Brazil, PB has been successful in health and education (Menegat, 2002; Su, 2010; Wampler, 2007). As Goldfrank (2007) posited, macroeconomic policies should strive for the inclusion of citizens in fiscal debates, be transparent, and promote pro-poor policies to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor to achieve poverty reduction.

The World Bank, the United Nation, and some left-leaning governments have encouraged the ubiquity of PB worldwide, particularly in developing economies (Fung & Wright, 2001; Goldfrank, 2007). The belief by these organizations and governments is that participatory institutions, specifically, PB, create an atmosphere of good governance. The evidence points to success stories of PB in several cities (Avritzer, 2012; Avritzer, 2010; Fung & Wright, 2001; Wampler, 2012a). There has been no empirical evidence to demonstrate that cities yet to adopted PB have produced different outcomes than cities that have adopted it (Boulding & Wampler, 2010). The failure of PB has been most noticeable in its inability to reduce poverty, or improve social wellbeing of citizens. The suggestion of Boulding & Wampler (2010) is for municipalities to formulate revenue

saving policies, as well as revenue generating initiatives that encourage transparency, which discourages corruption and reduces bureaucratic bottlenecks.

These facts notwithstanding, the civic benefits of PB are essential in assessing its overall impact on poverty and social wellbeing (Catell, 2004; Boulding & Wampler, 2010). Benefits such as citizen empowerment, providing public platforms for the poor to have a voice, and the creation of politically aware citizenry are laudable attributes that provide enough stimuli for the spread of PB (Boulding & Wampler, 2010). Participatory budgeting and similar participatory institutions serve to improve relations between the state and the citizens, promote transparency, and improve government performance.

Integrating Participatory Budgeting with Strategic Planning

In 1990, the Workers' Party administration in Porto Alegre streamlined the process of setting budgetary priorities. A team of experts in strategic planning attached to the mayor's office designed the structure of PB in response to the administration's request (Menegat, 2002). Thus, PB was born out of strategic planning and hence the similarities in the structures and processes of PB and strategic planning (Abers, 2001; Menegat, 2002). Bryson (2011) defined strategic planning "as a deliberate, disciplined approach" to essential decision making and taking particular actions that direct the purpose and the existential stratagem of an organization (pp. 7-8). Strategic planning provides the roadmap to organization leaders to determine courses of action and to provide the basis for those actions (Bryson, 2011).

By design, strategic planning gains its effectiveness from broad deliberative interactions among all stakeholders of an organization. Deliberations within strategic planning take place at fora where participating stakeholders exchange opinions and

engage in persuasive negotiations for competing alternatives based on reasoned and convincing arguments (Steiner, 1997). The challenge for managers is to facilitate collective thinking, learning and actions among the stakeholders without domination by any group of stakeholders or a dominant individual (Innes & Booher, 2010).

Organizations engage in strategic planning to determine what rational actions to undertake to project the organization's goals and to fulfill its mandates. Strategic planning aids in developing organizational capacity to deliver services effectively, economically, and efficiently (Bryson, 2011). This linkage connects the stakeholders with established structures, processes, available resources, and the political environment to produce the kind or organizational efficiency that fulfills the mission, goals, and mandates of the organization. Therefore, the deliberative nature of strategic planning makes it an attractive approach for governments and nonprofits organizations to address social problems.

Figure 2 is a model of an approach to strategic planning suggested by Bryson (2011). In this model for local governments, the council manager initiates the process of strategic planning, the ownership of which belongs to elected officials. Council managers recognize the importance of cooperation between elected officials and various groups in the community. By its nature, and similar to PB, strategic planning is capable of generating enthusiastic participation by entire communities in the interest of building a sustainable future. By discussing community values, vision, and mission early in the process, participants learn about the strategy of the community to improve the standard of living and the general environment of the community (Bryson, 2011). The mission

statement projects the *raison d'être* of the community and it provide a source of

community pride around which the citizens rally for collective motivation.

Assessing the internal and external environments of the community provides the

guide for the community to prepare for events that could cause disruptions and those

events that present opportunities for the society. Internal environmental factors include

the quality of elected officials, the employees, and the ability of these individuals to think

critically and absorb new ideas (Gordon, 2005). External factors include

macroeconomics, the political environment, the legal and regulatory environments, and

the physical context of the locality (Bryson, 2011).

Strategic planning takes a medium to a long-term approach to setting goals and

objectives. The goals and objectives feed into the vision of the locality (Gordon, 2005).

The plan outlines the purpose of each objective and the transparent means by which the

district measures its performance. An important feature of strategic planning is the review

and evaluation of the plan, the programs, and the projects it sets out to accomplish

(Steiner, 1997). The locality sets criteria for performance measurement that determine

cost efficiency, program effectiveness, and the impact of the plan of the municipality as a

whole (Innes & Booher, 2010). Since performance measurement is a continuous process,

strategic plans go through reviews and amendments to reflect emerging realities. For this

reason, the locality needs to collect data that will guide the management of the locality to

take prompt actions to maintain effective and efficient performance.

Participatory budgeting emerged as a process in response to urgent demands of

the needy majority in Brazilian communities (Cabannes, 2004). Because of the need to

meet this kind of emergency, PB is a short-term measure, which, according to Cabannes

(2004), fails to fit in with most municipalities' longer-term strategies and sustainable development plans. The challenge for government officials is to integrate the needs for community or neighborhood development with local government-wide physical and fiscal planning strategies. When the Workers' Party introduced PB to Santo Andre, São Paulo, Brazil and Rosario, Argentina, it was with strong linkage to the localities' strategic plans because the budgets of the strategic planning process spanned five to ten years, creating sustainable planning approach to governance and public policy (Menegat, 2002). Therefore, I propose an integration of PB into strategic planning process as shown in Figure 2, for more effective, longer term, strategic and sustainable development engendered by strategic planning.

Participatory budgeting stands to gain some added benefits if it is integrated within strategic planning structure. Government officials and politicians can better understand the context of budgeting when they consider various strategies, and how best to attain those strategies (Steiner, 1997). They are thus able to guide the process of PB to align with the local government's objectives, overall budget performance, and future strategic implications of agreed actions (Gordon, 2005; Innes & Booher, 2010). Consequently, officials can coordinate various demands of the citizens for improved service delivery while government becomes responsive by fulfilling its mandates, obligation, and creating meaningful public value (Bryson, 2011).

Local Governance in Nigeria

The main purpose of local government administration in Nigeria, as with other nations that use this tier of governance, is to ensure that every citizen, regardless of his or her socio-economic status, can participate in community development (Bashir &

Muhammed, 2012). Local officials under the local government arrangement are responsible and accountable to the communities under their purview. Under Nigeria's 1999 constitution, local governments are institutions of decentralized governance, the aim of which is to create national integration, efficient governance, and transparent administration (Adesopo, 2011; Bashir & Muhammed, 2012).

The Nigerian constitutional aspiration is that of active democratic participation that ultimately resonates at the national space. Therefore, the demands of the grassroots get the attention of the states and the central government for macroeconomic strategic planning. Bashir and Muhammed (2012) observed that the system has so far failed to deliver the expected political development and socioeconomic outcomes. This failure, posited Bashir and Muhammed (2012), has dogged freedom, liberty, and individual empowerment, but instead, it has entrenched perennial poverty and ignorance.

For too long, the political system in Nigeria failed to improve the general living standards of citizens, especially the poorer population (Adesopo, 2011). The absence of participation by those who government policies affect is evident in the nonexistence or inadequacy of basic amenities such as roads, portable water supply, schools, and health care facilities (Dobson, 2005). These failures are not because of scarce local government resources but because of opaque administration over local funds, lack of accountability, corruption, and wanton disregard for the rule of law (Bashir & Muhammed, 2012; Dobson, 2005).

Because of previous military regimes in Nigeria, there has been legitimacy crisis in the polity. By ensuring equality of all citizens demonstrated through grassroots opportunity to participate and deliberate on public policy issues, political systems may

Figure 2. A suggested model integrating participatory budgeting into strategic planning process: A visual representation partly designed from the narrative in *"Strategic Planning: For Public and Nonprofit Organizations"* by J. M. Bryson (2011), Jossey-Bass. San Francisco, CA.

yet overcome the legitimacy crisis (Avritzer, 2012). As Heller (2012) posited, when the lower economic class overcomes the myriads of obstacles to collective action, secures the anticipated gains of democracy. The role of civil society in this task is very pivotal to achieving the aspiration because through organizing for collective action, lasting changes could take place to create Rousseau's community of equals (Pateman, 1995).

The absence of several of the real virtues of budgeting has characterized government budgeting in Nigeria (Agbude & Egbide, 2012). In the absence of transparency and accountability, guided by institutionalized budget discipline, the country continues to suffer under the burden of waste, abuse, and fraud, the consequence of which is lingering underdevelopment. According to Agbude and Egbide, the level of underdevelopment in Nigeria, notwithstanding its wealth of crude oil reserve being the sixth largest producer, is a paradoxical embarrassment to the African continent. Reversing this trend requires good governance and by embracing the virtues of good budget practices (Agbude & Egbide, 2012). Because of the inherent weaknesses in governance, the urbanization of Nigeria and its attendant demand for infrastructure has left the government bewildered about how to tackle the problems. As more Nigerians move to urban centers, the growth of slums has been alarming due to lack of planning, especially in the areas of sanitation and waste management (Omar, 2013).

The largest city in Nigeria is Lagos, which has fast become a city-state with massive conurbation that has elevated its status to that of a megacity with a population of over 14 million inhabitants. In the opinion of Agbude and Egbide, the government needs to focus on providing shelter to combat overcrowding, mass transportation, infrastructure, and environmental sanitation.

Methodology in Literature

Since 1985 when PB took off in Porto Alegre, Brazil, there has been a burgeoning body of literature on both participatory democracy and PB. Authors and researchers have extensively examined the former through the prism of the latter thereby achieving empiricism through a variety of research methods depending on the questions the researchers set out to answer. Some inquiries into participatory democracy and institutions took the form of case studies, gathering data from purposively selected informants who participated in participatory processes especially PB (Bashir & Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008; Dobson, 2005; Donaghy, 2010). Alternatively, other researchers conducted surveys of individual citizens who had engaged in participatory institutions in one capacity or the other (Houtzager & Lavalle, 2010; Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010; Schier, 2000; Wampler, 2007; Wampler, 2012a).

The two alternate methods served different research objectives. According to Houtzager and Lavalle (2010), those who used surveys to collect data identified the features of the democratic institutions or those of civil society through the characteristics of the individuals that participated in the studies. On the other hand, researchers who adopted the case study and interviewing designs did so to generalize their findings on participatory governance, which often involved civil society. They achieved their aims by using characteristic modes of practice, dictated by the political terrain, to generalize conceptual or theoretical assertions, albeit space and time limited the studies.

Peruzzotti (2012) employed the review of the literature in the position paper, to probe noticeable advancements in the participatory space especially democratic accountability in some Latin American nations including Brazil. The literature review

honed in on the innovations involving CSOs as protagonists of accountability. Peruzzotti concluded that, with the progress made in participatory democracy, citizens have the opportunities to demand and to promote accountability. Monitoring accountability shifted to civil society and other social actors whose objectives were to encourage responsible, responsive, open, and accountable governance. Participatory institutions hold public officials accountable, not at election cycles but at all moments during the life of a government.

Discussion and position papers are quite common on discourses pertaining to PB and other participatory institutions. Baierle (2009) presented a thesis highlighting a number of issues on PB in the discussion paper on the anticipated challenges and roadblocks in the path of PB. In a similar vein, Avritzer (2010) presented a discussion paper on the development of PB and its transformative effects on the living standards of the poor in Brazil and its spread across the globe.

Goldfrank (2007) engaged the use of the wealth of literature on participatory democracy and budgeting to analyze why some PB experiments failed, and others succeeded. Goldfrank (2007) established the connections between decentralized administrative styles, funding, and active civil society as the drivers of meaningful program designs.

Participatory democracy researchers have also used quantitative and mixed methodology methods of research inquiry especially when they sought external validity and generalizability of their findings. Wampler (2012a) used secondary data from a survey of 833 elected officials involved with PB in Brazil to evaluate the effectiveness of the practices of PB in other participatory spaces and economic arenas. As is synonymous

with the quantitative method of research, the study used a random sampling method to select the survey participants from among the delegates who had taken part in PB. The study identified four categories of civil society organization actors, namely (a) leaders, (b) members, (c) ex-members, and (d) those citizens who had civic engagements without affiliations with any particular organizations.

Wampler (2012a) used logistic regression where agenda setting, political strategies, and arena shopping served as the dependent variables to examine how particular public activities carried out by these individuals translated into cooperation with government mandated participatory institutions. With only one instance in the agenda setting variable – who sets internal debate – CSO leaders were significantly more likely to be involved with agenda setting ($p \leq 0.05$), political strategies ($p \leq 0.001$), and arena shopping ($p \leq 0.001$) than any other group of citizens (p. 352). At the same confidence level, the leaders were 17% more likely to determine they collaborate with other CSOs rather than the government than PB winners whose projects were adopted. The same leaders were 5% more likely than their members and 8% more likely than PB project winners to collaborate with other groups to influence decision making, and to distribute public goods in various participatory spaces (p. 354).

In the exploratory study of Michels and De Graaf (2010), the authors used the mixed methods to assess the role of citizens who participate in public decision-making processes and to define the degree to which these citizens influence policies. The data for the qualitative case study design came from in-depth interviewing of eight informants including government officials, businesspersons, and professional association representatives. For the quantitative design, the authors conducted a thirty six-question

survey of 272 citizens who had participated in various participatory institutions including PB.

The phenomenological study by Owusu-Achiaw (2013) examined the effect of participation on housing for the poor from the perspectives of the beneficiaries of social housing. The interviews of purposively sampled 120 residents of the housing scheme provided the data for the study. The study found that, without community involvement in decisions about their environment, policy makers failed to provide what people needed. Owusu-Achiaw identified the need for communities to disseminate information among its citizens such that decision making on the part of the residents relies on the awareness of such information.

Using secondary data from the literature on participatory democracy, Fung (2006) developed a framework that provided a better understanding of various participatory institutions from three perspectives: who participates, how the participants communicate to make decisions, and the linkage between public policy and the deliberations by the participants. The research addressed the typology of participation and by how much participation was necessary for effective participatory governance. Fung (2006) posited in this article that participation ultimately should achieve the three fundamental democratic principles of "legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness of public action" (p. 73). Fung further posited that participatory designs are effective for the particular environment the designers have in mind. Therefore, there is no best practice; rather the process continually evolves within the context of the particular locus or arena, considering all the sociopolitical and economic nexus of the time.

The case study design was the choice of Bowen (2008) in a study of eight Jamaican communities. The study focused on what participants understood and associated with pro-poor initiatives. It was a follow-up study to a grounded theory study. Nonparticipant observations and review of public documents provided the triangulating data for the study.

Drawing on the theory of representation, Houtzager and Lavalle (2010) in their qualitative study utilized the case study design to explore civil society's claims to representation and the contextual meaning of representation to participatory governance. Data gathering was through secondary data from surveys of NGOs that work with poor communities in the megacities São Paulo, Delhi, and Mexico City. The secondary data also included interviews with 229 NGOs engaged with residents of poor urban communities. The participant selection was by the snowballing method where participants referred the researchers to others whom they believe could provide meaningful data for the research.

Houtzager and Lavalle honed in on the São Paulo survey because of the extensive Brazilian leading experience with participatory institutions. The researchers examined the claims of the NGOs to representing the people in political spaces, and the evidence to support the claims. The research found that CSOs in São Paulo were politically active, influencing the various stages that led to the formation of public policies. While the survey indicated that participants did not believe civil society was an alternative to democratic institutions, the research concluded that civil society had become the intermediary between the state and the poor communities.

Khuluq (2008) used the case study design to understand the implementation process of the various poverty alleviation agenda of three districts of Indonesia. The data provided the qualitative tool to analyze the effects those programs had on the living standards of the poor. It was a comparative case study of two villages, which collected data from the semi-structured interview of purposively selected participants consisting of petty traders, artisans, teachers, government officials, and representatives of civil society. Other triangulating data sources were from state documents and participant observations. The study found that when policies succeeded in improving the lives of the poor, the poor participated with enthusiasm in government programs and did away with the passivism. Out of necessity, the poor united in the fight against poverty to improve their economic status, rather than the old selfish approach to individual or parochial survival.

This study benefited from the qualitative approach, using the interviewing design that best answers the research questions in Chapter 1. It provides the model for better understanding of the practice of PB in the particular case of Ijede LCDA from the subjective experience of individuals who had experienced the process. Through interviewing of purposively selected participants, and the review of PB process documents from prior years, the study will contribute to strengthening the process of PB at Ijede LCDA.

<div style="text-align:center">Summary</div>

Participatory budgeting is a relatively recent process in Nigeria. The outcome of PB in Brazil encouraged the United Nations and the World Bank. Porto Alegre is the quintessential example of successful PB, which these institutions highlighted worldwide. The perception among several Nigerians and Africans in general is that participatory

democracy begins and ends with the ability to vote in general elections. Beyond voting,

there is the lack of interest in engaging the political class directly in dialogues on matters

that affect daily lives (Adesopo, 2011; Bashir & Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008;

Donaghy, 2010; Ganuza & Frances, 2012; Leduka, 2009). Circa 2007, Nigeria adopted

PB along with several other Sub-Saharan African nations (Adesopo, 2011). The provision

of technical and financial assistance by national and international agencies, the

availability of adequate budgetary allocations, and the active involvement of CSOs are

some of the enabling dynamics that have contributed to the success of PB (Avritzer,

2009; Baierle, 2009; Bherer, 2010; Goldfrank, 2007).

