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# Relationships Between Political Competition and Socioeconomic Status in the United States

Trevor K. Smith  
*Walden University*

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# Walden University

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

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Review Committee

Dr. Ross Alexander, Committee Chairperson,  
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

Dr. Mark Stallo, Committee Member,  
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

Dr. William Benet, University Reviewer,  
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

Chief Academic Officer

Eric Riedel, Ph.D.

Walden University  
2012

Abstract

Relationships Between Political Competition and Socioeconomic Status in the United

States

by

Trevor K Smith

MA, Webster University, 2009

BS, Pfeiffer University, 2004

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

November 2012

## Abstract

Over the past 30 years there has been an increase in socioeconomic inequities between Black and White persons in the United States. Some research suggests that political ideology, which in turn impacts political competition levels, may at least partially explain these disparities, though the body of academic literature in this area is sparse. Little is known about how Black political ideology is formed by perceptions of inequality. The purpose of this study was to examine the phenomenon of Black political ideology, political competition, and socioeconomic status to determine how political competition relates to social inequities between Blacks and Whites. The theoretical framework of the study was Lockean social contract theory. The overarching question guiding this study explored how competition could better defend natural rights to reduce social disparities and the obligations of government to equally protect, similarly to the protections of government historically extended to Whites. Multiple and multivariate regression models were developed using data from the 2010 General Social Survey, the 2010 American Community Survey, and the presidential election results of 2008. Results showed no significant relationship between Black beliefs of inequality with Black political ideology and that high political competition rates might contribute to the increasing Black/White socioeconomic gaps. Contrary to economic competition models developed through Locke's social contract, there was no evidence that political competition reduces socioeconomic inequities between Blacks and Whites. The implications for positive social change include education of policy makers that higher political competition rates in their states contribute to lower socioeconomic outcomes for Blacks.



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## Dedication

Above all else, I would like to dedicate this paper to a loving God who has led me on this journey throughout my entire life. Along that journey, I was blessed to marry the most loving and patient woman who has supported me throughout this entire endeavor. Cheri, I could not have done this without you. I owe you the world and cannot wait to give it to you. I would also like to dedicate this to my parents, Kirk and Betty-Jo, who always encouraged, challenged me, and never let me settle. My sisters have been an inspiration to me in my life; this paper is for you as well. Finally, this paper is also for every teacher, coach, and political mentor who constantly challenged my ability and helped make me a more complete person.



## Acknowledgments

I would first like to thank my Chairman, Dr. Ross Alexander, for all of the long hours that we have put into this paper; without your guidance and leadership, I would not have gotten through this process. I would also like to thank my committee member, Dr. Mark Stallo, for helping me understand what resources I had at my disposal and how to apply them. Also, I would like to thank my other committee member, Dr. William Benet; your detailed examination and suggestions for each of my submissions has forced me to think extremely critically about a serious social issue...thank you. Additionally, I would like to personally thank my high school advisor who told my father and me that I would never amount to more than a community college education...thanks for the extra motivation.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

### **Background of the Study**

Generally, Black voters are a homogenous voting bloc (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). Since the late 1960s, Blacks have largely supported liberal, Democratic candidates and have not given scholars reason to examine their voting behavior (Kidd, Diggs, Farooq, & Murray, 2007). However, about only one in six Black voters now identify as liberal, whereas in the early 1970s, about 40% identified with that political ideology (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). Hajnal and Lee found that unemployed Blacks are 16% more likely to support Republican candidates over Democratic candidates.

Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2010) and Ghosh (2010) found that political competition related positively to economic growth in a state. In this study, I attempted to understand what the relationships of political competition might be with socioeconomic status for Blacks in the United States. I found evidence that suggested that higher levels of political competition have a negative relationship with annual household incomes for Blacks.

Although Blacks have made socioeconomic progress in the U.S., specifically in the growth of the Black middle class (Marsh, Darity, Cohen, Casper, & Salters, 2007), Black-White gaps exist today (Hunt, 2007). There are many variations of individualistic and structuralist explanations as to why socioeconomic gaps exist between Blacks and Whites (Hunt, 2007). Black families living in poverty have decreased “from 34% in 1967 to 21% in 2001” (Attewell, Lavin, Domina, & Levey, 2004, p. 7). However, Blacks



faced obstacles to the accumulation of wealth and increasing their socioeconomic status (SES) as compared to Whites (Hardaway & McLoyd, 2009).

Prior to industry's decline, Blacks secured many of the blue-collar, manufacturing jobs (Sites & Parks, 2011). When recession occurs, Blacks seem to suffer the most economic setbacks as they rely on the manufacturing jobs that may be the first to be eliminated (Sites & Parks, 2011). Efforts to infuse communities with monies, such as venture capital, have higher returns than that of traditional investments; but, there are obstacles hampering these types of investments (Rubin, 2010).

Certain historical federal attempts to address structural issues, such as the Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC; 1941) contributed little to the opening of defense related jobs for Blacks (Sites & Parks, 2011). Additionally, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA; 1977) encouraged private investment into minority communities until the act was weakened in 2005 (Rubin, 2010). The state promotion of minority business enterprises (MBEs), are government programs intended to secure success, but might actually inhibit growth once the organization has grown to large (Bates, 2009). However, MBEs have the potential to help create jobs in poor, minority communities (Bates, 2009).

There are differences in educational achievement in urban and rural schools (Lee, 2002; Lee & Friedrich, 2007; Lewis, James, Hancock, & Hill-Jackson, 2008; Strayhorn, 2009). One attempt at educational reform known as Smaller Learning Communities (SLCs) has potential to improve educational outcomes (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). However, there was an inverse relationship based on race; White students had positive

correlations and Black students had negative correlations with the program (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). While, some low-income Black students recognize the importance of education, others may perceive opportunity for postsecondary education to be little or nonexistent (Payne, 2008). SES plays a role in determining educational aspirations in that the higher a student's SES, the higher their educational aspirations (Strayhorn, 2009).

An aspect of the overall, structural explanation of the Black/White SES gap involves the housing market (Hunt, 2007). In order to understand this, I reviewed the perceptions of discrimination and experiences of discrimination in the housing market. Programs meant to create more equal conditions for upward mobility such as the Gautreaux program from 1976 to 1998 and the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) beginning in 1994 have had success insofar as upward mobility, but the researchers have concluded that many of those who received vouchers from the program moved to areas with slightly lower poverty levels than the neighborhoods they left (Wilson, 2010).

Changes in overall SES have resulted in positive change. Blacks have made SES progress in that Black families living in poverty decreased by 13% from 1967 to 2001 (Attewell et al., 2004) and have had growth in the middle class (Marsh et al., 2007). However, substantial Black/White SES gaps still exist (Hunt, 2007), representing a social problem.

Political party affiliation can be related to perception. Republican efforts to mobilize members of Black communities in conjunction with social and moral issues have failed. The Republican Party is perceived, by many in Black communities, as the

party for Whites, while the Democratic Party is considered the more inclusive party (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008).

Lewis (2000) pointed out that Black conservatism is difficult to define; but, it can be generalized. That is, Black conservatives believe in individual achievement, capitalism, high moral standards, and a focus on accomplishments rather than obstacles (Lewis, 2000). A majority of Blacks have a strong religious commitment and their religious beliefs are more traditional than most other races (Mangum, 2008). This religious commitment is categorized as Black religious conservatism, as they have similar views as White conservatives on issues like abortion, homosexuality, and the role of faith in public (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008, p. 180). However, many Black religious conservative voters remain committed to the Democratic Party (Mangum, 2008).

Since the 1960s, Blacks have supported Democratic public officials (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). However, Black voters are not as homogenous as popularly advertised (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). Hajnal and Lee pointed out that these voters do not fit necessarily onto the traditional linear scale because their decisions in voting might be more complicated than most.

Historically, Blacks have maintained a more structuralist explanation of inequality compared to Whites, who have had a more individualistic explanation (Taylor & Merino, 2011). Individualism rests on the concept that all people have the following inalienable rights: life and liberty, the sanctities of private property, and freedom to dissent (Asumah & Perkins, 2000, p. 53). Structuralism attributes historical or institutional causes to lack of achievement (Kluegel, 1990, p. 512). Blacks and Whites continue to have differences

insofar as structuralist explanations but have been coming closer in individualism beliefs (Taylor & Merino, 2011).

Black Americans continue to have traditional, conservative beliefs when it comes to social and moral issues; yet, the connection between conservative messages and Blacks continues to remain weak (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008). This connection is likely weak because of a Republican opposition to policies regarding crime, school funding, and a other issues. These Republican views have resulted in the party being viewed as insensitive to the needs and circumstances of minority communities (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008, p. 189). It is likely that the party viewed to work hardest for Black interests will receive political support from Black voters (Hajnal & Lee, 2007).

There is a knowledge gap between political ideology and political competition as it relates to socioeconomic status for Blacks. Researchers have found a positive relationship with political competition and economic growth (Besley et al., 2010; Ghosh, 2010). In this study, I examined what relationships political competition has with SES for Blacks as compared to Whites. There is a more detailed discussion in Chapter 2.

### **Problem Statement**

Political competition offers the potential for solving some structural issues associated with the consistent Black-White socioeconomic gaps that continue to be a hindrance to Black progress. To address the obstructions to Black progress, I examined political ideology as it relates to certain determinants, specifically SES benefits. Jacobs (1982) pointed out that there are two political determinants related to income inequality, first, that political competition should lead to benefits for the have-nots, and second,

higher political participation and mobilization leads to more influence in political decisions. I focused on the aspects of political ideology related to political competition.

Researchers have addressed the voting habits of the general population; but, research on Black voting habits is lacking (Kidd et al., 2007). Hajnal and Lee (2007) found that Blacks did not sit on the traditional, political linear scale and “a multi-dimensional, unordered model more accurately depicts their partisan choices” (p. 36). Additionally, Kidd et al. (2007) found that Black religious conservatism could affect vote choice; but, identifying with the Democratic Party has a lot of influence for Black voters. Kidd et al. also found that the policy positions of Republicans are viewed with suspicion by Black voters. This suspicion of Republican policy positions is primarily rooted in the interpretation by many Black voters that they are detrimental to Black interests (Kidd et al., 2007).

Besley et al., (2010) found a correlation between higher political competition and stronger economic growth. Policy changes resulting from political competition have been associated with higher per capital growth rates (Besley et al., 2010, p. 1348). Ghosh (2010) confirmed this finding by studying electoral competition and economic growth in India.

### **Purpose of the Study**

Structural components affecting Black voting ideology and the resulting lack of political competition should be addressed. The purpose of this quantitative study was to understand how structural components predict political ideology. Further, I addressed

how differing political competition levels per state predicted components of SES Black/White gaps.

### **Research Questions and Hypotheses**

1. Do structural components and discrimination predict Black political ideology?

$H_01$ : The higher the perception that discrimination and structural components as causes of the identified gaps, the less likely the respondent will identify as liberal.

$H_A1$ : The higher the perception that discrimination and structural components as causes of the identified gaps, the more likely the respondent will identify as liberal.

2. Does higher political competition predict certain indicators of higher socioeconomic status?

$H_02$ : The higher political competition is in a state, the less likely household income and education for Blacks will be in higher brackets.

$H_A2$ : The higher political competition is in a state, the more likely household income and education for Blacks will be in higher brackets.

### **Nature of the Study**

In this study, I used secondary data collected from the General Social Survey (GSS) of 2010 to address the first research question. The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) collected 2,044 completed cases, a cross-section, from an original sample of 4,093 in 2010 by using a full probability sample (Smith, Marsden, Hout, & Kim, 2011). This sampling design gives an equal probability for each household in the United States to be included in the sample (Smith et al., 2011).

Hunt (2007) indicated that structuralist explanations for inequality from the GSS are discrimination (RACDIF1) and chance for education (RACDIF3). These two variables were again included in the 2010 GSS and were independent variables for this regression. The dependent variable was the traditional liberal-conservative self-identification scale (POLVIEWS).

For the second research question, I addressed how political competition per state might predict certain socioeconomic Black/White differences. Political competition was the independent variable and Black household income and educational attainment were the dependent variables. To measure political competition per state, I used the percentage of votes cast for the current governor of each state. Pacheco (2008) created a measure for political competition based on votes cast in in a single presidential election. The measure is operationally defined as Political Competition =  $100 - (\text{absolute value } \% \text{ Democratic Vote} - 50)$ . High values represent states with a high measure of political competition and low values represent no competition (Pacheco, 2008). Like Pacheco, I rescaled the measure to range from 0 to 1.

To measure SES, I used data collected from the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) based on two measures for socioeconomic status: income and education. These data were collected for two races identified by the ACS: Black or African American alone and White alone. For Black household income per state, I broke down household income into four brackets. I also broke down the educational attainment measurement into four brackets. I did the same for those that identified as White alone for each socioeconomic measure. These data were found in already published tables

through the American Fact Finder on the U.S. Census Bureau's website. The estimates of the population by the ACS measure the sampling error with either 90 % margins of error or different confidence intervals (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). The margins of error or confidence levels are all based on the amount sampled from the population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). There is a more detailed discussion of the analysis and methods in Chapter 3.

### **Theoretical Base**

Social contract theory involves three different schools: negative rights, positive rights, and the liberal/interest based approach (Hickey, 2011). Hickey noted that one of the primary goals for each of these social contract theories is for social protection and justice; but, the difference is in their approach. Additionally, the social contract theories have all attempted to describe the relationship between a government, communities, and citizens (Hickey, 2011).

In this study, I used the Lockean social contract theory which came from the *Second Treatise of Government* published in 1689. The Lockean social contract approach is considered negative, and relates to the natural rights that each individual has (Hickey, 2011). According to Hickey, key policy decisions come from a combination of market, community, and public-private partnerships which are meant to contribute to the public good.

A central component of Lockean social contract theory is the protection of property and the unequal distribution of it (Guest, 1992). The promotion of justice is based on the value of labor and the government's responsibility to protect that labor



(Guest, 1992). This is meant to create a competitive market meant to create more productivity and essentially, greater living standards for all (Guest, 1992). Thus, for Locke, the role of the government is to encourage a competitive market (Guest, 1992).

If Lockean social contract theory is meant to encourage economic growth through economic competition, this same approach may be applied to electoral politics. Besley et al., (2010) found that there is a positive relationship between interparty competition and statewide economic growth. These findings were later confirmed by Ghosh (2010).

For Locke (1996), the social contract evolved from the state of nature where humans are equal at birth and in a state of perfect freedom to one where political authority is given to a chosen legislature through consent. Power and authority was natural and equal for all individuals in the state of nature (Locke, 1996). The natural state of war, which pits one person against another without an intermediary, will be fully described in the literature review, created complications as an individual can inflict his or her own justice in the defense of personal property; personal property that was created by his or her own labor (Locke, 1996). Consent is an aspect of the social contract and the power an individual naturally has was given over to a legislature in order to become an impartial magistrate for the defense of property (Locke, 1996).

The purpose of the legislature was to preserve the life, liberty, and property of the individual (Locke, 1996). Locke provided four distinct components of the social contract that has been made with the legislature: to have the same rules for everyone, laws are to be designed for the common good, taxes must not be raised without consent, and power must not be transferred to another body without the consent of the people.

However, this contract can be reprieved or violated when those in charge overstep the bounds of their authority, and thus breaks the contract. The authority then becomes a tyrant, with behavior akin to a pirate (Crookston, 2009, p. 118). This authority can be taken away when the individual in power reduces the people into slavery or uses such components of arbitrary power such as force, treasure, or the institutions in society to maintain this power (Locke, 1996). In the Lockean social contract, the legislature is meant to protect individualism, the individual then gives up their own natural authority through consent, separation of power, government impartiality, and the removal of the legislature if power is used arbitrarily.

