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# The Implementation of Governance to Counter Islamist Militancy in Pakistan's Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa Province

David Robert DiOrio  
*Walden University*

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# Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Abstract

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MA, United States Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1995

BS, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 1983

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

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March 2016

## Abstract

Militancy inspired by Islamists is escalating globally, and government action is necessary to protect vulnerable populations. Security professionals generally agree that governance may complement the use of force to defeat militants; however, current doctrine does not address the concurrent integration of governance in a comprehensive strategy. This interpretive case study explored Pakistan's application of governance during the 2009 Khyber operation in Swat Valley, code-named Operation Rah-e-Rast. The central research question focused on how governance activities were integrated with military operations to subdue militancy. Data were collected through interviews with 6 planners, Pakistani secondary source survey data, and government artifacts. Data were inductively coded using a progressive axial coding process and validated through methodological triangulation. Data were then analyzed using a case study analytical model, grounded in neo-Clausewitzian theoretical principles, to derive key themes. Key findings indicate that an interministry collaborative approach to regain the public trust was more effective in placating violence than was solely using military action. Sound governance, enabled by strategic communications and intelligence, fostered tribal relationships that promoted confidence and undermined the militant support base. The civil-military planning protocols were successful, but mainly ad-hoc and suboptimized. Formal training, standing civil-military planning forums, and planning process improvements stemming from the Pakistan experience could instill social change by assisting national leaders in developing a cogent countermilitancy strategy to defeat the global Islamist movement.

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## Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to men and women of the United States and Pakistani armed forces who have given their lives in the service of their country to defeat Islamist militancy. This study is also dedicated to the many innocent Pakistanis who lost their lives during Operation Rah-e-Rast in the spring of 2009. From their sacrifice we gained an understanding of Islamist inspired violence so that others may live free of fear and tyranny.

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To my wife Maria, thank you for your steadfast encouragement throughout my doctoral journey. I could not have succeeded in this endeavor without your unwavering support and love.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

### **Introduction**

Top Pakistan government officials conceded that the Islamist militancy problem within their borders was an imminent threat to the nation. In an address to a joint session of Parliament in June 2013, Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari remarked, "Militancy, extremism, and terrorism pose the greatest threat to our national security. The nation is united against militants" (Gul, 2013, para.4). The Pakistani Taliban led a conglomeration of Islamist extremists who sought to undermine the Islamabad government and gain the right of autonomous governance based in Sharia law. They attempted to establish a firm political base among the Pashtun in their Northwest Provinces to expand their radical worldview (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Due to a weakness of governance, the militants had the initiative and the government effort to deter the violence through a reliance on military force was faltering (Fair, 2011). Thus, policymakers and planners need to understand how governance and military operations may be integrated into a comprehensive countermilitancy strategy.

Pakistan is at the epicenter of the violent Islamist militancy phenomenon. The escalation of global militancy is a significant social problem that warrants international attention and aggressive multinational action. The Institute for Conflict Management (2014) estimated that violence against innocent civilians will grow significantly in Pakistan and may then spread to other regions creating a worldwide crisis. The Pashtun are anchored at a geo-political fault zone where there is a constant political and social

struggle between Islam, the global super powers, and the national government (Khan, 2007). Khan suggests that the Pashtun perceived the government attempts to protect them as reluctant and only symbolic rather than a determined effort. Furthermore, Pakistan's failure to address the escalating violence in their highlands has had global implications.

The Pakistan government is a fragile parliamentary republic that loosely governs. For the most part, the government has failed to achieve the trust and confidence of the Pashtun (Cohen, 2007; Panwar, 2010). Cordesman and Vira (2011) assessed that Pakistan is plagued by a semidysfunctional political system that is paralyzed with infighting between the politicians, military, and the mullahs. The government's lack of understanding of cultural and social relations has perpetuated a fractured society. Humphrey (2012) asserted that the Pashtun were disenfranchised from the mainstream political processes and an Islamist shadow governance filled the leadership void. The Pashtun did not recognize Pakistan's military or the government as their guardian or protectors, and the Islamists had the initiative (Nawaz & Borchgrave, 2009).

In this research, I explored Pakistan's struggle to coordinate their government ministries with the military to mollify the destructive brutality of the Islamists and reinstitute the writ (authority) of government under the Malakand Division political agent of the Khyber Provincial Government. The 2009 Swat Valley operation conducted within the Malakand, codenamed *Rah-e-Rast*, was Pakistan's first committed attempt to integrate governance with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy using a doctrinal countermilitancy approach. Haq and Malik (2009) and Khattak (2010) provided



convincing evidence that the operation effectively defeated the Islamic shadow government and brought calm to the valley. In this scientific study, I examined the planning and implementation processes during the Swat campaign. International terrorism experts are closely monitoring the Pakistani experience as a bellwether of the global Islamist movement.

The research promotes social change by recommending improvements to Pakistani government planning and implementation protocols that influence Islamist social behavior. After a decade of conflict with Islamists, there is a lack of evidence that the increased lethality of radical militants through military action alone will change social behavior or achieve an enduring peace. The problem is that contemporary countermilitancy doctrine does not adequately address the concurrent integration of governance with military operations into a comprehensive strategy. Governance and military activity were typically planned and implemented in different phases of an operation separated by time and location, depending upon the security situation. Current strategy focuses primarily defeating the militants through a force of arms. It largely discounts the potential synergy of integrating governance with military action to reestablish a peaceful social order. In short, planning doctrine does not adequately address the simultaneous integration of governance using all instruments of national power (Jones & Fair, 2010). The study findings and planning process implications may assist planners in achieving a more effective countermilitancy campaign design.

The purpose of this case study was to determine the successes and failures of integrating governance and military activities during the Swat operation conducted in the heart of Pakistan's Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province. The Swati-Pashtun endured the brutality of militants bent on instituting their radical Islamic worldview based in strict compliance of Sharia law and they sought protection from their government (Fair, 2011). During Operation Rah-e-Rast, the Pakistani authorities—for the first time—pursued an aggressive population-centered approach by connecting to the people through governance while conducting an aggressive military maneuver against the Taliban (Haq & Malik, 2009). Pakistan's approach emphasized the importance of a whole-of-government effort to defeat the Islamists. However, identifying the most effective amalgamation of governance and military activity was elusive. The Pakistanis made significant progress in subduing militancy, but their methods were neither well understood nor codified in doctrinal planning processes. In this study, I explored the operational successes of Rah-e-Rast to improve the doctrinal foundation for future global contingencies.

The nature of the research is qualitative, using a single case to assess the unique application of governance in a hostile militancy environment. The theoretical foundation for the study is an emerging adaptation of social conflict theory, referred to as neo-Clausewitzian theory by military strategists, to explore the relationships between the people, the military, and their government that influence the implementation of governance under limited warfare circumstances. A qualitative approach was appropriate to assess the human dimension of the complex social environment by empowering

selected planners to share their personal stories (Creswell, 2013). This single case study includes an analysis bounded in time and location. Data analysis consisted of merging information from official government documents, interview data from a select cadre of planners, and credible survey data that captured the Swati perspectives.

Neo-Clausewitzian warfare theory provided a theoretical foundation for this research. The theory approaches society from a macrosociological viewpoint, described as a severe imbalance within the social system that makes it dysfunctional (Henslin, 2007). In this paradigm, the social imbalance is caused by a power struggle between a government and unconventional fighters (Islamist militants) who seek political and social change by collapsing the government and replacing it with their own authority founded in Sharia law. The neo-Clausewitzian school of thought emphasizes relationship building between the national government, the military, and the people as a counterbalance to stabilize the social situation (Clausewitz, 1832/1976).

In neo-Clausewitzian design, strong and enduring social and political relationships are vital to counter the destabilizing militant activity. Governance policy then becomes a key instrument of national authority to connect with the people politically and socially—and promotes a public trust and confidence that will strengthen government legitimacy. According to neo-Clausewitzian theorists, the two instruments, governance and the use of force, working in mutual support are the essence of a counterinsurgency strategy. This study is an analysis of Pakistan's implementation of this strategic approach during Operation Rah-e-Rast.

The study is based upon an ontological philosophical assumption that the nature of the social reality relied upon the epistemic and contextual values and experiences of the subjects and the views of the Swatis at large. The study was designed to analyze their subjective meanings through their views on the Islamist militancy phenomenon and their social interpretations of the Swati-Pashtun dilemma. Life truths were revealed by the analysis of the subjects' beliefs in the social dynamics contrasted with empirical evidence concerning the diminution of the militant threat. In essence, new knowledge was gained by adjudicating the participants' beliefs in governance with the social realities.

This study was significant and unique because I examined the Islamist problem from the viewpoint of Pakistani citizens rather than through a Western lens. The scientific approach to study this critical operation discerned a unique implementation of governance from those who planned the campaign, those who implemented the strategy, and those who endured the violence. There is a literature gap in attending to the root motivations of Islamic extremism and the implementation of competent governance to prevent it. Previous research has focused primarily on the overwhelming use of military force to defeat militancy. On the contrary, and perhaps more importantly, in this study, I focused on the integration of all instruments of national power to counter Islamist inspired violence. The Pakistan experience reflects the global Islamist movement, and this study yielded findings and recommendations that may be applied on a macroscale.

## **Major Sections of Chapter 1**

Chapter 1 provides a summary of the research including the geo-political context of the global Islamist problem. In the chapter, I present a qualitative research design of a single case study. Assumptions and delimitations are explained and a lexicon of relevant terms is included. Emerging doctrine, based in neo-Clausewitzian theoretical thought, formed the basis for an analytical assessment model to explore potential doctrinal adjustments that better address the current global threat. Design strengths and weaknesses are identified and steps to mitigate weaknesses are presented.

### **Problem Statement**

Contemporary countermilitancy doctrine does not adequately address the concurrent integration of governance with military operations into a comprehensive strategy. Militancy inspired by Islamists is on the rise, and the international effort to counter the emerging threat is failing (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Modern counterinsurgency doctrine describes a whole-of-government (interministry) approach to defeat the enemy, but the integration of governance in support of military operations is largely unproven. Most insurgency practitioners agree that a cogent governance strategy and improved planning doctrine are needed to develop an effective strategy.

Current doctrine highlights the importance of military action to defeat militants and promotes an interagency approach but does not address the synergy that may be achieved by integrating governance simultaneously with military action. Nawaz (2011) asserted that doctrine emphasizes the importance of the military to deal with the

radicalization problem; however, doctrine ignores the role of governance to address the Islamist movement. Therefore, research is needed to fully explore the idea of fostering constructive relationships with the people to undermine the Islamists' political and social base.

A military strategy without governance proved to be unsuccessful in the current Pakistani sociopolitical environment. Bommakanti (2012) argued that Pakistan's alliance with the United States and their aggressive operations are making the situation worse and will not achieve an enduring peace. However, others have suggested that the Army should take a more assertive role to crush the threat (Fair, 2011; Nawaz, 2011). A growing number of experts maintain that uncompromising military operations only serve to alienate the Pashtun and escalate the violence. Some experts argued that protecting the people to gain their unwavering support through improved governance is the right path to achieve positive social change (Imam, 2011; Siddiqa, 2011). Determining the correct balance between military operations and the application of governance is the challenge.

The application of governance is at least part of the countermilitancy solution. In this context, governance refers to Pakistani national policy, rules, processes, and decisions that define government sociopolitical activity or confer national authority. Governance describes the behavior by which national interests are articulated, and the instruments of national power are exercised. Governance may be perceived by Pakistani citizens as certain, predictable, and legitimate. For this research, governance is assessed

in principles that are valued by the Pashtun as confirmed in the literature review, including security, rule of law, and general services such as health and education.

Pakistan's experience in the remote and war torn highlands of Khyber Province provided an excellent opportunity to study governance during actual countermilitancy operations. Understanding the complex Islamic extremism phenomenon requires an in-depth study of the Swati social environment to unravel the connection between governance and militancy. The study reveals new knowledge of the Islamist movement and redefines how a government and the military may work in harmony to build a public trust to disable the Islamists' capacity to wage war. This research promotes positive social change by offering new approaches to synchronize the international effort and strike a decisive blow against the global Islamist support network.

There is a clear gap in the literature concerning the implementation of governance to counter the Islamist threat. Neo-Clausewitzian thought places a high degree of importance on understanding the cultural and social values of a vulnerable population—and the government's ability to protect the people. The right balance between military operations and governance remains unclear. Doctrine calls for isolating the insurgents without explaining how isolation is defined and accomplished. Doctrine also calls for enhancing government legitimacy, but assessing the trust and confidence of the governed is difficult. Furthermore, there is no methodology to ascertain the most important governance attributes for a given insurgency case.

Policymakers and planners may benefit from this research that addresses doctrinal gaps. I suggest that supported governance initiatives will reduce the need for military action and subsequently reduce the risk of violence escalation. The call for nations to respond to militancy through governance has historically been overwhelming and largely unsatisfied. Enhancing governance capacity through improved information, diplomacy, economic development, and private-sector engagement in places where vulnerable populations are at risk would likely lessen the dependence on military intervention.

### **Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this research study was to determine how Pakistani government planners integrated governance and military activities during the 2009 Swat Valley operation in Khyber Province. The study promotes social change by providing a better understanding of the nexus between governance and Islamist inspired violence. The research design applies a neo-Clausewitzian warfare theoretical lens to assess the complex sociopolitical environment and evaluate Pakistan's governance implementation. The new knowledge obtained in the study, codified in doctrine, may lead to a better strategic approach in addressing the escalating global militancy threat.

The central social phenomenon is defined as an escalation of militancy in Pakistan notwithstanding an aggressive military campaign to suppress the violence. The militancy phenomenon is complex, characterized by nefarious political, social, and ideological motivations. Lahoud (2010) listed three central themes that motivate the militants: a fervent pledge to a righteous Islamic cause, egoism in interpreting the Islamic faith, and



general defense of Muslims instilling violence as a moral obligation, often referred to as jihad. Islamists challenge government authorities and target institutions at all levels.

Despite a concerted effort by the Pakistani government to address root grievances and neutralize the militants, the region has suffered an escalation of violence and reduction in national influence (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Islamists usurped the government in Khyber Province, and the implementation of governance to counter the militancy was in question. Henslin (2007) asserted that people are influenced by norms and beliefs in their culture and society and develop a social construction of reality based in life experiences. Understanding the Swati life experiences may lead to key insights into the proper application of governance in subduing the growing Islamist threat in their homeland.

This study was necessary to explore the real world contextual situation in the region and how the government approached the militancy problem. The study exposes a correlation between an investment in governance and the effectiveness of military actions that generated an operational synergy to achieve success. In an unusual showing of solidarity, the Pakistani Parliament passed a consensus resolution that unanimously backed the Swat countermilitancy operation and resolved to unite the nation in the face of a determined Islamist insurgency. The study includes an analysis of the implementation of rehabilitation, reintegration, and reconciliation activities with military operations to defeat the Islamists, reassert governmental control, and stabilize the social environment.

### **Research Question**

During the implementation of Pakistan's countermilitancy campaign in Swat Valley in the Malakand Division of Khyber Province, how were governance activities integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy?

The research question was pursued by conducting a qualitative study with a single case design in assessing the Rah-e-Rast operation. The study is a planning process analysis that explored how operational success was linked to specific government actions.

### **Theoretical Framework**

Neo-Clausewitzian tenets are a contemporary derivative of social conflict theory. The theory is a modern adaptation of Clausewitz's 18th century approach to war that attempts to address the complex nature of limited and total warfare (Clausewitz, 1832/1976). As with conflict theory, neo-Clausewitzian thought approaches society from a macrosociological viewpoint, described as a severe imbalance within the social system that makes it dysfunctional (Henslin, 2007). In this paradigm, the imbalance is caused by a power struggle between a government and unconventional fighters (insurgents) who seek political and social change by collapsing the government with a force of arms. Ashcraft (1991) reiterated the social tenet of the Enlightenment-era British social theorist Locke who asserted that political legitimacy emanates from the consent of the governed. In the context of an insurgency, both the government and the insurgents are caught in a desperate competition for the allegiance of the people.

Galula (1964) avowed that the insurgent power base emanates from the people, and a successful counterinsurgency strategy may isolate the people from the militant and connect the people to a legitimate governing authority. Galula embraced the neo-Clausewitzian school of thought that emphasizes relationship building between the national government, the military, and the people as a balance to stabilize the social situation. When a government properly exercises control of the military to achieve policy ends—and the military enjoys the trust and confidence of the people—and the people perceive the government to be legitimate, the nation becomes resilient to militancy. The study data were analyzed through the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical lens to determine the strengths and weaknesses of a population-centered theory in contrast to a military-dominant theory.

The research question is focused on the concurrent integration of governance with military operations to strengthen the relationships defined by the neo-Clausewitzian trinity. Galula (1964) hypothesized that governance supported by military operations may be applied to restabilize a social environment stressed by insurgent violence. Galula explained that the government may weaken the insurgents through a force of arms and then isolate them politically and socially through governance. In this construct, military actions become the enforcement tool to isolate and protect a vulnerable population. Governance policy then becomes a key instrument of national power to reconnect the people to their government. According to Galula, the two instruments working in mutual support are the essence of a well-conceived counterinsurgency strategy.

Neo-Clausewitzian theory, inspired by Galula (1964), significantly influences contemporary thinking and doctrine related to today's global militancy threat. According to U.S. doctrine, counterinsurgency strategy requires a comprehensive analysis of the sociopolitical environment to protect the people by isolating them from adverse insurgent influences (U. S. Department of Defense, 2013). The Pakistani campaign focused on subduing militancy (through security operations) and dealing with its root causes (by promoting legitimacy through governance)—the key tenets of neo-Clausewitzian thought. According to Galula, protecting the population requires a balanced application of all instruments of national power—military, informational, diplomatic, and economic—to gain favor with the people. Then, a concerted effort to break the bond between the insurgents and their popular support base is possible.

Modern warfare theorists and military planners at large believe that the neo-Clausewitzian model is applicable to the contemporary Islamist threat. Conflict in Pakistan is best described as a postcolonial regional destabilization. Ethnic subgroups, most notably the Pashtun, seek order and security by reestablishing the rule of law and education inspired by the Islamic tradition. The Western worldview of democratic governance is in direct conflict with the Islamists who seek to reestablish a fundamentalist governing structure and legal system based in Sharia law. The situation is further complicated by the traditional governing structure and norms of the Pashtun tribe, called Paktunwali, which evolved as a hybrid between modern and ancient tribal customs that existed even before Islam. Neo-Clausewitzian theory suggests that strong

interrelationships and balance between government, military, and the people serves as an inoculation against insurgents who attempt to radicalize the population.

Neo-Clausewitzian thought influenced Pakistan's countermilitancy campaign that shifted to a population-centered strategy. The diversity of the ethnic populations and the multiplicity of shifting motivations among the Islamists depict the complexity of Pakistan's escalating militancy problem. Local militants are fighting alongside foreign fighters that have found sanctuary within the Pashtun homelands of Khyber Province (Mehboob, 2011). Therefore, the complex sociopolitical environment warrants an in-depth analysis of the relationships within the Clausewitzian trinity.

### **Nature of the Study**

The nature of the research is qualitative: applying a single case study methodology in assessing the implementation of governance during Operation Rah-e-Rast. The Swat operation defined a critical case that occurred during a decisive juncture in Pakistan's countermilitancy campaign. For the first time, the Pakistanis employed military forces in mass working alongside government civilians to implement a counterinsurgency campaign. The campaign successes are adequately documented; however, the challenges of the government planners who designed the campaign were not fully assessed. Their personal experiences yielded valuable information pertaining to important planning principles.

A qualitative case study was appropriate to explore the human dimension inherent in assessing complex social behavior (Creswell, 2013). The operation is bounded

by time and space that made it an ideal single case study (Yin, 2014). Gaining a comprehensive understanding of the social relationships required the collection and analysis of multiple qualitative data sources. The study includes a myriad of data sets related to government actions, popular support, and militant responses. A qualitative single-case study was an appropriate methodology to identify the essential attributes of governance. The study reveals answers to the "how and why" questions relevant to governance in the Swat campaign. A case study was well suited to assimilate actual events on the ground with the shared experiences of participants through interpretative, rather than deterministic, data analysis (Castellan, 2010; Fernandez-Cano & Fernandez-Guerrero, 2011).

The study incorporated the planners' perspectives as part of a continuing series of deliberations between U. S. and Pakistan representatives conducted annually at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. The college maintains a strong partnership with the Pakistan National Defense University in Islamabad, and the study benefited from that partnership by openly sharing ideas germane to the research topic. Conducting the research in conjunction with a series of annual conferences offered a measure of neutrality that promoted an open dialogue and unfettered information sharing without the barriers of political influence. The case study linear analytical model that follows contemporary planning doctrine, annotated in Appendix B, provided a systemic framework to analyze the planning of governance actions. The model promoted

credibility and transferability by codifying the data analysis methodology and organizing the data in an auditable and replicable format.

### **Definitions of Terms**

The following section lists the unique or special terminology that is used throughout the remainder of the study.

*Counterinsurgency operations (COIN)*: COIN describes a sociopolitical struggle that applies all national power instruments—military, political, economic, psychological, and informational—to defeat or contain an insurgency (U. S. Department of Defense, 2013).

*Counterterrorism operations (CTO)*: A collective term used to describe the government military and governance activities to disable or defeat Islamist militants who are engaged in the full spectrum of warfare (COIN and CT) independent of political motivations.

*Counterterrorism operations (CT)*: CT describes government preventative measures to deter or respond to terrorist activities, terrorism further defined as the use or threat of coercion to instill fear against civilians to advance political objectives (U. S. Department of Defense, 2013). Terrorism is an insurgent tactic.

*Governance*: Governing body policy, rules, processes, and decisions that define government activities or confer national power. In the context of this research, it is the behavior by which Pakistan's national interests are articulated, and instruments of

national power are exercised. Governance is certain and predictable and is assessed in these governmental functions: security, rule of law, and life quality (general welfare).

*Insurgency:* An extended political-military struggle aimed at lessening the writ and legitimacy of government by using violence and subversion to challenge, neutralize, or supplant governmental authority (U. S. Department of Defense, 2013). Insurgents are militants bent on subverting the current government authority.

*Islamist militant:* Groups or individuals pursuing political goals through violence inspired by Islamic radical ideology. An Islamist describes a religious activist on the radical ideological fringe of the Islamic world at large. A militant is an all-inclusive term to describe insurgents seeking to undermine existing government institutions or terrorists seeking social or political change by instilling fear among noncombatants. The Islamist is inspired by a Salafist worldview and is predominately characterized as intolerant of non-Muslims and adherent to strict compliance of Sharia (Islamic) law. The term Islamist or militant refers to all violent activists in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province.

*Mullah (Imam):* Interchangeable terms to describe the local Islamic spiritual leader who is generally accepted as having knowledge of the Quran and teaches Sharia law. Mullah/Imam leads Islamic prayer and provides religious advice to tribal leaders.

### **Assumptions**

The implementation of governance in countering the adverse effects of Islamist militancy may be explored by interpreting the meaning of the Swati-Pashtun social reality. This includes the tribe's historical conflict with government, their sociopolitical



struggle with the Taliban, and their dilemma of reconciling Pashtunwali with Sharia. The research was designed to explore the social dynamics during the Swat operation. Hence, the study was an orientational qualitative inquiry that assessed the concurrent integration of governance with military activities to subdue the militant threat from the perspectives of those who planned it and those who endured it.

The study is based upon an ontological philosophical assumption that the nature of the social reality relied upon the epistemic and contextual values and experiences of the participants and the views of the Swatis at large (Creswell, 2013). Participant perspectives were varied and complex, and the study was designed to analyze their subjective meanings through their views on the Islamist militancy phenomenon and their social interpretations of the Swati-Pashtun dilemma. The participant testimony was triangulated with government archival data and Pakistani survey data, processed through the application of a program-level analytical model to bolster credibility and confirmability. Life truths were revealed by the analysis of the subjects' beliefs in the social dynamics contrasted with empirical evidence concerning the diminution of the militant threat. In essence, new knowledge was gained by adjudicating the participants' beliefs in governance with the social realities on the ground.

Characteristic of critical theory interpretive analysis, I explored the militancy phenomenon through a neo-Clausewitzian theoretical lens to illuminate social action that empowered the Swatis to undermine the militant support base. A scientific study of Pakistani social institutions was intended to illuminate transformational approaches and

key governance attributes that subdue militancy. Hence, I explored the role of governance through an interpretive inquiry of the subjects' planning actions, influenced by social and cultural norms and guided by a doctrinal planning process based in neo-Clausewitzian theoretical principles. In the study, I focused on governance actions that empowered the Swatis to transcend social constraints and pursue their traditional way of life, absent the Taliban threat.

The interpretative analysis supposes that an objective view of the operational planning process could be achieved through a faithfulness to facts provided by a cadre of Pakistani security professionals who are protected by a stringent interview protocol. Strict adherence to the protocol counteracted the inherent nature of qualitative study subjectivity (Stake, 2010). Anonymity of the subjects promoted objectivity, although total objectivity cannot be achieved from national professionals who are employed by the Pakistani government. However, I did not rely solely on individual objectivity. Qualitative interpretation was applied to identify suboptimizations in the planning process—the essence of the research question. The planning process is codified and structured, subject to *inter alia*, or explications in terms of measurement procedures, individual reasoning processes, and institutional or social dimensions (Reiss & Sprenger, 2014). Reiss and Sprenger (2014) argued that process objectivity is achievable from subjective views because doctrinal processes do not depend upon individual social or ethical values.

My role as the researcher was to mediate the meaning of the participants' experiences through personal interpretations, but the phenomenon is presented from a Pakistani perspective, not personal perspectives. My military planning background and experiences influenced my analysis and interpretation of the campaign, but I compensated for personal biases by suspending value judgments while conducting interviews and gathering information. Personal experience was applied to frame the questions and develop an analysis methodology, not sway the discussion. The research was conducted within a neutral environment that was conducive to the free flow of information without the undue influence of personal prejudices or political interference. To achieve a complete and balanced view, the participant pool was culturally diverse and included all the skill sets necessary for planning a complex contingency. Conducting research upon neutral ground within academia afforded an opportunity to share views without prejudice—protected by academic freedom and sheltered from political tensions.

### **Research Scope**

In this study, I used a single-case design to explore the integration of governance with military operations during Operation Rah-e-Rast. Yin (2014) avowed that a single-case design is appropriate under longitudinal, revelatory, unusual, or critical conditions. The operation occurred during a pivotal shift in elected governments from a military to civilian authority, and a swing in national policy from a military-dominant to a population-centered strategy. The Pakistan authorities—for the first time—pursued governance as an enabler to military operations. The operation was a key milestone in the

continuum of countermilitancy efforts that showcases government decision points and unprecedented civilian collaboration with the military.

Qualitative data analysis included a program-level linear analytical model (Appendix B) to organize data for interpretation. Patton (2002) described data analysis as clarifying what is most important to the study if we had only understood the data beforehand. The model followed the doctrinal process and provided a repeatable data collection framework to facilitate and validate the operational assessment. Yin (2014) recommended a model to operationalize a complex chain of events over a period of time. The model incorporated real-world contextual conditions that described the inherent problem of Islamic militancy and the rival interventions that challenged the theoretical construct. The modeling technique was a valuable research tool to match empirically derived activities with theoretically predicted events (Chenail, 2011). The analytical model, coupled with the strict adherence to an interview protocol defined in Chapter 3, provided a framework that promoted transferability, credibility, and confirmability.

### **Limitations and Delimitations**

The study was delimited to a single case design bounded by time and location—the District of Swat within the Malakand Division of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province between October 2008 and August 2009. I focused the theoretical lens on a relevant point in Pakistan's countermilitancy campaign absent the bias of short term political instability. The Swat operation was an ideal case because it successfully integrated elements of both governance and military activities to defeat the Islamists (Haq & Malik, 2009; Kumar,

2009). The study included the Pashtun experience, although other subcultures reside throughout the region. Nawaz (2011) argued that the militancy problem centers on the political aspirations of the Pashtun—the social conditions, culture, and language. Islamist motivations were analyzed through their written proclamations and activities.

