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The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police: Effectiveness, Results, and Future Implications

Yarsuo Laezee Weh-Dorliae
Walden University

Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae

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Walden University
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Abstract

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Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae

LLB, University of Liberia, 1986

MPA, California State University, 1980

MA, California State University, 1980

BA, University of Liberia, 1976

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Abstract

After the United Nations' mission in Liberia (UNMIL) ends on September 30, 2015, effective policing will be a security concern for Liberians. Liberians have expressed fear that conflict could return if ongoing police training programs do not sustain public safety. The purpose of this mixed methods study was to understand how UNMIL's training affected public confidence in the Liberia National Police (LNP). The theoretical bases for this study included public choice theory and liberal democratic theory. Quantitative data were used to address impact of UNMIL's police training on the maintenance of law and order. These data were collected through a researcher-developed survey which measured recruitment, training, effectiveness, and public confidence in the LNP. Participants were government officials, members of UNMIL, LNP, and civic organizations ($n = 120$). Data were analyzed using ANOVA. Qualitative semistructured interview data were also gathered from 18 additional participants to address the challenges for quality improvement in the police security forces. The results were inductively coded and organized across themes and patterns. Quantitative findings indicated a moderately significant correlation between police perceived knowledge and job effectiveness ($r = -0.35$). However, qualitative findings show the government of Liberia failed to provide adequate resource support to complement the training due to its weak commitment. Diversity of trainers from contrasting policing jurisdictions produced an outcome that lacked a country-specific context for Liberia. This study promotes positive social change by informing future police training interventions by the United Nations on a host county's policing needs.

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Dedication

I dedicate this work to memory of the victims of the 2014 Ebola epidemic in Liberia. And to the Liberian health workers, doctors, nurses and the self-organizing local communities whose commitment to duty saved our country and paved the way forward to new public policy directions in participatory emergency response governance.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Introduction

In the past 2 decades, the United Nations (UN) has increased its involvement in international security reforms through police training in countries transitioning to democracies. Zanotti (2004) stated, "Starting in the 1990s, the United Nations has increasingly been mandated to bring about international security by intervening in failing states through complex operations which include institutional reform projects" (p. 1). The UN Security Council has mandated more than 69 peacekeeping missions, including police assistance operations (Bayley, 2006; Franke & Warnecke, 2009).

International police assistance to nations transitioning from conflict to state building is not a new phenomenon. To establish order and provide basic services in occupied Germany and Japan, postwar international police assistance programs were initiated by the United States following WWII. With the deployment of Ghanaian and Nigerian police contingents, international police assistance under a UN mandate first appeared in the Congo in 1960 (Bayley, 2006; Durch, 2010; Furuzawa, 2009). The UN peacekeeping and police reform interventions also occurred in Cyprus in 1964 and Namibia in 1989 (Krasno, 2004). The mounting conflicts of the post-Cold War period and security challenges in re-establishing legitimate national authority in fragile states impelled the reintroduction of international police assistance as a component of postconflict peacekeeping. Because of the emphasis on respect for human rights and the rule of law, contemporary international police assistance and reform requirements are different from those of the Cold War era. Police reform advocates stress the importance

of policing practices that adhere to standards of accountability, transparency in publicizing information on police operational activities, and responsiveness to the security needs of ordinary citizens (Bayley, 2006; Furuzawa, 2009).

Postconflict peacekeeping and police reform initiatives have not always been successful (Ellison, 2007). International police reform programs are often hampered by varying national agendas, limited resources, the lack of strategic guidance, and reluctance to engage in the local politics of providing postconflict security (Mobekk, 2001). Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007) argued that some police reform programs fail or become less effective because the interventions fail to consider local political and social realities of the reform environment. In addition, the antagonistic relationships between the military, police, and other security institutions, punctuated by poor justice and correctional systems, impact peacekeeping and police reform initiatives (Zanotti, 2004). These issues pose challenges to postconflict international police reform interventions.

Police reform has become recognized as an integral component of peacekeeping and state building operations (Furuzawa, 2009; O'Neill, 2005). Contemporary international police reform interventions are led by industrialized donor nations such as the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other Western liberal democracies. The overarching objectives of international police reform interventions are to build stable democratic regimes in postconflict fragile states and to secure conditions necessary to support the stability of an emerging new socioeconomic and political world order (Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010).

For the citizens of Liberia, the fear of conflict recurring after the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) leaves makes the issue of effective policing one of their most pressing security concerns (Call & Wyeth, 2008; McDonough, 2008; Sawyer, 2005). Liberia needs a well-trained, professional police force dedicated to upholding the rule of law and one trusted by the population. An effective police force capable of serving as an instrument for public safety and maintaining law and order is essential to sustainable statebuilding and democratic governance in Liberia (Alemika, 2009; Olukoshi, 2008; Sawyer, 2005).

In this study, I focused on the UNMIL's police reform intervention activities during the period from 2004 through 2010. It was during this time that the organization recruited, trained, and deployed officers of the reorganized Liberian National Police Force. The manner in which the UNMIL's police training has affected public safety, maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in the Liberia National Police was investigated.

Background of the Study

On December 24, 1989, Liberia, the only country in Africa founded by freed slaves from the United States, plunged into one of Africa's bloodiest civil wars. Internal political instability culminated in armed conflict between the government of Liberia and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), a rebel opposition faction. In later years, other rebel opposition groups organized warring factions opposed to the NPFL. These factions included the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), Liberia Peace Council,

(LPC), Liberians United for Reconstruction and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement

for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL; Gadagbui, 2005). The armed conflict lasted 14 years

(1989–2003) and brought death, destruction of life and property, and genocide. It is

estimated that out of the nation's population of 3.2 million, 250,000 thousand men,

women, and children were killed and 1,000,000 were displaced (Jaye, 2008; Sawyer,

2005). By the time the civil war ended in 2003, the nation had become a failed state

(Kraxberger, 2007).

The Liberian conflict became a concern for countries in the West African

subregion, and later for the international community of nations. In order to bring an end

to the civil war, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the

UN brokered a peace agreement that was signed between the warring factions in Accra,

Ghana in 2003 (Adibe, 1997; Gadagbui, 2005; Saikal, 2000). The Comprehensive Peace

Agreement signed on August 18, 2003 called for its implementation to be led by the UN.

The UNMIL was established on September 19, 2003 by UN *Security Council*

Resolution 1509. The mission was given the mandate to monitor the ceasefire agreement,

provide national security protection, and implement security sector reforms including

restructuring of the Liberian National Police (LNP) and other security institutions in

Liberia (Jaye, 2008). This included taking charge of organizing and rebuilding Liberia's

police force and other paramilitary security institutions until Liberian officers are judged

capable of taking over and managing them. The UNMIL was set up and deployed in

Liberia in 2003 (Muller & Sauvant, 2009). The UNMIL's police training, restructuring

programs, and other security sector reform activities are implemented through the United

Nations Police (UNPOL), which is also an integral component of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The UNPOL's involvements in peacekeeping operations vary according to the mandate of the UN Security Council. In the case of Liberia, the Security Council Resolution also mandated the UNMIL:

> To assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a civilian police training program, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), international organizations, and interested States. (Malan, 2008, p. 47)

This provision of the UN *Security Council Resolution 1509* provided the legal basis for the UNPOL's operations. The UNPOL had authority to maintain law and order, provide security, and train and restructure the Liberia National Police. According to the UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Document (2006), the UNPOL was given additional responsibilities under the DPKO's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program. These additional responsibilities included improving public confidence through controlling crime; maintaining law and order and security; and conducting police reforms through training, restructuring, and development of the national police. The DDR approach to postconflict policing and police reform focuses first on ensuring security through the maintenance of law and order, crime control, and postconflict police restructuring. In Liberia, UNPOL has been

engaged in all aspects of police work and in the training and restructuring of the Liberia National Police (Malan, 2008).

Liberia's constitution affirms a centralized system of governance and public administration. The security sector legislation that created the police force in 1975 provides for one centralized police force organization for the entire country, the LNP. The political subdivisions including municipalities do not operate any separate police systems. Candidates are recruited and trained at the National Police Academy located in Monrovia, the nation's capital, before deployment throughout the country (Jaye, 2008). It was within this legal and political context that UNMIL operated in implementing its security sector reform programs.

Problem Statement

If the police training and reform programs currently underway do not sustain public safety and social stability, the country could regress and conflict could return. The UN *Security Council Resolution 2190* (2014) extended the mission of the organization currently charged with peacekeeping and police reform in Liberia, UNMIL, to September 30, 2015. Policing issues such as inadequate responses, political suppression, corruption, and abuse of human rights before and during the civil war were central to the dynamics of the conflict in Liberia, and render a country-specific police reform strategy integral to sustainable democratic statebuilding (Kromah, 2007; Olukoshi, 2008; Sawyer, 1992). The process of reform of police structures and administrative arrangements are also central to ensuring fair, effective democratic policing and sustainable impact on civil society (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). International police reform efforts have not always

been successful (Ellison, 2007; Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). Against this backdrop, UNMIL's police reform interventions in Liberia provide an opportunity to assess how it has used international police reform standards to recruit, train, equip, and deploy the LNP force to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of how the UNMIL's police training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The findings contributed to understanding the dynamics that influence training outcomes and inform stakeholders and decision makers about any possible changes that might be needed to improve police effectiveness and public confidence. The objective of this study was to identify the underlying contexts and to contribute knowledge to the establishment of an effective police force that gains the trust and confidence of the citizens. The knowledge of the dynamics of a country-specific police reform program is useful for policymakers in Liberia and for the UN in planning and designing police reform programs for future postconflict states.

Nature of the Study

In this exploratory case study, I used a mixed methods approach to data collection and analysis. From the qualitative perspective, I reviewed documents and records and used open-ended and semistructured interview questions as primary sources of data collection. I also used the Likert rating scale to collect quantitative data that measured

numerical indicators of agreement and disagreement. I developed a questionnaire to evaluate police performance of graduates already working in the field and the public confidence of civil society. A more detailed discussion of the rationale for the research, objectives, and methods selected is presented in Chapter 3.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is that it filled the gap in the literature on the impact of the UN's training of the LNP. No earlier study exists on the impact of the UN's police training on the effectiveness of the LNP to maintain law and order and gain public confidence in postconflict Liberia (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Fallah, 2011; Kromah, 2007; Olukoshi, 2008). The goal is to contribute knowledge to the establishment of an effective police force capable of maintaining law and order, and one trusted by the citizenry. In this study, I examined the effectiveness and results of international police training and reform interventions in the context of the Liberian situation. Despite various international police training and reform efforts in postconflict states in Africa, professional policing and citizens' trust in the police forces remain elusive (Alemika, 2009; Olukoshi, 2008). Because international police reform in different postconflict situations reflects varying country-specific realities and experiences of each society, I sought to understand how UNMIL's police training and reform interventions affect the capacity of the LNP force to effectively and professionally carry out its duties, maintain law and order, and gain public confidence. I sought to understand the dynamics of UNMIL's police reform efforts and to generate knowledge that will contribute to the establishment of an effective police force that gains the trust and confidence of Liberians. The lessons learned from this Liberian

case study are important for planning and designing future police reform programs for postconflict police building. The study, therefore, has important social change implications such as the protection of human rights, crime reduction, a safer investment climate for businesses, economic growth, and social stability for Liberian government policy makers, for other governments in the community of nations, and for the UN in planning and designing police reform programs for future postconflict states.

Research Questions

The overarching research question that guided this investigation was the following: How has police training by the United Nations Mission in Liberia affected police effectiveness and public confidence in the ability of the Liberia National Police to maintain law and order? This question was expanded by two qualitative questions and one quantitative question.

Qualitative

Research Question 1: What strategies were used to recruit applicants for police training?

Research Question 2: What reforms are required to improve the quality of policing and insure a reliable police security force in Liberia?

Quantitative

Research Question 3: What, if any, difference has the UNMIL's police training made relative to the maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia's police force?

$H_0 1$: UNMIL's police training made no difference relative to the maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia's police force.

$H_1 1$: UNMIL's police training effected change related to the maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia's police force.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical frameworks that served as a foundation for this study were social contract theory, public choice theory, liberal democratic theory, and the theory of community policing. Social contract theory provides the rationale for the formation of civil society, considering that humans are by nature self-interested beings and are drawn by what they desire or perceive to be in their interest (i.e., personal security, protection of life and property, freedoms, equal distribution of resources) for which they submit to political authority or governments (Kathrani, 2010). Public choice theorists define police security as a public good in which benefits are expected by all and provided by the state to all citizens for their protection and wellbeing irrespective of their contribution (Stiglitz, 2000). Liberal democratic theorists justify the necessity of an effective police force as it is an embodiment of state authority for protecting the political and socioeconomic processes (i.e., investments that provide jobs, elections, etc.) that are crucial to maintaining stability in a democracy (Mulcahy, 1998). Proponents of community policing theory emphasize the participation of local citizens for effective public safety. Increasing criminality and rising public protests against police forces around the world, as seen in the case of ongoing insurgencies in Arab nations and particularly in countries in transition from conflict to democratization, all signal the need for including community

policing training and practice in international police reform interventions. The traditional, reactive way of policing is increasingly ineffective, resulting in low crime-solving rates and a lack of public confidence in the police (Alemika, 2009; Bayley, 1999). The aim of the community policing is to approach policing more from a problem-solving perspective by building partnerships between the police and the population (Bayley, 1999; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006).

Assumptions

The study was based on two assumptions. The first assumption was that the participants who were selected for the study were knowledgeable about the subject matter. The second assumption was that the participants would be open in their discussions and that they would answer the interview questions truthfully and to the best of their knowledge and ability. Factors such as past police culture of withholding information, pressure from ranking officers, and political influence did not inhibit objective comments from participants. These assumptions were necessary to the extent that participants were public officials of the Liberian government and the leaders of community-based civil society organizations. They represented the population that was the intended beneficiary of the program. Other key informants were ranking officers of the LNP force and ranking members of UN mission in Liberia who were the key decision makers of the police reform program.

Limitations

There were three limitations of this study. The first limitation was that the study involved a qualitative exploratory component with me as the main instrument for data

collection, analysis, and interpretation. My bias and subjectivity were recognized in the

process. To minimize this possibility, I remained self-aware and conscious about the

likelihood for bias and exercised neutrality at all times in the process (Creswell, 2007).

The second limitation was that I used purposive sampling. Purposive sampling depends

on the availability of respondents who are knowledgeable about the phenomenon under

study. It should be noted that I worked on location in Liberia, was conversant with the

local target population, and could make informed decisions about recruiting

knowledgeable participants. During the course of the research, I discovered that ranking

officers of the UNMIL, who participated in making key recruitment, training, and reform

decisions, had left Liberia for missions in other countries and could not be contacted.

UNPOL declined to participate in the study. The third limitation was that literature on

postconflict police reform in Liberia is scant and limited in scope (Call & Wyeth, 2008;

Fallah, 2011; Kromah, 2007). Although opinions about the Liberian police were obtained

from government functionaries, civil society, and the citizenry at large, there exists little

independent research data that can validate such opinions. The media have published

various stories, reports, and articles on police reform challenges resulting in alleged

ineffectiveness and a lack of professionalism of the LNP force. The incidents most

frequently cited are rape, sexual violence, drugs, theft, extortion, and involvement in

armed robberies (*Nation Times* 08/18/09:4; *New Democrat* 06/12/11:18; *Daily Observer*

06/20/12:14; *National Chronicle* 07/11/12:18). The Government's Poverty Reduction

Strategy (2008) also cited widespread dissatisfaction with, and a lack of citizens' trust in,

the new police force. Additionally, a recent UN assessment mission's special report of

the UN Secretary-General (2012) described the security situation in Liberia as "generally stable but fragile" and acknowledged the inability of the LNP to maintain law and order without the support of UNMIL (p. 8   ). However, there is limited independent research done specifically on the results of UNMIL's police training and its impact on police effectiveness and public safety in Liberia.

Scope and Delimitations

Participants who were selected for this study resided on location in Monrovia, the capital city of Liberia. They fell in three categories. In the first category, I used homogenous purposive sampling of 18 actors and decision makers in the UNMIL's reform program. In the second category, I used random sampling of 60 police officers who were trained and deployed by UNMIL and were active in the field. I also conducted a random sampling of 60 actors who were male and female leaders and members of community-based civil society organizations including the Federation of Liberian Youth, Institute for Research and Democratic Development, Liberia Marketing Association, New African Research and Development Agency, Action for Genuine Democratic Alternative, and the National Coalition of Civil Society Organizations of Liberia. These key informants were individuals who had past and current knowledge of police behavior and practices in Liberia. This was a representative group of the population that was the targeted beneficiary of the reform program. I learned about their real life experiences, including their confidence in the new police force and the overall security reform program in Liberia.

Definition of Terms

Conflict: As used in this study, the term refers to armed conflict characterized by civil war. Conflict results from disagreement over socioeconomic, cultural and political interests, or concerns that culminate in grievances and violent disagreements from perceived threats which trigger armed rebellion and war. The conflicts discussed in this study refer to civil wars between government forces (i.e., army, police and paramilitary forces) on the one hand and rebel forces on the other. Civil wars in Africa were rooted in cultural, economic, ethnic, and political factors (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Wezeman, 1999; Sawyer, 2005).

Democratic policing: As used herein, the concept embodies the idea that policing is a service with a primary focus more on protecting the human rights and security of the individual than the state. Democratic policing is the application of the law in a manner that is professional, impartial, and effective for the protection of all citizens regardless of their ethnicity, age, gender, political opinion, or religious belief (Bayley, 2001; Celador, 2005; Mulcahy, 1998).

International police: The term was used to refer to an organization of police officers representing various countries that are brought together to assist in providing law and order, public security, training, and stabilization in war-torn countries (Hume & Miklaucic, 2005; Krasno, 2004).

Police: In this study the definition provided by Bayley (1999) was adopted. Bayley defined police as "people authorized by a group to regulate interpersonal relations within the group through the application of physical force" (p. 7). The authorization to

apply physical force to affect behavior, including respecting the rights of others, preventing human rights abuses, and providing security for all is the distinguishing characteristic of the police. Bittner (as cited in Bayley, 1999) stated, "The policeman, and the policeman alone, is equipped, entitled, and required to deal with every exigency in which force may be used to meet it" (p. 8).

Liberia National Police: In this study, the LNP refers to Liberia's current police force trained and deployed by the United Nations Mission in Liberia.

Postconflict: This term is used to describe the period following the cessation of hostilities. This period is characterized by the signing of a formal peace agreement by which the warring factions give consent and agree to end the conflict and commit themselves to the process of national reconstruction. The Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (2009) described the postconflict environment as characterized by an unstable security situation which necessitates the provision of security as a priority for international actors.

Police reform: For the purpose of this study, police reform refers to international response assistance to a nation's police building program of which training is an integral component. A program of postconflict police security reform is a reflection of a dysfunctional police system and, therefore, the need for change and a clear break with the past. The Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (2009) summarized the goals of police reform as prioritizing the equal protection of human rights as primary objective: producing a humane, accountable, responsive, and capable police force.

Statebuilding: In this study, the term is used to describe international efforts to strengthen weak postconflict states by rebuilding public institutions; fostering renewed sociocultural cohesion within a geopolitical boundary; and establishing a legitimate internationally recognized functioning central authority having the ability to provide security, maintain peace, enforce state laws, and maintain a minimum level of economic development to support democratic transition. The process also involves political collaborative efforts between local political elites and international actors to ensure that the outcomes are in accord with the norms of liberal democratic statehood (Dobbins et al., 2007; Miller, 2010).

Stateness: In this study, the term is used to refer to a situation where, within a geopolitical boundary, there exists some level of sociocultural cohesion, and a legitimate functioning central authority has the ability to maintain peace and enforce state laws tp maintain minimum level of economic development to support democratic transition and is internationally recognized. The police are an embodiment of state authority and that stateness is as much a function of state authority as it is a function of effective policing (Dobbins et al., 2007; Kraxberger, 2007).

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (*UNMIL*:). The UNMIL was set up and deployed in Liberia in 2003 under the mandate of UN *Security Council Resolution 1509.* The mandate authorized UNMIL to maintain law and order, provide security, train, and restructure the Liberia National Police (Jaye, 2008; Muller & Sauvant, 2009).

Summary and Outline of the Study

Liberia was a fragile state in transition from a protracted civil war to peace and democratization with assistance from the UN and the international community at large. A critical component of this statebuilding process was security sector reform with a focus on police building. Liberia needed an effective police force capable of serving as an instrument for the protection of human rights, public safety, and the maintenance of law and order.

This study comprises five chapters. In Chapter 1 of the study, I presented an overview of the research problem, the background of the study, including the increasing role of the UN in responding to international crises. I discussed the purpose and significance of the study. I also posed questions about the UNMIL's police training and public safety reform interventions that have not been satisfactorily addressed in previous works. In Chapter 2, I position the study within a broader contemporary scholarly context on the subject of international postconflict police reform. I review scholarly literature that is relevant to security sector reform and the UN interventions in postconflict police-building. The international state building interventions in the last 2 decades have had more challenges and setbacks than successes, as security and peace remain elusive. Both local and international actors are in search of policy options. In this chapter, I provide an overview of the conceptual basis of international interventions in police reform in post conflict countries and the accomplishments, challenges, and dilemmas associated with these reform efforts. The history of the Liberian police force and its operations before and during the civil war are highlighted; three selected case studies are presented to

demonstrate their similarity to police reform activities in Liberia. I also discuss the

rationale for police security reform as a prerequisite to sustainable statebuilding and

democratization. I compare and contrast the views of scholars on the outcomes of various

statebuilding initiatives undertaken in the last decade. The theories of social contract,

liberal democracy, public choice and democratic policing, and community policing are

discussed. The perspectives of international public policy practitioners on statebuilding

interventions as a means of persuading weak states to abide by the norms of stateness

were presented.

In Chapter 3, I discuss and examine the theoretical methods of inquiry that

grounds the research. The detailed discussion on the research design used in the study

include the theoretical tradition of inquiry, research sample and population, method of

data collection and procedures, data analysis and issues of quality and ethical

considerations, the researcher's role, and participants' protection. The independent

variable in this study was the UNMIL's reform training strategy. The UNMIL's training

served as an indicator of whether or not the police was well-trained or poorly trained.

Factors considered included effective policing, issues of ethics, and police behavior. I

used existing research (Kromah, 2007; Ngaima, 2003; Sawyer, 1992) on the behavior of

the Liberian police. Kromah (2007) measured citizens' perception of the LNP before and

during the civil war and served as a comparative baseline measure. I did multiple year

comparisons of police effectiveness covering four 2-year periods beginning with the time

the UNMIL deployed trained police officers. The other intervening variables that are

discussed revolve around police preparedness and how they affect effectiveness of, and

public confidence in, the LNP. The dependent variable in this study was the outcome of

the training. This outcome was measured against the UNMIL's reform mandate and

standards of recruitment, training, and deployment strategies employed considering the

context of the country-specific situation of Liberia. The dependent variables for this study

also included citizens' confidence. I measured citizens' confidence in the reformed police

force. Hypotheses were developed to test citizens' confidence. In Chapter 4, I analyzed

the data and presented the findings of the study. The data analysis include a summary of

the data instruments, a descriptive analysis of the demographic characteristics of

participants, and the results of the statistical analyses of participants' perceptions, views,

and responses that answered the research questions. In Chapter 5, I presented the

conclusions and recommendations of the study based on my findings and the critical

lessons learned.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

In this chapter, I review the literature that is relevant to the study. The goal was to synthesize the literature on international police reform in the context of international statebuilding interventions in postconflict states. The chapter is organized into four sections. In the first section, I discuss the dynamics of postconflict statebuilding, including the roles, responsibilities, and challenges facing the UN. In the second section, I define police reform and provide a conceptual basis of police reform for democratic governance in the context of states undergoing transitions from conflict to democratization. An historical background of the LNP is presented. The behavior of the police and citizens' perception of it as an instrument of repression and terror before and during the conflict is discussed. In the third section, I review police reform tools and research works on international police reform interventions with selected cases as illustrations. In the fourth section, I provide a summary of the chapter highlighting the theoretical framework and strategies of international statebuilding through police security reform.

The strategy that I used in searching the literature included using literature relevant to postconflict international police reform. I used the Walden University library and other libraries of local universities both in the United States and Liberia. I used *Academic Search Premier* and *Business Search Premier*, *ProQuest Dissertations*, and *Google Scholar*. I explored the websites of the United Nations and the Government of

Liberia, including websites of government ministries and agencies in Liberia. I used

books and articles published within the last 5 years.

