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The Shift in the Roles of Local Emergency Management Agencies in the Planning and Response to Civil Unrest

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Walden University

College of Health Sciences and Public Policy

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Howard Ray Simons III

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2024

Abstract

The Shift in the Roles of Local Emergency Management Agencies in the Planning and
Response to Civil Unrest

by

Howard Ray Simons III

MA, American Public University, 2016

BS, Frostburg State University, 2002

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

May 2024

Abstract

Local government's response to civil unrest has continually shown a concerning level of unpreparedness and how quickly inundated local government becomes during a response to civil unrest. The theoretical framework used for this study is knowledge management due to its ability to be used in different disciplines like emergency management, safety, and business. This framework is used to get all stakeholders to work in concert to attain strategically planned goals. The research question explored how the local emergency manager's knowledge and experience directly impacted strategic planning, response, and community relations during a civil unrest event? The research design was a case study; as Dooley explained, case study research is one method that excels at understanding complex issues and can add strength to what is already known through previous research. Interviews were performed using a questionnaire and prior civil unrest lesson-learned reports for triangulation and validation of the study. The participants in the study were 11 first responders, police officers, emergency managers, political leaders, and community leaders. The study looked in depth at each participant's information, knowledge, and experience during the civil unrest. The data collected from these interviews were coded for themes that emerged regarding how the participants' knowledge and experience impacted strategic planning. The results from the data found that communication, coordination, and command structure issues were vital in the multiagency response to the Freddie Gray civil unrest. The positive social change this study provided is the need to use the whole community approach effectively to address the disconnect between police, first responders, local governments, and all stakeholders.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study.....	1
Introduction.....	1
Background.....	2
Problem Statement.....	4
Purpose.....	7
Research Question	7
Theoretical Framework.....	7
Nature of the Study	9
Definitions.....	10
Assumptions.....	11
Limitations	12
Significance.....	13
Significance to the Practice.....	13
Significance to Theory	14
Significance of Social Change.....	15
Summary	15
Chapter 2: Literature Review.....	18
Introduction.....	18
Literature Search Strategy.....	18
Theoretical Framework.....	19
Literature Review.....	23

The Right to Protest	24
Incident Command Structure	27
First Responders.....	30
All-Hazard Approach.....	34
Multiagency Coordination	45
Summary	48
Chapter 3: Research Methodology.....	51
Introduction.....	51
Research Design.....	52
Role of the Researcher	53
Methodology	54
Data Collection	57
Credibility	59
Transferability.....	60
Dependability	61
Confirmability.....	61
Ethical Procedures	61
Summary	62
Chapter 4: Results.....	64
Research Setting.....	64
Demographics	65
Data Collection	65

Data Analysis	66
NIMS and ICS.....	69
Actions of the Police	70
Forms of Communication in an Incident	71
Planning Between Different Agencies and Jurisdiction	72
Groups Involved or Affected by Civil Unrest.....	73
Lessons Learned/ After Action Reports.....	74
Evidence of Trustworthiness.....	76
Credibility	76
Transferability.....	77
Dependability	77
Confirmability.....	78
Summary	78
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations	80
Interpretation of findings	80
Limitations	84
Recommendations.....	84
Social Change	88
Conclusion	89
References.....	91
Appendix A-A: Interview Protocol.....	99
Appendix A-B: Interview Protocol.....	101

Appendix C: SECI Knowledge Management Framework.....	104
Appendix D: Coding and Themes.....	105

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Introduction

A protest has always been one of the most popular and effective tools for social and political groups to exercise freedom of speech. Some of the most iconic protests that became civil unrest events have shaped modern ways of life by shaping laws and how businesses are run in the United States. However, when a protest has transitioned from a peaceful to a civil unrest event, local governments have often fallen short in organizing a response. In this study, I attempted to address how the profession of emergency management (EM) can be used in strategic planning efforts and responses to civil unrest. EM responders have shown their ability to plan and prepare for any form of disaster and demonstrate why they are essential for planning, mitigation, response, and recovery before and during a civil unrest event. This qualitative case study could be used to gain an in-depth understanding of the social aspect of communities that have been affected by civil unrest.

The theory of knowledge management (KM) presented by Rhem (2017) focused on the need for relevant information to be promptly received in a disaster or crisis. So that first responders, critical leadership, and nongovernment agencies can make informed planning and response decisions. For this reason, KM was used as a framework to guide this study. The data gathered for this study came from interviews with emergency managers, first responders, community leaders, and political leaders who were part of the command staff during the civil unrest event in Baltimore, Maryland, known as the Freddie Gray riots. This study also looked at the social issues found within communities

facing financial and social-political inequities that can be one of the problems contributing to the different catalysts igniting civil unrest events.

Chapter 1 provided the background of this study and how strategic planning and the use of emergency management have a connection with the problem statement and the purpose of this study. I introduced the research questions that addressed the problem, a framework for the analysis, and the study's design. Definitions of key concepts and terms provided assist the reader in understanding the topics being discussed. The scope and limitations help the research focus. In the significance section, I identified the potential contributions to the field of emergency management and the social change implications of the research being conducted.

Background

Public demonstrations are not a new phenomenon; it is a right of the people to be able to voice their opinions to change policies or bring attention to injustices. According to the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (2015):

The First Amendment expressly protects the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly by participants; law enforcement personnel involved in mass demonstration management have a legal duty to protect these rights.” (p. 4)

The lines become blurred when the social issues that are protested are caused by the agencies that are supposed to protect the public during a demonstration. During a demonstration, an officer may use too much force, or the high tension, strong emotions, and unruly protesters may incite a protest to turn into civil unrest. The need for proactive actions such as training, strategic planning, and focus on community resilience programs

have been voiced in after-action reports from Baltimore, Maryland, and Ferguson, Missouri.

The primary function of an EM agency is to address issues using the comprehensive emergency model of the disaster cycle (preparedness, response, recovery, mitigation). According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA, 2020), the EM cycle is a process used by organizations to plan and reduce the impact of disasters. Each phase of the process has a role in the strategic planning to address possible community needs that are presented by civil unrest.

The purpose of the EM cycle is to provide a framework that can be used to manage any form of man-made or natural disaster, including a terrorist attack. To accomplish this primary function of the EM cycle, It has been an ongoing process to define the term *disaster*. In early attempts to define the term, social scientists Quarantelli et al. (2005) attempted to define what a disaster is. Quarantelli et al. argued that disasters are social constructions defined by the nature of their impact on social systems. Kreps (2005) explained how the term disaster is a vague term that provides a simple interpretation of the term “disasters.” Throughout the years, there have been many definitions of a disaster provided to the field of EM by different fields of science and practitioners of other specialties. At the same time, each area has defined the term for different needs and reasons. The overlapping concept in the various definitions is that a disaster is a social phenomenon. Mizrahi (2020) viewed it as a cross-cultural system aspect of disasters that can be characterized as a social event arising from a process involving a sociocultural system’s failure to protect its population from external or

internal vulnerabilities. (Mizrahi 2020) further described it as the collapse of cultural protections found in laws and public norms that have failed to deflect the threatening forces of a natural or man-made disaster.

In the study of disasters, Drabek (2007) explained that humanists have performed various examinations that revealed the outcome has progressively been considered catastrophes to be demonstrations of God or the compelling force of nature. However, disasters that man creates are created to challenge or decay the social structure found inside networks, which are straightforwardly or in a roundabout way, evident reason for calamities.

Throughout the years, there have been many definitions of the term “disaster” provided to the field of EM by different researchers across specialties. The overlapping concept in the various definitions is that a disaster is a social phenomenon. The use of EM can provide training, and planning, improve communication practices, and offer a cohesive multi-agency structure during a disaster response.

Problem Statement

Police misconduct has been an ongoing focus within communities. An increasing number of protests in response to police misconduct have galvanized urban communities and community leaders, leading to mass protests which have at times become major riots and civil unrest events. In most cases, the transition from peaceful protest to civil unrest was incited by an unlawful few (Rickford 2015). The terms “civil unrest”, “uprising”, “insurrection”, and “riots” are used interchangeably, depending on the context and the reason of the individual or group using the term to describe the event. Each of these terms

are defined differently from each other based on legal statutes. Strenheimer (2012) provided an outlook on the term “civil unrest” by describing it as a broad term that embodies both riots and uprising. Strenheimer further expanded his definition of “civil unrest” as inactivity arising from a mass act of civil disorder sparked by an action of a party or group that leads to violent action toward a different social or political party. “Riot” was defined by the federal Anti-Riot Act of 1968 as “a public disturbance involving acts of violence by one or more individual’s part of an assemblage of three or more persons whose actions constitute a present clear danger of or shall result in damage or injury to the property of any other persons or the persons of any other individual”. The National Fire Protection Association (2016) defined civil unrest as “acts of violence and disorder detrimental to the public law and order, with small or large groups of people protesting against major sociopolitical issues.” Insurrection or uprising is defined as an organized attempt by a group of people to defeat their government and take control of their country, usually by force or violence.

This study focused on the problem of how the local government’s response to civil unrest has continually shown a concerning level of unpreparedness and how quickly local government resources became inundated during a response to civil unrest. During civil unrest, an EM agency is called upon in leadership or a supportive function to manage multiagency and nongovernment resources during a response. In either leadership or supportive function, an emergency manager or the EM agency has to understand the concepts of Quarantelli’s (2007) 10 principles for disaster management that describe disasters as not just about a life safety response; they are the management

and coordination between multi-agency or multi-jurisdictional resources that will develop plans or mechanisms to allow the transfer of knowledge that will help coordinate decision making throughout planning and response.

The problem in past riot responses was that the local EM agencies lacked adequate approaches and rules for managing mass demonstrations and did not fittingly perceive the degree of the vital and strategic qualification between routine activities and mass demonstrations (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2015). These inadequacies have caused a reactive approach to riot responses in local government. In other forms of disaster response, local EM agencies have developed proactive strategic planning and mitigation efforts. EM has become better integrated into the mainstream of everyday government operations. According to Curnin (2015), EM framework has not often been used properly until there is significant risk to life and property, or negative press has directly affected the local political leader's longevity. Mangeri (2015) explained that order and structure are the results of EM. A civil unrest plan needs to effectively deliver communication regarding control and supervision. The definitive parameters of the incident command structure are crucial when handling civil unrest events. Common turmoil can reach nearby urban communities relying upon the social issue; it may be the impetus for different urban areas or common agitation episodes across the nation.

The gap found in the literature was that there is little to no data explaining the role of local EM agencies involved in the planning and response to civil unrest. In the after-action reports of the past significant riots that occurred in the Baltimore, Maryland disaster and Ferguson, Missouri, there was a need for local EM agencies to address

strategic planning in response to civil unrest. This study attempted to address the gap found in the literature on how the early use of EM planning can have a positive and proactive effect on the future response to civil unrest.

Purpose

The aim of this qualitative study was to research how the field of EM can work together with communities and local agencies to identify further social issues that may become a catalyst for future civil unrest. I followed the FEMA (2022) strategic national vision for EM for 2022 to 2026 to build a preparedness culture by addressing socially and politically charged disasters from local government and local EM levels. EM presents itself as a paradox with the use of meticulous planning and logistics ability are needed for long term multi-hazard planning, but it can also be spontaneous, with the ability to adapt and improvise based on the resources of a local government.

Research Question

Research Question (RQ): How does the local emergency manager's knowledge and experience directly impact strategic planning, response, and community relations during a civil unrest event?

Theoretical Framework

I used the knowledge management framework as the conceptual framework for my study. The knowledge management framework, as explained by Milton and Lambe (2019), is a framework that can be used in different disciplines like risk management and safety management. These disciplines represent how one manages an organization's behaviors that enforce the importance of safety and risk management. Each of these

disciplines has a process that needs to be continually managed from top to bottom and from the bottom to the top. This framework suggests that an organization can achieve its goals if all stakeholders can work in concert to attain strategically planned goals by sharing information. This idea applies to efforts to prepare for strategic planning, respond effectively, and mitigate different emergency events and disasters to foster the collective knowledge of all responsible entities (Senevirantne et al., 2010).

There are three forms of knowledge in knowledge management: (a) explicit, (b) tacit, and (c) implicit Dey, (2018). According to Dey, these types of knowledge are used to share and disseminate knowledge throughout organizations. For this study, I used all three knowledge types to explain how emergency managers, first responders, government agencies, and communities need to plan and respond to social issues that lead to civil unrest. (Dey 2018) explained that explicit knowledge is the most basic form of knowledge and is easy to pass along because it is written and accessible. In EM, this consists of the policies and procedures for responses. Implicit knowledge is a practical application of explicit knowledge. Emergency managers can put plans and policies in place when responding to a disaster. Tacit knowledge is gained from personal experience and context, which can be more challenging to express in the process of sharing (Milton 2019). In EM, practitioners are not getting the experience to manage certain disasters properly. Each knowledge type is used in the field of EM through knowledge gained and lessons learned and are specified by an EM practitioner. This information must be used in a systematic knowledge system to be effective in EM.

Nature of the Study

A qualitative case study was used to examine the need for early planning in response to civil unrest to evaluate the research problem. The use of a case study design was explained by Yin (2017) as one that gives the researcher the ability to understand issues and the phenomena and gain context about how things occurred and how they affected the environment being studied. Hancock and Algozzine (2021) explained that a case study is a method of research that encourages the investigation of a phenomenon inside its setting by using an assortment of information sources. Hancock et al. also stated that this guarantees the issues being investigated are not through one viewpoint, but an assortment of focal points, which considers various features of the phenomenon to be uncovered and comprehended. There is a crucial need to understand how early strategic planning can improve the local government's response in EM; I intend to meet this need through the interviews conducted for this study with different subjects from varying agencies within the communities where civil unrest incidents occurred.

