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Impact of 9/11 Attacks and Federal Funding on the National Guard's Organizational and Operational Focus

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Abstract

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Michael C. McMahon

MIA, Columbia University, 1994

BA, Hofstra University, 1984

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

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Abstract

There is a problem in the United States national security enterprise related to the National Guard's organizational responsibilities to state and federal governments, and it was unknown whether this hybrid structure caused capabilities to diverge between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 national security priorities. This quantitative study's purpose was to investigate the use of Congressional funding to determine how and to what degree the National Guard's capabilities diverged from the United States national security priorities from pre-9/11 to post-9/11 periods. Organizational change and stream analysis conceptual frameworks identified organizational challenges in overcoming inertia and resistance to change. The statistical analysis included public data to evaluate the federal government's security threat assessments and actions that addressed the threats. United States national archival and national security research data supported a comparative study assessing continuity or discontinuity with National Guard resources between 1996 and 2006. Data analysis revealed the National Guard's resources and capabilities did not significantly change in this period. Findings support an argument for active duty and reserve forces focusing on conventional warfare and allowing the National Guard to prioritize para military state militia missions. The National Guard could prioritize homeland security missions creating positive social change by improving stability and socioeconomic development within the United States.

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Dedication

I dedicate this study to my lovely wife, Marguerite, my wonderful daughter,

Emily, and the many family members and friends whose support and understanding made

this long journey possible and so much better.

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My sincerest thanks to Dr. David Milen, my committee chair, who supported and guided me through the many challenges I encountered researching and writing this study. From war to military relocations, to military deployments, to family tragedy associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, Dr. Milen was always positive and encouraging. I could not have completed this dissertation without his help.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

The United States of America faces diverse threats to its security ranging from existential threats from politically independent states to less catastrophic but potentially damaging attacks from terror organizations not formally affiliated with an independent state (see Ucko & Marks, 2018; United States Department of Defense [DOD], 2015a). In addition, the United States faces nonkinetic challenges such as environmental, economic, and social changes (White House, 2015, 2017). Different types of threats present a unique challenge to the United States because the country assumes a prominent role in the present international order and may feel compelled to solve, or more accurately address, this variety of concerns and issues (see Allison, 2020; Sarkesian, et al., 2008, 2013). The United States uses multiple levels of government and different types of organizations as instruments to approach its security threats.

The nature of security threats is neither static nor constant but changes over time based on assessment made by adversaries or potential adversaries of the approach they think will give them the best chance of success against the United States. Traditionally, the greatest threat to the United States has been powerful political states wishing to use force, primarily military force, to impose their will on the country or defeat its military forces (Kime, 2018; Snow & Drew, 2010). Internal security threats are frequently present, but, with the exception of the American Civil War from 1861 to 1865 and military campaigns during the 18th and 19th centuries against indigenous populations in North America, usually do not require a significant military response (see C. R. Brown, 2008; Wilson, 1986). Traditionally, the United States has relied on the existing law

enforcement and civilian internal security apparatuses for internal security (D. J. Campbell & K. M. Campbell, 2010).

Following the end of the cold war in the early 1990s, the United States became the preeminent political and military power in the world, and potential adversaries began to look for alternative ways to effectively oppose American policies and actions they opposed to offset United States superior military capabilities (see Kilcullen, 2009; McChrystal, 2014; Mead, 2004). One alternative approach took the form of terrorist or unconventional attacks against the United States overseas institutions, structures, or personnel as well as America's international allies (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004; Weiner, 2012). This irregular form of war resulted in a series of deadly attacks on the continental United States on September 11, 2001, causing large-scale casualties and significant structural and infrastructure damage in Washington, DC and New York, NY (Mahan & Griset, 2008). In response to these unprecedented attacks, the United States began to look for ways to combat and destroy the nonstate actors behind the attack, but it also reevaluated its own national security enterprise to thwart or mitigate future large-scale attacks such as those that occurred on 9/11 (Olson, 2010; Votel et al., 2016).

A key component of America's national security enterprise is the National Guard that is an armed force with a unique, hybrid organizational structure and mission set (Schumacher, 2011). The National Guard consists of 54 state and territorial units that are subordinate to the governors of their respective nonfederal government, but the National Guard units can also come under the command of the President of the United States

through the National Guard Bureau and the DOD (Doubler, 2001; Margis, 2016). The purpose of the current study was to evaluate the National Guard's relationship with the DOD by focusing on the relationship between the increasingly nontraditional national security threats contrasted with the impact of federal government funding and support for the National Guard's conventional military structures and capabilities.

I focused the study on two periods bracketing the millennium to compare the transition from the cold war state-centric security paradigm to the more unsettled post-cold-war terror security threats posed by nonstate actors. The two periods considered were the initial post-cold war period of the 1990s and the post-9/11 period during the first decade of the 21st century. These periods represented two significant shifts in the United States national security paradigm with the initial period representing a shift away from the state-centric security emphasis, with a focus on the bipolar superpower confrontation between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the 1990s (see Hammes, 2006; Kitfield, 2016; Tindall, 1992). The second period following the major terror attack in 2001 represented a transition period during which the United States and some of its allies began to actively confront transnational, nonstate, terrorist organizations that presented increasingly serious and potentially damaging threats to the United States (see Boot, 2013b; Morrell, 2015).

Background

Security is a fundamental element in society and, perhaps, is the most elemental component required to provide stability within a society (Sun Tzu & Sawyer, n.d./1994). Without security and the stability it brings, many of the other critical elements of society

become problematic (Galula, 2006; Kaldor, 2005; Schultz, 2016). Providing security for an independent political state usually entails securing the state from external threats as well as ensuring internal security threats do not challenge the structure or legitimacy of the state (Mead, 2004; Millet & Maslowski, 1994). Throughout the course of American history, a tension has existed between the four levels (federal, state, local, and tribal) that make up the United States government and the need to provide security for the American public (see Craig & Gilbert, 1986; Currier, 2003; Mason, 2013).

The United States Constitution provides for separation of powers both within a particular level of government and also between the governmental levels (United States Constitution, 1789, Articles I, II, and Amendment X). There are many different ways for a government to provide security, but the two most common are for an effective law enforcement judiciary system and a complementary armed forces military organization (see D. J. Campbell & K.M. Campbell, 2010; Hammond, 1997). Traditionally, in the United States, the law enforcement judiciary system was responsible for internal or domestic security, and the federal military was responsible for securing the country from external threats posed by other national states (D. J. Campbell & K.M. Campbell, 2010; Weiner, 2012). Within the individual sovereign states, the Militia Act of 1792 permitted individual states to maintain a state militia to provide a paramilitary armed force for internal security and, initially, as a counter to the possibility of the federal government's use of the national-level armed forces in the internal affairs of individual states (see Dougherty, 2008; Millett & Maslowski, 1994; Warren, 2019). Congress legally restricted the federal government's military involvement in domestic law enforcement activities

through the Posse Comitatus Act of 1876 in response to the use of the military in the post-Civil War reconstruction period (R. Burke & McNeil, 2016; Hammond, 1997; United States Department of State, 1879).

The combination of these two acts provided a mechanism for individual states to develop an internal state security mechanism and force that could also be used in a national emergency, such as a war or massive disaster. Although this improved the state's ability, both acts constrained the federal government's role and capability to use military force within the states. The initial impetus for the Posse Comitatus Act was to restrict the federal government's use of the United States Army in the post-Civil War south and in the "Indian Wars" in the western United States (see R. Burke & McNeil, 2015; Dougherty, 2008).

However, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there was an increasing push to increase the professionalism and capabilities of the various state militias to provide a more capable reserve force for the regular United States Army, which was always a secondary mission for the state militias (see D. J. Campbell, 2014; Stentiford, 2008). This trend toward increasing federal influence became federal law through the Militia Act of 1903, also known as the Dick Act that established the National Guard composed of all of the state militias to create a more uniform conventional and strategic military reserve. The states relinquished a greater degree of organizational control of their in order to receive increased funding from the federal government (D. J. Campbell, 2014; Wilson, 1986).

As a result of a series of additional Congressional Acts throughout the 20th century, the National Guard became increasingly integrated into the War Department and, in the post-1947 era, the DOD incorporated the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard into the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force, respectively (Cantwell, 1994; Mahon, 1983). The transition of the National Guard increased its conventional military capability, and it became a more capable operational reserve during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts in the first decade of the 21st Century (Griswold, 2011). This transitional trend culminated in the National Defense Authorization Bill of 2012, which designated the National Guard Bureau as a joint element of the DOD and gave the National Guard Bureau Commander a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff equal to all other military service chiefs (United States Congress, 2011).

A fundamental purpose of the current study was related to the concept of homeland security and addressed a gap in the literature focused on the type of funding for the National Guard between the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. Traditionally, the United States had bifurcated its security elements with the Department of State and the DOD focused on external threats and activities and a variety of organizations focused on internal security. The 9/11 attacks in 2001 combined with the rise of transnational terror organizations reflected a change in the nature of security threats, making a bifurcated security structure much less effective. The dual state-federal responsibilities of the National Guard could have acted as a bridge between the bifurcated security seams; however, its primary funding stream coming from the DOD made it less

effective in focusing on terrorism and internal security concerns and issues (see Mahon, 1983).

Problem Statement

There is a problem in the United States national security enterprise that is related to the National Guard's hybrid organization with split responsibilities to both individual state governments and the federal government, and it was unknown whether this hybrid structure caused the National Guard's capabilities to diverge from pre- and post-9/11 national security priorities. Despite the legal authorities establishing the hybrid organization, the National Guard Bureau is a subordinate organization within the United States DOD, and the department is biased toward conventional military operations (see Gates, 2014; Hammes, 2006; Punaro et al., 2008). This conventional military bias combined with a Congressional preference to fund these types of operations creates a similar bias within the National Guard Bureau toward conventional military operations compared to homeland security operations (Government Accounting Office [GAO], 2008).

A conventional military and security operations bias creates a problem because there is a lack of focus on the rising trend of nontraditional national security threats facing the United States (see Gates, 2014; Hadley & Perry, 2010). Meeting these new threats requires experimentation, innovation, and nonconventional approaches to combat or mitigate the nontraditional threats (see Ucko & Marks, 2018; White House, 2015, 2017). The purpose of the current study was to analyze the changing national security threats since the end of the cold war in the early 1990s combined with a novel statistical

analysis of how these changes were not reflected in a significant or equivalent change in the types of federal funding to the National Guard Bureau. I hoped through statistical analysis of Congressional funding for conventional or traditional versus irregular or unconventional capabilities to identify capability gaps in the National Guard's ability to effectively combat irregular or unconventional threats to the United States homeland.

I anticipated there might be a divergence between types of funding and anticipated threats that would provide direct evidence of divergence that was not found in the literature related to academic studies. Although research and literature addressed the National Guard's operational focus and capabilities or the relative cost difference between active duty and the reserve and National Guard forces, there was a gap in the research regarding a comparison of the National Guard budgets between the pre- and post-9/11periods (see Hoffman, 2016; Klimas et al., 2014; National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016). I evaluated the degree to which the changing nature of security threats combined with organizational and bureaucratic inertia inhibited the National Guard Bureau's abilities to change its operational focus creating a mismatch between National Guard operational requirements and existing operational capabilities through a quantitative analytical approach.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this quantitative study was to investigate whether there was a divergence between stated national security concerns and the National Guard's capabilities within the federal government's DOD from 1996 to 2006. First, to assess continuity or discontinuity in National Guard capabilities vis-à-vis national security

policies, I conducted an assessment of changes in security threats to the United States from the pre- to post 9/11 periods. Second, I conducted a statistical evaluation of continuity or a lack of statistically relevant change in Congressional funding to the National Guard in pre- and post-9/11 periods. I hypothesized that if there was no statistically significant change in capabilities funding between 1996 and 2006 and there was a change in the national security priorities, this would be evidence of a bias toward continuity and a focus on conventional or traditional warfare.

In the statistical analysis, I used quantitative data sets from the 1996 and the 2006 DOD budgets; these different budget years were the independent and dependent variables. The 1996 budget was the independent variable because this spending was completed before the 9/11 attacks occurred and therefore could not be changed. The 2006 budget was the dependent variable because it occurred after the 2001 terror attacks. These attacks were considered an intervention or action that may or may not have affected the United States Government's defense spending following the 2001 terror attacks (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008).

There was a gap in research regarding the comparative analysis of the types of capabilities obtained using federal funding versus existing research on active duty versus reserve and National Guard capabilities. I compared funding levels and the capabilities obtained by the funding from pre- to post-9/11 security environments to identify whether there was continuity in funding during a period of changing security threats, a disconnect between funding and threats, and how this represented a potential risk to the United States.

Research Question

To understand the relationship between America's national security threats and the type and level of Congressional funding for the National Guard Bureau, I used the following research question to guide the development of this research study: According to Congressional funding, how and to what degree do the National Guard's capabilities diverge from the United States national security priorities from pre-9/11 and post-9/11 periods?

Conceptual Framework

I blended two conceptual frameworks to provide structure to the research and analysis. The overarching framework was one of organizational change that emphasized the challenges in creating and implementing change to overcome an organization's and its members's preference for inertia and stability. Lewin (1947a, 1947b) and Schein (2010) focused on the importance of understanding and adapting organizational change to the organization's culture. These seminal works provided a foundation for understanding the challenges of implementing change within organizations. Their perspectives centered on the challenges of overcoming structural and cultural factors in an organization that create inertia that leads to resistance to change within the organizations. According to the conceptual framework, an organization must open up ("unfreeze") the organization, both structurally and culturally, to effect significant change (see Lewin, 1947a, 1947b; Porras, 1987; Schein, 2010).

The second framework focused on understanding the immediate and operational impact of the federal government providing funding to the National Guard Bureau

through the DOD (see Dunlap, 1994). To conceptualize these processes, I used a stream analysis framework introduced by Porras (1987) in foundational organizational development and stream analysis work. Porras recognized the role structure and culture play in the organizational change process, but emphasized the importance of process to understand how the inputs and processes influence an organization's outputs. I used these conceptual frameworks to assess the degree to which conventionally focused funding streams created divergence between United States security threats and National Guard capabilities.

Organizational Change

The concept of organizational change implies the need for an organization to adapt over time to ensure continued success in whatever mission or task (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b) it chooses to pursue or that is assigned to the organization by a higher authority (see W. W. Burke, 2011). The higher authority can be an external entity to the organization or a higher element within the same organization. The National Guard Bureau has both types of relationships because it is authorized and funded by an external organization, the United States Congress, but it also receives direction and guidance from the DOD whose organizational structure encompasses the National Guard Bureau (United States DOD, 2017c).

The importance of adaptation and change extends beyond the assignment of a mission because it operates on the assumption the external operational environment frequently or almost continuously changes, which requires modifications or alterations of the existing organization (W. W. Burke, 2011). An organization must make changes to

stay effective and relevant within the operational environment. The degree, the frequency, and the variability of the changes present challenges to an organization because it may be difficult to determine the appropriate response to the changing environment (W. W. Burke, 2011; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a). In addition, organizations may find it difficult to develop the appropriate internal structure to best address the fluctuating external environment (see W. W. Burke, 2011; Schein, 2010).

Analyzing an organization at the macro or institutional level provides a strategic perspective in understanding challenges facing an organization and the need for the organization to address these challenges. It is important to focus the assessment and evaluation of organizational change by using and understanding potential barriers to institutional change as well as how an organization may overcome such impediments (see W. W. Burke, 2011; Burnes, 2004). Organizational change theories and frameworks emphasize the role of organizational culture and how it is important to embed change practices within the organization's culture to be able to effect constructive change (Mastroianni, 2006).

Although there are many organizational concepts, Lewin's (1947a) three-stage organizational change model provides a widely accepted and seminal approach by focusing on the critical importance of processes an organization should follow to institute significant institutional change (W. W. Burke, 2011). The three stages include "unfreezing" the organization's structure to facilitate the critical second "change" phase during which organizational adaptation occurs. Following the change phase, Lewin's organizational change model concludes with the third or "refreeze" phase to stabilize the

modified organization (see Lewin, 1947a; Schein, 2010). Another way of assessing organizational change is the perspective that organizational culture is important to any organization, and successfully implementing organizational change requires creating and emphasizing institutionalized change practices within the organization's leadership (O'Toole et al., 2002). If an organization's leadership is resistant to change, then significant modifications of the organization are unlikely, if not impossible, to pursue or implement (O'Toole & Pasternak, 2000).

Stream Analysis

Porras (1987) and Henstra (2010) created stream analysis frameworks to evaluate organizational structures and processes using organizational inputs, processes, and outputs as prisms to understand internal and external influences on the organization. All organizations have external and internal environments that influence an organization's structures and processes. Therefore, an organization that desires or needs to change and adapt must analyze both environments (W. W. Burke, 2011; Hickman, 2010). In the current study, the stream analysis framework related to evaluating a systems-analysis approach to national security decision-making processes and, in turn, reflected how National Guard funding inputs could affect the National Guard's organizational processes and influence the types of outputs produced by the National Guard's processes (see Sarkesian et al., 2013). There are several external and internal factors that influence the National Guard, but I focused this study on the role of federal funding inputs channeled through the DOD and how this funding stream influenced the internal processes and,

ultimately, the output produced in the form of operational capabilities within the National Guard (Dibella, 2013).

Schein (1996), Vest (2014), and Yukl (2010) postulated that an analyst must understand an organization's culture and the role individual actions or traits play in shaping the organization's culture. The importance of these scholars's work is the explicit acknowledgement that organizations are human entities that are constructed and designed by humans for a purpose (see Schein, 1996; Yukl, 2010). Therefore, a human organization made up of individuals will develop a culture, and the organizational culture influences the ability of an organization to change as well as how any change is designed and implemented (Schein, 2010). In the case of the National Guard, the institution has an overarching culture of military service to their respective state or territory as well as the nation as a whole. The fact the National Guard represents 50 states and four territories indicated the possibility, even likelihood, of a large number of subcultures within the overarching institutional culture (see Cooper, 1997; Doubler, 2001).

In contrast, the National Guard Bureau is a joint element of the DOD and is not formally affiliated with a specific state or territory. The bureau was likely to align closely with the federal military culture (M. T. Owens, 2010; Punaro et al., 2008). A complicating factor was that members from the individual state and territorial National Guard organizations could bring their respective "Guard" cultures to the national organization, thereby creating a hybrid military (i.e., DOD and National Guard) culture within the National Guard Bureau.

Changing Role of the National Guard

Less theoretically, Griffith (2011), Griswold (2011), Hoffman (2005), and Lynch and Stover (2008) evaluated National Guard transformation from a traditional strategic reserve military and a traditional state militia force to an operational reserve focused on regular deployments. It was important for me to acknowledge the role of the National Guard within the national security enterprise is, to a degree, fluid and changeable (see R. Burke & McNeil, 2015; Doubler, 2001). Through its over 100 years of existence, the National Guard's missions and relationship with its home state and territorial governments as well as its relationship with the federal government, especially the DOD and its predecessor organizations, evolved and changed based on security requirements and political processes (see Cooper, 1997, Mahon, 1983; Punaro et al., 2008).

Therefore, placing the National Guard within this operational and political milieu provided an essential context to use the organizational change and stream analysis frameworks. As part of the national security enterprise, the National Guard receives guidance and direction from both the state and federal elements of government (Riker, 1957; Schumacher, 2011; Worley, 2015). Theoretically, the federal government provides guidance through the national security assessment and planning process starting at the presidential level and proceeding down through the executive branch's departments and subordinate organizations (United States DOD, 2020). This guidance can be seen as another form of input to the National Guard. The DOD provides guidance to the National Guard Bureau to prioritize the bureau's role in the national security enterprise and to

provide further federal direction to the state and territorial National Guard organizations via the National Guard Bureau.

Nature of the Study

I used a quantitative statistical analysis to analyze the relationship between levels of federal funding and the types of National Guard missions to assess change over time between two time periods with different assessments of the national security challenges facing the United States. In addition, I evaluated the relationship between the DOD and the National Guard Bureau, a subordinate joint command linking the federal government to 54 state and territorial National Guard organizations (see United States Congress, 2012). This research study addressed a disparity in how the federal government perceived national security threats and the actions of the federal government to address the threats through DOD and National Guard Bureau funding and organizational focus.

I used public documents to evaluate national security threats and quantitatively analyzed the impact of federal funding of through the DOD on the National Guard Bureau and on the organizational structure and operational focus of subordinate National Guard units. I used public documents as the primary data sets to facilitate analysis of Congressional funding for DOD and National Guard Bureau budgets and assess the levels of funding for different types of operations. This quantitative data analysis addressed the level of change or lack of change in funding for traditional military conventional operations compared to homeland security (traditional state militia) missions. I used a t test analysis to compare relative spending and capabilities between the fiscal years would provide insight into potential limits on organizational change within the National Guard.

This survey research project was a quantitative statistical analysis study because I analyzed existing public data to identify the existence of a diverging trend between federal government assessments of national security threats and the actions the government takes to address these threats (see W. W. Burke, 2011; Creswell, 2009). I selected two time periods bracketing a major national security event (the 9/11 terror attacks against the United States) to assess whether there was a significant change in the assessment of the threats and the response to the threats. Following the security threat assessment, I conducted a quantitative analysis of the National Guard's primary areas of investment and expenditures from a fiscal year during the 1990 and 2000 decades.