The contract between individual citizens, communities, and their representatives is meant to create an environment for individuals and communities to prosper (Guest, 1992). McGrath (2011) stated that a lack of electoral competition “frees legislators to behave in ways that may eschew the interests of their constituents in favor of self-interest, thereby decreasing the likelihood that public policy reflects the will of the people” (p. 616). Additionally, electoral competition created an environment where representatives will be more responsive to those they represent (McGrath, 2011). Political competition can create an environment of economic growth, similar to economic competition (Besley et al., 2010). The Lockean social contract theory provided political competition and a renewed commitment to the relationship of individual citizens, communities, and their representatives to provide economic growth in Black communities.

### **Definition of Terms**

*Black conservatism:* Black beliefs that are focused on accomplishments of the individual, capitalism, and high moral standards (Lewis, 2000).

*Black religious conservatism:* Religious commitment and conservative beliefs on faith, abortion, and homosexuality (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008).

*Individualism:* The concept that all citizens have inalienable rights to life, liberty, protection of property, and dissent (Asumah & Perkins, 2000).

*Minority business enterprise:* A business that is 51% owned by an individual defined as a racial minority (Ndofor & Priem, 2011).

*Political competition:* Political Competition =  $100 - (\text{absolute value } [ \% \text{ Democratic Vote} - 50 ])$ . Here, high values represent an equal split between the major parties and low values represent weak competition (Pacheco, 2008).

*Socioeconomic status (SES):* I used two dimensions of SES: household income per year and educational attainment (Iceland, Sharpe, & Steinmetz, 2003).

*Structural components:* Societal components such as jobs, education, housing, and income (Hunt, 2007).

*Structuralist explanations:* When a lack of achievement is attributed to historical or institutional causes (Kluegel, 1990).

### **Assumptions**

It is assumed that there is a link between political ideology for Blacks and a lack of political competition in areas where the population is considered to be a Black majority. It is also assumed that although both research questions include different

samples for data collection, the populations are similar and accurately represented the overall Black population. Additionally, it is assumed that statewide political competition levels for a presidential election represented the overall competition levels in the state.

### **Limitations**

Weaknesses of this study include the predictions of ideology. As noted in the literature review, there are multiple predictors of political ideology for Blacks and Black voters do not necessarily sit on the traditional ideological scale. Additionally, it is a limitation to assume that the only predictors necessary for ideology are explanations of inequality as political ideology is much more in-depth. There are many more reasons why income and education may vary from state to state such as geography (Holcomb & Lacombe, 2004).

### **Delimitations**

In this study, I did not test the relationship of voters and their representatives. I focused on the results of the relationship of political competition and SES. Political ideology may have resulted in a lack of political competition. States that lacked high levels of political competition may have weaker economic viability.

### **Significance of the Study**

Professionally, politicians and public servants may be able to use the ideas presented in this paper to begin to find alternative ways in addressing the Black/White SES gap. I hope it will help leaders and scholars recognize the importance of interparty competition and its economic benefits. That is, I hope to influence policies and practices

of electoral redistricting to give each political party equal access to their perspective bases in equal distributive measures.

The positive social change that can result from this study comes from the belief that individuals and communities can work better together to solve problems if given the opportunity. This study can lead to positive social change by helping policy makers look further into the importance of competition within the political system. This may help create conditions for individuals and communities to prosper.

### **Summary and Transition**

Although there has been a growth of the Black middle class over the last 40 years, Blacks face structural barriers to the accumulation of wealth as compared to Whites. The purpose of this quantitative, cross-sectional study was to examine how structural components relate to Black political ideology and how political competition related to socioeconomic status. Structural components continue to be related to Black-White socioeconomic gaps. Secondary data were used to address the research questions. Results may influence policies and practices of electoral redistricting.

Chapter 2 is a review of the literature and Chapter 3 is an explanation of the methods. Chapter 4 includes the results of the study. Chapter 5 includes my conclusions and recommendations for further study.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

Voting behavior of the general populace is well understood; however, few researchers have addressed Black voting behavior (Kidd et al., 2007). Researchers have suggested that a more accurate depiction of Black voting behavior is a multidimensional model rather than the traditional, linear model (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). That is, “race remains the central factor in black partisan decision making. How African Americans view American society and the degree to which America they think their own well being is tied to the fate of the larger black community” (Hajnal & Lee, 2007, p. 35). However, not all Black voters support the Democratic Party; rather, Black voters are more likely to support the party that works harder for Black interests (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). Republican policy positions may be viewed skeptically by some Black voters as these policies may be deemed harmful to Blacks as a group (Kidd et al. 2007). Furthermore, identifying with the Democratic Party is likely rooted in religious conservatism and guidance (Mangum, 2008).

In this literature review, I examined multiple structural components that may hinder Black progress: these components relate to jobs, education, housing, and income (Hunt, 2007). Sociologists have found that social structure is related to income inequality (Sorenson, 1996). To address these components, I examined political ideology as it related to certain determinants such as social structure. The positive and negative relationships of structural components on Black voting ideology need to be addressed. The purpose of this study was to understand how structural components related to Black

political ideology and if political competition has a positive relationship with socioeconomic status for Blacks.

The following literature was collected using multiple search terms and the following databases: Political Science: A Sage Full-Text Collection, EBSCO Host, Political Science Complete, EBSCO Host, Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, Thoreau, SocINDEX with Full Text, and Google Scholar. I used a variety of terms such as *Black conservatism* and *Black conservatives*, *African American conservatism* and *African American conservatives*, *racial equity*, *conservative racism*, and *Republican racism*. Ultimately, my literature search lead to researching *socioeconomic status gaps* between the Black and White communities and *political competition*. The time parameter of my literature review was over the past 30 years. This chapter is divided into five sections: the history of the Black vote; Lockean social contract theory; structural components and hindrances of growth; Republicans, Black conservatism, and Black religious conservatism; and voting habits, ideology, and connections of economic growth as a result of political competition.

### **History of the Black Vote**

A short description of the history of the Black vote, the changing patterns, and antebellum United States is necessary to better understand the current electoral paradigm. Since 1964 with Goldwater's nomination, Republicans have been perceived to have ignored the Black and other urban ethnics vote, writing them off as a probable electorate (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999). The year 1964 marked the end of the demographic shift from a majority Republican support to a majority Democratic support from Black voters

as the 36 year, Democratic strategy to bring together the urban electorate and the solid south, which began in 1928 with the nomination of a Catholic, appeared to come to fruition (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999). This strategy is popularly known as the New Deal coalition (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999). In 1964, Republicans largely gave up on their battle for racial equality, which began with the formation of the party, and started concentrating their efforts on disaffected White southerners (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999). In 1964, the Republican Party's presidential nomination was for Barry Goldwater, who called for ignoring urban voters. This marked the beginnings of the Republican southern strategy (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999).

The New Deal coalition or realignment began in 1928 as the Democrats nominated Al Smith for president, a Catholic who opposed the Ku Klux Klan (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999). This New Deal coalition, largely credited to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, organized the solid south with ethnic and urban minorities in the north (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999). The solid south is a term used to describe the overall southern U.S. region that was solidly Democratic (Hayes & McKee, 2008; Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999).

Prior to this realignment, the Republican Party was given almost complete loyalty by Black voters (Harrison, 2002). Black voters were often disenfranchised by conservative Democrats in the solid south, which, in the first 30 years of the 20th century, was still largely comprised of conservative Democrats who had a solid majority and no competition in electoral politics (Grynaviski, 2004).



Over the last 40 years, the solid south of old has transformed giving the Republican Party national strength (Hayes & McKee, 2007). The new south is not just Republican; it has intermittent Democratic strongholds made up of mainly urban, Black voters, but national Republican strength as well (Knuckey, 2006). As late as 1950, only 20% of the southern electorate identified as Republican as compared to 2002, where half of the voters were Republican (Hayes & McKee, 2007). This migration to the Republican Party was largely made up of White voters (Hayes & McKee, 2007). In 1990, Republicans held only 17% of statewide offices; but, in 2006, they held 53% of those offices. The primary reason for this shift can be traced to the Civil Rights Acts of the mid 1960s where national nominees took favorable positions, either for or against the Civil Rights Acts (Hayes & McKee, 2007). As the national nominees for each of the two major parties chose a position of the legislation, voting behavior eventually followed (Hayes & McKee, 2007).

The New Deal helped create a coalition of the solid south and urban voters in the north (Sauerzopf & Swanstrom, 1999). Pruitt (2005) noted, “the inadequate and overburdened local relief agencies got needed assistance from President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, which alleviated economic distress for some Black Americans and sealed the political migration of Blacks into the Democratic Party in the 1930s” (p. 462). The New Deal also played a role in the migration of Blacks from the Republican Party (Pruitt, 2005).

### **Lockean Social Contract Theory**

According to Locke (1996), power is ultimately derived from parental jurisdiction and the private domain; that is, power is derived from individual control. There are multiple levels of power from the magistrate over a subject to the lord over slave. By describing the multiple levels of power, Locke described the origins of government, which is solely in place “only for the public good” (Locke, 1996, p. 312). To describe the origins of government, Locke attempted to examine civil society.

According to Locke (1996), the state of nature is a state where men and women are equal at birth and in a state of perfect freedom. In this state, men and women do not rely on another, power and jurisdiction are reciprocal, and no human has greater power than another (Locke, 1996). When Locke referred to power and a state of perfect freedom, he was referring only to property owners as he justified slavery later in the text. Locke stated, “But there is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters” (p. 336). Locke was coming from the perspective of property owners who agree to a social contract.

Locke (1996) described a perfect harmony, liberty, or freedom in the state of nature; men and women who are created from God do not have the authority to destroy themselves, their possessions, or one another. However, an individual does have the authority to destroy or harm another if that individual is attempting to preserve him or herself. By doing so, the individual is actually preserving the rest of humankind by ridding it of persons who ignore the rules in the law of nature (Locke, 1996, p. 313).

Here, men and women not only have the authority but the obligation to punish transgressors of the natural law so that future violations might be deterred (Locke, 1996).

In the state of nature, Locke (1996) established two essential rights in the law of nature: to punish a crime for deterrence and to seek reparations for the harm done. Because of these two essential rights, Locke attempted to justify the need for a proper judicial system. In the state of nature, each individual has his or her own executive power, but stated that a person cannot be a judge in their own case because self-love results in being partial to themselves and to their friends (p. 315). Locke questioned the current state of governance or the monarchy, arguing that the state of nature might actually be better than subjecting individuals to a monarch's mistakes or passions.

By describing the state of nature, a state of perfect freedom and liberty, Locke (1996) established where men and women were prior to society. Each individual was left to defend what was his or hers. If an individual made an attempt on another's life or possessions, Locke argued that the individual then puts himself or herself into a state of war with another. An individual then has the natural right to defend himself or herself against his or her aggressor (Locke, 1996). Locke was pointing out that when one man or woman is taken under absolute or arbitrary power of another without consent, then that man or woman is violating natural law.

If an individual is taking another's power, he or she is declaring war on the other (Locke, 1996). Locke believed that the person has the right to defend him or herself from this aggression. Locke asserted that rebellion against an abusive use of arbitrary power as legitimate as this rebellion is authorized from heaven.

The state of war is one of the reasons men and women place themselves into society, either through consent or contract (Locke, 1996). Although slavery was discussed, Locke referred to the natural liberty of property owners, that unless consented too, a legislature has no authority. This is derived from the state of war where a man or woman consents to be ruled to avoid the issues in the state of nature. The state of war and slavery cease to exist when an agreement is made to limit an individual's power in exchange for obedience, as long as this agreement endures.

Locke (1996) contended that the Earth was given to human beings "for the support and comfort of their being" (p. 319). All that exists on earth was given from God to humankind in common. However, if the Earth was given to humankind in common, Locke asserted, that there must be a way to make the best use of its fruits and resources to be beneficial. Each person has only the natural right to property in himself or herself. Mixing the natural right of property and labor with nature an individual makes what is everyone's property his or hers.

According to Locke (1996), this is where property ownership begins. The right to property ownership is derived from the law of nature. Locke argued that cultivating property is more beneficial for all of humankind than the uncultivated land. The value of what is tilled on that land creates the need for money and this established the value of property by the labor that is placed on it (Locke, 1996).

According to Locke (1996), power is derived from the individual; but, a human is a creature that needs to be a part of society. Money is what drives an individual from the state of war to civil trade in society (Locke, 1996). Locke described multiple types of

society that fall short of political society such as conjugal society, society between parents and children, and society between master and servant. Since these societies differ from political society, Locke wanted to define where exactly political society exists. Locke contended that, in political societies, the sole purpose is to preserve property and punish offenses against natural law. By relinquishing one's own executive power as described in the law of nature to the public, a person is entering into a contract with society.

A person gives up some of his or her own natural authority when he or she enters into a social contract, and he or she does this for the protection of society (Locke, 1996). Naturally, a human is free, equal, and independent; therefore, a person cannot be exposed to a political power without his or her consent (Locke, 1996). An individual is then obliged to that society, particularly the rule of the majority (Locke, 1996). Locke pointed out that in some American empires, society weakened the strength of the ruler by separating the powers into different hands. Locke discussed how society continues from one generation to the next, by tacit agreement. In taking the property given to the next generation and using the products of society, men and women agree to the social contract agreed to by their parents.

A person enters into the social contract, putting themselves under the rule of government for the preservation of their property (Locke, 1996). It is because of prosperity that results from the preservation of property that a person agrees to the social contract (Locke, 1996). Herein, they give up some liberty and power that they had in the

state of nature to society for the good of society, because the good of society helps oneself (Locke, 1996).

Since the legislature is established by consent, Locke (1996) pointed out the extent of its power. The legislature cannot make laws without consent of the governed as the legislature receives its authority from the consent. This power cannot be arbitrary; that is, it cannot be unrestrained, subjective, or convenient. In the state of nature, no one has arbitrary power over life, liberty, and property of another, but the purpose of the legislature is to preserve this power. A component of the social contract deals with preservation of power and the legislative power to make preservation happen. Locke described the extent of legislative power in that it is meant to preserve society and not destroy it by means contrary to their rights of life, liberty, and property.

Locke (1996) stated that in legislative power, there are four distinct components of the social contract. The first is to have the same rules for everyone. Second, the laws are to be designed solely for the common good. Third, without consent, the legislature must not raise taxes on property. Fourth, power must not be transferred from one body to another without the consent of the people.

Locke (1996) discussed the dissolution of government, not by a hostile takeover, but rather from within. Locke gave multiple reasons as to why a government should be dissolved. Dissolution from within comes from a breach of trust or a violation of the social contract; that is, when legislators or those given power, take or otherwise destroy the property of the citizenry. This reduces those citizens to slaves and causes a de facto state of war. Citizens are essentially absolved from obedience (Locke, 1996, p. 378). The

individual who is given power then violates the social contract by using force and the fiscal resources of the office to corrupt legislators to influence votes (p. 378). Locke argued that people are to be the judges of the violators of the contract where they may engage in a new contract, with new leaders.

### **Recent Approaches**

Social contract theory has evolved into three different schools: liberal/interest, positive rights, and negative rights (Hickey, 2011). The two largest contributors to positive rights approach were Rousseau and Rawls (Hickey, 2011). The positive rights approach core concerns were empowerment and equity, social justice. The individual was an impartial actor, and the state was the primary policy actor (Hickey, 2011).

