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Exploring Potential Associations with the Presidential Discretionary Power of FEMA Funds Dispensation

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Matthew Eagles

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Walden University
2015

Abstract

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by

Matthew Thomas Eagles

CHR, Cornell University, 2013

MEd, University of Phoenix, 2010

MPA, Walden University, 2008

MBA, Suffolk University, 2006

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Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of

Philosophy

Public Policy Administration

Walden University

May 2015

Abstract

US presidential approval of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) funding has been the subject of much research that largely has been inconclusive or contradictory as it relates to whether funds may have been distributed in a biased way through the use of presidential discretionary power. The purpose of this study was to explore if or to what degree US presidents acted in a potentially biased manner with the approval of FEMA assistance during election years in election battleground states between1996-2012. The theoretical constructs for this study were group justification bias and social identity theory. Study data were obtained through freedom of information requests from FEMA for access to every gubernatorial request for FEMA aid from 1995-2012, resulting in 1,137 records. Data were measured as binomial variables, other than governor's party which included 3 nominal variables. Data were analyzed using frequency distribution tables and chi-square tests of association for political affiliation of the president, governor, and a categorization of battle ground states during election years. A key finding illuminated an association between presidential party affiliation and public assistance ($p = .005$), a type of FEMA aid. The study did not, however, indicate any statistical association between the award of FEMA hazard mitigation funding and presidential bias. The positive social change implication stemming from this study includes information to policy makers regarding how FEMA aid is granted, which could assist in an evaluation of the FEMA aid process and approval in the future.

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Dedication

The dissertation is dedicated to my wife through her continued support given throughout this educational journey. What started out as a way to further my career quickly turned into a passion for learning and a desire to make a difference. Without her support and encouragement this project would not have come to pass and my dream of achieving my PhD. would not have been fulfilled. Her example in finishing her own doctorate (OD) served as motivation along the way and further acted as friendly competition between loving partners. Thank you Keirsten for all that you have done for me, for your perseverance and patience these many long years and your continued support on my next educational path. Education is a continuous journey, not a singular goal and one I am happy to share with you.

I would further like to dedicate this to my parents, Dr. Garry Eagles and Janice McCollom R. RN, whose example and value of education has caused me to never stop learning. This has been a long process, yet the memory of that value has given me perseverance when all other logic failed me. Thank you both for instilling in me what a solid education looks like and the need to give back to others once I had achieved it. I really feel that Walden's mission of service and higher education has been a direct match with those goals.

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the support given to me by my dissertation committee and especially to the chair, Dr. Gary Kelsey. Early on in my doctoral quest at Walden University his support allowed me to continue my studies and arrive at the point I am today. It was his latter accepting to serve as my chair that enabled me to get a fresh set of eyes into the process and keep me on track. His knowledge of what a solid dissertation should encompass allowed me to better my writing and led me the production of this research paper. While the process has proved long, with multiple delays not of his doing, it has been immensely rewarding and I must thank you for that. Few could ask for someone as supportive in a process that has spanned years.

I would also like to thank Dr. John Gilbert, who served as my research methods advisor, for pushing me to be more precise in my research in Chapter 1-3. His expertise guided me through what had to be my weakest point in the paper, and his diligence in keeping my research on topic was appreciated. And I wish to thank Dr. A. Victor Ferreros for serving as my research methods advisor in Chapters 4-5 and getting my over my math challenges. His comments to get “out of the lab” and willingness to make my data understandable brought this project to a swift close after he signed on to the project. It’s hard to believe, as most of this is math now. I am so glad he came aboard to push me through the finish line.

Lastly I would like to recognize the effort placed on correcting numerous drafts by my university research reviewer. Dr. Tanya Settles repeatedly challenged me over the years to find more clarity in the paper, to back it in current research from industry experts

and to find a singular voice that tied theory, research questions and methodology into one cohesive argument that was not overstated or exaggerated. While this part of the process may have taken the longest, it was the most valuable in keeping my research sound, unbiased and on point.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

It is not known by researchers if presidents acted in a potentially biased manner with the use of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approvals during election years in election battleground states and/or if there was ingroup favoritism from 1996-2012 within those same states and times. It is also unknown if the type of aid approval from Hazard Mitigation (HM), Public Assistance (PA) and Individual Aid (IA) also played an important factor in those decisions.

Public policy from an academic level is often looked at from solely an administrative perspective, ignoring the impact of politics. Public policy in the United States, especially at the national level, must take politics into consideration and cannot be divorced from its impact on legislation and subsequent policy implications (Stanford, 2015). Political parties exert real power over the lives of those they represent through the policies which they legislate and the manner in which they act. In the United States, national politics is largely controlled by one of two parties, the Democratic or Republican Party. Though all elected officials are able to govern within the scope of the office they hold, each party's political priorities or philosophies often dictate what they will or will not do (Kirkland, Gray, & Lowrey, 2010). During times of national disaster, there could be a difference in financial focus each party places on a given region of the country both during and after a disaster is declared out of political motivations through the exercise of presidential discretionary powers. Salkwoke and Chakraborty (2009) demonstrated that presidential emergency declarations do change during election years and that politics play a role in disaster relief. Salkowe and Chakraborty also stated that when looking at data

through 2003, the political party affiliation of those in governing power had no effect on presidential disaster declarations.

The purpose of inquiry in this study was to explore whether past and current presidents acted with bias in the presidential discretionary allocation of FEMA funds in 1996, 2004 and 2012 in contested electoral election battleground states. Current researchers have not adequately explored whether such bias was present. Prior researchers did not separate the request and approval/turndown process by category, from HM, PA and IA each of which can be individually approved or turned down. Previous researchers did not look for correlating data in election battleground states versus the nation at large, areas with the most potential for bias by a sitting president in a reelection year with the use of discretionary powers.

Since presidential elections are waged in the swing states where neither candidate has a certain electoral lock, knowing the influence FEMA declarations have in these states during reelection years became imperative in studying the potential for bias. Previous researchers have looked at longitudinal data as far back as the 1950s in regards to FEMA dispensation (Sylves & Buzas, 2007); but, in each case, the researchers have only looked at full year data compared to other full year data. They failed to focus upon places/times that could have the greatest impact on the sitting president with the theoretical construct that approvals/turndowns taken by that president for personal gain (Group Justification Bias, 2004 p.12) could occur under these conditions at a more frequent rate.

Looking at data pre 1993 and trying to compare it to post FEMA cabinet level position and subsequent recommendations plus the technological advancement in real time reporting of incidents would lead to data with too many variables to compare accurately. Swing state focus by modern presidential campaigns has placed an additional variable that pre 1993 data would fail to address. It was for these reasons that data on approvals and turndowns was isolated to the Internet age, post cabinet level authority (Salkwoke et al., 2009). No previous researcher has used this approach through 2012 full year data coupled with recursive choice sociopsychological preferences within the defined data set.

In the wake of cases such as Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), understanding money's impact through political contributions, especially tax payer funded programs on national elections is imperative. If there was absence of bias, having this knowledge could begin to repair some of the lack of trust people have in government (Richey, 2010). Yet if bias was potentially present, having such knowledge may prompt citizens to put legislators and executives into office who can safeguard FEMA funds from being used for a single party's gain.

Throughout history, public officials have risen to the occasion of their office, doing outstanding things for the American public, from leadership in the face of adversity to legislating social programs for the underserved. Several examples exist in U.S. history to draw from, the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, the emancipation of the slaves during the Civil War and the creation of social safety nets such as Medicare and Medicaid for the elderly and impoverished (Clark, 1991). However, many public officials

have breached the social trust by committing ethical violations or even worked against the legislation previously mentioned. Examples include extra marital affairs of Congressman and Senators, calling into question their moral judgment, to bribery of a governor for appointment to a vacated Senate seat (Greene, 2012). Yet more insidious than such overt acts may be the bias that one person or party has in deciding who and what get public funding and attention. Citizens who experience the inadequacies of the government may feel that the resulting actions due to political bias when their needs are overlooked in favor of another, thus creating political disenfranchisement.

When political disenfranchisement occurs, citizens may fail to engage in the debate on issues that affect them. Through inaction, disengaged citizens abdicate their rights to politicians who are then free to enact policies that could favor politically elected officials over their duty to their constituents' well-being (Vig, 1996). However, when corruption by a politician is brought to light, voter turnout often increases in order to right the wrongs (Escaleras, Calcagno, & Shughart, 2008).

While the FEMA disaster relief process involves many people and steps from inception to execution, the decision to approve or turndown rests in the hands of one elected person, that of the president. For anyone to deny that the president is the party's leader while he/she is in office and that sitting presidents are politically motivated would be to deny the true power of the Presidency and the individuals who hold that office (Moe & Wilson, 1994). It is this singular discretionary power that the Presidency wields with regard to FEMA dispensation; one which has been alleged to have political ramifications that brings the parallel into being (McCarthy, 2011). The president has many

discretionary powers, such as the ability to mobilize the troops and pardon criminals (Crocker, 2011). The power the president can wield with the discretionary use of FEMA funds is evident with the money he is able to release into a given district (Garrett & Sobel, 2003).

In the democracy in the United States, public policy is shaped by the individuals the people elect to office, and these policies have direct impact on the lives of those who vote, or chose not to vote, those officials into office. Public policy decisions in the United States at the federal level are often the political machinations of a party ideology that drives emotional support yet lack evidenced-based decision making on the basis of scientific evidence, historical precedence, rational economic choice or equality in citizen support spending (Hoover & Pecurino, 2007). Recent political ramifications on fiscal policy have occurred as a result of raising the debt limit without increasing revenues on the United States credit rating demonstrate a current example of how policy has been shaped by political actions (Brandimarte & Lee, 2011).

When Standard & Poor's lowered the nation's previous perfect AAA rating to AA-plus in August of 2011, thus raising the interest rate on borrowing for millions, its managing director stated that the reason for the lowering the rating was due to political gridlock preventing the nation from addressing its debt and deficit problems (Brandimarte & Lee, 2011). The gridlock was a result of persons voting, or failing to vote, individuals into office who could work across party lines to raise income and cut spending or to raise the debt limit as a standalone vote and work on debt and deficit reduction as a separate issue (Brandimarte & Lee, 2011). Brandimarte & Lee (2011)

noted that while elected officials are put into office under the best of intentions, unprepared individuals or those acting out of self-bias can do a disservice to their constituents' needs. The debate which lasted weeks, caused market uncertainty as the full faith and credit of the United States was put in jeopardy without a debt ceiling change or a drastic cut in immediate spending (Brandimarte & Lee, 2011). It becomes imperative for people to know who they are voting into office as well as the policies they intend to pursue, as these choices will have direct ramifications on their lives for years to come as the above example has clearly demonstrated.

One of the best ways to know how a person will vote or what policies they will pursue, in the absence of previous voting records, is the party they have aligned themselves with (Ethridge & Handelman, 2015) . In the contemporary landscape of American politics two major political parties hold sway over the majority of national issues, that of the Democratic Party and that of the Republican Party (United States Senate, 2015). At the pinnacle of party power is the Office of the Presidency, especially when it comes to the administration of FEMA funds (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009). Yet under federalism principles, the president is not alone with disaster relief duties, for that also falls on each state governor to prepare, prevent and mitigate natural disasters as they occur within the boundaries of his/her state (FEMA, 2015).

The interaction between the governor of each state, the president and FEMA during times of natural disasters is both an urgent one, and one that could be politically charged for personal and party gain. Despite the interplay between the two, it is the

president's sole discretionary power that decides FEMA fund dispensation, intervention and support (Sylves, 2010). The subject of investigation remains timely for understanding if bias is present within a political organization can alter the voting actions of the public at large or can sway congress into action to take measures to limit potential bias in the future through the enactment of new federal laws.

Chapter 1 is a description of the research problem, research questions, and intended study goals. In addition, social implications are documented as well as the limitations to the scope of the research and concept definitions. The literature reviewed for this research comes from a variety of sources, including peer reviewed primary source materials, secondary databases compiled by the United States government, Supreme Court cases and periodicals of the day, including those in print and those in electronic media.

Statement of the Problem

The public policy problem that led to this study was the lack of knowledge the public and legislators have on the motives of presidents during their disaster declaration processes, especially during election years. While knowing the internal motivations of any president would be impossible, their decisions can be examined for potential self-serving interests. This can be done through quantitatively structured research questions, rather than qualitative questioning from presidents and principal agents, who may be reluctant to state the truth out of a desire to protect their images for posterity. It is possible that presidents have used the FEMA declaration process, one of their

discretionary powers, to enhance their own political interests specifically during their reelection years in election battleground states.

Background of the Problem

Few organizations have the ability to touch the lives of all Americans; but, those that do hold an implied public mandate to wield that power in a responsible manner benefitting the people as a whole (Canady, 1999). Some of those organizations, such as FEMA, hold an extra role that speaks to the weight of the power they possess, and that is in the ability to save lives and rebuild communities. During times of mismanagement, both may be sacrificed (Rowan, 2006).

From 1992 until 2012, three presidents sat in office and decided which States would receive federal aid, to what extent the federal government would lend that aid, and which States would receive no aid at all. Those presidents were the heads of national political parties and each rendered aid during their terms in office. Each president served, or was elected to serve, two consecutive terms. This has offered an historical opportunity to review the political policies of both parties in a time of technological similarities, during reelection years, through the actions of the president as the final authorizing authority, in regards to the use of FEMA funds and observe if bias may have been indicated. By researching this now and publishing the findings before the next national election is conducted in 2016, would inform the voting electorate as to the importance of discretionary powers when selecting a candidate. In the absence of bias this too could reaffirm the faith in the current system and allow legislators and academic the ability to focus on other areas of study and policy.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to explore if, or to what degree political bias may have been present in 1996, 2004 and 2012, with the use of FEMA funds by the incumbent administration in relation to approvals and disaster declarations, specifically in election battleground states. The years 1996, 2004 and 2012 were reelection years for three separate presidents, two Democratic and one Republican president party member. The years occurred in succession with similar technologies available for real time reporting.

The years also were ones in which the presidents had control of FEMA and actively sought a reelection to office in which they won. The goal was to see whether political bias was present in a between subject longitudinal design in order to inform the public of potential misuse of federal emergency management funds and/or to inform the public of the potential of bias surrounding a discretionary power of the president. During a time when the nation is in record debt, knowing where and why funds are being spent is imperative to a more appropriate use of federal funds. The study provided information that could lead to a better understanding of the presidential discretionary disaster declaration process and the understanding of money's impact in elections especially as it relates to such decisions in election battleground States during election years.

Theoretical Framework

Group Justification Bias

Bias can also be called favoritism in the realm of politics. I drew upon assumptions from two different social theories. Favoritism follows a modified systems/group justification theory that can be comprised of three different assumptions.

Jost, Banji and Nosek (2004) noted some assumptions that apply to group justification bias. Similar others are preferred to dissimilar others. (Allen & Wilder, 1975; Brewer, 1979; Tsui, Egan, & O'Reilly, 1992). Political ideology mirrors/group membership individual and collective self-interest and/or social position. (Centers, 1949; Downs, 1957; Olson, 1971; Sidanius, Singh, Hetts, & Federico, 2000).

Social Identity Theory

Drawing from social identity theory one is able to see that there is a propensity to favor those of similar traits in regard to social stereotyping, performance evaluation and resource allocation (Mullen, Brown & Smith, 1992; Ruben & Hewstone, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1986;). Ingroup bias is an associative psychological and social behavior. It is the favoring of one group over another, party ideology for self-interest and the allocation of resources to ones ingroup that begged the question if sitting presidents also succumbed to these biases with the use of public disaster relief funds. Social identity theory and group justification bias both form the basis for a president's decision making process, especially with discretionary powers during times that offer potential gains for self and/or party through the allocation of resources. Prior disaster research has yielded conflicting results, partially due to what was and was not studied yet this disparity further highlights the need to incorporate a sociopsychological overlay to the questions asked.

Garret and Sobel (2003) suggested that politics was the driving factor in over half of all disaster declarations suggesting that ingroup bias was present. Gaspar and Reeves (2011) noted that when a president denies a FEMA relief request they are hurt at the polls while the requesting governor is rewarded, further placing more pressure on the president

to approve requests out of self-interest, thus increasing the potential for bias. Gasper (2013) noted from 1992 through 2005 that presidential election years play a role on the turndown and approval process. Emergency managers have asserted that there are significant political factors in play when a disaster occurs during an election year (Selves, n.d.). Salkowe and Chakraborty (2009) found little association between party affiliation of the governor and that of the president in determining such decisions based on at data through 2004 in the aggregate. It should be noted that they did not break down the presidential election years within election battleground States to know if this held true for all election areas periods.

Husted and Nickerson (2014) asserted that after holding for flood damage, a state's ability to recover after the flood, that incumbents political economic choice to approve or deny has been influenced by their political party, the party of the governor in relation to the president and the number of electoral votes that the state grants directly refuting Salkowes and Chakrborty's (2009) data and supporting recursive choice. In each case the authors have looked at data going back to 1969 through 2005. They have not held for changes in FEMA organization, technological changes and response time, or differentiated between election, nonelection and election battleground state. They furthermore did not look at all FEMA request for aid, noting that in Husted and Nickerson's analysis flood damage was focused on and a determination on a State's ability to recover were inserted factors.

Silves (2010) asserted that governor requests for large scale events that occur on a rapid basis are decided more by administrative processes than out of the political benefit.

In addition, Reeves (2011) determined that post enactment of the Stafford Act the electoral competitiveness of a state influences whether or not the state gets FEMA aid.

This is where the theoretical construct comes into play. I theorized that a president could

1. Act in a manner that favors self-interest with FEMA dispensation.
2. Allocate resources to favor his or her collective (party) interests.
3. Be notable during times when his discretionary powers would favor self (reelection years in election battleground states).

The theoretical construct was founded in the belief that psychological and social factors of group justification bias, social identity, political economy and recursive choice theories play an active role in the approval and turndown decision making process of a sitting president. Since presidential discretionary powers are subjective by law, to assume that these constructs play little role in the outcome of a FEMA gubernatorial request would be to deny the power of political economy by the most powerful leader in the free world. This was where bias and potential corruption were drawn into the study.

Determining Bias

In order to determine if bias was present, a baseline in the comparative data sets had to be set prior to data gathering and evaluation in order to limit researcher bias playing a role in the subsequent data analysis. Since partial correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis of quantitative data to determine differences between longitudinal data sets was demonstrated by Glants, Abrmowitz, and Burkart (1976) work looking at monies effect on victory margins, similar analysis can be conducted to answer

the research questions and compare mean differences between administrations and within in order to help determine bias with the use of FEMA funds. In addition, chi square test for fit can be run with the data available to find statistical associations. A significance level of .05 between means, while it may show variance, might not alone determine bias if the majority of natural disasters occurred in one party's states in a given year.

To hold for this, I focused on election battleground states during reelection election years and compare the results versus other election years as well as uncontested states. In order to hold for group justification bias, the party of the requestor and that of the president was examined continuing the work previously done through 2005 and to bring new criteria as variables, such as election battleground states and potential personal political gain. Unlike Husted and Nickerson (2014) who tested using recursive choice, the use of multiple chi-square tests for fits analysis enables more factors to be studied, though it was possible to arrive at the same conclusion.

Several examples in the literature supported the notion of bias for political gain as has been previously mentioned. Chen (2008) found that in Florida in 2004, Republican voters were responsive to FEMA aid, while Democratic voters were not. For each $7,000 spent on FEMA aid one additional vote for Bush resulted. Furthermore, Snyder and Levitt (1997) found that $14,000 spent by an incumbent in earmark spending led to one corresponding vote for an incumbent congressman. While dated, both gave examples of how bias might have been used with federal spending to affect vote manipulation on a limited scale.

Bias could also be looked at from a corruption point of view. Corruption is the misuse of power, either implicit or entrusted, for political gain (Pope, 2000). Colombatto (2003) used the example of a public official using his/her power for their individual personal advantage at the expense of the general well-being of the public. This would be the case if presidents acted upon their own bias with the approval process of FEMA funds during election years in election battleground states. This was also the most relevant part as personal gain or gain for one's ingroup was at the core of this study. Corrupt practices have a negative effect on income and growth (Kaufmann, 1997).

Corruption does not necessarily mean any action that breaks the law. Examples of legal corruption in the United States exists when a legislative body votes for their own pay raise rather than using an outside body to determine that raise, judges deciding on cases where they have a self-interest, or when lobbying by the private sector allows passage of particular legislation (Kaufmann & Vicente, 2005). While those corrupt actions may not break the law, society at large often frowns on such practices and wishes to curb them. As its core, corruption unbalances democratic fairness by altering public service allocation. This latter effect often results in changes in elected officials or passage of legislation to curb the temptation and limit such practices (Chang, 2013). While corruption may be a strong word to some, by the above definition, actions for political gain fit and it was through this lens that the study was conducted.

Bias manifests itself either explicitly or implicitly (Casey, Warren, Cheesman, & Elek, 2012). While the actions of some bias might reflect the beliefs and attitudes of some through conscious thought others bias might manifest on a level below active

consciousness derived from experiences over time and often a product of one's social learning (Greenwald & Banji, 1995). The difficulty with looking at implicit bias in the case of potential presidential allocation of resources for personal gain is that all testing methods for measuring implicit bias to date involve lab tests in real time; this includes computerized measures, paper and pencil measures and physiological measurements (Casey et al., 2012). While implicit bias could have manifested, if bias was determined, knowing if the actions were either implicit or explicit bias cannot be known from the historical data alone. This does not rule out the ability to determine if bias was present for a bias is a departure from some point that has been marked as neutral (Kang, 2009).

Bias can also be called specific bias if the deciding body has an interest in the case before him or general bias such as prejudice (Vendel, 2005). Vendel wrote that determining bias can be done statistically or using other systematic manner through the examination of multiple decisions. It was therefore imperative that a thorough examination of the data be done to determine if there was a variance from a neutral point over multiple decisions. In the case of this data, the neutral point was deemed as the mean of all requests decided and would be compared as the potential political economy of the president increased, from general election year, reelection year and battleground state during a reelection year. The US Supreme court has accepted statistical proof if the pattern appears to be stark as the sole proof of discriminatory intent under the Constitution (U.S. Supreme Court, 1987).

Labeling bias is often a judgment call done through the lens of a reasonable person. Two sections of the Judicial Code in the United States address the subject of bias

or prejudice of a judge (United States Code 28, 2009 and 2015). These are not rulings after the case, but rather when a judge recuses himself/herself from presiding over a case because he/she might have the appearance of impartiality by a reasonable person. This includes when a judge has a financial interest in the outcome, or has expressed an opinion on the matter in the past. Even the multiple state legislatures have policies that allow a representative to withhold a vote if he/she has a potential personal financial interest (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2015). Flamm (2015) noted that, "bias is not an empirically provable fact but rather a way of characterizing an attitude or state of mind" (p. 2). This is because of no legal established percent of what constitutes a biased decision from an unbiased decision based on an absence of external and internal factors and reliant only on the mean of the decisions alone. Proving a biased position is about convincing a reasonable personal that there might be potential for the decision to be rendered to be one of a non-neutral position. Bias remains a propensity for or against one person or group (Oxford, 2012) and can be viewed most readily during times involving ethical choices, like the FEMA approval process.

When coupled with longitudinal studies over three administrations during reelection presidential years using system justification, recursive choice and social identify theories, bias should be able to be determined by focusing on both ingroup (presiding president's party) and self-serving (election battleground states) favoritism based on statistical tests of historical data and the discretionary approval/turndown of FEMA disaster requests over multiple decisions. Additionally it was important to note that extensive studies have looked at data through 2004, but did not compare election

battleground states to the population nor has any study looked at data through all of 2012 further breaking down the different types of FEMA aid.

Definitions of Terms

Approval: The presidential granting of disaster status to the original gubernatorial request in part or in full (Sylves, 2010)

Bias (also known as favoritism): Bias is defined as an inclination, prejudice or propensity for or against one person or group (Oxford, 2012). Measured in number of gubernatorial requests versus number of presidential FEMA approvals holding political party to be the determinate and compared as the potential political economy of the president rises from the general election, reelection year to a reelection year in a battleground state.

Corruption: The misuse of power, either implicit or entrusted, for political gain (Pope, 2000).

FEMA Aid: Federal Emergency Management Agency Aid approved by the president to help with the requesting state. For the purpose of this study can be in the form of Public Assistance (PA), Individual Assistance (IA), or Hazard Mitigation (HM).

Governor request for aid: The formal process of declaring a state of emergency through a request to the Office of the president (Sylves, 2010).

Gubernatorial party affiliation: The party of the governor is defined as the national party that he/she identified with at the time of his/her election.

Ingroup: The favoritism of one's own group or the derogation of another group. (Spears, 2013)

Presidential party affiliation: The party of the president is defined as the national political party that he identified with at the time of his election, either Democratic or Republican.

Political Economy: An examination of a political decision on the economic policy impacts. Involves the use of game theory, law, economics, social systems and political ideology. (Harvard University, 2014)

Propensity: An established pattern of behavior (Merriam-Webster, 2014) In this case calls into question the appearance of a pattern of behavior in the absence of an established pattern.

Recursive Choice: In this paper, defined as the president's positive decision of expected utility of a positive outcome to every action, chosen between two options, approval or turndown. (Fundenberg, Strzalecki, 2012).

Swing State (Also known as an election battleground State): A U.S. state where the two major political parties have similar levels of support among voters, viewed as important in determining the overall result of a presidential election (Oxford, 2013). Defined for the purpose of this study as a U.S. state where the margin of victory between the top candidates was less than 5%. Listed below are the identified swing states based on this definition as was recorded in the national archives Certificates of Ascertainment from each State (NARA, 2013).

- 1996: Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia

- 2004: Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin
- 2012: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia

Turndown: The presidential denial of disaster status to the original gubernatorial request in full (Sylves, 2010), or in part.