The quantitative analysis included a comparative analysis of the levels of spending of the targeted fiscal years to evaluate the lack of change in National Guard Bureau spending emphasis that, in turn, indicated the government's lack of adaptation to changing security threats (see Creswell, 2009; Green & Salkind, 2011). The result of the quantitative analysis of the public data sets was compared to prioritized national security threats facing the United States in the pre- and post-9/11 time periods represented by the budget years of 1996 and 2006. For comparison purposes, the United States Congress National Defense Authorization Acts of 1996 and 2006 were used to compare spending priorities 5 years before and 5 years after the 2001 terrorist attacks. This approach assisted in addressing the hypothesis that if there was no statistically significant change in capabilities funding between 1996 and 2006 and there was a change in the national security priorities, this would be evidence of a bias toward continuity and a focus on conventional or traditional warfare.

Operational Definitions

The following terms were operationalized in the following way in this paper:

Active duty: "Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. This includes members of the Reserve Component serving on active duty or full-time training duty, but does not include full-time National Guard duty. Also called AD. See also active duty for training; inactive duty training" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 5).

Citizen soldier: "A person who is primarily a civilian, acting, in war or peace, as a soldier. He may be a militiaman, a National Guardsman, or a member of Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force Reserves. He may have been brought into military service via volunteering or conscription" (Mahon, 1983, p. 4).

Complex warfare: "The arena of complex warfare blends confrontation and cooperation in a struggle to achieve national 'security' objectives, and is not necessarily violent. This type of warfare is consistent with East Asian-style Sunzi warfare as distinct from Western-style Clausewitzian warfare. Sunzi warfare is heavy on deception and indirect use of force to subdue the adversary, while Clausewitzian warfare is heavy on the use of force against the adversary to get him to submit" (Drohan, 2019, para. 17).

Conventional forces: "Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons and includes forces other than designated special operations forces" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 53).

Differentiation: "Is defined as the state of segmentation of the organizational system into subsystems, each of which tends to develop particular attributes in relation to

the requirements posed by its relevant external environment" (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a, pp. 3–4).

Enterprise: "A project or undertaking that is especially difficult, complicated, or risky; readiness to engage in daring or difficult action; a unit of economic organization or activity or a systematic purposeful activity" (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). An alternate business definition considers it to be an "establishment of means of production with a permanent organization…the enterprise contains both material and human components (Jinoria, 2014, p. 132). The combination of a traditional dictionary definition combined with the business definition accurately represented the complexity, purposefulness, and material and human elements of organizations and enterprises.

Homeland: "The physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, United States possessions and territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 106).

Homeland defense: "The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. Also called HD" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 106).

Homeland security: "A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur. Also called HS" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 106).

Integration: "Is defined as the process of achieving unity of efforts among the various subsystems in the accomplishment of the organization's tasks" (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a, p. 4).

Irregular warfare: ""This form of warfare is characterized as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)." (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 121). An alternate definition is "campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field" (Boot, 2002, p. xv).

National defense strategy: A document "signed by Secretary of Defense (SecDef), outlines DOD's approach to implementing the President's NSS (National Security Strategy) (United States DOD, 2017a, p. xii).

National Guard: "The inheritor of the militia tradition, the crucial part is the dual connection, state and national (or federal). Traditionally, the National Guard has been manned by volunteers" (Mahon, 1983, p. 4).

National Guard Bureau: "Is a joint activity of the Department of Defense" that serves as "the channel of communications on all matters pertaining to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States between (1) the Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, and (2) the several States" (United States Congress, 1994, section 10501).

National Security (a): "A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a

military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. a favorable

foreign relations position; or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile

or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. See also security" (United

States DOD, 2017b, p. 164).

National Security (b): "US national security is the ability of national institutions

to prevent adversaries from using force to harm Americans or their national interests and

the confidence of Americans in this capability" (Sarkesian, et al., 2008, p. 4).

National Security Council: "A governmental body specifically designed to assist

the President in integrating all spheres of national security policy. The President, Vice

President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense are statutory members. The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and the

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serve as advisers. Also called

NSC" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 164).

National security enterprise: A collective term encompassing both national

defense and foreign relations of the United States combined with a systematic purposeful

activity or a difficult, complicated, or risky project or undertaking (my definition derived

from combining the definitions of national security and enterprise). A recent assessment

of United States national security purposefully used the term enterprise to explain the

broadest possible interrelationship between all elements of government as well as non-

governmental elements such as the media, think tanks, and lobbyists (George & Rishikof,

2017).

National security establishment: "Normative-analytical term referring to those responsible for national security decision-making as well as a descriptive term that identifies a set of actors and processes that actually produce security policy outcomes" (Sarkesian et al., 2008, p. 19).

National security interests: "The foundation for the development of valid national objectives that define US goals or purposes. National security interests include preserving US political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic well-being; and bolstering international order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its allies" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 164).

National security strategy: "A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called NSS. See also National Military Strategy; strategy; theater strategy" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 164).

Operation: "1. Military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign" (United States DOD, 2017a, p. 14).

Organization: "Is defined as a system of interrelated behaviors of people who are performing a task that has been differentiated into several distinct subsystems, each subsystem performing a portion of the task, and the efforts of each being integrated to achieve effective performance of the system" (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a, p. 3).

Paramilitary forces: "Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 181).

Regular military forces: "Forces maintained both in war and peace by the national (federal) government. The members are military first and citizens second. They are also referred to as Standing Military Forces" (Mahon, 1983, p. 4).

Reserve: "1. Portion of a body of troops that is kept to the rear or withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement, in order to be available for a decisive movement. 2. Members of the Military Services who are not in active service but who are subject to call to active duty. 3. Portion of an appropriation or contract authorization held or set aside for future operations or contingencies and, in respect to which, administrative authorization to incur commitments or obligations has been withheld. See also operational reserve" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 201).

Reserve component: "The Armed Forces of the United States Reserve Component consists of: a. the Army National Guard of the United States; b. the Army Reserve; c. the Navy Reserve; d. the Marine Corps Reserve; e. the Air National Guard of the United States; f. the Air Force Reserve; and g. the Coast Guard Reserve. Also called RC" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 201).

Reserves: "Individuals or units available to fill out national forces when needed. Reservists are presumed to have skills which the military needs and have at least rudimentary military training. The Army and Air Force Reserves differ from the National

Guard in that their chain of command starts with the federal military departments and does not run through the state military hierarchy" (Mahon, 1983, p. 4).

Security (a): "1. Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness". 2. "A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences". 3. "With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 2010).

Security (b): "We adopt Arnold Woofer's definition of security—the absence of threats to acquired values. This basis for agreement or disagreement about values encourages different perspectives to understand threats, values, and interests. Unknown or ignored differences matter, as we find out when we make bad assumptions. So, we use a comparative prism to avoid mirror imaging others behaviors and desired effects" (Drohan, 2019, para. 7).

Special operations forces: "Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 219).

Standing militia: "Universal military training for men of military age. First the colonies and then the states required eligible, able-bodied men to muster and to be

associated in companies and larger units to drill. State laws specified the frequency of training" (Mahon, 1983, p. 5).

Task (a): "Is defined as a complete input-transformation-output cycle involving at least the design, production, and distribution of some goods or services" (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a, p. 4).

Task (b): "Is a clearly defined action or activity assigned to an individual or organization. It is a specific assignment that must be done as it is imposed by an appropriate authority" (DOD, 2017c, p. x).

Terrorism (a): "The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 236).

Terrorism (b): "Use of violence by nonstate actors directed primarily at noncombatants (mostly civilians, but also government officials, policemen, and off-duty soldiers) in order to intimidate or coerce them and change their governments policy or composition" (Boot, 2013a, p, xi).

Terrorism (c): "Warfare…primarily…carried out by bands of loosely organized, ill-disciplined, and lightly armed volunteers who disdained open battle in favor of stealthy raids and ambushes: the strategies of both tribal warriors and modern guerrillas and terrorists (Boot, 2013b, p. 100).

Traditional warfare: "Is characterized as a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states. With the increasingly

rare case of formally declared war, traditional warfare typically involves force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) against each other in all physical domains as well as the information environment (which includes cyberspace)". (United States DOD, 2017c, p. x).

Unconventional warfare: "Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Also called UW" (United States DOD, 2017b, p. 243).

Volunteer militia: "Individual militiamen often volunteered for particular duty, usually for the limited duration characteristic of the militia. If they volunteered for a longer tour, or for service beyond the boundaries of state or colony, they entered into a different legal category, that of a war volunteer. Elite militia units often volunteered into" (Mahon, 1983, p. 5).

War volunteers: "Individuals or units, more often than not from the militia, who volunteered to serve for an extended period, perhaps for the duration of an emergency. They became subject to laws different from those for the militia" (Mahon, 1983, p. 5).

Assumptions

I focused this study on United States national security enterprise organizations and their members because the perspectives these entities had on the national security threats are likely skewed and biased. This was because the complexity and scale of the security threats are so great and varied that they were virtually impossible to quantify (see

Sarkesian et al., 2013). The members within the national security enterprise base their

security analysis on an assessment derived from a fusion of knowable facts and

qualitative evaluations of potential capabilities and intentions (see Millen, 2012). This

circumstance led to a key assumption for the current study's analysis because the

qualitative nature of members and organizations analyzed in the study allows these actors

within the national security enterprise to skew, adjust, or modify their threat assessments

to develop their organizations and capabilities aligned with their preferences (see Morag,

2006).

The issue of bias within an organization and the influence this bias may have in

developing or sustaining an organization's culture plays an important element in an

organizational change analysis (Gerras & Wong, 2013). The issue of bias influencing a

risk assessment to justify a certain organizational structure or capability is especially

critical with issues involving the provision of security (see Bacevich, 2007). Providing

security is a key responsibility of any government. If security professionals biases

adversely affects security policies and decisions, this likely creates risks, both external

and internal, to a country's security and stability.

A second assumption in this paper was the United States national security

enterprise should focus efforts to address national security threats identified or assigned

by the national security strategy (United States DOD, 2012a; White House, 2017). The

absence of an empirically provable security threat prompts the federal government to

create a consensus around the most likely or the most dangerous security threats to the

country (Posen, 2013). The elements representing the national security enterprise should

focus on threats prioritized by national leaders through national strategy process rather than members of a bureaucracy identifying threats to justify their organization's capabilities, cultures, and existence (see Bacevich, 2007; Collins, 2013). Since the end of the cold war, the rise of nonstate actors with the capabilities to inflict significant casualties and losses to a country combined with their proven operational success should spur the national security enterprise to focus in this security arena (Kurth, 2007; Worley, 2015). Although these changes happened, a senior Air Force general declared much of the DOD remains interested in developing and preparing for large-scale conventional warfare between states (Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, personal communication, October 29, 2013).

Scope and Delimitations

The scope of this study was limited temporally to two time periods focusing on the federal government's funding of the National Guard from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. Second, the scope of the study was limited organizationally to the National Guard and excluded the individual state and territorial subordinate National Guard organizations. The National Guard Bureau is the DOD element responsible for integrating state and territorial National Guard organizations into the DOD and the national security enterprise (Jean, 2010; United States DOD, 2015b; United States Congress, 2011).

The two periods covered in this study provided an effective time frame to evaluate the effect of national security strategy changes spurred by the successful nonstate terror attacks evidenced by the 9/11 terror attacks in New York; Washington,

DC; and Pennsylvania. In addition, the consideration of federal funding levels and types provided to the National Guard through the DOD reflects the level of credence Congress and the DOD puts on terrorist threats by nonstate actors (Hadley & Perry, 2010; Worley, 2015). I evaluated changes in perceived national security threats and the federal government's national security enterprise's response to the threats (see Biddle, 2015; Donnelly & Kagan, 2010). However, the primary focus of this study was the evaluation on the National Guard's funding and its impact on the organization's operational focus and enduring relationship with the DOD.

I focused the study on the period from the end of the cold war (circa 1990–1991) to the withdrawal of United States military forces from Iraq (circa 2009–2010). The post-cold-war period is important because it represents the first period in United States history when the country did not face a major conventional threat from another country (Offner, 2007). In modern military parlance, the United States did not have a "near-peer" military competitor (see Dunlap, 2010; Eliason, 2017; O'Hanlon, 2009; Work, 2016). Although there may have been periods earlier in the country's history when major foreign powers were unlikely to attack the United States, throughout the United States history countries existed that had equal or greater military capabilities. However, the decade of the 1990s into the new millennium was a period in American history when no country could claim military parity or superiority to the United States (see Mead, 2004; Snow & Drew, 2010).

This time frame also included the rise of nonstate terrorist organizations as significant security threats to many countries including the United States. A series of increasingly lethal terror attacks against the United States and its allies in the 1990s

culminated in the successful 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda in the United States, that caused

the largest single loss of primarily civilian lives in the country's history as a result of

terrorism (Morell, 2015; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United

States, 2004). Comparing the pre-9/11 and the post-9/11 periods provided a clearer

understanding of potential and actual contemporary threats facing the United States and

permitted an assessment of the preparation and response to the threats by the DOD and

the National Guard.

I limited the area of analysis to the National Guard's and the DOD's relationship

with the United States Congress. The enormous size, scale, and complexity of the

national security enterprise required limiting analysis to a single element of the

enterprise. The threat posed by Al Qaeda and other nonstate terrorist organizations

emanated primarily from outside the United States during this time period (National

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Focusing the current

study on the United States military represented by the DOD and its subordinate elements

was appropriate because defending the country is the DOD's fundamental mission (see

United States DOD, 2017c).

However, even the DOD was too large and complex an organization to evaluate in

this study. Therefore, narrowing the focus further to the National Guard provided a

bridge between the National Guard's domestically focused state and territorial

responsibilities and the organization's externally focused federal security missions (see

Ellis & Mackenzie, 2014). However, limited personnel, resources, and time precluded

evaluating each state and territorial National Guard organization. As Mahon (1983)

articulated, throughout the 20th century federal funding took precedence over state

funding for state National Guard organizations. This funding was provided primarily

through the DOD, and it provided insight into the overall capabilities of the individual

state National Guard organizations.

Limitations

A major limitation to the study was associated with the assumptions and related to

the difficulty of empirically defining the security threats facing the United States. The

purpose of this study was to provide a quantitative analysis of the possible divergence

between stated national security concerns and the National Guard's capabilities within

the federal government's DOD from 1996 to 2006. The major impact this research may

have on the National Guard, the National Guard Bureau, and the DOD is a challenge to

the cultural paradigm of the preeminence of traditional or conventional warfare. The

results showed no statistically significant change in major program spending between the

1996 and 2006 defense budgets compared with a shift in national security threats. This

finding suggested the need to make changes to the existing organizations that threatens

organizational personnel with vested interests in the status quo.

The ill-defined nature of national security threats limited the ability to critically

evaluate all of the approaches to mitigating or defeating potential threats until after the

potential threat occurs (see Dempsey, 2013). Due to this ill-defined nature, spending

large sums of money for the military defense of a country can only accurately be

evaluated once war breaks out and one side's preparation is better, such as in Germany's

rapid defeat of France in World War II (Deighton, 2000; Macksey, 2003). Likewise, the

uncertainty of security threats makes analyzing bias within a security organization difficult because absent a convincing defeat it is hard to prove the bias is unfounded (see Boot, 2006; Gray, 2009). Therefore, the overall impact of the current study may not be understood until United States security forces face another major war or another 9/11-type terror attack.

To address this definitional limitation, I used national security strategies developed by United States presidential staffs to serve as a proxy for defining national security threats. The national security strategy documents represent the United States government's assessment of potential threats and provide a simple but effective way to highlight major and prioritized security concerns in a single document (White House, 2010). The purpose of the current study was to investigate whether there was a divergence between stated national security concerns and the National Guard's capabilities within the federal government's DOD from 1996 to 2006. I evaluated whether the DOD and the National Guard failed to adapt to meet an evolving security environment, and using national security strategies during this period provided the best framework and the appropriate context for the analysis (see Allison, 2020; Bacevich, 2007). This study was not designed to evaluate national security strategy development. A related limitation to the study was the magnitude of the United States national security enterprise. The enterprise consists of elements of all four main levels of governance within the United States, including federal, state, local, and tribal governments (Sarkesian et al., 2013).

Significance

The overall goal of the study was to improve America's homeland security enterprise by analyzing the degree of bias within the DOD and the National Guard toward conventional military operations. The National Guard's operational focus on federal missions provides a strategic, conventional military reserve but neglects state-centric requirements creating unfunded homeland security mandates (see Gates, 2009; Griswold, 2011). The federal government faced changing security threats in the 1990s from opponents using nontraditional operations, but delayed initiating significant security changes until after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 (see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). After 9/11, the federal government created the Department of Homeland Security that incorporated 22 federal departments and agencies including the Coast Guard, but not any DOD elements, to provide a limited armed forces capability within a largely civilian and law enforcement organizational structure (R. Burke & McNeil, 2016; United States Department of Homeland Security, 2017).

The retention of the National Guard's federal missions within the DOD allowed the National Guard to remain focused on traditional or conventional military operations and, consequently, less responsive to nontraditional domestic security threats and significant natural disaster challenges. The study design enabled assessing the degree of institutional biases and potential National Guard responses to the diverse national security threats in the 21st century. By better integrating the state and territorial National Guard organizations into Department of Homeland Security's planning and operations,

the country should have improved responses to changing and nontraditional national security threats (see R. Burke & McNeil, 2016).

Expected Social Change

Anticipated improvements in United States national security enterprise operations and programs could result in an overall increase in the country's national security. Security is a fundamental building block for socioeconomic development, although the security expenditures compete for government resources (see Holshek, 2014). Massive federal expenses associated with conducting wars in response to terror attacks diverted resources away from domestic social welfare spending and potentially created a significant internal instability threat that could deter economic investment and development (O'Hanlon, 2009). Bias and resistance to organizational change discovered in this study could prompt changes in national security policy and produce improved security. Improvements in effectiveness and efficiency could provide increased social welfare and economic development and lead to a better socioeconomic environment for the American public.

Summary

This research study provided insight into potential organizational cultural bias within the United States national security enterprise that potentially reduced the country's effectiveness in meeting nontraditional security challenges. Failure to meet these security threats provides a significant threat to the American public through potential physical attacks as well as potentially degrading their socioeconomic status. This chapter addressed challenges facing the United States national security enterprise following the

end of the cold war. I researched the role of the National Guard's organizational and cultural bias toward conventional military operations compared to traditional state militia and internal security missions.

In addition, I used an organizational change concept that included a stream analysis framework to analyze the impact of federal funding to the National Guard through the DOD. I analyzed changes in the United States national security strategy over two periods and evaluated changes to the country's national security threats to support a statistical evaluation of the National Guard Bureau's budget and operational capabilities in the two periods. Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant literature of the organizational change discipline with emphasis on organizational culture and stream analysis. The literature review also addresses military and governmental security studies emphasizing the importance of the United States military's reserve component and the role the National Guard plays within the United States national security enterprise.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

In this chapter, the academic literature review justified the research topic's relevance and indicated gaps in the academic research on challenges and resistance to organizational change within the National Guard and the National Guard Bureau. The National Guard is a key element in the United States national security enterprise, but the organization's role within the enterprise has evolved over its long history (see Doubler, 2001; Mahon, 1983; Stentiford, 2008). The current study was situated within an ongoing context of change and evolution. A second key element regarding the National Guard addressed in the current study was the nature and complexity of the National Guard's

relationship with state and territorial governments and a more extended relationship with the federal government through the National Guard Bureau and the DOD (see Punaro et al, 2008; Riker, 1957). A third element of this study was the relation between the state and territorial governments and the federal government and how these ties affect the types of change within the National Guard. In addition, I investigated how the government authorities and entities affected the nature and types of the funding for National Guard, as well as the organization's operational focus and change processes. The relationship between these three concepts was the heart of the study and drove the framework of the literature review.

The National Guard's hybrid responsibilities and authorities are nested between the federal level and the state and territorial levels of American government, and this related to the problem addressed in the current study. The security threats facing the United States were changing from interstate conflict and competition to less well-defined and more ambiguous threats from nonstate actors represented by terror organizations and groups. Meeting those changes in a responsible, fiscally prudent, and operationally effective manner was the fundamental challenge facing the United States national security enterprise. I reviewed the changing nature of security threats through a review of government documents and academic literature highlighted in this chapter. The initial research indicated there was tension between existing conventional security capabilities and changes occurring in the international and domestic security environments, and this tension supported the current study's research question and relevance.

This study's research question addressed the relationships and tensions within the national security enterprise. The research question addresses whether Congressional funding to the National Guard Bureau through the DOD created a bias toward conventional military operations and created a divergence between changing national security threats and National Guard operational capabilities. The literature review focused on organizational change concepts as well as analyses of national security topics and threats through a combination of strategy development and operational planning concepts.

The literature review was organized into the following sections: the literature search strategy, a discussion of an organizational change theoretical framework, and a literature review related to key concepts. The key concepts section had five subsections: organizational change, National Guard, budgets and finance, law and authorities, and strategy and security threats that provided insight and background into the overall research project's focus on the organizational change and the National Guard. The theoretical framework section focused on organizational change theory and concepts with special attention paid to the concept of challenges and resistance to change within organizations. The theoretical organization change assessment established a framework to address the analysis of national security challenges facing the United States. Using a narrower focus, I analyzed the roles and relationships between the National Guard and the DOD to address the national security challenges.

Literature Search Strategy

I used a wide range of research strategies including multiple academic databases and search engines as well as several university library systems. The three primary research areas related to this study were organizational change theory with an emphasis on stream analysis framework, the National Guard's role in the national security enterprise, and the contemporary security environment. Walden University's library was the primary academic library used throughout the research process. In addition, the United States Air Force Academy's library was also used because I was a faculty member with unlimited access and found the Academy's document repository valuable. The ready access to government documents facilitated research on the national security and operational assessment aspects of the literature review. A third library was the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The Naval Postgraduate School was an excellent resource because it is a premier repository and research center for DOD and interagency research on homeland security and homeland defense issues.