The purposive sampling of six security professionals limited the scope of the qualitative inquiry. Purposive sampling is appropriate to represent the requisite expertise found in a typical joint planning group. All the skill sets of a planning cell were present in the participant pool. The small sampling was mitigated by selecting expert informants with a detailed knowledge of the Swat operation. Purposive sampling efficiently acquired the necessary research data despite a limited access to Pakistani civil-military planners. Although access to trusted planners was available, there was no direct access to the Pashtun or the Islamists. The study relied on secondary source surveys to gain the Swati-Pashtun perspective. To mollify the limitations of a single case with few subjects, data triangulation was applied to merge the participant testimony, official government documentation, and Pakistani survey data.

Transferability (external validity) is a significant limitation of a single case design. Transferability relies on a strong correlation between the empirical data and associated themes, the research question, and the theoretical construct (Chenail, 2011). The study applied a linear analytical model to highlight the facts and reduce unsubstantiated innuendo and opinion that is inherent in a qualitative method. The model

promoted external validity by organizing the data and analysis along global themes and internationally recognized doctrinal tenets (Yin, 2014).

Given the time and adequate resources, a multiple case study approach may mitigate the aforementioned limitations. Scientific research of multiple cases would promote transferability and data validity by comparing different approaches in a myriad of sociopolitical environments, and the study design provides a methodology to conduct further research. Differing situations may require alternate governance strategies, and those distinctions may be determined with an analysis of multiple cases. The study findings are not absolute, but this case—albeit limited in scope—contributed to the social science discipline by highlighting an important case in the continuum of research.

### **Significance of the Study**

The escalation of Islamist militancy is a global social problem that warrants international attention and aggressive multinational action. There was a literature gap in attending to the root motivations of the conflict and the implementation of competent governance to prevent it. The study reveals insights into the radical Islamic movement and offers an improved universal planning processes to subdue militant violence. The study includes a repeatable methodology to analyze the complex social relations between the people and their government and the effect of that relationship on militant social behavior. The research was unique by exploring the Islamist extremist problem from the viewpoint of an Islamic Republic—the State of Pakistan—rather than a Western perspective. The study exposes the synergy that can be achieved by integrating governance

with military action. Policymakers and planners have new tools to design comprehensive countermilitancy campaigns and promote peace for the greater good of society.

### **Summary**

In this qualitative study, I explored the concurrent integration of governance with military operations to counter the rising Islamist threat in Pakistan's Khyber province. The successful Rah-e-Rast operation was significant and was planned with both governance and military elements. The operation offered a unique opportunity to compare and contrast the implementation of both theoretical constructs. The study includes a synopsis of the complex social phenomena to reveal the nexus of governance and military activity that made a difference in subduing Islamic extremism. The study includes a repeatable study methodology and a universal data analysis model to guide future countermilitancy research.

The study engenders a significant social change for the millions of people suffering from the devastation of Islamic inspired violence. Understanding the modern way of sectarian conflict is relevant to our national security and of great concern to the global society. Militant violence may be suppressed and the Islamist cause undermined if policymakers understand and apply governance activities that promote social stability. The study findings and conclusions empower government planners with new knowledge to defeat militancy and protect vulnerable populations. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive literature review that describes the Pakistani social environment and the evolution of neo-Clausewitzian theoretical concepts.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

### **Introduction**

Chapter 2 is a comprehensive literature synopsis that fully describes the evolution of neo-Clausewitzian warfare theory. The study includes a theoretical construct to assess the current sociopolitical environment in Pakistan. The review links the Clausewitzian trinity model to the relationships between the government, military, and people of Khyber Province—primarily the Pashtun. The chapter ties the theory to the practical application of governance in a complex and hostile militancy situation. Neo-Clausewitzian thought provides a theoretical foundation to fully assess the integration of governance with military actions during the 2009 Swat Valley operation.

### **The Research Problem**

Contemporary counterterrorism doctrine does not adequately address the integration of governance with military operations into a comprehensive strategy to subdue Islamist militancy. Modern counterinsurgency doctrine describes a whole of government (all-agency or all-ministry) approach to defeat the enemy, yet the process to integrate governance in support of military operations was uncodified and unproven in the contemporary environment. Most policymakers and strategists involved with global militancy agree that improved planning doctrine to integrate military and civilian efforts was needed to development of a comprehensive strategy. Current literature and established doctrine promotes the implementation of governance to subdue militancy;



however, it does not adequately address the simultaneous integration of governance with military action as an enabler for social change.

### **The Research Purpose**

The purpose of the study was to explore the concurrent integration of governance and military activities to subdue Islamist militancy. The research objective is to promote social change by contributing to the understanding of Islamist militancy and reveal findings that impact countermilitancy planning and policymaking implementation processes. This may be accomplished by researching the implementation of governance during the 2009 Swat Valley military operation to better understand the nexus between governance and military activity. The knowledge obtained in the study, codified in doctrine, may lead to better strategic approach and a net positive social change by addressing the escalating global Islamist militancy problem. The research design incorporates a neo-Clausewitzian warfare theoretical lens to assess the complex sociopolitical environment and evaluate Pakistan's implementation of governance. There is a lack of evidence that increased lethality of insurgents or terrorists through military action alone will succeed in subduing the violence in the long run. In this scientific study, I explored the sociopolitical dynamic between the people, the military, and their government to determine the most effective integration of governance to counter the Islamist movement.

### **Literature Review Content**

The review integrated the works of scholarly experts to describe the complex and tumultuous relationships within Pakistan and to provide a clear view of the sociopolitical environment. Both United States and Pakistan military doctrine promote this type of analysis in the first steps of military planning, referred to as gaining an understanding of the current operational environment (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013). Since governance reflects the intimate relationship between the people and their government, the literature review was designed to present the strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities of those relationships. Literature sources include research by scholar practitioners and operational experts in global Islamist militancy. The literature review explored the root causes of how and why a segment of Pashtun society embraced and supported the militant cause at the detriment of their elected government.

### **Literature Review Strategy**

The strategy of the literature review was to present an impartial view of the militancy problem from leading experts in Pakistani sociopolitical and civil-military dynamics. In the review, I summarized what is known about the nature of Islamist militancy and the key government attributes that may be applied to counter the threat. I cited international experts and theorists from academic, government, and military disciplines. The review includes previous research by Pakistani scholar-practitioners to promote a balanced and ethical approach.

In the literature review, I explored the contemporary application of warfare theory as it applies to the specific Islamist militancy problem in Pakistan. The review identified the origins the Islamic radicalization movement and the motivations of the Islamists. Because of the diversity in Islamic sects pursuing a variety of tactics to attain different political goals, Pakistan refers to the whole-of-government effort to subdue the violence as countermilitancy, derived from discrete counterterrorism and counterinsurgent elements. The series of operations is commonly referred to as a countermilitancy campaign. These terms are referenced in this context throughout the study.

### **Review of Related Research**

To understand the diverse sociopolitical dynamic in Pakistan, the literature review referenced ethnographic studies related to the Pashtun. The numerous subcultures within the Pashtun tribe make it impossible to satisfactorily illustrate every domestic conflict; however, the general militancy problem may be explored by examining the Pashtun at large. The study reveals the predicament of the tribe in the context of Islamic based militancy. The study also includes a synopsis of the Pashtun culture.

I explored qualitative studies and analysis associated with Pashtun life experiences, especially focused on perspectives and facts related to the Islamist militancy phenomenon. This revealed governance activities that promote, deter, or influence Islamist motivations. While mainstream Islamic values, in general, do not suggest a violent tendency, the religious extremist elements entrenched among the Pashtun may be thoroughly examined. Therefore, the research was focused on the Pashtun who reside in

the Malakand Division of Khyber Province and the Islamist militants who sought sanctuary among them.

### **Literature Search Strategy**

Understanding the regional social dynamics required a thorough examination the nature of Islamist militancy. The journals were found in databases accessed through the Homeland Security Digital Library, Sage Publications and Journals, and EBSCO host search engine including subdatabases: International Security and Counterterrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, and Political Science Complete. Key words or phrases used in the literature search included *Islamist*, *extremist*, *militancy*, *terrorism*, *insurgency*, *governance*, *Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa*, and *Pashtun*.

Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism theories were derived largely from military doctrinal publications that form the basis of strategy and joint operational planning.

The literature review included sources from the archives of sociopolitical research groups that have specific subject matter expertise in Pakistan's affairs such as the Islamabad Strategic Studies Institute (ISIS), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Rand Corporation (RAND), United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and National Defense University's Institute for Strategic Studies (INSS). Secondary source survey databases provided unique perspectives not available by primary contact. Secondary sources included Government of Pakistan Statistical Databases, Gallup Polls, New America Foundation Survey Databases, and Pew Research Center Survey Databases. The study includes open source information concerning Pakistan's government strategy and

policy as it relates to the sociopolitical landscape. Several of the literature resources were derived from scholarly journal articles that are based in countermilitancy strategy.

### **Theoretical Foundation**

#### **Neo-Clausewitzian Warfare Theory**

Neo-Clausewitzian warfare theory is a derivative of social conflict theory and serves as a foundation to assess the contemporary Islamist militancy problem. The 19th century military theorist Clausewitz concluded that the inspiration for warfare is a unique phenomenon, influenced by a “paradoxical trinity composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity” (Clausewitz, 1832/1976, p. 89). Clausewitz asserted that pervasive violence disquiets the people, hatred motivates the Army and its commander, and enmity creates apprehension within the government. Clausewitz stated that a warfare paradigm that “ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality” (p. 89) and would render the theory useless. The military planner may understand and “maintain a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets” (p. 89). Clausewitz described the employment of professional militaries against militants as the dominant instrument of politics by “other means.” Success in warfare depended upon a strict civil control of the military in the pursuit of well-defined national objectives. In Clausewitz’s paradigm, the power of government and the military is fueled by the “passion inherent in the people” (p. 89)—but the implementation of governance to foster that passion is not specifically addressed.

Theorists revisited the relevance of the Clausewitzian trinity during the Cold-War era of warfare. In the aftermath of total warfare experienced in WWII, modern theorists adapted Clausewitz's conventional warfare model to the more complex sociopolitical dynamic of small conflict by irregular forces focused on limited political objectives. The theorist, Trinquier, adapted Clausewitzian dogma to the growing French insurgency conflicts in Algeria and Indochina. Trinquier (1961) asserted that insurgents are often supported by external foreign influences to subvert the population against their government. To counter the subversion, an aggressive use of military force—even torture—is acceptable to gain intelligence and isolate the population from the insurgent influence. Trinquier suggested disconnecting the enemy from external foreign support, undermining their internal popular support, and then methodically destroying the enemy directly with overwhelming military force. In Trinquier's assessment, the aggressive use of the military, or *quadrillage*, must be integrated with other instruments of power such as diplomacy, information, and psychological operations to defeat the enemy and gain a popular allegiance—a shift to a population-centered strategy.

### **Emergence of Neo-Clausewitzian Warfare Theory**

Neo-Clausewitzian theory is a new adaptation to the complex nature of today's global insurgency and terrorism threat. As with conflict theory, neo-Clausewitzian thought approaches society from a macrosociological viewpoint, described as a severe imbalance within the social system that makes it dysfunctional (Henslin, 2007). David Galula, a colleague of Trinquier, emphasized the importance of analyzing the social

system to understand the militancy phenomenon (Galula, 1964). After gaining knowledge of the culture and perspectives of a vulnerable population, Galula proposed a balanced application of all methods of national power—military, diplomatic, informational, and economic—to gain favor with the people and break the bond between the insurgents and their popular support base. Galula inspired a neo-Clausewitzian school of thought that shifted counterinsurgency dogma from a military-centric use of arms to a people-centric quest for popular confidence in governance as the dominate national instrument.

Neo-Clausewitzian counterinsurgency doctrine gained momentum in the postconflict study of the Vietnam experience. Summers (1982) explained that in insurgency warfare, there is a natural tension between the state, military, and the people (Clausewitzian trinity)—and they may remain united to achieve a successful political outcome. To Summers, weaknesses within the trinity relationships create strategic vulnerabilities, but solidarity fosters a formidable capacity to advance the national interest. Summers concluded that the lack of American public support for the Vietnam war effort coupled with the inability of the corrupt Saigon government to connect with their people doomed the counterinsurgency campaign. The lack of popular support ultimately led to undermining the military effort and losing the war.

Gray (1999) believed that a contemporary military strategy should provide an organization of violence to force a political connection between the people, the government, and the militants. Governance plays a large role in forming this connection; however, the nature of the conflict and the relationships may change depending upon the

motivations and desires of the participants. Gray avowed that understanding the logic and reason behind the motivations of the belligerents may unlock the secrets of a successful strategy. Gray argued that building a warfare strategy is not just about disciplined problem-solving, but also a function of morality, culture, politics, geography, technology, and the enemy. A comprehensive analysis of all elements is warranted—and warfare in itself does not represent the optimal way of solving a political problem.

These aforementioned neo-Clausewitzians stressed the importance of gaining popular support when pursuing the use of force; however, they advocated caution when attempting to apply generic counterinsurgency principles to all situations. Clausewitz contended that warfare is unpredictable, equating war to a “true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to a given case” (Clausewitz, 1832/1976, p. 89). Doctrinal experts, O’Neill (2005) and Fitzsimmons (2013) cautioned us that developing a counterinsurgency plan to fit all sociopolitical situations is unlikely. Conversely, Islamist inspired militancy has common characteristics and the solution can always be found in the government’s connection to their people. General Sir Gerard Templar, in reference to the Malayan insurgency of 1960, first referred to this concept as “winning the hearts and minds” of the people—a phrase coined by his chief advisor, Sir Robert Thompson (Thompson, 1966). To secure the hearts and minds of the people, the war may be founded in a just cause and the government may convince the people that it holds the moral high ground. Thompson asserted that it is crucial for the citizenry to have confidence in both the national government to govern and the armed forces to protect.



Neo-Clausewitzian warfare theory greatly influences current international military doctrine and modern theorists believe that the theory is applicable to militancy inspired by Islamists. General David Petraeus, former U.S. Commander in Iraq, is the primary author of current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. Kilcullen (2013)—his principal advisor—stressed the importance of winning popular support by establishing security, and using noncoercive means (governance) to connect with the people. According to doctrine, counterinsurgency requires a detailed analysis of the sociopolitical environment that encompasses social, cultural, economic, and political factors (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013). Doctrine refers to a campaign as a comprehensive civil-military endeavor to check the insurgency (through security operations) and deals with its root causes (through improved governance)—the key elements of neo-Clausewitzian thought. Doctrine emphasizes the importance of understanding the nature of the conflict, then developing a plan to disrupt the militants and reduce their popular influence.

Many scholars and military planners debunk Clausewitz's original tenets—and his trinity—as not applicable to the world's complex geo-political situations. Melton (2013) referred to the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan as convincing evidence that the complexity of the environment renders Clausewitzian thought obsolete. Olson (2013) insisted that Clausewitz was not relevant and the phenomenon of Islamist militancy is too complex to calculate political outcomes from the application of force. Rineheart (2010) characterized counterterrorism as inherently police centered and advocated using law enforcement to disrupt terrorists by legal means, not through military action.

Scholars agree that the contemporary militant environment is unpredictable.

Kilcullen (2013) advocated that the application of force against Islamist militancy may not succeed if the militants do not have a coherent political strategy and are simply driven by a rapacious faith-based motivation. According to Kilcullen, the sporadic actions of the Islamists render them more unpredictable than any time in history, and their sporadic behavior undermines traditional counterinsurgency approaches. Kilcullen described a new phenomenon where the relationships between the insurgent, the population, and government are diametrically opposed. In his view, the counterinsurgent (government), not the insurgent (Taliban), may prolong the conflict with inept governance and aggressive military action in itself represents the forces of revolutionary change.

### **Neo-Clausewitzian Theory and the Role of Governance**

Contemporary doctrine reflects the neo-Clausewitzian school of thought. The United States interagency guidebook described counterinsurgency as a blend of comprehensive interagency activities designed to simultaneously "contain insurgency and address its root causes" (U. S. Department of State, 2009, p. 2). This suggests that the use of soft power is the most effective element of an insurgent contingency, with security forces playing a secondary enabling role. The military's counterinsurgency manual prescribed a similar population-centered strategy to promote government legitimacy and undermine the insurgent support base, while simultaneously isolating militant influence (U. S. Department of Defense, 2013). Both doctrinal directives caution planners that

success depends on the eagerness of the affected government to embark on the necessary political and social reforms to regain the public trust.

Strength in the Clausewitzian trinity relationships promotes national stability. Clausewitz (1832/1976) professed that when the government properly exercises its civil control of the military, and the military has the trust and confidence of the people to protect them, and the people perceive the government to be legitimate: The nation is strong and stable. In social conflict theory, political and social stability is vital to counter the subverting influences of insurgents—and if the stability is threatened, then governance and military operations are necessary to restore order. Galula (1964) asserted that the insurgent power base emanates from the people, and a successful strategy must focus on protecting the people from the insurgent influence. Governance then becomes a key instrument of national power to connect with the people, and military operations become the enforcement tool to protect the people.

Security forces working hand in hand with government institutions to address the militancy problem is better policy. Melton (2013) argued that an all-out military dominant approach is fundamentally flawed and a “fool’s errand” (p. 1). Melton cited several successful counterinsurgency campaigns from the last century where small military groups—often called security force assistance teams—worked hand in hand with the host governments to conduct economic development. Melton cautioned policymakers that complex foreign entanglements and aggressive coalition operations may undermine host government legitimacy rather than promote it. Allied doctrine does not adequately

distinguish between garrisoning with indigenous national troops or with foreign troops (Department of Defense, 2013). Galula (1964) reaffirmed the importance of using local troops that are culturally sensitive to the needs of the people and well connected to the national government. To Galula, deploying indigenous security forces rather than foreign troops avoids undermining sovereign authority and government legitimacy.

The prominence and strength of the relationship of the people to their government is the underpinning of neo-Clausewitzian theory. Samdani (2011) argued that economic development is the key to gaining popular support. He suggested a concerted multinational effort to drive away militants, then pursue economic development and political reforms to build relationships through government partnerships. Ahmad (2010) concluded that an enduring success requires Pashtun assistance—and popular support may be cultivated with effective community development and governance. Ahmad supported the Clausewitzian principle that popular participation in government is integral to achieving a durable peace through political reconciliation. Khan (2007) further suggested that achieving confidence in governance requires a peaceful approach that includes an information campaign, a smart strategy to improve basic life services, and a strong economy. To these scholars, military action only plays a supporting role.

Many experts disagree on the sequencing of military force and governance. General McChrystal, as the International Security Assistance Force Commander, assessed that many forces on the ground were needed first to stabilize and secure the people before governance reform is pursued (Brand, 2011). However, many strategists,

most notably Cohen (2007), Cordesman and Vira (2011), and Melton (2013) proposed a balanced whole-of-government approach with a small specialized military elements working closely with government to establish security in parallel—rather than in sequence—with achieving a public trust. Despite the sequencing disagreements, insurgency experts generally agree that public confidence may be fostered through government reform and nationally sponsored economic development projects. In military doctrine, this is referred to as a “clear, hold, and build” strategy, first introduced by Sir Robert Thompson (1966), and currently the fundamental tenet of a counterinsurgency campaign (U. S. Department of Defense, 2013).

As a counterpoint; new thinking among some warfare strategist suggests that good governance does not necessarily promote legitimacy or enable security. Lamb and Shawn (2012) argued that improving the host-nation’s capacity to provide life services may not necessarily drive the people closer to the government. Government legitimacy requires a focused attention on politics as well as the social environment. Lamb and Shawn contended gaining legitimacy may be futile if government officials are perceived as apathetic to social injustices or sympathetic to foreign interest. The counterinsurgency effort may fail if the government is too fragmented to embrace meaningful political reform, and the use of force may be the only viable option.

Altering the way the people think about the conflict is the only path to achieving a lasting peace. U. S. Department of Defense (2013) doctrine advised planners that most of a population may remain neutral during an insurgency, and the support of the multitude

may be promoted with the assistance of an energetic and welcoming minority.

Governance, in this context, may then be focused on gaining favor with the Pashtun leaders who would defuse militancy by distancing themselves from the militant factions.

Lamb and Hameed (2012) concluded that the role of governance is to convince the people that the government is preferred over any rebellious militant faction. The countermilitancy challenge then, is to know when to engage the enemy with weapons and when to contest the enemy with good governance (United States Marine Corps, 2006).

### **Neo-Clausewitzian Theory Applied in the Pakistan Case**

The Pakistan government characterizes the Islamist inspired violence on their frontier as illicit militant activity; however, some experts contend that the situation signals a mature insurgency. Siddiqa (2011) explained that the Pakistan government lacks clarity in defining the nature of the threat, but the extensive violence was a clear indicator of the Islamists' intent to dominate the region. Over the last decade, the government struggled with developing the right strategic approach. The strategy vacillated between a counterterrorism and counterinsurgency effort. President Musharraf aligned with the United States in support of the "war on terror" and a strict counterterrorism effort against discrete leadership and logistics nodes; however, the limited attacks against al-Qaeda had significant consequences. Musharraf fell from public favor as the overall violence level escalated and Pakistan's economy collapsed as the security situation degraded (Ali, 2010). A new administration under President Zardari and the Pakistan People's Party emerged and vowed to crush the rising militant threat.

The Pakistan insurgency became more acute when large and organized Islamist militant groups emerged from the frontier provinces. In 2008, the militants bombed the Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi and the Marriott hotel in Islamabad demonstrating a direct and immediate threat to the new Zardari government and the Pakistani people. The militants escalated violence and created political instability by undermining the newly elected governing authority. Immediately after the Islamabad bombings, the Pakistani government initiated a new campaign against the militants in the closest region to the nation's capital: the Swat Valley. However, a new strategic approach was needed.

A forceful military approach without governance proved to be unsuccessful in the current Pakistani sociopolitical environment. This view reflects the lessons of more than a decade of war in Pakistan where an escalation of military action only seemed to intensify insurgent activity. Bommakanti (2012) suggested that the military apply armed conflict to suppress the Islamists, but not defeat them. After violence is subdued, popular support may be pursued. Yet, Melton (2013) and Siddiqa (2011) asserted that governance activities may begin before military operations and extend long after operations are complete. These theorists avowed that governance is a long term solution and military operations are merely a near term enabler.

Neo-Clausewitzian theory has a direct application to Pakistan's new countermilitancy campaign. Mehboob (2011) argued that the diversity of the political objectives and the multiplicity of shifting motivations among the Islamists demands a new strategic approach. Pakistan's complex sociopolitical environment warranted a

comprehensive analysis of the relationships within the Clausewitzian trinity with emphasis on the militant influence upon the people. According to Bommakanti (2012), the Pakistani planners believed that an enduring peace through military action alone would not work. Bommakanti asserted that the Swati-Pashtun were cynical toward the government, and the military had a track record of failing to achieve a durable peace. To Bommakanti, it was clear that the government must attain popular support in pursuing the use of force against the enemy. The incursion of militants into the Swat Valley in 2009 prompted a strategic review emphasizing the application of neo-Clausewitzian thought.

The neo-Clausewitzian paradigm promotes the importance of governance and its impact upon the Swati-Pashtun as an instrument of national policy. Cordesman & Vira (2011) concluded that Pakistani policymakers may apply logic and reason to properly apply all elements of national authority to counter the chaotic nature of the Islamists. Clausewitz's trinity relationships consisting of the Pashtun, government, and the military is complex and dynamic. Therefore, the key to a successful countermilitancy strategy resides in a thorough examination and understanding of those relationships. This requires a holistic assessment of the trinity and the influence of the militants upon it. Neo-Clausewitzian theorists contended that the implementation of governance is linked to the ability of government to connect with the people, foster trust, and achieve legitimacy.

The study's theoretical foundation is based in understanding how governance is integrated with military operations to build meaningful relationships within the neo-Clausewitzian paradigm. The complex socio-political relationships within Pakistan may



be fully analyzed to understand the nature of the militancy. The literature review continues with a comprehensive analysis of the neo-Clausewitzian trinity to explore the nature of the existing relationships between the government, the military, and the Pakistanis—with a special focus on the Pashtun who are engrossed in the violence.

### **Review of the Literature**

#### **Neo-Clausewitzian Trinity Analysis: The Pashtun**

To gain the hearts and minds of the Pashtun tribesmen, Pakistani policymakers may strive to understand their tribal way of life. The Pashtun respect the traditional tribal hierarchy that functioned autonomously of national governing authorities (Kuhn, 2010). Estimated at about 50 million, the Pashtun reside along both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and are the largest tribal influence in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province. Kuhn asserts that the tribes were subject to brutal summary punishment under British colonial rule having very little interaction politically and are extremely cynical of ruling authority. According to Panwar (2010), the Pashtun tend to exhibit a conservative religious orientation that embraces the more moderate *Sufi-Hanfi* Islamic worldview which ideologically binds the tribe together.

**The Pashtun way of life.** Pashtun life is centered on the extended family. Kfir (2010) described the tribe's preference to gather in small family groups, known as *khol*, and congregate to form extended family lineages or clans, known as *khel*, that congregate into a tribal *quam*, led by a leader called the *malik*. The *malik* governs a group of elders known as a *jirga* that dictates tribal policies, enforces traditional laws, and institutes

taxes. The imam or mullah as part of the greater unified *ulema* or clergy is the religious leader who advises and guides the jirga on religious matters. For centuries, these tribes existed as a tight community socially and a loose confederation politically. Kfir explained that during the inception of the state in 1947, a loya jirga or grand council of Pashtun elders agreed to join with Pakistan in exchange for a degree of autonomy, which they have always exercised.

The Pashtun traditional tribal hierarchy of leadership shifted from the *maliks* to the *mullahs*. Buneri (2011) contended that the tribal hierarchy has been in a continual state of decline for the last several years. The malik traditionally served as the de facto arbiter in domestic disputes, interlocutors in national decision-making, tax revenue collectors, village leaders, and representatives to provincial jirgas. The Taliban marginalized the malik and emboldened the radical mullahs resulting in a diffusion of the traditional Pashtun culture. Cordesman and Vira (2011) reported that Wahhabist petrodollars have empowered the mullahs to break off from the protection of the maliks, and they have grown increasingly more independent. This enabled some mullahs to advance extremist policies that were far removed from mainstream moderate positions. Now, there is widespread Taliban domination of the ulema that trumps the traditional malik in Pashtu tribal life and decision-making. Mufti (2012) asserted that a portion of the older, more conservative generation, continues to honor and support the malik and the traditional Pashtun ways, but the mullahs are rising to prominence by championing the minds of the next generation of Pashtun.

The Pashtun are anchored at a geo-political fault zone where there is a constant political and social struggle between Islam and the global super powers. Rudyard Kipling referred to the unresolved imperial struggle between Russia and Great Britain as the “great game” (Kipling in Kuhn, 2011, p. 66) that relegated the Pashtun tribal areas to a mere buffer zone between India and foreign intruders. Since colonial times, the Pashtun lands were situated to block undesirable raiders along the lucrative spice road into India. Akhtar (2008) confirmed the tragic plight of millions of Pashtun refugees who embraced a culture of arms as a result of centuries of warring imperial powers. The great game culminated with the tragic fracturing of Pashtun clans divided between Afghanistan and British India, later becoming the state of Pakistan, across a clumsily drawn international border called the Durand line of 1893—ill-conceived by a British bureaucrat. Kuhn (2011) argued that the Durand line is a de facto border that failed to establish political identities, create legal jurisdiction, or regulate commerce along mountain trails that have existed since time immemorial. The Pashtun never recognized the Durand line, and they maintain family connections by crossing the line with impunity (Milhalka, 2008).

**Pashtun cultural and social values.** The Pashtun value their autonomy and are self-governed by their own tribal code called Paktunwali. Government control of the tribal areas has been ineffective and, in essence, only symbolic (Kfir, 2009). In the absence of governance, the Pashtun relied on Paktunwali to govern and resolve disputes (Ahmad, 2010). Paktunwali dominates the Pashtun way of life and at its core are the principles of badal (justice), ghayat (respect and courage), sabat (loyalty), melmastia

(hospitality), badragga (safe conduct), nanawatai (asylum), nang (defending the weak), and naamus (protection of women). The tribes vowed to defend and protect guests as a matter of honor—and an attack against them was considered an assault on the tribe.