Assumptions, Limitations, Delimitations and Scope

Assumptions

I looked at the presidential election years of 1996 through 2012 in order to limit the scope of the data to be analyzed and to elicit the data from the most potentially ethically challenged moments of each administration in regards to FEMA fund use, potential bias and potential political corruption. The research assumption was that all of these data were available and accurate and ready for analysis through governmental sources and that if potential bias were to occur with the use of FEMA funds it would be most evident during presidential reelection years in election battleground states, where the incumbent's discretionary power controls FEMA dispensation. Finally the intervening years were compared to understand presidential decision making trends outside of election battleground states and outside of election years in order to establish a pattern of behavior and a baseline for comparison.

Scope

The research was focused on 1996, 2004 and 2012 and all natural disasters that occurred in the States to which FEMA funds were requested during those years as well as the intervening years. Since governmental historical data was available, there was little

risk to outside parties in the research collection methodology. Since the scope of the research lay in understanding if, and to what extent, bias existed with the allocation of FEMA funds, the focus was on party bias and thus the ability of the research to do harm does not affect the research gathering methodology nor the data analysis methodology. Surveys were not appropriate in any form since the research was not interested in how people felt about FEMA or disaster recovery, but rather on the quantitative statistics that may have demonstrated potential bias or the lack there of. The data existed as had been verified--through a freedom of information request. The entire data set was used, not a sample, thus giving a more complete picture. The data set itself had been identified as present, accessible and on-hand through direct contact with FEMA representatives in the FOIA department of that agency.

Limitations

I was only able to analyze where publically collected data existed. I did not take into account factors such as local or state policies that may have hindered federal aid or limited federal involvement after a crisis. I did not look at polls from election years or other years that predicted what states would or would not be election battleground states, merely at postelection results where the margin of victory was less than 5%. Areas that show discrepancy will lead future researchers to gaps in the study that can be further explored, and to understand how FEMA's use can either enhance, or hinder local efforts to "prevent, relieve or overcome disaster hardship, injury or adverse condition" (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). If bias was shown, historical political

scientists would be able to better understand the election results of 1996, 2004 and 2012 with regard to the discretionary power of the president and the use of FEMA funds.

Delimitations

The scope of this research project was limited as per Creswell's (2003). The delimitations of the study include that personal interviews with each president were not conducted to understand their own decision making process, neither were interviews conducted with FEMA agents and executives who could shed light on intimate conversation made at the time of the approvals or turndowns in each instance. The ability to access data was limited to data available through FOIA requests and through published governmental data on each disaster request or related third party sites like those of the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI). Finally the research does not examine the motivations of the individual governors during each of their requests, with an estimated 3500-3700 disasters handled annually by the States without Federal assistance, there was ample opportunity for each governor to likewise act in a biased fashion hoping federal funds offset local costs (FEMA (b), 2013).

Significance of the Study

Reduction of Gaps

I sought to fill gaps in understanding presidential approval and turndowns both after 2005, continuing the work done by Salkowe and Chakraborty and Husted and Nickerson, as well as understanding the relationship of presidential FEMA decision making in election battleground states during election years versus nonelection years and non-election battleground states. I explored the contradictions in previous research

suggesting that party affiliation may or may not play a role in the decision making process of the president in regards to FEMA approvals or turndowns, something again the current published research does not explore after 2005. Lastly the focus of the study on election battleground states, discretionary powers, FEMA dispensation, ingroup bias and corruption had not been explored in this fashion before.

Implications for Social Change

An exploration of how each president has made decisions during times of a national disaster in recent history, especially when it comes to the health and welfare of United States citizens on sovereign soil can directly impact an individual's decision on whether or not to support a specific party, seek to reform it, vote independent or act to reform policy. In the light of politician's power over public policy and public policy's effect on each citizen's life, this is but one more piece of information along with a party's political platform, in choosing a path to shape that policy. Every person's vote counts, but knowing how to voice it is paramount to choosing one's freedom. At the least, understanding if bias occurred allows for a more critical dialogue of presidents and their discretionary policy effects on contemporary society and whether the ultimate power for approvals for FEMA disaster declarations should rest in the hands of a politically elected official or should instead be awarded based on specific delineated criteria As has been previously noted, discretionary powers have the ability to bias a president's decisions and this can lead to an appearance of corruption.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

1. Is there a statistically significant difference between the types of FEMA aid approved by a president to a Democratic or Republican governor during times of natural disasters during 1996, 2004 and 2012?

$H1_0$: There is no statistically significant difference between the types of FEMA aid approved by a president to a Democratic or Republican governors during times of natural disasters in 1996, 2004 and 2012.

$H1_a$: There is a statistically significant difference between the types of FEMA aid approved by a president to a Democratic or Republican governor during times of natural disasters in 1996, 2004 and 2012.

2. Is there a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals depending on the political party of the requesting governor and the party of the president and approvals in 1996, 2004 and 2012?

$H2_0$: There is no statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals between the political party of the requesting governor and the party of the president during 1996, 2004 and 2012.

$H2_a$: There is a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals between the political party of the requesting governor and the party of the president during 1996, 2004 and 2012.

3. Is there a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals depending on if the state was an election battleground state in 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to requests in the same year?

$H2_0$: There is no statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals depending on if the state was an election battleground state in 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to requests in the same year.

$H2_a$: There is a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals depending on if the state was an election battleground state in 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to requests in the same year.

4. Is potential bias present with regard to the use of FEMA funds by one or more presidents during 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to non-election years during that same time period?

$H2_0$: There is no significant bias between the presidents with regard to the allocation of the use of FEMA funds during 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to non-election years during that same time period.

$H2_a$: There is the appearance of bias with one or more presidents with the use of FEMA funds during 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to non-election years during that same time period.

Summary

While bias and corruption are both known to exist in politics, knowing if public disaster relief funds are being used to favor one political party or another at the expense of another was not known. Since FEMA funding approval and dispensation are largely the purview of the Executive branch and the president, the power to do both harm and good rests in the decision of one person and his/her ability to remain politically unbiased when making funding decisions and disaster relief calls (Lindsay

& McCarthy, 2012). Money has played a role in getting people elected as has been previously noted (Levitt et. al., 1997). This is ever more the case in a post Citizens United v. F.C.C. world. Knowing how one's party leader has behaved with sensitive and vital relief fund dispensation can drastically change voter perception and increase engagement especially if that dispensation has been biased by one's social construct or frame of mind.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

Administrators and academics alike understand how important public policy is in affecting the lives of Americans across this country. What both sometimes fail to communicate is how politics affects the shape and direction of public policy and how taking action when occupying a politically appointed position can have significant effects, both positive and negative, on the public. Those who do understand this may lack the necessary resources in order to form a cohesive argument for change.

The literature review was conducted using Walden Library's EBSCO Research database, SocINDEX, ProQuest, Google Scholar, governmental hosted sites such as FEMA.gov and House.gov, numerous open source documents and periodicals and other documents from the Unites States Government. Many keywords were used in the various searches, including bias, corruption, politics, FEMA, turndown, approval, disaster, in-group, favoritism, declaration, governor, president, political economy, recursive choice and money.

This literature review explored various ways in which publically elected officials utilize the powers of their office for political gain and what the effects of those actions may have been on subsequent elections. Knowing the major causes that lead to corruption gave a foundation to understanding potential bias. The research was not meant to be a full account of FEMA's role in society. Other research and books cited within this study go into greater depth and are more germane to their topics. Instead this literature review was meant to establish a brief framework on how FEMA aid when rendered can influence

people's lives and elections. It further explored FEMA's role as a political entity that appears to influence the voter decision making process. Such resources and citations not only set a foundation for this study, but may also offer the necessary resources for administrators and academics to elicit change.

Money and Votes in National Elections

Money has long played a role in U.S. politics. Even in the days of US founding fathers, money enabled supporters to take out advertisements in local papers, publish pamphlets, and even distribute alcohol at polling booths. Yet, direct evidence of the role of money in politics has been tracked more recently. Glants, Abrmowitz, and Burkart (1976) identified the distinct role that money played in the 1972 and 1974 California State Assembly and Congressional delegation and the 1972 House of Representative Elections. Using a partial correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis the authors found that the amount of money the challenger spent compared to the monies spent by the incumbent decided how large the victory margin would be, usually in the incumbent's favor due to the difference in mean spending. This did not take into account soft monies spent, but rather just the monies spent by the candidates themselves.

Snyder and Levitt (1997) found that $14,000 spent by an incumbent in earmarked legislative spending led to one corresponding vote for an incumbent congressman. This was one of the first attempts at quantifying a dollar to be set per vote. Their contention was that votes could be bought with earmark legislation in an election year. They did not look at presidential races or differences between parties. Earmarks, or what is coined as pork-barrel spending, are prevalent in many of the bills passed by either house of

congress (Shepsle, Van Houweling, Abrams & Hanson (2009). Though this would not be looked at as normal campaign expenditures, the link from an incumbent's power to influence the next election has been directly showed (Hiebert, 1998).

Campaign finance has also been researched on its role in participant's ability to run for office. Hiebert (1998) found that citizens could not participate in running for elections equitably without campaign finance laws that limited the amount of monies incumbents could generate. Hiebert further demonstrated that unrestricted spending influenced elections in Canada and made it too challenging for unequally funded challengers to run for office. While focusing on the democracy present in Canada, Hiebert highlighted many of the same issues that have plagued the United States, from political action committee spending or secondary sponsor monies, earmark spending, to primary monies spent by the candidates themselves. In each case monies spent have altered the voting outcomes.

In 1994 Senate races throughout the United States, spending was directly related to the amount challengers had to spend and that incumbents not only tended to win more, but also outspent their challengers, mimicking the 1976 findings of Glants et al. (1976). Gerber (1998) used a least squares estimation with a new tool to hold for candidate wealth. Even in doing so repeatedly the incumbent rose more money, spent more money and was reelected to office more often. Money, as the defined variable, was the primary factor of an incumbent being reelected.

Jacobson (2006), using the Annaberg studies, found that challengers to senatorial races did better the more money they spent in relation to the incumbent. Conversely,

while the incumbent's polls rose directly with the amount they spent compared to the incumbent, the incumbent's expenditures did not yield a rise in poll numbers related to what the challenger spent. This suggests that name recognition or another unmeasured factor such as soft money played a role in the election outcomes in addition to the monies spent (Whang, 2013). Although money still played a role, it was to a lesser degree than had been previously discussed.

Chen (2008) found that in Florida in 2004, Republican voters were responsive to FEMA aid, while Democratic voters were less. For each $7,000 spent on FEMA aid one additional vote for President Bush resulted. Her analysis controlled for the strength of the hurricane in each area compared to the damages as well as voter registration, election results of 2000, 2002 and of 2004. While her analysis looked at Florida and the use of funds in that state, she did not indicate if bias was evident on the part of those who dispensed FEMA funds. Chen indicated voter preference was related to the amount of FEMA dollars spent, which ended up favoring the incumbent remaining consistent with previous literature. Chen did not look at the monies the parties spent in their own campaigns, just the monies FEMA spent in the State.

National politicians understand the power of money in politics. Much of their time is spent in fundraising campaigns and often the candidate with the most capable or most effective fund raising machine gets his/her parties' endorsement (Pogue, 2011). News organizations report on the amount of money each campaign raised and spent in a given time period and the evidence of that money can be seen in newsprint, television, and Internet advertisements (Scherer, Rebela & Wilson, 2014). Money allows campaigns

to hire full time staff, establish places of operations, increase travel budgets and fill mailboxes with leaflets extolling their candidates' views while denouncing their opponents (Grober, Rueben & Tymula, 2013). Money can play subtle psychological roles too, from making people feel better about a candidate/office holder who gives/allows money to enter his/her district to bribes for votes such as when Washington would wheel barrels of liquor to courthouse lawns and polling places for election day (Pogue, 2011).

Brief Overview of Federalism and Disaster Relief

Disasters have struck the United States since its founding. In 1776, 4,170 people were killed along the eastern seaboard in a storm called the Hurricane of Independence (Jones, 2005). No federal mechanism existed at the time to help those in need, and the colonies were at war with Great Britain limiting any aid from overseas (Fitzpatrick, 2005). In 1803, congress passed the Congressional Act of 1803 to give New Hampshire residents aid for a town destroyed by fire since both the State and the local residents were unable to locally cope with the issue (Blanchard, 2015). The federal government remained weak during the 1800s and 1900s through the concept of states' rights and state sovereignty, the aforementioned federalism principle.

Advocates of federalism forced the separate states to rely on their own communities for aid during times of crisis (Public Broadcasting Service, 2005). When this became too much for those communities to bear they used the only mechanism they had to them for relief which involved getting o representatives to lobby their fellow congressmen for aid (Public Broadcasting Service, 2005). While Congress continued to act on behalf of the several states, reaction was slow and costly in lost lives. For over a

century, Congress passed similar relief efforts, but no disaster mechanism on a national level existed to render immediate aid to the States and would not exist until the 1930s (Public Broadcasting Service, 2005).

By 1950, Congress had endorsed the idea of federal consistent aid to the several states with the passage of the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, which organized coordinated federal responses to major disasters (Moss, Schellhamer & Berman, 2009). Expansion of this act continued in Congress over the next twenty years through shelter and food aid and federal loans and unemployment insurance for those affected by disasters (Public Broadcasting Service, 2005). What remained constant since the 1930's was an ever increasing US population, a more consistent and persistent media presence that shaped congressional action, and the presence of major disasters to remind people of the need for swift aid from all sources (Public Broadcasting Service, 2005). Disasters such as the Vanport, Oregon flood of 1948 when 20,000 people lost their homes or in New Orleans when Hurricane Betsey struck in 1965 flooding the city, remind people that they have been inundated with yearly events, though not all have had catastrophic results (Hopper, 2005).

FEMA was created in 1979 through Executive Order no. 12148 by an enactment of executive powers contained within The Disaster Relief Act of 1974, the Earthquakes Hazards Reduction Act of 1977, the National Security Act of 1947, the Production Act of 1950, the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1939 and the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, along with Public Law 92-385 (Carter, 1979). FEMA's initial role was to respond to disasters that local and state authorities could not

respond to, much as congressional supplemental aid had done in the past. However, FEMA was designed not just as a mechanism of funds to be sent to rebuild a community, but also as a coordinated federal effort to assist State and local officials mitigate disasters. Such mitigation occurred once a governor declared a state of emergency and requested aid from the president for FEMA relief (FEMA.gov, 2010). While state budgets continue to strain with each passing year, the rate of governor-requested aid to FEMA had not. From an average 43 declarations from 1989-1993 to 89 from 1993-2001 to 130 under the 43rd President Bush, the average per year has climbed (FEMA.gov (d), 2015).

In 1989 and 1992 FEMA was called upon to respond and provide aid during two hurricane events in Florida and the Gulf Coast. In both instances, the agency failed to provide aid in an efficient manner, leaving many people homeless and without shelter, food or water. Many in the media called for aid from military sources to fill in where FEMA failed (Rank, 2010). Yet FEMA was created for the very purpose of hurricane and earthquake disaster response leaving many to wonder what role the federal government should most effectively play in times of real need. According to Rowan (2006), FEMA failed to communicate effectively and was hampered by management and lack of authority at that time. Over 250,000 people were homeless as a result of hurricane Andrew in 1992 and caused over $30 billion in property damage (House.gov, 2007).

In 1993 when President Clinton took office, FEMA was elevated to a cabinet level position in hopes of amending some of the issues hurricane Andrew had highlighted (FEMA.gov, 2010). During the tenure of President Clinton, through congressional expansion, the role of FEMA grew to include low cost loans and training to first

responders (FEMA.gov, 2010). It was during this time that FEMA developed the nation's first coordinated plan for responding to disasters called the Federal Response Plan (FRP, House.gov, 2007).

When the attacks on September 11, 2001 occurred, FEMA was involved in direct operations in New York City. Yet even the agency's own actions during the day of the attack and subsequent days following showed opportunities for improvement (GAO, 2006). In an internal investigation, FEMA's Office of the Inspector General noted that the agency should have been more flexible and fair when assisting people with economic losses (GAO, 2006). The report cited ineffective assistance to those adversely affected by secondary economic traumas (Chen, 2003). Yet congress and the president did nothing to amend the cited issues at that time.

Presidential Discretionary Powers

The president has many discretionary powers at his/her disposal, such as those vested in the president by Article II of the U.S. Constitution. The president, acting as commander-in-chief can enter into treaties with foreign countries, can appoint judges, ambassadors, and other officials. Further powers include the use of executive orders through the aggregation of powers asserted under the mandate that all laws be faithfully executed, by areas where congress by inaction has left a vacuum, unilateral presidential actions and in the issuance of pardons (Chiou & Rothenberg, 2013).

Presidential Discretionary Power in the FEMA Disaster Process

When a natural disaster occurs in a given state, the initial response is the job of the local government's emergency services. In the case of an event deemed too

catastrophic for local resources to handle the state, in conjunction with federal officials, can do a joint damage assessment (Sylves, 2010). If deemed too much for the state to handle the governor may request FEMA aid (FEMA.gov (b), 2013). FEMA evaluates and then recommends to the president a course of action (FEMA.gov (b), 2013).

The president then chooses to approve or deny (turndown) that request in part or in full and may make modification to it, such as increasing the scope of the declaration, or approving hazard mitigation but turning down individual assistance aid (FEMA, 2013b). The recommendations given by FEMA to the president are covered under executive privilege and are not subject to public review (Gasper, 2013). It is this discretionary choice that is at the center of this research paper. See Appendix A. Lastly Sylves (2010) noted that presidential disaster declarations can be either major declarations, emergency declarations or catastrophic declarations, each allots a certain dollar threshold if approved, and only the president makes the decision as to what type it is if approved.

Waste Within Disaster Relief Programs and Political Motivations

While not peer-reviewed, newspapers can share a pulse of the public at a given time. Such examples include FEMA incidents in Florida in 2004. The Florida Sun-Sentinel reported in 2005 that millions of dollars had been awarded to Florida residents who did not have any damage from disasters occurring in 2004 (Kestin, O'Matz, Maines, & Burnstein, 2005). While this citation shows public interest, scholars likewise admit to FEMA's inadequacies at the time. Perrow wrote that FEMA paid Florida residents in excess of $31 million to those that were unaffected by 2004 hurricanes because of the

States-key political importance to the Bush administration (Perrow, 2005). While accusations of abuses of many governmental programs exist, why was congressional and executive oversight apparently lacking when it came to FEMA dispensation? While mismanaging of funds was alleged by the media and some in congress, the question remained if FEMA was being used in a biased fashion, or if the use of FEMA has remained consistent from one party to another. Since bias in policy making and implementation can be viewed as corrupt actions, knowing how the public at large has reacted to abuses in government spending that might influence elections is pertinent to this discussion.

Political Interest Groups Shaping Policy

Influence can occur from various levels. While some actions in the use of discretionary power stem from self-interest, others can be to further the end of another entity for a current or future reward to self. Kirkland et al. (2010) noted that during campaigns incumbents have a marked advantage. While they focused on PAC funds flowing largely to incumbent campaigns, they did not note why incumbents had such advantages, only that it was a given. In their study they addressed monies role in PAC contributions to campaigns, considered that issue-driven politicking had the sole purpose of raising funds for candidates regardless of party platform or policy ideology, and explored how PAC monies were given based on policy agendas (Kirkland et al., 2010). Issue-driven campaigning forced policy to be crafted that would fulfill campaign pledges, not out of initial citizen demand, but rather in a candidates' reaction to the spending and marketing that came from taking a stand on the issue. The media buzz and funds that

poured into the coffers made taking a stand on either side of an issue a PAC fund raising bonanza.

The concept of campaign contributions and whether limits to campaign contributions mattered are contested as the incumbent benefits from the use of such monies and would be at a personal disadvantage to get rid of it (Fuller, 2014). Stratmann and Francisco (2006) found that donations were conditional to the level of activity that concerned a particular political action committee (PAC) and that such activity often dictated the direction of candidates campaign and election chances. They further noted that PACs historically donate at a significantly higher rate to incumbent campaigns compared to a challenger's campaign, further increasing the amount of money an incumbent has to spend on a race. They also noted that PACs tended to donate more money as the public forum of debate increased and became more widely viewed and arguments more heated (Stratmann & Francisco, 2006). They further reiterated previous research, finding that incumbents had a more prevalent rate of reelection due to monies influence on those elections and the incumbent's ability to outspend a challenger (Stratmann et al., 2006).

Interest group spending can swing policy congruence by up to 18% (Lax & Phillips, 2012). The political weight lent by powerful groups in both advocacy and spending directly impacts policy adoption or lack of adoption, even when the majority of potential voters might differ. This further strengthens the effect political opinion has, as expressed through a PAC or other interest group, over swaying votes cast even in the face of majority opinion pre-election.

In today's society, political emphasis and money go hand-in-hand. Over the course of the articles listed in this literature review there is a trend between how money influences voter decision making and how politics can be shaped by that monies effect through policy passage or denial (Levitt et. al., 1997). Since money can alter policy through voter manipulation, the question remains if indirect money, such as the money spent by the federal government through FEMA aid, likewise alters voter turnout on a national scale (Glantz et al., 1976). It must be remembered that FEMA aid to Florida in 2004 had a direct effect on voter turnout for the incumbent (Chen, 2008). Is such an effect indicative of the rest of the states? Have presidents shown bias with the dispensation of FEMA funds during reelection years in hopes of influencing election results? The importance of answering these questions is not only important to safeguarding democracy, but to also insuring that monies that should be spent to those in need are not dispensed based on political ideology and reelection desires, but rather on the health and safety requirements of all citizens setting politics aside.

Bias and Corruption in Policy Shaping

Bias can appear in many ways in politics (Hibbing, Smith & Alford, 2014). While much of bias is known through one's political platform, voters have a choice on whom to vote into office and who not to elect based on the candidate's bias or political leanings. In a pure democratic way, this reflects the majority will of the people as expressed through the policies that one person will enact or legislate upon. Yet there are also times when bias is more insidious than the expressed will and needs of the people and this occurs when an elected official acts in a way that furthers their own ambitions at the expense of

their constituents at large, or when their actions clearly undermine the democratic process.

In recent years, political bias has reared its ugly head on the more insidious side through congressional misdeeds that tie directly back to lobbying and the effect money has on politics (Thurber, 2011). Members of both houses of congress have been forced to resign amidst allegations of bribery, and ethics violations. Numerous convictions have likewise risen out of the use of illegal campaign contributions from corporate sponsors, and for earmarking legislations for donations (Thurber, 2011). Yet both parties remain at fault, the only constant being corruption through monies influence on public officials.

The actions by members of congress have led to issues with the public's trust of in government and moreover have proved how money can adversely bend politician's actions to favor one viewpoint at the expense of others (Stratmann et al., 2006). While the direct actions of each member of congress are not mentioned here in relation to the charges they were brought up on, the ramifications of their actions was shown by the stern reaction of others in government who sought such convictions on both sides of the political aisle. Lobbying in its current form is a direct reflection of money's influence in politics (Lax et al., 2012). This can be in the form of gifts and favors to the new direction money can play in advertising and PAC's. Questions over bribery have not rested solely in the actions of congressmen and senators. Questions of undue influence and bias have also existed at the presidential and vice presidential level. A recent example includes former Vice President Cheney and his ties with Halliburton. As the former CEO of Halliburton, questions were raised as to contracts awarded during the Iraq War which

skirted around federal regulations (Weeber & Turner, 2007). While the actions of the vice president may or may not have been out of direct bias, the implications to policy are drawn into question, from the reasons of going to war with Iraq to the reasons for staying after no weapons of mass destruction were found (Weeber et al., 2007).

One of the greatest issues with bias and corruption in government are the after effects once exposed that lead to a reduction in generalized trust (Richey, 2010). When such trust is reduced, negative societal effects occur, such as a lack of citizen involvement in volunteer organizations, reduced voting rates, diminished health and a lack of interpersonal communication. In a time of budget crisis when communities are left with less money, personal funding to rely on and shrinking public services, reduced generalized trust due to corruptive or bias practices can further depress the social environment when societal involvement is needed most.

Discretionary Powers and Corruption

Studies have shown that corruptions' effects reverberate throughout an economy, well beyond the initial action (Brunett, Kisunko, & Welder, 1998). This has included economic disparity, a reduction in economic development, decreased entrepreneurial investment, and a disproportionate resource allocation (Brunett, et al., 1998). When looking at the use of FEMA funds for one's personal gain, a potential political act by the elite (The president) to allocate resources for personal gain as opposed to their principals interest, such an act has been called "Grand Corruption" (Jain, 2001). This diversion of public spending to areas they deem as greatest to themselves involves the use of a discretionary power entrusted by the public in those officials. Yet as Jain mention, this

type of corruption is difficult to identify in the absence of bribes. He further notes that this type of corruption may have the greatest consequences on a society (Jain, 2001). Other forms of corruption and discretionary powers, which have been touched upon earlier in this literature review, include legislative corruption through kickbacks, bribes and campaign funding and bureaucratic corruption, such as when an officer of the law takes a bribe to avoid giving someone a ticket. One of the most important facets of Jains research is his acknowledgement that corruption "requires, above all, that someone have discretionary powers over the allocation process"(Jain, pg. 77, 2001). There is no greater discretionary power than that of final say, especially in light of necessary funds and manpower distribution during a time of a potential crisis (Scheuerman, 2002). Sylves (2010) had noted that governmental officials are often rewarded politically if they address disasters in a successful manner while those who fail to do so may suffer politically.