The database research strategy focused on accessing academic articles and journals as well as government documents through Walden University's library and other academic libraries. I used the following databases: Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, EBSCO Host, Global Terrorism Database, Google Books, Google Scholar, Homeland Security Digital Library (Naval Postgraduate School), International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, Political Science Complete, Political Science: A Sage Full-Text Collection, ProQuest Central, Sage Encyclopedias and Handbooks, Sage Premier, and Walden Library Books.

In addition, multiple searches and reviews of journal articles and monographs occurred on key military research and journal websites associated with colleges and schools within the DOD professional educational system. Searches using these institutions were conducted to locate current and relevant supporting documents. The three most productive military research sites were the United States Army's Combined Arms Center, the center's *Military Review* journal, and the United States Army War College Press, which includes the *Parameters* journal and the Strategic Studies Institute's papers.

To maximize the academic research using these journals and databases, the following keywords were used to frame the search process: *National Guard*, *National Guard Bureau*, *National Guard budget*, *Department of Defense*, *United States Congressional Budget*, *national security strategy*, *national military strategy*, *homeland security*, *Department of Homeland Security*, *homeland security strategy*, *organizational change*, *organizational design*, and *stream analysis*. These terms focused on three broad areas: organizational change, the National Guard, and national security strategy.

The organizational change literature included Lewin's seminal work in the late 1940s and Schein's (1996, 2010) work that broadened Lewin's work to include culture as a key element of organizational change. The national security and National Guard searches focused on historical trajectory, the 1980s through the post-cold-war period, and emphasized the period following the 9/11 terror attacks. The research illustrated the change and transition of national security threats from the cold war to a contemporary security environment with nontraditional security threats (Ucko & Marks, 2018).

Major challenges for this literature review were the specialized nature of

homeland security studies in combination with the recent development and incorporation

of homeland security as an integral element in the United States national security

enterprise (see Buchalter, 2007; Winslow, 2013). Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the United

States viewed security threats as a bifurcated process of external threats being the

responsibility of the DOD, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department

with internal security challenges treated as criminal in nature and the responsibility of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation within the United States Department of Justice, the

country's other law enforcement agencies, and local National Guard (National

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). The impact of the 9/11

terror attacks in 2001 combined with the devastating effects of Hurricane Katrina in

Louisiana and Mississippi in 2005 led to a blossoming of homeland security studies and

academic research. The period from 2002 to 2010 resulted in the publication of a

significant amount of research on national security threats and homeland security

concepts. However, in the years following this burst of publications, there was a

reduction in studies on these topics.

From a literature review perspective, this created challenges in prioritizing and

utilizing academic and governmental research conducted in the past 5 years. One way to

address this was to consider some of the key studies on homeland security done in the

first decade of the 21st century as seminal works in a new academic concentration. The

rise of the Islamic State in the Levant in the Middle East during 2014–2015 and the

increase in terror attacks associated with this terrorist group, such as those in Paris,

France and San Bernardino, California in 2015, spurred new research on homeland

security threats and challenges as well as operational approaches to meet these threats.

Additional factors likely to add valuable research on homeland security studies

and the National Guard were the push by Congress under the Obama administration to

reduce DOD spending and the size of the various military services that make up the

department as well as President Trump's and Congress's reversal of this policy that

provided significant additional resources to the DOD (see United States Congress, 2017;

United States Congress, 2020; Alexander & Shalal, 2014). Congressional scrutiny

frequently evolves into tensions between the active military components and the reserve

components made up of the service reserves and the National Guard. Bureaucratically,

the various elements strive to retain as much funding and manpower as possible and this

"defense" of their national security missions and authorized resources frequently spurs

additional governmental and academic research (see Mahon, 1983; National Commission

on the Future of the Army, 2016).

Conceptual Framework

Organizational change theory provided an effective, but broad, theoretical

foundation to research the issue of whether the National Guard did or did not

significantly change its organization following the emergence of a significantly new and

different national security threat manifested in the 9/11 terror attacks against the United

States. To narrow the broad organizational change theoretical perspective, I used stream

analysis as a conceptual framework to analyze the effects of inputs on an organization's

outputs. The primary inputs analyzed in this study were the levels of funding for major

programs and acquisitions funded through the DOD for the National Guard. A changing

national security environment should be reflected in the nation's national security

enterprise and the things that it spends public resources to procure. If the national security

enterprise does not modify or adapt its spending to changed security challenges and

threats, then it may reflect a resistance to organizational change. If true, this condition

made organizational change theory and the stream analysis framework very appropriate

for this research study.

Organizational Change Theory

Organizations don't just appear, they are created. Likewise, they are not static

entities that never change. Therefore, how organizations develop and adapt to their

environments provides important perspectives into understanding an organization's

culture and decision-making processes. The concept of "environment" regarding

organizations needed to take both external and internal environments into account when

analyzing organizational changes and cultural factors (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b).

These complex factors were critical in the analysis of an organization using applied and

practice-oriented research into how a particular organization's members and leadership

act and the impact these actions or failures to act have on the organization, entities

associated with the organizations, and the environments or ecosystems within which the

organization operates (see W.W. Burke, 2011).

Organizational change is a broad and complex field of study that was essential to

consider when designing the research or analytical project on an organization. A seminal

scholar in the field was Kurt Lewin whose research and writings from the 1940s set the

stage for envisioning the fundamental perspective required to initiate, implement, and sustain an organizational change program (see Lewin, 1947a, 1947b). His value to the organizational change community was summed up by Hendry (1996); "Scratch any account of creating and managing change and the idea that change is a 3-step process which necessarily begins with a process of unfreezing" (p. 624). Lewin asserted it is critically important to stop an organization from continuing current organizational activities that require modification in order to make substantive changes to the organization. He described this as the first of a three-step process and described it as "unfreezing" the organization. Only after the organizational bureaucracy is thawed can it be shifted to the second step of implementing changes and Lewin described this process, unsurprisingly, as the "moving" that transforms the organization (Lewin, 1947a,). Finally, after the organization's changes are implemented, the third step of "freezing" the organization is critically important because it creates a "quasi-stationary equilibrium to describe how to keep a bureaucracy from becoming constantly in a change mode and from becoming chaotic" (Burns, 2004, pp. 985-987).

As with most good models or frameworks, it is best to keep an organizational change concept simple because any change process rapidly becomes complex, and the model or framework provides the scaffold that helps manage the complexity. This complexity can be exhibited in the size, structure, processes, or products the organization and its personnel create (W.W. Burke, 2011). Schein's (1996 & 2010) research further enhanced Lewin's model without fundamentally changing its basic structure. The key modification involved the introduction of the concept of culture to organizational change

theory. The introduction of culture as a strong stabilizing force for organizations was critical to address in any change process (Schein, 1996). In order to better describe the change process, Schein (2010) introduced the concept of "stages" instead of "Lewin's "steps" to better articulate the overlap between the various elements of the change "processes" (see Schein, 2010; W.W. Burke, 2011). This was a tremendously important perspective because an organization is made up of its individual members even if the members may work in various jobs with different levels of authority.

As Lewin and Schein astutely understood, any change process that disregards the individuals who create and change the organizational cultures and norms will create a change process that is unsustainable because an organizational bureaucracy is made up of individuals (Lewin, 1947a, 1947b; Schein, 2010). Organizational members always get a vote, even if it is voting with their feet and leaving an organization that they don't like. An organization's leadership, who are also individual members of the organization albeit more powerful than the average worker, that ignores its workforce's perspectives on the organization and the proposed change process courts disastrous failure over the long term. The interactions that occur between individuals and groups create an organizational culture that plays an important part in any organizational change process (see Jungdahl & MacDonald, 2015; Kotter, 2012; Lambert, 2019; Schein, 2010).

The importance of the individuals and groups in developing an organizational culture seems to downplay the importance of organizational leaders. In some respects this is appropriate, but it is also imprudent to completely dismiss the role of leadership in organizations and, especially, in any organizational change process (Dunford, 2017).

Leadership, if effective, does precisely that – leads. In all three phases of Lewin's model and throughout Schein's cultural expansion, leadership is crucial to formulating, initiating (the "unfreezing process), overseeing the implementation (the "change" process), and reigning in the trend toward chaos by "refreezing" the organization. These tasks need to be done in association with the organization's members, but leadership is required to be effective (Jergin & Cooper, 2018). Leadership sets the tone and fosters a favorable or unfavorable organizational climate and culture and communicates the need and conditions for successful organizational change and evolution (see Heckelman et al., 2013; Kotter, 2012; Yukl, 2012).

O'Toole (1999, 2002) provided important contributions to organizational change scholarship from developing the classic and widely referenced compendium, literally an "A-Z guide", on leadership (1999) as well as other works focusing on the multifaceted nature of leadership. At times it seems leadership as an organizational development or organizational change concept is overstated and expands the role of the leader at the expense of the other elements of an organization, especially the rank and file members. O'Toole, described by W.W. Burke (2011) "as one of the paramount thinkers and writers in the area of organizational change" (p. 272), emphasized the importance of effective leadership, but over time came to extoll the need for new and more diverse perspectives on leadership. This included treatises, frequently co-authored with another seminal scholar Warren Bennis, focused leadership needing to be forward thinking, transparent, candid, and ethical. Ultimately, an organizational change process is to build a better future for the organization (see O'Toole et al., 2002; O'Toole & Bennis, 2009).

As this survey of organizational development or change indicated, there is no singly unitary theory of organizational change, nor is there a single model, framework, or approach that elucidates the complexity that represents a modern organization. W.W. Burke (2011) is perhaps the most comprehensive chronicler of the field and his survey, now in a fourth edition, deftly captured the breadth of the field, but also provided sufficient depth to enlighten readers and guide researchers. Much of the research highlighted above acknowledges the place of an organization in its environment, but generally the authors had a bias towards what an organization can do within itself to initiate, make, and consolidate change (Jernigan & Cooper, 2018; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b).

My research nested within the larger organizational structure of the United States security enterprise and, in particular, the National Guard Bureau within the DOD. However, it explicitly acknowledged the impact on the overall "environment" within which an organization exists is equally or, at times, more important than the internal organizational machinations of change. In the latter case, failure to understand the operational environment likely means a much higher chance of organizational failure than any internal process.

Another influential scholar who attempted to corral the complexity of organizational development and change was Porras (1983, 1987) who developed a stream analysis approach to understanding organizational change in complex organizations. Porras and his associates focused on the nature of organizational change acknowledging the obvious existence of unplanned change but argued for the importance of planning

organizational changes using a theoretical framework or model (W.W. Burke, 2011; Porras, 1987). According to Porras (1987), "…everyone working in change settings should hold at least *some* theoretical perspective to guide their work (p. x)". I used Porras's framework because his systems-grounded approach overtly acknowledged the importance concerning the roles of external resources or inputs, internal organizational processes, and the organizational outputs provided to external entities (see Porras, 1987).

Stream Analysis and Stream Organization Model

As the previous section on organizational change highlighted the breadth and complexity of the organizational change field, Porras purposefully divided his stream analysis approach into both a theoretically based stream analysis analytical tool or process and a stream organizational model to incorporate aspects of organizational design theories and concepts into a tool practitioners could use to evaluate real-world organizations (Porras 1983, 1987). Porras's work was a combination of a practical application tool and a cogent model derived from organizational design theories that provided a powerful tool for managers, practitioners, and researchers. Originally defined as a "stream approach" in a 1983 journal article, Porras further expanded the stream analysis concept, a stream organizational model, and three applications of the model in a seminal book on the topic in 1987 (Porras, 1983, 1987).

Purposefully, Porras incorporated many elements of organizational change and leadership highlighted previously in the literature review. Porras's model combined Lewin's overt understanding of organizational complexity, the explicit relationships required to lead a change process, and a deliberative approach required to stop the change

process at an appropriate time to allow the organization's ongoing processes to best affect change (Lewin, 1947a; Porras, 1987). Likewise, Schein and Porras accepted this "refreezing" concept but increased the complexity of change analysis by highlighting the implicit role of culture in a change process (Porras, 1987; Schein, 2010).

In addition, Hickman (2010) emphasized the role of leadership in strategic planning and integrated these with Lewin's (1947a) 3-Step Process and was correlated with the stream analysis approach (Hickman, 2010; Lewin, 1947a; Porras et al., 1983). Porras also explicitly aligned his approach within the existing academic schema of stream organization management perspectives presented by Beckhard & Harris (1987), Beer (1980), Kotter (2012), Nadler (1981), and Weisbord (1976), but differentiated his approach by using four different or minimally addressed approaches such as organizational physical settings, technology's impact on change, organizational purpose, and the importance of individuals. These four concepts were not completely addressed by all of the previously noted researchers and several were only minimally addressed by one or two (Porras, 1987). This made Porras's approach more robust and more inclusive of the breadth of organizational change theory field of study.

The combination of theoretical grounding and practical applicability to real-world problem sets made Porras a viable framework to apply to any organization during an organizational change process because resource sourcing, resource allocation, and resource transformation into organizational outputs are all fundamental purposes to any organization (Henstra, 2010). If these concepts are not addressed, then it is reasonable to question the purpose for which the organization exists. Although Porras explicitly

designed his stream analysis model to help businesses more effectively deal with a rapidly changing business environment in the 1980s, the model remains applicable to a governmental institution such as the DOD, the National Guard and the National Guard Bureau (see Dunford, 2017; Porras, 1987). The rapidly changing national security environment identified in Chapter One provided an analogous changeable and uncertain operational environment similar to one faced by 1980 business organizations (Coletta, 2018; Jungdahl & MacDonald, 2015).

The stream analysis model's balance of theoretical and practical application to non-business case studies was supported by research Henstra (2010) conducted on Canadian emergency management policymaking processes where controlling access to resources for specific actions or programs is well-integrated into the Canadian democratic policy making processes. Consequently, using stream analysis to assess the impact of the DOD's funding on the overall National Guard's operations was an effective analytical approach to understanding how the National Guard conducts its role in national security. In the current organizational and bureaucratic structure, the department and the National Guard Bureau function as a "gatekeeper" for the distribution of funds (Jungdahl & Macdonald, 2015; Lewin, 1947b).

Over time, this did not present an insurmountable obstacle for the National Guard because since the late 1800s, the guard created effective avenues of access to the United States Congress that could by-pass the Department of War and its successor the DOD, if the state and territorial guard units did not agree with certain policies or programs (see Cooper, 1997). From a National Guard organization management and leadership

perspective, the organizational change model provided a valuable perspective on how resource sourcing influences resource usage and ultimately the impact of these decisions on organizational outputs. This research study used the stream analysis model to assess current national security threats, the roles the National Guard and the DOD play in the national security enterprise, and how potential changes to national security threats highlight weaknesses in the current relationship between the National Guard and the DOD within the overall national security enterprise.

Literature Review

The literature review in support of the research project involved using the search parameters to narrow the search to improve the likelihood of finding relevant and timely sources from the appropriated academic databases and other scholarly works. This was successfully accomplished by combining contemporary academic research and selective incorporation of seminal or critically important research from earlier than 2014. This latter category especially applies to research and studies related to the National Guard research on the militias and the National Guard accomplished to a large degree prior to 2001. Although there are a number of more focused academic papers since 2001, scholarly histories and analyses concerning the National Guard frequently pre-date the 2001 attacks. This is an indication of a perennial discussion of the role of the state security forces in the United States security enterprise and tensions between the federal government and the states and territories authorities and responsibilities.

As stated in this chapter's introduction, for much of American history the active duty (aka regular) military and the militia/guard had competing interests and perspectives

on the state-level security forces. What they did agree about was the need for the country's reserve forces to have the ability to help the country fight conventional-style military campaigns and wars. Both the federal and the state governments understood the state militias, as well as their current construct as the National Guard, needed to perform multiple missions from major interstate warfighting against foreign enemies to internal state constabulary and humanitarian relief missions (see Cooper, 1997; Riker, 1957). However, the state-level forces considered their mission to be in support of the national defense and consequently organized themselves towards conventional interstate warfighting. This trend accelerated after the United States Congress passed the Dick Act in 1903 that initiated the creation of the National Guard and formalized the "federalization" of the state militias (see Doubler, 2001).

The process of conducting the literature review influenced the research project parameters to evolve over time based on the research findings and the interrelationship of the various source topics and research. The research findings and sources evolved into the following research topic areas:

- organizational change

- National Guard role in American security

- budgets and finance

- law and authorities

- strategy and security challenges

These areas captured the essential areas of interest or concern for both federal and state governments when they assess their respective security concerns. It was important to note

that most of the topic areas were interrelated and many sources related to more than one of topic sections.

In essence, these topics areas served as the variables in this research project because their interrelationships represented tension between the different levels of governments and reflected their different priorities regarding these topical areas impact on their security issues. It was important to understand that these topical areas provided the variables and structure necessary to evaluate the research question as well as the areas drove the direction for data collection and analysis in the later phases of the study, especially Chapter Four. The following sections addressed the sources related to each of these topic areas and also addressed the interrelationships as appropriate.

Logically, the National Guard and the Military Reserves were the primary research topic area. Understanding the complexity of this element of the national security enterprise provided the intellectual underpinnings of this research project. As discussed previously in this chapter's theory section, organizational change was not only the theoretical basis for the stream analysis model applied to this study but was almost a constant in the relationships between the federal and state levels of government in the United States. Another factor in these relationships was research on how United States military organizations can be highly resistant to change. Although military adaption and innovation were often touted, research indicated the bureaucracies could be resistant to change (see A. B. Carter, 2014; Coletta, 2018; Jungdahl & MacDonald, 2015).

This interrelationship and tension in the establishment or competition for authorities was especially evident when it came to security issues and the role of state

militias in the national security model. A broad narrative derived from the literature review was that the federal government reflecting both the executive and legislative branches, but mostly the executive, were interested in increasing the federal government's authority and control over the state's militias. Within the narrative, the state governments resisted elements imbedded in this trend primarily through developing allies with the Congress (see D. J. Campbell, 2014; Cooper, 1997; Griswold, 2010).

A related theme derived from the research was the challenge for most states was, and remains, to find the financial and personnel resources to develop and maintain a state militia. Over time, and especially after the Civil War, many states stopped trying to maintain a militia (see D. J. Campbell, 2014; Griswold, 2010; Mahon, 1983). As with any trend, there are exceptions, northern states had the resources and the interest of segments of the population to maintain rather robust and capable militia units (Stentiford, 2008). Other states perceived a lack significant security threats to both the nation and the individual states and chose to let their militias wither and, in some cases, to essentially cease to exist. Those that did remain became community-based and socially focused institutions.

One consequence was the states acquiesced to significant federal involvement in state militia affairs in return for major financial support for state militia development and operations. This trend continued from the late 19th Century to the present with the federal government funding representing approximately 95 percent of all militia expenditures (Cooper, 1997; Doubler, 2001; GAO Report 08-331, 2008). This trend toward increasing "federalization" of the militia capability created a paradox where state leadership and the

population view state-based National Guard units as "state-controlled" institutions; although technically correct, the high cost of maintaining the current National Guard units required the high level of federal funding.

Therefore, to conduct training and operations missions, state National Guard units had three funding streams; state-funding for purely state missions, federal funding through United States Code Title 32 appropriations for training missions to prepare them for federal missions, and funds through United States Code Title 10 to conduct federal operational missions (C.R. Brown, 2008). Realistically, for any mission other than a small-scale state-level emergency, the state or territorial governor will resort to asking the President of the United States for financial and operational support. Effectively, the National Guard was, and remains, a federal institution "cloaked" in a state government structure.

This trend toward federalization was not inherently a bad thing; however, it did create a degree of frisson because the states continue to use the militia clause within the United States Constitution to justify their control of the state's National Guard units as representing their state militia (Cooper, 1997). The literature review indicated this created tensions between the federal government and the states and potential delays to use the National Guard associated with operations requiring a request for federal support. If not for training, this required the National Guard operate under federal not state authorities command. These tensions and delays affected the states because it potentially delayed military support to a state-based humanitarian or natural disaster (see R. Burke & MacNeil, 2015; Bush, 2010; Griswold, 2010; Schumacher, 2011).

Organizational Change

Key theories and models of organization change were discussed in the earlier theoretical foundation and conceptual framework section of this chapter. Admittedly, it was not possible to discuss all organizational change theories and models and this required narrowing the research focus to several fundamental and basic theories. I then used this foundation to analyze how they informed Porras's stream analysis research in the 1980s and 1990s. These theories and models were applicable to the study because the research conducted used them to evaluate whether there was any statistically significant change that occurred in U.S Congressional resources provided to individual state and territorially based National Guard organizations before and after the mass casualty foreign terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. Congress provided the federal resources for the DOD budget and managed through the department's National Guard Bureau.