Policing Statebuilding: International Interventions

UN peacekeeping interventions, including police reform assistance operations,

have increased in the post-Cold War period. The UN Security Council has mandated

more than 69 peacekeeping and statebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War to

help strengthen fragile states to transition from conflict to reform and democratization in

countries such as Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Solomon

Islands, and Sudan (Durch, 2010; Franke & Warnecke, 2009). There have been more than

100 armed conflicts around the world since 1989. More nations around the world

continue to endure civil unrest characterized by confrontations between police and

citizens and culminating in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. In 2011 for example,

scenes of demonstrators clashing with police became the defining images of ongoing

insurgencies in Arab nations such as Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen (West,

2011). The "Arab Spring" signaled the relevance of international police reform

intervention and how it has become a critical standard for the protection of human rights,

upholding the rule of law, and improving government-citizen relations in the global

context. A well-trained police force can promote postconflict democratization and

societal stability (West, 2011).

The term conflict as used in this study refers to insurgencies and armed conflict

characterized by civil war. Conflict results from disagreement over socioeconomic,

cultural, and political interests or concerns that culminate in grievances and violent

disagreements from perceived threats, which ultimately trigger armed rebellion and war. Most of the conflicts discussed herein refer to civil wars between government forces (i.e., army, police, and paramilitary forces) on the one hand and rebel forces on the other. Civil wars in Africa were rooted in cultural, economic, ethnic, and political factors (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Sawyer, 2005; Wezeman, 1999). In 1995, 14 countries in sub-Saharan Africa were emerging from complex political emergencies or conflicts and were facing challenges of postconflict statebuilding and democratization (Green & Ahmed, 1999). The term statebuilding as used in this study refers to international efforts that enabled fragile states to build capacity, reconstruct their institutions, and regain stateness and the authority to govern effectively in the delivery of public goods and services. Miller (2010) said, "International statebuilding is thus an attempt to spread norms about what states are, what they should be, and how states govern; it is an attempt by great powers to compel weak states to abide by norms of statehood" (p. 6). In the process, however, police reform has become recognized as an integral component of peacekeeping and statebuilding interventions (Furuzawa, 2009; Olukoshi, 2008).

Contemporary international police reform assistance led by the UN and industrialized donor nations such as the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other Western liberal democracies has occurred largely in postconflict settings. The overarching objectives of international police reform interventions in postconflict situations are to build stable democratic regimes in fragile states and to secure conditions necessary to support the stability of an emerging new socioeconomic and political world order (Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). The development of strategies by the UN to

reform postconflict police organizations and enhance their effectiveness often involves

varying perspectives and alternative approaches to police reform. Call (2003) identified

five alternative perspectives that bear on how local policy makers, the UN, and other

donor partners determine priority areas in the police reform process under specific

country conditions: (a) human rights perspective, (b) peacekeeping/military perspective,

(c) law enforcement perspective, (d) economic development perspective, and (e)

democratization perspective. The human rights perspective focuses on police behavior in

the context of upholding international human rights standards and removing violators

from the ranks of the police and the military (Call, 2003). The peacekeeping/military

perspective emphasizes the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of any

possible return to conflict, especially in the periods that immediately follow the cessation

of hostilities and periods of peacebuilding (Call, 2003). The law enforcement perspective

emphasizes local crime control and professional policing with a focus on the protection

of human rights and facilitating the processes of democratization (Call, 2003). The

economic development perspective supports disarmament and demobilization and favors

police reform efforts through broad security sector reforms (Call, 2003). This perspective

also reflects interest in removing impediments to foreign investment and enhancing

peaceful environment for overall economic development. The democratization

perspective emphasizes adherence to the rule of law, justice, and overall security as the

basis for fostering institutional development. This perspective also emphasizes economic

rationale for police reform in the broader context of a linkage between security, economic

development, and democracy (Call, 2003).

There are many challenges that confront national decision makers, the UN, and other donor partners in international police reform processes. Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) argued that most of the international police training strategies offered to postconflict and developing countries by Western democracies prove less effective because they do not adequately address issues such as conflict resolution, importance of citizens' trust and confidence, corruption, human rights, and citizens' engagement in crime control strategies. Call (2003) also described other challenges or tensions. The first challenge is that police reform often takes place exclusive of other auxiliary institutions. Call (2003) underscored that if a police reform program is to be successful; it must be holistic and must consider building the capacities of other relevant institutions in the justice system that have the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of the police. These institutions include the courts, prosecutors, and civil society organizations that advocate accountability of the government. Another challenge is that international police reform is relatively new and there are fewer credible models of policing (Bayley, 2006). This creates the need for the reform program to adapt to local realities, such as culture and political realities. Reformers also tend to draw more on external ideas, replicate their own models of policing, or insist on applying models that may have worked elsewhere. The goal must be to ensure local ownership of the reform program. Furuzawa (2009) argued that international police reform programs must vary from one country to another and be based on country-specific conditions in order to be successful. Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) recommended that police training programs must be implemented in ways that enable individual states " to be able to create their own versions of policing based on

standards embedded in democratic principles while tailoring their reforms to their own socially determined goals and needs" (p. 9). A third challenge identified by Call is the difficulty in promoting merit-based recruitment in the reform process. While merit-based criteria serve as the best yardstick for recruitment, the process of recruitment have often involved pressure from local decision makers to cater to the interests of particular political or ethnic groups outside of merit. Call argued that police reform programs should seek to exclude those who have committed human rights abuses or violated international laws irrespective of such special interests. The challenge here is that the lack of records resulting from the conflict can result in unintended recruitment of abusers (Call, 2003).

The overarching goal of international police training to ensure the effectiveness of postconflict police forces is to help fragile states to regain their stateness (Kraxberger, 2007). Stateness is defined as a situation where there exists within a geopolitical boundary, some level of sociocultural cohesion and legitimate functioning central authority having the ability to maintain peace, enforce state laws, maintain minimum level of economic development to support democratic transition, and is internationally recognized (Kraxberger, 2007). Stateness is also a function of security and a condition under the social contract theory. Hansen (2000) stated that "security is the key to a 'new social contract' between the population and its government or society in which the population is willing to surrender the responsibility for its physical safety into government hands" (p. 35). Social contract theory provides a rationale for the formation of civil society. Humans are by nature self-interested beings and are drawn by what they

desire or perceive to be in their interest (i.e., personal security, protection of life and property, freedoms, equal distribution of resources) for which they submit to political authority or governments. It is from this social contract theory perspective that the state must develop and strengthen its capacity to apply legitimate force to uphold the social contract and deliver security protection and such other public goods to the citizenry (Kathrani, 2010; Kraxberger, 2007; Miller, 2010).

The concept of stateness implies that there has existed a situation where a state has collapsed, and where state structures and legitimate authority for maintaining law and order have disintegrated. Contemporary literature on stateness also infer various perspectives of the state, such as weak, strong, failed or failing states depending on the particular circumstances and conditions of the given geopolitical boundary. Stateness is as much a function of authority as it is a function of effective policing. Effective policing is a minimum requirement for making postconflict democratic transition successful and sustainable (Ellison, 2007; Green & Ahmed, 1999; Olukoshi, 2008). Peace and socioeconomic and political stability are cardinal to liberal democracy, which also places a premium on the protection of individual liberties and rights including the rights of minorities. Liberal democratic theory justifies the necessity of an effective police force as it is an embodiment of state authority for protecting the political and socioeconomic processes (i.e., investments that provide jobs, elections, etc.) that are crucial to maintaining stability in democratic political systems. A police force is a representation of state authority. The citizens should look up to the state and therefore to the police to provide security, maintain law and order, ensure free movement of people and goods,

also with a sense of security, and to "provide protection for the social and political processes that are critical to democracy" such as free and fair elections (Mulcahy, 1998, p. 33). Police and "stateness" for a transitioning liberal democracy such as Liberia, are also tied together from the perspective of public choice theory.

Public choice theory considers the state or government as an agent and its institutions and policies as public goods (Stiglitz, 2000; Mulcahy, 1998; Kraxberger, 2007). A police force is, therefore, a public good to the extent that it is an embodiment of state authority. Public choice theory offers an explanation of police security as a public good which benefits are expected by all and provided by the state to all citizens for their protection and wellbeing, irrespective of their individual contribution (Stiglitz, 2000). An effective police force is one that is effective and efficient in performing its mission of providing security, safety, and justice to all citizens. Police failure or lack of effectiveness reflects on the broader issues of national security and political stability. This is why states transitioning from protracted internal conflicts are haunted by the well-founded fear that police failure makes the state susceptible to the kind of crises that has the potential to escalate into a total breakdown of law and order, sociopolitical instability, and a dreaded return to conflict (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007). Sawyer (2007) argued that "The postconflict state must be a different type of state if it is to meet new challenges. It must be capable, responsive and participatory" (p. 22).

Community policing theory emphasizes participation from local citizens for effective public safety. By the 1970s, police administrators, especially in the United States, recognized that the traditional reactive method of policing had inadvertently

eroded the citizens' sense of community and concern for one's neighbors (Kappler &

Gaines, 2012). Moreover, people were becoming estranged from their police because

they feared the police and criminals alike. They no longer trusted the police enough to get

involved in reporting criminals in their neighborhoods. Community policing therefore

evolved from the theory that a grateful public will gladly provide needed information and

assistance to the police in contrast to one of an adversarial approach. Therefore,

harnessing collaboration from law-abiding citizens in their neighborhoods was also

critical to long-term sustainable change and peace-building (Kappler & Gaines, 2012).

Trojanwicz and Bucqueroux (1998) defined community policing:

> Community policing is a philosophy and an organizational strategy that
>
> promotes a new partnership between people and their police. It is based on
>
> the premise that both the police and the community must work together as
>
> equal partners to identify, prioritize and solve contemporary problems
>
> such as crime, drugs, fear of crime, social and physical disorder and
>
> overall neighborhood decay, with the goal of improving the overall quality
>
> of life in the area. (p. 8)

Increasing criminality, and rising public protests against police forces around the

world, as seen in the case of ongoing insurgencies in Arab nations and particularly in

countries in transition from conflict to democratization (West, 2011), all signal the need

for including community policing training and practice in international police reform

interventions. The rationale for this new way of policing is that the traditional, reactive

way of policing is increasingly ineffective, resulting in low crime-solving rates and a lack

of public confidence in the police. The aim of community policing is to approach

policing more from a problem-solving perspective by building partnerships between the

police and the population (Alemika, 2009; Bayley, 1999; Kappler & Gaines, 2012).

Baker (2006) also argued for example, that the Government of Sierra Leone may have to

harness community policing groups because despite achievements in the country's police

reform program, delivering effective police services in most parts of the country remains

a significant challenge for the government. In Liberia, the relevance of community

policing to UNMIL's police reform intervention and to policing practices was

acknowledged in the Government of Liberia's social and economic development plan

referred to as the Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008):

> Given that the history of police-citizen relationships is one characterized
>
> by fear and mistrust, a new emphasis on involving local communities and
>
> adoption of more citizen-friendly policing methods will improve police-
>
> citizen relationships. The LNP and other security agencies will formulate
>
> policies to reduce the incidence of corruption, police brutality, and other
>
> ethical violations. (p. 54)

The PRS also recognized the need to train the police to cooperate with local governments

through district-level security committees in order to improve human and economic

security.

Defining and Conceptualizing Police Reform

Police reform as used herein refers to international response assistance to a

nation's police building program characterized by the construction of an entirely new

police force from bottom-up under conditions of total collapse resulting from violent internal conflict (Ellison, 2007; Goldsmith & Sinclair, 2007; Labonte, 2003). Police reform is also used to describe international efforts to achieve sustainable postconflict public safety and maintain fairness in the operational behavior of local police through rebuilding police capacity and restructuring police institutions. The process involves providing institutional support that focuses on transformational activities including mentoring, vetting, training and rebuilding services, providing operational security and support and establishing new structures of public policing to help the local force break away from its past (Baker, 2006; Bayley, 2001). Contemporary international police reform requirements are different from those of the Cold War era because of its emphasis on the respect for human rights and the rule of law. Police reform advocates stress the importance of policing practices that adhere to standards of accountability, transparency in publicizing information on police operational activities and responsiveness to the security needs of ordinary citizens (Ellison, 2007; Furuzawa, 2009). Police reform has become recognized as a critical and essential prerequisite for successful postconflict peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions in states that are transitioning from complex political emergencies or conflicts to regain their stateness (Celador, 2005; Furuzawa, 2009). The overarching objectives of international police reform interventions led by industrialized donor nations are to build stable democratic regimes in postconflict fragile states and to secure conditions necessary to support the stability of an emerging new socioeconomic and political world order (Marenin, 1998; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010).

Postconflict international police reform initiatives have not always been successful (Ellison, 2007). International police reform programs have often been hampered by varying national agendas, limited resources, the lack of strategic guidance, and reluctance reform missions to engage in the local politics of providing postconflict security. These issues often pose enormous challenges to postconflict international police reform interventions (Ellison, 2007). Durch (2010) noted:

> Summarizing the 1990s record in UN "Policekeeping," one might say that great ambitions were not matched by great strategies, great competence, or great success. Mandate drafters seemed to assume that the presence or moral authority of UN police would be adequate to stabilize post-war public security or to tame war-tainted police forces; these presumptions were invalidated nearly every time they were put to the test. (p. 7)

In the case of Haiti for instance, the UN police reform interventions through training and institutional restructuring of the Haitian National Police (HNP) produced less successful outcomes for periods that followed the interventions when measured against crime rates (Ho, 2006). Crimes against the person (i.e., murder and sexual assault of teen age girls) increased, and some of these crimes were committed by some members of the police and other security forces (Ho, 2006; Mobekk, 2001). Despite successive UN missions in the 1990s, reformers in Haiti failed to focus on taking factors such as local policing traditions, and country-specific sociopolitical realities into account. The antagonistic relationships between the military, police, and other security factors such as

poor justice and correctional systems impacted negatively on UN police reform initiatives (Cockayne, 2009; Zanotti, 2004).

Several researchers have written about postconflict statebuilding and police reform similar to the UNMIL's police reform interventions in Liberia. These researchers include Baker (2008), Bayley (2006), Durch (2010), Ellison (2007), Furuzawa (2009), Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007), Jones (2008), Kraxberger (2007), Labonte (2003), McDonough (2008), and Miller (2010). One such study which is relevant to the Liberian situation was a case study conducted by Glebbeek (2001) on police reform program in Guatemala. The study examined the strategy applied in the recruitment and training of aspirants. In that police reform program, members of the old police forces were deactivated and the old police institution was abolished to establish the new National Civil Police force. Glebbeek (2001) concluded that the process had not succeeded and faced significant challenges on account of the recruitment decisions. In contrast, a similar police reform study done by Stanley (2006) on statebuilding in El Salvador found that the strategy for building a new police force from the bottom-up was successful because it provided for continuity and grounded experience in the process by the inclusion of some members of the old military-controlled police. It also included members of armed factions, although it was significantly dominated by recruits from the civilian population who had had no record of involvement in the armed conflict. The two case studies on El Salvador and Guatemala demonstrate sharp similarities to the security sector reform program in Liberia.

Another notable study was done by Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007) focusing on police building in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. The authors examined police building in the context of peace building and state building. They focused on two case studies in arguing that despite its importance to the restoration of law and order, police building has been a relatively neglected dimension of post-war peace building in international police security reform programs, and that this neglect is primary the cause of failures in reforming police institutions especially in postconflict states. Emerging literature on effective international postconflict police reform emphasizes participation and ownership of reform programs by local stakeholders. The authors' conclusions were critical to understanding the challenges of the UNMIL's security sector reform initiatives in Liberia. In his essay on peace and stability in states transitioning from conflict to democratization, McDonough (2008) argued that despite years of statebuilding interventions by the international community, postconflict stability remains an elusive goal for many African nations such as Liberia. This is so because the socioeconomic and political conditions that culminated in protracted civil wars still prevail to date, and these conditions are the primary factors that continue to frustrate regional and international efforts at peace building. Attempts at mitigating these conditions do not by themselves play any determining role in the success or failure of statebuilding efforts. McDonough(2008) recommended that sustainable conflict resolution is possible only in the presence of peace building efforts that deal significantly with those socioeconomic preconditions that lead to conflict in the first place.

A program of postconflict police security reform is often a reflection of a dysfunctional police system which creates the need for change, and a clear break with the past. Jones (2007) argued that implementing change in police institutions have often been unsuccessful due to the failure of the administrators or the agents of change to understand or appreciate the organizational environments in which they operate. Jones (2007) explained this failure from the perspective of the theory of complex adaptive systems. Jones (2007) argued that administrative systems that succeed are systems that adapt to new realities and conditions. Olson (2007) provides an overview of an organization theory-based approach to the study of public administrative behavior, institutions, and developments within the context of democratic governance. Administration takes place in an environment of diversified structures and social relationships. Activities are organized around well-defined boundaries, rules, and practices. Olson (2007) argued that in the context of globalization, the ideal public administrator is one who advocates the emerging view in public policy that supports participatory forms of decision-making. The points raised by Olson (2007), and Jones (2007) about understanding and managing change bears strong similarity to this study in the context of interventions by international actors in police reform programs such as those in the UNMIL. Implementing change with assumptions that are nested in some international police reform template has the potential to pose challenges. Atkinson (2008) argued that while liberal intervention in Liberia has contributed to the process of peace building, the "deficiencies of the intervention" such as insufficient commitment from the government and the international partners, continue to pose challenges. Similarly, Sawyer (2005) described the shortcomings in various reform

activities spearheaded by the United Nations and other international nongovernmental

organizations in Liberia. Sawyer (2005) acknowledged that part of the implementation

challenges are due to problems emanating from resource constraints. However, Sawyer

(2005) emphasized that the greater shortcomings in the implementation of various reform

programs are lack of guidance of a long-term larger vision for a postconflict society, and

the lack of effective coordination amongst implementing agencies and their failure to

engage Liberians as stakeholders in designing and implementing these programs.

The liberal democratic theory on establishing an effective police force is that as

an embodiment of state authority, an effective police force strengthens democracy by

making society safer. A successful police reform program will enhance state authority,

make the society safer, and strengthen democracy in Liberia. Effective policing is a

benefit of liberal democracy because it protects freedoms, rights, and happiness such as

enjoyment of enhanced public safety as a public good (Stiglitz, 2000). Postconflict police

reform is more critical to and definitive of democracy. It is central to democratic self-

governance defined as the process of governing that involves both government and

citizen stakeholders working together as equal participants in finding solutions to public

problems such as police security reform (Zanotti, 2004). A strategy for postconflict police

reform ought not only to be directed at improving performance effectiveness or

delivering better services, but the strategy should also focus on a process of regaining

legitimacy from the citizenry. This is also why the liberal democratic model of policing

maintains that policing should be practiced in the context of community consent

expressed through respect and public reception and perception of the police both as law

enforces and protectors of peace. It is from this liberal democratic view of policing that concepts such as police-community relations and community policing emerged as central to quality public safety (Mulcahy, 1998).

The Liberia National Police: An Historical Background

Understanding the history of the Liberia National Police (LNP) and its organizational culture is critical to implementation of a successful police reform program design. Until it was legally established in 1924, policing functions in Liberia were performed by the Liberia Frontier Force (LFF). The LFF was a military defense force that was set up by the government with the mission primarily to patrol and protect Liberia's borders. In time, it became an integral part of the central administration of the hinterland and its functions were expanded to include protection for government officials, forced recruitment of unpaid laborers for public and private works, and enforcement of tax collection in the hinterland. The LFF was undisciplined, corrupt, and notorious for its brutal methods of tax collection (Liebenow, 1969; Sawyer, 1992). In 1924, the Legislature passed an act establishing the first police force in Liberia. It was a small 15-man police force known as the Monrovia City Police with a mission limited to protecting life and property in Monrovia, the capital city of Liberia. In time, the numerical strength of the force increased from 400 in 1965 to more than 1000 in 1971. In 1975, rising urban and rural population, crime, and increasing political and national security concerns caused the Legislature to amend the original police act and officially establish the Liberian National Police Force enabling the force to take over national public safety and

law enforcement duties with police detachments deployed throughout the country (Jaye,

2008; Sawyer, 1992).

The fundamental duty of any police force in a state is to ensure the security of the

citizens and their property. The security of citizens also means protection of human

rights, prevention of crime, and the detection of crime for the purposes of prosecuting

those who violate the social contract (Bayley, 2001; Furuzawa, 2009). In contrast, the

Liberia National Police had a long history of bias, corruption, intimidation, suppression,

and brutality. The LNP behaved in similar manner as did the Liberia Frontier Force

before it. From the outset of its formation, the Liberia National Police Force was largely a

dysfunctional institution that catered more to serving the social, economic, and political

interests of the wealthy and those with political power while it provided little protection

for the majority of the citizens. Prior to the civil war, the LNP was also perceived by the

citizenry to be one of the most corrupt government institutions in the country. The most

notorious bribe takers were the traffic police, investigators, officers on patrols, officers at

traffic check points or road blocks, and officers at report desks (Olukoshi, 2008; Opolot,

2008). The LNP also operated more as agents of state security, insofar as the "state" was

defined as the government in power (Sawyer, 1992; Liebenow, 1987). By 1970, the

security network in Liberia comprised the Liberia National Police (LNP), and a host of

secret police networks including the Special Security Service (SSS), National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI), Executive Action Bureau (EAB) and the National Intelligence and

Security Service (NISS) (Sawyer, 1992). From the 1950s onward, the Liberia police was

the instrument of political oppression executing orders of successive autocratic

governments and military dictatorships. It carried out countless cases of arbitrary arrests, detention and torture of students, civil servants, and the murder of members of the political opposition. By the onset of the civil war in 1989, police brutality had deepened as some members became part of the government's secret death squads. Sawyer (1992) described the use of police force for political repression in Liberia:

By the time of Tubman's death in 1971, the security network was in virtual control of Liberia. At least three celebrated treason trials had been held. In addition, countless instances of arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture of students, civil servants, and others had taken place under a veritable reign of terror as suspicion and fear gripped the society. (p. 282)

According to Sawyer (2005), the LNP intimidated and suppressed ordinary citizens and political opposition leaders to protect the regime during the war. The LNP became politically biased, militarized, and ethnically divided. Many officers of the LNP arbitrarily committed human rights abuses and participated in atrocities committed against unarmed citizens. In its strategy for consolidating peace and security, the Government of Liberia's Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008) acknowledged that:

Security in Liberia has been a major concern since independence. Security forces have been used to intimidate and at times to terrorize the population and intervene in the political process without respect for the due process of law. The security forces contributed to a system in which economic benefits and political power accrued to the elite, leaving the majority of Liberians in insecurity and poverty. (p. 35)

Sawyer (2005) argued that past political leaders in Liberia did not value the primary

mission of the police. The mission, to protect the social practices and political processes

that make society safer, included protection of human rights, freedoms, happiness, and

free and fair elections, all of which are critical to strengthening democracy.

Acccording to Kromah (2007) the lack of appreciation of the importance of the

police was reflected in recruitment processes, training, and conditions of work and

promotion practices during the period leading to the civil war. The feeder class of recruits

was from amongst the poverty stricken, demoralized population comprising elementary

and junior high school dropouts mainly from urban neighborhoods. The recruitment

processes and promotion were characterized by a culture of bribery, nepotism. Training

programs placed little emphasis on lessons in policing ethics, accountability, and linking

the protection of life and property to basic human rights and rule of law values (Dunn &

Tarr, 1988; Liebenow, 1987; Kromah, 2007). Officers deployed were poorly paid

compared to other civil servants. They had no benefits, and no housing allowances. They

were underfunded and poorly equipped. They regularly transported themselves in

commercial vehicles to their assignment stations. All of these factors impacted on the

operations of the Liberian police. Throughought the history of the LNP, policing issues

have revolved around the lack of professionalism, low morale, corruption, and extortion

as officers harassed civilians to augment their meager wages (Olukoshi, 2008). These

conditions also left the society under secured and made police service unattractive to

qualified high school and college graduates. Throughout its history, the LNP has been

haunted by a crises of public confidence and distrust. By the time the civil war ended in

2003, the country's police system had lost all credibility as a legitimate organization for public safety and had collapsed. This all accounted for why policing issues were central to the dynamics of the conflict and why any postconflict security interventions in Liberia required radical reformation of the police institution, police forces, and their conduct.

