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A Case Study of Joint Accountability Mechanism and Interorganizational Collaboration in Post-Earthquake Haiti

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Abstract

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M.S., New York University Polytechnic School of Engineering, New-York, 1999

B.T., City University of New-York, New-York, 1994

Final Study Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

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Abstract

The earthquake that hit Haiti on January 12, 2010, caused massive destruction of its capital city Port-au-Prince and its suburbs and killed over a quarter of million people. The recovery period that followed required effectiveness to plan and mobilize resources. The magnitude of the destruction, lack of local recovery plans or previous disaster experience, and scarcity of local resources inspired the creation of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), a compilation of local and international stakeholders who agreed to collaboratively address the recovery challenges. Several studies have examined post-earthquake recovery initiatives under the leadership of local governments, but having a consortium of local and international donors exclusively managing recovery planning in a post disaster context has yet to be studied. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to enhance understanding of the IHRC's public policy initiatives used to address recovery challenges. The social capital theory (SCT) was the theoretical framework to guide the study. Interviews were conducted with 31 participants with knowledge of the IHRC operations, performance, and realization. Five main themes emerged from which meanings and conclusions were extracted. Opinions were divided regarding effectiveness of the IHRC. Key findings revealed that some progress was made in terms of addressing recovery needs, but the framework of the IHRC failed to deliver on its key promises. Recommendations include a permanent body in charge of post disaster recovery in Haiti with a clear mandate and strategic paradigm. Disaster administrators may use the findings of this study as a catalyst to improve recovery plans for positive social change.

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Dedication

I dedicate this study to the survivors of the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti who suffered the horror of the devastation. I also dedicate this endeavor to my mom, Marthe Jean-Gilles for sowing the initial seed of passion for knowledge in me. Finally, I express sincere gratitude to my wife Beatrice for being a pillar of support throughout my adult life, and to my four children, Nadine, Anthony, Patrick and Judy for their love and patience to see me through. I am forever grateful to you all.

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I wish to thank the Almighty God for allowing me to overcome many obstacles and keeping me on the singular path that led me to complete this study. The prayers and support of family and friends have really kept me going throughout this journey. I want to thank Dr. Patricia Ripoll for her assistance in the initial planning and organization of the study. My special thanks are addressed to my committee, Dr. Victoria Landu-Adams for her incredible leadership and guidance as my chair person, Dr. Michael B. Knight, my second committee member, for his patience and support over the years, and Dr. Lori A. Demeter, my reviewer, for her clarity and precision while editing the content of this study. I am infinitely grateful for the lessons learned as you shaped my habits and put me on the path to become a scholar. I am indebted to the Haiti Ministry of Planning librarians for giving me access to a wealth of information on the IHRC and its operations. I am also grateful to many organizations in the civil society and key participants who freely shared their knowledge to ensure completion of the study. I owe a depth of gratitude to my mother, Marthe and my siblings for their words of encouragement and support during this study. To my wife Beatrice and my children Nadine, Anthony, Patrick and Judy, I am eternally grateful and invite them to celebrate this milestone with me, the culmination of many years of hard work and sacrifice.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Introduction

On January 12, 2010, a major earthquake with a 7.0 Richter scale magnitude hit Haiti, destroyed the capital city Port-au-Prince and its suburbs, with an estimated death toll of 230,000 people, negatively impacting the lives of millions more (Billam, 2010; Schuller, 2010). About 1.5 million people became homeless, while 17% of government workers perished. Port-au-Prince witnessed the death or injury of 15% of its population of 2.5 million. This disaster, the worst in the history of the country, caused more devastation than any other earthquake in the Western Hemisphere (Klarreich & Polman, 2012). Preexisting factors such as poverty, inadequate and unsupervised constructions, and lack of emergency preparedness contributed to the level of devastation (Reiersgord, 2011). The earthquake exacerbated an already fragile situation, with the collapse of a large number of government buildings, hospitals, schools, places of worship, and tens of thousands of private homes. The international community along with weakened local forces, initiated recovery and reconstruction efforts. They feared that a humanitarian crisis could follow. Entire communities were exposed to higher levels of mortality, diseases, and epidemics and health emergencies (Cecchine & Morgan, 2021).