Having insight regarding the knowledge of the administrative ability of a local government EM agency is essential to understand how to use its framework for planning to respond to civil unrest. To gain this understanding, there is a need to gather comprehensive data to recognize how all agencies respond to civil unrest. Interviews were conducted with members of the Baltimore Maryland EM agency, Baltimore Police Department (BPD), and other local government agencies to gain an understanding of the connection between communities. The sample population for this study to be interviewed will be three to five participants. The participants included people who have first-hand

experience responding to or providing resources to those who responded to the civil unrest. The interview questions focused on future strategic planning and their responsibility to improve relationships with their surrounding communities. The other data collected for this study came from case studies and after-action reports from different riots that occurred in the past five years in other urban areas.

Definitions

All-hazard: A natural or manmade incident requiring actions to not only protect life, property, environmental, health, and safety but also minimize the disruption of social, economic, and government services or activities (National Response Framework Resource Center, 2008).

Civil unrest: Inactivity arising from a mass act of civil disorder sparked by an action of a party or group that leads to violent action toward a different social or political party (Suleiman, 2016).

Emergency management: The discipline and profession of applying science, technology, planning, and management to deal with extreme events that can injure or kill significant numbers of people, do extensive property damage, and disrupt communities (Sylves, 2019).

Emergency manager: One that creates the framework within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters (Canton 2013).

Explicit knowledge: Knowledge that is easy to articulate, write down, and share (Daklir, 2017).

Implicit knowledge: The application of explicit knowledge. These skills are transferable from one job to another (Daklir 2023).

Knowledge management: Develops systems and processes to acquire and share intellectual assets. To increase practical, actionable, and meaningful information and seeks to improve both individual and team learning (Daklir 2023).

Strategic planning: The formal process that allows an organization to come together and assess the external environment, evaluate the internal workings, and plan accordingly (Ebener, 2015).

Riot: An unlawful disturbance of the peace by an assembly of numerous people acting unruly (Links, 2015).

Protest: An organized demonstration of disapproval about a situation such as social injustice, change in-laws, a government policy, or an institutional action with a common purpose in a violent or tumultuous manner that threatens or terrorizes the public

Assumptions

Simon and Goes (2013) explained assumptions are required to conduct research. Assumptions are statements, actions, or beliefs about a study that the researcher believes cannot be proven. Yet, within a study, one cannot assume that the study's assumptions cannot be proven but justify that each assumption can be addressed in the proposal. For this study, I assumed that I could interest emergency manager practitioners, first responders, community, and local government leaders to participate in the study. Epistemological assumption in conducting this study was the researcher's attempt to get as close as possible to the participants taking part in the study. Ravitch (2016) described

this assumption that all knowledge could be gained through an empathic understanding of the participants' experience in this work. There was also an assumption that the knowledge gathered can influence the interpretation of the data.

I assumed that I could find an increase in reports and lessons learned on civil unrest events and how planning played a vital role in response to a demonstration before it turned into a civil unrest event. I assumed that participants in the study would answer every interview question honestly and in detail to provide validity to the study.

Limitations

In a qualitative study a researcher has certain limitations that will have an effect on the study. Simon and Goes (2013) described limitations as constraints in a study that can be caused by the flow of the methodology or choices within the study design. In a qualitative study, the researcher must accept inherent limitations, which they have little to no control over. In this acceptance and acknowledgement of these limitations, These limitations found within the context of the present study might affect the conclusions that can be drawn from the research.

Another possible limitation of this research was not being able to generalize the findings of the study because the sampling was conducted purposefully, and all of the participants will be from Baltimore, Maryland. Another limitation was the ability of the participants to recall accurate and essential details about their experiences during the civil unrest. Baltimore's civil unrest event occurred in 2015, and this study was performed in 2022. The human mind may not be able to recall details in total accuracy or its proper sequential order as they occurred in real-time.

Significance

This study addressed how stakeholders can utilize KM to transfer explicit, tacit, and implicit knowledge and communication into planning between multiple agencies while including the communities as a part of the planning and response when social issues are the catalyst of a disaster. This becomes a vital part of early preparedness and strategic planning in response to civil unrest events. Multiple action reports have presented arguments regarding the need for early preparation for civil unrest response. This point has been continually stressed by local EM agencies and NGOs directly affected by the destruction caused by civil unrest and the mismanagement of their response.

EM is a continually developing field that has used any disastrous event's failure and success to improve its overall practice. Civil unrest brings a different element to EM practitioners, given that social issues are the cause and the catalyst for civil unrest. Mileti (1999) explained that sociocultural and sociodemographic factors have grown in recognition that they influence disaster preparedness and response. This study addressed the need for strategic management and preparation in understanding how social issues directly affect how emergency managers prepare and plan for a disaster.

Significance to the Practice

The practice of EM is the discipline and profession of applying science, technology, planning, and management to deal with extreme events that can disrupt communities, cripple every level of government, and exacerbate social issues. EM practitioners use the four phases of the EM cycle, which include: (a) preparedness, (b)

response, (c) recovery, and (d) mitigation, to build an all-hazard approach to be ready for all forms of disasters and events. EM practitioners have been ineffective in planning and responding to disasters (Flanagan et al., 2011).

Agencies and organizations focus only on developing emergency response plans that are explicitly based on the resources and practices that the single agency uses. This misuse of all-hazards concepts births a closed loop of developing strategies with other organizations and agencies. Flanagan et al. (2011) clarified that one of the most contended shortcomings of the all-Hazard approach was the endeavor to simultaneously relieve both cataclysmic events and psychological oppression. This danger has a place with two isolated and unmistakable classifications. The focus of this study was on policy development and planning that goes beyond the fundamental theories of EM. The aim was to address the need for policy development and planning based on the social and cultural issues that lead to disasters based on an outside catalyst within the community.

Significance to Theory

EM is a field that is forever evolving based on lessons learned from past disaster events. There is a need for policies and strategies that help address social disasters like civil unrest. Civil unrest is not a formal disaster event that emergency practitioners and EM agencies respond to typically or develop plans for this type of event. Understanding the deep rooted destruction that civil unrest causes a community makes the development of strategic planning essential to collaboratively work with local government, community leaders, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for a successful response. The development of standard practice helps with the issues found in response to Baltimore,

Maryland's Freddy Gray civil unrest and others that occurred in Ferguson, Missouri, and Charlottesville, Virginia.

Significance of Social Change

The underlying theory and function of the field of EM is the development of practices that protect the communities that are served. Milleti (2016) addressed this by explaining tragedy's misfortunes coming from startling occasions that originated from three significant frameworks, including: (a) the physical condition like the social and segment occasions; (b) the networks that experience them; and (c) structures, streets, and other built situations, of the networks. This study addressed the need for EM to plan for a disaster based on social needs and issues. Planning for a demonstration with the help of local government, community leaders, first responders, and EM agencies can mitigate the loss of life and property. Being a bridge to protect demonstrators' First Amendment rights and opening dialogue between all agencies to perform the task will help ensure the people's voice will be heard.

Summary

The field of EM has made a considerable amount of academic and professional achievement for just being considered an accredited profession and field. Professional EM practitioners should be able to adapt, plan, command, and manage any form of disaster. The area of EM can also be considered as a field that is still in its development stage as a discipline. This study introduced a topic to the field of EM that can help with making strides toward growth and development by viewing social issues not as merely

community issues that are based on geographic location but rather as a form of a disaster that a natural or man made disaster can exacerbate.

I examined the ineffective responses to civil unrest events by local governments in urban cities. Civil unrest is a different category of disaster that is not known as a normal response for emergency managers and governments. Emergency managers and local governments have not developed plans, policies & producers, and programs that address the social construct in civil unrest. Civil unrest causes the same human and property damage that natural and man made disasters can cause but planning and responding to civil unrest has a level of complexity that goes beyond the necessary level of planning by a single government agency. Civil unrest represents an acute or chronic circumstance, an earnest emergency on previous social and auxiliary issues (Wen et al., 2015). Many chronic disasters that urban communities like Baltimore face involved poverty.

In Chapter 2, I proposed that emergency managers should use the framework of KM to develop a system that would share knowledge with multiple organizations that are part of the government and non government organizations. Each organization should work toward developing strategic planning for demonstrations before they become civil unrest and plan for the response when protests evolve into civil unrest.

The field of EM is adaptable and is always in transition to be used to manage different emergencies and disasters. In the next chapter, a more comprehensive look at the field of EM is presented, which will involve exploring, analyzing, and evaluating the literature found in the field of EM. This pursuit addressed the gap in the literature to

grasp how the field of EM can be used in the planning and response to social issues like a protest that leads to a civil unrest event. The next chapter will introduce the literature review that will describe and identify other scholarly studies found on EM, planning, and civil unrest. These scholarly articles were synthesized to communicate the strength of the available evidence and the quality of the articles.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

This literature review focused on social issues and protests, EM, and the adaptation of knowledge management. The social problem, specifically racial division, has plagued society for centuries, and protests have been the last resolve to reach a positive outcome in being heard. The need to deal with these social issues before or after protesting, EM could or should be a tool to gain an understanding of the emotional conflict of the demonstration. This is where adaptation of KM becomes an essential tool in training, and the knowledge base of first responders would be of great value in extinguishing social conflicts.

Literature Search Strategy

For this study, the literature review utilized peer-reviewed articles, journals, dissertations, and books and after-action report documents from 2018 through 2024 on protest, civil unrest, knowledge management, EM, and strategic planning. The strategy used for this literature review included simultaneous searches of numerous databases, using the Walden University database Thoreau search, Sage search, EBSCOhost, Homeland Security Digital Library, the Journal of Emergency Management, and the Journal of Homeland and Emergency Management to identify the relevant literature throughout multiple databases. The following keywords were used: *emergency management, civil unrest, riots, protest, knowledge management, strategic planning, and disaster planning*. The focus of the research timeline was five years, 2018–to 2024; some essential research was found beyond the targeted five years of research range. There were

few current results and peer-reviewed articles connecting EM, riots, protest, and civil unrest during the search for these key terms. There were many articles on emergency and disaster management; more than half of them did not fit in the 2018 through 2024 range. KM is considered a new information management process; there was a large amount of research on the topic. There are some articles used in the study that are dated before 2018.

Theoretical Framework

Knowledge management theory (KM) was chosen as the theoretical framework for this study due to the need for multiple agencies to work together to share information to plan and respond to demonstrations and civil unrest events and could provide a way to do this. KM was initially a business model to help develop data and information to increase profits and the growth of companies. Becerra-Fernandez and Sabherwal (2024) stated that KM improves an association's ability to contend effectively in a significantly more condition. Associations became progressively esteemed for their scholarly capital that has tangible benefits. Over the past decades, KM has become more than just a business framework, and it has evolved to have different applications.

KM entered widespread usage in the late 1980s, and Peter Drucker was the first to coin the phrase "knowledge worker" in the early 1960s. Dalkir (2023) described how Drucker focused on learning how organizations can ascertain from their experience and store what they learned in a system to be reused. Over the years, the importance of organizational knowledge as a competitive asset was recognized by several people who saw the value in being able to measure intellectual assets. It was not until 2003 that KM

was accepted as a discipline. Dalkir further identified some of the key management theorists that have contributed to the growth of the field of KM from 1960 to the 2000s, which are Drucker, Senge, Nonaka, Takeuchi, and Stewart. Before KM was accepted into academia, it went through stages of development to become recognized as a discipline.

Dalkir (2023) provided an account of the history and growth of KM that can be explained in four stages of KM growth. In the first stage, the business realized that internal communication and information sharing were lacking, negatively affecting profits. Understanding this issue, resources were invested in improving and growing information technology, communication, and information-sharing resources. It would increase profit for companies, which would have a positive effect on the company's bottom line. When the Internet emerged, the ability to share information also increased, which turned the sharing of data into a profit. With the creation of every new product, it must be given a name that embodies the product or its use, so KM was created.

Koenig (2004) identified the second stage of KM was driven by identifying the human and cultural dimensions. This stage introduced the learning of organization and how to cultivate tacit knowledge. Senge's (2006) work was responsible for a learning organization. Bratianu (2019) credited Nonaka e with not focusing on the human factor of KM implementation; they also focused on the creation of knowledge as well as the sharing and communication of knowledge.

McInerny (2011) described the third stage as recognizing content and an awareness of the importance of retrievability and the arrangement, descriptions, and structure of content. During this stage, a summit was held for the chief knowledge

officer. During this summit, taxonomies emerged as a major topic, which developed the phrase, “content management.” With the development of technology and different forms of sharing and storing data, KM has become far more functionally present in other disciplines.

The two primary dimensions of KM are tacit and explicit. When defining tacit and explicit knowledge, they are simplistic in definition of each term because each term is represented a paradox within each term. Dalkir (2023) explained this paradox by stating that the more troublesome it is to demonstrate an ability or an idea, the more critical that information ought to be. Valuable tacit knowledge is often only observable so that people can learn that knowledge. (Dalkir 2023) further explained transmission of tacit knowledge is found in an intimate form such as socialization, observation, and apprenticeship. This knowledge is considered property to the user, which can make it difficult for the owner of the knowledge to articulate in a formal setting. This is what makes tacit knowledge so valuable.

Explicit knowledge can easily be transferred or articulated by the user either impersonally or formally. EM is a field that has made its advancement from explicit knowledge found in FEMA incident management courses, lessons learned, and college degrees to drive the overall development practice of EM. The tacit knowledge shared comes from the firsthand connection and communication between organization leaders.

McInerny and Koenig (2011) explained that Nonaka and Takeuchi were known as two of the most prominent theorists in the KM domain. They developed the socialization, externalization, combination, and internalization (SECI) model. The SECI model was a

process where knowledge goes from within an individual's own stored knowledge into a more explicit state that can be shared socially with others. Information was shared through externalization and combined with what an individual learns via their experiences and personal beliefs. This information could then be used in an internalization stage where an individual takes the information and incorporates it within. The SECI model shows how knowledge has been dynamically changing and synthesized.