In the postconflict context, sustainable statebuilding and socioeconomic development depend to a large extent on building a police force that can break away from its discredited past history of corruption, bias, intimidation, and brutality. UNMIL's police training process is taking place in a new global environment under country-specific realities and conditions that inform how training intervention for the LNP must happen in order to ensure sustainability and ownership.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on August 18, 2003 in Accra, Ghana called for security sector reforms to build and maintain effective national security institutions based on the rule of law, including the restructuring of the LNP. The focus on police reform was to develop a professional police force that is effective and capable to protect and serve the citizenry, build safe communities by respecting their human rights, and responding to crime, corruption, and abuse (Jaye, 2008). Given the tragic history of the LNP, the issue of how best to restructure the police organization and its operations and move it away from undue political influence has been a central concern of ordinary citizens and government leaders in the postconflict democratization process. The lingering questions are what an effective police force is and what type of police security force is appropriate to meet the needs of the people of Liberia. How should the LNP be organized to be effective in providing the police security needs for the people of Liberia?

The evolving debate appeared to favor the view that police accountability to citizens is central to public order and to effective policing (Fayemi, 2004; Sawyer, 2005). The national debate called for a kind of community policing in which local people actively participate in providing police protection. Sawyer (2005) recommended that the local people must actively participate as co-producers of their own security protection but in ways that do not militarize their communities. In 2008, Liberia's social and economic development plan referred to as the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) upheld that:

> The LNP will be the primary operational agency responsible for internal security and will be restructured to ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency. In particular, the LNP will reassess its recruitment and vetting practices, before being expanded to address shortages of personnel across the country. They will be better trained to address personal crime, to reduce incidents of corruption, and police harassment and to strengthen the confidence of local communities in the police. (p. 52)

Postconflict Police Reform in Liberia

The United Nations police reform program in Liberia (2003-2011) was implemented through the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) forces under the direction of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). UNCIVPOL's police-building and peacekeeping experiences were rooted in UN peacekeeping mandates implemented in previous postconflict states such as East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, and the Solomon Islands (Celador, 2005, Vetschera & Damian, 2006). Formerly called United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL), but now called United

Nations Police (UNPOL) the organization's mission in Liberia was similar to those of its previous missions: restore law and order, and provide security and public safety for all persons regardless of their ethnicity; train, restructure, and strengthen the local police to ensure its capability to uphold the rule of law and operate effectively in accordance with international policing standards, and the principles of democratic policing including respect for human rights (Kumar, 2010; Mobekk, 2001). By the time UNPOL arrived in late 2003, policing in Liberia had long collapsed and the country was without any effective rule of law. Police stations had been plundered, destroyed, and abandoned. The remnants were controlled by rebel factions who also manned roadblocks. In rural Liberia, informal policing functions were performed by intrusive individuals who called themselves "police volunteers" but were neither recruited by the interim National Transitional Government of Liberia, nor approved by their local communities (Jaye, 2008; Friedman, 2011).

UNMIL's police reform strategy began in 2003 with the establishment of a group that was responsible to make key police reform decisions. This group comprised ranking officers of UNPOL and ranking Liberian police leaders of the then interim National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). This group organized the Rule of Law Implementation Committee which jointly guided the implementation of the police reform program. Members of the committee were comprised of ranking officers of UNMIL and ranking police leaders and officials of the government. It included the UNMIL Police Commissioner, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of National Security, and the interim Director of Liberia National Police. The first approach was to respond to the urgent need

to restore law and order. According to the UN Secretary General's Report to the UN Security Council (2004), UNPOL and Liberian police leaders established a local police presence in early 2004. They recruited, vetted, and deployed an initial interim force of 400 former local police officers to work alongside UNPOL in its efforts to drive out former combatants and reclaim police stations in Monrovia. They also implemented "quick impact" projects which included the reopening of police sub-stations, taking over roadblocks, and constructing new mini-stations (Friedman, 2011).

Recruitment and Vetting

According to Friedman (2011) the next strategy of the Rule of Law Implementation Committee was to decide on the number of police officers to be trained both in the context of the population of the country and the long term funding capacity of the government to maintain the new Liberia National Police in the long term. Based on UN police standards, the Committee recommended that the target size of the new Liberia National Police would be 3,500 officers by the year 2007. That would amount to a police-citizen ratio of about 1 police officer per 1,000 citizens given an anticipated population of about 3.6 million when a national population census is conducted in 2008 (UN Security Council S/2007/479, 2007). The Committee's first action regarding issues of recruitment, vetting, and training was to decide on the qualifications and recruitment standards. A primary consideration was the need to attract qualified applicants from amongst the population, while avoiding individuals who had been involved in various crimes during the war. The Accra Peace Agreement had specified that all conflict-era militias including paramilitary and police-like forces at the country's international airports and public

corporation facilities such as the National Port Authority, Liberia Telecommunications

Corporation and the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company, should be dissolved (Jaye,

2008). This challenge was made more difficult when the hundreds of former self-styled

"police volunteers" from around the country flooded to Monrovia and presented

themselves for recruitment. Thousands of former police officers from the pre-war Liberia

National Police force also wanted to maintain their positions as part of the new police

force (Friedman, 2011). According to an International Crisis Group Report (2009), the

Committee decided and formally dissolved the old pre-war police and paramilitary

organizations. All police and paramilitary officers were deactivated along with all self-

styled "police volunteers" who had roamed rural Liberia. The Committee then asked all

interested individuals to apply, be subjected to the entire recruitment and vetting process,

and undergo basic training. Ex-combatants and individuals under the age of 18 or over 55

were ineligible to apply. UNPOL's restructuring and recruiting section conducted the

vetting. Local Liberian staff did not participate. The recruitment standards included

possession of a high school diploma, good reputation and character in one's local

community, no war crime history, physical fitness, and successful completion of a written

examination. The names of recruits were published in newspapers for approximately a

week, requesting the public to come forward with information that might disqualify

applicants. The Rule of Law Implementation Committee also sent names of recruits to

leaders and members of community-based civil society organizations and human rights

groups (Friedman, 2011; Malan, 2008).

The International Crisis Group (2009) reported that the recruitment and vetting process was controversial and marked by dissenting opinions especially over the decision to deactivate former police officers. Many local police leaders were concerned that this decision undermined institutional memory because many senior officers with decades of valuable policing experience had been relieved of their positions. Citizens and civil society organizations were concerned that the process made it possible for some applicants to give false information about their identities or hide information about their pasts. Liberian police leaders and local nongovernmental organizations such as the Liberia National Law Enforcement Association held the view that had the Committee included Liberian officers on the vetting team, this situation may have been avoided because local officers were better situated to verify the authenticity of applicants' claims (Friedman, 2011). According to the report of the International Crisis Group (2009), there were also internal disagreements within the ranks of the UNMIL brass over the recruitment and vetting process. As early as 2005, UNMIL's own human rights protection unit described the process as a failure, although others vehemently defended the process (Friedman, 2011).

Training

According to Friedman (2011), training of the first recruits began in 2004 at the National Police Academy. Initially, trainers at the academy were international police officers. Later in 2006, efforts were made to build local support by employing local Liberian trainers although these efforts were hampered by earlier decisions to deactivate former ranking LNP officers who possessed significant experience to serve as trainers.

The new LNP officers lacked the practical experience to serve as effective trainers and largely relied on the assistance of their international counterparts. The trainers used materials and format that the UNPOL had utilized in other postconflict training situations in Kosovo and later in East Timor. Initially training was largely fast tracked and lasted about 3 months. Later, it increased to 6 months for both training at the National Police Academy and field training. In 2006, some training coordinators determined that the curriculum compromised quality for quantity and that it favored producing large number of officers quickly. They argued that the curriculum was more suited for training of interim police officers than for the development of a sustainable long-term police force (Friedman, 2011). Moreover, the training materials did not cover subjects such as ethics, discipline, crime investigation, defensive tactics, and specialized training. The curriculum was revised in 2006. It included use of manuals on policies and procedures, report writing, and statement taking. It also covered subjects on police administration, ethics, discipline, democratic policing, criminal investigation, and community policing concepts and reflected best practices in other West African countries such as Ghana and Nigeria. By that time, however, more than 2000 police officers had already been trained and deployed. They did not benefit from the contents of the new curriculum (UN Security Council S/2006/958, 2006).

According to the Special Report of the Secretary General on the United Nation's Mission in Liberia (2012), UNMIL had vetted, trained, and deployed a new Liberia National Police force of more than 4,200 officers to date. UNPOL had trained 3,661 regular police, and more than 1,000 officers had received specialized training. UNPOL

has also set up specialized units within the new LNP organization. The *Professional Services Unit* (PSU) comprised 300 officers who received specialized training in crowd control in Nigeria. The unit serves as first line response to civil unrest such as riots and mob violence. The *Emergency Response Unit* (ERU) serves as the only armed counter-insurgency response unit. The ERU will deal with crime situations which may require the use of firearms in the arrest of armed criminals, hostage situations, and violent crimes in progress (International Crisis Group Report, 2011). The end of UNMIL's mission is near and its scheduled date of departure from Liberia is September 30, 2014. Liberians still remain genuinely concerned about what needs to be done to ensure police effectiveness and public confidence in the ability of the Liberia National Police to maintain law and order after UNMIL's departure.

Objectives of International Police Reform

This subsection describes the objectives of international police reform in postconflict states. The international community is increasingly involved in implementing police reform programs, especially in nations destabilized by political confusion and lawlessness, or weakened by civil wars. A review of the literature on the specific objectives of police reform and the strategies required to achieve them is critical to understanding how a successful reform program can contribute to an overall national reform agenda, particularly from the perspective of strengthening the process of democratization. Police reform in a postconflict situation is unlike reforms within police organizations in countries with stable, functioning governments such as in the United States and much of Europe. Police reform in a postconflict situation is haunted by a pre-

conflict experience under which instead of upholding the law, the police force is highly

politicized and discredited because it was controlled by an unpopular regime that used the

force as an instrument of political repression (Downes & Keane, 2006; Mulcahy, 2008).

Alemika (2009) argued that in most African countries, pre-conflict police practice is

characterized by regime protection and reactive policing. Police forces lack independence

and policing is characterized by protection of the regime in power. The protection of

rulers often culminates in violations of the rights of citizens thereby leading to open

conflict.

According to Alemika (2009) reactive policing is the form of policing by which

laws are enforced after they are violated. Reactive policing is in contrast to proactive

policing whereby laws are enforced before they are violated. Proactive policing involves

law enforcement by the prevention of general public insecurity and crime through

surveillance, intelligence gathering, and promotion of cordial relations with local

communities (Alemika, 2009). The reactive enforcement is manifested through

investigations, apprehension, detention, and prosecution of those suspected of the crime.

Here, the problem is that policing relies on victims to report crime, but victims are

reluctant to do so because they perceive the police as ineffective. The experience of past

police aggression and brutality under unpopular regimes raises the bar in determining the

objectives and requirements of a sustainable police reform program in a postconflict

situation. Understanding the key factors that lead to open conflict in a postconflict state

can link to how a police reform program should be structured to enable a reformed police

force to become more responsive and effective in policing when those factors recur

(Alemika, 2009).

        The goal of a transitional, postconflict police reform program must be structured

so as to enable the new reform police force to break away from the illegitimate

institutional practices of its discredited past. A reformed police force must be one that

embraces democratic policing principles and values and plays its critical role as an

integral component of democratization. This is defined as the process by which the rules

and procedures for citizen participation in governance are applied to institutions that were

previously governed by coercive control (Mulcahy, 1998). An effective democratic police

force is critical to the character of the postconflict security provided. This makes police

reform an integral part of the democratization process in a postconflict state. Here, the

emphasis is on how to create an effective democratic police force that adheres to the

requirements of the rule of law and respect for human rights. The goal is also to support

expansion of democratization and ensure a safe environment that is conducive for

investment and the development of market economies (Bayley, 2001; Alemika, 2009;

Celador, 2005). Bayley (2001) described the following as characteristics of an effective

police force that supports a sustainable program of democratization:

- A democratic police force caters to the needs of individual citizens; it is
  impartial in its exercise of police authority and serves the needs of the
  citizens. Such a police force is not one that is controlled by the government
  and does not cater to the orders of public officials. In other words, the citizens

should expect that their police force will respond effectively to their
individual and community needs;

- A democratic police force is one that serves the interest of individual citizens
  and their communities and demonstrates daily, that it is there to serve their
  interest; that its policing powers and protective capacity will be utilized to
  protect the citizens;

- A democratic police force is accountable to the law and not to the
  government; here, police actions are guided by the rule of law. In other words,
  the policing authority should not be controlled or directed by the arbitrary
  actions of those in the government. This will avoid the likelihood of abuse of
  power and abuse of the rights of the citizens; and

- A democratic police force is one that protects human rights. The protection of
  human rights also means that policing operations must at all times be impartial
  at all times. It must provide protection for individuals, groups and all of the
  processes and activities that are essential for the exercise of individual rights
  in a democracy. These activities include the exercise of rights such as freedom
  of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of movement and freedom to
  associate with others. The police must also protect the citizens from attempts
  by government functionaries to execute arbitrary arrest, and illegal detention.
  The police must also remain impartial in the administration of justice; and its
  operations must encourage citizens to pressure government for their rights. (p.
  51)

The democratic policing characteristics outlined above are also expounded by the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). According to the DCAF (2006), emphasis on the goals and objectives of police reform have shifted from prioritizing technical training and skills such as in investigation and evidence gathering in the 1990s, to include a focus on upholding human security, basic human rights, equal protection of all citizens without discrimination against illegal acts under the law, exercising restraint in the use of force except to achieve a necessary result, equal treatment and equal access to justice, equal protection of potentially vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly, women, refugees, displaced persons and members of minority groups; and community policing. Community policing is the strategy by which the goals of policing are redirected towards service to communities and responsiveness to their needs. Community policing ensures effective police–community engagement through consultations and feedback and the integration of the concerns of the citizens and their communities into policing policies, management, and delivery of security services. This shift in emphasis is the result of increasing international involvement in peacekeeping operations and postconflict democratic governance reforms. The DCAF also emphasizes the development of a police force that is transparent and accountable in its operations. A police reform program must also emphasize the principles of ensuring equal treatment and access to security and justice, inclusiveness or an ethnically integrated new police force, professionalism in the exercise of police powers, effective chain of command structure, and availability of requisite resources such as equipment. A successful police reform program should take place in an environment where there is a

strong judicial framework and a civil society that can exercise independent oversight. The reform should be one that fosters cooperation between the reformed police and other security institutions and actors that are both local and international. DCAF links effective democratic policing to poverty reduction, sustainable social and political stability, and economic development.

International Police Reform: Selected Cases

Since the 1990s, the international community has devoted substantial efforts to police and security sector reforms in many postconflict nations. The postconflict police building program is conventionally regarded as a key process of transition to democratization particularly from the perspective of the protection of human rights (Bayley, 2001; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). This section briefly describes reform strategies of three police reform programs in Bosnia/Herzegovina, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands. The cases were selected because they bear similarity to ongoing police reform program in Liberia.

The public safety and security mandates of the United Nations mission in each of the three postconflict states cited above were twofold: (a) restore law and order and provide security for all, and (b) restructure the local police force to ensure that they can effectively operate in accordance with international policing standards, principles of democratic policing and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Day, 2000; Celador, 2005, Vetschera & Damian, 2006; Dinnen et al., 2006). The restructuring strategies and certification processes employed by each of these missions were also similar. They included recruitment of candidates, vetting, screening, and investigation for

previous human rights abuses. Training was provided to all officers (Hood, 2006; Lemay-Hebert, 2009; Dinnen et al., 2006). At the time that each of these missions ended, they had achieved their mandate of restoring law and order. In East Timor for example, the mission achieved a number of other successes including the monitoring of parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007 (Hood, 2006). However, all of the missions failed in their mandate to establish effective functioning local police force in each of the three postconflict states (Celador, 2005; Dinnen et al., 2006). In the cases of East Timor and Bosnia/Herzegovina, the failure to establish effective police force led to extended periods of operation with redefined mandates (Day, 2000; Hood, 2006; Celador, 2005). The various reasons cited for the failure included political interference in the process, ethnic rivalries, ill-conceived police reform mandates, and failure to design country specific restructuring strategies (Furuzawa, 2009; Lemay-Hebert, 2009; Strachan, 2009).

Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from the case studies above attest that police reform is a critical component of any successful postconflict statebuilding program. In the three cases discussed above, police reform was not successful despite successes in restoration and maintenance of law and order (Dinnen et al., 2006). What all three cases also have in common with the Liberia National Police is that in all situations, the police were part of the problem. They were corrupt, ethnically divided, militarized, and politically manipulated. They abused the human rights of those they were trained to protect, lost public confidence, and were ineffective at providing security for all citizens (Celador, 2005; Lemay-Hebert, 2009; Sawyer, 1992). The other lesson learned is that donor-driven

reform program designs tended to be over-prescriptive, and non-consultative. The programs were not locally owned or planned in the context of local realities. This was the rationale for unsuccessful outcomes such as in the case of reforms in the Solomon Islands with a history of ethnic rivalries. The police restructuring programs were more complex and difficult to achieve. This led to the periodic replacement or extension of mandates of the reform missions. In Liberia, for example, UNMIL's mission was extended in 2008, 2012, 2013, and again in 2014 all on account of security sector reform concerns. Odugbemi and Jacobson (2008) argue that governance reform interventions in political societies must ensure country ownership. No reform program can succeed without participation of all stakeholders including the citizens who are ultimately the intended beneficiaries. To the extent that the local context of policing varies from one country to another, the design and implementation of any international police reform assistance program must be based on context-specific knowledge and expertise in order to be successful. Many of the problems experienced in the missions in the three case studies raise questions about UNMIL's approaches to police security reform in Liberia (Celador, 2005; Dinnen et al., 2006; Strachan, 2009; Lemay-Hebert, 2009).

Literature Analysis and Conclusion

Many authors provide a comprehensive overview of the issues regarding international postconflict police reform assistance led by the UN and industrialized donor nations such as the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other Western liberal democracies. The overarching objectives are to help fragile states regain stateness, foster stable democratic regimes, and secure conditions necessary to support the stability of an

emerging new socioeconomic and political world order (Kraxberger, 2007; Wiatrowski &

Goldstone, 2010). Mounting conflicts of the post-Cold War period and security

challenges in reestablishing legitimate national authority in fragile states signal the

increasing relevance of international police training interventions as a critical standard for

the protection of human rights, upholding the rule of law, and improving government-

citizen relations in the global context (Ellison, 2007; Furuzawa, 2009; West, 2011).

International police reform initiatives have not always proved successful owing to

factors such as absence of country-specific reform strategies and local commitment to

ownership. Call (2003) identified alternative perspectives that focus on police behavior in

the context of upholding international human rights standards and removing violators

from the ranks of the police force, maintenance of law and order, and the prevention of a

possible return to conflict as well as facilitating the processes of democratization. Many

challenges also confront national decision makers, the UN, and other donor partners in

international police reform processes. Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) argued that most

international police training strategies offered to postconflict nations by western

democracies prove less effective because they do not adequately address issues such as

conflict resolution, importance of citizens' trust and confidence, corruption, human

rights, and citizens' engagement in crime control strategies. Call (2003) underscored that

if a police reform program is to be successful, it must be holistic and must consider

building the capacities of other relevant institutions in the justice system (i.e., courts,

prosecutors, civil society etc.) that have the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of

the police. Another challenge is that international police reform is relatively new and

there are fewer credible models of policing. This creates the need for the reform program

to adapt to local realities. In contrast, reformers tend to draw more on external ideas,

replicate their own models of policing or insist on applying models that may have worked

elsewhere. Furuzawa (2009) argued that international police training and reform

strategies must vary from one country to another and be based on country-specific

conditions in order to be successful.

There is a well-founded fear amongst Liberians that conflict can return in the

future if the UNMIL's police training and reform programs do not yield effective results.

What is absent from the literature is an analysis of the effectiveness, results, and future

implications of the police training and overall reform program by the UN Mission in

Liberia. UNMIL's police training interventions provide an opportunity to assess how the

UN has responded to the global challenges of postconflict police reform in the process of

recruiting, training, and building a new Liberian National Police Force that can break

away from its discredited past, effectively maintain law and order, and gain public

confidence as a professional force.

Chapter Summary

In Chapter 2, I examine the contemporary scholarly literature on international

postconflict police reform. I provide the conceptual basis of international interventions in

postconflict police reform. The overarching objectives are to help fragile states regain

stateness, foster stable democratic regimes, and secure conditions necessary to support

the stability of an emerging new socioeconomic and political world order (Kraxberger,

2007; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). According to Kathrani, (2010), stateness is a

function of security and a condition under the social contract theory. The state must strengthen its capacity to apply legitimate force to uphold the social contract and deliver security protection as a public good for which the citizens surrender responsibility for personal security and protection of life and property to government. Liberal democratic theory justifies the necessity of an effective police force as an embodiment of state authority for protecting the political and socioeconomic processes (Miller, 2010). Public choice theory offers an explanation of police security as a public good which benefits are expected by all and provided by the state to all citizens for their protection and wellbeing (Stiglitz, 2000; Kraxberger, 2007). Community policing theory emphasizes participation from local citizens for effective public safety (Kappler & Gaines, 2012).

Many authors provide a comprehensive overview of the issues. Effective policing is a minimum requirement for making postconflict democratic transition successful and sustainable. International police reform initiatives have not always proved successful owing to factors such as absence of country-specific reform strategies and local commitment to ownership (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). Call (2003) underscored that if a police reform program is to be successful, it must consider building the capacities of other relevant institutions in the justice system (i.e., courts, prosecutors, civil society etc.) that have the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of the police. Another challenge is that international police reform is relatively new and there are fewer credible models of policing (Bayley, 2006). This creates the need for the reform program to adapt to local realities. In contrast, reformers tend to draw more on external ideas, replicate their own models of policing or insist on applying models that may have worked elsewhere.

Furuzawa (2009) argued that international police training and reform strategies must vary from one country to another and be based on country-specific conditions. Lessons learned from the case studies are that police reform programs must be context-specific, and be grounded in local participation.

What is absent from the literature is an analysis of the effectiveness, results, and future implications of the police training and overall reform program by the UN mission in Liberia. UNMIL's police training provides an opportunity to assess how the UN has responded to the challenges of postconflict police reform in the process of recruiting, training, and building a new Liberian National Police Force that can break away from its discredited past, effectively maintain law and order, and gain public confidence. Chapter 3 describes the method of inquiry that grounds the study.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the research design applied in the study. I provide a rationale for selecting the most suitable theoretical method of inquiry that grounds the study. I also describe the theoretical tradition of inquiry, research setting, sample and population, and process of data collection. I discuss issues of ethical considerations. I describe the role of the investigator and the steps taken to contact and protect participants in this study. The purpose of this study was to provide a deeper understanding of how the UNMIL's police training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The overarching research question was the following: How has police training by the United Nations Mission in Liberia affected police effectiveness and public confidence in the ability of the Liberia National Police to maintain law and order? The mixed-method model of inquiry, which combines both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, was used as the most suitable method of inquiry for the study (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). The independent variable in this study was the training by the UN mission in Liberia. The dependent variable was the impact of the training on the effectiveness of LNP to maintain law and order and gain public confidence.

Research Design and Approach

The LNP was chosen as a case study in order to carry out an in-depth study and to be able to assess the effects of the UNMIL's police reforms on the organization. The defining characteristic of a case study approach is its focus on one instance of the

phenomenon that is to be investigated. There may be insights to be gained from looking at one case, which can have wider implications that may not be realized by trying to cover a wider scope. The goal is to illuminate the general by looking at the particular (Denscombe, 2005). In this exploratory case study, I combined both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. According to Creswell (2012), the planned mixing of the methods is a procedure for collecting, integrating, and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study to understand a research problem. Rudestam and Newman (2007) also described the mixed model as

> A pragmatic approach in which questions of method are secondary to the adoption of an overriding paradigm or worldview guiding the investigation. Thus, it might be possible to mix research hypotheses of a confirmatory nature with general questions of an exploratory nature, structured interviews and scales that are quantitative with open-ended interviews and observations that are qualitative, and methods of analysis that draw on both traditions to expand the meaningfulness of the findings. (p. 51)

The mixed model brings balance to data analysis and affirms interpretation. According to Creswell (2007), qualitative research is a process of inquiry through which the researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, and reports detailed information. The qualitative exploratory case study method of inquiry often is recommended for studies where the research requires exploration and there is a need to present a detailed account of the topic. The researcher needs to learn about the topic in order to provide a narration and the viewpoint of participants (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam

& Newton, 2007). The method focuses on the study of real life situations, places, organizations, events, and concepts. It is preferred because of the type of data that are required and the purpose of the study, which is how the UNMIL's police training and reform interventions have affected the maintenance of law and order and public confidence in the LNP. In this study, the qualitative method of inquiry was employed because international police reform under postconflict conditions is an emerging phenomenon. This methodology enabled the discovery of how the UNMIL administered its police reform program and what happened in the process. The objective was to determine whether any change might be needed to develop a police force that is effective for maintaining law and order and is legitimate in the eyes of Liberians.