Individuals were considered to be primarily motivated out of concern for the other and fairness (Hickey, 2011). Rawls would rather ensure equality by overhauling the current institutional arrangements. This would include redistribution based on need (Hickey, 2011, pp. 7-8). In many ways, Rousseau and Rawls believed that earlier social contract thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke were primarily concerned with maintaining the status quo of institutional inequality (Hickey, 2011).

The liberal/interest approach goals when committed to the social contract were for the state to protect its citizens; the individual was isolated from others, the promotion of economic opportunity, and a free market guided by the invisible hand (Hickey, 2011). This approach was developed first by Hobbes and then more recently by Buchanan (Hickey, 2011). The mutual growth of the community was best done through individuals maximizing their self-interest (Hickey, 2011).

The negative rights approach to social contract theory originated with Locke and is considered negative because they are rights naturally had by each person (Hickey, 2011). This approach promoted the individual rights of citizenship based on mutual respect for the other (Hickey, 2011). The primary policy concerns were similar to the liberal/interest approach in regards to security and economic opportunity (Hickey, 2011). Instead of the key policy actors being just the state or the free market, there was more of a combination where the market, community, and public-private partnerships contribute to the public good (Hickey, 2011).

Locke's (1996) version of social contract theory was meant to protect the individual against a predatory state; yet in cases where there might be disputes with another, the state was supposed to be the impartial judiciary. The protection of the individual's natural rights and liberty increases economic output (Holocomb, 2004). Gwartney, Holcombe, and Lawson (1998) noted that the relationship between government expenditures and growth of GDP is strong and persistently negative (§ 42). Reductions in government spending increased economic output (Gwartney et al., 1998).

The relationship of government and its citizens is a central aspect of Lockean social contract theory (Guest, 1992). To Guest, government withdraws its right to rule when it violates natural law. Guest noted that the government makes it possible for citizens to realize the value of personal labor through exchange (p. 24). Government is meant to create an exchange or economic environment for the human species to flourish (Guest, 1992).



The promotion of justice in Lockean social contract theory was an aspect of the role of government (Guest, 1992). Justice was complex in the negative rights version; however, it was based on labor, the value of it, and the government's responsibility to protect that labor (Guest, 1992). This idea asserts that inequality of property ownership was necessary to preserve all of humankind (Guest, 1992). This inequality created a competitive market, which is meant to create more productivity and essentially, greater living standards for all (Guest, 1992).

### **Structural Components and Hindrances of Growth**

Affirmative Action is considered by some a necessary component of life in the United States because it attempts to balance out the imbalances perpetuated by slavery (Drake, 2003). Drake argued that a majority of the personal wealth in the United States was generated from slavery, the Industrial Revolution, or both (p. 59). If the imbalance of wealth and equality is a direct result of slavery, then affirmative action has the potential to close the achievement, education, and socioeconomic gaps.

Affirmative Action is the transfer or distribution of wealth from one group to a preferred entity (Drake, 2003). This program is not just a 4 decade old package suited to curb economic inequality between Whites and Blacks, but rather a 4 century old policy that dates back to the beginning of the European settling of the Americas (Drake, 2003). This was the beginnings of Affirmative Action but not in the same meaning that is often associated with the phrase today; one of a redistribution of opportunity or wealth to underserved communities (Drake, 2003). Rather, the argument pointed out that the

transfer of wealth came from indentured servants and later slaves, to the preferred group of European settlers (Drake, 2003).

The overall Black condition in society as compared to Whites, has remained largely unchanged since mid 1970 (Sites & Parks, 2011). Sites and Parks argued that this has been a direct result in the decline in industry in the United States as many jobs secured by Blacks in the United States are blue-collar, manufacturing, and low to medium wage. Pager, Wester, and Bonikowski. (2009) suggested that discrimination helps explain current and historical disparities between Blacks and Whites.

Pager et al. (2009) ran a field experiment testing contemporary discrimination in a low-wage job market. Pager et al. attempted to measure how negative attitudes about Blacks are converted into real discrimination in the job market. Pager et al. noted that each of the testers, came from a variation of White, Black, and Hispanic racial groups. They were artificially given different resumes and histories (Pager et al., 2009). The testers applied for real jobs and were asked to record the responses during the interviews, call backs, and/or nonreplies (Pager et al., 2009). Even with similar backgrounds presented on paper and interview training completed by all testers, Blacks were less likely to receive a call back or a job offer at only 15.2%, whereas Whites were at 31% (Pager et al., 2009). Pager et al. found that a White job applicant who had a criminal record would do equally well, if not better, than a Black applicant with no criminal record (p. 785). While there was no evidence of overt racism or hostility by potential employers, by giving the testers similar backgrounds and training for a variety of job openings, in many cases race can be explained as the sole criterion for the decision to hire

or not (Pager et al., 2009). Pager et al. added the uncompromising nature that categorized the employer's decision was a form of exclusion (p. 785). Discrimination was a reality in that job market (Pager et al., 2009).

Hunt (2007) measured perceptions or beliefs of inequality from Black, White, and Hispanic respondents over a 27 year period ending in 2004 by using General Social Surveys. The findings show many similarities in Black-White perceptions as far as direction of inequality (Hunt, 2007). Hunt identified four items that address perceptions of inequality. Hunt pointed out that the two structuralist items from the GSS were mainly due to discrimination and because most Blacks don't have the chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty. Insofar as individualist explanations for inequality, according to Hunt, the items were because most Blacks have less in-born ability to learn and because most Blacks just do not have the motivation or will power to pull themselves out of poverty. As far as White perceptions are concerned, there was a 7 point decline in Blacks lacking the ability (5.3%); however, there was a 6 point increase in the belief that Blacks lack motivation (26.8%) in that time frame (Hunt, 2007). White perception of education (12.6%) and discrimination (20.5%) as the causes of inequality increased during that 27 year period examined (Hunt, 2007).

Black explanations of inequality in regards to lack of Black ability increased slightly (2.2%) as motivational explanations did as well by 11.3% (Hunt, 2007). Educational (5.4%) explanations decreased just a point, and discrimination (35.4%) dropped 13 points (Hunt, 2007). Black and White respondents recognized the impact discrimination has in determining socioeconomic differences between Blacks and

Whites; but, Blacks are more likely to believe that discrimination was the cause of the differences (Hunt, 2007). The individualist explanations for inequality for Black respondents have increased during this time period.

When combining the items ability and motivation into a person-centered category or individualism, Hunt (2007) found that Black yes responses increased but fell short of Whites. Hunt combined the items education and discrimination into a structuralist category. Whites had a three point increase to 33.1% and Blacks had a 15 point decline to 40.8% (Hunt, 2007). Blacks and Whites recognized that certain structural components might be reasons for Black/White SES differences (Hunt, 2007). The findings by Hunt suggested that beliefs in individualism for Blacks are actually increasing, while beliefs in structural inhibitions are decreasing.

The 1940s offered the Black population in the United States a period of wage increases compared to Whites; this time period is considered the first Black improvement era (Sites & Parks, 2011). This era occurred shortly after the Great Depression as the entire nation recovered, suggesting Black SES improvement is positively correlated with national economic improvement (Sites & Parks, 2011). Sites and Parks argued that this was a because of the migration of millions of Blacks from the southern agricultural-based economy, to northern cities, which were more industry and labor intensive. This was a factor that contributed to the lessening of the wage gap between Blacks and Whites (Sites & Parks, 2011).

Certain federal, state, and local policies that effected discrimination during this time period were also factors (Sites & Parks, 2011). Sites and Parks noted that the FEPC

mandated that there be no discriminatory practices within the government and defense related industries. The growth of unions, other government policies meant to reduce discrimination and the mobilization of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), might have helped in decreasing the wage, achievement, and opportunity gaps (Sites & Parks, 2011). A government mandated approach; however, dealt only with government institutions and defense-related industries (Sites & Parks, 2011).

Sites and Parks (2011) noted that Black wage growth stagnated between the first and the second Black improvement era. The second era occurred from 1965 and 1975 (Sites & Parks, 2011). It was during the second Black improvement era that equality and simple, democratic rights such as voting, became the primary focus for Black activists and politicians from both parties (Sites & Parks, 2011). Moreover, Sites and Parks added that “black-white male earnings ratio stood at .62 in 1964, rose to .72 by 1975, then fell to .69 by 1987” (Sites & Parks, 2011, p. 47). In the 23 years following 1964 there was fluctuation in the black-white male earnings ratios (Sites & Parks, 2011).

According to Sites and Parks (2011), the second Black improvement era can be explained by Civil Rights enforcement along with other landmark Civil Rights legislation that were passed during the mid 1960s, which included desegregation of schools. This explanation is largely accepted by scholars as the reasons for the decline in the wage gap from 1965-1975, however, the Black-White earnings ratio has further separated since 1975 (Sites & Parks, 2011). The increasing wage gap since 1975 can be associated with the deindustrialization that has occurred and the increase in cultural or economic

emphasis on skills-based jobs (Sites & Parks, 2011). Sites and Parks noted that Black workers were disadvantaged by this new economic emphasis as a potential explanation for the current disparity. However, critics of the skills-based explanation offer an alternative view that emphasized that employment losses in industry for Blacks actually began as early as the 1950s (Sites & Parks, 2011). These critics have also contended that the real value of minimum wage and less unionization in the private market could be stronger arguments for the persistent increase in the wage gap (Sites & Parks, 2011). Sites and Parks argued that the most viable solutions in closing the wage gaps came from government and political intervention (Sites & Parks, 2011).

While evidence existed suggesting that the supply and demand explanations for the wage gap are legitimate, Blacks still faced a disproportionate wage disparity, even though educational gains should be continuous (Sites & Parks, 2011). Gains in education should continue from generation to generation and close the wage and achievement gaps (Lee, 2002). Proper education is considered an equalizer that results in economic and cultural equality (Lee, 2002). Lee added that proper education increases educational or learning outcomes for all students and increases the chances of higher education and earnings for minority students. However, the Black-White achievement gap in education has increased since the late 1980s (Lee, 2002).

From the 1970s to the late 1980s, White educational achievement remained relatively stable while Black educational achievement skyrocketed; this pattern has reversed itself since the late 80s (Lee, 2002). Overall, the Black-White achievement gap associated with education has narrowed; however, there is empirical evidence suggesting

that there still are gaps among different racial groups (Lee, 2002). Similar patterns were observed with college-bound SAT takers (Lee, 2002).

Nowhere is the Black-White achievement gap in education more prevalent than in urban centers throughout America (Lewis et al., 2008). From the critical race theory background, there is the insistence that the urban classroom is today's most prominent expression of racism and segregation (Lewis et al., 2008). Moreover, Lewis et al. noted that there is a substantial achievement gap in education nationally, but the urban student's gap is far worse. Of the 11 urban education settings examined by Lewis et al., not one had more than 20% of their Black fourth-grade math students ranked in the At Proficient or the At Advanced categories combined. The national average was 30% of students in the United States in the proficient category in Grade 4 math (Lewis et al., 2008). In comparison, the national average for White students was 40% in the proficient category and just 12% for African American students (Lewis et al., 2008, p. 133).

Similar results are found when examining 8th grade students in mathematics (Lewis et al., 2008). While it seems that the achievement gap through education has fluctuated nationally, the gap is worse in urban school settings (Lewis et al., 2008). The Black-White achievement gap in education as it narrowed is a much researched subject and many scholars attempted to attribute something to the successes (Lee, 2002).

One attempted reduction in the achievement gap in education came via social capital theory put into practice (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). Lee and Friedrich noted that this attempt in reducing the achievement gap was known as SLCs, which were small schools inside of big schools, where teachers and students interact consistently together in a

designated area. SLCs existed with solid theoretical foundations and appear to be financially viable as funding comes from government and private resources (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). However, according to Lee and Friedrich, large central city schools trailed behind other schools who participated in the SLC program.

Lee and Friedrich (2007) examined 193 schools in 30 different states that ranged from schools in large cities to small, rural schools and were identified by being already underperforming. Lee and Friedrich noted that these schools were very segregated as these schools were only 38.7% racially diverse. The majority of ethnic minority students were located in large city schools (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). There was student improvement seen each year at the large city schools but the improvement was modest and students were not affected equally (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). The year-by-year improvement had an inverse relationship based on race (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). White students had positive correlations while Black students had negative correlations with this measure of achievement (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). There was more improvement by White students from this type of approach; but, Black students seemed to lag behind depending on the location as rural and suburban schools had different results (Lee & Friedrich, 2007). Lee and Friedrich argued that this program is an attempt to change the outcome for opportunity by changing certain assumed structural limitations.

Payne (2008) attempted to understand the perception of educational opportunity by lower-income Black students who have experiences of street life. Payne examined two different subsamples. First, Payne examined high school and nonhigh school graduates and second, a subsample organized by generation in ages ranging from 16-24,



25-44, and 45-65. Payne also gathered two focus groups of seven men each to explore the standpoint of men coming from or living in street life.

All generations of the men had negative attitudes toward the availability of opportunity and education as they believed that generally, they were prohibited from accessing opportunity in the United States (Payne, 2008, p. 14). Even though they generally felt as if they were blocked from opportunity through education, 74.1% of the men cared about the grades that they are currently or did receive (Payne, 2008). Further, 71.4% of the men agreed that if a student tries hard enough, then they can succeed (Payne, 2008).

In the first subgroup, the men identified with the traditional belief in the United States that if an individual worked hard then success will happen; however, a majority of the men believed that opportunity and the structure of society hampered their chances (Payne, 2008). Almost three quarters of respondents disagreed that all people get fair treatment and that low-income students have a similar chance at success and a solid education as a wealthy student (Payne, 2008).

In the second subgroup, Payne (2008) found that attitudes towards education and opportunity differed. Specifically, the young men were more optimistic about success than the older men. The older generations had developed more negative attitudes toward economic and/or educational opportunity being equal or better than Whites (Payne, 2008).

SES levels can affect educational goals. Strayhorn (2009) stressed that Black males who are from families of high SES tend to have higher educational aspirations than

those from families of lower and low SES (p. 722). Educational aspirations and perceptions of opportunity through education are related to SES and SES has the greatest influence in measuring college aspirations (Strayhorn, 2009).

Strayhorn (2009) found that the educational goals and ambitions are influenced by a student's neighborhood and urbanicity. Black men from suburban neighborhoods and schools have higher aspirations than those in urban schools. The differences were even more pronounced between Black males who live in suburbs and rural areas (Strayhorn, 2009, p. 723). Strayhorn surmised that there might be some group effect at each of the different areas examined; that within similar contexts or neighborhoods, values and beliefs, may be reinforced.

Some solutions for eliminating the achievement gap in education within urban settings recommended by Lewis et al. (2008) dealt directly with each level of individuals involved; administrators, families, and communities. The administrators must create an environment promoting excellence and academic achievement instead of focusing on discipline and other duties that do not include instruction (Lewis et al., 2008). Lewis et al. concluded that administrators must also be responsible for high standards, professional development, and ensuring a high quality of teaching that is based on best practices (p. 146). Lewis et al. recommended new funding for after-school activities, which should not be limited to athletic functions, but include functions that are meant to improve academic achievement. There must also be more involvement from Parent-Teacher Association activities than what currently exists (Lewis et al., 2008).

One solution for increasing SES could be venture capitalism (Rubin, 2010). Venture capitalism has become one of the strongest job creating machines promoting economic growth in the served areas (Rubin, 2010). Venture capitalism is an equity investment into a private company that is in its early stages (Rubin, 2010). These investments primarily occur in locations that have a supportive infrastructure and are technologically related (Rubin, 2010). Rubin added that 66% of the dollars received from 2006 to 2008 were located in just five industries: software, biotechnology, medical devices and equipment, industrial/energy, and telecommunications. Because of this concentration of venture capital into very few economic areas, certain populations and locations are underserved (Rubin, 2010). Besides issues of discrimination, information failure and a lack of common networks between the venture capitalists and those underserved communities, is relevant in Black communities (Rubin, 2010). However, it was found that minority-focused venture capital had higher returns than that of traditional investments (Rubin, 2010).