The two frameworks that drive this study include Avritzer's (2009) theory of

participatory institutions establishing a tripartite relationship between civil society, the

political society, and institutional design. The effectiveness of the relationship between

the three institutions, in turn, determines the outcomes of PB as the other framework for

this study. The willingness of the political class to cede some power under PB, the

promotion of pro-poor policies, and redistribution agenda have been the stimulants

encouraging participation by ordinary citizens (Postigo, 2010).

As with other participatory democratic institutions, citizens who participate in PB

learn civic activities and responsibilities through practice and thus improve the quality of

the electorates (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006). Citizens learn to think of collective goals and

benefits rather than personal gains and selfish agitations. Some of the aims of the PB

process include the elimination of clientelism, combating corruption through a

transparent budget process, and the reversal of socio-political exclusion of low economic

status citizens (Baierle, 2009). Fung (2006) conjectured that if the government is to

improve the type and quality of services that meet the needs of the citizens, the contributions of ordinary citizens should be the source of information for government officials.

Alves and Allegretti (2012) used the concepts of fragility and volatility to identify sustainability problems such as the absence of legal framework to protect the process from abandonment by Right-wing politicians. The researchers identified the quest for the establishment of a perfect PB process, regime changes, and political alliances as other issues that could threaten PB. There is unanimity among authors that there is no best practice in PB, and each locality would need to consider its sociocultural, political, and economic dynamics to determine what mix produces the best outcomes.

The review of literature explored the concept of integrating PB with strategic planning given the high likelihood of project abandonment due to lack of funds, time to complete projects, and regime changes particularly in the case of Ijede LCDA and Nigeria. Participatory budgeting is an adaptation of strategic planning by a team of experts attached to the office of the mayor of Porto Alegre, Brazil (Menegat, 2002). The challenge for PB organizers is the measurement of the performance of the process, which strategic planning and its medium to long-term approach are designed to achieve (Gordon, 2005).

Some essential components of successful participatory outcomes include the role of CSOs in the training and empowering of citizens, the willingness of the state to mandate the process and provide adequate financial resources, and the private sector corporate social responsibility initiatives. This study examined the influence of this mix of ingredients in strengthening PB at Ijede LCDA.

      In Chapter 3, I describe the research methodology, the locus of the study, and the purposive nature of informant selection to provide the data for this study. The chapter provides details of the process as practiced at the particular setting. Chapter 4 details the data analysis strategy, process, and interpretation. In Chapter 5, I present the discussion on the findings, the study conclusion, and recommendations.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

It is not known whether and how civil society empowers citizens to participate in the participatory budgeting (PB) process. Specially, it is not known whether and how civil society can empower citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria to participate in the PB process. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to gain a better understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA in order for them to participate in the budgetary decision-making processes. The research questions of this study interrogated various elements that identify the dynamics CSOs need to consider in coordinating their activities to empower the citizenry.

Data collection for the study was conducted through interviews with purposively selected participants consisting of residents of the community, government officials, politicians, and representatives of CSOs that are active in the local government. The study reviewed budget documents for the fiscal years 2012 through 2014. The local government did not maintain official records of past PB processes.

In this chapter, I present the research paradigm that directed the data gathering process for this study. The research questions determined the qualitative methodological approach. In the first section of this chapter, I lay out the details of the research methodology, the description of the locus of the study, the participants, and the method of participant selection. In the third section, I discuss the data collection, method of data analysis, and finally, I present the discourse on ethics in research and the protection of the participants in this study.

Research Design

As stated in Chapter 1, the research questions for this study drive the investigation and choice of a case study approach. The choice of the constructivist paradigm to which the case study design belongs was driven by the research questions, which were designed to collect rich data from the narratives of the research participants. The participants provided the information that revealed the particulars the research questions set out to investigate; namely, the activities of NGOs and their roles in mobilizing the community to participate in PB.

RQ1: What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the PB process at Ijede LCDA?

RQ2: What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at Ijede LCDA?

RQ3: What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business community in the PB process?

RQ4: What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected projects?

These research questions were designed to extract from the participants the essential factors needed for citizens to possess the ability to interact with the government over budgetary allocations and spending in a PB process. The interview questions examined the roles of NGOs, if any, in empowering citizens to acquire the necessary skills to engage the government effectively.

Research question 1 addressed the problem statement by investigating the roles of NGOs, if any, in the design of the PB process that enables the citizens to participate in,

and benefit from, the objectives of interacting with the government. The question also examined the methods NGOs adopt to interface with the citizens toward their empowerment. Research question 2 unraveled, through the intuitive perception of the participants, the activities CSOs needed to embark on to empower the citizens towards participating in the PB process at Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria.

Idemudia (2009) conjectured that some corporate organizations do reinvest in communities by providing funds, materials and equipment towards the execution of community projects because financial resources are hardly adequate for local and municipal administrations to fund PB. Thus, in their advocacy role, NGOs are expected to interface with corporations to participate in community projects.

Research question 3 explored, through the experiences of the participants, the underlying factors that encouraged corporations to fill the resources gap experienced by governments. Essential to the success of PB is the intervention by NGOs establishing connections with corporations to create awareness about community needs. Research question 4 was also exploratory, surveying the sustainability strategies the government could consider to ensure citizen-selected projects are completed and maintained. This research question has the potential to lead to policy changes requiring the government to consider some sustainability strategies such as medium-term to long-term budgeting, and increased funding for PB.

Together, these research questions provided the background for the collection of relevant data during the semi-structured one-on-one interviewing, the follow-up questions, and the focus group discussions. The data collected led to further

understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in the budgetary decision making.

Qualitative Method

The qualitative approach is a social constructivist and naturalistic paradigm researchers use to understand their existence and their world (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Miller & Salkind, 2002). Researchers who engage in this approach gather most of their evidence through open-ended interviews with individuals who live phenomena under inquiry in the study (Kvale, 1996; Seidman, 2006). Creswell (2009) discussed the social constructivist paradigm along with the advocacy and participatory model. Sharing knowledge through social construction, researchers are able to organize relational patterns of thoughts and behaviors to give meaning to the experiences of research subjects (Yin, 1994). Advocacy and participatory models present the opportunity for a researcher to investigate the socioeconomic issues of poverty, oppression, inequality, and empowerment (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Patton, 2002). Researchers in this area, through advocacy, appeal to the conscience of society about the plight of marginalized citizens.

Yin (2012) described as a compelling feature of the case study design the need to acquire in-depth understanding of phenomena in a real world context. Consequently, data collection for the case the study design occurs in the natural setting of the unit of analysis. Such an embedded mode of research produces new insights and learning. Case study research outcomes have been applied to the evaluation of process initiatives and to document the analyses of the results of social experiments in public policy decision making (Yin, 2012).

There are various research traditions under the qualitative paradigm. Common among these are: ethnography, grounded theory, phenomenology, and case studies (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Patton, 2002).

Yin (2009) identified interviewing as a very important method for collecting information for case studies. Interviewing is a significant part of the case study design and is widely used in process evaluation research into sociopolitical programs and initiatives and social projects by governments and NGOs (Kvale, 1996; Yin, 2012). Interviewing permits the inclusion of a broad range of context and other conditions without restricting the researcher to remote variables (Seidman, 2006; Yin, 2012). Interviewing assumes that the researcher has some strategic interest in the activities of the participants at a particular point in their lives. Blumer (1969) submitted that through interviewing, the participants grant context access to the researcher to understand their actions, behaviors, and meanings. In effect, the meaning people ascribe to their experiences determines the manner in which they pass through those experiences (Mishler, 1991; Seidman, 2006).

Although there are various forms of interviews, such as in surveys where close-ended questions are appropriate, the open-ended interview questions used in case studies enable the researcher to convert interview respondents into informants (Yin 2009). The researcher, according to Yin (1994) can ask for the respondents' opinions about aspects of the phenomenon under study or about specific events or to suggest personal insights (Yin 1994). Such personal insights often provide the researcher the opportunity for deeper probing questions.

The Setting

In conformity with Yin's (2012) clarification of what constitutes the case in case the study design, this study's unit of analysis is the PB process at Ijede LCDA of Lagos State, Nigeria, one of the local governments that should have completed five rounds of PB. As a bounded entity, "the boundary between the case and its contextual conditions – in both spatial and temporal dimensions – may be blurred" (Yin, 2012, p. 6). For this study, the PB program in Ijede LCDA is the case but without definitive boundary between the PB process at the LCDA, and its space and time. A single case study site avoids diluting the details of the study and provides robust analysis of the context of the development of a novel phenomenon (Wolcott, 2008). The selection of Ijede LCDA was purposeful because of the ease of access to the site through a trusted gatekeeper, the Council Manager, whose position offered access to the participants.

In 1999, the Lagos State government, in a controversial political maneuver, created 37 new local governments out of the existing 23. The move was controversial because the federal government opposed it due to the belief that the creation of additional local governments would increase the amount of federal allocations to the state. Ijede LCDA, along with the other local governments and LCDAs in the state, did not receive the statutory allocation of funds from the government at the center for nearly nine years. In spite of the nonpayment of its statutory allocations, Lagos State government was able to fund local administrations, albeit with far fewer resources than should have been available (Ugoh & Ukpere, 2009). Consequently, development was on hold for 9 years.

Ijede is an old, semi-rural town with a history dating back further than 650 years (IDF, 2014). Geographically, it is to the north of Lagos Island, separated by the Lagos

Lagoon. Fishing was the mainstay of the people of Ijede. However, as the economy of Lagos State grew, the proximity of Ijede has attracted low income and middle-class dwellers who commute to work in the city of Lagos daily.

The presence of federal and state institutions has been sustaining the economic activities in Ijede. The LCDA has a number of government institutions including: schools, hospitals, community health centers, ferry terminals, a federal government-owned gas company, an oil palm plantation, and some housing estates. The majority of the inhabitants of Ijede are poor, and citizens look to the LCDA to enact policies that would address poverty and improve their economic status. Ijede LCDA, like most local governments in Nigeria, is in need of a network of roads, housing, electricity, and other essential social services and amenities. However, according to Khalil and Adelabu (2012), the most urgent need is for the people to engage local officials to identify priorities, obtain the commitment of the government to address those priorities, and hold the government accountable for its actions. Participatory budgeting has presented such opportunity.

Population and Sample

The method of selecting participants for this study was purposive sampling that ensured the collection of relevant and useful data from those with sufficient PB experience in the LCDA. This kind of criterion sampling is useful where informants have had direct exposure to the phenomenon under study (Yin, 1994). The sample population provided the required information to understand the roles of actors in PB. This study embraced Yin's (2012) approach to the population, sample selection, and sample size. The purposively selected participants included adult citizens of Ijede LCDA: the civil

servants, the elected representatives, and the members of NGOs active in the community, all of whom had previously participated in PB.

The study sample of 30 participants was drawn from this population. There were 15 one-on-one interviews and two focus group discussions including five participants each. The focus group discussants were selected based on the usefulness of the information they provided at the individual interview stage. Each category of participants was represented in the focus groups. The focus group discussions encouraged the participants to generate spontaneous and emotional conversations. A large focus group could become unwieldy and beyond the interviewer's control (Kvale, 1996; Seidman, 2006).

The study population consisted of adult citizens of Ijede LCDA: the civil servants, the elected representatives, and the members of NGOs who were active in the community. Participants were purposively selected for their previous PB experiences. The other criteria for participant selection included literacy, ability to communicate in English, and availability for the in-person interview and discussion sessions. See Appendix A for study population criteria. The sample size ($n = 15$) was sufficient to minimize the risk of participant attrition, and according to Marshall and Rossman, (2011), the diversity of the population group required such large sample, in order to enhance transferability.

Participant Selection Process

The gatekeeper provided assistance to locate individuals who met the participant criteria for this study (Patton, 2002). The gatekeeper made initial contact with the participants, relating to them this research and its purpose. The gatekeeper provided

telephone numbers and email addresses of each willing individual. I contacted the

participants to provide detailed information about the study, confirmed their

qualifications under the participant criteria, and obtained the agreement of each

individual to participate voluntarily in the study.

Informed consent procedure

Research participants should be informed of the risks and benefits of taking part

in research studies and be informed of the voluntary nature of their participation

(Rudestam & Newton, 2007). The process of obtaining participants' consent to be part of

this study was by telephone, explaining the purpose of the study and the criteria under

which participants qualified. I requested via short message services (SMS) that the

participants send their email addresses so that they could receive the informed consent .

The informed consent provided details of the research topic and purpose, specifying the

criteria for including the participants in this study.

The initial correspondence included some sample questions, the estimated 45 to

90 minutes time allotment for each of the two interviews, in which the participants were

involved, and the risks and the mitigation of the risks to which the participants might be

exposed. It also stated the voluntary nature of participation, the equivalent of $10 reward

for each interview, and the freedom to withdraw from the study at any time. Participants

were encouraged to communicate questions, concerns or any other issues that needed

clarification to the researcher or to an appropriate representative of the institutional

review board of Walden University, who was identified in the consent document. The

participants were given up to a week to consider the conditions stated in informed

consent email before communicating their responses by replying to the email. At the

venue of the interviews, each participant was handed two copies of the informed consent; one to be signed, dated and returned to me and the other to be retained for the participant's record.

Confidentiality

To ensure the confidentiality of the participants in this study, I expunged from the data, all references to identifying information. I retained sufficient information in field notes to identify the participants for member checking. A professor of intercultural communication at Iowa Wesleyan College undertook the data transcription, a fee based service rendered in a consulting capacity. He is an experienced communications expert with expertise in data transcription. The service is necessary to ensure accurate and detailed transcription. In addition, under consideration was the short turnaround time that made member checking possible during fieldwork and not several weeks thereafter when participants might not have full and accurate recall of their accounts.

The transcriber signed a confidentiality agreement for the data transcription service. During data collection, I uploaded the audio files of the recorded interview to the transcriber via an encrypted link to an iCloud account I set up for the fieldwork. The transcriber returned the transcripts to me via an encrypted link from the transcriber's iCloud account. The transcriber deleted the interview audio files and transcripts of the interviews as soon as I completed member checking satisfactorily. I encrypted all audio files I generated during the fieldwork and I backed them up to iCloud. I deleted all the recorded interviews on my phone and on my computer after backing them up to iCloud. I will retain the data I collected for this study in my secure iCloud account for the mandatory five years after which I will delete them permanently.

Sharing Study Results with Stakeholders

The study participants and the community, through the Ijede Community Online News, and the website of Ijede Development Foundation (IDF), will have the opportunity to read the summary of the results of this study as Stake (1995) recommended. The community holds monthly fora at which attendees deliberate on issues of concern to the community. The Ijede community, at one of these fora, will have the opportunity to discuss the results of this study. Policymakers and other stakeholder are inspired and likely to take action because of media interests and public opinions. Therefore, there should be a platform for stakeholder feedback to attract the attention of policymakers in the community and the broader Nigerian space. The successful adoption of results and recommendations of this study by the Ijede LCDA could pave the way for its presentation and adoption at larger fora at state and national levels.

<div align="center">

The Interview Protocol

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The interview protocol for this study was standardized open-ended questioning with structured wordings designed to capture, in general, the same information from participants in the same group as recommended by Gall, Gall, and Borg (2003) and Kvale (1996);. The dialogues thus focused on the main points of the interviews and flexible enough for probing questions to explicate additional information from the participants.

The interviews took place at a conference room in a hotel located within Ijede Community. The hotel and its facilities were adequate for hosting the interviews. The one-on-one interviews lasted between 17 and 47 minutes. As with the one-on-one interviews, I facilitated and moderated the two focus group discussions, which lasted about 50 and 53 minutes respectively. I recorded the interviews with iTalk [TM], a

telephone application, which was located close to the participants. Additionally, the Microsoft Word ™ version of Apple ™ MacBook laptop, which has the capacity for audio recording and annotation at various timelines, acted as backup recording device.

To ensure confidentiality of the focus group participants, I instructed the participants on the importance of discretion during the discussions, which proceed without referring to anyone by name but by pre-assigned alphanumeric identifiers. I devised a list of identifiers, each unique to each participant to maintain anonymity (Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I applied the identifiers in place of participants' names on all the notes taken during the group discussions. The recordings on iTalk contained prompts to indicate speakers' identifier, which I annotated on the recording timeline on the Microsoft Word media recorder.

Rudestam and Newton recognized difficulties such as domination of discussions by some individuals or muted participation by some women, which were addressed by requesting contributions from less active participants, respectfully thanking the dominant contributors and allowing other participants to provide alternative perspectives. I made deliberate eye contact with others who might want to contribute to the discussions whenever the opportunity arose. This study had a participant pool of 16 from which only 15 were required. The proposed target for the participant pool was 30. The interview protocols for the one-on-one interviews, the focus group interviews, and the document review protocols are in Appendices B through F.

At the conclusion of each focus group discussion, the participants had sufficient opportunity to ask questions. Kvale (1996) suggested participants confirm the clarity and transparency of the research process, and to encourage them to share their feelings and

reactions to any aspects of the research. The participants were interactive and spoke freely throughout the discussions. Finally, with gratitude, I reminded the participants of the content of the informed consent form and the contact information contained therein, should there be the need to clarify any issues or desire to be informed of the study result.

Validation of Interview Questions

The interview questions were specifically constructed for this study, and they were subjected to validation of application as de Vaus (2001) recommended. To ensure content validity of range of meanings, and the reliability that the interview questions would give the same result when used recurrently in varying circumstances, two cross-cultural communications experts reviewed the interview protocol through a consensual validation process. A professor of political science and culture at a leading Midwest university who is a prolific writer and researcher, and whose works have focused on Nigeria and Africa's political spaces, and an associate professor at a Southern university, who used the interviewing method to interview participants in ethnographic research in parts of Africa, validated the interview questions. I chose these professors for their contributions to African socio-political commentaries and their expertise in the nuances of African sociocultural constructs.