Quantitative research is based on the idea that information about a social phenomenon can be quantified or measured. It can be expressed numerically and analyzed by statistical methods (Creswell, 2012). From the quantitative perspective, I developed a competency skills level questionnaire and used the Likert rating scale to collect quantitative data that measured numerical indicators of agreement and disagreement levels. I also developed a questionnaire to evaluate police performance and the public confidence of graduates already working in the field. I reviewed documents and records and used open-ended and semistructured interview questions. The primary sources of data consisted of the following: (a) documentary sources such as reports, mass media, and archival sources; (b) individual semistructured interviews with open-ended questions; and (c) a survey questionnaire. The methods of analysis under the mixed-model strengthened the meaningfulness of the research findings (Rudestam & Newton,

2007). There was difficulty in identifying comparative baseline measures because prewar factual data do not exist because police records and documents were destroyed during the civil war (Jaye, 2008; Kromah, 2007; Malan, 2008). However, I used existing research (Kromah, 2007; Ngaima, 2003) on the behavior of the Liberian police which measured citizens' perception of the LNP before and during the civil war. I also did multiple year comparisons of police effectiveness covering four 2-year periods beginning with the time UNMIL deployed trained police officers. Other intervening variables that were considered included police preparedness and response to crime, riots, and natural or human made disasters and how they impact the effectiveness of, and public confidence in, the LNP.

Setting and Sample

In qualitative research, sampling is the process of selecting a subgroup of the population. The sample is the representative group of potential participants who are relevant given their understanding of the phenomenon under study (McNabb, 2008). In this section, I describe the population, sampling procedures, sample size, and the approaches that I used in selecting and accessing potential participants for the study. The research was done in Liberia. The target research population consisted of participants who have resided in Liberia before and after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the warring factions in Accra, Ghana in 2003.

Sampling Procedure

In this section, I describe the procedures used to contact participants. According to Rudestam and Newton (2007), providing a detailed description of steps taken to gain

access to participants is crucial in the research process. Walden University's Institutional

Review Board (IRB) approved both my dissertation proposal and my IRB application

under approval #07-30-13-0065268 and authorized the use of the research instruments to

conduct the research. Following the IRB approval, I submitted separate recruitment

letters to my community partners for the survey and the interview. The recruitment letters

provided information and criteria for participation in the study and how interested

individuals could contact me to express their interest. The recruitment letters were

displayed on the information boards of my community partners. My community partners

also authorized me to use their public premises to conduct the research. For this study,

my community partners were the UNMIL, LNP, the Ministry of Justice, University of

Liberia, Federation of Liberian Youth, Institute for Research and Development, and the

National Civil Society Council of Liberia.

Potential participants first contacted me by phone to express their interest. I

arranged meetings with interested participants who met the qualifications for

participation at scheduled dates and times during which I gave them the consent forms.

Initial contacts began with informal conversations about the research being undertaken

and how important the result of the research might be for participants and for Liberia as a

whole. I developed rapport and built participants' trust by explaining the purpose and

importance of the study, particularly why participants were targeted to participate in the

study. I attempted to persuade participants that their knowledge about UNMIL's police

training program and their opinions about its outcome were important to the building of

an effective police force in Liberia. I explained the consent forms and informed

participants that they could decide to participate or not to participate in the study and that

their participation must be based on their voluntary informed consent. Participants were

given the assurances that they were free to cancel their participation at any time.

Participants were also assured of complete confidentiality and total anonymity throughout

the study and long thereafter (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I conducted

the research from December 2013 through August 2014.

Sample Size

The sampling practice most frequently applied in sampling procedures is to

randomly select a sample size that is representative of the population, study it, and then

generalize the findings from the sample to the whole population (Creswell, 2007;

Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). According to the report of the population and housing

census conducted by the Government of Liberia (2008), the population of Liberia was 3.4

million. There were also 1,566 registered community-based civil society organizations in

Liberia (Civil Society Organizations Directory for Liberia, 2012). I drew a sample size

from these community-based civil society organizations because they are a representative

group of the population that is the beneficiary of UNMIL's police training program. I

drew a sample size from among the police officers who had been trained and deployed.

According to the Report of the UN Secretary-General (2012), UNMIL had trained and

deployed 4,200 police officers since the inception of its police training program in 2004. I

also took a sample size from decision makers in government and in UNMIL.

For this study, the selection criterion was experience as the unit of analysis. Here,

experience meant experience as an actor having either participated in the process of

administering UNMIL's police training, or as an officer trained and deployed by UNMIL. It also meant experience as a decision maker or an observer and a targeted beneficiary from civil society of the outcome or impact of UNMIL's police reform program. Random sampling and purposive sampling were utilized for the three categories of population based on experience as the criteria for selecting potential participants who are key informants. Key informants were participants who were knowledgeable about the phenomenon to be studied and who had the ability to provide information useful in drawing meaningful conclusions (McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I proposed a sample size of 70 participants comprising 10 to 15 decision makers, 20 to 30 police officers, and 15 to 25 members of civil society organizations to guide the research. However, after recruitment letters were posted, many police field officers and civil society members called and expressed interest to participate in the study. According to the literature, key informants should be recruited until the aim of the research is accomplished (Creswell, 2012; McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & Newton, 2007).

I increased the sample size to 136 participants because of the diversity of data sources (Creswell, 2007). For the interview protocol, I used homogenous purposive sampling of 16 actors and decision makers. Key informants in this category included leaders of community-based civil society organizations, ranking officers of UNMIL's Civil Affairs Division, the LNP, and former ranking officials of the Liberian Government as policy level decision makers who participated in, and were knowledgeable about the police training process. Their experiences as actors in the police training program purposefully informed the research problem. UNMIL's police division, UNPOL, initially

consented to participate in the study but later declined. For the survey questionnaire, I used random sampling of 60 police officers and supervisors who were trained and deployed by UNMIL and were actively in the field. I also did random sampling of 60 members and leaders of major community-based civil society organizations. Their experiences as civil society beneficiaries of UNMIL's police training program purposefully informed the research problem. Sampling is the purposeful selection of potential respondents that are relevant for the study (Creswell, 2012; Singleton, 2005). Participants who responded to the survey questionnaire were leaders and members of community-based civil society organizations and police field officers and supervisors. Participants who responded to the interview questions were leaders of community-based civil society organizations, ranking officers of the LNP, officials of the Civil Affairs Division of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, and officials of the Liberian government. The community-based civil society organizations included the Federation of Liberian Youth, Liberia Marketing Association, Center for Transparency and Accountability in Liberia, New African Research and Development Agency, Action for Genuine Democratic Alternatives and the National Coalition of Civil Society Organizations of Liberia. These organizations were a representative group of the population that was the anticipated beneficiary of the police training and reform program. I learned from their real life experiences and their perceptions about the new police force and about the overall police security reform program in Liberia. Table 1 below shows the category of participants in the sample size.

Table 1

Category of Participants

Population	Sample Size		
	Interview Questions	**Survey Questionnaire**	**Total participants**
Liberia National Police:			
Police Ranking officers	4		4
Police Field Supervisors	1	10	11
Police Rank-and-File		50	50
UN Mission in Liberia: UNMIL			
Civil Affairs Officials	4		4
Government of Liberia:			
Ranking Officials of Government	3		3
Civil Society Organizations:			
Leaders - Civil Society	6		6
Members – Civil Society		60	60
Total number of participants	18	120	**138**

Data Collection

I collected data for this research on location in Liberia. This was because UNMIL was still actively involved in police reform efforts in the country, and also because all of the other actors and prospective participants were in Liberia. A limitation in the collection and analysis of the data was the difficulty in identifying comparative baseline measures because pre-war factual data did not exist as police records and documents were destroyed during the civil war. However, I used existing research (Kromah, 2007; Ngaima, 2003; Sawyer, 1992) on the behavior of the Liberian police. Research conducted by Kromah (2007) measured citizens' perception of the LNP before and during the civil war and served as a comparative baseline measure. I also did multiple year comparisons of police effectiveness covering four 2-year periods beginning with the time UNMIL deployed trained police officers. Other intervening variables considered included police preparedness and response to riots and natural or manmade disasters and how they affect the effectiveness of, and public confidence in, the LNP.

Pilot Test

Following the IRB's final approval, I conducted a pilot test. According to Rudestam and Newton (2007), a pilot test is appropriate because it can help strengthen the validity and reliability of the instruments. The pilot test was administered in Monrovia, Liberia with a sample size of 15 respondents who did not form part of the main study target group members. They possessed the characteristics similar to the main target audience. A response pattern to ensure an understanding of the questions was also studied. As a result of the pilot test, I determined that a modification of the instruments

was needed. The one rationale was that one set of questions sought information that only

police officers could provide, while the other rationale was that some of the survey items

were written in ways that were not clear and did not solicit the appropriate responses. I

filed a Request for Change in Procedure Form with the IRB to revise the language in

some of the items and to prepare separate survey questionnaires for the Liberia National

Police. The IRB granted my request and the revisions were made. The revisions did not

change the original content of the questionnaire. The data collection instruments I used in

this study consisted of a set of 13 individual interview questions, a separate survey

questionnaire which comprised 31 items for community-based civil society respondents,

and a survey questionnaire which comprised 40 items for officers of the LNP. Other data

sources utilized were public documents and observational field notes.

The four sets of data analyzed were the folllowing: (1) survey questionnaire; (2)

interview questions, (3) documents, and (4) field notes. I dsigned a survey questionnaire

to collect quantitative data using a Likert rating scale (Passmore et al., 2002; Trochim &

Donnelly, 2008). The questionnaire consisted of two types with one specifically for

participants from the LNP and the other for members of community-based civil society

organizations. This rationale was that some of the survey items were specific only to

police participants who participated in the UNMIL police training and were deployed in

field as officers. I used the interview questions to collect qualitative data (Creswell,

2012). Participants in the interview protocol were ranking officers of the LNP, officials

of the UNMIL, officials of the government of Liberia, and leaders of community-based

civil society organizations. The documentary sources included public documents or

archival sources, institutional reports, and reports from mass media including local and international newspapers on the Liberian National Police (McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I also used existing research (Kromah, 2007; Ngaima, 2003; Sawyer, 1992) on the condition and behavior of the Liberian police. Research conducted by Kromah (2007) measured citizens' perception of the LNP before and during the civil war and served as a comparative baseline measure. I maintained meticulous records of observational field notes and used good quality recording tapes which aided in the transcription and analysis of the data (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007).

The data for this study was collected from multiple sources, namely interviews, survey questionnaires, documents, and field notes. I utilize three sources of data for the qualitative component of the research. These sources were interviews, documentary sources, and the field notes. For the quantitative component, I applied survey questionnaires utilizing the Likert rating scale to collect quantitative data that measured numerical indicators of agreement and disagreement levels.

Qualitative Data

Interviews

The survey interview is one of the main sources of data collection in a qualitative study. In this study, the interviews consisted of prepared, semistructured questions that focused on the purpose of the research. I used the individual, in-depth interview technique because it was intensive and flexible, and it allowed me to solicit detailed information about the phenomenon being studied (Creswell, 2007; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). I prepared open-ended questions for all categories of participants. The interview

technique was individual one-on-one interviews. I conducted face-to-face, individual, in-depth interviews with informants to solicit key information and to explore the subject matter of the interviews in detail (Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I took care not to engage participants with a fixed agenda during the interviews and ensured that the questions were answered in appropriate sequence. I also probed for details and sought clarifications to avoid ambiguities ((McNabb, 2008). There was one case in which 3 key informants who were ranking officers in the LNP preferred not to be recorded. The informants signed the consent form and responded to the interview questions in writing.

Documents

According to Singleton and Straits (2005), documentary sources include public documents, reports, mass media, and archival sources. In this study, I used available documentary sources which included public documents from UNMIL, LNP, and the Ministry of Justice reports and literature reviews. Other documentary sources that I used included the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Accra, Ghana in 2003 between Liberia's warring factions, relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and mandates, and reports from local and international newspapers on the LNP.

Field Notes

The final source of qualitative data for the study was my recorded field notes. According to Creswell (2007), the researcher's observational field notes are a credible source of valid data. I maintained meticulous records of observations in the field and kept a journal of the notes that I took on a daily basis during the interviews and throughout the study. These notes formed part of the data analysis and the findings of the research.

Quantitative Data

Survey Questionnaire

In order to focus on the research objective, I prepared and used semi-structured and open-ended survey questionnaires using Likert scales for two separate sets of participants (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I used the Likert rating scale to collect quantitative data that measured numerical indicators of agreement and disagreement levels. On the scale items, I asked respondents to rate each item on a 5 item response scale of disagreement and agreement levels where 1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree, 4=strongly disagree; and 5=neutral (Passmore et al., 2002; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). I also developed the questionnaire to evaluate police performance and public confidence of graduates already working in the field. In Chapter 4, I analyzed the data, conducted comparisons, and validated the findings through triangulation (Creswell, 2012).

Issues of Ethics and Quality

My primary responsibility as a researcher was to behave in an ethical manner and uphold ethical standards throughout the study. The ethical issues involved in data collection include requirements for ensuring informed voluntary consent, protecting confidentiality of participants, and being careful in clearly communicating information about any benefits of the research to participants. Additionally, I concerned myself with the possible risks of their involvement as participants and the need to communicate with participants before and after the research. The main ethical issues were the need for informed consent of participants and the need to ensure that participants did not

experience harm or were not placed at some disadvantage as a result of their participation

(Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). Ethical concerns of quality also revolved

around the need to establish the credibility of the research. The requirement for

credibility was to ensure validity and reliability. Reliability is the extent to which

research is dependable or has the potential to produce the same results when replicated

under similar circumstances. Strategies to improve reliability include maintaining

meticulous records of fieldwork, using good quality recording tapes, and documenting

the process of analysis. I applied these strategies during the course of data collection.

These strategies aided in transcribing and analyzing the data and establishing the stability

of responses from the participants (Creswell, 2007; McReynolds et al., 2001). Validity is

the extent to which the research findings are accurate and well-founded and are in

consonance with participants' perspectives and beliefs. Acceptable measures of validity

recommended by the authors include prolonged engagement with participants to build

trust, persistent observation and learning, checking for misinformation, using field notes,

memos, and multiple researchers, using multiple sources of data, peer review, clarifying

researcher's bias, member checking, providing rich thick description, and external audits

(Creswell, 2007; McReynolds et al., 2001; Rudestam & Newton, 2007).

In this study, I attempted to deepen my knowledge and understanding by building

trust through personally visiting participants and spending extensive time with them in

the field. I used a tape recorder to record interviews, probe and check for misinformation.

I maintained thorough records of field work, and documented the process of analysis. I

took care to delineate what was salient and relevant to the purpose, interest, and focus of

the study. The findings were peer reviewed by professionals in the field. Additionally, the

preliminary findings were also shared with selected participants for their feedback to

ensure that they conform to the participants' experiences, perceptions and beliefs. These

measures enhanced accuracy and the quality standard of the study (McReynolds et al.,

2001; Rudestam & Newton, 2007; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).

Researcher's Role

I personally conducted the research and managed the processes involved at all

stages from data collection, data analysis, and report writing. I recruited potential

participants for the interviews through use of cell phones and visits to participants'

offices or locations. I served as the primary instrument for data collection. During the

interviews, I used good quality voice recorders and took written notes, all of which I used

in transcribing and analyzing the data. I collected all relevant documents. I utilized my

technical training and skills in conducting interviews which were achieved while working

as a hiring services analyst with the City of Philadelphia. I also utilized my longstanding

public service experience as an economist, lawyer, and public administrator, as well as

my knowledge as a newspaper columnist and author on socioeconomic and political

governance issues on Liberia.

Avoiding Researcher's Bias

I avoided bias in the research because doing so was critical to credibility and

trustworthiness. I remained conscious of my role as the researcher and the main

instrument of data collection to avoid bias in the data collection process. According to

McNabb (2008), there is likelihood that a researcher being the main source of data

collection can be tainted by bias given his proximity with the data and its sources. I maintained a high degree of consciousness about the possibility of bias and I was objective in the process at all times. In order to enhance credibility and trustworthiness, I took care not to engage participants with a fixed agenda during the interviews.

Participants' Protection

Protecting participants by maintaining confidentiality and anonymity was critical to the success of this study. Participants were recruited on the basis of their voluntary informed consent. I explained the purpose of the study and how the information they gave would be used in the research. I explained the consent form and informed participants that they could decide to participate or not to participate in the study, reminding them that their participation was based on their voluntary informed consent. Before starting the interviews and survey questionnaires, I gave participants the assurance that they were free to cancel their participation at any time that they wished to do so. I assured participants of complete confidentiality and total anonymity throughout the study. I demonstrated respect for the privacy of the participants by asking them to decide where they should be interviewed. After the interview data was collected, the identity of participants was sealed by use of codes in the data analysis presentation (McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). A detailed description of actual ranks and positions of the key informants, especially for the qualitative interview data, cannot be cited because doing so may reveal their identification. Participants in qualitative interviews consisted of ranking officers of UNMIL Civil Affairs Division, leaders of key civil society organizations, heads and former heads of the Liberia National Police

directorate, police field supervisors, career trial lawyers, former solicitors-general, a former Judge of the Civil Law Court, and ranking government officials, including a former minister of justice and a former minister of labor. I coded the names of participant interviewees in letters and numbers to maintain confidentiality. I coded the UNMIL respondents as UN with the first respondent on the list as UN1, followed by UN2 and so on. I coded leaders of civil society organizations as CSO1, followed by CSO2 and so on. I coded ranking police officers as PO1, PO2, PO3, et cetera. I coded ranking officials and former officials of government including judges, lawyers, solicitors-general, and ministers as G1, G2, G3 and so on. All respondents demonstrated interest in the research and considered it necessary and timely considering the looming UNMIL drawdown.

Chapter Summary

In Chapter 3, I described the theoretical method of inquiry and design that grounds the study. I used the mixed-method model combining both qualitative and quantitative methodologies as the most suitable theoretical method of inquiry. From the quantitative perspective, I developed a survey questionnaire and used the Likert rating scale to collect quantitative data. From the qualitative perspective, I used open-ended and semistructured interview questions. I also reviewed documents and records. The primary sources of data consisted of documentary sources such as reports, mass media, and archival sources, as well as individual semistructured interviews with open-ended questions for stakeholders. The methods of analysis under the mixed-model approach strengthened the meaningfulness of the research findings. The number of participants for

both the interview and survey questionnaire was 138. Participants were purposefully

selected utilizing experience criterion as unit of analysis. I coded and analyzed the data

through detailed description, direct interpretation, and the establishment of patterns. I

examined the impact of UNMIL's police training on the effectiveness of, and public

confidence in, the ability of the Liberia National Police to maintain law and order. I

validated the research findings by using multiple sources of data, rich thick description,

member checking and peer review. The methodology yielded information that

contributed to my understanding of the context of international postconflict police reform

as a critical tool for postconflict state building. In Chapter 4, I analyze the data and

present the findings in response to the research questions.

Chapter 4: Results, Data Analysis, and Findings

Introduction

In this chapter, I analyze the data and present the findings of the study. Participants in the sample were asked to indicate their views on how the UNMIL's police training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The data analysis was divided into three sections. In the first section, I summarize the data instruments used in the study. The second section provides a descriptive analysis of the demographic characteristics of participants. In the third section, I present the results of the statistical analyses of participants' perceptions, views, and responses that answered the research questions.

Summary of Data Instruments

The survey and interview items were used to measure competencies that were arranged in three defined categories and subcategories: (a) recruitment strategy, (b) training, and (c) effectiveness on job performance. Recruitment strategy was used to measure procedures applied by UNMIL in the recruitment and vetting of applicants for the new LNP. Training was used to measure the nature and content of knowledge and skills imparted, inclusive of country-specific policing guidelines, and citizens' perception of training acquired based on demonstrated police performance. According to McLellan (1998), the benefits derived from police training are not easily measured and are often realized in the long term. However, they can be reasonably assessed by the targeted beneficiaries. In the case of Liberia, the targeted beneficiaries of the UNMIL police reform are the citizens who also comprised members of civil society organizations. They

were in the position to make a before-and-after comparison and gauge the relation

between police training acquired and their effectiveness on job performance.

The effectiveness on job performance was used to measure the ability of the

police to apply knowledge and skills acquired to effectively conduct policing operations

and maintain law and order. Subcomponents of effectiveness on job performance were

the following: (a) public confidence, and (b) police conduct. Public confidence was used

to measure the extent of citizens' self-assurance in the ability of the police to provide fair,

impartial, and equal treatment to all citizens in the exercise of police authority and to

respond effectively and timely to crime. Police conduct was used to measure behaviors

and practices of police officers which impact on police integrity. Table 2 below shows

how each category was defined and the competency that was measured. Table 2 also

shows the items assigned from both survey and interview instruments. In the case of the

interview protocol, several probing questions were posed to respondents in addition to the

items cited in each category.

Table 2

Competency Category

Competency Category	Survey & Interview Items		
	Survey Items: **Civil Society Participants**: Item #s:	**LNP: Police Participants** Item #s:	**Interview Items:** **Interview Participants:** Item #s:
5. Recruitment Strategy: Measured procedures established and thoroughness applied in the recruitment and vetting processes to ensure that only applicants who had not committed human rights abuses and who had demonstrated good behavior in the local communities were recruited.	5, 6, 7	8, 9,10, 11, 12, 13, 14	1, 10, 12, 13
II. Training: Measured nature and content of knowledge and skills imparted inclusive of local content and international policing principles; and citizens' perception of training acquired based on demonstrated performance by police.	8, 9	15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24	5, 6, 8
III. Effectiveness on Job Performance: Measured the capacity of the police trained to respond effectively in conducting policing operations; to maintain law and order and gain the confidence and trust of the citizenry.	8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30	25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40	2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13
Effectiveness Subcategory: **3a. Public Confidence** Measured citizens' self-assurance in the ability of the police to respond effectively and timely to crime; and public perception of fair and impartial treatment in the exercise of police authority.	9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 25, 34	25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 40	3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13
3b. Police Conduct Measured behaviors and practices of officers that impact on police integrity and public confidence.	6, 17, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29	32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39	4, 9, 10, 12, 13

Demographic Characteristics

In this section, I describe the demographic characteristics of police officers and civil society actors who responded to the survey questionnaire. I present the data in two parts. The first part is about the demographic characteristics of civil society actors. The second part is about the demographic characteristics of police officers.

Demographic Characteristics of Civil Society Participants

The data shows that 33 (55%) of the civil society participants were females and 27 (45%) were males (Table 4). A majority of the civil society participants were between 35 and 59 years of age, indicating that they were middle-aged people (constituting 52%). This was followed by youthful citizens between 18 and 35 years, constituting 43.3% (Table 3). The percentage of the civil society participants aged 60 years and above was small (5.0%). The ratio of those participants were married or single (Table 5). A majority of the civil society participants were college students representing 43.3% followed by college graduate and those attending graduate school, representing 37% (Table 6). The participants concurred with the police officers that background checks were important in recruiting police officers. The participants also concurred that the background checks by UNMIL were not thorough (Table 16).

Table 3

Age of Civil Society Participants

Age	Frequency	Percent
Between 18-35 Years	26	43.3
Between 35-59 Years	31	51.7
60 Years and Older	3	5.0
Total	60	100.0

Table 4

Gender of Civil Society Participants

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Male	27	45.0
Female	33	55.0
Total	60	100.0

Table 5

Marital Status of Civil Society Participants

Marital Status		Frequency	Percent
	Single	25	41.7
	Married	27	45.0
	Divorced	4	6.7
	Widow	2	3.3
	Total	58	96.7
Missing	99.00	2	3.3
Total		60	100.0

Table 6

Educational Level of Civil Society Participants

	Frequency	Percent
Did not go to school	2	3.3
Junior high school	5	8.3
High school	5	8.3
College	26	43.3
Graduate/Post graduate school	22	36.7
Total	60	100.0

Demographic Characteristics of Police Officers

The data shows that 23 (38%) of the police participants were females, and 37

(61%) were males (Table 8). A majority of the police participants were between 18 and

35 years of age, indicating that they were youthful law enforcement officers. Thirty-seven

(62%) were married, and 22 (37%) were single (Table 9). A majority of the police

participants were high school graduates, indicating that they met the recruitment criteria

regarding educational level (constituting 63%). Approximately one-tenth of the police

participants were college students (Table 10). Regarding the police training program, all

of the police participants (100%) indicated that they graduated from the police training

academy (Table 11). A majority graduated in 2007 (28.3%) followed by 2005 (18.3%).