The Pashtun became isolated and sought to preserve family connections and cultural traditions in the midst of strained geo-political tensions. The tribes claim a legal right to cross national boundaries based on easement concessions guaranteed by the original British arrangement. This enables a freedom of maneuver for Pashtun families to communicate and preserve ancestral ties. According to Milhaka (2008), the government was not prepared for the voracious determination of the Pashtun to preserve their tribal heritage and traditional customs. The Pashtun contest Western democracy initiatives because these foreign intrusions threaten their traditional livelihood. Ahmad (2010) characterized the Pashtun as victims of the American war that was not of their making. Javaid (2011) asserted that a series of devastating wars created severe negative economic, political, and social repercussions and fostered an intense hatred for foreign intervention.

The Pashtun value family, security, health, and education. A New America Foundation survey analysis by Bergen and Doherty (2010) found that the Pashtun place a far greater priority on the health and education of their children than defeating foreign intruders. Dealing with an insecure environment has been a way life for generations, but an investment in the Pashtun children is considered essential for a prosperous society. Pashtun value security to the extent that it affords an opportunity for education. According to Bergen and Doherty, the Pashtun view education as an escape from

poverty, a way for women to gain equality to men, and a means to achieve recognition from the affluent Punjabi majority. This is contrary to Salafist fundamentalism that discourages female education. A ultraconservative view among Islamists considers *naamus*, or the protection of women, as a prohibition of female exposure within the public domain, including the pursuit of education. Although the Quran promotes education, Islamists prohibit female education under Sharia law.

### **Neo-Clausewitzian Trinity Analysis: The Islamic Republic of Pakistan**

The Pakistan government is a weak parliamentary democratic republic that loosely governs a confederation of four provinces and lesser territories. Since the inception of the State and the partition from India, political infighting within dozens of political parties, rampant ethno-nationalism, and friction with the military inhibited the power, reach, and effectiveness of the government (Panwar, 2010). Most Pakistan experts would not dispute the weakness of the state. Ali (2010) identified significant government deficiencies that include the inability to provide basic services, escalating poverty, illiteracy, poor healthcare, and corrupt policymaking. The government has a history of political instability, a poor human rights record, and a notable lack of authority presence in the remote provinces. Pakistan's security situation is unstable, ranking 13<sup>th</sup> in the Fund for Peace Failed States Index for nations likely to collapse or lose control of internal security (Global Fund for Peace, 2013). Many scholars contend that the Pakistanis have lost faith in government. In 2010, Pew Polls cited in Cordesman and Vira (2011) declared that only 14% of the population was satisfied with their government's performance.

Throughout the tribe's existence, the Pashtun have been at odds with their government. Ahmad (2010) and Panwar (2010) described the phenomenon of "neo-Talibanism" that emerged from the politics of ethnic nationalism after a government inspired jihadist force designed to protect Pakistan against the Soviets backfired—and the militants turned against their own government. Panwar asserts that internal tribal tensions, and a pervasive disrespect for tribal sovereignty, undermined Pashtun support for Islamabad. Panwar asserted that building enduring relationships with the Pashtun requires a respect for tribal traditions and sovereignty. Ahmad further concluded that the use economic assistance (carrots) and punitive measures (sticks) to control tribal activity is faltering. Today, the Pashtun remain fiercely independent and will defend their families, and their foreign militant guests, against all threats external to the tribe, even if the threat is their own government.

**Pakistan's semidysfunctional political system.** Some scholars assert that the government neglect of social services perpetuated a fractured society. Farooq (2012) reported that a class divide is evident with 60% of the Pashtun below the poverty line. Cohen (2007) argued that weak government institutions created a social gap because of an unequal distribution of water, lack of fertile lands, and lack of a fair energy allocation. Cordesman and Vira (2011) characterized Pakistan's governance systems as semidysfunctional and attributed Pashtun dissatisfaction to economic stagnation that created a political "systemic malaise" (p. XIII). The malaise created a vulnerability that threatens a complete social destabilization and a fracturing of Pakistani society. Some

scholarly experts disagree. Aktar (2010) asserted that the class divide is not directly linked to weak governance, but rather it is a function of the historical salience of an Islamic jihadist idiom in Pashtun society that promotes a distinct and natural separation of cultures. Aktar asserted that the radical Islamic ideological agenda in itself is fracturing the society.

Lack of civil-sector development, investment, and security in the Pashtun regions is perceived as discrimination by the Punjabi-Mohajir dominated government. Panwar (2010) avowed that the Pashtun were never integrated into mainstream governance. He stated that a culture of ethno-nationalism, legacy hatred, and mutual suspicion, superimposed on a “democratically unconsolidated polity” (p. 8) encouraged ethnic fault lines that create instability and inspire sectarian violence. According to Nawaz and Borchgrave (2009), the Pashtun are excluded from the legal and bureaucratic systems that are afforded to the Pakistan majority. The Pashtun contend that government bureaucrats wield an inordinate judicial power that infuriates the tribal elders, and they resent outside intrusion into their internal affairs (Cordesman and Vira, 2011). The Islamist militants have taken full advantage of this prejudice by harnessing the narrative that pits *kashers* (poor young tribesmen) against *mashers* (Pakistani elite and privileged).

Pakistan is plagued by a fragile political system that is paralyzed with infighting between the politicians, military, and the mullahs. Cordesman and Vira (2011) characterized the civilian governance as impotent with self-serving politics, internal squabbling, and an eagerness to exploit ethnic tensions for political gain. Humphrey

(2012) goes further and postulated that Pakistan is an incomplete nation with competing religious and secular components caught between an unstable Democratic State and ineffective Islamic Republic. Humphrey concluded that the weak government “franchised its sovereignty” (p. 145) by ceding security to para-military militias and the rule of law to the local mullahs. Humphrey asserted that the parallel existence of two forms of “hyper governance,” one local and one centered in Islamabad, have created a contemporary crisis that is being played out in a frontier war where violence is used as a basis for political legitimacy.

**Pakistan’s political corruption and nepotism.** Political ineptness and social injustice have alienated a large segment of the Pashtun population. Fair (2011) postulated that the dysfunctional government pushes away the Pashtun who have become cynical of government corruption and nepotism. Top down decision-making from Islamabad rarely considers the voice of the tribal elders and fosters patronage networks instead. Political parties are legally banned in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province, and there are no delegates at the provincial level. Representation at the national level is merely symbolic since Parliamentary acts are not recognized without presidential endorsement (Haider, 2009). Cohen (2007) stated that the major source of Pakistan’s instability and rising extremism stems from a culture of governmental injustice, misguided impunity, and nepotism. Cohen also asserted that the government deliberately leveraged ethnic tensions among former tribal allies to maintain the Pashtun in a weakened political posture. Hussain and Khan (2012) recommended a different approach. They suggested that the government



leverage nationalism to rally the diverse ethnic factions against the rising Islamist threat rather than weaken the Pashtun into a submissive position.

The Pashtun were disenfranchised from the mainstream political processes and Islamist shadow governance filled the leadership void. In the absence of a national level presence, the Pashtun formed a religious alliance of Islamist sectarian parties, the *Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal* (MMA). The coalition evolved into a shadow government that applied strict Sharia law and governance practices that restricted civil liberties. Though not directly affiliated with the Taliban, the MMA provided maneuverability for the Islamists as the jirgas ignored the growing militant threat. At first, many elders tacitly condoned strict Sharia adherence. However, as the Taliban created a foothold among the tribes, any resistance to the adoption of Sharia was met harshly with severe repercussions. Sial (2009) asserted that the maliks are caught in the middle of the government and the warring Islamists, and many are killed if they fail to support the Taliban. Others are set-aside if they have acquiesced to Taliban demands. The ability of Islamabad to protect the progovernment maliks has been grossly ineffective. Sial reported that over 600 dissenting maliks were killed and many others forced into hiding.

**Weak government institutions in Pakistan.** Provincial judicial processes are not recognized as legitimate by the Pashtun. The antiquated British Federal Crimes Regulations (FCR) of 1901, applied inequitably and only to the frontier provinces, were instituted as a tool of imperialist subjugation. The regulations deny basic rights to the Pashtun—basic rights that are afforded to Pakistan’s majority. The existing courts poorly

execute the rule of law as a hybrid between Sharia law and the legacy statutes. Jones and Fair (2010) argued that the outdated and idiosyncratic FCR may be reformed to comply with the Sharia based Paktunwali code. The court system rarely challenges the authority of magistrates who are not bound to follow the recommendations of the tribal jirgas. Senior civilian bureaucrats wield unlimited judicial authority and corruption is rampant (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Cohen (2007) reported that the militant lawbreakers operate with impunity and citizens doubt the capacity of Pakistan's law enforcement to arrest and imprison criminals. Pashtun frequently explore extrajudicial means to solve legal problems rather than pursue the official system. Cohen further asserted that there is an absence of rule of law, and concluded that government officials are "viewed by most as predators, not protectors" (p. 29) and the region is simply "a lawless society" (p. 30).

The Pakistan government neglected the public education system and significant reform is needed. A large disparity in education across Pakistan created a demand for private madrassas (increase from 12,448 in 2008 to 19,104 in 2010) to fill the education gap (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Cordesman and Vira avowed that the rapid growth in madrassas was a sign of the dissatisfaction with the federal education system and a clear symptom of a failed state. They provided convincing evidence that the poor educational system is a significant cause of social stagnation, but not necessarily a breeding ground for militancy. Although evidence for the direct correlation of Islamic teaching to militancy is not clear, there is little doubt that the madrassa education system significantly promotes Islamic nationalism and anti-Western sentiment.

The madrassa religious schools are known to profess fundamentalist views; however, their linkage to militancy is widely debated. Madrassas represent only about 10% of Pakistan's education sector, but have a significant impact on societal perceptions (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). According to Mufti (2012), the radical Deobandis control two-thirds of the madrassas although they represent only 15% of the population. Mufti asserted that a segment of Pakistan's children, mostly those in poverty, attend madrassas to recite the Quran and promote the Islamic worldview rather than learn how to read or write. Imams profess a highly potent and extremely dangerous ideology to the Pashtun youth. On the contrary, Bergen (as cited in Cordesman & Vira, 2011) concluded that the madrassas are theological and do not teach the technical skills necessary to wage violence. Bergen's study included 75 active militants and found that only a few attended a madrassa, implying that there is no direct correlation between graduates and militancy.

**Call for a greater Pashtun Nation.** Militarization and escalating violence have driven the Pashtun away from their government. Kuhn (2011) contended that the level of violence reached intolerable levels and obstructed reconciliation. Scholars disagree on the causes of the rising violence. Cordesman and Vira (2011) concluded that the growing Islamist shadow government inspired the youth to engage in an antistate violence campaign. Lamb and Hameed (2012) disputed this assertion by suggesting that the Islamist shadow governance is widespread and welcomed by the Pashtun. They concluded that Islamabad—not the Taliban—promotes violence by implementing policy that does not resonate with the tribe.

Islamic nationalism is on the rise. Despite the differing views on the causes of militancy, Kuhn (2011) found that the devastation of the tribal structure severed the last remaining channels of communication between the elders and Islamabad. Panwar (2010) confirmed that a social disconnect created a rise in Pashtun nationalism. The nationalism encouraged a self-determination movement and inspired calls for the formation of a greater “Pashtunistan.” Panwar concluded that uncontrollable violence is promoting “autonomy, unity, and identity” (p. 11) that inspires the creation of a separate state.

### **Neo-Clausewitzian Trinity Analysis: Civil-Military Relationships**

The Pakistan Government and their military have a tumultuous relationship. The Army ruled over half of Pakistan’s existence and has a tendency to overtake a civilian government by coup when the military elite loses confidence in the civilian administration. Government authorities and their associated political parties rarely challenge the military and they often seek the “military’s good graces” (Cordesman & Vira, 2011, p. 3). The military is headquartered in Rawalpindi, near the government center in Islamabad, and is the most professional and efficient institution in Pakistan. According to Cordesman and Vira, the military controls about 10 % of Pakistan’s economy including managing extensive landholdings and controlling many large businesses—and, in essence, the military is the only glue holding Pakistan together.

Pakistan’s military is popular despite a history of overwhelming defeats with India. Fair (2011) asserted that Pakistan’s military is dedicated to more than the security; the military advocates for the overall welfare of the people and may intervene politically

and economically to promote nation-building. Military leaders are much more popular than the sitting civilian president, with 79% of Pakistanis responding that the military has a good influence on the country and only 14% have confidence in the president (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2011). Military leaders, many still in uniform, were appointed to prominent ministry positions and oversee important government institutions. Fair concluded that the military is the true political authority in Pakistan, not the civilians. Fair postulated that the Army offers the best solution to the nation's political dysfunction; however, he argued that civil control of the military is preferred and both institutions need to conduct policymaking with solidarity.

Senior Pakistani leaders recognize the vulnerability and instability that is inherent with a dominant military. According to Fair (2011), the military created a secretive decision-making process that misled the national security debate. The government recognized the danger of an overbearing military—particularly in the provinces—and attempted to promote civilian influence by passing the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the constitution. The amendment vested more power in Parliament and the Prime Minister and limited military and judicial powers. Fair (2011) concluded that the new legislation promoted popular confidence in government and healed some ingrained political wounds. Fair argued that policymakers should refrain from pandering to military leaders, and may divert financial allocations from the military to the people. Despite these reforms, it is clear that the military remains the main instrument in the conflict. Connable and Libicki

(2010) and Jones and Fair (2010) recommended that the Army collaborate with the civilian administration to achieve enduring social solutions.

Pakistan tends to resolve its political conflicts with the aggressive application of the use of arms that destabilizes the fragile civil-military relationship. Bommakanti (2012) asserted that the Pakistanis prefer armed conflict over diplomacy despite the lack of clear progress in the war against the militants. Ahmad (2010) concluded that the government is over-reliant on warfare as an instrument of national policy. Ahmad found that the inadequacy of sound policy coupled with the inability of the military to successfully implement policy is unsettling to the people. Exum, Fick, Hummayun, and Kilcullen (2009) agreed that the aggressive military campaign induced instability that resulted in a periodic confidence crisis for both the military and the government. Brand (2011) argued that a renewed civil-military collaboration would regain public confidence and stabilize the popular unrest. Brand argued that military operations may be used as a strategic communication campaign to win a popular allegiance.

The Pashtun do not recognize the military as their guardian or protector. This is in stark contrast to the support that the military enjoys from the Pakistani majority. Pickering and Rubin (2009) asserted that the military relied upon a scorched earth policy to undermine the enemy support base rather than protecting the population from the militants—and this exacerbated the trust problem. Brand (2011) explained that gaining popular support is problematic for a Punjabi dominated military that many Pashtun consider to be a foreign force within their own borders. The people's confidence in the

military is a key component of neo-Clausewitzian theory, and confidence in government cannot be achieved without a trust in the military.

### **Neo-Clausewitzian Trinity Analysis: The Islamist Militants**

The Taliban rose to prominence after the Soviet exodus from Afghanistan. The Taliban were primarily a Pashtun politico-religious movement focused on reestablishing the Afghan state under Sharia law (Dorrnsoro, 2009). When the Soviets withdrew in 1989 and the United States disengaged, several mujahedeen alliances splintered to pursue their own vision and political objectives. After 5 years of devastating civil war, from 1989-1994, it became clear that a single legitimate governing authority would not emerge. Instability on the northwest border threatened national sovereignty, and the Pakistan government was anxious to seize the initiative. According to Kfir (2009) and Panwar (2010), the Pakistanis shifted financial and equipment support to a new leader, a relatively unknown, albeit charismatic, Afghan cleric, named Mullah Muhammad Omar who inspired the Taliban movement. According to N. Akhtar (2008), the followers of Mullah Omar's movement, many recruited from refugee camps in Pakistan, became known as the Taliban, referring to students of ultraconservative Saudi-Wahhabist financed madrassas.

The Pakistan government exploited the religious affiliations between the Pashtun and the Islamists to form a formidable jihadist force to advance their national interests. Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro (2010) asserted that Pakistan employed Islamists as tools of foreign policy. Ahmad (2010) further maintained that the government leveraged the

tribe's strong adherence of Paktunwali to bond them with the foreign fighters called *mujahedeen* who sought sanctuary in the tribal lands. Ahmad explained how the mujahedeen were afforded safe conduct throughout the region, and once accepted into the clans, the Pashtun were loyal to their guests. The government leveraged Paktunwali to gain a political advantage with the Islamists who were postured to defend the border against foreign intrusion. The Taliban, however, were never successfully subordinated to the government and became violent toward all external authorities (Kfir, 2009).

The Taliban influence with the Pashtun expanded far beyond the government's intent and expectation. Fair (2011) postulated that the military considers most Taliban to be their strategic reserve in the event of an Indian incursion. Government support of sympathetic Islamists is founded in strategic interests that ensure the survival of the state. Fair maintained that it is unlikely that Pakistan would abandon their long-standing relationship with dangerous militant proxies. Ahmad (2010) attributed Islamist inspired violence to the policy of recruiting militants to hedge against India—and the policy backfired. The escalating level of violence in the Khyber Province reaffirms that discrete militant factions are undoubtedly out of the political control of the government. Ahmad asserted that these extremist groups are dangerous—bent on destabilizing the region to advance a radical Islamic political agenda.

The Taliban made clever use of social tensions to gain influence with the Pashtun. The Taliban subscribe to the *Barelvi*, *Deobandi*, or *Ahl-e-Hadith* neo-fundamentalist worldview that professes a return to traditional Islamic principles. These principles



resonated with the Pashtun yearning for moral guidance and justice (Mufti, 2012). Neo-fundamentalism has two main features: a strict interpretation of Sharia that dominates politics, and a vehement opposition to Western influence. Mufti explained that the Taliban's belief in a simple, messianic, and puritan Islamic worldview resonated with the village mullahs. In keeping with Paktunwali, the mullahs offered sanctuary to the Islamists who embraced their worldview. For the Pashtun, it became a matter of tribal honor to extend hospitality and safe conduct to the Taliban who professed a righteous conflict for the greater good of the Pashtun. Kfir (2009) explained that the Taliban influence had a second order effect; it weakened the traditional tribal hierarchy and began shifting the political powerbase to the mullahs who professed a more radical worldview.

The ascendancy of the Taliban movement emanated from the growing influence of the political mullahs who became arbitrators and enforced a more righteous legal system. The Taliban and their mullahs gained the respect of the “common people” by providing an alternate means of governance that afforded safety and order. An Asian Indigenous and Tribal People Network study attributed the strong Pashtun-Taliban alliance to a complete breakdown of Pakistan’s legal system (Editorial: The Dark Region of Pakistan, 2014). According to the study and reaffirmed by Kfir (2009), the Taliban succeeded in marginalizing the Pakistan authorities by subverting the ineffective and antiquated British legal system. Kfir explained that the implementation of Sharia was astute but ruthless, described as an innovative form of Islamic fundamentalism combined with Paktunwali. To the Pashtun, Sharia law was brutal, yet just, and in keeping with

their Islamic faith. Kuhn (2011) found that the atrocious Taliban enforcement of Sharia law was far more appealing to the Pashtun than corrupt Pakistani magistrates enforcing the archaic and unjust British system.

**Islamist influence gains an enduring foothold.** The Taliban were adept at altering their social structure to assimilate within society and promote themselves as the preferred governing authority. Mufti (2012) reported that today's Taliban—often called neo-Taliban—have evolved into a network of fundamentalist affiliates that are sophisticated in their use of propaganda and adept in coercing the Pashtun to support them. Mufti (2012) found that acerting control of the media is normally their first order of business. The Islamists effectively use propaganda to communicate *azadi* which means freedom or self-determination. Azadi became a political rallying cry that inspires the Pashtun to fight against non-Muslims and corrupt authorities (Fair, Malhotra, & Shapiro, 2010). Mufti explained that the Taliban network is flexible with decentralized command relationships that are capable of initiating operations quickly and resilient to military action against it.

There is disagreement to whether the Pashtun-Taliban alliance is inspired by the higher calling of radical ideology, or simply influenced by local politics. According to A. Akhtar (2010), Islamists replace the tribal malik with a “political mullah” (p. 600) who takes full advantage of the tribe's Islamic identity and fills the moral void left by the elders who were corrupted by the government. Scholars disagree on the Taliban's primary motivation. N. Akhtar (2008) postulated that radical ideology in itself forms the

support base for the mullahs. According to N. Akhtar, the Taliban reflected a common religious zeal that resounded with the Pashtun and the tribe rallied to their cause. Mufti (2012), however, concluded that Taliban support is inspired by both a religious call for Islamic fundamentalism and a political correction of social injustices. A. Aktar agreed with Mufti, and explained that the militants have not been inspired by a revolutionary upheaval. They are primarily motivated by social injustices rather than by the religious call for “jihad.” A. Akhtar concluded that the Islamists have rearranged the tribal social fabric to gain influence by hijacking the Pashtun dispute resolution process. Despite the disagreement on motivations, most scholars agree that the voracity of Islamist factions creates a social weakness and political vulnerability that may be exploited.

The Taliban offer a better quality of life for the Pashtun, although they often use coercion to institute reform. Khan (2007) postulated that the government’s helplessness in providing any substantial level of social services delegitimizes the state and its capacity to maintain good order. Lamb and Hameed (2012) reported that the Islamists have effectively filled the void by providing life quality and security to the Pashtun, but the tribesmen pay a huge cost. Tribesmen are forced into obedience through intimidation or threat of assassination. In a terror campaign, tribal elders were intimidated to comply with a stringent enforcement of Sharia law or be killed. Kfir (2009) reported that some Pashtun leaders fled and many were slaughtered, yet a majority conformed to Taliban rule. Jones and Fair (2010) characterized the Taliban as extremely dangerous and capable of terrorizing the population into total submission.

**An Islamic fundamentalist network of opposition.** Taliban enforced Salafist-Deobandi radical ideology supplanted the more tolerant Sufi–Hanfi doctrine that united extremist factions into a network of opposition. The Taliban movement transcended tribal structures across the mountain regions to create an expansive sphere of influence (Mufti, 2012). The Taliban foothold spread across Pakistan by creating alliances with other jihadist groups who professed radical ideology and promoted violence. They shared common objectives with other Salafist sects that included the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), often referred to as the “Pakistani Taliban,” based in Waziristan. Mufti explained that the Taliban cannot match force-to-force with a competent military, so they have adopted a defensive stance by attacking vulnerable civilian targets such as aid workers or government officials.

Though skeptical of their long-term political intentions, the Taliban found a formidable ally in al-Qaeda, comprised of mostly foreign fighters who found sanctuary among them. The TTP considered the rugged terrain of the Khyber region to be a perfect sanctuary due to the close cultural and religious ties to the sympathetic Pashtun. Mufti (2012) postulated that a synergistic relationship developed within these Islamist groups who became competent in militant activity against the government. The result was a resilient and united Islamist adversary, able to engage in strategic planning and coordinated attacks to achieve common goals while remaining autonomous to pursue local political objectives. Javaid (2011) assessed that many Pashtun entered into a grand alliance of convenience with al-Qaeda foreign fighters to protect their families from

unwarranted foreign aggression. Javaid explained that al-Qaeda fighters sought refuge from intense military operations and gained influence with the TTP and local Pashtun tribesmen who were sympathetic to their cause. The Taliban and Pashtun sympathizers, seeking spiritual guidance and the rule of law in an era of incessant violence, turned to the al-Qaeda for leadership, logistical support, military prowess, and political stability (Dorrnsoro, 2009).

The Western pursuit of the global war on terror encouraged violent extremism and enabled the uncontested authority of the Taliban mullahs. This view discounts the idea of a common strategic or ideological objective between the Pashtun and Taliban, and suggests that the violence brought on by the West itself. Hence, many Pashtun consider Allied aggression as the root cause of the swelling radical opposition—referred to as *Talibanization*. Javaid (2011) asserted that Western military raids have pushed the Pashtun to the Islamist militants for protection and security. Javaid (2011) cited drone attacks and persistent raids by special military forces that killed innocents and conducted unlawful search and seizure as the primary reason for Talibanization. Javaid postulated that Islamist militants are enabled by cash-flushed fundamentalist groups aimed at ousting the corrupt Western influence that brought war upon them, not of their own choosing.

**The Islamist strategy.** The Pakistan Taliban seeks to undermine the government and exercise the right of autonomous governance based in Sharia law. According to Cordesman and Vira (2011), the TTP strategy aligns with the Maoist insurgency

approach of a protracted popular war. The militants are capable of operational planning and coordinated attacks with sophisticated networks that reach beyond the national borders. The local networks often compete with each other, resulting in violence manifested in different ways: intertribal warfare, antistate violence, sectarian violence, global jihad, and criminal activity. According to Cordesman and Vira, the militants sought to replace traditional tribal values with its own form of Islamic extremist ideology by destroying the traditional Jirga system. They asserted that the Islamist strategy emphasizes patience in an attempt to gain influence with the Pashtun and exhaust Pakistan's political will and resources over time—for years if necessary.

The Taliban established a firm political base among the Pashtun as a foundation for militancy. Nawaz and Borchgrave (2009) reported that the Taliban operate clandestinely through propaganda, subversion, and intimidation to supplant the traditional tribal leadership and foster support among the Pashtun, especially the vulnerable youth. Cordesman and Vira (2011) explained that the Taliban effectively disseminate a strategic narrative that connects tribal grievances to a governance platform that invigorates the tribesmen. Taliban accomplish this by either co-opting existing ethnic identities or fashioning new identities based on religious extremism rather than traditional Pashtun culture. After achieving a firm political base, the Taliban pursue coercion and intimidation to recruit young warriors, collect intelligence, and acquire logistical support for guerrilla or terrorist operations against the military and police constabulary.

Islamist inspired militancy and political action generated gaps in state control that the Taliban filled with “shadow” governance. According to Cordesman and Vira, the Taliban sought to inspire and mobilize the people—known as Focoism—to collapse the government through civil disobedience rather than outright military defeat. Focoists pursue limited military operations supported by a sustained tempo of strategic propaganda to inspire the people into rallying against the government. It remains unclear whether the militants seek to collapse the government or merely wound it enough to settle for some limited political objectives such as the right of self-determination, independence, or simply equal representation in government.

**The Pakistan countermilitancy campaign is irresolute.** The national strategy to counter Islamist militancy is marked by indecision and limited success. Pickering and Rubin (2009) and Nawaz (2011) assessed that the military has been ineffective in clearing and holding territory because of an incoherent strategy. Mohammad (2009) further explained that the government does not understand the dynamic between a counterterrorism and counterinsurgency situation. The counterterrorism strategy, conceived to disempower the worldwide terrorist network by eliminating support nodes may be counterproductive in achieving the Pashtun trust and confidence. Mohammad reported that hundreds of innocents were hurt or killed in the process to annihilate the Islamist support networks. The radical movement is emboldened by the anger exuded by the families of those killed. Cohen (2007) affirmed that military operations have not only

failed to reduce violence, but caused additional civil unrest stemming from the lawlessness left by the exodus of competent governing bodies.

The Islamists move throughout the region with impunity and the lethality of insurgents is not a valid indicator of success. Cordesman and Vira (2011) concluded that constant military pressure on the Taliban tends to displace them to other provinces, merely transferring the militancy problem to other locations. They describe the freedom of maneuver as a “balloon” where the militants pressured by intensive military action in one sector were pushed into another by seeking refuge in benign provinces where they could reconstitute and receive local support. In order to maneuver more effectively, the militants cleverly modified the cultural diversity of their forces to mirror the population and thus became more accepted. As the militants moved through tribal regions, they acculturated and assumed many young fighters into their ranks. The new diversity in tribal makeup bound by a common religious ideology promoted the concept of a united Islamic front and pushed moderate Muslims closer to the radical factions.

The Pashtun were not convinced that it is better to be a Pakistan citizen rather than a Taliban subject. Khan (2007) contended that governance steadily deteriorated at the very time when it is needed to gain the confidence of the people. Khan asserted that the government demonstrated little interest or ability to engage in economic development or correct social disparities that would foster enduring relationships. Aslam and Yilaz (2011) studied the impact of decentralized reforms on service delivery in Pakistan’s remote provinces and concluded that bringing inclusive decision-making to the Pashtun



people would improve life services and promote trust that is clearly absent. N. Akhtar (2008) concluded that peace cannot be achieved with weapons. Peace may only be achieved with harmony—and good governance is the key to achieving that end.