In reviewing the interview questions, the experts considered the language of the interview questions appropriate for the average Nigerian English speaker. While the questions were adjudged acceptable, further explanations were suggested for participants who, from responses to the first two icebreaker questions, might require additional prompting to obtain detailed accounts that contributed to the thick data obtained. In particular, I was cautioned to listen for local jargons or slangs and to paraphrase

responses provided by the participants ensuring concurrence of meanings between the researcher and the participants. During data collection, I modulated the language of the interview questions to accommodate the level of understanding and verbal articulation of the participants. The interview protocols were validated without material alterations, and they were used on the field as they were designed.

Researcher Role

I had conducted a study of the practice and implementation of PB in six local governments in Lagos State, Nigeria, which revealed weak implementation of PB, skeptical electorates, and unmotivated state officials. The study further revealed a general lack of trust on the part of the citizens in the motive of the state. The poor residents who are the targets of PB declined the calls to participate for fear of tax dodger labeling. The study also found that rather than encouraging individuals to participate in PB, representatives of neighborhood associations were the invited participants. All the participants in the research identified inadequate funding as a challenge to development. These findings prompted the need for further study into the process of PB in Lagos State. None of the participants in the preceding narrative was involved in the present study. Therefore, this study and its participants were independent of the prior research. The qualitative researcher is a data collection instrument during a research process (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The qualitative researcher designs his or her instruments and does not rely on some third party survey questions developed for other purposes. I had the moral imperative to collect data as objectively and realistically as possible (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Thus, the task of this researcher, as Kvale (1996) submitted, was to ask good open-ended questions and reduce bias to the minimum by being neutral. Following

Kvale's suggestion, I explored the responses of the participants and extricated their meanings from those narratives. My responsibility was to ensure the interviews remained focused as structured..

This study involved human subjects who provided the data. Consequently, before entering the field, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Walden University ensured that the benefits of this research outweighed the risks. As I proceeded to fieldwork, I conducted interviews with participants with whom he established some empathetic or emotional relationship in the course of collecting data. My duty as the researcher was to put the participants at ease such that without undue pressure or influence, the stories they were willing to tell unfolded. Because of the large data qualitative research potentially produces, the number of participants is usually not very large. Therefore, 15 participants were sufficient to reveal information that ranged from personal through controversial to subversive all of whom contributed towards answering the research questions and influencing the conclusion of this study (Stake, 1995). This researcher in his role ensured accuracy and objectivity through member checking and data triangulation strategies.

Data Collection and Analytical Strategies

Data were collected from interviewing, focus group discussions, and public documents available at the local government (Janesick, 2011; Yin 2009). Transcripts of interviews, with all good intentions, might not accurately reflect what transpired during the interviews and discussions. This kind of limitation imposes additional burden on researchers who wish to ensure the trustworthiness of the data and the subsequent interpretations adduced to the data (Lave & Steinar, 1995).

The purpose of collecting data was to possess adequate information to answer the research questions. According to Yin (2009), data collection strategies available to qualitative researchers include individual interviews, documents, direct observations, artifacts, and participant observation, which should be derived from two or more sources. The preferred data collection strategy for this study was to elicit information through in-depth, semi-structured, open-ended one-on-one interviews, focus group discussions and the review of government records. A fundamental assumption of interviewing is that the interviewer is interested in people, but that assumption requires the interviewer to suppress personal ego and allow the importance of the participants to prevail (Seidman, 2006).

Case studies are directed by the theoretical concepts (Yin, 2012). Therefore, Avritver's (2009) theory of participatory institutions provided the theoretical proposition from which this study emerged. The theory contributed to the development of the essential methodological steps of this study. Yin (2012) posited that theories assist researchers in developing the research questions, defining the research data, directing the data analysis, refining the case study design. Theories also play a major role in the interpretation of the data. The application of Avritver's theoretical orientation simplified the implementation of this study by providing a number of theory-generated pre codes as the foundational guide to data analysis.

I recorded the interviews without objections from any of the participants. The recordings were transcribed verbatim, and copies of the transcripts were shared with the participants for member checking. Following the approval of the participants that the transcribed information was an accurate reflection of the details they wished to provide

for the study, coding of the data began. Atlas.ti™, a qualitative analysis software, was used

for the coding process. The analytical process categorized the data under various topics or

pre codes from the literature, the theoretical and conceptual frameworks for easy retrieval

at any time. Thus, according to Stake (1995), the standardized unit of analysis was either

a word, a phrase or a complete sentence.

The initial open codes uncovered meanings and ideas, and they revealed the

thoughts contained within the texts. Yin (2009) described qualitative data analysis as a

process seeking matching textual patterns and conflicting or missing information. The

patterns form categories of themes around concepts found both the theoretical and

conceptual frameworks, and in the literature. Using the tools available in Atlas.ti, some

concept maps or models emerged to display the interrelationships between codes and

around concepts and themes graphically (see Appendix H for coding protocol).

The triangulation of information from multiple sources is an intrinsic element of

qualitative research (Patton, 2002). In addition to the one-on-one interviews and the focus

group interviews, government budget documents completed the data triangulation for this

study. During PB process, the usual practice is to maintain some records of the

government's preparation and how citizens are invited and delegates elected. In effect,

there should be a log of participants, attendees at meetings, and delegates representing the

citizens. The records should also contain minutes of meetings and the decisions reached.

The local government did not maintain any records of past PB processes.

The government provided budget documents and records of budgetary allocations

and disbursements for the fiscal years 2012 through 2014. There were no logs of project

launches, project assessments at various stages of completion, or completion details.

Also, of importance were social factors that played important roles in the decisions of the community in its preference for project selection. The type of projects selected by the community helped to unravel the strategies and tactics of the people.

Discrepant Data Analysis

During data analysis, I sought for evidence of information that might be contrary to emerging categories, or data that produced disparate perspectives from the rest of the categories. Such disparate cases produced alternative prognosis, which explored during the data analytical process. As Scheurich (2001) suggested, discrepant cases provide the opportunity for the researcher revise the categories to provide better interpretation of the data. Seeking conflicting or missing information is one of the activities in the process of data analysis (Yin, 2009). Therefore, the absence of any account or references to the legal framework to entrench or institutionalize PB was of particular concern. Without supporting legal backing, the process is fragile and vulnerable to the whimsical dictates of politicians and civil servants when financial constraints call for competing interests over resources.

Trustworthiness

Guba (1981) constructed credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability, as the criteria qualitative researchers need to establish the trustworthiness of their studies. The criteria as they affect this study are described below.

Credibility. Credibility or construct validity is the effort by the qualitative researcher to gauge the truth of research findings from the narratives of the participants. Yin (2009) points to construct validity as the method used to accurately measure the phenomenon of the study. Therefore, to ensure that the outcomes of this study are

meaningful and true, and to locate the reader vicariously in the study locus, the claims of this study derives a substantial proportion of contextually thick data such that sufficient information is available to the reader. Triangulating data from public records of past PB processes and field notes contributed to the validity of the study. The strategy of identifying discrepant cases or data and revising the emerging pattern for alternative interpretative analysis increased the credibility of the study (Patton, 2002).

The source of the researcher bias is the passion as a Nigerian citizen concerned about developing an electorate that is sensitive and sufficiently enlightened not to be gullible to the manipulations of the political actors. Such bias could have had an impact on the data interpretation. As Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested, the researcher solicited the participants' input in member checking, interpretation of the data for accuracy, and conformity with the participants' meanings of their narratives.

Transferability. Merriam (1998) and Yin (2009) described transferability as the extent to which common characteristics between the study population and a broader population could make the findings apply to subsets of the population. In naturalistic studies, each case is unique and findings are not transferable (Guba, 1981; Yin, 2009). In spite of this restriction, Stake (1995) suggested that each case is in some way a reflection of the broader population and the researcher should not reject transferability. Instead, the onus is on interested follow-up researchers to make the case for transferability having determined that adequate information is available about the fieldwork. Sufficient information about the research paradigm, participant selection, the interview questions, and the data analysis strategy indicate that this study is sufficient in detail for applicability in other settings.

The categories of participants represent all stakeholder groups including politicians, civil servants, officials of nongovernment organizations, and the residents of the local government. The broad variation in participant collections is an additional triangulation strategy, which together with the wide variation in participant selection increased the prospect for transferability (Guba, 1981; Patton, 2002).

Dependability. Kvale (1996) described reliability (dependability) as the extent to which the results of an inquiry are consistent, accounting for changing dynamics of the phenomenon under study. The various steps of the design such as the data collection protocol, should be replicable to produce the same result (Yin, 2009) As Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested, for other researchers to develop a methodical understanding, and to establish dependability, this study included sections dedicated to the research design, planning, and implementation, working details of data collection, and reflexivity. Following Patton's (2002) suggestion, I engaged some level of self awareness and some sense of socio-political consciousness in the examination, analysis, and interpretation of the textual corpus. The interviewing process is particularly susceptible to reliability issues specifically when the interviewer, albeit inadvertently, asks leading questions, which might influence participants' responses (Kvale, 1996).

Confirmability. It is inevitable that personal biases and preferences influenced some aspects of this study. However, as Hancock and Algozzine (2011) recommended, I provided direction in the form of an audit trail to the reader of this study through detailed descriptive representation of the various stages of critical decisions and procedures. The findings of this study relate directly to the experiences of the participants as opposed to the subjective preferences of the researcher. Therefore, I concretized the audit trail by

maintaining the electronic recording of interviews, full interview transcripts, and government records in the public domain. Atlas.ti aided in establishing themes, definitions, and relationships between categories. Qualitative data analysis software such as Atlas.ti also serve as the repository of all the records generated from research studies (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Ethical Procedures

Ethical considerations are present in all phases of research right from the beginning through to the final report (Kvale, 1996). This study investigated issues connected with PB introducing some improvements that affected human lives. Therefore, this study abode by good ethical conduct in research, avoiding harm in the process of providing benefits for the sake of many. Since social research participants are prone to privacy risk, the qualitative researcher strikes a balance between participant anonymity and the ability to generalize research findings (Yin, 2009). It was imperative that I protected and preserved the privacy of the participants since participants not anonymous to the researcher. In any case, the content of the informed consent form was discussed with participants and their consent obtained before collecting data from them.

The informed consent form provided the research purpose, a brief description of the design, and likely risks and benefits to participants. To overcome the potential for undue influence or coercion, the document contained information about participants' right to withdraw from the study at any time since participation was voluntary. Each participant expressly granted his or her consent by attesting on a consent form, a copy of which the participants retained while I retained another copy as part of the records of this research.

In addition, the accuracy of the data gathered was member-checked for informant authentication and approval (Hancock & Algozzine, 2011). The participants had the opportunity to confirm the accuracy of the interpretation of their information. Rudestam & Newton, 2007) suggested at the conclusion of member checking, all identifying information of the participants on the transcripts be replaced with pseudonyms to maintain anonymity.

<div align="center">**Summary**</div>

Participatory budgeting is a relatively recent process in Nigeria. The outcome of PB in Brazil encouraged the United Nations and the World Bank. Porto Alegre is the quintessential example of successful PB, which these institutions highlighted worldwide. The perception among most Nigerians and Africans in general is that participatory democracy begins and ends with the ability to vote in general elections, beyond which there is lack of interest in engaging the political class directly in dialogues on matters that affect daily lives (Adesopo, 2011; Bashir & Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008; Donaghy, 2010; Ganuza & Frances, 2012; Leduka, 2009).

The two frameworks that drive this study include Avritzer's (2009) theory of participatory institutions establishing a tripartite relationship between civil society, the political society, and institutional design. The effectiveness of the relationship between the three institutions in turn determines the outcomes of PB, the conceptual framework for this study. The willingness of the political class to cede some power under PB, the promotion of pro-poor policies, and redistribution agenda have been the stimulants encouraging participation by ordinary citizens (Postigo, 2010).

As with other participatory democratic institutions, citizens who participate in PB learn civic activities and responsibilities through practice and thus improve the quality of the electorates (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006). Citizens learn to think in terms of collective goals and benefits rather than personal gains and selfish agitations. Some of the aims of the PB process include the elimination of clientelism, combating corruption through transparent budget process, and the reversal of socio-political exclusion of low economic status citizens (Baierle, 2009). Fung (2006) conjectured that if the government is to improve the type and quality of services that meet the needs of the citizens, the contributions of ordinary citizens should be the source of information for government officials.

Alves and Allegretti (2012) used the concepts of fragility and volatility to identify sustainability problems including the absence of legal framework to protect the process from abandonment by Right wing politicians, and the quest for the establishment of a perfect PB process rather than organic systems amenable to changes, modifications, regime changes, and political alliances. There is unanimity among authors that there is no best practice in PB, and each locality would need to consider its sociocultural, political, and economic dynamics to determine what mix produces the best outcomes.

The review of literature explored the concept of integrating PB with strategic planning in view of the high likelihood of project abandonment due to lack of funds, time to complete projects, and regime changes particularly in the case of Ijede LCDA and Nigeria. Participatory budgeting is an adaptation of strategic planning by a team of experts attached to the office of the mayor of Porto Alegre, Brazil (Menegat, 2002). The challenge for PB organizers is the measurement of the performance of the process, which

strategic planning and its medium to long-term approach is designed to achieve (Gordon, 2005).

Some essential components of successful participatory outcomes include the role of CSOs in the training and empowering of citizens, the willingness of the state to mandate the process and provide adequate financial resources, and the private sector corporate social responsibility initiatives. This study examined the influence of this mix of ingredients in strengthening PB at Ijede LCDA.

Chapter 3 describes the research methodology, the locus of the study, and the purposive nature of informant selection to provide the data for this study. The chapter provides details of the process as practiced in the particular locus of study. Chapter 4 details the data analysis strategy, process, and interpretation. In Chapter 5, I provide the detailed discussion on the findings, the conclusion, and recommendations.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

In this chapter, I present the data collection and data analysis processes, and strategy. Finally, I lay out the results of the study. The research questions of this study determined the qualitative methodological approach to gain further understanding of the role of CSOs in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede Local Council Development Area (LCDA) to participate in participatory budgeting (PB). The case study design fits the paradigm, requiring interviews of the participants ($n = 15$) that provided the dense data for the study. The following research questions drive the case study design of this study.

RQ1: What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the PB process at Ijede LCDA?

RQ2: What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at Ijede LCDA?

RQ3: What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business community in the PB process?

RQ4: What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected projects?

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in the budgetary decision-making processes. The disadvantaged people that stand to benefit the most from PB have yet to give their full attention to the PB process in their community. Nongovernmental organizations, by the design of PB, are the advocates of the citizens. It

is necessary for them to use education to empower participation in the process. However, is not known whether and how civil society empowers citizens to participate in the PB process. Specifically, it is not known whether and how civil society can empower citizens of Ijede in Lagos state, Nigeria to participate in the PB process. The research questions were designed to collect dense information from the research participants based on their subjective perspective of the PB process.

Through the data collected, I analyzed the local paradigms that strengthened participatory democracy by strengthening PB.

Contextual Premise of the Study

The nature of the research questions of this study dictated the choice of the case study design. The data sources synonymous with the design are interviewing, focus group discussions and government budget documents. Data were collected at the locus of study. I proceeded to Ijede to collect data from 15 one-on-one interviews, two focus group discussions, and the analysis of the budget documents of the government of Ijede LCDA. Demographic distribution of the participants is shown in Table 1. The venue of the interviews was in the conference room of a hotel in Ijede.

Participant Anonymity and Interview Protocol

Conforming to the approval of Walden University's Institutional Review Board on approval number 09-23-15-0329984, I preserved anonymity by devising acronyms for each participant depending on the group to which he or she belonged. Citizens were represented by C1 to C9; politicians and civil servants were G1 to G5, and the individual who identified as a representative of an NGO was N1 (see Table 2 and Table 3).

The interview protocol consisted of standardized, open-ended questions with structured wordings designed to extricate similar information from participants in the same group (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2003; Kvale, 1996). The interviews focused on the theme of the study with some flexibility to elucidate additional information from the participants.

The individual interviews lasted between 16 and 47 minutes while the two focus group interviews lasted 50 and 53 minutes respectively. By the conclusion of the eleventh one-on-one interview, the point of redundancy had been attained. Patton (2002) described redundancy as saturation, the point where participants are no longer offering new information. Nevertheless, I proceeded to complete the other four interviews as specified in the proposal of this study.

To validate the data I collected, I presented the transcript of the interviews to the respective participants to confirm the accuracy of the transcripts. This member-checking process presented the opportunity for four of the participants to clarify some information they provided during the interview sessions.

<div align="center">

Data Analysis

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The analysis of the data collected started with 29 precodes: 13 from the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of this study and 16 from the literature review in Chapter 2 of this study (see Table 4). More codes that emerged during data analysis were grouped into themes. Employing pattern matching as the overall data analytical strategy, and following Yin's (2009) recommendation, I subjected the nodes to further reiterative analysis until all possible perception had been achieved. Some patterns emerged to

provide logical thematic aggregation of the salient issues, which explained the model

necessary to strengthen the internal validity of the study.

Table 1

Participants' Demographic Distribution

Groups	n	%*
Gender		
Female	3	20
Male	12	80
Social Groups		
Citizens	9**	60
Politicians and civil servants	5	33
Representatives of NGOs	1	1

* Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole numbers.

** Of the nine citizens, five were representatives of the Community Development Associations, the Community Development Committee, and Ijede Development Fund, which I later understood to be nongovernmental organizations.

Table 2

Participant Interview Data

Participant Anonymous Code	Interview Duration in Minutes	Number of Pages Transcribed*
Citizens		
C1	17:25	2.3
C2	22:39	4.2
C3	23:51	4.4
C4	20:22	2.4
C5	18:06	3.3
C6	16:52	2.5
C7	18:43	3.1
C8	16:58	3.0
C9	20:15	2.5
Government		
G1	21:27	3.7
G2	24:33	4.1
G3	20:01	2.2
G4	20:48	2.5
G5	16:17	2.0
Nongovernmental Organization		
N1	47.31	5.5

* Number of single spaced, transcribed pages.