The third group graduated in 2006 and 2009 with the same number of graduates,

constituting 13.3% (see Table 12). Most of the police described their professional area of

concentration as criminal investigation representing 35% followed by multiple areas of

assignment representing other as 32% (see Table 13). Traffic control constituted 15%.

The police described education as important for recruitment with the mean ($M = 2.95$

with *SD* = 0.22); followed by background checks (<u>M</u> = 2.88) and by physical ability as well as honesty (*M* = 2.82 and *M* = 2.81 respectively).

Table 7

Age of the Police Participants

Age	Frequency	Percent
Between 18-35 Years	31	51.7
Between 35-59 Years	28	46.7
60 Years and Older	1	1.7
Total	60	100.0

Table 8

Gender of the Police Participants

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Male	37	61.7
Female	23	38.3
Total	60	100.0

Table 9

Marital Status of Police Participants

Marital Status	Frequency	Percent
Single	22	36.7
Married	37	61.7
Divorced	1	1.7
Total	60	100.0

Table 10

Police Training: Education of the Police Participants

Educational Level	Frequency	Percent
Junior high school	1	1.7
High school	38	63.3
College	18	30.0
Graduate/graduate school	3	5.0
Total	60	100.0

Table 11

Police Training: Did you graduate from the Police Academy?

Did you graduate from the police training academy?	Frequency	Percent
Yes	60	100.0

Table 12

Police Training: In what year did you graduate from the Police Academy?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
2000	1	1.7
2002	1	1.7
2005	11	18.3
2006	8	13.3
2007	17	28.3
2009	8	13.3
2010	4	6.7
2011	2	3.3
2012	4	6.7
2013	1	1.7
2014	1	1.7
1995	1	1.7
1979	1	1.7
Total	60	100.0

Table 13

Police Training: Please indicate your professional area of concentration

		Frequency	Percent
	Criminal investigation	21	35.0
	Traffic Control	9	15.0
Valid	General Civil Protection	9	15.0
	Other	19	31.7
	Total	58	96.7
Missing	99.00	2	3.3
Total		60	100.0

Results of Data Analysis

In this study, I used the survey and interview instruments to determine participants' perception of the ways in which, if any, the UNMIL training made a difference in police effectiveness and public confidence in the context of recruitment strategies, training, and effectiveness on job performance. I used the data instruments also to determine whether there were challenges that required reform. In this section, I present the results of the statistical analyses of participants' perceptions, views, and responses that answered the research questions. I present the results and analyses by category and subcategories of the variables being measured in the context of answering the research questions.

Research Question 1

What strategies were used to recruit applicants for police training?

I sought to assess the strategy or procedure applied by UNMIL in recruitment and vetting of applicants for the new LNP. This included any possible participation of the local population in the recruitment process to ensure that only applicants with good character, who had not committed human rights abuses and who had demonstrated good behavior in the local communities, were recruited. The UN international police reform mandates for postconflict states require that restructuring strategies include a thorough process of recruitment, vetting, and investigation of candidates for previous human rights abuses (Day, 2000; Celador, 2005; Vetschera & Damian, 2006).

I analyzed the responses from the survey questionnaire, interview transcripts, documents, and field notes. Police respondents agreed that conducting background

checks was important for recruitment of applicants to serve in the new LNP (Table 15:

M=4.77); and civil society respondents also agreed with the police assessment (Table 16:

M=4.77). However, while police and civil society respondents all agreed that that

conducting background checks was important for recruitment, they concurred that

background checks conducted by UNMIL were not thorough and that the vetting process

did not prevent applicants who had committed human rights abuses from being recruited

into the police force (Tables 15: M=2.75; and 16: M=2.18). Interview respondents also

agreed with this view. Responses from participants in the interview indicated that the

UNMIL's recruitment and vetting processes from the onset were less organized and less

thorough, and that this situation caused criminals and former combatants to be recruited

especially in the years between 2004 and 2007.

Table 14

Police Perception of UNMIL Recruitment Criteria (n = 60)

UNMIL Recruitment Criteria	Low	High	Mean*	SD
Education	2.00	3.00	2.95	0.22
Tribe	1.00	3.00	1.07	0.32
Physical Ability	2.00	3.00	2.82	0.39
Honesty	1.00	3.00	2.81	0.44
Background Check	1.00	3.00	2.88	0.37
Trauma Healing/Counseling	1.00	3.00	1.21	0.59
Membership in old LNP	1.00	3.00	1.15	0.52
Not being a former combatant	1.00	3.00	1.89	0.82

5. Mean values: 1= Not Important, 2= Important, 3= Very Important

Table 15

Police Perception of Background Checks conducted by UNMIL (n = 60)

Survey Items	Low	High	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Backgrounds checks are important for the recruitment of applicants to serve in the Liberia National Police.	1.00	5.00	4.77	0.77
Background checks conducted by UNMIL were thorough and prevented former combatants from being admitted for training.	1.00	5.00	2.75	1.65
Applicants recruited for training were given trauma counseling before starting training.	1.00	5.00	1.98	1.41
Liberian Government officials were involved in the recruitment and selection of applicants for police training.	1.00	5.00	2.75	1.49
Liberian Government officials exercised oversight to ensure that police training content was country-specific.	1.00	5.00	2.18	1.23
During the recruitment if a citizen knew an applicant who had committed human rights abuses he or she would not complain to UNMIL for fear of revenge.	1.00	5.00	4.00	1.24

5.   Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 4= Agree, 5= Strongly Agree

According to interview respondents, the UNMIL's recruitment process from the onset began by UNMIL officers calling interested persons through loudspeakers to come and join. The UNMIL police recruiting officers mounted on vehicles with loudspeakers went into the communities around Monrovia and started randomly calling on interested persons to come and join the police. According to CSO5, during the civil war, more than 60% of Liberian youth took up arms. The war lasted 14 years and most of these youths grew up knowing only about the use of arms. By the time the UNMIL recruitment started, most of these people were the ones who first rushed to get recruited. They felt that being in the police was the way they could protect themselves in the communities because they knew that residents in these communities knew about their involvement in atrocities against them during the war.

On the question of whether UNMIL applied due diligence to ensure that former combatants were not recruited, UN1 argued that:

> "It was not written in black and white, but former combatants certainly were exempted from the process. But again given the number of combatants in the country nobody can say they know all their former ex-combatants but then that's why the thing was open also to the public because the public would be able to identify ex-combatants who had some kind of human rights issues."

Table 16

Civil Society Perception of Background Checks conducted by UNMIL (n=60)

Survey Items	Low	High	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Background checks are important for recruitment of applicants to serve in the Liberia National Police.	1.00	5.00	4.77	0.621
The behavior of the Liberia National Police show that background checks conducted by UNMIL prevented former combatants from being admitted for training.	1.00	5.00	2.18	1.19
During recruitment if a citizen knew an applicant who had committed human rights abuses he or she would not complain to UNMIL for fear of revenge.	1.00	5.00	3.90	1.13

5. Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 4= Agree, 5= Strongly Agree

However, the theme which emerged was that the recruitment process was arbitrary and compromised due diligence in favor of recruitment of large numbers of candidates. G3, a former solicitor-general in the Ministry of Justice observed that:

> "UNMIL recruitment process, I believe was wrong. They came and just took the microphone, the loud speakers went around in the communities in their pickups and saying "who all want to join the police come!" without giving the Liberian people the opportunity to say look this man participated in the war; or he did this, he did this. So they recruited people on their own and their vetting standards were different; their vetting requirements were different from if Government had to do

it itself. You see, so they came and said well we just have to take anybody we can. And as a result, the police force does have an integrity problem where people who participated in crimes around the country are in the security services, and it is known."

Interview participants G2, PO1, PO2, PO3, CSO1, CSO4 and CSO5 all concurred with this view. They argued that in the years especially between 2004 and 2007, candidates who were recruited were not investigated with due diligence regarding their previous human rights records to ensure that only applicants who did not commit human rights abuses were enlisted. CSO5 maintained that "We saw at the beginning of the whole recruitment and training of new police that there was not sufficient due diligence done in terms of going and engaging communities." Citizens in the local communities were not consulted regarding prior behaviors and character of candidates. G1 also concurred with this view:

> "At the time I served as Minister of Justice, I felt that there were some lapses in the process in that many of the recruits that UNMIL hired were people who were perpetrators of heinous crimes during the civil crisis. We even argued that we don't have any issue that these people should come and may be rehabilitated. But you need to have people with more experience; some old hands in the business to be here to serve as mentors of these people. But UNMIL refused. They recruited people entirely new; many of them young people who had been involved into all kinds of things. UNMIL did not listen to what we were telling them. So you know many times you see today police officers are being disrobed because of this crime

and that crime and turned over for prosecution. It doesn't tell very well for a force

that was trained by people such as the United Nations."

Participants argued that UNMIL should have done more radio communication in the

country's local vernaculars to inform residents in the local communities that police

applicants should be people who have good character and good human rights

backgrounds.

Similar themes emerged over the vetting process. Police and civil society

participants in the survey strongly agreed that conducting background checks were

important for the recruitment of police applicants. However, they acknowledged that the

recruitment and vetting processes conducted by UNMIL were not thorough and did not

prevent some applicants who had poor human rights records from being recruited.

Interview participants UN1 and UN2 argued that the vetting process was open to the

public throughout the country. According to UN1, pictures of candidates were posted at

various locations including marketplaces throughout the country because the public

would be able to identify ex-combatants and other applicants who had some kind of

human rights issues and then pass the information to UNMIL. UN3 explained:

"We used that method because we felt that the citizens were trusting UN as

impartial body to convey their messages without any fear. Whenever a name or

information was given to us about applicants, we confidentially provided them to

the recruiting officers and there were no cases of retaliation."

In contrast, the themes that surfaced most was that during the vetting process, citizens

feared retribution and avoided reporting combatants of former warring factions and

known criminals from their neighborhoods to UNMIL, especially in first four years of the

recruitment. Because security was fragile at that time, UNMIL did not provide immediate

protection for people in the local communities. For fear of retribution, citizens in the local

communities avoided giving information to UNMIL on any candidates especially, those

who were ex-combatants, former soldiers of the old disbanded army, police, and known

criminals from the neighborhoods. G1, G2, G3, PO1, and PO3 all concurred with this

view. According to PO3, there was fear of the unknown and the people did not feel safe

or free to give information to UNMIL. PO1 argued that:

> "They would not report to UNMIL as to the person's past abuses and criminal
>
> record. Primarily because they didn't feel that the system in itself actually was
>
> strong enough to provide them the kind of protection that they needed if they
>
> provided such information."

G2 also explained that:

> "People were afraid that there could be reprisals because especially from the
>
> beginning when they were recruiting at the time that right after the war police was
>
> not present everywhere and even UNMIL was not present everywhere and they
>
> were putting pictures of these people on bulletin and asking people to come and
>
> report. People were afraid to report. And number two, the publicity was poor."

The lesson here was that as the result of these lapses in the recruitment and vetting

processes, former combatants known to have committed human rights abuses, and

individuals who exhibited bad behavior in the neighborhoods were recruited into the new

police force. CSO2 and CSO5 concurred with this view, and cited examples:

CSO5:

"I used to live on the Old Road during the period of the crisis. One of the fighters who really terrorized us in the community became a big person in the police. Yes, when I moved to where I am now, I saw him again in that neighborhood. I got terrified because he knew how he terrified us."

CSO2:

"There is a young lady who is now in the police. When she lived before in our community, she went and took feces and put it in the community's well, you know out of anger. They had to close the well because of that. That woman got recruited in the police."

Apart from feelings of insecurity and fear of retribution, other social and economic factors such as high unemployment also impacted negatively on the vetting process. UN4 acknowledged that there were "isolated cases" in which people would avoid reporting individuals who had demonstrated bad behaviors in the communities:

> "I wouldn't say people would fear retribution. I would say most people would
> consider that if I did this, I would be harming somebody who wants to earn a
> living. So this is more on the social consideration rather than on understanding
> human rights and the need to pay for human rights abuses."

G1 and CSO5 argued in contrast that such cases would not apply to known criminals and former combatants. By the time UNMIL determined in 2006 that its recruitment and vetting processes had been compromised and needed to be revised, more than 2000 police officers had been recruited, trained and deployed (Freidman, 2011).

Research Question 2

What, if any, difference has the UNMIL's police training made relative to the

maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia's police force?

Through this question, I sought to assess police training and effectiveness on job

performance. Training measured the nature of knowledge and skills imparted inclusive of

local content or country-specific policing guidelines and methods applied. The Geneva

Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (2006) emphasized that the new

focus of international police reform interventions in addition to technical training and

skills such as criminal investigation and evidence gathering in the 1990s, included

upholding human security, basic human rights, equal protection of all citizens without

discrimination, exercising restraint in the use of force, equal access to justice, and equal

protection of potentially vulnerable groups. The citizens' perception of training acquired

was also assessed based on demonstrated performance by police trained and deployed.

The effectiveness on job performance measured the ability of the police to apply

knowledge and skills acquired to effectively conduct policing operations and maintain

law and order.

Research Hypothesis

For the quantitative component, the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS)

was used to analyze the data collected. The data collected was coded and entered into

SPSS current version (V 20). A frequency was run to clean the data. Data entry errors

were corrected since all questionnaires were coded prior to entry. Restating the

hypotheses:

H_0: UNMIL's police training made no difference relative to the maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia's police force.

$H_1 1$: UNMIL's police training effected change related to the maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in the Liberia National Police Force.

The UNMIL training began in 2004. Police respondents agreed that they acquired technical knowledge and skills during the UNMIL training through various courses ranging from criminal investigation, civil protection and the rule of law to international policing principles such as upholding human rights, equal protection of all citizens including protection of potentially vulnerable groups (Table 17). Correlations and regression were used to evaluate the hypotheses. There is a moderately significant correlation between police perceived knowledge and skills gained during UNMIL training and the job effectiveness perceived by them ($r = -0.35$). However, the relationship is an inverse one, implying that as the knowledge gained increases, the job performance cannot be associated in the same manner or direction. The implication is that as more resources were being used in training the police, limited resources were used for on the job performance which also formed the basis for a reduction in police effectiveness.

In research question 2, I also explored issues revolving around the UNMIL's training decisions and coordination challenges that impacted on program results. The issue of the need for psychological trauma counseling to police recruits was raised. The findings show police respondents indicated the view that UNMIL did not consider trauma healing or counseling important (Table 14: M=1.21). However, interview respondents

expressed the view that some level of psychological counseling should have been provided by UNMIL as an integral part of the training strategy. Respondents emphasized that counseling was needed because the country was just emerging from conflict, and that former combatants and criminals had found their way into the rank-and-file of the new police force and some had even become supervisors. PO2, Commandant and Deputy Director for Training at the Liberia National Police Academy, concurred with this view and stressed that because the training was against the backdrop of the civil war, "there is a need for psycho-social counseling for officers of the LNP. They need to tell their stories in order to get healing. They need reconciliation too amongst themselves as some of their supervisors were perpetrators of violence as members of the several belligerent forces."

The earliest concerns about the UNMIL training program in addition to the recruitment challenges were the diversity of the trainers and the nature and content of the training. Trainers at the Liberia National Police Academy were international police officers of contributing countries from around the world including Bangladesh, China, Ghana, Great Britain, India, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Sweden, Ukraine, United States, and Zimbabwe. After 2006, member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also continued to provide trainers from its member countries. Early in the program, Liberian officials voiced their concerns over the diversity of trainers from different policing jurisdictions. G3, a former Solicitor-General and now a Judge who earlier taught at the Liberia National Police Academy, narrated his experience in response to the research question on

whether or not the UNMIL training was coordinated and followed country-specific

guidelines:

"I am not sure of what it is today, but when the training started, it was not

coordinated. It was disjointed. For example, you have a group of trainers coming

from Ukraine; you have another group coming from Israel; you have another

group coming from Malaysia; you have another group coming from UK . . . so

our people were confused in the early days. They were taking training and

instructions from different people. . . . For example some trainers will tell our

people the way we march, the kinds of steps we take is wrong; that we should

take steps the other way like the British do: they hold their steps and throw it, they

hold their steps and throw it; unlike the US you take marching steps in beat. . .

some trainers trained to salute like the US do with your arm across your eyebrow;

some other trainers trained like the British do with your palm exposed above your

forehead . . . So they confused our trainees. One week or two weeks the people

from Russia will train them; another two weeks the people from Great Britain will

train them; another two weeks the people from Zimbabwe will train them . . . and

each of these came with their own methods of training. . . I know for a fact that

the discipline aspect was a problem also because one group of trainers were

telling police officers they are not supposed to greet or salute their seniors;

another group telling them no you must greet your seniors and pay respect to them

and it confused our people."

Table 17

LNP: Knowledge and Skills Competency of Police Officers (n= 60)

Knowledge and Skills Competency	Low	High	Mean	Std. Deviation
As a Police Officer who underwent the UNMIL training, the content of the training received was understood and comprehensive.	1.00	5.00	4.45	0.67
As a Police Officer, I acquired knowledge and skills in civil protection during the UNMIL training.	2.00	5.00	4.57	0.59
As a Police Officer, I acquired knowledge and skills in crime scene investigation and prevention.	4.00	5.00	4.60	0.49
Training facilities and materials provided by UNMIL were adequate and appropriate.	2.00	5.00	4.28	0.64
UNMIL training emphasized that fair and impartial training of citizens is important in the exercise of police authority.	1.00	5.00	4.67	0.65
As a Police Officer, I acquired skills in case file management and report writing.	4.00	5.00	4.83	0.38
As a Police Officer, I acquired knowledge and skills in international police training principles that all police officers must uphold basic human rights and equal protection of all citizens against illegal acts under the law.	2.00	5.00	4.80	0.51
The UNMIL training emphasized that police operations must encourage citizens to pressure their government for their rights under the law.	1.00	5.00	3.41	1.37
During the UNMIL training, I acquired knowledge that police power must be guided by the rule of law, not orders from public officials.	1.00	5.00	4.63	0.74
During the UNMIL training, I acquired knowledge about the major role of police officers during national political elections.	4.00	5.00	4.63	0.49

5. Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree 4= Agree, 5= Strongly Agree

G2, a human rights lawyer and also former Solicitor-General of Liberia who later taught criminal procedure at the Liberia National Police Academy, concurred with this view and observed that the trainers came from various legal jurisdictions with different policing traditions. For instance, in some of these jurisdictions, "police observance of human rights and the rights of the accused is of lower standards than others." He also pointed out for example that the application of the *Miranda Rights* principle is not something that is universal, and some countries do not observe it. They do not observe it decidedly because *Miranda* came from the American jurisdiction and not all of the common law countries practice it. Moreover, policing practices in some jurisdictions are influenced by their political traditions. He pointed out that at one point for instance, the head of UNMIL's training program at the Liberia National Police Academy was a Ukrainian woman and Ukrainian trainers were part of UNMIL's core team of trainers. However, "their political tradition come from the communist rule of the Soviet Union and many of them were trained in the Soviet police tradition." This was one of the major confusions in the training program because the Liberia National Police "have not been trained under a uniform criminal justice system and tradition." UN4 supported this view and acknowledged that the policing jurisdiction in Liberia is historically patterned after the American model and the UNMIL's intervention should have recognized that reality:

> "I believe that many of these trainers who come have British police training; and only few countries in the world have American training. So this for me is the conflict. For me, mentors should understand that this area is America-specific because of history and they should adapt and not force you any other way."

On the issue of the nature and course content of the training, two interview respondents expressed the view that training was limited in content. For example, according to PO2, "The UNMIL's curriculum did not cover subjects like discipline and courtesy, city and county geography, diplomatic immunity, forensics and defensive tactics." This view is shared by Friedman (2011), who argued that the UNMIL trainers used materials and format that the UNPOL had utilized in other postconflict training situations in Kosovo and later in East Timor. According to Freidman (2011), the training manuals used by the UNMIL between 2004 through 2006 also did not cover subjects on ethics, discipline, crime investigation, defensive tactics, and specialized training. Respondents also stated that subjects covered were not discussed in-depth because the training periods were short. From the onset, the training was largely fast tracked and lasted about three months. On the average, trainers from different police jurisdictions took turns conducting training on a bi-weekly basis.

Another critical theme that emerged was that the UNMIL's training lacked country-specific policing guidelines for Liberia. Respondents expressed the view that the diversity or broadness of the base of trainers also diminished training content and police on the job performance. According to them, UNMIL did not collaborate with the Government of Liberia's police administration to develop training contents and to identify specific local skills, policing principles, culture, and guidelines, around which UNMIL's training activities, would revolve and be coordinated. Furuzawa (2009) argued that international police reform programs must vary from one country to another and be based on country-specific conditions in order to be successful. This view is shared by

Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) who argued that international police training programs must

be implemented in ways that enable individual states "to be able to create their own

versions of policing based on standards embedded in democratic principles while

tailoring their reforms to their own socially determined goals and needs" (p. 9).

Responses from police participants also revealed that the Government of Liberia was less

involved in the recruitment (Table 15: M= 2.75) and in exercising oversight (Table 15:

M=2.18) to ensure that training was coordinated and its content was country-specific. The

training was conducted with little coordination between UNMIL and Government of

Liberia or between trainers from the various contributing countries who provided training

to recruits at the academy. However, the interview participants argued that UNMIL alone

should not take responsibility for this situation, but rather the Government of Liberia.

They argued that the Government of Liberia did not put itself in the position to take

ownership of the training program and did not provide much needed leadership and

direction in working with UNMIL to jointly develop a training framework. The idea was

that first they needed to conducting training needs assessment based on the country's own

policing principles, guidelines and code. PO1, a former Commissioner of Police for

Administration and Professional Standards underscored this point:

> "The Government does not see the LNP as its responsibility. It sees the LNP as a
>
> responsibility of the international community, because it's the international
>
> community that started this whole idea of restructuring and reform and then they
>
> put the money into it . . . the Government of Liberia through the Liberian National
>
> Police had to accept whatever was provided to them based on the funding

available by the donating country; and in most cases they sent their own experts.
And so if you look at the Liberian National Police today, the entire force received
different trainings – some received Jordanian training, some from Nepal, some
from Pakistan, some from Nigeria, Ghana, some from America, it depended on
whatever fund was available."

After 2006, different trainers continued to conduct training based on the values of
their own police jurisdictions. UN2 acknowledged that values are important and vary
within the police force of each jurisdiction. He argued however, that although trainers
brought their own set of values from their various jurisdictions, they used police training
manuals based on the Liberian Penal Code. G1, G2, G3, and CSO4 disagreed. They
argued that while the Liberian Penal Code was used, manuals produced and utilized on
the various topics covered were not Liberia-specific because to that date, UNMIL had not
involved the Ministry of Justice in the development of a comprehensive training manual
for the Liberian National Police. G2, made the following observations about UNMIL
police training manuals:

> "I was trying to teach from a material produced by UNMIL on criminal procedure
> and like they just took it from the Internet. Somewhere there I saw "federal" and I
> said we don't have federal here. So the training manual needs to be properly
> developed with the aid of the Justice Ministry . . . because at the end of the day
> police work affects what the lawyers, and the prosecutors do. The collection of
> evidence is based on the kind of training they received from different people who
> come from different police jurisdictions and traditions. So it's better for the

Ministry of Justice to develop training manual . . . We are a common law country

but we have a different jurisdiction so we need that because some of the capacity

problem in the police is based upon the nature of the training that they receive. I

think it is a fundamental issue that the justice system has to get over. We have to

have a uniform training manual."

UN1 concurred with the view that Liberia did not have its own set of local policing

principles and guidelines, which would identify specific skills around which UNMIL's

training activities, would revolve and be coordinated. He cautioned that:

"My experience in other missions and in Sierra Leone where we had police

reform is that when police come from different parts of the world, they are

influenced by different doctrines and how that is coordinated locally to deliver

their training is something that maybe needs to be looked at carefully; and if the

country also does not have its own policing principles and guidelines it could

create the room for controversies and in the end it may lead to Liberia not having

a kind of unified code for police."