KM has been used to argue that an organization can achieve its goals if all stakeholders can work in conjunction to attain strategically planned goals by sharing information. Knowledge sharing has occurred when individuals exchange relevant information, ideas, suggestions, and expertise by requiring careful transmission by the sender and careful absorption by the receiver to effect change and cooperation. This thought endorsed in KM is practiced in getting ready for vital arranging, reacting, and alleviating in various crisis occasions and calamities that cultivate the aggregate information on every mindful element (Senevirantne et al., 2010).

The importance of sharing knowledge was essential, and there is a need to use a standard form to share knowledge effectively between organizations. In this study, the KM cycle (KMC) was used. This seven-step process identified or created, stored, shared, used, learned, and improved knowledge (Evans et al., 2013). Evans et al. described that a knowledge request triggers numerous strategic or operational decision-making reasons. When the knowledge has been requested, the searcher has to identify if it already exists and if it does not, the knowledge has to be created. After analyzing the knowledge, it is deemed valuable and has to be stored to be used as part of the organization's files or

corporate portals. During the sharing stage of the cycle, this knowledge can be shared internally and externally. Evans et al. explained that the planning and recurrence of sharing this information could be prebuilt or refreshed as required between the offices and workers who have access. The use of knowledge could be applied throughout a shared group to promote problem-solving, improve efficiency, and promote innovation in planning.

Evans et al. (2013) stated that users have the ability to deconstruct knowledge to refine, integrate, connect, combine, and understand the value of the learned knowledge. If the knowledge being used was found to be insufficient to provide positive use, it required the organization to go back to the creation and identify the stage of the cycle. The learning phase of the KMC can be considered a part of the process or just to identify that this knowledge will help. Evans et al. mentioned that leaders must make decisions to archive, retire, or transfer knowledge outside the organization for further use and time for refinement.

Literature Review

In this chapter, I highlighted the literature found on the right to protest. While also discussing knowledge management, the EM cycle, incident command system, all-hazard approach, and the multiagency response. All of these are mechanisms that emergency managers have used for planning, response, and the sharing of communication and knowledge before or during an event. Rhem (2017) explained that during disasters or a crisis, knowledge has been exchanged and transferred rapidly in real-time to and from the incident commander to the operations unit, tactical group, and to geographical locations

during a disaster and during a larger scale event, it can also be agency to agency. While each of these systems have been used at different junctures in the planning and response to an event, the transfer of knowledge within these systems can be vital to the success of the response to an event.

The Right to Protest

Protests have always been the voice of people who take action against social and political issues. Protests occur in different forms that can be complex or simple. In general, protests have been either violent or nonviolent. The United States government has guaranteed the right of its citizens to protest nonviolently in the forms of demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, letter-writing campaigns, or occupying government buildings.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution established that the government cannot restrain or constrict the freedom of speech of a citizen and the press. While freedom of speech is promoted by the First Amendment, Lakier (2021) explained that in the past decade one of the most powerful mechanisms of individual rights is the First Amendment but we must understand that not all forms of free speech are absolute. Some forms of speech can be contested or outright prohibited based on topic and location. The First Amendment protects groups and organizations that take part in nonviolent protests. The First Amendment does not protect violent protests in the forms of civil unrest, warfare, acts of terrorism, or kidnapping. Some groups believe that violent protest is necessary to promote genuine social and political change (Ruane, 2014). The most recent example of a form of protest that goes directly against the First Amendment

was the attack on the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021. The United States Senate's report (2021) stated that this was an unprecedented attack on this country's democratic process of voting. This attack on the U.S. Capital can and should be described as an insurrection against the United States government. An insurrection has been defined by case law "as a violent uprising by a group, organization, or movement acting for the specific purpose of overthrowing the government or seizing control and power from the government" (Iglesias, 2021, p. 44). On January 6, 2021, President Trump gave a speech on how the election results were rigged. Iglesias (2020) explained President Trump gave a speech that incited the insurrection by stating that he won the election in a sacred landslide election. "If the Left did not admit that Biden lost the election and stopped the certification of the election results. The people should march to Pennsylvania and march to the senate to give courage to the weak Republicans to not certify the election results". The comments from this speech empowered the crowd to attack the Capitol hoping to stop the election certification. An insurrection is a high-profile event that happened on the federal level against the United States. The focus of this study was based on the response on a local government level.

According to the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (2015), activists considered nonviolent protests to be a central right, just as security against a severe government, social unfairness, or political talk. In this study, I highlighted the relationship between the demonstrations that turned into civil unrest events, like those that occurred in Ferguson, Missouri and Charlottesville, Virginia, Berkeley University and the insurrection of the United States Capitol attack. Each of the aforementioned

events overwhelmed the ability of the local government response system. The main focus of the research was the Freddie Gray riots in Baltimore, Maryland. According to the Institute for Intergovernmental Research, Baltimore riots were fueled by the deaths of African American men namely Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, and Michael Brown, at the hands of the police all from 2014 to 2015. Those other instances caused the death of Freddie Gray in 2015 to result in a violent protest that required Baltimore's mayor to ask the governor to activate the National Guard for six days and issue a curfew after arson and looting took place in predominantly minority and economically depressed areas of Baltimore.

The social tension that caused communities to protest these events was just a part of the catalyst that turned a protest into civil unrest. Police response to the social issue that was being protested or the protest itself has become a trigger for civil unrest. George (2014) provided historical evidence of the effect that police have on protests. The historically militarized aggression from the protests of the 1950s to the protests of 2015 has left urban communities looking for ways to be heard. The deaths of Black men and women at the hands of police officers have left minorities with deep feelings regarding the inability of minorities to find justice, which has spawned community rights groups like Black Lives Matter, which was started as a hashtag.

Community based groups like Black Lives Matter take on police brutality and the unjust treatment of people in the Black community. Since the Ferguson protest in 2014, Black Lives Matter has been the primary mantra for the people to bring light to the issues that have been plaguing Black communities in urban areas for years. Russell (2016)

described the “Black Lives Matter” movement as the young reenergizing more seasoned exercises to work with the new age activist. That was pursuing a simple, vote-based, activist campaign, resolved to stay self ruling from the American political foundation. The Black Lives Matter movement has brought different forms of post-segregation police tactics to the forefront of public awareness. (Russell 2016) described the most well-known systems including: (a) stop-and-search, (b) extraordinary observation, and (c) enslave as opposed to serving and secure. All of these techniques have fostered deep-rooted resentment towards law enforcement among minority communities.

During a peaceful protest, the tension between police and protesters can become high based on the police’s tactics and the perception of why the police are there. The visual animosity that neighborhood police display in their strategic apparatus during a reaction to a civil unrest event can cause incremental strain among protestors and cops which can eventually become the reason for brutal activities from each gathering (McCord, 2014). According to McCord, police should be there to serve, and ensure requests for nonconformists to practice their First Amendment rights can be practiced.

Incident Command Structure

The World Trade Center terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 provided insight from the response that there was a need to develop a comprehensive national approach to manage large and small incidents involving multiple agencies and multiple jurisdictions. Kastros et al. (2019) explained the importance of ICS during Command of fire ground, the incident command system (ICS) based on a variety of principles, including: (a) hierarchical modular organization; (b) the span of control; (c) establishment; and (d)

transfer of command, chain of command, unity of command, accountability, and information sharing Under Homeland Security Directive [HSPD] 5. The federal government adopted the National Interagency Incident Management (NIMS) plan and ICS that was developed by the California wildland fire program, FIRESCOPE. Under HSPD 5, every local government had to adopt the incident management system to gain federal funding for Homeland Security and EM. Early implementation and the use of the ICS system were slow. Most organizations and agencies ignored the system, underused it, or did not use the ICS at all. Jensen and Waugh explained that fire services were the only agency that studied and employed ICS in their executive officer training.

Canton (2020) described that the ICS' main function was to establish a clear and present leadership to coordinate response and resources. Over the years, the use of the ICS has improved how every local government and NGO respond to everyday emergencies. Civil unrest cannot be viewed as a normal or an everyday emergency for local fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and police agencies. The speed and dynamic movement of a protest turned into a civil unrest event can overwhelm any command structure that has had experience dealing with any form of emergency.

In Baltimore, civil unrest issues with ICS glared through the inability to maintain a command structure that could provide clear leadership separation between city wide ICS and BPD operations commanded respect and discipline around ICS roles. The incident commander did not consistently appear to have full, unambiguous, and uncontested authority to manage the city-wide incident. The commander has been extensively involved in BPD operational-level tactical decision-making. These actions

eroded the trust that the commander had to have in the operational level of the command system, which led to the ineffectiveness that the commander had during the incident. To address the issues of ICS in Baltimore's civil unrest, recommendations in the after-action report were that BPD should ensure that there are two different individuals to fill the roles as the city-wide incident commander and one BPD operations chief (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2015). The overall incident commander should have full authority to manage the entire incident while the BPD operations chief manages operations within the BPD. This recommendation was an example of the span of control, which can be broken down into smaller branches, groups, tasks, and locations. During civil unrest, the incident evolves into disparate locations within a community or in the span of a jurisdiction. National Fire Protection Association (2021) recommended that unified incident commanders implement area commands. An area commander would have the authority to manage incidents in their areas and resources based on their priorities and strategies within their command. Developing this level of span control would have helped with maintaining a communication discipline where there are not thousands of voices giving reports, requesting additional resources, and tying up radio communication. All communication would instead have funneled to a proper incident commander who can grant requests or take them to the person that can provide an answer or fill the request that has been made.

Communication is the lifeblood of responses to an event, and it is the key to every form of emergency. The ability to provide commands to those in the field on how to use resources and receive intelligence from the field is key to the success of a response.

NFPA (2021) posited that the concerns and debates of communication during civil unrest during a single agency response are magnified during a multiple agency response.

When establishing a multi-agency response to civil unrest, there should be forethought about the senior members that will act as the communication team according to NFPA. A pre-planned communication strategy should be developed to establish the need for communication to facilitate safe and effective operations, which will establish the overall lead in the field and who would be the voice of unified command to develop a communication plan that will help with the span of control and create geographical locations and tasks during the response. During the planning of the communication plan, all plans should reflect the capabilities of fire, EMS, law enforcement, and all mutual aid partners.

First Responders

The members of fire departments and emergency medical services historically take pride in their service to all stakeholders equally in their times of need. NFPA (2021) pointed out that this perspective can be clouded depending on social contrasts among subsets inside the bigger network. The goal of providing services as evenly as possible has been difficult due to the lack of social equity. NFPA stated social capital is the idea that systems, connections, and activities among people and associations depend on trust, correspondence, and collaboration. The developed relationships have been vital in planning for events that have social-political issues. The tactic for fire departments and EMS to engage their communities is not a new idea. The idea needed to be improved upon, and this relationship should go beyond a superficial connection and become

something that provides an in-depth relationship with the cultures of the community served (NFPA, 2021). Effective community engagement strategies have been crucial to the prevention, mitigation, and management of civil unrest events placing a priority on the development of community engagement strategies.

The actions of the police officers in Baltimore, Ferguson and Minneapolis caused anger and strained trust among Black communities nationwide. Oliver (2020) explained that police officers are permitted to use force and are expected to use force when it's appropriate. It is identified as a bad apple paradigm that is cause personality disorders, racism, and previous traumatic job-related experience, inexperience, and the inability of officers to adjust when their authority is challenged. Furthermore, the targeting of black residents in an attempt to raise local budget revenue through fines reported by the Department of Justice. These events widened the gaps in understanding and tolerance between the police and the communities they serve and protect. During civil unrest, police dressed in riot gear are supposed to be a deterrent. Increasing evidence from research (Cobbina et al, 2019) suggests that the image of police officers in full riot gear that has taken a militarization posture is linked to disproportionately to disadvantaged racial groups that have caused a negative effect on protesters and the general public that has increased mistrust of the police

Police play an essential role during civil unrest because they have provided a visual centerpiece of a demonstration and civil unrest next to the individuals who are protesting. Police departments must work on their social capital within their communities to repair trust. BPD should keep building an office-wide culture and practice of

procedural equity and present-day network policing, including foot watch and relationship building, unequivocally characterizing the qualities of the authoritative way of thinking and recognizing clear, basic, significant rules for field faculty (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2015).

The focus on the lack of police training or the inability of police officers to manage crowd control and timing has been shown with a certain level of force during demonstrations. Recommendations made in the Fraternal Order of police after-action reports addressed the requirement for correspondence with pioneers of exhibitions previously and during current turmoil, which could help with community and group guided endeavors to keep up harmony and limit and deescalate pressures at the source (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2015).

The basic need for changing tactics of first responders during civil unrest can help with the instability of the incident commander that was mentioned early in Baltimore's response. The importance of implementation of a command structure was paramount to the success of a response due to the multiple agency involvement and often required a multi-jurisdictional response. The unified command would have facilitated coordinated effort. The key stakeholders in the unified command are police, fire, and EMS. Emergency a , public works officials, and public health representatives served as liaisons in operations or logistics section roles. Due to the dynamic shift that a civil unrest event can take, it was essential to implement strategies to adjust to these changes. Emergency responders needed to be more fluent and maintain a level of situational awareness to be able to recognize when there is a need to modify their response to ensure their safety

(Cox, 2015). EMS and the fire department have to change how they plan for incidents that are not the typical day to day function. This change in planning was a crucial component for all significant initiatives and starts long before an incident occurs.

