


2016

Mutuality, Inter Organizational Cultural Understanding, and the Efficacy of Humanitarian Response

Elizabeth Anne Yeomans
Walden University

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Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Walden University
2016

Abstract

Mutuality, Inter Organizational Cultural Understanding, and the Efficacy of

Humanitarian Response

by

Elizabeth Anne Yeomans

MBA, Troy University, 2001

BA, University of Florida, 1985

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

February 2016

Abstract

Organizations responding to humanitarian crises often have different organizational cultures and observational lenses, presenting barriers to collaborative efforts at the outset of a crisis. The chaotic nature of these crises exacerbates this problem, slowing the speed of response and the degree of efficacy of the response effort. Researchers have examined these organizational differences but have not defined barriers to mutuality and possible ways to overcome those barriers presenting a gap in knowledge. The purpose of this study was to fill this gap by offering areas to focus on to improve cultural awareness between disparate organizations. The central research question investigated the extent to which intrinsic value descriptions of organizational cultures provide opportunities to mitigate barriers between the military and humanitarian aid workers. A qualitative study using narrative ethnography was applied in answering this question. Two Participants were recruited from the military and two from civilian aid organizations based upon their experience and insight and their commensurate ability to relate the need for mutual understanding between their organizations. Data were collected through descriptive interviews of the participants' lived experiences in crisis response. The data were coded using existing theory on cultural dimensions from Project GLOBE and then analyzed using relational theory. The results confirmed a need for more effective coordination and unity of effort, which may be achieved through cultural understanding and which can result in a more efficient crisis response. These findings may ease the suffering encountered in humanitarian crises by improving the collaborative education of both military and civilian responders to these crises.

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this body of research to my parents, Franz Schubert Yeomans and Margaret Henderson Yeomans. Without their love, support, and positive energy dedicated to education, I would not have the tools and drive to complete this monumental task. My parents are both departed and my mother passed away during the completion of my doctoral studies.

I would also like to dedicate this dissertation to my children Andrew David O'Connor and Christina Elizabeth McClary. They have been a true gift in my life and have always inspired me and been supportive of me.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Background of the Study

Organizational cultures often differ between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations, necessitating mutual understanding and appreciation for organizational strengths key elements of cooperation in an effort to achieve common goals.

Administrators need to identify and understand organizational differences early in the relationship and learn to work in a cooperative manner with other organizations that they aim to leverage in a common purpose. If properly leveraged by organizational leadership, this phenomenon of having a common purpose and unity of effort can serve as an effective tool for motivating members of divergent organizational cultures to achieve common goals. The main objective of this study was to devise a method for increasing mutuality prior to the occurrence of crisis situations. The outcomes and conclusions I present in my final two chapters are intended as contributions to the body of knowledge available to members of organizations who may be called upon to respond to a humanitarian crisis – prior to or even as the crisis unfolds. I intend to make the results widely available with the intention of helping solve the problem of initial misunderstandings that have been observed by study participants from two separate groups of humanitarian crisis responders who work with the other as a matter of course during a real world crisis response: Military personnel and civilian humanitarian aid workers.

Scholars in many fields have done research as to how culture influences how a government treats citizens of a nation and how culture must be understood prior to entering into a humanitarian situation. Taking one step back, the disparate cultures of organizations responding to a humanitarian situation also need to be examined and understood by participants in order to effectively work together. Human rights aspects of humanitarian response have been examined extensively, but cultural values with regards to humanitarian affairs (instances where response organizations are primarily focused on relieving human suffering) in response to crises have not. When examining the response to humanitarian disasters, it is imperative that international responders have an awareness of organizational culture so that they can deliver aid in an organized and effective manner.

Organizational leaders can use cultural models of what is deemed to be important in a particular culture in order to understand the values of a particular organization. Leaders can supplement these models by drawing from existing literature on cultural values. Members of civilian aid organizations hold humanitarianism as a core value that they put into practice through their charters and day to day work. Members of the military do not necessarily deem humanitarianism as their core competency, but view providing humanitarian assistance as the right thing to do to relieve human suffering. Members of both types of organizations ultimately value human life and will provide assistance to alleviate or prevent human suffering.

Statement of the Problem

Organizations that typically respond to humanitarian crises often differ with respect to organizational cultures which in turn presents barriers to effective inter-organizational efforts at the outset of a crisis. This problem can be exacerbated by the inherently chaotic nature of crisis response and result in friction between organizations, thus slowing United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations' arrival at the needed cooperative relationship and ultimately the delivery of aid. This problematic situation is characterized by parochially-driven organizational barriers, despite the fact that the organizations share a common desire to alleviate human suffering.

Inherent organizational cultural differences between military and civilian organizations have degraded the speed and efficacy of humanitarian response efforts. These cultural differences make necessary a study such as this which provides knowledge to these organizations in order to promote mutual understanding and appreciation for organizational strengths as a means of improving cooperation at the very outset of a crisis. The ultimate goal for my study was to affect social change through inter-organizational understanding and thus enable disparate organizations to better work together to alleviate human suffering in crisis situations. Studies have been conducted on how organizational complexity can increase in a crisis situation (Kapucu, 2009), how inter-organizational relationships in crisis response can be challenging due to inter-organizational diversity (Brower, Choi, Jeong, & Dilling, 2009), and how inter-organizational disparity is a benefit versus a challenge (Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2009).

While these studies have focused on identifying diversity and challenges, critical a gap exists with respect to the causal factors of organizational barriers and ways to reduce them. Prescience of inter organizational cultural disparities and existing parochialisms that produce barriers at the commencement of crisis response was the ultimate goal of this particular study.

Purpose of the Study

My study aimed to improve cultural awareness between culturally disparate organizations and was designed to help those organizations avoid some of the initial chaos at the outset of a crisis. Crisis response efforts are inherently chaotic in nature, but developing an earlier understanding of the unique attributes of a separate organization in advance has the potential to improve the swiftness and effectiveness of crisis response.

In this study, I sought to determine the value of organizational cultural understanding between disparate organizations prior to crisis response. Research has been conducted on relationships and effectiveness within and between cultures in humanitarian and peace operations, but a specific study of the often subjective observations of one organization's perceptions of a disparate organization's culture has not been conducted. This study and resulting analysis of focused, narrative-style interviews of a variety of participants of real world disaster relief operations was aimed at increasing cross-cultural effectiveness prior to and during a crisis event.

I examined the elements essential to collaborative cooperation between organizations with differing organizational cultures and mandates, and worked to determine whether a common purpose outweighs cultural differences. Many studies have

been conducted regarding organizational culture and leadership (Schein, 2010) and the interrelationship between the organization's values (how things should be) and its practices (how things are) (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002). These prescribed cross-cultural organizational values, defined by Project GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness), an organization that conducts research on culture and leadership effectiveness in 61 nations, will define the theoretical basis for this study.

Additionally, my study builds upon a study conducted at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College that utilized the Competing Values Framework. This recent study examined the cultural differences between Department of State employees and Department of Defense military officers in an effort to explore how these differences related to conducting organizationally integrated and complementary national security endeavors (Davis & Paparone, 2012).

Nature of the Study

This study was exploratory in nature and thus derived a richer array of data through the subjective approach associated with qualitative research. I used open-ended interview questions and observations of interview participants who have experience responding to humanitarian crises to generate this data. I took a narrative organizational ethnography approach, and utilized existing theory on organizational culture from social psychologists Hofstede and Schein as a theoretical basis for the determination of organizational values. I utilized the cultural dimensions added to Hofstede's work by Project GLOBE, a research program that examines culture and leadership. My study revealed both disparities and likenesses in organizational culture between the United

States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

The overarching purpose of the study was to determine what barriers exist between these two organizations and, ultimately to identify modes for improving mutuality among disparate crisis responders prior to a humanitarian crisis. The participant pool was comprised of selected individuals with operational experience working side-by-side with culturally disparate organizations during a crisis response. The data collection methodology consisted of interviews of criterion-based samples and inquiry by observation of those participants during the interview process. I targeted these data collection tools towards addressing the main research problem. Accordingly, I wanted to determine how organizational culture can affect the behavioral norms of individuals in an organization and how those behaviors can be detrimental to collective action with outside organizations who have a common purpose.

The most recent work of Hofstede et al. (2010) expanded upon Hofstede's earlier (1980) work describing a set of six cultural dimensions: uncertainty avoidance, power distance, collectivism I (societal collectivism), collectivism II (in-group collectivism), gender egalitarianism, and assertiveness. These cultural dimensions were utilized and expanded by Project GLOBE (2002) to include future orientation, performance orientation, and humane orientation. They derived future orientation and humane orientation from Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's (1961) studies, and performance orientation from the works of McClelland (1985). Project GLOBE utilized these cultural dimensions to diagnose disparities in organizational culture as extant potential causal factors

contributing to any barriers derived from an organization's inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought. Schein's (2010) work on the progressing levels of organizational culture provided my study a basis for establishing the degree to which intercultural awareness of disparities is needed to establish mutuality between crisis response organizations. I took as a key assumption that this knowledge could ultimately lead to unity of effort earlier in the event of a crisis.

Research Questions

I tied each of my research questions to existing theory and related research and assigned each area to an appropriate category or theme, taking heed of the viewpoints of the participants to insure the questions' validity. Using purposeful sampling, I selected participants who were retired military officers and retired members of international nongovernmental and governmental aid organizations. My research questions were related to existing theoretical lenses. I validated and coded my targeted participant questions by using a selection of the cultural dimensions defined by Project GLOBE's nine cultural dimensions "performance orientation, future orientation, assertiveness, power distance, humane orientation, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and gender egalitarianism" (Gupta, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002, p. 3). My research questions are as follows:

RQ1: How do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture, and which values are most important to the individual groups?

RQ2: What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences?

RQ3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational cultures result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations?

Theoretical Framework

I based this study's theoretical framework on Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov's (2010) theory of Cultural dimension in order to assess the cultural disparities between organizations. These attributes were expanded into nine dimensions by Project GLOBE (2002), eight of which I applied to my data analysis. I did not apply the cultural dimension of gender egalitarianism to this study because deemed to be more of an intra-organizational factor and beyond the scope of this study. The resident attributes of organizational culture and inherent values systems of United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations are often disparate in nature, and can present barriers to coordination of the initial response to humanitarian crises. These barriers form out of the organizations' intrinsic inter-subjective behavior and patterns of thought, producing a parochialism which needs to be mitigated. The findings of this ethnography-based organizational cultural diagnosis provide means for such mitigation.

I used the works of social psychologists Edgar Schein and Geert Hofstede as a theoretical foundation in diagnosing organizational culture, determining intercultural differences, and recommending ways to improve understanding between crisis response

organizations. In the case of this study the United States military and civilian humanitarian aid organizations are likely to find themselves working together in the humanitarian space. Hence I used the cultural dimensions and other existing theories of organizational culture as the theoretical basis for diagnosing each culture and then assessed the differences in organizational culture that may cause such barriers. The relational theory-based diagnoses produced from my inquiry is intended to inform decision makers and practitioners in the humanitarian space. Of note, relational theory is generally applied to the behavioral sciences, specifically in the case of social work, where “the clinician’s self is not regarded as an impersonal and solid object that perceives the patient’s projections and transferences, but rather as an interpersonal process in interaction, which exists not on its own but always and only in relation to some other” (Shaeffer, 2014, p. 13). As the researcher, I was the instrument of data collection and applied this theory in a manner related to organizational ethnography.

Operational Definitions

Cooperation: Refers to “cooperative behaviour between two or more entities focused upon achieving a particular objective, set of objectives or ensuring a mutually beneficial relationship” (Humanitarian Futures Programme (HFP), 2011, p.6). I used this term to assess how participants valued working with other organizations and to what degree.

Humanitarian Assistance: “Actions to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations”

(HPF, 2011, p. 6). This is the type of operation being discussed by means of experiences of the participants of this study.

Humanitarian Space: Refers to the operating environment in which humanitarian aid takes place (HFP, p. 26). For the purpose of this study it refers to the geographical area where organizations are working together to provide alleviate human suffering.

Inter-subjective Behavior and Patterns of Thought: Refers to the human sense of community within a group. More specifically, Duranti (2010) describes philosopher Edmund Husserl's notion as "the human relation with the natural world, the role of tools and other artifacts in evoking other minds and other lives, the sense of belonging to a community or to a particular relationship even when others are not co-present, the participation in particular types of social encounters, the access to and use of human languages and other semiotic resources" (p. 14). For the purpose of this study it refers to the intra-organizational relationships that form between members of a group which at times are exclusive in nature.

Mutuality: Refers to a situation where a relationship forms in which there is an exchange "both affecting the other and being affected by the other; one extends oneself out to the other and is also receptive to the impact of the other" (Jordan, 1986, p. 2). For the purpose of this study, mutuality (as part of relational theory) was examined with respect to the relationship and exchange between organizations.

Nongovernmental organization (NGO): For the purpose of this study, an NGO is defined as "an organization established by individuals or associations of individuals. NGOs are not endowed with government powers" (Georgetown Law Library, n.d.).

Professional Military Education (PME): “PME conveys the broad body of knowledge and develops the habits of mind essential to the military professional’s expertise in the art and science of war” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2011, p. GL-8). For the purpose of this study, this is one of the venues that could be used to improve intercultural awareness between disparate organizations.

Unity of Effort: “Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013, p.256). This is a commonly used term that is understood by the military and often understood by members of organizations who have worked with the military. I found that this term was used by my study participants to indicate a desire to work collaboratively.

Wargaming: Refers to a process in which military planners analyze potential courses of action for a military operation. The process takes into account the flow of actions in the intended operation with respect to forces, the operating environment, and any opposing forces. It is intended to determine if a course of action is feasible and acceptable and if, according to joint military doctrine, “each critical event within a proposed COA should be wargamed based upon time available using the action, reaction, and counteraction method of friendly and/or opposing force interaction. The basic wargaming method (modified to fit the specific mission and operational environment) can apply to noncombat as well as combat operations” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2011, p. IV-27). For the purpose of this study, this is one of the possible venues in which

better organizational understanding can be accomplished by means of participation by a variety of military and non-military organizations.

Assumptions

I made some assumptions with respect to the participants of this study, and I identified these up front in order to mitigate any challenges to validity and to allow for flexibility during data collection.

My first assumption was that participants would be willing to participate in my study due to their lived experiences conducting humanitarian assistance. I assumed that they would therefore agree with the purpose and importance of my study. This assumption was based upon pre-existing conversations in professional settings with the participants. I have formed positive working relationships with a wide range of military officers and civilian aid workers during my career. This has been accomplished by means of professional schools, conferences and networking in the realm of humanitarian organizations writ large.

Lastly, I assumed that the interviews would be of an open nature because of my established rapport with the participants as is necessary with a narrative ethnographic study. None of my participants were from a vulnerable population and the subject matter is, for the most part, non-controversial. All of the participants had worked with culturally disparate organizations, are not profit driven (all are from either the public sector or nonprofit organizations), and thus understand the importance of unity of effort when alleviating human suffering.

Scope and Limitations

The immersive part of this ethnographic study was limited to personal and professional relationships formed by working and collaborating with participants by means of professional conferences, and exchanging contact information and personal experiences at schools. The key limitation was therefore my inability to observe the two preformed groups working an actual disaster or crisis, which is both unpredictable and financially and physically untenable.

Throughout the study, I was careful to avoid personal organizational cultural bias as a retired military officer, and I kept that bias from influencing the interpretation of opinions and trends in the study. Bias was not only an ethical consideration in my study, but also a potential threat to validity as readers may read my biography and make conclusions regarding bias.

A key limitation of my study was the transient nature of military officers and humanitarian aid workers. This created challenges in my recruitment of study participants and in simply finding a mutual window of availability the interviews that I needed to conduct. Accordingly, I made the assumption that some participants for the intensive interviews may change. Several of my participants were transient due to their having expeditionary occupations forcing me to conduct the interviews by phone. The intended interviewees are often in areas such as Liberia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Jordan and Japan as a normal part of their jobs.

Significance of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative study was to help Military and civilian humanitarian crisis responders overcome the lack of the understanding of inter organizational cultural disparities and existing parochialisms by providing knowledge of these disparities to both policy makers and organizations involved with crisis response. The gap in knowledge that warrants this inquiry was that studies have examined how organizational cultures exist and how organizations can better coordinate post-crisis, but they have not ascertained what the barriers to mutuality are. The foundation of my inquiry was formative evaluation and was inductive in nature. The inductive nature was appropriate for the intended purpose--that of filling the gap in research which exists regarding the determinate factors contributing to a lack of efficiencies in coordination at the outset of a humanitarian crisis. Accordingly, my inquiry sought means of improving the effectiveness of the coordinated responses of culturally disparate crisis response organizations (Patton, 2002, p. 221). More specifically, I sought to provide insight to stakeholders on how to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance efforts by means of inter cultural awareness. Ultimately, providing informational tools on cultural disparity to crisis responders has the potential to save more lives and relieve human suffering sooner rather than later in a crisis by stimulating mutuality among the various crisis response organizations. These informational tools will provide building blocks for educators and practitioners through publication of the data in curricula and online humanitarian relief resources.

Chapter Summary

The United States government, specifically the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), responds to an average of 70 disasters outside of its borders every year (OFDA, n.d., para. 1). The United States military provides support to OFDA for an average of 12% of those disasters (OFDA, n.d.). Contrary to what is seen in the press, the United States military is generally not the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for the United States government response to disasters both at home and abroad.

The capability to respond rapidly to disasters, coupled with the sheer size of the United States military make it a very capable option for supporting response organizations. Disaster relief is not the core capability of the United States military, but when it is selected as a support option, prescience of expected organizational cultural disparities with other responders and vice versa may lead to earlier mutuality. Ultimately, this may lead to the organizations involved arriving at unity of effort sooner in the disaster. An examination of relevant existing literature will provide a foundation to this study in chapter two. I will analyze the literature, taking into account the theoretical basis of organizational culture and the known organizational cultural attributes of the organizations to be examined.

Chapter 1 has shown the underlying need for this study. Further, it has demonstrated the utility of the information derived from my results and analysis, and has shown how my study contributes to the body of knowledge regarding the causal factors of barriers to collaborative cooperation.

Chapter 2 lays the literary groundwork that is relevant to this study and provides an analysis of existing literature while assessing applicability. Ultimately, I use my literature review to describe how I determined the need for a study of this nature.

Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology and demonstrates why an ethnographic approach is appropriate for this form of data collection and analysis. It includes a description of the research design, the data collection venues, participant pool and selection criteria, as well as the method of data analysis. Chapter 4 provides the analysis and results of the study, and Chapter 5 concludes the study by providing recommendations for how to use the analyzed data while also indicating the potential for further research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

In this chapter, I present the lens I used for arriving at my general areas or topics, and I offer a topically organized examination of literature. Various studies and scholarly articles have been written about the organizational cultural differences, both perceived and actual, between organizations who respond to humanitarian emergencies. I found a gap in knowledge, however, in the assessment of organizational cultural differences by means of experiential interviews of participants who had operational, on the ground experience working with disparate organizations. The synopsis of this current literature section sets the stage for my examination of the need to study this gap in knowledge. The subsequent sections include reviews of literature on humanitarian assistance, organizational culture, and the complexity of organizational cultural differences. I also offer a focused examination of military culture versus civilian aid worker culture, and the nexus of coordination between these disparate cultural groups. The chapter concludes with the idea that there may exist potential barriers to inter organizational coordination.

Humanitarian assistance operations are inherently complex and dynamic, whether aimed at disaster relief or the myriad of other types of assistance including human rights work. This complexity and dynamic nature stems not only from the physical environment, but also the socio-cultural environment. Add responders from outside of the affected nation, and there exists a solid mix of both national and organizational cultural differences converging in this environment. There exists a vast amount of literature on the influence of culture—both organizational and national—and on the complexity of

humanitarian situations. These studies generally focus on interactions between disparate cultures either during or after working together, or in some cases simply identify and investigate the differences that exist. They do not focus on experiential data and derived relational assessments from practitioners from military and humanitarian organizations gathered through interviews focusing on those experiences. Accordingly, a more proactive approach is warranted to avoid the ad hoc nature of stakeholders meeting for the first in the humanitarian space. There is a gap in knowledge with regards to studies aimed at finding effective ways mitigate the resultant barriers to coordination amongst culturally diverse organizations responding to a humanitarian situation. There is indeed a need for these organizations to have the knowledge and tools to effectively work together. Organizational cultural awareness by members of organizations from the international community responding to humanitarian crises is essential to the formation of a knowledge base how to relieve suffering in an efficient and complementary manner. This knowledge base could conceivably allow responders to better leverage the assortment of capabilities present in the humanitarian space. Cultural models are often used to assess the norms and rules of a culture may facilitate an understanding of that culture's values. Theories on culture presented in existing literature can provide a lens for assessing the cultural landscape of an organization.

