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An Exploration of Anti-Terrorism Policy Implementation in Nigeria

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Abstract

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Abstract

In 2015, the Boko Haram formally aligned with the jihadists within the Islamic State of Iraq, further increasing its financial and strategic resources. Currently, the Nigerian government remains ill-equipped to address the constant and increasing issues of food restrictions, disease, and poverty facilitated by the presence of the Boko Haram in Nigeria. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to develop a better understanding of how Nigerian government officials implemented policies and strategies of the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy. The theoretical framework that underpinned this study was strain theory, which indicates that stress (i.e., strain) and failure can facilitate participation in crime. Two research questions were developed to determine how Nigerian government officials perceived implementation of terrorism policies impacted terrorist groups and affected national safety. The study results suggested that policies, such as the TPA, were not effective in combating Boko Haram and that Boko Haram activities would continue to affect the safety of Nigerians. As such, more effective policies for combating terrorism should be developed.

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Dedication

I dedicate this doctoral study to my late father, Prince Sule V. Osagiede Ogbeowemwenkon Osemwende Sr., and my mother, Princess Mercy I. Osagiede Ogbeowemenkon, who supported my father to ensure that I received quality education that will excel me.

My dedication goes to Oba Solomon Erediauwa of blessed memory for his prayers, care and support for my siblings and I.

My dedication also goes to my wife, Princess Hannah, and my children, Sule Jr. III, Wisdom Jr., Emmanuel, Jamie, and oldest son, Prince Sule Jr. with blessed memory.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

The Boko Haram was considered the fastest growing terrorist group throughout the entirety of Africa (Pham, 2016). Aligned with Middle Eastern jihadists, the Boko Haram occupied regions of the African continent using violence, rape, and human trafficking to gain compliance from citizens (Akinbi, 2015; Attah, 2016). Even when citizens did comply to the demands of the Boko Haram, occupied territories were often depleted of resources that were vital for survival of occupied persons. Akinbi (2015) found that regions occupied by the Boko Haram faced severe poverty, starvation, access to fresh water, and were routinely denied access to basic medical care.

Although the Boko Haram occupied territories throughout parts of the continent, this terrorist group was particularly prevalent in Nigeria, within Western Africa. The Boko Haram was and still is problematic within Nigeria, as even its members infiltrated the workings of the government (Thurston, 2017). This presented difficulties in creating policy change and implementing antiterrorist programs, such as the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA), that aide in dispelling the Boko Haram from Nigeria and restoring peace and well-being amongst citizens (Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014; Dasuki, 2013; Pham, 2016; Thurston, 2017). In this study, I focused on how Nigerian government officials implemented the policies and strategies of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy.

This chapter begins with a presentation of background information on the Boko Haram and the need for this study. The problem statement and the purpose of the study are then discussed. Subsequently, the theoretical framework is outlined. I also provide

definitions of key themes to this study as well as information regarding the nature of the study, assumption, limitations, and delimitations. I then provide information on the significance of the study before concluding the chapter with a summary of the key points and an introduction of the contents of Chapter 2.

Background

The Boko Haram, in its present form, was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yousef with the distinct purpose of correcting, what he believed was a corrupt and immoral government (Suleiman & Aminul, 2015). Suleiman and Aminul (2015) asserted that Yousef saw the Nigerian government as prejudicial and oppressive against Muslim persons and insisted that the current system of government be dismantled to protect Muslim citizens in the future (Thurston, 2017). With these ideologies, the Boko Haram gained popularity, amongst unemployed or uneducated Muslim citizens (Backstrom, 2019; Suleiman & Aminul, 2015). Originally nonviolent, the Boko Haram recruited members largely unopposed by the Nigerian government (Thurston, 2017). However, as their numbers grew, the Boko Haram became more secretive, and violent attacks against non-Muslims began (Backstrom, 2019). In 2012, al-Ansari created what is known as the Ansaru faction, which was tasked with unifying the Boko Haram sects throughout the regions and perpetuating the importance of fighting the Nigerian government by violently persecuting Christians and Muslims that opposed the Boko Haram (Thurston, 2017)

The terrorist members of the Boko Haram inhabited and occupied many regions of Nigeria, especially the Yobe, Borno, and Kaduna regions within the northern portion of the country led by Usmatul al-Ansari (Thurston, 2017). Although the Boko Haram

were operational in Nigeria and surrounding African countries, in 2015, the Boko Haram formally aligned with the jihadists within the Islamic State of Iraq, further increasing both its financial and strategic resources (Pham, 2016). With this unification, the Boko Haram became more powerful and violent in Nigeria (Ivekepolo, 2016).

In 2011, the Nigerian government passed the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram (Attah, 2016). Although amendments to the TPA were made in 2013, the Nigerian government has been slow to implement policies and strategies. From 2015 to 2017, the Nigerian government implemented a variety of TPA policies, including the criminalization of terrorism using military and social tactics that led to some success in fighting Boko Haram (Attah, 2016; Brechenmacher, 2019). However, with the recent alignment of Boko Haram with jihadists in Iraq, much of the efforts of the Nigerian government have been hindered (Dunn, 2018; Fox, 2016; Pam, 2016). A gap in the literature persisted regarding the impact and perceptions of how to mitigate the atrocities of the Boko Haram now that they are aligned with the jihadists in Iraq (Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014; Dasuki, 2013; Pham, 2016; Thurston, 2017). Thus, the Nigerian government forces were unsuccessful in expelling the Boko Haram from Nigeria or eradicating the terrorist sects from the country (Joscelyn & Weiss, 2019; Nyadera et al., 2020).

The Boko Haram carried out violence within occupied territories, and their presence created a multitude of indirect hardships for citizens (Ebeku, 2020). Currently, the Nigerian government remains chronically ill-equipped to address the constant and increasing issues of food restriction, disease, and poverty facilitated by the presence of

the Boko Haram in Nigeria (Brechenmacher, 2019; Cumber et al., 2017; Dunn, 2018). These outcomes are especially troubling because the Boko Haram were projected to get stronger as they regained control of the regions they lost between 2015 and 2017 (Joscelyn & Weiss, 2019; Pham, 2016). My intent with this study was to gain a better understanding of how the TPA policies combated this terrorist organization from the perspectives of government officials and restored peace in Nigeria.

Problem Statement

The problem to be addressed in this study was the lack of knowledge regarding the perceptions of Nigerian government officials on the implementation of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy (see Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014; Dasuki, 2013; Pham, 2016; Thurston, 2017). The violence of the Boko Haram and the turmoil their presence brought upon occupied territories are well studied (Adesoji, 2019; Akubo & Okolo, 2019; Brechenmacher, 2019; Ebeku, 2020; Felbab-Brown, 2018; Mahmood & Ani, 2018; Nyadera et al., 2020; Omenma et al., 2020; Sampson, 2016; Weeraratne, 2017). Additionally, it is known that the Boko Haram are guided by the jihadist factions of the Middle East (CITE). However, the TPA policies and strategies being implemented by the Nigerian government and whether the policies were effective at combating Boko Haram under the new jihadist philosophy were understudied. Shuaibu et al. (2015) surveyed security forces within Nigeria regarding their perceptions of Boko Haram and how to address this terrorist organization, but the authors did not include questions regarding the TPAs of 2011 and 2013 or did they address specific solutions to terrorist issues.

Additionally, there is a gap in literature related to qualitative research on the impact of the Boko Haram now being aligned with jihadists in Iraq and perceptions of how to address this change (see Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014; Dasuki, 2013; Pham, 2016; Thurston, 2017). Furthermore, Akinbi (2015), Brechenmacher (2019), Ebhohimen (2017), and Obarissiagbon (2019) opined that future research should focus on antiterrorism policy as a means for combatting terrorism, especially from the Boko Haram. The current study provides Nigerian government officials with empirical research to help them better understand the problem of terrorism and specifically develop solutions to combat the Boko Haram.

Purpose

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to increase the understanding of how Nigerian government officials implemented the policies and strategies of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy. In this study, I explored the TPA policies and strategies from the perspectives of Nigeria government officials. The government authorities at the local, state, and national levels handle eradicating extremist groups from Nigeria. Government authorities, such as local law enforcement agencies, state law enforcement agencies, and the National Intelligence Agency of Nigeria, are tasked with restoring stability to Nigeria by addressing the problem of growing extremism among the Nigerian public. I explored the perceptions of 15 Nigerian government officials related to the TPA of 2011 and 2013 and how this mandate was implemented in addressing issues with Boko Haram (see Attah, 2016).

Research Questions

I developed the following two research questions to guide this study:

RQ1: What are the perceptions of Nigerian government officials regarding the implementation of the TPA antiterrorism policies in Nigeria to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy?

RQ2: What are government officials' perceptions of how the jihadist philosophical change of terrorist groups in Nigeria has influenced the overall safety of Nigerians, including the number of terrorist acts, loss of property, and disruption to day-to-day activities of Nigerian citizens?

Theoretical Framework

I selected the theoretical framework of strain theory to guide the development of the research questions and provide context to the study findings.. In this section, I provide a brief introduction to strain theory with a more comprehensive description of the theoretical framework appearing in Chapter 2.

Strain theory was developed by Merton (1938), who posited that stress (i.e., strain) and failure can facilitate participation in crime. Building on this hypothesis, Agnew and White (1992) opined that strain theory was often associated with low socioeconomic status and poverty that created a feedback loop resulting in more strain and increased crime. Other sources of strain were identified as the failure of goal achievement, removal or restriction to amenities, and the presence of negative influence (Agnew & White, 1992). Negative influence was often more problematic because they

appeared to have access to resources that could alleviate poverty and strain (Agnew, 2007).

Strain theory was linked to a variety of crimes, including participation in terrorism (Agnew, 2010). According to Agnew (2010), strain within a society causes people to join terrorist groups to mitigate strain and address perceived injustices. Additionally, many terrorist organizations provide the illusion of access to resources and a more comfortable lifestyle than is attainable outside the group (Agnew, 2007).

The final facet of strain theory addresses how to end terrorism and other criminal activities. According to strain theory, to alleviate terrorism, or other criminal activity, community leaders must work with law enforcement and other policy makers to create opportunity, reduce poverty and increase access to resources (Agnew & White, 1992). In this way, strain is reduced and the want to participate in criminal actions is also reduced (Agnew, 2007).

I used strain theory as the theoretical framework because the theory explains and describes the situation in which criminal activity, including terrorism, occurs. Finally, strain theory also provided a framework for how to alleviate crime and terrorism, which was a theme central to this study. The problem addressed in this study was the lack of knowledge regarding the perceptions of Nigerian government officials on the implementation of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy (see Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014; Dasuki, 2013; Pham, 2016; Thurston, 2017).

Nature of Study

I employed a qualitative methodology with a case study design to conduct exploratory and descriptive analysis in this study. Qualitative methodology was selected because it allows researchers to collect robust data from the lived experience of participants (see Glesne, 2016). Moreover, the qualitative method presented me with the ability to explore a phenomenon of interest in depth, to understand how or why the given phenomenon occurred. Given that this study explored how the TPA was related to the Boko Haram within Nigeria from the perspective of the Nigerian safety officials, a qualitative methodology was appropriate.

I chose to employ a single case study design to complete this study. Case studies may be multiple or single case studies (Yin, 2017). Because I only explored how 15 Nigerian safety officials perceived the efficacy of antiterrorism policy to combat the Boko Haram, a single case study design was selected. Additionally, the design was used to understand the experiences of participants, while bolstering participants' perspectives with evidence from the literature and other sources of a data. Yin (2017) found that case studies were more prevalent in qualitative patterns where there was intense effort to understand an individual work unit in a complex context.

I used three data sources to reach triangulation and increase data validity (see Yin, 2017). Data collection was completed after receiving Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval and after all other appropriate permissions had been granted. The first source of data was in-depth, semistructured interviews with Nigerian safety officials. I conducted semistructured interviews because they allowed me to ask all

15 participants the same questions and afforded the participants the opportunity to answer in robust ways. Each interview took approximately 90 minutes and was digitally recorded and transcribed. The second source of data was focus groups comprised of Nigerian safety officials. I used focus groups to develop a more robust understanding of the topic under study through the collaboration and discussion amongst Nigerian safety officials. Each focus group was composed of seven to eight people and lasted approximately 90 minutes. The responses were digitally recorded to allow for accurate transcription. Archival data were used as the third source of data. Archival sources in this context included a review of antiterrorist policy and associated tools needed for the implementation of and adherence to the TPA. With a review of archival data, I gained understanding as to how information was disseminated and why this information may or may not be effective.

Once data were collected from the interviews, focus groups, and archival data, I transcribed it all into an electronic Microsoft Word document. The data were then thematically analyzed. I completed thematic analysis using the NVivo 12 software package and following the six-step approach discussed by Braun et al. (2019). Thematic analysis was used because it permitted me to find common themes amongst data and provided context for practical application of findings (see Braun et al., 2019).

Definitions

Boko Haram: A recognized, anti-Christian terrorist group throughout the whole of Africa, especially prevalent in the country of Nigeria (Ebeku, 2020; Thurston, 2017). Their occupation of territories was often accomplished through violence; human

trafficking; rape; and restriction of resources, including food, water, and health care services (Thurston, 2017).

Nigerian safety official: Officials charged with maintaining peace and the well-being of Nigerian citizens (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2007). They have worked for many years to mitigate the issues facilitated by the Boko Haram through the implementation of antiterrorism policy (Suleiman & Aminul, 2015).

TPA: Passed in 2011 by the Nigerian government to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram (Attah, 2016). From 2015 to 2017, the Nigerian government implemented a variety of TPA policies, including the criminalization of terrorism using military and social tactics that led to some success in fighting Boko Haram; however, the overall success of fighting the Boko Haram has been slow (Attah, 2016; Brechenmacher, 2019).

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Assumptions

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I made a few assumptions in this study. The first assumption was that Nigerian safety officials wanted to rid the country of the Boko Haram. Without this assumption, this study would be largely moot. Another assumption was that Nigerian safety officials possessed the capacity to enact change that could rid Nigeria of the Boko Haram. This assumption was necessary because Nigerian safety officials were the chosen population of interest and sample participants. A third assumption was that Nigerian safety officials answered honestly, both within the interviews and the focus groups. Honesty within participant answers was an essential assumption, or the data collected would mean very

little. Finally, I assumed that the thematic analysis and NVivo 12 facilitated honest trends within the data and allowed for reliable results from data analysis.

Scope and Delimitations

The scope of this study included collecting data from 15 Nigerian safety officials regarding how they implement the policies and strategies of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy. This study was delimited to safety officials from Nigeria only. Additionally, I chose to only interview 15 safety officials. Finally, the study was delimited to a focus on the TPA and the efforts of safety officials on implementation and efficacy of the TPA exclusively.

Limitations

This study had some limitations based upon the methodology and research design used for this study. First, because I employed a qualitative case study design in this study, interviews and focus groups with a small number of participants, all of which were Nigerian safety official, were used as two of the three data sources. As such, the results of interviews and focus groups could not be generalized to the overall population of the Nigerian safety officials. Moreover, the results could not be generalizable to the population of safety officials in other countries.

Additionally, I relied on self-reporting in this study, which created pressure for respondents to answer as they perceived they should instead of in ways that reflected reality. This phenomenon is also known as social desirability bias (Grimm, 2010). This topic was also sensitive and uncomfortable for participants, so I diligently tried to treat all participants with respect and understanding throughout the entirety of this study.

The use of archival data as the third data source was also a limitation. Because I explored themes that were sensitive to national security, the availability of full versions of information was restricted. Because I supplemented the data collected from focus groups and interviews with extant data, archival data influenced the collected data. Archival data possessed inherent biases that influenced the data collection efforts and subsequent data analysis. To mitigate this limitation, I used data from reputable sources, such as peer-reviewed articles and government-affiliated websites.

Finally, a limitation to this study was associated with researcher bias because I had preconceived notions and ideas regarding both the Boko Haram and the handling of security measures. To mitigate researcher bias, I participated in bracketing (see Cousin, 2010). Bracketing included writing all prior opinions and thoughts regarding study topics into a notebook throughout the research process. Additionally, I used the notebook to reflect upon and separate my own opinions and beliefs from those of others (see Cousin, 2010).

Significance

This study is significant because it filled the gap in the literature related to lack of knowledge regarding the perceptions of Nigerian government officials on the implementation of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy (see Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014; Dasuki, 2013; Pham, 2016; Thurston, 2017). This study added to the body of knowledge in the field of public policy related to the understanding of how jihadist philosophy has impacted terrorist organizations in Nigeria and the impact that TPA policies and strategies has on

combating terrorist organizations. Combating the brutality of the Boko Haram and the associated issues of disease, poverty, and restricted access to education that is facilitated by the occupation of the Boko Haram has proved only minimally successful in the past; moreover, the Nigerian government was only successful for only for a short time (CITE). Thus, the results of this study are significant for a variety of reasons. First, the results of this study have empirical significance because they fill the gap in literature regarding which policies were perceived as most effective in combatting the Boko Haram.

The social change implications include how Nigerian safety officials perceived threats from the Boko Haram despite the TPA in 2011 and amendments to the TPA made in 2013. The Nigerian government has been slow to implement policies and strategies (Akinbi, 2015; Attah, 2016; Campbell, 2014; Pham, 2016). Government authorities, such as law enforcement, state security, and the National Intelligence Agency of Nigeria, possess the domestic responsibility to eradicate extremist groups, such as Boko Haram, and to restore civility throughout the country (Ebeku, 2020).

Summary

The Boko Haram, a recognized terrorist group throughout Africa, is especially prevalent in Nigeria. They have partnered with Middle Eastern jihadists, which has enabled them to infiltrate the larger regions and facilitate corruption (Thurston, 2017). This has created difficulty for the policy change process and implementation of antiterrorist programs, such as the TPA, which aided in dispelling the Boko Haram from Nigeria and restoring peace and well-being amongst citizens (Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014; Dasuki, 2013; Pham, 2016; Thurston, 2017).

Using the strain theory to underpin this study, I employed a qualitative, single case study design focused on how Nigerian government officials implemented the policies and strategies of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy. Data were collected from 15 Nigerian safety officials through semistructured interviews, focus groups, and archival data. I subsequently analyzed the data thematically using the NVivo 12 software package and informed by Braun et al. (2019). Results of data analysis were used to address the research questions associated with this study.

In this chapter, I provided information on the background, problem, and purpose of this study. Moreover, the research questions, nature of the study, theoretical framework, assumptions, delimitations, and limitations associated with this study were presented. Finally, I discussed the significance of this study.