The current countermilitancy strategy lacks a coordinated whole-of-government effort and is over reliant on military operational success. Overwhelming military activity has completely overshadowed the government's effort to intervene politically, socially and economically. The neo-Clausewitzian approach is hampered by political instability and turmoil. A healthy dialogue and mutual understanding between the Pashtun and their government is clearly lacking.

### **Conclusion**

The militancy problem in Pakistan is an imminent threat to their national security and has global security implications. The Islamist phenomenon is complex and violent, and a solution requires a comprehensive analysis of the Pashtun social and political environment. A scientific study of the Pashtun and the government operations in their lands is need to discern the right balance of governance and military actions to subdue the militancy threat. The cynicism and distrust between the Pashtun, their government, and the military destabilized the sociopolitical environment and created vulnerabilities for the Islamists to exploit. Due to a weakness of Pakistan's governance, the militants have the initiative; however, the Pakistani government achieved significant success during the Swat operations in Khyber Province. This study explored the reasons for that success.

Current doctrine and the application of classic insurgency and terrorism theory have significant gaps that require additional scientific research to determine the true role of governance in a countermilitancy campaign. Current strategies remain military dominant rather than population focused. Neo-Clausewitzians stress the importance of earning the allegiance of the people to undermine the enemy support base. However, the planning process to identify and implement the right governance services to promote public trust is lacking. An aggressive military approach has proven to be problematic in the current sociopolitical environment, and most scholars agree that military forces working hand-in-hand with the government institutions is more effective. Still, there is disagreement on the best methods to integrate governance with the military effort.

Altering the way the Pakistan government and the Pashtun think about the conflict is the only path to achieving a lasting peace. To gain the confidence and trust of the tribesmen, the government may study the Pashtun way of life that was centered on the extended Pashtun family and governed by a traditional tribal hierarchy. The Pashtun are anchored at a geo-political fault zone where there is a constant social struggle between Islam, the global super powers, and their own government. The Taliban, created and supported by the government as a strategic reserve, made astute use of ethnic tensions to gain favor with the Pashtun seeking justice and moral guidance founded in Islam. The Taliban were skilled at altering their communal fabric to assimilate with the people and promote themselves as the chosen governing authority, thereby supplanting the Pakistani authority. The Pashtun are not convinced that it is better to be a Pakistani citizen than a

Taliban subject. The Taliban do not have the capacity to openly confront the military in large conventional formations, so they resort to irregular warfare and terror tactics. The national strategy to counter the threat lacks a coordinated whole-of-government effort and is marked by an over reliance on military operational success.

The Pakistan government has experienced limited success in the conflict. Pakistan is plagued by a dysfunctional political system that is paralyzed with infighting between the politicians, military, and the mullahs. It is a fragile parliamentary democratic republic that loosely governs and failed to achieve the trust of the Pashtun. Lack of development in infrastructure and social services perpetuated a fractured society. The Pashtun are disenfranchised from the mainstream political processes and the Islamists have filled the leadership void. Militarization and escalating violence further alienated the Pashtun from their government which is at odds with their own military. As a result, the Pashtun do not recognize the military or the government as their guardian or protectors. The tribe may be reconnected to their government to achieve an enduring peace.

There is a clear gap in the literature concerning the specific implementation of governance and the potential for a whole-of-government approach to counter Islamist militancy. Current doctrine focuses on military operations as the primary instrument to defeat the militants. Governance plays only a secondary role. Neo-Clausewitzian thought clearly places a higher degree of importance on understanding cultural values, and the application of governance throughout the campaign. Determining the right balance between military operations and governance is the challenge.

Chapter 3 describes a qualitative design that applies a neo-Clausewitzian theoretical lens to analyze the successes of Pakistan's 2009 Swat Valley operation. Conducting scientific research to gain an understanding of the relationships between the participants in the conflict may provide a baseline of knowledge of how governance may be integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist inspired violence. Clearly, promoting a trust in government provides a promising method to counteract militant influence upon a vulnerable people. The research methodology explored the best processes and methods to promote government legitimacy and disable the Islamists' capacity to wage war.

## Chapter 3: Research Method

### **Introduction**

In this chapter, I describe the qualitative study research design and the rationale for a case study strategy of inquiry. The single case design methodology and tradition are primarily based upon the approach developed by the recognized leader in the field, Yin (2014). In this chapter, my role as a researcher is defined, and the process for recruiting and protecting the participant pool in an appropriate and ethical manner is described in detail. The specified design elements of the Yin-inspired methodology are illustrated. The data collection plan includes a description of the desired instruments and the methods of collection are provided. To facilitate data analysis, the application of a linear analytical model and manual coding scheme are depicted. The specific steps to promote study trustworthiness are expressed in the final section.

### **Purpose Statement**

The purpose of this study was to determine the most effective integration of governance and military activities to subdue Islamist militancy. The study results and conclusions promote social change by gaining a better understanding of Islamist inspired violence and recommending planning improvements to subdue it. The new knowledge obtained in the study, potentially codified in planning doctrine, may lead to a better strategic approach in addressing the escalating global Islamist militancy problem. The research design applies a neo-Clausewitzian warfare theoretical lens to assess the complex sociopolitical environment and evaluate Pakistan's implementation of

governance. A qualitative approach to explore the relationships between the people, the military, and their government may facilitate the integration of governance and militarism to subdue violent extremism.

### **Research Design Summary**

In the study, I explored the sociopolitical phenomenon of Islamist militancy and deteriorating writ of government in Pakistan's Khyber Province. The nature of the research is qualitative, focusing on a single case in assessing the integration of governance with civil-military operations. I focused on the practical problem that contemporary counterterrorism doctrine does not adequately address the concurrent integration of governance with military operations into a comprehensive strategy. The study contributes to the social science discipline by addressing the broader problem of escalating militancy inspired by Islamists spread around the world.

The Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, VA, hosted Pakistani policymakers and operational planners involved with the Swat Valley campaign. My role as a professor at the college and researcher was to create a neutral environment that is conducive to the free flow of information without the undue influence of personal prejudices or political barriers. To achieve a balanced view, six Pakistani planners with a breadth of planning experience were selected to participate in the study. Primary data were merged with Pakistani secondary source survey data to include the perspectives of the Swatis.

The study includes qualitative data from official government records and other source documents that record the facts of the operation. The qualitative data analysis flow

included a program-level linear analytical model (Appendix B) to analyze the implementation of governance. The model was useful in analyzing the impact of government policy, planning, and governance actions that directly supported the military effort. The model incorporated real-world contextual conditions that describe the inherent problem of Islamic militancy and the rival interventions that challenge the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical construct. The analysis technique proved to be a valuable research tool to match empirically observed activities to theoretically predicted events.

Trustworthiness, confirmability, and transferability remain a significant concern and weakness of a single case study in comparison to a multicase approach. Small data sampling sizes may produce subjective results (Stake, 2010). To address this concern, the participant pool included key Pakistani subject matter experts across the breadth of required planning skill sets that were directly involved in the Swat operation. Moreover, the case leveraged the strength of triangulating data from a myriad of official sources (Yin, 2014). Data triangulation between the testimony of trustworthy participants, reliable surveys of the affected population, and official documentation upholds credibility. The analytical model promotes transferability by organizing the data analysis along global militancy themes and internationally recognized doctrinal tenets. Stringent compliance with the data collection methodology and development of a transparent audit trail for other researchers to follow enhances confirmability.

The participants were protected by safeguarding their identities in a nonattribution forum to foster a forthright dialogue. The political situation in Pakistan is tenuous and the

United States-Pakistan relationship is volatile, so the Pakistanis who participated were vulnerable to political pressure and their employment security could be at risk. In accordance with National Research Council (2013) guidelines, informed consent procedures were strictly applied and subject confidentiality guarded while exercising the research methodology. The study does not contain personal information or subject identities: No names are included.

My profession as a professor of military studies at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, VA placed me in a unique position to gain access to Pakistani planners. The study provides these planners with a standard for researching additional counterterrorism cases. Study conclusions and recommendations may be used to formulate improved doctrine as codified in Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency Manual (U. S. Department of Defense, 2013). New counterterrorism doctrine based on real-world operations could provide a valuable tool to address the escalating global terrorism problem. By researching the Rah-e-Rast operation, policymakers and planners may better understand how to design and implement governance activities that undermine the Islamist support base and subdue their violent activity.

## **Research Design and Rationale**

### **Research Question**

During the implementation of Pakistan's counterterrorism campaign in Swat District in the Malakand Division of Khyber Province, how were governance activities integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist terrorism?



## **The Islamist Militancy Phenomenon**

The research revealed the sociopolitical phenomena of escalating Islamist militancy and deteriorating writ of government in Pakistan's Khyber Province. Despite a concerted government effort to neutralize the militants, the region experienced an escalation of violence and reduction in governmental authority (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). However, there was a marked reduction in violence after the Swat Valley operation (Khattak, 2010). Khattak (2010) reported that the sociopolitical activities and military operations restored national confidence and brought calm to the valley. This study exposes the reasons behind the operational success by analyzing the complex relationships between the Islamists, the Swati-Pashtun, and the government security forces—all from the Pakistani perspective. Understanding the social dynamics may provide insights into an effective application of governance in a hostile militancy situation. Improved governance might enhance or supplant the execution of costly and often counterproductive military activity in the overall effort to subdue violence.

## **Research Tradition**

The nature of the research was qualitative, using a single case study to assess the integration of governance during the Swat campaign. This design was appropriate to examine the wide variety of available information, the complexity of the sociopolitical environment, the subjectivity of Pakistani perspectives, and the inductive nature of the analysis. Yin (2014) explained that the strength of the case study methodology is the ability to triangulate multiple qualitative data sources on a complex research problem.

### **Case Study Design**

In the study, I examined the integration of governance during Operation Rah-e-Rast using a single case study design. Yin (2014) contended that a single case design is appropriate under longitudinal, revelatory, unusual, or critical conditions. The operation was conceived during a critical juncture in Pakistan's counterterrorism campaign. Rah-e-Rast occurred during a pivotal shift from a military to civilian administration and a swing in national policy from executing a military dominant strategy to an interministry strategy focused on governance. The operation defined a key milestone in the continuum of counterterrorism efforts that showcased government decision points and an unprecedented civilian collaboration with the military. The operation directly challenged the neo-Clausewitzian theory of social conflict.

### **Rationale for Qualitative Research**

A qualitative case study methodology was the most appropriate design. Morse (1991) recommended a qualitative approach in complex sociopolitical situations where existing social theories fall short. The qualitative approach was founded in a paradigm of subjectivity and emphasized the importance of interpretation and popular perspective (McLafferty, Slate, & Onwuegbuzie, 2010). The subjectivity of governance and complexity of the terrorism phenomenon lends itself to a qualitative inquiry. Birkinshaw, Brannen, and Tung (2011) suggested that the analysis of sociopolitical phenomena within the human domain be described qualitatively rather than measured quantitatively. A qualitative design was well suited to assess the implementation of governance in

countering the adverse effects of Islamist militancy by interpreting the meanings of Swati-Pashtun social realities. This includes their historical problems with government, their social struggle with the Taliban, and a vision of what positive social change could occur with the proper application of governance.

The study is based upon an ontological philosophical assumption that the understanding the nature of the social reality relies upon the contextual values and experiences of the subjects, and the views of the Swatis at large (Creswell, 2013). Participant perspectives were varied and complex, and subjective meanings were assessed through their views on the Islamist militancy phenomenon. Life truths were revealed by the analysis of the subjects' beliefs in the social dynamics contrasted with empirical evidence concerning the diminution of the militant threat. In essence, new knowledge was gained by adjudicating the participants' beliefs in governance with the social realities in the region.

Characteristic of critical theory analysis, I explored the militancy phenomenon through a neo-Clausewitzian theoretical lens to illuminate social action that empowered the Swatis to undermine the militant support base. A scientific study of Pakistani social institutions was designed to illuminate transformational approaches and key governance attributes that subdue militancy and then improve planning processes to leverage the government's social actions. Hence, I explored the role of governance through an interpretive inquiry of the subjects' planning action, influenced by social and cultural norms and guided by a doctrinal planning process based in neo-Clausewitzian theoretical

principles. I focused on governance actions that empowered the Swatis to transcend social constraints and pursue their traditional way of life, absent the Taliban threat.

### **Rationale for the Case Study Design**

The case design complements the qualitative methodology and critical theory interpretative analysis. Kapoulas and Mitic (2012) directly linked the methodology to the research purpose, knowledge being sought, and the inquiry strategy. The case offered a pragmatic inquiry of the complex phenomenon with precision. Yin (2014) asserted that case studies are useful in explaining causal links between variables that may be overly complex for experimental or survey designs. Yin recommended the case methodology for a real-world context, especially when the seam between the context and the phenomenon are not clearly defined: a direct application to the social dynamics in Pakistan.

The study was designed to explore the concurrent integration of governance with military operations in a countermilitancy campaign. Yin (2014) explained that research questions that pursue the “how and why some social phenomenon works” (p. 4) are germane to a case study method. How and why governance was integrated with military operations in the Swat case is the essence of the research question. There were many governance activities of interest, and the case study methodology was particularly effective in analyzing the approach to deal with such a socially complex situation.

### **Selection of the Swat Valley Operation for the Case**

The selection of the Rah-e-Rast operation had several advantages. First, it was a critical case that defined a decisive event in Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign. The

Pakistani authorities—for the first time—pursued an aggressive population-centered approach to conducting military operations. The militant violence at that time created a level of public desperation previously unseen, and the government intervention was unprecedented. Second, the operation provided elements of both a governance and a military approach. More so than any time in the past, governance and military operations were planned and conducted in a mutually supporting way. In this context, the case was a revelatory where the phenomenon was previously approached in a different way and inaccessible to a social science inquiry.

### **Role of the Researcher**

Creswell (2009) referred to qualitative study as interpretive research where the inquirer is the key instrument and is involved in an intensive experience with the respondents as an observer-participant. As the director of a Department of Defense endorsed U.S.–Pakistan Senior Officer Program, I developed longstanding relationships with Pakistani military officers and government civilians involved with ongoing counterterrorism operations. The program included a series of important strategy conferences over the last several years between U.S. and Pakistani planners who were engaged in actual operations. The study subjects were selected from former conference participants. I had the privilege to engage in frank and open discussions concerning ongoing counterterrorism operations in the Pakistani tribal areas. The conferences also afforded access to planning discussions and operational documents not available to the general public.

### **Avoiding Bias in the Research**

Moustakas (1994) emphasized the importance of establishing a comfortable interview environment in a neutral venue to foster a candid and frank sharing of thoughts and experiences. Conducting the research on secure military academic networks within academia at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia had many advantages. Academia provided a neutral venue that promotes an open dialogue without the biases or political constraints found within a national embassy, military operational headquarters, or government ministry. Academia offered an environment that was conducive to the free flow of information absent external political or military influence. The study includes Pakistani perspectives with a measure of discretion and autonomy to protect the participants from potential government retribution. The study was conducted within academia that is protected by the principles of nonattribution and academic freedom.

Yin (2014) stressed the importance of maintaining an open mind to rival theories and contrary evidence. As a researcher conducting a qualitative study, my role was to suspend preconceived ideas or doctrinal tenets with respect to militancy. The study does not favor a particular political stance between the Islamists and their government, although a research objective was to reveal findings that may impact the social behavior of violent Islamist militants. The study includes evidence that supports alternate theories or opposes the mainstream narrative concerning countermilitancy operations. The risk of partiality was minimized by suspending personal value judgments while gathering information. Qu and Dumay (2011) cautioned researchers to guard against

preconceptions and concentrate on the participants' life experiences absent leading questions. The study was designed with an open-ended questioning methodology that afforded an opportunity to present contrary views.

### **Ensuring an Ethical Approach**

Presenting perspectives of the predominantly Muslim Pakistanis through a Christian or Western lens may be unjust and even unethical. To ensure an ethical and moral approach, the study embodies the Pakistani view irrespective of politics or religion by including a culturally diverse participant pool. The subjects represent an equitable sampling of planning professionals from a religiously and tribally diverse cross-section of Pakistani society. A diverse cadre interviewed on neutral ground within academia minimized the likelihood of misrepresenting views in an unethical manner.

### **Methodology – Case Study Protocol**

#### **Participant Selection Logic**

Garza (2011) suggested that the participants must have more than casual knowledge or limited involvement with the phenomenon to fully benefit from their experience; therefore, purposeful sampling was utilized. The participant pool included Pakistani planners, both civilian and military, who actively participated in the planning of Swat operations, for the expressed purpose of determining the most effective integration of governance and military activities to subdue Islamist militancy. The participants were selected based on their operational experiences, diversity in culture and military background, and the government permission to access them.

### **Sampling Strategy**

A critical case sampling strategy within the purposive sampling construct efficiently gathered information directly related to the operation. Patton (2002) asserted that critical case sampling targets participants who are intimately familiar with the phenomenon and are capable of providing the most detailed information on the research topic. Patton also contends that the audience is an important factor in determining the best sampling approach. The participant selection focused on a small cadre of Pakistani professionals who were formerly engaged in the countermilitancy effort, and were directly involved with the Swat campaign.

Creswell (2013) contended that a critical case typology facilitates a logical generalization of a specific event that may be directly compared to other cases. Creswell recommends sampling at least four or five “cases,” referring to individuals in this context, for any given case study. Creswell also prefers diverse perspectives within the small sample to employ some variation in data that upholds credibility and ensures that contrary perspectives are represented. For these reasons, a sampling size of six experienced Pakistani security professionals were interviewed. The comprehensive knowledge, judgment, and experiences of this small selected sampling created an information rich source of qualitative information.

### **Criterion for the Participant Pool**

To include all the desired operational planning skill sets, the selectees included one government civilian familiar with policy, two Pakistani military planners (one



familiar with military operations and one with civil-military coordination), and three military operators (one intelligence officer, one air operations officer, and one doctrine expert) to gain a balanced perspective on how the operations were planned and executed. The selection provided a balanced view of government policymaking, military planning, and all-government execution, including civil-military collaboration. Since all participants worked on the same operational plan, the balanced skill sets reached saturation by assimilating their extensive operational experiences.

### **Procedure for Participant Recruitment and Assignment**

To select the most qualified participants, the United States Office of Defense Representative Pakistan (ODRP) in Islamabad was consulted. The office is a subordinate military command to the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and affiliated with the United States Embassy in Pakistan. The ODRP addresses Pakistan's militancy issues with a cadre of security professionals to synchronize United States and Pakistan operations, facilitate military sales, and coordinate humanitarian support. Access to the participants was arranged as part of a USCENTCOM sponsored conference to promote a collaborative dialogue among the joint planners. Within the pool of approximately 60 conference attendees within a three year range, six qualified respondents were screened and selected.

Due to the political sensitivities between Pakistan and the United States, interaction with the participants was structured by military liaison officers assigned to the National Defense University. This approach had some distinct advantages. First, the

conferences offered an efficient and convenient way to gain access to vetted participants who have been officially sanctioned by the United States and Pakistan. Second, the Joint Forces Staff College, as an academic institution, offers a neutral venue with adequate communication equipment to provide a secure environment that promotes academic freedom and an open exchange of ideas. Third, the researcher was an active participant in the conferences, and therefore developed personal relationships with the Pakistani contingent. Connecting with the Pakistanis over an extending period of time fostered a more comfortable interview environment and promoted a frank exchange of ideas.

### **Qualitative Interview Protocol**

A comfortable and neutral interview climate within academia maximized the free exchange of ideas. The questions were predetermined and consistent with the research themes and propositions while maintaining the option for additional questions to take full advantage of their experiences (Oyegoke, 2011; Petty, Thomson, & Stew, 2012). The semistructured interviews were conducted via secure audio-teleconference channels. Testimony verification and follow-up questions were addressed by secure email. The questions are presented in Appendix A. The interview duration was between 60 and 90 minutes consistent with interview protocol standards (Petty et al., 2012).

Subjects were briefed on the purpose and objectives of the study prior to conducting the interviews. Subject credentials and experience were verified at the onset. All participants were assured of nonattribution and provided an opportunity to either consent or opt-out. Interviews were recorded (with interviewee permission) and verbatim

transcripts produced for verification and analysis. The recordings were password protected and secured under Department of Defense security protocols. To promote an ethical approach, the participants were afforded an opportunity to review the transcripts for accuracy of translation and intent (Osborne, 1994). All interview recordings, transcripts, and correspondence are secured under lock and key.

### **Theoretical Propositions**

Yin (2014) stated that theoretical propositions are derived from the theoretical framework and will help define the appropriate data collection to assess the existing theory. The study includes three theoretical propositions that are derived from the theoretical framework. First, positive governance interactions integrated with protective military activities create stability and trust between the government, the people, and the military. Stability and trust, in turn, fosters government legitimacy. Second, trust in government undermines the Islamist militant support base and empowers the mainstream Islamabad government. Third, governance may enable or partially supplant military operations in subduing the Islamist militancy. These propositions guided the methodology design and shaped the data collection plan.

### **Data Collection Plan**

Creswell (2013) described four main forms of information: survey or observation information, public open source documents, interview transcripts, and multimedia materials. The collection was comprised of three units of observation: interviews, secondary source survey data to gain the perspectives of the Pashtun people, and official

government artifacts of the operation. The design included analysis elements characterized by the total system, intermediate units, and individuals (Yin, 2014). The following sections describe the specific embedded units.

### **Embedded Unit of Analysis 1: The Swat Valley Operational Construct**

The key chain of evidence for this embedded unit was linked to the strategic planning of the operation in the context of the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical construct. The total system for this embedded unit was the actual operational plan and associated artifacts that are releasable to the public domain. The intermediate units include the associated information plan and economic development plan. Documents are available in the public record at <http://www.pakistan.gov.pk>. This internet source is the official authoritative archive for the Pakistani government. The main instrument includes researcher produced individual interviews by those who conducted the different facets of governmental planning, both military and civilian.

### **Embedded Unit of Analysis 2: Government Policy and Activities**

The key chain of evidence for this embedded unit was the implementation of the operational plan and the compliance with elements of the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical framework. The total system for this embedded unit was the executive decision-making chain to execute the plan and the facts surrounding the activities on the ground. The intermediate units include government archival directives and documentation, public declarations, and open forum speeches. The documentation instruments for this embedded unit were published official government memos, documents, minutes, and

multimedia materials that describe the relevant policy actions and activities of the Pakistan government. Government policy resources for a broad spectrum of governance services were readily available on <http://www.pakistan.gov.pk>. Documents associated with defense policy, strategic communications, Pashtun culture, and rule of law were particularly insightful. The website represents the best information available from a reputable open-source. The study includes additional operational source materials obtained directly from the planners, and are not releasable to the public.

Additional demographic survey instruments were available on official government open-source websites. The Government of Pakistan official population census website provides germane demographic data at <http://www.census.gov.pk>. The survey information was provided by the Population Census Organization, a department of Pakistan's government Statistics Division. This division is the official agency that is chartered to plan and implement the population census and provide access to the information for public use. The organization processes and disseminates data in the form of regular census reports based on analysis of demographic information.

### **Embedded Unit of Analysis 3: Pakistani Perspectives**

The key chain of evidence for this embedded unit were the popular perceptions of governance. The study revealed the popular support for the mainstream government and the linkage to militant freedom of maneuver. The total system for this unit includes Swati-Pashtun perspectives of the government plan and associated activities. Direct access to the Pashtun or the militants was problematic, but survey information was

readily available. The intermediate units were restricted to secondary source survey data. Reputable survey instruments employed by internationally recognized survey organizations were available on open source websites.

**Secondary source survey instrument: Pashtun popular sentiment.** The New American Foundation (NAF) provided comprehensive survey data and agency-specific analysis from regional experts with interview data from Khyber residents conducted before, during, and after the Swat operations. New America monitored the effect of drone strikes and conducted extensive research on Islamist militancy, written by recognized regional experts. The surveys were conducted by the NAF, with field support provided by the Community Appraisal & Motivation Program (CAMP). Respondents were selected using a multistage random stratified sampling methodology. The surveys involved over 1,000 Pakistanis, conducted by professional interviewers and field supervisors.

**Secondary source survey instrument: Swati perspectives.** Popular perspectives on the Swat Valley conflict, compiled into survey information, was available at the World Public Opinion (WPO) website. WPO was a collaborative project comprised of a consortium of reputable international research centers that voice public views from across the globe. The surveys revealed popular sentiments during the Swat Valley operations (Fair, 2009; Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis, 2009). Professional survey experts from Socioeconomic Development Consultants, Islamabad, conducted numerous surveys in the native languages. The surveys were oversampled, and the results were weighted to reflect actual religious and cultural proportions.

**Secondary source survey instrument: Pakistani public opinion at large.** The International Republican Institute (IRI) provided public perspectives and surveys on the Swat Valley conflict. Two surveys of special interest were conducted, one before and one after the Swat Valley operation. These surveys were particularly useful in analyzing the real impact of the government actions. The IRI methodology consisted of interviews conducted by professional consultants. To establish content validity, a multistage probability sample was used and the Kish selection method was applied. In addition, Gallup conducted a study through their Abu Dhabi Gallup Center that included 10,139 Pakistani adults from diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. This survey provided insights into popular in government confidence during the Swat campaign.

**Secondary source survey instrument: Islamist militant perspectives.** The Pew Research Center provided information on Pashtun surveys conducted on the topic of Swat operations. The Center's Global Attitudes project explored international public opinion on a broad range of topics from individual assessments of their own lives to views about governance and the geopolitics. Pew used Crimson Hexagon statistics technology and computer coding to establish content validity.

### **Data Analysis and Interpretation Plan**

My qualitative information analysis included a content analysis flow and program-level linear analytical model (Appendix B) to assess the relevant data. Patton (2002) described data analysis as clarifying what is most important to the study if we had only understood the information beforehand. The model provided a precise analysis

framework that directly follows the planning process. Yin (2014) explained how a modeling technique operationalizes a complex chain of events over a period of time: a perfect tool to assess the Swat case. The model is designed to assess real world contextual conditions that describe the inherent problem of Islamic militancy, and the rival interventions that challenge the theoretical construct. The model was a useful research tool to match empirically observed activities to theoretically predicted events.

### **Application of Manual Coding**

Babbie (2004) asserted that the fundamental process for analyzing qualitative research is categorizing and coding the plethora of information in a logical and useful way. To accomplish this, the data were organized and coded manually using Microsoft Excel to bin the information within the modeling construct. Axial coding was applied to deductively determine content identifiers based upon the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical tenets. The interviews were coded with respect to the political, social, or operational attributes relevant to the case. Additional codes were derived inductively through *selective coding* to identify preeminent codes relevant to civil-military planning. Data analysis revealed correlations between governance, military operations, and militancy.

### **Quality of Research Design and Trustworthiness**

#### **Credibility (Construct and Internal Validity)**

Data triangulation from the testimony of knowledgeable participants, official documentation, and secondary source survey data were my primary method to achieve credibility. Patton (2002) asserted that triangulation may be used to discover a deeper



meaning of the information and may uncover discrepant information. Thurmond (2001) explained that, “the benefits of triangulation include increasing confidence in research data, creating innovative ways of understanding a phenomenon, revealing unique findings, challenging or integrating theories, and providing a clearer understanding of the problem” (p. 254). The case method inherently applies methodological triangulation to merge multiple sources data into coherent chains of evidence (Yin, 2014). Chains of evidence based on upon an operational set of measures within a linear logic model dispels the critique that a qualitative approach tends to reflect a researcher’s opinion.

Achieving data saturation enhanced credibility. Saturation defines the point at which additional information collection was not anticipated to provide additional evidence or insights (Suri, 2011). The saturation level for this study was linked to a purposive sampling of planners with a detailed knowledge of the operation. With semistructured interviews, Suri explains that data saturation is achievable with a small sampling. My interview sample size of six knowledgeable and reputable participants, who worked on the integrated plan, reached data saturation. The study explored all aspects of the theory, with no known gaps or unexplained parts of the militancy phenomenon.