Literature Search Strategy

This study has its foundations in my observation of and personal involvement in disaster relief and other civil-military coordination efforts during my career in the U.S. Navy. It was readily apparent to me that better understanding between the different

organizations involved in disaster relief, prior to a disaster, would have led to more efficient relief of human suffering. I observed this lack of understanding and the associated psychological challenges incurred by survivors and responders personally as a responder to Hurricane Andrew in Miami in the early 1990s.

I have since become an educator who focuses on instructing military officers from the United States and other friendly nations about humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Accordingly, my day-to-day job includes continual research on disaster relief, civil-military relations, and culture (both national and organizational). This background has provided a solid foundation of articles, books and case studies, as well as a network of like-minded professionals for my early PhD studies and associated research.

My literature search started by simply seeking out like-minded researchers and authors and asking them for recommendations of literature that they had found useful. This is where I obtained the materials I used to establish the theoretical basis of this study, Schein's and Hofstede's work on organizational culture. I also spoke with a former colleague (Davis) who had recently done a study that explored the organizational cultural differences between military officers and State Department Foreign Service Officers. My study builds directly on Davis' work. I then used databases available to me at both the Walden University Library and the National Defense Library including One Search, JSTOR, EBSCO Academic Search Complete, and Google Scholar. My keyword search included: *humanitarian assistance, organizational culture, interagency dynamics, NGOs, military culture, cultural disparity, civilian-military coordination, wicked problems, and complexity*. Additionally, I discovered some of the literature in the course of finding

scholarly articles to use in my duties as a curriculum developer and educator at the Joint Forces Staff College. I also used reference lists in related literature to expand my array of literature, and personally contacted specific authors to discuss the study and obtain recommendations. Other online sources I used for the review included the Strategic Studies Institute website, the U.S Agency for International Development website, the RAND Corporation website, and the Congressional Research Service website. I also perused library bookshelves and hardcopy journals. My literature search focused on scholarly, peer-reviewed articles and books by experts in the areas being studied.

Often people and organizations involved in crises take note of lessons learned and best practices after the fact. The problem is that these “lessons learned” can become more “lessons noted” as they are written down and not referred to again unless there are serious consequences as a result of bad practices. One recurring theme of crisis response is the lack of efficacy at the outset of a crisis due to a lack of awareness of the capabilities and organizational cultures that the variety of response organizations brings to the humanitarian space or operating environment. A recent example that highlights this problem is from a workshop held in June of 2010 by the U.S. Agency for International Development and The U.S. Department of Defense. The proceedings highlighted the need for an international framework for crisis response, a need for previously established personal relationships between members of response organizations, and the need for better information sharing amongst responders – to name a few.

Synopsis of Current Literature

Studies have been conducted on how organizational complexity can increase in a crisis situation (Kapucu, 2009), how inter organizational relationships in crisis response can be challenging due to inter organizational diversity (Brower, Choi, Jeong, & Dilling, 2009), and how inter organizational disparity is a benefit, not a challenge (Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2009). Stephenson and Schnitzer (2009) argued that humanitarian organizations do not need to lose their individuality or unique cultural landscape to effectively respond to crises. These studies were focused on identifying diversity and challenges, but left a gap with respect to the causal factors of organizational barriers and ways to reduce those barriers. The ultimate goal of my particular study was to facilitate prescience of inter organizational cultural disparities and existing parochialisms that produce barriers to effective crisis response.

Humanitarian Assistance

It can be observed from research on humanitarian assistance that many organizations and analysts meet regularly to discuss the difficulties and successes disaster response. One common theme in the literature is that there needs to be a universally understood coordination process in place for international disaster response. This observation is reasonable and sensible, but without buy-in from the myriad civilian and military response organizations, a coordination tool and associated processes can never come to fruition. A key challenge that Olson (2008) of the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) pointed out is that organizations responding to a crisis want to coordinate, but no one wants to be coordinated (p. 225). He also pointed out that in a complex situation

where a variety of organizations come together to accomplish a desired end, the very act of doing what the individual organizations intended to do can result in making the situation worse without coordination (pp. 216-217). It was my assertion that the root of the problem may very well be that disparities in organizational culture add to the already complex systems and environments.

Coles and Zhuang (2011) offered a solution to coordination challenges in the wake of natural disaster by applying game theory to disaster relief. Game theory essentially examines relationships between groups of actors in a given series of situations (games) and studies the outcomes of these various “games” (p. 4). The results are used to predict future outcomes based upon interaction of actors in order to support decision making (p. 6). The authors set the stage by asserting that the wide-range of organizational cultures of responders, termed “actors” in the study, coupled with outside responders’ unfamiliarity with the environment (cultural or otherwise), turns the disaster response operation into a complex situation. They focused on the recovery phase since there is little time to organize efforts earlier in the disaster. I would argue that this is too late in the operation to improve effectiveness of disaster responders, which is largely the intent of my study. Essentially, they showed that earlier actions can impact outcomes for both sets of actors, allowing for earlier decisions to set the stage for better recovery efforts and ownership by the host nation. Their study ultimately aimed to form partnerships between culturally disparate actors, an aim that resonates with the intent of my study.

Organizational Culture

A vast amount of literature revolving around the concept of organizational culture has been written in recent times (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010). Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) described some of the challenges involved in measuring values in a culture and stated that it is this measure that should be the first element of comparative research between cultures. The central theoretical concept was that cultures vary with respect to a set of attributes or what Hofstede, et al. (2010) referred to as “cultural dimensions”: dimensions “power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance index, and masculinity and femininity” (pp.40- 41)”. The authors broadly defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category for people from others” (p. 6). This theoretical work allowed me to apply this concept to both nations and organizations. This was caveated by Hofstede, et al. in their assertion that national cultures are more enduring than the more superficial organizational cultures (p. 346). They assessed that individuals will not always act in a manner consistent with the way that they score on a questionnaire that measures preferences and caution that when interpreting statements, a researcher must “distinguish between the desirable and the desired: how people think the world ought to be versus what people want for themselves” (p. 28). This tied directly to how I worded my interview questions when using them as data collection tools to develop my pilot study. It also provided a basis for applicable coding and follow on data analysis utilizing Historical Discourse Analysis (HAD) and Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA). Hofstede, et al. described the “desirable” as measuring norms, which are an absolute (what is ethically

right), and the “desired” as more of a statistical measure of majority wants (p. 29).

Accordingly, the term desirable was most appropriate when constructing an attitude assessment and relational theory analysis about organizational culture. Hofstede et al. (2010) conducted a research project (Institute for Research on Intercultural Cooperation – IRIC) that examined culture on both a cross-national and cross-organizational level. For instrumentation and methodology, the study used a mixed methods model starting with interviews and following up with pencil and paper questionnaires utilizing a Likert scale based upon six cultural dimensions (Hofstede et. al., 2010).

The need for an understanding of one’s own organizational culture to increase organizational effectiveness has been established as a norm of improvement. This area of study has been supported with assessments of organizational values, both current and desired, by Cameron and Quinn (2006) amongst others. To expand upon this concept, I determined that there is a need for better intercultural understanding between disparate organizations with a common interest of responding to a crisis. My purpose in this assertion was affect to improvement the effectiveness of response efforts. Cameron and Quinn (2006) published a supporting methodology that was designed to establish the current state of an organization’s culture, determine the desired culture, and provide a pathway to move from present to desired conditions. Their methodology provided an assessment framework to aid organizations to understand the core dimensions of culture and recognize the different forms of culture. Cameron and Quinn (2006) espoused an approach to improvement in organizational effectiveness that starts with a much neglected assessment of the type of organizational culture that exists (pp. 2-6). The

authors used the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) which consisted of a questionnaire containing six questions (each assessing one of the six key dimensions of organizational culture) as a means to diagnose organizational culture. This instrument was based upon Cameron, Quinn, DeGraff and Thakor's (2006) Competing Values Framework (CVF) from which flows a theory that different aspects of an organization function "in simultaneous harmony and tension with one another" (Cameron, Quinn, DeGraff, and Thakor, 2006, p. 6).

In an article by Karkoulian, Messarra, and Sidani (2009) the authors described the "Correlates of the Bases of Power and the Big Five Personality Traits: An Empirical Investigation. Allied Academies International Conference Academy of Organizational Culture, Communications and Conflict" (p.71). The authors argued that, in addition to what members of an organization regard as enduring beliefs of qualities of effectiveness, the predominant personality types in an organization define how members are motivated by the types of power wielded by leaders (Karkoulian, Messarra, and Sidani, 2009). Accordingly, the authors assessed in this study that "personality traits are viewed as significant and powerful variables, and are perceived as the most central psychological tools for directing and controlling behavior" (Karkoulian et al., 2009, p. 72). In their study, the researchers used an assessment of the "big five" personality traits (agreeableness, extroversion, emotional stability, conscientiousness, openness to experience) as a framework for evaluating work behavior across cultures (Karkoulian et al., 2009).

Gupta, Hanges, and Dorfman (2002) conducted a study for Project GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness), utilizing the concept of “Cultural Clusters” as a methodology and for data collection and the determination of their findings. Their study intended to place different societies into clusters based upon various societal forces the main three being geographical proximity, mass migrations and ethnic social capital, and religious and linguistic commonality (p. 11). The purpose of the study was to assist with theory development with regards to determining potential boundary considerations when considering management decisions (by multinational corporations with regards to investments) and interventions (humanitarian or otherwise). The researchers used previous research, historical analysis and other factors such as language and religion to divide societies into clusters. They then did an analysis of the clusters using variables to predict membership in order to test their original classifications. The researchers concluded by presenting a description and membership of ten clusters, to include characteristics of the societies within these clusters (pp. 12-15). The description of the societies in these clusters was useful to my study in that it helped to focus on what cultural factors must be considered by responders to disasters.

House, Javidan, Hanges, and Dorfman (2002) published another article for Project GLOBE regarding culture as it relates to leadership theories in which they also provided background information on Project GLOBE. The article examined the some of the modern results of a globalized society and the resulting connections among different cultures. The central purpose of this article was to determine the cultural influences in societies that impact leadership and the need for leadership and organizational theories

that cut across cultures to determine what works and what does not (p. 3). The researchers developed a series of objectives in order to develop a theory regarding the impact of cultural variables on leadership and organizational processes in a society. The conclusion was the construction of a theory that the “attributes and entities that distinguish a given culture from other cultures are predictive of the practices of organizations and leader attributes and behaviors that are most frequently enacted, acceptable, and affective in that culture” (p. 8). This article was valuable to my study in that it provided a theoretical model to examine when trying to influence leadership in a nation to provide better development and thus be less vulnerable to natural disasters.

Legro published a 1996 article that discussed the influence that culture has on international cooperation. He likened international cooperation to a complicated dance due to culture and preferences by the involved organizations (p. 118). He further offered a helpful domestic model of cultural explanation of preferences that contrasts with the view that the desires of the state are driven by functions and constrained by the international system controlling them (p. 118). Legro suggested that there is a disparity between having a cultural view of an organization as opposed to having a structural view. Specifically, “a cultural view anticipates that organizations with similar formal structure may have very different understandings, interests, and behavior... a cultural view anticipates that the prevailing beliefs in a military can lead to a bias for either escalation or restraint” (p. 121). Alternately “a functional view of organizations (one compatible with the realist position outlined below) recognizes that organizations come into being for specific purposes...this view expects that organizations will pursue those purposes in a

functional manner in light of environmental circumstances” (p. 121). This article demonstrates where priorities lie within a state organization as influenced by culture, thus demonstrating their willingness to coordinate with others in the international community.

In his book *Organizational Culture and Leadership* Edgar Schein (2010) identified three levels of culture that are essential to analysis of an organizational culture: observable culture, shared values, and common assumptions. He describes how there is increasing difficulty of analysis as researchers work from one level to the next, with observable culture containing the most obvious indicators and common assumptions of a culture requiring deeper immersion (Schein, 2010). This layered approach to cultural analysis provided me with a means to recommend an approach to taking intercultural understanding from one level to the next deeper level. Culturally disparate organizations may never arrive at the common assumptions level of intercultural understanding, but the efforts to move from one level to the next may prove fruitful to better intercultural coordination.

Observable aspects of organizational culture manifest themselves in the actions and decisions of an organization’s members. Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2002) conducted a study on the relationship between an organization’s principles and its culture utilizing an ethnographic approach. They interviewed a selection of members of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) – Holland, which is a humanitarian organization modeled after the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 490). Humanitarian organizations base their operations on the founding principles of humanitarianism, which are based upon International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the start

of which being the Geneva Convention of 1864 (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 491). These principles are “humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality” (ICRC, 2013, para. 3). These principles lead to an organization’s culture and “in classic organizational thinking, precede policy, which in turn precedes implementation” (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 493). Essentially, these principles manifest themselves as an organization’s code of conduct which is set by the founders and translated into writing (policy) by managers, and thus carried out by the staff as guiding principles for their actions (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 493). It can be argued that this general organizational process can be applied to most organizations and provides a commonality when examining the organizations that were analyzed in this study. This generalized commonality is merely a foundation, however it is the differences between military and aid organizations that creates an additional layer of complexity during a mutual response to a crisis.

The Complexity and Complements of Differences

Kapucu (2009) used complexity theory as a basis for a study of the inter organizational dynamics involved in crisis response and concluded that these dynamics have increased in complexity over time due to the need for adaptation within the environment. Brower, et al. (2009) presented a conceptual model of the how challenges to inter organizational learning and effectiveness are exacerbated by emergency management scenarios. Others have viewed organizational disparities as an asset to multi-faceted operations, indicating that complex scenarios require a complex solution. Acosta, Chandra, Sleeper and Springgate (2011) conducted a study that probed effective

gains realized by coordination of domestic governmental efforts by leveraging the capabilities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Military Culture

Military culture, the United States military in particular, has been the subject of a rich amount studies with varying viewpoints and varying areas of emphasis. Some of the most relevant articles to this study revolve around the collective nature of military culture and its evolution to a professionalized service in the case of the United States military. The contemporary involvement of the United States military in noncombat operations such as stability operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as day to day “helping hands” type of activities (such as the deployment of hospital ships to provide routine medical care to nations without capacity to provide for their own citizens) provides evidence that there are cultural aspects and values that are not kinetic in nature. This is diametrically opposed to what some civilian organizations view as a militarization of the humanitarian space as is discussed by Baumann in his 2014 article that discussed civilian and military organizations working together. He described how clashes in organizational culture between these types of organizations can create challenges to their integration of efforts in stabilization efforts in a destabilized operating environment. Of note I, the researcher for this particular this study, am a retired career military officer with experience working with civilian organizations.

Kirke (2008) published an article in which he described viewpoints on the definition of military culture. He argued that the typical mindset of historians and political scientists is to characterize military culture as nothing more than an extension of

aristocratic culture. This is due in part to their focus on the officer corps which, in the past, was drawn from the aristocracy (an example is the case of England), and were the vessels of maintaining military values (2008). He further posited that military culture is not the same as militarism, a culture of violence as is seen by some, but must be examined as a subset of society (2008).

Thus military culture must be studied with respect to its relationship to the greater society that surrounds it, the State, other organizations with which it interacts (which he argues should be classified as institutions) in order to get a clear, unadulterated picture of its true nature (Kirke, 2008). He substantiates this by observing that military culture as well as other societal institutions are interrelated (2008). Essentially, military culture is a microcosm of the greater society and cannot be dissociated from other inclusive organizations in that society for a researcher to objectively study this institution. It can be argued here, as supported by Wilson (2008), that today's military in the United States is more professionalized in nature, drawing its members (both officer and enlisted) from the whole spectrum of society.

Further, as related to my study, military forces find themselves participating in noncombat operations such as disaster relief which is not a situation, in some cases, where militarism is appropriate. The efficacy in these noncombat operations is perhaps due to, for one thing, the military value of cohesion as is discussed by Kirke (2010). Kirke, of the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom (UK) asserted that cohesion is a vital element of military unit effectiveness (2010). His article viewed cohesion in military organizations as something that occurs separately from what is the main purpose of the

organization, but is supportive of that mission due to its inherent organizational value of collectivism (2010). This is directly tied to Hofstede, et al.'s (2010) cultural dimension of collectivism versus individualism—the good of the whole outweighs the good of the individual. This element of cohesion, coupled with long periods of separation from the home and family causes the military to take on what Hilhorst and Schmiemann describe as a “closed community” nature (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 493). Other members of the organization form the only social network in a “closed community” as the members do not go home or work on a frequent basis with outsiders, resulting in what the military calls “unit integrity”. This is directly tied my study and my desire to determine what adds to the efficacy of civil-military responses to humanitarian disasters and what could potentially, from the viewpoint of organizational cultural disparities, lead to barriers to a comprehensive approach to response efforts.

Briceno (2009) took a broader viewpoint in his development of a cultural model used for the assessment of values based differences. His descriptive articles was part of a compilation of articles regarding cultural considerations in military operating environments-referred to as “Operational Culture” (p. 37). He applied the aforementioned cultural dimensions of Hofstede (2010) in his conceptualization of a cultural model for use by the United States military. In this model, different cultural values are examined with respect to their significance among the indigenous population (pp. 37-40). These values would be ranked with regards to their importance on a numerical scale (the highest number being the most significant) and, additionally, a justification of ranking must accompany the ranked value (pp. 37-38). This model was fundamental to my study in that

it provided ideas of a methodology for coding using elements of culture as ranked by their relative importance to an organization or population.

Davis and Papparone (2012) conducted a study that assessed how members of the US Department of Defense and members of the US Department of State ranked themselves and ranked each other with respect to organizational values. In their study they applied the theory of organizational effectiveness modeled upon what members of an organization culturally hold as beliefs about what makes an organization effective (essentially what they value). This study used the CVF (Quinn & McGrath, 1985) and the OCAI (both described earlier) as an instrument of measurement in quantitative study on the organizational cultural differences between United States military Officers and Department of State Foreign Service Officers. Their findings of military culture demonstrated a view that adhocracy, being innovative and not staying with the norm was bad and that their organizational culture is characterized by a strong sense of mission accomplishment (market value) and, to a lesser degree a hierarchical value (pp. 34-36). They stated in their results “the DoD respondents perceive their organization expects them to be hard drivers, producers, and competitors. They are more used to tough and demanding leaders than are the State respondents. DoD respondents also identify that their home organization expects well-planned actions that achieve measurable goals and targets” (p. 35). The results of this study, coupled with additional research and studies on the organizational cultures of the military, civilian aid organizations and the nexus between the two provided data to validate the findings of my study.

Some other elements that provided data validation were found in research conducted by Nancy Roberts, professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. Her 2010 article examined the organizational cultural disparities between NGOs and the military that exist in the Post-Cold War Era. Her article examined the organizational cultures of the military and international NGOs in order determine “how best to structure for effectiveness the increasingly vital peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts of the military and NGOs in failing or failed states and combat zones around the world” (p. 212). Her assessment of military culture is described as having:

- Organizational structures that reinforce hierarchical authority.
- Clearly defined of command and control relationships.
- Rules of engagement that are clearly defined to ensure accountability to policy makers.
- Roles, responsibilities, and unity of command definitions that are necessary to achieve the mission successfully
- Pride in the ability to conduct advanced planning and organized execution tasks in support of the mission (p. 213).

These elements of military organizational culture, coupled with the elements in the aforementioned studies were used to validate participant statements in response to interview questions in order to answer my research questions. As such, I used them to augment the organizational cultural themes derived from interviews with questions and analysis founded on existing theory on cultural dimensions.

Civilian Aid Worker Culture

In a 2011 RAND Gulf Studies report by Acosta, Chandra, Sleeper, and Springgate authored a 2011 RAND Gulf Studies conference report on the nongovernmental sector's involvement in disaster resilience. They examined the merits of federal, state and local efforts in coordinating with and leveraging the capabilities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The report made recommendations to conference agenda discussion areas that focus on policies and programs in support of the active involvement of NGOs in domestic disaster recovery (pp. 11-13). The study, though domestic in nature discussed ways to improve areas such as information exchange, resource allocation and clearly breaking out responsibilities between stakeholder, and thus provided ideas to my research for breaking down organizational barriers.