Using Porras's stream analysis framework, the key question was whether the "inputs" (federal funds and equipment) changed the various National Guard ofganizational "processes" that, in turn, changed the guard's "outputs" as defined as National Guard operational capabilities or missions. I reviewed the various national security guidance such as appropriate national security strategies, national defense strategies, and national homeland security strategies to assess if the federal government changed guidance and directions following the 9/11 attacks. There were several possible anticipated outcomes of this assessment:

- Threat Changed – Inputs Changed – Process and Outputs Changed
    - Confirms Porras Stream Analysis Framework

- Threats Changed – Inputs Changed – Process and Outputs Same

    - Indicates possible DoD/NG resistance to environmental change

- Threats Changed – Inputs Same – Process and Outputs Same

    - Indicates Congress/DoD/NG resistance to environmental change

- Threats Same – Inputs Same – Processes and Outputs Changed

    - Indicates possible independent DoD/NG innovation

The first scenario would be expected using Porras's (1987) stream analysis model. The second scenario indicated the strong possibility or probability of organizational or bureaucratic resistance to change and bias for the status quo, which would not be surprising for the DOD (see A. B. Carter, 2014; Coletta, 2018; Worley, 2015). The third scenario indicated the threat changed but Congress didn't provide different resources (inputs) and the DOD and National Guard didn't request nor want different resources. Clearly, this indicates a national security enterprise resistant to change. The fourth option may indicate the DOD was innovative. However, given the National Guard's 100-year tradition of focusing on conventional war capabilities and the high degree of Congressional oversight and control of funding, this scenario was unlikely (A. B. Carter, 2014).

The following sections discussed the various concepts relevant to the research process and helped evaluate their impact on the National Guard's particular, perhaps unique, role and place in the United States national security enterprise. Perhaps, the National Guard's dual-status as a state and federal institution provided the National Guard the ability to bargain or negotiate with elements within the two levels of

government against each other in order to maintain or create the type of organization the Guard wants to be (see Cantwell, 1994; Griswold, 2010). Or, it may represent a potential bias towards the "regular or traditional", conventional, large-scale, industrial warfare that arguably was the "preferred American way of war" for both federal and state armed forces (see Barnett, 2004; Boot, 2002; R. Burke & McNeil, 2015; Gray, 2005; MacCarley, 2012; Schumacher, 2011; Waldman, 2018).

National Guard's Role in American Security

The National Guard, consisting of both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, represents the first line of reserve defense forces for the United States (Cantwell, 1994) as well as serving as a state militia for 54 states and territories (Doubler, 2001). This simple description belies the complexity of the National Guard's legal authorities, missions, funding and resources, and personnel policies. As described in Chapter One, I limited the scope of the research study and concentrated on the National Guard's missions as well as its budget and resources received during the time period spanning the 5 years prior to and following the terror attacks on 9/11 in 2001. The budget and the resources received served as the inputs in Porras's (1987) stream analysis framework whereas the missions represented the outputs produced from the inputs. In order to better understand the value of this framework, it was important to have an understanding of the National Guard to include its history, culture, structure, and missions. This knowledge helped to understand how the historical trajectory from state militia to the National Guard resulted in a conventional military reserve integrated into the national Army and Air Force services.

The historical trajectory of the state militias and the National Guard was critical in helping to understand the organization's place in the American security enterprise at both the national and state levels of government. The term "National Guard" came into official federal usage with the passage by Congress of Militia Act of 1903 (commonly known as the Dick Act) that converted the volunteer state militias into a formal state-based federal reserve that remained under the original constitutional parameters – federal standards and resources with state governments executing training and development (see Doubler, 2001). The National Guard's relationship with the federal government was further strengthened and formalized with additional Congressional legislation in 1916, 1920, and 1933 (see Cooper, 1997).

Cooper (1997), Mahon (1983), and Riker (1957) wrote scholarly historical works on state-centered military forces, during the state militia or the National Guard periods. These works remain critically important for understanding the trajectory of the militia or guard institutions and especially for understanding the ebbs and flows of authorities, mission effectiveness, and funding streams. Additional works were relatively few in number and most were not recently produced. Mahon (1983) and Riker (1957) focused on the militia from colonial times to their publication dates and along with Cooper's (1997) seminal work on the National Guard period from 1865 to 1920 were essential sources for understanding the organizations and their relationships with both their individual state and their relationship with the federal government.

These broadly focused works combined with service-specific works by Doubler (2001) for the Army National Guard, Rosenfeld and Gross (2007) for the Air National

Guard, and Cantwell (1994) for the Air Force Reserve provided a foundational

understanding of the ebbs and flows of federal government control as well the varying

levels of the state militias and National Guard's effectiveness throughout the republic's

history. They were effective in highlighting the interaction of legal authorities, at least

interpretations of authorities, with the operational requirements for both the state, from an

internal security perspective, and the federal government's priority on maintaining a

conventional military strategic reserve. In addition, Stentiford's (2008) more narrowly

focused research on the Richardson Light Guard, a pre-Civil War volunteer unit from

Massachusetts, that later became absorbed into the National Guard. This work

highlighted how the unit lost control of its operations, funding, and, more importantly, its

local identity and connections to the town that founded and supported it (see Stentiford,

2008).

The interaction between federal government and the state, territorial, and district

governments perceptions of their security requirements were a perennial issue between

the different sovereign political entities with each frequently claiming precedence over

the other's requirements (Doubler, 2001; Spangler, 2014). The competition was often

manifested in a competition between the federal active duty components and the state

militia or the National Guard. This competition frequently came down to which level of

government forces had command and control of the forces and the missions required by

the federal and state governments (see Doubler, 2001; Ellis & Makenzie, 2014; Riker,

1957).

The literature on these topics beyond the treatment in the broad histories of the militia, National Guard, and their elements varied from time period to time period and reflected the position and role of the reserve components (state militias, National Guard, and component reserves) in the historical security environment. The period of interest in this study focused on the decade following the "end" of the Cold War and the decade following the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001. One of the strongest themes in contemporary research and writing reflected the varying perspectives concerning the issue of whether the National Guard was a "strategic reserve" or should it become an "operational reserve" (see D. J. Campbell, 2014; Ellis & Ingram, 2012; Irwin, 2019; Lieb, 2016; Lynch & Stover, 2008; MacCarley, 2012; Makenzie, 2014; W. Matthews, 2016; Morris, 2004; Tussing, 2008; Wormuth, 2006). All the authors generally argued for a transition into an operational reserve with caveats highlighted below.

The predominant argument supporting an operational reserve was the high usage of the National Guard to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq indicated the active component armed forces were unable to conduct major military operations without using the reserve component forces, the National Guard and component reserves (see United States DOD, 2008; Ellis & Mackenzie, 2014; Nagl & Sharp, 2010). The proponents of this perspective generally fell into the operational reserve camp and supported the National Guard continuing to be a key and regular participant in these type of contemporary military operations, but they also generally argued there must be organizational changes and increased funding (see Campbell, 2014; Ellis & Makenzie,

2014; Ingram, 2012; Lieb, 2016; Lynch & Stover, 2008; MacCarley, 2012; Wormuth, 2006).

Ellis and Mackenzie (2014) argued throughout their paper that an operational reserve was required, but they hedged in their recommendations and conclusions by finally recommending additional research was necessary. Keene (2015) presented an interesting contrast to the American-centric writing above by discussing the reserve utilization from a British perspective and generally sided with an "operational reserve" perspective as way to keep a larger military force at a lower overall cost. Although all the authors argued there was a need for the operational reserve, there was also a trend in the papers that the barriers might be too high for the reserve component to truly transition into a fully functioning and capable operational reserve force. A good example of this was MacCarley (2012), who argued in his conclusion that the Army needed one, but the paper's historical survey provided evidence that the reserve components, both the National Guard and component reserves, have initially performed poorly transitioning from strategic reserve status to operational status.

Authors who differed on operational reserve or strategic reserve perspectives also tended to differ on the types of missions the National Guard should perform in their preferred roles. The proponents of operational reserve almost always agreed the National Guard should retain a robust conventional combat capability to include significant operational units such as divisions and, especially, combat brigades with heavy weapon systems like tanks and other armored vehicles (see Chitwood, 2014; Ellis & Mackenzie, 2014; Johnson, Kniep, & Conroy, 2013; W. Matthews, 2016; Wormuth, 2006). The

argument for increased resources and funding generally paralleled the argument that being an operational reserve meant the National Guard units must have comparable equipment to merge seamlessly when deployed with the active and reserve component forces. However, the National Guard still must retain the capability and funding to perform their state-centric militia and domestic operational capabilities (MacCarley, 2012).

The importance of domestic and state-centric militia mission areas was supported by the proponents who believe the National Guard should be a strategic reserve. One outlier to the predominance of operational reserve supporters was Morris (2004) who argued against the continued focus of the National Guard on being the combat arms part of the nation's reserves. Morris (2004) made the case that the National Guard should change its missions to primarily focus on homeland defense and homeland security missions because both the international threats to America and internal threats to America writ large and the state-centric risks will primarily be non-traditional, irregular threats such as terrorism or a consequence management following the use of a weapon of mass destruction.

This argument aligned with the United States Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (2001) report published just before the 9/11 terror attacks. This report along with the commission's co-chairman and former Senator Gary Hart's (2003) short post-9/11 article called for shifting the focus of the National Guard from foreign combat missions to homeland-centric security missions (see United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001). Even with a primary homeland security mission

focus, the National Guard could revert back to being a strategic reserve and remain ready to support the active component's missions, but just not on the regular, predictable, or frequent basis required of an operational reserve.

Given these assumptions, the strategic reserve proponents proposed shifting the National Guards focus from conventional combat capabilities, though none called for completely divorcing the National Guard from retaining combat capabilities. The type of forces for non-combat type missions made the National Guard look much more like the state militia constabulary force of the late 19th Century (see Cooper, 1997). The supporters also emphasized this type of National Guard would still be relevant to support the active component because these broad constabulary capabilities would be needed when the United States was involved internationally in irregular or non-traditional conflicts and operations (see Griswold, 2010; Hart, 2003; MacCarley, 2012; National Guard Bureau, 2016).

The discussion of strategic versus operational reserve and the accompanying argument for combat-focused capabilities versus constabulary forces reflected ongoing tensions between the active component and the reserve component's views of their place in the national security enterprise. It was important to note this enterprise represents a conceptual grouping of all the elements of federal government and state, territorial, or tribal governments that were part of security mission to protect the United States against external or internal enemies and threats (Troeder, 2019). Clearly, this was a broad group of organizations that had an equally broad set of capabilities and authorities to conduct security operations for the United States. It was also clear there were finite resources such

as personnel and funding to conduct these operations at both the federal or state level. This was the arena where the active components and the two reserve components competed for resources and authorities (Griswold, 2010, 2011; Kievit & Bankus, 2014).

Research on these relationships focused on the issues of complexity, competition, and cooperation and was also essential in providing a clearer picture on how the National Guard not only operated, but how it interacted with the larger national security enterprise. In other words, researchers focused on relationships and interactions of the National Guard with elements of the DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice on a recurring and regular basis. Likewise, the federal and state governments interacted on numerous issues to include security concerns (see Bergeron, 2013; C.R. Brown, 2008; Merutka, 2014; Roberts, 2014; Troeder, 2019; Weiner, 2012; Wilde, 2014).

These interactions frequently, perhaps even usually, were positive and cooperative in mutually working towards securing the United States. However, as was the case with all bureaucracies, it was important to understand the federal and state governments consisted of bureaucracies and there were frequent disagreements on authorities, responsibilities, and funding (Griswold, 2010). When the disagreement could not be mutually agreed upon there must an arbiter. In this case, it was the United States Congress. How Congress made these decisions and how the decisions affected the National Guard's relationships with aforementioned elements of government was a complicated and fascinating research topic (aww Cooper, 1997; Doubler, 2001; Lowenberg, 2005; Mahon, 1983; Punaro et al, 2008).

The relationship between the active component and the National Guard had both a positive side of cooperation as well as a darker side of competition. This ambivalent relationship followed the state militia and then the National Guard through their historical trajectory since the Revolutionary War with ebbs and flows in their mutual relationship with the federal government. As mentioned previously, Cantwell (1994), Cooper (1997), Doubler (2001), and Mahon, (1983) all described and explained the historical trajectory by providing details on both the mission sets as well as the relative power of the organizations. Other works focused their efforts towards explaining the contemporary give and take interactions between the active and reserve components (see Ellis & Mackenzie, 2014; Griswold, 2010; Irwin, 2019; Lynch & Stover, 2008; Punaro et al, 2008; Stentiford, 2008).

Recent research focused on the concept of duality within both the National Guard organizations as well as with the citizen-soldiers within the units, but it was important to note the research diverged in interpretations. The fundamental nature of the National Guard was it consisted of citizen-soldiers who, theoretically, were closely tied to their communities (see Krebs, 2009; Punaro et al, 2008; Vest, 2014). Krebs (2009) argued this was one of the fundamental strengths of the National Guard and the militias before it. However, Stentiford (2008) and Vest (2014) argued the ties to the community were strained in the contemporary environment. Stentiford (2008) used an historical case study to show how a Massachusetts volunteer militia unit was more closely aligned to the community in the 19th Century because it was directly supported by volunteers and local funding. When it shifted to the National Guard, members came from a broader regional

area and the national-level requirements broke ties to the local community's needs. This break from state and local to federal requirements actually resulted in organizational funds for the specific unit decreasing during the federally funded National Guard era (Stentiford, 2008). Vest (2014) took a different perspective and assessed the unit members were challenged to maintain dual-identities and with increased operational activities they had increased difficulty managing their community and National Guard member identities.

The concept of duality was also a contested issue between the active component and the National Guard when it came to the issue of active component support to civil authorities in cases of domestic crises or unrest. These missions were described as Defense Support to Civilian Authorities. Griswold's (2010, 2011) papers were important works describing the National Guard and the DOD's relationship through agency response, principal agent theory, and historical institutionalism analytical frameworks. This duality of domestic security needs of sovereign state governments and the national-level federal government security requirements were prioritized and managed through a process of bargaining and negotiation through the political process.

Griswold asserted the "durable" relationship, however contested it was, could be attributed to the National Guard's relationship with both the state governments and United States Congress. Mahon (1983) argued the National Guard has successfully managed to maintain its position by insisting to both Congress and the DOD that it should be the first reserve the federal government should use in times of national emergencies. This prioritization for the National Guard has been consistently approved

by Congress with the Militia Act of 1792, the Dick Act of 1903, and the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 (see Buchalter & Elan, 2007; Mahon, 1983, Riker, 1957).

Dual-command status was another relative power issue contested between the active component and the National Guard. Traditionally the active component resisted putting its federal Title 10 forces under the command of a National Guard commander during domestic security or natural disaster missions. Although envisioned in previous federal and state emergency planning sessions, the tensions related to dual-command status culminated after major difficulties having parallel command structures and organizational cultures during the multi-state Hurricane Katrina disaster response (see R. Burke & McNeil, 2015; Bush 2010; Hayes, 2015, Schumacher, 2011). Congress interjected in the disagreement and dictated in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 that dual-command will be the "usual and customary" command and control arrangement during simultaneous employment of National Guard and active component forces in domestic disaster response scenarios. In other words, a National Guard officer could command federal active component forces during a domestic disaster mission. (R. Burke & McNeil, 2015).

Ultimately, this Congressional intervention reinforced Griswold's (2010, 2011) perspective on the Guard using Congress to balance active and reserve components relationships. Johnson, Kniep, and Conroy (2013) complemented Griswold's perspective by introducing the concept of symbiosis and the value of viewing active and reserve component's relationship as symbiotic or complementary. They argued this should help reduce friction and change the less than helpful "zero-sum" perspectives. The command

and control issue was symptomatic of the friction between the two key military elements of national security.

It was important to note, this was what the makers of the United States Constitution desired when they authorized all the country's sovereign entities (federal and state governments) to maintain military forces (United States Constitutional Convention Delegates, 1787). This was another element of checks and balances, but it was important to question how independent was the National Guard when the federal government provided the vast majority (over 90 percent) of the National Guard's funding through Title 10 and Title 32 authorizations via the DOD's National Guard Bureau (see GAO-08-311, 2008; Griswold, 2011).

Budgets and Finance

Funding and resources for the National Guard changed throughout United States history from periods where the state governments provided the majority of the funds to other times when the federal government provided the majority of National Guard funds. The United States is currently in a period where the federal government is the preeminent provider of National Guard resources and has done so for over 100 years (see GAO-08-331, 2008; Cooper, 1997). The reason the federal government began to supply the majority of the guard's funding was to allow the National Guard to prepare for and perform federal security missions (Ellis & Mackenzie, 2014). The funding was provided under the authority the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8 as well as and two United States Codes, Title 10 for the Armed Forces and Title 32 for the National Guard (United States Congress, 1994, 2004).

Although the National Guard is formally part of United States Armed Forces, the National Guard's funding through Title 32 indicated a formal separation of national wartime security issues and state-level training and security missions. This federal versus state separation are discussed further in the legal and authorities section. From a budgetary perspective, Title 10 resources primarily funded wartime or combat missions and Title 32 provided support for state-managed programs and missions, such as training, internal security, and disaster relief activities (Punaro et al, 2008). It was very difficult to divorce discussions whether a strategic versus operational focus was required for the National Guard element of the reserve component forces from what were the funding and resource streams. Legal authorities permit the flow of federal government funding that Congress then assigns to a particular type of program or mission through its budgetary processes. This complex interaction of legal, budgetary, and operational authorities was, and remains, a somewhat murky locus of federal versus state responsibilities for the National Guard.

This locus was the heart of this research study and why budgeting, funding, and the resources they provide to the National Guard were critical elements in this study. It would then be possible to consider funding and material resources, which were almost solely obtained by Congressional funding vice state government processes, as the critical inputs utilized by the Porras stream analysis paradigm for organizational change analysis and assessment of the National Guard's 1996 versus 2006 resources and mission prioritization (see GAO-08-331, 2008; Mahon, 1983, Porras, 1987). Based on whether there was a statistically significant change over this decade, then it could be possible to

assess if there was any change of perspective, focus, or operational capability and whether the change was directed towards non-traditional types of conflict. If there was no statistically significant change, then it was reasonable to assess the National Guard as part of the national security enterprise was likely to be resistant to change and might likely be biased toward conventional, industrial security or military operations.

There was another fundamental reason to consider budgetary data in an analyzing an organization. A budget represents tangible "things". In this case, the somewhat nebulous and ill-defined concept of the American national security enterprise and, more concretely, the National Guard and resources it received from the DOD. The National Guard's share of the DOD's Congressional procurement budget is the amount of federal financial resources the National Guard can use to obtain tangible items such as personnel, equipment, and facilities as well as execute actual missions and activities (National Guard Bureau, 2019). (Note: These expenditures are above what the DOD transfers from its appropriations for operations and equipment). In short, an organization does not exist without resources.

Since the passage of the Dick Act in 1903, the federal government has become the predominant revenue source for the National Guard, although the National Guard units still receive some funding from their respective State governments (see GAO-08-311, 2008; Mahon, 1983). (Note: The state share of funding went from 33% in 1933 to 6% in 1963 and the federal government still provided the "vast majority" in 2008). The review of the budget-focused literature identified two primary types of data sources; United States government-directed studies and reports along with a limited quantity of academic

research studies and reports. Regarding the government produced documents, a significant amount of the reports focused on the broader reserve component to include both the National Guard and component reserves and were generally narrow in focus and tended to focus more on policy.

One example was the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves Final Report (2008) that had a 69-page section on "Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available Operational Reserve" including an 18-page subsection concerning "Equipment and Supplies". However, this analysis did not discuss specific capabilities of the National Guard nor the component reserves. In addition, almost all the discussions were broad-stroked discussion of policy with general figures but did not focus a significant amount of attention to specific capabilities. The only exception to this trend was a graph that highlighted five items consisting of transportation equipment and personal equipment items that were Army Reserve equipment shortages (Punaro et al, 2008). This analysis was not intended as an overall critique of the commission's work, but merely identified a gap or shortfall in government funded research and a lack of academic focus within the government's research.

The quantity of academic articles and research focused on the National Guard was quite limited. This included academic research conducted at military educational institutions and think tanks and those articles frequently focused on broader DOD funding, programs, or policies. Wipfli and D. D. Owens (2008) produced a colloquium brief from a "State of the United States Military Reserve Components" event. Although not specifically a budget-focused event, the experts attending the colloquium delved into

the importance of the role types of funding played in establishing priorities. The authors cogently described the National Guard fear that shifting operational focus into stability or civil support operations might jeopardize the National Guard's critical reliance on Title 10 warfighting funding (see Wipfli & D. D. Owens, 2008).

Morrison (2014) does drill down to analyze a reserve component program area or functional capabilities budget issues. In Morrison's work, the research reported the analysis of the relative Army National Guard and Army Reserve costs to conduct a series of functional missions compared to the cost of Army Active Component unit. The results showed mostly lower costs ranging from 71%-102%, but the National Guard's heavy combat unit costs were much closer to the active forces. The overall analysis was from a budget and cost perspective and argued the heavy combat units should remain in the active component because of the higher costs combined with the additional readiness time needed to get reserve components ready for deployment (Morrison, 2014). The longer deployment readiness timelines for the National Guard's heavy combat units is also supported by MacCarley's (2012) research. These assessments challenge the National Guard Bureau's assertion that keeping combat forces in the National Guard was a cost savings with little or no degradation in mission capabilities (National Guard Bureau, (2013).

The literature search discovered other works on defense spending and recommended reductions, but none were specifically targeted at the National Guard or the reserves. Adams and Leatherman (2011) research focused more broadly on the DOD's budget, but the authors did make recommendations to cut specific programs

ranging from the F-35 to attack submarines. However, these recommended program cuts only affected the Air National Guard's F-35 program (National Guard Association of the United States, 2016 & National Guard Bureau, 2018). The other programs reviewed did not represent current or projected National Guard capabilities. Other defense spending research tended to be more broadly focused on overall spending and the implications for United States budget deficits (see Hale, 2015; Leffler, 2013; W. Matthews, 2016).