Ex-president Bill Clinton and Haitian prime minister Jean-Max Bellerive, co-chairs of a newly created entity called the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), agreed to work collaboratively with Haitians and international donors to address recovery effort challenges. The IHRC was established as a centralized body that was responsible for coordinating, streamlining, and planning reconstruction projects according to the

priorities and vision of the Haitian people. This study involved providing insights regarding the role of the IHRC and its effectiveness in terms of addressing earthquake recovery challenges. This study filled a critical void and reveals dynamics that the IHRC put in place to address challenges of reconstruction. I examined interorganizational collaboration processes involved with transitional recovery and reconstruction efforts of the IHRC in post-earthquake Haiti. This study involved using social capital as a theoretical framework to measure and interpret findings and their implications for the IHRC. This chapter includes a description of the theoretical framework used to analyze contextual information, problem statement, purpose of the study, and research questions. In addition, I addressed the nature of the study, definitions of key terms, social change implications, and the significance of the study.

Background

Historically Haiti has been the center of many natural disasters. Since 1998, the country been hit by 10 hurricanes, tropical storms that caused widespread devastation, and serious loss of life. The earthquake that hit with a magnitude of 7.0 on the afternoon of January 12, 2010 was by far the most devastating disaster the country ever experienced (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012). The estimated death toll was 250,000 people, and 300,000 others were seriously injured, with about 1.5 million individuals without a home who were forced to live in makeshift or displaced camps. In addition, due to issues related to political governance and lack of basic infrastructure and economic resources, Haiti faced the greatest humanitarian challenge in its history.

In the aftermath of the disaster, donors worldwide responded with aid. Within 2 months, in the United States, private citizens donated $2.2 billion in aid, while international donors at a conference in New-York pledged $5.3 billion over 18 months period thereafter (Katz, 2010). Major recipients, such as the American Red Cross, UNICEF, Doctors without Borders, and Catholic Relief Services collected over $1 billion in donations. Although Haitian laws required nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to register with the local government, nearly 90 percent of NGOs circumvented this practice, causing the NGO sector to grow exponentially with minimal government supervision, accountability, and coordination. Consequently, many NGOs had little to show for money being spent. International donors directly channeled most of the money raised to NGOs, bypassing Haitian government entities often accused of corruption and operating with lack of capacity building and resources (Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010). The absence of institutional accountability measures was the main cause for the spread of corruption in the NGO sector in addition to its inability to empower communities to address major issues. NGOs over time became frustrated, and the Haitian government was unable to address NGO waste and mismanagement (Cunningham, 2012). Complaints from local grassroots organizations regarding poor NGOs coordination efforts multiplied. They accused the NGO sector of taking initiatives that weakened the Haitian government, as it was unable to effectively address recovery and reconstruction challenges. There was growing public mistrust regarding both the Haitian government and the NGO community. In April 2010, the Haitian congress voted a law that created the IHRC for an 18th month mandate to coordinate, plan, and approve recovery and

reconstruction projects. The IHRC became operational in June 2010 and faced challenges to initiate the rebuilding process using its interorganizational collaborative framework.

Problem Statement

Globalization and its corollaries have impacted states around the world as they have become increasingly interdependent. As a result, governments and transnational and international organizations have been involved in providing joint and cooperative responses to natural disasters. This new and progressive approach has been effective in the practice of transitional recovery and reconstruction in post-earthquake contexts. Most recently, the Wenchuan earthquake in China, Kobe in Japan, the tsunami in Sri Lanka, the Bam earthquake, and earthquakes in Chile and Haiti have demonstrated the role of government in carrying out the process of transitional recovery and reconstruction (Ghafory-Ashtiany & Hosseini, 2008; Murao & Nakazato, 2010; Xu & Lu, 2012). In many cases, donors from civil society, NGOs, and public and private sectors strived to develop solutions while the government played the critical role of providing leadership in order to restore order (Davidson et al., 2006; Yetkiner, 2003). Often, stakeholders including government, nongovernment, and international organizations provided relief and supported rehabilitation projects (Shaw et al., 2003).