Brief Role of FEMA Changes from 1992-2012

During the tenure of President Clinton through congressional expansion, the role of FEMA grew to include low cost loans and training to first responders (FEMA.gov, 2010). It was during this time that FEMA developed the nation's first coordinated plan for responding to disasters called the Federal Response Plan (FRP) (House.gov, 2007). It was FEMA and the American Red Cross that provided a mechanism for delivery of resources to state and local governments during times of disasters that exceeded the abilities of State government to handle without Federal assistance. Those resources could be in the form of direct federal manpower, supplies or monies. What is certain is that federal focus

in an area would mean a boost to the local economy and a bonus to the political capital from Washington if it was seen to aid the local citizens in their time of need.

According to the basic plan of the FRP as was republished in 1999, the FRP:

1. Sets forth fundamental policies, planning assumptions, a concept of operations, response and recovery actions, and Federal agency responsibilities;

2. Describes the array of Federal response, recovery, and mitigation resources available to augment State and local efforts to save lives; protect public health, safety, and property; and aid affected individuals and communities in rebuilding after a disaster;

3. Organizes the types of Federal response assistance that a State is most likely to need under 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), each of which has a designated primary agency;

4. Describes the process and methodology for implementing and managing Federal recovery and mitigation programs and support/technical services;

5. Addresses linkages to other Federal emergency operations plans developed for specific incidents;

6. Provides a focus for interagency and intergovernmental emergency preparedness, planning, training, exercising, coordination, and information exchange; and

7. Serves as the foundation for the development of detailed supplemental plans and procedures to implement Federal response and recovery activities rapidly and efficiently. (Federal Response Plan, p. 1, 1999)

In 1996 FEMA was elevated to a cabinet level position in hopes of amending some of the issues hurricane Andrew had highlighted within the federal response, such as a lack of an immediate on-the-ground support, long bureaucratic lapses of support and delayed medical aid (Franklin, 2005).

Following the World Trade Center attacks on the United States in 2001, FEMA was removed from its cabinet position and placed under the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This was done under the DHS Act of 2002 (FEMA (b), 2013). However issues with expenditures during the 2004 hurricane season in Florida coupled with the failure by DHS and FEMA to meet public expectations in the wake of Katrina forced congress to pass the DHS Appropriations Act of 2007 which included an act to give more power and oversight to FEMA (Govtrack.us, 2010).

Research on the Role of the Governor and President in Relation to FEMA

When administrative law was set by FEMA as given power by congress, the process of an emergency declaration required time prior to action. For example, after a governor had consulted with local governmental officials and had decided that the recovery was beyond the ability of the State, they could request assistance under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Relief Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (FEMA.gov (a), 2010). That request would then be investigated through a preliminary damage assessment and impact study. Following the FEMA review, the president would then be notified and a suggested course of action could then be taken (FEMA.gov (a), 2010). The president could then decide to approve the request for

disaster relief, modify it by expanding or contracting the area covered or turndown the request.

Climate Change and FEMA's Increasing Role

While the frequency of governors to request FEMA aid has risen since its inception, so too have the amount of storms increased in both frequency and severity. Projections show that cyclones will intensify in their strength as greenhouse gases increase in the atmosphere (Knutson, McBcBride, Chan, Emanuel, Holland, Landsea, Held, Kossin, Srivastavs & Sugi, 2010). With the rise of more frequent and violent storms predicted, FEMA aid was required more as the years pass. It has been asserted by Styles (2010) that presidential turndowns do not have a political motivation, but rather stem from a lack of administrative clout and that when news media outfits place coverage into an event that could be called a disaster but only on a small scale a president might be more inclined to approve the governor's request. In light of this, it becomes even more imperative to know if FEMA funds have been used biased fashion to influence an incumbent's chance at reelection, even when the media might not be present.

Chapter 3: Research Methods

Rational

Often doctoral quantitative researchers use samples to understand more about the whole. This is done in part due to limitations in expense, time and availability. However, in this case, no sample is needed when the entire data set is available. Having the entire data set, which comprises all governor requests for aid through FEMA and the subsequent presidential approvals or turndowns from 1993-2012, gave a far more accurate picture. This rational was further reinforced in that FEMA houses all of this information and retrieval of the data from the primary source has no additional cost. This further prevented the need to use outside third party sources for the data sets, even if they were peer reviewed, such as the work by Sylves (2010). It is always preferable to use primary data in a study.

Data Set

Study data were gathered from primary governmental sources through the use of Freedom of Information Requests (FOIA) to the FEMA FOIA office. The federal government gathers and compiles an immense amount of data. Congress, in their role as oversight and budget regulators, requires specific reports that each agency is mandated to give under law (Rosenbloom, Kravchuk, & Clerkin, 2009). The scope of governmental data, the methodology used in gathering that data, and the number of years that is maintained in these databases make it ideal for congressional studies and third parties alike to conduct research. All of the data required for this study were housed within the FEMA databases and those of each state. The data were available through a FOIA request

and had been confirmed as available through direct contact with that agency's FOIA office. Individual state websites were used to determine who served as the governor in each of the years studied and their party affiliation?

The primary research population was defined as all states where natural disasters occurred in 1996, 2004 and 2012. The states affected were Arkansas, Alaska, Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. In addition all US territories and US protectorates were looked at for comparison. In order to account for natural disaster randomness and their relative damage in nonpresidential election years, the additional research population looking at the years of 1997 through 2003 and 2005-2011 was used as a baseline comparison in all 50 States, US protectorates and US territories. The comparison looked for FEMA aid requests from governors to approved FEMA aid from the president during nonreelection years. In addition, types of aid were clearly investigated separately for type focused approval or denial. Lastly, the data were compared to election battleground states in 1996, 2004 and 2012 in order to assess for bias, something that previous research had not investigated using the same metrics.

The data were accessed through governmental historical data as collected and reported by FEMA to Congress. The data requested gave the date of each declared

disaster from 1996-2004, the type of disaster, and if the request was approved or denied by FEMA. This information was stored by the Department of Homeland Security in the Mount Weather Emergency Operations Center Emergency Services Division unclassified Firehouse Database. In addition the National Archives and Records Administration maintain similar records.

Variables

The variables chosen reflected the bivariate data needed to determine if ingroup favoritism was present. Since social identity bias requires a propensity to favor and group justification bias revolves around political ideology and self-interest the variables were chosen as they were available, measurable, pertain to the subject matter theory, and can address the proposed research questions (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).

Variables included were political party of the president, the requesting states' governor's party and whether it matches the sitting president's, election year or nonelection year, reelection year or nonreelection year, type of disaster relief requested (HM, PA, IA) and election battleground state. Party was defined as Democrat, Republican or Other. These variables were chosen as they were all available in the historical data and assumed could answer the four research questions listed in Chapter 1.

The dependent variable was presidential party. The independent variables were party-match/non-match, election year/non-election year, election battleground/non-election state, disaster relief type approved (HM, PA, IA) and reelection year or nonreelection year.

Design

The design consisted of historical primary and secondary data collection from governmental sources. The methodology was a quantitative test for association design using bivariate data. The purpose of the design was to discover if there was an association between presidential party affiliations, the reelection election year, election battleground versus nonelection battleground state request for financial aid and the dispensation of FEMA funds using chi-square test for fit analysis. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Statistics 21 was used to analyze the data once entered. Data collection was done in electronic format backed up to a secure offline source. G* Power (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) was used to determine the necessary sample size. No additional tools were used.

Procedures, Instrumentation and Statistical Analysis

I used chi-square test for fit analysis. I examined requested FEMA aid from governors to approved FEMA aid from the president. The data gathered were analyzed to see if there is a difference between administrations and their use of FEMA funds with regard to party affiliation in election battleground states. A significance level of .05 was used for the analysis.

The population data set was the entire set of disasters from 1996-2012. There was no sample from the data set to be extracted as all the data were evaluated. The data set included 1137 disaster declarations from January 3, 1996 through December 19, 2012. This included 158 disaster declaration requests in 1996, 109 disaster declarations in 2004,

and 58 in 2012 from the affected States (FEMA, 2012), territories and protectorates which were years in which the presidential election occurred. The data set has been verified from direct contact to FEMA as well as review of Congressional records. As an alternative hypothesis to research question 3, potential significant bias by the president may be determined if the data reflects a probability that the awarding of FEMA aid due to party affiliation and/or election battleground state is unlikely to be due to chance. In order to account for natural disaster randomness and their relative damage, the years of 1997 to 2003 and 2005-2011 was used as a baseline comparison for FEMA aid requests from governors to approved FEMA aid from the president during nonreelection election years. While nonreelection election years may still have bias with the use of FEMA funds, the comparison was interesting to note but more difficult to establish based on the premise of self-interest established in this study criteria.

The G* Power analysis from the data generates an A priori power of .95 at an effect size of .06. The year with the least number of instances was 2012 with 58 while 2004 had 109. In 1996 there were 158 requests for FEMA aid while the combined three reelection election years is 325. The nonreelection years had a total of 812. When all years were combined, the total number of instances was 1137. Given that the study effect size was between a small and medium effect size both calculations for a priori were used. The below calculations represent the small and medium effect size and their sample size A priori using G*Power as well as the calculated a priori power (.05) based on a set sample size of 267. See Appendix B for test details.

Given the need to mediate bias in statistics, Cohen's (2003) effect size (f^2) was used as 2004 had slightly more than the required sample size with 109. The entire study, 1137 instances of FEMA aid requests, approaches the small effect size while maintaining the same relative .95 power. As noted above the study will employ a .05 effect size (f^2) as it is between a small and medium effect size and requires only 261 samples, less than the three reelection years requests.

The analysis consisted of examining the relationship between the dependent variable to the independent variable both on a singular examination as well as in unison. The question was whether a predictor variable was able to be identified. In addition it was important to note the difference in means, between the turndown/approval of a president and the variable involved. The propensity (if above 50%) for a president to act in a certain fashion can give insight into his/her analysis of the political economy of their decision to approve or turndown a FEMA request when compared over different time frames. While alone a mean comparison would not be indicative of a scholarly paper, when coupled with the more in depth chi-squared analysis a more clear picture may evolve in order to close the gaps in the research and answer the research questions and highlight potential associations. It should be noted that according to the Congressional Research Service 30 data points are needed to establish statistical significance (Lindsay et. al., 2012), and that any data will not show a definite "yes" or "no" to the answer for bias, but could lead to the appearance of bias based on the research questions findings.

Chapter 4: Results

This chapter presents the results of the research. The research documentation and summation is based on an examination of the data collected and statistical tests run. The data were gathered using the preferred method of primary data gathering through several FOIA requests to the FOIA department within FEMA. NARA was accessed for their Certificates of Ascertainment for each State and each State's governmental website was referred to for knowledge of the political party of the governor at the time the approval or turndown occurred based on the date provided by FEMA. Excel was used to organize and code the data while SPSS 21 was used to produce descriptive statistics in order to analyze the data.

Demographics

The data provided by FEMA listed all 50 States and US holdings from 1996-2012 that requested FEMA aid. Swing States were as follows: 1996: Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.2004: Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin. 2012: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia. If decisions fell after Nov. 4 for a given swing state the data was coded as not having fell in an election year.

Data: Variables Listed and Organized

There were 1211 requests for FEMA aid gathered in the combined data set. Each request for aid was further broken down into several variables and labeled into Excel. Each dichotomous variable included if aid was given as Individual Aid (IA totaling 493),

Hazard Mitigation (HM totaling 939), and Personal Assistance (PA totaling 893). Other dichotomous variables included listing if the decision fell in a presidential election year, a presidential reelection year, what the party of the president was (554 Republican to 657 Democratic), the party of the requesting governor (544 Democratic, 31 Independents to 636 Republican), and if the State was an electoral Battleground State (34 times). In total there were 1031 Approvals for aid of some fashion.

Excel and SPSS

All of the information sent by the FEMA FOIA department was in Excel format. From the time of request to the time of receipt over a year had passed. Multiple requests were asked for as each request failed to give all of the data requested. This information was collected via private e-mail and downloaded onto my desktop computer at home and was organized into a single file by date of occurrence. Each variable as listed above was given its own heading and all data was converted from yes/no dichotomous responses to 0 and 1's for coding. The same held true for the listing of Republican, Democratic or Independent parties with 0, 1 and 2 listed. The variables were chosen to match previous studies and to further test my own suppositions as to what variables could potentially influence a president's decision making process for the approval and turndown phase of a FEMA request. The data, State, and designation number given by FEMA are all self-descriptive categories.

Once all of the data were labeled and coded in Excel it was all migrated to SPSS. This enabled the data to be more easily manipulated and the outputs from both regression analysis and descriptive statistics to be clearer and rendered in more professional format.

It should be noted that the data do not control for other variables such as demographic data, income levels, party of State Senator or State Representative and the like. All data included comes directly from FOIA requests from FEMA and is bivariate in nature. It was believed that the data gathered would be able to answer the research questions.

Chi Square Test of Independence

Understanding the association between each variable, if any, was important to the overall ability to answer the 4 research questions. Each qualitative variable was tested for association with each other.

Presidential Party

The first analysis looked at all data from 1996-2012 and if the party of the president was associated with the type of aid approved. Table 1 below show that there were 1211 instances where PA was either approved or turned down. Of the 1211, PA was approved 893 times or 73.7% of the time. Democratic presidents approved PA 77% of the time while Republican presidents approved PA 69.9% of the time.

Table 1

Presidents Party * PA Granted Crosstabulation

			PAGranted		Total
			No	Yes	
presidents Party	Democratic	Count	151	506	657
		% within presidents Party	23.0%	77.0%	100.0%
		% within PA Granted	47.5%	56.7%	54.3%
		% of Total	12.5%	41.8%	54.3%
	Republican	Count	167	387	554
		% within presidents Party	30.1%	69.9%	100.0%
		% within PA Granted	52.5%	43.3%	45.7%
		% of Total	13.8%	32.0%	45.7%
Total		Count	318	893	1211
		% within presidents Party	26.3%	73.7%	100.0%
		% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		%ofTotal	26.3%	73.7%	100.0%

The null hypothesis was that there is no relationship between the president's party and PA being approved. However, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis and the findings show that there is evidence of a very strong relationship between the president's party and PA being approved. (chi square = 7.960, df = 1, p= .005). That being said, both parties showed a penchant to approve PA when requested with Democratic presidents 7% more likely to approve than Republican presidents during the studied time frame.

Public assistance is but one of three types of FEMA aid that can be rendered to the States. The next one examined is that of Individual Assistance. Table 2 demonstrates IA granted from 1996-2012 by presidential Party.

Table 2

Presidents Party * IA Granted Crosstabulation

			IA Granted		Total
			No	Yes	
Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	399	258	657
		% within Presidents Party	60.7%	39.3%	100.0%
		%withinIAGranted	55.6%	52.3%	54.3%
		%ofTotal	32.9%	21.3%	54.3%
	Republican	Count	319	235	554
		%withinPresidentsParty	57.6%	42.4%	100.0%
		%withinIAGranted	44.4%	47.7%	45.7%
		%ofTotal	26.3%	19.4%	45.7%
Total		Count	718	493	1211
		%withinPresidentsParty	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%
		%withinIAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		%ofTotal	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%

Table 2 shows that there were 1211 instances where IA was either approved or turned down. Of the 1211, IA was approved 493 times or 40.7% of the time. Democratic presidents approved PA 39.3% of the time while Republican presidents approved PA 42.4% of the time.

The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the president's party and IA being approved. Because of the high p value, shown in Table 3, there is no presumption against the null hypothesis (chi-square = 1.235, df = 1, p= .266). That being said, as shown in Table 4, both parties showed a penchant to deny IA when requested with Republican presidents 2.1% more likely to approve than Democratic presidents during the studied time frame.

Table 3

Presidents Party * IA Granted Chi-Square

		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
PearsonChi-Square		1.235	1	.266
Linear-by-LinearAssociation		1.234	1	.267
		Value	Approx. Sig.	
	Phi	.032	.266	
	Cramer'sV	.032	.266	
NofValidCases		1211		

Table 4

Presidents Party * HM Granted Crosstabulation

			HM Granted		Total
			No	Yes	
Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	158	499	657
		% within presidents Party	24.0%	76.0%	100.0%
		%withinHMGranted	58.1%	53.1%	54.3%
		%ofTotal	13.0%	41.2%	54.3%
	Republican	Count	114	440	554
		% within presidents Party	20.6%	79.4%	100.0%
		%withinHMGranted	41.9%	46.9%	45.7%
		%ofTotal	9.4%	36.3%	45.7%
Total		Count	272	939	1211
		% within presidents Party	22.5%	77.5%	100.0%
		%withinHMGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		%ofTotal	22.5%	77.5%	100.0%

Table 4 shows that there were 1211 instances where HM was either approved or turned down. Of the 1211, HM was approved 939 times or 77.5% of the time. Democratic presidents approved PA 76% of the time while Republican presidents approved HM 79.4% of the time.

The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the president's party and HM being approved. Because of the high p value, shown in Table 5, there is no presumption against the null hypothesis (chi-square = 2.079, df = 1, p= .149). That being said, both parties showed a penchant to approve HM when requested with Republican presidents 3.4% more likely to approve than Democratic presidents during the studied time frame.

Table 5

Presidents Party * HM Granted Chi-Square

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
PearsonChi-Square	2.079	1	.149
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.078	1	.149

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx.Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.041	.149
	Cramer'sV	.041	.149
NofValidCases		1211	

Next it is important to see the relationship, if any between the president's party and that of the requesting governor. The below cross tabulation table from SPSS shows that of the 1211 requests by governors to presidents for HM, PA and/or IA aid 44.9% of the time it was a Democratic governor requesting aid and 52.5% of the time a Republican governor asking for aid and an Independent governor asking for aid only 2.6% of the requests from 1996-2012. Of those requests, Democratic governors requested aid of Democratic presidents 51.1% of the time, while Republican governors requested to Republican presidents 43.7% of the time. In addition, Democratic governors requested to Republican presidents 48.9% of the time, while Republican governors requested aid from Democratic presidents 56.3% of the time. Independent governors accounted for 31 of the 1211 requests and no president held the party of Independent during the selected years of 1996-2012.

Table 6

Presidents Party * Governors Party Cross

			Governors Party			Total
			Democratic	Republican	Independent	
Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	278	358	21	657
		% within presidents Party	42.3%	54.5%	3.2%	100.0%
		% within governors Party	51.1%	56.3%	67.7%	54.3%
		%ofTotal	23.0%	29.6%	1.7%	54.3%
	Republican	Count	266	278	10	554
		% within presidents Party	48.0%	50.2%	1.8%	100.0%
		% within governors Party	48.9%	43.7%	32.3%	45.7%
		%ofTotal	22.0%	23.0%	0.8%	45.7%
Total		Count	544	636	31	1211
		% within presidents Party	44.9%	52.5%	2.6%	100.0%
		% within governors Party	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		%ofTotal	44.9%	52.5%	2.6%	100.0%

Table 7 depicts the amount of times, as well as the relative percentages, that each party had to decide on FEMA aid in their ingroup and outgroup. While the percent's are

interesting from a historical perspective understanding if there is a relationship between the variables is necessary to answering the research questions. Below is the chi square test for independence.

Table 7

Presidents Party * Governors Party Chi-Square

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
PearsonChi-Square	5.510[a]	2	.064
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.114	1	.024

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.067	.064
	Cramer'sV	.067	.064
NofValidCases		1211	

The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the president's party and the requesting States governor's Party. Because of the moderate p value listed in Table 7 there is a low presumption to reject null hypothesis (chi-square = 5.510, df = 2, p = .064). It should be no surprise that simply having more requests by one party or that a presidential Party might have had more requests made of them would lead to a potentially biased effect. It should be remembered that in order to request for FEMA aid, from this studies perspective that a natural disaster had to have occurred on that States soil during the studied time period. However, just because one party occupied the White House while another occupied the State house during a time of a natural disaster does not demonstrate the potential for bias, but instead sets the stage for occasions in the data set

where one party's president, the Democratic Party's, had more opportunity to approve or deny their own party's request and reject or approve their opponents during the studied time period of 1996-2012. It is also why listing the percent's in each case remains important to the discussion and in answering the forth research question, because though the Republican party occupied the White House less years than the Democratic party during the studied period does not indicate that they are more or less inclined to be biased, it simply means they had less years in which to impact the turndown and approval process. Thus one need to not look at just the counts, but also the frequency of approvals and turndowns as defined by the percentages listed. Lastly knowing if the frequency is statistically significant to answering the research questions one looks to the chi-square crosstabulations to see if the studied data falls within the acceptable range 95% confidence level, or p value of .05 or less.

Table 8

Presidents Party * Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4 Crosstabulation

			Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4	
			No	Yes
presidents Party	Democratic	Count	483	174
		% within presidents Party	73.5%	26.5%
		% within Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4	55.0%	52.3%
		% of Total	39.9%	14.4%

(Continues)

Republican	Count	395	159
	% within presidents Party	71.3%	28.7%
	% within Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4	45.0%	47.7%
	% of Total	32.6%	13.1%

Total	Count	878	333
	% within presidents Party	72.5%	27.5%
	% within Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	72.5%	27.5%

Election years accounted for 5 of the 17 years studied, or 29.4%. As shown in Table 9, governors were not more apt to request aid during election years, over non election years accounting for only 27.5% of the total requests or 333 of the 1211 submitted. Each data point collected was dated to occur prior to the presidential election date of November 4. If the data occurred on November 5th or later it was attributed to the following year. This finding suggests that either there were not additional disasters during election years compared to non-election years or that governors did not find the need or desire to request for federal aid more so during these times. This further lends credence to the suggestion that governors did not find it personally politically valuable to request additionally for aid during presidential election cycles as opposed to non-election years.

Table 9 examined the reelection years and those years accounted for 3 of the 17 years studied or 17.7%. As was noted in the election year results, the total number of requests was also slightly lower than the average for the studied years, numbering 16.6%

or 1.1% lower. As during election years, the finding and assumptions remain the same. There either were not additional disasters during election years compared to non-election years or that governors did not find the need or desire to request for federal aid more so during these times.

Table 9

Presidents Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4 Crosstabulation

			Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov4		Total
			No	Yes	
Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	529	128	657
		% within presidents Party	80.5%	19.5%	100.0%
		% within Decision Falls In Reelection YearBeforeNov4	52.4%	63.7%	54.3%
		%ofTotal	43.7%	10.6%	54.3%
	Republican	Count	481	73	554
		% within presidents Party	86.8%	13.2%	100.0%
		% within Decision Falls In Reelection YearBeforeNov4	47.6%	36.3%	45.7%
		%ofTotal	39.7%	6.0%	45.7%
Total		Count	1010	201	1211
		% within presidents Party	83.4%	16.6%	100.0%
		% within Decision Falls In Reelection YearBeforeNov4	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		%ofTotal	83.4%	16.6%	100.0%

Public Assistance

Since it was determined that PA being granted has strong evidence of having a relationship to the president's party it was important to know if the party of the requesting governor's party played an additional relationship to how PA was approved or denied. The following cross tabulation table demonstrates the breakdown of PA being approved or turned down based on the president's party and the party of the requesting governor.

PA was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When PA aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was done 893 times. Of those 893 times Republican governors asked for aid a Republican president for PA aid 278 times and asked a Democratic president for PA aid 358 times. In that set of data, Republican governors were granted PA by Republican presidents 194 times or 69.8% of the time and they were granted PA by Democratic presidents 266 times or 74% of the time. There existed a 5% disparity, with Democratic presidents granting aid more often to Republican governors than Republic presidents did.

In addition, Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for PA aid 278 times and asked a Republic president for PA aid 266 times. Democratic governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 226 times or 81.3% while they were granted PA aid by Republican presidents 186 times or 70.0%. The opposite effect occurred in this example with a striking 11.3% disparity. Democratic presidents granted a large majority of aid to Democratic governor's request, yet when requesting aid to a Republican in the White House Democratic governors PA approval dropped to 70.0%.

When comparing third party requests, the data shows that Independent governors requested PA aid 31 times. PA was granted 21 times or 67% of the time. When an Independent governor requested aid from a Democratic president (21 times) they were approved 14 of those requests or 66.7%. When they requested PA aid from a Republican president (10 times) they were approved 7 times or 70%.

Republican presidents PA approval, regardless of party affiliation remained consistent around 70% of the time 74.3% (D) vs 69.8% (R) vs 70.0% (I) with a slight favoring of Democratic governors. However Democratic presidents PA approval noticeably favored Democratic governors with 81.3% (D), vs 74.3% (R) vs 66.7% (I). The expanded details are shown in Table 10.