Table 3

Focus Group Discussion Data

Group	Discussion [a] Duration in Minutes	Number of Pages Transcribed [b]
Group 1	53:16	7.0
Group 2	50:34	6.7

[a] The discussion were conducted on November 5, 2015.
[b] Number of single spaced, transcribed pages.

Table 4

Precodes Generated from Theoretical Framework and Literature

Codes from theory	Codes from literature
Opportunities for deliberation	Vocal social movement
Claims for rights	Political will to cede power
Redistribution of power	Legal framework
Redistribution of public goods	Binding PB decisions
Empowerment	Citizen mobilization
Citizen control	Equality of participants
Capacity to understand and decide on issues	NGOs as equal partners with state
Institutional design to promote participation	Negotiating skills
Direct interaction between state and NGOs	Efficiency in resource management
NGO autonomy from the state	Transparency
State connects grassroots with NGOs	Informed and involved NGOs
Approachability of politicians	Absence of influential elites
Connection between state and community	Willing head of government
	Sustainability
	Change of government
	Private-Public Partnership

Table 5

Nodes and the Research Questions (RQ) they Address

RQ	Nodes
RQ1	Confusion about PB
	PB design
	Attracting NGOs
	Cooperation between state and community
	Project oversight and evaluation
	Encouraging citizen participation
	Mobilizing the community
RQ2	Activities of local NGOs
	Education/training (understanding how democracy works)
	Inhibitors
	Limited resources
	Transparency and Accountability
	Willing government
	Actions for the future
RQ3	Community development
	Corporate social responsibility
	Limited resources
RQ4	Strategic planning
	Sustainability

Table 6

Nodes Dominance from One-on-One Interviews

Nodes	Number of Codes	Research Questions
Attracting NGOs	45	1
Development/Community needs	35	3
PB design	36	1
Education and training	30	2
Mobilizing the community	25	1
Activities of NGOs	24	2
Corporate Social responsibility	23	3
Limited resources	20	2 & 3
Encouraging citizen participation	15	1
Socio-cultural problems	15	2
Strategic planning	10	4
Inhibitors	9	2
Sustainability	9	4
Future actions	6	2
Oversight and evaluation	6	1
Transparency and accountability	6	2
Cooperation between government and community	4	1
Confusion about PB	3	1
Willing government	3	2

Table 7

Node Dominance from Focus Group Discussions

Nodes	Number of Codes	Research Questions
Attracting NGOs	45	1
PB design	21	1
Development	17	3
Mobilizing the community	15	1
Activities of local NGOs	15	2
Corporate social responsibility	12	3
Education and training	10	2
Future actions	6	2
Confusion about PB	6	1
Limited financial resources	3	2 & 3
Encouraging citizen participation	3	1
Transparency and accountability	2	2

The initial analysis of the data generated 299 codes, including the precodes. The codes were subjected to further analysis, which produced a thematic taxonomy of 23 nodes. The nodes were further grouped according to the research questions they addressed (see Table 5). Before coding, I read the interview transcripts three times for familiarity and error correction as Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested.

Table 6 and Table 7 show the spread of the codes among the nodes. The most dominant nodes were attracting NGOs, Development and community needs, PB design, education, and training.

The codes from which the nodes emerged primarily came from the 15 interview transcripts and two transcripts from the focus group discussions. The nodes that emerged from the data are relevant to the research questions as presented in the following section on findings.

Findings

Research Question 1

What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the PB process at Ijede LCDA? Seven dominant themes represented the roles of NGOs in the design of PB. The question sought to extricate the input of nongovernmental organizations as to how, at Ijede Local Council Development Area (LCDA), PB was designed. The data revealed the noninvolvement of NGOs in the design and organization of PB in Ijede LCDA.

Confusion about PB. There was some misunderstanding about whether the PB process was a series of stakeholders' meetings with the government over budget (Figure 3). In responding to interview questions, respondents had different notions of PB as a

concept. There were conflicting recollections about when it was introduced to the community. To some participants, PB was an annual stakeholder meeting with the government. At the focus group discussions, G1 clarified:

> The executives of Community Development Associations (CDAs) form the Community Development Council (CDC), which coordinates the activities of all CDAs and represents Ijede LCDA at the state conference of CDCs. The state government registers the CDAs and the CDCs as nonprofit organizations. In addition, present in Ijede is the Ijede Development Foundation (IDF) formed by some educated indigenes of the community to promote the heritage of the community and to offer scholarships to indigene students.

G3 clarified further during one of the focus group interviews:

> I don't know if we are getting the definition of NGO right. We may be looking at an NGO as a foreign organization or an organization from outside here. Ijede Development Foundation is an NGO. Landlords Associations, CDAs and CDC are NGOs. May be we should redefine our perspective of NGOs so that we can take our minds away from dollar based NGOs.

> Given that NGOs exist in Ijede, but their presence not recognized as those of NGOs, it is evident that PB in Ijede was without NGO involvement. Seven themes appeared prominently from the analysis of the data.

> The concept of PB is still relatively new in Ijede LCDA. The time line of the introduction varied between 2009 and 2013, depending on which participant was supplying the information. The participants also had various meanings attached to the process. According to C7, at the one-on-one interview stage, it was simply a process for

Figure 3. Codes Linked with Confusion about PB

the government to "let us know what they are doing with the people's money." From

C3's perspective:

> …it was about two months ago that we discussed in a group and it was
>
> mentioned. But from the description, I realize that is what we have been doing but
>
> nobody call it that name. However we have it in mind that when this year's
>
> budget process begins, we will like to call it PB and fully participate the way we
>
> should be participating.

At the one-on-one interview, N1 explained in similar vein,

> Until you mentioned it, I did not know. I know they have stakeholders meetings
>
> over budgets. They don't call it participatory budgeting. The stakeholders'
>
> meeting is through the CDC arrangement. In those meetings the representatives of
>
> the local government, the head of department for Agriculture is in attendance.
>
> Indeed, a few other participants echoed N1's opinion believing the processes in

which they participated were stakeholders' meetings with the government over budgetary

matters. There was no consensus among the participants about the meaning and purpose

of PB and about the timeline. At one of the focus group discussions, G2 disputed PB was

a new process:

> I want to make a correction. I want to correct the impression that participatory
>
> budgeting is new. May be the name we call it is different. If they could recall, in
>
> 2005, we had NEEDS, SEEDS and LALEEDS. LALEEDS was the process for
>
> Local governments to call the community to be involved in the development of
>
> the budgets for local governments. We called the community to know their needs.

The local government did not just give the community what the government imagined the community wanted but what the people identified as their needs. Contextually, PB as practiced in Ijede met some criteria of the process. The government, according to G5 at the one-on-one interview, followed a process in which:

We called all the stakeholders and we provided the guidance on how to go about presenting their opinions or how to go about bringing their opinions to the floor at the stakeholders meeting. My usual advice to them was, before coming to the stakeholders meeting, they should have had their minor in-house meeting on their major needs so that when they come to the stakeholders meeting, they present the views of the larger majority of those within their groups. Basically, to some of them, it was more or less a political process that this is their council and they needed to be there to shout and make noise. But to others, they believed, yes if they talked to the government they could get one or two things done, but if they did not discuss they might get nothing. So some felt it was a serious matter. Some were there as observers, to see how things went and may be the following year, they could have something to say.

PB design. The node identified a number of actions, decisions, and processes constituting the designing of PB process. There was some misunderstanding about whether the PB process was a series of stakeholders' meetings with the government over budget (Figure 3).

For PB to achieve its intended objective of inclusive governance, connecting the state with the business community and providing effective local governance, PB requires strong institutional design (Avritzer, 2009). One factor that permits the success of PB is

the absence of influential elites who provide the usual Right Wing opposition to a socialist initiative such as PB. G4 at the one-on-one interview informed about the absence of influential elites, "This place [Ijede] is a community of artisans, fishermen and farmers." In the absence of any Right-wing opposition, the community formed some associations known as Community Development Associations (CDAs). The executives of the CDAs constituted the Community Development Committee (CDC) with which the government regularly interacted. In spite of the regular meetings between the CDC and the government, C4 at the one-on-one interview believed the government had not communicated the objectives of PB properly with the CDC:

> Unofficially, we the CDC members have discussed with the council manager that we will like to be carried along in the proper way, but I don't think we were properly involved in the past. As a community, we really don't know the process as you (the researcher) have described it.

One of the important steps in a PB process is the invitation to all stakeholders as groups and as individuals to attend the meetings. Without a doubt, stakeholders who form themselves into groups tend to have much stronger influence over decisions (Boulding & Wampler, 2010). Notwithstanding, individuals are capable of significant contributions. However, G5 at the one-on-one interview expressed concern over who were invited to PB meetings:

> During our 2013 budget retreat, the budget officer at the time was asked a question by one of the staff of the budget department that we should have invited some of the public [individuals] to the retreat. Unfortunately, it was only the

community development associations (CDA) and community leaders that

attended the meeting. That was what brought out the discussion on PB.

Individual local officials appear to understand how PB should run. The

participants representing the government, excluding the politicians, enunciated at the one-

on-one interviews general descriptions of a typical PB process. As a government official,

G2 conjectured:

> To the best of my knowledge, when we talk of participatory budget, it is supposed
>
> to include the majority of the stakeholders. By the time the local government
>
> involves all the stakeholders in its budgetary process …we will know their
>
> problems and we will know how much to budget.

Participatory budgeting is a yearly process, but at the one-on-one interview, G4 exposed

a design gap that allowed the postponement of the process due to insufficient funds:

> There was the problem with the finance of the local government in 2010, I think.
>
> We did not complete all the projects that were selected in that year, so we had to
>
> wait to complete those projects before we did another round of the process.

Thus, an apparent institutional design weakness stemmed from poor and unstructured PB

process. The absence of experienced professional NGOs that should have performed the

necessary advocacy role on behalf of the citizens might have been responsible for the

poor PB design. Experienced NGOs would have alerted government organizers of the

process to any potential flaws in the design.

Attracting NGOs. The perception of the absence of NGOs in the community was

especially pervasive among government officials responsible for organizing the process.

Specific invitations were not extended to any NGOs since they were perceived to be

Figure 4. Codes Linked with PB Design

nonexistent. This node identified what the participants suggested be done to attract NGOs external to the community. Professional NGOs with some expertise required for PB advocacy were not present in the community. The participants suggested several strategies to attract NGOs to the community (see Figure 5).

In the absence of NGO involvement in the design process, the fact emerged that the community needed to embark on efforts to attract professional NGOs with experience in various social issues that the community desires to address. Ijede has all the conditions that attract professional NGOs. According to C6 at the focus group discussion, Ijede is "a rural community of peasant farmers, fishermen, artisans and petty traders". N1 at the one-on-one interview identified potential environmental problems such as pollution "from the nearby hydroelectric plant at Egbin. NI further informed:

> NGOs can come here because we are by the lagoon. NGOs might be interested in
> the fishing culture, protecting the eco system, pollution, and water purification.
> There are NGOs who are interested in those areas including agriculture and
> greenhouse effect and all that because of the power plant we have here. So you
> have NGOs to relate to Ijede, they have every reason to be here. They can come
> and look at problem of erosion, water and the socio-cultural aspects of the
> indigenes here.

In spite of these reasons, G1 at the focus group discussions acknowledged that "NGOs refuse to come." C4 from the discussion group postulated some explanations as to why NGOs would not establish their presence in Ijede:

> Let's look at the structures of the NGOs themselves because there is the tendency
> that you find NGOs mostly in urban areas. I don't know if the ideology behind

them is different from what we understand NGO to be because NGOs are

supposed to provide one service or another and not supposed to make a profit. But

the way I see NGOs and why I believe they are not in this axis is that there is little

to be gained. Typically, NGO is supposed to look for gaps in the services a

community desires and they fill in that gap left by the government… There are so

many things we lack here.

Virtually all the participants agreed that the community would have to rely on

IDF and CDC to reach out to external NGOs and create the necessary interactive fora to

promote Ijede. In advising the community, C9 suggested at the focus group discussions:

We try to assess NGOs that we feel can address our felt needs. So, we will

interface with them to partner with us on some projects. Annually, we will have

programs of activities that will bring them to the community. Most of those NGOs

are situated in urban areas but we will still reach out to them because the

community development associations have three levels; primary, the secondary

and the tertiary. So, the apex level is at the state level, we can interface at that

level because we have representation there. We can interface with different NGOs

through the Ministry of Local Governments and other parastatals. We will

continue to look for opportunities to interface with those NGOs that can meet our

needs.

In G1's view at the group discussions, "charity begins at home." The community

should direct its efforts towards utilizing the meager resources wisely and effectively. G1

thus echoed similar suggestions of four other participants:

…Everyone should go back to their locality and have an introspective view of what they believe their requirements or their needs are. Secondly, they should document everything on paper, may be in form of minutes of meetings from the smaller units of associations to the CDC, to identify where they believe their challenges are, collate them together and may be the local NGOs could become stronger and more effective or use those documents to put out request to an external NGO. When they have major decisions, they should share those with the local government but their decisions to a large extent can be implemented without government input as long as those decisions do not go against the law.

Ijede is a peninsula, on the Lagos Lagoon. Compared to other communities across the Lagoon, the community is largely underdeveloped. Less than 10-minute boat ride across the Lagoon are some of the most affluent communities in Nigeria. Ijede on the other hand is still rural and underdeveloped. Its picturesque hilly view of the lagoon and its affluent neighbors on the other shores of the Lagoon keep first-time visitors in awe of its beauty.

Ijede has developed mainly from the numerous self-help projects embarked upon by the residents. With the exception of the main access road to the community, the community health center, and the two primary schools, Ijede has relied on self-help efforts from the residents, especially those with more means than the average residents have. The success of the self-help projects prompted G5 to suggest at the one-on-one interview:

Figure 5. Codes linked with Attracting NGOs

If we the politicians within this community can embark on a project within ourselves, may be the project can attract the governments and the NGOs. That is what we can do. You know we politicians we campaign a lot and promise we want to do this, we want to do that. We don't have to get into office before we can mobilize the community to do some of those things we promise. We can really help ourselves. If we come together and establish one or two projects that can attract the attention of the state government, the projects may in turn attract the NGOs at the same time.

At the focus group discussions, C8 suggested another way to attract external NGOs:

Ijede is supposed to be a good tourist attraction because there is the Ororo Spring that flows into the lagoon. It is very important to Lagos State because when there is to be the installation of new Oba of Lagos, the kingmakers have to collect water for the new Oba from the spring. But the spring is there and abandoned when it can be developed as a tourist attraction with history behind it.

Ijede is at the Northeastern extreme of Lagos State. There is only one access road leading to the peninsula. All the participants agreed that another access road is required for the community to be accessible to other communities, and more importantly to Lagos metropolis. C2 at the focus group discussions, and similar to three other participants, made the case for such a project:

The road leading to Ijede is bad. There is only one entrance to the community. There is no exit. The other road that would have served as the exit road, which is

Igbe-Igbogbo Road, is impassable. If the government can do something about it, it

will open up the community.

For government intervention such as the construction of major infrastructure, there need

to exist some cooperation between the state and the community. For PB to succeed, the

state must be willing to cooperate with the community and its NGO advocates.

Cooperation between state and community. This node is an essential element

of PB design structure. The political society should be willing to encourage participation

by ceding control of part of the budget to the citizens (Rodgers, 2010). In Ijede, sufficient

cooperation existed between the local government and the community to create strong PB

design (see Figure 6).

An important element of PB that is capable of derailing the process is the lack of

cooperation between the state and the community. The state should be willing to cede

control of part of its budget to the citizens (Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011; Postigo,

2011). On the surface, this has been the case in Ijede. In a PB process, the citizens select

a project or some projects, which they expect the government to undertake although,

according to G1 during the one-on-one interview:

Like any public policy, I would not say the citizens selected most of the projects.

They come, prioritize what they felt. At the end of the day, in most cases, it is

really what government officials, the politicians want to do that they really set

about doing. So in the long run, the impact on the citizen is, may be one, two or

three projects, out of the multitude of projects, which are approved in the budget,

are actually executed. As per the performance, it is usually on the low side.

Budget performance on capital projects is just over 2% of the total budget. Most

of the funds accruing to the local government are used for overheads costs. We

have 98% recurrent expenditure and 2% capital budget. So funding is a major

problem when it comes to project implementation.

*Figure 6.* Codes Linked with Cooperation Between Government and Community.

G2 corroborated the inadequate financial resources of the local government at the one-on-

one interview:

The only challenge we have is implementation, which has to do with finance. This

place is very rural, and they could not generate much internally generated revenue

(IGR) here. They have to rely on the money coming from the federation account.

By the time they deduct staff salaries, teachers' salary, overhead costs from the federation account, there is nothing to write home about. So it is the small amount remaining they have been using to embark on all the projects that were identified during the conference and town hall meeting for the purpose of the PB process.

The only relevant documents the local government could provide were the approved budgets for fiscal years 2012, 2013 and 2014. Records were not maintained for the conduct and outcomes of past PB processes at the local government. According to the approved budgets of the local government, the percentage of actual capital expenditure of total revenue declined from 2.30% in 2012 to 0.3% in 2013 (see Table 8). The 2% capital budget, which declined year on year, corroborated G1's account. However, it is not known how much of the capital budget was allocated to PB. This explained G5's account that the people believed the process was "a scam, and they had to be pacified to participate in the succeeding year". The approved budgets also confirmed G5's recollection: "I could recall in 2012 and 2013 or so, we were forced to fail them because of paucity of funds, there was so much outcry"

Project oversight and evaluation. As part of PB structure, there should be a system of project evaluation and oversight championed by civil society organization to ensure timely project execution to specification and within budgeted cost (Adesopo, 2011; Bryson, 2011; Schick, 2003; Sintomer et al., 2008). There were no project oversight and evaluation by the citizens, a required element of a PB design. Figure 7 shows the codes linked with project oversight and evaluation.