Rubenstein published a (2003) article that examined the considerations of cross-cultural organizational efforts in complex peace operations. The article discussed how “cultural models provide a coherent, systematic arrangement for the knowledge that characterizes each cultural group” (p. 31) and further discussed how people from different cultures (those responding to complex peace operations to include the military, nongovernmental organizations and international civil servants) become culturally competent with regards to each other's cultures (and the culture that they are operating in) through observation and experience via activity. The methodology of the study presented by Rubenstein is tied closely to this idea of “cultural competence” and therefore provided a good foundation my intended study. It must be noted here that in reality, however, these organizations form collaborative cells after a crisis begins, (Center for

Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM), 2009) thus taking a step backwards when they find themselves in the midst of a crisis.

In an alternate view Stephenson and Schnitzer (2009) professed that humanitarian organizations don't need to resort to this mono-centricity. The authors posited that humanitarian organizations can be equally effective by employing Polanyi's concept of poly-centricity in these types of situations, where the various organizations maintain their own autonomous rules and norms while at the same time mutually accommodating each other for maximum effectiveness in relief operations (p. 929).

I previously described a study of humanitarian aid workers conducted by Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2002) which aligned internationally recognized humanitarian principles with this type of organization's culture. These humanitarian principles define the code of conduct for members of the organization and frame the culture of the organization. The following list and definitions demonstrates the underlying principles adopted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – an international consortium of humanitarian societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (Sommers-Flanagan, 2007).

The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement:

- **Humanity:** The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to

protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.

- **Impartiality:** It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.
- **Neutrality:** In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.
- **Independence:** The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.
- **Voluntary service:** It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.
- **Unity:** There can be only one Red Cross or Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

- Universality: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide (p. 191).

Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2002) applied some of these principles to their study of members of MSF who had recently returned from humanitarian assistance fieldwork. It must be noted here that MSF is only one of thousands of humanitarian aid organizations in the world, so this study is only a representative sample of how the humanitarian principles apply to organizational culture. The results of the ethnographic interviews demonstrated that this particular NGO demonstrated the attributes of a “closed organization” (p. 496). The interviewees indicated a positive view of the “un-bureaucratic” nature of the organization during their work conducting humanitarian assistance, specifically being empowered with responsibility and flexibility of decision making and actions (p. 497). They indicated that they like the “horizontal” nature of the organization; un-bureaucratic and independent (p. 497). Hilhorst and Schmiemann’s (2002) findings ultimately stated that:

When asked how principles ordered their action, it was remarkable that volunteers more often referred to what may be termed organisational ordering principles than to the humanitarian values normally associated with the notion of principles. On the basis of the interviews, four such ordering principles were identified: an un-bureaucratic attitude, a focus on emergency relief, democracy, and ownership. Democracy applies to the notion that each person has a voice in the organisation, and ownership implies that 'we are all a big family' (p. 497).

The most resonant values emerging from the interviews were found to be the un-bureaucratic attitude and the focus on emergency relief (p. 497).

These organizational values, or cultural themes are similar to Roberts (2010) study of civilian-military working relationships in the Post-Cold War era. Her findings indicated the following cultural attributes exist in civilian humanitarian organizations:

- Relief of human suffering is paramount and is blind to the victim's nationality, political or ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex, or ethnicity.
- Organizational mandates are to be fulfilled by staying autonomous, neutral, and impartial.
- Taking instructions and being tasked by outside organizations is generally not done.
- They value their freedom of operations and are thus are suspicious of attempts to organize or integrate with others.
- Their organizational structures tend to be decentralized with respect to authority and decision making. This decentralization enables them to quickly adapt as needed while conducting field level operations in austere operating conditions.
- They tend to assemble in an ad-hoc manner when needed and execute on the fly.
- The value transparency, member accountability, and consensus-based decision making as opposed to directives or orders from their headquarters (p. 213).

These elements of civilian aid worker organizational culture, coupled with the elements in the aforementioned studies were used to validate participant statements in response to interview questions in order to answer my research questions. As such, I used them to augment the organizational cultural themes derived from interviews with questions and analysis founded on existing theory on cultural dimensions.

The Nexus: Civil-Military Coordination

The theory of organizational effectiveness being modeled upon what members of an organization culturally hold as beliefs about what makes an organization effective was applied in a study by Davis and Paparone (2012) that used the CVF (Quinn & McGrath, 1985) and the OCAI as an instrument of measurement. Davis and Paparone conducted a quantitative study on the organizational cultural differences between United States military Officers and Department of State Foreign Service Officers. Their study was described in their 2012 article and stated that they “determined that not only would an intra-cultural assessment be insightful (how one views one’s own organization), but also that an inter-cultural assessment (how one views the other’s culture) would also be fruitful” (p. 31). They concluded that “there seemed to be considerable overlap in shared values with this population, which reflects more integration than differentiation” (p. 38) and suggested further research in similar areas such as how NGOs “see themselves with respect to governmental agencies” (p. 38) as I proposed in my intended study.

Conclusion: Disparities among Organizational Cultures-Potential Barriers

When examining the existing literature on the response to humanitarian disasters, organizational cultural awareness on the part of international responders is essential to an

initial understanding of how to best deliver aid in an organized and effective manner. The organizations described in this literature review are among the types that typically respond to humanitarian crises. I assessed from the existing literature on these cultural groups that they (the military and humanitarian aid workers) often differ with respect to organizational culture, thus presenting a barrier to effective inter organizational efforts at the outset of a crisis. Using cultural models from previous studies of what is deemed to be important in a particular culture led me to a determination of what aspects of culture are important in a particular organization. Additionally, methods of examining cultural values were drawn from existing literature, providing a theoretical basis for assessment of organizational cultural disparities.

A vast amount of time, study and legislation has been devoted to finding ways to improved civil-military coordination, particularly within the Executive Branch of the U.S. Federal government. In a crisis event where human lives are at stake, such as in the case of a natural disaster, a variety of civilian and military organizations converge in the humanitarian space with the ultimate goal of providing aid. Too many times, however, these organizations or systems are dealing with one another's disparities and knowledge thereof for the first time and taking a giant step back or what I like to call "meeting on the dance floor for the first time". This takes a complex environment and makes it what is termed by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber (Ritchey, 2008) to be a "wicked problem" or one that is both structurally complex and unpredictable.

The United Nations (UN) has responded to this convergence of aid organizations by taking their array of agencies and organizing them into sectors. This was after

observations of humanitarian disasters associated with Darfur and the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 and was termed the “Cluster System” (Jensen, 2012). The Cluster System essentially provides responders outside of the UN to know who to go to for a specific type of aid, for example, a nongovernmental aid organization such as Project Hope would go to the World Health Organization sector on the ground for medical supplies. Taking this a step further, Yeomans and Stull (2013) described how the US government military and civilian response organizations could plug into this system with and International Operations Response Framework (IORF) mirrored on the domestic National Response Framework (NRF) (Yeomans & Stull, 2013). Translating a domestic framework overseas and adding in the array of responders requires not just a framework or mechanism; it requires advance knowledge of the potential barriers to coordination. In my study I intended to find one of the root causes of barriers – basic organizational cultural differences between civilian and military organizations – and provide that information in a venue such as the UN’s Reliefweb.Int.

To examine the aforementioned root causes, I deemed an ethnographic approach to be the most appropriate. This methodology, in its purest form, uses the application of cultural anthropological concepts to establish, explore and analyze cultural characteristics. This allows for the identification of both real and perceived differences and contributing stereotypes and barriers.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

In this chapter I present the qualitative methodology that utilizes narrative interviews in an effort to provide a richer exploration of this mainly ethnographic approach. I describe my observation and interview methods and the theoretical methods of inquiry, including considerations of other methodologies and a description of the ethnographic approach. I then restate the research questions, describe the methods of data collection and analysis by examining the purpose of the research and the specifics of the questions that were asked during interviews, and finish with a discussion of ethical considerations.

This study follows the pragmatist epistemological tradition of ethnography by informing stakeholders about the body of organizational research on societal practices which uses analysis and presentation of holistic, grounded accounts of “how the social world works” (Watson, 2011, p. 210). My research was intended to explore and reveal differences in organizational culture between the United States military and humanitarian organizations in an effort to pinpoint barriers to unity of effort during disaster relief operations. Ethnographies, by their very nature, involve the various elements of field research and have the potential to provide a rich addition to organizational and managerial studies (Watson, 2012). Accordingly, I chose an ethnographic approach (specifically organizational ethnography) because of the nature of the study’s main attribute of exploring the shared characteristics and complexities of culture-sharing, pre organized groups. I used an array of cultural dimensions as a theoretical basis for

structuring my participant observations and in-depth narrative interviews of key participants in past humanitarian assistance efforts (one military and one civilian). These cultural dimensions are based upon those of Hofstede, et al.'s six cultural dimensions, expanded by project GLOBE by adding "performance orientation, future orientation, assertiveness, power distance, humane orientation, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and gender egalitarianism" (Gupta, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002, p. 3).

This study required me to form relationships with participants in order to better assess day-to-day activities of each group and the meanings associated with those activities related to humanitarian assistance. I also used opportunistic sampling and a narrative approach for interviews of participants from each organizational type that has experience working with the other type of organization. Taking cue from Watson (2012), I approached ethnography as a "culturally holistic social science genre" as opposed to just a methodology (Watson, 2012, p. 16). This allowed me to enrich social science research by enhancing the classical immersion and observation style of ethnography with the full range of social science investigative techniques as I deemed appropriate. Ethnographies allow for adaptations in the midst of the study as Neyland (2008) describes. More specifically Soin and Scheytt (2006) advocate the use of narrative methodologies as a complementary method of studying organizations as I intended in this data collection and analysis.

As is recommended by Creswell (2013), ethnographer David Fetterman provides a sound basis for the phases that a researcher should step through for an ethnography. In

this study, my analysis and interpretation utilized a realist ethnographic approach as its basis, maintaining my position of a researcher who has a particular stance about the culture-sharing group being studied and taking an objective, third-party role (Creswell, 2013). One of the main challenges to ethnographic studies that Creswell (2013) identifies is that the researcher needs to have some sort of a background or knowledge of cultural understanding. In the case of this study, I have a Bachelor of Arts in Cultural Anthropology, and thus I possess an academic foundation for my knowledge of cultural understanding.

Cultural understanding of an organization's values and accepted behaviors can be derived by means of organizational ethnography as a basis for study. Organizational ethnography is characterized by field work that places the researcher in a role of observing day-to-day work places (or other organizational venues) as a natural versus a priori setting (Yanow, 2012). This allows for an objective collection of the etic of the organizational participants that when combined with the interpretation, or emic of the researcher, ultimately provides a comprehensive "cultural portrait" of each organization (Creswell, 2013, p. 96). I accomplished this in my study by engaging with participants during civilian-military coordination conferences, humanitarian disaster response simulations, and general conversational engagements.

My methodology involved determining the characteristics of culture-sharing groups by means of organizational ethnography. I characterized these culture-sharing groups by developing "cultural portraits" of each group based upon the literature described in chapter two and by means of participant interviews and observation. After

deriving the two disparate organizations' "cultural portraits," I assessed cultural differences and potential barriers to mutuality based upon the aforementioned research questions. In order to derive meaning associated with this "cultural portrait," I worked to "gaining access to the conceptual world in which [my] subjects live so that [I could], in some extended sense of the term, converse with them" (Geertz, as cited in Yanow, 2012, p. 32). Yanow further describes ethnographic research as being a sort of methodology in which the researcher has the freedom to adapt the methodology due to the ambient situation and cultural context. I adapted this ethnographic methodology into a narrative ethnography by asking open ended questions that drove the participants to relate lived experiences that related to organizational culture. These questions allowed me to derive the aforementioned "cultural portrait" of the participant's parent organization as well as their perception of the disparate organization's "cultural portrait". The ambient situation was of an informal, conversational environment that allowed me to both derive cultural themes by means of participant responses and to observe participant reactions to questions.

Methods of Data Collection

In this study, I interviewed people from two very different organizations (military officers and civilian aid organizations) in a neutral location. From the interviews, I expected to encounter similarities within the groups due to elements of inter-subjective behavior and found this to be a true assumption. These elements of intersubjective behavior were the values and accepted behaviors of the two culturally disparate organizations. Also, as expected, I encountered differences between the organizational

cultures, some of which were nonparticipant deemed by participants to be barriers to mutuality. I have regularly been a nonparticipant observer of members from both groups working together, and this helped me formulate my assumptions about each group and ultimately help me to identify the need for this study. With regards to ethical considerations, I gained authorization from the Institutional Research Board at Walden University to conduct participant interviews and observation during the interviews. I also informed my participants that their participation was voluntary and anonymous, and I obtained written permission from each as part of the study. In writing, I fully explained the purpose and design of the study to the participants. Prior to the interviews I provided participants a written protocol form, and then reinforced the purpose, design, and ethical requirements verbally at the outset of observations and interviews.

I conducted interviews with a relational theory lens that focused not only on how organizational members view themselves, but also on how they view the other organization, and I worked to establish trends based on the cultural dimensions. I a priori coded the interview transcripts. The a priori coding was based upon the relationship between organizational bias with regards to intersubjectivity within each organization and bias with regards to perceptions of the other organization by utilizing a cultural model. By conducting interviews with members of each organization at a neutral location (or by phone if travel costs were prohibitive) and using open-ended questions, I was able to assess trends (themes) of how the participants perceived one-another (thus deriving stereotypes) and how the members perceived their own organizational values and practices. I also observed the participants during the interviews in order to derive what

the participant was more descriptive of in their experience conducting humanitarian crisis response operations. I observed the participants for nonverbal cues to determine what elements of organizational culture were most poignant to them both within their organization and with respect to the disparate organization. One particular nonverbal cue was the amount of time spent discussing a cultural theme. For example, it is my view that if a participant provides a detailed description of an actual event relating to an interview question, then this particular theme is of higher importance to their personal, lived experience. I recorded my observations using Janesick's (2011) journaling procedures to determine how participant perceptions reflected these themes and related to how relationships change and evolve into mutuality.

Theoretical Methods of Inquiry

This study was exploratory in nature and thus derived a richer array of data through the subjective approach associated with qualitative research that uses open-ended interview questions and observation of participants during interviews. It was readily apparent to me what topics and areas of discussion the participants felt passionate about. I noted these, as they tended to spend more time detailing personal experiences when they wanted to illustrate their feelings and values regarding a particular area of discussion. I considered use of quantitative inquiry by means of a quasi-experimental design, but the inductive nature of the study's purpose warranted either the use of qualitative inquiry or mixed-methods. I deemed narrative ethnography to be the most appropriate design, as this study used existing theory on organizational culture from Hofstede and Schein as a basis, adding the additional cultural dimensions identified by Project GLOBE.

An ethnographic approach to qualitative research aims to examine and document shared patterns of behavior within a particular group (Creswell, 2013). Ethnographic researchers immerse themselves in the particular day to day lives of the group being studied to examine values, beliefs, behaviors, and languages of the group being studied to determine the meaning of these elements (Creswell, 2013). I accomplished this by forming relationships with local volunteer organizations, and visiting and meeting with them on a nonparticipant observer basis. This approach is a qualitative method of inquiry that is an accepted and widely used manner of studying societal issues and societal change (Patton, 2006). Additionally, there exists a rich body of both inter and intra organizational studies using ethnography as a basis, thus making the method highly researchable and less vulnerable to challenges to validity. This wide acceptance and use in the social sciences not only aligns with nature of this study, but also add to validity as it is particularly appropriate to any study of culture (Patton, 2006). Ethnography can also be narrowed to accommodate organizational ethnography as suggested by Patton (2006) and will be employed in this study.

Pre-formed groups provided a participant pool and the method of data collection consisted of interviews of purposeful samples and inquiry by observation. This supported the main research problem that aims to examine how organizational culture can affect the accepted norms of behavior by individuals within that organizational culture to the point that it conflicts with outside organizations with a common purpose. The ethnographic approach allowed for the examination of experiences of a particular group and the cultural influences that have contributed to those experiences. Ethnographical studies in

existing literature were examined for similar phenomena utilizing the theoretical lenses of Schein and Hofstede. The works of these social psychologists have been widely used in studies of both national and organizational culture. Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov's (2010) work (based upon earlier works of Hofstede in this area and augmented by additional cultural dimensions used by Project GLOBE) with respect to cultural dimensions were used to diagnose cultural differences that were assessed to be causal factors contributing to inter-subjective behavior and patterns of thought. Schein's (2010) material on the different levels of culture were used to examine the amount of inter cultural knowledge that is needed to arrive at mutuality.

Edgar Schein is the author of *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (2010), in which he describes his theory that there are three levels of culture. The lowest level (level one) is what he terms "artifacts" or more simply the aspects of a culture-sharing group that we see, but that we do not necessarily understand (p. 24). The next higher level of culture (level two) is termed "espoused beliefs". The espoused beliefs and values of an organization originate in personal values and beliefs of what an individual feels about how things should be versus how things are (p. 25). The personal values and beliefs of those individuals who prevail in decision making when individuals come together as a group may become the shared values of the group (p. 25). Level three, the deepest level of cultural understanding, is termed by Schein (2010) as "basic underlying assumptions" (p. 28). This is when an organization uses the same effective solution to a problem to a degree of repetition that the behavior becomes second nature and the degree of variation or alternative solutions are not considered (p. 28). These three levels of culture formed

the basis for my recommendations in chapter five for a way ahead for disparate organizations to improve awareness of the values and behaviors of organizations that they could potentially encounter in the humanitarian space.

My study examined the differences in organizational culture between United States military officers and civilian aid workers to determine what barriers result from an organization's inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought, and how to improve mutuality prior to a humanitarian crisis. My recommendations to improve mutuality prior to a humanitarian crisis are founded upon attainment of a higher level of intercultural understanding using Schein's (2010) levels of culture as a basis. The purpose of my study and theoretical basis of cultural considerations warrants the use of a qualitative, ethnographic means of inquiry.

Research Questions

My central research question was whether a common purpose outweighs cultural differences between culturally disparate organizations (in the case the military and nongovernmental organizations) in situations where they need to work together, such as in humanitarian assistance crisis response operations. My sub-questions were related to existing theoretical lenses (Schein (2010) for organizational culture and McClelland for human motivation) and targeted participant questions were validated by a selection of the cultural dimensions (providing a basis for coding) defined by Project GLOBE. The most recent work of Hofstede, et al. (2010) expanded upon Hofstede's earlier (1980) work describing a set of six cultural dimensions: uncertainty avoidance, power distance, collectivism I (societal collectivism), collectivism II (in-group collectivism), gender

egalitarianism, and assertiveness. These cultural dimensions were utilized and expanded upon by Project GLOBE (2002) to include future orientation, performance orientation, and humane orientation. They derived future orientation and humane orientation from Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's (1961) studies and performance orientation from the works of McClelland (1985). Project GLOBE utilized these cultural dimensions to diagnose disparities in organizational culture as extant potential causal factors contributing to any barriers based upon inter-subjective behavior and patterns of thought. It was assumed that this knowledge will ultimately lead to unity of effort earlier in the case of a crisis event.

RQ1: How do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture and which values are most important to the individual groups?

RQ2: What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences?

RQ3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations?

Methods and Data Collection Analysis

Purpose of the Research

The day-to-day organizational cultures and intrinsic value systems of United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations often differ and can present barriers to their mutual response to humanitarian crises. These barriers result from an organization's inter-

subjective patterns and habits of thought and potentially a parochial view of working with disparate organizations. This can have deleterious effects on efforts to alleviate human suffering and saving lives in the humanitarian space.

On the other end of the spectrum from an organization's inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought is the phenomenon of mutuality during which disparate organizations overcome barriers while operating in the humanitarian space. It can be argued, however that this is too late in the process to efficiently aid those in need whose government lacks the capacity or will to assist them. It is the aim of this study to explore ways to arrive at an at least a moderate state of mutuality prior to entering the humanitarian space by arriving at a state of mutual understanding and appreciation for inter organizational strengths. These are some key elements of the cooperative efforts to cooperation achieve common goals.