In the next chapter, I will provide a comprehensive review of the literature. Topics within Chapter 2 include an elaboration on the strain theory that was used as the theoretical framework and themes central to the study, including the history and background of the Boko Haram and Nigerian government; current issues with the Boko Haram and how the Nigerian government has attempted to mitigate them in the past; and what is known about the TPA and its impact on the Boko Haram, Nigerian citizens, and Nigerian government.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The problem addressed in this study was the lack of knowledge regarding the perceptions of Nigerian government officials on the implementation of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new ihadist philosophy (Akinbi, 2015; Dasuki, 2013; Campbell, 2014; Pham, 2016; Thurston, 2017). Therefore, the purpose of this qualitative case study was to increase the understanding of how Nigerian government officials implemented the policies and strategies of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy.

Eme (2018) noted that the counterterrorism policies aimed to fight these types of insurgencies needed realignment and change. From its origins as a group fighting for religious rights in early 2000, Boko Haram evolved into one of the deadliest and most brutal terrorist groups by 2015 (Eme, 2018). The Boko Haram became an unparalleled threat to national security and the existence of the Nigerian state (Ejeh et al., 2020). Their uprising altered the security outlook of Nigeria and developed into a challenge for the Nigerian government.

In this study, I addressed the Boko Haram and other terrorist groups because researchers have continued to debate forbidding or banning people or groups of people as contained in the TPA (e.g., Adesoji, 2019; Akubo & Okolo, 2019; Brechenmacher, 2019; Ebeku, 2020; Felbab-Brown, 2018; Mahmood & Ani, 2018; Nyadera et al., 2020; Omenma et al., 2020; Sampson, 2016; Weeraratne, 2017). It raised fundamental questions about basic rights and the government's limits of power (Ebeku, 2020; Ejeh et al., 2020). The banning of groups of people with different political ideologies or religious

beliefs has serious consequences for the people directly concerned, and this issue led to questions of human rights values (Adesoji, 2019; Akubo & Okolo, 2019; Brechenmacher, 2019). There was a clear indication that more studies were required to ascertain whether these policies are effective at combating Boko Haram; therefore, this study is of significance to Nigerian leaders considering issues related to Boko Haram and ways to combat those issues.

In this chapter, I provide further history of and background on the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, including their objectives and a brief overview of other forms of terrorism, and how the government authorities have attempted to mitigate the challenges brought by this terror group

Literature Search Strategy

To locate peer-reviewed journal articles published within the past 5 years for this review, I searched the following databases and search engines: Google Scholarly, EBSCO, JSTOR, Springer Link, SAGE Journals, IIARD, Emerald Insight, Science Direct, and ProQuest. At times, the search needed to be extended to articles published beyond this period because of the lack of relevant articles matching the search criteria for certain keywords and topics of age. Certain databases did not allow access to the full article and only gave a brief overview or abstract. However, a further search was allowed in several databases that resulted in additional articles and information for the study.

I used keyword search terms and word combinations in Google Scholar and scholarly databases that yielded articles and books that appeared in line and relevant to that specific topic under study. The main keyword search terms used (both on their own

or in combination) were *Boko Haram, Jihadism, Jihadist philosophy, terrorism, policy implementation, efficiency, Nigeria, Nigerian Government, security officials, corruption, anti-terrorism, counterterrorism, Strain theory, criminal, the Terrorist Prevention Act,* and *crime.* The reference lists were available within several of the articles reviewed from each search, and these led me to further searches, which produced additional literature. Further searches also originated by accessing additional references within articles that narrowed the search gap.

Theoretical Foundation

Agnew (2010) associated the strain theory with criminal activity and criminality, including acts of terrorism. Therefore, I chose the strain theory as the theoretical foundation for this study. In a criminological overview study, Fisher and Dugan (2017) noted that criminologists since the turn of the century had stressed the importance of developing theoretical comprehension of the reasons for the emergence and onset determination of terrorist groups.

The strain theory was an apt framework for this study because its considerations and principles showed the formation of groups associated with terrorism in the correct context. Strain or stress occurs in people for several reasons (Agnew & White, 1992). However, the main contributing factor associated with the advent of strain is when outside influences fail in achieving valued goals. A further factor is when personal property, acquired possessions, or valued belongings are taken away or destroyed. Threats intended to cause personal injury or harm are another important and relevant cause of people experiencing strain.

The response to these strains and stresses encountered by members of terrorist groups causes them to be recruited into these types of organizations (Agnew, 2010). Researchers have posited that the impact of strain on criminal behavior consisted of several variables (Adesoji, 2019; Akubo & Okolo, 2019; Brechenmacher, 2019; Ebeku, 2020; Felbab-Brown, 2018; Mahmood & Ani, 2018; Nyadera et al., 2020; Omenma et al., 2020; Sampson, 2016; Weeraratne, 2017). However, researchers identified a link or association with people committing offenses or crime and an increase in self-esteem and personal fulfillment (Agnew & White, 1992). Agnew (2010) stated that a variety of crimes were associated with this theory, and the strain experienced by individuals caused them to join terrorist organizations involved in crimes to alleviate the strain or stress experienced while addressing their perceptions of unfairness.

An individual's aspirations to improve their reputation and personal importance by committing illegal activities, such as terrorism, are especially significant when viewed from a perspective of social separation. Such people had diminished loyalty toward the law and the trust placed in organizations (Ljujic et al., 2017). Agnew and White (1992) posited that low socioeconomic status and poverty also had a greater impact on the strain, with the exposure to these conditions resulting in a life of recurring strain, which led to an increased exposure to criminal activity. The possibility of resorting to terrorism or joining a terrorist group is an effect of a life of repeated and increasing strain; however, this is not always the case. These collective strains increased the likelihood of terrorism for several reasons, but they did not lead to terrorism in all cases (Agnew, 2010).

The perception of failure in life and not achieving set-out expectations, when linked with the absence of basic amenities and experiencing this while under negative influencing conditions, are all contributing factors to the advent of strain (Agnew & White, 1992). The presence of such a negative influence is normally the main concern, and this concern is especially relevant when the individual is presented with access to a solution to relieve the strain and associated stress (Agnew, 2007). Jager (2018) found that theoretical and practical evidence showed that the absence of basic amenities, which normally was associated with poverty, was not the only contributor to terrorism; however, poverty influenced the starting point of the process to resort to a life of terrorism. Agnew (2010) contended that involvement with a terrorist group could be an influential element to join. Many joining such a group experienced a sense of belonging; therefore, they receive a means to express their grievances and discontent within a group.

Ljujic et al. (2017) determined that the lack of finances and associated economic impacting factors, together with the absence of education, as some of the oldest reasons that led people to commit terrorist activities. When utilizing the strain theory, the argument was that even though these factors may relate to partaking in terrorism, the strains experienced can cause fewer opportunities to resort to terrorism. Individuals with perseverance to endure strain and overcome it had the skills to resist extremism and radicalism (Ljujic et al., 2017).

By reducing strain, the necessity of and contributors to resorting to a life of crime and terrorism are reduced; therefore, the aim is to find and implement means of alleviating these contributing factors. Community leaders should join law enforcement

and persons in government to initiate policy changes opposing terrorism (Adesoji, 2019;

Agnew & White, 1992; Ebeku, 2020; Felbab-Brown, 2018; Mahmood & Ani, 2018;

Nyadera et al., 2020; Omenma et al., 2020; Sampson, 2016; Weeraratne, 2017). Poverty

must be reduced and access to resources increased to facilitate an improvement in socio-

economic conditions (Brechenmacher, 2019). With the implementation of these types of

initiatives, the need to take part in criminal activities, such as terrorism, will be reduced

(Agnew, 2007; Brechenmacher, 2019).

In the strain theory, the reasons and societal situations that result in persons

resorting to crime, including terrorism, are described. The theory also permits the

inclusion of actions to address criminal activity and terrorism; therefore, the theory was a

suitable framework to use in the current study.

Literature Review Related to Key Concepts

To understand the application of the theoretical portion of the study, it is

necessary to comprehend the concepts that are of relevance to and guided the findings of

the study. In this section of the literature review, I provide an overview, history, and

objectives of terrorism. The literature review also contains a discussion of the Boko

Haram and its history and impact on Nigeria. In the final section, I present the Nigerian

governmental response to terrorism and topics relating to this insurgence.

Overview of Terrorism

Terrorism is an unlawful act to force violence against persons and property to

threaten or force a government to give in to the terrorists' political, materialistic, or

religious objectives (Obani, 2019). Terrorism occurs when a person or group of persons

uses violence to achieve political objectives and gain (Obani, 2019). People use terrorism to force sociopolitical transformation by forcefully persuading a government to give in to demands, thus escaping future violence and disruption to government operations (Chibuike & Innocent, 2019). When the act of terrorism is initiated for political gain, the disgruntled people from the affected country may be persuaded to join a rebellion, thereby intensifying conflict with the hope of overturning the state, making known the injustices against them, or drawing attention to an underlying cause (Chibuike & Innocent, 2019).

History of Terrorism

The history of terrorism goes back as far as 2,000 years (Brechenmacher, 2019; Garrison, 2003). Even though the objectives, victims, offenders, and the underlying reasons for terrorism against other humans have changed, the methods used by terrorist groups remain the same during history (Ebeku, 2020; Garrison, 2003). These methods include arson; mass killings; suicide bombing; and use of explosives, kidnapping, and forced enlistment (Chibuike & Innocent, 2019).

Since 1945 and the aftermath of the Second World War, terrorism has developed due to unfulfilled promises made by world leaders at that time and have persisted to date (Ebeku, 2020; Shughart, 2006). The three conventional waves of terrorism from this period include terrorism for national emancipation and ethnic independence, left-wing terrorism, and Islamist terrorism. Shughart (2006) contended that terrorism over the period from 1945 to 2000 was fundamentally founded and originated from the conquered states of the Ottoman Empire and the unfulfilled promises made as part of the Atlantic

Charter. The oppression caused during the interwar period by the colonial forces, and

from 1945 up to 1989 by Soviet supremacy, led to a new type of insurgence. Since 1979,

a new Islamist movement started making itself known (Shughart, 2006). Ebeku (2020)

supported Shughart's notion when applying historical discourse of acts of terrorism to the

Boka Haram of today, finding that such terrorist acts parallel those of the past.

Objectives of Terrorism

Terrorism is a means of achieving goals or objectives by exerting violence or

extortion (Chibuike & Innocent, 2019). Terrorists wish to change the way that authorities

and politicians act by using violence and intimidating people into behaving the way the

terrorists want. Chibuike and Innocent (2019) commented that just as politicians

canvassed for the votes, terrorists used threats, extortion, and bloodshed to meet their

objectives and satisfy their demands.

Terrorists resort to criminal activity with extreme political or religious objectives

and motivations at hand (Ebeku, 2020; Roach, 2004). Roach (2004) further suggested

that certain democratic countries also resorted to terrorism to achieve political, religious,

or other goals, and this action was normally associated with what was generally termed as

rogue states. Thus, terrorism was and is fundamentally and intrinsically political (Ebeku,

2020; Mahmood & Ani, 2018). For example, Mahmood and Ani (2018) studied the Boko

Haram in the Lake Chad region and found that innocent people were encouraged to join

Boko Haram due to their own government's response to the terrorists. Many had

expressed that the government said their villages were stabilized and that the government

had rebuilt buildings destroyed by the Boko Haram, only for residents to find that the

buildings were not rebuilt and had only been given a new coat of paint. The government used such instances to state that they had stabilized the region when they had not in actuality, which gave the Boko Haram political ground to draw more people into their terrorist acts (Mahmood & Ani, 2018).

Terrorists inevitably pursue power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to attain political change (Chibuike & Innocent, 2019). Terrorism stems from violence and threatens the use of violence in the pursuit of a political objective. Irrespective of terrorist groups being associated with violence and violent measures to fulfill their objectives, some certain individuals and sectors ascribe to their beliefs and principles and, therefore, join them (Mahmood & Ani, 2018; Tella, 2018). However, this act is not a justification because terror is violence directed against civilians and, therefore, is punishable as an ordinary crime (Roach, 2004).

Forms and Effects of Terrorism

Terrorism originates from several sources, including from persons with criminal intentions, governments with corrupt officials, and from movements seeking to gain politically or even religiously (Ebeku, 2020; Nelson, 2003). The spheres in which terrorism operates are for a strategic gain during the war, to oppress people, to protest or rebel against the government, for revenge, due to psychotic behavior, to cause devastation, or for cultural emergence (Ebeku, 2020; Nelson, 2003). Acts of criminality, violence, greed, and corruption originate within the various types of terrorism. While there are many different types or forms of terrorist activity, those relevant to this study include the following.

State terrorism is a type of terrorism used by the state to force control over its citizens, political adversaries, and minority groups (CITE). State terrorism was defined as the use of violence by nations and forces under their control to promote their political agenda (Ejeh et al., 2020). Religious terrorism is used by terrorists who use violence to advance what they believe to be their divinely ordained purpose (CITE). Nationalist terrorism includes terrorist groups that seek to form a separate state and members who wish to achieve their objectives of sovereignty because they claim to fight for liberation from the ruling government (CITE). Anarchist terrorism includes terrorism intended to force the government to change its policies and is aimed at toppling the government in question (CITE).

A major form of terrorism is Jihadism. Fisher and Dugan (2017) referred to Jihadism as a "subcultural" response to societal strain. The term "Jihadism" or also referred to as "jihadist movement," was first adopted by Western journalists in the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001. Jihadism refers to the most violent persons and terrorist movements in contemporary Islam, and it ascribes to the Islamic ideology of Jihad. Nachanda (2017) noted that ideology with religious connotations is a driving force that motivates people to take action.

The Jihadist philosophy in Nigeria can be traced back as far as 1804 with the upswing of the Fulani War, also termed the Fulani Jihad. This insurgence resulted in the formation of the Sokoto Caliphate in1808, which was disassembled when the British occupied the region (Nachande, 2017). Boko Haram also ascribed to the ideology of Jihadism because they claimed that their fight was to implement sharia law, which

required the change of the political rule and establishment of an Islamic state (Montclos, 2016).

Terrorism and Socio-Economic Effects

Chibuike and Innocent (2019) examined the socio-economic impact of insecurity on Nigeria's population and economy. They used the grievance theory as the framework of the analysis. The researchers found that the security forces could not address the various acts that promoted insecurity in Nigeria, such as bombings, kidnappings, and destruction of properties. These issues resulted in a low quality of life, displacement of the population, death, destruction of businesses and their properties, and economic downturn. The absence of economic opportunities, connected with the absence of education, can contribute to the development of the conflict, thus heightening the crisis (Kamta et al., 2020).

The prevalence of terrorism was found to directly relate to high unemployment levels even though the growth of the population of the country was found to have no relation to terrorism (Salihu, 2018). Salihu (2018) found that a population could be quite large and experience a few acts of terrorism; therefore, large populations did not directly influence terrorist actions. Salihu further determined that terrorism in a country was influenced by economic factors, such as poverty and unemployment, thereby influencing illiteracy. Thus, the lack of education and poverty, coupled with the absence of possibilities, contributed to youth being recruited into terrorist groups. Evans and Kelikume (2019) found that violence occurred due to predominant unbearable socio-economic conditions in a battle for survival. Therefore, poverty, structural inequalities

amongst the population, damage to the environment and resources, and shortages further encouraged the development of terrorism among the population.

Kamta et al. (2020) showed that economic factors, such as poverty, would lead to acts of terrorism against a government, and economic factors have a greater effect on the incidence of confrontation than that of political woes. Poverty and unemployment have often been identified as causes of terrorism. For example, Adelaja et al. (2018) agreed that certain respondents to the qualitative survey believed that terrorism occurred due to socio-economic conditions rather than poverty and unemployment. The general belief was that unemployed and economically strained people were more susceptible to use violence to voice their complaints. A relationship existed between poverty and conflict in the sense that confrontations were more likely in poverty-stricken nations resulting to increased cases of, conflict. Evans and Kelikume (2019) also referred the effect of deprivation in a country as influencing terrorism. The various forms of deprivation that resulted fueled violence and conflict, as evident in the various acts of terrorism by Boko Haram.

Since getting information on terrorism from terrorists is almost impossible, researchers of these incidents are dependent on secondary sources to acquire data for analysis (Nnam et al., 2020). Nnam et al. (2020) utilized an ex post facto survey design and performed a content analysis of the collected data. The researchers concluded that the severity of terrorism and induced trauma on the citizens of the country caused moral anxiety, with devastating consequences for education, the economy, food provision, human rights, and the national solidarity of the population (Nnam et al., 2020). Ebeku

(2020) used history to examine the Boko Haram and agreed with Nnam et al. (2020) that terrorists negatively influenced the society's ability to function healthily. Both sets of researchers concluded that terrorism was a severe threat to humanity.

Boko Haram

Boko Haram is a terrorist group in Nigeria and operates in the northern regions of the country. The group was and is known for unleashing terror on the people of Nigeria while pursuing the idea of turning the country toward the religion of Islam (Kamta et al., 2020). These extremists were named among the most dangerous terrorist groups in the world, with one of the founding purposes to have Sharia law and Islamic traditions imposed on the Northern regions of Nigeria (see Adesoji, 2019; Akubo & Okolo, 2019; Brechenmacher, 2019; Ebeku, 2020; Felbab-Brown, 2018; Mahmood & Ani, 2018; Nyadera et al., 2020; Omenma et al., 2020; Sampson, 2016; Weeraratne, 2017).

In ideological terms (Sulaiman, 2018), this group loathes western education, the associated culture, and modern science to such an extent that western cultural events that encompass education, clothing and fashion, social activities, and even entertainment are a sin. The group's hatred of western education might be the very reason why they got the name Boko Haram. The meaning of the expression in the local Hausa dialect is "Western education is forbidden" (Sulaiman, 2018, p. 94). The founding name of the group is, however, Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal Jihad, which means "people committed to spreading the heritage of the prophet and the Jihad" (Sulaiman, 2018, p. 94).

Aguwa (2017) claimed that Boko Haram started as a response to alleviating the underdevelopment and impoverishment of northeast Nigeria. At the time, this region was

predominantly inhabited by citizens belonging to the Muslim religion. The preceding

argument was established on the apparent injustice and corruption within Nigeria. This

theory has occurred in most cases of Islamist insurgency and religious conflicts.