In some cases, a demonstration can spontaneously occur and then erupt into full civil unrest. In most cases, demonstrations are planned by requesting a permit and routes through local government or non government agencies, giving agencies enough time to mobilize. In the planning phase, based on the route of the demonstration, potential zones could be identified. The locations of hot, warm, and cold zones could have been established before a demonstration takes place. During planning and response, NFPA (2021) was the standard developed to guide fire department operations and planning before and during civil unrest. (NFPA 2021) recommended that during planning, alternate forms of a response profile should occur, and the protection of the fire station and fire department equipment shall happen. It also stated that fire departments should mobilize their equipment and resources in a safe area (cold zone) that law enforcement has secured and deemed safe before any fire department personnel responded to a scene. The standard further stated that when violence does occur after operations are initiated, a withdrawal shall be engaged to a safe staging area until the scene is safe again.

During civil unrest, fire department personnel's suppression activities should rely on quick knockdown methods (NFPA, 2021). The goal of this method is to knock down enough active fire quickly and exit the impacted area. (NFPA 2021) established that it is crucial to utilize hand lines that will provide the most significant amount of water for a

quicker attack, and to only perform interior firefighting as a last resort or unless known occupants are in a structure.

All EMS personnel will be accompanied by appropriate law enforcement support. All patients will be assessed quickly to avoid excess scene time. To avoid large crowds, gather around the scene with increasing chances for providers and law enforcement personnel to lose control of the scene. The rescue task force has become an ideal tactic during events like civil unrest and an active shooter (NFPA, 2021). EMS providers will team up with police officers to form a group that will do rapid patient care in the warm and hot zones. This grouping of the number of providers can be different based on jurisdictions. EMS will be provided with a ballistic vest and tactical helmet with tactical medical equipment.

All-Hazard Approach

EM agencies and practitioners have focused their development of disaster plans and responses on the basic theory of an all-hazard approach. The practice and the use of the all hazard approach by practitioners was explained by Brown (2022) that it requires an understanding of the baseline and risk of the potential damage and the likelihood of the potential impact to an area. To build a comprehensive approach to emergency preparedness and response to every scenario so that practitioners can provide permutations to effectively respond to a disaster or event, the all-hazard approach gave EM a common framework to address the needs of local, state, and federal government agencies throughout the disaster cycle (preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation). Martin et al. further explained that an all-hazards approach was based on the realization

that regardless of the cause of a disaster situation, the similarities are more significant than the differences regarding how governments lessen the likelihood of human harm from disasters, preparing for their eventuality, responding to their incidence, and recovering from their aftermath.

Peters (2015) stated that the advantage of the all-hazard approach in EM was that it is financially savvy, that the methodology requires coordination between all associations that forestall disarray and the misuse of assets rather than each organization developing its plan to respond to an event. Organizations can consolidate resources by creating a single joint plan for their jurisdiction. As mentioned earlier, the all-hazard approach fosters an underlying infrastructure of management and resources that can theoretically be used to respond to any emergency or disaster.

The theory was a sound practice in the field of EM with an increasing number of demonstrations and riots. The concern was that the all-hazard approach may not be a universal fit for social driven disasters. Brown (2022) addressed obsolescence of the all hazard approach by pointing out that there is an advantage of separating and planning for specific hazards and disasters that are social rooted also addressed this concern as an explanation for the disadvantages of the all-hazard approach by stating that one of the most contended shortcomings is the all-hazard approach at the same time alleviates both catastrophic events and fear-mongering, which are two independent classes. Martin (2015) also explained the resources and policies that are necessary for the response and recovery of both terrorism and natural disasters. The processes to mitigate and plan for these events are very different. Events like demonstrations and riots can be considered

unique emergencies or as unpredictable as terrorist attacks. A general plan may not be sufficient or as adequate as a specific plan tailored to a particular type of event.

With the continued growth of EM, there has been continued detachment to social issues that should be considered as a form of disaster. Drabek (2016) explained that it is basic to consolidate the investigation of calamities inside standard social issues points of view in human science. Such perspectives highlight both objective conditions and social definitions of human harm and social disruption capturing how these require attention to mainstream social problem constructs like class, status, power, ethnicity, and gender, which are the fundamental issues that act as a catalyst for civil unrest. In the civil unrest in Baltimore and Ferguson, the catalyst, which can also be described as the flashpoint, gave a cause to communities to voice their anger. Crises or disasters such as these were placed into the broader contexts of structural inequality and conflicts that result when activists say that enough has occurred and no more will be tolerated.

Emergency Management

The field of EM was defined as a discipline and profession that applies science, technology, planning, and management to deal with extreme events that can cripple governments or disrupt the ecosystem of communities (Sylves, 2019). It also can be defined as risk management to identify a daily decision that will use the avoidance of risk to make decisions on disaster preparedness. To accomplish this goal, EM uses the theoretical framework of the EM cycle or the four phase of EM (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery). Each phase has been identified in different after-action reports, which is why Sylves (2019) described it as a reason why national priorities

and significant changes in policies tangibly link to disaster policy. Xia et al. (2011) also explained how EM is inherently complex and dynamic, no matter how small or big the planning, response, and recovery efforts are in each stage of EM. Knowledge sharing is the only way to execute effective decision-making and coordination among multiple individuals or multiple organizations.

In the last 60 years, EM has evolved from the original emergency manager being the Era of Civil Defense to the growth of professionalization of EM to the emergence of Emergency Management degree programs to the use of social science, and the development of disaster science. The history of emergency management goes back to 1800 when emergency management was reactionary, and all disaster relief was up to the local government (Rubin, 2020). Disaster relief legislation was not typical, and Congress did not commit to provide any relief. Canton (2020) further explained that Congress was only motivated to act when disaster victims lobbied for assistance. The disaster lobbying led to legislation recognizing the need for disaster relief, but disaster relief was still up to the local government, private donations, and local taxes. It wasn't until the era when the United States Army led emergency management that federal disaster relief was provided. (Rubin 2020) asserted this change occurred because of the army's ability to provide expediency of their supplies and their logistical infrastructure. While having the ability to assess how much and what type of relief is needed, at that time, local governments lacked the organization and infrastructure to provide disaster relief. The decisions the federal government made to address disaster relief were considered a piecemeal effort toward emergency management. (Canton 2020) explained it wasn't until 1950 when the Federal

Disaster Relief Act was passed, which is known as the legislation that laid the foundation for modern-day emergency management in the United States.

From 1950-1980, each administration added and subtracted legislation to disaster relief or reorganized the responsibilities of federal agencies overseeing disaster relief and civil defense. During this time, Congress held firm on policies that were still considered a reactive approach to EM and disaster relief. Rubin (2020) pointed out that the amount of disaster relief programs that were created by the reactionary actions created more confusion and fragmentation of relief programs and efforts. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter brought every program under one agency to provide preparedness, response, and relief to disasters. The agency is known today as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (Rubin 2020) asserted that FEMA struggled to bring the different programs under one agency, and every program operated independently with its own culture, funding, and congressional oversight. It took FEMA over 10 years to develop an agency that was unified, and effective in disaster relief. In 1988, the government made an amendment that merged the Civil Defense Act and disaster relief to make what is known as the centerpiece of federal disaster policy, the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act gave guidance on how the federal government declares a disaster and determines the types of assistance local governments will receive. Further, the Stafford Act established the cost-sharing arrangements between federal, state, tribal, and local governments.

While legislation and policies were developed for disaster relief, the field of emergency management was being developed in parallel with research. Caton (2020)

explained that this parallel developed in 1950 during the Cold War when the emergency management discipline was manifesting, and the first social science research study was happening on how people would react to a nuclear attack. This introduction to social science research was conducted at the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center between 1950 and 1954. During this time, emergency managers' focus were tactics that were inherently based on planning for a response to a disaster. Turning the early form of emergency management into an operational concept was short sighted to address the needs of those communities affected by a disaster. This evolution of social science had a significant effect on the development of emergencies beyond an operational concept. (Canton 2020) explained that social science provided an insight that looked beyond the disaster itself, but also provided a look into disasters on different levels. The focus was on the public, and their expectations were the true driving force of the evolution of EM as a profession. A deeper understanding of the nature of a disaster and the reaction of the people changed EM from being a technical skill and process to the development of EM into a complex intersection of sociocultural, scientific, geographic, technological, and system literacy.

The journey for EM to be considered a profession was explained by Phillips et al., (2022). To become a professional in a specific field, you must acquire a specialized body of knowledge, skills, and a professional code of conduct that includes ethics and principles that guide the profession of EM. This led to the formation of the International Association of Emergency Management. The association was developed to set standards

for the profession of EM, which became the cornerstone of the development of higher education programs and degrees in the field of EM. With the development of higher education programs and advanced EM programs, the new EM professional was someone that can be flexible, a self-starter, someone that understands the importance of being culturally competent, being adaptable to change, and possessing the ability to remain inner-directed while evolving with the surrounding society (Phillips et al., 2022).

The field of EM attempted to focus on the social-political connection between the perception of failure and success in response to a disaster or event. Building sustainable and resilient communities have been the focus of EM since the 1990s when Robert Lee Witt was the head of FEMA. Witt has always believed that disasters begin with the local government, which has the responsibility to keep the public safe. In this decade, an increase in frequency, size, types, and cost of the disasters have been witnessed. Rubin (2015) described EM as an ever-changing field with the development of more complex problems, hazards, and threats. In 2011, HSPD 8, a whole community approach to EM, was established to help local EM practitioners address the social issue that was specific to the communities they serve. HSPD8 (2011) described the importance of EM practitioners in building strong working relationships to develop an understanding of the intricacy of their communities. Phibbs, et al. (2018) explained EM practitioners have to understand the inequities that are driven by the economic and social disparities caused by a history of institutional decision making that has created vulnerabilities before a disaster, which has magnified disasters through entrenched structural differences due to unfair or lack of access to resources. To gain the trust of the community, leaders and organizations work

together to build social infrastructure, networks, and assets that can be applied throughout the EM cycle to improve relationships with their local communities (Biedrzycki, 2012). Currently, underlying social and economic considerations are not fully integrated within traditional EM planning and activities.

During the EM preparedness and planning phase, emergency managers must identify the socio-economic issue that will affect planning for demonstrations and civil unrest. Emergency managers must engage the community in a manner that is meaningful and inclusive (Biedrzycki 2012). Inclusion must be acknowledged and emphasized in community knowledge and other assets and enact a genuinely collaborative process between all stakeholders, which helps build the trust needed to be gained by communities that already have an enormous amount of mistrust for the government. Biedrzycki also stated that emergency managers should be at the periphery, and the center of the relationship must include the eddy and flow of input in a timely and constructive manner so that ideas are mutually agreed upon. Outcomes benefit the communities, which benefits EM preparedness that can dictate government response to demonstrations that could avoid civil unrest events.

The Modern Evolution of Emergency Management

In the past four years, EM has had to go through another evolution of change to respond to the most recent crisis and disasters described by Overly (2022) such as the proliferation of climate change, political strife, and the general divisiveness causing the increasing protest and unrest events within communities; and the ongoing COVID-19

global pandemic response. These disasters have not been the normal natural disaster response that political officials and the communities know emergency managers are responsible to manage. The response to these aforementioned disasters was further illuminated by (Overly 2022), the highly skilled, sophisticated, and evolving multidisciplinary staff of modern emergency management agencies. It also provided EM to show how they can act as the backbone for the community during a response and showing their indispensability to the community.

Overly (2022) explained that the modern EM professional has been able to organize and combine the collective talents with multiple agencies and disciplines to be able to respond to new complex problems. The more complex the problem the use of KM becomes more valuable to the EM process of planning and response to crises or disasters. KM Bratianu (2020) went beyond the simplicity of command and control. The overall focus was to create a KM structure, competencies and capabilities that can evaluate knowledge gaps associated with common and uncommon disasters. This would help develop creative solutions while addressing those knowledge gaps found in evaluation. Understanding knowledge gaps can help leaders integrate new knowledge in their knowledge structures that helps prepare them for fast emergent strategies to crisis. This further shows the importance of leadership in EM and its use of KM.

During a time of complex issues, leadership becomes key in information sharing in the use of KM during a disaster, Pellegrini et al. (2020) explained that effective KM could only occur when the entire process is properly engaged and motivated by a leader has a strong understanding and implementation skills of the KM process during a

disaster. The ability to use different leadership behaviors can be critical in encouraging employees to use KM to improve knowledge sharing. One of the most critical things a leader must understand in KM is understanding diversity is an essential part of KM during a disaster (Lee, 2020).

The new emergency manager comes from a diverse, highly educated background with advanced degrees and has lessons learned that are taught in practical and real time situations. Those who completed an advanced degree in EM, have developed the ability to think with more than just EM concepts and are able to develop the expertise needed to proactively plan and execute emergency strategies by integrating FEMA's five mission areas into a holistic process. The modern emergency manager can use forward-thinking, social media, and analytics that helps with swift, decisive decision-making. The use of these tools that help with decision making for the modern emergency manager is the basis of KM. Oktari (2020) explains that KM's focus was to gain the correct knowledge at the appropriate time and place by facilitating and creating the process sharing to develop an effective disaster management strategy. To be able to develop and implement a best practice during the whole disaster cycle.

During the COVID-19 response, we also learned local government EM agencies are still understaffed and were not prepared to respond to an international disaster. Overly (2022) explained, "how the normal agreements of mutual aid and compacts like the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) were not able to be utilized. These agreements are the cornerstone for EM to request resources needed to aid in local areas and regions in response to a disaster." During COVID, EM internationally learned

that these agreements were nullified (Overly, 2022) as bidding wars were fought with neighboring governments and organizations. Emergency operations centers (EOC) remained activated for months and even years locally, while some EOCs are still activated due to COVID responses going beyond the capabilities of local EM agencies. During a disaster human resources management became a persistent problem whether the shortage was part of humanitarian efforts of stakeholders or if it's the staff that were responsible for the response of a disaster (Ratih et al., 2022). KM supports the transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge transfer of knowledge found in training, coaching, and workshops which have increased the ability for EM to address the needs of humanitarian efforts during a disaster and are able to address the staffing needs of EM agencies. The use of KM can help EM understand how to manage and look past staff they have available to look across their entire enterprise and to stakeholders to identify and think creatively to find EOCs staff by identifying people with unique skills that can interchange positions in the EOC to help with long term staffing issues (Overly, 2022).