Existing theories from experts in the field of organizational culture, such as Edgar Schein and Geert Hofstede were used as a theoretical basis for diagnosing intercultural differences between the United States military and civilian aid workers, two organizations proposed to have disparate organizational cultures and are likely to find themselves working together in the humanitarian space. Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov's (2010) characterization of organizational cultures utilizing what they term "cultural dimensions": "power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance index, and masculinity and femininity" (pp.40-41) were used as the theoretical basis for assessing the differences in organizational culture. These cultural dimensions were based upon Hofstede's earlier work from 1980 and are expanded upon by Project GLOBE (2002) as

described earlier in this chapter. It was imperative that this assessment be performed on the subjects of the study as a first step of cross-cultural examination as is supported by Hofstede et al. (2010) and Project GLOBE (2002). The interview questions that I provided to the sample participants (military officers and civilian aid workers) were worded to derive which cultural dimensions dominate each organizational culture and define what sets the two apart and what similarities exist between the two. My questions were also targeted at deriving perceptions of one organization by the other, thus evoking discussions of barriers to mutuality.

The second step of the cross-cultural examination of disparate organizations or culture-sharing groups is observation. This observation took place by means of my observation of participant reactions to questions and the ensuing discussion during interviews. Interviews were narrative in nature, so it was essential to derive participant reactions and emotional responses during their description of lived experiences in the field during humanitarian response efforts. I was able to assess what elements of their experiences were most poignant by observation. This was done by evaluating how passionate they were about the need to come to a consensus of each organization's efforts and how much time and detailed description they used to tell their story. The observation field notes will be recorded on my iPhone and then transcribed with an observation sheet using Janesick's (2011) observation methodologies. The various outcomes are intended to aid decision makers in the humanitarian space and ultimately policy makers.

Sampling Strategy and Size

The two groups that I recruited participant samples from were U.S military officers and civilian aid organization aid workers. This was done in a purposeful sampling manner. The underlying phenomena of intersubjective behavior within these different organizations and the effect of mutuality (and which phenomena would dominate in a crisis) led me to think that examining the underlying causality of these phenomena was more appropriate to the purpose of my study. Therefore, I concluded that with respect to the narrative interview portion of the study, the intensity sampling method was most valuable to the purpose of this study as it provided an information-rich examination of samples to reveal the basis and causes of the phenomena that it was desired to illuminate (Patton, 2002).

Based upon the purpose of my study an in-depth, targeted data collection was warranted. In order to accomplish this and provide the appropriate and helpful information to the intended audience, the sample size was relatively small, but the questions utilized effectively probed participants to provide detail in depth. Of note, I had already established relationships with individuals and have worked with the other type of organization in question (I am retired military, but have worked with civilian aid organizations). The narrative interviews were conducted on an individual basis from a small group of individuals who have actively participated in operations where military officers and civilian aid workers worked side-by-side providing humanitarian assistance.

My original intent was to draw the military participants from students in my workplace. Creswell (2013) warns the researcher of risks associated with presenting a

study of one's own "backyard" as is in the case of this first sample of participants (p. 151). Risks include items such as putting ones job in jeopardy by presenting negative aspects of the organization (p. 151). Accordingly, this plan was found to be fraught with difficulties, so I drew my participants from an array of military officers outside of my workplace that were retired and had experience responding to humanitarian crises. They also had a minimum of thirty years in their organization and held prominent positions during the humanitarian crises, allowing for a narrative, ethnographic approach. Their first-hand experience in prominent positions allowed for a deeper narrative account of their personal experience and their years of experience in their respective organization allowed me to apply elements of ethnography to my analysis. The sample size was two senior military officers.

For the sample size of civilian aid workers, access and resources (travel funding) available was limited. There are several NGOs, such as Operation Blessing and Operations Smile, as well as the American Red Cross, in my geographical area who have vast experience in the realm of humanitarian assistance. During the time of the study, these organizations were deployed in support of various international humanitarian crises, such as the Ebola outbreak in Western Africa and the natural disaster in Nepal. My solution to the difficulty of having available participants was to recruit retired civilian aid workers that I had networked with in the past at professional forums and schools. Like their military counterparts they also had a minimum of thirty years in their organization and held prominent positions during the humanitarian crises, allowing for a narrative, ethnographic approach. Their first-hand experience in prominent positions allowed for a

deeper narrative account of their personal experience and their years of experience in their respective organization allowed me to apply elements of ethnography to my analysis. The sample size was two civilian aid workers, one of which from a private, non-governmental volunteer organization and the other from a governmental organization that routinely responds to humanitarian crises.

Methods of Analysis

I designed each interview question to answer one or more of my research questions. They were written in an open-ended manner allowing for deep discussion and data collection based upon the participants' lived experiences in order to draw out statements (raw data) that could be aligned to the cultural dimensions of Project GLOBE (2002). The interview questions that were provided to the sample participants (military officers and civilian aid workers) were worded to dissect which cultural dimensions dominate each organizational culture and define what sets the two apart and what similarities exist between the two.

The second step of the cross-cultural examination of disparate organizations or culture-sharing groups is observation. This observation took place by means of my observation of participant reactions to questions and the ensuing discussion during interviews. Interviews were narrative in nature, so it was essential to derive participant reactions and emotional responses during their description of lived experiences in the field during humanitarian response efforts. I was able to assess what elements of their experiences were most poignant by observation. This was done by evaluating how passionate they were about the need to come to a consensus of each organization's efforts

and how much time and detailed description they used to tell their story. The observation field notes were recorded on my iPhone and then transcribed with an observation sheet using Janesick's (2011) observation methodologies. The emerging themes from the cultural dimension based data collection were then hand-coded in an *a priori* fashion, drawing out key observations and statements aligning with the cultural dimensions.

As Gibbs and Taylor (2010) discuss, themes identified from *a priori* ideas such as pre-existing theories to start coding and then allow the bias that the participants provide to form a basis for my study. In this study I used an appropriate selection of *a priori* ideas from Project GLOBE's nine cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, and humane orientation) (House, et al., 2002) to add theoretical and historical validity to the previously mentioned study questions and to allow for the development of themes. The interviews, just as the observation field notes, were recorded on my iPhone and then transcribed. The interview questions were:

Question 1: What do you think makes your organization successful? What are you proud of with respect to your organization? (In-group collectivism, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation)

Question 2: What makes the leadership in your organization effective in producing organizational and public value? Do you personally feel empowered by your leadership? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, performance orientation, humane orientation)

Question 3: How are decisions made in your organization? (Power distance, in-group collectivism, humane orientation)

Question 4: How often have you worked with members of organization y? What is your opinion of organization y? (If the person has not worked with the other organization, the questioning strategy will drive the interviewee to provide their opinion of the organization (Future orientation)

Question 5: What value do you see in working with organization y? (Societal collectivism, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation).

Question 6: Do you think that barriers exist between your organization x and organization y that affect working relationships? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, performance orientation, humane orientation).

Data Organization and Management

I hand transcribed each recorded interview and then sent each transcript to the respective participant for verification and agreement. I then *a priori* coded each interview question response and discussion, noting any observations. I counted the number of positive and negative views of each cultural dimension and tallied up each interview question for frequency coding, but also looked beyond frequency for what was deemed to be the most important element being discussed by the participant. An illustration of positive and negative is if a participant views itself as having a positive degree of a particular cultural dimension, the code would be a +1 for the participant organization. If

the participant viewed the disparate organization as having a negative degree of a cultural dimension, the code would be -1.

The *a priori* coded interview transcripts and observation provided me with raw data for analysis of emerging cultural themes based upon the cultural dimensions of Project GLOBE (2002). Each interview question, inclusive of relevant statements and researcher observations of participants were transcribed onto a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (table 1). I constructed a spreadsheet for each interview question with the cultural dimensions on the y-axis and the participant code, supporting literature and notes on the x-axis. I then transferred the coded participant statements that were particularly relevant to the cultural dimension onto the spreadsheet. This allowed me to derive themes regarding cultural differences and similarities, as well as potential barriers to mutuality. I must note here that these data organization spreadsheets were solely used for my hands-on organization purposes and were originally hand written on large “butcher-block” paper. They are thus not included in the appendices of this dissertation.

Table 1

Data Organization Spreadsheet

Cultural Dimension	Interview Question				Supporting Literature/ Data	Observations/ Notes
	Participant CAG	Participant CAP	Participant MO1	Participant MO2		
CD1 Uncertainty Avoidance	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:		
CD2 Power Distance	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:		
CD3 Societal Collectivism	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:		
CD4 In-Group Collectivism	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:		
CD5 Gender Egalitarianism – N/A*	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:		
CD6 Assertiveness	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:		
CD7 Future Orientation	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:		
CD8 Performance Orientation	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:		
CD Humane Orientation	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:	Code Frequency: Statement:		

*Note. Gender Egalitarianism was not used in this study as I deemed it to be beyond the scope of the research.

Limitations and Ethical Concerns

Throughout the study, I knew that I needed to avoid personal organizational cultural bias as a retired military officer to keep that bias from influencing the interpretation of opinions and trends in the study. This is not only an ethical consideration

of this research study due to bias, but also a potential threat to validity as readers may read my biography and make conclusions regarding bias. I sent out numerous invitations to potential participants, but only received five positive responses, which was within my number (4-6) approved by the Walden University Institutional Research Board (IRB). My IRB approval number is 04-01-15-0253434. It must be noted here that one of my participants suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, so data collection became problematic and I did not pursue this person's further participation due to not wanting to re-traumatize her. I conducted interviews and observations after gaining approval from the Walden University IRB and after obtaining participant signed agreements. I also read the agreement forms to each participant at the start of each interview and asked if there were any questions or concerns.

After obtaining permission to conduct interviews and observations, I ensured that participants were informed of the voluntary nature of their participation. Additionally, I kept the identities of the participants anonymous. I needed to characterize each participant with a code and that allowed me to discern who they are and what characteristics they possess. This allowed me to provide the results of the study to participants to aid me as the researcher with checking for the validity of my data prior to publishing to results. For quality assurance of the research plan, which is based upon ethnography, the researcher will use Creswell's (2013, pp. 262-263) suggested questions to assess the quality of the study quality as the actual study has not yet completed. Specifically:

- The researcher must clearly identify the culture-sharing groups to be studied (p. 263)
- The cultural themes to be studied must be specified (p. 263). In this case the theoretical framework will be used to observe the etic of the culture-sharing groups.
- The culture group must be clearly described (p. 263).
- Cultural themes will be identified and derived after applying the theoretical framework, thus leading to the ultimate emic (p. 263).
- Identify any issues arising in the field with respect to the relationship between the researcher and participants, “the interpretive nature of reporting, and sensitivity and reciprocity in the co-creating of the account” (Creswell, 2013).
- The manner in which the culture-sharing group works must be explained (p. 263).
- The researcher must self-disclose and relate reflexivity with respect to their role and position in the study (p. 263).

To assess trustworthiness, I utilized two of Patton’s (2002) triangulation of sources and triangulation of analysis in the study. My study initially utilized triangulation of sources by examining interviews, observations and theoretical background material (Patton, 2002). Later in the study, the triangulation of analysis consisted of the researcher’s own analysis using *a priori* coding, the analysis from the participants by allowing them to review the results of the study, and a peer review by a cohort in this same academic program (Creswell, 2013). To ensure credibility of the research plan, I

identified and self-assessed upfront any self-bias that could have affected the credibility of my results in the eyes of the audience of my research.

Conclusion

My experiences thus far in establishing relationships, or access, to organizations outside of my own has proven to be mostly positive. Both groups see the need for an improvement of an understanding of disparate values and other organizational themes that ultimately inform how an organization derives their processes. As a result of just forming relationships with local humanitarian organizations there has already been a desire shown by my military students and the aid workers to learn more about one another. I view this as an early success that has happened simply with bringing people together.

Chapter 4: Results of the Study

Introduction

In chapter four I present the data collected and analyzed based on participant interview transcripts and observation of participant reactions during the interview process. I restate the overarching purpose of this study and supporting research questions to be answered through the analysis of an *a priori* coding process. My coding methodology took into account frequency coding, but also utilized Historical Discourse Analysis by organizing statements by participants into “subjects” and “objects” in a manner consistent with the Foucauldian approach of text analysis (Peräkylä, 2005, p. 871). In my analysis of the coded data collected from the interview text, I further utilized Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA) as a basis for methodology (Peräkylä, 2005, pp. 872-873). I applied the MCA approach by aligning the themes arising from the coded interviews with what Peräkylä (2005) describes as “categories” for the participants and arranging them into “category-bound activities” (p. 873). In what follows, I offer an explanation of my pilot study, its impact on the main study, and its overarching purpose. I also describe the actual data collection, the setting for data collection, and the participants with their coded identifiers. Next, I restate the themes with relevant cultural dimensions to set the foundation for the following sections, which include the results of the interviews (the thematic statements emerging from the interview questions), the analysis of the data collected, evidence of trustworthiness of the study, and the results of the study. The results section addresses each research question with respect to themes.

Pilot Study

I intended to use my study to examine the differences in organizational culture between military officers and civilian aid workers (both governmental and nongovernmental). The overall purpose of the study was to determine what barriers result from an organization's inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought and identify how best to improve mutuality prior to a humanitarian crisis. This purpose warranted the use of a qualitative, ethnographic means of inquiry. I collected data for my main study by means of narrative-style interviews using open-ended questions to derive the lived experiences of participants during times when they were responders to humanitarian crises. Data collection was done by means of interviewing opportunistic samples of members (retired) of each of the aforementioned groups who had experience working with members of the culturally disparate group during a humanitarian crisis.

I did not conduct a formal pilot study, but my intended original design was to observe members of each organization (military and civilian) separately and conduct opportunistic interviews with the intention of deriving organizational cultural themes. I would then observe the participants during a simulated disaster in a classroom environment. I intended to use the observation during the simulated disaster to derive barriers to mutuality and the development of mutuality. I would then re-interview participants after the exercise with the intent of comparing data derived from the observations and the pre and post exposure interviews. Thus the intent of my pilot study was to gather organizational cultural data using non-participant observation and opportunistic interviews. My main study evolved into a narrative, ethnographic approach

that became necessary due to the aforementioned limitations and ethical concerns regarding data collection in my workplace. The largest problem with my original data collection design was the setting for data collection. The site for observation of the interaction between members of the disparate organization was going to be in my workplace where I am an instructor, placing me in a supervisory role of sorts. This was untenable and discarded in favor of my main study in which data was collected in a neutral setting.

Impact on the Main Study

My original strategy for my pilot study provided a basis for data collection, but the means and environment for data collection was changed to that of interviewing and observing targeted participants (based upon specific criteria) and observation in a neutral environment. In order to glean what was most important to each participant, I took a narrative approach to interviewing to allow for better observation of participant reactions to the open-ended interview questions. This enhanced the initial frequency sampling, which appeared to be skewed due to the topic of discussion (humanitarian response) and its direct relation to the cultural dimension of humane orientation. I extracted representative statements that aligned with themes associated with the relevant cultural dimensions of Project Globe (2002) which in turn have a theoretical basis in the work of Hofstede et al. (2010). These cultural dimensions were the theoretical basis for the *a priori* coding I used to derive themes from and analyze the interview transcripts. The frequencies of codes were tallied, but the narrative showed a different picture of the

participant experiences because of the observation of participants' organizational values and lived experiences.

I based the data collection methodology on ethnography, which is typical of cultural studies in the field of cultural anthropology. This involves the study of particular groups; in this case pre-formed groups in organizations. Neyland (2008) described this methodology as encompassing engagement with these groups using questions that determine how the group operates, deriving the values-based meanings regarding membership, and evaluating the impact of change on the group (Neyland, 2008). The practice of studying cultural groups has been expanded over the years from focusing on societies, to focusing on organizations because ethnography has been deemed effective in studying the day-to-day activities and values (Neyland, 2008). The overall ethnographic strategy for this study and its analysis was to determine what focal point or subsets thereof brings people together in each organization being studied and assess these elements using what Neyland (2008) describes as a narrative ethnography using unstructured practical questions. A narrative approach using practical questions as a strategy requires interaction between the researcher and participant through negotiation and the formation of a relationship of sorts, and the use of questions that "involve a clear emphasis on using the strategy as a process for bringing people together" (Neyland, 2008, pp, 35-36).

The pilot study of informal, non-participant observation of members of both organizations was intended to shape the main study by providing a foundation for interorganizational cultural disparities. This was to be done by simple observation of

members of each organization as a course of casual visits (tours of facilities, attendance at conferences and lectures), but I concluded that I needed a more participative approach in order to glean out organizational values. I adapted the pilot study by adhering to the requirements of the Institutional Research Board and recruited participants from each organization that met specific requirements regarding experience both in their parent organization and in working with the disparate organization. I gained a richer array of data by means of engaging one on one with each participant after forming a rapport for open conversation and the observation of nonverbal cues. Essentially, I retained the ethnographic approach, but eliminated observation and interviewing of participants in the workplace.

Setting of the Study

I work within a military organization as a faculty member. This personal factor placed me in a position of authority over potential participants within my work place so I did not utilize my workplace as a setting for participant recruitment or interviews. Additionally, I am a retired military officer. This factor has the potential to influence my interpretation of the data. In order to compensate for this factor, I have formed relationships with local NGOs and have become immersed in their organizations as a volunteer. This has effectively provided me with a wider scope of organizational understanding of nonmilitary organizations.

Purpose of the Study

My study aimed to improve cultural awareness between culturally disparate organizations and was designed to help those organizations avoid some of the initial

chaos at the outset of a crisis. Crisis response efforts are inherently chaotic in nature, but developing an earlier understanding of the unique attributes of a separate organization in advance has the potential to improve the swiftness and effectiveness of crisis response.

In this study, I sought to determine the value of organizational cultural understanding between disparate organizations prior to crisis response. Research has been conducted on relationships and effectiveness within cultures and between cultures in humanitarian and peace operations, but a specific study and analysis of the often subjective observations of one organization's perceptions of a disparate organization's culture has not been conducted. This study and resulting analysis was accomplished by means of focused, narrative-style interviews of a variety of participants of real world disaster relief operations, and was aimed at increasing cross-cultural effectiveness prior to and during a crisis event.

I examined the elements essential to collaborative cooperation between organizations with differing organizational cultures and mandates, and sought to determine whether a common purpose outweighs cultural differences. Many studies have been conducted regarding organizational culture and leadership (Schein, 2010) and the interrelationship between the organization's values (how things should be) and its organizational practices (how things are) (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002). These prescribed cross-cultural organizational values, defined by Project GLOBE as applied to the competing values framework, defined the theoretical basis for this study.

Additionally, this study builds on a study conducted at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College that utilized the Competing Values Framework. The recent

study examined the cultural differences between Department of State employees and Department of Defense military officers in an effort to explore how “these related to conducting integrated and complementary efforts in national security” (Davis & Paparone, 2012).

Research Questions

I used each of these three research questions to undergird a series of interview questions and a practice of participant observation that I employed to enrich data collection.

RQ1: How do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture and which values are most important to the individual groups?

RQ2: What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences?

RQ3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations?

Data Collection and Flow – Interviews and Observation

Narrative-style, loosely structured interviews were conducted with participants who were recruited based upon criterion sampling. All participant interviews were safeguarded in a locked container with their identities kept confidential, and identifying codes kept in a separate, locked container. The narrative-style was chosen to allow for a deeper analysis that was based upon personal, lived experiences of responding to a

humanitarian crisis and working with members of culturally disparate groups. I deemed it important for them to have the time and full opportunity to relate their own story of the crisis event.

I conducted loosely structured interviews using open-ended questions, each one being linked to my research questions with the results being linked to the cultural dimensions of an appropriate selection of *a priori* ideas from Project GLOBE's nine cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, and humane orientation) (House et al., 2002, p. 3). Project GLOBE expanded upon the cultural dimensions described by Hofstede et al. which they used as a theoretical basis for diagnosing the uniqueness of cultural groups. I used each cultural dimension to develop a theme for the coding and analysis of participant responses. This practice is described by Murchison (2010) as a starting list from which to derive codes for the record of the ethnographic study and ultimately draw the cultural landscape of the organizations being studied (p. 178). The interview protocols may be found in appendix A. Participants were coded with respect to their occupation during their experience conducting humanitarian assistance in order to maintain anonymity. These are as follows:

MO: United States military officer

CAG: Civilian Aid Worker U.S. Federal Government Employee

CAP: Civilian Aid Worker Private (nongovernmental organization employee)

The participants were also observed as they related their experiences in conducting crisis response activities where they were forced to work collaboratively and

cooperatively with organizations that are culturally different. I recorded my observations using Janesick's (2011) journaling procedures to determine the existence of organizational inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought and how relationships change and evolve into mutuality. Each statement, word or phrase relating the aforementioned cultural dimensions are annotated with side notes and the frequency of these are tallied up for each question with a negative sign indicating that there existed a lack of a certain cultural dimension for either type of organization. It must be noted here that observation of participants with respect to the time spent on interview questions and the amount of detail (particularly their accounts of example situations the encountered in the field) were deemed to outweigh the simple tallying of frequency coding. This is due to the nature of the discussion and the fact that some of the cultural dimensions arose more frequently due to the topic of humanitarian response (such as humane orientation).