### **Transferability (External Validity)**

The implementation of governance in the Pakistan case is transferable to the global militancy problem. Transferability relies on a strong correlation between the empirical data and associated themes, the research question, and the theoretical construct

(Chenail, 2011). The study includes a linear logic analysis model derived from the theoretical construct. The model promotes external validity by organizing the data along global militancy themes and internationally recognized doctrinal tenets. Also, the literature review was pursued within a global context that merged the testimony of Pakistani regional experts with global experts.

### **Confirmability and Dependability (Reliability)**

Stringent compliance with the information collection methodology and development of a transparent audit trail enhanced confirmability (Petty et al., 2012). Reliability was further enhanced by the strict adherence to the interview protocol. The protocol leveraged the strength of a semistructured questioning methodology that promoted information consistency (Hanson, Balmer, & Giardino, 2011). The structured protocol combined with a model analysis framework allows researchers to replicate my analysis processes and procedures. Dependability was strengthened by a secure data collection protocol that is auditable by researchers in the field (Hanson et al., 2011; Petty et al., 2012). These measures combined fostered a data collection process that is transparent and verifiable.

### **Ethical Considerations and Human Subject Protection**

The subjects were protected by safeguarding their identities in a nonattribution forum. Israel and Hay (2006) emphasized the importance of developing a trust by guarding against misconduct and impropriety that would impugn the integrity of the research or reflect poorly upon the institution. The political situation in Pakistan was

tenuous and their relationship with the United States was volatile, so the Pakistanis who participated were vulnerable to political pressure. To mitigate undue influence, informed consent was obtained and confidentiality guarded in accordance with National Research Council (2013) guidelines. Study participation was voluntary and interviewees could opt-out at any point. All participants were informed of the study objective and there was no obligation to complete the interview after commencement. The identities and information provided by the respondents is nonattribution and is safeguarded. Personal information was not directly or indirectly attributable to a specific participant. In addition, names and personal information are not included in the study.

Authority to access Pakistani participants was obtained from the appropriate United States and Pakistan government officials. Furthermore, Walden University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) granted study approval; reference number 03-18-15-0225369. A letter of cooperation from the Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan authorized access to United States and Pakistan government representatives in direct support of this specific study. USCENCOM delegated the authority to conduct the U.S.-Pakistan Senior Officers program to the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, VA. The charter of the program is to build relationships, and this study was a natural extension of the program charter to codify the operational lessons.

Due to the political nature of the topic, the identity of the participants will not be published. The subjects' identities will remain confidential and their privacy will be protected. The Joint Forces Staff College is located on a secure military installation that

provides a safe and secure environment, protected by the Norfolk Naval Support Activity security infrastructure. Since the study was authorized in conjunction with a government sanctioned conference, there was little risk of a political influence. Interview data were personally transcribed and secured in a safe that restricts access to only the researcher. To ensure confidentiality, the raw data will be destroyed by shredding after a period of 10 years following the study.

### **Summary**

The study exposed the facts and realities concerning the implementation of governance to subdue Islamist militancy in Pakistan's Khyber Province. The single-case design was bounded by time and space, focusing on the successful 2009 Swat operation codenamed Rah-e-Rast. The research design applies a neo-Clausewitzian warfare theoretical lens to assess the social environment and evaluate the implementation of governance to counter Islamist inspired violence. Islamic extremism is multifaceted, so multiple qualitative data sources were needed to validate the theoretical construct.

Stringent adherence to the case study methodology promoted transferability to the macro militancy problem. The interpretive inquiry of six Pakistani planners was supported by empirical evidence derived from official documents that included operational metrics. A strict data collection protocol protected the participants, avoided the injection of biases, and built an auditable data trail that other researchers may easily access and review. The study includes a program-level linear analytical model to determine the nexus between governance and military activity in the countermilitancy

campaign. The study promotes social change by offering improved processes to integrate governance in a real-world countermilitancy operations. The new knowledge obtained, potentially codified in doctrine, may lead to a better strategy in addressing the global Islamist phenomenon. The lessons from the Pakistan experience in Swat may have a direct impact on how modern nations approach the global militancy threat.

## Chapter 4: Results

### **Introduction**

This qualitative research revealed the facts and circumstances related to the implementation of governance during the 2009 countermilitancy operations within Khyber Province. In this chapter, I present the testimony of six operational planners using a critical case sampling construct to assess the impacts of governance on Islamist inspired militancy in the Swat Valley. The participants were familiar with the design of the Pakistani countermilitancy campaign and were selected for the sole purpose of providing descriptive information concerning the planning effort.

Data collection and analysis included three units of observation: semistructured interviews of selected respondents, secondary source survey data to gain Pakistani perspectives, and official government artifacts of the Swat operation. Progressive axial and selective coding schemes organized and validated the data through methodological triangulation. The study includes a qualitative content analysis flow model to conceptualize themes and analyze the data through a countermilitancy theoretical lens. The findings are organized by themes, germane to the research question and the theoretical propositions.

### **Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of the study was to determine the most effective integration of governance and military activities to subdue Islamist militancy. The research objective is

to promote social change by contributing to the understanding of Islamist militancy and reveal findings that impact countermilitancy planning and policymaking processes.

### **Research Question**

During the implementation of Pakistan's countermilitancy campaign in Swat Valley in the Malakand Division of Khyber Province, how were governance activities integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy?

### **Setting**

The study includes interviews from six Pakistani countermilitancy professionals who met the study selection criteria. All respondents were familiar with the planning and implementation of the 2009 Swat operation, codenamed Rah-e-Rast. The participants were involved in an ongoing dialogue with U.S. military planners concerning operations in the South Asia region. A stringent participant verification process and interview protocol was applied. The testimony revealed diverse perspectives concerning Pakistani national policy objectives, leadership guidance, operational planning processes and barriers, and civil-military coordination successes and failures.

Participants were informed about the purpose and objective of the study and its intended use. Each respondent was afforded an opportunity to verify the data and review the preliminary study results. Informed consent was achieved with each participant. Semistructured interviews were conducted using protected audio conferencing capability to maximize privacy and security and government security protocols were applied to protect information storage. Interviews were conducted on encrypted audio

networks, and the recordings are kept in a secure location with limited distribution. The transcripts are available for review without restrictions. Archived transcripts are not attributed to any named participant and may be publicly released. None of the respondents expressed a concern about the release of information or their participation.

### **Demographics**

The participants consisted of knowledgeable experts familiar with Rah-e-Rast. They possessed the desired operational planning skill sets typical of a joint civil-military planning group. Each respondent was assigned a code based on the person's occupation and experience, and the rest of the report refers to each of them by the assigned code. The participant codes are as follows:

MILA1 – Pakistani military air operations officer

MILO2 – Pakistani military operational planner

MIL3 – Pakistani military intelligence expert

MILN4 – Pakistani military civil-military coordination expert

MILO5 – Pakistani military educator and countermilitancy doctrinal expert

CIV6 – Pakistani civilian national security professional and policy advisor

The participant pool was reflective of the religious and tribal diversity of the general Pakistani population. The pool included three respondents from the Punjab province, one from Karachi in the province Sindh, one from the Kashmir region, and one Pashtun from the Malakand Division. The diversity in representation provided a balanced view of government policymaking, military planning, and the interministry execution.



The balance and breadth of skill sets in the participant pool was representative of practitioners in the field who plan civil-military operations.

### Data Collection and Flow

The study includes data relevant to the Rah-e-Rast operational case. The interview protocol was consistently applied with no exceptions, and there were no unusual circumstances or deviations from the plan presented in Chapter 3. Data were analyzed using the qualitative content analysis flow model shown in Figure 1. The flow provided a directed comparative analysis to link theory and the research question directly to results. Krippendorff (2013) asserted that a qualitative content analysis flow is a valid and replicable method for making inferences from qualitative source information.




Figure 1. Qualitative content flow model.

### **Development of Conceptual Themes**

The conceptual themes were derived from the theoretical propositions that follow the civil-military planning process. Pakistan's planning process was aligned with military decision making, called the joint operational planning process in military doctrine (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013). A progressive coding process was applied: axial coding, to inductively formulate conceptual themes and selective coding to determine the most important content identifiers germane to the integration of governance and military operations. Pakistani perspectives were additionally role-time matrixed to assess shifting views over time. The conceptual themes and content identifiers are shown in Table 1.

Table 1

*Conceptual Themes and Content Identifiers*

Conceptual theme	Content identifiers in the scripts
National policy objectives	Cultural values, social justice, end-state, effects, objectives, and reform.
Strategy and doctrine	Strategy, doctrine, governance, writ, rights, legitimacy, and root causes.
Military operational planning	Defense, militancy, security, sovereignty, threat, and internally displaced persons.
Information planning	Information, public affairs, messaging, media, dialogue, reconciliation, and madrassa.
Civil-military planning	Social reform, culture, root grievances, education, rule of law, and civil-military.
Rival interventions	Culture, foreigners, United States, immigrants, and Al-Qaeda
Pakistani perspectives	Militant support, Government support, Army support, trust, confidence

**Data Analysis and Interpretation**

The linear analytical model shown in Appendix B provided a prestructured sequential analysis framework (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The model proved valuable in coding the data logically and sequentially through the planning process. The framework facilitated the data analysis from a naturalistic approach to validate the countermilitancy approach. The analytical model enabled the development of assessment standards for replication and application to other contingencies (Stake, 2010). Data collection and interpretation included only the civil-military aspects of the planning process that dealt

directly with the research question and did not fully explore all military operational planning aspects.

The analytical model provided a coherent and repeatable means to assess the effectiveness of the planning process. The results closely follow the thoughts and actions of the six planners who translated national policy guidance into a multiministry action plan that was synchronized with the military effort. The analysis started with an assessment of the national policy guidance, including the planner's interpretation of national policy and their analysis of the social environment. The analysis then shifted to the staff estimates of the threat situation and the associated civil-military activities. This phase of analysis focused on the integration of governance with military activities.

### **Evidence of Trustworthiness**

Use and validation of the analytical model framework and the naturalistic generalization analysis approach promoted trustworthiness.

### **Credibility (Construct and Internal Validity)**

The case study method inherently applies methodological triangulation to merge multiple sources of evidence into coherent chains of evidence (Yin, 2014). Data triangulation from the testimony of knowledgeable participants, official government documentation, and Pakistani secondary source surveys was accomplished through the coding and modeling flow shown in Figure 1. A linear analytical model (Appendix B) is embedded in the flow to enhance credibility by providing a systematic framework that is repeatable and verifiable.

Data saturation further reassured the reliability of the data. The saturation level was linked to a representative and purposive sampling of planners with an in-depth knowledge of the operation and who were immersed in the same planning effort. With purposive sampling and comprehensive interviews, data saturation was achieved with a small sampling of six planners who were directly involved in the integrated plan.

#### **Transferability (External Validity)**

The analytical model promotes transferability to the global Islamist problem by organizing the data and conducting analysis along international militancy themes and universal doctrinal tenets. The model focuses on process rather than content or actions, so the model methodology may be readily applied to other countermilitancy planning contingencies. The literature review was written within a global context and the model provides a framework that facilitates a worldwide peer review.

#### **Confirmability and Dependability (Reliability)**

The participants were vetted and selected in a collaborative effort between the Pakistan Embassy in Washington, the Pakistani military, Office of the U.S. Defense Representative in Pakistan, and me. Their reputations are impeccable and the reliability of their testimony was enhanced by a strict adherence to the interview protocol. The protocol leveraged the strength of a semistructured questioning methodology that promoted data consistency and a depth of exploration with probing follow-up questions (Hanson et al., 2011). The stringent interview protocol, qualitative content flow, and systematic analytical framework enable other researchers to follow the same study

methodology and facilitates their ability to confirm the results. Confirmability was bolstered by archiving verbatim transcripts and coded spreadsheets based on propositions derived from the literature review (Petty et al., 2012). Verbatim transcripts provide quality objective evidence for independent confirmation.

### **Swat Valley Case Study Overview**

In 2009, the stability of Pakistan was significantly threatened by the deteriorating security situation in the Khyber Province. The Swat Valley within the Malakand Division became the focus of Pakistan's struggle against Islamist inspired militancy. The regional terrorist group, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), and elements of the broader Pakistani Taliban group, Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), converged in the Swat Valley and collaborated with religious extremist elements to exert political influence through intimidation and violence. The Taliban goal was to supplant regional civil authorities and institute Sharia law in keeping with their radical worldview.

The militants openly showed contempt for the Pakistani Constitution and directly challenged government authority by gaining complete political and social control of the Swati Pashtun. The militants called for the overthrow of the Pakistani government and the imposition of Sharia law under their terms. Violence in the region erupted between the militants, the police constabulary, and the tribesmen who resisted the Taliban authority. The Pakistani military attempted to augment the regional police, but the militant infiltration was overwhelming. The Pakistani Army reported 142 soldiers and 230 security personnel killed from August 2008 to December 2008 (Pakistan Operations

in PATA and SWAT, 2009). One participant reported that the military was losing more soldiers to violence per day that in any other period in the decade long campaign. By April 2009, the militants had control over most of the Malakand region. The international media portrayed the Taliban encroachment as a direct threat to the national capital of Islamabad. The Taliban-led insurgency had the initiative and the Swatis began a period of enormous deprivation, persecution, and suffering.

The escalating violence triggered an unprecedented national response, supported by a rare all-party political consensus, to subdue the militant violence and reestablish the provincial government authority. Pakistani religious leaders from all denominations united against the violence that was inspired by a rogue Islamist faction. After a collapse of government negotiations concerning the implementation of Sharia, the militants launched a brutal offensive against government officials, security forces, educators, and the media. They engaged in violent demonstrations, launched suicide attacks against innocents, and destroyed government property. The Taliban banned the media and killed several reporters. Many foreign aid workers were kidnapped or killed. Militants targeted hotels and restaurants, police stations, intelligence agencies, and military check points. Popular support for government intervention grew as the violence escalated. During this period, the International Republican Institute (2009) reported that the concern among the general population of Islamist militancy reached a three-year peak at over 74%.

Islamabad responded with an aggressive national countermilitancy operation named *Rah-e-Rast* or Right Path to restore order and reassert the writ of government in

the Swat. With widespread support from the Parliament and the populace, the Pakistani Army reasserted the government authority and subdued militant violence throughout the region. Within eleven weeks (April 26, 2009 – July 15, 2009), Pakistani forces regained control of the Swat Valley and killed or captured over 1700 militants, dismantled their support network, eliminated their camps and sanctuaries, and recovered huge weapon caches. However, the fighting displaced over two million Swatis.

The military operation created a humanitarian crisis not seen since the mass exodus experienced during the partition of India in 1947. Care and protection of the displaced persons overwhelmed national resources, but multimilitary collaboration and coordination showed promise and ultimately the ministries provided sufficient life services. On June 12, 2009, President Asif Ali Zardari announced victory and ordered a military cantonment (garrison) to foster an enduring popular trust and confidence in government at all levels. Rah-e-Rast represents a key milestone in the continuum of countermilitancy operations that showcases the planning nexus between governance and military action.

The Rah-e-Rast operation provides an ideal case to achieve the study purpose: to determine the most effective integration of governance to subdue Islamist militancy by analyzing the Pakistani operational planning process. The planning and implementation of the operation occurred at a critical juncture, representing a pivotal swing in strategy from a military dominant antiterrorism approach to an interministry counterinsurgency approach. Pakistan's new strategy embraced many of the doctrinal elements of the neo-



Clausewitzian theoretical construct, and shaped the associated *civil-military planning process* as a component of the overall military planning effort.

## **Case Study Results**

### **Introduction**

The results answer the research question; how were governance activities integrated with military operations during the implementation of Operation Rah-e-Rast? Tables 2 through 15 provide a synopsis of the participants' perspectives and approaches to key governance attributes, expressed in contextual themes, and assessed through an analytical framework. The tables document first-hand insights into the planning process: factors considered, approaches applied, and barriers encountered. The participants also describe planning successes, shortcomings, and failures.

The results section begins with the participants' interpretations of the national policy and guidance concerning the operation. These interpretations are reflected in the planning approaches pursued by each participant. Individual approaches often differed based on personal biases and experiences. The participants' assessments of the real world contextual environment provides insights into planning priorities—or lack thereof—and the adequacy of the process to identify the most important governance activities to apply. Results of the integration of governance within the operation are described in detail to determine if the planning process efficiently and effectively achieved the right balance to achieve success. The last three sections focus on the postconflict planning effort to resettle, reintegrate, and reconcile with the Swatis and foster an enduring peace. In

summary, the results section follows the planning process from inception, through the military operations phase, culminating with the postconflict stabilization period.

### **Pakistani Governance Policy**

Government documentary evidence reaffirms that the Pakistani government considered the deteriorating security situation in the Swat Valley as a significant threat to the State. Pakistan's 13th National Assembly of Parliament (2008) convened an All Parties Conference (APC) in October 2008 to address the immediacy of the rising violence in Swat. The APC, in a rare display of multiparty solidarity, issued a consensus resolution that was adopted on May 19, 2009. The resolution stated that militancy and the manifestations of terrorism posed a grave danger to the stability and integrity of the Pakistani nation-state. The APC avowed that Pakistan stands united against any militant incursions of the Malakand, and called upon all government ministries and the military to immediately address the threat (Haq & Malik, 2009).

The resolution provided the operational framework for planning Rah-e-Rast. The national policy objectives were to subdue violence, discredit the Taliban influence with the Swatis, and regain the writ of the State. Specific tasks included the re-establishment of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, restoration of peace, rehabilitation of internally displaced persons, and implementation of economic development. The objectives were consistent with Pakistan's overarching countermilitancy strategy to alleviate root grievances stemming from poverty and widespread unemployment (Pakistan Strategy for Countermilitancy, 2009). Pakistani policymakers envisioned a

collaborative approach by the Foreign, Defense, and Interior Ministries to lead an interministry effort to decisively combat Islamist militancy and counter extremist ideology.

**National planning guidance.** The National Assembly Standing Committee of Defense provided strategic guidance and oversight for the operation. The countermilitancy strategy evolved to what planners commonly refer to as a 3-D approach of deterrence, development, and dialogue. Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT (2009), a key planning directive, describes the convergence of military and political components to subdue and deter violence, conduct economic development, and establish a meaningful dialogue with the militants. At the provincial level, Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reaffirmed that all elements of national power, political, socioeconomic, and military may be applied to eliminate the Taliban menace.

The Defense Committee was successful in gaining broad political support for the operation, and emphasized the importance of sustaining popular support of the military during the campaign. To achieve this, all participants recognized the importance of the provincial government to be synchronized with the national effort to fully support the aggressive military maneuver against the Taliban. Table 2 provides a synopsis of the participants' perspectives on the overarching planning construct for Operation Rah-e-Rast. The data were derived from interview Question 2: *What was your overarching national policy guidance?* A follow-up question was included in the analysis: *How was policy guidance integrated into the campaign plan?*

Table 2

*Interpretations of the National Planning Guidance*

Participant	Interpretations of operation Rah-e-Rast planning guidance
MILA1	<i>Promote District governance and reassert the writ of the State by reinstating the traditional tribal hierarchy, establishing the rule of law, and empowering the elders with resources.</i>
MILO2	<i>Reconnect Swatis to the government by protecting them, then show immediate signs of social investment. Launch an evenhanded military operation and regain popular confidence through development.</i>
MILI3	<i>Disperse the militants and separate them from the population, then re-establish a legitimate local authority. Employ a divide and rule approach to win hearts and minds with a hybrid strategy to integrate the military campaign with the political dimension.</i>
MILN4	<i>Conduct a comprehensive civil-military effort to contain the insurgency and address the root causes of militancy. Efforts to be coordinated functionally through political, economic, security, information, funding, and transnational dynamics.</i>
MILO5	<i>Multiministry effort with a sustained military engagement supported by strategic messaging. Convince Swatis that it is better to a loyal subject than to support militants.</i>
CIV6	<i>Apply political measures that foster a meaningful dialogue with the Swatis, supported by real socioeconomic development. Promote an enduring confidence in the local civil administration.</i>

***National guidance finding.*** All planners understood the National Assembly policy directive and strategic framework, but their approaches varied based on individual biases and different policy interpretations. The planning process did not adequately translate national policy to specific governance tasks or activities.

All participants understood the concept of a multiministry approach; however, the priorities and methods to develop a joint action plan were left to the discretion of the planners. Some respondents focused on district level actions and politics while others approached the problem from a national perspective. Some planners stressed the importance of governance and others focused on improving national institutions. The interpretation differences were largely due to a lack of governance priorities, and a varied perspective on the most significant social problems. At the onset of planning, the causes of militancy were conjecture, and the activities to address grievances were merely anecdotal. Consistent with current planning doctrine, a comprehensive study of the social environment was necessary to gain a common understanding of the militancy problem.

**Operational approaches and methodology.** The planners' assessment of the Swati social conditions revealed that planning was focused on protecting the population, building trust and confidence in government, reforming the legal system from detention to prosecution, and investing in economic development. The planning challenge was to prioritize potential activities and determine the best value in terms of time and money, and both were limited. Table 3 provides a synopsis of the approaches and priorities of each respondent as they commenced detailed operational planning. The data were derived from interview Question 7: *What was your involvement with and perspective on the joint civil-military planning process?*

Table 3

*Perspectives on the Operational Planning Approach*

Participant	Operational approach	Planning priority
MILA1	<i>Collaborative multimilitary approach with strategic patience to influence social environment.</i>	<i>Foster relationships and build confidence with elders and create progovernment militias that deter violence.</i>
MILO2	<i>Countermilitancy approach (focusing on people) through a sustained multimilitary campaign.</i>	<i>Use military and police to set the security conditions for social reform and investment.</i>
MILI3	<i>Hybrid civil-military approach to disperse militants by isolating them politically, then reconnect with tribes.</i>	<i>Re-establish the rule of law, and win support through a military campaign supported by strategic communications.</i>
MILN4	<i>Comprehensive civil-military effort to contain the violence and address the root causes of militancy.</i>	<i>Coordinate within ministries to apply political, economic, security, information, funding, and transnational dynamics.</i>
MILO5	<i>Comprehensive interministry response across all agencies supported by the international community.</i>	<i>Seal borders with international help, contain and crush the militants, and protect the people. Conduct economic development to regain popular support.</i>
CIV6	<i>Apply soft power (diplomacy and political reform).</i>	<i>Focus on Pashtun culture (Paktunwali) to devise activities that resonate with the people.</i>

**Operational approach finding.** The government policy to apply a civil-military approach that included all ministries was understood, but each respondent had a different view on ministry roles, responsibilities, and priorities. The government had no formal

venue or forum to plan or coordinate interministry activities. A comprehensive analysis of the social environment was necessary to determine ministry priorities and coordinate government capabilities within a fiscally constrained environment.

The participants had significantly different perspectives on how to implement the civil-military approach. Each participant stressed the importance of connecting with the Pashtun people; however, the precise role of each ministry working in coordination with the military was not clear. Some respondents focused on establishing physical security, such as border security, while others focused on institutional reforms to gain a public trust. Other participants placed a greater emphasis on diplomacy and public affairs while others focused on infrastructure development.

The respondents unanimously agreed that a synergy could be achieved with a balanced civil-military effort. Each participant realized that the problem required the conduct of both military and governance activities to destroy the militants and regain a public trust. Most respondents conceded that a further exploration and understanding of the social environment was warranted. A comprehensive social assessment would reveal the actual contextual conditions that would drive the planning process.

### **Real World Contextual Conditions**

The government initiated Rah-e-Rast operational planning within weeks of the conclusion of the National Assembly's All Parties Conference in October 2008. During the initial planning, the participants received daily reports of escalating militant violence. Militants raided coalition convoys and marauded check points. Suicide bombers, inspired

by religious zealots, killed hundreds of soldiers, police, and innocent bystanders. The participants explained that the violence created an urgency to quickly plan an aggressive move in the Swat. Planners had little time to frame the problem during this phase.

The planners quickly, albeit methodically, assessed the social environment in the Swat District. Planners needed a comprehensive analysis to outline the root causes of government dissatisfaction. Each respondent reviewed the social conditions to gain a deeper understanding of the most pressing problems. Axial coding of the interview data revealed that the Swati social problems were framed within five themes that link directly to grievances: a predominant mistrust of government, a dangerous security environment, a malicious radical ideology, a lawless society and unfair judicial system, and widespread social injustice. All participants recognized the importance of establishing priorities within these themes to properly allocate limited fiscal resources and manpower to achieve the greatest political and social gains.

**Government trust deficit.** The Pakistani National Assembly (2009) reaffirmed that the state shall reestablish its authority by instituting confidence building mechanisms with customary communities, such as the elder council or jirga. Pakistan SWAT Campaign Strategy (2011) also characterized government legitimacy as a major policy objective. These directives were consistent with the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical construct that emphasizes a strong relationship between the people and their government to mitigate the influence of radical elements. The planners understood that the Taliban



effectively exploited government weaknesses to exert their influence, and saw an opportunity to reverse the trend.

The participants sought to identify institutional weaknesses that could be bolstered to gain favor with the Swatis. In May 2009, the Pakistani Minister of Defense conceded that militant antistate activities were paralyzing the civil authorities in Swat. Gallup Poll (2011) survey of June 2008 supports this assertion by reporting a three year low of only 33% public confidence in government. The lack of Swati trust in government was indisputable; however, there were notable differences in interpretation concerning the aspects of governance that would regain trust. Table 4 describes the participants' interpretations of the trust deficit and their considerations in planning governance activities to promote trust. The data were derived from the responses to interview Question 3: *Please share your views on the causes and effects of the Islamist militancy problem.*

Table 4

*Perspectives on the Popular Trust Deficit With Government*

Participant	Causes of trust deficit	Planning considerations
MILA1	Government <i>not providing security and quality of life</i> is below national standards.	Complement military capabilities with economic strength to <i>protect and provide for the people</i> .
MILO2	<i>Destitute and illegitimate government</i> with history of broken promises...and unequal distribution of assistance.	Conduct <i>political reform</i> to eliminate corrupt system and gain an allegiance through <i>military enabled economic development</i> .
MILI3	<i>Political parties were disorganized and corrupted</i> by family oligarchies who seek power without purpose.	Offer <i>Pashtun representation and participation</i> in governance. <i>Devolution of government</i> to empower provincial and local authorities.
MILN4	<i>Poor quality of life, lack of security and legitimacy</i> due to disenfranchised tribal elders.	<i>Protect and resettle the internally displaced people</i> . Promote political legitimacy through tribal jirgas.
MILO5	<i>Poor governance</i> . Institutional neglect empower the Taliban. Passive Pashtun were <i>disenfranchised</i> .	<i>Form an inclusive government and counter the militant call for jihad</i> . Improve Pashtun quality of life to prove a viable alternative.
CIV6	<i>No popular confidence</i> in security forces or the civil administration.	<i>Restore popular trust in security forces</i> by reforming security teams.

***Trust in government finding.*** The planning process adequately identified causes of popular mistrust in government, but the planning protocol was insufficient to develop a coherent confidence building strategy. Political corruption and popular disenfranchisement were identified as major grievances, but the participants differed on

the manifestation of these issues. Some respondents suggested that an inept and untrustworthy government created a leadership void for the militants to assume, while others believed that it promoted social instability that encouraged violence. The difference in perceptions would lead to differing governance solutions, and the planning process did not sufficiently link potential solutions with root causes.

Most respondents suggested that the political mistrust was systemic and a significant barrier to reassert national authority in the region. Some participants favored economic investment, while others pursued legal or political reform. All agreed that stemming political corruption would foster trust, but only if it resulted in positive social change and real development within the villages, and this would take time to achieve. The participants generally understood that pursuing government reform to bridge the trust deficit, such as eliminating corruption or offering inclusive representation, required a long-term strategy beyond the scope of the forthcoming operation. Therefore, most of the planning effort focused on regaining confidence at the District level by reestablishing the traditional tribal jirga system and affording the Swatis a voice in government.

The Taliban's brutal methods of governing and draconian enforcement of Sharia law offered a strategic opportunity. During the time of the operation, despite the widespread mistrust of politicians, a World Public Opinion survey reported that 70 % of Swatis preferred national government, and only 5% preferred the Taliban (World Public Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis, 2009). The planners leveraged the Swati cynicism toward the Taliban by devising actions that offered immediate protection from

their brutality. This included a greater presence of police and military security forces and the temporary resettlement of the people in well-resourced displacement camps until the operation was completed. Offering the Swatis a measure of near-term security would go far to pull them away from the militants.