Local governments have learned the true importance of non-government organizations, and the private sector can help with the whole community approach in EM. Long and Haerty (2021) explained that 85 percent of our nation's critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector. When disasters impact the critical infrastructure or when the disaster is the critical infrastructure, it can have a cascading impact and can increase the complexity of an incident. This was shown in the supply chain issue during COVID-19 and has become increasingly apparent during cyberattacks. FEMA acknowledged the private sector's importance through the adoption of the whole

community, and community lifelines approach as well as the incorporation of the private sector in the National Response Framework. This acknowledgment from FEMA and the day-to-day partnerships that EM has to develop relationships with the private sector from COVID-19 response, past and future planning for the next disaster, whether it's natural or man-made, with KM being the core of these decisions and strategies.

Multiagency Coordination

Due to the growing diversity, complexity, and social connection that modern disasters have on communities, emergency manager practitioners have focused on understanding the makeup of a community and develop relationships within communities while also developing relationships with the government and nongovernment organizations long before an event or disaster occurs. This concept is steadfast and understood by every practitioner in the field of EM. It has been used to identify critical agencies and members of those agencies that can accurately perform tasks to support emergency managers in their duties. These relationships can help build an effective future command structure that will be able to achieve its mission and responsibilities during the stages of the disaster cycle. This concept has held true for any type and size of disaster. In past responses to a disaster, the number of agencies have played a significant role in the positive outcome of disasters.

Even with the fragment amount of research, multi-agency coordination disaster responses are substantial challenges and have not normally successful due to the complexity of coordination, supply issues, manpower, public impact, pressure, urgency, and overall fear that key agencies do not have the infrastructure. O'Brien et al. (2020)

explained that due to the dynamic nature of a disaster the roles and tasks of different responding agencies may change during an event. Their normal day-to-day responsibilities transform from autonomous to interdependent network. Key leaders of these agencies do not understand the responsibility of their roles during a disaster that needs a multi-agency response . Every agency has different abilities and processes that are needed in multi-agency coordination due to the variances found between agencies, and the issues found in the different levels of the agencies working together. These different levels of perspectives are macro, intermediate, and micro perspectives.

From a macro perspective, the focus has been on coordination among individuals or inter-agency. Bharosa et al. (2009) preferred to use the term “community” over “inter-organizational” because it prefers more than just a legal term, but the entire community was involved in the process. The complexity found at this level was found in the number of actors within the network and the interactions of each actor within the network. While these issues between actors can have a profound effect on coordination, these issues were also necessary to develop mutual agreements. At the community level, communication must be clear, coordinated, and flow to the entire community because a clear and present agency is able to take leadership to the centralized location of communication.

At the intermediate level, also known as the “agency level,” when a disaster strikes, coordinating managing a multi-agency disaster has been truly different than managing a single agency disaster. In a large disaster, every agency becomes concerned with trying to figure out what information is relevant or noncritical. The need to obtain situational awareness (O’Brien et al., 2020) has been critical to the decision-making

process understand and knowing what is going on throughout the system to provide critical information to people or nonhuman agents within the system. At the agency level, these issues have been due to the lack of processes and technological factors that make the agency susceptible to these information issues.

The micro perspective, also known as the “individual level,” occurs when obstacles are found based on leadership and the ability to make decisions during a disaster. All leaders’ abilities are different based on personality and leadership capabilities, and experience. Each of these traits has a direct effect on their ability to handle time, pressure, and the flood of information that comes with being in the leadership role. Information has always been key and can be considered currency during a disaster. The severe time and pressure that has been put on those in leadership roles can be attributed to the inaccurate or outdated information that is received, which can have an adverse effect on the decision that has to be made in such a complex, intense information-driven environment that can cause a leader to be cognitively overloaded.

Cognitive overload limits can be attributed to the abilities of the incident commander’s level of experience and their ability to deal with severe time, pressure, and a flood of information. This explanation of cognitive overload in a disaster does not excuse the lack of ability of a leader to execute their responsibilities. It has shown the relationship between information and cognitive capacity that exists, in which it is important to determine what information is valuable and what information should be exposed at an individual level disaster management (Bharosa et al., 2009). This can be corrected by establishing a communication infrastructure. The flow of information needs

to be controlled and verified, which makes a reliable communication environment critical for effective multi-agency disaster response management to hinder the effects of cognitive overload.

Summary

The field of EM has evolved in so many ways in the form of research, growth, education, communication forms, and the adoption of social media use. EM as a field has not found a consistent and effective way to embrace and work with the communities that they are supposed to protect. The whole community approach was supposed to be the answer to this issue. Yet the whole community approach has not overcome this barrier of a lack of community trust in government bodies that is deeply rooted in vulnerable communities from past injustices and the continuing inequalities within the community (Ramsbottom et al., 2018). This issue has not found within EM; it is an issue that is found with first responders, specifically the police departments throughout the nation. The only way to heal this growing wound is to develop a partnership with stakeholders and community leaders. When attempting to plan or respond to an emergency that is socially and politically community-based specifically on demonstrations and civil unrest, this can be considered the key step in future planning for these events.

In this study, the focus was to address how different organizations and agencies can find methods to understand ways to improve the use of EM in planning for civil unrest. The identified gap in the literature was that there is a need for more research with a multi-agency response to social issues that lead to civil unrest. There is still a lack of understanding regarding the relationships between communities and social issues that

lead to civil unrest, and there is a need for emergency managers to build relationships within communities. The lack of research regarding the relationship between community members and first responders, and local police officers can have a direct effect on the actions of protestors during a protest.

In the active practice of EM, practitioners understand how to attain and use information through explicit, tacit, and implicit knowledge to work through the stages of the disaster cycle. Understanding that knowledge sharing is important, Oktari (2022) explained in the field of emergency management knowledge, and information sharing can be fragmented that could have been used to support coordination efforts. Instead of practitioners' knowledge and experiences remaining at the tacit level, they exist at the individual and institutional levels. To address this issue, (Oktari 2022) described how practitioners must become innovative in how they learn from the lessons taught in practical and real-time situations to constantly enhance their knowledge and skills. Achieving this helped form a network and a culture of learning from prior knowledge and developing current best practices.

Learning from past disaster responses, EM programs have come to accept that knowledge sharing is key in the planning and response to a disaster and the development of different ways to share knowledge. The implementation of KM strategies was broken down by Oktari (2020) Technology that stores and collects knowledge to be accessed so that individuals can collaborate, communicate, and participate in real time learning. The human centered based on person to person connection, documentation, and social interaction. People oriented in KM improve the knowledge process through acquisition,

distribution, and creation, which will trigger influence and innovation of KM skills and practice.

When planning for an event like civil unrest that is out of the normal disaster response and EM agency, the practitioner's use of KM and the importance of the movement and flow of information becomes vital to the growth of EM. KM can be used in other events that may involve multiple agencies.

In the next chapter, I provide a more detailed explanation of the research design chosen for this study and the research questions that will act as the narrator for this study. The next chapter also further explained the case study method that was used to investigate if the field of EM can have an effect in response to civil unrest.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

Introduction

Protests have been used as a tool to bring attention to some of the most significant social issues in American history. Protests have brought light to issues like the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights Movement, police brutality, labor, and work issues. Demonstrations have carried strong emotions and beliefs from those who are affected and active in the protest. These same intense feelings and emotions are found in people who are opposed to the reason for a protest. These strong emotions tied to the demonstration can be considered as a fuse ready to be ignited to turn a peaceful protest into something that causes mass confusion and violence that can overwhelm local agencies known as civil unrest. Suleiman (1999) described civil unrest as a collapse of the medium of social control specialists, such as network, law, religion, and political frameworks that have expanded moral and common distress. The manner in which local governments attempt to respond to civil unrest has been inadequate in facilitating an understanding of strategic planning, response, and the tactical difference between routine operations and responses (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2015).

In this chapter, I have described the research design and present the rationale for the use of the design. I have explained my role as the researcher and as the primary research tool. As the researcher, I have addressed how to minimize biases throughout the study. The number of participants and the procedure used to protect the identity of those participants, the data collection, and the analysis method have also been described in this

chapter. Issues regarding trustworthiness and ethical concerns pertaining to data collection have also been discussed.

Research Design

The following research question has guided this study: How does the knowledge and experience of the local emergency manager have a direct effect on the response to a civil unrest event?

The answers to these questions were obtained by interviewing three to five participants from each of the following professions or agencies: (a) emergency managers, (b) political leaders, (c) first responders, (d) police officers, and (e) community leaders that had firsthand experience and knowledge of the civil unrest incident also known as the Freddie Gray riots in 2015 in Baltimore, MD.

The use of a case study research methodology was ideal for understanding the complexity of planning and understanding social issues found in civil unrest. Case study research has been one method that excels at understanding complex issues and can add strength to what is already known through previous research. Case study research emphasizes a detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their relationships (Dooley, 2002).

KM was used in this study as the theoretical framework to share and control information needed to improve strategic planning, responses, and how to be part of the community to mitigate civil unrest incidents. Rhem (2017) described the use of KM as appropriate to improve information between government agencies and communities in the execution of national emergency orders or frameworks.

Role of the Researcher

The role of the researcher in this qualitative study was to assume the responsibility of collecting the data. This study addressed a gap found in the field of EM planning and response to civil unrest. In this study, I did not focus on my personal experience as an EM practitioner and a first responder. For this phenomenon, I took an etic approach in this case study. I was the facilitator conducting interviews with other emergency managers and first responders that were recorded, either via video or audio, depending on the comfort of the interviewee. During the interviews, I took notes on body language and how the questions were answered. The interview questions will be open-ended to promote a more in depth conversation for each question. To address the validity of the data collected, all interviews were recorded by using the dictate2us application, which provided the ability to send interviews to their internal system to be dictated and sent back to the researcher.

Local emergency managers usually are very familiar with each other due to the overlapping exposure during a disaster or different events. This also includes a close professional relationship with police and first responders. In this study, the researcher had developed a professional relationship with some of the participants in the context of an EM practitioner. The level of professionalism was maintained throughout the process of the study. Emergency managers have traditionally used case studies as a lesson learned to educate themselves and to prepare their agencies for a future similar event. Maintaining this professionalism helped preserve with the validity of the study.

All of the participants in this study came from a different jurisdiction than me. This addressed the concern of me being a supervisor or having any power or control over any of the participants. The participants were given the ability to choose the location for the interview to take place. The location fit the criteria of being a quiet location, and somewhere the participants have the ability to speak freely. If they did not have an area that fit these criteria, I provided a neutral location in a rented office location.

Methodology

The target population for data collection for this study was first responders, political leaders, emergency managers, and community leaders who participated in the Freddie Gray civil unrest. Recruitment was done by using the emergency network in Maryland and reaching out to community leaders of the Penn Station neighborhood. Also, being a first responder and an emergency manager in the Maryland area, I used that network to reach out to police officers and first responders in Baltimore by using a combination of network and snowball sampling. Musarrat et al. (2019) explained snowball sampling as a common form of purposeful sampling that is used to locate information rich participants, by using those who participated in the study to recruit others that are qualified to take part in the study. When using snowball sampling, those who usually take part are either friends and colleagues or colleagues of friends, which helps build upon the trust of participants, between participants and the researcher. While also building upon the relationship of the interviewer and those who have taken part during the interview process.

It should be noted that Geddes et al. (2018) explained that snowballing sampling does not always provide the necessary participants to reach saturation. To address this concern, networking sampling will be used in combination with snowball sampling. Ravitch (2020) explained a network sample as a strategy to target a population that can be hard to access with specific knowledge of a phenomenon. Those participants that were considered part of network sampling are part of a personal network that are generally found in rare events. The limitations of network sampling are that the method has been only applicable to public events that are likely to be known to a peer network. For example, I used an email invitation found in Appendix C that I sent to participants whom I may have a professional relationship with. In this email invitation, there was a statement that asked if they know any other emergency managers, first responders, or community leaders that were involved in the civil unrest event.

The participants that agree to take part in the study were asked to recommend anyone else that would be interested in taking part in the study that meets the requirements of the study. This population needed to have first hand experience and knowledge of the planning and response to the Baltimore civil unrest. This population would have known about any past planning efforts between agencies and community leaders.

The number of participants for this study was between 15 to 20, which was made up of: (a) emergency managers, (b) political leaders, (c) first responders, (d) police officers, and (e) community leaders, with 3-5 coming from each sector. In a qualitative study, there has been a need to focus on the amount of data that comes from the

participants in a study. These data are the essence of the study to provide answers to the research questions of the study. van Rijnsoever (2017) explained that researchers have control in determining whether theoretical saturation has been reached. It remained at the discretion of the researcher, who uses their judgment and experience to assess saturation. This decision was based on the repeating of data or the inability to produce new data from the participants' interviews that have a direct effect on new themes and codes.

For this case study, the plan was to also review after-action reports and other reports from the Freddie Gray civil unrest, Ferguson civil unrest, and other demonstrations that did not lead to a civil unrest event. Reports on the demonstration captured the same tension of social issues that did not turn into civil unrest events. The main data for this study came from interviews of the first responders, political leaders, community leaders, and those who responded to the Freddie Gray civil unrest in Baltimore, Maryland, to achieve triangulation for this study.

The in depth interviews were conducted with three to five total participants from each of the disciplines stated earlier. According to Yin (2013), the selection and the number of participants in a qualitative study has been seen as the same number of experiments in a quantitative study. This indicated the importance of each participant in a qualitative study and why the selection process is important. Each participant's experience was different, which is why it is essential to provide comfortable experiences during interviews to gain in-depth information about the phenomenon.