Interview Questions

Each interview question is linked back to one or more research questions as depicted in table 1. The answers were coded with respect to the cultural themes listed next to each interview question in table 1. Observation was needed to complement the discussion during the narrative interviews as it allowed the researcher to determine if the participant was discussing a negative or positive existence of a cultural dimension in their organization and the culturally disparate organization.

Question 1 (IQ1): What do you think makes your organization successful? What are you proud of with respect to your organization? How does the organization

view risk? (Uncertainty avoidance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation)

Question 2 (IQ2): What makes the leadership in your organization effective in producing organizational and public value? Do you personally feel empowered by your leadership? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation)

Question 3 (IQ3): How are decisions made in your organization? (Power distance, in-group collectivism, societal collectivism, humane orientation)

Question 4 (IQ4): How often have you worked with members of organization y? What is your opinion of organization y? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation, humane orientation)

Question 5 (IQ5): What value do you see in working with organization y? (Uncertainty avoidance, societal collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation).

Question 6 (IQ6): Do you think that barriers exist between your organization x and organization y that affect working relationships? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation).

The following table was used to extract relevant data from observation and interviews for coding and data analysis using the cultural themes. It will ultimately allow me to answer my research questions based upon my derived emic.

Table 2

Data Collection Linkage

Interview Question	Link to RQ	Cultural Dimension	Derived Theme (CD-Based)
IQ1	RQ1, RQ2	CD1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9	
IQ2	RQ1, RQ2	CD1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9	
IQ3	RQ1	CD2, 4, 9	
IQ4	RQ1, RQ2, RQ3	CD3, 6, 7, 9	
IQ5	RQ2, RQ3	CD3, 7, 8, 9	
IQ6	RQ2, RQ3	CD1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9	

Note. Not all cultural dimensions were deemed applicable to this study. This is annotated next to cultural dimensions not applicable in the list below. Each cultural dimension is described in a context that matches its definition with associated key words and phrases considered synonymous with the cultural dimension.

Cultural Dimensions

The following is a list of the cultural dimensions that I used to derive themes from participant statements and observation. The associated definitions from my theoretical basis (House, et al, 2002) are provided for clarity of meaning:

Cultural Dimension 1 (CD1) uncertainty avoidance: “The extent to which members of an organization or society strive to avoid uncertainty by reliance on social norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices to alleviate the unpredictability of future events” (p. 5)

Cultural Dimension 2 (CD2) power distance: “The degree to which members of an organization or society expect and agree that power should be equally shared” (p. 5)

Cultural Dimension 3 (CD3) societal collectivism: “The degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action” (p. 5)

Cultural Dimension 4 (CD4) in-group collectivism: “The degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty and cohesiveness in their organizations or families” (p. 5)

Cultural Dimension 5 (CD5) gender egalitarianism (not applicable): “The extent to which an organization or a society minimizes gender role differences and gender discrimination” (p. 5)

Cultural Dimension 6 (CD6) assertiveness: “The degree to which individuals in organizations or societies are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social relationships” (p. 6)

Cultural Dimension 7 (CD7) future orientation: “The degree to which individuals in organizations or societies engage in future-oriented behaviors such as planning, investing in the future, and delaying gratification” (p. 6)

Cultural Dimension 8 (CD8) performance orientation: “The extent to which an organization or society encourages and rewards group members for performance improvement and excellence” (p. 6)

Cultural Dimension 9 (CD9) humane orientation: “The degree to which individuals in organizations or societies encourage and reward individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others” (p. 6)

Participant Interview Results

Four participants were interviewed in this study. They were recruited based upon their experience having worked with the culturally disparate organization during humanitarian crisis response and based upon their large amount of personal experience in leadership roles in these types of operations. Each participant had a minimum of 30 years of experience in their respective organization. Two participants were from civilian aid organizations (one governmental and one nongovernmental). The two other participants were senior United States military officers. Interview protocol, observation protocol, and complete interview transcripts are found in appendices one through six.

Participant observation was conducted during the interviews in order to gain more insight with respect to items that influence organizational culture that are outside of the aforementioned cultural dimensions. The most frequently noted items in this sense were the role of political implications on organizational processes, attitudes and other attributes, as well as the influence of the greater societal culture on the organizations values. Of note, all participants voluntarily emphasized the need for better inter-cultural understanding of disparate response organizations. It can be inferred that this was due to the participants having been provided the purpose of the study in advance, but more importantly was due to the participants’ own lived experiences and attitudes.

Analysis of Data Collected

I organized the data collected from the four participants into themes related to each cultural dimension. These themes were derived from the interpretive coding of each interview question. I then tied these themes to each one of the three research questions in order to tie the data collected and analyzed back to the purpose of the study. Examples of participant statements related to the research questions are provided below.

RQ1: How do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture and which values are most important to the individual groups?

RQ2: What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences?

RQ3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations?

Interview Question One

Question 1 (IQ1): What do you think makes your organization successful? What are you proud of with respect to your organization? How does the organization view risk? (Uncertainty avoidance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation).

Previous research on military culture indicate that the military values training, cohesion and mission accomplishment. These values, along with a negative view of adhococracy are reflected in the answers to interview question one, both from the military

participants and the civilian aid worker participants in discussing their view of the military. The values of training and mission accomplishment are reflective of a high degree of Cultural Dimension 8 (CD8) performance orientation: "The extent to which an organization or society encourages and rewards group members for performance improvement and excellence" (House, et al., 2002, p. 6). Participant MO1's statement is demonstrative of this organizational value "We had no luxury of early warning. We had to rely on our training." His additional statement "It was...that the experience of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines and leaders and their adaptability that ability to be able to quickly recognize environment and adapt from their previous experiences, their training that had served them extremely well obviously during peace and war proved to be essential" indicates that this value of training and experience (CD8) allowed for them to overcome the adhocacy of the unfolding crisis. So, essentially, the previous research of Davis and Paparone (2012) supports the value of mission accomplishment, but in the face of human suffering the military dislike for adhocacy (CD1-uncertainty avoidance – is compensated for by performance orientation (through training and experience in their core competency). It must also be noted here that both military officers felt that saving lives and relieving human suffering was paramount (CD9-humane orientation) and is supported by what as Kapucu (2009) describes an ability to adapt to the environment based upon needs.

Interestingly, this question elicited a response from participant CAP with reference to experience working with the military which indicated differences in power distance between the two organizations being studied. Participant CAP stated "The

military tend to want to give us orders to do things and that, I will tell you, is not the way to win friends and influence civilians. And where we need to discuss what we're going to do and why we are going to do it, the military has limitations as far as their mission statement." This view indicates that civilian aid workers from private organizations view the military as having a short power distance (I have control of the immediate things around me) versus a long power distance (I need to wait to be told what to do with respect to decisions and actions). This view, however, is contra-indicated in other statements in the interview by civilian aid workers as they indicated that the military is hierarchical (long power distance) as opposed to civilian aid organizations being classified as "collaborative" and organizationally "flatter". This observation is supported by Professor Roberts' 2010 study of the working relationships between the military and NGOs that indicated that the military values "organizational structures that reinforce hierarchical authority, clearly defined of command and control relationships, and rules of engagement that are clearly defined to ensure accountability to policy makers" (Roberts, 2010, p. 213).

The answers examining civilian aid worker culture provided by participants to interview question one are closely correlated with the organizational values described in Roberts' 2010 article "Spanning "Bleeding" Boundaries: Humanitarianism, NGOs, and the Civilian-Military Nexus in the Post-Cold War Era" and Hilhorst and Schmiemann's (2002) study of how internationally recognized humanitarian principles influence the organizational culture of NGOs. It must be noted here that the cultural dimension of

humane orientation (CD9) showed a frequent occurrence due to the nature of the discussion and the nature of the study.

One statement from participant CAG indicated a similar value of mission accomplishment correlating somewhat to CD8 (performance orientation). The participant stated "I think what makes it successful really is the willingness of the people that work there to take on the mandate, and it has a unique mandate. And therefore I think that is why some people are willing to give a lot extra...for the mandate to work on humanitarian assistance type activities." This indicates a strong value in accomplishing the organization's mission and indicates a strong degree of humanitarianism (CD9—which is essentially the organizations overarching mandate.

Power distance was also a strong theme of discussion as noted through observations of reactions and strong statements by civilian aid worker participants. Participant CAP stated "One of the difficulties in nonmilitary organizations and military organizations working together is that very often we come from very different cultures, very different backgrounds, and very different styles. Particularly in leadership, we are much more horizontal in our organization structure than vertical as is the military" and "we are much more participative...we do things by consensus, the military generally does things by orders and you don't discuss the order you just salute smartly and do it, where if we don't think it's appropriate we are just as likely to say "well that's not a very good idea because If we did it this way it would be different and in my experience." This is supported, as in the case of the analysis of the military side of the answers to this interview question by the research by Roberts (2010) and the study conducted by Hilhorst

and Schmiemann (2002) indicating values of intra organizational collaboration, participation, and independent thought in civilian aid organizations. These values show a high degree of short power distance CD2 (empowerment of the organization's members when they are in the field) and CD4 (in-group collectivism). Power distance relates to individual empowerment and to the nature of an organization's leadership and how that leadership relates to subordinates in an organization. This is to be analyzed in interview question 2.

Interview Question Two

Question 2 (IQ2): What makes the leadership in your organization effective in producing organizational and public value? Do you personally feel empowered by your leadership? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation)

Participants from both the military and from civilian aid organization felt a strong sense of empowerment within their respective organizations. This may very well be due to each participant's respective time working for their organization (all had at least 30 years working for their organization). My observation here is that this in-group collectivism found in statements from both military and civilian aid organizations is indicative of inter-subjective behavior and can be a cause of a lack of coordination efforts. I derive from this a theme of both of these organizations being "closed communities" due to their members spending long periods of time, isolated from the day-to-day family and friends at home while operating in austere environments. The result of

this is inter-subjective behavior and patterns of thought, or essentially the group “closing ranks” to the point of not feeling positive about working with a culturally disparate group. This essentially answers my Research Question RQ2 – What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences? This answer to RQ2 is supported by Roberts (2010) study that found that NGO cultural attributes include (and are not limited to): organizational mandates are to be fulfilled by staying autonomous, neutral, and impartial, taking instructions and being tasked by outside organizations is generally not done, they value their freedom of operations and are thus are suspicious of attempts to organize or integrate with others (p. 213).

Participant MO2 stated "I think you can't isolate the leadership of an organization without being cognizant of the role that higher headquarters plays, if you will. I think our leadership had a great deal to do with our success by being cohesive. The core of that initial Joint Task Force and then Combined Support Force was the XXX staff which was a very cohesive organization. They had planned and trained together extensively and it was pretty comfortable bringing in individual augments into the staff from the other services. Because it was a very competent organization, folks could come in and play a role quickly." This statement is again supported by Kirke's 2010 research "Military Cohesion, Culture and Social Psychology" and his findings that military cohesion is a core cultural aspect of collectivism in the military. This statement and supporting research indicates that when asked about leadership and empowerment, the military values in-group collectivism (CD4) as a core cultural dimension. They are thus what

Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2010) describe as a closed organization due to this cohesion developed over time by the members becoming each other's social system in the absence of family and friends during long periods of time away from home.

The core mission of the military and its ability to adapt to the environment was viewed by participant MO2 as the means that military leadership provides public value. He stated "I think it is just that in a sense our military's core mission is to defend the nation against all enemies foreign and domestic. I think that when we are called upon to do humanitarian and disaster response missions and while we don't necessarily train for that mission, we are able to use those capabilities that we do have in appropriate ways to respond in the interest of the United States. So I think Haiti was a great example of how we proved how effectively we can do that." It can be argued here that this is a prime example of a strong value of CD8 (performance orientation) which is supported by Wilson's (2008) research "Defining Military Culture" in which he describes the modern military as being more professional in nature and more reflective of society as a whole. This is as opposed to previous beliefs that the military was merely a reflection of the aristocracy (Wilson, 2008). My observation is that in the case of the Officer Core, this was the case in earlier times in history.

The civilian aid workers also indicated a strong degree of empowerment (short power distance—CD2). But, as is in the case of the military, they do have a "master" driving what their actions and decisions in the field. Participant CAP discussed this element by telling me that, although private volunteer organizations are not political, their actions are constrained by the grants that they have written in order to gain financing

from sponsors. Likewise, the military is constrained by laws and is, in the case of the United States, under the control of civilian government officials. Participant CAP stated "When I was running an organization in a country I had, within the bounds of what I was there to do, I had pretty much a free reign. That didn't mean it was laissez faire, I had to check back occasionally but they were a long way away and decisions had to be made on the field. I mean in the situation at the time, you couldn't be fooling around with waiting 24 to 48 hours to get a decision from somebody when the situation needs to be dealt with right now. So the country director has a good deal of leeway within certain parameters. We can't just go off and start new programs just because we want to." This statement indicates a limit on power distance, but she also stated "The country director is the commanding officer and has a good deal of discretion" which is supported by Hilhorst and Schmiemann's 2002 study of NGOs and finding that they value freedom and autonomy. Roberts's (2010) research also found that NGOs value the freedom to make decisions in complex field conditions.

Interview Question Three

Question 3 (IQ3): How are decisions made in your organization? (Power distance, in-group collectivism, societal collectivism, humane orientation)

The largest thematic difference between the culture sharing groups here was a "flat" versus a hierarchical group. This is supported by Roberts' (2010) assessment of military culture is described as having organizational structures that reinforce hierarchical authority and clearly defined of command and control relationships. It is also supported by the observation that the interviewees in Hilhorst and Schmiemann's 2002 study

indicated a positive view of the “un-bureaucratic” nature of the organization during their work conducting humanitarian assistance, specifically being empowered with responsibility and flexibility of decision-making and actions (p. 497). They indicated that they like the “horizontal” nature of the organization; un-bureaucratic and independent (p. 497). This theme was resonant throughout the interviews and indicates a strong difference in CD2–power distance. The civilian aid workers describe a value of a shorter power distance (more empowerment in the field) while the military officers describe taking direction from higher headquarters for the higher levels of decision making. It must be noted here, however, that a difference in observed values – hierarchical versus “flat” only goes so far with respect to reality. Specifically, the military is directed by national interests while NGOs actions are driven by donor requirements.

This observation, or theme, of organizational differences essentially answers my Research Question One (RQ1): How do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture and which values are most important to the individual groups? The military as an organization values hierarchy and thus clearly defined command and control relationships and NGOs value collaboration and empowerment on the ground. However, during the interviews, all participants indicated they were empowered at the tactical (field) level to make decisions.

Of note, participant CAG is a civilian humanitarian aid worker, but works for a governmental organization, thus indicating a hybrid of results between the military and civilian aid groups. His statement is indicative of this: "Sometimes, I think that overall...there are high profile activities that are sometimes overshadowed by politics

rather than mission – and that’s just real world...however, with that said, there are many humanitarian professionals within that organization that really do look at a decision or an activity and approach it from a humanitarian professional standpoint, and approach it from that. I would say that first and foremost, overall the staff are humanitarian professionals first and deal with the politics secondarily.” This indicates a strong degree of CD9 (humane orientation) as a value that is considered foremost even in an organization whose actions can be impacted by political decisions.

Accordingly, the actions and decisions of the US military driven by national interests and therefor are political as well. Kinetic military actions are sometimes referred to as “violent politics”. Participant MO1 indicates a large power distance when making a decision to employ the military, but, much like civilian aid organizations decisions on the ground are not so driven by what is going on in Washington. When asked how decisions are made in his organization, he stated “the way that I would characterize it is most decisions are made at the top-what you are going to do, what the priorities are, and what the direction are made at the top. But the execution is very decentralized.”

Civilian aid organizations indicated a higher focus on sustainability in the population that they are rendering aid to. Their responses tended to be more long term focused indicating a strong value in CD7-future orientation and CD3–societal collectivism. Participant CAP stated "We have more involvement, and I think I can make this a blanket statement, we have more involvement with the people we are there to serve than the military. We work with the local government if there is one. We work with the local people. We don't tell them what they need. We asked what they have, what they

need, what we can bring, what are their priorities and we negotiate with them if we don't agree with their priorities." This value essentially equates to "if you give a man a fish, he will eat for a day. If you teach a man to fish, he will eat for a lifetime". The inherent theme derived here of short term versus long term focus with respect to humanitarian intervention provides another indicated cultural disparity between civilian aid organizations and the military. This theme adds more depth to my answer to RQ1 which revolves around organizational differences. Essentially, the military is in a supporting role (in general) during humanitarian crises and needs to provide this support quickly to the main effort (civilian aid organizations) so that the military can return to its core competency. Civilian aid workers are focused on sustainability, thereby enabling the affected population and not making them dependent upon outsiders.

Interview Question Four

Question 4 (IQ4): How often have you worked with members of organization y? What is your opinion of organization y? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation, humane orientation)

The value in answering my research questions with the data and themes derived from this interview question was found more in the answer to the second part of the question regarding the participant's opinion of the other organization. This is supported by elements of relational theory by applying Historical Discourse Analysis by organizing statements by participants and organizing them into "subjects" and "objects" in a manner consistent with the Foucauldian approach of text analysis (Peräkylä, 2005, p. 871).

Participant CAG was asked about his opinion of the military. His response indicated a high degree of assertiveness (CD5) in his description of certain personalities in the military being “type A”. He also indicated a high uncertainty avoidance (CD1) when describing the military in his discussion that when encountering a foreign problem set, they revert back to their training. He stated: "They understand kinetic. When they get into a new operational environment, an environment which they are not familiar with, two things occur: One is because many of them come from a type A personality where they are given a problem set and look for a solution-when they see a problem set outside of their solution set – some people will make the mistake of thinking that they know best and execute and fix and come up with a solution set. Therefore their solutions may be short-sighted and incomplete." Likewise, participant CAP stated “the military come in and do what they are told to do. I don't mean to be disrespectful-but regardless of what the population wants." This is somewhat supported by Davis and Paparone’s 2012 study their findings of military culture that demonstrated a view that adhocracy, being innovative and not staying with the norm was bad and that their organizational culture is characterized by a strong sense of mission accomplishment (market value) and, to a lesser degree a hierarchical value (pp. 34-36).

Similarities exist between the military and civilian aid organizations with respect to power distance. Participant CAP explained earlier in the interview that their actions (NGOs in this case) are driven by what their donors and sponsors have agreed to give them money for in the grant proposals submitted by the organization. Participant MO1 also related this similarity by stating "most of them, particularly the larger ones have a

Board of Directors back in the United States who are putting constraints on them just like our Department of Defense and Department of State put constraints on us. So, they don't just have leeway to do just what they'd like to on the ground." This is somewhat contrary to Hilhorst and Schmiemann's 2002 interviews finding that the most resonant values emerging from the NGO interviews were found to be the un-bureaucratic attitude and the focus on emergency relief (p. 497). This is also contrary to Roberts (2010) finding that one of their key attributes being that their organizational structures tend to be decentralized with respect to authority and decision making. This decentralization enables them to quickly adapt as needed while conducting field level operations in austere operating conditions (p. 213). I would like to state here that an organization's values (in this case a long power distance (CD2) between workers in the field executing operations and their headquarters) may not always reflect what actually happens due to fiscal needs.

Both military officers had a high opinion of civilian aid organizations and, likewise the civilian aid organizations valued the US military and its professionalized capabilities that support crisis response. Participant MO1 described civilian aid organizations as having a high degree of experience (CD8-performance orientation) and humane orientation–CD9. He stated "I didn't run into too many people that were doing that because they wanted to become millionaires. So I think their motivations are very pure because they are doing it because they generally really want to help people. Many of them have a lot of experience, sort of bounce around that world in different places." He further stated "I think that as a group and as people who volunteer their services, work in

NGOs that are humanitarian aid type organizations, do it because they have a real passion for it and really want to help people." This is supported by Hilhorst & Schmiemann's 2002 findings that humanitarian principles define aid worker values (p.491); these humanitarian principles being humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality (ICRC, 2014).