Table 10

Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party Crosstabulation

Governors Party			PA Granted		
			No	Yes	Total
Democratic Ppresidents Party	Democratic	Count	52	226	278
		% within presidents Party	18.7%	81.3%	100.0%
		%withinPAGranted	39.4%	54.9%	51.1%
		%ofTotal	9.6%	41.5%	51.1%
	Republican	Count	80	186	266
		% within presidents Party	30.1%	69.9%	100.0%
		%withinPAGranted	60.6%	45.1%	48.9%
		%ofTotal	14.7%	34.2%	48.9%
	Total	Count	132	412	544
		% within presidents Party	24.3%	75.7%	100.0%
		% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		%ofTotal	24.3%	75.7%	100.0%
Republican Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	92	266	358
		% within presidents Party	25.7%	74.3%	100.0%
		% within PA Granted	52.3%	57.8%	56.3%
		%ofTotal	14.5%	41.8%	56.3%
	Republican	Count	84	194	278

(Continues)

	% within presidents Party	30.2%	69.8%	100.0%
	% within PA Granted	47.7%	42.2%	43.7%
	% of Total	13.2%	30.5%	43.7%
Total	Count	176	460	636
	% within presidents Party	27.7%	72.3%	100.0%
	% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	27.7%	72.3%	100.0%

Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	7	14	21
			% within presidents Party	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	70.0%	66.7%	67.7%
			%ofTotal	22.6%	45.2%	67.7%
		Republican	Count	3	7	10
			% within presidents Party	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	30.0%	33.3%	32.3%
			%ofTotal	9.7%	22.6%	32.3%
	Total		Count	10	21	31
			% within presidents Party	32.3%	67.7%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	32.3%	67.7%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	151	506	657
			% within presidents Party	23.0%	77.0%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	47.5%	56.7%	54.3%
			%ofTotal	12.5%	41.8%	54.3%
		Republican	Count	167	387	554
			% within presidents Party	30.1%	69.9%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	52.5%	43.3%	45.7%
			%ofTotal	13.8%	32.0%	45.7%
		Total	Count	318	893	1211

(Continues)

% within presidents Party	26.3%	73.7%	100.0%
% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
% of Total	26.3%	73.7%	100.0%

Table 11

Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party Chi-Square Tests

Governors Party		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	9.563	1	.002
	Continuity Correction	8.954	1	.003
	N of Valid Cases	544		
Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	1.596	1	.207
	Continuity Correction	1.378	1	.240
	N of Valid Cases	636		
Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.034	1	.853
	ContinuityCorrection	.000	1	1.000
	N of Valid Cases	31		
Total	Pearson Chi-Square	7.960	1	.005
	Continuity Correction	7.594	1	.006

Governors Party			Value	Approx. Sig.
Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.133	.002
		Cramer'sV	.133	.002
	NofValidCases		544	
Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.050	.207
		Cramer'sV	.050	.207
	NofValidCases		636	
Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.033	.853
		Cramer'sV	.033	.853
	NofValidCases		31	
Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.081	.005
		Cramer'sV	.081	.005
	NofValidCases		1211	

The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the president's party and PA being approved influenced by the governor's party. However, there exists enough evidence, as is shown in Table 11, to reject the null hypothesis and find that there is strong evidence of a relationship between the president's party and PA being approved influenced by the party of the governor. (chi-square = 7.960, df = 1, p= .005). When looking at partial analysis one finds that if the party of the requesting governor is Independent then there is no relationship between the president's Party and PA being approved (chi-square = .034, df = 1, p= .893) and find no presumption against the null hypothesis. When looking at additional partial analysis one finds that's if the party of the requesting governor is Democratic, there is a strong likelihood to affect PA being approved based on the party of the president (chi-square = 9.563, df = 1, p= .002). If the party of the requesting governor is Republican, than we must assume there is no relationship to PA being approved and the party of the president (chi-square = 1.596, df = 1, p= .207) and find no presumption against the null hypothesis.

The next step is to see if being an election year had an effect on PA being approved, maintaining the rest of the previous analysis.

Table 12

Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4 Crosstabulation

Decision Falls In Election Year BeforeNov4	Governors Party				PA Granted No	PA Granted Yes	Total
No	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	40	168	208
				% within presidents Party	19.2%	80.8%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	43.0%	55.6%	52.7%
				%ofTotal	10.1%	42.5%	52.7%
			Republican	Count	53	134	187
				% within presidents Party	28.3%	71.7%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	57.0%	44.4%	47.3%
				%ofTotal	13.4%	33.9%	47.3%
		Total		Count	93	302	395
				% within presidents Party	23.5%	76.5%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	23.5%	76.5%	100.0%
	Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	60	201	261
				% within presidents Party	23.0%	77.0%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	48.0%	59.8%	56.6%

(Continues)

	% of Total		13.0%	43.6%	56.6%
Republican	Count		65	135	200
		% within presidents Party	32.5%	67.5%	100.0%
		% within PA Granted	52.0%	40.2%	43.4%
		% of Total	14.1%	29.3%	43.4%
	Total	Count	125	336	461
		% within presidents Party	27.1%	72.9%	100.0%
		%withinPAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		%ofTotal	27.1%	72.9%	100.0%
Independent	Presidents Party	Count	6	8	14
		%withinpresidentsParty	42.9%	57.1%	100.0%
		%withinPAGranted	75.0%	57.1%	63.6%
		%ofTotal	27.3%	36.4%	63.6%
		Count	2	6	8
		%withinpresidentsParty	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
		%withinPAGranted	25.0%	42.9%	36.4%
		%ofTotal	9.1%	27.3%	36.4%
	Total	Count	8	14	22
		%withinpresidentsParty	36.4%	63.6%	100.0%
		%withinPAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		%ofTotal	36.4%	63.6%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Count	106	377	483
		%withinpresidentsParty	21.9%	78.1%	100.0%
		%withinPAGranted	46.9%	57.8%	55.0%
		% of Total	12.1%	42.9%	55.0%

(Continues)

				Count	120	275	395
				% within presidents Party	30.4%	69.6%	100.0%
			Republican	%withinPAGranted	53.1%	42.2%	45.0%
				%ofTotal	13.7%	31.3%	45.0%
				Count	226	652	878
				% within presidents Party	25.7%	74.3%	100.0%
		Total		%withinPAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	25.7%	74.3%	100.0%
				Count	12	58	70
				% within presidents Party	17.1%	82.9%	100.0%
			Democratic	%withinPAGranted	30.8%	52.7%	47.0%
		Presidents Party		%ofTotal	8.1%	38.9%	47.0%
				Count	27	52	79
	Democratic			% within presidents Party	34.2%	65.8%	100.0%
			Republican	%withinPAGranted	69.2%	47.3%	53.0%
				%ofTotal	18.1%	34.9%	53.0%
				Count	39	110	149
				% within presidents Party	26.2%	73.8%	100.0%
Yes		Total		%withinPAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	26.2%	73.8%	100.0%
				Count	32	65	97
				% within presidents Party	33.0%	67.0%	100.0%
			Democratic	%withinPAGranted	62.7%	52.4%	55.4%
		Presidents Party		%ofTotal	18.3%	37.1%	55.4%
				Count	19	59	78
	Republican			% within presidents Party	24.4%	75.6%	100.0%
			Republican	%withinPAGranted	37.3%	47.6%	44.6%
				% of Total	10.9%	33.7%	44.6%

(Continues)

	Total		Count	51	124	175
			% within presidents Party	29.1%	70.9%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	29.1%	70.9%	100.0%
Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	1	6	7
			% within presidents Party	14.3%	85.7%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	50.0%	85.7%	77.8%
			% of Total	11.1%	66.7%	77.8%
		Republican	Count	1	1	2
			% within presidents Party	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	50.0%	14.3%	22.2%
			%ofTotal	11.1%	11.1%	22.2%
	Total		Count	2	7	9
			% within presidents Party	22.2%	77.8%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	22.2%	77.8%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	45	129	174
			% within presidents Party	25.9%	74.1%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	48.9%	53.5%	52.3%
			%ofTotal	13.5%	38.7%	52.3%
		Republican	Count	47	112	159
			% within presidents Party	29.6%	70.4%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	51.1%	46.5%	47.7%
			%ofTotal	14.1%	33.6%	47.7%
	Total		Count	92	241	333
			% within presidents Party	27.6%	72.4%	100.0%

(Continues)

			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	27.6%	72.4%	100.0%
Total Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	52	226	278
			% within presidents Party	18.7%	81.3%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	39.4%	54.9%	51.1%
			%ofTotal	9.6%	41.5%	51.1%
		Republican	Count	80	186	266
			% within presidents Party	30.1%	69.9%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	60.6%	45.1%	48.9%
			%ofTotal	14.7%	34.2%	48.9%
	Total		Count	132	412	544
			% within presidents Party	24.3%	75.7%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	24.3%	75.7%	100.0%
Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	92	266	358
			% within presidents Party	25.7%	74.3%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	52.3%	57.8%	56.3%
			%ofTotal	14.5%	41.8%	56.3%
		Republican	Count	84	194	278
			% within presidents Party	30.2%	69.8%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	47.7%	42.2%	43.7%
			%ofTotal	13.2%	30.5%	43.7%
	Total		Count	176	460	636
			% within presidents Party	27.7%	72.3%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	27.7%	72.3%	100.0%

(Continues)

Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic Party	Count	7	14	21
			% within presidents Party	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	70.0%	66.7%	67.7%
			%ofTotal	22.6%	45.2%	67.7%
		Republican Party	Count	3	7	10
			% within presidents Party	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	30.0%	33.3%	32.3%
			%ofTotal	9.7%	22.6%	32.3%
	Total		Count	10	21	31
			% within presidents Party	32.3%	67.7%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	32.3%	67.7%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic Party	Count	151	506	657
			% within presidents Party	23.0%	77.0%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	47.5%	56.7%	54.3%
			%ofTotal	12.5%	41.8%	54.3%
		Republican Party	Count	167	387	554
			% within presidents Party	30.1%	69.9%	100.0%
			%withinPAGranted	52.5%	43.3%	45.7%
			%ofTotal	13.8%	32.0%	45.7%
	Total		Count	318	893	1211
			% within presidents Party	26.3%	73.7%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	26.3%	73.7%	100.0%

As is demonstrated in Table 12, PA was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When PA aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was done 893 times. PA aid was requested 333 times during an election year or 37.3% of the overall requests. Of those 333 times Republican governors asked for aid a Republican president for PA aid 78 times and asked a Democratic president for PA aid 97 times. In that set of data, Republican governors were granted PA by Republican presidents 59 times or 75.6% of the time and they were granted PA by Democratic presidents 32 times or 67.0% of the time.

In addition, Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for PA aid 70 times and asked a Republic president for PA aid 79 times. Democratic governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 58 times or 82.9% while they were granted PA aid by Republican presidents 52 times or 65.8%. This finding supports the notion for PA being approved based on political party affiliation during an election year.

Lastly Independent governors asked Democratic presidents for PA aid 7 times and asked a Republican president for PA aid 2 times. Independent governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 1 time or 14.3% while they were granted PA aid by Republican presidents 1 time or 50%. The relatively low number of requests by Independent governors makes this visual statistical difference not significant.

Table 13

Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4 Chi-Square Tests

Decision Falls In Election Year BeforeNov4	Governors Party		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	4.541	1	.033
		Continuity Correction	4.049	1	.044
		NofValidCases	395		
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	5.183	1	.023
		Continuity Correction	4.713	1	.030
		NofValidCases	461		
	Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.702	1	.402
		Continuity Correction	.142	1	.706
		NofValidCases	22		
	Total	Pearson Chi-Square	8.085	1	.004
		Continuity Correction	7.650	1	.006
		NofValidCases	878		
Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	5.573	1	.018
		Continuity Correction	4.727	1	.030
		NofValidCases	149		
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	1.560	1	.212

(Continues)

		Continuity Correction	1.170	1	.279
		NofValidCases	175		
	Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	1.148	1	.284
		Continuity Correction	.011	1	.915
		NofValidCases	9		
	Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.568	1	.451
		Continuity Correction	.398	1	.528
		NofValidCases	333		
Total	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	9.563	1	.002
		Continuity Correction	8.954	1	.003
		NofValidCases	544		
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	1.596	1	.207
		Continuity Correction	1.378	1	.240
		NofValidCases	636		
	Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.034	1	.853
		Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		NofValidCases	31		
	Total	Pearson Chi-Square	7.960	1	.005
		Continuity Correction	7.594	1	.006
		N of Valid Cases	1211		

(Continues)

Decision Falls In Election YearBeforeNov4	Governors Party			Value	Approx. Sig.
No	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.107	.033
			Cramer's V	.107	.033
		NofValidCases		395	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.106	.023
			Cramer's V	.106	.023
		NofValidCases		461	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.179	.402
			Cramer's V	.179	.402
		NofValidCases		22	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.096	.004
			Cramer's V	.096	.004
		NofValidCases		878	
Yes	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.193	.018
			Cramer's V	.193	.018
		NofValidCases		149	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.094	.212
			Cramer's V	.094	.212
		NofValidCases		175	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.357	.284
			Cramer's V	.357	.284
		NofValidCases		9	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.041	.451
			Cramer's V	.041	.451
		N of Valid Cases		333	

(Continues)

Total	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.133	.002
			Cramer's V	.133	.002
		NofValidCases		544	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.050	.207
			Cramer's V	.050	.207
		NofValidCases		636	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.033	.853
			Cramer's V	.033	.853
		NofValidCases		31	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.081	.005
			Cramer's V	.081	.005
		NofValidCases		1211	

Table 13 shows very strong evidence that when PA is approved, holding for presidential party, and governor party affiliation regardless if the decision falls during an election year to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative (chi-square = 7.960, df = 1, p = .005). Partial analysis looking at PA being approved during an election year as a whole for all governors parties does not find sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis (chi-square = 1.148, df = 1, p = .451) but during non-election years there remains strong evidence to reject the null and accept the alternative (chi-square = 8.085, df =1, p = .004). Lastly, it should be noted that in both election years and non-election years Democratic governor party affiliation and PA being granted showed very strong evidence to reject the null and accept the alternative (chi-square 5.573, df =1, p= .018 and chi-square = 4.541, df =1, p = .033 respectively).

In continuing with this line of reasoning and looking to answer the research questions election years is changed to reelection years holding everything else equal. PA was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When PA aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was done 893 times. PA aid was requested 201 times during a reelection year or 22.5% of the overall requests. Of those 201 times Republican governors asked a Republican president for PA aid 33 times and asked a Democratic president for PA aid 70 times. In that set of data, Republican governors were granted PA by Republican presidents 29 times or 76.7% of the time and they were granted PA by Democratic presidents 50 times or 71.4% of the time.

In addition, as Table 14 shows, Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for PA aid 52 times and asked a Republic president for PA aid 39 times. Democratic governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 44 times or 84.6% while they were granted PA aid by Republican presidents 23 times or 59%. This finding supports the notion that PA aid favors the president's party.

Lastly Independent governors asked Democratic presidents for PA aid 6 times and asked a Republican president for PA aid 1 time. Independent governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 5 times or 83.3% while they were granted PA aid by Republican presidents 1 time or 100%. The relatively low number of requests by Independent governors makes this visual statistical difference not significant, other than it should be noted that the majority of requests they made for PA during all the studied years fell during a reelection year (6 of the 7 times).

Table 14

Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4 Crosstabulation

Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov4	governors Party			PAGranted No	PAGranted Yes	Total
No	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count 44	182	226
				% within presidentsParty 19.5%	80.5%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted 40.7%	52.8%	49.9%
				%ofTotal 9.7%	40.2%	49.9%
			Republican	Count 64	163	227
				% within presidentsParty 28.2%	71.8%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted 59.3%	47.2%	50.1%
				%ofTotal 14.1%	36.0%	50.1%
		Total		Count 108	345	453
				% within presidentsParty 23.8%	76.2%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted 100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal 23.8%	76.2%	100.0%
	Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count 72	216	288
				% within presidentsParty 25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted 47.4%	56.7%	54.0%
				%ofTotal 13.5%	40.5%	54.0%
			Republican	Count 80	165	245
				% within presidentsParty 32.7%	67.3%	100.0%

(Continues)

			% within PA Granted	52.6%	43.3%	46.0%
			%ofTotal	15.0%	31.0%	46.0%
		Total	Count	152	381	533
			% within presidentsParty	28.5%	71.5%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	28.5%	71.5%	100.0%
Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	6	9	15
			% within presidentsParty	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	66.7%	60.0%	62.5%
			%ofTotal	25.0%	37.5%	62.5%
		Republican	Count	3	6	9
			% within presidentsParty	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	33.3%	40.0%	37.5%
			%ofTotal	12.5%	25.0%	37.5%
		Total	Count	9	15	24
			% within presidentsParty	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	122	407	529
			% within presidentsParty	23.1%	76.9%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	45.4%	54.9%	52.4%
			%ofTotal	12.1%	40.3%	52.4%
		Republican	Count	147	334	481

(Continues)

				% within presidentsParty	30.6%	69.4%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	54.6%	45.1%	47.6%
				%ofTotal	14.6%	33.1%	47.6%
			Total	Count	269	741	1010
				% within presidentsParty	26.6%	73.4%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	26.6%	73.4%	100.0%
Yes	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	8	44	52
				% within presidentsParty	15.4%	84.6%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	33.3%	65.7%	57.1%
				%ofTotal	8.8%	48.4%	57.1%
			Republican	Count	16	23	39
				% within presidentsParty	41.0%	59.0%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	66.7%	34.3%	42.9%
				%ofTotal	17.6%	25.3%	42.9%
			Total	Count	24	67	91
				% within presidentsParty	26.4%	73.6%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	26.4%	73.6%	100.0%
	Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	20	50	70
				% within presidentsParty	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	83.3%	63.3%	68.0%
				%ofTotal	19.4%	48.5%	68.0%

(Continues)

		Republican	Count	4	29	33
			% within presidentsParty	12.1%	87.9%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	16.7%	36.7%	32.0%
			%ofTotal	3.9%	28.2%	32.0%
	Total		Count	24	79	103
			% within presidentsParty	23.3%	76.7%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	23.3%	76.7%	100.0%
Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	1	5	6
			% within presidentsParty	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	83.3%	85.7%
			%ofTotal	14.3%	71.4%	85.7%
		Republican	Count	0	1	1
			% within presidentsParty	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	0.0%	16.7%	14.3%
			%ofTotal	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%
	Total		Count	1	6	7
			% within presidentsParty	14.3%	85.7%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	14.3%	85.7%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	29	99	128
			% within presidentsParty	22.7%	77.3%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	59.2%	65.1%	63.7%

(Continues)

				% of Total	14.4%	49.3%	63.7%
			Republican	Count	20	53	73
				% within presidentsParty	27.4%	72.6%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	40.8%	34.9%	36.3%
				%ofTotal	10.0%	26.4%	36.3%
		Total		Count	49	152	201
				% within presidentsParty	24.4%	75.6%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	24.4%	75.6%	100.0%
Total	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	52	226	278
				% within presidentsParty	18.7%	81.3%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	39.4%	54.9%	51.1%
				%ofTotal	9.6%	41.5%	51.1%
			Republican	Count	80	186	266
				% within presidentsParty	30.1%	69.9%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	60.6%	45.1%	48.9%
				%ofTotal	14.7%	34.2%	48.9%
		Total		Count	132	412	544
				% within presidentsParty	24.3%	75.7%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	24.3%	75.7%	100.0%
	Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	92	266	358
				% within presidentsParty	25.7%	74.3%	100.0%

(Continues)

			% within PA Granted	52.3%	57.8%	56.3%
			%ofTotal	14.5%	41.8%	56.3%
		Republican	Count	84	194	278
			% within presidentsParty	30.2%	69.8%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	47.7%	42.2%	43.7%
			%ofTotal	13.2%	30.5%	43.7%
	Total		Count	176	460	636
			% within presidentsParty	27.7%	72.3%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	27.7%	72.3%	100.0%
Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	7	14	21
			% within presidentsParty	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	70.0%	66.7%	67.7%
			%ofTotal	22.6%	45.2%	67.7%
		Republican	Count	3	7	10
			% within presidentsParty	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	30.0%	33.3%	32.3%
			%ofTotal	9.7%	22.6%	32.3%
	Total		Count	10	21	31
			% within presidentsParty	32.3%	67.7%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	32.3%	67.7%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	151	506	657

(Continues)

		% within presidentsParty	23.0%	77.0%	100.0%
		% within PA Granted	47.5%	56.7%	54.3%
		%ofTotal	12.5%	41.8%	54.3%
	Republican	Count	167	387	554
		% within presidentsParty	30.1%	69.9%	100.0%
		% within PA Granted	52.5%	43.3%	45.7%
		%ofTotal	13.8%	32.0%	45.7%
	Total	Count	318	893	1211
		% within presidentsParty	26.3%	73.7%	100.0%
		% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		%ofTotal	26.3%	73.7%	100.0%

Looking at Table 15 there exists very strong evidence that when PA is approved, holding for presidential party, and governor party affiliation regardless if the decision falls during an election year to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative (chi-square = 7.960, df = 1, p = .005). Partial analysis looking at PA being approved during an reelection year as a whole for all governors parties does not find sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis (chi-square = .567, df = 1, p = .659) but during non-reelection years there remains very strong evidence to reject the null and accept the alternative (chi-square = 7.250, df =1, p = .007). Lastly, it should be noted that in both election years and non-reelection years Democratic governor party affiliation and PA being granted showed very strong evidence to reject the null and accept the alternative (chi-square 7.546, df =1, p= .006 and chi-square = 4.747, df =1, p = .029 respectively).

Table 15

Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4 Chi-Square Tests

Decision Falls In Reelection Year BeforeNov4	governors Party		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	4.748	1	.029
		Continuity Correction	4.280	1	.039
		NofValidCases	453		
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	3.804	1	.051
		Continuity Correction	3.437	1	.064
		NofValidCases	533		
	Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.107	1	.744
		Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		NofValidCases	24		
	Total	Pearson Chi-Square	7.250	1	.007
		Continuity Correction	6.872	1	.009
		NofValidCases	1010		
Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	7.546	1	.006
		Continuity Correction	6.283	1	.012
		NofValidCases	91		
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	3.396	1	.065
		Continuity Correction	2.538	1	.111

(Continues)

			N of Valid Cases	103	
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.194 1	.659
			Continuity Correction	.000 1	1.000
			NofValidCases	7	
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.567 1	.452
			Continuity Correction	.339 1	.561
			NofValidCases	201	
		Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	9.563 1	.002
			Continuity Correction	8.954 1	.003
			NofValidCases	544	
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	1.596 1	.207
			Continuity Correction	1.378 1	.240
			NofValidCases	636	
Total		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.034 1	.853
			Continuity Correction	.000 1	1.000
			NofValidCases	31	
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	7.960 1	.005
			Continuity Correction	7.594 1	.006
			NofValidCases	1211	
Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4	Governors Party			Value	Approx. Sig.

(Continues)

No	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.102	.029
			Cramer's V	.102	.029
		NofValidCases		453	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.084	.051
			Cramer's V	.084	.051
		NofValidCases		533	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.067	.744
			Cramer's V	.067	.744
		NofValidCases		24	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.085	.007
			Cramer's V	.085	.007
		NofValidCases		1010	
Yes	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.288	.006
			Cramer's V	.288	.006
		NofValidCases		91	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.182	.065
			Cramer's V	.182	.065
		NofValidCases		103	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.167	.659
			Cramer's V	.167	.659
		NofValidCases		7	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.053	.452
			Cramer's V	.053	.452
		NofValidCases		201	
Total	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.133	.002
			Cramer's V	.133	.002

(Continues)

	N of Valid Cases		544	
Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.050	.207
		Cramer's V	.050	.207
	NofValidCases		636	
Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.033	.853
		Cramer's V	.033	.853
	NofValidCases		31	
Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.081	.005
		Cramer's V	.081	.005
	NofValidCases		1211	

In continuing with this line of reasoning and looking to answer the research questions, is to add battleground states to the analysis below holding everything else equal. As one can see from the statistical percent's, the number of cases where PA was both in an electoral battleground state and during a reelection year was quite tiny relative to times it was requested in non-reelection years in non-battleground states. PA was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When PA aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was done 893 times. PA aid was requested 33 times during a reelection year in a battleground state or 3.7% of the overall requests. Of those 33 times Republican governors asked a Republican president for PA aid 6 times and asked a Democratic president for PA aid 14 times. In that set of data, Republican governors were granted PA by Republican presidents 5 times or 83.3% of the time and they were granted PA by Democratic presidents 9 times or 64.3% of the time. This further supports the notion for like-party

affiliation, reelection year and battleground states all playing a role in PA being approved.

Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for PA aid during reelection years in battleground states 6 times and asked Republican presidents for aid 7 times. In that data set Democratic presidents granted PA aid 100% of the time and Republican presidents only granted aid 42.9% of the time.

Lastly no Independent governor occupied a State house in a battleground state to compare third party variables during the data set. To know if the results were statistically significant the chi-square test for fit table is included below.