In Haiti, the IHRC took charge in the post-earthquake era with a mandate to identify priorities, mobilize local and external resources, and enhance coordination and implementation of transitional recovery and reconstruction improvements. The IHRC was known to be the first post-earthquake governmental institution of its kind that brought together different stakeholders, including the government, donors, nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs), the diaspora, the private sector and civil society. To date, little research has been conducted on the IHRC and the effectiveness of its policies. There was a gap in literature in this regard. I identified a need for policy research and an in-depth investigation to address the work of the IHRC. This qualitative case study used social capital as a theoretical framework to measure progress of recovery through IHRC collaboration. The study explored characteristics and dispositions of the IHRC, its decision-making processes, and its effectiveness. The aim of the study was to generate knowledge and develop a new conceptual model or framework for future inquiries.

Research Questions

The following questions guided this inquiry:

RQ1: How did Haiti coordinate post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction tasks through the joint accountability mechanism of the IHRC?

RQ2: What kind of relationship existed between community leaders, the Haitian government, and international partners working through the IHRC?

RQ3: What was the role of the IHRC in terms of outcomes of recovery collaboration efforts?

Purpose of Study

This study involved examining implementation of the IHRC in the post-disaster context of Haiti. I proposed to investigate underlying contexts that are responsible for the creation of the IHRC, examine how key stakeholders among Haitians and the international community built mechanisms for interoperability and accountability, and analyzed work relationships among the different sectors of the IHRC. In addition, I

scrutinized priorities and projects alignment, assessed outcomes, evaluated use of transparency in projects selection, and analyzed perceptions, failures and successes of the recovery process. I used the theory of social capital as a lens to guide the research questions, to measure community participation, to identify areas of improvements, to assess the work of the Commission and the overall model of collaboration, and to underline elements that ensured progress, local development and sustainability.

I selected 31 Haitian public officials, IHRC and Haiti Reconstruction Funds (HRF) officials, as well as members of local and international NGOs, civil rights activists, and members of the Haitian diaspora. The HRF was a post-earthquake initiative of the World bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations that mobilized, coordinated and allocated resources to finance reconstruction projects in the aftermath of the January 12, 2010 disaster in Haiti. Participants either participated in relief efforts following the earthquake or experienced the disaster in some other form. I deliberately designated participants for this study based on their involvement as key actors in the relief effort or as important witnesses of the work of the IHRC. These participants represented a diversity of perspectives, experiences and interests on the topic being studied. I collected in-depth information from those who were in key positions to deliver it.

Rationale of the Study

The task of establishing a transitional recovery and reconstruction process through the IHRC using joint accountability mechanisms to plan and facilitate the reconstruction process led to concerns from the public regarding the type of collaboration that is

required from involved sectors. Questions regarding which sectors influenced actions of the Commission and whether the Haitian people benefited from the IHRC as intended, remained unanswered. The creation of the IHRC was considered a shift in previous policies where the Haitian government did not have any control over donor funds in favor of NGOs (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012). Concerns regarding the role of NGOs in terms of facilitating development in Haiti predated the earthquake. It was reported that 98% of all aid went to the NGOs and since the year 1995, NGOs received all United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funds, depriving the government of most needed funds for development (Schuller, 2010). Etienne (1997) said the invasion of NGOs was a neoliberal framework that had failed Haiti. Lee (2011) said the work of NGOs in Haiti and efforts involving long-term development had been positive for short term job creation and negatively impacting sustainability and local development. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the situation intensified dependence on foreign aid, destroying local production of foods and other products, which isolated the government even more. There was an urgent need for change in international aid policies to promote self-sufficiency and allow the government to have access to resources and establish priorities for the Haitian state.