The emerging themes from IQ4, part two regarding the participant opinions of the alternate cultural group lead to answers to my third research question, RQ3—How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations? Participant MO2 felt strongly about building better relationships between the two organizational types prior to a crisis. He stated "I think that they need to train together (referring to the military and aid organizations). There needs to be an adjustment in the personnel system that will put them in positions at the Joint Forces Staff College or any of the (military) service command and staff colleges or war colleges to have a much better sense and greater experience in deliberate planning and a better understanding of the (military) services." The civilian aid worker participants expressed similar sentiments. This indicates a theme, derived by participant statements and researcher observation of a need for mutuality. This is supported by Roberts' 2010 purposeful research article "Spanning "Bleeding" Boundaries: Humanitarianism, NGOs, and the Civilian-Military Nexus in the Post-Cold War Era" which examined the organizational cultures of the military and international NGOs in order determine "how best to structure for effectiveness the increasingly vital peacekeeping and humanitarian

efforts of the military and NGOs in failing or failed states and combat zones around the world” (p. 212). A secondary theme, also supported by this article, is that both organizations value what the other brings to crisis response.

Interview Question Five

Question 5 (IQ5): What value do you see in working with organization y? (Uncertainty avoidance, societal collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation).

A stated in the results of interview question four, both organizations recognize and value the capabilities and abilities of the disparate cultural group. This is a strong theme relating to CD8–performance orientation, and supports answering my third research question; RQ3–How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations? It must be noted here that all participants were observed to have a strong desire for better inter organizational understanding between the two groups. All participants were most passionate about this particular area of the need for mutuality as could be observed by their spending extra time describing in detail personal experiences with actual cases of challenges to working together and misunderstandings. Getting past these misunderstandings of one another’s organizational culture in order to more effectively alleviate human suffering was a resonant theme throughout all interviews.

Participant CAP responded to this interview question by demonstrating a value in the military’s capabilities and strengths that could be used to support her organization in a

crisis. She stated "the military are essential to get things done. But also security, communications. Those are the big ones logistics, security, and communications-lift. Those are the things that we cannot do nearly as well as the military does. We do not have the resources, usually. It is a skill. The military have people who do this all the time." This indicates a theme that some of the core competencies of the military can be translated into non kinetic operational activities, thus further answering research question three regarding intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Participant CAG viewed the military as a complementary organization to his if they were better aware of the problem set presented to them that was outside of their standard role. He stated "in working with them and engaging them, as I said, in this new problem set, the value-added is that if we can improve their knowledge set and their understanding of handling that problem set the value-added is that they can be more efficient and help my organization to meet its goals, its mandate and that is key, as the military would say, we like them to become a force multiplier for humanitarian assistance." His statement supports what amounts to an overarching theme of mutuality through mutual appreciation.

The participants therefore indicated value in working together but not necessarily losing their autonomy. Roberts' 2010 study found that cultural values of civilian aid organizations reflected: organizational mandates are to be fulfilled by staying autonomous, neutral, and impartial, taking instructions and being tasked by outside organizations is generally not done, they value their freedom of operations and are thus

are suspicious of attempts to organize or integrate with others (p. 213). Going back to participant CAP's response to interview question one, she felt strongly about these values by stating "the military tend to want to give us orders to do things and that, I will tell you, is not the way to win friends and influence civilians. And where we need to discuss what we're going to do and why we are going to do it, the military has limitations as far as their mission statement."

The military officers interviewed mirrored this strong sentiment of the value and professional expertise of civilian aid organizations. Participant MO2 stated "the value is that those folks bring tremendous expertise. The World Health Organization brings expertise in preventing epidemics. They have tremendous capability from a public health perspective that is not resident in military organizations. World Food Program; the military can handout yellow bagged MREs and high energy biscuits but the reality is that the World Food Program brings experience in terms of feeding populations that is absolutely nonexistent in military organizations." Essentially, the mutual feeling is that neither organization can accomplish humanitarian assistance alone, but both cultural groups need to respect one another's values and appreciate one another's capabilities.

Interview Question Six

Question 6 (IQ6): Do you think that barriers exist between your organization x and organization y that affect working relationships? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation).

The emerging themes regarding barriers affecting working relationships are based upon inter organizational misunderstandings and a strong desire for unity of effort between disparate response organizations. Participant MO2 stated "I think that they (the barriers) are based on a lack of understanding on both sides about what the mission is. There are probably some preconceived notions on both sides of the relationship that aren't totally correct, but they are there. It takes some time to knock down those barriers." He further stated "I think that the more that you can put these organizations together, whether it is in the schoolhouse or planning exercises, training together is the key to breaking down those barriers of stereotyping to not really understanding each other's capabilities and frankly how you can take some very disparate capabilities and how the pieces fit together and have a synergistic effort." To add to this participant MO1 stated "I think we've got to figure out how to have those kind of relationships so when we do have to work together we can do it in a better collaborative way and make it more effective." The word collaborative is a key element as civilian aid organizations desire collaboration as opposed to being tasked by outside organizations or organized or integrated with others (Roberts, 2010, p. 213).

Participant CAG stated "I think the barrier really is the lack of understanding. I think that is one of the big ones. I think that if barrier can be chipped away at, the two organizations can work together more effectively." Participant CAG also described his personal observations in the Haiti earthquake response emphasized the need to break down barriers between the military and civilian aid organizations. He added "my organization is trying to push to the military is that unity of effort and that it has to be a

unity of effort among all organizations to be effective. It can' be parallel efforts and I will just use Haiti as an example – there were too many examples of parallel efforts as opposed to unity of effort across the board, which led to inefficiencies in that response." I also observed that the civilian aid workers showed an understanding of military vernacular. The military participants did not seem to use civilian aid organization vernacular.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

I needed to characterize each participant with a code and that allowed me to discern who they are and what characteristics they possess. This allowed me to provide the results of the study to participants to aid me as the researcher with checking for the validity of my data prior to publishing to results.

For quality assurance and transferability of this narrative ethnographic study, I used Creswell's (2013, pp. 262-263) suggested questions to assess the quality of the study quality as the actual study has not yet completed. Specifically:

- The researcher must clearly identify the culture-sharing groups to be studied (p. 263). The culture sharing groups in this study were military officers and civilian aid workers with at least 30 years of experience in their field and experience working with the alternate culture sharing group during a crisis event.
- The cultural themes to be studied must be specified (p. 263). In this case the theoretical framework will be used to observe the etic of the culture-sharing groups. This are stated earlier as Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions as expanded by Project GLOBE which were used as the basis for coding and analysis of the etic.

- The culture group must be clearly described (p. 263). The group had at least 30 years of experience in their field and experience working with the alternate culture sharing group during a crisis event.
- Cultural themes will be identified and derived after applying the theoretical framework, thus leading to the ultimate emic (p. 263). The emerging cultural themes from each interview question are described in the analysis section of this chapter. They were derived from participant statements, researcher observations and were supported by previous scholarly research.
- Identify any issues arising in the field with respect to the relationship between the researcher and participants, “the interpretive nature of reporting, and sensitivity and reciprocity in the co-creating of the account” (Creswell, 2013). My original research plan consisted of interviews and observation of students in my workplace. This was not a viable option due to my leadership position as their faculty. I recruited and interviewed members of the relevant culture sharing groups who were both retired and from outside of my work organization.
- The manner in which the culture-sharing group works must be explained (p. 263). Each culture sharing group works together in often austere and or isolated settings for varying periods of time. One group consists of civilian aid workers whose charter it is to provide humanitarian assistance. The other group consists of military officers whose charter it is to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies both foreign and domestic.

- The researcher must self-disclose and relate reflexivity with respect to their role and position in the study (p. 263). My personal role and process in this study was to continually reflect upon and keep in mind my objective of determining my emic with respect to the cultural dimensions being observed for existing themes. These themes, amounting to my emic, ultimately reflected upon and answered my research questions.

To assess trustworthiness, I utilized two of Patton's (2002) triangulation of sources and triangulation of analysis in the study. My study initially utilized triangulation of sources by examining interviews, observations and background material from previous scholarly research (Patton, 2002). Each finding regarding a strong presence of a particular cultural dimension from resultant analysis of data collected was correlated to a related study described in my literature review and methodology chapters. Later in the study, the triangulation of analysis consisted of my own analysis using a priori coding, the analysis from the participants by allowing them to review the results of the study, and a peer review by a cohort in this same academic program (Creswell, 2013).

To ensure credibility of the research plan, I identified and self-assessed upfront any self-bias that could have affected the credibility of my results in the eyes of the audience of my research. I am a retired military officer and had to keep this potential bias in mind when determining my emic of the cultural analysis of the culture sharing groups. My primary method of avoiding my identification too much with the military group was to form ongoing professional relationships with some local NGOs and with members of

civilian governmental aid organizations. I strongly believe that this gave me a higher degree of open-mindedness.

Results

The overarching purpose of my study was to determine what barriers exist between these two organizations and, ultimately to identify modes for improving mutuality among disparate crisis responders prior to a humanitarian crisis. In this section supporting research questions are answered or addressed supported by the previously discussed interview question analysis utilizing *a priori* coding. My coding methodology took into account frequency coding, but more effectively utilized Historical Discourse Analysis (HDA). I found that HDA was more relevant to relational theory and I utilized it by organizing statements by participants and organizing them into “subjects” and “objects” in a manner consistent with the Foucauldian approach of text analysis (Peräkylä, 2005, p. 871). The analysis of the coded data collected from the interview text further utilized Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA) as a basis for methodology (Peräkylä, 2005, pp. 872-873). I applied the MCA approach by aligning the themes arising from the coded interviews with what Peräkylä (2005) describes as categories for the participants and arranging them into “category-bound activities” (p. 873).

My results section addresses each research question with respect to themes. Each of the three research questions were analyzed and answered by deriving themes from the previously described interview questions and through participant observation to enrich data collection. These themes are supported by existing research as described both below

and in the analysis of data section where I describe the experience and etic from the participant responses.

Table 3

The Derivation of Themes (Researcher Etic)

Interview Question	Link to RQ	Cultural Dimension	Derived Theme (CD-Based)
IQ1	RQ1, RQ2	CD1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9	Flat versus hierarchical organizational structure.
IQ2	RQ1, RQ2	CD1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9	Personal empowerment. Closed communities.
IQ3	RQ1	CD2, 4, 9	Triage versus sustainability. Mission focus versus population focus.
IQ4	RQ1, RQ2, RQ3	CD3, 6, 7, 9	Need for mutuality. Mutual respect/appreciation. Respect for humanitarianism.
IQ5	RQ2, RQ3	CD3, 7, 8, 9	Mutuality through mutual appreciation.
IQ6	RQ2, RQ3	CD1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9	Lack of understanding. Unity of effort.

Note. The emerging themes are from the interview questions are expanded upon in the following section.

Research Question 1: How do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture and which are most important to the individual groups?

My intended purpose of this research question was to set a baseline for deriving the basic differences between the organizational cultures of the participants' organizations. These organizational cultural differences were gleaned out of interview statements and the observation of participant reactions to questions and the ensuing discussion. Project GLOBE's 2002 cultural dimension assessment model was used as a baseline for deriving organizational cultural differences.

Finding. The largest thematic difference between the culture sharing groups here was a “flat” versus a hierarchical group. This is supported by Roberts' (2010) assessment of military culture is described as having organizational structures that reinforce hierarchical authority and clearly defined of command and control relationships. It is also supported by the observation that the interviewees in Hilhorst and Schmiemann's 2002 study indicated a positive view of the “un-bureaucratic” nature of the organization during their work conducting humanitarian assistance, specifically being empowered with responsibility and flexibility of decision-making and actions (p. 497). They indicated that they like the “horizontal” nature of the organization; un-bureaucratic and independent (p. 497). This theme was resonant throughout the interviews and indicates a strong difference in CD2–power distance. The civilian aid workers describe a value of a shorter power distance (more empowerment in the field) while the military officers describe taking direction from higher headquarters for the higher levels of decision making. It must be noted here, however, that a difference in observed values – hierarchical versus “flat” only goes so far with respect to reality. Specifically, the military is directed by national interests while NGOs actions are driven by donor requirements.

This observation, or theme, of organizational differences essentially answers an element of my Research Question One (RQ1): How do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture and which values are most important to the individual groups? The military as an organization values hierarchy and thus clearly defined command and control relationships and NGOs value collaboration and empowerment on the ground. However, during the

interviews, all participants indicated they were empowered at the tactical (field) level to make decisions.

Another theme was that answered RQ1 that was derived from interview question three was short term operational focus or triage versus long term focus or sustainability. The military is “mission focused” (this is supported by Davis and Papparone’s 2012 study) while civilian aid organizations are focused on humanitarianism (supported by both Roberts’ 2010 research and Hilhorst and Schmiemann’s 2002 study). Civilian aid organizations indicated a higher focus on sustainability in the population that they are rendering aid to. Their responses tended to be more long term focused indicating a strong value in CD7-future orientation and CD3–societal collectivism. Participant CAP stated “We have more involvement, and I think I can make this a blanket statement, we have more involvement with the people we are there to serve than the military. We work with the local government if there is one. We work with the local people. We don't tell them what they need. We asked what they have, what they need, what we can bring, what are their priorities and we negotiate with them if we don't agree with their priorities.” This value essentially equates to “if you give a man a fish, he will eat for a day. If you teach a man to fish, he will eat for a lifetime”. The inherent theme derived here of short term versus long term focus with respect to humanitarian intervention provides another indicated cultural disparity between civilian aid organizations and the military. This theme adds more depth to my answer to RQ1 which revolves around organizational differences. Essentially, the military is in a supporting role (in general) during humanitarian crises and needs to provide this support quickly to the main effort (civilian

aid organizations) so that the military can return to its core competency. Civilian aid workers are focused on sustainability, thereby enabling the affected population and not making them dependent upon outsiders.

Research Question 2: What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences?

The purpose of research question 2 was to organize key participant discussions and statements into themes derived from interviews and observations. These themes were used to aid my development of the etic of the ethnographic analysis and ultimate conclusions with respect to my researcher's perspective or emic. This research question is essential to determining barriers to mutuality between culturally disparate organizations that may find themselves working together in a crisis response situation and is essential to the overarching purpose of this study.

Finding. Participants from both the military and from civilian aid organization felt a strong sense of empowerment within their respective organizations. This may very well be due to each participant's respective time working for their organization (all had at least 30 years working for their organization). My observation here is that this in-group collectivism found in statements from both military and civilian aid organizations is indicative of inter-subjective behavior and patterns of thought and can be a cause of a lack of coordination efforts. I derive from this a theme of both of these organizations being "closed communities" due to their members spending long periods of time, isolated from the day-to-day family and friends at home while operating in austere environments. The result of this is inter-subjective behavior and patterns of thought, or essentially the

group “closing ranks” to the point of not feeling positive about working with a culturally disparate group. This essentially answers my Research Question RQ2 – What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences? This answer to RQ2 is supported by Roberts (2010) study that found that NGO cultural attributes include (and are not limited to): organizational mandates are to be fulfilled by staying autonomous, neutral, and impartial, taking instructions and being tasked by outside organizations is generally not done, they value their freedom of operations and are thus are suspicious of attempts to organize or integrate with others (p. 213).

The strongest theme that emerged with respect to this research question may be found in the answers to interview question six in which the participants were very passionate about how a lack of understanding of each other creates a barrier. They all felt that this lack of understanding takes time to overcome, and, through experience working together and overcoming this barrier the result could be a more synergistic working relationship. The theme “unity of effort” resounded in this question, indicating the importance of professional growth and learning associated with performance orientation (CD8). This is resonant in participant CAG’s statement (which is directly tied to barrier mitigation in RQ3) "my organization is trying to push to the military is that unity of effort and that it has to be a unity of effort among all organizations to be effective. It can't be parallel efforts and I will just use Haiti as an example – there were too many examples of parallel efforts as opposed to unity of effort across the board, which led to inefficiencies in that response."

Research Question 3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations?

The purpose of research question three was to determine what values members of the two participant organization hold as resiliencies; essentially what values a culture-sharing group clings to as deep rooted values. These deep rooted values have the potential to provide a basis for barrier mitigation if they are understood by both culture-sharing groups and are demonstrated during crisis response.

Finding. The emerging themes from IQ4, part two regarding the participant opinions of the alternate cultural group lead to answers to my third research question, RQ3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations? Participant MO2 felt strongly about building better relationships between the two organizational types prior to a crisis. He stated "I think that they need to train together (referring to the military and aid organizations). There needs to be an adjustment in the personnel system that will put them in positions at the Joint Forces Staff College or any of the (military) service command and staff colleges or war colleges to have a much better sense and greater experience in deliberate planning and a better understanding of the (military) services." The civilian aid worker participants expressed similar sentiments.

This indicates a theme, derived by participant statements and researcher observation of a need for mutuality. This is supported by Roberts' 2010 purposeful research article which examined the organizational cultures of the military and international NGOs in order determine "how best to structure for effectiveness the increasingly vital peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts of the military and NGOs in failing or failed states and combat zones around the world" (p. 212). A secondary theme, also supported by this article, is that both organizations value what the other brings to crisis response.

Both organizations demonstrate respect for human life or humanitarianism. In interview question one, participant MO1 went into quite a bit of detail describing the sense of urgency associated with preventing further loss of human life. At one point during the large disaster response effort that he responded to, his military organization noticed that thousands of victims who were displaced from their homes were gathering in an open area. His organization realized that this open area would soon become a flood zone with the impending rainy season, thus washing thousands of people out to sea. He had discussions with the government of the affected nation and responding relief organizations and they were planning to wait for a long term development focused solution to the displaced persons situation. Essentially they wanted to wait and move them into buildings, while participant MO1 wanted to get them out of the flood zone by any means possible even if it meant moving them into tents in a safe area. This presented a conflict in viewpoints and thus a theme related to CD7-future orientation. He stated "there is no easy solution here, do you want to be answering the question "why you

didn't do anything to save these lives here" or do you want to be answering the question "why you are preemptively doing an emergency movement?" I think it's easier to explain the latter rather than the former and try to address it." Eventually, the various stakeholders came to agreement and the people were moved to a safer area and no lives were lost due to floods. The theme arising from this instance is long versus short term solutions and finding ways to mitigate these two barriers by coming together with a humanitarian worldview.

The most prominent theme to this particular research question related to performance orientation (CD8) and its importance to removing barriers to mutuality through mutual respect of one another's organizational values. Both organizations recognize and value the capabilities and abilities of the disparate cultural group. It must be noted here that all participants were observed to have a strong desire for better inter-organizational understanding between the two groups. All participants were most passionate about this particular area of the need for mutuality as could be observed by their spending extra time describing in detail personal experiences with actual cases of challenges to working together and misunderstandings. Getting past these misunderstandings of one another's organizational culture in order to more effectively alleviate human suffering was a resonant theme throughout all interviews.

The participants therefore indicated value in working together but not necessarily losing their autonomy. Roberts' 2010 study found that cultural values of civilian aid organizations reflected: organizational mandates are to be fulfilled by staying autonomous, neutral, and impartial, taking instructions and being tasked by outside

organizations is generally not done, they value their freedom of operations and are thus are suspicious of attempts to organize or integrate with others (p. 213). Going back to participant CAP's response to interview question one, she felt strongly about these values by stating "the military tend to want to give us orders to do things and that, I will tell you, is not the way to win friends and influence civilians. And where we need to discuss what we're going to do and why we are going to do it, the military has limitations as far as their mission statement." But she also indicated an immense appreciation for the support capabilities (communications, security, and logistics) that the military brings to the humanitarian space. Likewise participant MO1 reflected that the humanitarian community brings capabilities, such as public health and camp management, that the military is just not well suited to manage.

Summary

Research question one asked how the organizations being examined do differ with respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture and which are most important to the individual groups? The answer lies in the researchers etic as derived from the strongest themes emerging from participant accounts. These were that the largest thematic difference between the culture sharing groups here was a "flat" versus a hierarchical group and that the military has a more short term operational focus or triage versus the long term focus or sustainability valued by civilian aid organizations. It is my opinion that the theme of organizations being hierarchical versus flat with respect to organizational structure is a peripheral element with respect to this study. The decision making element of these hierarchical versus "flat" aspects is the more important part of

this theme. Ultimately, both organizations take guidance from their leadership, but members of both organizations are empowered in the field with respect to making decisions that are within their authoritative and legal limits. This, coupled with the long term focus of aid workers versus the short term mission accomplishment focus of the military provide the answers to research question one.