Law and Authorities

Almost all legal discussions of state militias or the National Guards roles in the United States national security enterprise fundamentally involved two major issues. Legal authorities and the authorities to control the National Guard's activities and operations. The legal authorities were referred to in every history work and journal article reviewed and they revolved around the militia's authorities provided by the United States Constitution and Congressional Laws passed to expand or curtail interpretations of these authorities. The second issue, which was directly derived from the first, involved the authority to direct and manage various types of activities and operations along with the training required to perform them. This section of the literature review analyzed these major issues through these two "authority" lenses, but added a discussion on the types of missions related or assigned to the National Guard as well as discussing the important issue of National Guard funding. Legal authorities, command and control, mission types, and funding streams provided a broad-based perspective on the National Guard's development and employment throughout its history, especially on its national security role over the past 120 years.

The issue of constitutional or legal authorities for the state militias and the National Guard to exist and to operate started from the very foundation of the American Republic. Throughout the initial phases of the American Revolution, state and local militias provided the overwhelming preponderance of military forces for the rebels (Mahon, 1983). This reflected the fact that the militias represented the faction of American Colonial society that was frustrated by British Colonial rule and was willing to use force to resist and eventually overthrow imperial rule. A second reason was that the rebel government, represented by the Continental Congress, did not have the ability nor the resources to develop a significant national army and through necessity had to rely on the existing colonial militias (Cooper, 1997).

When a researcher departs from using long and detailed militia and National Guard history products, the field of academic research narrows considerably and frequently used the historical constitutional issue as a starting off point. Campbell and Campbell (2010), Dunlap (1994), and Merutka (2014) assessed how authority issues affected mission types, effectiveness, and command and control structures of these organizations. These areas of research became rather important following the less than seamless state and federal interaction during and after the Hurricane Katrina disaster in Louisiana in 2005. Related to this area of studies was the Posse Comitatus Act passed by Congress as part of Army Appropriations in 1878 to constrain the use of the Army in law enforcement activities. This became an issue of debate concerning not only domestic disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, but also the role of the federal government's

armed forces in counterterrorism missions (see Currier, 2003; Daugherty, 2009; M.

Matthews, 2006; Merutka, 2014).

Works by M. Matthews (2006), Newland, (1989), and Sulmasy & Yoo (2007),

were written to address the broad issue of the National Guard's command and control

requirements. These works paid particular attention to a state's authority to appoint

National Guard officers and how the state military leadership interacted with the federal

government and active duty military leaders. It was important to note this was not a

distant historical issue, rather it was a recurring issue from the Revolutionary War to 21st

Century disaster relief and emergency response requirements to include not only

Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast, but also in the Northeastern United States for the

9/11 terror attacks response and Hurricane Sandy (C.R. Brown, 2008).

A less frequently discussed, but important, militia studies area was the funding

required to maintain the state militias and how to fund state-centric missions using

federal government funds. This area was discussed in greater depth in the separate budget

and finance section within this chapter. However, a cursory discussion was applicable

here because funding and legal authorities were closely aligned. Many people overlook or

lack understanding of the concept that the United States Government cannot legally

spend money unless it is authorized and appropriated by the United States Congress

(United States Constitutional Convention Delegates, 1787).

Many, if not most, of the works associated with this law and authorities section

devoted key sections of their works towards funding issues and research. Of course, the

general militia and National Guard historical works emphasized the importance of

funding issues to the militias with same going all the way back to the British Colonial

governments. However, Mahon's (1983) was by far the most detailed in providing data

on the multifaceted financial battles waged between the regular army and the

militia/guard organizations, between the state and federal governments, and between the

regular army and Congress. This work and to lesser degree those by Cantwell (1994),

Cooper (1997), and Doubler (2001) detailed the three-way relationship between the state

militia/National Guard units (National Guard was not the official title for all states

militias until 1916), their respective state governments, and the National Guard

Association of the United States (formerly known as the National Guard Association

from the 1880s to 1911). This organization functioned as a lobbyist for the state-based

military organizations and their respective state governments (see Doubler, 2001).

Interestingly, this triangular relationship existed not only within the individual

states, but this relationship was also replicated these same entities and their federal

government counterparts, especially the United States Congress. The state militias

interacted with the War Department and then the National Guard interacted with the

Department of Defense through the National Guard Bureau. Likewise, state governments

interacted with the federal government including the state governor's relationship with

the President, the nation's Commander in Chief. The National Guard Association of the

United States lobbying duties shifted accordingly to the United States Congress (Mahon,

1983). The connection between all these relationships from the relationship between legal

authorities, to command authorities, and to mission authorities were enabled through

funding authorities and appropriations.

This discussion came back full circle to the this section's opening discussion regarding interpretation of constitutional authorities and how various state and federal actors operationalized their federalist or antifederalist perspectives. The spectrum of these competing viewpoints illustrated the competition reflected in the state militia and National Guard histories and their contemporary status within their relationships to the federal government manifested in United States Codes Title 10–"Armed Forces" and Title 32–"National Guard" (United States Congress, 1994, 2004). Over the past two decades, three instances of National Guard or active duty military actions or failure to take effective actions spurred a reassessment of the role of military forces in domestic events. Two cases reflected the use of the National Guard, both concerning support for policing the nation's international boundaries, and one case reflected the delay in using active duty military forces for a domestic humanitarian assistance/disaster relief mission to support Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina. Not surprisingly, the academic and professional research on these cases was mixed.

The research followed the well-trod trail of the federalism versus states rights or "antifederalist". Several authors fell into the antifederalist camp that argued using or relying on military forces to conduct operations within the United States undermined the concept of civilian control of the military (see Dunlap, 1994; Hammond, 1997; Hughes, 2017; Sulmasy & Yoo, 2007). The general argument was that even if the short-term benefit of using military forces alleviates a domestic problem there was a longer-term diminution of the power and credibility of the civilian elements of both the federal and state governments. These concerns reflected a perspective of a slippery slope between

civilian and military authorities combined with a sense of increasing militarism within society when the citizenry began to view the military as more capable than the civilian components of government and society (Dunlap, 1994; Hughes, 2017).

Associated with this line of research, J. J. Campbell and K. M. Campbell (2010) viewed militarism in American society through a perspective of convergence between the militarization of civilian police forces and "constabularization" of the military since the 9/11 attacks. It was interesting the authors did not mention the National Guard's state militia role in supporting internal security for their respective states. Nor did the authors discuss the potential to use the National Guard's constabulary capabilities in support of their perspective on the DOD's missions included a "significant degree of peacekeeping, civil-conflict stabilization, and nation-building" (D. J. Campbell & K. M. Campbell, 2010, pp. 327-332).

Much of the research on the role of the National Guard reflected the interplay between the authorities and missions of the National Guard under Title 10 (federalized status) and Title 32 (state-controlled status). Traditionally, Title 32 was reserved for using federal funds to support the state-controlled training of the National Guard in order to maintain federal military standards. Much of the recent research focused on the loosening interpretations of the "Other Duties" clause within Title 32 (see C.R. Brown, 2006; Mason, 2013; Romano, 2005; Sliney, 2016). The "Other Duties" clause was enacted by Congressional amendment in 1964 and over the next 50 years expanded to include counterdrug and counterterrorism missions originally under state control.

Later, it was further expanded to include using the National Guard to support federal counterdrug, weapons of mass destruction, and counterterrorism missions (C.R. Brown 2008). Regarding what was becoming a perennially contentious issue of the using the National Guard to help secure the nation's borders, Sliney (2016) argued Congress should further expand authorizations under the Title 32 "Other Duties" category because it was advantageous to enhance federal and state coordination. Although the state governments retain the right to call their National Guard for internal state-centric missions, albeit at the state's expense, border security and immigration control missions along the international boundaries were inherently the responsibility of the federal government and controlling both federal agencies and the National Guard would improve coordination and performance (Sliney, 2016).

The net assessment of all the historical studies and contemporary academic research indicates there was no consensus on a way forward towards resolving the federalist or state's rights perspectives regarding control of the state-centered National Guard units. In many ways this was to be expected because the framers of the constitution purposely created this tension to prevent one level of government from dominating the other. However, Dunlap (1994) summed up this relationship best when he stated the federal government controls the National Guard because with "almost all of its budget drawn from the federal government, the National Guard is, for all practical purposes, a federal force" (p. 384).

What was extensively discussed in this section's research was the degree of control or the level of funding, but not the National Guard's capabilities. This was a

major gap in national security academic research and led to the question: Should the

National Guard change its orientation from a "combat-warfighting" organization to a

"constabulary" force to increase support for internal state security concerns? These

increased constabulary capabilities would bring skills and capabilities needed for non-

combat requirements for DOD responsibilities and missions (D. J. Campbell & K. M.

Campbell, 2010). If the answer to this question was yes, then Congress must change the

laws and authorities pertaining to the National Guard and the DOD must also change the

mission and training requirements expected of the National Guard.

Strategy and Security Challenges

As stated in Chapter One, there was no way anyone can capture or encapsulate all

the security risks facing the United States nor effectively prioritize a list even if

developing a comprehensive list was possible. In light of what is an essentially

insurmountable challenge, researchers must resort to using estimates or "proxies" of

security threats. Some threats were known, at least conceptually. Russia, China, North

Korea, India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and France were all states with declared

nuclear weapon capabilities. All these countries theoretically presented a potential risk of

nuclear attack against the United States, or its interests protected under a United States

security assurance or a "nuclear umbrella" (White House, 2017). Of course, not all risks

were equal and some may have legitimately presented almost a zero degree of risk (i.e.

United Kingdom or France).

To a security professional the questions were; which was a nuclear threat to the

United States and what type of risk did they pose? Although a somewhat simplistic

example, this example added to other potential threats to the United States provided insight into the challenges of assessing or even understanding the complexity of national security threats (see Ben-Haim, 2016). Faced with this conundrum, I chose to use the United States National Security Strategy documents as "proxies" for what the United States Federal Government assessed to be security challenges facing the country at the time of their publication.

The national security strategy is produced by the National Security Council for the President's approval. Every president from Ronald Reagan to Donald Trump approved at least one national security strategy document during their administrations (White House, 1987, 2017). President Jimmy Carter issued the United States National Strategy and, later, the Modifications to United States National Strategy documents that left the reader to assume the word strategy is implied (White House, 1977, 1981). All of these documents contained an assessment of risks or the key threats to the United States and/or its national interests as well as a declaration of approach or intent to combat or mitigate these challenges.

For the purpose of this study, these documents were treated as primary data sources that captured the executive branch's perspectives on the United States interests and potential threats to these interests. I focused my assessment on President William Clinton and the President George W. Bush administrations's national security strategies because their terms of office included the nine years prior to and seven years after the terror attacks in New York City, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania in September 2001. Their National Security Strategy documents (1994, 1999, 2002, 2006) provided a

baseline threat assessment in order to guide additional research on security threats and provided a sense of the environment American security enterprise leadership faced before and after the 9/11 attacks.

Admittedly there were limitations in using the national security strategy documents as a proxy. First, national security strategy documents were not really strategies. The generally accepted broad elements of a strategy consist of ends, ways, and means. What goal was it you wanted to accomplish, what methods and practices you would use, and what resources were required to achieve your goal (see Hoffman, 2016; Liddell Hart, 1967; Rathke, J, 2018; Strachan, H. 2011; Yarger, 2006)? The national security strategy documents set out broad security objectives (ends or goals?) for the United States as a whole, but they did not really identify what the country would do (the ways?) nor what resources (the means?) the government would provide in order to achieve the desired objectives.

These limitations existed because, although the executive branch controls the identification of the desired "ends", it does not completely control the "ways" and "means" that would be used to achieve the "ends". Other elements of the United States political system control some, if not many, of the activities often required to support the "ways" of addressing the national strategy (see Krepinevich, 2012; Murdock & Flournoy, 2005). Likewise, Congress and state legislatures control federal and state budgetary decisions and they decide what "means" will be provided and, also frequently, the "ways" acceptable to be used to assist their governments achieve their desired "ends" (White House, 1987; Worley, 2015).

Second, a national security strategy presented the national government's executive branch's view of the nation's security concerns. However, this may or may not have been representative of other branches of the federal government, state, tribal, or local governments, or the even the American public's, perspectives or concerns. As previously mentioned, Congress was in charge of the purse strings that paid for resources, to include personnel, funding for operations or equipment, and also provided the legal authority to conduct operations. Therefore, the executive branch required Congressional support to provide the "means" and approve the "ways" needed to execute a national security strategy. It was important to note that the national security strategy may not have reflected the opinion of a large percentage of American citizens, especially if they were not political supporters of the administration responsible for the strategic documents. In addition, if there was a gap between the federal and state governments regarding their perspectives or prioritizations of national security concerns, this would likely create problems for the National Guard as it tried to address a variance in state and federal security concerns.

Lastly, the national security strategy was a political document and therefore almost certainly could not necessarily reflect the diverse perspectives of the country's security threats resonating within the nation's national security-focused academic and research communities (see Hoffman, 2016; Lamb, 2016; Waldman, 2018). Even with all these limitations, it was important to note national security strategy documents do provide a type of longitudinal series of documents produced by the same government organization over time but by different groups of individuals. Albeit, these governmental

and academic groups were extremely diverse and it was impossible to capture all of their ideas and concepts in the national security strategies, even if the National Security Council wanted to incorporate them. Likewise, for all the same reasons it was an impossible task for this research study. Therefore, a national security strategy provided the best possible proxy to guide an assessment of the federal government's executive branch leadership's overarching security concerns at the time of publication.

Besides the national security strategies, there was a considerable body of associated research that provided insights into the nature of the security threats facing the United State in the post-Cold War era (1991-present) as well as national security implications derived from the 9/11 terror attacks. One theme present throughout this era was the rise of significant terror threats, both state-sponsored and nonstate sponsored and how they presented a different security challenge than other national states (see Blanchard & Humud, 2018; Coletta, 2018; Kitfield, 2016; Weiner, 2012). This rise of nonstate versus state threats became a recurring theme in American security perspectives following the end of the Cold War, with the notable and recent exception of the Trump administration's heavy emphasis on "near-peer" competitors (see Bush, 2001; Renz, 2016; White House, 1994, 1999, 2002).

There have been multiple terms used to describe this security perspective to include global war on terror, irregular war, long war, unconventional war, hybrid war, and the gray zone to name just a few of the most common descriptors (Mazarr, 2015). One element of the National Guard's national security roles relevant to this study was its support to the DOD as a one of the nation's two reserve components. Perhaps what was

even more important for this research study, the National Guard was the only element of the federal government's national military forces with continuous national and state authorities relevant to addressing the novel security challenges that emerged in the post-Cold War period (see R. Burke & MacNeil, 2015; Punaro et al, 2008; Schumacher, 2011).

The United States government's reaction to the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001 was to almost immediately initiate significant military, intelligence, and law enforcement operations and for President Bush, not Congress, to declare the campaign against Al-Qaeda was a "War on Terror" (White House, 2002). This term essentially survived through the Bush administration, but both academia and national security specialists challenged the term and the concepts it implied. The migration from a war on terror through titles such as the long war, irregular war, hybrid war or gray zone conflicts represented an increasing awareness of the need to think differently about the operational security environment.

This was an important idea to help conceptually understand that both the operations required and the environment where they occurred were fundamentally different than required for the standard concept of conventional and industrial war in a traditional war-peace dichotomy (see Banasik, 2016; Barnett, T., 2004; Freier, 2007; Hunter & Pernik, 2015; Mazarr, 2015; Olson, 2010; Takahashi, 2018; Votel, et al., 2016). Essentially, the "Gray Zone "concept asserted there was an operational realm between the dichotomy of war or peace. To successfully deal with nonstate extremist organizations as

well as state actions that occurred in the gray zone required changes within the United States security enterprise (see Freier, 2007; Troeder, 2019; Votel et al., 2016).

One challenge to a national security enterprise that emphasized "gray zone-centric" threats operations was the potential loss of focus on and the capabilities to conduct traditional, conventional, industrial warfare. Proponents of this view, such as Thomas (2013), Kaplan (2016), Odierno (2012), and Boot, (2003) used the specter of increasing conventional military capabilities of America's competitors and potential adversaries, such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, as existential national security threats. If there was ever a war between the United States associated with potential regional or global conflicts, countering these increasing conventional threats would require the United States to use conventional military capabilities to defeat these countries (A. B. Carter, 2014; Odierno, 2012). The National Security Strategy (2017) stated the "United States must retain overmatch—the combination of capabilities in sufficient scale to prevent enemy success and to ensure that America's sons and daughters will never be in a fair fight." (p. 28).

This strategy document and other proponents of this perspective minimized the strategic nature of terror threats and often suggested changing the focus of counter-terrorism from war back to crime. This change could be seen as moving counter-terrorism from a military-focused effort into primarily one of law enforcement agencies and the American justice system. Reynolds (2007) reported observing a similar shift in the United Kingdom's government's position that by ceasing to use the term "war on terror" (para. 16) it represented the government's perspective terrorism was essentially a crime.

Taking an even broader position, Head (2011) discussed at length whether terrorism is even a crime because it is associated with political acts and therefore should be protected likewise as "free speech" (pp. 181-218). Not surprisingly, the words war or warfare were not used at all in Head's chapter on terrorism.

Ultimately, the issues of terrorism and conventional war should not be considered to be "one or the other", i.e., all terrorism is war or all terrorism is crime. The issue really came down to one of scale. Was there a "group" with a form of structure and did this "group" have access to weapons or modified "weapons" that could inflict large-scale damage or casualties, i.e., the 9/11 attackers using hijacked aircraft to kill 4,000 people in one day? This shift towards treating terror as a crime represented a return to pre-2001 strategies (White House, 1994). Although these were reasonable and cogent arguments, to be truly valid the arguments required proving that the 9/11 attacks could have been prevented by better civilian law enforcement capabilities. The concept of all terrorism is a crime or protected political act was challenged following the 9/11 attacks precisely because the overall assessment of the attack was that to avoid this kind of catastrophic attack required a "whole of government approach". This type of response includes civilian law enforcement, the military's homeland defense capabilities to include, at a minimum, fighter aircraft able and authorized to shoot down hijacked planes, and civilian and military intelligence to be able to operate against well-financed, capable, and highly motivated transnational terror organization(s) (see Punaro et al, 2008; Troeder, 2019; Weiner, 2012).

The importance of this assessment was that accepting the argument implies accepting that national security should not be defined in a binary way; either a military with all conventional military capabilities versus a military that emphasizes in capabilities effective in the "Gray Zone" associated with reduced conventional warfare capabilities (Mazarr, 2015). The primary purpose of asserting the importance of a nonbinary perspective was to help generate discussion and analysis about what type of potential national security environments the United States was likely to face and what were the best type of national security capabilities likely to be most effective in these environments (Boot, 2002). Votel, et al. (2016) highlight that the "Gray Zone" is just one segment within a continuum of potential security challenges and operations. Therefore, the intra-military discussion of conventional versus irregular capabilities must be integrated into a "whole of government" assessment that would include law enforcement and other civilian "constabulary" capabilities.

Summary and Conclusions

This review of literature associated with the National Guard and its place within the broader American national security enterprise highlighted the ongoing dialogue between the elements of national power and the various constitutionally mandated structures within the United States. A challenge related to the topic of the National Guard was associated with the organization's complexity from the breadth of the organization, which includes 54 National Guard organizations in all 50 states, three territories, and the District of Columbia, to the depth of how the National Guard worked with organizations and situations from the President down to local citizens within their state. Another

challenge associated with the National Guard's complexity was the challenge of utilizing

and integrating the many different types of research appropriate and necessary to analyze

the National Guard's role in the national security environment. This literature review

addressed these issues and identified there was a gap in the research and discussed how

this research study nested in both theoretical and practical analyses. I developed this

research proposal to help fill this gap.

The focus of this research study was to assess using a quantitative approach the

relationship between perceived national and sub-national security threats and whether the

American political and security systems, to include the National Guard, are biased toward

conventional military capabilities rather than state-centered constabulary functions. The

gap in the research found there was very little academic research focused on this

particular element with in the broad National Guard topic and there was no contemporary

research that analyzed the relationship of DOD funding levels and provision of other

resources to the National Guard before and after the 9/11 attacks. The literature reviewed

represented superb work on the National Guard and its historical trajectory, its

relationship to the contemporary security environment, its organizational challenges, and

issues related to the law and pertinent authorities. Although the research did touch on

National Guard budget issues, the literature focused much more intently on policy and

addressed the National Guard's budget, funding, and resourcing processes mainly in

broad terms. It also tended to focus on the shift of funding from state-centric to national-

centric security concerns.

In sum, the works highlighted, although important and certainly useful for this study, did not analyze the National Guard's relationship to funding and the impact of 9/11 on the organization using an academic prism or an organizational change framework. The literature review indicated data from the federal budget was a critical element within this research study, but the missions and activities of the National Guard funded via the budget processes were an equally, if not a more, important element. My goal was to critically analyze and compare what the budget bought and what missions the procured resources enabled the National Guard to perform in order to obtain a sense of the focus and priorities the National Guard had prior to and after the 9/11 attacks. I identified the Porras stream analysis model as an appropriate framework to identify and analyze the budget and resources that provided "raw" inputs for the National Guard and then analyze how the DOD and the National Guard processed these resources to produce outputs in terms missions and activities in support of the national security strategy objectives. Building upon the foundation established in this chapter, I will propose a quantitative methodology in Chapter 3 to assess National Guard adaptation and response to changes in national security threats and priorities.