Furthermore, Aguwa stated the theory of the origin of Boko Haram was concentrated on

Islamic jihadist movements. From this view, Boko Haram falls within the tradition of

jihadism in Nigeria, though in the most extremist form (Aguwa, 2017). This theory

resonated with statements of the leader of Boko Haram, who claimed that the group was

fighting a religious war against nonbelievers. They stated this intending to turn Nigeria

into an Islamic religious state. This statement did not hold because the Boko Haram was

linked with killing Muslims and Christians.

History and overview. Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by Ustaz Muhammad

Yusuf as an Islamist movement. He vehemently taught and thereby generated hatred

toward Western civilization. Yusuf fervently declared the accuracy of the Qur'an and

professed Allah as the uncreated and immortal word (Aguwa, 2017). With his desire for

an Islamic State, he ordered the implementation of the Sharia Law in Nigeria and so

doing created division.

Zenn (2017) noted that the Boko Haram was initially a peaceful group, with

limited affiliation with Al Qaeda. There was an early relationship that developed between

the leadership of Al Qaeda and Boko Haram, which influenced their founding in 2002

(Zenn, 2017). Boko Haram desired to change the government and ignore any Western

beliefs associated with the government (Ebeku, 2020). With several terrorism-related

attacks in Nigeria between 2004 and 2009, Boko Haram became associated with Al-

Qaeda. Their goal was set to create an Islamic State in Northern Nigeria; by 2009, the group had developed into a jihadist movement.

In mid-2009, the government launched an attack against the Boko Haram, and the leader, Muhammad Yusuf, was killed (Zenn, 2017). The death of Mohammed Yusuf, which, according to several people, was ascribed to extrajudicial killing andhad several implications. After his death, the group progressively adopted more violent tactics (Obani, 2019). The new leader of Boko Haram proclaimed jihad against the Nigerian government and the United States in 2010 (Obani, 2019).

The relationship between Al-Qaeda and the Boko Haram grew in significance, and jihad was initiated, leading up to several suicide bombings by 2011 to destabilize Nigeria and dismiss all western ideologies (Zenn, 2017). Al Qaeda was instrumental in training the recruits of the Boko Haram, which had a significant impact on their successful yet violent quests in Nigeria in 2013, and in establishing a connection with the Islamic State in 2013 (Zenn, 2017). From this relationship, an international connection was secured in 2015 with the Islamist ideological sect ISIS (Thurston, 2017). They have been responsible for the deaths of more than 20,000 people (Thurston, 2017) while displacing over 2 million since the insurgence began.

Due to an organized hierarchy with successful attacks on Nigerian peoples, Boko Haram rose to be the deadliest terrorist group of the world in 2014, and second deadliest in 2015 (Aliyu et al., 2015). In a study to determine how Boko Haram was able to rise to power in Nigeria, Aliyu et al. (2015) noted certain points of relevance. Factors contributing to the insurgence of Boko Haram were Nigeria's corruptible and ineffective

government originating from colonial governance, the political awareness of religion, and the relationship that Boko Haram had with other terrorist organizations, namely Al-Shabab, Al-Qaeda, and Daesh.

Maiangwa et al. (2012) found similar findings relating to a deficient government and security forces, as well as corruption within the military ranks. In their reference to factors that intensified the insurgence of Boko Haram, Maiangwa et al. laid blame on the brutal action of the military against its people. Further factors having a direct influence on the rise of Boko Haram included the government having a neglected and underdeveloped infrastructure and erroneous reporting by governmental agencies. Due to conditions of high levels of discrimination, poverty, illiteracy, religious hostility, governmental inefficiency, and military incompetence, Boko Haram rose to power (Varin, 2018).

The violent and destructive tactics and actions of the Boko Haram have attracted global attention, while their insurgence was aggravated and, in a sense, fueled by the government responding and acting in an overly violent way to the terrorists (as discussed further in the section, Governmental Response to Terrorism). Aliyu et al. (2015) conducted a qualitative research paper to assess the growth of the Boko Haram phenomenon and the Nigerian government's response to the insurgence. Their findings revealed a similar notion that the lack of a comprehensive strategy by the government to address the situation contributed to the situation and their growth as a terrorist group (Aliyu et al., 2015). The government did not focus on humanitarian efforts to stop the Boko Haram, instead of focusing on military operations of violence, even moving whole

villages to camps with members suspected of being in the Boko Haram, torturing anyone suspected of interacting with the Boko Haram, and further exacerbating the issue by splitting whole families up among those imprisoned and moved to such camps (Adesoji, 2019; Akubo & Okolo, 2019; Brechenmacher, 2019; Ebeku, 2020). The Boko Haram grew in power due to this response as the Nigerian peoples became upset by the government's violent response, and the Boko Haram was able to use these issues as a platform to draw others into their web (Adesoji, 2019; Akubo & Okolo, 2019; Brechenmacher, 2019; Ebeku, 2020). Furthermore, Aliyu et al. (2015) suggested the Nigerian government to focus on addressing the reasons for their insurgence and not only focused on the challenges that the terrorists caused for Nigeria.

The Boko Haram insurgence. The Boko Haram are associated with the meaningless destruction of human lives and devastation to property, with careless disregard for anything that comes in their way, to achieve their goals of overthrowing the current government and dismiss western ideologies (Attah & Mokwenye, 2019). They accomplisheed this annihilation through bombings, abduction, and brutal killing of human beings while focusing their efforts mainly on Northern Nigeria. Adelaja et al. (2018) conducted a qualitative research survey into the underlying reasons for terrorism and the objectives of terrorist groups, which produced overwhelming and agreeable findings. Most of the respondents agreed that the root causes for Boko Haram resorting to extremist action involved fighting unemployment, poverty, and economic problems. Furthermore, it was caused by discontent with the government, extreme political ideas,

religious sentiments, and exploitation by certain politicians; however, the major objective was that of vengeance against security forces (Adelaja et al., 2018).

Botha and Abdile (2019) studied the reality of why members joined the Boka Haram by interviewing policymakers and former Boka Haram members. The researchers found a discrepancy among the reasons listed as to why people became terrorists in the following excerpt:

Although peacebuilders that were interviewed worked in areas where Boko Haram was active, they mistakenly identified religion (82 percent) and political reasons (44 percent), followed by poverty (26 percent) and belonging (26 percent) as the most prominent reasons why individuals join Boko Haram, whereas former Boko Haram respondents referred to the need to be respected and feared (23.52 percent), need to belong (16.81 percent) and poverty or lack of money (15.13 percent) as primary reasons for joining the organization. (Botha & Abdile, 2019, p. 24)

This disagreement of reasons for joining such a terrorist operation shows the need for further research on the subject. Other researchers even claimed that Boko Haram members were mostly influenced by religious reasons for joining, which disagrees with the researchers above. For example, Salihu (2018) suggested that the Boko Haram claimed religious overtones for their insurgence. However, it was difficult to verify the validity of these claims, as suggested by Botha and Abdile's (2019) study. Terrorists often quoted religious books to defend their actions. However, it was also difficult to establish the authenticity of these assertions because these writings were often subject to

differing, circumstantial, factional, and academic explanations (Salihu, 2018). However, when consideration were made of the religious claims by terrorists, the idea that the majority portion of that same religion did not take part in terrorism was raised. Thus, this specific research was limited to studying the religious motives of terrorist groups (Salihu, 2018) and did not consider other underlying reasons for joining terror groups, as discussed by Botha and Abdile (2019).

Effects of economic terrorism. The development of a country was impeded through acts of terrorism (Sulaiman, 2018). Terrorism threatened the lives of people and their belongings, inhibited business activities and economic growth, and hindered investment into the country, such as when donors like the United States had attempted to offer aid to the Nigerian peoples after the government claimed those villages in need of help were stabilized when they were unstable (Brechenmacher, 2019). The combination of all these negative attributes disrupted the socio-economic development and growth of a country. This act is evident in the causal effects of the Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria (Sulaiman, 2018).

The government's overly violent response and susceptible economic conditions against Boko Haram were suspected of having caused the Boko Haram to thrive (Kamta et al., 2020). Obani (2019) noted that the elevated levels of poverty brought on by terrorism, as well as underdeveloped infrastructure, increased the growth of the population, damage to the environment, and the marginal treatment of its citizens, thereby exacerbating the uprising of terrorist activity. For example, Brechenmacher (2019) discussed at length the violent treatment of anyone suspected of slightly being

related to the Boko Haram. The government's response was so violent that they broke up

possibly innocent families and tortured people with little evidence of their actual

involvement with the Boko Haram (Brechenmacher, 2019). This violence against its

peoples caused stigma to grow among the population, thereby distorting perception about

anyone possibly related to the terrorist group. People who had been forced into the group

and wanted to leave could not because of the political propaganda driven by the violent

government response to possible members (Brechenmacher, 2019). Witnesses were

afraid to come forward to help place actual members in jail, and those who wanted to

leave were too afraid due to the possibility of being killed or completely ostracized by

Nigerian society (Brechenmacher, 2019).

When observing and studying the economic impact on Nigeria brought on by the

Boko Haram insurgence, these attacks were exacerbated by the weak economic

development of the region (Evans & Kelikume, 2019). Furthermore, an investigation into

this contradiction established that the primary cause of the terrorist activities carried out

by the Boko Haram stemmed from the noncompliance with the socio-economic

requirements (Olofinbiyi & Steyn, 2018). These shortcomings stimulated fundamental

human rights abuse, corruption, poverty, and unlawful acts in Northern Nigeria.

Obani (2019) further showed that money intended for the economic development

of the country was diverted from the government coffers to procure weapons and

armament to combat the terrorist insurgence. The Nigerian response was focused on

military war objectives and not humanitarian methods. There is a severe and adverse

effect on the government budget as billions of naira are spent in areas to reconstruct

infrastructure and facilities; however, most facilities are merely painted and not truly fixed, as claimed by residents of villages (Mahmood & Ani, 2018). Such residents believed the government did a poor job of rebuilding homes to claim that they are stabilized before they were for political agendas (Mahmood & Ani, 2018). These half-hearted attempts to rebuild usually came around times of political elections and when other countries had turned their views to the governmental response in Nigeria and areas around Nigeria influenced by the Boko Haram, such as the Lake Chad region (Mahmood & Ani, 2018). The defense expenditure alone had an alarming rise from past years; in 2015, an amount of 6 billion dollars was spent on acquiring weapons and military equipment, with the specific purpose of fighting Boko Haram and not rebuilding societies (Obani, 2019).

The surge of Boko Haram terrorism and economic consequences for Nigeria were also evaluated from various perspectives. There are direct and indirect as well as long- and short-term consequences (Chibuike & Innocent, 2019). The direct consequences related to the destruction of infrastructure and property, thereby leading to the loss of production. In contrast, indirect consequences relate to unforeseen military expenditure by the government to fight terrorism. The results of this study supported the opinion that the Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria negatively impacted the efforts of the government to improve the socioeconomic status of the country. Failure to address the socio-economic issues in their areas of prevalence will ultimately destabilize the impacts of antiterrorism policies (Obani, 2019).

Certain academics believe that terrorism finds its origin in areas where people experience poverty and discrimination (Sulaiman, 2018). The socioeconomic status of people needed to be considered, especially in the presence of criminal and violent activity. Mukhtar et al. (2016) performed a qualitative secondary and found that a symbiotic relationship existed among poverty, unemployment, and security challenges. The researchers used qualitative data and the analysis, with the results indicating that the social hierarchy of people, disorder, and violence were related (Mukhtar et al., 2016). Therefore, terrorism emerged from harsh socio-economic circumstances; however, it also contributed to these conditions that spurred more acts of terrorism.

Moreover, poverty resulted in despair and anger, which then found its expression through violence and acts of terrorism. Sulaiman (2018) further highlighted that sustainable peace was impossible in a culture where poverty and economic hardship were prevalent. Therefore, terrorist groups find it easier to recruit in areas where there are high levels of poverty.

Effects of criminal activity. Since the advent of the Boko Haram insurgence, there have been numerous atrocities and violence associated consequences over their many years of persecuting the people of Nigeria. Terrorism threats extended across individual, organizational, and societal levels and have economic, psychological, political, and social consequences (Qin et al., 2005). Qin et al. (2005) further argued that terrorism could only be overcome if terrorism and terrorist organizations are studied, and their goals understood. Furthermore, the findings showed that terrorists and criminal

groups used violence and conflict to accomplish their goals of undermining governmental policies and laws.

Sulaiman (2018) also referred to the criminal element of the Boko Haram insurgency as an occurrence that Nigerian society was unfamiliar with until that point. The spread of fear on the people of Nigeria threatened social and economic growth. Moreover, their reign of terror remained a threat to the security and economic prosperity of the country. Industrial growth, an increase in trade relations, and future product development was impossible in a country where there is no peace (Sulaiman, 2018). The research also concluded that further studies are required on the impact of Boko Haram on the economy of Boko Haram during the rule of President Goodluck Jonathan which lasted up to 2015 (Sulaiman, 2018)

Sexually abusive effects. The presence of terrorist activities in a country is usually associated with excessive loss of lives, damage to property and infrastructure, sexual abuse and privacy violation, and other forms of humanitarian crisis (Ebeku, 2020; Lord-Mallam & Sunday, 2018). In a study performed in 2018, the relationship between terrorist activity brought on by Boko Haram, sexual violence, and exploitation was investigated. Lord-Mallam and Sunday (2018) aimed to determine factors that fueled this trend and found that the Boko Haram terrorist insurgence resulted in the sexual exploitation of women and younger girls. These acts of sexual violence against women and children resulted in the spread of fear among the population of Nigeria (Lord-Mallam & Sunday, 2018). People were forced from their properties in fear of succumbing to these acts, women and children's freedom of movement were impeded, women and children's

possibilities for employment and education were effectively suppressed, and they were exposed to illnesses associated with these acts. The transgressions were not only committed by the terrorist factions but also by the Nigerian military officials, law enforcement agencies, relief workers, and civilian staff working for non-governmental agencies. It was a finding that military officials and soldiers were forcing sexual favors on afflicted citizens in exchange for protection and relief. Women were sexually exploited instead of being protected by soldiers (Lord-Mallam & Sunday, 2018).

There are many reported cases of sexual slavery and enforced prostitution, unabated occurrences of rape of women and children, incidents of involuntary marriage, forced pregnancy or abortion, and a plethora of other forms of sexual violence (Brechenmacher, 2019; Ebeku, 2020). These human rights violations were rampant amongst the Boko Haram terrorists and other offenders (Lord-Mallam & Sunday, 2018). These very same persons were trusted by the people and appointed in a capacity to protect them from these very types of acts.

Socially abusive effects. Social abuse occurs when a group creates propaganda that stirs distrust among its peoples of the government itself (Ebeku, 2020). The Boko Haram abused the economic and societal situation in the region. Members used propaganda to entice and brainwash young people into joining them to fight with them for their ideological views. Through these actions, they managed to enroll poor and vulnerable people into their group in return for a minor financial incentive (Kamta et al., 2020). The Boko Haram managed to manipulate impoverished and uneducated adolescents into taking up arms and fight for a cause they did not even fully comprehend

themselves. This act is apparent in the many attacks where local communities, schools, and religious institutions, were targeted. The Boko Haram ensured shelter for their troops to evade the state security forces by strategically choosing the locations they occupied (Kamta et al., 2020). This beneficial strategy helped because they could recruit impoverished and desperate youths from these areas to join them in their fight against the government.

At present, terrorist activity is flourishing due to access to foreign funding and driven by a personal gain in the quest to acquire power and riches. Unfortunately, many terrorist groups received funding from public organizations and individuals, who had ulterior motives of financial gain incited by personal greed (Chibuike & Innocent, 2019). The measures that had been put in place thus far to fight terrorism and the Boko Haram in Nigeria are insufficient. A revised campaign needs to be implemented to rebuild the country and restore peace.

Nigeria's Governmental Response to Terrorism

The response of the Nigerian government to terrorist activities and the initiatives to secure stability in their country should be considered (Adesoji, 2019; Akubo & Okolo, 2019; Brechenmacher, 2019; Dim, 2017; Ebeku, 2020; Felbab-Brown, 2018; Mahmood & Ani, 2018; Nyadera et al., 2020; Omenma et al., 2020; Sampson, 2016; Weeraratne, 2017). In a foundational study about governmental responses to terrorism in general, Qin et al. (2005) noted that a government should have a comprehensive understanding of terrorism and organizations to ensure that effective defense plans could be initiated against the threats they pose. Governments understood that terrorism influenced personal,

organizational, and social levels, with dire economic, psychological, political, and social impacts on that country (Qin et al., 2005).

Ebeku (2020) agreed with this view and further suggested that a lack of understanding of the reasons that people were drawn to join a terrorist group could further exacerbate the situation, as the government might carry out responses that encourage its peoples to join the terrorist group. Ebeku suggested this assertion by giving an example of how the Nigerian government responded to the terrorist group with further acts of violence, as they violently imprisoned any person even remotely suspects of being in contact with the Boko Haram, despite little evidence or judicial hearings to prove this belief.

In a democratic country, swift action was required to prevent the unnecessary and unfortunate killing of innocent people, the destruction of property, and destruction of infrastructure. Roach (2014) noted that terrorists and their actions should be viewed under the normal democratic law of a country. Once the terrorist activity was identified, terrorists could be apprehended and charged under the normal criminal law if found that they were scheming against the government or attempted to commit heinous crimes, such as bomb attacks or murder (Roach, 2004). For western democratic countries, this method of fighting terrorism and their associated crimes were more effective than preventing freedom of expression or association. However, the Nigerian government did not operate under this rule, imprisoning and torturing many people suspected of being involved with the Boko Haram with little evidence (Adesoji, 2019; Akubo & Okolo, 2019; Brechenmacher, 2019; Ebeku, 2020).

Udoh et al. (2019) stated that the limitation of the basic fundamental rights and freedom of the citizens of democratic governments in times of security threatened by terrorists had an adverse and "boomerang" effect for the government, as shown in Nigeria's governmental response (Ebeku, 2020). Due to these types of governmental actions and associated policy implementation, as well as by restricting the freedom and rights of its citizens, the terrorist groups appeared to get unnecessary support, which led to more terrorist attacks (Udoh et al., 2019)

The effectiveness of law and policy can only be ensured if it is compared to that of other countries where similar atrocities occur (Ejeh et al., 2020). It is important to consider that the Nigerian system on prohibition was comparable to Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. These countries implemented anti-terrorism laws following a rise in acts of terrorism, such as after the World Trade Center attacks in New York (Ebeku, 2020).