Research question two asked what patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences? Participants from both the military and from civilian aid organization felt a strong sense of empowerment within their respective organizations. My observation here is that this in-group collectivism found in statements from both military and civilian aid organizations is indicative of inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought and can be a cause of a lack of coordination efforts. I derive from this a theme of both of these organizations being “closed communities” due to their members spending long periods of time, isolated from the day to day family and friends at home while operating in austere environments. The result, and the answer to research question two is that these groups tend to “close ranks” due to the phenomena of becoming closed communities due to operating away from home with other members becoming their “society” (replacing their home society) for long periods of time in austere locations. They do this to the point of not feeling positive about working with a culturally disparate group.

Research question three asked how the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental

organizations. Both the civilian aid worker and participants expressed similar sentiments that there is need for mutuality and that both organizations value what the other brings to crisis response. Both organizations also demonstrate respect for human life or humanitarianism. The most prominent theme to this particular research question related to performance orientation (CD8) and its importance to removing barriers to mutuality through mutual respect of one another's organizational values, thus answering research question three. Both organizations recognize and value the capabilities and abilities of the disparate cultural group. It must be noted here that all participants were observed to have a strong desire for better inter organizational understanding between the two groups, collaboration, but not integration.

The strongest themes that emerged were a need for unity of effort and humanitarianism from all participants, but this can be attributed to the nature of the lived experience that was being discussed as a lived experience. Deeper analysis indicated that humanitarian aid workers view themselves as having a strong degree of humanitarianism in general and view their organizations as being "flatter" as opposed to hierarchical with respect to power distance and decision making. They essentially viewed themselves as having a collective approach to their decisions and actions during a humanitarian crisis that is more inclusive and sustainable by the crisis affected population. Alternately, they viewed the military as being hierarchical, short sighted with respect to humanitarian interventions and having aggressive personalities with a lock step approach to humanitarian action. They felt that the military is highly capable and is often a necessary asset during humanitarian response. The military participants viewed themselves as being

highly capable, well trained and cohesive which allowed them to transition from focusing on their core competency (kinetic operations) to humanitarian action. Alternately, they view the humanitarian aid workers as needing more training and resources and having a long term development focus as opposed to fixing the immediate problem in front of them. They also viewed the humanitarian community as being difficult to get a decision from.

Ultimately, all participants agreed that removing the ad hoc nature of early coordination and replacing it with more effective means of coordination through cultural understanding would result in more efficient crisis response. Chapter five will explore some recommendations for removing some of the ad hoc nature during the early phases of crisis response and discuss how more research and education in this area may further effect social change. Schein's (2010) material on the different levels of culture were used to examine the amount of inter cultural knowledge that is needed to arrive at mutuality and as a basis for my recommendations.

Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

Culturally disparate organizations often find themselves working together in the field in response to crises. Often coordination efforts are ad hoc at the outset of a crisis. I intended to use this study to show that mutual understanding between these organizations can be realized as the result of intercultural understanding among members of these disparate organizations prior to the humanitarian crisis response. In this study, I interviewed selected participants from the United States military and international aid workers from governmental and nongovernmental organizations using qualitative, open ended questions. I used narrative ethnography as the study's methodology and asked participants to describe in detail their experiences responding to humanitarian crises. This allowed me to listen, observe, and ask follow up questions in order to establish what each participant felt was most important with respect to their experiences. The data from these interviews were essential in helping me to identify and understand the difference and similarities in organizational cultures, the barriers that result from those differences, and the potential areas for barrier mitigation.

Purpose of the Study

In this study, I aimed to improve cultural awareness between culturally disparate organizations and designed it to help those organizations to avoid some of the initial chaos at the outset of a crisis. Crisis response efforts are inherently chaotic in nature, but developing an earlier understanding of the unique attributes of a separate organization in advance has the potential to improve the swiftness and effectiveness of crisis response.

I intended to use this study to determine the value of organizational cultural understanding between disparate organizations prior to crisis response. Research has been conducted on relationships and effectiveness within and between cultures in humanitarian and peace operations, but a specific study and analysis of the often subjective observations of one organization's perceptions of a disparate organization's culture has not been conducted. This study and resulting analysis was accomplished by means of focused, narrative-style interviews of a variety of participants of real world disaster relief operations, and was aimed at increasing cross-cultural effectiveness prior to and during a crisis event.

I examined the elements essential to collaborative cooperation between organizations with differing organizational cultures and mandates, and worked to determine whether a common purpose outweighs cultural differences. Many studies have been conducted regarding organizational culture and leadership (Schein, 2010) and the interrelationship between the organization's values (how things should be) and practices (how things are) (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002). These prescribed cross-cultural organizational values (defined by Project GLOBE as applied to the Competing Values Framework) defined the theoretical basis for this study.

Additionally, my study built upon a study conducted at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College that utilized the Competing Values Framework. This recent study examined the cultural differences between Department of State employees and Department of Defense military officers in an effort to explore how "these [differences]

related to conducting integrated and complementary efforts in national security” (Davis & Paparone, 2012).

Nature of the Study

This study was exploratory in nature and thus derived a richer array of data through the subjective approach associated with qualitative research that uses open ended interview questions and observation of interview participants. My approach for this study was a narrative organizational ethnography utilizing existing theory on organizational culture from social psychologists Hofstede and Schein as a theoretical basis, while modifying it with the additional cultural dimensions from Project GLOBE, a research program that examines culture and leadership. My study revealed both disparities and likenesses in organizational culture between the United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

The overarching purpose of my research was to determine what barriers exist between these two organizations because of existing inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought, and ultimately to improve mutuality among disparate crisis responders prior to a humanitarian crisis. The participant pool was comprised of selected individuals with operational experience working side by side with culturally disparate organizations during a crisis response. The data collection methodology consisted of interviews of criterion based samples and inquiry by observation of those participants during the interview process. These data collection tools were targeted at addressing the main research problem which was aimed at determining how organizational culture can affect

the norms of behavior accepted by individuals within an organization to the detriment of working collectively with outside organizations who have a common purpose.

The most recent work of Hofstede et al. (2010) build upon Hofstede's earlier (1980) work describing a set of six cultural dimensions: uncertainty avoidance, power distance, collectivism I (societal collectivism), collectivism II (in-group collectivism), gender egalitarianism, and assertiveness. Project GLOBE (2002) has built upon these cultural dimensions to include future orientation, performance orientation, and humane orientation. They derived future orientation and humane orientation from Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's (1961) studies, and performance orientation from the work of McClelland (1985). Project GLOBE utilized these cultural dimensions to diagnose disparities in organizational culture as extant potential causal factors contributing to barriers resulting from an organization's inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought. I assumed that this knowledge could ultimately lead to unity of effort earlier in the case of a crisis event.

Summary of Key Findings

Research question one asked how the organizations being examined differ with respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture, and which are values are most important to the individual groups. The answer lies in my etic that I derived from the strongest cultural themes emerging from participant accounts. These answers showed that the largest thematic difference between the culture sharing groups was a "flat" versus a hierarchical group, and that the military has a more short term operational focus or triage approach, while civilian aid organizations have a more long term focus and value sustainability. I found that the theme of hierarchical versus flat

organization with respect to organizational structure was a peripheral element with respect to this study. The decision making element of these hierarchical versus “flat” aspects is the more important part of this theme. Ultimately, both organizations take guidance from their leadership, but members of both organizations are empowered in the field with respect to making decisions that are within their authoritative and legal limits. This, coupled with the long term focus of aid workers versus the short term mission accomplishment focus of the military, provide the answers to research question one.

Research question two asked what patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences. Participants from both the military and from civilian aid organization felt a strong sense of empowerment within their respective organizations. My observation here is that this in-group collectivism found in statements from both military and civilian aid organizations is indicative of inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought, and can cause a lack of coordination efforts. I derived from this a theme that both of these organizations were “closed communities” because of their members spending long periods of time isolated from the day-to-day family and friends while operating in austere environments. The result and answer to research question two is that these groups tend to “close ranks” due to the phenomena of becoming closed communities that operate away from home; other members become their “society” (replacing their home society) for long periods of time in austere locations. They do this to the point of not feeling positive about working with a culturally disparate group.

Research question three asked how the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Both the civilian aid worker and participants expressed similar sentiments that there is need for mutuality, and that both organizations value what the other brings to crisis response. Both organizations also demonstrate respect for human life or humanitarianism. The most prominent theme to this particular research question related to performance orientation (CD8) and its importance to removing barriers to mutuality through mutual respect of one another's organizational values. Both organizations recognize and value the capabilities and abilities of the disparate cultural group. It must be noted here that all participants were observed to have a strong desire for better inter-organizational understanding between the two groups, and all desired collaboration but not integration.

Interpretation of the Findings

The strongest themes that emerged were a need for unity of effort, and humanitarianism from all participants, but this can be attributed to the nature of the lived experience that was being discussed. Deeper analysis indicated that humanitarian aid workers view themselves as having a strong degree of humanitarianism in general and view their organizations as being “flatter” and less hierarchical with respect to power distance and decision making. They essentially viewed themselves as having a collective approach to their decisions and actions during a humanitarian crisis that is more inclusive and sustainable for the crisis affected population. Alternately, they viewed the military as

being hierarchical and short sighted with respect to humanitarian interventions, and having aggressive personalities with a lock step approach to humanitarian action. They felt that the military is highly capable and is often a necessary asset during humanitarian response. The military participants viewed themselves as being highly capable, well trained, and cohesive which allowed them to transition from focusing on their core competency (kinetic operations) to humanitarian action. Alternately, they viewed the humanitarian aid workers as needing more training and resources, and as having a long term development focus as opposed to fixing the immediate problem in front of them. They also viewed the humanitarian community as being difficult to get a decision from.

I found that this summary of the emerging themes from the data collection and analysis was not always consistent with existing literature. I state this because, when examining culture, I found that there are underlying values that emerge as themes, but when an organization's values are put to practice in a humanitarian response, some of those values become desires as opposed to reality. The emerging themes from each research question are supported by the peer reviewed literature described in chapter two of this study. The relation of interview question results to supporting literature ultimately led me to answer each of my research questions.

Research question one asked "how do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture and which are most important to the individual groups"? The purpose of this research question was to set a baseline for deriving the basic differences between the

organizational cultures of the participants' organizations using Project Globe's (2002) cultural dimensions as a theoretical basis.

The largest thematic difference between the culture sharing groups here was a "flat" versus a hierarchical group. This is supported by Roberts' (2010) assessment of military culture is described as having organizational structures that reinforce hierarchical authority and clearly defined of command and control relationships. It is also supported by the observation that the interviewees in Hilhorst and Schmiemann's 2002 study indicated a positive view of the "un-bureaucratic" nature of the organization during their work conducting humanitarian assistance, specifically being empowered with responsibility and flexibility of decision making and actions (p. 497). They indicated that they like the "horizontal" nature of the organization; un-bureaucratic and independent (p. 497). This theme was resonant throughout the interviews and indicates a strong difference in CD2–power distance. The civilian aid workers describe a value of a shorter power distance (more empowerment in the field) while the military officers describe taking direction from higher headquarters for the higher levels of decision making. It must be noted here, however, that a difference in observed values–hierarchical versus "flat"-only goes so far with respect to reality. Specifically, the military is directed by national interests while NGOs actions are driven by donor requirements.

This reality indicates that the perceived differences between the two organizations is more of an intrinsic value embedded in each organization (how things should be) as opposed to how things actually work in the field. Both organizations' actions are guided by higher headquarters' mandates and policies. So while the values described in the

supporting literature are validated by my data, the reality is that these two organizations are not as different with respect to freedom of action as would be purported by Roberts' (2010) and Hilhorst and Schmiemann's (2002) studies.

Research question two posed the question "what patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences"? The purpose of this question was to organize key participant discussions and statements into themes derived from interviews and observations. These themes were used to aid my development of the etic of the ethnographic analysis and ultimate conclusions from my perspective as the researcher, thus my emic. This research question is essential to determining barriers to mutuality between members of culturally disparate organizations that may find themselves working together in a crisis response situation. The findings of this question are essential to the overarching purpose of this study and, coupled with the findings of research question three add to the body of data that exists from previous studies of the organizational cultures of military and civilian aid organizations.

A key finding was that participants from both the military and from civilian aid organization felt a strong sense of empowerment within their respective organizations. This does not contradict any of the studies that I deemed most relevant to my study of organizational culture. These were the studies by Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2002), Roberts (2010), Kirke (2010) and Davis and Papparone (2012). It must be noted here that this feeling of empowerment may very well be due to each participant's respective time working for their organization (all had at least 30 years working for their organization). My observation here is that this in-group collectivism found in statements from both

military and civilian aid organizations is indicative of inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought, and can be a cause of a lack of coordination efforts. I derive from this a theme of both of these organizations being “closed communities” due to their members spending long periods of time, isolated from the day-to-day family and friends at home while operating in austere environments. This finding is supported by all of the above stated relevant studies.

The result of this is inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought, or essentially the group “closing ranks” to the point of not feeling positive about working with a culturally disparate group. This essentially answers my Research Question RQ2 – What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences? This answer to RQ2 is supported by Roberts (2010) study that found that NGO cultural attributes include (and are not limited to): organizational mandates are to be fulfilled by staying autonomous, neutral, and impartial, taking instructions and being tasked by outside organizations is generally not done, they value their freedom of operations and are thus are suspicious of attempts to organize or integrate with others (Roberts, 2010, p. 213). This led to discussion between myself and each participant and ultimately allowed me to arrive at the first element of my emic. I arrived at this first part of my emic by means of interpreting the strongest theme that emerged with respect to this research question which was be found in the answers to interview question six in which the participants were very passionate about how a lack of understanding of each other creates a barrier. They all felt that this lack of understanding takes time to overcome, and, through experience working together and overcoming this

barrier the result could be a more synergistic working relationship. The first part of my emic is that both organizations feel that the alternate organization is difficult to understand due to differences in organizational culture.

Research question three asked “how do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations?” The purpose of this question was to determine what values members of the two participant organization hold as resiliencies; essentially what values a culture sharing group clings to as deep rooted values. These deep rooted values have the potential to provide a basis for barrier mitigation if they are understood by both culture sharing groups and are demonstrated during crisis response. Ultimately, these barriers comprise the basis for the second part of my emic of this narrative, ethnographic study.

The finding for research question three is based upon the key emerging theme from IQ4, part two regarding the participant opinions of the alternate cultural group. The theme of a need for better mutuality through better understanding of organizational cultural values emerged as a dominant area of discussion with respect to this research question. This is supported by Roberts’ 2010 purposeful research article which examined the organizational cultures of the military and international NGOs in order determine “how best to structure for effectiveness the increasingly vital peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts of the military and NGOs in failing or failed states and combat zones around the world” (p. 212). A secondary theme, also supported by this article, is that both organizations value what the other brings to crisis response. Ultimately, my emic, or

researcher's interpretation of this theme was that the need for better mutuality by way of valuing the capabilities of the disparate organization would result in more effective relief of human suffering during a crisis event. Participants from both organizations valued respect for human life or humanitarianism as the highest purpose for their organization. Both organizations recognize and value the capabilities and abilities of the disparate cultural group. It must be noted here that all participants were observed to have a strong desire for better inter organizational understanding between the two groups. All participants were most passionate about this particular area of the need for mutuality as could be observed by their spending extra time describing in detail personal experiences with actual cases of challenges to working together and misunderstandings. Getting past these misunderstandings of one another's organizational culture in order to more effectively alleviate human suffering was a resonant theme throughout all interviews.

The participants therefore indicated value in working together but not necessarily losing their autonomy. This is somewhat contradictory to Roberts' 2010 study which found that cultural values of civilian aid organizations reflected: organizational mandates are to be fulfilled by staying autonomous, neutral, and impartial, taking instructions and being tasked by outside organizations is generally not done, they value their freedom of operations and are thus are suspicious of attempts to organize or integrate with others (p. 213). Once again, the intrinsic values, in this case autonomy in the case of civilian aid workers, is out matched by the ultimate reality of the need to relief human suffering. The value of humanitarianism in civilian aid organizations is supported by the studies of Hilhorst and Schmeimann (2002) and Roberts (2010). Mission accomplishment, in this

case humanitarian mission accomplishment (in a supporting role), in the case of the military is supported by the studies of Roberts (2010) and Davis and Paparone (2012).

Ultimately, all participants agreed that removing the ad hoc nature of early coordination and replacing it with more effective means of coordination through cultural understanding would result in more efficient crisis response. Chapter five will explore some recommendations for removing some of the ad hoc nature during the early phases of crisis response and discuss how more research and education in this area may further effect social change.

Limitations of the Study

The immersive part of this ethnographic study was limited to personal and professional relationships formed by working with and collaborating with participants by means of professional conferences, and exchanging contact information and personal experiences at schools. The key limitation was therefore my inability to observe the two preformed groups working an actual disaster or crisis, which is both unpredictable and, at the same time, financially and physically untenable for the researcher.

Throughout the study, I was careful to avoid personal organizational cultural bias as a retired military officer and kept that bias from influencing the interpretation of opinions and trends in the study. This is not only an ethical consideration of this research study due to bias, but also a potential threat to validity as readers may read my biography and make conclusions regarding bias. I conducted interviews and personality assessments (with approval from the Walden University IRB # 04-01-15-0253434) by getting participants to voluntarily respond to interview questions and by observing the

participants during my interactive interviews. For both sets of interviews, I obtained permission from the Institutional Research Board at Walden University and signed informed consent forms from participants.

Recommendations

It is recommended that in order to more effectively respond as a multi-organizational group to a humanitarian crisis, potential responders must strive to educate themselves (preferably by some formal requirement or incentive) to gain a deeper understanding of potential co-responders. It have therefore used Edgar Schein's (2010) material on the different levels of culture to recommend the amount of intercultural knowledge that is needed to arrive at mutuality.

Edgar Schein is the author of *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (2010), in which he describes his theory that there are three levels of culture (p. 24). The lowest level is what he terms "artifacts" or more simply the aspects of a culture sharing group that we see, but that we do not necessarily understand (p. 24). It is easy to make assumptions about a culture sharing group based upon these "artifacts", but assumptions can lead to misunderstanding, as is the case with two culturally disparate groups working together for the first time. This is supported by Schein's (2010) statement "the most important point to be made about this level of the culture is that it is both easy to observe and very difficult to decipher" (p. 24). Schein also warns that assumptions lead to false interpretations (he describes this as dangerous) when he describes an observer seeing an organization as being informal and equating that attribute to making the organization inefficient (p. 25). Likewise another observer may see an organization that is very

structured as being resistant to innovation (p. 25). These two assumptions can be seen clearly in the participant interviews as the military participants viewed the civilian aid workers as being “ad hoc” and the civilian aid workers viewing the military as being “hierarchical”. This is particularly relevant to this study as it shows the need for potential responders to humanitarian crises to strive to educate themselves on potential co-responder’s organizational cultural attributes or values. This can be done by attaining the next level of cultural understanding described by Schein as “espoused beliefs and values” (p. 25).

The espoused beliefs and values of an organization originate in personal values and beliefs of what an individual feels about how things should be versus how things are (p. 25). The personal values and beliefs of those individuals who prevail in decision making when individuals come together as a group may become the shared values of the group (p. 25). These individuals that prevail with respect to their influence in group decision making or problem solving become leaders in the group and their individual beliefs and values, in some cases but not all, evolve into the espoused beliefs and values of the organization that the group becomes (p.25). Schein describes this process by stating “such beliefs and values often become embodied in an ideology or organizational philosophy, which then serves as a guide to dealing with the uncertainty of intrinsically uncontrollable or difficult events” (p. 27); in the case of this study, a humanitarian crisis. It is interesting to note here that this phenomenon reflects back to Hilhorst and Schmiemann’s (2002) study on the relationship between an organization’s principles and its culture utilizing an ethnographic approach and their theory that humanitarian

organizations base their operations on the founding principles of humanitarianism, which are based upon international humanitarian law the start of which being the Geneva Convention of 1864 (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 491). Schein warns, however, that often these espoused beliefs and values may be abstract or in some cases mutually contradictory, making certain behaviors confusing to an outsider as they only see part of the puzzle (p. 27). This will not necessarily lead members of the participant organizations (military and civilian aid workers) to attain Schein's level three of organizational cultural understanding, which is a deeper level of understanding of an organization's basic underlying assumptions (p. 28).