There are three obstacles that need to be overcome in order to enable greater capital investment into underserved communities (Rubin, 2010). These obstacles include difficult travel time, absence of developed infrastructure, and a lack of education that involves the operation of venture capital (Rubin, 2010). Rubin noted that in order to overcome these obstacles, venture capitalists must increase operating costs and lower their profits (p. 826). Rubin pointed out that incentive for venture capitalists in overcoming these obstacles reduces their motivation to invest in underserved communities.

Regardless of the obstacles that take place in venture capitalism, Rubin (2010) offered the idea of developmental venture funds where the intent is not only profit but also social returns. One example of developmental venture funds from the public-sector is the CRA (Rubin, 2010). One purpose of this act is to encourage banks to invest in typically underserved regions or communities with subsidies in order to get over the venture capitalism obstacles (Rubin, 2010). With that, the idea is to begin with public-sector investment, in order to jumpstart the private venture capital market (Rubin, 2010).

One area that has received attention from scholars and politicians with regard to public investment are MBEs (Bates, 2009). Typically, MBEs are smaller and younger than other vendors (Bates, 2009). Bates concluded that MBEs are usually more credit-constrained and usually a subcontractor for government projects in hopes to jumpstart their businesses (Bates, 2009). However, public agencies that are meant to pave ways for equality may be hindrances for stronger minority-owned firms in that these agencies attempt to help smaller, younger MBEs first (Bates, 2009). Bates added that stronger firms generally foster economic development and create jobs. The public agencies may also be hindrances for some start up MBEs, especially agencies that attempt to secure procurements for MBEs as they often have slow payments of invoices (Bates, 2009).

In 2002, there were a total of 38,324 MBEs throughout the country that generated an income of more than \$1 million, and this included Black and Hispanic owned firms (Bates, 2009). MBEs also employed just fewer than 1.5 million people which was roughly 38 workers per firm (Bates, 2009). Bates noted that the stronger MBEs typically located in underserved communities. However, these businesses are penalized for

success as public agencies often assume that they have overcome discriminatory barriers (Bates, 2009). Most MBEs start out with capital of \$50,000 or less and are less reliant on debt financing, 36.4% of MBEs were started by college graduates, and almost 70% have the government as a major client as compared to nonminority businesses at only 50% (Bates, 2009). When asked about perceptions of barriers for MBEs, almost 70% wanted large contracts to be unbundled, and 45% wanted quicker payments of invoices (Bates, 2009).

When considering that MBEs, especially in construction-related industries, often locate operations or headquarters within minority communities, there is the potential to help some low-income Black neighborhoods (Bates, 2009). MBEs have the potential to help create jobs in poor, minority communities and target low-income Blacks for job openings (Bates, 2009).

Blacks are not the only racial group that has received benefits from Affirmative Action policies. Harris (2009) noted that Whites can be beneficiaries as well because organizations involved in affirmative action benefit from new groups (Harris, 2009). However, as much as these organizations might seem to grow, there are still disparities in the Black-White SES gaps (Harris, 2009). Harris noted that diversity leads an organization to recruit, retain, and promote the most talented workforce; resulting in higher productivity for employers (p. 368). If an organization does not have a structure that promotes diversity, then it lacks diversity and creativity from its workers (Harris, 2009). Harris found that discrimination still exists even with the intervention of affirmative action policies.

Another structural component of the Black/White SES gap deals with housing (Hunt, 2007). Although it is illegal, people are often separated or segregated as a result of where they might live or what they might look like (Osypuk, Galea, McArdle, & Acevedo-Garcia, 2009). To quantify residential segregation, Osypuk et al. introduced a mechanism they called the interquartile range and overlap statistic (IQR-OS) which is “a measure of distributional overlap to characterize the degree of separateness of two groups’ distributions on a continuous measure of neighborhood poverty” (p. 32). The IQR is the central 50% of distribution of poverty per neighborhood and the overlap statistic measured how much this distribution overlaps based on demographics (Osypuk et al., 2009). For Whites, the median neighborhood poverty rate was 5.8% with a range of seven points and for Blacks was 17.5% with a range of 20 points (Osypuk et al., 2009). This statistic showed the overall average; but, when examining metropolitan areas, 27% of the minority distribution overlaps the White distribution (Osypuk et al., 2009). Osypuk et al. indicated that neighborhood poverty distributions are separated between minorities and Whites. The neighborhood environment for minorities was worse than for Whites. Osypuk et al. argued that the more that segregation increases the higher the poverty increases.

Squires, Friedman, and Saidat (2002) conducted a 2001 survey of D.C. residents and the surrounding suburbs attempted to understand adult perceptions of their housing search; their experiences of discrimination, satisfaction with their neighborhood, and their perceptions of racial equality. Overall, Blacks had different experiences and outcomes than Whites (Squires et al., 2002).

Approximately 60% of Black respondents believed that being near public transit is very important; in contrast about a third of White respondents viewed that as a necessity (Squires et al., 2002). Squires et al. added that Black respondents rated level of crime, neighborhood racial composition, taxes, and public services as being very important in the selection of their current neighborhood of residence more often than White respondents (p. 162). Of equal importance for Black and White respondents were affordability, the quality of schools, and proximity to work (Squires et al., 2002).

Squires et al. (2002) pointed out that 77% of Blacks prefer to live in a racially mixed neighborhood or a majority Black neighborhood as compared to about half of the White respondents. As far as their experiences with discrimination, Blacks were three times as likely as Whites to report that they had experienced it themselves and two times as likely to report that they knew someone who has experienced discrimination (Squires et al., 2002). More than 95% of Blacks who experienced discrimination did nothing about it and 50% of that percentage claimed that nothing would come out of filing a complaint and the same percentage of Whites felt the same way (Squires et al., 2002).

Squires et al. (2002) found that almost 60% of White respondents believed that opportunity and housing choices of Blacks and Whites are essentially equal; whereas 16% of Blacks felt a similar way. This is a key difference between Black and White perceptions of discrimination. Squires et al. found that Blacks viewed generations of slavery and discrimination as factors in creating unequal conditions where it concerns upward mobility.

There have been some programs developed and run in order to create more equal conditions for upward mobility (Wilson, 2010). Wilson pointed out that MTO was a program meant to help create conditions of upward mobility and was created by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This program was modeled after the Gautreaux program, which ended up relocating 7,100 families from inner-cities to suburbs, half of those families relocated to White suburbs (Wilson, 2010).

Wilson (2010) argued that critics of the Gautreaux program asserted that it was nonrandom and contained elements self-selection bias. Self-selection bias describes the effect of people grouping themselves together based on common characteristics (p. 206). The program conducted a lottery awarding housing vouchers to families who lived in public housing in five major U.S. cities: Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York (Wilson, 2010). This program was more experimental than the Gautreaux program as winners were randomly assigned to one of three groups: two groups received vouchers of which, one group was allowed to use the voucher anywhere in the market and the other must find rentals in low-poverty areas, and the third group received no assistance (Wilson, 2010). The results were significant but offered weak conclusions: first, there were improvements in health, physically and mentally and second, the employment and educational gaps did not close (Wilson, 2010). Sampson (2010) argued that a majority of MTO families moved from a highly segregated neighborhood to another highly segregated neighborhood.

Programs like affirmative action have had some positive effect; but, that effect has not necessarily benefitted the intended recipients. As of 2009, White households



averaged \$51,861 while Black households averaged only \$32,584 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010). Overall, discrimination and chance for education appear to be the largest structural impediments to Black upward mobility.

### **Republicans, Black Conservatism, and Black Religious Conservatism**

Republican efforts to mobilize Black voters in conjunction with social and moral issues have failed (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008). McDaniel and Ellison noted that the Republican Party is often perceived as the party for Whites while the Democratic Party is often considered the more inclusive party. White religious conservatives have moved to the Republican Party; however, Blacks of a similar religiously conservative background have not because they have different religious interpretations (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008). This is largely because “the combined effects of historical, community, and familial ties to the Democratic Party may serve as an anchor, slowing any drift toward the GOP” (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008, p. 189). According to McDaniel and Ellison, Blacks are, as a majority, Biblical literalists, and Black preachers continue to interpret culture in relation to biblical interpretation (p. 180). McDaniel and Ellison added that the real belief in socially conservative values of many Blacks is offset by certain Democratic policies.

Lewis (2000) found that there has been an overall ideological shift of African Americans identifying themselves as liberal to conservative. However, there has not been the same consistency in a shift from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. Instead, there was a decline in Republican identification for Blacks to as low as 4% in 1996 (Lewis, 2000). Whereas for Whites, as conservatism goes up, so does registration

of or preferences for the Republican Party (Lewis, 2000). Lewis pointed out that this is because there is a distinct difference in the definitions of conservatism between Blacks and Whites. Specifically, Blacks often associate conservatism with religion focusing on social and moral concerns than with politics (Lewis, 2000). Lewis noted that Whites focus more on issues involving the proper government role and economy.

Race has an impact on public impressions of candidates and whom voters choose to represent them in office (Matsubayashi & Ueda, 2011). Matsubayashi and Ueda pointed out that in most cases, the regular voting public does not know what a candidate stands for, relying on simpler ways of getting information on who they might vote for. This means that most voters do not cast their vote on solid details of the candidate's political stances. For this group of voters, the vote is largely decided based on incumbency, race, and party (Matsubayashi & Ueda, 2011). Matsubayashi and Ueda pointed out that if the precinct or district is majority White and is considered to be in high SES, the candidate will be less likely to win if they are Black and Democrat. However, race has little effect on low socioeconomic areas that are majority White (Matsubayashi & Ueda, 2011).

According to Matsubayashi and Ueda (2011), there were three reasons why race plays such a significant impact on majority White and upper socioeconomic areas. First, White voters assumed Black, Democratic candidates are more concerned about racial equality than other issues. Second, voters dreaded any competition for control of economic resources (Matsubayashi & Ueda, 2011). The third reason is that Black public officials are labeled with lower qualifications or a lack of competence by these voters

(Matsubayashi & Ueda, 2011). The vote for Democrats decreases by as much as 25% in precincts where the candidate is Black and Democratic (Matsubayashi & Ueda, 2011).

The role of Black conservatives in political life has not significantly affected Black political identity (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). A distinguished Black conservative who used to be one of two Black Republicans elected to Congress since the New Deal and the end of WWII was Watts (Snipe, 2000). Snipe pointed out that Watts declined to be involved with the Congressional Black Caucus as he insisted that he did not have to belong to group identity.

Mangum (2008) wanted to know if Black Partisanship was affected by religious guidance and church attendance (p. 916). Whites who have strong religious beliefs have a strong association with the Republican Party (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008). Mangum asserted that Blacks remain committed to both the Democratic Party and its candidates (p. 918). Mangum argued that the majority of Blacks have stronger religious commitment and their religious beliefs are more traditional than most other races.

Mangum (2008) found that religious guidance keeps Blacks devoted to the Democratic Party, but the church does not. Religious guidance and attendance to church are poor predictors. Mangum did not find a relationship between Black, Democratic partisanship and race identification or Black common fate (p. 927). The doctrine espoused by Black churches is more favorable to the Democratic Party, a doctrine that has roots in liberalism and social justice; it is the message being delivered within churches that keeps Blacks entrenched within the Democratic Party (Mangum, 2008).

Hall (2008) argued that today's political institutions are an extension of slavery, an extension that continues to dominate Black communities. Hall concluded that there are issues with conservatism, Black conservatism, and Black America. Hall argued that there is a hidden racism that exists within the Republican Party and that Black conservatism and components of the ideology can be traced back to those slaves who worked in the master's house. Hall argued that words like special interest and diversity, when coming from conservatives, are code words meant to continue the history of oppression of Black citizens of the United States.

Hall (2008) claimed that most scholars are oblivious or have chosen to ignore the racism. Hall pointed out most members of Black communities still today consider they themselves field slaves and relate Black conservatives with house slaves. Hall argued that historically, "domination encouraged them to embrace the master's political perspective as their own" (p. 567). Hall reasoned that individuals who branch out and call themselves Black conservatives are mentally subjugated by White conservatives as conservatism is actually meant to keep the status quo. Because of this mental subjugation, Black conservatives embrace, in order to garner better status within the conservative world, their master's political stances.

Asumah and Perkins (2000) pointed out that Black Conservatives' ideas in solving the multiple issues of the multiple Black communities are similar to today's White conservative platform; but, they are insufficient. Asumah and Perkins argued that these ideas involve limited government, materialism, and individualism but are underdeveloped do not lead to the resolution of problems of the Black community"(p.

52). Asumah and Perkins reasoned that the biggest issue with conservative ideas in solving these problems comes from the structure of today's political society and the assumption that opportunity is equal.

The conservative political platform concerns corporations or big business and contains a racist syllogism. Asumah and Perkins (2000) argued that this syllogism relies on the assumption that the Black community does not need government assistance because the American polity is now on a level playing field. Asumah and Perkins asserted that another necessary assumption is that the state of the Black community is the result of nihilism and a lack of moral rectitude (p. 58).

### **Voting Habits, Ideology, and Connections of Economic Growth as a Result of Political Competition**

Black voters, as a majority, are considered being highly partisan with the majority voting for officials on the Democratic ticket (Kidd et al., 2007). However, Black voters are far from identical (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). For instance, Hajnal and Lee pointed out that when examining Black partisan choice, the structure of party choice is more complex than is suggested by a simple, linear continuum (p. 11). Hajnal and Lee noted that unlike Blacks, most United States citizens fit onto the traditional linear scale, with Democrats on the left, Independents in the middle, and Republicans on the right.

Hajnal and Lee (2007) pointed out that because of the Civil Rights legislation of the late 1950s and 1960s, which occurred while Democrats had leadership roles in the legislative and executive branches, 40% of Blacks identified themselves as liberal, half as moderates, and 10% identified themselves as conservatives in the early 1970s. The

majority identified themselves as Democrats. However, there has been a steady shift from the Democratic Party where today only two-thirds of Blacks identify as Democrats (Hajnal & Lee, 2007).

According to Hajnal and Lee (2007) the majority of Blacks who leave the Democratic Party, or never register with the party in the first place, become Independents. Of the 40% of Blacks who no longer identify as Democrat, 2% identify as Republican and the rest identify as Independent (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). Hajnal and Lee argued that the main reason for the link between liberal and conservative party affiliation are fiscal and social issues, rather than moral or religious issues (p. 17). Hajnal and Lee confirmed that specific liberal approaches to issues had an effect on Black partisanship while socially conservative approaches to issues did not.

The reason Blacks maintain Democratic and Independent, as a majority, for party identification was because they principally agreed that government should have an interactive, more liberal role (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). Hajnal and Lee asserted that unemployed Blacks were 16% more likely to identify as Republicans and is contrary to the upward mobility thesis. Upward mobility thesis assumes that the higher the socioeconomic status is for an individual the more likely they would identify as Republicans (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). Black home owners were also more likely to identify as Democrats (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). These findings were consistent when measuring perceptions of Blacks who either live in the suburbs or in urban areas (Hajnal & Lee, 2007).