CSO4, CSO5 and CSO6 concurred with this view and reiterated that acquisition and use

of local knowledge in handling policing operations was critical and needed to be captured

and taught. CSO4 maintained that:

"I think this is what has been absent in most of the interventions not just the

interventions with the police, of course we are talking about police now. I think in

most of the interventions how we did things here before, the real use of local

knowledge and managing local knowledge really have been absent in most of

what we have seen coming from the UN and the international circles. Most of the

lessons learned have to come from outside. That's true we want standards but we

also supposed to recognize our uniqueness as a country. We have a particular

context and a particular history and that should be the basis upon which we should

do all of these interventions."

In 2006, UNMIL determined there was a need to revise its approaches to police

reform interventions in Liberia. According to Freidman (2011), some of its training

coordinators had resolved that the curriculum compromised quality for quantity and that

it favored producing a large number of officers quickly. They argued that the curriculum

was more suited for training of interim police officers than for the development of a

sustainable long-term police force. Since 2006, UNMIL revised and updated its training

curriculum with manuals that covered subjects on democratic policing, human rights and

international policing principles, criminal investigation, community policing concepts,

case file management, and report writing. It also covered subjects on police

administration, policies and procedures, ethics, and discipline reflecting best practices.

Before that time however, UNMIL had trained and deployed 2000 police officers who

did not benefit from the contents of its revised training curriculum and other new

program approaches (Secretary General's Report to the UN Security Council S/2006/958,

2006).

Interview respondents also argued that even some of the revised program

approaches that UNMIL had determined to implement after 2006 were hampered by its

earlier decisions. For example, UNMIL decided to build the local capacity of the police

through the training of Liberian trainers. However, the new officers trained and deployed by UNMIL lacked the practical experience to serve as effective trainers. According to G1, UNMIL's efforts were also hampered by decisions it had made from the onset to deactivate all former ranking officers of the old LNP, although many of them had not committed human rights abuses, and they possessed significant experiences to serve as future trainers. G1 explained:

> "We even argued that . . . you need to have people with more experience; some old hands in the business to be here to serve as mentors of these people. But UNMIL refused. They recruited people entirely new; many of them young people who had been involved into all kinds of things."

The UNMIL's recruitment and vetting practices improved and became more thorough between 2006 and 2013, although its overall reform program was also still not locally owned. The training manuals still did not include materials specific to policing operations in Liberia. Trainers still came in from the West African region and from different policing jurisdictions around the world.

The impact of the UNMIL's training on the LNP was also assessed in the context of citizens' perception of training acquired based on demonstrated performance including fair and impartial treatment of all citizens. Police and civil society respondents in the survey agreed that an effective national police force was crucial for maintaining law and order (Table 18: M=4.6). However, the perception of civil society respondents regarding police training was that the performance of the UNMIL trained police did not reflect training acquired (Table 19: M=2.56).

Table 18

Police Job Performance as Perceived by the Police Participants (n= 60)

	Low	High	Mean*	Std. Deviation
An effective Liberia National Police Force is crucial for maintaining law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia.	1.00	5.00	4.67	0.86
Crime rates are still high today	1.00	5.00	2.98	1.17
Crime rates are still high today because the Liberia National Police do not respond to crime scenes effectively.	1.00	5.00	2.78	1.21
The Liberia National Police are not able to respond timely to crime scenes.	1.00	6.00	4.32	0.98
The problem with effective response of the Liberia National Police is more related to the lack of authority to bear arms.	1.00	5.00	2.95	1.41
The problem with effective response of the Liberia National Police is more related to the lack of equipment.	1.00	5.00	4.70	0.65
Residents of the local communities do not trust the LNP	1.00	5.00	2.75	1.19
A citizen cannot get a fair redress if he or she files a complaint against a police officer to his or her superiors.	1.00	5.00	2.43	1.23
The Liberia National police used excessive force during the elections incident involving some members and supporters of the CDC political party on November 8, 2011.	1.00	5.00	2.72	1.34
Some members of the Liberia National Police were involved in some of the crimes committed today in the country.	1.00	5.00	4.37	0.66
The Liberia National Police today are corrupt.	1.00	5.00	3.83	1.12
Liberia National Police today are more corrupt than Police before the civil war.	1.00	5.00	2.20	1.04
Liberia National Police today are less corrupt than the Police before the civil war.	1.00	5.00	3.48	1.00
The problem of corruption in the police is more related to poor salary and lack of benefits for officers.	2.00	5.00	4.78	0.61
The Liberia National Police today is not effective and capable to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia.	1.00	5.00	3.68	1.49

5. Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree 4= Agree, 5= Strongly Agree

Table 19

Police Job Performance as Perceived by the Civil Society Participants (n= 60)

	Low	High	Mean*	Std. Deviation
An effective Liberia National Police Force is crucial for maintaining law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia	1.00	5.00	4.50	0.81
The performance of the UNMIL trained police shows that they acquired the needed knowledge and capacity for effective police work.	1.00	5.00	2.56	1.28
Crime rates are still high today.	1.00	5.00	3.67	1.23
Crime rates are still high today because the **Liberia National Police do not respond to** crime scenes effectively.	1.00	5.00	4.00	1.07
I trust that the Liberia National Police are able to effectively respond to crime in my neighborhood.	1.00	5.00	2.07	1.09
If I noticed a crime being committed in my neighborhood, I prefer to call my neighbor first before I call the Liberia National Police.	1.00	5.00	4.40	1.03
I feel more secured in the community in which I live because of the professional job the Liberia National Police is doing.	1.00	4.00	2.05	0.82
The Liberia National Police are not able to respond timely to crime scenes.	1.00	5.00	4.50	0.83
The Liberia National Police today are likely to protect the government more than the citizens.	1.00	5.00	4.18	0.98
The problem with effective response of the Liberia National Police is more related to the lack of authority to bear arms.	1.00	5.00	2.95	1.42
The problem with effective response of the Liberia National Police is more related to the lack of equipment.	1.00	5.00	4.33	0.91

	Low	High	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Residents of the local communities do not trust the Liberia National Police.	1.00	5.00	3.87	1.17
A citizen cannot get a fair redress if he or she files a complaint against a police officer to his or her superiors.	1.00	5.00	4.02	1.10
The Liberia National Police Officers do not treat all citizens fairly and impartially when they investigate cases.	2.00	5.00	4.30	0.77
Some members of the Liberia National Police were involved in some of the crimes committed today in the country.	2.00	5.00	4.53	0.65
The Liberia National police used excessive force during the elections incident involving some members and supporters of the Congress for Democratic Change political party on November 8, 2011.	1.00	5.00	3.38	1.11
The Liberia National Police today are corrupt.	1.00	5.00	4.50	0.68
Liberia National Police today are more corrupt than Police before the civil war.	1.00	5.00	3.44	1.18
Liberia National Police today are less corrupt than Police before the civil war.	1.00	5.00	2.54	1.16
The problem of corruption in the police is more related to salary and lack of benefits for officers.	1.00	5.00	4.57	0.74
The Liberia National Police today is not effective and capable to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia.	1.00	5.00	3.90	1.33

5.   Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree 4= Agree, 5= Strongly Agree

Table 20

Police Views About Crime Rates Over the Years Using Today as a Reference Point

	Low	High	Mean*	Std. Deviation
a) Do you believe that the crime rate today is higher, lower or about the same than in the years between 2004-2005?	1.00	3.00	2.03	0.32
b) Do you believe that the crime rate today is higher, lower or about the same than in the years between 2006-2007?	1.00	3.00	2.03	0.32
c) Do you believe that the crime rate today is higher, lower or about the same than in the years between 2008-2009?	1.00	3.00	2.02	0.43
d) Do you believe that the crime rate today is higher, lower or about the same than in the years between 2010-2011?	1.00	4.00	1.60	0.67

5.   Mean values: 1= About the same, 2= Lower, 3= Higher

Table 21

Civil Society Views About Crime Rates Over the Years Using Today as a Reference

	Low	High	Mean*	Std. Deviation
a) **Do you believe that crime the crime rate** today is higher, lower or about the same than in the years between 2004-2005?	1.00	3.00	2.17	0.56
b) **Do you believe that crime the crime rate** today is higher, lower or about the same than in the years between 2006-2007?	1.00	3.00	2.10	0.66
c) **Do you believe that crime the crime rate** today is higher, lower or about the same than in the years between 2008-2009?	1.00	3.00	2.02	0.70
d) **Do you believe that crime the crime rate** today is higher, lower or about the same than in the years between 2010-2011?	1.00	3.00	1.78	0.74

5. Mean values: 1= about the same, 2= Lower, 3= Higher

The effectiveness on job performance measured the ability of the police to effectively conduct policing operations and maintain law and order. The regression based on the analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows a significant relationship between knowledge gained and police job performance (Table 22). This meant that police job performance is the result of the training acquired, thus implying that UNMIL's police training effected some relative changes related to the maintenance of law and order. This significant relationship further implies that police effectiveness would be higher if their capacity regarding logistics and materials for job performance were adequately provided.

Table 22

Relationship Between Police Knowledge, Skills Level and Job Performance

	N	Mean (SD)	R	p(2 tail)
Police Knowledge and skills level	**60**	**4.50 (.31)**	**-.35****	**.008**
Police Job Effectiveness Perceived by Police		**3.31 (.44)**		

** Correlation is statistically significant at p ≤ .01

Table 23

Analysis of Variance (ANOVA[a])

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
	Regression	1.426	1	1.426	7.587	.008[b]
1	Residual	10.522	56	.188		
	Total	11.948	57			

a. Dependent Variable: Police Job performance perceived by police

b. Predictors: (Constant), Computed police knowledge and skills competency

Effectiveness of job performance was measured in the context of (a) the ability of the UNMIL trained police to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia; (b) Police protection of citizens and government; and (c) Citizens' trust of police to bear arms in order to effectively fight crime. Police survey respondents neither disagreed nor agreed (Table 18: M=3.68) that the UNMIL trained police was capable to maintain law and order when UNMIL leaves Liberia at the end of its mission. Civil society survey respondents also neither disagreed nor agreed (Table 19: M=3.90). However, a majority of interview respondents expressed the view that they did not believe that the Liberia National Police was capable to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia. They

point to challenges in UNMIL's recruitment and vetting process, need for psycho-social counseling, additional training to increase the size of the police to the population and to improve the character of the police, resources and improved conditions of work, and the need to build a people-oriented police force as preconditions to ensure performance effectiveness after UNMIL leaves Liberia. UN4 emphasized that the question of the capability of the LNP to take the place of UNMIL:

"Means that you need to build a people-oriented police . . . . For example if you recruit me into the police, send me to the community I came from, it is very difficult for me to halt people in my community. Because they know me . . . and I want to prove to them that I am here to serve you, but . . . I am going to be firm, and they understand that . . . So that's one approach to make the police more people oriented, more people focused. For this I don't think they have achieved. So before UNMIL leaves, if they can cover that gap, then to a large extent there will be respect for the police, and the police will also respect the citizens. Number two, I still believe the number of the police to the population is still small. Number three I think equipment is very, very vital, not necessarily weapons, because weapons have a way of providing false confidence to the carrier . . ."

On the issue of police protection, civil society respondents agreed that the police are likely to protect government more than citizens (Table 19: M=4.18). PO2 expressed the view that the culture by which police power is applied in the interest of the state or on orders of public officials for political ends (Sawyer, 1992) has not changed: "Nothing has actually changed. We still have and continue to maintain the colonial state structure,

which is state-centric and not people-centric. So the police will protect the government more than the people." G2 cited an example in which high school students staged a peaceful protest on March 22, 2011 in solidarity with their teachers who were on strike for lack of payment of their salaries. Attempts by police to quell the protest resulted in use of excessive force by which several students were brutalized, leaving some students with serious injuries. According to G2, "one of them, a handicap student took fifteen stitches on her head." The Commission set up to investigate the incident recommended that several senior police officers who were involved should be dismissed and some should be suspended. G2, who chaired the Commission that investigated the incident and made the recommendations, said that when the President of Liberia received the report, "she thought that the recommendations were harsh." G2 took the President's expression to mean that "at the highest level, the President must have felt that the police acted in the interest of the government, to protect government's image; because protests of students in the streets shouting 'pay our teachers' was an anti-government protest." UN4 expressed the view that the behavior of the police is often impacted by a fear of consequences:

> "One must first understand and be trained to that level that if I stand on the citizens' side, the state will support; the citizens will support. What are the consequences of me supporting the citizens rather than the state? So the fear of consequences alone is a deterrence to make the police more on the government side."

PO4 concurred and explained that "most police officers are afraid of losing their job, so they work in the interest of the government and not the public as required." UN3

expressed the view that there have been cases in which the police have been seen taking

the side of the government when the situation involved citizens from different political

parties other than the ruling party. CSO2 argued that "The Police Director and most of

the people in the police force are appointed by the president and can be dismissed by the

President . . . so that keeps the police tied to the Chief Executive . . . and they are going to

protect people in the government more than the they will protect the citizens."

The sub-components of effectiveness on job performance were public confidence and

police conduct. Public confidence measured the extent of citizens' self-assurance in the

ability of the police to provide fair, impartial, and equal treatment to all citizens in the

exercise of police authority, and to respond effectively and timely to crime. Police

conduct measured behaviors and practices of police officers which impact on police

integrity.

On public confidence or the fair and impartial treatment of citizens in the exercise

of police authority, civil society respondents agreed (Table 19) that they do not get fair

and impartial treatment from the police: (a) when they investigate their cases (M=4.30);

(b) when they file complaints against police officers to their superiors (M=4.02). These

views were corroborated by interview respondents. However, they also argued that most

often this was the result of interference from superior officers. CSO6 expressed the view

that it depends on who is involved:

"if it is between a government official and you, it is not fairly done because they

prioritize. But if it is you against your colleague, because I have witnessed some,

they investigate fairly and even sometimes some of the police can be very rigid ...

but sometimes there is interference by calls from somewhere above telling them

to let that person go; calls from above from senior police officers in the central

office or sometimes from higher cabinet ministers."

The extent of public confidence in the police was also measured in the context of

police responses to crime. Police officers who participated in the survey agreed that

despite the knowledge and skills acquired as the result of the UNMIL's training, they

were not able to respond effectively and timely to crimes and crime scenes (Table 18:

M=4.32); although they disagreed that crime rates are still high today (M=2.98); and they

linked this problem to lack of equipment (M= 4.70). Civil society survey respondents

strongly agreed with the police assessment that the police do not respond effectively to

crimes and crime scenes (Table 19: M= 4.50). They did not link this problem to the

police's lack of authority to bear arms (M= 2.95) but rather to the lack of equipment (M=

4.33). However, interview respondents G1 and CSO5 argued that the issue of the lack of

equipment does not apply in all cases and should not be used as an excuse. G1 stressed

the point that "You can't say for such a crime as murder, that because I don't have a

vehicle so I can't go to investigate . . ." CSO5 concurred, arguing that "So everybody just

sit down and make that excuse about equipment. Yes, we know equipment is very key . . .

to do evidence gathering, forensic and all of that . . . but what were we doing in the past?

So we shouldn't just use it as excuse to cover up for our inefficiencies." UN4 concurred

and made a distinction between police roles. He argued that while some police roles

require equipment, there are most other roles "that require just presence, policemen

everywhere and just surveillance. You know where those criminals are. You don't need

all the weapons in the world. You just need the numbers and people carrying out shifts;

so you need human resources there." G3, CSO6, and PO1 argued that when you train a

police force and deploy them to undertake the task of maintaining law and order,

equipment and other needed resources and incentives must be provided as part of the

support that yields performance effectiveness. According to G3, "you must give them the

tools to work with" because equipment and resources are the complementary aspects of

the training that support effective performance in the field. According to G3,

> "The police have been trained in forensic investigation; but they do not have the
>
> equipment to carry out those forensic investigations . . . some travel abroad and
>
> train in properly equipped laboratories; they come back to Liberia, there are no
>
> laboratories . . . if you transfer police officers from one county to another, they do
>
> not have barracks where to stay. They have to go and pay rent; and the rent is
>
> coming from their basic salary. There is no rent allowance; there is no housing
>
> allowance; there is no transport allowance. They have to beg to take car to get to
>
> work. It is unfair to the police."

Civil society survey respondents also agreed that crime rates are lower today compared to

earlier years, but agreed that crime rates today are still high because police do not

respond timely and effectively to crimes in their neighborhoods (Table 21: M=4.00). In

the event of a crime in progress, respondents also agreed they prefer to call their

neighbors first before they call the police (Table 19: M=4.40). The majority of interview

respondents agreed with this view. They point to the development of neighborhood watch

groups as community responses to the problem of ineffective police response. According

to UN3, however, poor organization and lack of control over these groups also led to proliferation of mob actions or "street justice" in the neighborhoods.

G2 also reasoned that the value in calling one's neighbor first is also that your neighbor "provides your first line of evidence, at least somebody will see something happening to you so when the police comes later on, whenever they get to you at least you have someone to corroborate what you say happened to you." Respondents, who indicated the view that they would call the police first, reasoned that the police are responsible to enforce the law. According to CSO6,

> "Your neighbor will do it family way. And if for instance I found somebody raping my child, I call the neighbor, they will say let's settle it the family way. But the police will be able to apprehend that person, put that whole case under control and see how best they can take your case to court".

The issue was also raised on the need for the police to be authorized to carry arms in order to carry out effective police operations. On this issue, civil society respondents agreed that the problem with effective response of the police is related to a lack of equipment (Table 19: M=4.33). However, equipment did not include arms. Respondents disagreed that police should bear arms in order to do effective police work. Police respondents concurred with this view (Table 18: M=2.25) that they did not need arms in order to do effective police work. Interview respondents agreed with the views of police and civil society respondents. They also indicated that they did not trust their police to bear arms because of the vetting process which allowed former combatants and criminals to be recruited into the police force.

Police conduct measured behaviors and practices of police officers which impacted on police integrity and public confidence. Police conduct was measured in the context of corruption and crime. Interview respondents defined corruption as unethical behaviors and practices such as drinking, taking of drugs while on duty, collection of bribes from motorists, parties to investigations and to court cases involving presentation of evidence by the police, all of which have negative impact on police integrity and public confidence. The police has not broken away from its discredited past. Analysis of responses from the survey questionnaire, interviews, documents, and field notes revealed that the UNMIL training had no impact on police integrity. On the issue of crime, police respondents agreed that police officers have been involved in some of the crimes committed around the country (Table 18: M=4.18). Civil society respondents agreed with the police assessment (Table 19: M=4.53). Police and civil society respondents linked this result to UNMIL's recruitment and vetting practices. On the issue of corruption, police and civil society respondents agreed that the Liberia National Police are corrupt. A culture of corruption is sustained by a culture of unfavorable conditions of work. However, police and civil society respondents linked police corruption more to unfavorable working conditions such as poor salary, lack of transportation, and benefits such as housing, medical care, and pension programs for officers.

The analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant relationship between knowledge gained and police job performance, meaning that the police job performance is the result of the training acquired (Table 23). The implication is that the UNMIL has conducted the theoretical training in relation to police field work in classroom settings

and field locations. However, this does not necessarily imply that the LNP have adequate logistics and other resources needed to enable them perform effectively. Other conditions of service, complementary to training, include salary, benefits, equipment, and resources. These are fundamental factors of effective performance that enable the police to respond effectively to crime scenes and to calls from communities for protection. Respondents G1, PO2, and CSO6 argue that better conditions of service including salary and benefits is one of the fundamental factors of motivation, especially in Liberia where poverty is on the increase.

Research Question 3

Are there current challenges that require reform to improve the quality of policing and ensure a reliable police security force in Liberia?

This question sought to assess the critical lessons learned from responses to Research Questions 1 and 2 regarding the UNMIL's training program and how the findings point to challenges that require reforms in order to improve the quality of policing in Liberia. Question 3 also explored challenges perceived by the citizens about their new police force and what respondents believed must be done to build a professional police force capable of providing equal protection to all citizens, while upholding their basic human rights and maintaining law and order. The findings in Research Questions 1 and 2 point to several internal and external challenges in UNMIL's training program. These challenges were examined from two perspectives: (a) The UNMIL; and (b) The Government of Liberia.

From the perspective of the UNMIL, challenges that required reform were examined from three angles: (a) recruitment decisions; (b) local content; and (c) training methodology. The key findings in the UNMIL's recruitment decisions are that it failed to observe established UN mission standards for recruitment and vetting, to communicate the message to the population that the new police being organized was for individuals with good character, and that policing is for individuals with records of good conduct and behavior. UNMIL failed to consult the population in the local communities in the recruitment process. Although it posted pictures of candidates around the country and asked citizens to speak out and point individuals who had committed human rights abuses, UNMIL did not provide the needed security protection to encourage their participation in the vetting of candidates. Moreover, the UNMIL's preference for quantity in recruitment of large numbers of candidates compromised quality in the context of establishing a sustainable long-term police force. All of these were the additional adverse impacts on the outcome of the training program.

I found that the majority of respondents emphasized their concern about the UNMIL's controlling influence over the program from the onset. According to G1 and PO2, although there was a joint transitional working group collaborating on the training program, UNMIL had insisted that as the experts, they had to make the final decisions. They cited as an example, the decision taken by UNMIL to deactivate and disband the entire old Liberian National police force and to build a police force that is entirely new. The challenge that this created was the absence of institutional knowledge and memory and the absence of experienced police leadership that would have provided mentoring to

new officers. All of these were the additional adverse impacts on the outcome of the training program. The UNMIL's Liberian counterparts had argued unsuccessfully in favor of retention of some of the ranking officers in the old disbanded force. They had argued that some of the ranking officers of the old police force who had not committed human rights abuses should be retained to serve as mentors for the new recruits. The challenges from these lapses were: (1) individuals who committed heinous crimes against the population were recruited and are now serving in the new police force with some serving as ranking officers, and this also impacts on the morale of the rank-and-file; (2) some police officers trained and deployed have been involved in crimes around the country for which the citizens do not trust their police; and (3) there was a lack of effective leaders in the new police force who can provide leadership by example. The rank-and-file admittedly engaged in corrupt activities, while some senior commanders frequently interfered in investigations for social, financial and political ends. Still, others are caught engaging crimes such as drug trafficking.

On the issue of local content, respondents indicated their concern that courses taught by UNMIL at the academy did not include country-specific contents for Liberia. According to them, UNMIL did not collaborate with the government's security sector regime to develop and include course contents that have specific local skills and policing guidelines around which UNMIL's training activities would revolve. Training manuals used in earlier missions and brought to Liberia were not revised to adapt to the country's policing context and history.

Another critical theme that emerged was the UNMIL's training methodology. The earliest concerns about the UNMIL training program, in addition to the recruitment challenges, were the diversity of the trainers and the nature and content of the training. Trainers came from different countries with diverse social and political backgrounds and contrasting policing jurisdictions. The research found that as the result of the broadness of the base of trainers and the restricted course content, the overall output of the UNMIL's police training was not country-specific to Liberia and that police trained and deployed have different policing orientations and values.

From the perspective of the Government of Liberia, challenges that required reform were examined from three angles: (a) UNMIL-GoL coordination challenges; (b) GoL support to police reform and capacity challenges; and (c) political interference in policing operations. Analysis of the survey results, transcripts from the interviews, documents and field notes revealed that the support of the Government of Liberia is complementary to the UNMIL's training and necessary to ensure effectiveness of performance. However, the findings reflect that the government's direct support in this regard had been minimal, instead it had relied on international donor support. On the issue of political interference, respondents expressed concern over the government's continued control over the administration of the police through political appointment of ranking officers. The President of Liberia appoints the top brass. The individuals appointed are most often not from within the organization. Internal promotions have also followed no set criteria for merit based on performance, experience, and tenure. All of

these factors have historically demoralized the police rank-and-file, dissuaded

motivation, and adversely impacted on the development of a professional police force.