Chapter 3: Research Method

The United States faced diverse threats to its security ranging from existential threats from other politically independent states to less catastrophic but potentially damaging attacks from terror organizations by nonstate organizations (United States DOD, 2018a). In addition, the United States faced nonkinetic challenges such as medical, environmental, economic, and social changes (White House, 2017). A recent example of this type of nontraditional threat along with the challenges of coordinating 54 state and territorial governments with the federal government was the COVID-19 pandemic. This national and global crisis was responsible for approximately 200 times the American deaths from the 9/11 terror attacks (Balz, 2020; Sonmez et al., 2020). These types of threats presented a unique challenge to the United States because the country assumes a prominent role in the international order and addresses a wide variety of security concerns and issues (Sarkesian et al., 2008, 2013). The United States used multiple levels of government (federal, state, local, and tribal) and different types of organizations as instruments to approach these security threats.

Although the types of threats facing the United States were not static, the most significant threat to the United States was other political states using military force to try to defeat the United States military forces and impose their will on the country (see Rosecrance, 2014; Snow & Drew, 2010). Internal security threats were traditionally dealt with by using law enforcement and civilian internal security apparatuses (D. J. Campbell & K.M. Campbell, 2010). The rise of transnational terror groups in the latter quarter of the 20th century presented a third threat to the United States both domestically and to its

overseas institutions, structures, and personnel (National Commission on Terrorist

Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

The unprecedented 9/11 attacks in 2001 came to be seen as an irregular form of

war, and the United States began to look for ways to combat and destroy the nonstate

actors behind the attack. During the 2000s, the United States reevaluated its national

security enterprise to thwart or mitigate future large-scale attacks such as those that

occurred on 9/11 (Olson, 2010). A key component of America's national security

enterprise was the National Guard that was an armed force with a unique, hybrid

organizational structure and mission set (Schumacher, 2011). In the current study, I

evaluated the National Guard's relationship with the DOD by investigating the

relationship between nontraditional national security threats and comparing that change

to the impact of federal government funding and support for the National Guard's legacy

conventional military structures and capabilities.

To assess the impact of Congressional funding to the National Guard through the

DOD, I used two periods bracketing the millennium in order to compare the transition

from the cold war state-centric security paradigm of the 1990s to the unsettled post-9/11

terror security threats posed by nonstate actors following the 2001 terror attacks. In the

pre-9/11 period, the United States military forces concentrated on traditional military

concerns facing the country such as conventional warfare capabilities or weapons of mass

destruction threats from other states (see Tindall, 1992; United States DOD, 1995, 2004).

In the mid-1990s security strategies, counterterrorism was addressed within a peacetime

engagement section and was considered a support to civilian law enforcement

responsibility (United States DOD, 1995). The second period of this study followed the major 9/11 terror attack in 2001 and represented a transition period during which the United States and some of its allies began to confront transnational nonstate terrorist organizations that presented serious and potentially damaging threats to the United States (see Boot, 2013a; United States DOD, 2004).

There was a significant transition within the national security and national military documents from a predominantly conventional warfare focus in the pre-9/11 period to an emphasis on counterterrorism and other irregular threats in the post-9/11 period. As a major reserve component of the United States Army and Air Force, the National Guard was assumed to experience a corresponding shift in the focus of missions and budgets. Comparing budget data between these two periods was expected to show a significant change to reflect an adjustment to changing priorities. In contrast, no statistically significant budget changes could indicate bias within the national security enterprise toward conventional military operations and a divergence between stated national security priorities and what this enterprise did or was funded to do.

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Research Design and Rationale

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To achieve the purpose of this quantitative study, I used a comparative statistical analysis to identify whether there was any statistically significant change to the type of funding (resources) provided by the United States Congress through the DOD to National Guard between the two time periods. The time periods chosen were the federal government's Congressional Fiscal Years 1996 and 2006. Within the federal government, budgetary resources provide justification for and capabilities to do activities or missions.

Therefore, it was appropriate to analyze budgets as a proxy for permissions and resources for operational capability. The rationale behind this research study was to examine whether there was a bias toward conventional military operations compared to unconventional, nontraditional, or irregular military operations that could be observed through a quantitative study of federal resources provided to the National Guard (see Creswell, 2009; Green & Salkind, 2011).

I used the federal government's budget for Fiscal Years 1996 and 2006 because these years were 5 years before and 5 years after the 2001 terror attacks on New York City and Washington, DC. Prior to 2001, the United States Government considered terrorism a national security threat, but it considered terrorism a crime not an unconventional warfare activity (White House, 1994). During this the first period, I expected to find the National Guard's funding to be focused on giving the nation's first reserve a conventional warfighting capability. Therefore, I anticipated the 1996 defense budget, which occurred approximately 5 years after the end of cold war and 5 years before the 9/11 attacks, to be focused on conventional military capabilities. In contrast, the 2006 defense budget was anticipated to illustrate a transition from conventional warfighting toward increased capabilities that supported unconventional, nontraditional, or irregular warfighting capabilities suited for challenging terror organizations that used these capabilities to attack the United States in 2001. This type of shift would be logical to help the National Guard address the number one priority in the National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006 (White House, 2002, 2006).

Assessing whether there was a statistically significant change in resources or funding changes over this decade was the primary purpose of this study. Based on that assessment, it would become possible to assess any changes of perspective, focus, or operational capability and whether the change was directed toward nontraditional types of conflict. If there was no statistically significant change in fiscal resources or capabilities provided, it would be reasonable to assess the National Guard as part of the national security enterprise that was resistant to change, and to assert a bias toward conventional industrial operations.

Variables

I used statistical analysis of quantitative data sets from both the 1996 and the 2006 DOD budgets. In the broadest sense, I considered the 1996 budget as the independent variable because this spending was completed before the 9/11 attacks occurred. The DOD could not return to or influence the data in the 1996 budget after the 2001 attacks occurred. Therefore, I considered the 2006 budget to be the dependent variable because it occurred after the 2001 terror attacks. I considered these attacks an intervention or action that may or may not have affected the United States Government defense spending following the 2001 terror attacks (see Frankfort-Nachimias & Nachimias, 2008).

Time and Resource Constraints

This study required access to publicly available information because I planned to use open-source, unclassified congressional budget data and other nationally recognized research regarding a particular subset of the DOD's budget focused on the National Guard and the DOD resources provided to the National Guard. The data was stored as

historical documents and there were no anticipated resource constraints in collecting the

pertinent data. The only potential time constraint was related to managing the complexity

and quantity of data available. These potential constraints were discussed further in the

methodology section of this chapter.

Design Choice and Knowledge Advancement

I chose the Porras's stream analysis model as a conceptual framework to analyze

either a consistency or a divergence in the level and, more importantly, the type of federal

government funding and capabilities provided to the National Guard in two

Congressional Budgets over a ten-year period (Porras, 1987). I am confident this study

advanced knowledge within the national and homeland securities disciplines by analyzing

how federal government funding affected or did not affect capabilities that existed in the

National Guard. It was important to improve the discipline's understanding whether the

United States government did not have the appropriate capabilities or programs available

to avoid the losses involved with the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001 and whether this type of

funding did not change after such a major national security defeat. A key outcome of this

research study was the improvement of the understanding of the national security

enterprise's ability or inability to adapt to changing security environments. Security is a

fundamental element of all societies and, if the United States government was unable to

adapt to the 2001 attacks, the risk to the United States society would likely increase.

Methodology

Archival public data created and published by the United States government was

the preferred data source for a comparative quantitative study to assess whether there was

any statistically significant change between the two data sets. Obtaining this data was rather straightforward. The federal budget data is published on an annual basis by Congress and can be downloaded from United States government websites. The data could be used without restrictions because it is United States law and therefore it is considered publicly available data. There was no need to obtain any permission prior to downloading or using these data. The reputability of the data was high because the source of the data is the United States Congressional Budget for both 1996 and 2006 (see Frankfort-Nachimias & Nachimias, 2008).

There was one unavoidable limitation to the data sets because I was limited to using only unclassified data for this study. If there was any classified funding provided to the National Guard by the federal government, I could not obtain the data. Given this limitation, the data used still represented the best data to assess the national security focused capabilities of the National Guard because the federal government provides most of the funding to the National Guard. As discussed in the research design section, the most fundamental input a government organization receives is funding. In the case of the National Guard, funding from Congress was essential to obtain capabilities and effectively function by using permissions to conduct missions for the federal government under Title 32 or Title 10 United State Codes (see Ellis & Mackenzie, 2014; Mahon, 1983).

I anticipated using the Congressional Budget allocations to the National Guard as a proxy for capabilities to assess whether the National Guard modified its capabilities relative to changes in the national security priorities before and after the terror attacks in

2001. Limitations and threats to validity to this study were discussed in the threats to validity section of this chapter. A potentially significant limitation and challenge could have been data collation processes needed to ensure various elements of the two budgets could be effectively compared. If sub-elements of the Congressional budget did not align, an assessment would need to be made regarding the disparate budget elements whether they focused on conventional or irregular warfare capabilities. This "binning" processes analysis and manipulation hopefully could use Congressional budgets and equipment transfer documents, but proxy type data might be needed.

Research Question

In order to better understand the relationship between America's national security threats and the type and level of United States Congressional funding for the National Guard Bureau, I developed the following research question during the initial planning and development phase of the study: According to Congressional funding, how and to what degree do the National Guard's capabilities diverge from the United States national security priorities from pre-9/11 and post-9/11 periods?

Data Analysis Plan

The initial data analysis plan anticipated using data derived from the 1996 and 2006 DOD budgets. This approach assisted in developing answers to the hypothesis that if there was no statistically significant change in fiscal resources or capabilities provided, it would be reasonable to assess the National Guard as part of the national security enterprise that was resistant to change, and to assert a bias toward conventional industrial operations. The data, although published by the United States government, needed to be

collated into two separate data sets to facilitate evaluation. The two data derived sets are separated by a ten-year period and United States Congress, or the DOD may have reclassified the budget data differently over the intervening years between 1996 and 2006. There were no instruments, pre-validations, site permissions nor informed consent required for this quantitative research study because the data was publicly available and open source for public evaluation and usage with the exception if a need arose that required ancillary, auxiliary, or additional data to support analysis of the government data sets.

Unfortunately, the scale and scope of the effort required to develop workable data sets was unknown prior to execution. The extent of the statistical research and evaluation was assessed during the research process and the actual data analysis plan executed. Fortunately, ten years was not a long period of time for the United States Government and particularly the DOD. The Congressional Budget process for the DOD was driven by as the President's budget process and the department's Future Years Defense Program (McGarry, 2020). The purpose of this process was to help the government attempt to forecast out sufficiently into the future to help both the executive and the legislative branches plan for the often multi-year, defense development programs. The key to this initiative was to categorize "like" items and budgets across the two data sets.

The goal of the data analysis plan was to compare the cost of major equipment items either procured for the National Guard by the Congress or transferred to the National Guard from other DOD active duty services. As identified in the previous paragraph, capturing all the data and categorizing it into similar sub-categories from the

two Congressional Budgets other DOD actions over ten years was challenging. A

difficult task, but one that was reasonable and achievable.

Threats to Validity

Threats to validity of the data and statistical analysis in this research study was

expected to be minimal. The largest challenge to validity discussed in the previous

methodology section (see pp. 96-97) and related to the scale and scope of the data within

the DOD's budget as well as the constraint of using only unclassified data. For example,

the recent 2019 DOD budget was approximately $675 billion out of a $1.205 trillion

discretionary federal budget was large. This represented a distribution of approximately

56 percent for defense versus 44 percent for all other department's discretionary budgets

(Office of Budget Management, 2019). Fortunately, the scope of this study was limited to

only National Guard resources provided through the DOD Department of Defense. The

size of this funding was substantially smaller than the department's active duty research,

development, and operational budgets.

The National Guard Bureau's budget for the individual state National Guard

organizations for the most current Fiscal Year 2019 budget was approximately $27

billion out of the DOD Budget $600+ billion budget (National Guard Association of the

United States, 2020; United States DOD, 2018b). However, this amount does not include

transfers of equipment and material from the services active components to the National

Guard and, consequently, the federal budget support is likely greater than reflected in the

annual DOD budget (United States DOD, 2016). Care needed to be taken with the

"binning" of the data sets to ensure consistency between the individual budget data sets.

As previously mentioned, the fact that this study was limited to using only unclassified budget data did present a threat to validity. This could not be helped. The estimated federal government's current intelligence budget was approximately $85 billion for the National Intelligence Program. The amount to support tactical military operations was reported to be $23.1 billion. Therefore the amount supporting all DOD strategic, operational, and tactical operations and research is somewhere between 3 and 11 percent of the overall DOD budget. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2022). The proportional share of the classified budget did not present a significant threat to the study's validity.

The last, but albeit, minimal threat to the validity of the data was the exclusion of any individual state or territory's budget allocation for their respective National Guard's budget. The reason this was not considered a problem relates to the significant and fundamental shift from primarily state funding for the National Guard institutions to United States Congressional funding becoming the preeminent source of funding through United States Code Title 32 for training or Title 10 for operations in support of federal security missions (see Ellis & Mackenzie, 2014; GAO-08-311, 2008; Mahon, 1983). The contemporary fiscal reality remains that the states and territories could not afford to maintain their National Guard organizations without the federal government's fiscal support.

Summary

I used the national security strategies of President William Clinton and President George W. Bush administrations as proxies for the prioritized security threats facing the

United States in 1996 and 2001 respectively. These strategies showed an evolving

perspective that non-traditional threats to the United States, such as terrorism, grew in

contrast to a more traditional threat perspective of other national state conventional

militaries (White House, 1994, 2002, 2006). I focused this study on the state and

territorial National Guard because these organizations had a dual-role as local, non-

federal militia units as well as a strategic and operational reserve for the nation's active

duty armed forces. In its non-federal militia role, the National Guard was always the most

likely military force to respond to the rise in the domestic non-traditional security

challenges highlighted in relevant national security documents.

This study consisted of a quantitative statistical assessment of the 1996 and 2006

United States Congressional Budget for the DOD's fiscal and material support to the

country's National Guard units. The goal of this simple, yet powerful, statistical analysis

was to ascertain whether there was or was not a statistically significant change in the

National Guard's budget and capabilities to reflect a change in prioritization from

conventional military operations to the newly prioritized unconventional, non-traditional,

or irregular security threats. If there was no significant change, it is reasonable to assess

this represents bias towards resistance to change within the DOD and the broader national

security enterprise. Chapter 4 will operationalize the plan set forth in the proposal and, in

particular, execute the methodology proposed in this chapter.

Chapter 4: Results

The purpose of this quantitative study was to investigate whether there was a divergence between stated national security concerns and the National Guard's capabilities within the federal government's DOD from 1996 to 2006. First, to assess continuity or discontinuity in National Guard capabilities vis-à-vis national security policies, I conducted an assessment of changes in security threats to the United States from the pre- to post 9/11 periods. Second, I conducted a statistical evaluation of continuity or a lack of statistically relevant change in Congressional funding to the National Guard in pre- and post-9/11 periods. I hypothesized that if there was no statistically significant change in fiscal resources or capabilities provided, it would be reasonable to assess the National Guard as part of the national security enterprise that was resistant to change, and to assert a bias toward conventional industrial operations.

I used quantitative data sets from the 1996 and 2006 DOD budgets, and these budget years were considered the independent and dependent variables. The 1996 budget was the independent variable because this spending was completed before the 9/11 attacks occurred and therefore could not be changed. The 2006 budget was the dependent variable because it occurred after the 2001 terror attacks. These attacks can be considered an intervention or action that may or may not have affected the United States Government's defense spending following the 2001 terror attacks (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008).

To guide this study, I used the following research question: According to Congressional funding, how and to what degree do the National Guard's capabilities

diverge from the United States national security priorities from pre-9/11 and post-9/11 periods? I conducted the study to test following hypothesis: If there was no statistically significant change in capabilities funding between 1996 and 2006 and there was a change in the national security priorities, this would be evidence of a continuity bias and a focus on conventional over unconventional warfare. In Chapter 4, I described the data collection that focused on the DOD funding for the National Guard and other evaluations of National Guard operational capabilities. The results of the data analysis were also presented, and the chapter concluded with a brief summary.

Data Collection

I anticipated using open source or publicly available data on Congressional funding for the National Guard through the DOD's National Guard Bureau. The logic behind this approach was supported by research highlighting the federal government's provision of resources for state and territorial National Guard personnel, operations, and equipment (see Doubler, 2001; Mahon, 1983). Based on Porras's stream analysis model, given the preponderance of the DOD funding, the equipment purchased (inputs) should indicate the type of operations (processes) an organization planned to conduct, in this case the National Guard Bureau, and the individual state and territorial National Guard organizations. These operations (processes) were designed to support the national military strategy that supported the national security strategy (outputs; Hoffman, 2016).

As evidenced by the research reviewed in Chapter 2, the state militia's reorganization in the early 20th century into the National Guard was intended to become the conventional Army's and later the Air Force's strategic reserve (see Cooper, 1997). I

used the unconventional attack by a transnational terror organization against the United States on 9/11 and the drastic change in national security emphasis it provoked as an inflection point to conduct an analysis of continuity or discontinuity in the National Guard. The data collection plan was intended to include National Guard funding streams to assess whether the conventionally focused National Guard strategic reserve changed after 9/11 into a more unconventionally focused and capable force. This would indicate a discontinuity that would support the new anti-terrorism-focused national strategy.

The data collection process occurred from late 2021 following institutional review board approval on August 6, 2021. Data collection efforts focused on the Congressional National Defense Authorization and Appropriation documents as the foundational data to compare spending levels between 1996 and 2006. The purpose of using these data was to capture the federal government's support for the 54 state and territorial National Guard organizations through the DOD. Using the 1996 budget provided insight into the level of the spending 5 years before the 9/11 attacks when the DOD's focus was conventional military war, albeit at a reduced level due to the end of the cold war in the early 1990s. The 2006 budget data provided a comparison with the 1996 data because the national security and national military concerns were identified with multiple national security documents and were prioritized as nongovernmental terrorist organizations. However, the data did not provide good insight or an assessment of the types of operations or force capabilities to allow detailed assessment regarding continuity or discontinuity between the time periods (see Buchalter & Elan, 2007) apart from 2006 providing separate

overseas contingency funding separate from the normal budget lines to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This limitation led to a second line of data collection in early 2022 to obtain data that could indicate either a change in capabilities or evidence of a status quo in operational capability. I hypothesized that there would be a preference toward the status quo of conventional military forces rather than a significant change toward unconventional or counterterrorism capabilities. There was a consistent lack of transparent data from the federal government and the DOD on the interaction of the active duty components and the National Guard's procurement processes. As late as 2010, the acting director of the Army's budget office emphasized the need for tracking the amounts of equipment allocated to the National Guard and developing some effective audit trail to better track allocations (Greenhill, 2009). This lack of governmental budget data with the level of fidelity required to address the research question led to further research to discover and evaluate proxy data sets related to this research study.

The clearest example of these types of proxy data was provided by the Air Force Association's annual almanac. The Association of the United States Army publishes a similar document but does not produce a comprehensive almanac. In the case of the Department of the Army, I could not discover an official document that distinguished between equipment and procurement actions of the active duty component and reserve components. The reserve component consisted of the National Guard and Army Reserves. Therefore, the data collection effort to capture the major weapons programs

and transfers from the active component to the reserve component shifted to other governmental and nongovernmental organizational publications.

The use of nongovernmental publications and research conducted with both governmental and nongovernmental funding support was a deviation from the original plan to use governmental sources. The most significant nongovernmental organizational resource on capabilities was the Air Force Association's professional journal *Air Force*. This journal provided a detailed and respected annual Air Force almanac presenting a wide array of accurate facts and figures on the entire Air Force, including the Air National Guard. These annual almanacs provided critical and credible nongovernmental data on Air Force equipment inventories that facilitated an assessment of capabilities resident in the Air National Guard for Fiscal Years 1996 and 2006.

Historical events and actions taken by governmental organizations were the primary emphasis during the data collection process. No individuals were related with or involved in the data collection process as noted and approved by the Institutional Review Board approval process. As expected, there were no adverse effects associated with this study. During the data collection process, I used documents or data either produced directly by the government or documents produced with government funding and therefore all are in the public domain. In addition, a limited number of documents published in professional or academic journals considered open source documents available to the public were used to complete the research and data collection process.

Results

As previously stated, the initial data collection process focused on publicly

available data, but the data lacked the level of detail necessary for analysis of the two

time periods, the Fiscal Years 1996 and 2006. The macro-level funding provided by

government documents in combination with the authoritative and publicly available

military almanacs clearly identified a preponderance of conventional, combat-related

equipment in the National Guard during both periods. These data supported the

assessment that the National Guard continued to be designed as a conventionally focused

strategic military reserve for the Army and Air Force and, in the 2006 period, functioned

as an operational reserve during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. The difference

between a strategic versus operational reserve had less to do with military capabilities

and was more related to organizational, operational, and procedural perspectives. An

operational reserve force needed the organizational ability to prepare forces for recurring

and relatively short notice operational deployments versus remaining a strategic reserve

force which could deploy that required significantly more time to prepare.

As evidenced in Table One, Congressionally provided budgets for the Army

National Guard and the Air National Guard increased significantly between 1996 and

2006. The Army National Guard's and Air National Guard's personnel costs increased 75

and 69 percent respectively. In addition, the Army National Guard's operational and

maintenance budget grew by 95 percent and Air National Guard's by 70 percent., the

personnel resource costs increased above the ten-year inflation rate of 28.49 percent,

however, these increases coincided with increased personnel costs across all military

services during this period with pay raises in 2000 and 2002 being the largest since 1982 (Goering, 2022). The increased Army National Guard personnel costs above the ten-year inflation rate were not caused by increase in the number of personnel. The authorized end-strength of the Army National Guard was 450,000 in 1986, reduced to 353,000 following the end of the Cold War, and remained essentially the same at 350,000 in 2006 (see Table 3).