Amid such challenges, the IHRC intended to promote collaboration among the international community, the Haitian government, donors, and other important sectors of Haitian society. Millions of dollars in aid needed to be channeled through this new umbrella organization, to plan and manage recovery. IHRC actors and experts had a mandate to promote relationships between stakeholders, prioritize recovery efforts, and

ensure planning was inclusive and led by Haitians. The IHRC's mission was to streamline recovery efforts via bilateral and multilateral strategies, applying project reviews to avoid duplication of efforts and follow government-established guidelines and priorities. It was important to discover if the IHRC met its objectives and examine its effectiveness in terms of using joint accountability mechanisms to collaborate and plan transitional recovery tasks in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti.

Significance of the Study

Nations no longer resolve problems in isolation with each other. Local and national issues require global solutions that are often complex and unprecedented (Hickman, 2010). When disasters strike, effective leadership must be inclusive in order to integrate local, national, and international stakeholders for positive results. The joint accountability initiative of the IHRC brought together important stakeholders to align projects based on key priorities was "a first-of-its-kind institution in a post-disaster environment" (IHRC, 2011, p. 2). Post-earthquake transitional recovery involves available local and foreign efforts and resources from governments, NGOs, and civil societies in preparation for the reconstruction phase (Xu & Lu, 2011). This requires parallel and concurrent accountability mechanisms in place for each actor involved in the process. In the case of Haiti, the IHRC regulated cooperative arrangements among all stakeholders for joint accountability. It was possible for stakeholders to introduce these accountability mechanisms in good faith to benefit the Haitian people, while others may have been self-centered and acted to promote a different agenda. Nevertheless, it was imperative to generate knowledge about these joint accountability mechanisms and

analyze how they may have contributed to progress in Haiti. It was Important for the various sectors involved to settle any issue that may have emerged due to the unique and unprecedented cooperative arrangement of the IHRC. This study was significant in terms of examining ways for Haiti and its stakeholders to establish policies to collect, plan, and manage reconstruction funds successfully. Additionally, I sought to further understand joint accountability as an effective tool to coordinate efforts in post-disaster areas. This study had profound social change implications for governments, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the United Nations when intervening in countries with parallel political and socioeconomic conditions as Haiti. This can be used as a guide to assist countries in transitions or rebuilding from disasters.

Social Change Implications

Social change implications of the study included improved collaboration, cooperation, and coordination among the IHRC stakeholders for better outcomes regarding the earthquake recovery initiatives. This study can impact reduction of earthquake vulnerability and preparedness for Port-au-Prince and other Haitian cities. The study can be a catalyst for social change and reveal measures that were taken by the leadership of the IHRC to mitigate the impact of future disasters by promoting and adopting better construction and engineering systems in reconstruction projects. Community leaders, government authorities, NGOs, IGOs, and United Nations officials as partners of the IHRC may be compelled to duplicate the success of the IHRC model, reject its failed policies, and improve its deficiencies in terms of future intervention in communities with parallel political and socioeconomic conditions.

The study demonstrated ways in which IHRC processes needed improvement in order to lead to positive social change. Hiring qualified Haitians in top management positions would have been beneficial to the IHRC. Such decision would improve public perception, increase community participation, and minimize the popular view that the more powerful international community leaders treated their Haitians counterparts inside the IHRC as pawns or simply irrelevant in the decision making process. Additionally, there may have been a need to recruit leaders of the international community in high management positions who are knowledgeable about Haitian culture, history, and lifestyle to ensure mandates were applicable and beneficial to all Haitians.

Positive social change may result due to more transparency in fundraising, budgeting, and spending of the IHRC's resources to build trust and provide better services to people in affected communities. Stakeholders can establish proper guidelines to ensure harmonious coexistence of all parties in a recovery and reconstruction context where power and cultural and socioeconomic dynamics became contending forces that impinged on the IHRC as a whole. Lessons learned from IHRC experiences may become useful when assisting other countries that are recovering and rebuilding from disasters, using the IHRC as a reference model.