Table 16

Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4 * Electoral Battleground State Crosstabulation

Electoral Battleground State	Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4	governors Party			PA Granted		Total
					No	Yes	
No	No	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	44	182	226
					% within presidents Party	19.5%	80.5%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	40.7%	52.9%	50.0%
					% of Total	9.7%	40.3%	50.0%
				Republican	Count	64	162	226
					% within presidents Party	28.3%	71.7%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	59.3%	47.1%	50.0%
					% of Total	14.2%	35.8%	50.0%
			Total		Count	108	344	452

(Continues)

				% within presidents Party	23.9%	76.1%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	23.9%	76.1%	100.0%
		Republican	Presidents Party	Count	72	216	288
				% within presidents Party	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
			Democratic	% within PA Granted	47.4%	56.7%	54.0%
				% of Total	13.5%	40.5%	54.0%
				Count	80	165	245
				% within presidents Party	32.7%	67.3%	100.0%
			Republican	% within PA Granted	52.6%	43.3%	46.0%
				% of Total	15.0%	31.0%	46.0%
				Count	152	381	533
				% within presidents Party	28.5%	71.5%	100.0%
		Total		% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	28.5%	71.5%	100.0%
		Independent	Presidents Party	Count	6	9	15
				% within presidents Party	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
			Democratic	% within PA Granted	66.7%	60.0%	62.5%
				% of Total	25.0%	37.5%	62.5%
				Count	3	6	9
				% within presidents Party	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
			Republican	% within PA Granted	33.3%	40.0%	37.5%

(Continues)

				% of Total	12.5%	25.0%	37.5%
			Total	Count	9	15	24
				% within presidents Party	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
		Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	122	407	529
					% within presidents Party	23.1%	76.9%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	45.4%	55.0%	52.4%
					% of Total	12.1%	40.3%	52.4%
				Republican	Count	147	333	480
					% within presidents Party	30.6%	69.4%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	54.6%	45.0%	47.6%
					% of Total	14.6%	33.0%	47.6%
			Total		Count	269	740	1009
					% within presidents Party	26.7%	73.3%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total	26.7%	73.3%	100.0%
	Yes	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	8	38	46
					% within presidents Party	17.4%	82.6%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	40.0%	65.5%	59.0%
					% of Total	10.3%	48.7%	59.0%
				Republican	Count	12	20	32

(Continues)

			% within presidents Party	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	60.0%	34.5%	41.0%
			% of Total	15.4%	25.6%	41.0%
		Total	Count	20	58	78
			% within presidents Party	25.6%	74.4%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	25.6%	74.4%	100.0%
	Republican	Presidents Party	Count	15	41	56
			% within presidents Party	26.8%	73.2%	100.0%
		Democratic	% within PA Granted	83.3%	63.1%	67.5%
			% of Total	18.1%	49.4%	67.5%
		Republican	Count	3	24	27
			% within presidents Party	11.1%	88.9%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	16.7%	36.9%	32.5%
			% of Total	3.6%	28.9%	32.5%
		Total	Count	18	65	83
			% within presidents Party	21.7%	78.3%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	21.7%	78.3%	100.0%
	Independent	Presidents Party	Count	1	5	6
			% within presidents Party	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
		Democratic	% within PA Granted	100.0%	83.3%	85.7%

(Continues)

				% of Total	14.3%	71.4%	85.7%
			Republican	Count	0	1	1
				% within presidents Party	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	0.0%	16.7%	14.3%
				% of Total	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%
		Total		Count	1	6	7
				% within presidents Party	14.3%	85.7%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	14.3%	85.7%	100.0%
	Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	24	84	108
				% within presidents Party	22.2%	77.8%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	61.5%	65.1%	64.3%
				% of Total	14.3%	50.0%	64.3%
			Republican	Count	15	45	60
				% within presidents Party	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	38.5%	34.9%	35.7%
				% of Total	8.9%	26.8%	35.7%
		Total		Count	39	129	168
				% within presidents Party	23.2%	76.8%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	23.2%	76.8%	100.0%
Total	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	52	220	272

(Continues)

				% within presidents Party	19.1%	80.9%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	40.6%	54.7%	51.3%
				% of Total	9.8%	41.5%	51.3%
			Republican	Count	76	182	258
				% within presidents Party	29.5%	70.5%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	59.4%	45.3%	48.7%
				% of Total	14.3%	34.3%	48.7%
		Total		Count	128	402	530
				% within presidents Party	24.2%	75.8%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	24.2%	75.8%	100.0%
	Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	87	257	344
				% within presidents Party	25.3%	74.7%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	51.2%	57.6%	55.8%
				% of Total	14.1%	41.7%	55.8%
			Republican	Count	83	189	272
				% within presidents Party	30.5%	69.5%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	48.8%	42.4%	44.2%
				% of Total	13.5%	30.7%	44.2%
		Total		Count	170	446	616
				% within presidents Party	27.6%	72.4%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

(Continues)

			% of Total	27.6%	72.4%	100.0%
		Democratic	Count	7	14	21
			% within presidents Party	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	70.0%	66.7%	67.7%
			% of Total	22.6%	45.2%	67.7%
	Presidents Party	Republican	Count	3	7	10
			% within presidents Party	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
Independent			% within PA Granted	30.0%	33.3%	32.3%
			% of Total	9.7%	22.6%	32.3%
			Count	10	21	31
			% within presidents Party	32.3%	67.7%	100.0%
	Total		% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	32.3%	67.7%	100.0%
			Count	146	491	637
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	% within presidents Party	22.9%	77.1%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	47.4%	56.5%	54.1%
			% of Total	12.4%	41.7%	54.1%
		Republican	Count	162	378	540
			% within presidents Party	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	52.6%	43.5%	45.9%
			% of Total	13.8%	32.1%	45.9%
	Total		Count	308	869	1177

(Continues)

					% within presidents Party	26.2%	73.8%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total	26.2%	73.8%	100.0%
Yes	No	Democratic	Presidents Party	Republican	Count		1	1
					% within presidents Party		100.0%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted		100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total		100.0%	100.0%
			Total		Count		1	1
					% within presidents Party		100.0%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted		100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total		100.0%	100.0%
		Total	Presidents Party	Republican	Count		1	1
					% within presidents Party		100.0%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted		100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total		100.0%	100.0%
			Total		Count		1	1
					% within presidents Party		100.0%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted		100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total		100.0%	100.0%
	Yes	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	0	6	6
					% within presidents Party	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	0.0%	66.7%	46.2%

(Continues)

				% of Total	0.0%	46.2%	46.2%
			Republican	Count	4	3	7
				% within presidents Party	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	33.3%	53.8%
				% of Total	30.8%	23.1%	53.8%
		Total		Count	4	9	13
				% within presidents Party	30.8%	69.2%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	30.8%	69.2%	100.0%
	Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	5	9	14
				% within presidents Party	35.7%	64.3%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	83.3%	64.3%	70.0%
				% of Total	25.0%	45.0%	70.0%
			Republican	Count	1	5	6
				% within presidents Party	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	16.7%	35.7%	30.0%
				% of Total	5.0%	25.0%	30.0%
		Total		Count	6	14	20
				% within presidents Party	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
	Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	5	15	20

(Continues)

					% within presidents Party	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	50.0%	65.2%	60.6%
					% of Total	15.2%	45.5%	60.6%
				Republican	Count	5	8	13
					% within presidents Party	38.5%	61.5%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	50.0%	34.8%	39.4%
					% of Total	15.2%	24.2%	39.4%
			Total		Count	10	23	33
					% within presidents Party	30.3%	69.7%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total	30.3%	69.7%	100.0%
	Total	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	0	6	6
					% within presidents Party	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	0.0%	60.0%	42.9%
					% of Total	0.0%	42.9%	42.9%
				Republican	Count	4	4	8
					% within presidents Party	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	100.0%	40.0%	57.1%
					% of Total	28.6%	28.6%	57.1%
			Total		Count	4	10	14
					% within presidents Party	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

(Continues)

			% of Total	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	5	9	14
			% within presidents Party	35.7%	64.3%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	83.3%	64.3%	70.0%
			% of Total	25.0%	45.0%	70.0%
		Republican	Count	1	5	6
			% within presidents Party	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	16.7%	35.7%	30.0%
			% of Total	5.0%	25.0%	30.0%
	Total		Count	6	14	20
			% within presidents Party	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	5	15	20
			% within presidents Party	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	50.0%	62.5%	58.8%
			% of Total	14.7%	44.1%	58.8%
		Republican	Count	5	9	14
			% within presidents Party	35.7%	64.3%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	50.0%	37.5%	41.2%
			% of Total	14.7%	26.5%	41.2%
	Total		Count	10	24	34

(Continues)

					% within presidents Party	29.4%	70.6%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total	29.4%	70.6%	100.0%
				Democratic	Count	44	182	226
					% within presidents Party	19.5%	80.5%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	40.7%	52.8%	49.9%
			Presidents Party		% of Total	9.7%	40.2%	49.9%
				Republican	Count	64	163	227
					% within presidents Party	28.2%	71.8%	100.0%
		Democratic			% within PA Granted	59.3%	47.2%	50.1%
Total	No				% of Total	14.1%	36.0%	50.1%
					Count	108	345	453
					% within presidents Party	23.8%	76.2%	100.0%
			Total		% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total	23.8%	76.2%	100.0%
				Democratic	Count	72	216	288
					% within presidents Party	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
		Republican	Presidents Party		% within PA Granted	47.4%	56.7%	54.0%
					% of Total	13.5%	40.5%	54.0%
				Republican	Count	80	165	245
					% within presidents Party	32.7%	67.3%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	52.6%	43.3%	46.0%

(Continues)

			% of Total	15.0%	31.0%	46.0%
			Count	152	381	533
			% within presidents Party	28.5%	71.5%	100.0%
		Total	% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	28.5%	71.5%	100.0%
			Count	6	9	15
			% within presidents Party	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
		Democratic	% within PA Granted	66.7%	60.0%	62.5%
			% of Total	25.0%	37.5%	62.5%
	Presidents Party		Count	3	6	9
			% within presidents Party	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
Independent		Republican	% within PA Granted	33.3%	40.0%	37.5%
			% of Total	12.5%	25.0%	37.5%
			Count	9	15	24
			% within presidents Party	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
		Total	% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
			Count	122	407	529
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	% within presidents Party	23.1%	76.9%	100.0%

(Continues)

				% within PA Granted	45.4%	54.9%	52.4%
				% of Total	12.1%	40.3%	52.4%
			Republican	Count	147	334	481
				% within presidents Party	30.6%	69.4%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	54.6%	45.1%	47.6%
				% of Total	14.6%	33.1%	47.6%
		Total		Count	269	741	1010
				% within presidents Party	26.6%	73.4%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	26.6%	73.4%	100.0%
Yes	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	8	44	52
				% within presidents Party	15.4%	84.6%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	33.3%	65.7%	57.1%
				% of Total	8.8%	48.4%	57.1%
			Republican	Count	16	23	39
				% within presidents Party	41.0%	59.0%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	66.7%	34.3%	42.9%
				% of Total	17.6%	25.3%	42.9%
		Total		Count	24	67	91
				% within presidents Party	26.4%	73.6%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	26.4%	73.6%	100.0%
	Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	20	50	70

(Continues)

			% within presidents Party	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	83.3%	63.3%	68.0%
			% of Total	19.4%	48.5%	68.0%
		Republican	Count	4	29	33
			% within presidents Party	12.1%	87.9%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	16.7%	36.7%	32.0%
			% of Total	3.9%	28.2%	32.0%
	Total		Count	24	79	103
			% within presidents Party	23.3%	76.7%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	23.3%	76.7%	100.0%
Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	1	5	6
			% within presidents Party	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	83.3%	85.7%
			% of Total	14.3%	71.4%	85.7%
		Republican	Count	0	1	1
			% within presidents Party	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	0.0%	16.7%	14.3%
			% of Total	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%

(Continues)

			Total	Count	1	6	7
				% within presidents Party	14.3%	85.7%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	14.3%	85.7%	100.0%
		Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	29	99	128
					% within presidents Party	22.7%	77.3%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	59.2%	65.1%	63.7%
					% of Total	14.4%	49.3%	63.7%
				Republican	Count	20	53	73
					% within presidents Party	27.4%	72.6%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	40.8%	34.9%	36.3%
					% of Total	10.0%	26.4%	36.3%
			Total		Count	49	152	201
					% within presidents Party	24.4%	75.6%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total	24.4%	75.6%	100.0%
Total		Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	52	226	278
					% within presidents Party	18.7%	81.3%	100.0%
					% within PA Granted	39.4%	54.9%	51.1%
					% of Total	9.6%	41.5%	51.1%
				Republican	Count	80	186	266
					% within presidents Party	30.1%	69.9%	100.0%

(Continues)

			% within PA Granted	60.6%	45.1%	48.9%
			% of Total	14.7%	34.2%	48.9%
	Total		Count	132	412	544
			% within presidents Party	24.3%	75.7%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	24.3%	75.7%	100.0%
Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	92	266	358
			% within presidents Party	25.7%	74.3%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	52.3%	57.8%	56.3%
			% of Total	14.5%	41.8%	56.3%
		Republican	Count	84	194	278
			% within presidents Party	30.2%	69.8%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	47.7%	42.2%	43.7%
			% of Total	13.2%	30.5%	43.7%
	Total		Count	176	460	636
			% within presidents Party	27.7%	72.3%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	27.7%	72.3%	100.0%
Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	7	14	21
			% within presidents Party	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
			% within PA Granted	70.0%	66.7%	67.7%
			% of Total	22.6%	45.2%	67.7%

(Continues)

			Republican	Count	3	7	10
				% within presidents Party	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	30.0%	33.3%	32.3%
				% of Total	9.7%	22.6%	32.3%
		Total		Count	10	21	31
				% within presidents Party	32.3%	67.7%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	32.3%	67.7%	100.0%
Total		Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	151	506	657
				% within presidents Party	23.0%	77.0%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	47.5%	56.7%	54.3%
				% of Total	12.5%	41.8%	54.3%
			Republican	Count	167	387	554
				% within presidents Party	30.1%	69.9%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	52.5%	43.3%	45.7%
				% of Total	13.8%	32.0%	45.7%
		Total		Count	318	893	1211
				% within presidents Party	26.3%	73.7%	100.0%
				% within PA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	26.3%	73.7%	100.0%

Table 17

Presidents Party * PA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4 * Electoral Battleground State Chi-Square Tests

Electoral Battleground State	Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4	Governors Party	Statistics	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
No	No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	4.866	1	.027
			Continuity Correction	4.392	1	.036
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	3.804	1	.051
			Continuity Correction	3.437	1	.064
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.107	1	.744
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	7.361	1	.007
			Continuity Correction	6.979	1	.008
	Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	4.002	1	.045
			Continuity Correction	3.017	1	.082
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	2.635	1	.105
			Continuity Correction	1.793	1	.181
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.194	1	.659
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000

(Continues)

		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.167	1	.683
			Continuity Correction	.047	1	.827
	Total	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	7.728	1	.005
			Continuity Correction	7.173	1	.007
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	2.075	1	.150
			Continuity Correction	1.821	1	.177
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.034	1	.853
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	7.583	1	.006
			Continuity Correction	7.220	1	.007
Yes	No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.	1	
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.	1	
	Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	4.952	1	.026
			Continuity Correction	2.633	1	.105
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.726	1	.394

(Continues)

				Continuity Correction	.102	1	.749
			Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.676	1	.411
				Continuity Correction	.189	1	.664
		Total	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	4.200	1	.040
				Continuity Correction	2.107	1	.147
			Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.726	1	.394
				Continuity Correction	.102	1	.749
			Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.455	1	.500
				Continuity Correction	.086	1	.770
Total	No		Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	4.748	1	.029
				Continuity Correction	4.280	1	.039
			Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	3.804	1	.051
				Continuity Correction	3.437	1	.064
			Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.107	1	.744
				Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000

(Continues)

		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	7.250	1	.007
			Continuity Correction	6.872	1	.009
	Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	7.546	1	.006
			Continuity Correction	6.283	1	.012
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	3.396	1	.065
			Continuity Correction	2.538	1	.111
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.194	1	.659
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.567	1	.452
			Continuity Correction	.339	1	.561
	Total	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	9.563	1	.002
			Continuity Correction	8.954	1	.003
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	1.596	1	.207
			Continuity Correction	1.378	1	.240
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.034	1	.853
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	7.960	1	.005

(Continues)

				Continuity Correction	7.594	1	.006

Electoral Battleground State	Decision Falls In Reelection Year BeforeNov4	Governors Party			Value	Approx. Sig.
No	No	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.104	.027
				Cramer's V	.104	.027
			NofValidCases		452	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.084	.051
				Cramer's V	.084	.051
			NofValidCases		533	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.067	.744
				Cramer's V	.067	.744
			NofValidCases		24	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.085	.007
				Cramer's V	.085	.007
			NofValidCases		1009	
	Yes	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.227	.045
				Cramer's V	.227	.045
			NofValidCases		78	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.178	.105
				Cramer's V	.178	.105
			NofValidCases		83	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.167	.659
				Cramer's V	.167	.659
			N of Valid Cases		7	

(Continues)

		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.032	.683
				Cramer's V	.032	.683
			NofValidCases		168	
		Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.121	.005
				Cramer's V	.121	.005
			NofValidCases		530	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.058	.150
				Cramer's V	.058	.150
	Total		NofValidCases		616	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.033	.853
				Cramer's V	.033	.853
			NofValidCases		31	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.080	.006
				Cramer's V	.080	.006
			NofValidCases		1177	
		Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.[c]	
			NofValidCases		1	
	No	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.[c]	
			NofValidCases		1	
Yes		Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.617	.026
				Cramer's V	.617	.026
	Yes		NofValidCases		13	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.190	.394
				Cramer's V	.190	.394

(Continues)

			N of Valid Cases		20	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.143	.411
				Cramer's V	.143	.411
			NofValidCases		33	
		Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.548	.040
				Cramer's V	.548	.040
			NofValidCases		14	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.190	.394
	Total			Cramer's V	.190	.394
			NofValidCases		20	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.116	.500
				Cramer's V	.116	.500
			NofValidCases		34	
		Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.102	.029
				Cramer's V	.102	.029
			NofValidCases		453	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.084	.051
				Cramer's V	.084	.051
			NofValidCases		533	
Total	No	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.067	.744
				Cramer's V	.067	.744
			NofValidCases		24	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.085	.007
				Cramer's V	.085	.007
			N of Valid Cases		1010	

(Continues)

	Yes	Democratic	Nominal by	Phi	-.288	.006

			Nominal	Cramer's V	.288	.006
			NofValidCases		91	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.182	.065
				Cramer's V	.182	.065
			NofValidCases		103	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.167	.659
				Cramer's V	.167	.659
			NofValidCases		7	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.053	.452
				Cramer's V	.053	.452
			NofValidCases		201	
Total		Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.133	.002
				Cramer's V	.133	.002
			NofValidCases		544	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.050	.207
				Cramer's V	.050	.207
			NofValidCases		636	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.033	.853
				Cramer's V	.033	.853
			NofValidCases		31	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.081	.005
				Cramer's V	.081	.005
			NofValidCases		1211	

In the chi-squared test for fit table, Table 17, comparing PA approved, presidential and governor party affiliations, reelection year and battleground state, the results are striking.

In further partial analysis Democratic governors who were granted PA aid in non-electoral battleground states in non-reelection years also finds evidence against the null hypothesis and accept the alternative (chi-squared = 4.866, df = 1, p = .027) and in reelection years but still not in battleground states the Democratic governors who were approved PA again demonstrate enough evidence against the null hypothesis and accept the alternative (chi-squared =4.002, df = 1, p = .045). Similar findings were shown in battleground states during reelection years with PA being awarded to Democratic governors showing enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative (chi-squared = 4.952, df = 1, p = .026). As an overall analysis there is very strong evidence to reject the null and support the alternative hypothesis that there is a relationship between presidential party affiliation, gubernatorial party affiliation, reelection years and battleground state (chi-square = 7.960, df = 1, p = .005). These results support the notion for potential bias with the use of federal funds, specifically as it applies to FEMA PA funding.

One of the ways to summarize the findings is to look at relative percentage of approval from the general sample to that of the final assumptive variable relationship. As was stated at the beginning PA was requested 1211 time of which, PA was approved 893 times or 73.7% of the time. Democratic presidents approved PA 77% of the time while Republican presidents approved PA 69.9% of the time. The final assumptive results

showed that during non-reelection years Democratic presidents approved Democratic governors 80.5% and Republic governors 71.7%, Republican presidents in that same data set approved Republican governors 67.3% and Democratic governors 75%. Once it was a reelection year those numbers changed with Republican presidents favoring Republican governors at 88.9% and granting aid to Democratic governors a dropped amount to 73.2%. Democratic presidents likewise changed their approvals during reelection years approving Democratic governors 82.6% of the time and Republican governors only 62.5%. Once the variable of a battleground state was thrown in, Republican presidents approved PA to republican governors 88.9% of the time and Democratic governors 73.2% while Democratic presidents approved Democratic governors an astonishing 100% of the time and only 42.9% to Republican governors.

Two stark consistencies can be seen in the percentages alone. First in-party favoring increases as the stakes for potential bias increase with the Republican president showing a 69.9% overall base, 67.3% non-election, 88.9% reelection and 83.3% battleground state. Conversely opposing party was based at 69.9%, 75% non-election years, 73.2 re-election years and down to 64.3% in battleground States. The same pattern remained for Democratic presidents showing an overall 77.0% base, 80.5% non-election, 82.6% reelection and 100% battleground State. The opposing party pattern remained at 71.7% non-election, 62.5% reelection year and 42.9% battleground state.

To place it in terms of the hypothesis the research questions null and alternative hypothesis are again listed below, along with the corresponding answers.

1. Is there a statistically significant difference between the types of FEMA aid approved by a president to a Democratic or Republican governor during times of natural disasters during 1996, 2004 and 2012?

$H1_0$: There is no statistically significant difference between the types of FEMA aid approved by a president to a Democratic or Republican governors during times of natural disasters in 1996, 2004 and 2012.

$H1_a$: There is a statistically significant difference between the types of FEMA aid approved by a president to a Democratic or Republican governor during times of natural disasters in 1996, 2004 and 2012.

In the first question it has been shown that FEMA aid, specifically PA, has a very strong assumption against the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative with a chi-square of 7.960, df =1, p=.005 when comparing the relationship of presidential political party, PA approval, party of the governor, reelection year and battleground state.

2. Is there a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals depending on the political party of the requesting governor and the party of the president and approvals in 1996, 2004 and 2012?

$H2_0$: There is no statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals between the political party of the requesting governor and the party of the president during 1996, 2004 and 2012.

$H2_a$: There is a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals between the political party of the requesting governor and the party of the president during 1996, 2004 and 2012.

Once again, using PA, there is strong evidence to reject the null and accept the alternative hypothesis.

3. Is there a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals depending on if the state was an election battleground state in 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to requests in the same year?

$H2_0$: There is no statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals depending on if the state was an election battleground state in 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to requests in the same year.

$H2_a$: There is a statistically significant difference in FEMA aid approvals depending on if the state was an election battleground state in 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to requests in the same year.

For PA, it did not seem that being a Battleground State made a statistically significant difference compared to non-battleground states. This did not mean there was not a % difference in how the presidents acted, just that those actions were not significant to the overall difference. It should be noted again that the data set had few overall battleground states compared to the large dataset as a whole.

4. Is potential bias present with regard to the use of FEMA funds by one or more presidents during 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to non-election years during that same time period?

$H2_0$: There is no significant bias between the presidents with regard to the allocation of the use of FEMA funds during 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to non-election years during that same time period.

$H2_a$: There is the appearance of bias with one or more presidents with the use of FEMA funds during 1996, 2004 and 2012 compared to non-election years during that same time period.

To answer this question one must refer back to how bias would be defined in the research. Labeling bias is often a judgment call done through the lens of a reasonable person and can be established statistically over multiple decisions. Chapter 1 theorized that…

…a president could

1. Act in a manner that favors self-interest with FEMA dispensation.
2. Allocate resources to favor his collective (party) interests.
3. Be notable during times when his discretionary powers would favor self (reelection years in election battleground states).

Remember bias cannot be proven using a chi-squared test for fit, only that an association may or may not exist and its relative strength. If PA was the sole type of FEMA aid that was rendered than it would appear that there could be the possibility of bias but without further testing, such as gathering more data and using logistic regression analysis, this cannot be stated for certain. The % of variance alone from base line non-election years to how each party president approved their own ingroup and disproved the other in both reelection years and when in battleground states shows a propensity to act in a potentially self-serving way but does not prove the existence of bias. As was discussed in chapter 3, propensity was defined as turndowns/approvals above 50% and that any data will not show a definite "yes" or "no" to the answer for bias, but could lead to the

appearance of bias. The data must be presented at face value, and allow a reasonable person to make the judgment call.

Hazard Mitigation

It was earlier shown that there appeared to be no apparent association between the president's party and HM being granted. Yet it was important to know if the party of the requesting governor's party played an additional relationship to how HM was approved or denied. Table 19 demonstrates the breakdown of HM being approved or turned down based on the president's party and the party of the requesting governor.

Table 19 shows that HM was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When HM aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was done 939 times. Of those 939 times Republican governors asked for aid a Republican president for HM aid 278 times and asked a Democratic president for HM aid 358 times. In that set of data, Republican governors were granted HM by Republican presidents 212 times or 76.3% of the time and they were granted HM by Democratic presidents 261 times or 72.9% of the time. There existed a 3.4% disparity, with Republican presidents granting aid more often to Republican governors than Democratic presidents did.

Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for HM aid 278 times and asked a Republic president for HM aid 266 times. Democratic governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 225 times or 80.9% while they were granted HM aid by Republican presidents 223 times or 83.8%.

Table 18

Presidents Party * HM Granted * Governors Party Crosstabulation

governors Party				HMGranted		Total
				No	Yes	
Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	53	225	278
			% within presidents Party	19.1%	80.9%	100.0%
			%withinHMGranted	55.2%	50.2%	51.1%
			%ofTotal	9.7%	41.4%	51.1%
		Republican	Count	43	223	266
			% within presidents Party	16.2%	83.8%	100.0%
			%withinHMGranted	44.8%	49.8%	48.9%
			%ofTotal	7.9%	41.0%	48.9%
	Total		Count	96	448	544
			% within presidents Party	17.6%	82.4%	100.0%
			%withinHMGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	17.6%	82.4%	100.0%
Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	97	261	358
			% within presidents Party	27.1%	72.9%	100.0%
			%withinHMGranted	59.5%	55.2%	56.3%
			%ofTotal	15.3%	41.0%	56.3%
		Republican	Count	66	212	278
			% within presidents Party	23.7%	76.3%	100.0%
			%withinHMGranted	40.5%	44.8%	43.7%
			%ofTotal	10.4%	33.3%	43.7%
	Total		Count	163	473	636
			% within presidents Party	25.6%	74.4%	100.0%
			%withinHMGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	25.6%	74.4%	100.0%

(Continues)

Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	8	13	21
			% within presidents Party	38.1%	61.9%	100.0%
			%withinHMGranted	61.5%	72.2%	67.7%
			%ofTotal	25.8%	41.9%	67.7%
		Republican	Count	5	5	10
			% within presidents Party	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
			%withinHMGranted	38.5%	27.8%	32.3%
			%ofTotal	16.1%	16.1%	32.3%
	Total		Count	13	18	31
			% within presidents Party	41.9%	58.1%	100.0%
			%withinHMGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	41.9%	58.1%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	158	499	657
			% within presidents Party	24.0%	76.0%	100.0%
			%withinHMGranted	58.1%	53.1%	54.3%
			%ofTotal	13.0%	41.2%	54.3%
		Republican	Count	114	440	554
			% within presidents Party	20.6%	79.4%	100.0%
			%withinHMGranted	41.9%	46.9%	45.7%
			%ofTotal	9.4%	36.3%	45.7%
	Total		Count	272	939	1211
			% within presidents Party	22.5%	77.5%	100.0%
			%withinHMGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	22.5%	77.5%	100.0%

Lastly Independent governors asked Democratic presidents for HM aid 21 times and asked a Republican president for HM aid 10 times. Independent governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 13 times or 61.9% while they were granted HM aid by Republican presidents 5 times or 50%. The relatively low number of requests by Independent governors makes this visual statistical difference not significant.