Chapter Summary

In Chapter 4, I analyzed the data, discussed the research results and presented the

findings. The overarching research question that guided this study was: How has police

training by the United Nations Mission in Liberia affected police effectiveness and public

confidence in the ability of the LNP to maintain law and order? This question was

expanded by two qualitative questions and one quantitative question. In Research

Question 1, I assessed the UNMIL's strategy for recruitment and vetting of applicants for

the new LNP, in the context of thoroughness applied in the process to ensure that only

applicants who had not committed human rights abuses and who had demonstrated good

behavior in the local communities were recruited. The UNMIL's recruitment and vetting

procedures were not thorough and did not adhere to United Nations international police

reform standards. In Research Question 2, I assessed training and citizens' perception of

training based on observed police performance. The training was not uniform and did not

include a country-specific context for Liberia. The broadness of the base of trainers from

diverse and contrasting police jurisdictions diminished training effectiveness and

undermined the effectiveness of performance of the police. Participants' responses to

Research Question 3 affirmed that there were current challenges that required reform to

establish a professional police force that is in synch with its policing jurisdiction and is

effective and capable of maintaining law and order in Liberia. The LNP currently faces

several challenges that impede effective performance. These challenges require reform

and re-orientation interventions by UNMIL and the Government of Liberia. In Chapter 5,

I briefly discuss the conclusions and present my recommendations for positive social

change based on the findings.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

In this chapter, I present the conclusions based on the findings, critical lessons learned, and the recommendations. I conducted the on location in Monrovia, Liberia. I conducted the study in the wake of the country's fight to eradicate the Ebola epidemic under conditions of emergency management public policy challenges never before experienced in Liberia nor in the West African subregion. Participants in the study were from the government, community-based civil society organizations, the LNP, and the UN mission in Liberia. The mixed-model research method was used to collect and analyze the data. The purpose of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of how the UNMIL's police training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The objective of the study was to identify the underlying contexts and to contribute knowledge to the establishment of an effective police force that gains the trust and confidence of the citizens of Liberia.

I can conclude, based on the findings, that the UNMIL's police training program has yielded mixed results and impacts on the effectiveness of police performance in Liberia. The deficiencies in the UNMIL's police training and reform interventions reflect a broader problem of shortcomings in various reform programs implemented by the UN and other international nongovernmental organizations in Liberia. Sawyer (2005) emphasized that the greater shortcomings in the implementation of reform programs are lack of guidance of a long-term larger vision for a postconflict society, the lack of

effective coordination amongst implementing agencies, and their failure to engage

Liberians as stakeholders in designing and implementing these programs. In the case of

UNMIL, the police training program took place in a new global environment under

country-specific realities and conditions that informed how training intervention for the

LNP ought to have happened in order to establish a country-specific professional police

force that gains local ownership. In an analysis of the results of the survey questionnaire,

interview transcripts, and field notes, I found that the UNMIL training of the LPN was

impacted by what Durch (2010) referred to as a "crisis of strategy" from the onset (p. 8).

Respondents emphasized that UNMIL was not well-informed about its mission

environment in Liberia and did not seek much needed guidance from the local security

sector regime.

The adverse impacts, however, are not entirely training related but result also

from negative externalities emanating from the behavior of the government of Liberia

towards its police force. Policing in Liberia takes place in a political environment of an

entrenched centralized, imperial presidential system in which political leaders do not

place a premium on the mission of the police, and therefore on its organization and

administration even in its postconflict state. The future implications of the results are that

the UNMIL and the government of Liberia need to heighten collaboration to implement a

comprehensive program of professionalizing the police before the UNMIL's departure

from Liberia. They must jointly respond to the need to rehabilitate, retrain, and

reorientate the LNP and to situate it in its original uniform common law criminal justice

system and policing tradition, which is specifically patterned after that of the United States.

The conclusions and recommendations are presented in two parts based on Research Questions 1 and 2. Question 3 was a restatement of the critical lessons learned and the challenges that informed the recommendations. In each part, the findings are summarized to provide the basis for the conclusions and the recommendations for positive social change based on each research question from the perspectives of (a) the UNMIL and (b) the government of Liberia.

Research Question 1

What strategies were used to recruit applicants for police training?

The UNMIL Perspective

In the findings for Question 1, I found that the UNMIL's approach to recruitment and vetting of candidates was adhoc. Candidates were not investigated with due diligence regarding their character and previous human rights records. The UNMIL's recruitment and vetting practices were not exhaustive. The procedures were not thorough and did not adhere to the standards applied in other UN police reform missions such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor, and Kosovo. Citizens in the local communities were not consulted in the vetting process regarding prior behaviors and character of applicants. In conclusion, UNMIL's failure to apply due diligence in the recruitment of candidates resulted in the admission of known criminals and former combatants of the warring factions who had committed human rights abuses during the civil war. To date, they continue to serve in the rank-and-file and leadership of the new LNP.

On the issue of police integrity, I also found that psychological counseling was needed as part of the training package because the country was just emerging from 14 years of conflict from which the people were traumatized. Former combatants, criminals, and individuals with questionable character had found their way into the rank-and-file of the new police force and some had even become supervisors. In Question 1, I further concluded that the admission of former combatants, criminals, and individuals with questionable character was partly responsible for the citizens' lack of trust in the new police to bear arms. It also bears on a crisis of public confidence in the integrity of the police as an instrument for peace-building given that some of the UNMIL trained officers were found to be involved in various crimes, such as armed robberies and drug smuggling around the country.

The Government Perspective

From the perspective of the government, the participants also raised the critical issue of the weak commitment by the government to its police training program. PO1, PO2, and G3 argued that the government of Liberia did not put itself in the position to take ownership of the UNMIL training program to provide much needed leadership and direction in working with UNMIL to jointly develop a training framework. In the view of respondents, taking ownership meant providing funding for the training or for some aspects of it instead of relying entirely on the international community. Had the government committed to taking ownership of the training program, it would have been able to insist on country-specific training and orientation. That is, it would have been in the position to decide on the direction of the training and also decide on which training it

would accept for the LNP and which training it would reject. To the contrary, the government compromised its position by failing to take responsibility for its police training program. It had to accept whatever training was available based on funding provided by any given country.

Recommendation 1

The United Nations must require future postconflict international police reform missions to:

(a) Ensure that joint efforts in recruitment and vetting must go beyond consultations with officials of the local security sector regime to ascertain participation of local community-based civil society members in an inclusive process of postconflict police and security sector reform;

(b) Emphasize participation of the local communities in the vetting of candidates for the police force and provide immediate security and protection for the citizens as the basis for their participation in the vetting of candidates;

(c) Communicate recruitment standards through local languages, while articulating the need for applicants with good character; inform residents in the local communities that police applicants should be people who have good character and good human rights backgrounds; and

(d) In the case of Liberia, UNMIL and the government of Liberia must jointly implement a periodic and revolving program of psychological counseling and rehabilitation for all members of the current police force. This should include the rank-and-file as well as the leadership.

A key component of any international reform intervention is a strong partnership and effective coordination between the mission and the local authorities to jointly provide program direction and support. In the findings to question 1, participants raised the issue of the UNMIL's controlling influence over the training program. According to G1 and PO2, although there was a joint transitional working group collaborating on the training program, UNMIL had insisted that as the experts, they had to make the final decisions. For example, participants referred to the case of UNMIL's decision to deactivate the entire old LNP and to build a police force that is entirely new. On this issue, UNMIL's Liberian implementing partners had requested that some of the ranking officers of the disbanded old police who had not committed human rights abuses should be retained to serve as mentors for the new recruits. Respondents emphasized that UNMIL refused and none of the ranking officers of the old disbanded police was recruited. However, the literature supports the position of the UNMIL's Liberian counterparts. A study by Glebbeek (2001) on police reform in Guatemala showed that the process did not succeed and faced significant challenges because it involved a decision to abolish the entire old police force and to establish a new force bereft of members of the old institution. In contrast, a similar police reform study done by Stanley (2006) on statebuilding in El Salvador found that the strategy for building a new police force from bottom-up was successful because it provided for continuity and grounded experience in the process by the inclusion of some members of the old police force. In conclusion, I found in Question 1 that the recommendation for retention of some of the ranking officers of the old

disbanded LNP to ensure continuity would have been a successful strategy. This strategy was adopted by UN police training missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in East Timor and yielded successful results. It should have been adopted by the UNMIL in Liberia. The impacts of the failure to provide for institutional memory and organizational continuity were reflected in leadership capacity gaps of the new LNP. Respondents emphasized the point that as the result of this decision, the LNP lacked capacity in terms of experience and the competencies associated with law enforcement leadership such as administration of the police revolving around the ability to mentor subordinates, exercise command and control, and providing overall leadership.

Recommendation 2

Future UN police training missions must be guided by the general standard of a strong partnership and collaboration to integrate, rehabilitate and strengthen what is found on the ground in the host country. The mission must collaborate with its local counterparts to reform the institution it finds on the ground and to place it in synch with contemporary international policing principles and standards. The overall police reform goal need not be to disband the structure is found on the ground; but rather to rebuild and strengthened it through a jointly developed program of integration, rehabilitation, and re-orientation specific to the policing needs of the host country.

<div align="center">Research Question 2</div>

What, if any, difference has the UNMIL's police training made relative to the maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia's police force?

The UNMIL Perspective

A critical concern raised by respondents was the weak collaborative relationship and coordination between the UNMIL and its local police administration counterparts in the implementation of the training program. Although a joint transitional team for designing and administering the training existed, I found that UNMIL made the final decisions that were critical to the direction of the program (Freidman, 2011). In the process, the UNMIL did not coordinate its activities with the other implementing partners to ensure that the nature and direction of its police training intervention was country-specific to the context and history of Liberia and to its criminal justice system. This is the key challenge which points to the need for additional training, rehabilitation, and re-orientation to exact this country-specific policing context. In Question 2 I also found that course materials and contents were taken from earlier UN missions in other postconflict countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor, and Kosovo and did not include Liberian local content. UN1, CSO4, and G2 argued that UNMIL needed to collaborate with the Ministry of Justice to develop a training manual for Liberia. It was important that Liberia develops its own unified code and that the use of local policing principles and guidelines and local knowledge in handling policing operations was critical and needed to be captured and taught.

In the findings to Question 2, respondents raised the issue of UNMIL's training methodology and the nature and content of the training. The UNMIL used a diversity of trainers from countries with different political orientations, criminal justice systems, and policing methods and traditions. A majority of trainers, including those from Africa, had the British police training orientation, and some trainers had the Russian police training

orientation originating from the policing traditions of the Soviet era. The challenge that

this broadness of the base of trainers posed was recognized in the "Brahimi Report" of

the United Nations Panel on Peacekeeping Operations (2000):

> "The police component of a mission may comprise officers drawn from up to 40
>
> countries who have never met one another before, have little or no United Nations
>
> experience, and have received little relevant training on mission-specific
>
> briefings, and whose policing practices and doctrines may vary widely . . . All of
>
> those factors make it extremely difficult for missions . . . to transform a disparate
>
> group of officers into a cohesive and effective force." (p.20)

In the case of Liberia, the challenges described in the panel's report resulted in a training

outcome that lacked a uniform criminal justice orientation with a country-specific local

content. Respondents indicated the view that the diversity of trainers from diverse social

and political backgrounds and contrasting police jurisdictions compromised training

effectiveness and adversely impacted on the effectiveness of job performance of the

UNMIL trained LNP. It also failed to situate the training program within the context of

the country's history and policing tradition. Liberia is a common law country with a

criminal justice system and a policing tradition specifically patterned after that of the

United States of America. Policing in Liberia is based on that particular context and

history which should have been the basis upon which UNMIL's police training and

reform interventions was conducted. UNMIL's failure in this regard affirmed a

significant failure to understand its mission environment. It resulted in the major

challenge of establishing a new police force that is estranged from its history and

tradition. In Research Question 2, I found that the UNMIL established a police force that

is not harmonized with the policing tradition of Liberia. The LNP today has conflicting

performance orientations, policing values, and even contrasting rank nomenclatures. This

failure presents another critical lesson learned for future UN police training missions. The

conclusion, based on the findings on this issue, is that the practice observed in the

Brahimi Report, by which a multiplicity of trainers is drawn from a variety of policing

jurisdictions based on available donors, should be abolished. Future UN postconflict

international police training and reform programs must not be donor-driven. Instead, the

programs must be driven by what is required to implement reforms specific to enhancing

a host country's policing needs. That is, trainers must be recruited from countries whose

policing traditions and jurisdictions are the same as that of the host country. The training

program must be implemented to exact the outcome specific to policing in that country.

Recommendation 3

    (a) The future UN postconflict international police training programs must not be

        donor-driven. The programs must be driven by what is required to implement

        reforms specific to enhancing a host country's policing needs. The mission

        must be guided by a standard of a strong partnership, and collaboration to

        rehabilitate, integrate and strengthen what is found on the ground and not to

        discard it;

    (b) Training materials and contents of courses must be developed and reviewed

        jointly by the mission and its local counterparts to ensure inclusion of local

content specific to the context of a country's history, policing tradition and jurisdiction; and

(c) As far as practicable, trainers must be recruited from countries whose policing traditions and jurisdictions are the same or similar to that of the host country.

Recommendation 4

(a) Liberia is a common law country with a criminal justice system and a policing tradition specifically patterned after that of the United States of America. Policing in Liberia is based on that particular context and history, which should have been the basis upon which UNMIL's police training, was conducted. The UNMIL and the government of Liberia must embark on a program of retraining, rehabilitation, and re-orientation to situate the police in its common law criminal justice system and policing tradition with harmonized organization, structure, and rank nomenclatures specifically patterned after that of the United States before UNMIL departs Liberia;

(b) Integral to the new program of retraining and re-orientation should be a collaborative effort to develop a training manual specific to policing in Liberia. Liberia should have its own unified code that is based on its criminal justice jurisdiction, and utilizes local policing principles, guidelines and local knowledge in handling policing operations; and

(c) This transformation must take place with UNMIL trained officers serving in the highest ranking strategic positions under the watch of UNMIL for some time before UNMIL mission ends.

The Government Perspective

From the perspective of the Government of Liberia, I found several externalities not directly related to training but which impact on the effectiveness of job performance of the LNP. I found that correlations and regression used to test the hypotheses showed a moderately significant correlation between police perceived knowledge and skills gained during UNMIL training and the job effectiveness perceived by them (r = -0.35). However, the relationship is an inverse one, implying that as the knowledge gained increases, the job performance cannot be associated in the same manner or direction. The implication is that as more resources were are used in training the police, limited resources were allocated to facilitate their job performance. This formed a basis of reducing police effectiveness. Moreover, the regression based on the analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant relationship between knowledge gained and police job performance. This meant that the police job performance is the result of the training acquired, thus implying that UNMIL's police training effected some relative changes related to the maintenance of law and order. This significant relationship further implied that police effectiveness would be higher if their capacity regarding questions of equipment and resources were adequately provided by the government.

These findings provide useful insight into the effectiveness of job performance of the UNMIL trained police relative to challenges in the context of the government's interventions in its police reform program. In the analysis of the survey results, transcripts from the interviews, documents, and field notes I also found that although the UNMIL had conducted the theoretical training in relation to police fieldwork, this did not

necessarily imply that the LNP had the logistics and other resources needed to enable them perform effectively. Respondents emphasized that the support of the government of Liberia was complementary to the UNMIL's training and necessary to ensure effectiveness of performance. However, the findings showed that the government's direct support in this regard had been minimal, and that instead it had relied on international donor support. To the contrary, respondents emphasized the view that the government ought not to rely on donor support. They expressed the view that the international community is committed largely to providing funds for technical training and advisory support, and much of its funding goes to that area. It is the government of Liberia that has primary responsibility to provide the actual resources and the funding for the police institution. The government's failure to meet this obligation left the UNMIL trained LNP as one of those institutions that was seriously underfunded and underpaid. A majority of the respondents emphasized that the public's lack of confidence in the ability of the police to maintain law and order is based more on their perception that the government had not been forthcoming in providing adequate support to capacitate the police to perform its law enforcement duties. PO1, PO2, CSO6, and G3 argued that the government of Liberia did not provide the needed support to the police as articulated in its Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008) and the Agenda for Transformation (2013), and that its support was necessary to yield performance effectiveness. They argued that when a police force is trained and deployed to undertake the task of maintaining law and order, equipment and other needed resources and incentives must be provided as part of the support that yields performance effectiveness. According to G3, "you must give them the

tools to work with" because equipment and resources are the complementary aspects of the training that support effective performance in the field.

On the question of the ability of the police to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia, I found that civil society respondents did not believe that the LNP was capable to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia. Police and civil society also agreed that police were not able to respond effectively and timely to crimes. They linked these to the need for additional training and the lack of equipment and resources. Moreover, other conditions of service that are complementary to training include salary, benefits, and good working conditions and environment. These are fundamental factors of effective performance. In postconflict Liberia where poverty is on the increase, police officers are among the least paid with an average monthly salary of about one hundred and fifty ($150.00) United States dollars. Out of this salary, they pay income tax, transport themselves to work, relocate to distant areas of assignment, pay rent, and care for their families.

In the responses to Question 2, I also found that the UNMIL training had no impact on police integrity as evidenced by corruption and unfairness in the exercise of police authority. However, police and civil society respondents linked this lack of integrity to a culture of unfavorable conditions of work punctuated by factors such as poor salary and a lack of benefits such as housing, transportation, medical care, and pension programs for officers. This culture of unfavorable conditions of work was also linked to low level of attention and handling of the police by the government in all areas of police work.

Another issue which emerged as critical to the need for police reform was political interference in police operations and the need to depoliticize the police. According to Liebenow (1969), Liberia is a country where "politics is king." Policing takes place in a political environment of an entrenched centralized, imperial presidential system. Political leaders do not place a premium on the mission of the police, and therefore on its organization and administration even in its postconflict state. To date, the state continues to regard the police organization more as an instrument for exerting state control over the citizenry than for the enforcement of laws in the process of postconflict democratic peace-building and state-building. According to G2 and G3, the state's control of the police is exercised primarily by its political appointments of all ranking officers, and by its control over the finance and expenditure decisions of the police. The President of Liberia appoints the top brass. The individuals appointed are most often not from within the organization. Internal promotions also had no set criteria and promotions are not based on performance, tenure, and merit. All of these factors have historically demoralized the police rank-and-file, dissuaded motivation, and adversely impacted on the development of a professional police force.

In Research Question 2, I also found that in the wake of UNMIL's drawdown, it was critical for Liberia's political leaders to appreciate the need to place a high premium on the mission of the nation's police force and to act quickly to professionalize it. A functioning professional LNP will reduce the risk of conflict and make society safer by providing security for all, including ordinary citizens. It will create the enabling environment for investment and sustainable economic development, enhance state

authority and strengthen Liberia's nascent democracy. The research also found that this was the rationale for respondents' call to depoliticize the police and its operations.

The call to depoliticize the police institution as much as possible emerged as a major dynamic for professionalizing the LNP. G1, G2, G3, PO1, and PO2 all called for restructuring the police such that the LNP becomes semi-autonomous with an independent body exercising oversight responsibility over its operations. For example, when a vacancy occurs within one of the strategic ranking offices of the police, the Commission would vet candidates, establish an eligible list of three successful candidates and submit same to the President from which list one candidate is selected to fill that vacancy. I advance the following recommendations below based on the findings:

Recommendation 5

5.1 Organization

(a) Enactment of a new law establishing the new Liberia National Police must be based on recommendations for rehabilitation, reorganization, and reorientation of the entire LNP, officers, and rank-and-file alike;

(b) Depoliticize and restructure the police organization. By law, establish the LNP as a semi-autonomous institution as far practicable;

(c) Establish a 5-member *Law Enforcement Commission* to oversee all aspects of the operations of the Liberia National Police;

(d) Appointment of senior ranking officers of the LNP must be based on merit. Once appointed by the President, senior ranking officers must have tenure to serve for a

definite period; they should be removed only by process of impeachment through the Legislature;

(e) Line level officers must be promoted based on merit; consider education, experience, tenure and meritorious performance; salary increments and promotions must be based on results of performance evaluation.

5.2 Remuneration

(f) Establish a pay and grade system based on position classification that begins with police entry-level pay and benefits graduated over time periods; consult the Civil Service Agency on the position classification and pay starting with line level oficers; and

(g) Abolish the income tax for line level officers earning monthly gross income below USD$200.00.

5.3 Housing

(h) New LNP law to be enacted must have a provision requiring construction of barracks for police officers throughout the country. Police barracks of conventional standard (i.e., West Africa sub-region) must be constructed in all county capitals throughout the country; and in populated cities and emerging urban areas around the country;

(i) Housing allowance scheme should be put in place for line level officers assigned to areas not having barracks.

5.4 Service benefits

(j) Education**:** Provide free education to children and dependents of line level police officers up to completion of the 12th grade. Free education defined to include free registration fees and books;

(k) Medical: Free medical care in government clinics and hospitals for officers, their children and dependents. Free medical care defined to include free registration and free laboratory tests; and

(l) Insurance: Establish a program to provide free life insurance coverage for line level or rank-and file police offiers.

Implications for Social Change

UN Police Reform Missions

Future UN police training missions must be guided by the general standard of a strong partnership, effective coordination and collaboration between the mission, and the local security sector regime to jointly provide program direction and support. Additionally, the practice observed in the *Brahimi Report,* by which a multiplicity of trainers is drawn from a variety of policing jurisdictions should be abolished. Future UN postconflict international police training missions should be driven by what is required to implement training specific to a host country's policing needs and not by donors.

The Liberia National Police

The government of Liberia must take ownership of the UNMIL training program to provide much needed leadership and direction. It must recommit to the police training program and place a high premium on the mission of the nation's police force. The

government and UNMIL must jointly respond to the need to rehabilitate, retrain, and re-orientate the police and to situate it in its original uniform common law criminal justice system and policing jurisdiction, which is specifically patterned after that of the United States of America. Another major dynamic of the findings of the research was the clarion call for the Government to act quickly to professionalize the Liberia National Police and to depoliticize its operations. Respondents emphasized the need to implement a merit-based system for officers and the rank-and-file, and to restructure the police organization as a semi-autonomous institution as far as is practicable before the UNMIL's departure from Liberia. The social change implications of all this is that an effective functioning professional LNP will reduce the risk of return to conflict. It will make society safer by providing security for all including ordinary citizens. It will create the enabling environment for investment and sustainable economic growth, development, and social stability and enhance state authority while strengthening Liberia's nascent democracy.

Recommendations for Future Research

The LNP operates as a part of the larger criminal justice system of Liberia. According to G2, the three tiers of Liberia's criminal justice system include the police, prosecution, and corrections. Police work involves pretrial detentions, evidence gathering, and production of admissible evidence to protect the rights of parties in the courts. According to the US State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (2013), Liberia's courts are laden with judicial inefficiencies. Liberia's jurors, judges, and magistrates are subject of influence and corruption. There is also the issue of uneven distribution of human resource personnel, equipment, and resources throughout

the judicial system. All of these undermine effective police performance. The effectiveness of job performance of the police is somewhat tied to the effectiveness of the entire criminal justice system. However, there is no current related judicial reform program in place that could be aligned with the ongoing UNMIL police training and reform interventions. Additional research is needed to determine how police reform can be implemented as part of a larger program of a holistic criminal justice reform in order to enhance the effectiveness of performance of the police in the future.

Chapter Summary

This study examined how UNMIL police training affected effectiveness and public confidence in the ability of the LNP to maintain law and order. A mixed methods approach was used. Likert scales were used to collect quantitative data. Qualitative data consisted of documentary sources and individual, semi-structured interviews with open-ended and closed questions. Participants were officials of government, UNMIL, officers of LNP, and leaders and members of civil society organizations.

The UNMIL's police training yielded mixed results. To the extent that local context of policing varies from one country to another, the design and implementation of any international police reform assistance program should be based on context-specific knowledge and expertise. In the case of Liberia, UNMIL was not well-informed about its mission environment. This resulted in the repetition of errors made by earlier police reform missions in countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor. In Liberia, the diversity of trainers from contrasting policing jurisdictions of different nations yielded a program outcome that lacked a country-specific context of history and policing tradition.

Liberia is a common law country with a criminal justice system and policing tradition patterned after that of the United States. Liberia's history and policing context should have been the basis upon which the UNMIL training was conducted in order to establish a country-specific professional police force that gains local ownership. Instead, the UNMIL established a police force that is not harmonized with its policing tradition and has conflicting performance orientations, policing values, and even contrasting rank nomenclatures.

I also found that the government of Liberia failed to take ownership of the training program and to provide much needed leadership and direction due to its weak commitment and inadequate resource support to complement the training. Respondents emphasized the view that had the government been committed to taking ownership of the training program, it would have been able to insist on country-specific training, orientation, and program outcomes. Another issue which emerged as critical to the reform was that policing in Liberia takes place in a political environment of an entrenched centralized, imperial presidential system in which political leaders do not place a premium on the mission of the police, and therefore on its organization and administration even in its postconflict state. The administration and operation of the police remained highly politicized.

The future implications of these results are that the UNMIL and the government of Liberia need to heighten collaboration to implement a comprehensive program of retraining, rehabilitation, and reorientation to professionalize and situate the LNP in its original uniform common law criminal justice system and policing tradition. Liberia's

political leaders should depoliticize the police, grant semi-autonomous status to it, and

provide adequate resource support. All of the transformation cited above must take place

with UNMIL trained officers serving in the highest ranking strategic positions under the

watch of UNMIL for some time before the end of its mission in Liberia. For the UN,

police training missions should be driven by what is required to implement training

specific to a host country's policing needs and not by donors.