Project monitoring is an important aspect of PB that encourages the citizens to protect projects in their community. Often, local contractors are involved in project

Table 8

Revenue and Expenditure Profiles of Ijede LCDA

	2012		2013[a]		2014[b]	
	Naira	% Total Revenue	Naira	% Total Revenue	Naira	% Total Revenue
Revenues						
Federal Statutory Allocation	580	96.5	670	97.2	831	97.0
Internally Generated Revenue	21	3.5	19	2.8	25	3.0
Total	601	100.0	689	100.0	856	100.0
Expenditures						
Personnel Cost	185	31.0	175	25.3	217	25.4
Teachers' Salaries	255	42.3	77	11.2	79	9.2
Other Overheads	135	22.4	103	15.0	209	24.4
Capital Expenditure	14	2.3	2	0.3	351	41.0
Total	589	98.0	357	51.8	856	100.0
Cash Balance	12	2.0	332	48.2	-	-

Note. Amounts are in millions of Naira.

[a] No explanation was provided on the budget for the large cash balance and the low actual capital expenditure.

[b] This were the approved budget estimates. The actual revenue and expenditure profiles were not available during data collection at the site.

Figure 7. Codes Linked with Project Oversight and Evaluation.

implementation. Where the projects are too complex for a local contractor to handle,

some aspects of the projects are subcontracted to local contractors (Baierle, 2005).

 Participatory budgeting anticipates the civil society would represent the citizen in

ensuring accountability and transparency over funds available to the state (Goldfrank &

Schneider, 2006; Leduka, 2009). Civil society would ensure citizen selected projects are

executed on time and within budget. G3 revealed an important shortcoming of the

citizens during the one-on-one interview:

 The process of formulating the document was not that difficult. But the

 implementation became a problem because when funds start to flow in, we more

 or less focused on overheads than the projects. We can do that because, at the end

 of the day, the people that initiated this projects hardly come back to ask about the

 progress. They hardly take part in the supervision of the projects or get involved

in any way. After the stakeholders meeting, I think the next time we get to meet

them again is another stakeholders meeting. May be once a year. In extreme

cases, if there is any event initiated by the local government, we invite them and

then they have a chance to vent their displeasure on how projects are being

implemented.

There was the indication that when projects were completed, the citizens noticed.

For example, flooding was a major problem in the community. It was one of the early

projects the community elected under the PB process. During the one-on-one interview,

C5 confirmed, "By solving the flooding problem alone, the people felt secured again,

they were very happy."

Encouraging citizen participation. An important design structure represented by

this node goes to the core of PB. An essential feature of PB is encouraging the electorate

to participate at the local level in decision making on issues of direct concern to their

daily economic and social lives (Avritzer, 2010; Dobson, 2005; Michels & de Graaf,

2010). Participatory budgeting process works well when there are actors in the

community, including the government through its actions that encourage citizen

participation. The codes that converge into this node are in Figure 8.

Participatory budgeting thrives when the citizens are sufficiently motivated to

participate in decision making on issues that affect their daily lives (Bashir &

Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008; Donaghy, 2010; Ganuza & Frances, 2012). At the one-

on-one interview, G4 suggested the government should strive towards gaining the trust of

the people to encourage participation in the process:

…call everybody to town hall meetings, let them say what they want, put it down

in writing and, bring it back to the council. The council should confirm what it

wants to do, and then execute it to the letter. That is how the people can trust us.

Figure 8. Codes Linked with Encouraging Citizen Participation.

A few other participants reiterated the need for the government to gain the trust of the

citizens as a motivating factor for citizen participation. In a suggestion to encourage

citizen participation, G5 at the one-on-one interview recommended,

The only thing I think we want for greater participation, which will serve as an

incentive…is that what we budgeted for last year we actually deliver. If we do

that, all the Olorituns [heads of CDAs] will be happy. I could in 2012 and 2013 or

so, we were forced to fail them because of paucity of funds, there was so much

outcry. I had to practically beg them to participate in the next process because

they saw it as a scam and a waste of time. In fact the only incentive you can give

them is to do what you have promised, you must earn their trust, be transparent,

let them know in good time if for any reason such as funds or whatever, why you

will not deliver on your promise. If you do that, you have got them.

It is important also that project selection is left to the citizens. G4 at the one-on-

one interview acknowledged that government imposed its agenda on project selection

over citizen-selected projects:

At the end of the day, there was a technical session among the counselors, the

chairman and the management of the local government. That was more or less

like a budget retreat in which a synopsis of the stakeholders meeting was

presented and based on the synopsis; everything was prioritized based on the

needs of different stakeholder groups. The council then agreed on the projects to

undertake.

The government intervened in the selection of projects because of limited resources. Such

intervention, as G5 enunciated above, led the citizens to believe the process was "a

scam," eroding the citizens' confidence in the process.

Mobilizing the community. The effort to mobilize the community to action and

participation is a role for CSOs within the basic structure of PB. Civil society

organizations are deemed equal partners with the state in mobilizing the citizens to

participate in decision-making processes, to learn negotiating skills, and by so doing

participatory institutions are strengthened (Acharya, Lavalle, & Houtzager, 2004). An

important role of NGOs in a PB process is to organize and mobilize the citizens. Figure 9

is the network of codes that make up this node.

Figure 9. Codes Linked with Mobilizing the Community.

One of the functions of civil society in a democratic process such as PB is to

mobilize the citizens (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). In Ijede, the CDAs, the CDC, the

IDF performed the roles of NGOs in the absence of professional NGOs in the

community. Indeed, the community thrived on self-help projects initiated, financed, and

executed exclusively by the citizens of the community without assistance from the

government or any external source. At the focus group discussions, C2 explained the

activities of the CDAs:

What are CDAs established for? They are set up for self-help projects based on

communal efforts expected to be supported by the local government. In most ideal

cases, we have our CDC that is the local government level of community

development associations; we have been coordinating self-help projects at the individual community levels.

Limited financial resources of the local government necessitate intense competition among contending projects and groups. The more diverse the community's demand on government, the less impact the government will have on the community (Donaghy, 2010). Thus, G4 suggested, "At the end of the day, the community is the beneficiary of the projects so they need to speak with one voice." However, through self-help, the CDAs and the CDC have learned to motivate the community into action. According to C8,

> In my own community, I expended more than N6 million to be sure that electricity gets to my community without the assistance of the corporate organizations located in the community or the government. That was done purely through self help.

The CDC assumed the role of organizing the coordination of self-help efforts in the community. The motivation for the CDC's actions was because of the state government's policy of reimbursing self-help efforts of communities. At the one-on-one interview, N1 observed the counter productivity of the self-help efforts:

> The problem is that the system [of self help] has worked too well, and the government does not want to take any responsibility at all. So you have communities doing things by themselves and the government merely observing and then the government comes to collect taxes on the usage of some of those projects. They may also collect allocation [federal receipts] for the projects and

not do much to help the communities since the communities have already completed these projects themselves.

The youths who form a very large demographic of Ijede, are often left out of community activities. During the focus group discussions, C7 opined that the youths of the community should be involved in PB process:

The youths form a significant segment of the community. We should get them involved in PB activities. The government and the community should decide on what age limits they want to have among the youths to be part of the community when they discuss PB. I think the way our children mature, we could even make it 15 years. The government and the community could give them special assignments during the organizing stage so that they can see how the whole process works. The youths can be involved in sports as part of bringing fame to the community, but we need to get them to participate in debates so that they can learn how to conduct themselves and how to convince other people about their opinions without resorting to fights. They too can learn how to negotiate what they want with the elders.

Traditional institutions in Ijede are quite influential on the people of the community. At the one-on-one interview, G3 expressed the opinion that the traditional rulers be part of the process, "be sincere, and open up to tell us what exactly is their problem." In contributing, G2 agreed:

The chiefs should have held a meeting with Kabiyesi [the traditional head of the community] and determine how the traditional institutions can help the

community. We need to enlighten them before they attend the meeting. So, we too need to be involved in mobilizing for participation.

Research Question 2

What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at Ijede LCDA? The question interrogated the resource framework and network that are necessary for effective PB advocacy in the particular case of Ijede. Seven nodes addressing this question emerged from the data analysis. Participatory budgeting requires civil society organizations (CSO) to play a role for meaningful and effective process outcomes. Through their advocacy, NGOs work with communities to empower them through some interventional programs. Civil society organizations are autonomous of government (Diamond, 1994; Fowler, 2012; Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). Consequently, they use that autonomy to mobilize at the communal level to produce coordinated participation in public discourse (Montambeault, 2009). The community associations consisting of the CDAs, the CDC, and the IDF have played the roles of NGOs. With the successes they have collectively achieved, there is little doubt that with adequate resources and networking, they could prove to be sufficient and effective in their advocacy roles for Ijede Community.

Activities of local NGOs. This node identified the activities of local NGOs at connecting with resources, and networking with other institutions for effective community advocacy. Nongovernmental organizations are at the forefront of advocacy for PB. Their visibility in the community is shown by the codes that make up the network in Figure 10.

For civil society to thrive, there must be a willing government to allow the space for CSO activities (Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011). The CDC in Ijede fit the outlook posited by Acharya et al. (2004) of "institutionally embedded actors" that are too close to the government (p. 41). Its affinity with the government is a tacit demand by the state that summons monthly meetings hosted by the State Commissioner for Local Governments. Bherer (2010) posited that participatory mechanisms create opportunities for the government and the civil society to dialog and collaborate, but without excluding the rights of civil society to protest (Essia & Yearoo, 2009).


Figure 10. Codes Linked with Activities of Local Nongovernmental Organizations.

It is possible for ordinary citizens to learn governance by participation. The educational benefits create a population with a high sense of civic responsibility (Bherer, 2010). A sign of the link between policymakers and the poor in the society is visible when citizens can hold politicians accountable for public spending on issues that affect the poor and the vulnerable in the society. In the one-on-one interview, G3 confirmed the affinity with the government and posited on the structure of the CDC:

> They are the people of the environment but recognized and registered by the government. When there is something coming to the community, they will be the first point of contact. They hold their regular meetings with the local government and the state government. They are a well-recognized body.

At the one-on-one interview, C9 appreciated that the CDAs and the CDC "have been assisting, but they do not have the expertise that professional NGOs have. They have been assisting in transmitting the information they received from the residents to the local government authority." At the focus group discussions, C1 confirmed that in the past, members of the CDC were not properly involved in the process, but the CDC was getting ready to be more involved:

> Unofficially, we the CDC members have discussed with the council manager that we will like to be carried along in the proper way, As a community, we really don't know the process as you [the researcher] have described it.

The community associations hold regular meetings to deliberate on issues of interest to the community. In addition, they hold monthly meetings with local government officials. The CDC leveraged on these opportunities for deliberations to

stimulate and coordinate the all-important self-help efforts by the communities of Ijede. The participants recognized the need to reach out to persons and organizations external to the community but according to C4 at the one-on-one interview, "The only movements we have in the community are the CDAs and the CDC. We need help from more enlightened people to help us." There is the particular expediency to interact with external NGOs with professional expertise in socio-political matters. Through external networking with these professional NGOs, the community associations could tap into the expertise that empowers them towards improved participatory strategies.

Education/training. The local NGOs are not perceptive at delivering resources to the community. This node identified education and training as a resource the participants recognized as desirable for effective advocacy. Empowerment of the citizens is delivered through education and training. Figure 11 shows the codes that form the network of training and education.

Perhaps the most important resource network with which the CDC needs to engage is in education and training. The citizens should understand how democracy works, how to engage the government from a position of strength as equal partners. Therefore, to participate effectively in a democratic process, poor citizens require education in the form of social and civic training, the responsibility for which falls on the CDC in particular. This kind of advocacy creates engaging citizenry that demands transparency, accountability, and efficiency (Postigo, 2011). At the one-on-one interview, C3 narrated a situation that signified the need for training in advocacy:

In the course of our intervention, some people wrote letters and petitions that the government has not been forthcoming in terms of assisting them in their business.

They even wrote the petition to us at the CDC that we should assist them to drop

the petitions at the local government. We said no, we are not to provide these

facilities for you. We told them to write directly to the local government but copy

us. By copying us, when we got to the stakeholders meeting, we table the issues

there. We have some of the illiterates come to us with their grievances, and we

advise them to go to the local government when we have stakeholders meetings

with the government to present their views at the meeting.

A professional NGO would handle these situations differently by directly advocating on

behalf of the illiterates and the underserved in the community. In NI's view during the

focus group discussions, whatever external NGOs do in Ijede, the approach should be

organic:

Figure 11. Codes Linked with Education and Training.

The NGOs need to come, not with a foreign mentality. It has to be home grown

that we can relate to, not the way they do it in London or the US, it has to be

something we develop here that we can relate to here. Otherwise, they will simply

turn up for meetings, eat drink and go back home, but we should still encourage

NGOs to come and teach these things.

On the side of the government, especially those responsible for overseeing the PB process

and organizing it, there is the consensus about inadequate understanding of the process as

a whole, and every group in the community, including the local officials, should benefit

from some training.

    Inhibitors. Adesopo (2011) identified some inhibitors, which hinder community

access to resources and networking with institutions. This node identified some of the

inhibitors preventing effective advocacy in Ijede. Some of these factors were identified

and form the codes in the network in Figure 12.

    Adesopo (2011) described as inhibitors, some challenges that might stand in the

way of effective or successful PB process in Nigeria. These include lack of understanding

of how democracy works, misunderstanding about the obligations of stakeholders. poor

oversight and evaluation of projects, transparency and accountability issues, poor

communication, and inadequate resources. Every participant identified one factor or the

other that posed a challenge for PB. On their own, the citizens of Ijede have learned to

network with the government. During the focus group discussions, C9 suggested:

If we have to get in touch with the federal government, we do not have access to

the president in Aso Rock. We have the state assembly; we channel our

grievances through our representative in Lagos state House of Assembly to the

Governor, and may be from the governor to the presidency. I don't know how

long that will take but in the meantime, some people are dying because what is

supposed to be health care is not adequate.

Figure 12. Codes Linked with Inhibitors.

The poor residents of Ijede make up the bulk of the memberships of the CDAs and the

CDC. They had provided some training designed to the best of the abilities of those

residents who developed the training materials. At the one-on-one interview, C5

informed:

We have had three trainings this year. The CDC organized training for artisans,

hairdressers, barbers, and tailors. The second training was for auto mechanics

telling them about their rights. The CDAs and CDC are doing some of those things NGOs are supposed to be doing.

In the absence of NGOs the CDC could coordinate the activities of the CDAs so that the trainings could be more focused on community needs and how to get the best from the government. While these trainings provided some benefits to those who attended, the community has not developed political sophistication in its citizens. Government is still perceived, according to C7 at the one-on-one interview, "…as lord and master. We can't confront them because we rely on them for many things." This is a manifestation of the fact that the citizens lack the understanding of their obligations toward the government and the obligations of the government to the people. In recognition of the effect of not fully understanding the ways obligations flow back and forth between the community and the government, G6 during the one-on-one interview proposed some lessons in political awareness:

Lessons in awareness will go a long way. We need to let them know the importance of participatory budgeting and what benefits they stand to gain if they devote more time to learning about how government is organized. They should be asking us questions and demanding answers.

According to G4 at the one-on-one interview, the community needs to be enlightened:

The people should be aware that there's something called participatory budgeting. Even though they are practicing it, they really do not know that is what they are doing. They should be aware of the expected outcomes, the advantage it can bring. They need to know about the history of the process in Brazil where it originated and I think they should be involved and be part of the process itself.

They should be able to form different groups and know that they can belong to different groups that address different interests that they align with.

G1 suggested that the people needed to play more roles in the PB process:

The second step is in the implementation of projects. They should be given supervisory and contractual roles. Let them suggest contractors for projects and the people that are closest to the project should supervise and report to the appropriate groups as often as possible. That may improve the level of participatory budgeting.

As there are no professional NGOs in Ijede to assist with empowering training towards better participations C3, echoed the suggestion of a few other participants that "through seminars and presentations of that sort in open forum, the NGOs can help, but the NGOs are not here."

Cultural Problem. During the one-on-one interview, N1 introduced the cultural dimension to the factors inhibiting proper PB process. N1 expressed concern about policy formulation or engaging the government,

Our traditions are contrary to most Western culture. First, we have the tradition of when the elder talks, you keep quiet. You have the situation where the person who used to be your king or your chief is now a civil servant, or the government has now taken over the position of traditional heads, once you become the local government chairman, whatever you say goes, you become the king. So you have people who now project traditional images and traditional ways of doing things to basic civil governance, which is not.

Before citizens develop the capacity to engage the government effectively, they should understand their rights and responsibilities as citizens. The citizens of Ijede, in C5's opinion expressed during the one-on-one interview, are inhibited by their cultural values:

> The difference is; do they [the citizens] care? Do they care about their wellbeing, about their health, about pollution? People in America do not say because they are janitors they don't care because they do care. They know they have rights, and they will not be put down by a wealthy man. The problem in Ijede is they are very religious and they believe that God put them wherever they are, and they don't complain. They work tirelessly and make every effort they believe can get them there.

Limited resources. This node stands apart from other inhibitors as a significant resource the community lacked at all levels including government, civil society, and individuals, thus contributing to stunted community development. Resources, especially financial resources, are necessary for PB to be of any consequence. Figure 13 is the taxonomy of codes that form the limited resources network.

A prominent theme among the participants was inadequate resources. The more optimistic of the participants would say resources were limited. Lack of resources or limited resources is a major inhibitor to the success of PB. All governments experience limited resources in one way or the other. In the case of Ijede, it is particularly dire. According to G7 at the one-on-one interview, Ijede LCDA and four other LCDAs were

Figure 13. Codes Linked with Limited Resources.

created out of Ikorodu Local Government in 1999 therefore, "the funds coming from the

federal government has to be divided into six." G2 posited a reason the revenue of the

LCDA is less than it should be; "…they did not do proper census before they gave the

figure to the census board. That is the major problem they have with federal allocation."