When looking at Table 20, there is not enough evidence for a presumption against the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the president's party and HM being approved influenced by the governor's party (chi-square = 2.079, df = 1, p= .149). Furthermore, when looking at partial analysis one finds that if the party of the requesting governor is Independent then there is no relationship between the president's Party and HM being approved (chi-square = .394, df = 1, p= .530) and fail to reject null hypothesis. When looking at additional partial analysis one finds that's if the party of the requesting governor is Democratic, then there is no relationship between the president's Party and HM being approved (chi-square = .786, df = 1, p= .375) and find no presumption against the null hypothesis.. Lastly if the party of the requesting governor is Republican, than we must assume there is no relationship to HM being approved and the party of the president (chi-square = .924, df = 1, p= .337) and find no presumption against the null hypothesis.

It has been suggested that party affiliation might not play a role in FEMA aid allocation. Needing to test for this the variable, governor party affiliation was taken out and instead substituted for election year. The results are listed in Table 21.

Table 19

Presidents Party * HM Granted * Governors Party Chi-Square Tests

governors Party		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Democratic	PearsonChi-Square	.786	1	.375
	Continuity Correction	.599	1	.439
Republican	PearsonChi-Square	.924	1	.337
	Continuity Correction	.756	1	.385
Independent	PearsonChi-Square	.394	1	.530
	Continuity Correction	.057	1	.811
Total	PearsonChi-Square	2.079	1	.149
	Continuity Correction	1.885	1	.170

GovernorsParty			Value	Approx.Sig.
Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.038	.375
		Cramer's V	.038	.375
	NofValidCases		544	
Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.038	.337
		Cramer's V	.038	.337
	NofValidCases		636	
Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.113	.530
		Cramer's V	.113	.530
	NofValidCases		31	
Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.041	.149
		Cramer's V	.041	.149
	NofValidCases		1211	

Table 20

Presidents Party * HM Granted * Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4 Crosstabulation

Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4				HMGranted		Total
				No	Yes	
No	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	129	354	483
			% within presidents Party	26.7%	73.3%	100.0%
			% within HM Granted	60.6%	53.2%	55.0%
			% of Total	14.7%	40.3%	55.0%
		Republican	Count	84	311	395
			% within presidents Party	21.3%	78.7%	100.0%
			% within HM Granted	39.4%	46.8%	45.0%
			%ofTotal	9.6%	35.4%	45.0%
	Total		Count	213	665	878
			% within presidents Party	24.3%	75.7%	100.0%
			% within HM Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	24.3%	75.7%	100.0%
Yes	presidents Party	Democratic	Count	29	145	174
			% within presidents Party	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
			% within HM Granted	49.2%	52.9%	52.3%
			%ofTotal	8.7%	43.5%	52.3%
		Republican	Count	30	129	159
			% within presidents Party	18.9%	81.1%	100.0%
			% within HM Granted	50.8%	47.1%	47.7%

(Continues)

			% of Total	9.0%	38.7%	47.7%
	Total		Count	59	274	333
			% within presidents Party	17.7%	82.3%	100.0%
			% within HM Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	17.7%	82.3%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	158	499	657
			% within presidents Party	24.0%	76.0%	100.0%
			% within HM Granted	58.1%	53.1%	54.3%
			% of Total	13.0%	41.2%	54.3%
		Republican	Count	114	440	554
			% within presidents Party	20.6%	79.4%	100.0%
			% within HM Granted	41.9%	46.9%	45.7%
			%ofTotal	9.4%	36.3%	45.7%
	Total		Count	272	939	1211
			% within presidents Party	22.5%	77.5%	100.0%
			% within HM Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	22.5%	77.5%	100.0%

Looking at the Table 20 HM was approved or denied in 1211 cases. Of those 1211 cases 333 requests for HM aid were made during election years. Democratic presidents approved 145 of 174 or 83.3% requests for aid during election years while Republican presidents approved 129 out of 159 or 81.1%. The percentages do not demonstrate a large statistical difference. During non-election years Democratic

presidents approved 73.3% of the requests for HM aid while the Republican president approved 78.7%. To know if the results are statistically significant the chi square test for fit is below in Table 21

Table 21

Presidents Party * HM Granted * Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4 Chi-Square Tests

Decision Falls In Election Year BeforeNov4	Governors Party		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	1.035	1	.309
		Continuity Correction	.791	1	.374
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	1.734	1	.188
		Continuity Correction	1.467	1	.226
	Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.105	1	.746
		Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
	Total	Pearson Chi-Square	3.503	1	.061
		Continuity Correction	3.213	1	.073
Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.036	1	.849
		Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.154	1	.695
		Continuity Correction	.043	1	.836

(Continues)

		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	3.938	1	.047
			Continuity Correction	.502	1	.479
	Total		Pearson Chi-Square	.276	1	.599
			Continuity Correction	.146	1	.703
Total	Democratic		Pearson Chi-Square	.786	1	.375
			Continuity Correction	.599	1	.439
	Republican		Pearson Chi-Square	.924	1	.337
			Continuity Correction	.756	1	.385
	Independent		Pearson Chi-Square	.394	1	.530
			Continuity Correction	.057	1	.811
	Total		Pearson Chi-Square	2.079	1	.149
			Continuity Correction	1.885	1	.170

Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov4	Governors Party			Value	Approx. Sig.
No	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.051	.309
			Cramer's V	.051	.309
		NofValidCases		395	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.061	.188

(Continues)

			Cramer's V	.061	.188
		NofValidCases		461	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.069	.746
			Cramer's V	.069	.746
		NofValidCases		22	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.063	.061
			Cramer's V	.063	.061
		NofValidCases		878	
Yes	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.016	.849
			Cramer's V	.016	.849
		N of Valid Cases		149	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.030	.695
			Cramer's V	.030	.695
		NofValidCases		175	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.661	.047
			Cramer's V	.661	.047
		NofValidCases		9	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.029	.599
			Cramer's V	.029	.599
		N of Valid Cases		333	
Total	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.038	.375

(Continues)

		Cramer's V	.038	.375
	NofValidCases		544	
Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.038	.337
		Cramer's V	.038	.337
	NofValidCases		636	
Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.113	.530
		Cramer's V	.113	.530
	NofValidCases		31	
Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.041	.149
		Cramer's V	.041	.149
	NofValidCases		1211	

Once again there does not exist enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis in total (chi-squared = 2.079, df =1, p = .149), nor in partial analysis. Table 21 shows the results of a reelection year analysis. When holding for a reelection year instead of an election year there is still not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis as is seen below in the chi-square test for fit. Lastly knowing if being in a battleground state has any bearing on the findings the variable was added. When running the tests the findings, shown in Table 22, even in partial analysis, did not demonstrate any evidence to reject the null hypothesis.

In Summary, all tests run holding for president's party and that of HM being approved there was not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis and accept the

alternative. There appears to be no potential for bias based on these findings within FEMA Hazard Mitigation aid.

In answering the 4 research questions there is not enough evidence to reject the first 3 null hypotheses. Were HM the only type of FEMA aid, then there does not exist enough evidence in the data set to reject the null hypothesis, nor does the data in base percent lend evidence to suggest bias based on presidential party affiliation in any of the case criteria.

Table 22

Presidents Party * HM Granted * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4 Chi-Square Tests

Decision Falls In Reelection Year BeforeNov4	Governors Party		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	1.244	1	.265
		Continuity Correction	.988	1	.320
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.612	1	.434
		Continuity Correction	.469	1	.493
	Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.011	1	.916
		Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
	Total	Pearson Chi-Square	2.255	1	.133
		Continuity Correction	2.039	1	.153

(Continues)

Yes		Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.067	1	.795
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	2.821	1	.093
			Continuity Correction	1.905	1	.167
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.		
				7		
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.844	1	.358
			Continuity Correction	.500	1	.480
Total		Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.786	1	.375
			Continuity Correction	.599	1	.439
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.924	1	.337
			Continuity Correction	.756	1	.385
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.394	1	.530
			Continuity Correction	.057	1	.811
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	2.079	1	.149
			Continuity Correction	1.885	1	.170
Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4	Governors Party			Value		Approx. Sig.

(Continues)

No	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.052	.265
			Cramer's V	.052	.265
		NofValidCases		453	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.034	.434
			Cramer's V	.034	.434
		NofValidCases		533	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.022	.916
			Cramer's V	.022	.916
		NofValidCases		24	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.047	.133
			Cramer's V	.047	.133
		NofValidCases		1010	
Yes	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.027	.795
			Cramer's V	.027	.795
		N of Valid Cases		91	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.166	.093
			Cramer's V	.166	.093
		NofValidCases		103	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi		
		NofValidCases		7	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.065	.358
			Cramer's V	.065	.358
		N of Valid Cases		201	

(Continues)

Total	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.038	.375
			Cramer's V	.038	.375
		NofValidCases		544	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.038	.337
			Cramer's V	.038	.337
		NofValidCases		636	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.113	.530
			Cramer's V	.113	.530
		NofValidCases		31	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.041	.149
			Cramer's V	.041	.149
		NofValidCases		1211	

Table 23

Presidents Party * HM Granted * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4 * Electoral Battleground State Chi-Square Tests

Electoral Battleground State	Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4	governors Party		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
No	No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	1.195	1	.274
			Continuity Correction	.945	1	.331
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.612	1	.434
			Continuity Correction	.469	1	.493
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.011	1	.916
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	2.200	1	.138
			Continuity Correction	1.987	1	.159
	Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.104	1	.747
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	3.174	1	.075
			Continuity Correction	2.062	1	.151
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.		
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.786	1	.375
			Continuity Correction	.420	1	.517

(Continues)

	Total	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.731	1	.392
			Continuity Correction	.550	1	.458
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.932	1	.334
			Continuity Correction	.762	1	.383
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.394	1	.530
			Continuity Correction	.057	1	.811
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	1.971	1	.160
			Continuity Correction	1.780	1	.182
Yes	No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.		
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.		
	Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.014	1	.906
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.060	1	.807
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.113	1	.737
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000

(Continues)

	Total	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.049	1	.825
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.060	1	.807
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.185	1	.667
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
Total	No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	1.244	1	.265
			Continuity Correction	.988	1	.320
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.612	1	.434
			Continuity Correction	.469	1	.493
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.011	1	.916
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	2.255	1	.133
			Continuity Correction	2.039	1	.153
	Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.067	1	.795

(Continues)

				Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
			Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	2.821	1	.093
				Continuity Correction	1.905	1	.167
			Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.		
					7		
			Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.844	1	.358
				Continuity Correction	.500	1	.480
		Total	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.786	1	.375
				Continuity Correction	.599	1	.439
			Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.924	1	.337
				Continuity Correction	.756	1	.385
			Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.394	1	.530
				Continuity Correction	.057	1	.811
			Total	Pearson Chi-Square	2.079	1	.149
				Continuity Correction	1.885	1	.170

Electoral Battleground State	Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4	governors Party			Value	Approx. Sig.
No	No	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.051	.274
				Cramer's V	.051	.274

(Continues)

			N of Valid Cases	452	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.034	.434
				Cramer's V	.034	.434
			N of Valid Cases	533	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.022	.916
				Cramer's V	.022	.916
			N of Valid Cases	24	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.047	.138
				Cramer's V	.047	.138
			N of Valid Cases	1009	
	Yes	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.036	.747
				Cramer's V	.036	.747
			N of Valid Cases	78	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.196	.075
				Cramer's V	.196	.075
			N of Valid Cases	83	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.	
			N of Valid Cases	7	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.068	.375
				Cramer's V	.068	.375
			N of Valid Cases	168	
	Total	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.037	.392
				Cramer's V	.037	.392
			N of Valid Cases	530	

(Continues)

		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.039	.334
				Cramer's V	.039	.334
			N of Valid Cases		616	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.113	.530
				Cramer's V	.113	.530
			N of Valid Cases		31	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.041	.160
				Cramer's V	.041	.160
			N of Valid Cases		1177	
Yes	No	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.	
			N of Valid Cases		1	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.	
			N of Valid Cases		1	
	Yes	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.033	.906
				Cramer's V	.033	.906
			N of Valid Cases		13	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.055	.807
				Cramer's V	.055	.807
			N of Valid Cases		20	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.058	.737
				Cramer's V	.058	.737
			N of Valid Cases		33	
	Total	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.059	.825
				Cramer's V	.059	.825

(Continues)

			N of Valid Cases		14	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.055	.807
				Cramer's V	.055	.807
			N of Valid Cases		20	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.074	.667
				Cramer's V	.074	.667
			N of Valid Cases		34	
Total	No	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.052	.265
				Cramer's V	.052	.265
			N of Valid Cases		453	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.034	.434
				Cramer's V	.034	.434
			N of Valid Cases		533	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.022	.916
				Cramer's V	.022	.916
			N of Valid Cases		24	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.047	.133
				Cramer's V	.047	.133
			N of Valid Cases		1010	
		Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.027	.795
				Cramer's V	.027	.795
	Yes		N of Valid Cases		91	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.166	.093
				Cramer's V	.166	.093

(Continues)

			N of Valid Cases	103	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.
			N of Valid Cases	7	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.065	.358
				Cramer's V	.065	.358
			N of Valid Cases	201	
	Democratic		Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.038	.375
				Cramer's V	.038	.375
			N of Valid Cases	544	
	Republican		Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.038	.337
				Cramer's V	.038	.337
			N of Valid Cases	636	
Total		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.113	.530
				Cramer's V	.113	.530
			N of Valid Cases	31	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.041	.149
				Cramer's V	.041	.149
			N of Valid Cases	1211	

Individual Assistance

It was earlier shown that there appeared to be no association between the president's party and IA being granted. Yet it was important to know if the party of the requesting governor's played an additional relationship to how IA was approved or denied. Table 24 demonstrates the breakdown of IA being approved or turned down based on the president's party and the party of the requesting governor.

IA was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When IA aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was done 493 times. Of those 493 times Republican governors asked for aid a Republican president for IA aid 278 times and asked a Democratic president for IA aid 358 times. In that set of data, Republican governors were granted HM by Republican presidents 104 times or 37.4% of the time and they were granted IA by Democratic presidents 149 times or 41.6% of the time. There existed a 4.2% disparity, with Democratic presidents granting aid more often to Republican governors than Republican presidents did.

Table 24

Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party Crosstabulation

Governors Party				IAGranted		Total
				No	Yes	
Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	173	105	278
			% within presidents Party	62.2%	37.8%	100.0%
			%withinIAGranted	55.6%	45.1%	51.1%
			% of Total	31.8%	19.3%	51.1%
		Republican	Count	138	128	266
			% within presidents Party	51.9%	48.1%	100.0%
			%withinIAGranted	44.4%	54.9%	48.9%
			% of Total	25.4%	23.5%	48.9%
	Total		Count	311	233	544
			% within presidents Party	57.2%	42.8%	100.0%
			%withinIAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	57.2%	42.8%	100.0%
Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	209	149	358
			% within presidents Party	58.4%	41.6%	100.0%
			%withinIAGranted	54.6%	58.9%	56.3%
			% of Total	32.9%	23.4%	56.3%
		Republican	Count	174	104	278
			% within presidents Party	62.6%	37.4%	100.0%
			%withinIAGranted	45.4%	41.1%	43.7%
			% of Total	27.4%	16.4%	43.7%
	Total		Count	383	253	636
			% within presidents Party	60.2%	39.8%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

(Continues)

			% of Total	60.2%	39.8%	100.0%
Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	17	4	21
			% within presidents Party	81.0%	19.0%	100.0%
			%withinIAGranted	70.8%	57.1%	67.7%
			% of Total	54.8%	12.9%	67.7%
		Republican	Count	7	3	10
			% within presidents Party	70.0%	30.0%	100.0%
			%withinIAGranted	29.2%	42.9%	32.3%
			% of Total	22.6%	9.7%	32.3%
	Total		Count	24	7	31
			% within presidents Party	77.4%	22.6%	100.0%
			%withinIAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	77.4%	22.6%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	399	258	657
			% within presidents Party	60.7%	39.3%	100.0%
			%withinIAGranted	55.6%	52.3%	54.3%
			% of Total	32.9%	21.3%	54.3%
		Republican	Count	319	235	554
			% within presidents Party	57.6%	42.4%	100.0%
			%withinIAGranted	44.4%	47.7%	45.7%
			% of Total	26.3%	19.4%	45.7%
	Total		Count	718	493	1211
			% within presidents Party	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%
			%withinIAGranted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%

In addition, Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for IA aid 278 times and asked a Republic president for IA aid 266 times. Democratic governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 105 times or 37.8% while they were granted IA aid by Republican presidents 128 times or 48.1%. This goes against the idea of like party affiliation being a deciding factor for granting IA aid.

Lastly, Independent governors asked Democratic presidents for IA aid 21 times and asked a Republican president for IA aid 10 times. Independent governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 4 times or 19.0% while they were granted IA aid by Republican presidents 3 times or 30%.

When looking at Table 24, as a whole there is not enough evidence for a presumption against the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the president's party and IA being approved influenced by the governor's party (chi-square = 1.235, df = 1, p= .266). Furthermore, when looking at partial analysis one finds that if the party of the requesting governor is Independent then there is no relationship between the president's Party and IA being approved (chi-square = .465, df = 1, p= .495) and find no presumption against the null hypothesis. Additionally, if the party of the requesting governor is Republican, than we must assume there is no relationship to IA being approved and the party of the president (chi-square = .1.158, df = 1, p= .282) and find no presumption against the null hypothesis. However, looking at additional partial analysis one finds that's if the party of the requesting governor is Democratic, then there is a strong presumption against the null hypothesis

when looking at the relationship between the president's Party and IA being approved (chi-square = .5.947, df = 1, p= .015).

The next logical progression was to see if there remained any potential association when an added variable was added, that of it being an election year. The following cross tabulation table demonstrates the breakdown of IA being approved or turned down based on the president's party, the party of the requesting governor and if it was an election year.

Table 25

Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party Chi-Square Tests

Governors Party		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Democratic	PearsonChi-Square	5.947	1	.015
	ContinuityCorrection	5.532	1	.019
Republican	PearsonChi-Square	1.158	1	.282
	ContinuityCorrection	.989	1	.320
Independent	PearsonChi-Square	.465	1	.495
	ContinuityCorrection	.049	1	.824
Total	PearsonChi-Square	1.235	1	.266
	ContinuityCorrection	1.108	1	.293

GovernorsParty			Value	Approx.Sig.
Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.105	.015
		Cramer'sV	.105	.015
	NofValidCases		544	
Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.043	.282
		Cramer'sV	.043	.282
	NofValidCases		636	
Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.122	.495
		Cramer'sV	.122	.495
	NofValidCases		31	
Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.032	.266
		Cramer'sV	.032	.266
	NofValidCases		1211	

Table 26

Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4 Crosstabulation

Decision Falls In Election Year BeforeNov4	governors Party			IAGranted No	IAGranted Yes	Total
No	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count 131	77	208
				% within presidentsParty 63.0%	37.0%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted 58.2%	45.3%	52.7%
				%ofTotal 33.2%	19.5%	52.7%
			Republican	Count 94	93	187
				% within presidentsParty 50.3%	49.7%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted 41.8%	54.7%	47.3%
				%ofTotal 23.8%	23.5%	47.3%
		Total		Count 225	170	395
				% within presidentsParty 57.0%	43.0%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted 100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal 57.0%	43.0%	100.0%
	Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count 150	111	261
				% within presidentsParty 57.5%	42.5%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted 54.9%	59.0%	56.6%
				%ofTotal 32.5%	24.1%	56.6%
			Republican	Count 123	77	200
				% within presidentsParty 61.5%	38.5%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted 45.1%	41.0%	43.4%

(Continues)

			% of Total	26.7%	16.7%	43.4%
			Count	273	188	461
		Total	% within presidentsParty	59.2%	40.8%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	59.2%	40.8%	100.0%
Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	13	1	14
			% within presidentsParty	92.9%	7.1%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	72.2%	25.0%	63.6%
			%ofTotal	59.1%	4.5%	63.6%
		Republican	Count	5	3	8
			% within presidentsParty	62.5%	37.5%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	27.8%	75.0%	36.4%
			%ofTotal	22.7%	13.6%	36.4%
		Total	Count	18	4	22
			% within presidentsParty	81.8%	18.2%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	81.8%	18.2%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	294	189	483
			% within presidentsParty	60.9%	39.1%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	57.0%	52.2%	55.0%
			%ofTotal	33.5%	21.5%	55.0%
		Republican	Count	222	173	395
			% within presidents Party	56.2%	43.8%	100.0%

(Continues)

				% within IA Granted	43.0%	47.8%	45.0%
				%ofTotal	25.3%	19.7%	45.0%
			Total	Count	516	362	878
				% within presidentsParty	58.8%	41.2%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	58.8%	41.2%	100.0%
Yes	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	42	28	70
				% within presidentsParty	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	48.8%	44.4%	47.0%
				%ofTotal	28.2%	18.8%	47.0%
			Republican	Count	44	35	79
				% within presidentsParty	55.7%	44.3%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	51.2%	55.6%	53.0%
				%ofTotal	29.5%	23.5%	53.0%
			Total	Count	86	63	149
				% within presidentsParty	57.7%	42.3%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	57.7%	42.3%	100.0%
	Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	59	38	97
				% within presidentsParty	60.8%	39.2%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	53.6%	58.5%	55.4%
				%ofTotal	33.7%	21.7%	55.4%
			Republican	Count	51	27	78

(Continues)

			% within presidentsParty	65.4%	34.6%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	46.4%	41.5%	44.6%
			%ofTotal	29.1%	15.4%	44.6%
		Total	Count	110	65	175
			% within presidentsParty	62.9%	37.1%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	62.9%	37.1%	100.0%
	Independent	Presidents Party	Count	4	3	7
			% within presidentsParty	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
		Democratic	% within IA Granted	66.7%	100.0%	77.8%
			%ofTotal	44.4%	33.3%	77.8%
			Count	2	0	2
			% within presidentsParty	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
		Republican	% within IA Granted	33.3%	0.0%	22.2%
			%ofTotal	22.2%	0.0%	22.2%
			Count	6	3	9
			% within presidentsParty	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
		Total	% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
	Total	Presidents Party	Count	105	69	174
			% within presidentsParty	60.3%	39.7%	100.0%
		Democratic	% within IA Granted	52.0%	52.7%	52.3%
			% of Total	31.5%	20.7%	52.3%

(Continues)

			Republican	Count	97	62	159
				% within presidentsParty	61.0%	39.0%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	48.0%	47.3%	47.7%
				%ofTotal	29.1%	18.6%	47.7%
			Total	Count	202	131	333
				% within presidentsParty	60.7%	39.3%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	60.7%	39.3%	100.0%
Total	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	173	105	278
				% within presidentsParty	62.2%	37.8%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	55.6%	45.1%	51.1%
				%ofTotal	31.8%	19.3%	51.1%
			Republican	Count	138	128	266
				% within presidentsParty	51.9%	48.1%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	44.4%	54.9%	48.9%
				%ofTotal	25.4%	23.5%	48.9%
			Total	Count	311	233	544
				% within presidentsParty	57.2%	42.8%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	57.2%	42.8%	100.0%

(Continues)

Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	209	149	358
			% within presidentsParty	58.4%	41.6%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	54.6%	58.9%	56.3%
			%ofTotal	32.9%	23.4%	56.3%
		Republican	Count	174	104	278
			% within presidentsParty	62.6%	37.4%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	45.4%	41.1%	43.7%
			%ofTotal	27.4%	16.4%	43.7%
	Total		Count	383	253	636
			% within presidentsParty	60.2%	39.8%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	60.2%	39.8%	100.0%
Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	17	4	21
			% within presidentsParty	81.0%	19.0%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	70.8%	57.1%	67.7%
			%ofTotal	54.8%	12.9%	67.7%
		Republican	Count	7	3	10
			% within presidentsParty	70.0%	30.0%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	29.2%	42.9%	32.3%
			%ofTotal	22.6%	9.7%	32.3%
	Total		Count	24	7	31
			% within presidentsParty	77.4%	22.6%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	77.4%	22.6%	100.0%

Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	399	258	657
			% within presidentsParty	60.7%	39.3%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	55.6%	52.3%	54.3%
			%ofTotal	32.9%	21.3%	54.3%
		Republican	Count	319	235	554
			% within presidentsParty	57.6%	42.4%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	44.4%	47.7%	45.7%
			%ofTotal	26.3%	19.4%	45.7%
		Total	Count	718	493	1211
			% within presidentsParty	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%

As is demonstrated above in both Table 25 and 26, IA was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When IA aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was done 493 times. IA was requested during a presidential election year 333 times and was approved 131 times or 39.3%. Republican governors asked a Republican president for IA aid during an election year 78 times and asked a Democratic president for IA aid 97 times. In that set of data, Republican governors were granted IA by Republican presidents 27 times or 34.6% of the time and they were granted IA by Democratic presidents 38 times or 39.2% of the time. There existed a 4.6% disparity, with Democratic presidents granting aid more often to Republican governors than Republican presidents did.

In addition, Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for IA during a presidential election year aid 70 times and asked a Republic president for IA aid 79 times. Democratic governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 28 times or 40.0% while they were granted IA aid by Republican presidents 35 times or 44.3%.

Lastly Independent governors asked Democratic presidents for IA during a presidential election year aid 7 times and asked a Republican president for IA aid 2 times. Independent governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 3 times or 42.9% while they were granted IA aid by Republican presidents 0 times or 0%..