However, unlike in other countries, terrorism in Nigeria became a severe problem and appeared out of control (Chibuike & Innocent, 2019). The uncertainty associated with terrorism was harmful to the overall wellbeing of the citizens. Such terror aspects had subsequent effects that impacted citizens' quality of life. Terrorist acts and the governmental response to these acts resulted in people being displaced from their homes; damage to their businesses, property, and equipment; and the ultimate closing down of businesses. All of these issues had a detrimental effects on Nigeria and its people. As far back as 2013, Oyewole (2013) conveyed that the Boko Haram had become a national and international threat to security for Nigeria, as well as its foreign allies. According to

Chibuike and Innocent, in their research of 2019, the actions taken by Nigeria's government to date needed to be reconsidered because the government has been ineffective in combatting the insurgence.

      Nigerian politics and terrorism. As recently as 2020, researchers (Ejeh et al., 2020) noted that Nigeria remained "bedeviled" by Boko Haram and its terrorist factions. This report came a mere three years after Onapajo (2017) published an article noting that the president of this country, Muhammadu Buhari, had eradicated, or as they noted, "technically defeated" (p. 20) this terrorist insurgence. The claim was largely debated (Ejeh et al., 2020). Therefore, the governmental response to the Boko Haram was to fight them with military might and then declare them defeated when the group remained operating among its peoples.

      Afoaku (2017) opined that the ongoing resilience and growth of the Boko Haram and other terrorist groups was, in part, due to the failure of the Nigerian state to address the issue in a humanitarian way. Decisions made by politicians to separate constitutional and religious matters within the state were influenced and biased. Clear signs of disorder within the state and its public institutions and resources were further evidence of the ongoing abuse of the power of political elites in their roles (Afoaku, 2017). In the time of President Jonathan, politicians throughout Nigeria contributed to the rise of Boko Haram by requesting donors, such as the United States, to send aid to supposedly stabilized regions that were not stabilized in actuality (Afoaku, 2017; Brechenmacher, 2019). Such politicians claimed regions were stabilized before they were safe, forcing peoples to even move back to villages that were still under threat, due to political elections and a need to

seem capable in the eyes of other countries (Brechenmacher, 2019). These politicians' obsession with self-entitlement had severely compromised the country's membership in the Organization of Islamic Countries, the adoption of sharia law by the northern region, the counterterrorism strategy, and the ability to protect the safety of the citizens and their properties.

The Nigerian government seems unable and incapable of stopping the terrorist threat (Ekumaoko & Ezemenaka, 2020). Utilizing a qualitative research model and with documentary evidence, Ekumaoko and Ezemenaka (2020) highlighted the perceived failure of the government to protect its people and suggested that assistance and intervention from the international community were required. The government did not initiate the correct response against Boko Haram when required, and at the time of the response, the execution was also ineffective and questionable; the government's response was so violent that it perpetuated violence (Ekumaoko & Ezemenaka, 2020). In their study, the researchers also raised questions surrounding the strategy and intervention that should be adopted without undermining the independence of Nigeria.

In 2016, Sampson examined the strategic responses of the Nigerian government to the Boko Haram. Sampson found that the governmental response was too violent. Therefore, the violence would perpetuate the development of this terrorist organization, giving them a platform to draw more members into the fold, as Weeraratne (2017) similarly found. The government addressed the issue of Boko Haram by conducting solely military operations to stop the uprising, leading to different results and the embarrassment of the Nigerian political officials associated with this military response

(Brechenmacher, 2019). The government separated whole villages of families suspected

of harboring Boko Haram members with little evidence, as suggested by Brechenmacher

(2019).

Brechenmacher (2019) studied the governmental response to the Boko Haram

through their request of donors to help fund the stabilization of the area. The researcher

found issues with this governmental response as Muhammadu Buhari assumed his second

term as president. The president, to gain face with possible donors like the United States,

claimed that the insurgency was defeated before they were defeated and requested donor

aid to add humanitarian efforts to regions that were not stabilized. The president most

likely cited such regions were stabilized in response to international partners explaining

that the Nigerian government could not stop the Boko Haram through military operations

on the battlefield alone. The Nigerian government requested international assistance too

late, as they had already responded with excess force that encouraged the growth of the

Boko Haram while dismissing the idea that the group had grown in the first place.

Brechenmacher (2019) stated that following governmental responses to the

terrorist actions, citing these actions came too late and could not operate while relying on

a corrupt, disorganized government:

> At the international level, key donors set up the Oslo Consultative Group on the
>
> Prevention and Stabilization in the Lake Chad Region to coordinate their response
>
> activities. The Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Union Commission
>
> have adopted a regional stabilization strategy . . . In parallel, donors have also
>
> begun expanding bottom-up stabilization programs aimed at addressing the

drivers of insecurity at the local level . . . The Nigerian case thus exemplifies the difficulties of implementing effective local-level stabilization efforts while working with a host government that lacks political commitment, transparency, and coordination. While local-level programs have shown positive impacts in various areas, they have struggled to gain wider traction—particularly since donors are often working through or dependent on the government to operate. (p. 2)

Therefore, the government finally did request international support, but it came too late as the insurgence had grown beyond control. The government had effectively grown this terrorist group through their violent military response, instead of seeking out humanitarian agendas to reharmonize their peoples, as suggested by international entities, like the United States.

Brechenmacher (2019) expressed that the Nigerian government sought the support of donors, who wished to develop a "national framework for demobilization, deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR)" (p. 4). Despite this wish on the donors' parts, they cannot combat the actual Nigerian governmental response to Boko Haram suspects, which gives issues with any reintegration initiatives. The military "maintains tight control over the screening and vetting of terrorism suspects, a process that lacks transparency and is not subject to civilian oversight" (Brechenmacher, 2019, p. 10). The Nigerian military had held suspected Boko Haram people for many years, with little to no evidence of actual commitment or aid to the Boko Haram. This military action, that mirrored the violence of the Boka Haram itself, had seeded distrust among the

Nigerian peoples, further destabilizing areas the government claimed to have stabilized, and hindering any efforts of international donors brought in by request of Nigerian officials.

Brechenmacher (2019) claimed that the government attempted to create a "small-scale defectors program" (p. 4) to draw members back into the fold of Nigerian society; however, little effort from the Nigerian government was exerted to make this small program a success. Instead, the governmental response of sending military might into villages suspected of conversing with or harboring the Boko Haram made their peoples too afraid to defect from the insurgency or even come forward as witnesses (Brechenmacher, 2019). The Nigerian society also developed a stigmatizing effect on any person remotely related, whether proven or not, with the Boko Haram, making any type of rehabilitation program near impossible to implement (Brechenmacher, 2019).

As the United States attempted to develop a Nigeria Planning and Operations Group due to requests from the Nigerian government, that same government hampered such efforts (Brechenmacher, 2019). The Nigerian government had committed atrocities against its society, which greatly mirrored the terrorists' actions of violence, which caused the United States to question its involvement in any rehabilitation efforts (Brechenmacher, 2019). The government had released the Buhari Plan to demonstrate a path to recovery after the conflict had ended. The Nigerian government made suggestions to give emergency assistance to destabilized regions and early recovery operations using donor support. However, these methods were not entirely possible as the Nigerian government has yet to enter a post-conflict period, as insisted on by government officials.

For example, Brechenmacher (2019) stated that Nigerian officials kept insisting that villagers return to war-torn homes because the insurgency was defeated, sending many into violent areas with little support from a government they fear to even approach with information about the insurgency. Any type of interaction with Boko Haram led to these families being further displaced by their own government based on the government's violent tactics of interrogation and imprisonment (Brechenmacher, 2019). Thus, the governmental response in Nigeria focused on security measures, ignoring the humanitarian crises of its peoples.

Felbab-Brown (2018) mentioned the small-scale operation to bring in "low-risk" members of the Boko Haram and rehabilitate them, as discussed by Brechenmacher (2019). This operation was called Operation Safe Corridor by the Nigerian government and was supposed to allow low-risk men to reenter Nigerian society (Felbab-Brown, 2018). The government also created a separate program to rehabilitate women and children who may have been victims of the Boka Haram, which may save them from further abuse. However, both programs have been unsuccessful due to the small size, a lack of the government upholding safety for such individuals, and the vast stigmatization of the society against anyone associated with the Boko Haram, as caused by the government's harsh and terrifying response to such individuals (Felbab-Brown, 2018). Nigerians simply are too afraid to even speak to someone who may have been associated with the Boko Haram, even if that person was a victim or had willingly left to rejoin the Nigerian state (Felbab-Brown, 2018). The goal of the operation was positive as it offered the only way for these people to leave the Boko Haram battlefield; thus, Felbab-Brown

(2018) opined that the government should expand this program and begin teaching Nigerian society that these people were capable of reform and needed support by protecting them instead of disavowing them.

Supporting Felbab-Brown's (2018) belief that such programs should be expanded due to the negative military response by the Nigerian government, Adesoji (2019) suggested the following:

> Beyond the traditional militaristic way of dealing with religious riots and later insurgency, the employment of subtle approaches, such as encouraging insurgents to lay down their arms through dialogue and propaganda, followed by a well-thought-out process of deradicalization and rehabilitation, will go a long way to deplete the ranks of the Boko Haram sect. (p. 2)

Nyadera et al. (2020) supported the research of Adesoji (2019), Brechenmacher (2019), and Felbab-Brown (2018), finding that the harsh security measures of the Nigerian government were a woeful response to the crisis. In response to the Boka Haram, Nigerian officials formed the Joint Task Force, imposed a state of emergency to request international aid, and even recruited vigilantes to battle the insurgents further. These acts created a platform of violence initiated by the government itself, which seemed "oblivious of the fact that the prevailing world order demands moral accountability, formal or informal, for the use of violence" (Nyadera et al., 2020, p. 298). The government has deployed officers who are juniors in rank and lack experience to northern regions most affected by the Boko Haram, which has further hindered the governmental response to the issue. Moreover, state officers killed a man named Yusuf

who had information about corrupt politicians of Nigeria, further exposing the lack of the government's commitment to the cause, as well as the corruption within the government. This issue caused any requests by the Nigerian government for international aid to be questioned by any donors, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and more (Nyadera et al., 2020). In conclusion, Nyadera et al. (2020) stated the following:

> Complete annihilation of the group has proved to be a strategically and militarily impossible endeavour since most members of the group are ordinary artisans who can blend well into the general population. Annihilation of the group would then mean total destruction of the entire northern region. (p. 300)

A notable development of the progress of the Boko Haram terrorist uprising was raised in a study by Obamamoye (2018) in which he referred to the incident in 2014 when a group of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, were kidnapped. At that time, the Nigerian government committed unconditionally to the rescue of these girls, irrespective of the action required to accomplish this goal. The Boko Haram made known their intentions, and both parties irrevocably noted their intentions to resort to violent action to ensure that their objectives were met (Obamamoye, 2018). Certain girls were released through negotiation, which raised the question of the motivation and implications of both parties for this successful approach. The release of the Chibok girls was deemed successful following an agreement to release previously prosecuted members of Boko Haram from prison. However, the Nigerian government only acted with negotiation tactics due to international pressure, as suggested by Brechenmacher (2019) and Felbab-Brown (2018) above. Although this action resulted in securing the release of the Chibok girls, it exposed

that the Nigerian government's prior response of violence against anyone associated with the Boko Haram was ineffective and that they could have addressed the issue in a more humanitarian way from the beginning (Mahmood & Ani, 2018). The Nigerian governmental response to violence inadvertently caused the Boko Haram to strengthen throughout Nigeria.

Antiterrorism policy and law. The Nigerian government has an ongoing history of terrorism (Faluyi et al., 2019). The approach used in the past to resolve this violence was by alleviating the concern on a case-by-case approach. There was no structured policy to respond to the terrorist insurgency, and the Nigerian government would react to the symptoms of the violence instead of responding to the root causes (Faluyi et al., 2019). The initial response of the government to acts of terrorism was based on Section 11 of the Nigerian Constitution of 1999, which stipulated that the National Assembly had to enact laws for public safety and public order.

Over the years, there were numerous conflict situations with underlying features of terrorism; however, labeling these acts as such was vehemently opposed (Ejeh et al., 2019). This action resulted in terrorism remaining unclear under Nigerian law for several years. Without a definite and clearly defined antiterrorism law, these types of acts could not be effectively addressed, and suspected terrorism-related cases were not prosecuted. Only with the enactment of the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) of 2011 was this impediment overcome (Ejeh et al., 2019). Counter-terrorism laws and policies could from here on be passed and enforced.

The legislative measures to restrain and control the threat of terrorism in the form of the TPA was amended in 2013 (Ejeh et al., 2020). In part, this action was due to prohibition, which was new to the Nigerian legal system. The act caused a lot of disagreement because it inhibited the fundamental rights of citizens and raised concerns over the power presented to politicians.

Bamidele (2015) compared the efforts in Nigeria to curb terrorism and the security of the Nigerian state. Such efforts included the Nigerian government requesting international aid to provide emergency assistance to begin early recovery in influenced regions, as supported by Brechenmacher's (2019) research. The security of the Nigerian state was supposed to be secured and assured by dealing with the safety of Nigerian citizens and the protection of its borders and territories. He argued that the need for effective antiterrorism strategies was evident not only to purge the insurgence of Boko Haram but also to fight other constructs of criminality and threats to the security of the country. Bamidele (2015) urged that the campaign and initiatives against terrorism need to avoid narrow-minded politics and religion. The Nigerian state cannot undermine the human rights, security, and freedom of the citizens because of the fight to curb terrorism. Nigerian officials would not admit, as noted by Brechenmacher (2019) above, that a problem truly existed to avoid embarrassment from the international community during times of political unrest in Nigeria. These officials made decisions that had negative consequences due to the need for reelection or to save face with the international community, such as violently attacking any village suspected of harboring the Boko

Haram, thereby wishing to stop the insurgence as quickly as possible to prove their inaccurate claims (Brechenmacher, 2019).

Like Brechenmacher (2019) and Felbab-Brown (2018) had stated that Nigerian peoples lived in simultaneous fear of the Boko Haram and their own government, Njoku (2017) mentioned that the counterterrorism laws and policies gave an excuse for governmental representatives to repress the basic human rights and freedoms of citizens and opposing parties in the pretext of preventing terrorism. As suggested by researchers above, Njoku similarly discussed that the government had led attacks against villages suspected of interacting with the Boko Haram, despite little evidence. Njoku also argued that the antiterrorism laws for Nigeria were reproduced and taken from the counterterrorism laws and structures of the United States and the United Kingdom. In formulating the laws, the lawmakers did not fully consider the historical, political, and social environment of Nigeria, which was seen as an authoritarian state.

Njoku (2017) studied the nature of the Nigerian counterterrorism laws, policies, and structures by making use of empirical analysis. The researcher found that by separating human rights and civil freedom of its population, the spread of terrorism was promoted. For these reasons, the Nigerian counterterrorism laws were not fully effective (Njoku, 2017). The laws should be scrutinized, re-assessed, and then formulated to address the terrorist insurgencies experienced in Africa (Njoku, 2017).

As an example, Lord-Mallam and Sunday (2018) discussed victims of terrorism offered sex in exchange for protection and materials, and sexual violence was rife amongst terrorists, soldiers, and even within relief organizations. The researchers

highlighted the need for the TPA to include sexual violence and associated acts in the policies. Acts and atrocities of sexual violence, such as rape, promote terrorist activity; therefore, such acts should be criminalized (Lord-Mallam & Sunday, 2018). Moreover, this issue further exposed the corruption of Nigerian officials who simply offered help to Boko Haram's victims and prevented these victims from experiencing trauma after receiving aid.

Nigeria implemented numerous counterterrorism measures in partnership and with the support of foreign governments (Brechenmacher, 2019; Gana et al., 2018). The Nigerian government requested aid from donors to fight, which by then had become a serious humanitarian crisis. Irrespective of the ongoing efforts, the insurgence remained active, and the group sustained violence and attacks. Gana et al. (2018) indicated that the continued and sustained insurgency of the Boko Haram, irrespective of the continued implementation of counterterrorism measures, could be attributed to the approach used by the Nigerian state in fighting their activities, (Brechenmacher, 2019).

Njoku (2020) explored the sociopolitical factors that influenced the writing of laws and measures to combat terrorism in Nigeria. He raised a concern of government officials purposefully excluding civil society organizations (CSO) from the process of originating the counterterrorism policies and measures. In empirical mixed-methods analysis research of CSOs and government officials, the objective was to determine the effect of their exclusion from the formulation of counterterrorism policies, and the associated impact on their roles and responsibilities (Njoku, 2020). Therefore, the Nigerian government has rendered the CSOs incapable of being part of the law-making

process, taking away their rights to act on behalf of sidelined or exposed groups from the perspective of anti-terrorism actions in Nigeria (Njoku, 2020). This purposeful exclusion of the CSOs also resulted in the politicians being able to formulate a service delivery role, which restricted the CSOs from influencing political decisions and policy. The CSOs did not pursue public support to challenge the actions by politicians, which were effectively restricting them from being part of the decision making and have conformed with these laws and policies (Njoku, 2020).

Corruption within the Nigerian government. The rise of the Boko Haram insurgency and associated terror attacks were attributed to corruption within the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan. These comments were made by Ayodeji (2015) when a Qualitative Content Analysis study was done to investigate the role which exemption and the impact of corruption had on the weak action taken against the Boko Haram insurgence, under the Jonathan administration. The findings of this study pointed to inappropriate and ineffective action against the terrorist groups, such as violent opposition of anyone possibly associate with the Boko Haram despite little evidence (Brechenmacher, 2019).

The corruption within the Jonathan administration was rife, and reports of bribes being paid by the government to get the Boko Haram to co-operate created an unfounded sense that the situation was under control. This act was contrary to actions that might have assisted the insurgence of Boko Haram. The ongoing corruption within the government ranks prevented decisive action against terrorism when it was most needed (Ayeodeji, 2016)

The lack of decisive action, together with the misappropriation and theft of funds, which were allocated for fighting these very acts, contributed to the inability to curb the spread of terrorism when it was crucial (Ayeodeji, 2016). Duke et al. (2017) also reported on this concern in 2017 when they reported on corruption within the Nigerian military. Funds for fighting terrorism were misappropriated, substandard weapons were purchased to reduce costs, bogus defense contracts were created, and soldiers were not supported while in combat. Felbab-Brown (2018) explained that junior officers were sent to the northern regions who had little experience with battle or the opposite, supporting humanitarian efforts for stabilization. Nigerian officials gave little funding to operations, such as a small-scale endeavor to rehabilitate low-risk peoples, which could have made a positive difference for Nigerian society combating the Boko Haram (Felbab-Brown, 2018).