The Army National Guard's and Air National Guard's operational and maintenance (O&M) funding increase from 1996 to 2006 could also be attributed to the ten-year inflation rate. However, increased spending above the inflation rate also reflected increased operational activity associated with the Global War on Terrorism. The greater increase in the Army National Guard could also be related to increased domestic security associated with post-9/11 Homeland Defense, Defense Support to Civil Authorities operations, and disaster relief requirements. These increased costs were also associated with a major increase in Army National Guard involvement in overseas military contingency operations that are partially represented by the congressionally funded overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding line. This type of funding was not available in 1996.

In late 2001, the United States initiated a military campaign to target Al-Qaeda safe havens in Afghanistan following the terror group's 9/11 attacks. Then in 2003, the United States invaded Iraq to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. The Iraq invasion was purportedly related to the regime's affiliation with a small Islamic extremist group in northeastern Iraq, but it was more likely associated with ending a United States led

coalition air campaign protecting the Shia tribes in southern Iraq and Kurdish groups in

the north (Senior Air Force and Navy officers in Saudi Arabia, personal communications,

2002-2003).

Table 1

Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) Comparison Data
Between Fiscal Year (FY) 1996 and FY 2006

Budget Program	FY1996	FY2006/2007
ARNG personnel	$3,242,422,000*	$4,751,971,000**
ANG personnel	$1,259,627,000*	$2,067,752,000**
ARNG O&M	$2,440,808,000	$4,478,319,000
ANG O&M	$2,776,121,000	$4,701,991,000
ARNG MilCon	$137,110,000	$523,151,000
ANG MilCon	$171,272,000	$316,117,000
(MilCon is Military Construction)		
ARNG - equipment	$160,000,000	unknown
ANG - equipment	$255,000,000	unknown
ARNG O&M - OCO Iraq/AFG	$0	$196,300,000
ANG O&M - OCO Iraq/AFG	$0	$13,400,000

(OCO is Overseas Contingency Ops)
* Personnel Cost data from DOD Appropriations Act FY 1996
** Personnel Cost data is derived from FY 2007 Budget

Note. From United States Congress DOD Appropriations Act, 1996; NDAA, FY1996;

MilCon Appropriations Act, 1996; NDAA FY2006; DOD Milcon Appropriations Act,

2006; NDAA, FY2007. Personnel cost data were derived from FY 2007 budget because

NG data were not disaggregated within overall Department of Defense personnel budget

in NDAA, FY2006.

An additional resource Congress usually provides to the National Guard was the National Guard and Reserves Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) that was a direct funding program separate from and above the presidential budget request for the DOD and the National Guard. This program provided the National Guard and the services reserve organizations funding to procure equipment items they had difficulty bureaucratically incorporating into the larger DOD budget. In addition, Congress gave National Guard and reserves wide latitude regarding what they could procure and three years to complete the process. As evidenced in Table 2, the amounts varied over time and could be divided into four rather distinct periods:

- 1983-1989: Cold War – Bipolar World

- 1990-1999: Post-Cold War – Unipolar World

- 2000-2009: Post 9/11 Phase One– Global War on Terror

- 2010-2019: Post-9/11 Phase Two – Multipolar World Emerges

Although the amounts provided to the organizations varied, analysis of the data from the identifiable periods indicated that there was an observable pattern related to factors affecting the active duty service components as well as overall United States national security concerns.

Table 2

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA); FY1983–2019

Fiscal year	Army NG	Air NG	Reserves	Total
2019	421	421	458	1,300
2018	429	429	442	1,300
2017	248	248	254	750
2016	330	330	340	1,000
2015	415	415	370	1,200
2014	315	315	370	1,000
2013	460	455	580	1,495
2012	320	315	358	993
2011	250	250	345	845
2010	575	135	240	950
2009	779	155	313	1,248
2008	1,268	149	318	1,734
2007	1,075	75	195	1,344
2006	**770**	**230**	220	**1,218**
2005	111	99	190	398
2004	99	119	180	397
2003	29	29	40	98
2002	217	280	192	689
2001	50	30	20	99
2000	30	30	90	149
1999	20	212	120	352
1998	64	303	276	642
1997	101	217	457	773
1996	**96**	**255**	401	**751**
1995	117	245	397	759
1994	191	335	632	1,158
1993	387	409	488	1,284
1992	344	558	1008	1,910
1991	806	648	1045	2,498
1990	332	239	421	991
1989	256	399	484	1,139
1988	273	341	393	1,007
1987	146	50	361	557
1986	532	255	715	1,502

Fiscal year	Army NG	Air NG	Reserves	Total
1985	150	20	210	380
1984	100	25	51	176
1983	50	15	60	125
1982	<u>50</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>50</u>
Total	12206	9035	13034	34261

Note. From National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA), Defense Acquisition University, Department of Defense, no date, 2008, *Acquipedia Database.* (Funding is in current year dollars in millions of dollars).

Although funding was an absolutely essential resource required to procure "things" (primarily military equipment), it also procured personnel. An organization cannot exist without personnel and it was a critical requirement to obtain funding to recruit people to develop and then maintain the organization. In this case, the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard made the personnel budget funding line, highlighted in Table 1, a fundamental resource of the National Guard. Funding provided resources and capabilities in order to create capabilities that could then conduct operations. Using Porras's stream analysis model, funding was the foundational resource that in turn procured equipment and personnel who developed processes necessary to create capabilities that enabled military or security operations as illustrated in in Figure 1.

Figure 1

Porras Stream Analysis Model and National Guard Comparison

Porras Stream Analysis Model: Inputs + Processes = Output

National Guard: Funding + Personnel + Equipment + Processes = Operations

As shown in Table 3, a reduction in the congressionally authorized size of the Army National Guard decreased the organization from 440,000 in 1986 to 373,000 in 1996. This was a 16 percent decrease and coincided with the end of the cold war and the entire DOD decreased significantly as well. Even though the 9/11 attacks created new domestic security concerns and two major overseas conflicts, the Army National Guard decreased an additional six percent from 1996 to 2006. In contrast, Table 3 showed the Air National Guard increased approximately three percent from 1986 to 1996 and then decreased by three percent by 2006.

The personnel reductions following the Cold War coincided with years of significantly larger NGREA amounts awarded to the National Guard. From 1990 to 1995, Congress provided $4.611 billion dollars ($768.5 million per year) in NGREA funding to the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. This was significantly higher than the decade average of $588 million per year. These transfers represented an increase in conventional warfare capabilities as the active duty Army declined in size. The period of Army National Guard personnel reduction through the early 2000s, albeit at a lower rate than the early 1990s, saw the National Guard receive $1.123 billion ($187 million per year). This rate was significantly lower than the decade's annual rate of $562 million per year.

The lack of significant additional funding after the "intervention" of 9/11 and its effect on the national security enterprise was an indication Congress and the DOD continued to see the National Guard as a strategic reserve that already received significant conventional resources in the 1990s. The NGREA amounts rapidly increased starting in 2006 and, from 2006-2010 Congress provided more money each year than any other year in the 1983-2019 period with the exception of 1991 that was the first year after the end of the Cold War. These increases coincided with a period in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts when the active duty Army realized it could not sustain the deployment rates and needed to call on the National Guard, its strategic reserve.

Table 3

National Guard Personnel Authorized

National Guard	FY1986	FY1996	FY2006
Army NG - military	440,025	373,000	350,000
Army NG - civilian	n/a	25,500	25,563
Army NG total	n/a	398,500	375,563
Air NG – military	108,700	112,707	106,800
Air NG - civilian	n/a	22,906	22,971
Air NG Total	n/a	135,613	129,771

Note. From "National Defense Appropriation Act, 1986," the "National Defense Authorization Act, 1996" and the "National Defense Authorization Act, 2006." United States Congress.

The macro data presented in Tables 2 and 3 reflected the overall financial and resource support for personnel to manage and maintain Army National Guard and Air National Guard organizations. Without this federal government support channeled through the DOD, the overall military capabilities of the 54 state and territorial National Guard organizations would have been a fraction of its 1996 and 2006 capabilities. This paradigm remains true today. The next result from the data collection and analytical processes addressed the capabilities provided by the major types of equipment the federal government primarily provided through the DOD. This equipment could be provided through direct transfer of equipment from the military's active duty components, the Army and the Air Force, or through National Guard equipment acquisition processes.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the stream analysis model developed by Porras (1987) asserted an organization's outputs are directly attributed to the inputs and processes in-place at the organization. The results section of this chapter started with an assessment of National Guard funding and the increasing amounts provided for personnel and operations. Both were critical inputs that directly affected National Guard processes. The equipment provided was the third component of inputs provided by Congress through the DOD and directly through the NGREA process acquisition funding program.

Obtaining relevant data on the equipment either procured or transferred was extremely difficult (Greenhill, 2009). This was an ongoing challenge within the federal

government requiring both Congressional mandates and DOD instructions for better reporting that, although in place since 1992, resulted in a DOD Inspector General's report indicating the Department of the Army failed to do so for over a decade (United States DOD, 2012b). Consequently, and as highlighted in this chapter's data collection section, I needed to blend both government data sets with reliable non-governmental publications that served as "proxy" data sets to be able to analyze the National Guard's operational capabilities and priorities to compare the FY1996 and FY2006 periods.

Open source data provided the best available data on the Air Force's key equipment components for both active duty and reserve elements. The resulting analysis of the data provided in Table 4 provided a clear assessment that the Air National Guard maintains a predominantly combat-focused air fleet. In 1996, the Air National Guard maintained 1,471 aircraft of which 80 percent were combat-capable or direct-combat support aircraft. In 2006, the quantity of aircraft was reduced to 1103 aircraft (a 25 percent reduction), but the combat to support capabilities ratio remained essentially the same at 77 percent vice 80 percent in 1996. In addition, the percentage of fighter aircraft, arguably one of the most conventionally focused of all combat aircraft, also remained extremely close with 60 percent fighters in 1996 and 58 percent being fighters in 2006 of the total aircraft inventory. Clearly, the Air National Guard did not change the major operational focus (input) away from conventional operations in spite of the increasingly unconventional wars being fought in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Table 4

Air National Guard (ANG) Major Aircraft Types Inventories: FY1996 & FY2006

Aircraft Type	ANG Fleet FY1996	ANG Fleet FY2006
Fighter	877	634
Tanker	224	196
Transport	307	235
Helicopter	18	15
Recce	34	19
SOF	0	4
Bomber	<u>11</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	1471	1103

Note. From "Air Force in Facts and Figures" by Tamar A. Mehuron, Editor, 1996, *Air Force*, p. 58. Reprinted with permission and from "Air Force in Facts and Figures", 2006, *Air Force*, p. 63. Reprinted with permission.

Table 5 highlights and details both the reduction in the total number of aircraft from 1996 to 2006 as well as provides greater fidelity and detail into the individual types of aircraft in the inventory in both years. Four of the five aircraft completely removed from the inventory were the F-4 Fighter, the Personnel Transport, the C-141 Strategic Heavy Jet Transport, and the T-43 Personnel Transport (Training) had all reached obsolescence. The aircraft added to the inventory replaced some of the previous aircraft and some, especially the special operations aircraft (MC-130 and HC-130), represented a new capability for the Air National Guard. The special operations aircraft represented a small movement towards the changing nature of threats facing the United States because

special operations forces continued to have a major role in confronting transnational terror and unconventional threats. However, the preponderance of the rest of the fleet remains conventionally focused as highlighted in Table 4.

Table 5

Air National Guard (ANG) Aircraft Inventory - FY1996 & FY2006

	Aircraft type	Quantity FY1996	Quantity FY2006
A-10	Ground Attack - Fighter	104	72
B-1	Bomber	11	0
C-5	Strategic/Heavy Transport - Jet	13	16
C-12	Personnel Transport - Small	4	0
C-21	Personnel Transport - Small	4	2
C-22	Personnel Transport - Med	3	0
C-26	Personnel Transport - Small	40	11
C-130	Medium Transport - Prop	225	186
KC-135	Strategic/Heavy Tanker	224	189
C-141	Strategic/Heavy Transport - Jet	16	0
HH-60	Helicopter	18	15
F-4	Fighter	34	0
F-15	Fighter	119	96
F-16	Fighter	654	448
T-43	Personnel Transport - Med	2	0
OA-15	Recce	0	18
E-8	C3I	0	14
EC-130	Electronic Warfare	0	5
MC-130	Medium Transport - Prop	0	4
HC-130	Medium Tanker - SOF	0	7
C-17	Strategic/Heavy Transport - Jet	0	8
C-32	Personnel Transport - Med	0	0
C-38	Personnel Transport - Small	0	2
C-40	Personnel Transport - Med	0	0
LC-130	Medium Transport - Prop - Arctic	0	10
Total		1,471	1103

Note. From "Air Force in Facts and Figures" by Tamar A. Mehuron, Editor, 1996, *Air Force*, p. 58. Reprinted with permission and from "Air Force in Facts and Figures", 2006, *Air Force*, p. 63. Reprinted with permission.

Conducting an assessment of the Army National Guard's overall equipment capabilities between 1996 and 2006 proved to be more difficult than the Air National Guard. In the case of Army National Guard, I needed to rely more heavily on the overall Army's equipment priorities and assumed the United States Army's "Total Force" concept had similar priorities (see R.A. Brown et al, 1997). The Army designed the Total Force Concept almost 50 years ago to align all of the DOD active and reserve components into a single, cohesive force to purposefully align and integrate the active duty Army, Army Reserves, and the Army National Guard forces in order to primarily prepare all three organizations for large-scale, conventional operations (see Pint et al., 2017). Therefore given the Army's doctrine, if the Army's equipment priorities did not appreciably change from 1996 to 2006, neither did the National Guard (Director of Emergency Management of Pennsylvania, personal communication, October, 2010).

A RAND study identified the items listed in the left column of Table Six as the most significant items for their case study because they were the preponderance of the items identified in the 1996-98 National Guard and Reserves Equipment Report (NGRER) requests (see R.A. Brown, et al., 1997). In addition, the right-hand column provides the prioritized acquisition list for the Total Force Army (active and reserve components). Although data displayed ion Tables Six and Seven are not the same, they can be considered to be analogous because the majority of the items represent combat

equipment supporting United States Army conventional combat operations such as; armored vehicles (to include tanks), artillery/mortars, missiles/rockets, and ammunition. Although not quite as clear-cut as Air Force combat aircraft, the Army equipment highlighted were appropriate to be considered inputs within the stream analysis model.

Table 6

Major Army National Guard Equipment Acquisitions - FY1996

Equipment type	Equipment sourcing	Mission profile
M1A1 Tank	Transferred from AC	Combat
Truck 2.5 ton	Transferred from AC	Transport
Truck 5 ton	Transferred from AC	Transport
ROWPU 3000 gal	Transferred from AC	Supply
SINCGARS Radio		Communication
HMMWV	Transferred from AC	Transport

Note. From "Equipping the Reserve Components of the Armed Services Summary of Findings and Recommendations" RAND Study/Briefing DB209, 1997 (US Government sponsored research)."

Table 7 data reflects what was reported as "fielded" to the National Guard in FY 1996. It was interesting because in a paragraph above the table in an official United States Army history document stated "ln FY 96, the National Guard received 413 aircraft from the production line, the refurbishment program, and the Reserve. As the Guard acquired more modern systems, it retired 397 of its oldest aircraft" (Reeves, 1997, p. 99). From this statement, it was unclear how many of the aircraft were procured versus

transferred nor was it clear how many were already in the National Guard's inventory,

but just sent out for refurbishment. The inconsistency of this official historical document

was symptomatic of the challenges in deciphering the status of reserve component

equipment programs (Reeves, 1997). Regardless of the challenges associated with

capturing accurate numbers, the predominance of equipment designed for conventional

warfare was clearly evident in the reporting and documentation used in this study.

Table 7

Equipment Fielded to the Army National Guard - FY1996

Equipment type	Mission profile
M1 Abrams Tank Mark2	Combat
M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle	Combat
M 121 120-mm. Mortar	Combat
Multiple Launch Rocket System	Combat
Single-Channel Ground-Air Radio Communications	
Mine Clearing Line Charge	Combat
Initial Fire Support Automated System	Combat
Palletized Load System	Transport
Heavy Equipment Transport System	Transport

Note. From "Department of the Army: Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1996"

Publication 101-27-1, United States Army's Center for Military History, p. 99.

As was the case for the 1996 data on Army National Guard equipment programs,

Table 8 represented the top United States Army procurement programs for Fiscal Years

2006 and 2007. Unsurprisingly, the table provided further confirmation the United States

Army's Total Force continued to show a predilection towards conventional warfighting

capabilities. Even if the "Medium Tactical Vehicles" are removed from the list because it

is not a "combat weapon system", the remaining value of required combat equipment was 88.42 percent of the requirements. This number was relatively close the Air Force combat aircraft percentage Air National Guard combat-focused aircraft (80 percent in 1996 and 77 percent in 2006).

The Total Force Army was involved in two shooting wars in 2006. Perhaps the United States military was fighting the wrong type of war by trying to use a conventionally trained and equipped military, in this case an Army, to fight an unconventional opponent. The United States essentially lost both these conflicts: Leaving Iraq in 2011 (only to have to return to fight the Islamic State in 2014) and leaving Afghanistan in a rather ignominious, chaotic departure, a la Saigon in 1975. These war results indicated there was validity to this assessment. However, for the purposes of this study, the fact that the Army and its associated reserve components, which included the National Guard, continued to equip its forces with conventional combat focused material five years after the 9/11 attacks created changed priorities within the government's security strategy documents was also a significant indicator of bias and resistance to change.

Table 8

Top United States Army Equipment Procurement by Categories

Equipment Category	Amount Allocated	Major System
Missiles	$567,000,000	Patriot Air Defense
Ammunition	$1,317,000,000	Artillery/Tanks/Small Arms
Weapons/Tracked Combat	$875,000,000	Stryker Combat Vehicles
Tactical Support Vehicles	$451,000,000	Medium Tactical Vehicles
Aircraft	$684,000,000	Apache Attack Helicopters
Total	$3,894,000,000	

Note. From "United States Army Budget Overview Briefing for FY2006/2007" by Major General Edgar Stanton, Director of United States Army Budget Office, 2006, Department of Army's Army Financial Management & Comptroller Office

The data sets provided above are evidence of the requirement to use multiple and varied data sets to create a comprehensive perspective of various fiscal and physical equipment resources to provide an integrated assessment of National Guard capabilities. Using Porras's stream analysis model, these capabilities can be considered inputs and are designed to create an output of conventional or industrial warfare. Although these inputs and outputs were appropriate for the Cold War that ended in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they likely do not represent an appropriate response to a transnational terror organization, such as Al-Qaeda. As indicated in the national security documents published after 2001, the transnational terror threat became the United States number one security priority following the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

By 2006, there was sufficient time to change organizational priorities which, in turn, should have driven changes to the National Guard's fiscal, physical, and doctrinal policies (inputs and processes). The five-year span also allowed existing five-year

budgetary processes and negotiations between the executive and legislative branches of the government to enable organizational changes to the National Guard operational activities (outputs). These potential changes would have authorized the National Guard to modify its operational capabilities to address the emerging threat represented by the nontraditional and unconventional terror organizations identified in the national strategy during the 2001-2006 time period.

The data sets are independent because, although related, there are significant enough variance in the types of data that prevented using standard statistical analytical tests to statistically measure the degree of change within the National Guard's budget, personnel, and equipment. However, the data sets used were the best available and were robust enough to allow assessing and evaluating whether there was continuity or discontinuity with the National Guard's capabilities following the 9/11 attacks (the "intervention"). Capturing continuity or discontinuity was the fundamental purpose of this study.

The review of national security documents in Chapter Two indicated there was a change in prioritized national security threats from conventional, country-versus-country, military threats to challenges increasingly focused on transnational terrorism or unconventional threats usually emanating from non-governmental organizations (White House, 2002, Preface). This analytical process was designed to assess whether the National Guard's organization, resourcing, and capabilities *significantly* changed or did they essentially remain the same in the face of a documented *significant* changes in the

United States National Security Strategy. Based on the analysis and the results highlighted above, the answer was the National Guard did not.

Summary

The data collected and data analysis conducted clearly indicated the National Guard's capabilities as evidenced by the type of equipment it had in 1996 remained essentially the same in 2006. Although smaller in actual numbers in 2006, the National Guard's major equipment distribution displayed no statistically significant change in terms of distribution of combat capabilities by percentage of equipment designed for major conventional military operations. Likewise there was no statistically significant increase in equipment better suited for homeland security and counter-terrorism operations.

The overall funding levels did increase, by a larger amount for the Army versus the Air Force, but the equipment distribution within both organizations remained statistically the same. These results indicated a continuity towards conventional and a bias against unconventional operations even though the terror attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 were declared a major and new security threat by the President and national leaders. In the years following the 2001 attacks, the government's leadership identified and prioritized this new and increasingly dangerous type of threat as the number one security threat using official governmental security documents.

The data collection and analytical process of this study's provided results indicating bias within the executive branch's DOD as well as the legislative branch that is solely responsible for funding the United States national security enterprise. Therefore,

continued conventional warfare DOD funding requests for the National Guard in the

Presidential Budget combined with continued Congressional sponsorship and funding

appropriation of conventional warfighting capabilities was evidence of bias and

resistance to change. A failure to change could lead to increasing future risks from other

nations or transnational terror organizations who may have learned lessons from

American failures in the Middle East and South/Central Asia. The results of the study did

not necessarily provide evidence that significant conventional security and military

threats do not remain. However, I am convinced the results supported the hypothesis the

National Guard should transition back to a more state militia type security organization

allowing the active duty Army and Air Force, along with their respective reserve forces,

to remain the primary forces preparing for and fighting conventional wars.