**Security environment.** In April, 2009, a vicious cycle of violence ensued in the Swat Valley after the collapse of the government negotiations with the militants. The Taliban began a spree of criminal activities, such as stealing livestock, berating men without beards, and impressing teen males into their ranks. They also stole vehicles belonging to government officials and ransacked the offices of local nongovernment organizations. Police withdrew to their stations, and the militants began patrolling the villages to assert their authority and enforce Sharia law. In response, government troops in and around the Malakand poised for a major offensive. New American Foundation in Tankel (2010) reported that 69% of the tribesmen perceived a lack of security as the most important factor in undermining government authority.

In contemporary doctrine, establishing a safe and secure environment is a vital precondition to exercising any governance activities. Interministry efforts and activities can only be pursued and sustained in a relatively benign environment. Pakistan 13th National Assembly of Parliament (2008) reaffirmed that the safety of civilians was paramount and operations may include provisions to minimize harm to the noncombatant population. Table 5 provides a synopsis of the participants' perspectives on the security situation prior to operations and the linkage of violence to the planning effort. This data

were derived from Interview Question 4: *How did you coordinate the government's civil-military ability to counter militants operating in Swat Valley?*

Table 5

*Perspectives on the Swat Valley Security Situation*

<b>Participant</b>	<b>Security Situation</b>	<b>Planning Considerations</b>
MILA1	<i>Lack of security. Tribesmen traumatized by militant intimidation by illegally occupying government buildings...and attacking police.</i>	<i>Coordinate police constabulary and military effort to prevent innocent deaths and protect schools.</i>
MILO2	<i>Persistent violence created social instability and a psychological strain. People suffering from trauma – most pronounced with children.</i>	<i>Establish secure environment with capable security teams and provide adequate healthcare resources to reduce stress.</i>
MILI3	<i>Militants rendered government ineffective by intimidating or killing elders and threatening politicians. Warlords escalate violence to divide the tribal hierarchy.</i>	<i>Reduce fear among public to disable the militant authority. Reinvigorate local administrative structure and government institutions.</i>
MILN4	<i>People grieving the martyrdom of security personnel and family. Maintaining the safety and security of civilians is the first priority.</i>	<i>Protect the people and eliminate militant infrastructure and leadership before pursuing economic development.</i>
MILO5	<i>Militants pursued targeted killings, the destruction of government buildings, and attacks on police posts. Islamabad responded with massive bombing and shelling that posed a risk in itself.</i>	<i>Change perceptions. People were torn. Brutal militant actions generate resentment and disproportionate government actions portray military as an occupier rather than protector.</i>
CIV6	<i>Militant brutality and coercion against innocents was significant, but Swatis were disenchanted with the Taliban because of brutality.</i>	<i>Leverage popular mistrust with militants by offering improved government services to draw the people away from the violence.</i>

*Security finding.* The planners were adept in determining the proper balance between using a force of arms and applying governance activities to subdue the militant threat. Some respondents cautioned that an overambitious military response risks inducing unwarranted fear. This portends the selective and judicious use of military force, and the integration of local militias, to plan a balanced and proportional response. The planning success of integrating a measured military response with governance activities that afforded protection and life quality services was particularly noteworthy.

The Swatis became disillusioned with the militants who exercised a brutal and unjustified use of violence. The Taliban fostered a dangerous security environment and most Swatis feared for their lives. Tribal elders attempted to reassert their authority by organizing *lashkars* (private militia loyal to tribal elders) to counter the Taliban savagery. The *lashkars* began torching the houses of Taliban commanders and vowed to fight them until they were expelled. Several tribal elders proclaimed that anyone found sheltering militants would be fined and their homes would be destroyed. The violence escalated and clashes erupted between the Taliban and a growing number of progovernment factions. Many civilians were killed or displaced in the crossfire, creating over two million displaced Swatis who emerged from the valley to escape the Taliban brutality.

The opportunity to leverage the Taliban brutality against them became a primary focus of the planners. One respondent explained that the people blame the Taliban twice as much as they criticize the generals. During this period, 86% of all Pakistanis agreed

that the Taliban militants posed the most serious threat to the country—not India (International Republican Institute, 2009). This was the highest level ever surveyed. The planners considered the dangerous security situation to be the most significant challenge for the police constabulary and military. However, some participants suggested that this offered an opportunity to bolster popular confidence by protecting the vulnerable population in crisis. Capable civil-military teams established checkpoints, enforced curfews, and targeted suicide terrorists. The military working with their civilian counterparts exploited the Taliban atrocities through strategic communications via social and conventional media. The objective was to characterize the Taliban as villains, and characterize the police and the military supporting them, as saviors.

*Foreign military integration finding.* The planning process did not adequately integrate foreign military assistance. Most participants reported that external support from the United States merely complicated the situation, and joint planning coordination was necessary to prevent mutual interference. Advances in Pakistani government credibility with their people were often undermined by violations of territorial integrity from Allied strikes within Pakistan's borders.

The participants generally considered foreign intervention as a barrier to regaining popular support. Throughout this period, the United States and their Allies conducted several military ground and air raids (mostly drone attacks) against key Taliban leaders and militant strongholds throughout the region. Some respondents reported that military gains were often negated by unilateral U.S. attacks that compromised Pakistani

sovereignty. To appease an incensed population, Islamabad provided tacit approval for the attacks, but openly scorned the U.S. for violating its sovereignty. Pakistanis generally believed that the government was not doing enough to protect its sovereignty. World Public Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis (2009) reported that during this period, 82% of Pakistanis believed drone attacks to be unjustified and not in their national interest, and 79% felt that the Allied bombing of Taliban elements within Pakistan was not justified. Some participants cautioned U.S. advisors that a close coordination was necessary to prevent strikes from derailing the government efforts.

**Radical Islamic influence.** The militants effectively used radical religious ideology as a call to mobilize against the government and foreign invaders (U.S. and their Allies). Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (2009b) survey in early 2009 reported that 76% of Pakistanis were concerned or somewhat concerned with Islamic radicalism and only 12% were not concerned. The militants invested in madrassas that professed radical doctrine that inspired violence against established institutions. Table 6 provides the participants' insights into the role of radical ideology in the militancy situation. The data were derived from the responses to interview Question 3: *Please share your views on the causes and effects of the Islamist militancy problem.*



Table 6

*Perspectives on the Social Impact of Radical Ideology*

<b>Participant</b>	<b>Impact of Radical Ideology</b>	<b>Planning Considerations</b>
MILA1	<i>Militants use ideology to recruit young warriors. Radio and social media used to inspire young men to clash with security forces.</i>	<i>Requires constant rhythm of strategic messaging to counter the ideological view.</i>
MILO2	<i>Radical ideology is center of gravity of the social environment. Although the Swatis are moderate, radicalism was used as a rallying cry for militancy.</i>	<i>Address and reform madrassas by strangling financial resources. Invest in conventional schools.</i>
MILI3	<i>Militants appealed to popular religious sentiments by proclaiming a “foreign intrusion” that is forcing conflict between infidels and Islam.</i>	<i>Use strategic messaging to profess that this is not a war with the West, but an internal struggle for legitimacy.</i>
MILN4	<i>Militants infiltrated the military and promoted killings in the name of Islam to inspire sectarian violence within our ranks to weaken us. Madrassas were important recruitment areas that provide venues for militant planning.</i>	<i>Prevent zealots from leveraging the distorted ideological view. Eliminate radical scholarship. Draw a wedge between militants and moderate religionists.</i>
MILO5	<i>Militant leaders used radical ideology to malign the government that they claim supports an un-Islamic legal system and only seeks power.</i>	<i>Promote legal and political reform to counter the misguided ideological message.</i>
CIV6	<i>Madrassas were centers of hate where religious scholars control students through coercion. Radical teachers were unable to articulate a coherent vision or exercise leadership.</i>	<i>Counter with a positive message that leverages the conservative majority that rejected most of the radical ideology.</i>

**Radical ideology finding.** The Taliban effectively recruited militants using radical ideology as a rallying cry. The planners identified ideology as a major factor, but the planning process was ineffective in devising activities to neutralize its impact on influential young tribesmen. Participants disagreed on whether radicalization stems from the madrassas or from multimedia messaging, but the recruiting impact was clear. This resulted in actions to block radical messaging and invest in traditional education. Conversely, the government was uncertain concerning madrassa radicalization, and reform became a controversial topic.

All respondents agreed that a long-term strategic messaging campaign and educational reform initiative to counter the radical ideology was necessary. Some planners focused on the media to counter the radical messaging in real time, while others focused on a longer term approach to invest in traditional education as a preferred alternative to madrassas. However, madrassa reform remained elusive. Three respondents were adamant that the madrassa influence was not a significant factor. Despite the true role of madrassas in radicalization, most participants agreed that the government education system had failed, and a renewed investment in schools would be a significant enabler in the overall effort. Strategic messaging and education reform would both become significant lines of effort during the Swat campaign.

**Pakistani jurisprudence.** The absence of a fair and impartial legal system undermined the national and provincial governance in the region. Pakistan's constitutional judicial system did not meet the Pashtun expectations. Since the golden

days of the *Swat Wali*, or traditional governor, the Swatis place the utmost value on the rule of law and a swift and just legal system. The *Wali* had established an effective network of *Qazi* courts administered by a religious scholar and based in sharia law known as *Dasturul Amal*. The antiquated Federal Crimes Regulations (FCR) established by the British and based on common law (foreign to the Swatis) during the time of the British Raj is inconsistent with their Paktunwali customs. In a December 2008 survey, Gallup Poll (2011) reported that only 39% of Swatis had confidence in the national judicial system. Many Swatis turned to the Taliban that offered a swift form of justice (Sharia) to alleviate disputes and deter criminal elements. Most lawmakers recognized that legal reform would bolster public confidence and perhaps disable the militant cause.

The government attempted to rectify the lack of law and order by issuing the *Nizam-e-Adl* Regulation on March 15, 2009. Planners attempted to create what the Pakistani military calls “social space” to gain operational planning and preparation time by appeasing the militants. The regulation imposed Sharia in the Malakand and ceded control of large swathes of land to the Taliban. The Taliban controlled courts were allowed to decide all cases. The government agreed to release captured militants, even those responsible for public executions and rape. In return, the militants pledged to end the violence. The government thought that appeasing the Taliban in exchange for a pledge of peace would be successful. Table 7 provides a synopsis of the planner’s view of the lawless situation and planning considerations to redefine the legal system. The data

were derived from interview Question 3: *Please share your views on the causes and effects of the Islamist militancy problem.*

Table 7

*Perspectives on Jurisprudence System in the Swat Valley*

<b>Participant</b>	<b>Causes of Lawlessness</b>	<b>Planning Considerations</b>
MILA1	<i>Unwarranted search and seizure. Police stop citizens without warrant or probable cause, but elites never see court room.</i>	<i>Reform system from police apprehension and detention to prosecution. Provide resources, proper training and equipment.</i>
MILO2	<i>No access to speedy justice. Lack of a professional cadre of lawyers and judges to administer justice.</i>	<i>Resource and reform legal system consistent with Pashtun cultural and religious values - Paktunwali.</i>
MILI3	<i>No political accountability for legal proceedings that were poorly executed. Chaos absent a fair justice system...and Swatis turned to sharia system for law and order.</i>	<i>Reform political and legal systems and discredit militant authority... a long-term proposition.</i>
MILN4	<i>Slow and corrupt Federal courts. Swatis perceive Taliban justice as superior to slow and corrupt Federal courts.</i>	<i>Reform legal systems and discredit militant authority.</i>
MILO5	<i>Judicial system inefficient. Many Swatis yearn for return of the Wali, whose rule was renowned for equal justice.</i>	<i>Legal system reform and incorporate best elements of the Wali system that resonate with tribesmen.</i>
CIV6	<i>Timely justice elusive. Cases may take years, even decades, which empowers militants that promise swift Sharia justice.</i>	<i>Expedite due process and incorporate elements of Sharia to gain Pashtun tribal support.</i>

*Federal jurisprudence finding.* Swati confidence in the national legal system was low due to corruption, lack of accountability, inefficiency, and inequity. The ineffective judicial system was a valid grievance, and may be reformed by competent officials backed by adequate resources. Legal reform fell short of the national goal, creating a missed opportunity to bridge the government trust gap.

The government attempt to reform the antiquated Federal Crimes Regulations by implementing the Nizam-e-Adl regulation was an indisputable failure. The deal unraveled when confidence in the newly founded Sharia system wavered. Militant leaders rejected the Islamic courts outright, placing the blame on corrupt government-appointed judges. In addition, the militants violated the agreement by refusing to lay down their arms. One respondent reported that the “hope of peace and order” among the people was shattered when the Taliban enforced their distorted view of Sharia. Swatis were horrified when a videotape surfaced showing Taliban enforcers publicly whipping a 17-year-old girl accused of adultery. The girl had not committed any offense, but was flogged simply because she refused her family's demand to marry someone of their choosing. The public flogging of this young girl created a severe uproar in Pakistan and inspired a worldwide condemnation of Taliban inhumanity. All participants agreed that the failure of Nizam-e-Adl and the subsequent Taliban atrocities provided enough justification for the military to execute Rah-e-Rast and commence an all-out campaign to neutralize them.

The Nizam-e-Adl failure created a significant opportunity for the planners. The subsequent Taliban atrocities weakened militant popular support and initiated a vicious

cycle of animosity among the tribes. The government could leverage that animosity. Before the Swat operation, International Republican Institute (2009) found most Swatis (72%) supported the Nizam-e-Adl peace deal with the extremists. After an extended period of militant violence and brutality, popular support of the agreement flipped. By April 2009, the World Public Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis (2009) reported that only 21% of Swatis approve and 63% disapprove of Nizam-e-Adl. The Swatis were convinced that the militants could not be trusted to keep their word, and this presented an opportunity to bridge the trust gap. Since comprehensive judicial reform would take time and significant resources, the planners generally considered the effort to be beyond the scope of Rah-e-Rast. However, the planners agreed that a long-term investment in the legal system would yield enduring returns in trust and confidence.

**Social injustice and inequities.** Poor social and economic conditions were major tribal grievances. Promises of social investment and development often resulted in little real activity. Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reported that the Khyber Province experiences the highest incidence of poverty in Pakistan with 39.2% of the population characterized as poverty stricken, 41.1% in rural areas. Broken promises resulted in Swati cynicism in government. New American Foundation in Tankel (2010) reported that the Pashtun believe the greatest social problems in Khyber province include: lack of jobs (82% very important), lack of schools/education (73% very important), lack of good roads and transportation (82% very important), and poor healthcare (92% very important). Table 8 provides a synopsis of the participant's perspectives on the social

environment. The data were derived from interview Question 3: *Please share your views on the causes and effects of the Islamist militancy problem.*

Table 8

*Perspectives on Social Injustice and Militancy*

<b>Participant</b>	<b>Social Injustices</b>	<b>Planning Considerations</b>
MILA1	<i>Poor education.</i> Swatis value education and do not have access to quality schools.	<i>Rebuild destroyed schools</i> and afford access to all children...particularly young girls.
MILO2	<i>Social inequality.</i> Society elites have access to a high living standard within secure residential areas. Common people do not have such access.	<i>International investment</i> by NGO donors such as USAID, UK department of international development, UNICEF and the World Bank. Use military to run the programs.
MILI3	<i>Poverty.</i> Absence of economic opportunity discourages younger generation, making them susceptible to radicalization.	<i>Investment in social reform</i> to demonstrate that the government provide for the future.
MILN4	<i>Social neglect.</i> Tribal tension and a poor economy enable militants to operate. Severe social neglect fuels radicalization.	<i>Socioeconomic and human resource development,</i> creation of equal opportunities and optimal utilization of resources in a sustainable manner.
MILO5	<i>Unemployment and lack of education</i> create militants. Most militants were unemployed, uneducated, and landless tenants.	<i>Rebuild the educational system</i> by reopening the Swat University with programs in agriculture, politics, forestry, and conflict resolution.
CIV6	<i>Economic disparity.</i> Sense of deprivation seduces new recruits and inspires violence as a means to force social change.	<i>Ministry of Finance accelerate economic growth and poverty reduction.</i> Improve accountability through tax and financial reform.

*Social impact finding.* The planning process readily identified infrastructure development opportunities, but did not prioritize or adequately fund economic development. Social inequities and poverty directly correlated to the popular support of the Taliban who promised hope for the desperate. The opportunity to invest in socioeconomic development to gain a popular trust was hindered by inadequate interministry planning and insufficient fiscal resources.

All respondents believed an investment in economic development was crucial to shifting popular support to government, but this was problematic for a poor nation. Some participants realized that international community assistance was required to augment meager national resources. This required an international coordination effort where aid and assistance would be solicited from government or nongovernment organizations and then fairly distributed to high priority projects. Most respondents reported that establishing project priorities was elusive and political corruption prevented aid from reaching those who could make a difference. Some respondents suggested that resource allocation and oversight should reside with the military, considered the most trustworthy federal institution. An improved aid distribution process supported with accountability would promote positive results.

### **Governance and Military Integration**

Pakistan SWAT Campaign Strategy (2011) presented an overarching civil-military strategy based in intelligence gathering to achieve the national policy objectives. The strategy involved the deployment of military forces while simultaneously conducting



select governance activities to support the military maneuver. The military campaign was extensive and involved an unprecedented three Pakistani Army Divisions. Given the disparity of focus and methods as previously described, the planners adopted an evolutionary operational term to describe the planning approach, called Targeted Intelligence Based Operations. The concept was based on establishing an extensive intelligence network within the region to identify and find the militants, protect the Swatis, and apply smart political reform and economic development to gain the enduring allegiance. Intelligence gathering was the key to success.

The integration plan included three main phases with subcomponents. The first phase consisted of a *civil-military campaign* that was designed to destroy the militant capacity to wage war, establish security, and protect the Swatis during the operation. This included two military lines of effort: to provide an extensive relief effort to relocate the Swatis in well-provisioned displacement camps, while the Pakistani Army pursues a direct military assault against the militants. The second phase consisted of a *Swati rehabilitation and reintegration campaign* to return the displaced persons to their homes and reconnect the tribal society with the mainstream government through political reform and socioeconomic development. The third phase consisted of a long-term *Taliban reconciliation and de-radicalization campaign* to address root grievances and draw the younger Pashtun generation away from the extremists by countering the radical ideology.

**Synopsis of the military operation (April-June, 2009).** This study focuses on the planning process rather than military maneuver; however, a brief synopsis of the

military operation is provided for context. Operation Rah-e-Rast began on April 26, 2009 when paramilitary troops and helicopter gunships bombed Taliban strongholds. The military offensive would be executed in force involving over 30,000 soldiers. The operational objective was to kill or capture an estimated 5,000-7,000 Taliban in the Swat Valley. By connecting with progovernment Swatis, the military gained valuable intelligence before the general forces began operations. Prime ambush locations were scouted well in advance, and military conducted maneuver in large formations to deter ambushes. On April 29, Army forces advanced into adjacent districts to secure a critical line of communication into Swat. The Taliban quickly recognized that a large number of special operating forces and airborne troops were attacking, and started a collapsing defense into the Swat Valley. On May 3, the rapidly advancing Pakistani military assembled at the main entrance to the valley.

The Army conducted a massive three-pronged air and ground offensive on May 7, 2009. Swat's emerald mines were secured by the 50th Airborne Division as the militants retreated to the hills and the capital city, Mingora. The Pakistani 19<sup>th</sup> Division/10 Corps supported by the insertion of Navy Seals advanced from the northeast into the Shangla Valley. Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were inserted by helicopter from the Northwest into the adjacent Peochar Valley to conduct seek-and-destroy missions. The XI Corps would advance from the Southwest to secure Mingora, and then advance through the valley. Soldiers approaching from three directions surrounded the militants to eliminate the possibility of escape. The combined forces then delivered a crushing blow.

Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT (2009) reported that fighting was particularly fierce since the Taliban recognized the unusual determination of the massive offensive. Surprising to the Army, the Taliban resorted to conventional frontline warfare rather than guerilla tactics. The military conducted extensive air strikes, artillery bombardment, and rocket attacks by helicopter gunships. Commandos were continuously inserted into known militant strongholds—and some were captured and beheaded. The Taliban prepared for a bloody urban battle against airborne forces by concentrating forces in Mingora—digging trenches, laying mines and taking positions on rooftops. Special Forces engaged in fierce urban fighting where the Taliban made fortresses of government buildings and hotels. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that over 2.5 million fled in panic causing a significant humanitarian crisis (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009).

The Pakistani military regained control of Swat and declared the offensive over on June 14, 2009. Key cities, such as Mingora, were retaken in a week and only sporadic fighting occurred in the outskirts. According to Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT (2009), more than 1,700 Taliban militants were killed with a loss of more than 800 soldiers killed and about 3000 wounded during the operation. At least 37 of the militants killed were Libyan, Uzbek, and Saudis linked to al-Qaeda. The military subdued the remaining small pockets of resistance.

Swati assistance in identifying plain clothed militants during the final stages of the operation proved extremely effective. The tribesmen heralded the Army and they

helped them distinguish between reconcilable insurgents and those who were relentlessly dedicated to jihad; however, some militants escaped. The military reported an insufficient capacity of helicopters to guard valley approaches, and many Taliban repositioned to adjacent safe havens (Haq & Malik, 2009). Security forces bombed and destroyed the headquarters of the Taliban leader, Maulana Fazlullah, but he evaded capture due to gaps in intelligence (Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, 2009).

**Intelligence based military operations.** The civil-military support planning would focus on gaining intelligence to identify the militants and protect the Swatis. Progovernment lashkar militias and the Frontier Corps were integrated with the military to solicit assistance and information from the Swatis, tired of the Taliban brutality. The planners segmented this phase into three main subcomponents: use of intelligence to gain a strategic advantage, strategic communications, and protection of displaced persons. First, a robust intelligence network was crucial to minimize collateral damage to persons and property. Second, the planners implemented a national strategic communication plan to inform the people of the government's intentions, and alleviate their fears by providing detailed instructions for their safe transit away from the fighting. Third, the planners planned and organized humanitarian assistance for displaced persons well in advance. Every effort to protect the population would be taken. Table 9 provides a synopsis of the operational construct and individual efforts. The data were derived from interview

Question 8: *Is Pakistan's countermilitancy doctrine adequate, or could it be improved to leverage the government interministries?*

Table 9

*Approach to the Military Operational Campaign*

<b>Participant</b>	<b>First line of effort</b>	<b>Second line of effort</b>	<b>Third line of effort</b>
MILA1	<i>Border control measures to isolate, and weaken militants. Push militants out of strong positions and away from population.</i>	<i>Identify and destroy militant enabling hubs. Daylight Air campaign with precise targeting to minimize collateral damage.</i>	<i>Establish security checkpoints to prevent militant movements and isolate and protect the Swatis.</i>
MIL02	<i>Special Forces connect with local leaders to gain intelligence on militant strongholds.</i>	<i>Frontier Corps recruit lashkar militias to directly assist ground forces.</i>	<i>Isolate Valley by containing militants and draw them away from urban areas.</i>
MIL13	<i>Established joint border bases. Protect important logistics nodes.</i>	<i>Mobilize the tribes and reform lashkar militia who would join the govt. fight.</i>	<i>Selective air and ground offensive targeting leadership with minimal collateral damage.</i>
MILN4	<i>Encircle militants with blocking forces. Isolate foreign interference.</i>	<i>Special Forces integrate lashkars. Quick snap actions to nab high value targets.</i>	<i>Counter narcotics effort. Identify routes, destroy labs and remove traffickers from influential positions.</i>
MIL05	<i>Seal the borders. Trap militants. Establish no-go areas to buffer the militants from people.</i>	<i>Disrupt militant support lines. Reform and coordinate w/local security to disable infrastructure.</i>	<i>Eliminate militant sanctuaries. No safe harbor to fight another day.</i>
CIV6	<i>Eliminate cross border smuggling. Destroy caches of arms and ammunition.</i>	<i>Unleash major counterinsurgency assault to dislodge the militants... limit collateral damage.</i>	<i>Eliminate militant cash crop–drugs. Alternate crop development a long-term strategy.</i>

***Campaign approach finding.*** The planning approach to the military campaign was varied and multifaceted. Although the Pakistani military was guided by the general counterinsurgency principle of isolating the people from the militants and then destroying their capacity to fight, the approaches differed among the planners. Some respondents leveraged the use of lashkar militias, while others focused on the deployment of regular troops. The conceptual method to isolate the valley varied from a network of checkpoints, blocking remote trails, to only guarding main entrance and exit points. Both direct action and indirect action was aimed at destroying a myriad of militant enabling nodes such as key leadership, cash crops, and arms caches. During the operation, the operation was so massive that all the aforementioned approaches and methods were applied. The most common theme for success was the effective use of intelligence.

**Use of intelligence.** Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT (2009) directed the exploitation of intelligence to identify and destroy the militants. Since the militants were irregular forces without uniforms or other identifying features, determining their strength or whereabouts was problematic. Protecting the Swatis, isolating the militants, and destroying their capacity to wage war would require a constant flow of information from insiders, or human contact, combined with remote sensor or signals data to corroborate the enemy disposition. Table 10 provides a synopsis of the critical elements of intelligence, and their preferred collection methods. The data were derived primarily from interview Question 9: *How did the joint planning team shape the social*

*environment in Swat Valley to augment or enable military operations against the Islamist militants?*

Table 10

*Approach to Gathering and Using Intelligence*

<b>Participant</b>	<b>Critical Elements of Intelligence</b>	<b>Gathering Method</b>
MILA1	<i>Conduct intelligence sharing between Ministries to infiltrate militant ranks and determine enabling capabilities.</i>	<i>Connect with local lashkar militia to identify who was friend and who was foe.</i>
MILO2	<i>Prevent militant recruitment and identify militants within displaced person camps.</i>	<i>Use Special Forces to infiltrate camps, deter recruitment, and identify enemy.</i>
MILI3	<i>Gain popular trust in local government by connecting with elders and Pashtun at large. Trusted officials were scarce.</i>	<i>Use Frontier Corps to infiltrate valley to gain trusted Pashtun agents.</i>
MILN4	<i>Reestablish confidence in security establishment by identifying criminals. Criminal and militant elements operate with impunity.</i>	<i>Infiltrate and reform security institutions to alleviate corruption and regain popular support.</i>
MILO5	<i>Distinguish friend from enemy. Distinguish irreconcilable militants from those who will turn was vital to reconciliation effort.</i>	<i>Empower tribal leaders to influence potential recruits by fostering a renewed hope.</i>
CIV6	<i>Foster a positive public opinion and by identifying threats. Protect operating forces by determining ambush locations in advance.</i>	<i>Build trust with lashkar militias to promote communication. Train lashkars to protect the lines of logistical support.</i>

***Intelligence impact finding.*** Intelligence significantly contributed to assuring public safety and minimizing collateral damage, but fell short of locating and detaining top militant leaders. Special Forces leveraged intelligence to receive valuable targeting information for precision munitions. General purpose forces swept the valley and eliminated subordinate militant leaders with the help of lashkar militia and tribal elders, but many top leaders escaped. There was some evidence of intelligence-sharing between government agencies and departments; however, the efficacy of an intelligence planning cell and extent of collaboration cannot be fully assessed.

The effective use of intelligence improved Swati confidence in military operations, a key neo-Clausewitzian tenet. Taliban atrocities created a convergence of popular opposition to militant rule that created an opportune set of enabling conditions to undermine and destroy them. Intelligence flowed from disgruntled Swatis who revealed militant strongholds and dispositions. Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (2009b) reported that during Rah-e-Rast, there was a complete reversal in Pakistani attitudes toward the use of military with 53% in support and only 24% in opposition. By the end of the operation, favorable ratings of the military escalated to 89% and an unfavorable military view dropped further to 12%. The Army's favorable conduct of the operation set the conditions for a successful implementation of governance.