Data Collection

Interviewing was the primary method of data collection in conjunction with the use of after-action reports and lessons learned. Yin (2018) explained that interviews could help provide explanations of details about the “how” and the “whys” of key events uncovering insight into participants’ relativist perspectives. In a case study, interviews guide conversations that will be the focus of open-ended questions to encourage detailed responses. Other data that came from after-action reports were focused on recent responses to civil unrest incidents in Baltimore, Ferguson, and recent events. Yin (2003) explained the importance of using numerous resources since it goes past the broadness of a contextual analysis’s extension.

Each interview was 60–90 minutes in length, with open-ended questions that helped facilitate a more in-depth interview. Follow-up questions were also used to gain depth of the interview questions. Each interview participant answered 15 questions that were video and audio recorded. The questions that were used to interview the participants have been developed based on the problem statement of the study and the literature used to gain an understanding of EM and how it can be used to plan and respond to civil unrest. Every participant that was interviewed had the choice of an in-person interview or the use of a virtual interview using Microsoft teams or WebEx. The video recording helped to identify nonverbal responses that can help during the coding process. To uncover themes that can add value to the study that cannot be found just by performing coding of dictation from the interview.

Each interview was one on one to promote trust, and allow the participants to be more forthcoming with their firsthand experience of the response to the civil unrest incident in Baltimore, Maryland. Before and after each interview, we reviewed the consent form to make sure every participant understood their rights. All data collected from the interviews were stored on a secure hard drive. To address the validity of the data collected, all interviews were recorded on the dictate2us application, which gives the ability to send interviews to their internal system to be dictated and transcribed, and returned within 5 to 24 hrs. Once the transcription was completed, I provided all participants with the chance to review their transcription and make corrections or additions. If the participant did not provide any revisions it was assumed the transcript is accurate. The interview transcript was put into the QDA minor program to help with storing the information from the interview and to save data that has already been through the coding process.

Data Analysis

Using a comprehensive data analysis process ensured that the interview responses and case studies provided a rich context of usable data to analyze. To analyze data for qualitative research, codes were generated to symbolize or translate data, which attribute interpreted meaning to each datum for later purposes of pattern detection, categorization, assertion or proposition development, theory building, and other analytic processes (Saldaña, 2016). Coding for this project was completed by me with the assistance of the QDA miner qualitative analysis software. This program offered the ability for the user to

code and organize data quickly and reliably while helping to reconfigure data to perform analytic reflection efficiently.

While performing coding on the data from the interviews, the focus was to find a theme that comes from the participants, which can be found in the data or facial expressions, tone of voice, and mannerisms expressed by participants during the interview. Without developing the deductive coding method, I anticipated seeing themes developed surrounding the terms command structure, community, civil unrest, EM, and planning.

I used the modified Van Kaam method for data analysis. Moustakas (1994) popularized the modified Van Kaam and explained each of the steps in analyzing the transcribed interviews of each research participant included in the process. The modified van Kaam method has seven key steps that make it a unique analysis plan that can be very detailed in its process including: (a) listing and grouping, (b) reduction and elimination, (c) clustering and thematizing, (d) validation, (e) individual textual description, (f) individual structural description, and (g) textural-structural description. After the interviews, I performed line by line coding to find themes and subcategories to help support the themes that were used during the coding process.

Credibility

A qualitative case study is a distinctive research method in social science, and it demonstrated fidelity to the participant's experience rather than a specific method. There are a few different distinct ways to address credibility in a qualitative study. One of the ways to establish credibility is to only interview participants that have the essential

knowledge of the phenomenon of the study. This issue had been addressed by only recruiting those who had firsthand experience during the response to the Freddie Gray civil unrest in Baltimore, Maryland. Ravitch and Carl (2019) explained that the overall goal is to generate insight and reflection on the study while maintaining standards to demonstrate that the researcher was performing precise and detailed reporting. The process should be transparent so that anyone that participates and anyone who wants to can check the data for confidentiality, which was an essential part of the credibility of the study.

The use of a triangulation strategy to further approach credibility triangulation is a set of processes that researchers can use to enhance the validity of the study. I used data triangulation or purposeful sampling, which meant that researchers explicitly search for as many different data sources as possible (Ravitch & Carl, 2019). Data for this study will come from after-action reports, studies, and in-depth interviews.

Transferability

To help researchers with the transferability for this study phenomenon, the details of this study were described in profound detail in the purpose of the study, the design, participant sampling, and its findings through data collection. The overall goal of qualitative research was not to produce true statements that can be generalized to other people or settings, but rather to develop descriptive context-relevant statements (Ravitch & Carl, 2019). This gave this study the transferability into broader contexts while maintaining its specific context to the topic and the field of study that this research will address.

Dependability

This study followed a consistent process from start to finish. Ravitch and Carl (2019) explained that the design and method must be consistent with the researcher's argument for the study and how data will be collected. The use of data triangulation in this study provided another level of dependability.

Confirmability

Qualitative researchers do not claim to be objective but somewhat subjective (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). The findings do need to be confirmed, and one way to establish this is through reflexivity. Due to the researcher being the primary tool in qualitative research, bias can form during the study. The researcher needed to be reflexive and explore the ways that bias can create interpretations (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). In this study, I developed positive relationships with the participants. I answered every question and concern. The use of a systematic approach throughout allowed the participants feel free to answer all questions in detail.

Ethical Procedures

I followed all IRB guidelines to maintain the safety and protection of all participants in the study before I began gathering data with human participants. I had to provide proof of completion of the CITI protection training. The study was submitted to Walden University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) for approval. Once approval was obtained, I began gathering participants and data for the study. The consent form for the study was approved, and the IRB assigned the ID number 07-10-23-0539317.

The participants were kept informed about how data was used in the study. All participants had to sign an approved IRB consent form that provided the participant with information about the study. The consent form explained the rights that a participant has during a study that uses human contact to collect data. All participants' data was always kept confidential throughout the study. The participant's personal data and files were stored on a password protected hard drive and backup cloud drive. Before and after a consent form was signed by participants, I reviewed the consent form with the participant to make sure that they truly understood that they can refuse to participate or leave the study at any time. Before each interview, I reviewed the consent form and described the process of how the data will be processed again with the participants. The interviews between the researcher and participant were considered to be a face to face activity. In this day and time of a worldwide pandemic, each participant was given a choice to use a video platform to complete the interview process for the study.

No private information was provided to a third party without the permission of all participants. All information that was collected was presented to the University before the final publishing of the study; each participant was invited to review their participation in the study to see if their statements were represented ethically before the study was submitted for final submission.

Summary

In this chapter, I described the methodology for this case study, the purpose of which was to address the need for strategic planning in response to civil unrest. I explored the level of preparedness for disaster of emergency managers and the need to

use KM to share information between different organizations and agencies that respond to plans, and take part in demonstrations that may lead to civil unrest.

In the next chapter, I explained the results of the coding process and the themes and subcategories that were found during our coding process. During this process, I was able to show if EM could help with the response and planning of future demonstrations and civil.

Chapter 4: Results

I analyzed the data provided by collected case studies to understand how the field of EM can work with communities and local agencies to identify future social issues that may catalyze civil unrest. For reference, the research question for this study was stated previously as the following:

Research Question (RQ): How does local government and stakeholders' knowledge and experience directly impact strategic planning, response, and community relations response to a civil unrest event?

Research Setting

There were 11 participants in this study. Seven participants were part of the initial response during the civil unrest event. While three were called in to help support and develop the ICS, one addressed the community to help deescalate the tension between the police and the community. Before each participant was interviewed, they were asked to review and sign a consent form detailing the research process. I interviewed first responders, emergency managers, police officers, and political officials who performed different tasks during the civil unrest.

During each interview, I used two different recording programs. All participants were offered a face-to-face interview at my private office at 1100 Wicomico St, suite 500, or via Microsoft Teams. For the participants who opted to be interviewed via Microsoft Teams, I used the Microsoft Teams recording and transcription program to record questionnaire responses and the iTranscribe application as a backup system for transcription purposes. I used iTranscribe as the primary recording device for the

participants who opted for the in person interviews. During both forms of interviews, I took short-handed notes to capture key emotional and facial responses to the questions.

Demographics

The 11 interviewed participants held different roles when responding to the civil unrest event, including: one emergency manager, two political leaders, and five first responders. Two of them were moved to EM positions during the civil unrest response: four police officers, one community leader, and a 911 call taker. Each participant played a role in responding to the Freddie Gray civil unrest event. Furthermore, the participants were a mix of men and women ranging in age from 25 to 60 years old. This demographic provided a broad range of comprehension and field experience to answer the questionnaires with depth and insight about the quality of the EM response.

Data Collection

Data collection was described by Yin (2019) as a systematic approach to gathering and measuring information. In the qualitative research method, data is collected from various sources to get a complete and accurate picture of the area of interest for which the researcher answers relevant questions, evaluates outcomes, and derives valuable findings. As the primary instrument of a qualitative study, I developed questionnaires for first responders who use the ICS system daily and a questionnaire for the public and community members who do not have the knowledge and experience of using the ICS system. Ten participants wanted to use Microsoft Teams to perform their interviews. Two participants preferred to be interviewed in person. I used the modified Van Kaam method for data analysis. Moustakas (1994) popularized the modified Van

Kaam and explained each step in analyzing the transcribed interviews of each research participant included in the process. The modified van Kaam method has seven key steps that make it a unique analysis plan for pulling insights out of transcribed interviews using a detailed process, including (a) listing and grouping, (b) reduction and elimination, (c) clustering and thematizing, (d) validation, (e) individual textual description, (f) individual structural description, and (g) textural-structural description.

Data Analysis

All participants provided valuable data that answered the interview questions and, ultimately, the research question. All the interview transcripts were initially reviewed line by line for initial coding. The transcripts were uploaded into QDA miner to help manage the data while continuing with line by line coding sessions. Categories and themes were developed using the data's initial line by line coding. The program showed the percentage of keywords and phrases, which is crucial for breaking down the data into categories and then ultimately into specific themes. Placing all interpreted interviews into a database that identified themes and keywords was vital to quickly sorting through all the interviews and data to be able to further gain insight of the meaning of the data. From the coding process of the data, I found several major themes in the interviews, which included: NIMS and Incident Command System, Actions of the Police Department, Forms of Communications during Incidents, and Planning between Different Agencies and Jurisdictions involved or affected by civil unrest. These themes provided valuable insights into the actions of different agencies, such as police, fire, and EM departments, and the forms of communication used to coordinate responses

Table 1*Initial coding*

67

Codes	Description	Count	% Codes	Cases
ICS	Incident Command structure	62	7.00%	8
IAP	Incident Action Plan	8	0.90%	3
Rules of engagement	Police engagement with the public	41	4.70%	7
Complex Incident	The size of the incident	36	4.10%	8
Leadership	Leading group	62	7.00%	10
Communication	Media	131	4.20%	10
Social media	All forms of social media	37	10.30%	10
Coordination	Between different agencies	91	10.30%	9
Trust	Trust between agencies and communities	64	7.30%	9
Emergency management	Perform duties of EM practitioner.	71	8.10%	8
CUP	Civil unrest participants	36	4.10%	10
Intel	Information to use for planning	6	0.70%	4
strategy	Planning for Incident	38	4.30%	6
Community	Working with community leaders	150	17.00%	8
Protection	The protection of the public	38	4.30%	6
Knowledge Sharing	The use of past experience	10	1.10%	2

Table 2*Themes cluster Chart*

Themes Coding				
Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Cluster 5
NIMS/Incident Command system	Actions of the police department	Forms of communication during incidents	Planning between different agencies and jurisdiction	Groups involved or affected by civil unrest
ICS Incident action plan	Rules of engagement	Communication/media	Coordination	Community Leadership
Complex incident	Protection leadership	Social media	Strategy	CUP (civil unrest participants)
Emergency management	Trust	Knowledge sharing	Intel	
			Knowledge sharing	

Table 3*Themes*

Themes	Count	%Codes	Cases	ND words	%Words
NIMS/Incident Command system(217	24.7%	8	5208	12.4%
Actions of the police department Forms of	134	15.3%	10	3541	8.5%
Communication during Incidents	176	20.0%	10	4453	10.6%
Planning between different agencies and jurisdiction	156	17.8%	9	4590	11.0%
The groups evolved or were affected by civil unrest	195	22.2%	10	5510	13.2%

NIMS and ICS

The NIMS and Incident management development theme came from the coding Phrases ICS, Incident action plan, Complex incident, and Emergency management leadership. Each of these codes was used throughout the data to identify a level of command or issues found within the command structure; the cascading events of the civil unrest turned the accident into an incident complex and a complex incident; the actions of the Office of Emergency Management and the presence of leadership. This theme was practical in its development because the National Incident Management System (NIMS) provided a framework that guides all levels of government, nongovernmental

organizations, and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from incidents. FEMA (2022) NIMS provided stakeholders across the whole community with the shared vocabulary, systems, and processes to deliver the capabilities described in the National Preparedness System successfully. NIMS defined operational systems that guide how personnel work together during incidents. AD001 “explained how when his IMT team arrived, all the organizations were using the ICS structure but were having issues with the organizations having different IAPs that did not coordinate, which caused coordination issues as the incident became more complex.”

PD00 stated another example of the importance of this theme:

It wasn't like we were all operating off the same sheet of music, you know, one sheet of music or an IAP where we had that command structure clearly identified, and it changed a lot from day-to-day and then from operational period to operational period.

This further showed the inconsistency and issues within the command structure during the civil unrest.