There are no other avenues for the LCDA to raise its revenue base, according to C9

during the one-on-one interview,

> …except through Federal allocation and internally generated revenues, but in this
>
> environment, because of the nature of things, we don't have much economic
>
> activities. It is only small small shops, no market. Revenue is so low we depend
>
> largely on the allocation from the federal government and from the state
>
> government.

At the one-on-one interview, C2 was empathetic towards the local government administration because "This place [Ijede] is very rural and they could not generate much internally generated revenue (IGR) here. They have to rely on the money coming from the federation account." In recognition of the efforts of the community at self-help projects, C7 suggested:

> The key thing is to meet with the leader of the community, to organize something like a seminar with the good people of this community. We have so much to do. We have no funds to tackle them except NGOs will come to our rescue, then we will tell them our problems. There is no availability of funds to address the problems we have.

The government is evidently resource strapped as G1 revealed earlier: "budget performance is usually on the low side with only 2% of total revenue expended on capital budget while 98% was expended on overheads or recurrent expenditures." Paradoxically, the NGOs that have shown any interest in Ijede, according to G2, "want money from the local government, but we don't have anything". G2 further conjectured in the one-on-one interview:

> It is the lack of financial resources that is driving them [NGOs] away. They don't have international backing; they source for themselves so they expect that we [the local government] would source for them too. So, finance has been our problem.

C3 expressed similar empathetic agreement towards the local government administration: "The Executive Secretary of the local government has actually initiated the digging of drainage, but the major challenge he has is finance."

Transparency and Accountability. The role of the government in its interface with CSOs is important for effective advocacy. This node identified what the participants recognized as essential to advocacy and in interacting with the government. Since PB involves fiscal issues, the government must be transparent in providing the citizens with its finance and policy guidelines (Wampler, 2012b). Two of the goals of PB are transparency and accountability. Where these are missing, networking between the government and NGOs is difficult. The codes are shown in Figure 14.

Donaghy (2010) posited that when the priorities of the citizens are integrated into state budget priorities, there is the strong perception of transparency by the citizens. In practicing PB, the government in Ijede demonstrated its willingness to be transparent as presented by G5 at the one-on-one interview:

We invite people from every sector money is budgeted for. So, in their presence, the chairman will present the budget and they can see what we are doing with their money. By the time we passed the budget, it will not be new to them because they are already aware of what we are doing. As far as I am concerned, we were transparent in our job.

In demonstrating the importance of transparency and accountability, G2 acknowledged during the one-on-one interview, "The only incentive you can give them [the citizens] is to do what you have promised, you must earn their trust, be transparent."

Figure 14. Codes Linked with Transparency and Accountability.

In NI's view, the people need to learn to demand accountability:

Once you teach them on how to engage the government and how to have

constructive criticism, how to demand accountability from the government, then

we are well on our way. The first step to getting people involved in governance is

to first of all expose them to the fact that they are not just the governed but they

are the government. Once they realize that as the electorate, their votes put the

politicians there, it is their right to have accountability from that government.

Willing government. Willingness on the part of the government to respect the

budget priorities of its citizens is essential for successful PB. The community-organizing

activities of civil society in educating and informing the electorates on procedural and legal matters need the support and encouragement of the government. The organizers of the PB process should be willing to consider the convenience of citizens when organizing for the process (Wampler, 2012b). A willing government willing to negotiate with NGOs is a prerequisite of a successful PB process. The codes that form the willing government network are shown in Figure 15.

Participatory budgeting only succeeds where the government is willing to accommodate the participation of the citizens, and the advocacy of civil society (Fung, 2006; Goldfrank, 2007). G1 submitted, "As civil servants, if the population we have to deal with is more enlightened about what we are doing, it makes our work easier and more rewarding." G3 further suggested,

> If we keep doing what is expected of us, providing the people with the services they need, eventually, some people will notice. They will let the people know that they can get more if they know how to engage the government and collaborate with us." C6 corroborated this willingness by observing, "Whenever the local government sees us organizing to undertake projects, they become jittery and they respond by contributing to our efforts. So, we take the initiative, and they follow. Next time, they start before we start.

Actions for the future. The participants recognize the inadequacy in resources and networking that might have contributed to the ineffectiveness of NGO advocacy. This node represents the suggested actions the community could embark upon to strengthen PB advocacy. The NGOs need to form new partnerships and alliances to

Figure 15. Codes Linked with Willing Government.

improve the level of resources required to improve advocacy. The codes that form the

network for future actions are in Figure 16.

The participants at the focus group discussions recognized the need to inject fresh

ideas into Ijede Community to assist with empowering the CDAs, the CDC, and the IDF

to help with progressive development of the community. G2 opined,

Development has to be through NGO involvement and on the side of the local

government, we do our best, and we continue to strive to do better because Ijede

should not have three primary schools and the children have to trek for miles to

go to school and to return home." C9 believed "the CDC should identify areas

where they can open up the community to outsiders because Ijede is a closed

community.

Figure 16. Codes Linked with Future Actions.

Before the arrival of external NGOs, C6 proposed "…to make sure that this community is developing, we must continue to with self help, and raising funds through donations from individual and corporate bodies present within the community." C7 recommended the involvement of the youths through extracurricular activities, if possible, "…we can hold some events in the school and let the children host us."

During the focus group discussions, several of the participants spoke about the beauty of Ijede and gentrification of the community to attract external interests. A few participants echoed G2's suggestion:

For example, this is the lagoon. Let us develop a very beautiful place for people to come from all over the country to relax and have fun. Then the whole country will be interested to know where Ijede is. Someone told me he boarded a ferry from Lagos Island to Ijede. That was when I was posted here. I was surprised. So this is a very good tourist attraction, and the community could be developed through

such a project. That is one. Again, I think they have a local magazine or

newspaper. They need to distribute it beyond the community to let people know

there is a beautiful place called Ijede.

At one of the focus group discussions, C6 typified the general optimism by the

participant:

I think ultimately NGOs will come from outside. As others have said, the

improved caliber of the people in the community as more people move into the

community will eventually attract outside NGOs. And these new people are likely

to have the necessary connections at their disposal to help the community. With

the discussion we are having today, I think in the next few years to come, Ijede

will be in the center of action.

Research Question 3

What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business

community in the PB process? The purpose of the question was to explore the local

dynamics at Ijede LCDA to encourage the involvement of the business community in the

PB process. Three thematic nodes emerged from the data to address this research

question. According to Lindgreen and Swaen (2010), corporations enhance their public

perception of accountability and social responsibility by undertaking social programs for

the benefit of people living within communities in which they operate. Through corporate

social responsibility (CSR) programs, corporations fill the gaps in services provided by

governments and the needs of communities (Idemudia, 2011).

Community development. The dire necessity for development at Ijede is a

significant driver for the need to encourage the business community to contribute to the

PB process in Ijede. The involvement of corporations in PB fills the resources gaps

experienced by governments and their communities. The intervention leads to faster

community development. The codes making up this node are in Figure 17.

Figure 17. Codes Linked with Community Development.

At no time did Ijede LCDA invite businesses and corporations operating in the

community to participate in the PB process. At the one-on-one interview, G3 revealed

and described the benefits of involving corporations in PB:

> We don't invite them [businesses and corporations] but I can see that if we invite
>
> them, they can see how we conduct ourselves and how we care about the

community they have located their business. We have drawn up a program to

have meetings with them monthly or quarterly to rub minds on the way forward.

The participants were aware of the benefits of CSR. Indeed, the community

appears to pursue the tactic albeit with native and uncoordinated approach. At the one-on-

one interview, C3 informed that:

> During the meeting for 2015 budget, it was mentioned that the council should be
>
> in a position to assist to approach corporate organizations to provide electricity,
>
> which the council actually did by relating with Egbin Electricity Company to
>
> ensure power is distributed to this area just as a sort of encouragement.

Electricity supply to the community is unreliable, but it is host to the power plant

supplying electricity to several communities in Southern Nigeria. Ijede is yet to reap the

benefit of the proximity to the supply source. The strategic location of Ijede is beginning

to attract newcomers. C5 is a relative newcomer to Ijede and disclosed during the one-on-

one interview, "The reason I have remained in Ijede is because of the potential. That has

encouraged me to engage. Like I said, we have the fishing and agricultural communities

and industrial base community, with road and water access." There is the proposal by the

state government to connect Ijede with metropolitan Lagos. If the government executes

the project, Ijede should experience the inflow of new settlers and economic development

from which the business community could benefit. N1 continued:

> The World Bank would not give the money to construct a six-lane highway to
>
> Ikorodu if there is no economic strength or potential in this area and they will not
>
> be thinking of a fourth mainland bridge that will bring traffic from Lagos to Ijede
>
> and Ikorodu axis roads. There is the Lagos state farmland for cattle ranching and

animal husbandry, rice farm in Imota, a neighboring town so; all these make Ijede

a potential growth town. The fishing industry has not been touched so Lagos State

seems to be encircling Ijede.

For the time being, while the community awaits the government to put super

infrastructure in place, in C1's reflection during the one-on-one interview:

"…communities [are] doing things by themselves and the government is merely

observing and then the government comes to collect taxes on the usage of some of those

projects." The self-help projects embarked upon by the community are sufficient to

encourage corporations to assist their host community with resources to complete more

projects.

Corporate social responsibility. The vehicle for business community

involvement is through corporate social responsibility. The involvement of corporate

organization in PB process is through CSR. The codes in this network are shown in

Figure 18.

There is the evidence that the business community in Ijede had been responsive to

the community's requests for assistance. At the one-on-one interview, C4 narrated the

community success at getting companies to act:

The Chairman of CDC went to the contractors that worked on the main road to

Ikorodu, told them about the efforts of the local people to develop the community.

That company became socially responsible and gave us the equipment for 48

hours. The company encouraged the CDC to identify areas where they can open

up the community to other areas. The CDC was encouraged. The progress we

have made so far is through the people's efforts, not the government.

Figure 18. Codes Linked with Corporate Social Responsibility.

G6 corroborated C4's contribution, "The companies provided road construction equipment like graders, and the oil companies assisted with road construction equipment. They have given financial assistance to the CDAs. That has been very effective." Other participants corroborated the community's attempt at engaging with corporations to be more socially responsible. Some participants echoed C1's account of the community's efforts at reaching out to businesses in the community:

About June this year, there was a meeting between my community association and some corporate organizations to discuss their corporate social responsibility. We provided a list of what need to be done. We wrote to their headquarters in

Lagos, and they promised to look into our requests from January 2016. We took

them round the areas, and they promised to start working from January 2016.

The major corporate activities in Ijede may be creating potentially serious

environmental problems. According to N1 during the focus group discussions, the

corporations are giving what might amount to tokenism, considering the environmental

effects of their activities:

Nobody has attempted to assess the environmental impacts of the hydroelectricity

plant and the sand dredging on the lagoon. The community does not have the

required advocates to confront the corporations involved in these activities. The

dredging activity alone should have attracted NGOs interested in the environment,

to be concerned whether the dredging activities could cause erosion, whether it

causes a drop in fishing activities. As I said, the road infrastructure takes a lot of

pressure from the sand-moving trucks, which use the roads that are not designed

for such heavy goods vehicles.

At the focus group discussions, C9 proposed the community organize events to

invite external businesses to extend their marketing programs to Ijede:

In terms of encouraging businesses, maybe we have a mini trade fair for the

companies in and out of Ijede to showcase their goods and services. If trade fair

can bring additional business exposure to the companies in Ijede, that may

encourage them to be socially responsible towards the community.

Limited resources. The unusually high level of scarcity of resources, especially

financial resources, is an important element that should promote and encourage the

involvement of the business community of Ijede in its PB process. A compelling reason

for corporations to embrace CSR is the scarcity of resources and how best corporations intervene. The code network that addressed limited resources is shown in Figure 13.

Research Question 4

What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected projects? The purpose of this question was to explore the sustainability strategies for citizen-selected projects. Two nodes emerged to address this question.

Participatory budgeting in Nigeria, as in other jurisdictions where it is practiced suffers from scarcity of financial resources to fully support citizen-elected projects. Where funds run out to complete projects within the same fiscal year in which they were initiated, the risk of abandoned projects increases. In order to ensure project completion and sustainability, PB could benefit from medium-term planning rather than single fiscal year planning. Bryson (2011) posited that medium-term strategy for government spending in a strategic planning model provides some assurance of project completion and sustainability. Issues relating to this research questions were not discussed during the focus group discussions because it was directed only at participants representing the government.

Strategic planning. Medium to long-term planning, as is the practice in strategic planning, is a sustainability strategy identified by the participants to prevent partisan intervention by politicians especially after regime change. Projects selected by citizens in a PB process are prone to abandonment especially when regime change occurs. Strategic planning is one strategic to reduce the risk. The codes that address this question are in Figure 19.

Figure 19. Codes Linked with Strategic Planning.

Participants representing civil servants and politicians responded to questions

relating to project sustainability. G3 appreciated the significance of strategic planning,

contextually associating it with the citizens' perception of confidence in the government:

The community has more confidence in the government when they know that

such longer-term projects have the commitment of any government that comes in.

For instance, we are in October, if the government wants to embark on a road

project, the people will have the confidence that the project will be completed, if

not this year, next year because it is already in the plans for the estimated time it

will take to construct the road. It is already in the budgets. Without the long-term

planning, the people will be skeptical and say, don't mind them, before February

they will abandon it, but if there is the strategic plan, the community will have

confidence that it will be completed.

G7 attributed sustainability issues to the nature of democracy itself:

> Politicians have their own agenda and their predecessors' programs do not excite
> them. They want to abandon what they meet on ground and start funding their
> own programs. Often times, when they say continuity and there is a change in
> government, the new government may not be interested in some projects, so they
> tend to abandon them.

The tenure and timing of strategic plan are just as important as its implementation. G2
suggested,

> If I were to be part of the policy formulators, I would say since the local
> government chairmen have three-year tenure, the strategic plan should be six
> years so that, at least, after three years there will be continuity. There will be no
> abandoned projects. If the new government knows there is six-year plan that has
> run for three years, I think they will follow it.

> G1 examined the topic from the problem local governments have in planning their
finances, which fluctuates due to factors beyond the control of the local governments, but
disagrees with a six-year term:

> Strategic planning would go a long way in assisting the local government to plan
> its financing. Elected local officials have three-year tenure, and it will make sense
> if we were to have stakeholders' priorities that will span a three-year plan for the
> life of each legislature. We will be able to plan for quality projects that can be
> completed within the three years into the budget. That will make sense.

> **Sustainability**. This node represents project sustainability involving regular
maintenance of citizen elected projects. Project sustainability is important where

resources are limited, and new projects are not commonplace. The codes in this network are shown in Figure 20.

Project sustainability involves completing a project and maintaining it for as long as it is needed and available for the citizens. G2 believed local government employees still have a lot to learn to serve the people efficiently:

We need more training, constant training, and this continuity; the government coming in should read the blueprint of the past government and really follow it. That will not disturb them from doing their own program, just to continue, not to dump what others have done.


Figure 20. Codes Linked with Sustainability.

C1 and C8 addressed the issue of project sustainability from the perspectives of the

citizens. They believed the government had done very little in terms of project

implementation. The citizens through self help, a common theme throughout the data

collection process, had achieved the little development the community currently enjoys.

C8 complained that the government failed to reimburse the community for all the self-

help projects it had undertaken, contrary to the arrangement make by the state with CDCs

all over the state:

> Some of those self-help projects need attention. The government can, at the very
>
> least, provide some funds year in year out to make sure that they help the
>
> community to maintain these projects.

C1 was concerned the community would like to do more self-help projects:

> …but the ones we have already done now need maintenance. Look at the drainage
>
> we constructed: yes, they have lasted well, but they need maintenance. The
>
> government does not include in their annual budgets the cost of maintaining these
>
> projects that we used our own efforts to build. They owe us money they promised
>
> they will pay for the self-help projects they approve, but till today, nothing.

The major drawback with self-help projects, according to C4, is:

> Who will maintain them? We have used our meager resources and the toil of our
>
> people to build these projects. The least the government can do is to ensure that
>
> there is provision for maintaining these projects, but as you know, in Nigeria, we
>
> lack maintenance culture.

Summary of Key Lessons Learned

An overarching revelation by the data analysis was that Ijede LCDA did not follow a structured or well-designed participatory budgeting process. Although the process was not identified as participatory budgeting, the process, as revealed by the individual interviews, was over simplified to mean stakeholders' meeting. The unstructured nature of the process was responsible for the absence of documents relating to prior PB process. Minutes of the minutes were not maintained, and attendance was not recorded. Decisions taken at the stakeholders' meetings were said to be included in the budget. Therefore, the finding of research question 1 is, NGOs did not play any roles in the design of participatory budgeting in Ijede.

The budget documents available did not indicate any specific projects or items of capital expenditure that were citizen-selected projects. The absence of structure to the process goes to the heart of Avritzer's (2009) theory of participatory institutions and civil society. For participatory democracy to be effective, there should be some strong interplay between institutional design, the political society, and an active civil society. The absence anyone of the three weakens participatory democracy. In the particular case of Ijede, the absence of strong institutional design was exacerbated by the non-inclusion of NGOs in the call notices inviting stakeholders to the process. Serendipitously, active NGOs existed in Ijede, but the CDAs, the CDC, and the IDF all constituted by the local citizens, were not recognized as such. The fact of their true statuses emerged during the first of the focus group discussions and confirmed during the second group discussion.

Regarding research question 2, the interview questions revealed the need for help from professional NGOs from outside the community to organize the community for

better participation in democracy. At the same time, all the participants recognized the challenge of getting external assistance. The members of the CDC, five of whom were participants in this study, had the time to deliberate before the group discussions. Indeed, a meeting of the CDC was scheduled a day before the focus group discussions took place. The participants appeared determined to get the process to work for the benefit of the community.