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AppendixA: List of Acronyms

AFL   Armed Forces of Liberia

BIN   Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization

CPA   Comprehensive Peace Agreement

ECOWAS   Economic Community of West African States

ECOMOG   ECOWAS Military Monitoring Group

UNMIL   United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNOMIL   United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

LINEA   Liberia Law Enforcement Association

LNP   Liberia National Police

LFF   Liberia Frontier Force

PRS   Poverty Reduction Strategy

Appendix B; Participants' Recruitment Letters

WALDEN UNIVERSITY
The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police:
           Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications

RECRUITMENT LETTER (Survey)

To Whom It May Concern:

You are invited to participate in my dissertation research survey of the police training provided by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the Liberia National Police (LNP). My name is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. I am the researcher conducting the survey as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for my PhD degree in Public Policy. The purpose of the survey is to gain better understanding of how police training by UNMIL has affected the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and order. For this survey, I am seeking the following participants:

    Members of community-based civil society organizations who have experienced the performance of the LNP in their local communities; and

    Police field officers who have been trained by UNMIL;

Participation in this survey is strictly voluntary. All information you will provide will also be strictly confidential. No names will be associated with the information you provide. You will be allowed to indicate where and when you choose to have the survey conducted.

Please contact me by phone **231-886-951-263** or email yarsuo.weh-dorliae@waldenu.edu to arrange a date and time for the survey. Thank you for considering to participate in this survey.

Sincerely,

Signed

Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae

WALDEN UNIVERSITY
The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police:
Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications

RECRUITMENT LETTER (Interview)

To Whom It May Concern:

You are invited to participate in my dissertation research interview in my study of the police training provided by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the Liberia National Police (LNP). My name is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. I am the researcher conducting this study as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for my PhD degree in Public Policy. The purpose of the interview is to gain better understanding of how police training by UNMIL has affected the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and order. For this interview, I am seeking the following participants:

Leaders of community-based civil society organizations who have experienced the performance of the LNP in their local communities;

Police supervisors and ranking officers who have been trained by UNMIL;

Ranking officers and officials of UNMIL; and

Officials of the Government of Liberia who participated in training decisions.

Participation in this study is strictly voluntary. All information you will provide will also be strictly confidential. Interviews will be audio recorded. No names will be associated with the information you provide. You will be allowed to indicate where and when you choose to have the interview.

Please contact me by phone **231-886-951-263** or email yarsuo.weh-dorliae@waldenu.edu to arrange a date and time for the interview. Thank you for considering to participate in this study.

Sincerely,

Signed

Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae

Appendix C: Informed Consent Forms

WALDEN UNIVERSITY
PARTICIPANT'S CONSENT FORM (Interview)

The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police:
Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications

You are invited to take part in a research study of the police training provided by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the Liberia National Police (LNP). The researcher is inviting police officers who have been trained by UNMIL, ranking UNMIL officers and officials of the Government of Liberia who participated in training decisions, and members of community-based civil society organizations who have experienced the performance of the LNP in their local communities to be in the study. This study is being conducted by a student named Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae (Researcher), as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for his PhD degree in Public Policy at the Walden University. The purpose of the study is to get a better understanding of how police training by UNMIL has affected the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence.

Procedures:
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to respond to answer interview questions presented by the researcher. Consent form must be signed by you in order for the interview to be conducted. You will be asked to:

- Respond verbally to thirteen (13) interview questions. The interview will be audio recorded. Some examples of the questions are: "Do you believe that the Liberia National Police today are likely to protect the government more than the citizens?" and "Do you trust the Liberia National Police today to bear arms in order to do effective police work?
- The interview will take about one hour to complete. Following the interview, I will request that you meet with me later to go over my interpretation and initial impressions of what you said in your responses.

Voluntary Nature of the Study:
Participation in this study is strictly voluntary. The researcher will respect your decision whether or not you choose to be in the study. If you initially decide to participate, you are still free to change your mind later and withdraw at any time.

Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
Your participation in this study will pose minimal risk. However, in the event you experience stress, you may terminate your participation at any time. You may refuse to answer any questions you consider invasive or stressful. A referral list of no-to low-cost

mental health providers is attached to this Consent Form for easy reference. The researcher will exhibit sensitivity to guard against a situation of the interview becoming emotionally charged. Your privacy will be respected. You will be allowed to indicate where and when you choose to have the interview.

In terms of benefits, if you choose to participate in this study, you will have an opportunity
to express your views and make a major contribution to knowledge about the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and order and gain citizens' confidence. Your views will also help the United Nations in planning police reform programs for future postconflict countries.

Compensation:
There will be no compensation provided for your participation in this study.

Confidentiality:
The records of this study will be kept private. In any report of this study that might be published, the researcher will not include any information that will make it possible to identify you. All data are strictly confidential and no names will be associated with the data in any way. Any information you provide will be kept confidential. The data will be used for the research purposes only. The data will be kept secured electronically with a password known only to the researcher. The data will also be kept for a period of at least five years as required by the University.

Contacts and Questions:
The researcher conducting this study is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae is also a Commissioner of the Governance Commission. However, the researcher's role as a commissioner is not in any way connected to this study.
The researcher's faculty advisor is Dr. Donald McLellan. You may ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae at 231-886-951-263 or email yarsuo.wehdorliae@waldenu.edu. If you want to talk privately about your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 001-612-312-1210. Walden University's approval number for this study is **07-30-13-0065268**, and it expires on **July 29, 2014**. You will receive a copy of this form from the researcher.

STATEMENT OF CONSENT:

I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a decision about my involvement. By signing below, I understand that I am agreeing to the terms described above.

Name of Participant: _____

Date of Consent: _____

Participant's Signature: _____

Researcher's Signature: _____

WALDEN UNIVERSITY
PARTICIPANT'S CONSENT FORM (Survey)

The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police:
Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications

You are invited to take part in a research study of the police training provided by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the Liberia National Police (LNP). The researcher is inviting police officers who have been trained by UNMIL, ranking UNMIL officers and officials of the Government of Liberia who participated in training decisions, and members of community-based civil society organizations who have experienced the performance of the LNP in their local communities to be in the study. This study is being conducted by a student named Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae (Researcher), as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for his PhD degree in Public Policy at the Walden University. The purpose of the study is to get a better understanding of how police training by UNMIL has affected the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence.

Procedures:
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to respond to survey questions presented by the researcher. You will be asked to respond to forty-one (41) survey questions that will take about 30 minutes to complete. Some examples of the survey questions are: "Do you believe that the Liberia National Police today are likely to protect the government more than the citizens?" and "Do you trust the Liberia National Police today to bear arms in order to do effective police work?

Voluntary Nature of the Study:
Participation in this study is strictly voluntary. The researcher will respect your decision whether or not you choose to be in the study. If you initially decide to participate, you are still free to change your mind later and withdraw at any time.

Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
Your participation in this study will pose minimal risk. However, in the event you experience stress, you may terminate your participation at any time. You may refuse to answer any questions you consider invasive or stressful. A referral list of no-to low-cost mental health providers is attached to this Consent Form for easy reference. The researcher will

exhibit sensitivity to guard against a situation of the interview becoming emotionally charged. Your privacy will be respected. You will be allowed to indicate where and when you choose to have the interview.

In terms of benefits, if you choose to participate in this study, you will have an opportunity

to express your views and make a major contribution to knowledge about the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and order and gain citizens' confidence. Your views will also help the United Nations in planning police reform programs for future postconflict countries.

Compensation:

There will be no compensation provided for your participation in this study.

Confidentiality:

The records of this study will be kept private. In any report of this study that might be published, the researcher will not include any information that will make it possible to identify you. All data are strictly confidential and no names will be associated with the data in any way. Any information you provide will be kept confidential. The data will be used for the research purposes only. The data will be kept secured electronically with a password known only to the researcher. The data will also be kept for a period of at least five years as required by the University.

Contacts and Questions:

The researcher conducting this study is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae is also a Commissioner of the Governance Commission. However, the researcher's role as a commissioner is not in any way connected to this study.

The researcher's faculty advisor is Dr. Donald McLellan. You may ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae at 231-886-951-263 or email yarsuo.wehdorliae@waldenu.edu. If you want to talk privately about your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 001-612-312-1210. Walden University's approval number for this study is _____, and it expires on _____. You may keep this consent form.

STATEMENT OF CONSENT:

In order to protect your privacy, your signature will not be collected. Your completion of the survey will indicate your consent, if you choose to participate.

Appendix D; Interview Protocol

WALDEN UNIVERSITY

**The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police:
Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications**

Interview Protocol:
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. My name is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. I am conducting this study as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for my PhD degree in Public Policy at the Walden University. The purpose of the study is to gain deeper understanding of how police training by UNMIL have affected the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence.

This interview will take no more than one hour. The interview be audio taped so I can properly transcribe all interviews. Also, I will be taking some notes during the session. Because we are on tape, please speak clearly so that your comments are heard. All responses will be kept confidential. This means that your interview responses will not be shared with anyone else. I will also ensure that any information you provide for this study does not identify you in any way as the respondent. Remember, you do not have to talk about anything you don't want to and you may end the interview at any time. Do you have any questions about what I have just explained?
Are you willing to participate in this interview?

Questions:
1. Do you believe that if a citizen knew a police recruit who had committed human rights abuses he or she will not complain to UNMIL for fear of revenge?
2. Do you believe that the Liberia National Police today are likely to protect the government more than the citizens?
3. Do you believe that the Liberia National Police Officers treat all citizens fairly and impartially when they investigate their cases?
4. How has UNMIL training impacted on the integrity of the police on the issue of corruption?
5. How has UNMIL training impacted on the effectiveness of the police to collect evidence and present accurate records of criminal investigations to protect the rights of parties in the courts?
6. Do the UNMIL trained ranking officers or leaders of the Liberia National Police have the knowledge to provide professional leadership to their subordinates?
7. If you saw a crime being committed in your community, who would you prefer to call first for help, your neighbor OR the Liberia National Police?

8. Do you believe that UNMIL training was coordinated and subjects covered followed country-specific guidelines?
9. **Do you believe that some members of the UNMIL trained Liberia National Police were involved in some of the crimes committed around the country?**
10. What do you believe are some of the current challenges facing the Liberia National Police?
11. The mission of UNMIL in Liberia will end on September 30, 2015. Do you believe that the Liberia National Police is capable to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia?
12. What recommendations do you have to improve the effectiveness of the Liberia National police and gain public confidence?
13. Is there anything more you would like to add?

I will be analyzing the information you and others have given me and I will be contacting you to review the transcription in order to ensure accuracy of information and increase the validity of the research findings. Thus, you will have the opportunity to review transcripts and be offered the opportunity to discuss the transcribed copy of your interview.
Thank you for your time.

Appendix E: Letters of Cooperation from Community Partners

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA

The Charles B. Alfonso Cain Building

Headquarters of the Liberia National Police

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Monrovia, Liberia

Office of the Deputy Director / Deputy Inspector
General of Police for Administration

Cell #: 0770600101

September 11, 2013

Mr. Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae
School of Public Policy & Administration
Walden University
Local Cell #: 0886-951-263

Dear Mr. Weh-Dorliae

Based on our review of your research request, we hereby give consent to cooperate with you as your community partner in the conduct of your research entitled: "The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police: Effectiveness, results and future implications".

As such, we permit you to do the following:

a. Post your recruitment letters on our bulletin board to invite potential participants for your research; and

b. Used our local branch officers in Monrovia to conduct interviews with Police Field supervisors on a scheduled date and time convenient to your operations.

We understand that participation of interested officers is voluntary and at their own discretion. We reserve the right to withdraw from the study at any time if our circumstances change.

We also understand that the data collected will remain entirely confidential and may not be provided to anyone outside of the research team without permission from the Walden University Institutional Review Board. Meanwhile, Hon. Gbor Phil Toughay, Commissioner of Police for Administration and Professional Standards, has been designated as contact person and can be reached on cell #: 0770-899-103.

Kind regards,

Sincerely,

Hon. Joseph S. Sheeler
Deputy Director, Administration
Liberia National Police

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Ashmun & Center Streets
Monrovia, Liberia

Office of the Minister/Attorney General

Cell: +231- 05-783-702

August 27, 2013

CPT/MOJ/AG/RL/479/'13

Mr. Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae
School of Public Policy and Administration
Walden University
Minneapolis, Minnesota
United States of America

Dear Mr. Dorliae:

I present my compliments and wish to acknowledge your letter of yesterday's date, acquainting me with the program in which you are engaged at Walden University, towards fulfilling the requirements for your PhD degree in Public Policy, entitled: *The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police: Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications*; and your request to obtain the consent and cooperation of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) so as to become a Community Partner, for the facility of permitting your recruitment letter on our bulletin board, thereby enabling you to invite potential participants for your research survey and interviews.

We are intrigued by your choice of academic concentration, which is directly related to one of the key concerns of the MOJ. In this connection, therefore, we are pleased to accord you our pledge that the MOJ will lend you its fullest cooperation, as we are confident that your endeavor will bring clarity to our engagement.

Meanwhile, we wish you every success in this monumental endeavor.

With kind regards, I remain,

Sincerely,

Cllr. Christiana P. Tah
MINISTER/ATTORNEY GENERAL

United Nations 🇺🇳 **Nations Unies**

MISSION IN LIBERIA · MISSION AU LIBERIA

Office of UN Police Commissioner

26 August 2013

Dear Mr. Weh-Dorliae,

Based on my review of your research request, I give consent to serve as your community Partner as you conduct research study entitled: "The United Nations Training of the Liberian National Police: Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications"

UNPOL's cooperation as your community partner is limited to our permission to use our offices to post your recruitment letter on our bulletin board and administer your interviews with UNPOL Officers after office hours and on a scheduled date and time.

I understand that participation of interested individuals in our organization is voluntary and at their own discretion. We reserve the right to withdraw from the study at anytime if our circumstances change.

I understand that the data collected will remain entirely confidential and may not be provided to anyone outside of the research team without permission from the Walden University's Institutional Review Board.

Yours sincerely,

Cesar Hawthorne Binag
Officer-in-Charge, UNPOL
United Nations Mission in Liberia

Mr. Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae
School of Public Policy and Administration
Walden University

UNMIL HQ, Pan African Plaza, Tubman Boulevard, Monrovia, Liberia
Tel. 1-212-963-9926/7 or 231-6-566-566
Fax: 1-212-963-9924 or 231-6-566-566, ext. 4231
www.unmil.org

Federation of Liberian Youth (FLY)

Samuel K. Doe Sports Complex
P. O. Box 10-2128, Paynesville City, Liberia
Cell #: 0886-537-175
Email: info@flyliberia.org/www.flyliberia.org

(Office of the Administrator)

August 23, 2013

Mr. Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae
School of Public Policy and Administration
Walden University

Dear Mr. Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae:

Based on my review of your research request, I give consent to serve as your Community Partner as you conduct your research study entitled:

"The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police: Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications"

FLY's cooperation as your Community Partner is limited to our permission to use our offices to:

a. Post your recruitment letter on our Bulletin Board; and
b. Use our conference room and offices to administer your interviews on scheduled date and time.

I understand that participation of interested individuals in our organization is voluntary and at their own discretion. We reserve the right to withdraw from the study at time if our circumstances change.

I confirm that I am authorized to approve research in this setting.

I understand that the data collected will remain entirely confidential and may not be provided to anyone outside of the research team without permission from the Walden University's Institutional Review Board.

Sincerely yours,

Ms Daintowon Domah Pay-bayee
Deputy Secretary General for Administration

Coordinating Youth and Students Activities in Liberia

University of Liberia

P. O. Box 9020
Monrovia, Liberia
West - Africa

**OFFICE OF THE VICE
PRESIDENT FOR ADMINISTRATION**

August 26, 2013

Mr. Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae
School of Public Policy and Public Administration
Walden University, USA

Dear Mr. Weh-Dorliae:

Compliments from the Administration of the University of Liberia.

This is in acknowledgement of receipt of your letter requesting the use of the University of Liberia auditorium for the conduct of a research study of the Police Training provided by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) under the title **"THE UNITED NATIONS TRAINING OF THE NATIONAL POLICE; EFFECTIVENESS, RESULTS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS"** in partial fulfillment of requirements for your Doctoral Program/Studies dated August 12, 2013.

In view of the aforementioned and with the consent of the Vice President for Administration Prof. D. Ansu Sonii, Sr., this communication is in affirmative to your request. Please as per your request contact the above office to arrange a date preferred.

Kind regards and best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Ignatius D. Kunmeh
Administrative Assistant
Office of the Vice President for Administration/UL

Emmett A. Dennis PhD.
President/UL

Wede Elliott-Brownell PhD.
Vice President for Academic Affairs & Provost/UL

File

IREDD

Institute for Research and Democratic Development

P.O. Box 1959, 1000, Monrovia, 10
111 Randall Street, 1st Floor American Dry Cleaning Building
Monrovia, Liberia

August 22, 2013

Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae
School of Public Policy and Administration
WALDEN UNIVERSITY

Dear Mr. Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae:

We have reviewed your research request for cooperation to serve as your Community Partner in the conduct of your research study entitled:

"The United Nations Training of the Liberian National Police: Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications"

Please note that the Liberia Democratic Institute has been reorganized into the Institute for Research and Democratic Development (IREDD). IREDD's cooperation as your Community Partner is limited to our permission to use our offices to post your recruitment letter on our bulletin board; and to use our offices to conduct interviews with participants on a scheduled date and time.

I understand that participation of interested individuals in our organization is voluntary and at their own discretion. We reserve the right to withdraw from the study at any time if our circumstances change.

I confirm that I am authorized to approve research in this setting.

I understand that the data collected will remain entirely confidential and may not be provided to anyone outside of the research team without permission from the Walden University's Institutional Review Board.

Sincerely Yours,

Harold M. Aidoo
Act. Executive Director

National Civil Society Council of Liberia

Mission House
Capitol Bye-pass
Capitol Hill, Monrovia, Liberia

Email: cordin05@yahoo.com/fraquel62@yahoo.com   Mobile: 0886-518724/0886-516996/0886-558981
/ncscliberia@gmail.com/ chriswlehtoe@ncscliberia.org
Website: ncscliberia.org.

Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae
School of Public Policy and Administration
Walden University
Local Cell #: 0886-951-263

Dear Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae

The National Civil Society Council of Liberia (NCSCL) present compliments and would like to inform that we give our consent to you to conduct your research entitled:

"The United Nations Training of the Liberian National Police: Effectiveness, Results and Future Implementations".

This letter permits you to post your recruitment letter on our bulletin board to invite potential participants for your research. We also permit you to use our conference room to administer your interview on a scheduled date and time that will be convenient to our organization.

We understand that participation of interested members of the Council is voluntary and at their own discretion. We reserve the right to withdraw from the study at any time if the circumstances change.

I confirm that in consultation with our secretariat I have authorized and approved your research in this setting.

I understand that the data collected will remain entirely confidential and may not be provided to anyone outside of the research team without permission from the Walden University IRB.

Sincerely yours

Frances R. Deigh Greaves
National Chairperson
NATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY COUNCIL OF LIBERIA

Curriculum Vitae

Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae   **Monrovia, Liberia**

PROFILE

Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae is a career civil servant. He is a public sector human resources management professional with more than twenty-five years of proven managerial experience in providing executive leadership, planning, program development, project coordination, compensation, and staff development. He is a highly analytical generalist who possesses a wide range of skills in public sector reform and socio-economic development administration. He consistently initiates action and accepts responsibility in exercising professional judgment with integrity; maintains outstanding relationship with people and is committed to furthering the success of team members. As author and newspaper columnist, Weh-Dorliae has written extensively on public service reform, decentralization and democratic governance in Liberia.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

GOVERNANCE COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA
Commissioner, Political & Legal Reforms/Decentralization, November, 2007 – Present:
Responsible at full performance level, for performing a variety of rotational assignments thinking and developing concepts and ideas to strengthen policy development in political and legal reform programs; provide policy guidance in the implementation of a system of decentralized participatory governance in Liberia; collaborate with ministries and agencies of the Government, United Nations organizations, local and international non-governmental organizations, civil society and the citizenry at large and lead public policy development under the Commission's Political and Legal Reforms mandate area.

PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
Personnel Analyst, Hiring Services Division, November 9, 1998 – March, 2007:
Responsible, at full performance level, for performing public personnel work proficiently in all areas including job design, assessment and compensation; managing projects involving development and implementation of hiring process procedures, policies and regulations; collaborating with City administrators, union officials, employees and the public to facilitate resolution of hiring issues; Interpreting and applying civil service regulations, laws, policies, standards, and procedures; mentoring and training others including new employees.

CIVIL SERVICE AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA
Senior Staff Analyst, Selections Division January 1980 – August 1981
Developed and supervised administration of written examinations. Responsible for test development and security of all examination materials; Conducted job analysis and position classification surveys along with colleagues, and coordinating the Agency's public relations activities and participating in interagency projects, seminars, and conferences.

CIVIL SERVICE AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA
Research Associate, Selections Division January 1977 – January 1978
Performed rotational assignments in human resources research support work; provided general administrative support in all aspects of human resource development work; assisted analysts in conducting job analysis and position classification surveys; work with analysts to ensure employment procedures are followed, and perform rotational personnel development work assignments.

UNIVERSITY OF LIBERIA, GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA
Lecturer, (part time) College of Business and Public Administration, 1981 – 1985/1992 – 1995:
Taught junior and senior levels courses in Public Personnel Administration,
Public Enterprise Organization and Management, Government Planning and
Rural Development.

TIALA LAW ASSOCIATES, INC. MONROVIA, LIBERIA
Attorney-At-Law, 1995 -1996
Achievements:
Served as legal counsel and provided advisory services to party litigants; evaluated clients' complaints, reviewed case related documents and records and conducted research to determine applicable laws. Prepared briefs, responses to motions and represented clients at trials and hearings; conducted legal research and discovery work in association with pending cases; interacted with court personnel and officials in association with clients' cases.

MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT, GOVRNMENT OF LIBERIA
Deputy Minister for Administration, 1991 – 1995
Provided executive leadership in implementation of the national laws, regulations and policies governing the transportation sector; direct the provision of administrative services through supervision of line functions for effective operations in the provision of services to the public; determined, analyzed, and resolved administrative problems in ensuring that functions meet the needs of the public; established effective working relationships with employees and associates; collaborated with officials of other ministries and agencies, and representatives of non-governmental and international organizations in pursuing specific and general the general objectives of the Ministry.

FIVE STAR PARKING, INC., PHILADELPHIA, PA (USA)
Field Manager, 1988 – 1991
Supervised operations of assigned parking garages and lots; participated in decisions relating to policy changes governing the operations and maintenance of facilities; collected revenues generated (in daily excess of $5,000.00) from cashiers and lot attendants; prepared daily and monthly financial reports; recruited and trained cashiers and parking lot attendants; maintained effective customer relations with clients and the general public

UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION/LIBERIA
Logistics Administrator, 1985 – 1986
Performed inventory and procurement operations administration work; worked with staff to resolve problems and monitored provision of services, equipment and supplies in accordance with established guidelines; interacted with local vendors, contractors and government officials in coordinating services on behalf of the Mission.

PARKER INDUSTRIES, INC. GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA
Managing Director, 1981 – 1983
Responsible to direct provision of administrative services necessary for managing the operations of the corporation such as management of personnel, maintenance of facility, budget preparation, and procurement of raw materials for production; responsible to analyze and ascertain the financial status of the corporation, set overall goals and priorities, and direct implementation of solutions to problems and issues; direct fiscal management and technical operations of corporation through subordinate managers and supervisors.

EDUCATION

Bachelor of Laws, Louise Arthur Grimes School of Law, University of Liberia   December 1985

Master of Public Administration, California State University, Sacramento   January 1980

Master of Arts, (International Affairs) California State University, Sacramento   May 1980

Bachelor of Arts, (Economics) University of Liberia   December 1976

RESEARCH

Weh-Dorliae, Y. (2009). *Liberia, we are alike, we are one! My reading Lesson for Peace*. Philadelphia: Bushfire Ventures.

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MEMBERSHIP

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Mrs. Heather McCaffrey
Hiring Services Team Manager
City of Philadelphia Human Resources Department
(215) 686-2375

Dr. Amos C. Sawyer
Chairman
Governance Commission
Monrovia, Liberia
www.goodgovernance.org.lr