Theoretical Framework

Haiti is a country that is vulnerable to natural disasters. Particularly, the country' geographic location makes it prone to earthquakes. Haiti is located near the intersection of two major tectonic plates that make up the Earth's crust, the Enriquillo-Plantain Garden fault system in the south, and the Septentrional fault system to the north. When

the plates move against each, they create friction, the main cause for earthquakes. In addition, Haiti's geographic location is in the path of hurricanes that makes it vulnerable to hydrometeorological disasters. Prior to the January 12, 2010 major earthquake, the country was densely populated and most of its building were designed to withstand natural hurricanes and remained vulnerable to earthquakes (Frankel et al, 2010). Perhaps this explains why so many buildings collapsed causing the death of nearly 230,000 people. So, given Haiti's location and its exposure to natural disasters, the study of earthquake occurrences and how recovery and reconstruction projects are managed should be the central focus to social change initiatives within the framework of the Haiti society.

In post-disaster areas, social capital can help create value for partners in private, nonprofit, and public sectors, as well as everyone in the affected community. Social capital increasingly plays a major role in brings various stakeholders together to facilitate collective actions through effective collaboration in post disaster situations (Green & Haines, 2002; Davidson, 2006). Additionally, social capital involves encouraging NGOs and public organizations to leverage collective action and mobilize resources that are used to support governmental actions in terms of building better and healthier communities. This is particularly true in post-disaster areas where one single organization is typically not capable of solving complex problems by acting alone. Major community problems require multisector interorganizational collaborations to allow various stakeholders to build social partnerships for the benefit of society (Savage et al, 2010). Communities worldwide are becoming aware of social capital as a growing paradigm that

facilitates addressing complex societal challenges through interorganizational social partnerships (Waddock 2008; Nambisan 2009). Post-earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction programs in places like Kobe, Japan and Gujarat, India showed that communities with social capital and with a tradition of collaboration can successfully participate in the recovery initiatives.

The theoretical framework of this study was based on SCT. Increasingly, social capital is viewed as integral to success in modern organizations because it represents their main resource on the basis of cooperative principles. SCT analyzes how communities solve problems in various contexts, and specifically in post disaster environments (Kapucu, 2006). Public participation in solving community problems increases the likelihood of obtaining better results when solving community problems, which strengthens both communities and democratic society (Brody et al., 2003; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Putnam, 1995). Post disaster recovery processes are viewed as opportunities for sustainable development, by revitalizing local economies and improving living conditions. This study used SCT to measure the role of community leadership in mobilizing resources to facilitate the work of the IHRC in post-earthquake Haiti. The study proposed to measure how much community social capital contributed to enhance success of recovery projects.

Definition of Terms

Accountability: an assurance that an individual or an organization will be evaluated on their performance or behavior related to something for which they are responsible. It involves delegating tasks and establishing expectations; verifying the

performance of those tasks; maintaining the responsiveness of accountable agents; assessing blame for accountable actions; and sorting out responsibility among many agents.(Romzek & Dubnick, 2000)

Disaster: Actual or threatened accidental or uncontrollable events that are concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society undergoes severe danger, and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted, the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of the society, or its subdivision, is presented (Fritz, 1961).

Disaster recovery: an organization's method of regaining access and functionality to its infrastructure after events like a natural disaster. Recovery starts with stabilization of damages and ends once social, economic, and political order is reestablished (Lindell, 2011).

Donors: International private and public organizations that provide resources and contribute to recovery and reconstruction efforts (Chen et al., 2006).

International Community: Hayner (2002) said this includes the United Nations as well as international partners such as governments, private, public and nonprofit international organizations.

Interorganizational collaboration: An emerging process that comes from interactions between partner organizations to create new structures for successful collective action (Thomson et al., 2007). Interorganizational collaboration involves

expanding beyond individual partner organizations to enhance and address complex and urgent societal issues (Nambisan 2009; Waddock 2008).