At the focus group discussions, the dominant topic was how to attract professional NGOs to the community to train, educate, and empower the citizens. The participants recognized they lacked the skills the process required. There were several suggestions on the strategies to adopt for professional NGOs in Lagos to pay attention to Ijede. Having overcome the confusion around the name and nature of PB, the participants focused their attention on how to develop Ijede to attract interests from the world at large. The CDC did much to motivate the people to action. It mobilized the community to undertake several projects through the efforts of the people contributing personal resources and communal labor. This strategy was what the CDC considered along with organizing business and cultural expositions to attract attention to the community, which although still underdeveloped, holds first-time visitors in awe of its aquatic splendor.

At the focus group discussions, there appeared to be the awakening of some consciousness and the need to project the community to attract investors, NGOs and governments. For the community's strategy to work, the citizens need education and training, not only for participation in PB but also to acquire networking skills. Such skills are required at the state level where there might be some opportunities for CDCs from more affluent communities across the state to provide information and share experiences.

In addressing research question 3, the participants appeared unsatisfied with the corporate social responsibility efforts of the major businesses in the community. Without some coordinated strategy to maximize the willingness of some of the corporations to assist the community, the participants at the one-on-one interviews appeared somewhat satisfied with the token largesse the community received. At the group discussions, the need to get more out of the businesses was discussed. The community lacked the skill to advocate for more contributions. The participants believed the involvement of professional NGOs with expertise in working with rural communities could encourage businesses to do more.

Research question 4 was for the participants representing civil servants and elected government officials during the one-on-one interview sessions. The participants were unanimous in supporting measures to protect citizen-selected projects from abandonment or non-implementation from a new government in the event of regime change. The consensus was for the government to adopt medium-term strategic planning to ensure the execution, completion, and sustainability of citizen-selected projects by earmarking funds for the completion of projects without interference from a new government. Considering the concerns of citizen participants over the maintenance and sustainability of projects the community undertook through self-help efforts, this strategy could help the government protect and preserve the projects undertaken by the citizens.

Research Data Trustworthiness

To attain what Patton (2002) described as particularity, "doing justice to the integrity of unique cases," the platform for trustworthiness of the data collected for this study was set with the acknowledgment that the nature of the data and the iterative

process of analyzing the data are grounded in my subjective researcher judgment (p.

546). To understand the constructions of meanings of the participants, I brought my deep

understanding of the context, content, and culture of the participants, all of which were

critical to interpreting the meanings and the experiences the participants projected.

Adequacy of the Data Corpus

I relied on multiple evidential sources for the data corpus to be adequate and for

the result of this study to be valid. I collected adequate amount of evidence from the

information provided by the 15 participants. There was adequate variety in the typology

of evidence, which consisted of the one-on-one interviews, focus group discussions, and

documents provided by the local government. Another adequacy of evidence included

intuitive interpretation of the data, and the presentation of the interpretation of the

findings to meet trustworthiness criteria.

Therefore, I located the validity of the result of this study within qualitative

paradigmatic reinforcements of multiple data sources including one-on-one interviewing

of the 15 participants, two focus group discussions, and the review of budget documents

provided by the local government. By establishing some nexus between these data

sources during data analysis, I established another positivist paradigmatic praxis of data

triangulation (Patton 2002). The contextual meanings of the participants were dominant

throughout the data analysis, the participants having been provided the interview

transcripts for member checking to support the validation of their understanding and the

result of this study.

Discrepant Data

Research question 1 and research question 2 were designed to address the sustainability of participatory budgeting as a democratic institution. "Legal framework" was a code from the literature review, the revelation of which was expected in the data. An essential element of for the sustainability of participatory budgeting is the legal instrumentality that entrenches the process and protects it from disruption or termination by an unsympathetic government. Participatory budgeting had survived assaults from Right-wing governments in parts of Brazil because the process had the necessary legal framework that institutionalized it (Rodgers, 2010; Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). The data did not reveal such enabling legal framework. Participatory budgeting is fragile and tenuous without the proper legislation to protect it. Perhaps the absence of the legal framework simplified the decision for the local government to suspend the process for two years between 2012 and 2013 because it was expedient to sidetrack the process.

Summary

In this chapter, articulated the results of the study. I also presented the data collection process, at the locus in quo, the transcription of the interviews from audio recordings, and the analysis of the interview transcripts. I commenced data analysis by identifying precodes from the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, and from the literature review. I proceeded to interpret the data according to the research questions to which they corresponded.

I used research question 1 to interrogate the roles of NGOs in the design structure of the participatory process at Ijede LCDA. The data revealed the lack of deliberate attempt to involve NGOs in the process. The general belief was there were no NGOs in

Ijede. However, there were the CDAs, the CDC and the IDF, all of which were formed by the citizens to perform as NGOs. Serendipitously, the government invited the CDAs and the CDC as representatives of the citizens to participate in the process, but without their involvement in the process design.

Research question 2 uncovered the resource framework and network that are necessary for effective PB advocacy at Ijede LCDA. The data revealed the intimate nature of the relationship between the CDC, which has stood as advocates for the community in the absence of professional NGOs. The participants acknowledged the need for training and education in civic responsibilities. There was the recognition of the need to learn how to engage the government for effective participation. The participants also identified some inhibitors to participation such as poverty, lack of or inadequate resources for the local government and the community, and illiteracy. The presence of these inhibitors hindered the ability of the people to demand accountability and transparency from the government, which by all accounts, was willing to conduct PB as effectively as it could.

I applied research question 3 to explore the possible local dynamics at Ijede LCDA that could encourage the involvement of the business community in the PB process. The data indicated lackluster efforts by the major corporate organizations operating in the community. The participants appreciated that the commercial activities of the corporations, which include hydroelectricity and sand dredging from the lagoon, pose potential environmental problems for the community. Most of the participants believed the corporations have contributed a much to the community while others

believed the corporations should be more responsible to their host community because of the potential hazards to which the community is exposed.

Research question 4 was exploratory in nature and it was intended for the government participants only. The question investigated the sustainability strategies Ijede LCDA could consider for citizen-selected projects. The consensus was the need for medium-term budget planning of three years. The participants believed the introduction of strategic planning at the local government level could eliminate the potential for the abandonment of projects by new governments unsympathetic to ongoing or uncompleted projects initiated by preceding administrations.

In Chapter 5, I probe deeper into the findings of this study and conclude with implication for social change, and recommendations for further research.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in the budgetary decision-making processes

To achieve this purpose, I conducted 15 one-on-one interviews and two focus group discussions. The purpose of the study was achieved by using the following interrogating research questions:

RQ1: What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the PB process at Ijede LCDA?

RQ2: What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at Ijede LCDA?

RQ3: What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business community in the PB process?

RQ4: What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected projects?

In this chapter, I recapitulate the data collection strategy and data analysis, provide insight into themes emerging from the data, and finally, I provide the study results.

Study Overview

The foundations of this study were the theoretical framework of participatory institutions and civil society and the conceptual framework of participatory budgeting. The theory of participatory institutions and civil society connects the tripartite

relationships between civil society, political society, and institutional design (Avritzer, 2009). These three approaches to democratic governance do not always create active public engagement and equitable distribution of public services unless local peculiarities form the basis of their application. Participatory budgeting is a democratic process that provides the opportunity for citizens to interact with the government by actively engaging in decision making on fiscal planning priorities (Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 2012).

Ijede is a semi-rural town and its proximity to Lagos conurbation has attracted low-income and middle-class dwellers who wish to escape the high property and rental costs of the metropolis. Residents of Ijede commute by ferry to the commercial hub of Lagos, a journey of less than 15 minutes (Ilesanmi, 2010). The presence of Egbin Hydroelectricity Plant, dredging activities on the Lagos Lagoon, a federal government-owned gas company, an oil palm plantation, and some housing estates owned by some of the corporations have sustained the economic activities of Ijede. The majority of the inhabitants of Ijede are poor. The citizens rely on the LCDA to implement policies that would alleviate poverty and improve the local economy.

It is not entirely clear when PB was introduced in Ijede LCDA. With this study, I set out to investigate whether and how civil society could empower citizens of Ijede to participate in the participatory budgeting process.

The findings of this study come from the views of the residents of Ijede. The participants characterized their perceptions of participatory budgeting as a process they need to learn. They acknowledge the expediency to reach out to professional NGOs to provide training and education to empower them to engage effectively with the government. Ijede has the potential to attract interests from outside the community. The

participants were committed to developing the community through their self-help efforts and through informed involvement in participatory budgeting. By transforming these ideas into action, participatory democracy could be strengthened through effective participatory budgeting. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the results and findings of this research and the implications for social change. Finally, I discuss recommendations for further research.

Discussion: Research Question 1

Research question 1 was: what roles do NGOs play in the design structure of the PB process at Ijede LCDA? An effective institutional design should consider and include civic mobilization, stable financial pathways, and consistent organizational arrangements (Hilmer, 2010; Wampler, 2012b). The first finding is the poor PB design at Ijede LCDA. The understanding of the participants representing the government was that there were no NGOs in Ijede. For this reason, the government did not involve the Community Development Associations (CDAs) the Community Development Committee (CDC), and the Ijede Development Foundation (IDF) in designing the PB process in Ijede. The lack of recognition of these entities as NGOs by the local government and the entities themselves was responsible in part for their non-inclusion in the design of PB at the local government level.

Acharya (2004) posited that community-based organizations (CBOs) are probably the most effective for participatory budgeting because they have a better understanding of local issues than advocacy NGOs, which often fail to empower the people with necessary skills for participation. Nongovernmental organizations participate when they have a relationship with the government or sponsors. Therefore, CBOs are the lowest level of

NGOs to engage the government. However, without the requisite skills, CBOs are ineffective in self-representation and they might inadvertently legitimize state actions against their wellbeing (Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). The failure to recognize the CBOs as NGOs was a fundamental flaw in the PB design at Ijede. The state, according to Bherer (2010), could correct this flaw by strengthening the community organizations through state-organized education and training arrangements.

The second finding is that the government did not have a communication strategy to explain the history, the purpose, and the process of PB to the citizens. Civic mobilization established through effective communication is one of the pillars of institutional design (Hilmer, 2010; Wampler, 2012b). The absence of strategic communication led to a misunderstanding among the citizens about the meaning and purpose of the PB process.

To the citizens' understandings, their PB experiences were annual stakeholders meetings with the local government for the presentation of annual budgets, which took account of their chosen projects. Given the belief that there was no NGO presence in the community, the local government, should have promoted the process by organizing informational sessions to educate the citizens about citizen roles and responsibilities in the process. This oversight weakened the PB design in the community and diminished the veracity of the intended outcome of active citizen engagement and the participation in public policy decisions that affected their daily lives.

The third finding is the weakness in the design of PB was due to inadequate or nonexistant training provided to government officials organizing the PB process. The civil servants, especially those with PB experiences from other local governments, were

better informed about the process than the politicians were. Regular training and updates on ideas that work in other local governments in Lagos State would empower the organizers to organize better PB processes. Although the government is not expected to play the role of NGOs, ensuring that the citizens play their roles in the process would enable the local government to perform its role as mandated by the state government.

The fourth finding addresses the need for educational empowerment and the enlightenment of the citizens. Most of the citizens in Ijede are active members of the CDAs. The CDC regularly holds meetings with other CDCs around the state. Through its state level interactions, the CDC could reach out to other CDCs for training, which could be sponsored by the Lagos State Ministry of Local Governments, the organizers of the state CDC meetings.

The enlightenment of the citizens prepares the local NGOs to perform impactful advocacy roles. Ijede Development Foundation would benefit from this arrangement, as many of the members of the CDC are also members of the IDF. The community leaders, through the CDC, regularly organize the citizens to execute developmental projects that are funded and performed by the citizens. Although the state government should have compensated the community for its efforts, the state failed to commit to this expectation. The citizens require empowerment programs that could teach them how to negotiate the bureaucratic terrain that fails to meet the expectations of the community and slows its ability to develop.

The IDF should play a leadership role in reaching out to professional NGOs to provide advocacy services to Ijede, albeit on ad hoc basis. The citizens of Ijede suggested various ideas to energize the community through socio-cultural events, tourism, funfair,

and gentrification projects. The IDF is in the best position to lead the efforts to transform Ijede from obscurity to some prominence. In spite of their PB experiences, it was unclear how much of participatory democracy civil servants have learned and put into practice for the benefit of the community.

The fifth finding concerns project funding, oversight, and evaluation. According to Adesopo (2011), poor funding for PB and the absence of project oversight and evaluation carried out by the citizens are two of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of PB. This finding is a direct effect of the lack of awareness of the roles of citizens in a well-designed PB process. Having taken the time to evaluate projects desired by the community, the citizens, under the leadership of the CDC and the IDF, should engage the government to ensure the implementation of their selected project choices. The government expended less than 2% of its total revenue on capital projects. It was not clear from government records how much of the 2% was directed at PB projects, but the citizens did not demand explanations and analysis of capital expenditures. In other words, the CDAs, the CDC, the IDF, and individual citizens did not demand accountability of the government.

The role of the citizens is to hold the government to the contract between the citizens and the government that is the agreed upon budget that the government presented to them at a town hall stakeholders' meeting. The role of the citizens does not end at identifying projects. They should take an active interest in supervising and ensuring the completion of projects to the agreed upon specifications.

Discussion: Research Question 2

Research question 2 asked: what resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at Ijede LCDA? In the particular case of Ijede, and considering the findings revealed by research question 1, the NGOs in Ijede require greater than the usual amount of resources and networking to perform advocacy roles in the community. The first finding is the willingness on the part of the government to permit the PB process and to encourage its continuity. The local government engaged with the people periodically and appeared sympathetic to the citizens' plight including poor road network, unreliable electricity supply, and low economic activities. Without the willingness of the government to cede roles to citizens and create the space for civic engagement, participatory democracy would lose its essence of putting power in the hands of the people (Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011). However, the CDCs in Lagos State are creations of the state government. They are embedded in the Lagos State Ministry of Local Governments, and they might have lost the voice to protest and to protect their communities.

The IDF is independent of the state, and it should be involved in the community's interfacing with the government to reduce the vulnerability that exists in the CDC's interaction with the state. In the meantime, more should be done to ensure that the citizens develop political sophistication and to learn the nuances of democracy.

The second finding is the willingness of the government to cooperate with the community. This obscures the reality of inadequate resources, thus preventing the citizens from confronting the government. Adesopo (2011) was particularly concerned about the diminutive funding local governments in Nigeria make available for PB. Given

the bloated recurrent expenditures of the local government, the community had little to gain from the capital expenditure allocation earmarked for physical development in the community. Since professional NGOs run on resources partly provided by the government, the local government in Ijede could allocate some funds for the NGOs to expend towards citizen empowerment specifically designed for participation in the PB process and for advocacy roles similar to professional NGOs. The local NGOs could direct such funds towards inviting professional trainers on topics directly relevant to the PB process and towards advocacy in general.

The IDF is already involved in providing scholarships to children of indigenes in Ijede. Some of the funds could be directed toward educating the community as a whole on how to develop the community space to attract more state and federal presence, and to project the willingness of the community to develop. Ijede is one of the few communities in Lagos state with available land for residential, industrial, and agricultural developments. Without a ready work force and the road network for easy access, investors could be unenthusiastic about locating their operations in the community.

Thirdly, NGOs provide better services to the people when the government is transparent and accountable. The activism of the NGOs should engender independent and politically aware citizenry, whose awareness inspires transparency, accountability, and efficiency (Postigo, 2011). Since the awareness of the NGOs was not strong, a willing government in Ijede should complement its willingness with its openness in matters of direct interest to the citizens. In the circumstance where the local government ran out of funds to implement its budget proposals, it should be as open to disclose its inability to implement elements of the budget that affect the people directly as it was enthusiastic in

announcing the budget. When citizens lose trust in the government, getting them to sit at the table to discuss matters relating to PB would require unnecessary persuasion, and it might lead to the collapse of the process.

A missing node from the data was the legal framework to strengthen the networking ability of NGOs with the government. In the absence of a legal framework to institutionalize the process, efforts of NGOs could be frustrated and undermined by unfriendly governments. The Lagos State government has not established a legal framework institutionalizing PB. The fragility of the process manifested when in 2012 and 2013 the local government suspended the process for lack of funds in spite of budgetary provisions for capital expenditures for those years.

Discussion: Research Question 3

Research question 3 was: what local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business community in the PB process? Corporate organizations are capable of committing considerable resources towards the socio-economic development of their host communities (Fowler, 2012; Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). When sufficiently persuaded, corporate organizations do reinvest in communities. Firstly, the businesses community in Ijede has had minimal impact on the locality. There was no evidence major businesses voluntarily assisted the community. The businesses appeared willing to accede to token requests by a community in dire need of a lot of assistance.

In conducting the PB process in Ijede, the organizers had left out local businesses when inviting participants to the process. By their presence at PB meetings, corporations are exposed to the needs, the challenges, and efforts of the citizens at making the community conducive for commerce. While the businesses might not be contending for

projects, they gain some understanding of the challenges of the environment, and they appreciate the necessity for whatever demands the community directs at their CSR programs. The businesses should be as concerned about the wellbeing of their host community as they are about their workforce and corporate performance. The business community should be willing to expend some resources to fill apparent gaps between the needs of the community and the resources of the local government.

Secondly, the requests for corporations to provide assistance under their CSR programs have been uncoordinated with different communities receiving what might amount to tokenism from corporations. The corporations are capable of providing better resources when the requests are coordinated community wide (Idemudia, 2011). There was the assumption by the citizens that the local government could approach the corporations on their behalf. In Lagos State, corporations are known to have collaborated with the government to develop modern infrastructure and city gentrification.

The local NGOs in Ijede should coordinate their requests to the corporations for investment in community projects rather than providing funds to the state, which according to Idemudia (2009), are often misdirected and misappropriated. In addition, CBOs can advance CSR initiatives of corporate organizations by helping to identify what message to communicate and what other factors are unique to the effectiveness of communication in the community (Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). Therefore, the community could channel its demands on corporations through the government, which is best placed to negotiate tax write-offs and other incentives for the businesses that participate in government initiated public-private partnerships (PPP). The PPP strategy is appropriate

for high-value projects that could be negotiated under Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) agreements with businesses inside and outside the community.