Actions of the Police

The Actions of the police theme came from the coding Rules of Engagement, Protection, Leadership, and Trust. Each of these codes came from the interaction police had with members of the communities and how the participants felt about the relationship between the police and the community. Every participant stated a strong level of mistrust between the public and the police department. On a normal day, the police department

had daily engagements with people in the community that were usually negative in nature for the communities that were affected by civil unrest. They saw the police as one of the reasons why their community was suffering and why everyone was guilty before proven innocent. During the civil unrest, engagement with the community became more complex. The code for leadership addressed who was in command, how they handled their command, and the decisions they made in that leadership role. The mayor did not want protesters to be imprisoned if they were arrested. The protestors attacked police officers during the civil unrest with bricks. At the same time, some groups of officers weren't getting clear orders during the engagement of protesters. Despite this, CL001 did not believe there was a lack of leadership, but a lack of training: "everyone from Fire, Police, and OEM was present during the civil unrest. There was a lack of experience in dealing with events of this magnitude."

Forms of Communication in an Incident

Forms of communication in an incident were formed with the codes of Media communication, social media, and knowledge sharing. These codes were used to identify forms of communication, issues with communication, and different platforms of communication to reach the community. During the Freddie Grey civil unrest, communication was found to be an issue between the Command, field operations, and the community. Participants explained that "communication became difficult due to civil unrest spanning different Baltimore City districts." Two participants, FD02 and PD001, made a similar statement: they felt that "communication was great, I mean as good as could have been with what was going on, with command, communications were great."

FD003, who was a 911 call taker, explained the difficulty the 911 center had communicating with field units as the civil unrest progressed.

The data showed that communication with the public was an issue, but the national news kept the public updated with the overall information about the civil unrest. During the civil unrest, social media was not used to provide timely information to the public. All the participants recognized the importance of social media and how it was key to getting information to the public in a timely and accurate manner to be effective during a disaster or event like civil unrest.

Planning Between Different Agencies and Jurisdiction

Planning between different agencies and jurisdictions codes that produced this theme were coordination, strategy, intel, and knowledge sharing. Without communication and planning, there could be no coordination between agencies and jurisdictions. Every participant shared an emotional response and was concerned with the local government's lack of coordination and preparedness when responding to a civil unrest event. PO002 expressed the realization that Baltimore City was unprepared to respond and deal with an incident of this magnitude. The overstrain of the civil unrest put on the city's emergency response system caused the city to request mutual aid from neighboring jurisdictions. The information and knowledge needed to coordinate a response were not available to commanders and leaders of the responding agencies. The lack of coordination also affected the rule engagement regarding policing and engaging protestors during the civil unrest. One of the most glaring issues was that police agencies from outside the

jurisdiction did not align with each other when it came to engaging violent protesters or addressing the safety of the mutual aid police officers.

Groups Involved or Affected by Civil Unrest

Groups that were involved or were affected by civil unrest codes that produced this theme were community, leadership, and civil unrest participants (CUP). The participants in the study described the City of Baltimore “as a place that is always in a climate of tension that is just waiting for a catalyst to cause an erupt of frustration and anger.” The death of Freddie Gray was just the catalyst for the community's need to release that frustration to demand justice for Freddie Gray. Other events were key to the start of aggressive behavior towards the police. Mondawmin Mall can be considered ground zero for the Freddie Gray protest when it turned violent. This situation can also be considered the first breakdown of communication between agencies. Maryland Transportation Authority (MTA) stopped a major bus line full of kids coming from school at Mondawmin Mall with no way to get home. This was done due to intel the MTA received from sources from social media. This intel was not shared with other agencies. Participants stated that it was not shared that they planned to shut down the bus lines. This was the first report of community engagement with the police. Those students and other community members left at the Mondawmin bus station became CUPs. Later, CUPs made their way to Camden yards in the heart of downtown, which again erupted into violent actions towards police and people at the baseball game.

This was when police officers and first responder participants identified that the protest spanned different areas, making it difficult to coordinate and manage the

response. This lack of coordinated, managed response required all local resources and agencies to operate independently, causing them to become inundated. Community leaders and groups attempted to help stop the destruction of communities and return to peaceful protest. During these events, PO001 explained how the protest got out of hand and made the elderly within this community prisoners in their homes. They were unable to get needed resources like medication and food. PO001 also took incident command in one of the elderly high rises in his district and invoked his leadership to protect the people in that community. The civil unrest lasted 17 days. During this time, one of the iconic moments that was seen on all news channels over and over that was shared by almost all participants of the study mentioned was the CUPs looting and burning down the community CVS. At the same time, firefighters were trying to extinguish the fire caused by CUPs. This CVS was key to the community's needs based on the data from the study, magnifying the social inequities in this community.

Lessons Learned/ After Action Reports

In the after action reports from Charlottesville, Virginia's response to the Unite the Right Rally, the January 6 insurrection, and George Floyd's civil unrest, similar issues had been pointed out. All the reports highlighted issues and recommendations for improvement with training, planning, communication, coordination, community engagement interoperability, and use of the NIMS and the incident command system. During each response, NIMS and ICS were not used in the proper manner that was supposed to be used based on best practice set forth by FEMA. During the George Floyd response, the AAR (2022) pointed out that there was no designated Incident Commander

or an attempt to fill all the roles within the Incident command system. While the Minnesota police department did not utilize the ICS system for their emergency responses, they used an ad hoc command structure.” This led to difficulty in decision making and management because the improvised command system that MPD used created a separate layer that did not follow NIMS. The communication between command and the field was unclear and limited to providing an overview of the situation; intelligence reporting, objectives, and rules of engagement did not occur.

During the Right to Rally, Huntun (2017) explained the different success Charlottesville Police department (CPD) had with local government and different agencies as they worked through First Amendment rights issues and other planning issues. When the Virginia Incident management team(VAIMT) was brought in, their effectiveness was limited due to lack of full cooperation by all agencies. Virginia state police did not participate in tabletops provided by VAIMT and did not provide an operational plan to go with a final IAP. There was also an incomplete version of NIMS that led to issues in coordinating incident response across the participating entities, leading to breakdowns in leadership and organization. Different agencies had approved operations plans by executive level officials. The unified command did not review these plans together; therefore, there was no coordination in consolidating those operational plans.

The communication between agencies and responders was an issue, and the communication between the community and the public was also a concern. There was some knowledge of the impending march and protest in each event. Messaging and

community engagement before the event to provide information for protection and a liaison to community leaders. The establishment of a PIO officer or setting up a joint information center (JIC) to provide timely and consistent information to the public. The recommendation of training from these AARs provided an outlook that there was a significant lack of understanding and knowledge of using NIMS. The other need for training was working with multiple agencies and multiple jurisdictions. Planning and practicing responding to events like civil unrest. All the AAR's pointed to the lack of trying as one of the keys to coordination failure. In the January 6 report, police officers identified that they didn't know what they were allowed to do in terms of less than lethal force, the protocol when responding to violent mass protests. In the Unite the Right Rally (2017) AAR, the Virginia State Police (VSP) had training limited to tactical training to protest. They did not understand what other agencies could provide during a response without involving state and local agencies in joint training exercises. Failure to involve state and local response personnel in a joint field training exercise on the plan's execution contributed to the lack of a synchronous response on the day of the event.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

Credibility

Triangulation between participants, the interviewer, and lessons learned from past civil unrest events were used to establish credibility. Each participant provided their personal experience during the Freddie Gray civil unrest. The participants understood the study and the intent of the study and were able to provide excellent responses to each question on the questionnaire. The ability of the participants to answer each question

openly and honestly helped produce consistent data without participants offering irrelevant or discrepant data. All the data that was collected was in person or by Microsoft Teams. All the collected data was analyzed using the Van Kaam method to produce consistent results from each interview.

Transferability

The transferability strategy identified in Chapter 3 was to use the participants' experience during the Freddie Grey civil unrest to respond to open ended questions and produce data to analyze for codes and themes. There were no adjustments to transferability from Chapter 3. The focus was to develop descriptive context-relevant statements.

Dependability

The data were collected in a systematic manner that could be easily understood for others to follow and recreate. An interview in person or by Microsoft Teams was used, along with lesson learned reports to gather data. To maintain confidentiality, all participants were given letters based on their profession and the order in which they were interviewed. Two questionnaires were used for first responders and one for political and community leaders. All raw data was recorded and transcribed through Microsoft Teams and a backup transcription application. All the data was uploaded into QDA miner, and the Modified van Kamm method was used to analyze data. QDA miner was used to structure and manage data and identify codes and themes.

Confirmability

The initial plan for this study was to have 15-20 total participants, 3-5 coming from emergency managers, political leaders, first responders, police officers, and community leaders. The original number of participants from each group was not able to be achieved due to participants wanting to be part of the study or no response to the email invite. The participants who were able to take part in the study were one EM who was part of the response and three firefighters who started in the field and were switched into the roles of EM personnel during the first 24 hours of the response to civil unrest. I interviewed only two political leaders, one community leader, and six police officers who would agree to an interview. With 12 total interviews, saturation was reached with the amount of interviews that could participate in the study when codes and themes were revealed through the data analysis protocol.

Summary

In this chapter, we addressed the data analysis protocol to answer the Research Question (RQ): How does local government and stakeholders' knowledge and experience directly impact strategic planning, response, and community relations response to a civil unrest event? The data collected from the participants showed a lack of preparedness, coordination, knowledge, and experience to respond to the Freddie Gray civil unrest event. The data also showed that the participants understood that there were multiple issues that affected the response and the outcome of the overall response. Issues with the lack of knowledge and experience to respond to a civil unrest event. Training and

coordination were also one of the major issues. In Chapter 5 we expanded on these issues and provided recommendations. We also provided an interpretation of the data.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

This qualitative study aimed to research how the field of EM could work with communities and local governments to address issues that become catalysts of civil unrest. The case study design was used for this study because it allows the researcher to examine, understand, and gain a deeper context of the phenomenon. Baxter (2008) explained how case studies encouraged the investigation of a phenomenon by using assorted forms of information and data.

Interpretation of findings

The study confirmed that local governments still struggle to prepare and respond to a civil unrest event. The data from the study has shown areas in planning, communication, coordination, and community engagement needed to respond to civil unrest. Data gathered from the study identified and confirmed the use of knowledge management, the EM cycle, ICS, all hazards, and the multi-agency response. There have been multiple civil unrest events before and after the Freddie Gray civil unrest. The Charlottesville Unite the Right Rally, the January 6 insurrection, and the George Floyd civil unrest have provided the field of EM with different forms of civil unrest to study. These civil unrest after-action reports provided recurring recommendations in the research data on the need to improve using the ICS, preplanning response, coordination, communication, and community engagement. Understanding the data that came from these reports can help with taking steps to build a knowledge management framework with explicit data for local governments to plan for the subsequent civil unrest event. Baltimore City has explicit and implicit knowledge to build its framework from the

Freddie Gray civil unrest to improve decision making, recognition, needs assessment allocation of resources, and command structure.

During the Freddie Gray civil unrest, the ICS was initiated and used by different agencies during the event. Practitioners understood and indicated, as explained by Chang (2017), that “ICS provides a complete structure that will provide an organized planning system and response to a disaster with common terminologies. That provides a standard of common control that can become scalable due to the incident's size or complexity.” As the Freddie Gray civil unrest expanded and became a complex incident, using the ICS structure at different levels was ineffective for different reasons. The reasons range from the lack of knowledge of how to use the ICS system to the lack of effective leadership in crucial positions as the system expanded during the incident.

One of the primary challenges with using the ICS during civil unrest typically has been ensuring effective communication between multiple agencies responding to the incident. Communication issues were found in the different civil unrest events. Establishing and maintaining clear lines of communication throughout an incident was difficult. That directly affected coordination, leading to delays in decision making and response efforts, which had serious consequences during the different civil unrest responses. This issue was pointed out in the George Floyd response (Hillard, 2020), which described that “MPD leadership had no plans of how officers deal with aggressive or noncompliant protestors or large crowds. Without leadership providing this directive or reviewing a policy, it leads to different interpretations of the policy and limited coordination. This caused frustration, leading to further questioning who was in

command to receive direction and guidance. Even with an incident command, information or resource requests were delayed.”

Another issue with ICS and coordination, according to the data, was ensuring mutual understanding and cooperation between the different agencies. In Freddie Gray's response, the coordination was affected by conflicting priorities and policies of the different responding agencies, which hindered the coordination of each civil unrest response used in this study. Coordinating with these stakeholders can also present challenges when using ICS. The lack of the everyday use of ICS by stakeholders can cause a gap in its command structure and function of the system due to their lack of use of the ICS system. Each stakeholder may have protocols and procedures for managing such situations, which may not always align with ICS's objectives for that event. This requires effective communication and collaboration to reach a consensus on effectively managing the incident. The MOEM established a virtual EOC but generally did not seem integrated with the Minneapolis police department (MPD) and Minneapolis Fire Department (MFD) command and identified clear opportunities for the OEM to engage and assist, such as the request for the Minnesota National Guard. Although the OEM is responsible for and best suited for making such requests, it was not involved in facilitating that or any other partnership because of the MPD's unconventional command approach to the crisis and because of those in the command post.

The data showed an inconsistency in what each participant understood and what type of community engagement each organization did before, during, and after civil unrest. The consistent issue acknowledged throughout participants' responses was that the

police department needed to improve its relationship with the community to reestablish trust and confidence in the local police department. The need for community policing had become vital to addressing the need. Links (2015) stated:

The culture of future policing is based on treating people with dignity and respect, being transparent in police decision making, while also giving people a voice during police encounters. This can be achieved by developing a transparent relationship through foot patrol, community outreach, and training, where the philosophy is to improve police and community relations.

Educating the public on their rights and responsibilities during civil unrest can help prevent unnecessary confrontations of violence with police and other responders. They were making education a key priority in the community as a form of prevention and preparedness.