Joint Accountability: Several institutions that are engaged and operate within a single organization to facilitate cooperation, collaboration, and coordination of resources and expertise to resolve a common problem (Edwards, 2011; Langford & Roy, 2009).

Partners or stakeholders: Member organizations in networks of organizations that partake in interorganizational collaboration for collective action (Shaw et al., 2003).

Social Capital: A network of relationship among people in a community or society, enabling people to solve problems collectively and to function effectively (Kapucu, 2006). Social capital creates value that indicates a community's capacity to bring together resources and efforts to self-organize and promote success through collective action (Ahn & Ostrom, 2002).

Transitional Recovery: Overall arrangement of available local and foreign efforts and resources including governments and NGOs in preparation for the reconstruction phase after a disaster (Xu & Lu, 2011).

Assumptions and Limitations

I assumed all participants were honest and truthful about their experiences and knowledgeable about the IHRC.

I am familiar with both the language and culture of Haiti, and my familiarity with Haitian society facilitated relevant decisions regarding data collection and analysis.

Given the size of the geographical location, most interviews had to be conducted via email, skype or telephone.

Although I explained to the potential participants the confidentiality of the study, many persons contacted did not want to participate for fear of being identified.

Given the continuous threat from natural disaster in Haiti, policies on disaster management based on past experiences should be promoted as a tool for progress and economic development.

Summary

In this chapter, I presented the introductory elements of the study. I explained the context of the study, the research background, rationale and objectives, followed by definition of terms used in the study. This chapter also included limitations and significance of the study. Traditionally, developing countries have benefited from intergovernmental cooperation in many ways. When major disasters take place, in various cases, governments do not avail enough resources and experts to assist affected populations. In many instances, government, public, and private sectors collaborate to bring about successful collective action. In Haiti, the earthquake of January 12, 2010 found a country weakened with recent political instability, poverty, and environmental degradation caused by previous natural devastations such a floods and hurricanes. To address challenges of recovery, representatives of the Haitian government, the Haitian private sector, the Haitian civil society, and donors from international community created a joint mechanism, the IHRC, a unique and centralized body, to coordinate, streamline, and plan reconstruction projects to benefit the Haitian people.

In this study, I examined the experiences of the IHRC, analyzed collaboration, coordination, and cooperation issues that derived from these experiences, and explained

the impact of the IHRC on reconstruction processes and sustainable development. In Chapter 2, I described and explained tools that are used in disaster recovery environments as well as related socioeconomic and political dynamics. Further, I presented an in-depth literature review of prior studies regarding the concept of joint accountability in post-disaster recovery initiatives.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

In this chapter, I review, analyze, and summarize literature on interorganizational structures used to address recovery and reconstruction challenges in the aftermath of natural disasters, particularly in Haiti following the earthquake of January 12, 2010. I examine literature and provide a lens for evaluating the impact of the IHRC consortium and its effectiveness in terms of addressing challenges in the aftermath of the disaster. I provide a review of the SCT and its role in terms of addressing vulnerability of social networks after natural disasters. In addition, I address other theoretical public policies regarding interorganizational collaboration. I identify gaps in knowledge, synthesize what authors have reported about the topic, and define a comprehensive theoretical and conceptual framework for interorganizational collaboration and complex coordination efforts required from participating partners. In this chapter, I evaluate assumptions and gaps in literature and use them to guide future researchers and practitioners.

Additionally, I offer an in-depth analysis of collaborative tools and organizational structures that underlie the study as well as socioeconomic and political considerations. I address strengths and weaknesses of prior research for future use of interorganizational collaboration in post-disaster contexts. The concept of organizational accountability is further examined in terms of ongoing collective processes involving shared and combined knowledge, beliefs, and responsibilities of organizational partners.