**Strategic communications.** The use of strategic messaging to counter the radical ideology and provide a viable alternative was an important component of the operational plan. On June 1, 2009, President Zardari emphasized that the war against militancy was a



total war and each section of society may, “defeat the mindset that nurtures militancy” (Associated Press in Haq & Malik, 2009, p. 53). Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relation (ISPR) communicated a unified government message to confront “Pakistan’s war” rather than “America’s War” by effectively broadcasting via electronic media, cell phones, and radio to promote tribal support. Some participants emphasized that social media progressed rapidly, and success largely depended on delivering information quickly and accurately.

Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT (2009) provided planning guidance that supported local media and regional broadcasting, protected radio towers, and disseminated meaningful information. The messaging focused on popular grievances and exposed militant atrocities. All participants agreed that accurate messaging was important to eliminate the government “say-do” gap, meaning that the military actions on the ground had to match government promises. Table 11 provides a synopsis of the different messaging objectives and the broadcasting methods. The data were derived from interview Question 9: *How did the joint planning team shape the social environment in Swat Valley to augment or enable military operations against the Islamist militants?*

Table 11

*Perspectives on Strategic Communications*

<b>Participant</b>	<b>Strategic Message</b>	<b>Delivery Method</b>
MILA1	<i>Militants were violent and government will protect you. Swatis advised to leave valley before military operations to reduce potential casualties.</i>	<i>Leverage technology by using social media to communicate with the tribes. Engage with decisive military when militants pursue extreme violence.</i>
MILO2	<i>Islamabad will provide for you and for a better future. Approach the youth through media to counter the extremist ideology.</i>	<i>Use Inter-Services Public Relations press releases to alleviate fears by providing detailed safety instructions</i>
MILI3	<i>Military engaging to protect you and the land. Synchronize ground operations with strategic messaging.</i>	<i>Conduct media campaign to discredit militant leaders. Block militant FM broadcasts.</i>
MILN4	<i>Militant leader Fazlullah does not share Pashtun values. Counter militant radio announcements that intimidate teachers and school girls.</i>	<i>Use psychological operations-leaflets to warn tribes of the false hopes, misguided path, and ill-conceived jihad.</i>
MILO5	<i>Militants were harming your women and families. Taliban reduced the social status of women by beating girls and closing schools. Use that information to our advantage.</i>	<i>Reach disparate Swatis through word of mouth in the villages. Reach influential Swatis connected to the global economy by cell phones/computers.</i>
CIV6	<i>Promote and enhance the true Islamic faith and condemn the perversion of Islam. Soldier's actions must match the rhetoric.</i>	<i>Exploit radio networks that reach the most remote locations. Military action must not conflict with the broadcasted information.</i>

***Strategic communications finding.*** The planning process adequately synchronized positive national messaging from multiple sources and at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. The military emphasized training the rank-in-file to

understand the messaging, and to ensure that actions on the ground were consistent with the government dispatches. The planners developed and implemented innovative ideas to broadcast a positive message. Participants reported that communication methods ranged from using social media (where available), exploiting cellular telephone messaging, using conventional radio and television, and even leveraging the word of mouth from village to village.

National messaging to promote government legitimacy and enhance public safety was effective. The Swatis responded favorably to a government appeal to recognize the tremendous sacrifices of the nation, economically and politically, to defeat the extremist threat. The Ministry of Religious Affairs rallied religious scholars and educators to promote tenets of the true Islamic faith that embraces education and the arts (Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2013). At the District level, tactical messaging enhanced safety by providing specific transit instructions and life sustenance information for displaced persons. The military rank-in-file were familiar with the transit instructions and effectively implemented the plan. Public Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis (2009) reports that during Rah-e-Rast, 72% of Swatis were confident in the way the government was dealing with the situation.

***Countermessaging finding.*** National messaging to uncover the harmful effects of the radical ideology effectively isolated the militants from the tribe. Taliban unfavorable ratings increased from 33% to 70% during the operation (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (2009 a, b). Strategic messaging revealed the moral bankruptcy

of the radical worldview. National broadcasts exposed the militant intransigence in an attempt to undermine their support base. Video broadcasts of teenage girls being flogged by Taliban leaders for going to school or committing trivial violations against Sharia tenets were uncovered. Broadcasts showed the militants destroying ancient statues of Buddha and prehistoric rock carvings, calling these antiquities un-Islamic. The militants prohibited vaccinations, and the government exposed the health risks associated with the misguided message (Mohammad, 2009). The Taliban purged everything considered to be evils including dancing, music, and female education. To gain esteem, the government exposed these draconian dictates. The Swatis, who value education for all children, became disillusioned with the militant rhetoric and responded by publicly opposing Taliban authority. Public opinion decisively turned against the militants.

*Information operations finding.* Information operations to block Taliban radical messaging were partially effective. Militant use of widespread FM radio communications were blocked, especially the viral broadcasts of militant leader Maulana Fazlullah called “the radio mullah.” Two participants reported that the Taliban use of FM channels was largely rendered ineffective by army special forces who took control of key radio and television nodes. Many Swatis rallied to his cause by gaining inspiration from occasional FM radio sermons from highly mobile, low-cost and low-tech transmission sites. Some participants attribute the collapse of the Fazlullah’s support base to the destruction of his messaging outlets. Government dominance of all Taliban communications was unachievable, but controlling most enemy messaging outlets proved decisive.

**Swati resettlement and rehabilitation campaign.** The second phase of the campaign consisted of a plan to safely transit and protect the Swatis in well provisioned camps, and then return them to their homes after the operation. In April 2009, the Ministry of the Interior encouraged all Swatis to evacuate the valley with all that they could carry, sending approximately 2 million Swatis fleeing south into established camps or to join with relatives. The volume of displaced persons overwhelmed the capacity of the government.

The military formed a Special Support Group (SSG) on May 12, 2009 to directly support the rehabilitation effort. The ad-hoc military led group was an interservice unit that coordinated the efforts of military engineers and logisticians, civil government, and international donors to systematically care for and safely return the displaced Swatis. The SSG was severely under resourced, but achieved some success in synchronizing international assistance. The provincial government proved to be of minimal help, and the pervasive political corruption at all levels diverted badly needed resources away from the rehabilitation effort. Despite the barriers, the planners worked diligently to coordinate and restore life quality services. By July, the Interior Ministry announced that all the displaced persons could return home.

***Resettlement of the Swatis.*** Planners designed the resettlement program to provide life services and protection with capable and well-trained security forces within well-provisioned camps. Participants explained that the Taliban atrocities, that became the most significant catalyst for change in support against them, could be reinforced with

a cogent resettlement plan. The plan highlighted safety with a goal to relocate, protect, and resettle Swatis quickly and efficiently. Local lashkar militias would be constituted to provide valuable threat intelligence and guard vulnerable travelers. Securing the lines of communication in and out of the valley would ensure a safe exodus of innocents, while preventing the militants from escaping to adjacent regions. The military considered it a significant challenge to secure all the transit routes in and around the valley, especially with insufficient helicopter surveillance capability. The participants recognized that safe movement of over two million IDPs was extremely risky, but the success of the entire operation hinged on their safety.

The quick and safe return of the Swatis was a national imperative. President Zardari explained to all Pakistanis, “We have been emphasizing upon the world that rehabilitation of the internally displaced people is the most critical element of the fight against militancy” (“Rehabilitation of IDPs”, 2009, para. 19). The preponderance of media reports claimed that the militants had melted away, at least from the urban areas, but they were still a formidable force in rural districts. The mayor of Swat, Jamal Nasir, was concerned that remaining militants still posed a dangerous threat, especially to landowners who were vulnerable to Taliban intimidation and outside the reach of security forces. The mayor called for a significant military presence to protect returning Swatis. All participants reported that this became the most significant part of operation. One participant referred to it as, “the nations’ greatest-ever humanitarian challenge.”

*Rehabilitation of the Swatis.* The combined government and international community effort to care for the displaced persons was massive and the resettlement created a significant humanitarian crisis. President Zardari remarked, “The issue of rehabilitation of displaced persons was a huge challenge before the nation which should be met through the collective effort of the people, the government, and the international community” (“Rehabilitation of IDPs”, 2009, para 7). Some participants expressed concern that local security forces had to be in place before sending Swatis home or else the gains of popular confidence achieved in rehabilitation would be squandered. Although the military reported that the valley was cleared of militants, many Swatis did not translate “clear of militants” to “safe for civilians.” Some participants reported that during the initial phase, the persistent mistrust in government created skepticism and a reluctance for many to return home. Consistent with neo-Clausewitzian thought, it was the military’s job to convince the Swatis that it was better to be a Pakistani citizen than a Taliban supporter—and to accomplish this, they may conduct actions to promote their popular perception as a protector. The safe passage of Swatis to their homes was a test that offered a great opportunity. Table 12 depicts the guiding principles to ensure public safety. The data were derived from interview Question 5: *Do you believe that government policy adequately addresses Pakistan’s integration of governance with military operations to subdue the militancy problem?*

Table 12

*Approach to Resettle, Protect, and Repatriate the Swatis*

<b>Participant</b>	<b>Resettlement</b>	<b>Protection</b>	<b>Rehabilitation</b>
MILA1	<i>Protect the Swatis by safely by relocating to well provisioned and protected camps.</i>	<i>Garrison the valley to supervise development and establish long-term relationships.</i>	<i>Safely return Swatis Increase military presence with Frontier Corps.</i>
MILO2	<i>Create camps supported by ministries. IGOs and NGOs augment food, shelter, and water.</i>	<i>Prevent militant infiltration into camps. Lessen risk of uprising or recruitment through intelligence.</i>	<i>Leverage NGOs to provide direct support during migration in Islamabad's behest.</i>
MILI3	<i>Establish 35 camps managed by the Army with consideration for cultural sensitivities.</i>	<i>Provide Humanitarian Assistance. Coordinate with NGOs and USAID to provide basic needs.</i>	<i>Coordinate multiminsty effort to repatriate and sustain the Swatis.</i>
MILN4	<i>Special Support Groups coordinate with Finance Ministry to resettle tribe: ensuring safety and rehabilitation.</i>	<i>Garrison to build relationships, including ex-Taliban. Military start infrastructure projects, protected from militant interference.</i>	<i>Return the displaced persons safely to their homes... and protect them during journey. Build trust through military.</i>
MILO5	<i>Sustained care for the IDPs. Quick response needed to maintain public confidence.</i>	<i>Garrison capital of Mingora with Army to provide extended local security.</i>	<i>Manage NGO investment: USAID, UNICEF, and the World Bank.</i>
CIV6	<i>Protect Swatis by migrating to secure camps. Move quickly to resettle families.</i>	<i>Military get out among the people. Garrison with checkpoints to isolate and protect.</i>	<i>Provide financial assistance. Leverage US/international monies.</i>



*Rehabilitation impact finding.* Superb planning for the resettlement and rehabilitation of millions of Swatis was a crowning achievement. The sustained all-government effort included a safe resettlement provided by the military and life services (rehabilitation) provided by the ministries working with nongovernment organizations. Some participants reported that bureaucratic processing, persistent shortages of supplies, and political bickering were significant hurdles; however, the overall effort was successful due to international assistance. Haq and Malik (2009) reported that the U.S. government (USAID) worked directly in support of Pakistani Special Forces to distribute aid to the temporary camps. The U.S. provided nearly \$246 million in humanitarian aid including nearly \$82 million in USAID-Office of Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funding. The European Union and Japan joined the effort and pledged \$150 million more. Despite the inflow of international investment, supplies were sometimes scarce and sanitation poor. Although weaknesses in bureaucratic processes resulted in inefficiencies, the safe passage of displaced families promoted confidence and greatly facilitated postconflict stabilization programs.

The combined government and international community resettlement effort made a significant impact on the lives of the Swatis. Over two million displaced persons were resettled in 35 camps or vacated schools for protection and sustenance, and many others sought refuge with family or friends. By August 2009, only 3 months after the operation commenced, over 70% of the displaced families had returned to their homes in the Swat (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009). The Army

and their auxiliary Frontier Corps managed to effectively protect and care for the people with few deaths or injury. Most participants reported that the return of the displaced persons was safe and orderly.

Despite a successful resettlement, some respondents expressed a significant concern of a tribal backlash. A vocal minority of Swatis perceived the national response to be lethargic, and the massive international effort risks undermining government credibility. Deploying too many government troops might generate excessive collateral damage that could tip the balance of support to the militants. An overaggressive military presence might fracture fragile agreements with neutral Taliban affiliates. Some participants reported that coercive sorting and favoritism toward politically connected Swatis turned many against the government and promoted militant recruitment. Militant infiltration into the camps was prevalent, and the threat of an uprising was ever-present. The government planners attempted to counter these second order effects.

***Intelligence impact finding.*** Intelligence was effectively used to prevent militant recruitment and disable influence within the internally displaced person camps. Most participants described the importance of intelligence to prevent militant infiltration, influence, or recruitment. Lashkar soldiers were embedded in the camps and used as informants. The operation was designed to draw the militants away from the camps and into urban areas (away from built-up-areas or BUAs) where precision strikes would effectively target militants, but preserve innocent lives and property. To protect Swati families with serving soldiers, Pashtun servicemen with a tribal attachments were

excused from duties. If elders discovered that these soldiers took up arms against fellow tribesmen, the entire family was at risk of death or injury. The military largely met the people's expectation for safety and protection, and the aforementioned negative effects were never realized to any great extent.

Post conflict surveys showed a significant rise in support of the Pakistani military due to the success in eliminating the Taliban threat while protecting the Swatis. Some participants reported incidents where tribesmen sought retribution against the militants: a positive sign that the military was gaining the trust of the tribe. In October, 2009, the International Republican Institute (2009) reported that 79% of Swatis desire the military to govern them and 70% support pursuing Taliban fighters in all tribal areas. Pew research data showed a consistent trend reporting a 60% support for the military during the postconflict phase, a significant increase in support previously reported to be 43% before the operation (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2009a). After the Swatis returned home, and with government popular support on the rise, all respondents acknowledged the great opportunity to reintegrate the Swatis into Pakistani society.

**Swati reintegration campaign.** Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) emphasized reintegration through the attainment of a secure, just, and prosperous society by way of socioeconomic and human resource development. The government-run Khyber Development Authority was formed to expedite the development of human and natural resources, and develop reconstruction opportunity zones to promote commerce. The strategy included Public-Private Partnerships to establish industry, promote

agriculture, and develop natural resources. At the strategic level, the main effort was a restoration of fundamental rights of the Swati citizens via a just legal system, equal opportunity employment, and equal access to services (Pakistan 13th National Assembly of Parliament, 2009). At the operational level, the critical elements of the plan included investments in education, health, agriculture, urban development, trade, and energy.

The aggressive reintegration plan would require a whole-of-government approach, and all respondents recognized that the resource intensive effort would be long-term. Data analysis revealed three main investment venues to bolster public confidence in government: an immediate investment in public education, improvements in healthcare, and long-term investment in life quality infrastructure and services. Table 13 depicts the reintegration initiatives and the data were derived from interview Question 6: *How did you apply and integrate governance principles with military activity?*

Table 13

*Approach to Reintegrate the Swatis into Pakistani Society*

<b>Participant</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Healthcare</b>	<b>Economic Development</b>
MILA1	<i>Education reform. Rebuild destroyed schools and afford unlimited access.</i>	<i>Reopen hospitals and improve infant mortality and reduce disease.</i>	<i>Build local governance framework.</i>
MILO2	<i>No comments.</i>	<i>Invest in healthcare, Swatis value health and modern medicine.</i>	<i>Limit international contributors to prevent undermining govt. authority.</i>
MILI3	<i>Education investment by reopening schools destroyed or closed by the militants.</i>	<i>No comments.</i>	<i>Conduct economic Development to demonstrate govt. commitment and dedication.</i>
MILN4	<i>Support Education Ministry during reconstruction.</i>	<i>Counter the Taliban degradation of health services. Afford access to female doctors and promote dignity.</i>	<i>Socioeconomic development to complement military. High visibility hydro-electric investment.</i>
MILO5	<i>Rebuild the educational system by reopening the Swat University. Focus on conflict resolution.</i>	<i>Rebuild healthcare infrastructure destroyed by the militants.</i>	<i>Expedite development of human and natural resources. Public-Private Partnerships to promote industry and agriculture.</i>
CIV6	<i>Institute National Action Plan for Madrassa reform.</i>	<i>No comments.</i>	<i>Conduct economic stimulation. Invest in the national power grid.</i>

***Reintegration impact finding.*** The planning process did not adequately establish social development priorities or match infrastructure projects with the most pressing life quality issues. The Swati reintegration plans were noble, but under resourced and beyond the financial capacity at the provincial or national levels. Despite the meager investment, the infrastructure projects positively influenced public opinion.

All participants suggested that the reconciliation plan was a good one; however, the resources to carry out such a strategy were lacking. Planners worked with the ministries to quickly allocate and implement the funds, although all participants recognized that return on these investments would not be seen for several years. Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reported the annual Swat Valley expenditures included 11 billion Rs. (110 million US dollars) on security, 26 billion Rs. (260 million US dollars) on education, 4 billion Rs, (40 million US dollars) on health, and 3 billion Rs. (30 million US dollars), on roads, water, agriculture, and industry combined. Most participants agreed that the expenditures were not enough to adequately provide services to the national standard. All respondents expressed concern that the investments would be short-lived, but conceded that they were making a difference in the short-term. A post operation poll conducted by World Public Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis (2009) showed that over 70% of Swatis were confident in the government's revitalization effort, and only 7% support the Taliban return.

***Education infrastructure.*** The government seized an opportunity to leverage the strong desire of the Swatis to educate their children. In January 2009, the Taliban

announced that the Pashtun had to stop sending girls to schools. They threatened tribal leaders who refused to heed the warning, announcing that schools would be bombed and girls that attended schools would be killed. The militants proclaimed that female education was against Islamic teachings and spreads vulgarity in society. Hundreds of schools were destroyed, and thousands of teachers lost their jobs—over 80 thousand children were left without a school.

*Education impact finding.* Investments in public education were limited by fiscal constraints, but the achievements resonated with the Swatis. The Swatis value education, perhaps above all other institutions, therefore rebuilding the degraded educational system provided a valuable opportunity to reconnect government with the tribes. Public Opinion in Pakistan's Tribal Region (2010) reports that 73% of Swatis believed education to be the most important governance issue. The Ministry of Education reversed the school closings and worked with security forces to protect the remaining infrastructure. Over 350 schools and colleges were rebuilt, but many remained decrepit, forcing children to study in open fields. The provincial authorities built temporary classrooms during the interim period. The Khyber Education Minister also directed teachers to resume their duties. Over 21,000 students, including girls, were enrolled in makeshift schools within the displaced population. Education standards in the Malakand improved markedly, literacy increasing from 37% to 47% in the year of the operation (Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2013).

***Healthcare infrastructure.*** Taliban harassment and degradation of the primary healthcare centers afforded another opportunity to defame the militants and shore up public confidence. The militants prohibited polio vaccination campaigns for children, and many women healthcare workers were targeted and killed (Din, Mumtaz, and Ataullahjan, 2012). Women were forced to deliver family planning and health services at the home since extremist ideology restricted their ability to work openly in public. Din estimates that 29% of health facilities in the Swat District were destroyed. Health workers were systematically killed as they worked to save wounded tribesmen loyal to the government. The Taliban shamed female workers on radio broadcasts and subjected them to forced marriages, kidnappings, and death. All respondents reported that the militants applied a combination of fatwas (religious decrees), threats, and physical assaults that extended even to their children. One fatwa stipulated that it was a Muslim's duty to kidnap female workers, to marry them forcibly or abuse them as sexual slaves.

***Healthcare impact finding.*** Investments in healthcare bolstered public confidence in government and discredited the Taliban. The Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority, working with the military and District Commissioner, instituted a plan to reopen and upgrade health care facilities as security improved (Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2013). Working with nongovernmental organizations such as UNICEF, the provincial authorities reinstated quality health services. Large percentages of children received vaccinations and psychological counseling. Thousands of expectant mothers were provided delivery kits and direct



assistance. The government offered free medical care to the poor and significant improvements were made in emergency response capacity. Public Opinion in Pakistan's Tribal Region (2010) reported that 91% of Swatis believe that improving healthcare was the most important governance achievement. To this end, the military worked diligently with the private and public institutions to normalize the regional healthcare institutions.

***Physical infrastructure.*** The government created a Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority (PaRRSA) to coordinate the multimilitary rebuilding effort. The Authority developed an effective Malakand Comprehensive Stabilization and Socioeconomic Development Strategy that sought to address the underlying grievances fueling the unrest and to provide equal access to resources through partnerships between the government, civil society and the private sector (Pakistan Senate Committee on Defence and Defence Production, 2012). The Khyber rehabilitation plan focused on three main investment sectors: hydro-electric power, water distribution, and road development (Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2013). Enhancing the power grid throughout the Malakand was considered a key enabler and included a multiyear plan to invest in two power plants at Machai and Ranolia. The plants added 20 megawatt electricity to the national grid and reduced power rates. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Oil & Gas Company was established to oversee the national effort to construct three new major hydro-electric projects. One participant reiterated the benefit of large visible project with considerable social impact over several small village projects that have limited benefit and are soon forgotten.

*Infrastructure impact finding.* The military working with the District Commissioner facilitated highly visible private-public projects provided a dual benefit of creating employment and fostering public confidence. Economic development had the combined effect of regaining popular confidence by improving life quality, and preventing radicalization by offering desperately needed employment opportunities. Power grid and flood control investments had an immediate impact. The construction of agricultural water channels and new dams solved a persistent regional water management problem. New dams helped manage annual rains to increase the regional water supply for potable water, sanitation, and irrigation. The provincial government pursued the development of agriculture for food production with an emphasis on aid to small farmers. Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reported that about 75% of the province was dependent on agriculture, especially the poorest households.

The government enhanced regional economic prosperity by improving the transportation nodes. The Khyber province created a special Urban Policy Unit to assist in provincial transportation planning and facilitate interprovincial coordination to gain synergy among investors. Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reported that 44% of provincial roads and 78% of Swat roads were in poor or bad condition after the operation. A concerted effort to improve existing road conditions by repairing damaged roads, constructing new links, and upgrading current transportation grids boosted commerce within the Malakand. As a result, 478 kilometers of roads and 11 bridges were constructed, but the demand for road transport expanded at a faster rate than

economic development. Two participants reported that the military worked with Swati business leaders to secure and upgrade the most vital transportation nodes to prevent the militants from disrupting vital commercial hubs.

**Swati reconciliation and de-radicalization.** The objective of this phase of Rah-e-Rast was to reconcile with the Pashtun, de-radicalize the militants, and promote an enduring national allegiance from the reformed militants. To accomplish this, the Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority pursued a dialogue with tribal elders to address root grievances, and a de-radicalization plan was initiated to change perceptions. The government restored the traditional tribal hierarchy to empower the elder leaders (Maliks), and marginalize the Taliban-backed holy men (Imams). Once the government stabilized the tribal system, a series of negotiations addressed the longstanding causes of dissatisfaction. In parallel, rehabilitation centers reformed active militants by changing their radical worldview, especially among young men.

**Tribal reconciliation.** Pakistan's 13th National Assembly of Parliament (2008) promoted reconciliation to address grievances with Swatis who pledged support for the Pakistan Constitution. The tribesmen often found themselves caught between an oppressive Taliban who demanded allegiance through coercion and the provincial government that required allegiance, but provided poor services. Most respondents reported that the Taliban tactic of coercion and intimidation provided an opportunity to reconcile. Pakistan SWAT Campaign Strategy (2011) outlined a plan to dialogue with the elders, backed by investment to promote credibility. As a guiding principle for

negotiations, the National Assembly espoused the rights of Swati citizens as equivalent to those of the Pakistani majority. Table 14 depicts the participant's planning construct. The data were derived from interview Question 6: *How did you apply and integrate governance principles with military activity in the execution of Swat operations?*

Table 14

*Approach to Reconcile with the Swatis*

<b>Participant</b>	<b>First line of effort</b>	<b>Second line of effort</b>
MILA1	<i>Restore the tribal hierarchy. Empower elders and marginalize the Taliban backed Imams.</i>	<i>Countermilitancy training to observe Paktunwali to gain hearts and minds of the moderate sector.</i>
MILO2	<i>Isolate tribe from foreign radicalized elements. Spill-over of foreign fighters promotes a Jihadi culture.</i>	<i>Form small unit bases manned by well-trained security forces, enforcing curfews and connecting with the people to gain confidence.</i>
MILI3	<i>Realize human rights for the most vulnerable through partnerships between the government and private sector.</i>	<i>Educate and train jawans (junior soldiers) in nation building to win the popular hearts and minds.</i>
MILN4	<i>Empower Maliks and marginalize Imams. Reestablish the tribal jirga system and start a dialogue.</i>	<i>Respect human rights and political inclusion to enable reconciliation. Government build relationship with reconcilable militants.</i>
MILO5	<i>Protect Swatis with a minimal force of arms. Prevent widespread arrests, targeted assassinations, and aggravated militant massacres.</i>	<i>Reform resource allocation and tax policy to gain confidence. Prevent collusion between citizens and tax officials who erode trust.</i>
CIV6	<i>Institute National Action Plan to implement confidence building measures.</i>	<i>Restore and reactivate the tribal jirga to replace the Taliban governance system.</i>

***Reconciliation impact finding.*** The Army and Frontier Corps, working with the Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority, effectively implemented near-term tribal confidence building measures and reconciliation activities. In the void of leadership created by the militant defeat, the government was able to reconstitute the traditional tribal jirga system. The provincial government reasserted tribal control under their oversight within one year of the operation.

The Pakistan SWAT Campaign Strategy (2011) directed that the Pakistani Army occupy the valley for one year, then cede control back to the Swatis supervised by the provincial authorities. Senior officials formed a provincial APEX committee (civil-military coordination cell) to coordinate military security operations, empower the tribal hierarchy, and reform the judicial system. The government reactivated the tribal jirga to supplant the Taliban shadow governance system. The committee frequently consulted the maliks on policy and transferred governance from the military back to tribal control.

The provincial government planned the orderly transfer of power from the military to the tribal jirga. Pakistan Current Countermilitancy Operations (2015) emphasized a strict observance and respect for culture and traditions. Soldiers attended familiarization training in Paktunwali. Soldiers ensured that government directives and activities were consistent with tribal customs. The police protected places of worship and tribal meeting areas from militant attacks. Some respondents reported that soldiers were previously perceived as foreigners to the Swatis, but cultural awareness training paid off. All participants reported that the soldiers were well-versed in Paktunwali, and they

adhered to stringent rules of engagement that afforded protection. Troops were locally garrisoned to build relationships and provide responsive security. Some respondents reported that tribal relationships provided a social buffer to militant influence.

**Militant de-radicalization.** To complement reconciliation, the Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority initiated an aggressive de-radicalization program. The program had two main components, a continuing dialogue to address grievances and a retraining program for young active militants. Pakistan SWAT Campaign Strategy (2011) prescribed an inclusive negotiation process that emphasized a national dialogue condemning extremism. The document outlined the importance of using persuasion rather than coercion to reconnect to the people. In conjunction with negotiations, de-radicalization schools were established for vulnerable youth.