The third finding concerns the potential environmental impacts of the Egbin Hydroelectricity Plant and the dredging companies located in and around Ijede. There has not been any attempt to assess the environmental footprints of these activities and the effects they have on the community's health and wellbeing. While the environmental consequence of the hydroelectricity plant and the dredging activities might be unknown without some research, the participants were concerned about the potential adverse effect on fishing, the mainstay of several of the residents. They were also concerned that the local fishermen might not have the ability to perceive the immediate causes of unexpected activities on the lagoon should they occur. The IDF and the CDC should express their concerns to the Lagos State Environmental Protection Agency to investigate their concern and issue a protocol to monitor the lagoon regularly for pollutants and to ensure the protection of the ecology of the lagoon.

Discussion: Research Question 4

Research question 4 asked: what sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected projects? Participatory budgeting was an idea born out of the fundamental concept of participatory democracy (Abers, 2001; Menegat, 2002). Adesopo (2011) agreed that the prospect for project sustainability is better when fiscal planning or budgeting co-occur with strategic planning. There is the danger of project abandonment under participatory budgeting when the project is of high value and spans more than a PB cycle of one year. The likelihood of change in political party controlling the government is a threat to project completion and indeed to the PB process. An incoming government

with no prior understanding or commitment to the process could abandon or discontinue ongoing projects. According to Schick (2003), fiscal policies are meaningless when budgets span a single year because budget monitoring is weak and sustainability is subjugated. The new strategy should encourage sustained and consistent information flow to all stakeholders, especially when budgeting is a product of strategic planning that would have involved these stakeholders in the first place (Gollwitzer, 2011).

A major sustainability problem creating fragility for the process was the absence of a legal framework. A legal framework would protect PB from funds starvation, bypass, and abandonment by unsympathetic regimes, and suspension and application of the process by government officials (Alves & Allegretti, 2012). A PB legal framework institutionalizes the process and opens up the opportunity for process improvements spearheaded by the government (Avritzer, 2010; Wampler, 2012).

The participants representing the group of politicians and civil servants believed a medium-term plan of three years would ensure that projects not completed in one fiscal year would be carried over for completion in the succeeding fiscal years. When a change in government occurs, sufficient provision will remain in the budget for project completion before the new government formulates its budget. The medium-term strategy gives some level of confidence in the government that it would complete the projects it began.

The second finding referenced the issue of sustainability and maintenance of projects especially those performed by the community through self-help efforts. The state government, by its policy, should reimburse the community for the costs of completing such projects. The state government did not fulfilled its end of the arrangement. The

citizens had to redirect resources that should have been utilized to develop other projects to maintain projects already in use. The local NGOs should negotiate with the local government to earmark some funds in its budget for the maintenance of all projects, including self-help projects that the government should have owned, had it reimbursed the community for the costs of the projects.

In the Brazilian experience of PB, governments hostile to the process had three issues against PB. The issues included the unsustainability of the single-year-span of PB that did not support sustainable development, the curtailment of citywide strategy by the parochial interests of the corporations, and the failure of PB to connect the demand for state funds with PPP investments (Leubolt et al., 2008; Sintomer et al., 2008). To support the state to supplement the scarce resources of government, there was the call for the mobilization of private sector investors. While Leubolt et al. saw the focus on large projects by PPP initiatives as a drawback, PPP initiatives could assist Ijede to develop more rapidly rather than the stagnant outcomes from small projects that have failed to improve the immediate locale of the poor. The private sector has always favored long-term fiscal planning, and if they are to contribute to the government's development strategy, there should be a concurrence of budget tenures between the two partners (Schneider & Baquero, 2006).

Implications for Social Change

This study challenged the participants, all of whom were actively engaged in the affairs of the community, to introspect on their individual and communal contributions. They spoke with enthusiasm and passion about the community. They were optimistic about the possibility of their community developing for the good of their families and

their future. The findings under the four research questions addressed how the community and the local government could collaborate to make participatory budgeting achieve its goals of efficiency in the administration of scarce resources and transparency in governance as suggested by Goldfrank (2007), Heller (2012) and Peruzzotti (2012).

This study exposed the fragility and volatility of PB in the absence of a legal framework institutionalizing the process. The government of Lagos State could consider a set of formal rules to protect the sustainability of PB in the state. The framework could mandate a minimum percentage of the revenue of local governments be reserved for citizen elected projects. The legal mandate has the potential to elevate PB to the consciousness of the residents of Lagos State in general.

The findings of this study also indicate the need for the Ijede LCDA to redesign its participatory budgeting process. The redesigning should take account of the active presence of the community bases organizations as the advocates of the community.

The local government currently does not engage in strategic planning (SP). By introducing SP, a redesigned PB process would be conducted during the stakeholders' conference of SP. The local government should have the capacity to undertake higher impact projects which implementation might span two or more fiscal years without the risk of abandonment due to lack of funds or regime change.

There is the dearth of training for the civil servants, the citizens, and the NGOs in Ijede in areas relevant to PB, negotiations, and community development strategies. Funds could be targeted at education and training to be provided by professionals. This educational strategy has the potential to develop better-informed and active electorates

and civil servants, and it could contribute to the acceleration of development in Ijede LCDA.

The IDF might become a dominant entity in the forefront of change if it takes the steps to initiate investor engagement programs. The IDF could negotiate with the Lagos State government for businesses and corporations in Ijede and beyond, to contract for PPP of high-value projects under build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreements.

Recommendations

Although the results of this study might be transferable to other communities in Nigeria and elsewhere, the findings indicate the need to research other rural communities for local peculiarities of what might be required to strengthen participatory budgeting for social and economic development in those communities.

Participatory budgeting being an extraction of strategic planning ab initio, further research could be conducted to understand the effects of funds availability, higher impact projects, and project sustainability if PB were attached to the medium-term strategic planning of localities. Additionally, this study revealed the fragility of PB in the absence of a legal framework to institutionalize the process. Research could be undertaken to understand the effect of legal frameworks on the effectiveness and sustainability of PB process in selected municipalities in Nigeria and elsewhere.

Conclusions

Participatory budgeting is a quintessential example of participatory democracy. It is a political institution that has not attracted sufficient interests among the socially disadvantaged citizens who stand to benefit the most from being involved in political discourses. Participatory budgeting gives citizens the opportunity to engage actively with

the government in decision making on fiscal planning priorities. With this study, I set out to gain further understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in the budgetary decision-making process. The foundations of this study anchored on Avritzer's (2009) theory of participatory institutions, and the concept of participatory budgeting.

In Chapter 2, I used the literature to examine the crucial roles of CSOs. Through advocacy, CSOs consolidate efforts of communities, groups, and individuals to highlight concerns for the attention of the state and the larger public. Civil society organizations have opened up the public sphere to the poor and the voiceless to be part of governance and public decision making through participatory democracy (Orji, 2009). As shown in the review of literature in Chapter 2, and as with other participatory democratic institutions, citizens who participate in PB learn civic activities and responsibilities through practice, and by so doing, improve the quality of the electorates (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006). Citizens learn to think in terms of collective goals and benefits rather than personal gains and selfish agitations.

This study helped to uncover the understanding of the civil servants, and the elected politicians at the Ijede LCDA that there were no NGOs operating in Ijede to assume advocacy roles and to prepare the citizens for participation in the PB process. However, the study revealed the existence of a number of active NGOs, which were not identified as NGOs primarily because their memberships consisted of local residents. These NGOs have been responsible for organizing the communities as best they could.

The results further revealed inadequate institutional design in the legal framework, planning, training, and in the financial resources at the local government, all

of which have contributed to weakening the PB process in Ijede LCDA. Particularly,

without a set of formal rules to institutionalize the process, PB is fragile and vulnerable.

Therefore, this study would have achieved positive social change if Lagos State

government could establish a broad system of formal rules to protect the process from

political actors unsympathetic to the process.

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Appendix A: Study Population Criteria

Criteria	Considerations	Examples
Inclusive criteria	Elected politicians	Council Chairperson/Counselors
	Employees of the LCDA	Council Manager/Treasurer
	Community residents	Community organizers
	NGOs in the community	Active NGOs
Target population	Prior PB experience	Neighborhood assembly
		Ward budget forum
Accessible Population	Civil servants	Employees of the LCDA
	Elected politicians	Ward counselors
	Citizens suggested by gatekeeper	Known prior participants
	Adults only	Male or female aged over 21
Criteria for exclusion	No prior PB experience	Inability to speak/read/write English
	Illiterates	
	Likelihood of prop-out	Unavailability for at least two days
	Ethical concern	Expectation of reward
		Quid pro quo
		Persons with mental disability

Appendix B: Individual Interview Protocol for Resident Citizens

Date of Interview:

Name:

Official Title/

Interest Group:

Responsibilities:

Purpose of interview: As you are aware, the Lagos State government introduced participatory budgeting to local governments in the state in 2005. After about 10 years of experience with the process, I am conducting this research to gain further understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in decision-making processes such as in participatory budgeting.

The information you provide has the potential to influence how government arrives at public policy decisions when active electorates are involved. As more citizens get involved, your information could improve how citizens negotiate opposing positions peaceably.

This interview should last no more than an hour and it will center on your personal experience of participatory budgeting and other issues associated with the process.

Appendix B: continued

IQ/RQ/FQ	Interview Questions for Resident Citizens

IQ	Participatory budgeting is said to be a democratic process that provides the opportunity for the electorates to interact with the state and through participation, citizens actively engaged in decision-making on fiscal planning priorities and in budgetary policy formulation. How did you hear about PB?
IQ	In how many PB sessions have you participated or organized?
IQ	What roles did you perform during PB process?
IQ	Describe other community groups or activities in which you have participated.
IQ	What do you understand to be the objectives of PB?
RQ1	Briefly describe your experiences with PB: the organizing, budget allocation, project selection and implementation.
FQ	How would you access your contributions to the process? Do you believe you made a difference to your community?
RQ3	How prepared were you to participate in the process? What was the nature of the preparation, if any?
FQ	What, if any, were the rules of participation in PB?
FQ	What benefits have accrued to the community as a result of PB?

Note. IQ = Introductory Question   RQ = Research Question   FQ = Follow-up Question

Appendix C: Individual Interview Protocol for Civil Servants

Date of Interview:

Name:

Official Title/

Interest Group:

Responsibilities:

_____

Purpose of interview: As you are aware, the Lagos State government introduced
participatory budgeting to local governments in the state in 2005.
After about 10 years of experience with the process, I am
conducting this research to gain further understanding of the role
of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede
LCDA to participate effectively in decision-making processes such
as in participatory budgeting.

The information you provide has the potential to influence how
government arrives at public policy decisions when active
electorates are involved. As more citizens get involved, your
information could improve how citizens negotiate opposing
positions peaceably.

This interview should last no more than an hour and it will center
on your personal experience of participatory budgeting and other
issues associated with the process.

_____

Appendix C: continued

IQ/RQ/FQ	Interview Questions for Civil Servants/Elected Politicians

IQ   Participatory budgeting is said to be a democratic process that provides the opportunity for the electorates to interact with the state and through participation, citizens actively engaged in decision-making on fiscal planning priorities and in budgetary policy formulation. How did you hear about PB?

FQ   In how many PB sessions have you participated or organized?

RQ3   What roles did you perform during PB process?

RQ1   Describe in as much detail as you can recall, the process of organizing a PB session? Tell me what you perceive the citizens expect from PB?

FQ   How successful would you say PB has been in project implementation? Why have you been successful or not so successful in implementing citizen nominated projects?

RQ1   What challenges, if any, have you identified that may be facing PB? Describe a most difficult moment you recall during the process?

RQ1   What changes have been introduced to the process since you have been organizing?

RQ1   How successful have you been at completing PB-selected projects? What factors, if any, might have prevented project completion, if projects were not complete?

FQ   In what ways did you influence the process and the decisions on project selection?

Appendix C: continued

IQ/RQ/FQ	Interview Questions for Civil Servants
RQ4	Strategic planning has been described as a deliberate, disciplined approach to essential decision-making and taking particular actions that direct the purpose and the survival strategy of an organization. Strategic planning provides the roadmap to organization leaders to determine courses of action and to provide the basis for those actions for long term planning. Given that strategic planning covers three to five years, how do you imagine longer-term planning under strategic planning could aid project completion?
FQ	How have you personally benefitted, in terms of information, skills and attitudes?
RQ1	In what ways do you believe the PB process could be improved?
FQ	Are there any other points of observations, information or suggestions you would like to share?

Note. IQ = Introductory Question   RQ = Research Question   FQ = Follow-up Question

Appendix D: Individual Interview Protocol for NGOs

Date of Interview:

Name:

Official Title/

Interest Group:

Responsibilities:

| Purpose of Interview | As you are aware, the Lagos State government introduced participatory budgeting to local governments in the state in 2005. After about 10 years of experience with the process, I am conducting this research to gain further understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in decision-making processes such as in participatory budgeting.

The information you provide has the potential to influence how government arrives at public policy decisions when active electorates are involved. As more citizens get involved, your information could improve how citizens negotiate opposing positions peaceably.

This interview should last no more than an hour and it will center on your personal experience of participatory budgeting and other issues associated with the process. |
| --- | --- |

Appendix D: continued

IQ/RQ/FQ   Interview Questions for Representatives of NGOs

_____

IQ   Participatory budgeting is said to be a democratic process that provides the opportunity for the electorates to interact with the state and through participation, citizens actively engaged in decision-making on fiscal planning priorities and in budgetary policy formulation. How did you hear about PB?

IQ   In how many PB sessions have you participated or organized?

IQ   What roles did you perform during PB process?

RQ3   Describe your NGOs involvement in past PB sessions?

FQ   What expectations, outcomes, or effects do you anticipate for your involvement?

RQ3   What training programs have you had with PB participants?

RQ3   To what extent would you say the trainings were adequate?

RQ2   What specific resources, (human, financial and material) do you consider necessary to be involved effectively in PB?

RQ2   What additional resources do you believe are required either from the government or from other sources?

RQ3   How could your advocacy encourage the business community in and around the LCDA to provide additional resources (financial, materials and expertise) to improve the quality and spread of projects approved at PB sessions?

FQ   How have you personally benefitted, in terms of information, skills and attitudes?

RQ1   In what ways do you believe the PB process could be improved?

Appendix D: continued

IQ/RQ/FQ   Interview Questions for Representatives of NGOs

_____

RQ3   Describe how you have interacted with government officials and the
      business community before, during, and after PB sessions?

FQ   Are there any other points of observations, information or suggestions you
      would like to share?

_____

Note. IQ = Introductory Question   RQ = Research Question   FQ = Follow-up Question

Appendix E: Focus Group Interview Protocol

Date of Interview:

Participant 1:

Official Title/Interest group

Participant 2:

Official Title/Interest group

Participant 3:

Official Title/Interest group

Participant 4:

Official Title/Interest group

Participant 5:

Official Title/Interest group

_____

Purpose of interview: This is a follow up session to the individual interviews you each had with me. This interview is to provide the opportunity to confer with others who have had participatory budgeting experiences and to reflect on what your particular experiences mean since your participation.

_____

RQ1   Considering how PB is currently designed in Ijede, what aspects of PB do you consider most beneficial and which areas need improvement?

Appendix E: continued

RQ1	How would you extend the benefits of your PB experiences to other areas in the community?
RQ/FQ	Interview Questions for Focus Groups
RQ2	NGOs are to assist the citizens to navigate the process and negotiate resources with the government. What specific skills are required but not yet acquired by different stakeholder groups involved in PB? In what ways can NGOs empower citizens to improve participation?
RQ1	During the one-on-one interviews, some of you identified certain challenges that might prevent the community from benefiting the most out of PB. These include... In what ways could the community overcome these barriers?
RQ3	What administrative and legal supports do civil society organizations need in order to support PB in Ijede LCDA?
RQ3	Describe the type of support the business community in and around Ijede LCDA could provide in support of PB
RQ4	The idea of incorporating PB within the frame of strategic planning was suggested and discussed during the one-on-one interviews with politicians, civil servants and NGOs. Let us discuss the viability of the idea and how it could ensure longer-term planning to ensure sustainability of citizen-selected projects.
FQ	Are there any other observations you have that might help improved the PB process?

Note. RQ = Research Question   FQ = Follow-up Question

Appendix F: Document Review Protocol

Step 1:

Make a list of documents and likely information required from the documents. Consider

sourcing documents from other sources, for example, state government, for inclusion.

Step 2:

Develop a list of relevant attributes in existing record such as date, time, source, authors,

and authorizations.

Step 3:

For each item of required information that could potentially be found in an existing

document, determine alternative sources for same information and the location of those

other sources. Consider accessing the alternative sources.

Step 4:

Develop a document review checklist that can be systematically used by any other

reviewer to ensure consistency of information to be collected, analyzed, and coded.

Include document title, file reference, storage location, and custodian.

Step 5:

Complete the protocol checklist to verify that all useful information has been extracted

and documented.

Step 6:

Document the findings of the reviews noting contradictory information, inconsistent

information from that collected from the interviews.

Appendix G: continued

Note where documents indicate the existence of other documents that might be relevant

or corroborative.

Step 7:

Collate the review documents and notes for data analysis

Appendix G: Coding Protocol

Step 1

Transcribe recorded interview, field notes, and public documents;

Step 2:

Format data for coding in Microsoft Word;

Step 3:

Copy formatted data to Atlas.ti;

Step 4:

Level 1 coding: Initial coding and open coding begin with key words or phrases from

literature, theoretic framework and conceptual framework

Level 2 coding: Review codes in Level 1 and develop categories

Level 3 coding: Study codes categorization from Level 2 and refine codes categorization

to develop themes.

Level 4 coding: Develop theoretical concepts emerging from categories and themes and

organize possible answers to research questions.