Duke et al. (2017) stated that despite huge amounts of the Nigerian budget being allocated to the Nigerian military forces, there were no corresponding or significant outcomes to justify these expenses. Duke et al. stated that investigations would show that senior government officials misappropriated the money allocated for counterterrorism against the Boko Haram, defense force officials, and other security agency officials in association with politicians and suppliers for defense force equipment and armament. The corruption within the Nigerian defense sector left the military with improper functioning, ineffective and below standard equipment, together with an improperly trained and unskilled defense personnel. Thus, Duke et al.'s (2017) findings correlated with

Ayodeji's (2016) findings. Furthermore, their suggestion was of persistent monitoring and scrutinizing of military contracts to be implemented by the government.

Oje et al. (2019) noted that it was apparent that prolonging the fight against the Boko Haram had a distorted benefit for politicians and military officers alike. Ojo et al. explored two major findings following their study of the illegal nature in which military funds were allocated and the role of politicians and senior military personnel in this defense corruption. The first point of relevance was that partnerships were formed between politicians and senior military officers to divert funds destined for the purchasing of armament. The second point of significance was that the Boko Haram insurgence was a means for ongoing corrupt activity by politicians and military personnel, as well as the diverting of funds and resources allocated for fighting their terrorist activities (Ojo et al., 2019). The Nigerian government spent too many funds on their violent response to the insurgency, while they should have supported more rehabilitation efforts, as requested by international donors (Brechenmacher, 2019).

Banini (2020) showed the link between corruption and the efficacy of the armed forces because of governance issues. Banini blamed the corruption in the Nigerian department of defense for having weakened the armed forces, as well as influenced their prompt ability to respond to threats. Banin referenced military successes after incidents of corruption within the military were addressed to show that this concern was valid and real. Additionally, Deckard and Pieri (2017) published an article on the perceptions of Nigerian citizens of corruption and the efforts required for the nation to be effectively governed. Before this research, no empirical studies existed in this relationship. A survey

pointed that concerns of Nigerian officials and politicians using the law for their gain, and widespread corruption, were major contributors for the ongoing security crisis of terrorism (Deckard & Pieri, 2017). This act fueled the population's support for the activist's violent actions.

According to a 2018 study, Nigeria was regularly rated as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (Fry, 2018). Fry (2018) referred to Nigeria as a failed state and noted that the lack of development was because of the corruption in the government. Because the public did not trust the officials to drive the development of the country, the officials responded by abstaining from and neglected these duties even further (Fry, 2018).

Olofinbiyi and Steyn (2018) referred to these actions and concluded that terrorist attacks and insurgency remained an ongoing concern if the preceding issues were ineffectively addressed. The prevalent and widespread socioeconomic problems in Nigeria were a consequence of power-seeking, unethical, and dishonest actions by politicians. Iyekekpolo (2020) referred to the grievances of Nigerians as a direct result of extremism. These actions were because of economic poverty and inequality of the population brought about by the actions, or lack thereof, of corrupt politicians.

Suleiman and Karim (2015) noted that the only sustainable short- and long-term solution to the endemic dishonesty, was to implement decisive measures to stamp out corruption. They further noted that these actions would enable the recovery of vital sectors, such as agriculture and production, which would ensure job creation. Failure of

the government to stop corruption would result in a dramatic rise in the activities of the

Boko Haram (Sulaimain & Karim, 2015).

Effectiveness of policies. It is significantly important for the TPA of 2011 as well

as the amended TPA of 2013 to operate within a legal structure, which will ensure its

efficacy in fighting terrorism (Omale, 2013). The researcher noted as well that the

counterterrorism strategy and policies could only be successful if the governmental

agencies are actively involved with the mediation of the terrorist groups. This act is

crucial in curtailing the ongoing Boko Haram insurgence (Omale, 2013).

The efficiency of the policies to overcome the terrorist insurgence relies on how

these policies are implemented. The Nigerian government should encourage fairness to

apply rigidity to the mandate of Boko Haram by coercing the group to communicate its

objectives through the judicial system (Nwankpa, 2017). This act will ensure public

involvement and initiate opinionated feedback and raise questions relating to the group's

influencers and contributors. A better understanding of the key players to connect with

and in which manner will also result from this and further ensure the efficiency of the

implemented policy.

Njoku (2020) used the Braun and Clarke procedure of thematic analysis to acquire

knowledge and understanding into the underlying causes of failure of the

counterterrorism actions. The results emerging from this study indicated the perception

that the actions used by the Nigerian government were ineffective. The further findings

were that there were discrepancies amongst the participants of the perception of the

policies and strategies (Njoku, 2020). According to the researcher, understanding and

addressing these discrepancies, hold the key to initiating a successful counterterrorism strategy.

The analysis of numerous counterterrorism measures indicated that the use of excessive military force has proven to be unsuccessful (Gana et al., 2018). The success of these measures were found with a refocus and re-alignment of the policies to gain the trust and respect of the population. Committing to recognizing the fundamental human rights and freedom of the population, was a significant contributor to ensuring the effectiveness of the policies (Udoh et al., 2019).

Strategies for success. Omale (2013) argued that terrorism could only be effectively fought if there is an understanding of the connection between activism and criminal behavior in the political, social, and religious context. Furthermore, there is an increasing global awareness of criminal activity, which is set to derail democratic growth and advances utilizing violence and anarchy. These criminals have the intention of being instrumental to ongoing chaos and, in so doing, draw politics into their criminal scheming (Omale, 2013).

Fisher and Dugan (2017) proposed that terrorist violence may be reduced if activists are included in political involvement. The applied theory approach, as studied by Emmanuel (2020), was in line with these sentiments. This approach may curb terrorism and extremism if properly employed. The argument is for the need of diplomacy between the government and the Boko Haram to address their ultimate objectives and to restore the concerns. This more efficient method could end terrorism because the use of military force did not always result to expected results (Emmanuel, 2020).

The findings of the study were that even though military action remains a consideration for the war against terrorist groups, it should be implemented together with other counterterrorism initiatives (Emmanuel, 2020). The main aim is to address the objectives and beliefs of the terrorist groups and remove the extremist and militant sentiments for which they stand. Here, the emancipatory counter-insurgency theory was relevant since it aligned to counteract the terrorist insurgence without resorting to violence and brings about the liberation of the members from the factional tendencies of the terrorist groups (Emmanuel, 2020).

The findings of Tella (2018) referred to the idea of using limited force in fighting terrorist groups, as a soft power approach. His findings were that counterterrorism approaches that adopt the use of soft power could be more efficient than when brute force or violence is used. Certain people in Nigeria support the beliefs of the Boko Haram, and by utilizing a non-violent approach within the counterterrorism initiatives, it can resort to a more appealing initiative to ensure positive results (Tella, 2018).

In 2018, Gana published findings on the counterterrorism actions of the Nigerian government against the Boko Haram. The study showed that military action and harsh laws and policies resulted in public opposition, which ultimately weakened the effectiveness of the counterterrorism campaign. Sampson (2016) also referred to discordance and increased tensions between the government and the citizens of Nigeria, in the presence of a primarily military approach against the Boko Haram. His suggestion was for the people of Nigeria to be allowed to participate in the political arena as a successful measure to manage the Boko Haram (Sampson, 2016). These findings agreed

with the recommendation from Gana (2018). The suggestion for the Nigerian government was to initiate a population-focused approach to address the socio-economic factors that lend public support to the terrorist group (Gana, 2018).

As highlighted in the 2019 research by Udoh et al., members of government security agencies should respect the basic human rights and freedom of their citizens. If the fundamental values remain intact following terrorist attacks or security threats, this strategy tends to reduce the possibility of further attacks. In doing so, the cost of further counterterrorism measures is also reduced (Udoh et al., 2019).

Nnam et al. (2020) opined that the national security forces must be realigned and reconsidered to eliminate the disruption and other forms of inequalities. The development of policies for action by social operatives, politicians, and the military police needs to be sustained. It is only by continuously monitoring the policies that the effectiveness can be evaluated (Nnam et al., 2020). Security authorities need to be encouraged and trained as crucial stakeholders within the counterterrorism laws.

The Boko Haram insurgence severely impacted the national development of the country (Attah & Mokweye, 2019). Attah and Mokwenye (2019) suggested a focus on creating employment opportunities for the youth of Nigeria to prevent the recruitment of uneducated or unemployed youths into the terrorist group. Duke et al. (2017) recommended the introduction of socio-economic empowerment programs to promote job creation and employment opportunities for the youth. This importance of the prompt supply of sufficient military support, and improved armament for the frontline soldiers, was also highlighted.

The implementation of proactive youth empowerment programs and inventive social, political, and economic policy changes will ensure an improvement of the problem of terrorist insurgency (Ordu, 2017). This researcher further recommended a complete rethink of the social and political structure of Nigeria, which aligned with the findings and suggestions made by Chibuike and Innocent (2019). They reiterated that the Nigerian government and security departments need to be more proactive and improve in how they collect their security surveillance data (Chibuike & Innocent, 2019). The findings also again reaffirmed the importance of generating more job opportunities for Nigeria to ensure that citizens are not drawn into the terrorist groups.

Nabiebu and Alobo (2019) evaluated the Boko Haram insurgency from the vantage point of the failure of the Nigerian military forces. The suggestion from this study was for Nigeria to turn to a civilian joint task force and implement the use of private military companies (PMC), to fight the insurgency. The conclusion from their study was that PMCs managed to achieve success in their counterterrorism efforts and gained a positive global image (Nabiebu & Alobo, 2019).

More effective strategies for counterterrorism projects will not only assist in combatting the northeast region of Nigeria from the Boko Haram and its related threat, but it will also assist in fighting other types of criminal activity and security risks. These were the sentiments of Bamidele (2015) when he compared the counterterrorism initiatives in Nigeria and the protection of the Nigerian state. Bamidele noted that the security of the Nigerian government would be jeopardized in the fight against terrorism if the counterterrorism policies get entrenched in trivial politics or religion.

Summary and Conclusions

The threat of terrorism expanded over individual, organizational, and social levels and extensively had financial, mental, diplomatic, and social implications (Chen, 2005; Ebeku, 2020). A country only effectively combated terrorism if there was a thorough understanding of terrorist organizations and their objectives. Oyewole (2013) commented that the Boko Haram terrorist group had become an ever-growing national and international security concern for Nigeria and its allies. They have been associated with atrocities and mass murders, which is thriving due to the weak institutional capacity of the Nigerian government (Oyewole, 2013). This study related to antiterrorism policy implementation in Nigeria and how Nigerian government officials perceived this subject. The study was specifically focused on the TPA anti-terrorism policies used to address the Boko Haram, which adheres to the jihadist philosophy. Furthermore, the study also focused on terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and how the government officials perceived the effect of the jihadist philosophy on them (Oyewole, 2013).

This chapter provided an overview and exploration of the literature available on the study theme. The main topics studied included the theoretical framework, an overview of terrorism, the Boko Haram, and the governmental responses to terrorism. Within each of these topics, further topics of relevance were addressed to delve deeper into the issue of Boko Haram and the anti-terrorism policy implementation as perceived by the government officials.

The review of the literature on strain theory as the apt theoretical foundation for the study proved to have relevance since experienced strain has been identified to lead to

criminal activity. Terrorism and terrorist actions have been proven to be a means of alleviating strain experienced through poverty and a lack of education as well as other social factors where self-worth is impacted. The strain theory correctly describes this condition and therefore is applicable

As part of the overview of the study, the topics identified as central and relevant, were an overview of terrorism, which included a look at the history, objectives, and different forms of terrorism. The forms of terrorism included the effects of terrorism on society and the economy and deprivation it brings. It was important to bring terrorism into context to get an understanding of the placement of the Boko Haram in this form of human rights violations.

The Boko Haram insurgence and the socio-economic, as well as other effects on society, were also highlighted TPA (see Adesoji, 2019; Akubo & Okolo, 2019; Brechenmacher, 2019; Ebeku, 2020; Felbab-Brown, 2018; Mahmood & Ani, 2018; Nyadera et al., 2020; Omenma et al., 2020; Sampson, 2016; Weeraratne, 2017). This section and background literature identified Boko Haram as one of the most violent terrorist groups and a threat to Nigeria as well as other countries. The jihadist philosophy they ascribe to and organizations which they are linked to, have increased their levels of violence.

The final major topic under review was the governmental response to terrorism. Reference was made to the Nigerian government officials and corruption as identified in the government, the antiterrorism policies and effectiveness, and the strategies that are effective and successful. The antiterrorism policies have been ineffective, mostly due to

corruption within the government and military ranks, as well as ineffective responses to the terrorism insurgence brought about by the Nigerian government officials (Nyadera et al., 2020). The public has no trust in government due to large scale corruption, which has a direct impact on further extremism (Felbab-Brown, 2018).

The definite and major concern of deep-rooted and ongoing corruption within the government and amongst the very officials appointed to serve the public needs to be studied. The endemic practices and means of corrupt practices need to be studied to establish processes for its abolition. Government officials are allowing terrorist actions because it provides them with access to funding, which they strategically channel to enrich themselves (Brechenmacher, 2019; Felbab-Brown, 2018). The TPA policies will continue to fail the country and its people unless corruption is brought under control.

In Chapter 3, the research focused on the method used for collecting the data. The topics included the research method and instruments used, the research design and rationale as well as the approach used. The role of the researcher and the important issues to consider as part of the qualitative research methodology were also discussed. Issues of trustworthiness to ensure credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability of the study, and the surrounding ethical issues were addressed.

Chapter 3: Research Method

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to increase the understanding of how Nigerian government officials implement the policies and strategies of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy. In this study, the TPA policies and strategies were explored from the perspectives of Nigeria government officials. The government authorities at the local, state, and national levels handle eradicating extremist groups from Nigeria. Government authorities, such as local law enforcement agencies, state law enforcement agencies, and the National Intelligence Agency of Nigeria, can restore stability to Nigeria by addressing the problem of growing extremism among the Nigerian public. In this study, I explored the perceptions of 15 Nigerian government officials related to the TPA of 2011 and 2013 to investigate this government mandate (see Attah, 2016).

In this chapter, I provide information regarding the methodological approach used in this study. This chapter begins with a discussion of the research design and rationale, the role of the researcher, and the methodology. Within the methodology section, the population, sampling technique, instrumentation, and data collection process are described. Next, I provide details on data analysis techniques used and information regarding the trustworthiness of this study. Finally, this chapter is completed with summary of key points and a transition to the next chapter.

Research Design and Rationale

I developed the following two research questions to guide this study:

RQ1: What are the perceptions of Nigerian government officials regarding the implementation of the TPA antiterrorism policy in Nigeria to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy?

RQ2: What are government officials' perceptions of how the jihadist philosophical change of terrorist groups in Nigeria has influenced the overall safety of Nigerians, including the number of terrorist acts, loss of property, and disruption to day-to-day activities of Nigerian citizens?

Central Phenomenon

Within this study, the phenomena of interest were the perceptions of Nigerian government officials regarding both the implementation of the TPA antiterrorism policies and the safety of Nigerian peoples as terrorist groups, such as the Boko Haram, operate under the jihadist philosophy.

Qualitative Methodology

To address the research questions, I used the qualitative methodology. I decided to use the qualitative methodology because this approach allows researchers to collect deep and meaningful data from the lived experience of participants (see Glesne, 2016). Unlike the quantitative method that focuses on identifying relationships between variables, the qualitative method also permitted me the ability to explore phenomena descriptively to understand how or why a given phenomenon occurs (see Bruce et al., 2017; Glesne, 2016). Because I explored how the TPA antiterrorism policies and the safety of the Nigerian people were related to the Boko Haram within Nigeria from the

perspective of the Nigerian safety officials, use of the qualitative methodology was appropriate.

Case Study Rationale

I employed a single case study design in this study. I selected case study design for a variety of reasons. The first reason is because the case study design uses multiple data sources to richly investigate a given phenomenon. Case studies are appropriate when there is a need to describe and understand an experience in a comprehensive manner (Harrison et al., 2017). Yin (2017) identified that case studies are more prevalent in qualitative patterns where there is an intense effort to understand an individual work unit in a complex context. Finally, the case study design is also used in a variety of disciplines, allowing for the inclusion of a variety of types of data to describe or document phenomenon. Thus, the design can be used to understand the experiences of participants, while bolstering participants' perspectives with literature and other sources of a data.

Case studies can be completed as multiple or single case study (Yin, 2017). Single case studies are more often used to describe a phenomenon in one setting, or amongst one group of persons, while multiple case studies look at a phenomenon across a variety of scenarios or peoples (Harrison et al., 2017). Because I only explored how 15 Nigerian safety officials perceived the efficacy of antiterrorism policy to combat the Boko Haram, a single case study design was selected for use.

Role of the Researcher

My role as the researcher in this study was as an observer-participant. I am a Nigerian American with experience in the U.S. military. Additionally, I have a variety of family members that still reside in Nigeria. Thus, my family members are routinely subjected to the jihadist influence of the Boko Haram, creating a vested interest to aid Nigerian safety officials.

As I have military experience, am Nigerian American, and have family members that are impacted by the Boko Haram, as a researcher I was subjected to my own preconceived notions that may have impacted the current study and introduced bias. To mitigate the influence of researcher bias, I participated in bracketing. Bracketing is a technique in which the researcher keeps detailed notes on all preconceived notions, ideas, or obvious bias throughout the study (Chenail, 2011). By writing these notes, the researcher is able to reflect upon them during the study and acknowledge the way in which they impact findings (Chenail, 2011). Additionally, as a written record exists, the researcher is able to submit bracketed notes for review that bolsters the trustworthiness of the current study.

Methodology

In this section, I discuss the methodology used in this study, including the population and sampling, data collection process, and data analysis techniques. Sampling and data collection began after gaining approval to conduct the study from the Walden University IRB (see Appendix A).

Population and Sample

The population of interest was Nigerian safety officials involved in combatting terrorist groups, such as the Boko Haram. From this population, I selected a sample of 15 Nigerian safety officials. Sampling was completed using a nonrandom, purposive sampling strategy. Nonrandom, purposive sampling was appropriate because it ensured that all participants had the skills, knowledge, or expertise needed to properly answer research questions (see Etikan et al., 2016).