When looking at Table 28, as a whole, there once again is not enough evidence to form a presumption against the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the president's party and IA being approved influenced by the governor's party during a presidential election year (chi-square = .015, df = 1, p= .902). Furthermore, when looking at partial analysis one finds that if the party of the requesting governor is Independent then there is no relationship between the president's Party during a presidential election year and IA being approved (chi-square = 1.286, df = 1, p= .257) and find no presumption against the null hypothesis. Lastly if the party of the requesting governor is Republican, than we must assume there is no relationship to IA being approved and the party of the president during a presidential election year (chi-square = .385, df = 1, p= .535) and find no presumption against the null hypothesis.

Table 27

Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Election Year Before Nov 4 Chi-Square Tests

Decision Falls In Election Year BeforeNov4	Governors Party		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	6.492	1	.011
		Continuity Correction	5.984	1	.014
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.761	1	.383
		Continuity Correction	.603	1	.437
	Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	3.154	1	.076
		Continuity Correction	1.443	1	.230
	Total	Pearson Chi-Square	1.953	1	.162
		Continuity Correction	1.765	1	.184
Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.282	1	.596
		Continuity Correction	.133	1	.715
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.385	1	.535
		Continuity Correction	.214	1	.643
	Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	1.286	1	.257
		Continuity Correction	.080	1	.777

(Continues)

	Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.015	1	.902
		Continuity Correction	.000	1	.991
Total	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	5.947	1	.015
		Continuity Correction	5.532	1	.019
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	1.158	1	.282
		Continuity Correction	.989	1	.320
	Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.465	1	.495
		Continuity Correction	.049	1	.824
	Total	Pearson Chi-Square	1.235	1	.266
		Continuity Correction	1.108	1	.293

Decision Falls In Election YearBeforeNov4	Governors Party			Value	Approx. Sig.
No	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.128	.011
			Cramer's V	.128	.011
		NofValidCases		395	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.041	.383
			Cramer's V	.041	.383
		NofValidCases		461	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.379	.076
			Cramer's V	.379	.076
		N of Valid Cases		22	

(Continues)

	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.047	.162
			Cramer'sV	.047	.162
		NofValidCases		878	
Yes	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.043	.596
			Cramer'sV	.043	.596
		NofValidCases		149	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.047	.535
			Cramer'sV	.047	.535
		NofValidCases		175	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.378	.257
			Cramer'sV	.378	.257
		NofValidCases		9	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.007	.902
			Cramer'sV	.007	.902
		NofValidCases		333	
Total	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.105	.015
			Cramer'sV	.105	.015
		NofValidCases		544	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.043	.282
			Cramer'sV	.043	.282
		NofValidCases		636	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.122	.495
			Cramer'sV	.122	.495
		NofValidCases		31	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.032	.266
			Cramer'sV	.032	.266
		N of Valid Cases		1211	

Interestingly, when looking at additional partial analysis one finds that if the party of the requesting governor is Democratic during a non-election year, then there is a very strong presumption against the null hypothesis when looking at the relationship between the president's Party and IA being turned down (chi-square = 6.492, df = 1, p= .011). The next step is to see if this trend remained true during reelection years.

Table 28

Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4 Crosstabulation

Decision Falls In Reelection Year BeforeNov4	Governors Party				IAGranted		Total
					No	Yes	
No	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	143	83	226
				% within presidents Party	63.3%	36.7%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	54.0%	44.1%	49.9%
				% of Total	31.6%	18.3%	49.9%
			Republican	Count	122	105	227
				% within presidentsParty	53.7%	46.3%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	46.0%	55.9%	50.1%
				% of Total	26.9%	23.2%	50.1%
		Total		Count	265	188	453
				% within presidentsParty	58.5%	41.5%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	58.5%	41.5%	100.0%
	Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	162	126	288
				% within presidents Party	56.3%	43.8%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	50.8%	58.9%	54.0%
				%ofTotal	30.4%	23.6%	54.0%
			Republican	Count	157	88	245
				% within presidentsParty	64.1%	35.9%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	49.2%	41.1%	46.0%

(Continues)

			% of Total	29.5%	16.5%	46.0%
	Total		Count	319	214	533
			% within presidentsParty	59.8%	40.2%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	59.8%	40.2%	100.0%
Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	14	1	15
			% within presidentsParty	93.3%	6.7%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	70.0%	25.0%	62.5%
			%ofTotal	58.3%	4.2%	62.5%
		Republican	Count	6	3	9
			% within presidentsParty	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	30.0%	75.0%	37.5%
			%ofTotal	25.0%	12.5%	37.5%
	Total		Count	20	4	24
			% within presidentsParty	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	319	210	529
			% within presidentsParty	60.3%	39.7%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	52.8%	51.7%	52.4%
			%ofTotal	31.6%	20.8%	52.4%
		Republican	Count	285	196	481
			% within presidents Party	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%

(Continues)

				% within IA Granted	47.2%	48.3%	47.6%
				%ofTotal	28.2%	19.4%	47.6%
				Count	604	406	1010
				% within presidentsParty	59.8%	40.2%	100.0%
			Total	% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	59.8%	40.2%	100.0%
				Count	30	22	52
				% within presidentsParty	57.7%	42.3%	100.0%
			Democratic	% within IA Granted	65.2%	48.9%	57.1%
				%ofTotal	33.0%	24.2%	57.1%
		Presidents Party		Count	16	23	39
				% within presidentsParty	41.0%	59.0%	100.0%
	Democratic		Republican	% within IA Granted	34.8%	51.1%	42.9%
				%ofTotal	17.6%	25.3%	42.9%
Yes				Count	46	45	91
				% within presidentsParty	50.5%	49.5%	100.0%
			Total	% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	50.5%	49.5%	100.0%
				Count	47	23	70
				% within presidentsParty	67.1%	32.9%	100.0%
			Democratic	% within IA Granted	73.4%	59.0%	68.0%
				%ofTotal	45.6%	22.3%	68.0%
		Presidents Party		Count	17	16	33
	Republican		Republican	% within presidentsParty	51.5%	48.5%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	26.6%	41.0%	32.0%
				%ofTotal	16.5%	15.5%	32.0%
				Count	64	39	103
				% within presidentsParty	62.1%	37.9%	100.0%
			Total	% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	62.1%	37.9%	100.0%

(Continues)

			% within presidentsParty	51.5%	48.5%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	26.6%	41.0%	32.0%
			%ofTotal	16.5%	15.5%	32.0%
		Total	Count	64	39	103
			% within presidentsParty	62.1%	37.9%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	62.1%	37.9%	100.0%
	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	3	3	6
			% within presidentsParty	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	75.0%	100.0%	85.7%
			%ofTotal	42.9%	42.9%	85.7%
		Republican	Count	1	0	1
			% within presidentsParty	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Independent			% within IA Granted	25.0%	0.0%	14.3%
			%ofTotal	14.3%	0.0%	14.3%
		Total	Count	4	3	7
			% within presidentsParty	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	80	48	128
			% within presidentsParty	62.5%	37.5%	100.0%
Total			% within IA Granted	70.2%	55.2%	63.7%
			% of Total	39.8%	23.9%	63.7%

(Continues)

			Republican	Count	34	39	73
				% within presidentsParty	46.6%	53.4%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	29.8%	44.8%	36.3%
				%ofTotal	16.9%	19.4%	36.3%
		Total		Count	114	87	201
				% within presidentsParty	56.7%	43.3%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	56.7%	43.3%	100.0%
Total		Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	173	105	278
				% within presidentsParty	62.2%	37.8%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	55.6%	45.1%	51.1%
				%ofTotal	31.8%	19.3%	51.1%
	Democratic		Republican	Count	138	128	266
				% within presidentsParty	51.9%	48.1%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	44.4%	54.9%	48.9%
				%ofTotal	25.4%	23.5%	48.9%
		Total		Count	311	233	544
				% within presidentsParty	57.2%	42.8%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				%ofTotal	57.2%	42.8%	100.0%
	Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	209	149	358
				% within presidentsParty	58.4%	41.6%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	54.6%	58.9%	56.3%

(Continues)

			% of Total	32.9%	23.4%	56.3%
		Republican	Count	174	104	278
			% within presidentsParty	62.6%	37.4%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	45.4%	41.1%	43.7%
			%ofTotal	27.4%	16.4%	43.7%
	Total		Count	383	253	636
			% within presidentsParty	60.2%	39.8%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	60.2%	39.8%	100.0%
Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	17	4	21
			% within presidentsParty	81.0%	19.0%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	70.8%	57.1%	67.7%
			%ofTotal	54.8%	12.9%	67.7%
		Republican	Count	7	3	10
			% within presidentsParty	70.0%	30.0%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	29.2%	42.9%	32.3%
			%ofTotal	22.6%	9.7%	32.3%
	Total		Count	24	7	31
			% within presidentsParty	77.4%	22.6%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			%ofTotal	77.4%	22.6%	100.0%
Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	399	258	657
			% within presidents Party	60.7%	39.3%	100.0%

(Continues)

		% within IA Granted	55.6%	52.3%	54.3%
		%ofTotal	32.9%	21.3%	54.3%
	Republican	Count	319	235	554
		% within presidentsParty	57.6%	42.4%	100.0%
		% within IA Granted	44.4%	47.7%	45.7%
		%ofTotal	26.3%	19.4%	45.7%
	Total	Count	718	493	1211
		% within presidentsParty	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%
		% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		%ofTotal	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%

As before, IA was approved or denied in 1211 cases. Table 29 clearly shows that when IA aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was done 493 times. IA was requested during a presidential reelection year 201 times and was approved 87 times or 43.3%. Republican governors asked a Republican president for IA aid during a reelection year 33 times and asked a Democratic president for IA aid 70 times. In that set of data, Republican governors were granted IA by Republican presidents 17 times or 51.5% of the time and they were granted IA by Democratic presidents 47 times or 67.1% of the time. There existed a 15.6% disparity, with Democratic presidents granting aid more often to Republican governors than Republican presidents did.

In addition, Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for IA during a presidential reelection year aid 52 times and asked a Republic president for IA aid 39

times. Democratic governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 30 times or 57.7% while they were granted IA aid by Republican presidents 16 times or 41.0%.

Finally Independent governors asked Democratic presidents for IA during a presidential reelection year aid 6 times and asked a Republican president for IA aid 1 times. Independent governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 3 times or 60.0% while they were granted IA aid by Republican presidents 1 times or 100%. Once again, relatively low number of requests by Independent governors makes this visual statistical difference not necessarily significant due to the small sample size.

Table 30 demonstrates the chi square values of the decision falling during a reelection year, the party of the president, the Party of the governor and if IA was granted. As a whole the null hypothesis can be rejected. The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the president's party and IA being approved, influenced by the governor's party, during a presidential reelection year (chi-square = 1.235, df = 1, p= .266). Yet as was noted before, partial analysis reveals that when IA was granted to Democratic governors there appeared to be strong evidence against the null hypothesis, thus favoring the alternative (chi-square = 5.947, df = 1, p = .015). In addition, when IA was approved during reelection years there exits strong evidence against null in favor of the alternative (chi-square = 4.802, df = 1, p = .028). It should be noted that approval of IA during non-reelection years did not reject the null hypothesis (chi-square = .116, df = 1, p = .734). This lends further credence to the hypothesis that reelection years may bias FEMA aid dispensation, specifically as it applies to IA.

The last test in this line of reasoning adds the value of a battleground State as is seen below in Table 31.

Table 3

Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov Chi-Square Tests

Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4	Governors Party		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	4.236	1	.040
		Continuity Correction	3.853	1	.050
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	3.379	1	.066
		Continuity Correction	3.061	1	.080
	Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	2.880	1	.090
		Continuity Correction	1.280	1	.258
	Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.116	1	.734
		Continuity Correction	.076	1	.783
Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	2.476	1	.116
		Continuity Correction	1.855	1	.173
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	2.328	1	.127
		Continuity Correction	1.711	1	.191

(Continues)

		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.875	1	.350
			Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	4.802	1	.028
			Continuity Correction	4.175	1	.041
Total		Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	5.947	1	.015
			Continuity Correction	5.532	1	.019
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	1.158	1	.282
			Continuity Correction	.989	1	.320
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.465	1	.495
			Continuity Correction	.049	1	.824
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	1.235	1	.266
			Continuity Correction	1.108	1	.293

Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov4	Governors Party			Value	Approx. Sig.
No	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.097	.040
			Cramer's V	.097	.040
		N of Valid Cases		453	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.080	.066
			Cramer's V	.080	.066
		N of Valid Cases		533	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.346	.090
			Cramer's V	.346	.090

(Continues)

		N of Valid Cases		24	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.011	.734
			Cramer's V	.011	.734
		N of Valid Cases		1010	
Yes	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.165	.116
			Cramer's V	.165	.116
		N of Valid Cases		91	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.150	.127
			Cramer's V	.150	.127
		N of Valid Cases		103	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.354	.350
			Cramer's V	.354	.350
		N of Valid Cases		7	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.155	.028
			Cramer's V	.155	.028
		N of Valid Cases		201	
Total	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.105	.015
			Cramer's V	.105	.015
		N of Valid Cases		544	
	Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.043	.282
			Cramer's V	.043	.282
		N of Valid Cases		636	
	Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.122	.495
			Cramer's V	.122	.495
		N of Valid Cases		31	
	Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.032	.266
			Cramer's V	.032	.266
		N of Valid Cases		1211	

Table 30

Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4 * Electoral Battleground State Crosstabulation

Electoral Battleground State	Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4	governors Party			IA Granted		Total
					No	Yes	
No	No	Democratic	presidents Party	Democratic	Count	143	83	226
					% within presidents Party	63.3%	36.7%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	54.2%	44.1%	50.0%
					% of Total	31.6%	18.4%	50.0%
				Republican	Count	121	105	226
					% within presidents Party	53.5%	46.5%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	45.8%	55.9%	50.0%
					% of Total	26.8%	23.2%	50.0%
			Total		Count	264	188	452
					% within presidents Party	58.4%	41.6%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total	58.4%	41.6%	100.0%
		Republican	presidents Party	Democratic	Count	162	126	288
					% within presidents Party	56.3%	43.8%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	50.8%	58.9%	54.0%
					% of Total	30.4%	23.6%	54.0%
				Republican	Count	157	88	245
					% within presidents Party	64.1%	35.9%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	49.2%	41.1%	46.0%

(Continues)

			% of Total	29.5%	16.5%	46.0%
		Total	Count	319	214	533
			% within presidents Party	59.8%	40.2%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	59.8%	40.2%	100.0%
	Independent	presidents Party	Democratic	Count	14	1	15
				% within presidents Party	93.3%	6.7%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	70.0%	25.0%	62.5%
				% of Total	58.3%	4.2%	62.5%
			Republican	Count	6	3	9
				% within presidents Party	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	30.0%	75.0%	37.5%
				% of Total	25.0%	12.5%	37.5%
		Total		Count	20	4	24
				% within presidents Party	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
	Total	presidents Party	Democratic	Count	319	210	529
				% within presidents Party	60.3%	39.7%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	52.9%	51.7%	52.4%
				% of Total	31.6%	20.8%	52.4%
			Republican	Count	284	196	480

(Continues)

				% within presidents Party	59.2%	40.8%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	47.1%	48.3%	47.6%
				% of Total	28.1%	19.4%	47.6%
			Total	Count	603	406	1009
				% within presidents Party	59.8%	40.2%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	59.8%	40.2%	100.0%
Yes	Democratic	presidents Party	Democratic	Count	27	19	46
				% within presidents Party	58.7%	41.3%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	65.9%	51.4%	59.0%
				% of Total	34.6%	24.4%	59.0%
			Republican	Count	14	18	32
				% within presidents Party	43.8%	56.3%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	34.1%	48.6%	41.0%
				% of Total	17.9%	23.1%	41.0%
			Total	Count	41	37	78
				% within presidents Party	52.6%	47.4%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	52.6%	47.4%	100.0%
	Republican	presidents Party	Democratic	Count	36	20	56
				% within presidents Party	64.3%	35.7%	100.0%

(Continues)

			% within IA Granted	70.6%	62.5%	67.5%
			% of Total	43.4%	24.1%	67.5%
		Republican	Count	15	12	27
			% within presidents Party	55.6%	44.4%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	29.4%	37.5%	32.5%
			% of Total	18.1%	14.5%	32.5%
	Total		Count	51	32	83
			% within presidents Party	61.4%	38.6%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	61.4%	38.6%	100.0%
Independent	presidents Party	Democratic	Count	3	3	6
			% within presidents Party	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	75.0%	100.0%	85.7%
			% of Total	42.9%	42.9%	85.7%
		Republican	Count	1	0	1
			% within presidents Party	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	25.0%	0.0%	14.3%
			% of Total	14.3%	0.0%	14.3%
	Total		Count	4	3	7
			% within presidents Party	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%

(Continues)

				Count	66	42	108
			Democratic	% within presidents Party	61.1%	38.9%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	68.8%	58.3%	64.3%
		presidents Party		% of Total	39.3%	25.0%	64.3%
				Count	30	30	60
			Republican	% within presidents Party	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	Total			% within IA Granted	31.3%	41.7%	35.7%
				% of Total	17.9%	17.9%	35.7%
				Count	96	72	168
				% within presidents Party	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
		Total		% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
				Count	170	102	272
			Democratic	% within presidents Party	62.5%	37.5%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	55.7%	45.3%	51.3%
Total	Democratic	presidents Party		% of Total	32.1%	19.2%	51.3%
				Count	135	123	258
			Republican	% within presidents Party	52.3%	47.7%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	44.3%	54.7%	48.7%
				% of Total	25.5%	23.2%	48.7%
		Total		Count	305	225	530

(Continues)

			% within presidents Party	57.5%	42.5%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	57.5%	42.5%	100.0%
Republican	presidents Party	Democratic	Count	198	146	344
			% within presidents Party	57.6%	42.4%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	53.5%	59.3%	55.8%
			% of Total	32.1%	23.7%	55.8%
		Republican	Count	172	100	272
			% within presidents Party	63.2%	36.8%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	46.5%	40.7%	44.2%
			% of Total	27.9%	16.2%	44.2%
	Total		Count	370	246	616
			% within presidents Party	60.1%	39.9%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	60.1%	39.9%	100.0%
Independent	presidents Party	Democratic	Count	17	4	21
			% within presidents Party	81.0%	19.0%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	70.8%	57.1%	67.7%
			% of Total	54.8%	12.9%	67.7%
		Republican	Count	7	3	10
			% within presidents Party	70.0%	30.0%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	29.2%	42.9%	32.3%
			% of Total	22.6%	9.7%	32.3%

(Continues)

			Total		Count	24	7	31
					% within presidents Party	77.4%	22.6%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total	77.4%	22.6%	100.0%
				Democratic	Count	385	252	637
					% within presidents Party	60.4%	39.6%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	55.1%	52.7%	54.1%
			presidents Party		% of Total	32.7%	21.4%	54.1%
				Republican	Count	314	226	540
					% within presidents Party	58.1%	41.9%	100.0%
		Total			% within IA Granted	44.9%	47.3%	45.9%
					% of Total	26.7%	19.2%	45.9%
			Total		Count	699	478	1177
					% within presidents Party	59.4%	40.6%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total	59.4%	40.6%	100.0%
					Count	1		1
					% within presidents Party	100.0%		100.0%
Yes	No	Democratic	presidents Party	Republican	% within IA Granted	100.0%		100.0%
					% of Total	100.0%		100.0%
			Total		Count	1		1

(Continues)

				% within presidents Party	100.0%		100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%		100.0%
				% of Total	100.0%		100.0%
		Total	presidents Party	Count	1		1
				% within presidents Party	100.0%		100.0%
			Republican	% within IA Granted	100.0%		100.0%
				% of Total	100.0%		100.0%
			Total	Count	1		1
				% within presidents Party	100.0%		100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%		100.0%
				% of Total	100.0%		100.0%
Yes	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	3	3	6
				% within presidents Party	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	60.0%	37.5%	46.2%
				% of Total	23.1%	23.1%	46.2%
			Republican	Count	2	5	7
				% within presidents Party	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	40.0%	62.5%	53.8%
				% of Total	15.4%	38.5%	53.8%
		Total		Count	5	8	13
				% within presidents Party	38.5%	61.5%	100.0%

(Continues)

				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	38.5%	61.5%	100.0%
			Democratic	Count	11	3	14
				% within presidents Party	78.6%	21.4%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	84.6%	42.9%	70.0%
		Presidents Party		% of Total	55.0%	15.0%	70.0%
	Republican		Republican	Count	2	4	6
				% within presidents Party	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	15.4%	57.1%	30.0%
				% of Total	10.0%	20.0%	30.0%
				Count	13	7	20
		Total		% within presidents Party	65.0%	35.0%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

				% of Total	65.0%	35.0%	100.0%
			Democratic	Count	14	6	20
				% within presidents Party	70.0%	30.0%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	77.8%	40.0%	60.6%
		Presidents Party		% of Total	42.4%	18.2%	60.6%
	Total		Republican	Count	4	9	13
				% within presidents Party	30.8%	69.2%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	22.2%	60.0%	39.4%
				% of Total	12.1%	27.3%	39.4%

(Continues)

				Count	18	15	33
				% within presidents Party	54.5%	45.5%	100.0%
			Total	% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	54.5%	45.5%	100.0%
				Count	3	3	6
				% within presidents Party	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
			Democratic	% within IA Granted	50.0%	37.5%	42.9%
		Presidents		% of Total	21.4%	21.4%	42.9%
		Party		Count	3	5	8
				% within presidents Party	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
	Democratic		Republican	% within IA Granted	50.0%	62.5%	57.1%
Total				% of Total	21.4%	35.7%	57.1%
				Count	6	8	14
				% within presidents Party	42.9%	57.1%	100.0%
			Total	% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	42.9%	57.1%	100.0%
				Count	11	3	14
	Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	% within presidents Party	78.6%	21.4%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	84.6%	42.9%	70.0%
				% of Total	55.0%	15.0%	70.0%
			Republican	Count	2	4	6

(Continues)

					% within presidents Party	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	15.4%	57.1%	30.0%
					% of Total	10.0%	20.0%	30.0%
				Total	Count	13	7	20
					% within presidents Party	65.0%	35.0%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total	65.0%	35.0%	100.0%
			Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	14	6	20
					% within presidents Party	70.0%	30.0%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	73.7%	40.0%	58.8%
					% of Total	41.2%	17.6%	58.8%
		Total		Republican	Count	5	9	14
					% within presidents Party	35.7%	64.3%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	26.3%	60.0%	41.2%
					% of Total	14.7%	26.5%	41.2%
				Total	Count	19	15	34
					% within presidents Party	55.9%	44.1%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
					% of Total	55.9%	44.1%	100.0%
Total	No	Democratic	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	143	83	226
					% within presidents Party	63.3%	36.7%	100.0%
					% within IA Granted	54.0%	44.1%	49.9%
					% of Total	31.6%	18.3%	49.9%

(Continues)

			Republican	Count	122	105	227
				% within presidents Party	53.7%	46.3%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	46.0%	55.9%	50.1%
				% of Total	26.9%	23.2%	50.1%
		Total		Count	265	188	453
				% within presidents Party	58.5%	41.5%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	58.5%	41.5%	100.0%
	Republican	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	162	126	288
				% within presidents Party	56.3%	43.8%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	50.8%	58.9%	54.0%
				% of Total	30.4%	23.6%	54.0%
			Republican	Count	157	88	245
				% within presidents Party	64.1%	35.9%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	49.2%	41.1%	46.0%
				% of Total	29.5%	16.5%	46.0%
		Total		Count	319	214	533
				% within presidents Party	59.8%	40.2%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	59.8%	40.2%	100.0%
	Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	14	1	15

(Continues)

				% within presidents Party	93.3%	6.7%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	70.0%	25.0%	62.5%
				% of Total	58.3%	4.2%	62.5%
			Republican	Count	6	3	9
				% within presidents Party	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	30.0%	75.0%	37.5%
				% of Total	25.0%	12.5%	37.5%
		Total		Count	20	4	24
				% within presidents Party	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
Total		Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	319	210	529
				% within presidents Party	60.3%	39.7%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	52.8%	51.7%	52.4%
				% of Total	31.6%	20.8%	52.4%
			Republican	Count	285	196	481
				% within presidents Party	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	47.2%	48.3%	47.6%
				% of Total	28.2%	19.4%	47.6%
		Total		Count	604	406	1010
				% within presidents Party	59.8%	40.2%	100.0%

(Continues)

				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	59.8%	40.2%	100.0%
			Democratic	Count	30	22	52
				% within presidents Party	57.7%	42.3%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	65.2%	48.9%	57.1%
		Presidents Party		% of Total	33.0%	24.2%	57.1%
			Republican	Count	16	23	39
				% within presidents Party	41.0%	59.0%	100.0%
Yes	Democratic			% within IA Granted	34.8%	51.1%	42.9%
				% of Total	17.6%	25.3%	42.9%
				Count	46	45	91
		Total		% within presidents Party	50.5%	49.5%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	50.5%	49.5%	100.0%
			Democratic	Count	47	23	70
				% within presidents Party	67.1%	32.9%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	73.4%	59.0%	68.0%
		Presidents Party		% of Total	45.6%	22.3%	68.0%
	Republican		Republican	Count	17	16	33
				% within presidents Party	51.5%	48.5%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	26.6%	41.0%	32.0%
				% of Total	16.5%	15.5%	32.0%

(Continues)

		Total		Count	64	39	103
				% within presidents Party	62.1%	37.9%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	62.1%	37.9%	100.0%
	Independent	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	3	3	6
				% within presidents Party	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	75.0%	100.0%	85.7%
				% of Total	42.9%	42.9%	85.7%
			Republican	Count	1	0	1
				% within presidents Party	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	25.0%	0.0%	14.3%
				% of Total	14.3%	0.0%	14.3%
		Total		Count	4	3	7
				% within presidents Party	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
	Total	Presidents Party	Democratic	Count	80	48	128
				% within presidents Party	62.5%	37.5%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	70.2%	55.2%	63.7%
				% of Total	39.8%	23.9%	63.7%
			Republican	Count	34	39	73
				% within presidents Party	46.6%	53.4%	100.0%

				% within IA Granted	29.8%	44.8%	36.3%
				% of Total	16.9%	19.4%	36.3%
			Total	Count	114	87	201
				% within presidents Party	56.7%	43.3%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	56.7%	43.3%	100.0%
		presidents Party	Democratic	Count	173	105	278
				% within presidents Party	62.2%	37.8%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	55.6%	45.1%	51.1%
				% of Total	31.8%	19.3%	51.1%
	Democratic		Republican	Count	138	128	266
				% within presidents Party	51.9%	48.1%	100.0%
				% within IA Granted	44.4%	54.9%	48.9%
				% of Total	25.4%	23.5%	48.9%
Total				Count	311	233	544
				% within presidents Party	57.2%	42.8%	100.0%
			Total	% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	57.2%	42.8%	100.0%
				Count	209	149	358
				% within presidents Party	58.4%	41.6%	100.0%
	Republican	presidents Party	Democratic	% within IA Granted	54.6%	58.9%	56.3%
				% of Total	32.9%	23.4%	56.3%
			Republican	Count	174	104	278

(Continues)

			% within presidents Party	62.6%	37.4%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	45.4%	41.1%	43.7%
			% of Total	27.4%	16.4%	43.7%
		Total	Count	383	253	636
			% within presidents Party	60.2%	39.8%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	60.2%	39.8%	100.0%
Independent	presidents Party	Democratic	Count	17	4	21
			% within presidents Party	81.0%	19.0%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	70.8%	57.1%	67.7%
			% of Total	54.8%	12.9%	67.7%
		Republican	Count	7	3	10
			% within presidents Party	70.0%	30.0%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	29.2%	42.9%	32.3%
			% of Total	22.6%	9.7%	32.3%
		Total	Count	24	7	31
			% within presidents Party	77.4%	22.6%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	77.4%	22.6%	100.0%
Total	presidents Party	Democratic	Count	399	258	657
			% within presidents Party	60.7%	39.3%	100.0%
			% within IA Granted	55.6%	52.3%	54.3%
			% of Total	32.9%	21.3%	54.3%

(Continues)

	Republican	Count	319	235	554
		% within presidents Party	57.6%	42.4%	100.0%
		% within IA Granted	44.4%	47.7%	45.7%
		% of Total	26.3%	19.4%	45.7%
	Total	Count	718	493	1211
		% within presidents Party	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%
		% within IA Granted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	59.3%	40.7%	100.0%

As has been noted, IA was approved or denied in 1211 cases. When IA aid was granted from 1996-2012 it was done 493 times. IA was requested during a presidential reelection year in a battleground state 33 times and was approved 18 times or 54.4%. Republican governors asked a Republican president for IA aid during a reelection year in a battleground state 6 times and asked a Democratic president for IA aid 14 times. In that set of data, Republican governors were granted IA by Republican presidents 2 times or 33.3% of the time and they were granted IA by Democratic presidents 11 times or 78.6% of the time. There existed a 45.3% disparity, with Democratic presidents granting aid more often to Republican governors than Republican presidents did.