Level three, the deepest level of cultural understanding, is termed by Schein (2010) as "basic underlying assumptions" (p. 28). This is when an organization uses the same effective solution to a problem to a degree of repetition that the behavior becomes second nature and the degree of variation or alternative solutions are not considered (p. 28). If a member of the organization challenges the underlying assumption, they make other conformist members uncomfortable or anxious (p. 28). To quote Schein "in this sense, the shared basic assumptions of a culture of a group can be thought of both at the individual and group level as psychological cognitive defense mechanisms that permit the group to continue to function" (p. 29). On the other hand, he states that "the human mind needs cognitive stability" (p. 29) and this level of culture provides members of a group with an identity and values that they can identify with (p. 29).

Accordingly, each of the organizations in this study possess an array of shared values and beliefs regarding how things should be as well as a deeper level of basic

underlying assumptions. It may not be possible for members of disparate organizations to attain a level of cultural understanding amongst a variety of groups commensurate of level three as that may take years of immersion in that organization. My recommendation is clearly tied to the overall purpose of this study. The two disparate organizations in this study need to embark upon a path in which they engage with one another on a regular basis through education, training and other venues such as conferences in order to better understand each other's organizational espoused beliefs and values. This pathway will allow the members of these two organizations to arrive at Schein's (2010) level three of cultural understanding as this level requires a degree of immersion in a culture that appears to require years of membership in the organization. In other words, those aspects of a culture that are unspoken and not clearly visible to outsiders who have not "grown up" in an organization cannot be recognized through even frequent contact.

It is therefore my recommendation that these two types of organizations endeavor to educate themselves on the other organization, beginning with research and online educational tools. I further recommend that both military and civilian aid organizations, as a sample from each organization indicates, endeavor to reach out and value the other organization by inviting them to participate in educational venues in which the opportunity for cross-organizational collaboration exists. I recommend that a follow on study be conducted with respect to the effectiveness of organizational education through the integration of members of military and civilian aid organizations. This study could be tested in civilian academic institutions or in military academic institutions, such as the US military service schools. The researcher could set a baseline of the understanding of one's

own organizations perceived values and that of the disparate organization's values in the form of a questionnaire. The members of the two organizations could be given a follow up questionnaire asking questions aimed at determining their understanding of the disparate organization after having an integrated educational event. This event could be a class or simulation of a crisis event in which the two organizations were forced to work together.

The emic derived from my study could be used to set a baseline for the thesis of this follow on study and the cultural dimensions of Project GLOBE could be used as the basis for the questionnaire given to participants before and after the educational stimulus (class or simulation event). This could be a quantitative or mixed methods study utilizing an instrument such as the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) and, in the case of mixed methods, a series of interviews for greater fidelity of data collection. This recommended follow-on study could very well test the themes and derived findings of my study in an effort to move the intended audience of professionals from each organization forward and arrive at a higher level of cultural understanding as described by Schein (2010).

Implications for Social Change

The ultimate goal of this study is to affect social change through inter organizational understanding, thus allowing disparate organizations to better work together to alleviate human suffering in crisis situations. Knowledge is power and the findings of this study may very well provide a knowledge base to members of organizations that provide people and capabilities as response mechanisms to

humanitarian crises. This social change is aimed at both organizations and individual members of organizations. Ultimately, providing informational tools on cultural disparity to crisis responders has the potential to save more lives and relieve human suffering sooner rather than later in a crisis by stimulating mutuality among the various crisis response organizations.

Organizations that typically respond to humanitarian crises often differ with respect to organizational culture, thus presenting a barrier to effective inter organizational efforts at the outset of a crisis. This problem can be exacerbated by the inherently chaotic nature of crisis response causing friction and thus slowing United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations' arrival at the needed cooperative relationship and ultimately working to achieve a common end state. The resultant situation is problematic: It is characterized by parochialism driven organizational barriers, despite the presence of the common desire to alleviate human suffering.

This problem has degraded the speed and efficacy of response humanitarian response efforts due to the inherent organizational cultural differences between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations. These cultural differences made necessary a study that provides knowledge to these organizations in order to promote mutual understanding and appreciation for organizational strengths as a means for improving cooperation at the outset of a crisis as opposed to during later stages. It is thus recommended that the information from this study be used as a baseline, knowledge level foundation for the

leadership (organizational policy makers and practitioners alike) to increase efforts to make inter organizational integration common practice. This could be implemented in the form of educational requirements for members of each organization to endeavor to develop curriculum in their training and education venues that involves exposure and collaboration with culturally disparate organizations. Too often organizations that spend long periods of time in the field away from their society of origin become what can be described as closed communities or closed cultural subsets. Getting to know outside organizations can prove beneficial through acculturation and may very well prove that what drives organizations to work together in a crisis is not so different from one culture sharing group to another.

Conclusion

In this narrative ethnographic study I examined the differences in organizational culture between military officers and civilian aid workers (both governmental and nongovernmental). The overall purpose of my study was to determine what barriers result from an organization's inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought, and how to improve mutuality prior to a humanitarian crisis. These barriers and the knowledge base thereof provide a baseline for members of organizations that may typically, or at least potentially may provide responders to humanitarian crises. The saying "knowledge is power" is the bottom line. Lack of knowledge may very well deter from this bottom line due to an unintentional ignorance or misunderstanding of what members of organizations that are different from one's own value.

I found that the two organizations that I studied possess different world views with respect to the mission or purpose of the organization. Their values, however, sound very different when examining literature on studies of each organizational culture and its attributes. When interviewing the actual practitioners, however, I found that both members of both organizations held in common the basic value of humanitarianism and its intrinsic motivation to help those who are suffering. This commonality has led to some efforts in different organizations to better educate members about the nature of culturally disparate organizations.

In my quest for knowledge, and as part of my day to day occupation as an educator, I have seen these efforts progress. I have been asked to provide training to civilian aid organizations (nonprofit volunteer organizations) on the basics of the military. There have also been numerous professional conferences that I have attended where U.S. Government organizations invite nongovernmental organizations (both nonprofit and for profit) participate in an effort to better understand each other and integrate efforts. Humanitarian crises are often the topic of discussion as these types of operations and the response to them is not something likely to become obsolete. We must take this fact forward as a driver, coupled with a common value of humanitarianism, and endeavor to spread knowledge through education (driven as a requirement by organizational leadership) and ultimately organizational mutuality. Returning to the old saying “if you give a man a fish, he will eat for a day, but if you teach a man to fish, he will eat for a lifetime”. I would like to take this one step forward by recommending that if

we want to really understand another culture and invest in a higher degree of mutuality, disparate organizations need to go fishing together.

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Appendix A: Title of Appendix

Data collection tool and Interview Protocol

The study is aimed at examining the differences in organizational culture between military officers and non-governmental organization aid workers with an overall purpose of determining what barriers exist due to organizational inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought and how to improve mutuality prior to a humanitarian crisis. This purpose warrants the use of a qualitative, ethnographic means of inquiry. Data will be collected by means of participant interviews using open-ended questions. Data collection will be done by means of opportunistic sampling and a narrative approach for interviews of participants from each organization type that have experience working with the other type of organization and experience responding to humanitarian crises.

Method

In this study, I will interview people from two very different organizations (military officers and NGOs and other aid organizations. From the interviews, it is expected to see similarities within the groups due to elements of inter subjectivity, but differences between the organizational cultures. I will obtain written permission (informed consent) from each participant as part of the study. It will be explained fully in writing the purpose and design of the study to all participants ahead of time in a written protocol form, reinforcing the purpose and design, as well as ethical requirement verbally at the outset of interviews.

The interviews will establish themes and trends that can be coded regarding the relationship between organizational bias with regards to inter subjectivity within each

organization and bias with regards to perceptions of the other organization by utilizing a cultural model. By conducting interviews with members of each organization in a private setting (or by Skype or FaceTime if travel is cost prohibitive) utilizing open-ended questions, I hope to be able to assess trends of how the participants perceive one-another (thus deriving stereotypes) and how the members perceive their own organizational values and practices.

Pre-formed groups (US Military members (retired) and civilian aid workers not currently active) will provide a participant pool and the method of data collection will be interviews of purposeful samples. This supports the main research problem that aims to examine how organizational culture can affect the accepted norms of behavior by individuals within that organizational culture to the point that it conflicts with outside organizations with a common purpose. The ethnographic approach will allow the examination of experiences of a particular group and the cultural influences that have contributed to those experiences.

Research Questions

My central research question was whether a common purpose outweighs cultural differences between culturally disparate organizations (in the case the military and non-governmental organizations) in situations where they need to work together, such as in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. My sub-questions were related to existing theoretical lenses (Schein (2010) for organizational culture and McClelland for human motivation) and targeted participant questions will be validated by a selection of the cultural dimensions defined Hofstede, Hofstede and Mikov's (2010)

cultural dimensions “power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance index, and masculinity and femininity” (pp.40- 41)”.

RQ1: How do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture and which values are most important to the individual groups?

RQ2: What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences?

RQ3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and non-governmental organizations?

The study is aimed to detect and organize themes identified from a priori ideas such as pre-existing theories to start coding and then allow the bias that the participants provide to form a basis for my study. In this study, the my intent is to use an appropriate selection of a priori ideas from Project GLOBE’s nine cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, and humane orientation) (House, et al., 2002) to add theoretical and historical validity to the previously mentioned study questions. The interview portion of this study will consist of open ended questions that have a basis founded in Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. The interviews, just as the observation field notes, will be recorded on my iPhone or iPad and then transcribed. The intended Interview questions are:

Question 1: What do you think makes your organization successful? What are you proud of with respect to your organization? (In-group collectivism, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation)

Question 2: What makes the leadership in your organization effective in producing organizational and public value? Do you personally feel empowered by your leadership? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, performance orientation, humane orientation)

Question 3: How are decisions made in your organization? (Power distance, in-group collectivism, humane orientation)

Question 4: How often have you worked with members of organization y? What is your opinion of organization y? (If the person has not worked with the other organization, the questioning strategy will drive the interviewee to provide their opinion of the organization (Future orientation)

Question 5: What value do you see in working with organization y? (Societal collectivism, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation).

Question 6: Do you think that barriers exist between your organization x and organization y that affect working relationships? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, performance orientation, humane orientation).

Appendix B: Informed Consent Form

You are invited to participate in the following study due to your experience as a responder to a humanitarian crisis and having experience working with (members of the US Military – in the case of a consent form sent to a civilian aid worker) **or** (members of civilian aid organizations – in the case of a consent form for a retired military member). This study involves research in which you will be a voluntary participant and your responses will be used to gather data with respect to the study of organizational culture.

1. Research Title: Improving the Efficacy of Humanitarian Response through Mutuality Derived From Inter-organizational Cultural Understanding

2. Primary Investigator/Researcher Contact Information: Elizabeth Anne Yeomans, doctoral student at Walden University.

3. Purpose of the Research:

- Improve cultural awareness between culturally disparate organizations and help those organizations to avoid some of the initial chaos at the outset of a crisis.
- Developing an earlier understanding to improve crisis response.
- Value knowledge of organizational cultural understanding prior to vice during crisis response.
- Make resultant cultural disparities available via existing humanitarian protocols.

4. Procedures: I will be conducting interviews with selected participants.

Interviews will be conducted at your convenience either in person or through media such

as Skype or FaceTime (phone interviews are another option should that be the only choice available. Interview questions are aimed at finding cultural disparities between organizations that respond to humanitarian crises and are intended to spur conversation about personal experiences and perceptions of your own and the alternate organization. Interview questions are general in nature (open-ended) and can be provided to you in advance should you desire. Your interview will be audio-recorded and then transcribed by me (no third party will see or hear it). You will be provided with a copy of the transcript for your review to ensure accuracy and to protect your rights as a voluntary participant since you can withdraw from the study at any time.

The populations from which the samples will be drawn are from civilian aid worker organizations and military officers that meet the following requirements:

Field experience conducting humanitarian aid

Field experience working in a civilian-military coordination environment

5. Risks and Mitigations: There are minimal risks to you with respect to your participation in this study. Should you feel uncomfortable at any time during the interview process, the interview will cease and I will discuss with you any risks that may arise. Bear in mind that your identity and any personal attributes which could lead to your identification (age, position during the humanitarian response, exact organization, etc.) will be kept strictly confidential between myself as the researcher and you as the participant.

6. Benefits: I cannot provide incentives such as money or promotion, but the study is aimed at positive social change in that it aims to make organizational coordination at the outset of a crisis more efficient and effective.

7. Length of Time: The interview will take no longer than one hour, but should you desire to discuss the topic for greater length of time, this will be at your discretion and convenience. Should I, the researcher see the potential for additional time, I will discuss this with you and time extension determinations will be at your discretion.

8. Payment or Cost: I cannot provide payment to you as a participant and any costs associated, such as my travel to your location for the interview, will solely be incurred by me as the researcher.

9. Confidentiality: Your data collected will be kept strictly confidential. What this means to you: Confidential data contains one or more identifiers, but identifiers are kept private by myself as the researcher. This will be done in this study in order to protect participant privacy and assure that study participation is truly voluntary. I confirm that I will provide complete confidentiality.

10. Participant Rights: You have the right to withdraw from participation at any time; if significant new findings are developed during the course of the research which may relate to your willingness to continue participation, I will notify you immediately. You may keep a copy of the informed consent form.

11. Voluntary Consent:

Your participation in this study is voluntary and refusal to participate or withdraw will not result in any adverse consequences or any loss of benefits that you are otherwise

entitled to receive. You may withdraw from this study at any time without consequence. Information that you provide as part of this study will be kept confidential and will not be divulged to others in ways that are inconsistent with the understanding of this disclosure without permission. Your signature below indicates that you agree to participate in this study. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant or this form, please contact the Walden University IRB at irb@waldendu.edu.

12. Signature Blocks:

Participant Signature / Date:

Primary Investigator Signature / Date:

Appendix C: Invitation to Participants

Invitation to Participate in a Doctoral Study – Provided By E-Mail to Participant Pool

You are invited to take part in a research study of how differences between organizations responding together in a humanitarian crisis could potentially present unintended consequences – the key consequence is a slow response to human suffering. I am inviting people who have responded to humanitarian crises in the past who had a key role in the response and who have either military or civilian aid worker experience to participate in the study.

This study is being conducted by a researcher named Elizabeth Yeomans, who is a doctoral student at Walden University. You may already know the researcher as a faculty member at the Joint Forces Staff College, but this study is separate from that role and I will not be recruiting participants from the Joint Forces Staff College to participate in this study or acting in any role that would represent the Joint Forces Staff College in this study.

Background Information:

The purpose of this study is to improve cultural awareness between culturally disparate organizations and help those organizations to avoid some of the initial chaos at the outset of a crisis by developing an earlier understanding to improve crisis response.

Procedures:

If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to be interviewed either in person or via Skype or FaceTime by the researcher. Your answers will be kept confidential as will your

identity and attributes particular to your identity. The interviews will take approximately one hour of your time and will be conducted at your convenience.

Please let me know if you are interested in being interviewed or if you have further questions.

Sincerely,

Elizabeth Yeomans (Doctoral Student, Walden University)

Curriculum Vitae

ELIZABETH ANNE YEOMANS**PROFESSIONAL SUMMARY**

21 years as a Commissioned Officer in the United States Navy as a Surface Warfare Officer. Accomplished leader; seasoned educator with a particular focus in partnership building to include joint military, multinational and interagency coordination and planning. Forward thinking, innovative team builder with years of leadership experience in a high stress, fast paced and continually adapting career field. Professional experience and skill as a Joint Strategic and Multinational Planner led to being selected to educate others in this field.

Assistant Professor, Dual-Course Director and Curriculum Developer, Joint Forces Staff College. Team leader for over 200 students (midgrade military officers from all services and the international military community) specializing in Joint Strategic and Operational Planning. Develops, maintains and executes twenty percent of the JCWS curriculum as the Course Director for all crisis action planning exercises. Her innovative approach to education and willingness to explore new approaches to curriculum delivery have yielded tremendous benefits for the JCWS's crisis action planning exercises to include the capstone humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise due to added realism by recruiting outside experts and practitioners (to include public, private and non-profit sectors) to participate in the exercise. Leads a specialized elective course entitled "The Comprehensive Approach to Complex Contingencies" focusing on joint, interagency and multinational operations and on new developments of non-DoD organizational processes in response to the modern complex security environment has resulted in a contemporary focus on the impact of culture (both national and organizational culture).

Scholar-practitioner and focused team leader, hand-selected to lead the Joint Staff OPMEP required Joint Transition Course (JTC) which prepares students who have not completed Phase I JPME and is generally comprised of students from other nations and agencies within the US government, providing the first impression of the faculty to these students. Deputy Director of the Joint Interagency and Multinational Planner's Course.

Executive Leader and Human Resource Manager. Second in command of a U.S. Navy Warship during Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Arabian Gulf region, expertly planned and organized the work of 400 military personnel, and provided leadership and supervision to the ship's staff. Managed human resource programs to include administration, pay, discipline, morale and habitability needs. Supervised all budgeting,

supply, maintenance and administrative systems, as well as the safe on load and offload of a Marine Corps unit and associated equipment. Responsible for the safety and well-being of 800 Sailors and Marines during the initial amphibious landing into Kuwait of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Joint Operational/Homeland Defense Planner/Exercise Planner. Developed Interagency Coordination Matrix for Maritime Homeland Defense resulting in a Concept Plan for the layered defense of the United States. As Joint Operational Planner, led staff planning efforts for numerous crisis and contingency operations, resulting in effective execution of operational plans by assigned forces.

Program Manager: Doctrine/Policy Expert. Coordinated innovative and transformational updates to both U.S. and NATO Policy on the employment of maritime forces as part of the military instrument of national power. Co-authored a complete rewrite of the concepts, policies and procedures governing the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC Concept).

Project Manager: Future Concepts Projects/Sea Power 21 Project Officer. Led maritime coordination of testing future Sea Basing experimentation concepts and automated tools sponsored by Joint Forces Command's Sea Viking project. Provided consulting services resulting in the development of enhanced combat systems design for the LPD-17 project.

CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF MILITARY ASSIGNMENTS

08/2005 to Present; Assistant Professor and Curriculum Developer, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia.

08/2003 to 08/2005; Operational/Homeland Defense Planner; Commander, US Second Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia.

03/2002 to 08/2003; Executive Officer; USS AUSTIN (LPD-4)07/2000 to 12/2001; Amphibious Exercise Trainer/Sea Power 21; Commander, Amphibious Group TWO.

01/1998 to 06/1999; Assistant Operations Officer/Public Affairs Officer/Tactical Action Officer; USS KEARSARGE (LHD-3).

01/1995 to 2/1997 Operations Officer USS RAINIER (AOE-7).

1989 to 1995 Navy Diving and Salvage Officer. Various Operational Diving and Salvage Units.

EDUCATION

Walden University, Minnesota; PhD in Public Policy and Administration, 3.85 GPA, DEC 2015

Troy University, Alabama; Master's in Business Administration, 3.85 GPA, 2000
University of Florida; Bachelor of Arts in Cultural Anthropology, 1985

PROFESSIONAL TRAINING

Joint Humanitarian Operations Course – USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

Joint Forces Staff College - Joint Professional Military Education Phase II, Elements of

Effective Instruction Course, Harvard Case Study Teaching Workshop

Marine Corps Command and Staff College - Joint Professional Military Education Phase I

Surface Warfare Officer's School - Division Officer, Department Head and Executive Officer courses

Basic Diving Officer/Salvage Officer

PROFESSIONAL LICENSES/CERTIFICATES

Certificate in College Teaching, Virginia Tidewater Consortium, 2009

Assistant Professor, Joint Forces Staff College-- 2008

Resource Management and Analysis Subspecialty – U.S. Navy. 2000

PUBLICATIONS

Walden University Dissertation: Improving the Efficacy of Humanitarian Response through Mutuality Derived From Inter-organizational Cultural Understanding (Draft)

Article: Taking the Next Step in Transforming Comprehensive Approach: Designing a Functional International Operations Response Framework (IORF) for the 2013 Third International Transformation Conference and Work Shop on Leader Development