Sampling Method

I employed a snowball sampling method. Snowball sampling allowed already recruited participants to suggest other persons that would make suitable participants. By utilizing this method, I ensured that an appropriate sample size was recruited for this study. Because the sample was selected using nonrandom, snowball sampling, all participants were required to meet the inclusion criteria established to ensure they were qualified. The inclusion criteria were that all participants be at least 18 years of age; employed as a Nigerian safety official concerned with antiterrorism policy, such as the TPA of 2011 and 2013; and had experience combating the Boko Haram and other terrorist groups with jihadist philosophies. Additionally, all participants were required to give consent to participate in this study (see Appendix B). Exclusion criteria included any persons under 18 years of age; not employed as a Nigerian safety official; not familiar with antiterrorism policy, such as the TPA of 2011 and 2013; who did not have experience with the Boko Haram or other terrorist groups; and/or did not give consent.

Procedure for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection

To select participants, I posted an invitation to participate in the study on public websites and social media especially for Nigerian safety officials (see Appendix C). Social media included Facebook and LinkedIn. The invitation included included information on this study and informed consent, my contact information, expectations for participants, and inclusion and exclusion criteria.

The consent information detailed that all participants were ensured the right to privacy and that all identifying information would be kept confidential by myself and the affiliated institution. I maintained confidentiality for participants through the use of pseudonyms provided to participants prior to data collection. The possible participants were also informed that their participation was voluntary, meaning that they had the right to cease participation at any time, for any reason, without fear of retribution from myself.

Once interested parties contacted me, I emailed them information regarding times and dates to schedule data collection interviews and focus groups. I recruited approximately 15 persons because this number is generally acceptable to reach data saturation, the point in which new data ceases to yield novel results (see Yin, 2017). Additionally, at this stage, pseudonyms were assigned to each participant, and consent was formally granted by participants electronically via a link embedded in the email I sent to them. Once sampling was completed and interviews and focus groups arranged, data collection began.

Instrumentation

I used a qualitative single case study design with three separate data sources (i.e., in-depth, one-on-one, semistructured interviews; focus groups; and a review of archival data) to reach triangulation and bolster the trustworthiness of the study (see Yin, 2017). . Through the use of three separate data sources, I ensured that the data collected within this study aligned with extant research (see Yin, 2017).

The first source of data I used was in-depth, semistructured interviews with Nigerian safety officials. I selected the semistructured interview approach because it allowed me to ask all 15 participants the same, open-ended questions (see Appendix D). The interviews consisted of 10 questions and were audio recorded for transcription. Each interview took approximately 90 minutes; however, more time was allowed if needed.

Because the interview instrument was created by me, all questions were subject to an expert review by Walden faculty to bolster their content validity. The expert review began with the approval of all one-on-one and focus group questions by my dissertation committee. Once all their feedback was addressed, both the interview questions and focus group questions were reviewed by three additional Walden faculty experts with terminal degrees in policy and public administration to ensure that the questions were appropriate and unambiguous. After the expert review was completed, I modified the interview questions to address the comments made by the panel of experts were addressed prior to the interviews.

Focus Groups

The second source of data was focus groups comprised of Nigerian safety officials that participated in the semistructured interviews (see Appendix E). I used focus groups and the collaboration and discussion amongst Nigerian safety officials in them in conjunction with interviews to create a more robust understanding of the TPA of 2011 and 2013 as well as the safety of the Nigerian people. Within each focus group, participants were asked seven questions, and I guided and encouraged the conversation. Each focus group was composed of seven to eight people, lasted for approximately 90 minutes, and was audio recorded digitally. As with interview questions, I created the questions for the focus group, and as such, these questions were also subject to an expert review. Expert review was completed identically to the expert review of interview questions.

Archival data were used as the third source of data. Archival sources within this context included a review of antiterrorist policies and associated tools needed for the implementation of and adherence to the TPA. Archival data were also used to determine if data were congruent or different from extant data. With a review of archival data, I gained an understanding of how information was disseminated and why this information may or may not be effective.

The Walden University IRB examined the purpose of the study, the research questions, and the methodology to ensure that ethical standards were met throughout the study. Once IRB approval was granted, I began sampling using instruments that were field tested after which the process of collecting data commenced.

First, one-on-one interviews were completed in Nigeria at a time and place of the participants' choosing. When participants arrived, I greeted them and reviewed the purpose of the study, confidentiality procedures, and the voluntary nature of their participation after which I asked them if they had any questions before commencing the data collection process. Before collecting any data from them, the participants were asked to fill out the consent form that explained their participation was voluntary with the freedom to quit at any given time. In the interviews, the participants were asked the same 10 questions in the same order to ensure consistency after which they were allowed some time to revise their responses for accuracy. The participants were then thanked for their involvement and asked to join in subsequent focus group.

Once all interviews were completed, focus groups were held at a private meeting space that I arranged. Focus groups began with a review of study purposes and consent information, including the participants' right to confidentiality and voluntary participation. Once participants consented, I began the focus group session by moderating and controlling the discussion to ensure that it adhered to the purposes and objectives of the study. After focus groups were concluded, all participants were given opportunities to review their answers, after which they were thanked for their time.

Once focus groups were completed, I reviewed archival data, including antiterrorism policies and information as well as information about how policies were disseminated. I also looked into any research that focused on the outcomes of the safety of the Nigerian peoples. In this way, archival data provided an additional context for the data collected in interviews and focus groups.

Data Analysis

Once data were collected from interviews, focus groups, and the review of archival data, I transcribed all data verbatim into an electronic Microsoft Word document. All raw data were then stored on a password-protected computer and stored in a locked cabinet to which only I have access. Once the document was transcribed, I analyzed all data using thematic analysis. Thematic analysis was chosen because this data analysis approach allowed me to identify themes common amongst data and provide context for results of qualitative data collection (see Braun et al., 2019).

I selected the following six-step thematic analysis approach informed by Braun et al. (2019) to analyze all data:

- The first step in this approach was to become familiar with the data by reading and rereading transcriptions.

- Then, I designated descriptive codes to similar ideas. These codes were then uploaded into NVivo 12 software package.

- Using, NVivo 12 software, I was able to group codes into larger, more inclusive themes.

- These themes are then refined and revised.

- Themes were placed on a thematic map. This thematic map can be printed and is used to illustrate the relationships between themes.

- Once the thematic map was created, I addressed the research questions.

Issues of Trustworthiness

Trustworthiness was a central part of the qualitative research process. Trustworthy studies provided reliable and accurate answers to research questions. Trustworthiness is composed of four separate facets, including credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.

Credibility

Credibility within this study was established in a variety of ways. First, credibility was established using triangulated data. As there are three separate data sources, each source of data will bolster accuracy of the data collected. Credibility will was also established through member checking. At the end of the interview and focus group portions of data collection, participants will be able to review respective answers to ensure accuracy and reduce ambiquity (Yin, 2017).

The researcher also ensured participation in bracketing to reduce bias introduced by the role of the researcher (Chenail, 2011). A bracketing notebook was used to ensure that all preconceived notions and opinions were reflected upon and reduced the likelihood that they will impact study results (Chenail, 2011). Finally, credibility was established through ensuring that enough participants were recruited to meet data saturation, the point in which new data yields no new results (Yin, 2017).

Transferability

Transferability refers to the appropriateness of using study results in future research, or in other study settings (Connelly, 2016). To ensure transferability, robust

description of all methods were provided, including methods for sampling, data collection, and data analysis (Connelly, 2016).

Dependability

Dependability refers to how reliable the data collected during the study is and how reliable the study findings were (Connelly, 2016). Dependability was first established through the use of triangulation of data sources (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). Additionally, dependability was ensured through field testing of both semi-structured interviews and focus group instruments prior to data collection efforts (Marshall & Rossman, 2014).

Confirmability

Confirmability referred to the degree to which results of the study could be confirmed, or replicated, by others (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). Confirmability was established through the use of bracketing notebook. The researcher kept a detailed account of all preconceived notions and opinions regarding the Boko Haram, Nigerian safety officials, and the efficacy of anti-terrorism legislature. Additionally, both Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 can be used as an audit trail which can be used to guide future researchers that wish to complete similar studies or replicate similar studies.

Ethical Procedures

In any study that uses human participants, ethical considerations must be made by the researcher. By ensuring participants are treated ethically, the researcher also ensured that results of the study were more reliable. Therefore,, I will do my best to ensure ethical procedures are followed throughout study completion. First, the IRB reviewed this study

prior to sampling to ensure the purpose and methodology of the study were ethical. No persons were be recruited, nor any data was collected without IRB approval.

Second, all participants were required to give consent prior to involvement within this study. Informed consent included that all participants were aware that their respective identity was kept confidential through the use of pseudonyms, and that involvement was voluntary. All participants were also made aware that they could cease participation at any time, for any reason, without fear of retribution from the researcher or affiliated institutions. Consent was mandatory for all participants, and participants were granted consent prior to both interviews and the focus group.

Finally, to ensure that all participants were comfortable and treated ethically, I took care to properly store all raw data collected throughout the study. All identifying information were stored separately from other raw data, on a password protected flash drives, in a locked cabinet to which only the researcher had access. Raw data was stored on password protected flash drives which were stored in a separate drawer in a locked cabinet. All raw data were stored for 5 years per IRB guidelines and then the flash drives will be destroyed.

Summary

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to increase understanding of how Nigerian government officials implemented policies and strategies of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new Jihadist philosophy. In this study, the TPA policies and strategies will be explored from the perspectives of Nigeria government officials. To accomplish these goals, I decided to employ a qualitative single

case study, which allowed me to robustly describe and provide understanding to themes central to this study (Yin, 2017). Data will be collected using semi-structured one-on-one interviews, focus groups, and a review of archival data. Once data was collected, all data were analyzed using a six-step approach to thematic analysis informed by Braun et al. (2019). Once thematic analysis was completed, the research questions central to this study were addressed.

This chapter provided information on the methodology, sampling, data collection, and data analysis techniques that will be used to successfully complete this study. Additionally, information was provided regarding trustworthiness and ethical considerations I will make during study completion. The next chapter will provide all raw data collected during interviews, focus groups, and archival data review. Additionally, raw data presented within Chapter 4 will be accompanied by short descriptions and explanations for context.

Chapter 4: Results

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to increase the understanding of how Nigerian government officials implement the policies and strategies of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy. To address this purpose, the following research questions were asked:

RQ1: What are the perceptions of Nigerian government officials regarding the implementation of the TPA antiterrorism policies in Nigeria to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy?

RQ2: What are government officials' perceptions of how the jihadist philosophical change of terrorist groups in Nigeria has influenced the overall safety of Nigerians, including the number of terrorist acts, loss of property, and disruption to day-to-day activities of Nigerian citizens?

In this chapter, the results of the study are discussed, including a presentation of the participant demographic information, setting of the study, and how the data were collected and analyzed. I also discuss the evidence of trustworthiness of the study before presenting the results. The chapter ends with a summary.

Setting

I conducted this study in Nigeria, and it was not impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic because all interviews went ahead as planned. The participants were assured of their anonymity to minimize their fear regarding retaliation. To recruit participants, I posted an invitation to participate in the study on public websites and social media especially for Nigerian safety officials, such as on Facebook and LinkedIn groups (see

Appendix C). The posting included information on this study and informed consent, my

contact information, expectations for participants, and inclusion and exclusion criteria.

The setting for the focus group was in Nigeria in a hallway near the safety

officials' base. To ensure their personal protection, the participants brought their own

security officers. I was not involved in the selection of security officers and did not

request that the participants bring security officers. However, I allowed the participant to

bring security personnel to the interview if they felt more comfortable doing so.

I was initially concerned conducting interviews and focus groups remotely due to

concerns about the COVID-19 pandemic. However, after speaking to the potential

participants, I decided to conduct the focus groups and interviews in person. This

decision was made due to the fact that potential participants stated that fear of contacting

COVID-19 was not an issue because they did not believe in COVID-19 despite almost all

the research participants not being vaccinated for COVID-19. The focus group and

interview participants shared that they were not concerned about COVID-19 because they

believed that COVID-19 was a disease that affected Westerners and that they disease was

unable to spread as effectively due to Africa's climate. Due to this belief of the

participants, I decided to conduct interviews and the focus group in person to better

establish rapport and respect the preference and availability of the research participants.

However, I participated in the focus group and interviews while wearing a mask.

Demographics

The population of interest in this study was Nigerian safety officials who are

involved in combatting terrorist groups, such as the Boko Haram. From this population, I

selected a sample of 15 Nigerian safety officials to participate in the individual interviews, at which point data saturation was reached. Another 15 participants were recruited to participate in the focus group. To participate in the study, all individuals were at least 18 years of age; employed as a Nigerian safety official concerned with antiterrorism policy, such as the TPA of 2011 and 2013; and had experience combating the Boko Haram and other terrorist groups with jihadist philosophies.

The average age of participants in the interview was 49 years old. The oldest participant was 84, and the youngest was 26 years old. The average years of experience combating the Bolo Haram and other terrorist groups with jihadist philosophies for interview participants was 10 years. The maximum years of experience was 29 and the minimum was 2.

The average age of focus group participants was 43 years. The oldest focus group participant was 56 and the youngest was 25. The average years of experience was 8. The minimum years of experience was 3 and the maximum was 25. Table 1 displays the interview participant demographics, and Table 2 shows focus group participant demographics.

Table 1

Demographics of Semistructured Interview Participants

Name	Age	Years of Experience
P1	84	8
P2	72	6
P3	54	8
P4	50	10
P5	47	9
P6	40	7
P7	56	9
P8	45	10
P9	46	10
P10	30	2
P11	49	25
P12	26	3
P13	50	29
P14	45	3
P15	40	8

Table 2

Demographics of Focus Group Participants

Name	Age	Years of Experience
FG1	56	7
FG2	41	5
FG3	48	8
FG4	50	10
FG5	43	6
FG6	40	4
FG7	45	8
FG8	50	10
FG9	42	11
FG10	31	3
FG11	40	8
FG12	49	25
FG13	25	3
FG14	26	3
FG15	54	3

Data Collection

I employed the snowball sampling method to collect data. A total of 15

individuals participated in individual interviews, and 15 individuals participated in the

focus group ($N = 30$). The location, frequency, and duration of data collection was the

same in all cases. Data collection occurred over 13 weeks. A single semistructured

interview was conducted with every one of the 15 focus group participants over the

course of an hour. One or two interviews were conducted each week until all 15

participants were interviewed. All interviews were recorded using an audio recorder.

Each interview and focus group took place at a safe location where there was no risk of

the interviewee or focus group being overheard. At the conclusion of the interview, I

transcribed the participant's responses. Each interview participant was asked to review

their transcript to ensure the accuracy of the data collection. No participant chose to make

edits to their transcript during the member checking phase.

Data Analysis

Once data were collected from the interviews, a single focus group, and review of

archival data, I transcribed all data verbatim into an electronic Microsoft Word document.

The text data were analyzed using the six-step thematic analysis process described by

Braun et al. (2019). That process is as follows: The first step in this approach was to

become familiar with the data by reading and rereading the transcriptions. Then, I

designated descriptive codes to similar ideas. These codes were then uploaded into the

NVivo 12 software package where I was able to group codes into larger, more inclusive

themes. These themes were then refined and revised. Finally, themes were placed on a

thematic map, which I printed and used to illustrate the relationships between themes (see Braun et al., 2019). Once the thematic map was created, the research questions could be addressed. Table 3 describes the codes and themes that arose during data analysis.

Overall, there were little discrepant data throughout the study. Participants largely agreed on how the TPA could be improved to better combat terrorist groups and how terrorist groups have influenced the overall safety of Nigerians. The one case of clear discrepant data was the two participants who believed that, despite the room for improvement, that the TPA was effective. While the vast majority of overall participants did not believe the TPA was effective, these two participants strongly supported the TPA. Since this opinion was in the extreme minority, it was not included as a theme in the report.

Table 3

Codes, Themes, and Example Quotes

Theme	Contributing Codes	Research Question	Example Quote
Effectiveness of TPA	TPA is effective, TPA is not effective	1	TPA did not take into consideration the root cause of terrorism in Nigeria, e.g., poverty, joblessness, corruption etc. – P3
Training	Train soldiers, train civilians	1	We should be educating Nigeria about terrorist groups. – P11
Expanding community policing and intelligence gathering	Partnering with communities, training communities, effectiveness of community policing, Gathering tactile information, strategic planning, information quality	1	Community policing of individuals should be brought down to local people who can do intelligence gathering. – FG12
Negative economic impact to the country	Availability of jobs, closure of businesses, lack of credibility on world stage	2	Boko Haram impact has reduced Nigeria economy. Business is not as usual, that has led to a devalue of Nigeria currency – FG3
Availability of goods and services	Disruption of supply lines, breakdown of healthcare system, closure of schools	2	It has caused scarcity of food. – P13
Displacement	Destroyed homes, unsafe territories, refugee camps	2	It has affected Nigerians because many people have deserted their homes. – P8
Modern warfare equipment	Need for more modern equipment, availability of technology, quality of weapons available to terrorism groups	1	The government should give full support to anti-terrorist to include finance and modern weapons. -FG14

Evidence of Trustworthiness

I established credibility in this study in a variety of ways. First, credibility was established using triangulated data. Because there are three separate data sources, each source of data bolstered the accuracy of the other data collected. Credibility was also established through member checking. At the end of the interview and focus group portions of data collection, participants were able to review respective answers to ensure their accuracy and reduce ambiguity (see Yin, 2017). I also conducted bracketing to reduce bias introduced by the role of the researcher (see Chenail, 2011). A bracketing notebook was used to ensure that all preconceived notions and opinions were reflected upon and reduce the likelihood that they would impact study results (see Chenail, 2011). Finally, credibility was established through ensuring that enough participants were recruited to meet data saturation, the point in which new data yields no new results (see Yin, 2017). To ensure transferability, robust description of all methods was provided, including methods for sampling, data collection, and data analysis (see Connelly, 2016).

I established dependability through the use of data triangulation (see Marshall & Rossman, 2014). Additionally, dependability was ensured through field testing of both the semistructured interview and focus group instruments prior to data collection efforts (see Marshall & Rossman, 2014). Confirmability was established through the use of bracketing notebook. I kept a detailed account of all my preconceived notions and opinions regarding the Boko Haram, Nigerian safety officials, and the efficacy of antiterrorism legislature. Additionally, both Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 can be used as an audit trail to guide future researchers that wish to complete or replicate similar studies.