This chapter includes an analysis of interorganizational collaboration. I first provide the literature search strategy, theoretical foundation, and conceptual framework

to position research within clear boundaries and ensure clarity and success. I begin with an introduction of the SCT as the theoretical framework that guides this study. Community awareness is an essential component of social capital when addressing challenges in post-disaster area (Burdy, 2005). Social capital becomes an effective tool that communities can use to mobilize available resources and attain valued outcomes. Social capital is defined in order to better examine its impact on the IHRC.

This chapter includes an analysis of shared or joint accountability in collaborative environments to measure the IHRC's effectiveness during recovery efforts. A review of literature regarding shared accountability and the role it plays in the process of building social capital for community mobilization and development was done. This included an analysis of shared accountability used to control stakeholders actions in the operations of the IHRC. An explanation of tools used for interorganizational collaboration is provided. Further, the role of social capital in collective actions is investigated in order to construct an organizing framework for a deeper understanding of the IHRC and its efforts to plan and manage earthquake recovery challenges. Lastly, this chapter reviews conceptual frameworks from previous studies and questions and evaluates methodologies in order to discover themes, policy similarities and differences, and relationships.

Literature Search Strategy

I searched the Walden University Library and used databases such as Thoreau, Academic Search Complete, ProQuest Central, Academic Research Premier, Sage, and ScienceDirect. In addition, I used full text databases and engines such as Google, Ludwig and Bing, in addition to relevant literature found in both local public and university

libraries. The majority of articles used in the study were found through keyword searches based on selected keywords and the topic. In addition, I used textbooks that were either bought from the Internet or borrowed from the Fairfax County Public Library. Literature key search terms included *inter-organizational collaboration*, *inter-organizational cooperation*, *interagency cooperation*, *interagency collaboration*, *collective action*, *joint or shared accountability*, *social capital*, *collective actions*, *human capital*, *public partnership*, *nonprofit partnership*, *private partnership*, *networks and disaster*, *disaster outcome*, *disaster evaluation*, *earthquake recovery*, *earthquake reconstruction*, *international relief*, and *outcome*. Results of searches provided fundamental knowledge for this review, a framework for interpretation of previous studies, and a design for future studies. However, literature failed to provide substantial knowledge and scholarly articles regarding the IHRC and its joint accountability collaborative efforts. I used the SCT as a catalyst to derive a conceptual framework to measure progress or lack thereof and identify gaps for further research. Findings that were relevant helped to establish methods for analysis and meaningful exploration of IHRC experiences.

Theoretical Foundation

The theory employed in this study is the SCT. The SCT facilitated measurement and interpretation of findings and their implications. Social capital can be used as a key indicator to assess the process and pace of recovery (Aldrich, 2012; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). In the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti, performance of recovery initiatives depended largely on internal social networks used to strengthen existing relationships and build new ones to mobilize resources and provide required services. I

investigated how much social capital influenced the performance of the IHRC in terms of facilitating effective planning to build community resilience and sustainability in a shared accountability context. During disasters, social capital is paramount to access resources and capabilities in order to plan recovery and reconstruction stages (Coleman, 1988; Uzzi, 1996). The SCT was used to share knowledge and resources in disaster affected areas.

I used the SCT as the theoretical framework while focusing on the role that community networks play in post-earthquake recovery contexts. In the case of the IHRC, leaders from local organizations, NGOs, and the government agreed to share accountability in order improve collaboration. It is common for researchers to employ the SCT as a theoretical framework to study recovery efforts in post-disaster contexts (Kapucu, 2006; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). Aldrich (2012) argued that SCT is essential for explaining successful and unsuccessful outcomes in post disaster situations because of many important factors such as social trust, networks, norms and reciprocity. Those key factors are viewed as preconditions for successful collective actions.

Although these factors do not always guarantee success, they can, to some degree, justify why communities fail or succeed when participating in collective actions (Weber, 2010). They can enforce cooperation and positively influence cooperative behavior. The absence of those factors can reduce participation and impact the outcomes of successful collective actions. Browning et al. (2000) said social capital through networks may increase bonding among members in a community, but has the potential to be counterproductive in instances where it does not foster a sense of collective duty.