Sigelman and Willnat (2000) tested attitudinal differentiation between Blacks who either lived in the urban areas of D.C. or lived in suburban areas of Prince George's county Maryland. Sigelman and Willnat first tested assimilation theory, which asserts that Black suburban homeowners will assimilate to White culture, but found little support in their analysis for this theory. Sigelman and Willnat then tested transplantation theory, which suggested that suburbia families even before becoming middle class were distinctly middle class all along, as they moved to suburbia they just brought their middle class attitudes with them. However, Sigelman and Willnat found no support for this theory. The final theory tested by Sigelman and Willnat was that of identity persistence emphasized an attitudinal unity rather than bifurcation among Blacks (p. 679). There were some differences of attitudes between suburbanites and urbanites, but this theory seemed to have the strongest results of the three theories (Sigelman & Willnat, 2000).

The respondents in Prince George's county were generally more educated, more affluent, and younger than their urban counterparts (Sigelman & Willnat, 2000). However, both groups agreed that the persistence of inequality fell on the shoulders of White racism (Sigelman & Willnat, 2000). Sigelman and Willnat found that D.C. residents were more likely to believe that if Blacks would be just as thriving as Whites if they tried harder. Sigelman and Willnat found that D.C. residents were more open to the idea the Black progress was being decelerated by White resistance (Sigelman & Willnat, 2000). As far as policy differences, D.C. residents believed more in economic redistribution, racial preferences during hiring, and community development in African American communities (Sigelman & Willnat, 2000). Both groups of residents were

slightly left of center in a traditional political ideology scale and heavily pro Democratic, even though, there were SES differences between the two groups, identity persistence theory prevailed (Sigelman & Willnat, 2000).

Hajnal and Lee (2007) pointed out that partisan choice for Blacks, regardless of SES and ideology, is most likely rooted in the perception of how hard a party might work towards solving Black issues. Hajnal and Lee found that Blacks who think that the Democratic Party is working to resolve such issues are 34% more likely to self-identify as Democrats, whereas if respondents thought that the Republican Party worked harder toward resolving these issues, they were 28% less likely to identify as Democrats (p. 19). Blacks will likely support candidates or a party who are perceived as working hard for Black interests.

Spence and McClerking (2010) examined participation rates of Black voters when the mayor of a city was Black along with the length of time served by the mayor. The results revealed a dichotomy with regard to participation (Spence & McClerking, 2010). In every situation Spence and McClerking examined they found that as the Black population increases in a given city, Black political participation increases as well when donations and activism are considered (Spence & McClerking, 2010). However, the longer an incumbent is in office, the more participation rates decreased (Spence & McClerking, 2010). Spence and McClerking surmised that “citizens living in strong empowerment contexts were 9 percentage points less likely to participate in voter registration drives than citizens not living in strong empowerment contexts” (p. 919). Spence and McClerking also found that SES had an effect on participation in regards to



donation and activism in that the higher an individual's SES, the more likely that person would be to participate.

Leighley and Matsubayashi (2009) found that Whites are more likely than Blacks to discuss politics within their circle of friends, largely because of education and income. Leighley and Matsubayashi pointed out that people of racial and ethnic minorities who have a higher SES have richer and more diverse networks. Networks, population increase, and high SES all play significant roles in determining Black political participation (Leighley & Matsubayashi, 2009; Spence & McClerking, 2010).

There was an old racism in the United States that equated certain races superior to other races (Carmines, Sniderman, & Easter, 2011). Carmines et al. pointed out that there is now a new racism in the United States. Carmines et al. argued that this new racism is an alliance of racial animosity and traditional American values, such as individualism. Carmines et al. reasoned that Whites are no longer overtly racist, but they have special resentment for Blacks because they believe they lack specific, traditional values such as hard work, sacrifice, and discipline. Carmines et al. pointed out that racism is intertwined in the language of American values, specifically individualism.

Taylor and Merino (2011) examined racial attitudes, religion, and stratification ideology with an emphasis on individualism. Taylor and Merino found that historically, Black respondents had more of a structuralist ideology regardless of what religious background the respondent might have had. Differences between Blacks and Whites in individualism beliefs were coming closer as Whites were 5 percentage points more likely to associate a lack of Black motivation for racial inequality (Taylor & Merino, 2011).

However, Taylor and Merino found that when considering issues such as a chance for education or discrimination, Whites were 30% less likely to agree on those issues with Blacks.

Black voters are generally conservative when it comes to social and moral issues related specifically to their community (McDaniel & Ellison, 2008). Taylor and Merino (2011) found that over 60% of Blacks were Protestant, a form of Christianity that emphasizes beliefs that focus on these social and moral issues. Whites, of similar religious backgrounds as Blacks, had a more significant showing of beliefs in individualism (Taylor & Merino, 2011). However, according to Taylor and Merino, this difference in this statistic between Whites and Blacks was edging closer.

Soliman and Cable (2011) found that there is more likely to be corruption if political competition is weak. Soliman and Cable argued that political corruption is inversely related to economic growth. Corruption is widely regarded as having an inverse relationship with economic growth (Drury, Krieckhaus, & Lusztig, 2006). Kim (2009) pointed out that political competition is necessary to reduce political corruption in that “political competition opens up the government, reduces secrecy, and thus, reduces corruption” (p. 85). Kim noted that if there is a reduction in political corruption by an increase in political competition, then there should be an increase economic growth.

Besley et al. (2010) found that political competition increased economic growth. However, political competition as it relates to economic growth is a subject that has received little attention (Besley et al., 2010). Besley et al. developed a theoretical model that illustrated how a positive effect of political competition may result from encouraging

political parties to promote growth rather than focus on special-interest policies implement growth-promoting policies rather than special-interest policies” (p. 1330). This model is based on swing voters and a critical threshold of competition that when met, will create more progrowth economic policies (Besley et al., 2010). Besley et al. found that there was a positive relationship between high political competition and high economic growth results.

Ghosh (2010) confirmed the findings of Besley et al. (2010) by examining political competition in India. Ghosh argued that there is a significant positive association between political competition, measured in terms of percentage of votes and per capita income (p. 1040). In areas where competition is higher, the more likely that economic growth is stronger than in areas with weak political competition (Ghosh, 2010).

### **Summary**

Although there has been a growth of the Black middle class over the last 40 years, Blacks face structural barriers to the accumulation of wealth as compared to Whites. The purpose of this quantitative, cross-sectional study was to examine how structural components relate to Black political ideology and how political competition related to socioeconomic status. Structural components continue to be related to Black-White socioeconomic gaps. Secondary data were used to address the research questions. Results may influence policies and practices of electoral redistricting. Chapter 3 is an explanation of the methods used to gather and interpret the data.

### **Chapter 3: Research Method**

The purpose of this cross-sectional, quantitative study was to examine the effects of perceptions of structural conditions on Black political ideology and to add to the multidimensional model originally created by Hajnal and Lee (2007). I assessed the relationship of statewide political competition on Black household income and education. Besley et al. (2010) and Ghosh (2010) suggested that there is a positive correlation between statewide economic growth and political competition. I examined whether this correlation existed, specifically for factors of household SES, for a continually underserved population in the United States.

There are interrelated aspects of the sociocultural and economic structure faced by Black Americans. The perceptions of inequality and its relation to Black political ideology needed to be addressed. One area of the literature that has yet to be examined is the relationship of political competition with Black household income and Black educational level. In this chapter, I explain the reasons for conducting a cross-sectional design over others design types, the population and sample, where the data came from, and the instrument used.

#### **Research Design and Approach**

The sampling design was a cross-section and is a common design in many of the social science fields (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, causality in the traditional sense is difficult to establish in this design and is considered a limitation to this design. The limitation of the design concerns its internal validity. This is overcome through the use of “statistical analysis to

approximate some of the operations that are naturally built into an experimental design” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 117). To avoid this issue, I ran multiple and multivariate regressions to approximate results.

A cross-sectional design was chosen over experimental or quasi-experimental design as I did not intend to measure causality. Rather, I attempted to find relationships between perceptions of inequality and political ideology. Additionally, I attempted to find what correlations existed between state political competition, Black household income, and Black educational level compared to Whites.

### **Setting and Sample**

The GSS has been run by the NORC since 1972 and has a vast richness of data. In order to get a snapshot of the perceptions of inequality and the relationship with political ideology, I used secondary data collected by the GSS in 2010. NORC collected 2,044 complete cases out of an original 4,093 randomly selected cases using a full probability sample (Smith et al., 2011). Full probability sampling design gives each household in the United States an equal probability of being included in the sample (Smith et al., 2011). The data were collected using computer assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) and in 2010, there was a response rate of 0.703 (Smith et al., 2011).

In order to get a snapshot of the relationships between political competition, Black household income, and Black educational level, I collected data based on the political competition measure created by Pacheco (2008). The data were collected from each of the states in the U.S. official election boards. This was based on the votes cast in the 2008 presidential elections.

To assess the Black household income and educational level per state, I used data collected by the American Community Survey (ACS). The data were collected using a sampling frame of the U.S. Census Bureau's Master Address File (MAF), which is the official inventory of housing units (HUs) and group quarters (GQs), the two different samples collected by the U.S. Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). Data for HUs were randomly selected and collected in two different phases: Phase 1 was also referred to as main and supplemental sampling where interviewers attempted to interview potential participants either by phone or mail questionnaire of approximately 3 million U.S. samples; the second phase was conducted on samples that had not completed the first option through the use of CAPI (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).

GQs are considered "college residence halls, residential treatment centers, skilled nursing facilities, group homes, military barracks, correctional facilities, workers' dormitories, and facilities for people experiencing homelessness" (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009, p. 4-10). GQs consist of roughly 200,000 individuals annually (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). Two different strata are identified, small facilities, where data are collected similarly to HUs and large facilities (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Small facilities are separated into five subframes, "small versus closed on Census Day, new versus previously existing, GQ type (such as skilled nursing facility, military barracks, or dormitory), and geographical order (county, tract, block, street name, and GQ identifier) in the small GQ frame" (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009, p. 4-11).

Large facilities are sorted by type and geographical order where a sample of groups of 10 for each facility is selected (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). For example, if a

large facility had a population of 600, then there were 60 groups of 10. Then, a random sample of the groups was selected based on the predetermined sampling rate, which depends on the size of the state and number of facilities (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).

### **Data Analysis**

For the first research question, I ran a multiple regression with two independent variables (RACDIF1; RACDIF3) and a single dependent variable (POLVIEWS). Black political ideology is complicated, fluid, and potentially related to structural issues in U.S. society (Hajnal & Lee, 2007; Hunt, 2007). Explanations for the economic disparity between Blacks and Whites may be related to discrimination (RACDIF1) and an equal chance for education (RACDIF3) by Blacks (Hunt, 2007). What is not known is how they might relate to political ideology.

For the second research question, I determined what correlation existed between politically competitive states, Black household income, and Black educational level for most of the U.S. States. This correlation was examined by running a multivariate regression where political competition was the predictor variable. The four different brackets of household income and educational level were the outcome variables.

### **Instrumentation and Materials**

For the first research question, I used variables from the GSS. These variables can be accessed from the NORC Public Use Data Catalog. The dependent variable was the traditional seven-point political ideology scale and the GSS labeled it as POLVIEWS: one is *extremely liberal* and seven is *extremely conservative*. The independent variables were labeled RACDIF1 and RACDIF3 on the GSS and are concerned with explanations

for differences in jobs, income, and housing between Whites and Blacks. RACDIF1 asks if the differences are due to discrimination and RACDIF3 asks if the differences are due to a chance at education to rise out of poverty. The responses to these variables are categorical, yes or no.

For the second research question, I collected the percentage of votes cast for the Democratic presidential candidate in 2008. This measure is operationally defined as Political Competition =  $100 - (\text{absolute value } [\% \text{ Democratic Vote} - 50])$ . High values represent higher political competition in a state whereas lower values represent lower political competition in a certain state. Pacheco (2008) rescaled the measure from 0 to 1 to ease statistical interpretation and I did the same. The data for elections came from each of the states' official election boards.

For Black household income and educational level, I used data collected by the 2010 ACS. Household income per year brackets were as follows: (a) \$0-\$24,999, (b) \$25,000-49,999, (c) \$50,000-\$74,999, and (d) \$75,000-above. Educational brackets are as follows: (a) no high school diploma, (b) high school diploma, (c) some college, and (d) college degree. These variables can all be found using the American FactFinder. The different estimates of the population all contained one of two measures for sampling error: either a 90 % margin of error or confidence intervals (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). This measure was based on the amount sampled from the population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).



### **Protection of Human Participants**

The data used in this study were all secondary data coming from various sources: the GSS, the U.S. Census' American Community Survey of 2010, and the various states official election boards. Each of these sources employed protective measures of their participants and did not release any personal information of participants. All of the respondents for the GSS were 18 years or older (Smith et al., 2011). For the U.S. Census' American Community Survey, all information for identification was removed and certain methods were introduced to make sure that respondents remained confidential (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).

### **Summary**

Chapter 3 is a description of the research method that was conducted. For the first research question, a simple multiple regression was run with explanations for inequality variables as the predictor variables and political ideology as outcome variables. There is a description of the results of this model in Chapter 4.

For the second research question, a multivariate regression with political competition as the predictor variables and differences in socioeconomic status for Blacks and Whites as the outcome variables was run. There is a detailed explanation of the results in Chapter 4.

## Chapter 4: Results

### **Introduction**

Black political ideology was more complicated than the traditional, political ideology self-identification scale for most United States citizens (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). Additionally, some Blacks may believe that reasons for the Black-White SES gap are related to structural issues faced by Blacks in the United States (Hunt, 2007; Taylor & Marino, 2011).

There is a positive relationship of high political competition and high economic growth (Besley et al., 2010; Gosh, 2010). Essentially, higher political competition might persuade policy makers to adopt policies that promote growth rather than special interest ones (Besley et al., 2010). The purpose of this quantitative study was to understand how structural components predict political ideology and how differing political competition levels per state predict components of SES for Blacks. In this chapter, I describe and interpret the results of this study.

### **Data Analysis**

Data analysis began after receiving approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) with approval number 08-08-12-0182323. Data for the first research question were taken from the 2010 GSS and were focused specifically on Black respondents. Data for the second research question were taken from the 2008 election results of each of the state's official election boards in order to measure political competition. The data for educational attainment and household income for Blacks and Whites came from the 2010 American Communities Survey conducted yearly by the U.S. Census Bureau.

### Descriptive Statistics

For the first research question, there were a total of 311 Black respondents in the 2010 GSS. To begin, I calculated the frequencies and percentages of responses to the survey for the three variables: think of self as liberal or conservative (POLVIEWS), Black/White socioeconomic differences are due to discrimination (RACDIF1), and Black/White socioeconomic differences are due to lack of education (RACDIF3). Response rates varied for each of these variables: POLVIEWS had 293 respondents, RACDIF1 had 219 respondents, and RACDIF3 had 224 respondents answer the question.

For the political self-identification measure or POLVIEWS, there were seven different possible responses, and ranged from *extremely liberal* to *extremely conservative*. The results were as follows: extremely liberal (7.2%), liberal (16.0%), slightly liberal (11.6%), moderate (38.2%), slightly conservative (10.2%), conservative (11.6%), and extremely conservative (5.1%). See Table 1 for more information.

Table 1

*Political Self-Identification Measure*

	Frequency	Percent
Extremely Liberal	21	7.2
Liberal	47	16.0
Slightly Liberal	34	11.6
Moderate	112	38.2
Slightly Conservative	30	10.2
Conservative	34	11.6
Extremely Conservative	15	5.1
Total	293	99.9

Both of the variables, RACDIF1 and RACDIF3, had categorical, yes and no responses. For RACDIF1, 62.1% of respondents believed that the Black/White

socioeconomic differences were related to discrimination while 37.9% believed that it did not (see Table 2). For RACDIF3, 54% of respondents believed that the Black/White socioeconomic differences are related to a lack of opportunity for education (see Table 3). The majority of respondents still believed that the Black/White socioeconomic gaps were related to structural issues.