Lastly, Democratic governors asked Democratic presidents for IA aid during a presidential reelection year in a battleground state 6 times and asked a Republic president for IA aid 7 times. Democratic governors were granted aid by Democratic presidents 3

times or 50.0% while they were granted IA aid by Republican presidents 2 times or 28.6%. To understand the statistical significance the chi-square is once again listed below in Table 31 for full and partial analysis.

Table 31

Presidents Party * IA Granted * Governors Party * Decision Falls in Reelection Year Before Nov 4 * Electoral Battleground State Chi-Square Test

Electoral BattlegroundState	Decision Falls In Reelection YearBeforeNov4	Governors Party		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
No	No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	4.408	1	.036
			Continuity Correction	4.016	1	.045
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	3.379	1	.066
			Continuity Correction	3.061	1	.080
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	2.880	1	.090
			Continuity Correction	1.280	1	.258
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.135	1	.713
			Continuity Correction	.092	1	.762
	Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	1.691	1	.194
			Continuity Correction	1.144	1	.285
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	.586	1	.444

(Continues)

			Continuity Correction	.275	1	.600
Independent			Pearson Chi-Square	.875	1	.350
			ContinuityCorrection	.000	1	1.000
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	1.944	1	.163
			ContinuityCorrection	1.517	1	.218
	Total	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	5.610	1	.018
			Continuity Correction	5.202	1	.023
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	2.041	1	.153
			Continuity Correction	1.811	1	.178
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.465	1	.495
			ContinuityCorrection	.049	1	.824
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.636	1	.425
			Continuity Correction	.545	1	.460
Yes	No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.		
		Total	PearsonChi-Square	.		
	Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.627	1	.429
			ContinuityCorrection	.048	1	.826
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	3.778	1	.052
			Continuity Correction	2.051	1	.152
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	4.891	1	.027
			ContinuityCorrection	3.436	1	.064
	Total	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	.219	1	.640
			ContinuityCorrection	.000	1	1.000
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	3.778	1	.052
			Continuity Correction	2.051	1	.152
		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	3.927	1	.048
			ContinuityCorrection	2.659	1	.103
Total	No	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	4.236	1	.040
			ContinuityCorrection	3.853	1	.050
		Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	3.379	1	.066
			Continuity Correction	3.061	1	.080
		Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	2.880	1	.090
			Continuity Correction	1.280	1	.258

(Continues)

	Total	Pearson Chi-Square	.116	1	.734
		ContinuityCorrection	.076	1	.783
Yes	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	2.476	1	.116
		Continuity Correction	1.855	1	.173

	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	2.328	1	.127
		ContinuityCorrection	1.711	1	.191
	Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.875	1	.350
		Continuity Correction	.000	1	1.000
	Total	Pearson Chi-Square	4.802	1	.028
		ContinuityCorrection	4.175	1	.041
Total	Democratic	Pearson Chi-Square	5.947	1	.015
		ContinuityCorrection	5.532	1	.019
	Republican	Pearson Chi-Square	1.158	1	.282
		Continuity Correction	.989	1	.320
	Independent	Pearson Chi-Square	.465	1	.495
		ContinuityCorrection	.049	1	.824

		Total	Pearson Chi-Square	1.235	1	.266
			Continuity Correction	1.108	1	.293

Electoral Battleground State	Decision Falls In Reelection Year Before Nov 4	governors Party			Value	Approx. Sig.
No	No	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.099	.036
				Cramer's V	.099	.036
			N of Valid Cases		452	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.080	.066
				Cramer's V	.080	.066
			N of Valid Cases		533	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.346	.090
				Cramer's V	.346	.090

(Continues)

			N of Valid Cases	24	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.012	.713
				Cramer's V	.012	.713
			N of Valid Cases	1009	
	Yes	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.147	.194
				Cramer's V	.147	.194
			N of Valid Cases	78	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.084	.444
				Cramer's V	.084	.444
			N of Valid Cases	83	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.354	.350
				Cramer's V	.354	.350
			N of Valid Cases	7	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.108	.163
				Cramer's V	.108	.163
			N of Valid Cases	168	
	Total	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.103	.018
				Cramer's V	.103	.018
			N of Valid Cases	530	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.058	.153
				Cramer'sV	.058	.153
			N of Valid Cases	616	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.122	.495
				Cramer's V	.122	.495
			N of Valid Cases	31	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.023	.425
				Cramer's V	.023	.425
			N of Valid Cases	1177	

(Continues)

Yes	No	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.	
			N of Valid Cases		1	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.	
			N of Valid Cases		1	
	Yes	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.220	.429
				Cramer's V	.220	.429
			N of Valid Cases		13	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.435	.052
				Cramer's V	.435	.052
			N of Valid Cases		20	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.385	.027
				Cramer's V	.385	.027
			N of Valid Cases		33	
	Total	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.125	.640
				Cramer's V	.125	.640
			N of Valid Cases		14	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.435	.052
				Cramer's V	.435	.052
			N of Valid Cases		20	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.340	.048
				Cramer's V	.340	.048
			N of Valid Cases		34	
Total	No	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.097	.040
				Cramer's V	.097	.040
			N of Valid Cases		453	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.080	.066
				Cramer's V	.080	.066
			N of Valid Cases		533	

(Continues)

		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.346	.090
				Cramer's V	.346	.090
			N of Valid Cases		24	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.011	.734
				Cramer's V	.011	.734
			N of Valid Cases		1010	
	Yes	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.165	.116
				Cramer's V	.165	.116
			N of Valid Cases		91	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.150	.127
				Cramer's V	.150	.127
			N of Valid Cases		103	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.354	.350
				Cramer'sV	.354	.350
			N of Valid Cases		7	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.155	.028
				Cramer's V	.155	.028
			N of Valid Cases		201	
	Total	Democratic	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.105	.015
				Cramer's V	.105	.015
			N of Valid Cases		544	
		Republican	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.043	.282
				Cramer's V	.043	.282
			N of Valid Cases		636	
		Independent	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.122	.495
				Cramer's V	.122	.495
			NofValidCases		31	
		Total	Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.032	.266
				Cramer's V	.032	.266
			NofValidCases		1211	

As is noted in the Chi-Square test for fit in Table 31, when looking at IA granted during a reelection year in a battleground state, that partial analysis finds that when it is not a battleground state governed by a Democratic governor there is strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (chi square = 5.610, df = 1, p = .018) even in non-reelection years. When IA requests fell in a battleground state, regardless of the governors party affiliation, or if in a reelection year, there existed enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (chi square = 3.927, df = 1, p = .048). What remains striking is that partial analysis reveals that whether or not the IA approval occurred in a battleground state, or governors party affiliation, that falling in a reelection year was enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis and favor the alternative (chi-square = 4.802, df = 1, p = .028). Digging deeper into the partial analysis discounting the governors party affiliation but maintaining that IA was approved and that is was a battleground state, there again existed evidence to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative (chi-square = 3.927, df = 1, p = .048). Holding for the full association when IA was granted during a reelection year in a battleground state, (but not breaking it down by governors party affiliation) there was enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative (chi-square 4.891, df = 1, p = .027). It appears that IA approval is influenced by reelection year, presidential party affiliation, and battleground state.

Table 31 further shows in partial analysis that when IA is approved being in an electoral battleground state during a reelection year there appears to be a potential association to presidential party affiliation (chi-square = 4.802, df = 1, p = .027) which

leads to the null hypothesis being rejected in favor of the alternative. However there appears to be a lack of evidence to reject the null hypothesis during non-reelection years in non-battleground states (chi-square = .135, df = 1, p =.713).

In Summary, IA and presidential party affiliation show a statistical association by the data, the first being that if the requesting governor is Democratic in a non-electoral battleground state than approvals and turndowns remain statistically significant (chi square = 4.408, df =1, p = .036). Being a requesting Republican governor did not show similar relationships, except when it came to requesting aid during an election year (chi square = 7.080, df =1, p =.008). IA showed statistical significant comparisons at the election year level for approvals and at the reelection year level (chi-square = 4.822, df = 1, p =.028 and chi-square = 4.802, df = 1, p = .028 respectively.

In order to understand what may be occurring, it is important to look at the percentages from a layman's eye. Looking at the percentages in approval and denials for these levels is important to putting a picture into place. Democratic presidents approved IA 39.3% of the time as a base line average. In non-election years they approved 37.0% to requesting Democratic governors, 40.0% during election years and 42.3% during reelection years and 50% in battleground States. Conversely they approved to requesting Republican governors 42.5% in non-election years, 39.2% in election years, 32.9% in reelection years and 21.4% in battleground States. While their ingroup favoring raised steadily their out-group declined as the presidential political economy increased.

Republican presidents approved IA 42.4% as a base line. In non-election years they approved 38.5% to requesting Republican governors, 34.6% during election years,

48.5% in reelection years and 66.7% in battleground States. Conversely, they approved to requesting Democratic governors 49.7% in non-election years, 44.3% during election years, 59% during reelection years and 62.5% in battleground States. While there was a slight favoring of ingroups as the political economy increased, the same out-group propensity was not witnessed as with Democratic presidents suggesting either no bias existed or that they subscribed to Gaspar and Reeves (2011) assertions that when a president denies a FEMA relief request they are hurt at the polls while the requesting governor is rewarded, further placing more pressure on the president to approve requests out of self-interest. When looking at Republican approvals for Democratic governors requests one can see the overall percent rise to support this leaning suggesting bias might indeed have been at work.

In Chapter 1, I theorized that a president could

1. Act in a manner that favors self-interest with FEMA dispensation.
2. Allocate resources to favor his collective (party) interests.
3. Be notable during times when his discretionary powers would favor self (reelection years in election battleground states).

As was previously noted, the theoretical construct was founded in the belief that psychological and social factors of Group Justification Bias and Social Identity theories play an active role in the approval and turndown decision making process of a sitting president. Since presidential discretionary powers are subjective by law, to assume that these constructs play little role in the outcome of a FEMA gubernatorial request would be to deny the power of political economy by the most powerful leader in the free world.

This was where bias and potential corruption were drawn into the study. Yet in every statistical test rendered in this study, in not one place could bias or corruption be demonstrated. At most there appeared to be some statistical associations between presidential party and PA approval in the given data set. The theory remains plausible, but this study could not answer the research question adequately in relation to bias.

Trying to determine bias based on approvals and turndowns, associated p values from chi-square tests and related percentages proved to be too much for the data gathered and the tests run. Again, bias is the propensity to favor self or others. We do not know what each president was thinking, but the evidence does suggest the potential for the propensity to favor self/party at the expense of others. The evidence shows an association between presidential Party and PA approvals. As the potential to favor self and party grew from non-election, to election, to reelection years so too did both presidential parties increase their PA approval percentages during each of these time frames. At the same time to their out-group, or opposing party, there appeared to exist an inverse association to PA approvals and a noted percent increase in Turndowns during the same time frames. While HM proved to be awarded on criteria not related to presidential Party, from the data at hand determining how IA was awarded was inconclusive. Neither HM nor IA added to the ability to answer the 4 research questions without further data. It is what is done next with these findings that ultimately could yield positive change and additional insight.

Chapter 5: Future Recommendations and Gaps in the Study

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to explore if, or to what degree it appears that US presidents acted in a potentially biased manner with the use of FEMA approvals during election years in election battleground states and/or if there was ingroup favoritism from 1996-2012 within those same states and times. The data indicated a potential association between presidential Party and PA approvals. As the potential to favor self and party grew from nonelection, to election, to reelection years so too did both presidential Parties increase their PA approval percentages. At the same time to their outgroup, or opposing party, there appeared to exist an inverse association to PA approvals and a noted percent increase in Turndowns during the same time frame.

While HM proved to be awarded on criteria not related to presidential Party, from the data at hand determining how IA was awarded was inconclusive. Neither HM nor IA added to the ability to answer the 4 research questions without further data. In every statistical test rendered in this study, in not one place could bias or corruption be demonstrated as that is not what a chi-square test for fit measures. At most there appeared to be some statistical associations between presidential party and PA approval in the given data set. The proposed theory that drove this study remains plausible, but this study could not answer the research question adequately.

Interpretations of the Findings

It is important to remember that FEMA allocation requires part chance, part recommendations, and part presidential discretionary power. The chance element occurs

when a natural disaster strikes a given state, for no one can know where or when a disaster will strike. The second aspect of chance occurs if it happens to hit in an area of the country that could potentially benefit the sitting president through their ability to look and act presidential, potentially gaining political points from those in the affected areas including supporting those down the ticket or harming those of the opposing party by denying them funding. While both the requesting governor and FEMA makes their own assessment, the former by saying the state does not have the resources or means to adequately handle the disaster alone and the latter by assessing if the claim is warranted. Yet for all the chance and recommendations that can occur in an election year, it is the discretionary power made by the president, potentially weighing their political economy that creates the data points in this research. Early in Chapter 1 I proposed a theoretical model that purported that a president could/would:

1. Act in a manner that favors self-interest with FEMA dispensation.
2. Allocate resources to favor his collective (party) interests.
3. Be notable during times when his discretionary powers would favor self (reelection years in election battleground states).

Using both visual methodology of comparing relative percent's found in the presented the extensive chi-square analysis of the data in the accompanying Tables has yielded unexpected results. Take for example Hazard Mitigation, which are used to assist in implementing long-term hazard mitigation measures following a major disaster. At no point, even in partial analysis of the data set, did there appear to be any association between presidential party and hazard mitigation approval. Neither presidential party

affiliation (chi-square =2.079, df =1, p = .149), nor approvals during reelection years in battleground states (chi-square =.113, df =1, p = .737) yielded adequate evidence to reject the null hypothesis which stated that there was no association between presidential party affiliation and hazard mitigation approvals/turndowns. Thus far it appears the presidents have acted upon recommendations in a manner consistent with the public good.

IA, or monies and program to persons to house, repair, replace, move, or other individual expenses due to a disaster awarded to an individual, showed mixed results as was demonstrated earlier. Individual assistance was turned down 59.3% during all years studied by both parties. It could be argued that if FEMA aid was being rendered to gain political support than individual assistance would be the one area to approve more than deny, yet as a whole this does not weigh out (chi-square =2.079, df =1, p = .149), However, this research does not hinge alone on a singular blanket statement and p value. It is through the partial analysis of IA that the researched yielded some interesting findings. The data revealed that if the party of the requesting governor was Democratic, then there was a strong presumption against the null hypothesis when looking at the relationship between the president's party and IA being approved (chi-square = .5.947, df = 1, p= .015). So while the Party of the president alone did not demonstrate an IA association, when paired with the governor's party, specifically a Democratic governor, a likely association was shown to exist. As had been previously shown in the data analysis, when looking at additional partial analysis it was discovered that if the party of the requesting governor was Democratic during a non-election year, then there was a very strong presumption against the null hypothesis when looking at the relationship between

the president's Party and IA being turned down or approved (chi-square = 6.492, df = 1, p= .011). When narrowing it down even further and looking at reelection years as opposed to election years, there again appeared to be no presumption against the null, and yet looking at all nonreelection years once again showed the same presumption against the null for Democratic requesting governors (chi-square = 4.236, df = 1, p= .040).

In regards to IA, while the initial hypothesis that a president would favor their own self-interest and their own party in times most ethically challenged did not demonstrate it as expected, valuable information suggesting some kind of association was shown. However, because IA did not seem to be awarded more often as the political economy rose, knowing the historical factors that occurred could help illuminate the relationship seen with Democratic governors during non-election years. One of the key notes is that Republican presidents awarded IA more often to Democratic governors than did Democratic presidents in non-election years. This effect is not explained in the data, and does not comply with the tested theoretical model, even though there appears to be a thus far unexplained association.

Lastly Public Assistance was studied, and here is where the data followed expected theorized results. The PA monetary burden is not less than 75%, carried by the federal government, with the remaining amount carried by and decided by the state, and this can be a sizeable dollar award for States. PA was the one type of aid awarded the most as a percent of requests, 73.7%, and the one that showed a strong association between presidential party (chi-square = 7.960, df = 1, p= .005) and disaster approval. Further partial analysis showed that not all parties were the same, as Democratic

governor's requests for PA showed a strong association to presidential party and their respective decision under all criteria, other than battleground state.

Inparty favoring increased as the stakes for potential bias increased, with the Republican president showing a 69.9% overall base, 67.3% non-election, 88.9% reelection and 83.3% battleground state. Conversely, opposing party was based at 69.9%, 75% non-election years, 73.2 reelection years and down to 64.3% in battleground States. The same pattern remained for Democratic presidents showing an overall 77.0% base, 80.5% non-election, 82.6% reelection and 100% battleground state. The opposing party pattern remained at 71.7% non-election, 62.5% reelection year and 42.9% battleground state. Both examples showed an effect related to the potential political economic factors with a direct rise for ingroup and a direct drop for outgroup. The strength of p values throughout reflected the percentages. Remember bias cannot be proven using a chi-squared test for fit, only that an association may or may not exist and its relative strength. The data must be presented at face value, and allow a reasonable person to make the judgment call.

Recommendations for Further Study

When analyzing the study findings, it becomes clear that more information would have been beneficial in order to address some of the research questions, specifically the relationship of IA approvals/turndowns during nonelection years. It has to be remembered that all the data gathered were bivariate in relationship, and this was the design of the study. In hindsight other data could have helps answer lingering questions. Such data that would have been beneficial would have been the dollar amount awarded

per claim by FEMA, the population size affected per claim, the voter rolls of both pre and post disaster locations to compare electoral shift, complied similar data since FEMA's inception for a more robust data sample specifically for battleground states, personal interviews with FEMA agents who established the reports for each president, personal interviews with governors on why aid was requested when it was, demographics data, and lastly interviews with each president to know if there was any political economy to their FEMA dispensation decisions. In addition, it has been just over 2 years since the data set used in this research was new and a new set of election data and subsequent FEMA requests exists for the intervening years which need to be examined for potential associations.

This research has yielded new and valuable information to the discussion on associations between presidential party and the use of FEMA funds, specifically on approvals and turndowns from 1996-2012. It is now up to someone else to take the next step and dig deeper. It should be further noted that researchers should look for more than just associations, and try and find direct correlations in the data. In addition, conducting logistic regressions might yield some startling finds. Regardless of what new is found there are actions that could be taken today based on the research that could help to mitigate lingering doubts as to the state of mind of the president during the approval and turndown process with the use of their discretionary FEMA power.

Recommendations for Action

While gaps exist, studies of this type that examine discretionary powers are needed and should be encouraged. While this study did not demonstrate correlation

between the party of the president and various other variables, there were some strong statistical associations that have been shown. This does not equate to any unethical behavior. This research should compel others to gather more data to determine if there was a correlation and should suggest to Congress and other stakeholders that there might be alternatives to the current FEMA approval process that are equally efficient and potentially remove discretionary choice and the appearance of favoritism. As it still stands, even with this studies data, it is unknown if presidents acted with potential bias with the use of their discretionary powers for FEMA approvals and turndowns.

It is important to note that the findings of this research, while interesting, still leave many questions unanswered. What is has brought to light is that there remain questions as to what association a president's party has to the approval and turndown process. There is no greater discretionary power than that of final say, especially in light of necessary funds and manpower distribution during a time of a potential crisis. As long as discretionary power remains, void of additional research, questions may remain unanswered. What factors played a role in the presidential decision making process that led to turndowns and approval, and to that end, what weights did each president have, internally, on each factor when rendering those final decisions?

Summary and Implications for Social Change

While HM demonstrated to be awarded on criteria not related to presidential Party, aspects of IA beg the question as to what association being a Democratic governor and requesting this type of aid had in the studied time period. Neither HM nor IA added to the ability to answer the 4 research questions without further data. Yet there is no

doubt as to the plausibility of the argument that the proposed theory has on how PA was awarded. It was theorized that a president could

1. Act in a manner that favors self-interest with FEMA dispensation.
2. Allocate resources to favor his collective (party) interests.
3. Be notable during times when his discretionary powers would favor self (reelection years in election battleground states).

The evidence shows a statistical association between presidential party and PA approvals. As the potential to favor self and party grew (political economy) from non-election, to election, to reelection years so too did both presidential Parties increase their PA approval percentages (see Table 17) within their same party. At the same time to their outgroup, or opposing party, there appeared to exist an inverse association to PA approvals and a noted percent increase in Turndowns during the same time frame.

What is most telling is that this study leaves with more questions than answers. What set out to be a study into if presidents acted in a potentially biased manner with the use of FEMA approvals during election years in election battleground states and/or if there was ingroup favoritism from 1996-2012 within those same states and times, turned out to be a series of tests for associations between presidential party and other variables and the associated findings with no clear ability to answer the question. It is encouraging to note that this research warrants further examination. Whether it is I, or future researchers, there now is a beginning framework in which to test future questions about presidential discretionary powers. In addition, the identified gaps in this research will allow future researchers to more easily build a solid foundation to their own studies

revolving around the same questions. I welcome future clarifying studies into this, and associated questions.

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Appendix A: Presidential Discretionary Power in the FEMA Disaster Process



(FEMA (a), 2013)

Appendix B: A Priori G* Power Tests

F tests - Linear multiple regression: Fixed model, R^2 increase

Analysis: A priori: Compute required sample size

Input: Effect size $f^2 = 0.15$

α err prob = 0.05

Power (1-β err prob) = 0.95

Number of tested predictors = 2

Total number of predictors = 2

Output: Noncentrality parameter $\lambda = 16.0500000$

Critical F = 3.0837059

Numerator df = 2

Denominator df = 104

Total sample size = 107

Actual power = 0.9518556

F tests - Linear multiple regression: Fixed model, R^2 increase

Analysis: A priori: Compute required sample size

Input: Effect size $f^2 = 0.02$

α err prob = 0.05

Power (1-β err prob) = 0.95

Number of tested predictors = 2

Total number of predictors = 2

Output: Noncentrality parameter $\lambda = 15.5200000$

Critical F = 3.0073722

Numerator df = 2

Denominator df = 773

Total sample size = 776

Actual power = 0.9502132

F tests - Linear multiple regression: Fixed model, R^2 increase

Analysis:	A priori: Compute required sample size	
Input:	Effect size f^2	= 0.06
	α err prob	= 0.05
	Power (1-β err prob)	= 0.95
	Number of tested predictors	= 2
	Total number of predictors	= 2
Output:	Noncentrality parameter λ	= 15.6600000
	Critical F	= 3.0307877
	Numerator df	= 2
	Denominator df	= 258
	Total sample size	= 261
	Actual power	= 0.9504517

Appendix C: IRB Approval Number

Walden University: Approval Date 5/6/14 #05-06-14-0112832