Results

Research Question 1

Overall, 13 of the 15 participants in the interviews and all 15 focus group participants reported that they did not believe the TPA was effective. To make the policy more effective, participants recommended acquiring more modern warfare equipment, increasing training, and expanding community policing and intelligence gathering.

Table 4

Themes and Contributing Participants in RQ1

Theme	Interview Participants	Focus Group Participants
Effectiveness of TPA	13	15
Training	6	2
Expanding community policing and intelligence gathering	4	6
Modern warfare equipment	12	7

TPA is Not Effective

Only two participants indicated that the TPA was effective at curbing terrorist groups and terrorist activity. Three other participants did not know enough about the TPA or had not formed an opinion. The remaining 25 participants believed that TPA was not effective, either because the policy itself was poorly written or because it was not implemented properly. For example, P3 said, "TPA did not take into consideration the

root cause of terrorism in Nigeria, e.g., poverty, joblessness, corruption etc." P11 said

"The TPA budget was mismanaged." P7 said,

> The TPA has more disadvantages than advantages. It was created for a purpose:
> politics, religion, and corruption. There are administrative bottlenecks, the process
> of passing a bill takes a long time. The president has no power of its own.
> President goes through senate for approval. Because corruption, religion and
> politics are involved, it cannot work smoothly.

Participants offered a variety of suggestions in order to improve the
implementation of the TPA. The most common of these suggestions included purchasing
modern warfare equipment, training both community members and military members,
and expanding community policing and intelligence gathering. While participants had a
wide-ranging variety of concerns related to the implementation of the TPA, these themes
emerged relating to improving it.

Modern Warfare Equipment is Needed. Nineteen participants indicated that the
acquisition of modern warfare equipment would improve the implementation of the TPA
and combatting terror in Nigeria. For example, P2 said, "More equipment should be
provided." P8 concurred with this statement and said, "Security forces were not well
equipped. The Governor of Borno State once said that Boko Haram are more equip in
arms than security forces." FG10 said,

> Nigeria is not doing the rightful things to the citizens by not provided the right
> weapon to use against Boko Haram. The Nigeria Governments has failed to

provide the right arms. Nigeria Government can act fast like other neighboring countries that will be able to tackle Boko Haram.

FG14 said, "The government should give full support to anti-terrorist to include finance and modern weapons." P6 specifically believed that additional military hardware was needed because Boko Haram had more advanced equipment. P9 said, "To advance in the military technology, because Boko Haram are advance in technology.

More Training is Needed. Eight participants indicated that more training was needed, either for the community or for the troops combating Boko Haram. In the case of P2, additional training was needed on the TPA policy itself. P2 said,

> Train people on the policy. In early part participation of Boko Haram crisis was a disaster. There were gaps in information relay and information transfer among the stakeholders who needed to act on such specific breaches of the policy.

Like P2, P4 believed that the general populace needed to be trained about terrorist groups. P11 said, "We should be educating Nigeria about terrorist groups." Other participants, such as P1, were less specific about the training that was needed. P1 said, "Terrorist war demands special training to deal with terrorists." P6, on the other hand, believed that training was needed for security forces. P6 said, "Military and safety officers are not given support by the government, financial modern training, and local knowledge of the particular area of operations."

Expand Community Policing and Intelligence Gathering. Five participants believed that the TPA would be more effective if community policing was expanded, and eight participants believed that intelligence gathering should be expanded. However,

there was a lot of overlap between these two themes. Many participants believed that the way to improve community policing was through intelligence gathering, and that intelligence could be improved by working with communities. For example, FG7 said, "Community policing of individuals should be brought down to local people who can do intelligence gathering." Similarly, FG12 said, "Government should empower local hunters because the hunter knows the terrain." Both of these statements reflect the belief that local people are more knowledgeable about their communities and are therefore more capable of policing those communities.

Other participants also believed that gathering intelligence from community members was an important part of general intelligence gathering. For example, FG1 said, "We need intelligence gathering from the locals." While FG1 did not explicitly discuss community policing, FG1's statements expressed the conjoined nature of the community and intelligence gathering.

Comparison of Interview and Focus Group Data. All four themes relevant to research question one appeared in both the focus group and the individual interview data. However, there were some discrepancies. For example, while community policing and intelligence gathering was discussed in both the focus group and the interviews, the focus group focused more on the community police component of this theme, while the individual interviews focused more on intelligence gathering. While there was too much overlap between the discussions to separate out the themes, the focus group did discuss what community policing would look like, while the individual interviews focused more on how community policing would be a valuable tool for intelligence gathering.

A few focus group participants mentioned training, but it was much more frequently discussed in the individual interviews. Training was mentioned by several participants in the focus group, but the group moved on shortly after, and did not linger in this discussion. During the interviews many participants mentioned training, meaning that theme was more predominant in the individual interviews.

The focus groups were in very similar agreement on the topic of the TPA's effectiveness and the need for modern warfare equipment. These themes were frequently discussed in both methods of data collection. It may be relevant that the only two individuals who believe the TPA was effective participated in the individual interviews. However, the number of individuals who believe the TPA was effective was so low it could have been a coincidence.

Research Question 2

Research Question 2 asked, what are government officials' perceptions of how the Jihadist philosophical change of terrorist groups in Nigeria has influenced the overall safety of Nigerians, including the number of terrorist acts, loss of property, and disruption to day-to-day activities of Nigerian citizens? Participants most commonly reported that the safety of Nigerians was impacted through the negative economic impact to their country, the lack of available goods and services, and displacement. Table 5 below presents the number of participants and the themes that contributed to research question 2.

Table 5

Themes and Contributing Participants in RQ2

Theme	Interview Participants	Focus Group Participants
Negative economic impact to the country	7	5
Availability of goods and services	4	3
Displacement	5	1

Negative Economic Impact. Twelve participants indicated that terrorist groups have decreased the overall safety of Nigeria by having a negative economic impact on the country. This was a major topic of discussion in the focus group. For example, FG3 said, "Boko Haram impact has reduced Nigeria economy. Business is not as usual, that has led to a devalue of Nigeria currency." Similarly, FG13 said, "Boko Haram brings fear to Nigeria. It paralyzes Nigeria economy due to disaster cause by Boko Haram." FG14 said, "Boko Haram causes under development in Nigeria. It reduces Nigerian economy. It made Nigeria security seems incapable." FG15 said, "Nigerians have serious disadvantage packet economy welfare of the people. It makes Nigeria Government to borrow money from other countries to purchase weapons."

The economic impact of Boko Haram was also a common theme in the individual interviews. P6 said, "It creates insecurity of lives and the economy." P5 said, "Business has slowed down because of the poor economy." Finally, P4 said, "Sources of livelihood are affected."

Lack of Services and Goods. Seven participants indicated that Boko Haram also affected the safety of Nigerians by disrupting the flow of goods and services, including essential services like healthcare centers and schools. P3, for example, said "It makes education lag behind." P10 said, "It reduces education." FG2 said, "It affects school."

Aside from the disruption of education, several participants also discussed the disruption Boko Haram caused to food pipelines. FG8 said, "Boko Haram are disturbing the farmers during raining season. It makes our government to close the boarder and there are no external food supplies from other African countries." P13 said, "It has caused scarcity of food." similarly, P9 said, "There is a shortage of food."

While food and education were the biggest areas of concern related to good and services, there were other concerns as well. P1 said, "There is a lack of medication available." P6 said, "There is a lack of health care system due to insufficient medical manpower will serve in the rural areas."

Displacement. Population displacement was a major contributor to the decreased safety of the population of Nigeria according to participants. Almost all participants discussed population displacement in some form, though six participants explicitly indicated that this displacement had been a direct result of the Boko Haram and that it was a safety concern. Population displacement was fueled by property destruction and led to increase crime due to cramped living quarters, desperation, and fear. P12, for example, said, "Boko Haram activities destroy many things such as roads, houses, bombing of schools." FG1 described the refugee camps in the following way,

The people of Nigeria have not had a good impact as regard to Jihadist philosophy rather than the bad impact of Jihadist philosophy whereby people are homeless living in IDP camps control and protected by Nigeria Government and people are being killed on daily basis, lives and properties destroyed on daily basis, people live in fear without the two eyes close. Whoever you see on sight as an enemy because of the fear people live with.

P8 said, "It has affected Nigerians because many people have deserted their homes. People have lost of family members and friends." P4 simply said that "properties have been destroyed." P9 echoed that statement by saying one of the greatest threats to safety was the "destruction of properties."

Comparison of Interview and Focus Group Data. A similar number of participants in the focus group and the individual's interviews discussed the negative economic impact to the country and availability of goods and services. The sentiment was similar in both mediums of data. Participants in both mediums agreed that the availability of goods and services had been negatively affected and that there would be a negative impact to the economy. However, while displacement was mentioned in the focus group, it was more commonly discussed in the individual interviews. During the focus group only one participant brought up the issue of displacement, while five did in the individual interviews. In this way, the displacement theme was much more prominent in the individual interviews than it was in the focus group.

Summary

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to increase understanding of how Nigerian government officials implement policies and strategies of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new Jihadist philosophy. Social media sites, including Facebook and LinkedIn served as the setting for this research. The population of interest in this study was Nigerian safety officials, which are involved in combatting terrorists' groups, such as the Boko Haram. From this population, a sample of 15 Nigerian safety officials was selected for to participate in the individual interviews, at which point data saturation was reached. Another 15 participants were recruited to participate in the focus group. Prior to the start of data collection, the researcher pilot tested both the semi-structured interview protocol and the focus group protocol. During data collection, the researcher employed a snowball sampling method to collect data. The thematic analysis process described by Braun et al. (2019) was used to analyze the data. Credibility was established using triangulated data. The researcher also participated in bracketing to reduce bias introduced by the role of the researcher. Research Question 1 asked, what are the perceptions of Nigerian government officials regarding the implementation of the TPA anti-terrorism policy in Nigeria to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram under the new Jihadist philosophy? Overall, participants reported that they did not believe the TPA was effective. In order to make the policy more effective, participants recommended acquiring more modern warfare equipment, increasing training, and expanding community policing and intelligence gathering. Research Question 2 asked, what are government officials' perceptions of how the

Jihadist philosophical change of terrorist groups in Nigeria has influenced the overall

safety of Nigerians, including the number of terrorist acts, loss of property, and disruption

to day-to-day activities of Nigerian citizens? Participants most commonly reported that

the safety of Nigerians was impacted through the negative economic impact to their

country, the lack of available goods and services, and displacement.

      In Chapter Five, the results of the study presented in this chapter will be

discussed. This will include a discussion about how the findings connect to the body of

literature, and the implications that the presented findings may have on future study and

current practice. Additionally, a discussion on the recommendation and limitations

encountered during the study was provided.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Recommendations and Conclusion

The Nigerian government passed the TPA in 2011 to address terrorist groups such as Boko Haram (Attah, 2016). Even though the TPA was amended in 2013, Nigeria's government has been slow in the implementation of these policies and strategies of combating terrorism (Attah, 2016). Various TPA policies and strategies, such as the criminalization of terrorism using military and social tactics, resulted in success in the battle against Boko Haram (Attah, 2016; Brechenmacher, 2019). However, Boko Haram has been considered the fastest growing terrorist group in the entire Horn of the African continent (Pham, 2016). Having aligned with Middle East jihadists, Boko Haram has occupied regions of the African continent by using rape, violence, and trafficking of humans to gain compliance from innocent citizens (Attah, 2016). The regions known to have been occupied by the Boko Haram were more likely to face various issues, including poverty, hunger and starvation, lack of access to freshwater, and even routinely denied access to primary medical care, because when citizens comply with their demands, the Boko Haram-occupied jurisdictions are most often depleted of the resources that are essential for the survival of the persons occupied those regions (Akinbi, 2015; Attah, 2016).

The problem addressed in this study was that there was a lack of knowledge about Nigerian officials' perceptions of how to implement the TPA policies and strategies to address terrorist groups, such as the Boko Haram, that are under the new jihadist philosophy (Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014; Dasuki, 2013; Pham, 2016; Thurston, 2017). The Nigerian government was still sluggish in the TPA policies implementation process,

which hindered or reduced the rate at which this terrorist group should have been dealt

with, and this, in the long run, strengthened Boko Haram, which is still ravaging the Horn

of Africa continents (Campbell, 2014). The conflicts, violence, turmoil, suffering, and

poverty the Boko Haram brings upon the occupied regions have been well studied by

several scholars (i.e., Adesoji, 2019; Akubo & Okolo, 2019; Brechenmacher, 2019;

Ebeku, 2020; Felbab-Brown, 2018; Mahmood & Ani, 2018; Nyadera et al., 2020). It is

also well known that Boko Haram is also being guided by and receives training from a

jihadist faction from the Middle East (Sampson, 2016; Weeraratne, 2017)

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to develop a better understanding

of how Nigerian government officials handle the implementation of the amended policies

and strategies of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as the Boko Haram, who are

currently under the new jihadist philosophy and regime (Attah, 2016). My goal with this

study was to explore the opinions and the perspectives of the officials in the Nigerian

government regarding the implementation of the TPA policies and strategies to

understand some of the challenges these officials face that makes the implementation

process of TPA policies too slow.

The phenomena of concern in this study were the perceptions of Nigerian

government officials concerning both the implementation of the TPA antiterrorism policy

and the safety of Nigerian people as terrorist groups, such as the Boko Haram, still

operate under the new regime of the jihadist philosophy (see Attah, 2016). Overall, the

Nigerian government authorities, such as the local law enforcement agencies, the state

law enforcement agencies, and the National Intelligence Agency of Nigeria, should

swiftly restore stability to Nigeria by addressing the growing problem of extremism among the Nigerian public.

The population and sample of the study interest was the Nigerian safety official, which was being involved in fighting terrorists' groups such as Boko Haram. A sample of 15 Nigerian safety officials was selected using the nonrandom, purposive sampling method. I also employed the snowball sampling method in this study. This sampling method was selected because it allowed the already recruited participants to suggest other people who would make suitable participants. The method also ensured that an appropriate sample size was recruited for the study. The inclusion criteria for the study were that all participants should be 18 years of age and employed as Nigerian safety officials. I used the qualitative methodology in this study because it allowed for the collection of deep and meaningful data from participants' lived experiences (see Glesne, 2016).. Data were collected using three data sources: in-depth, one-on-one, semistructured interviews; focus groups; and the review of archival data. I analyzed the data thematically once the transcription of all data verbatim into an electronic Word document was completed.

The findings from the participants regarding Research Question 1 revealed that they did not believe that the TPA was ever practical. Participants also suggested that to make policy more effective, Nigeria should acquire more modern warfare arsenals, increase training programs and facilities, and expand the community policing and intelligence gathering. Regarding the study results related to Research Question 2, the participants most commonly reported that the safety of Nigerians was

affected through the negative economic impact to their country, the lack of readily available goods and services, and the displacement of Nigerian citizens from their ancestral lands and properties. The participants also reported that terrorism caused great harm to the Nigerian community, such as loss of property, rape cases, killings, abduction of school-going children, and forced marriages to Boko Haram militias that have led to low Nigerian economic growth.

In this chapter, I provide a detailed discussion of the study findings, the limitations for the study, my recommendations for future studies, and both social implications and the implications for practice. Lastly, I present the conclusion of the study.

Discussion of Study Findings

I developed the following two research questions to guide and complete the purpose of the study:

RQ1: What are the perceptions of Nigerian government officials regarding the implementation of the TPA antiterrorism policy in Nigeria to address the terrorist groups, such as the Boko Haram, under the new jihadist philosophy?

RQ2: What are the Nigerian government officials' perception of how the jihadist philosophical change of terrorist groups in Nigeria has influenced the overall safety of Nigerians, including the number of terrorist acts, loss of property, and disruption to day to day activities of Nigerian citizens?

From the data analysis, I identified several themes to address the two research questions: the TPA is not effective in Nigeria, more training is needed, expanding community

policing and intelligence gathering, the negative economic impact to the country of Nigeria, availability of goods and services, displacement of Nigerians, and modern warfare equipment is needed.

RQ1

I identified four themes related to this research question during the thematic analysis of the data sample. The overall findings show that 13 of the 15 participants in the interviews and all the 15 focus group participants did not believe the TPA was effective in the fight against Boko Haram and recommended four ways to implement TPA policies effectively. The themes were the TPA was not effective, need for acquiring more modern warfare equipment, increasing training, and expanding community policing and intelligence gathering. These themes are discussed in the following subsections.

Theme 1: TPA is not Effective

Only two participants indicated that the TPA antiterrorist policies were effective at curbing terrorist groups and their terrorist activities. This implied that TPA policies were well known among the two safety officials. However, Nigerian government officials did not understand such policies and implement them. For instance, three other participants reported that they did not have enough knowledge about the TPA antiterrorist policies or had not formed any opinion regarding the TPA policies. In this regard, having enough knowledge about the TPA policies was significant in its implementation to effectively combat Boko Haram in Nigeria. Such sentiments from the three participants are the likely reason why the TPA is not yet effective in the fight against terrorism that has stricken the African continent, particularly the country of Nigeria.

In support of this theme, the 25 remaining participants reported that they believed that TPA antiterrorist policy was not effective in the battle against the Boko Haram resurgence in Nigeria and the horn of the African continent. According to these 25 participants, the reason they had such an opinion of the TPA was either because the policy itself was poorly written or because it was not implemented properly. Understanding the TPA had a significant impact on the implementation and execution, and more so among the Nigerian government safety officials, since they are mostly on the frontline of ensuring these policies are executed for the safety of Nigerians against terrorist attacks from the Boko Haram terrorist group under the new jihadist philosophy from the Middle East. For instance, one participant reported that the TPA antiterrorist policy did not take into consideration the root cause or reason for terrorism in Nigerian.

During the interview, this participant highlighted the likely root causes of terrorism in Nigeria, such as poverty, joblessness, and corruption, among others.

The 25 participants who believed that TPA antiterrorist policy was ineffective in the fight against the Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria had the same perception regarding the root causes of why the TPA was ineffective. According to these participants, the TPA antiterrorist policy had more disadvantages than advantages. The participants believed that these TPA policies were created solely for political propaganda, religious differences, and corruption (see Ayodeji, 2015). The participants cited that these constraints are the administrative bottlenecks that make passing a bill a long process. According to these participants, before any policy bill is passed, it takes a long time since the role of president has no power and mandate on its own to pass any bill because it has to go through the senate and because corruption, religion, and politics are all involved, the TPA policy cannot work smoothly and swiftly towards implementation for the fight against the Boko Haram.