The research results did not necessarily support an argument for a wholesale shift

to unconventional, counter-terrorism missions for the entire DOD, but they did support

the argument the active duty and service reserve forces should focus on conventional

warfare and allow the National Guard to transition and focus on less conventional and

more counterterrorism mission sets. This transition allows a return to National Guard's

more traditional para-military state militia role. If it did so, it was logical that if the active

duty Army and Air Force cannot meet this type of conventional military risk remained,

then United States government and the DOD should consider shifting convention warfare

capabilities to the Army and Air Force Reserves controlled by the federal government.

Changing the national security enterprise by this type of shift would provide

governors and states with more focused and capable paramilitary-type National Guard

units capable of combating unconventional threats to the homeland and be more capable supporting broader Defense Support to Civilian Authorities missions. These paramilitary capabilities would still be available to support the federal government in times on national crisis or war. Chapter 5 will provide an overall assessment of the final study and will analyze and discuss potential research and projects that could further identify bias within the national security enterprise, especially within the National Guard and the DOD.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

This chapter included a review of the purpose and the nature of the study, the processes involved in the research, and the results obtained during the course of this study. Other sections included an interpretation of the results, the limitations of the study, the implications of the study, recommendations for further research derived from the study, and a conclusion offering an overall assessment of the research project.

The purpose of this quantitative study was to investigate whether there was a divergence between stated United States national security concerns and the National Guard's capabilities within the federal government's DOD between the period of 1996 and 2006. First, I conducted an assessment of changes in security threats to the United States from the pre- to post-9/11 periods to enable an assessment of continuity or discontinuity in National Guard capabilities vis-à-vis national security policies. Second, I conducted a quantitative evaluation assessing whether Congressional funding to the DOD for the National Guard resulted in continuity or a lack of statistically relevant change between the 1996 and 2006 time periods. I hypothesized that if there was no statistically

significant change in capabilities funding between 1996 and 2006, including equipment

and capabilities transferred from the Army or Air Force, and if there was a change in

national security priorities, this would be evidence of bias toward continuity resulting in a

continued focus on conventional, industrial, or traditional warfare.

The nature of the study was quantitative to assess change between two time

periods using a quantitative statistical analysis to analyze the relationship between levels

of federal funding provided to the National Guard. The comparative quantitative analysis

of capabilities highlighted by the levels and types of spending and equipment stocks

during the targeted fiscal years enabled an evaluation of whether there was change or a

lack of change in the National Guard's capabilities. If there was no change, this could

represent a lack of adaptation to changing security threats (see Creswell, 2009; Green &

Salkind, 2011). The quantitative analysis of the public data sets and national security

publications was conducted to prioritize national security threats facing the United States

in the pre- and post-9/11 periods represented by the budget years of 1996 and 2006. This

approach addressed the hypothesis that if there was no statistically significant change in

operational capabilities between 1996 and 2006 and there was a significant change in

national security priorities, this would provide evidence of bias toward continuity and a

focus on conventional, industrial, or traditional warfare.

The primary goal of the study was to evaluate the responsiveness of the National

Guard in adapting to a changed national security environment. According to government

national security strategy documents, the large-scale and deadly terror attacks that

occurred on September 11, 2001, were unprecedented and represented a new and

significant threat to the United States (White House, 2002). As a major element of the

United States national security enterprise, the National Guard played an important role

because of its federal and state security responsibilities. National security research on

United States responses or preparations against enemies or potential foes who use or plan

to use asymmetric tactics and strategies would be valuable to the country. I conducted

this study to examine whether the DOD continued to invest in a primarily conventional

military and security organizations, which included the National Guard.

I found a gap in research related to comparative analyses of the types of

capabilities obtained using federal funding between active duty and National Guard

capabilities. By analyzing funding levels and capabilities obtained by federal funding and

comparing the National Guard in pre- and post-9/11 security environments, I found a

continuity in funding that maintained status quo capabilities during a period of changing

national security threats. The quantitative data analysis indicated no statistically

significant change in proportional distribution of capabilities within the National Guard

between 1996 and 2006. The results indicated the existence of a diverging trend between

federal government assessments of national security threats and the actions that the

National Guard was capable of taking to address these threats (see W. W. Burke, 2011;

Creswell, 2009). A failure to adapt to a changing national security environment increased

the risk to the United States.

Interpretation of the Findings

The results indicated that the capabilities of the National Guard and the primary

equipment procured and retained during the period between 1996 and 2006 were

predominantly conventionally focused. This provided evidence of bias toward

maintaining the status quo of traditional or conventional warfare capabilities compared to

adapting or changing to meet emerging national security threats. Comparing the results of

this study with the models and theory regarding organizational change relevant to both

private and governmental organizations confirmed their applicability to this research

program.

Lewin's (1947a) 3-step change process identified the challenges organizations

face in unfreezing the organization, creating change, and then refreezing the institution.

During time frame of the study, the National Guard did not unfreeze or significantly

change. Schein's (2010) amplification of Lewin's processes by introducing the

importance of organizational culture into the organizational change models and theories

can be observed in the importance of tradition in the military. This is especially true in

light of its preference for conventional, industrial warfare following the successes of

these tactics and operations in World War I, World War II, to a lesser the Korean War,

and the Iraq War in 1990–1991. The success of conventional or industrial warfare in

these conflicts created a bias that can reasonably be argued led to failures in the Vietnam

War, the second phase of Iraq War in 2003–2010, and the invasion and occupation of

Afghanistan in 2001–2022 (Boot, 2013b; Cleveland & Egel, 2020; Maloney, 2012; Millet

& Maslowski, 1994; Weigley, 1973). The latter two conflicts occurred after the 9/11

terror attacks in 2001. The assessment of continuity based on the organizational change

field of studies was supported by the data, findings, and scope of the current research

project.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the data analysis indicated the National Guard's capabilities, as evidenced by the type of equipment it possessed in 1996, remained essentially the same in 2006. Although smaller in number in 2006, the National Guard's major equipment distribution displayed no statistically significant change in terms of proportional distribution of combat capabilities by percentage of equipment designed for major conventional military operations. The data showed no significant modifications to equipment or increased capabilities better suited for homeland security and counterterrorism operations, either for domestic operations or those conducted outside the continental United States, in support of the active components. The overall funding levels increased by a larger amount for the Army compared to the Air Force, but the equipment distribution within both organizations remained statistically and proportionally the same.

These results indicated a continuity focus on conventional warfare capabilities and a bias against unconventional operations. This was the case even though the terror attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, were declared a major and new security threat by President Bush and senior leaders. In the years following the 2001 attacks, government leadership identified and prioritized this type of threat as the number one security threat using official governmental security documents (White House, 2002). Findings from the current study did not indicate significant conventional security and military threats do not remain, but they did suggest there are significant advantages for the country if the National Guard transitions back to a state militia security organization. This will require the federal government's Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve forces to

assume the primary role of preparing for and assisting the active duty Army and Air Force to fight conventional wars.

The results of the data collection and analytical process indicated bias within the DOD, which is in the executive branch. However, the legislative branch that is solely responsible for funding the United States national security enterprise continued to authorize and appropriate resources to the DOD. In turn, Congress, through the DOD, provided funds to the National Guard to support a force optimized for conventional warfare. Therefore, continued conventional warfare funding requests from the DOD within the Presidential Budget and sustained Congressional sponsorship and appropriations for these requests provided strong evidence of systemic bias representing resistance to change. A failure to change could lead to increasing future risks from other nations or transnational terror organizations that may learn lessons from American failures in the Middle East and South/Central Asia.

It was beyond the scope of this study to evaluate why the change did not occur, but it was likely, at least in part, the strong tradition of large-scale conventional warfare played a role. If this was so, Schein's (2010) work on the role of culture facilitating or impeding organizational change might be relevant. A potential major impact of the research results on the National Guard and the DOD could be a challenge to the cultural paradigm of the preeminence of traditional or conventional warfare. The results showed no statistically significant change in major program spending and relative distribution of major equipment inventories between the 1996 and 2006 defense budgets amid changing national security threats. Therefore, the results indicated there was a need to make

changes to the existing national security enterprise's organizations. These changes probably would appear as threats to the organizations and their personnel with vested political, traditional, and cultural interests that support retaining the status quo.

If this is so, then Porras's (1987) "stream analysis model" was also applicable in helping consider why change did not occur. Porras (1983, 1987) argued organizational change processes are so complex that they are best viewed as a stream encompassing many factors Therefore, to change an organizational output the organization must change its inputs and, more importantly, the processes used to create the output. The National Guard did not change inputs from 1996 to 2006 as evidenced by no significant change in major equipment procurement and stocks. Making significant changes to organizational processes was possible, but highly unlikely.

Therefore, even if process changes might have occurred, they were less likely to be effective because the "tools", "equipment", or "trained personnel" (aka inputs) remained the same. Combining Schein's (2010) and Porras's (1987) frameworks or models provided a stronger argument to explain why the inputs (equipment) did not change and why creating significant change in processes must overcome a cultural or traditional bias towards conventional, traditional warfare. In addition, the "tools" or inputs were not designed for unconventional warfare. This continuity in inputs and processes indicated there was a very slim chance of creating a change in outputs; conducting a different type of war focused on counterterrorism operations or executing a nonconventional warfare campaign.

Using the previous organizational change frameworks as a guide, it was logical the United States government and the DOD should consider shifting conventional warfare capabilities to the Army and Air Force Reserves instead keeping them in the National Guard; if a conventional military risk remained and the active duty Army and Air Force could not meet this type of threat. The "service reserves" are a national military component completely controlled by the federal government, unlike the National Guard's hybrid command structure with shared federal and state control. Changing the national security enterprise by this type of shift would relieve the National Guard of a combat role in conventional wars and provide governors, states, and territories with a more focused and capable National Guard relative to domestic security missions. These units could be equipped for paramilitary and combat support missions creating an equipped and trained force focused on unconventional threats, homeland security, and homeland defense.

According to Porras's (1987) framework, the National Guard would be equipped (have the right *tools*) and trained (able to do the right *processes*) to conduct unconventional or homeland security focused missions (create the right *outputs*). These paramilitary capabilities would still be available to support the federal government in times of national crisis or large-scale wars. The results and analysis supported potential future academic research projects as well as social, political, and national security policy research and initiatives discussed in later sections of the chapter. These recommendations were not beyond the scope of this paper.

Limitations of the Study

A major limitation to this study was associated with assumptions related to the challenges of empirically defining the security threats facing the United States. The purpose of this study was to provide a quantitative analysis of the possible divergence between changed national security concerns and the National Guard's ability to adapt its capabilities between 1996 and 2006. The inherently amorphous nature of national security threats presented challenges to analyzing and critically evaluating all of the approaches to mitigating or defeating potential threats until after the threat occurs (see Dempsey, 2013). To address this definitional limitation, I used national security strategies developed for American Presidents to serve as a proxy for defining national security threats. Although an executive branch of government document, the various national security strategy documents represented the United States government's overall assessment of potential threats. They provided a simple but effective way to highlight major and prioritized security concerns in a single document (White House, 2010).

Due to this ill-defined nature, spending large sums of money for the military defense of a country can only truly be evaluated once war breaks out. If one side's preparation was better, such as Germany's rapid defeat of France in World War 2, then it was rather clear whose preparation was better (Deighton, 2000; Macksey, 2003). Conversely, poor planning, preparation, and execution can create a more tragic occurrence. If no combatant was clearly superior, a war can become a stalemate such as World War I (Gilbert, 1994; Keegan, 1993; Stokesbury, 1981). Likewise, the uncertainty of security threats makes analyzing bias within a security organization difficult because

absent a convincing defeat it is hard to prove the bias is unfounded (see Boot, 2006;

Gray, 2009). Therefore, the overall impact of the current study may not be understood

until United States security forces face another major war or another "9/11-type" terror

attack. The United States security enterprise, to include the DOD and the National Guard,

did not understand the unconventional terrorist threat facing America before the 9/11

attacks and thousands of individuals were killed in the attacks and many additional

people died from effects of rescue and recovery operations.

Another related limitation of this study was the magnitude of the United States

national security enterprise. The enterprise consisted of all four main elements or levels

of government within the United States to include federal, state, local, and tribal

governments (Sarkesian et al, 2013). I overcame this limitation by focusing on federal

government data for Congressional budget allocations, DOD equipment transfers to the

National Guard, and data produced by non-profit national security research institutions.

Using these sources, I was able to develop greater fidelity and better insights into not

only the funding, but also other major National Guard capabilities received from the

federal government. My use of federal funding and equipment transfer data sets helped

overcome this limitation because the federal government, not the states or territories,

provided up to 90 percent of the National Guard's budget (see Mahon, 1983).

Throughout the execution of the study, there were no indications of any issues

regarding trustworthiness, reliability, or validity issues with the data used in assessing the

research question and objectives of the study. I used either United States governmental

data or data derived from government data and published by non-profit national security

research organizations. Therefore, the generalizability of the data used and the

conclusions derived from the data created little, if any, limitations regarding the

generalizability for the wider academic and governmental institutions and communities.

Recommendations

The most important recommendation derived from this study was the potential to

expand the scope of conceptual analysis of national security organizational continuity

versus organizational adaptation to strategic, operational, or environmental changes. This

would be especially true when comparing additional periods that occur before and after

major changes to the United States national security environment. Two potentially

worthwhile efforts would be to research the National Guard's budget and capability in the

mid-1980s versus 1996. This would allow a researcher to assess the National Guard

during the latter part of the Cold War and compare it to the 1990s immediately following

the end of the Cold War. A second study could evaluate the National Guard's budget and

capabilities in the 2010-2022 time period that included the drawdown and conclusion of

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This period's analytical results could then be compared

with the results of the 2006 conflict period analyzed in this study.

By doing this research and analysis, academia and the national security enterprise

could evaluate whether a culture that supports the status quo and continuity in the face of

changing national security threats can be discerned over additional time periods and

related to different types of changes to national security threats. Recommending these

types of related studies does not exceed the boundaries of this study. They clearly and

appropriately would be closely related to this study and could result in an amplification,

clarification, or confirmation of findings from this study. Conversely, the recommended studies might challenge the findings of the study by identifying significant changes made by the National Guard during a period with major changes in national security threats. This result, in turn, could lead to additional research efforts to evaluate why there were divergent findings.

An additional area of potentially valuable research could be to assess advantages and challenges integrating the National Guard more closely with the Department of Homeland Security including the possibility of formally transferring federal responsibility for the National Guard into that department. An advantage of this potential study would be to provide an assessment of whether integrating the Army National Guard and Air National Guard would increase the nation's security by providing the Department of Homeland Security with a land and air component to complement the United States Coast Guard, the department's existing maritime component,. This type of assessment should include an evaluation of the relevance and value of the Coast Guard's historically close affiliation with the Department of the Navy. The Coast Guard functions as a naval auxiliary or "reserve" component that can be transferred to the Navy during times of war (United States Coast Guard, 2021).

A study on a Department of Homeland Security integration option could provide an academic assessment of the viability and the impact of the Army and Air National Guard organizations adaptating a "Coast Guard" type of alignment and a continued association with the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force. One anticipated advantage associated with this arrangement is it would allow the Air and

Army National Guards to reorient their capabilities toward unconventional and domestic

security issues as well as humanitarian support missions. This realignment still provides

the ability to augment the DOD's conventional forces in times of major conventional war

or when the Army and Air Force Reserve forces cannot meet the DOD's mission

requirements. This shortfall could be related to a lack of capacity or, perhaps, a mission

requiring specialized unconventional, combat support, or constabulary capabilities that

might exist in a refocused National Guard and that may not exist in other reserves forces.

These topics and the studies recommended were within the boundaries of the

scope and work of this study. If conducted, these studies would help amplify or clarify

initial research of the study and would continue to close a gap identified in academia and

the national security research community. It is likely the future research

recommendations derived from the results of this study may not be politically popular

with various constituencies associated with research areas. Of course, this type of

opposition could be taken as further indications of a community threatened by or resistant

to change and adaptation.

Implications

My primary goal was to assess whether the National Guard, a key component of

the United States national security enterprise, was organized and equipped to address

significant changes to the national security of the United States following the major terror

attacks in Washington, DC; New York City; and over Pennsylvania on September 11,

2001. This goal was evaluated using National Guard federal funding and capabilities the

funding provided in order to evaluate whether the federal government and the National

Guard changed to meet the increased emphasis on countering transnational terrorist organizations as indicated in the country's national security strategies (White House, 2002). Hopefully, the results of the study will inform the national security enterprise and national security-focused academia in order to improve the nation's counterterrorism capabilities and responses to unconventional national and domestic security threats.

An anticipated improvement in the United States national security enterprise's operations and programs should result in an overall increase in the country's national security. Although security expenditures compete with other government organizations and programs for government resources, security remains a fundamental building block for socio-economic development (see Holshek, 2014). However, massive federal expenses associated with conducting wars in response to the 9/11 terror attacks diverted resources away from domestic social welfare spending and created larger federal budget deficits. Over the long-term, excessive expenditures or a failure to align security resources to appropriate security threats could lead to significant internal instability and create the potential to deter economic investment and development (O'Hanlon, 2009). Consequently, the bias and resistance to organizational change discovered in this study could help identify or prompt potential changes in national security policy producing improved and more efficient security. Any improvements in national security organizational effectiveness and efficiency could provide increased social welfare and economic development that, consequently, could lead to a better socio-economic environment for the American public.

As discussed in the recommendation section of this chapter, one identified potential for additional research was to evaluate, through academic studies, the transfer of federal government National Guard oversight from the DOD to the Department of Homeland Security. A major potential advantage associated with conducting this type of research was an assessment of the potential enhanced domestic security and natural disaster response capabilities of a refocused National Guard. The DOD's National Guard Bureau could be redirected into a planning and coordination entity that assists in facilitating the integration of the new National Guard capabilities into major conventional war scenarios for the DOD.

A potentially negative implication in pursuing a Department of Homeland Security integration scenario could be fiscal challenges. Historically, the DOD has the largest discretionary budget within the federal government and consistently receives nearly 50 percent of all "discretionary" federal expenditures. It is important to note discretionary spending became approximately 35 percent of the federal budget and non-discretionary ("entitlements) spending became the majority (65 percent) of the budget since the 1960s (United States Congressional Budget Office, 2013). The scenario of moving the National Guard into the Department of Homeland Security could possibly lead to reduced federal funding for a refocused and likely reduced National Guard. With the potential loss of DOD funding, the state and territorial governments along with their National Guard organizations might struggle to develop and maintain improved domestically focused capabilities and continue to maintain a force capable of providing relevant augmentation to the DOD.

Overall, the use of a quantitative approach was a positive implication for this type of study. By using an empirical approach to study pre- and post-event organizational funding or operational capabilities, this type of study's results supported a less subjective assessment of the National Guard's priorities and overall capabilities. In addition, an empirical approach assisted in assessing the more subjective topic of organizational culture by highlighting what the organization "materially" prioritizes. Overall, this methodological approach was generally a positive implication because it provided a valuable and relatively unbiased way to evaluate the procurement and maintenance of capabilities in the face of a changing operational environment. It is reasonable to infer an organization that does not adapt or change is exhibiting, to some degree, resistance to change and inertia associated with a preference for the status quo.

All of the assessments regarding the implications of this study with reference to academia, the national security enterprise, and potentially the American society were reasonable in their generalizability and trustworthiness. Although the study was assessed to be reliable, it would be prudent to conduct additional research to ascertain if similar findings can be observed before and after other national security crises. Therefore, the inherent recommendations were reasonable and the evaluation and implications for social change do not exceed the study boundaries.

Conclusion

The topic of the National Guard and its relationship to the United States federal government is as old as the republic and closely associated with the competing concepts of federalism and states rights. Over much of the country's history, this relationship was

contentious and frequently produced a high degree of wariness and, at times, distrust. Much of this tension was intentionally created by the writers of the constitution who wanted to create a weak national military by dispersing the bulk of the nation's warfighting capabilities to the individual sovereign states (see Weigley, 1973).

Over the first century of the American republic, this national army and state militia construct proved rather ineffective in national warfighting. It did effectively balance state and federal warfighting capabilities as planned by the country's founders. However following a particularly poor showing by the state militias in the Spanish-American War in 1898, Congress began to pass a series of laws over the next 50 years that brought the state militias into closer alignment and a regular and more formal relationship with the federal armed forces. The inducement to this closer, and increasingly subservient, relationship with the federal government was not only legal codification, but also federal money and resources (see Cooper, 1997; Millet & Maslowski, 1994).

I looked at one result of the increasingly interconnected relationship between the national armed forces and the nominally, at least since the early Twentieth Century, state-controlled National Guard organizations. I used a research framework to evaluate the type of resources the federal government provided to the National Guard units through the DOD's resource allocation programs before and after a national security crisis, the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001. Did this unprecedented, nontraditional attack on the United States create a sufficient justification and requirement for the National Guard to change to meet this new type of threat?

Alas, the hypothesis was proven correct; the types of DOD support and the Army and Air National Guard organizations did not change in any statistically significant way. The National Guard in 1996 and 2006 remained essentially conventional warfighting organizations and the nation used these forces to augment the federal, active duty Army and Air Force to fight in two major conventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Arguably both of these conflicts ended in defeat with the withdrawal of United States military forces, to include the National Guard.

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