Table 2

*Are Black/White Socioeconomic Gaps Mainly Due to Discrimination*

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	136	62.1
No	83	37.9
Total	219	100

Table 3

*Are Black/White Socioeconomic Gaps Because Most Blacks Not Having the Chance for Education That it Takes to Rise Out of Poverty*

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	121	54
No	103	46
Total	224	100

For the second research question, political competition values ranged from the highest level in Indiana (.9995) and the lowest level in Hawaii (.7820). See Table 4 for more information. The mean for all 50 states was .9190 with a standard deviation of .0489.

Table 4  
*Political Competition Levels per State*

State	Political Competition Level	State	Political Competition Level
Indiana	0.9995	Michigan	0.9257
North Carolina	0.9970	Washington	0.9235
Missouri	0.9929	Maine	0.9229
Florida	0.9897	Tennessee	0.9183
Ohio	0.9850	Kansas	0.9165
Virginia	0.9737	Nebraska	0.9160
Montana	0.9727	Kentucky	0.9117
Georgia	0.9699	Louisiana	0.8993
Colorado	0.9634	Connecticut	0.8941
Iowa	0.9612	California	0.8899
Minnesota	0.9594	Arkansas	0.8886
New Hampshire	0.9562	Alabama	0.8874
Pennsylvania	0.9535	Massachusetts	0.8820
Arizona	0.9512	Illinois	0.8808
South Carolina	0.9490	Delaware	0.8806
Nevada	0.9485	Alaska	0.8789
South Dakota	0.9475	Maryland	0.8777
North Dakota	0.9462	New York	0.8708
Wisconsin	0.9378	Rhode Island	0.8687
Texas	0.9368	Idaho	0.8610
Oregon	0.9325	Utah	0.8441
New Mexico	0.9309	Oklahoma	0.8435
Mississippi	0.9300	Vermont	0.8254
New Jersey	0.9273	Wyoming	0.8237
West Virginia	0.9260	Hawaii	0.7820

The SES indicators were educational attainment of the population over the age of 25 and household income per year. The percentage of the Black population within each bracket of each state were calculated and then subtracted against the percentage of the White population within each bracket of each state. There were variances for each of the states, which is why it is important to figure the socioeconomic differences for Blacks and Whites, in each of the states. For educational attainment, the data for the Black

population in the following states were unavailable: Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Similarly for household income per year, the data for the Black population were unavailable in the following states: Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. These states were not included in the analysis.

Nationally, the mean for the percentage of the Black population in each educational attainment bracket were (a) no high school diploma (17.45%), (b) high school diploma (31.65%), (c) some college or associates (33.26%), and (d) college degree (17.63%). See Table 5 for more information.

Table 5

*Mean Percentage of the National Population of Blacks within each Educational Attainment Bracket, age 25 or over*

Bracket	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance
% With no High School Diploma	17.45	3.66	13.38
% With High School Diploma	31.65	4.27	18.20
% With Some College or Associates	33.26	4.70	22.14
% With a College Degree or Higher	17.63	3.36	11.30

The mean percentage of the national Black population for household income per year in each bracket was (a) \$0-24,999 (38.98%), (b) \$25,000-49,999 (26.91%), (c) \$50,000-74,999 (15.65%), and (d) \$75,000 and above (18.47%). See Table 6 for more information.

Table 6

*Mean Percentage of the National Population of Blacks within each Household Income per Year Bracket*

Bracket	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance
% With Income Between \$0-24,999	38.98	8.60	73.96
% With Income Between \$25,000- 49,999	26.91	2.13	4.55
% With Income Between \$50,000- 74,999	15.65	2.77	7.66
% With Income Above \$75,000	18.47	7.53	56.77

In order to properly calculate the differences in Black/White socioeconomic gaps, White brackets for the same socioeconomic indicators were also created. The same states included in the analysis for the Black population were used for the White population. Insofar as the percentage of the national White population within the educational attainment bracket, Whites appear, on average to have higher educational attainment levels than Blacks: (a) no high school diploma (11.61%), (b) high school diploma (29.58%), (c) some college or associates (29.69%), and (d) college degree (29.26%). See Table 7 for more information.

Table 7

*Mean Percentage of the National Population of Whites within each Educational Attainment Bracket, age 25 and over*

Bracket	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance
% With no High School Diploma	11.61	3.07	9.44
% With High School Diploma	29.58	4.26	18.18
% With Some College or Associates	29.69	3.73	13.90
% With a College Degree or Higher	29.26	5.31	28.17

As for the percentage of the national White population within each household income bracket per year, Whites again, on average appeared to have higher incomes than Blacks: (a) \$0-24,999 (22.06%), (b) \$25,000-49,999 (24.35%), (c) \$50,000-74,999 (19.01%), and (d) \$75,000 and above (34.57%). See Table 8 for more information.

Table 8

*Mean Percentage of the National Population of Whites within each Household Income per Year Bracket*

Bracket	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance
% With Income Between \$0-24,999	22.06	4.40	19.39
% With Income Between \$25,000-49,999	24.35	3.21	10.29
% With Income Between \$50,000-74,999	19.01	1.21	1.46
% With Income Above \$75,000	34.57	7.77	60.30



To get the difference in the Black/White socioeconomic gap, I subtracted the difference of the population percentage between educational attainment and household income per year between Blacks and Whites. If more of the Black population falls within a certain bracket the integer is positive, while if Whites fell within a certain bracket, the integer is negative. In most states, the percentages of the White population in each bracket had more of their population than Blacks. Insofar as the national educational attainment brackets, on average the majority of the Black population had a smaller percentage of their population achieving high educational levels: (a) no high school diploma (5.84%), (b) high school diploma (2.07%), (c) some college or associates (3.57%), and (d) college degree or higher (-11.63%). More Blacks have no high school diploma, just a high school diploma, or have not finished college than Whites. However, a majority of Whites, on average, have finished college (see Table 9).

Table 9

*Percent Difference of the Population Between Blacks and Whites within each Educational Attainment Bracket, age 25 and over*

Bracket	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance
% With no High School Diploma	5.84	4.26	18.155
% With High School Diploma	2.07	4.76	22.66
% With Some College or Associates	3.57	3.80	14.42
% With a College Degree or Higher	-11.63	4.37	19.13

*Note.* Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.

As for the national differences of household income per year between Blacks and Whites, Whites appeared to have more of their population in the upper two income brackets, while Blacks have more of their population within the lower two income brackets: (a) \$0-24,999 (19.48%), (b) \$25,000-49,999 (2.55%), (c) \$50,000-74,999 (-3.37%), and (d) \$75,000 and above (-15.39%). See Table 10 for more information.

Table 10

*Percent Difference of the Population Between Blacks and Whites within each Household Income per Year Bracket*

Bracket	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance
% With Income Between \$0-24,999	19.48	6.87	47.20
% With Income Between \$25,000- 49,999	2.55	2.70	7.30
% With Income Between \$50,000- 74,999	-3.37	3.28	10.78
% With Income Above \$75,000	-15.39	5.59	31.22

*Note.* Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.

The SES differences varied between states as indicated by the variances for each of the descriptive variables. The state with the highest number of Blacks as compared to Whites in educational attainment for no high school diploma was Minnesota (12%). The state with the largest amount of Whites as compared to Blacks in this same bracket was Nevada (-4.5%). See Table 11 for more information.

Table 11

*The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Educational Attainment Bracket (a): no High School Diploma, age 25 and over*

State	Difference	State	Difference
Minnesota	12.0	Missouri	6.6
Mississippi	11.4	Alabama	6.3
Wisconsin	10.7	Connecticut	6.0
South Carolina	10.6	Ohio	6.0
Louisiana	10.2	New Jersey	5.5
Nebraska	10.0	Alaska	5.3
Colorado	9.7	Georgia	4.1
Florida	9.5	Indiana	4.0
Iowa	9.0	Kansas	3.9
Arizona	8.9	Washington	3.3
New York	8.6	Tennessee	3.2
Massachusetts	8.2	Maryland	3.0
Virginia	7.7	Oklahoma	2.6
Delaware	7.4	Kentucky	0.6
Michigan	7.4	California	-2.8
Illinois	7.3	Arkansas	-2.9
Oregon	7.3	Texas	-4.0
Pennsylvania	7.3	Nevada	-4.5
North Carolina	6.8		

*Note.* Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.

The state with the highest number of Blacks as compared to Whites in educational attainment for high school diploma was Colorado (12.8%). The state with the highest number of Whites as compared to Blacks in this same bracket was Arkansas (-10.4%).

See Table 12 for more information.

Table 12

*The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Educational Attainment Bracket (b): High School Diploma, age 25 and over*

State	Difference	State	Difference
Colorado	12.8	Georgia	1.8
Arizona	12.6	Washington	1.6
California	9.4	Wisconsin	1.3
Connecticut	8.3	Louisiana	1.1
South Carolina	7.8	Kansas	1.1
Nevada	6.6	Minnesota	0.7
Maryland	5.7	Mississippi	0.4
Virginia	5.3	Tennessee	0.2
Texas	4.8	Missouri	-0.2
Alaska	3.6	Michigan	-0.09
New Jersey	3.5	Illinois	-0.09
Alabama	3.3	Indiana	-1.7
New York	3.2	Ohio	-1.8
North Carolina	3.2	Kentucky	-1.8
Massachusetts	3.1	Nebraska	-3.2
Florida	2.3	Iowa	-4.6
Delaware	2.3	Oregon	-7.8
Oklahoma	2	Arkansas	-10.4
Pennsylvania	1.9		

*Note.* Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.

The percentage of the Black population per state who had some college or an associate's degree was on average higher than for Whites. For the majority of states, Blacks either did not finish college or Blacks have an associate's degree at a greater percentage than Whites. The state with the largest percentage of Blacks compared to Whites who fell in this bracket was Arkansas (12.3%). The state with the largest percentage of Whites compared to Blacks who fell in this bracket was Arizona (-6.4%). See Table 13 for more information.

Table 13

*The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Educational Attainment Bracket (c): some College or Associate's degree, age 25 and over*

State	Difference	State	Difference
Arkansas	12.3	New York	4
Kentucky	7.8	Michigan	4
Nebraska	7.6	Missouri	3.9
Illinois	7.5	Pennsylvania	3.6
Ohio	7.3	Virginia	3.5
Texas	6.8	Alaska	2.5
New Jersey	6.8	North Carolina	2.1
Massachusetts	6.7	Oklahoma	1.9
Washington	6.7	Wisconsin	1.7
Indiana	6.5	Minnesota	1.3
Kansas	6.1	Louisiana	0.2
Maryland	5.7	Alabama	-0.2
Georgia	5.1	Florida	-0.4
Oregon	5	Colorado	-1
Connecticut	4.8	Mississippi	-2.3
California	4.7	Delaware	-3.3
Iowa	4.7	South Carolina	-3.6
Tennessee	4.5	Arizona	-6.4
Nevada	4		

*Note.* Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.

For the final bracket, there are differences between Blacks and Whites in percentages of the populations that have a college degree or higher. The state where more Blacks than Whites, as a percentage of the identified population, have a bachelor's degree was Arkansas (1%). The state with the largest difference between Whites and Blacks was Colorado (-21.5%). See Table 14 for more information.

Table 14

*The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Educational Attainment Bracket (d): College Degree or Higher, age 25 and over*

State	Difference	State	Difference
Arkansas	1	Florida	-11.5
Oregon	-4.5	Louisiana	-11.6
Nevada	-6	North Carolina	-12.1
Delaware	-6.4	Pennsylvania	-13
Oklahoma	-6.5	Wisconsin	-13.7
Kentucky	-6.6	Indiana	-13.8
Texas	-7.4	Minnesota	-13.9
Tennessee	-7.9	Illinois	-14
Iowa	-9.2	Maryland	-14.4
Alabama	-9.4	Nebraska	-14.5
Mississippi	-9.5	South Carolina	-14.8
Michigan	-10.4	Arizona	-15.1
Missouri	-10.4	New Jersey	-15.7
Georgia	-11	New York	-15.9
Kansas	-11.1	Virginia	-16.5
Ohio	-11.3	Massachusetts	-18.1
Alaska	-11.3	Connecticut	-19.3
Washington	-11.4	Colorado	-21.5
California	-11.5		

*Note.* Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.

The other socioeconomic indicator, household income per year, showed a similar pattern of population percentage differences between Blacks and Whites as the educational attainment variable with a higher percentage of Blacks in the lower brackets. For the first bracket, household income per year between \$0 and \$24,999, there was one state, Hawaii (-7.99%), where the White percentage of the population outnumbered the Black percentage. As for the rest of the states, West Virginia (33.24%) had the largest difference and Alaska (6.72%) had the lowest (see Table 15).

Table 15

*The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Household Income per Year Bracket (a): \$0-24,999*

State	Difference	State	Difference
West Virginia	33.24	Alabama	20.21
Iowa	29.99	New York	19.85
Tennessee	27.74	Washington	19.45
Minnesota	27.54	Texas	19.32
Oklahoma	26.57	Connecticut	18.96
Oregon	24.89	Utah	18.07
Nebraska	24.52	Indiana	17.73
South Carolina	24.47	Colorado	17.42
Ohio	24.33	Virginia	17.39
North Carolina	23.97	Georgia	16.9
Mississippi	23.47	Missouri	16.9
New Mexico	23.36	Delaware	16.44
Pennsylvania	22.74	New Jersey	14.72
Rhode Island	22.28	Florida	14.68
Louisiana	22.21	Massachusetts	14.6
Wisconsin	21.98	Kentucky	14.57
Kansas	21.67	California	13.98
Illinois	21.19	Arizona	12.73
Michigan	20.49	Maryland	8.03
Nevada	20.49	Alaska	6.72
Arkansas	20.24	Hawaii	-7.99

*Note.* Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.

In the bracket of household income between \$25,000 and \$49,000, there was some change in the differences, as six states had more Whites than Blacks in the bracket as a percentage of the population: Michigan, West Virginia, New Mexico, Kansas, Arkansas, and Oregon. The differences in the percentage of the population also became smaller with the largest in Rhode Island (10.36%) and the smallest Ohio (0.06%). See Table 16 for more information.

Table 16

*The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Household Income per Year Bracket (b): \$25,000-49,999.*

State	Difference	State	Difference
Rhode Island	10.36	South Carolina	2.05
Virginia	8.04	Louisiana	2.05
Maryland	6.46	Missouri	2.03
Massachusetts	6.27	Nebraska	1.94
New Jersey	5.99	Minnesota	1.93
Hawaii	5.85	Wisconsin	1.68
Connecticut	5.71	Pennsylvania	1.57
Texas	4.87	Tennessee	1.51
Nevada	4.58	Utah	1.23
Delaware	4.24	Alabama	1.20
California	4.13	Iowa	0.75
New York	3.86	Arizona	0.74
Florida	3.49	Mississippi	0.69
Georgia	3.22	Oklahoma	0.56
North Carolina	3.21	Ohio	0.06
Indiana	3.01	Michigan	-0.45
Colorado	2.84	West Virginia	-0.69
Kentucky	2.75	New Mexico	-1.22
Washington	2.54	Kansas	-1.32
Alaska	2.17	Arkansas	-1.58
Illinois	2.07	Oregon	-3.23

*Note.* Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.

The gap of household income per year between Blacks and Whites was large for those making between \$50,000 and \$74,999. Here, very few states had as a percentage of the population, more Blacks than Whites in this income bracket: Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey, and California. The rest of the states all had more Whites than Blacks, by percentage of the population, within this bracket. Iowa (-10.63%) has the largest difference with Arizona (-0.52%). See Table 17 for more information.