Similar to the current study findings, Nabiebu and Alobo (2019) provided various suggestions on improving the implementation of the TPA antiterrorist policy in combating Boko Haram in Nigeria and the horn of the African continent. In their recommendations, the participants offered the most common suggestion that the Nigerian government purchase modern warfare equipment since Boko Haram has current arsenals they receive from the new jihadist group in the Middle East, making it difficult for safety officials to fight against them. Another suggestion by the participants was that the Nigerian government should give enough to both the members of the community and the

military members for their safety and the safety of Nigeria as a country. Gana (2018) also recommended that the Nigerian government expand community policing and intelligence gathering in the country, which may help identify any terrorism-related dangers within the communities.

Theme 2: Modern Warfare Equipment is Needed

Nineteen participants reported that the Nigerian government acquiring new modern warfare equipment or arsenals would improve the process of implementing the TPA antiterrorist policy for combating terror against Boko Haram in Nigeria and Africa. Modern warfare weapons are needed by the Nigerian army or safety officials to match the weaponry strength of and overpower the Boko Haram in possession of dangerous and modernized weapons for the fight against terror (Nwankpa, 2017). For instance, one participant stated that the government should provide more equipment to the safety officials and reported that the Nigerian security forces were not well equipped to combat Boko Haram that are now under the new jihadist philosophy from the Middle East. The latter is well known for possessing modernized, improvised, and complex weapons for their terror activities across the globe (CITE). To support this point, one of the participants cited that one of the governors also mentioned Boko Haram having equipped themselves with more modernized warfare equipment than the security forces in Nigeria.

The participants highly recommended supplying advanced weapons to the Nigerian security forces who reported that Nigeria was not doing the right thing for their citizens by not providing the security forces with the right arsenals amid the resurgence of the Boko Haram in the country (Gana, 2018). Adesoji (2019) also underscored that the

Nigerian government act swiftly like other countries to tackle Boko Haram by purchasing and arming its security personnel with the right, advanced warfare equipment. Obani (2019) also suggested the need for additional military hardware was required since Boko Haram had more advanced warfare equipment to fight the government's security forces who cannot fight back with the same strength. Therefore, the government should also advance its military technology because Boko Haram already has advanced technology among its weapons to fight against the government. Nwankpa (2017) also emphasized the government should support antiterrorist by financing modern weapons for security forces.

Theme 3: More Training is Needed

One of the suggestions raised by participants for effective implementation of the TPA antiterrorist policy was that more training was required. In this theme, eight participants established the need for more training. According to these participants, the training could be for the community or the security forces/troops fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria (see Attah & Mokwenye, 2019). In addition, according to the participants, additional training was also needed on the TPA policy itself to be understood by the Nigerian government safety officials and the community. In their responses, participants highlighted that people should be trained about the TPA policy in Nigerian because the early part of participation in combating Boko Haram was a disaster for both the government and the community because there was no or little awareness concerning the TPA policy in the country (see Ordu, 2017). Training about the policy would provide or relay information and enhance the information transfer among stakeholders who need the information to act on specific policy breaches as far as terrorist activities are concerned in Nigeria for the fight against Boko Haram (Nnam et al., 2020).

Similar to current study finding relating to the need for more training for those dealing with terrorists, Nnam et al. (2020) noted that the general population also needed to be trained concerning the terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, in Nigeria for their safety in their daily work and interactions in various regions or states of Nigeria. Attah and Mokwenye (2019) also reported that the war on terrorists significantly demanded specialized training in or to deal with terrorists in Nigeria, in particular, Boko Haram. A participant stated that training was needed specifically for the security forces in Nigeria

to understand modernized terror-fighting strategies and tactics to handle Boko Haram in the country (see Bamidele, 2015). Gana (2018) recommended giving military and security officers the needed support, modern financial training on how to combat terrorism, and local knowledge about the particular area in which the security and military officers were to conduct their safety operations in Nigeria. Such training, particularly getting crucial information about a particular area of operation, helps security forces locate the hideouts of Boko Haram militants (Nabiebu & Alobo, 2019).

Theme 4: Expand Community Policing and Intelligence Gathering

This theme was one of the suggestions recommended by participants on the strategies to be used in the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) anti-terrorist policy implementation in Nigeria to combat Boko Haram's terrorist group activities. Five participants reported that TPA would be implemented more effectively if community policing was expanded. However, eight participants established that they believed that intelligence gathering should be broadened (Omale, 2013). Many of the participants thought that improving and enhancing community policing was done by intelligence gathering. The intelligence may be enhanced or improved through working with the local communities. For instance, during the interview, one of the participants reported that Nigerian authorities should use community policing. Community policing of individuals has to be brought down to the local people, that can do the intelligence gathering in their respective local communities in Nigeria. As reported by the participant, the reason for this was that the local people are more conversant with their local cultures and understand local policies guiding community welfares and morals (Oyewole, 2013).

The intelligence channeled to the local community through social gatherings may help the Nigerian government implement the TPA policy. Community members will get training about terrorism, particularly the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria (Brechenmacher, 2019). People in the local communities are more knowledgeable about their communities and are also more capable of policing them. One participant reported a need for intelligence gathering from the locals to enhance security in local communities in Nigeria. Another participant expressed that community and the intelligence gathering have a conjoined nature, such that security officers could use the intelligence gathering to get more intelligence from the community locals. Locals in those communities may have information regarding terrorists' hideouts and could relay the message to the Nigerian authorities (Njoku, 2020).

The current empirical literature corroborates the study findings relating to overwhelming empirical evidence consistent with the study findings about the need to expand community policing and intelligence gathering. For instance, Omale (2013) reported that for the effectiveness of TPA, it was important that the TPA of 2011 and the amended TPA of 2013 operate within a given legal structure to ensure efficacy in the fight against terrorism. This supports participants who had reported from the interview that the TPA policy was not effective. In a study performed by Nwankpa (2017), the study findings indicated that the effectiveness and efficiency of the policies to overcome terrorist insurgence relied on how those policies are being implemented. Nwakpa (2017) suggested the need for the Nigerian government should encourage fairness in applying rigidity to the mandate of Boko Haram by coercing the group to communicate its

objectives through the judicial system in Nigeria. Sampson (2016) also noted that the understanding of key players to connect with and how will also result from this and ensure the efficiency of the implemented policy.

Further, in support of the participants' report that when implementing policies, the government should understand the root cause for terrorism, Gana (2018) published findings on the counterterrorism actions by the Nigerian government against Boko Haram. In this study, Gana (2018) indicated that military activities and the harsh laws and policies led to public opposition, which later weakened the effectiveness of counterterrorism campaigns. In similar findings to Gana (2018), Sampson (2016) also reported the discordance and tension increase between the government and the Nigerian citizens due to the military approach used to fight against Boko Haram. Sampson (2016) suggested that the people of Nigeria should be allowed to participate in the political arena as a successful measure in managing Boko Haram (Sampson, 2016). During the interviews for the study, most participants reported the ineffectiveness of the TPA policy in Nigeria. This perception can be supported by Njoku (2020). Njoku (2020) used the Braun and Clarke thematic analysis procedure to learn the root causes of the fight against terrorism actions. Njoku (2020) reported the perceptions that the Nigerian government's efforts were relatively ineffective in tackling terrorist activities in Nigeria.

According to Gana et al., 2018), the analysis of several counterterrorism measures such as TPA indicated that the use of excessive military force had already proven to be ineffective and unsuccessful. Committing to the recognition of the fundamental human rights and the freedom of a given population can be an important contributor to ensuring

the effectiveness of the policies (Udoh et al., 2019). One of the root causes of ineffective implementation of the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) anti-terrorism policy as reported by the study participants interviewed was corruption.

The current findings were supported by previous studies such as Ayodeji (2015) reported inappropriate and ineffective action against the terrorist groups, such as violent opposition of anyone possibly linked to Boko Haram, despite little evidence. Udoh et al. (2019) also reported weaknesses in current counter terrorism policies by stating that bribes were being paid to Boko Haram by the government for Boko Haram to corporate in the pretence that the situation was under control. This was contrary to the actions that might have helped the insurgence of Boko Haram in Nigeria. In sum, the theme Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) anti-terrorist policy was not effective has been relates to literature review such as Olofinbiyi and Steyn (2018) who noted that the were weaknesses in tracking and punishing terrorists.

RQ2: What are the government officials' perceptions of how the Jihadist philosophical change of terrorist groups in Nigeria has influenced the overall safety of Nigerians, including the number of terrorist acts, loss of property, and disruption to day to day activities of Nigerian citizens? Research question two had three themes identified during the study interview. These themes were; the negative economic impact on their country, the lack of available goods and services resulting from insecurity, and displacement of people from their ancestral homes and lands. Therefore, during data analysis, the participants had reported that the safety of Nigerians was affected through the negative economic status of the country due to terrorist activities, which hinders

trading activities for fear of insecurity, goods and services were scarce or unavailable because of low trade activities. Lastly, terrorist activities led to the displacement of people from their homes to the purported safe areas in Nigeria. These themes are discussed below.

Theme 5: Negative Economic Impact

Concerning this theme, twelve participants reported that terrorist groups such as Boko Haram have led to a decrease in the overall safety of Nigeria through having a negative economic impact on the country of Nigeria. Increased terrorist actions implied that little economic activities would occur, leading to decreased economic activities in diverse sectors of the Nigerian economy. The existing literature is consistent with this current study results relating to negative economic impact of terrorism. Evans and Kelikume (2019) reported that the attacks brought on by the Boko Haram insurgence exacerbated the weak economic development of the region. Thus, leading low economic development of Nigeria.

The theme relating to the negative economic impact due to terrorist activities was also supported by literature discussed in Chapter 2. For instance, Olofinbiyi and Steyn (2018) conducted a study and reported that the primary cause of the terrorist activities carried out by Boko Haram stemmed from the noncompliance with the socio-economic requirements of the Nigerian economy. Chibuike and Innocent (2019) also reported that such setbacks stimulated fundamental human rights abuse, corruption, poverty, and unlawful actions in northern Nigeria. In addition, one of the participants reported that Boko Haram had reduced the economy of Nigeria because of its terrorist activities that

scare both the local and international investors in the Nigerian economy (Olofinbiyi &

Steyn, 2018).

Boko Haram led to the reduction and drastic drop of the Nigerian economy.

According to the participants, particularly the focus group participants, terrorist activities

by Boko Haram made the Nigerian security seem incapable of protecting its country

against attacks to secure the economic development activities by traders. Moreover, since

the business was never, as usual, it led to devaluing the Nigerian currency in Nigeria

because of the terrorist actions of Boko Haram, which scares investors and even local

traders from conducting businesses in their country territories. The current empirical

literature also supports this perception about the effect of Boko Haram on the Nigerian

economy. For instance, Chibuike and Innocent (2019) reported that the surge of Boko

Haram terrorism and economic repercussions for Nigeria could be evaluated from various

perspectives. That direct consequence is the destruction of infrastructure and property,

leading to loss of production. Indirect repercussions are the government's unforeseen

military expansion to combat terrorists (Chibuike & Innocent, 2019).

Theme 6: Lack of Services and Goods

In this theme, seven participants reported that Boko Haram had impacted the

safety of Nigerians through disruption of the flow of goods and services. According to

these participants, essential services that were disrupted were healthcare centers and

schools. The provision of essential services like medical services proved to be more

difficult because of terrorist activities by Boko Haram in Nigeria. In addition, such

terrorist actions make the country's education system lag behind with low school

admission, especially in terrorist prone regions such the Northern Nigeria. Current

literature also supported lack of services and goods theme as one of the participants' lived

experiences. As an illustration, Suleiman (2018) reported that terrorism threatens people's

lives and their belongings and access to basic and essential services. This inhibits

business activities and economic growth and hinders investments in both the education

and healthcare sectors by potential investors who would love to invest in Nigeria

(Suleiman, 2018). Obani (2019) established that the increased levels of poverty brought

by terrorism and the underdeveloped infrastructure, increased population growth, damage

to the environment, and marginal treatment of citizens because of limited healthcare

facilities in operation

Other than the impact on services such as education and healthcare, participants

also highlighted that terrorism by Boko Haram disrupted the food pipelines in Nigeria.

For instance, one participant from the focus group reported that Boko Haram disturbed

the farmers during raining season. This makes the government close the border, and there

is no inflow of external food supplies from other African countries. Other participants

added by reporting that such actions led by Boko Haram in Nigeria result in scarcity of

food supply, increasing the hunger rate in Nigeria because of shortage of food because of

terrorist activities in the farming regions in Nigeria. Participants also established in their

reports that Boko Haram actions led to a lack of medication available, particularly in

rural areas, because no health manpower would go to serve in rural areas where Boko

Haram activities were rampant due to lack of healthcare system. Current literature further

supported lack of services and goods theme. For instance, Qin et al. (2005) reported that

terrorism resulted in the loss of property and goods. The presence of terrorist activities in a country is often associated with loss of lives due to lack of healthcare facilities, damage to property and infrastructure and privacy violations (Ebeku, 2020; Lord-Mallam & Sunday, 2018).

Theme 7: Displacement

In this theme, participants reported that population displacement contributed to the Nigerians' decrease in safety. Nearly all the participants reported one population displacement in Nigeria. However, six of the participants explicitly reported that displacement had been a direct result of the terrorist activities of Boko Haram, which provided the citizen with a concern for their safety. In their reporting, participants established that displacement resulting from Boko Haram terrorist actions led or fueled the destruction of property and increased crime rates in Nigeria. Terrorist activities by Boko Haram led to people losing their loved ones, people deserting their own homes, and that the greatest threat to safety was the destruction of property. Current literature supports displacement theme. For instance, Udoh et al. (2019) reported that limitation of basic fundamental rights such as the right to a home, property and security and freedom of citizens of a democratic government in times of security threats by terrorists have adverse effects like the Nigerian government and Boko Haram. Kamta et al. (2020) also reported that Boko Haram recruits' young people into terrorist groups who later comes back to displace their people from their place of residents.

Limitations of The Study

This study had several limitations based on methodology and research design. First, the study was limited by the sample size used. The sample size was small since interviews were conducted with a small number of Nigerian safety officials. As such, the results may not be generalizable to the overall population of the Nigerian safety officials, nor can the results be transferred to other countries. Another limitation of this study was that the study relied on self-report. As a result, participants may not provide genuine responses to the questions asked the results may not be generalized.

This study was limited by using only Nigerian safety officials. In this case, the results may not be generalized to reflect other countries. The use of archival data also limited this study. Archival information may possess an inherent bias, influencing data collection from some reputable sources. The researcher used data from reputable sources such as peer-reviewed articles to mitigate this limitation. Finally, another limitation of this study was researcher bias because the researcher was apt to have preconceived notions and ideas concerning the Boko Haram and handling security measures.

Recommendations For Future Studies

The researcher advanced several recommendations for future studies regarding the study findings and the study limitations. The first recommendation advanced by the researcher was that future studies should be performed using a large sample size to provide generalizability of the study results. The researcher recommended that more prospective studies be conducted with enormous geographical scope for the generalizability of the study findings. Future studies regarding the effects of Boko Haran

should be performed using other countries in the Horn of African, especially counties in the West and Northern Africa, where Boko Haram has also established its bases.

Implications For Practice

The implications for this study is that government security agencies may use the results of this study to implement policies on terrorist activities such as Boko Haram in West Africa and Alshabab in East Africa. In addition, the international Security Council may use the result of this research to combat terrorism in the world, and in particular nations where the terrorist groups are based, such as in the Middle East. Furthermore, security officers such as the Military personnel may benefit from the findings of this study by using the results for the implementation of the TPA policy in Nigeria for combating Boko Haram.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to increase the understanding of how Nigerian government officials implement policies and strategies of the TPA to address terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, under the new Jihadist philosophy. Data was sourced from social media sites, including Facebook and LinkedIn, which served as the setting for this study. The Nigerian safety officials involved in combating terrorist groups were the population of interest. A sample of 15 Nigerian safety officials was used in this study, and another 15 participants were recruited to participate in interviews as a focus group. Interviews were employed as the data collection method, and snowball sampling was used. Overall, the participants reported that they did not believe the TPA was effective in

combating Boko Haram and that the safety of Nigerians was affected by the insurgence

of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

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Appendix A: Interview Questions

Demographic questions

1. Please state your age.

2. Do you work as a Nigerian safety official concerned with anti-terrorism policy?

   YES   NO

3. Please state your years of experience combating the Boko Haram and other terrorist groups with Jihadist philosophy.

Interview Questions

4. Describe your role regarding combatting terrorism and ensuring the safety of the Nigerian people.

5. What is your experience with the TPA of 2011 and 2013?

6. Explain to me the shortcomings and strengths of the TPA of 2011 and 2013.

7. How do you believe the TPA of 2011 and 2013 has impacted efforts to mitigate the negative impacts of the Boko Haram?

8. Can you please tell me about your personal experiences with anti-terrorism measures and their efficacy?

9. How do you perceive government efforts to mitigate terrorist activity under changing Jihadist philosophy?

10. Explain to me some measures you believe would be effective in combatting terrorist groups' Jihadist philosophy.

11. Explain to me some measures that are currently in use or used in the past that were ineffective in combatting terrorist groups' Jihadist philosophy.

12. How do you think the safety of the Nigerian people has been affected under the

Jihadist philosophy?

13. Is there anything else you think I should know about efforts to combat to Boko

Haram or ensure the safety of the Nigerian people under Jihadist philosophy?

Appendix B: Focus Group Questions

Demographic questions

1. Using the type function of the Zoom platform, please state your code number and replies to the following questions:

2. What is your age?

3. Do you work as a Nigerian safety official concerned with anti-terrorism policy? YES NO

4. Please state your years of experience combating the Boko Haram and other terrorist groups with Jihadist philosophy.

Semi-structured questions

1. What are your professional experiences with the Boko Haram?

2. How has your experiences changed since the Boko Haram adopted Jihadist philosophy?

3. How do you believe the people of Nigeria are impacted by the Boko Haram, especially under Jihadist philosophy?

4. How do you believe the TPA of 2011 and 2013 have impacted safety officials?

5. How do you believe the TPA of 2011 and 2013 has impacted safety efforts for the Nigerian people?

6. What would you like to see change to aid in combatting terrorist groups like the Boko Haram?

7. What is currently helpful in combatting terrorist groups like the Boko Haram?

8. What do you believe would be helpful to change to combat the Boko Haram under Jihadist philosophy?