The Pakistani Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education focused on rehabilitating young militants. The government established a joint venture between the Pakistani Army, private foundations, and UNICEF to care for juveniles who were rescued by security forces. Most of the candidates were recruited from families who were unable to pay Taliban tax levies, and became paid suicide bombers. About one-third of the children were turned in by their parents, one-third were apprehended by security forces, and one-third surrendered themselves. The students were lodged in rehabilitation centers located in Mingora, locally called *Sabawoon*, and in *Bara Tehsil*. In-resident students received quality education in ethics, patriotism, and the true meanings of Islam. Medical professionals, especially psychologists and psychiatrists, worked alongside social

workers to reintegrate them back into mainstream society. Table 15 provides a synopsis of the respondents' expectations concerning de-radicalization. The data were derived from interview Question 6: *How did you apply and integrate governance principles with military activity in the execution of Swat operations?*

Table 15

*Approach to De-radicalize Active Militants*

<b>Participant</b>	<b>First line of effort</b>	<b>Second line of effort</b>
MILA1	<i>Advanced training for police to institute militant de-radicalization programs and replace military to lessen tensions.</i>	<i>Support de-radicalization centers to return reconcilable militants back into mainstream society.</i>
MILO2	<i>Replace Army governance with a competent civil authority and support de-radicalization centers. Political dimension important.</i>	<i>Encourage reconciliation with insurgents who vow to break with extremist groups, especially foreigners aligned with al-Qaida.</i>
MILI3	<i>Promote dialogue to instill cooperation among the tribes.</i>	<i>Prevent the return to Taliban rule.</i>
MILN4	<i>Establish de-radicalization centers. Prevent human rights abuses within the centers.</i>	<i>Negotiate w/reconcilable militants. Release captured militants in return for pledge to cease violence and surrender weapons.</i>
MILO5	<i>De-radicalization program to rehabilitate young men prone to suicide bombing. Provide counseling and religious education.</i>	<i>Reunite families and provide economic opportunity. Ministries assist with search and unification of divided families.</i>
CIV6	<i>Strength through negotiations rather than military force. Address root causes and provide legitimate alternatives.</i>	<i>Establish a national narrative to condemn all extremist militancy and delegitimize the extremist worldview.</i>

*De-radicalization impact finding.* Planning for the establishment of joint civil-military de-radicalization centers was innovative; however, the effectiveness of the overall de-radicalization program remains uncertain. De-radicalization programs were initiated immediately after military operations concluded. Sabawoon and several centers in Bara operated with the assistance of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps supported by the privately operated Hum Pakistani Foundation and UNICEF. One participant reported that more than 102 of a total 177 youngsters between the ages of 12 and 17 were released from Sabawoon and over 600 at Bara after completion of their reformatory courses. The respondent lauded the performance of the center that reintegrated the former militants into society after receiving behavior training. However, most participants remained skeptical of program success. Some respondents suggested that de-radicalization will ultimately fail in the absence of a national narrative to condemn all radical elements. Some participants preferred the Secretary of the Interior's effort to focus on madrassa reform (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2009). Two respondents reported that madrassa reform provided a dual benefit: to de-radicalize current students and directly prevent recruitment.

To augment the de-radicalization effort, most participants believed that the government may redouble efforts to publicly condemn the extremist worldview. The national government needed a meaningful dialogue to change public perceptions of the war. Gallup poll (2011) revealed that public perceptions concerning ownership of the war were divided, with 37 % of Swatis believing it to be Pakistan's war, 39 % considering it



to be America's war, and 22 % believing both had a shared stake in the outcome. However, a few respondents were convinced that a public condemnation of radicalism would not change militant behavior. Hardcore militants were not willing to compromise Sharia law, nor were they willing to concede or share governance. One respondent reported that it is difficult to get the militants to negotiate at all. However, survey data showed that there was hope that an ongoing discourse will promote peace. A poll by Al Jazeera and Gallup Pakistan revealed that Swatis prefer to reconcile rather than endure an extended military campaign (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2011).

### **Summary of Swat Campaign Findings**

The findings provide clear evidence that governance activities were productively integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy during Operation Rah-e-Rast in 2009. The national policy guidance to assimilate ministry activities was cogent, but the planners faced some significant challenges. The planning process did not ascertain governance priorities nor identify the most promising socioeconomic investments or institutional reforms. The planners differed in their approaches to identify the right governance activity at the right time to subdue militancy and achieve an enduring peace. The findings provide insights into the planning barriers and suboptimal processes that may provide a catalyst for doctrinal change.

The national policy objectives were well understood by all participants; however, their solutions varied based on individual biases and policy interpretations. Strategic guidance findings revealed that the planning process did not adequately address

translating national policy to a coherent implementation of governance activities. The planners skillfully designed a hybrid civil-military plan, but each participant had a different view on governance priorities and methods. The national government had no formal venue or forum to plan and coordinate interministry activities. The operational approach findings exposed that a comprehensive analysis of the real world contextual situation was necessary to determine priorities and coordinate limited government capabilities to improve the social conditions within a fiscally constrained environment.

Despite a lack of ministry coordination, the application of governance significantly contributed to subduing militant violence. The use of force findings showed that integrating a measured military response with effective governance effectively destroyed the enemy while fostering a trust in government. At the provincial level, the government achieved this by affording protection and providing life quality services during the operation. The planners were adept in finding the proper balance between using force and exercising governance.

Participant testimony supported by government metrics reaffirmed that the campaign instilled calm to the valley, ending the recurrent bombing of schools, police stations, and hospitals, and the public beheading of opposition leaders. The intelligence impact findings revealed that the planning process took full advantage of intelligence to identify and locate the militants while minimizing collateral damage. Intelligence planning empowered ministries to disable militant support networks, enable lashkar militia units, and prevent militant recruitment within the displacement camps. As a result,

the militants were effectively neutralized in the valley, and their capacity to reconstitute was diminished.

The Swat operation reestablished peace in the valley; however, maintaining provincial government control remains a challenge because tribal grievances were not fully addressed. The trust in government findings confirmed that the Swatis remain optimistic of district governance, but skeptical of national authority. The government established tribal control with provincial oversight within one year of the operation, but the slow progress of political reform and economic development undermined government credibility. The military working with the District Commissioner empowered the traditional tribal jirga to fill the void left by the militant leadership, but the establishment of a stable political environment remains elusive. The social impact findings revealed that the government missed an opportunity to foster public confidence by inadequately resourcing infrastructure projects. Planners have differing perspectives of the most pressing social issues, and the planning process failed to adjudicate the differences.

The consensus resolution goal to fully reestablish the writ of the State was hindered by the lack of political reform and intrusive foreign intervention. The federal jurisprudence finding showed that judicial system reform initiatives have fallen short, and local civil governance requires military protection and oversight. The elders viewed military intervention into tribal affairs as inconsistent with traditional values and historical lines of authority. The foreign military integration findings revealed that public confidence was further undermined by Islamabad's tacit approval of foreign support,

most notably allowing U.S. drone strikes, which caused an unnecessary loss of lives. The planning process did not adequately address the proper synchronization of Allied military support. Advances in Pakistani government credibility were often negated by violations of Pakistani territorial integrity from Allied strikes.

The consensus resolution goal to use public messaging to counter radical ideology contributed to mission success. The strategic communications findings revealed that positive messaging to condemn Taliban brutality and solicit national support was helpful in shifting the dialogue in favor of Islamabad. As confirmed by the reconciliation finding, the Swati perception of the military changed from invader to protector, and laid the foundation for reconciliation. National and regional messaging from multiple media sources provided valuable information to the Swatis that afforded protection during the resettlement, but changing public perceptions requires a long-term effort. The information operations finding showed that a considerable effort was required to block the Taliban propaganda from many media outlets. The countermessaging finding confirmed the political benefits of exposing the Taliban atrocities; however, the planners needed a better process to craft an enduring strategic narrative. Nationally controlled media adequately revealed the harmful impact of the militants' nefarious actions, but a coherent national narrative to condemn jihad and all the radical elements was absent.

The Parliament's goal and actions to protect and rehabilitate displaced persons significantly reduced the public trust deficit with government. The rehabilitation impact findings confirmed that the resettlement and reintegration over two million Swatis was a

success. Although weaknesses in bureaucratic processes resulted in service inefficiencies, the safe passage of displaced families was the crowning achievement of the postconflict stabilization work. The combined Pakistan and international community endeavor to maintain security and provide life services fostered a public confidence that enabled all other governance efforts. The education, healthcare, and infrastructure impact findings showed that despite limited resources, the government's meager investment in these services resonated with the tribes and built a basis for reconciliation.

The national goal to implement social change and economic development achieved limited results. Positive improvements were seen in the rebuilding of educational institutions, and the revitalization of healthcare facilities; however, the social impact finding revealed that an under resourced economic development plan at the District level failed to take full advantage of the opportunity to shift Swati allegiances to the government. The reintegration impact findings exposed gaps in service delivery that were exploited by the militants attempting to solidify their foothold. The Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority was responsive and governance processes became more transparent, but the accomplishments fell well short of alleviating poverty, advancing human rights, or creating employment. The de-radicalization impact finding showed that the lack of social development progress created a significant problem for post-conflict de-radicalization programs, run by joint military-government partnerships. Program administrators found it difficult to regain the allegiances of young radicalized Pashtun, and the efficacy of the de-radicalization initiative is uncertain.

## Chapter 5: Discussions, Conclusions, and Recommendations

### **Introduction**

The concurrent integration of governance activities with military actions significantly contributed to the success of Operation Rah-e-Rast. Although there were many barriers and shortfalls in the planning process, the operation represents Pakistan's first successful whole-of-government countermilitancy operation. By June 30, 2009, the military cleared the valley of Taliban and the level of violence was subdued to levels experienced before the Islamists intruded into the Swat District. After the operation, the Swatis enjoyed a safe security environment, a functioning education system, and access to healthcare, and a return to tourism and commerce.

Prior to Rah-e-Rast, the Pakistani military had a mixed record of countermilitancy successes and failures; however, the approach to the Swat campaign diverged significantly from contemporary military doctrine. The Pakistani Army showed an impressive capacity to adapt emerging counterinsurgency doctrine to the militant threat. Planners learned from previous failures, resulting in a new hybrid planning approach incorporating neo-Clausewitzian prescriptions into the military's traditional planning construct. The union of the Pakistani Army, Swat District Commissioner, and the Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority adequately implemented a civil-military approach that strengthened the Pashtun confidence in government and disabled the militant support base. Conversely, the overall planning

process was ad-hoc and suboptimized. Improvements in planning doctrine may facilitate future successes in the global Islamist militancy struggle.

### **Interpretations of the Findings**

Operation Rah-e-Rast successfully reduced militant violence in the Swat District and bolstered confidence in the mainstream government authority. The Swat campaign achieved the two main national policy objectives: to eliminate the terrorist threat from the Malakand and to protect the Swati people. The Rah-e-Rast planners deviated from a traditional counterterrorism approach aimed at destroying militant leadership and support nodes and applied a population-centered approach. The planners embraced the tenets of neo-Clausewitzian theory by designing a campaign with governance activities that reconnected the people to their government and to their military. However, the planning team was not optimally postured to translate all the national policy guidance into effective and efficient governance action. The analysis of the social environment was inadequate, and the prioritization of governance activity supported by sufficient resources was not realized. Governance may be methodically pursued by a team of subject matter experts knowledgeable in government, the social sciences, and program management.

The Pakistani national and provincial authorities did not fully achieve all their stated objectives. Political reform to afford collective tribal representation, judicial reform to provide quick and effective justice, and educational reform remain unresolved. The objective shortfalls were linked to the planning process that did not adequately identify governance priorities nor properly allocate scarce resources to the most pressing

social problems. Policy and doctrine did not provide sufficient guidance to establish cross-organizational venues or forums to address root grievances, prioritize governance initiatives, and efficiently apply private and government resources in the most productive way.

Despite an ad-hoc civil-military planning process and planning teams with limited expertise in governance, the Rah-e-Rast planners performed well. The planners innovatively applied strategic communications and intelligence to build meaningful relationships between the people and their government. The relationships fostered trust, and that trust undermined the militant support base that was tenuously sustained with coercion and intimidation. The Swatis readily assisted the military in identifying many militant strongholds, and the military responded by providing safe transit and a secure environment for the Swatis. The new countermilitancy approach based in neo-Clausewitzian theory proved to be more effective in subduing militancy than the sole use of direct military action. Documented and derived evidence supports the three theoretical propositions identified in Chapter 3.

Concerning the first theoretical proposition, the findings confirmed that positive governance interactions integrated with protective military activities promoted stability between the government, the people, and the military. The stability promoted confidence in the Military Commander and Swat District Commissioner that enhanced provincial government legitimacy. The operation successfully reestablished the writ of provincial authority and disabled the Islamic shadow governance. The military embraced neo-



Clausewitzian tenets that emphasize protecting the people and establishing enduring relationships with social and economic solutions rather than applying a predominant force of arms. Pakistani survey data showed a marked improvement in government trust, a testament that the new approach was successful in reaching the people. The overwhelming defeat of the militants and reduction in violence provided compelling evidence that Pakistan's new countermilitancy strategy worked; however, shortcomings in the planning process prevented taking full advantage of the military successes.

The study results validate Pakistan's countermilitancy approach, but planning effectiveness was not optimized. The National Assembly and the All Parties Conference strategic framework provided excellent guidance; however, governance integration varied based on individual biases and policy interpretations. The clarity of national objectives facilitated a unity of effort and common understanding among the ministries. Conversely, the planning process did not sufficiently identify the most important governance attributes to pursue—and when to pursue them. Governance and military activity were on parallel paths to a peaceful end-state, but were merely mutually supporting rather than fully integrated. The formation of a joint civilian-military partnership to rebuild destroyed infrastructure was a collective success, but reform opportunities were squandered after the dissolution of the Taliban authority.

The planning process did not adequately address translating national policy to specific governance tasks. The ministries pursued governance activities that enabled the military by happenstance or intuition rather than in an analytical way. One notable

example was the approach to alleviate political corruption and disenfranchisement that were identified as major grievances. The planners differed on the manifestation of the problem. Some participants suggested that corruption fostered violence and a dangerous security situation, while others believed that it promoted social instability. The difference in perceptions would lead to differing solutions—one military and one sociopolitical—and the implementation of both solutions were independent of each other.

Concerning the second theoretical proposition, the findings confirmed that the renewed confidence in government successfully undermined the Islamist militant support base. The findings revealed that the militants were weakened and vulnerable without a popular support base, thus enabling a military use of arms to readily destroy them. Effective government dissemination of information and use of local media enabled a safe and efficient resettling of displaced persons. Public safety increased public confidence that precipitated valuable intelligence that contributed to operational successes. The military leveraged intelligence to pinpoint militant strongholds and facilitate precision targeting to minimize collateral damage and reduce unwarranted deaths. Despite these successes, durable political and social reform remains intangible and a barrier to sustaining tribal relations. Judicial reform to implement Nizam-e-Adl (Sharia jurisprudence) and establish a quick and just legal process fell short, political reform to increase inclusivity did not become manifest, and the tempo of economic development did not meet tribal expectations. Lack of political and social reform sustains an ever-present risk to government authority.

Operational success in Swat was impeded by an incomplete analysis of the social environment. Understanding the social dynamics within Clausewitz's trinity consisting of the people, national government, and the military was fundamental. The planners need social research to prioritize governance pursuits that are consistent with the cultural and religious values of the tribe. This would signify a holistic assessment of the relationships within the trinity and the influence of the militants on those relationships. Neo-Clausewitzian theorists envision that the implementation of governance is directly linked to the ability of government to foster trust and achieve legitimacy. The military may apply sufficient armed force to suppress militancy; then governance may be pursued unencumbered by an unstable security environment. Political and social reform can then be sustained after operations or the Taliban authority may reemerge.

Concerning the third theoretical proposition, the findings confirmed that governance enabled military operations in subduing the violence. However, there was no evidence to support that governance could fully supplant military action. The planning process was adept in determining the right balance between using a force of arms and applying governance, but the process was ad-hoc. Neo-Clausewitzian thought emphasizes the application of logic and reason to properly apply all elements of national authority in balance to counter the chaotic nature of the enemy. This portends a planning process that analyzes the social environment and efficiently applies all instruments of national power against the threat. The government's winning of Swati hearts and minds kept the radical militant threat at bay with only a discriminatory use of force; however, the fragile peace

requires a constant tempo of governance reform. The findings revealed that Rah-e-Rast planning did not include a formal process to assess the social dynamics and allocate resources accordingly. As a result, near-term military tactics proved successful, but the lack of long-term social investments failed to advance important government reform initiatives.

Pakistani planning doctrine did not adequately provide a process to efficiently apply an all-government approach in an austere fiscal environment. The study reveals that a planning process that establishes governance priorities may optimize the application of limited resources. The Pakistani strategic review astutely embraced an interministry approach; however, in a fiscally constrained environment, determining which governance attributes to pursue proved elusive. Absent a formal prioritization process, the planners pursued several programs simultaneously with an unknown sense of impact or duration. Governance pursuits were left to interpretation, and the linkage of investment to social impact was uncertain. The de-radicalization program validates this point. The planning for de-radicalization centers was exceptional, but the success of the program is in jeopardy due to an uncertain commitment to resources and manpower.

The Pakistani military successfully adopted a population-centered approach to countermilitancy; however, formal training on the approach remains ad-hoc. Provisional training proved instrumental in achieving operational success. Soldiers were schooled on Pashtun cultural sensitivities, and small unit formations easily operated among the people. Conventional military doctrine advocated massive firepower—both from the air

and with artillery—but the military applied it judiciously to minimize collateral damage. The Army shifted focus to community protection by working with the District Commissioner, lashkar militias, local police, and the Frontier Constabulary. These tactical adaptations reaffirmed the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical tenets that local security and community relations were paramount in this environment, but embedding these tactics, techniques, and procedures into the mainstream civil-military continuum of training and education remains elusive.

The planning process did not take full advantage of foreign economic and military assistance. The Pakistani people frequently misinterpreted the military support from the United States because many events were not coordinated with Pakistani ground operations. Joint planning coordination was necessary to prevent mutual interference. Advances in government credibility were often negated by violations of territorial integrity by Allied forces. The Taliban effectively recruited militants using anti-American sentiment as an enabler. Substantial American support for displaced persons mitigated the perception problem, but the dichotomy of views concerning international aid and military support is reconcilable within the planning process.

### **Limitations of the Study**

The results of the qualitative study are limited by the subjective nature of participant testimony. The study reflects a scientific objectivity of the planning process through a faithfulness to facts provided by a cadre of Pakistani security professionals who are protected by a stringent interview protocol. Strict adherence to the protocol

counteracted the inherent qualitative subjectivity. Protection and anonymity of my participants promoted objectivity, although total objectivity cannot be achieved from national security professionals who are exceedingly dedicated to their profession—and are employed by the Pakistani government. My role as a researcher to conduct a subjective interpretation of Swati behavior and of the participant testimony and observations concerning that behavior is a study weakness. However, an objective view of governance may be achieved by analyzing the first-hand experiences of those who planned the operation and the Swatis who experienced the effects.

A weakness inherent in qualitative research is its limited generalizability of the findings due to the particularity of case-based data. The application and meticulous adherence to the analytical model counteracted this qualitative study weakness. Although hundreds of civilian and military planners were involved with the Swat campaign, the participant pool represented subject matter experts with a broad and complete perspective on the research problem. The study uncovered some inconsistencies in their expert testimony, despite working on the same plan under identical circumstances. The application of the analytical model in Appendix B uncovered undisputed facts and common themes by triangulating data with official government documents and surveys.

The study findings are not absolute, but this single case study—albeit limited in scope—contributes to social science discipline by validating a critical case in the continuum of counterterrorism research. Given the time and adequate resources, a multiple case study approach that includes several operations within a myriad of

circumstances could legitimately be accomplished with a succession of case studies. Multiple cases would promote transferability and data validity and may serve to validate doctrinal recommendations. Differing sociopolitical objectives may require alternate governance strategies, but those distinctions may be determined from the research of multiple cases.

### **Implications for Social Change**

This study contributes to the body of militancy research by focusing on the integration of governance with military operations in a contemporary campaign. This case study validated Pakistan's new strategic approach that embraced neo-Clausewitzian theoretical tenets. Joint operational planning process improvements may better address the motivations of conflict inspired by Islamists and the implementation of competent governance to prevent it. The research was unique by exploring the problem from the viewpoint of an Islamic Republic—the State of Pakistan—rather than a Western perspective and the impact of addressing governance on desired changes at the societal level. Several implications for increasing effective governance in fighting Islamist militancy emerged from the Pakistani experience within the Swat Valley of Khyber Province.

### **Study Implications**

**Establish a permanent Joint Interministry Coordination Group to synchronize the civilian and military countermilitancy effort.** The study findings revealed the governance promotes a public confidence that undermines militant support,

but planning effectiveness was not optimized. This group may facilitate a unity of effort among the ministries. A permanent body of civilian and military experts located within the Interior Ministry may translate national policy to specific governance tasks that may be implemented at the provincial or district level. Experts in security, justice, health, and education may establish governance priorities, call for global resources, and allocate resources to the most pressing social issues. A standing Special Support Group, similar to the Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority that formed after the Swat operation, could implement the national policy and distribute the resources provided by the governing body at the ministry or provincial level. This is a similar concept the U.S. Office of Military Affairs located within the State Department's USAID.

**Establish a National Human Rights Board to protect human rights by coordinating and implementing a social improvement strategy.** The study findings revealed that operational success was impeded by an incomplete analysis of the social environment and the lack of a formal planning process resulted in a disjointed rehabilitation, reintegration, reconciliation, and de-radicalization strategy. This board, chartered by the Pakistani National Assembly and under Khyber Provincial oversight, could conduct a holistic assessment of the at-risk population and devise a cogent strategy to protect the people from Islamist influence. A national level human rights group that embraces Pashtun cultural values may serve to sustain tribal confidence in government and prevent the radicalization of youth to undermine the Islamist social support system.



The board could also provide policy for judicial reform and militant rehabilitation to further isolate the Islamists and strengthen a popular trust in government.

**Establish a Regional Strategic Policy Committee to advise and implement national policy at the regional level.** The study findings showed that some local reform opportunities were squandered after the expulsion of the Taliban. A standing joint advisory committee within the District, codified in civil-military doctrine, could provide policy development and implementation oversight of militancy contingencies prior to, during, and after operations. The District Commissioner may lead a cooperative jirga comprised of tribal or community elders, local and magistrates, and military commanders to address regional security concerns, government reformation initiatives, and economic development priorities. The committee could assess governance activities using existing social assessment tools, and advise national leaders in policy implementation and the proper allocation of resources.

**Codify strategic messaging in countermilitancy doctrine.** The study results showed the positive impact of government information dissemination in enabling a safe and efficient resettling of displaced persons. To bolster effectiveness, the message planning process within Pakistan's Inter-Services Public Relation (ISPR) organization could be formalized to coordinate national messaging themes across all ministries. The messaging may transcend all levels of warfare, and all information domains. The process could leverage current technologies, establish unified themes, and synchronize information dissemination to meet national objectives.

**Expand the Pakistani Army's Special Services Group to enhance the military's capacity to expand the countermilitancy campaign to other Islamist controlled regions.** The study revealed the importance of specially trained counterinsurgency units, supported by good intelligence, in implementing a population-centered strategy. These forces proved invaluable to the success of Operation Rah-e-Rast. A permanent cadre of special operating forces trained and educated in insurgency warfare may be imbedded with general purpose forces to plan and implement countermilitancy operations. This capability may be enhanced by instituting a formal course of instruction for all civil-military security professionals. This course of instruction is teachable within the Pakistani professional military education system. Government planners across all governance disciplines should have access to foster an interministry culture. The Pakistani National War College and subordinate staff colleges within the military domain may be a suitable venue for this joint education.

### **Conclusions**

The emerging global Islamist militancy threat may be countered by protecting vulnerable populations and isolating them from the radical ideology, then reconnecting them with the mainstream government. To accomplish this, national authorities may integrate governance with military operations in a balanced way to directly destroy the militant capacity to wage war. Achieving this balance requires an all-government effort to identify address grievances, apply governance principles that resonate with the people, and provide adequate resources to regain the "hearts and minds" of the affected

population. National efforts to foster an interministry culture that embraces a population-centered approach may promote a synergy that focuses limited resources on the most important social issues to undermine the radical Islamic movement. Governance then becomes a valuable tool for national and provincial leaders to achieve an operational harmony that protects the people from militancy and promotes government legitimacy.

The Pakistani operations in the Swat Valley revealed valuable insights on the joint planning process. The military sought to understand the Pashtun culture and protect their way of life. The military commanders worked alongside the Swat District Commissioner to build enduring relationships, founded in trust. Economic development in healthcare and education sent a clear message that tribal values would be honored and the government intended to stay for the long term. Although somewhat ad-hoc and under resourced, the Pakistani Army successfully collaborated with government ministries to foster a public confidence that challenged the Taliban and undermined their capacity to wage war. The Swatis responded positively to the gestures of political inclusivity and accommodation, but enduring political reform remains elusive due to the exigent nature of merging tribal cultural norms with mainstream Pakistani political principles.

The study indicates that the Pakistani implementation of governance to counter Islamist militancy in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province was an effective strategy in reducing violence and restoring government control. Most of the Swat Valley remains under the provincial authority and violence was subdued to preoccupation levels. Several years after the operation, the Pakistani government continues social investment, relative peace

ensues, and the Swatis generally reject Islamist influence. The theory of promoting public confidence to enable the military and disable the Islamists was validated; moreover, future government efforts may be enhanced by leveraging the Swat lessons.

Cogent policy from standing national and regional policy committees comprised of government, military, and tribal representatives may empower civil-military planning and implementation. A sound strategy, backed by sufficient resources, from rehabilitation to de-radicalization is necessary to ensure the safety and repatriation of people suffering the misguided brutality of radical Islamists. The study reaffirmed that direct military action alone is not sufficient. Specially trained and educated security teams comprised of military, paramilitary, and police may communicate and reconnect with the people to draw them away from militant influence. A renewed public confidence in government promotes valuable intelligence and weakens the militant support base. In addition, doctrinal enhancements that assess the social environment, identify priorities, and design governance activities that are directly linked to cultural values may foster a public trust in government that undermines the Islamist cause. These operational planning enhancements are universal, and may be transferable to other regions of the world that are devastated by Islamist inspired violence.

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## Appendix A: Interview Protocol and Interview Questions

The narrative inquiry is designed to explore the planning considerations and implementation of governance in countermilitancy operations in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK) during the Swat Valley government activities and operations of 2009. The manner for interviews will be conducted via a secure internet or audio-teleconference connection. The questions are meant to obtain your perspectives on Pakistan's countermilitancy campaign. Only audio and no video will be recorded. Digital recorders will be used during the interview session and secured in locked containers.

No more than two interview sessions will be needed and each interview session will not exceed 90 minutes. In addition to the audio recordings, extensive field notes may be taken to synchronize discussion points. The field notes may contain observations regarding body language, facial expressions, or tone of voice. In addition to obtaining a signed consent, the full description of the study and all consents will be provided to the participants. The interviewee will be provided the opportunity to review the transcript. The interviewee will be reassured that the participant's identity will be kept confidential and all research data will remain secure.

### **Research Question**

RQ1 - During the implementation of Pakistan's countermilitancy campaign in Swat Valley of the Malakand Division of Khyber Province, how were governance activities integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy?

### Interview Questions

The questions are designed to be flexible and open-ended to explore the effectiveness of the countermilitancy planning process. The initial three questions are directed for an establishment of personal experience (non-identifiable) that validate participant credibility. Questions 4-6 are designed to gain an understanding of the participant's experience with the planning process and view of Islamist militancy in general and the perspective of the ability of the government to deal with it. Questions 7-9 are directly related to the specific research that I have already conducted through literature review and document analysis.

**Question 1-** What are your national security related duties associated with the 2009 Swat Valley operation conducted in Khyber Province? Follow-up question - What involvement did you have in the planning or conduct of countermilitancy operations in the Swat Valley? Please do not share your actual position title or other data that may be specific only to you or divulge your identity.

**Question 2-** Please share your experiences in planning with the different ministries to deal with the Islamists who operated in Swat Valley. Associated follow-up questions: What was your overarching national policy guidance? How was policy guidance integrated into the campaign plan? Was the national policy implemented as anticipated? Did the operation meet the desired policy end states?

**Question 3-** Please share your views on the causes and effects of the Islamist militancy problem in Pakistan's Khyber Province. Possible follow up question - Do you have any first-hand experience with Islamist Militant activities?

**Question 4** - How did you coordinate the government's civil-military ability to counter militants operating in Swat Valley? Possible follow-up question-How do you view your government's ability to protect the Pashtun tribe from the militant threat?

**Question 5**- Do you believe that government policy adequately addresses Pakistan's integration of governance with military operations to subdue the militancy problem?

**Question 6** – How did you apply and integrate governance principles with military activity in the execution of Swat operations?

**Question 7**- What is your involvement with and perspective on the joint civil-military countermilitancy planning process? Possible follow-up question - How did the militants exploit weaknesses in the plan? Were the militants deterred by strengths in the relationship of the military to their people and government?

**Question 8** – Is Pakistan's countermilitancy doctrine adequate, or could it be improved to leverage the government interministries?

**Question 9**- How did the joint planning team shape the social environment in Swat Valley to augment or enable military operations against the Islamist militants?

Appendix B: Case Study Linear Analytical Model