Table 17

*The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Household Income per Year Bracket (c): \$50,000-74,999.*

State	Difference	State	Difference
Hawaii	7.88	New Mexico	-3.42
Maryland	2.05	Missouri	-3.52
New Jersey	1.36	Pennsylvania	-3.77
California	0.15	Utah	-3.86
Arizona	-0.52	Delaware	-3.99
Massachusetts	-0.56	North Carolina	-4.30
Virginia	-0.66	Louisiana	-4.79
Alaska	-0.72	Michigan	-4.79
New York	-0.92	Oregon	-4.85
Washington	-1.12	Nevada	-5.16
West Virginia	-1.39	Alabama	-5.19
Connecticut	-1.59	Kentucky	-5.48
Colorado	-1.63	South Carolina	-5.82
Texas	-2.08	Ohio	-6.23
Georgia	-2.41	Arkansas	-6.40
Illinois	-2.74	Indiana	-6.55
Tennessee	-2.86	Mississippi	-6.61
Kansas	-2.98	Minnesota	-7.66
Florida	-3.21	Nebraska	-8.47
Rhode Island	-3.27	Wisconsin	-9.39
Oklahoma	-3.35	Iowa	-10.63

*Note.* Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.

The household income per state Black/White gap was separated by an even further margin in the final bracket, \$75,000 and above. The state with more Blacks than Whites within this bracket was Connecticut (6.90%). Rhode Island had the largest difference with 26.84% more of the White population than the Black population within this bracket. Hawaii (-5.75%) had the lowest difference (see Table 18).

Table 18

*The Population Percentage Difference for Blacks and Whites for Household Income per Year Bracket (d): \$75,000 and above.*

State	Difference	State	Difference
Connecticut	6.90	Maryland	-16.54
Hawaii	-5.75	Delaware	-16.69
New Mexico	-7.17	Pennsylvania	-16.88
Alaska	-8.16	New York	-17.27
Oregon	-8.70	Kansas	-17.38
West Virginia	-8.83	Mississippi	-17.56
Utah	-10.68	Georgia	-17.69
Kentucky	-11.84	Nebraska	-17.99
Tennessee	-12.00	South Carolina	-18.08
Arkansas	-12.27	California	-18.27
Arizona	-12.94	Wisconsin	-18.28
Oklahoma	-13.35	Colorado	-18.64
Indiana	-14.19	Louisiana	-19.47
Nevada	-14.86	Texas	-19.51
Florida	-14.96	Virginia	-19.93
Michigan	-15.25	Iowa	-20.11
Missouri	-15.41	Massachusetts	-20.33
Washington	-16.09	Illinois	-20.51
North Carolina	-16.13	Minnesota	-21.81
Alabama	-16.22	New Jersey	-22.35
Ohio	-16.30	Rhode Island	-26.84

*Note.* Positive integers indicate that more of the Black population falls within bracket and negative integers indicate that more of the White population falls within bracket.

### Findings for Research Question 1

For the first research question, I focused on a possible relationship between structural components faced by Black Americans in gaining similar socioeconomic status as Whites with self-identified political ideology. Below is the hypothesis

$H_01$ : The higher the perception that discrimination and structural components as causes of the identified gaps, the less likely the respondent will identify as liberal.

$H_{A1}$ : The higher the perception that discrimination and structural components as causes of the identified gaps, the more likely the respondent will identify as liberal.

To test this hypothesis, I ran a forced entry multiple linear regression with the model:  $POLVIEWS_i = b_0 + b_1RACDIF1_i + b_2RACDIF3_i + \varepsilon_i$ . POLVIEWS was transformed from the original 1-7 point scale to account for the differing political ideologies one might ascribe too. *Extremely liberal*, *liberal*, and *slightly liberal* were coded as 0. Moderate was coded as 0.5 and *slightly conservative*, *conservative*, and *extremely conservative* were coded as 1.

I found that discrimination and an equal chance at education beliefs for inequality were not good predictors of political ideology. The two predictors accounted for just 1.7% of variance  $F(2, 203) = 1.77, p > .05$ . Additionally, I found that discrimination as reasons for socioeconomic inequality had a nonsignificant prediction of political ideology ( $\beta = .089, p > .05$ ), as did belief that a lack of opportunity for education ( $\beta = .029, p > .05$ ). See Table 19 for more information.

Table 19

*Are Structural Beliefs of Socioeconomic Inequality Predictors of Black Political Ideology*

Variables	<i>B</i>	SE <i>B</i>	$\beta$
Constant	.328	.099	
Differences Due to Discrimination	.089	.058	.114
Differences Due to Lack of Education	.029	.057	.037

*Note:* No results are statistically significant

### Findings for Research Question 2

For the second research question, I focused on the relationships of political competition in states and the SES for Blacks in those states. Below is the hypothesis:

$H_02$ : The higher political competition is in a state, the less likely household income and education for Blacks will be in higher brackets.

$H_A2$ : The higher political competition is in a state, the more likely household income and education for Blacks will be in higher brackets.

Prior to including the socioeconomic differences of Blacks and Whites, correlations and multivariate regressions were run. For Blacks, there was one significant correlation between educational attainment and political competition and that was with those with a college degree or higher ( $r = -.404$ ). The other three variables were all nonsignificant. For the lower two brackets, there was a positive correlation between educational attainment and political competition: no High School diploma ( $r = .234$ ) and High School diploma ( $r = .163$ ). For the third educational attainment bracket, some College or Associates degree, there was a negative correlation ( $r = -.040$ ). See Table 20 for more information.

There was a positive and significant correlation of political competition and the lower two income brackets for Blacks. That is, there is a positive correlation between political competition and a household income between \$0 and \$24,999 ( $r = .451$ ) and a household income between \$25,000 and \$49,000 ( $r = .404$ ). There was a negative and significant correlation between political competition and a household income between \$50,000 and \$74,999 ( $r = -.466$ ) and a household income of \$75,000 and above ( $r = -.458$ ). See Table 20 for more information.

Table 20

*Correlations Between Socioeconomic Status Variables and Political Competition for Blacks*

Variable	N	Pearson Corr.	Sig.
Political Competition	42	1	
No High School Diploma	37	.234	.163
High School Diploma	37	.163	.336
Some College or Associates	37	-.040	.816
College Degree or Higher	37	-.404	.013
Income Between \$0-24,999	42	.451	.003
Income Between \$25,000-49,999	42	.404	.008
Income Between \$50,000-74,999	42	-.466	.002
Income \$75,000 and Above	42	-.458	.002

Insofar as the correlation between political competition and educational attainment for Whites, there were three significant correlations and one nonsignificant.

Both of the higher educational brackets were significant and positive, some college or an associate's degree ( $r = .403$ ) and a college degree or higher ( $r = .310$ ). As for no high school diploma, there was a positive and significant correlation with political competition ( $r = .320$ ). The non-significant correlation of political competition with educational attainment was with high school diploma, however, it was positive ( $r = .294$ ). See Table 21 for more information.

The correlation between political competition and household income for Whites had two significant results. First, the correlation between those making between \$25,000 and \$49,999 a year and political competition was significant and positive ( $r = .416$ ). Second, the correlation between those making \$75,000 and above and political competition was significant and negative ( $r = -.337$ ). As for the other two brackets, the results were nonsignificant but positive nonetheless: \$0-24,999 ( $r = .243$ ) and \$50,000-74,999 ( $r = .169$ ). See Table 21 for more information.

Table 21

*Correlations Between Socioeconomic Status Variables and Political Competition for Whites*

Variable	N	Pearson Corr.	Sig.
Political Competition	42	1	
No High School Diploma	37	.320	.039
High School Diploma	37	.294	.062
Some College or Associates	37	.403	.008
College Degree or Higher	37	.310	.046
Income Between \$0-24,999	42	.243	.121
Income Between \$25,000-49,999	42	.416	.006
Income Between \$50,000-74,999	42	.169	.285
Income \$75,000 and Above	42	-.337	.029

When examining the percent differences between Blacks and Whites for correlations, none of the educational attainment brackets have significance with political competition. However, the higher educational brackets have a negative correlation: some college or associates ( $r = -.125$ ) and college degree or higher ( $r = -.150$ ). The lower brackets, however, have a positive correlation: no high school diploma ( $r = .206$ ) and high school diploma ( $r = .005$ ). See Table 22 for more information.

The household income per year had two significant and three negative correlations. The first significant result was in the bracket of those making between \$0 and \$24,999, had a positive correlation ( $r = .398$ ). The second significant result was in

the bracket of those making between \$50,000 and \$74,999, had a negative correlation ( $r = -.455$ ). The second and fourth bracket had nonsignificant correlations: between \$25,000 and \$49,999 ( $r = -.175$ ) and \$75,000 and above ( $r = -.226$ ). See Table 22 for more information.

Table 22

*Correlations Between Socioeconomic Status Variables and Political Competition for the Socioeconomic Difference of Blacks and Whites*

Variable	N	Pearson Corr.	Sig.
Political Competition	42	1	
No High School Diploma	37	.206	.220
High School Diploma	37	.005	.976
Some College or Associates	37	-.125	.460
College Degree or Higher	37	-.150	.377
Income Between \$0-24,999	42	.398	.009
Income Between \$25,000-49,999	42	-.175	.268
Income Between \$50,000-74,999	42	-.455	.002
Income \$75,000 and Above	42	-.226	.150

A multivariate regression was run for Black and White racial groups, along with the socioeconomic differences of them. For Blacks, political competition significantly predicted the fourth educational attainment bracket of those with a college degree or higher. Specifically, the results were significant and accounted for 16.3% of the variance,  $F(2, 37) = 6.84, p < .05$ . That is, political competition significantly predicted



the percentage of Blacks with a College degree or Higher ( $\beta = -33.36, t = -2.62, p < .05$ ).

See Table 23 for more information.

Table 23

*Multivariate Regression on Educational Attainment for Blacks over 25: Political Competition*

Dependent Variables	<i>B</i>	SE <i>B</i>	$\beta$
No High School Diploma	21.04	14.75	.234
High School Diploma	17.04	13.70	.163
Some College or Associates	-4.57	19.50	-.040
College Degree or Higher	-33.36	12.75	-.404*

Note: \*  $p < .05$

Insofar as political competition predicting household income per year for Blacks, I found a significant prediction for all four brackets. The bracket that explained the largest amount of variance was bracket (c) or income between \$50,000 and \$74,999 as it explained 21.7% of the variance,  $F(2, 42) = 11.10, p < .05$ . Political competition significantly predicted the percentage of Blacks within bracket (c), ( $b = -27.56, \beta = -.466, t = -3.33, p < .05$ ). See Table 24 for more information.

Table 24

*Multivariate Regression on Household Income per Year for Blacks: Political Competition*

Dependent Variables	<i>B</i>	SE <i>B</i>	$\beta$
Income Between \$0-24,999	82.84	25.93	.451*
Income Between \$25,000-49,999	18.44	6.60	.404*
Income Between \$50,000-74,999	-27.56	8.27	-.466*
Income \$75,000 and Above	-73.70	22.63	-.458*

Note: \*  $p < .05$

In explaining White educational attainment, I found that political competition is not a good predictor. All four variables were nonsignificant (see Table 25).

Table 25

*Multivariate Regression on Educational Attainment for Whites over 25: Political Competition*

Dependent Variables	<i>B</i>	SE <i>B</i>	$\beta$
No High School Diploma	-.53	12.74	-.007
High School Diploma	16.43	17.46	.157
Some College or Associates	7.12	15.41	.078
College Degree or Higher	-17.31	20.27	-.133

*Note:* No results are statistically significant

Insofar as political competition predicting household income per year for Whites, I found that brackets (b) and (d) were statistically significant. Political competition predicted that for Whites making between \$25,000 and \$49,999, 17.3% of the variance was explained  $F(2, 42) = 8.38, p < .05$ . I also found that political competition significantly predicted the percentage of Whites within bracket (b), ( $b = 28.54, \beta = .416, p < .05$ ). For bracket (d), White households making \$75,000 or above each year, 11.34% of the variance was explained. Additionally, I found that political competition significantly predicted the percentage of Whites within bracket (d), ( $b = -55.79, \beta = -.337, p < .05$  [see Table 26]).

Table 26

*Multivariate Regression on Household Income per Year for Whites: Political Competition*

Dependent Variables	<i>B</i>	SE <i>B</i>	$\beta$
Income Between \$0-24,999	22.86	14.43	.243
Income Between \$25,000-49,999	28.54	9.85	.416*
Income Between \$50,000-74,999	4.36	4.02	.169
Income \$75,000 and Above	-55.79	24.67	-.337*

Note: \*  $p < .05$

A multivariate regression was run to see what the relationship was of political competition with differences in the brackets for the socioeconomic measures, educational attainment over the age of 25 and household income per year. Insofar as political competition predicting educational attainment, political competition was not a good predictor. That is, political competition does not significantly predict whether or not, educational attainment for the differences between the populations (see Table 27).

Table 27

*Multivariate Regression on Black/White Educational Attainment over 25 Differences: Political Competition*

Dependent Variables	<i>B</i>	SE <i>B</i>	$\beta$
No High School Diploma	21.58	17.29	.206
High School Diploma	.60	19.74	.005
Some College or Associates	-11.68	15.62	-.125
College Degree or Higher	-16.05	17.94	-.150

Note: No results are statistically significant

When measuring the household income per year difference, I found significant results for bracket (a) and bracket (c). The percentage difference between Blacks and Whites who had incomes between \$0 and \$24,999, 15.9% of the variance was explained,  $F(2, 42) = 7.54, p < .05$ . Political competition significantly predicted the differences between Black and White incomes for bracket (a), ( $b = 58.47, \beta = .398, p < .05$ ). Additionally, I found that political competition significantly predicted the differences in bracket (c), \$50,000-74,999, and 20.7% of the variance was explained,  $F(2, 42) = -31.92, p < .05$ . The differences between Black and White incomes for bracket (c) were ( $b = -31.92, \beta = -.455, p < .05$ ). See Table 28 for more information.

Table 28

*Multivariate Regression on Black/White Household Income per Year Differences:  
Political Competition*

Dependent Variables	<i>B</i>	SE <i>B</i>	<i>B</i>
Income Between \$0-24,999	58.47	21.29	.398*
Income Between \$25,000-49,999	-10.10	8.99	-.175
Income Between \$50,000-74,999	-31.92	9.88	-.455*
Income \$75,000 and Above	-27.01	18.39	-.226

Note: \*  $p < .05$

### Summary

The findings of this study were presented in Chapter 4. First, I attempted to see if there was a relationship with Black beliefs of inequality with Black political ideology. Second, I attempted to see if there was a positive relationship with political competition and four brackets of each socioeconomic measure: educational attainment over 25 and household income per year.

I found that there was no significant relationship of Black political ideology with Black beliefs of inequality. Additionally, of the four brackets for educational attainment differences, there were no significant relationships with political competition found. As for differences in household income per year, I found two significant relationships with political competition. Chapter 5 is a discussion, conclusions for the findings, implications for positive social change, and recommendations for additional studies of ideology and political competition.

## Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

### **Discussion**

In this study, I examined the relationship of Black political ideology with structural issues faced by Black Americans. Additionally, I examined the relationship of statewide political competition with certain structural components of the United States. This chapter is a discussion, some conclusions, and recommendations from the inferences derived from Chapter 4.

Researchers have provided a new approach to political theory. This approach is a less discussed proposition to solving economic problems (Besley et al., 2010). The theoretical foundation for this study was the Lockean social contract theory, specifically, the aspects that include economic competition as it might relate to political competition. In most economic models, economic competition, not monopolies, is valued and cherished (Besley et al., 2010). Rather, I applied the aspects of a competitive economic market to a competitive political environment. When a competitive political environment is created, there should be more bureaucratic or government productivity, and less political corruption that should create greater living standards for all.