The All Hazard approach has been the principal framework in the field of EM; Bodas (2020) explained that “All hazard approaches present several advantages in theory when responding to different disasters that share commonalities in disaster preparedness and response, the most significant issue with all hazard approach is that hazards are not evenly distributed across all geographic areas. There have been disasters like civil unrest that have challenged the all hazard concept. Civil unrest and events based on the disasters within communities have failed to deliver optimal results regarding successful planning, response, and recovery. The alternative approach is hazard-specific disaster planning instead of covering all potential hazards. Developing a hazard-specific approach that considers the unique features of each hazard found within communities.” The data from

the study provided an understanding of how social disasters can be politically driven or cannot be planned for, like natural and man-made disasters. The unpredictability of civil unrest changed the regular coordination between agencies that EM uses during natural disaster responses. This failure made it vital for the field of EM to focus on developing an institutional response to civil unrest.

Limitations

As stated in Chapter One, the limitation of this research was not being able to generalize the study's findings because the sampling was conducted purposefully, and all participants were from Baltimore, Maryland. Another limitation was the ability of the participants to recall accurate and essential details about their experiences during the civil unrest. Baltimore's civil unrest event occurred in 2015, and this study was completed in 2024. The human mind may have been unable to recall details accurately or their proper sequential order as they occurred in real time. One limitation was not expected: the critical leaders of agencies that responded to the Freddie Gray civil unrest could not be contacted, or they would not respond to the email invitation to be a part of the study. Their participation could have provided a deeper insight into the command structure and decision making process.

Recommendations

Watching a civil unrest event on a media outlet painted a picture that the event escalated quickly and gave the feeling that it spontaneously erupted into violence without warning. From the after-action reports and the data gathered in this study, we have learned that different significant events that happened or the event that was planned

became the catalysts for the civil unrest event. The Freddie Gray to the George Floyd civil unrest events was the death of two black men who were accused of a crime but died in police custody.

Emergency management has always been a field that is forever evolving to address events and emergencies. However, the field has struggled to respond to events of civil unrest. This study has pointed out a few key issues that could be improved in future responses to civil unrest. They were building strong partnerships between government agencies, law enforcement, community faith-based groups, and NGOs. These partnerships should have been built and cultivated before any disaster response. Effective emergency management response to civil unrest has always required a high level of knowledge and comprehensive planning to address the community concerns and needs, the amount and type of resources, emergency response coordination, and potent expending and complexity during civil unrest. Understanding this could help develop responsive and targeted emergency management plans involving all stakeholders' knowledge and abilities.

The development of comprehensive planning for civil unrest must always start with understanding the social issues within the communities on local and state levels and an initial risk assessment to identify potentially vulnerable areas and issues found within communities. Developing a robust risk assessment of these communities would have helped identify the needs of stakeholders. The help and feedback from stakeholders could have helped develop detailed emergency plans that address different reasons and types of civil unrest events. As mentioned in the data of the study, these plans should always

include clear protocols for response, communications, evacuation, and a system to address issues with conflicting concerns and protocols of other jurisdictions during the response. In these plans, the ICS system should have been used to designate roles and responsibilities for all responding agencies and a multi jurisdiction response.

Developing a comprehensive plan has always been vital to future responses to civil unrest. The use of past lessons learned and the knowledge required from training for the subsequent civil unrest has always been essential. We have used the knowledge to review and update response strategies and continuously monitor, evaluate, and improve policies and procedures. Doing so has ensured safety and response efforts safeguard community resilience during the emergency management cycle due to civil unrest.

The public information officer (PIO) has been among the most critical positions during a disaster, event, and community outreach process. Based on the standards of NIMS (2017), to be an effective PIO in a disaster, “During a disaster, they become the communication hub between response teams, government agencies, media, and the public to disseminate accurate information to minimize confusion, panic, and misinformation that arises during a disaster. During an event that can become as complex and complicated as civil unrest, the flow and the speed of communication must become instantaneous, with social media becoming the primary form of information sharing and gathering. The role of the PIO needed to expand to a multi-agency PIO response known as a Joint information center (JIC). The JIC became the Hub for all information to target and address misinformation, maintain communication with stakeholders, identify information that needed to go to the public, and maintain information flow to IC and the

responders in the field. Initiating the PIO early and often for incidents and disasters has been essential to successful emergency management.

This study presented a lack of knowledge of leadership and organizations on how to respond and plan for civil unrest. The last civil unrest that happened in Baltimore City was in 1968. The city suffered under Jim Crow laws, where segregation was legal in housing, education, and employment following the assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968. It was the catalyst of the civil unrest of 1968, which left hundreds of homes and properties being burned and destroyed, killing six and leaving a dozen more people injured. The current leadership responsible for planning and responding to Freddie Gray's civil unrest had no fundamental knowledge or explicit and tacit knowledge of the past civil unrest of 1968 to develop a plan and response for Freddie Gray, even with the Ferguson civil unrest happening a year before the Freddie Gray civil unrest. There was no explicit knowledge that was used in the planning process of Freddie Gray to help with the response. The data from the study pointed out that Baltimore leadership wanted to ease the tension by taking police wearing riot gear to the frontline to show less military aggressive posture towards protesters. The use of military force by police was also a significant cause of the Ferguson civil unrest, from the number of lessons learned from civil unrest in the past ten years and the use of codified explicit knowledge that is documented and transferred into principles, processes, and procedures. Tacit knowledge from the data stressed the intuitive understanding to anticipate the risk of a community's cultural and social dynamics. Both explicit and tacit knowledge have been crucial to

planning and response and the overall understanding of the needs of the people who are responders, participants, and the communities affected.

Social Change

There has been one true understanding of EM: it is not if a disaster will happen, it is when it will happen. Alternatively, what event or incident has been the catalyst to show the disaster is the community, which has been dealing with poverty and social inequities that have plagued it for generations? Arcaya (2020) explained that “disaster will provide the same level of destruction to an area. Social inequities can shape who is most at risk and vulnerable to an event or disaster. The concept of vulnerability is increasingly used to understand and point out social aspects rather than the physical root of a disaster is the actual disaster.” This concept has become more apparent in the field of EM, which has led to the whole community approach to EM.

The social change this study provided is the need to use the whole community approach effectively to address the disconnect between police, first responders, local government, communities, and all stakeholders. This approach emphasizes understanding the social issues in the communities they serve and protecting or understanding the need for communication, collaboration, and coordination that builds trust, Noor Afzan (2021) explained, “by recognizing the potential risk that a population presents. EM and other responding agencies of authority can further access the capabilities and vulnerabilities in particular communities.

What was found in the data of the study was that Baltimore's local government and the local EM office knew that Baltimore Communities faced a large amount of

poverty and social inequities. The inability of Baltimore City agencies to build partnerships within these affected communities has led to an increase in distrust, which was already a systemic issue in urban communities. Noor Afzan (2021), the partnership between communities in the government can be seen as a collective mechanism in which disadvantaged communities mobilize due to a shared interest in protecting the community from crises and disasters that encompass the entire community preparticipation with the help of NGOs as a supportive structure. Ensure that communities and civic members have the resources, expertise, and capacities to address issues before they become a catalyst for exposing disaster, which is the community.

Conclusion

Baltimore City became ground zero for another civil unrest event that made national news and caused questions to be asked by local governments and the field of emergency management: How do we prepare for a civil unrest event? The Freddie Gray civil unrest was on the heels of the death of Mike Brown in Ferguson. That was the catalyst of the Ferguson civil unrest. The Freddie Gray civil unrest reminded communities of the racial tension, economic inequality, and the social disconnect and mistrust between local government and police officers. The response to the Freddie Gray civil unrest highlighted issues in previous civil unrest; the lack of planning and coordination significantly affected the response to the civil unrest. The past response to civil unrest was for the police's primary job to focus on restoring law and order through the use of force to control protestors and those who exited the event to civil unrest

without prejudice, which has been one of the catalysts that have turned the protest into civil unrest.

With the rise of social justice and the understanding that the disaster itself is the community, the field of emergency management has to evolve and develop new practices and strategies that would help with awareness of human rights, education and training of police officers, coordination, communication, and planning for effective civil unrest response, by focusing on the whole community response that addresses community social inequities. With the data from this study, the field of EM will be able to develop a framework or use Knowledge management to use the experience of those that were part of the response to civil unrest or use the lesson learned and case studies to develop strategic planning to improve future response to civil unrest.

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Appendix A-A: Interview Protocol

Interview Introduction

I have asked you to participate in this study because you may have firsthand experience and knowledge of what happened in the Freddy Grey/civil unrest event in Baltimore, Maryland. This study's focus is to understand:

Research Question (RQ): How does local government and stakeholders' knowledge and experience directly impact strategic planning, response, and community relations response to a civil unrest event.

With the focus being on the civil unrest that happened in Baltimore, Maryland, your help in this study may provide data that will help local governments improve how they plan, prepare, and respond to civil unrest. These questions were developed for Fire, Police, and emergency managers that took part in the response to the civil unrest.

Interview Questions

1. What was your role or what was your title during the Freddie Gray event?
 - a. Were you a part of the initial response? If so, describe how the initial response went.
2. How would you describe the response to the civil unrest?
3. Can you describe the social makeup and the atmosphere of the communities where the civil unrest occurred?
4. Please describe the command structure used during the civil Unrest.
5. Please describe the Incident Commander's presence during the civil Unrest.

6. During the response, please describe any issues that significantly affected the response.
7. What role did Baltimore City's local emergency management agency play in responding to the civil Unrest?
8. How often does your agency work with their local emergency management agency, other than during a disaster response?
9. Please describe the community relationship between police, fire, and the emergency management office in your jurisdiction?
10. Can describe a relationship between the Baltimore city community, police, fire, and the emergency management office that could have helped avoid the civil unrest event.
11. Can you describe how government and non-government community programs could help with social issues and other disasters?
12. Please describe how this civil Unrest has changed your outlook on community relations between government and non-government organizations
13. What government and non-government agencies do you think should be part of emergency preparedness and strategic planning for future civil Unrest?
14. Can you describe any improvements that can be made in the response and planning for future civil unrest?

Appendix A-B: Interview Protocol

Interview Introduction

I have asked you to participate in this study because you may have firsthand experience and knowledge of what happened in the Freddy Grey/civil unrest in Baltimore, Maryland. This study's focus is to understand the following:

Research Question (RQ): How does local government and stakeholders' knowledge and experience directly impact strategic planning, response, and community relations response to a civil unrest event.

With the focus being on the civil unrest that happened in Baltimore, Maryland, your help in this study may provide data that will help local governments improve how they plan, prepare, and respond to civil unrest. These questions were developed for political and community leaders.

Interview Questions

1. What was your role or what was your title during the Freddie Gray event?
 - a. Were you a part of the initial response? If so, describe how the initial response went.
2. How would you describe the response to the civil unrest?
 - a. Can you describe the social makeup and the atmosphere of the communities that were affected by the civil
3. Please describe the leadership presence during the civil unrest. During the response, please describe any issues that significantly affected the response.


4. Can you describe Baltimore City's local emergency management agency's role in responding to civil unrest?
5. How often does your agency work with the local emergency management agency, other than during a disaster response? Please describe the community relationship between police, fire, and the emergency management office.
6. Do you believe that if the relationship between the Baltimore city communities, police, fire, and the emergency management office would have been different, it could have avoided the civil unrest event and can you describe how that relationship would work?
7. Can you provide some recommendations to improve the relationship between these agencies?
8. Can you describe how government and non-government community programs could help with social issues and other disasters?
9. Please describe how this civil unrest has changed your outlook on community relations between government and non-government organizations.
10. What government and non-government agencies do you think should be part of emergency preparedness and strategic planning for future civil unrest?
11. Can you describe any improvements that can be made in the response and planning for future civil unrest?

Closing

Thank you for participating in this study by completing this question
questionnaire. I would like to remind you that your information will not be used for any
other purposes. It will only be used for this study. The consent form you have signed will
protect the use of your name and job title in the study unless you consent to use your
name and job title to be named in the study. Your participation in the study will help to
elevate if there is a need for local emergency management agencies to help with strategic
planning and preparedness to respond to civil unrest events.

Finally, I urge you not to discuss this study with anyone else who is currently
taking part or might participate at a future point in time. Participants must answer all the
questions truthfully without pre-planning their responses.

Appendix C: SECI Knowledge Management Framework



Appendix D: Coding and Themes

Table 1*Initial coding*

Codes	Description	Count	% Codes	Cases
ICS	Incident Command structure	62	7.00%	8
IAP	Incident Action Plan	8	0.90%	3
Rules of engagement	Police engagement with the public	41	4.70%	7
Complex Incident	The size of the incident	36	4.10%	8
Leadership	Leading group	62	7.00%	10
Communication	Media	131	4.20%	10
Social media	All forms of social media	37	10.30%	10
Coordination	Between different agencies	91	10.30%	9
Trust	Trust between agencies and communities	64	7.30%	9
Emergency management	Perform duties of EM practitioner.	71	8.10%	8
CUP	Civil unrest participants	36	4.10%	10
Intel	Information to use for planning	6	0.70%	4
strategy	Planning for Incident	38	4.30%	6
Community	Working with community leaders	150	17.00%	8
Protection	The protection of the public	38	4.30%	6
Knowledge Sharing	The use of past experience	10	1.10%	2

Themes Data chart 2

Table 2

Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Cluster 5
NIMS/Incident Command system	Actions of the police department	Forms of communication during incidents	Planning between different agencies and jurisdiction	Groups involved or affected by civil unrest
ICS Incident action plan	Rules of engagement	Communication/media	Coordination	Community Leadership
Complex incident	Protection leadership	Social media	Strategy	CUP (civil unrest participants)
Emergency management	Trust	Knowledge sharing	Intel	
			Knowledge sharing	

Table 3*Themes*

Themes	Count	%Codes	Cases	ND words	%Words
NIMS/Incident Command system(217	24.7%	8	5208	12.4%
Actions of the police department Forms of	134	15.3%	10	3541	8.5%
Communication during Incidents	176	20.0%	10	4453	10.6%
Planning between different agencies and jurisdiction	156	17.8%	9	4590	11.0%
The groups evolved or were affected by civil unrest	195	22.2%	10	5510	13.2%