### **Conclusions**

In response to Research Question 1, a majority of Blacks believed that they were politically moderate (112) with more considering themselves liberal (102) over conservative (79). I confirmed that Blacks are, as a majority, center-left on the traditional political ideology scale; but, this ideology cannot be explained by structural beliefs of inequality. A majority of Blacks believed that the structural issues identified,

discrimination (62.1%) and educational opportunity (54%), were still reasons for socioeconomic inequality. The relationship of yes responses to these two structural issues did not have a significant relationship with political ideology. I confirmed that Black political ideology is still complicated and more multidimensional than previously thought. The null hypothesis of explanations for inequality predicting political ideology for Blacks failed to be rejected

Although Black political ideology is not predicted by beliefs of structural inequality, there is still something that can be gleaned from this. Party loyalty was not examined in this paper; but, previous researchers have indicated that Blacks are, as a majority, loyal to the Democratic Party (Hajnal & Lee, 2007; Kidd et al., 2007). Perhaps beliefs of structural inequality are better predictors of party loyalty than ideology.

In response to Research Question 2, there are socioeconomic differences between Blacks and Whites. Nationally, 29.26% of Whites have a college degree or higher and 34.57% have an annual household income above \$75,000. On the other hand, nationally, 17.63% of Blacks have a college degree or higher and 18.47% have incomes above \$75,000. More Blacks (33.26%) over the age of 25 either did not finish college or have an associate's degree as compared to Whites (29.69%). It seems that Blacks do not have the necessary resources due to the structural differences shown in the literature as compared to Whites. However, I did not examine this particular aspect of U.S. society. Although it cannot be shown from this research, I believe it would be an important study.

The differences in the educational attainment variables included predictable outcomes. As percentages of each population, more Blacks have high school diplomas

(2.07%). Perhaps this is because of the college degree or higher variable as many Blacks either choose to or cannot, due to structural issues mentioned in this study, attain higher education. The college degree or higher variable indicated that many more Whites per state fall within this bracket than Blacks (-11.63%).

As far as household income per year, the trend from lower incomes to higher fell within expected differences. That is, on average per state, 19.48% more of the Black population than Whites fell in the lowest income bracket. As for the highest income bracket, 15.39% more of the White population fell here. The household incomes per year from \$25,000 and \$74,999 differences were closer.

Political competition per state had a negative, but significant correlation with the percentage of Blacks per state with a college degree or higher ( $r = -.404$ ). As political competition levels rise in U.S. states, Blacks are less likely to have college degrees or higher.

Insofar as household income per year for Blacks, there were positive and significant correlations for the lower income brackets. The higher political competition is, the more likely Blacks will remain in the lower two brackets. As political competition rises, the correlation became negative and significant for Blacks within the higher two brackets.

Political competition had a correlation with Whites getting some college or an associate's degree ( $r = .403$ ) and a college degree or higher ( $r = .310$ ). Political competition had an impact on the educational attainment for Whites. Political



competition also had a positive correlation with the percentage of the White population who did not have a high school diploma ( $r = .320$ ).

Political competition had a positive relationship with the percentage of Whites whose households made between \$25,000 and \$49,999 a year. However, political competition had a negative relationship with White households making over \$75,000 a year. This indicated that states with higher political competition maintain a White middle class.

The differences for Blacks and Whites for educational attainment had no significant relationship with political competition. The differences of Blacks and Whites for household income per year had two significant relationships. That is, the higher that political competition rises, the higher percentage of Blacks that have household incomes \$24,999 and below rises. The second significant correlation for household income differences was with those that made between \$50,000 and \$74,999 per year. Here, the more political competition rises, the more that the White population in a state had household incomes in this bracket. Higher political competition levels indicate that the population of the White middle class is stronger.

A multivariate regression was then run for the Black and White populations and their socioeconomic differences. For Blacks, the four educational attainment brackets were regressed on political competition and the only significant result was for the bracket of college degree or higher holders. The rate of change of the conditional mean of Blacks with a college degree or higher with respect to political competition is estimated to be between -59.25 to -7.47. For each increase in political competition, the percentage of

Blacks in the highest educational bracket decreased by 33.36% was significant at the 95% level and explains just 16% of the variance in the model. Political competition had a negative relationship with educational attainment with just Blacks for the highest educational bracket.

Each of the household income per year brackets for Blacks were significantly predicted, at the 95% level, by political competition. Almost 80% of the variance was likely explained by the model. The percentage of the Black population in the lower income brackets was positive, while the percentage in the upper brackets was negative. These results indicated that the higher political competition is the lower the Black household incomes. I expect that if political competition is high, then Blacks are more likely to have lower income levels.

I found that political competition is not a good predictor of educational attainment for Whites; however, it did significantly predict two of the four household income brackets. Specifically, as political competition levels rise, the percentage of White household incomes with incomes between \$25,000 and \$49,999 also rise. As for the percentage of households with incomes \$75,000 and above as political competition rises, the percentage of White households within this bracket significantly fell.

I also found that political competition, when the differences in educational attainment are found, was a poor predictor with no significant results. When I examined the differences in household income with political competition, however, there were two significant results at the 95% level. Contrary to the alternative hypothesis presented in this study, it appeared that political competition did relate positively to the lowest bracket

of Black household incomes. There was a significant and positive prediction of differences for the lowest income bracket. The higher political competition rises, the more likely Blacks will have the lowest amount of their population in household income. Political competition had a positive relationship with Whites and incomes between \$50,000 and \$74,999. The null hypothesis of political competition relating positively to Blacks in the higher brackets for each socioeconomic measure failed to be rejected.

Although political competition does not have a positive relationship with differences in Black/White SES, there is still much to be learned from this study. Hajnal and Lee (2007) found that unemployed Blacks are more likely to identify with the Republican Party, and is contrary to the upward mobility thesis. That is, unemployed Blacks are 16% more likely to identify as Republican rather than Democratic (Hajnal & Lee, 2007). SES was not a good predictor of certain voting patterns for Blacks. Political competition had a negative relationship with household income differences between Blacks and Whites. The higher the political competition per state, the more likely that Blacks will be in the lowest household income per year bracket. This does not indicate that Blacks in this bracket will be unemployed, rather, it indicate that the higher political competition, the more likely that lower income Blacks contribute to that competition model.

### **Implications for Social Change**

I attempted to see if political competition related positively to certain socioeconomic measures. Political competition increases per capita income per state (Besly et al., 2010; Ghosh, 2010), but there was a gap in the literature as to how this

affected certain racial groups identified by the U.S. Census. Contrary to previous studies, I could make no conclusion that this relationship existed. Rather, it appeared that political competition might create an atmosphere of negative socioeconomic growth for Blacks. The implications for social change appeared to be a reduction in political competition might have stronger results for the household income per year for Black households. It is likely that because Blacks continue to have socioeconomic inferiority than Whites, on average, Blacks will thrive more in states that have lower political competition levels.

It will be important to examine future political competition models and their relationships with socioeconomic measures for different races of U.S. citizens. It appeared that unlike economic competition, where rising tides should lift all boats, political competition results in the maintenance in socioeconomic divides between Blacks and Whites.

### **Recommendations for Further Study**

The multidimensional model for Black political ideology needs further evaluation. Not only do beliefs of structural reasons for Black/White inequality not predict political ideology, but they do not correlate. I found that Blacks are more divided on the ideological spectrum than previously thought, but maintain a center-left structure. One recommendation for this model is to see how Black allegiance to the Democratic Party and Black center-left political ideology are related to historical variables such as the Civil Rights movement, Jim Crow laws, and Affirmative Action.

Insofar as political competition and socioeconomic status, the results were contrary to previous studies (Besley et al., 2010; Ghosh, 2010). However, it should be noted the models used were different where other studies focused on per capita income. The relationship to a government protecting natural rights and socioeconomic status needs further examination. States with higher levels of political competition may be restricting the natural rights of Blacks within those states. Whites may be taking advantage of a system that favors political competition. A politically-competitive state could be predisposed to favoring the racial majority in the state.

These are important questions that need answers. They are important because one of the greatest travesties in the United States is that it still has the SES differences I highlighted between Blacks and Whites. I do not believe that public policies that favor one group over another can necessarily close this gap; however, it appears that the macro political system might already favor one group over the other.

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## Appendix A: Permission To Use Instrument

To measure political competition per state, I received permission of an instrument developed in 2008 from Julianna Pacheco, Ph.D. on 4/23/2012 through email. Below is the transcript:

### Original E-mail

Hi Trevor,

I apologize for my late response. I was at a conference last week and am just now getting caught up on email. I'd be happy to share my measure of political competition.

Did you want it for the state or zipcode level?

Let me know!

Julie

On Wed, Apr 18, 2012 at 11:03 AM, Trevor Smith

> Hi Dr. Pacheco,

>

> I am currently in the proposal stage of my dissertation and have come across

> your measure of political competition from your article: Political

> Socialization in Context: The Effect of Political

> Competition on Youth Voter Turnout.

>

> I was wondering if I could get permission from you to use that measure. I'm

> attempting to see how political competition might affect median Black

> household incomes, if at all.

>

> Thank you for your time,

>

> Trevor Smith, M.A.

## Appendix B: IRB Approval Letter

Dear Mr. Smith,

This email is to serve as your notification that Walden University has approved BOTH your dissertation proposal and your application to the Institutional Review Board. As such, you are approved by Walden University to conduct research.

Please contact the Office of Student Research Administration at [research@waldenu.edu](mailto:research@waldenu.edu) if you have any questions.

Congratulations!

Jenny Sherer  
Operations Manager, Office of Research Ethics and Compliance

Leilani Endicott  
IRB Chair, Walden University



## Appendix C: IRB Approval Number

Dear Mr. Smith,

This email is to notify you that the Institutional Review Board (IRB) has approved your application for the study entitled, "Relationships Between Political Competition and Socioeconomic Status for a Continually Underserved Population: An Analysis of Political Competition in the 50 United States."

Your approval # is 08-08-12-0182323. You will need to reference this number in your doctoral study and in any future funding or publication submissions.

Your IRB approval expires on August 7, 2013. One month before this expiration date, you will be sent a Continuing Review Form, which must be submitted if you wish to collect data beyond the approval expiration date.

Your IRB approval is contingent upon your adherence to the exact procedures described in the final version of the IRB application document that has been submitted as of this date. If you need to make any changes to your research staff or procedures, you must obtain IRB approval by submitting the IRB Request for Change in Procedures Form. You will receive confirmation with a status update of the request within 1 week of submitting the change request form and are not permitted to implement changes prior to receiving approval. Please note that Walden University does not accept responsibility or liability for research activities conducted without the IRB's approval, and the University will not accept or grant credit for student work that fails to comply with the policies and procedures related to ethical standards in research.

When you submitted your IRB application, you made a commitment to communicate both discrete adverse events and general problems to the IRB within 1 week of their occurrence/realization. Failure to do so may result in invalidation of data, loss of academic credit, and/or loss of legal protections otherwise available to the researcher.

Both the Adverse Event Reporting form and Request for Change in Procedures form can be obtained at the IRB section of the Walden web site or by emailing [irb@waldenu.edu](mailto:irb@waldenu.edu): [http://inside.waldenu.edu/c/Student\\_Faculty/StudentFaculty\\_4274.htm](http://inside.waldenu.edu/c/Student_Faculty/StudentFaculty_4274.htm)

Researchers are expected to keep detailed records of their research activities (i.e., participant log sheets, completed consent forms, etc.) for the same period of time they retain the original data. If, in the future, you require copies of the originally submitted IRB materials, you may request them from Institutional Review Board.

Please note that this letter indicates that the IRB has approved your research. You may not begin the research phase of your dissertation, however, until you have received the **Notification of Approval to Conduct Research** e-mail. Once you have received this notification by email, you may begin your data collection.

Both students and faculty are invited to provide feedback on this IRB experience at the link below:

[http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=qHBJzkJMUx43pZegKImdiQ\\_3d\\_3d](http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=qHBJzkJMUx43pZegKImdiQ_3d_3d)

Sincerely,  
Jenny Sherer, M.Ed., CIP  
Operations Manager  
Office of Research Ethics and Compliance  
Email: [irb@waldenu.edu](mailto:irb@waldenu.edu)  
Fax: 626-605-0472  
Tollfree : 800-925-3368 ext. 1341  
Office address for Walden University:  
100 Washington Avenue South  
Suite 900  
Minneapolis, MN 55401

## CURRICULUM VITAE

Trevor K. Smith, Ph.D., M.A.  
trevor.smith@waldenu.edu

### EDUCATION

Ph.D., Public Policy and Administration, 2012  
Walden University, Minneapolis, MN, GPA: 4.0  
Concentration: Public Policy  
Dissertation Topic: Relationships Between Political Competition and Socioeconomic Status in the United States

M.A. in Public Administration, 2009  
Webster University, San Antonio, TX, GPA: 3.53

B.A. in Political Science, Pfeiffer University  
Misenheimer, NC, 2004

### EMPLOYMENT

Research Assistant to President, Pearson & Pipkin, Inc.	May 2012 Present
Political Director, New Day Maryland PAC.	Oct 2011-Present
Researcher/Policy Advisor, Americans for Prosperity/Maryland.	Feb 2011-Oct 2011
Research Director, Charles Lollar for Congress, 5 <sup>th</sup> Congressional District Maryland.	Feb 2010-Nov 2010
Lab Technician, Sterling Medical, San Antonio, TX.	Feb 2009-Nov 2009
Lab Technician, United States Air Force, San Antonio, TX.	Oct 2004-Oct 2008
Intern, Chemung County Government	May 2002-Aug 2002
Intern, Robin Hayes for Congress	Sep 2000-Nov 2000

### CAREER HIGHLIGHTS

- Three years of experience running grassroots, research, and political action committee organizations.
- In-depth knowledge of government and its processes, in both theory and directly
- Managed political campaign polling ensuring results accurate within +/- 5%.
- 10 years of public service in county, federal (Air Force), non-profit, and campaign experiences
- Over 12 years of public policy, administration, and political science education
- Authored over 45 public policy positions, press statements, and opposition papers for campaigns and state political action committees.
- Candidate research, social media and hard mail fundraising, national policy research, Capitol Hill experience, and endorsement writing.
- Maintain and update 2012 election guide as well as candidate contributions. Deal directly with multiple D.C. organizations from private to public.
- Air Force and Operation Iraqi Freedom Veteran.

## **ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

### **Research**

- Authored New Day Maryland's Red Print; a plan that delivers lower tax, less state regulation, and lowers energy cost type policies meant to bring job growth.
- Have identified and brought attention over 20 state legislative bills that could enhance or hurt the state's business climate.
- Crafted policies based on empirical evidence and legislative investigation
- Dissertation focuses on the Black-White socioeconomic gaps that have remained statistically unchanged since the mid-1970's.
- Have spent career working in a multi-ethnic, geographically dispersed, and culturally diverse environments

### **Leadership**

- Helped raise over \$20,000 for various clients since May 2012.
- Devised the \$20.12 for 2012 campaign, raising over \$2,500 in two weeks.
- Grew Team New Day, a state-wide volunteer organization, members from 0 to 300.
- Directed research of an all-volunteer/5 member staff that gathered up-to-date facts for issues that affected citizens of Maryland's 5<sup>th</sup> Congressional District.
- Managed staff on research topics/direction and created a quick access smart book for candidate.
- Taught the proper use and functions of deployment blood donation machines.
- Trained military and civilian staff on proper use, maintenance, and quality control