Applying SCT is useful to the assessment of the claims that supported the creation of the IHRC based on shared accountability. The question remains whether accountability in joint initiatives should be concentrated at the top (in one person or organization) or diffused all the way to the bottom (multiple persons or organizations). Boston and Gill (2011) envisaged two main models for shared accountability: concentrated accountability with sole responsibility that rests on one actor and shared responsibility where responsibility is dispersed across a group of stakeholders. In shared responsibility, one participant organization can take the lead role in reporting collective actions or the reporting can remain dispersed. Jones and Stewart (2009) warned that shared accountability in some settings can become joint accountability, creating the perception that no one is accountable. Other problems can arise in shared accountability actions when participating stakeholders have different or sometimes conflicting expectations regarding goals, performance and outcomes.

Theoretical Framework

This study used SCT as its theory. Applying SCT is useful to construct a framework of the IHRC built on interorganizational collaboration and shared accountability structures. The shared accountability mechanism of the IHRC offered the potential to bring an effective response to the devastation of the earthquake. The consortium of the IHRC comprised donors in the international community, representatives of the government of Haiti, and representatives from the civil society. Consequently, these sectors faced the obligation to use combined and coordinated efforts to increase communication and improve understanding among people from various

backgrounds and nationalities to carry out the tasks of the recovery. This qualitative case study examined, explored and described various concepts found in the IHRC's public policy response of the earthquake. An interview protocol helped in the data collection process with questions relevant to the work of the IHCR in the aftermath of the earthquake.

The Concept

The literature offers several models of disaster recovery frameworks regarding the participation of stakeholders in collective actions (Patterson et al., 2009). The first model is referred to what Lemyre called Psychosocial Risk Assessment and Management (PRAM). This framework model is a development process that shows how communities and other stakeholders come together to embrace the psychosocial effects of a post disaster environment. PRAM highlights the issues placed in the context of the disaster area, with risks and benefits assessed to analyze and identify strategies for implementation. All stakeholders must be involved in the entire process from beginning to end, focusing on the communities as the main stakeholder of the collective action. Additionally, Lemyre (2005) designed a complementary framework to the development process, with a focus on outcomes. The framework emphasizes on individual, community and society interacting with the various aspects of the disaster event to provide solutions (Lemyre, 2005).

Chen et al. (2006) designed a conceptual model to integrate both the planning and response processes, into a complete disaster management project, using communities' strengths and resources. This model encourages the building of partnerships between

stakeholders to manage risks and promote survival and recovery. Establishing a comprehensive framework helps to illustrate the advantages of integrating various community groups into the many facets of disaster recovery. Communities have strengths and weaknesses, advantages and drawbacks, that must be incorporated into the framework to assess needs and allocate resources appropriately. Social infrastructure systems and community networks facilitate collaborative efforts in post-disaster recovery settings (Sadri et al, 2018). Communities with stronger human networks and social ties are likely to better respond to the challenges of disaster responses.

Siembieda (2001) designed a recovery model for disaster recovery based on two paradigms. Paradigm A focuses on studying the communities in relations to their ability to return to normalcy while paradigm B seeks for transformation in the communities. A practical approach would be to combine the benefits of the studies of communities and create a paradigm between A and B. This new paradigm would reflect areas of progress in set of communities. Sadri et al (2018) revealed that communities with higher level of social capital could reduce the number of victims and the recovery time with quick dissemination of information, physical and financial assistance to affected communities. Social capital may directly impact the rate of recovery. Sustainability in disaster recovery is a function of internal or horizontal factors and external or vertical factors. External factors are resources from outside the community, originated from national, state or international cooperation while the internal factors come from within the communities.

The study of the IHRC's policy response to the January 12, 2010 earthquake must provide a holistic framework that reflects the ability to return to normalcy, transform the

affected communities, and provide sustainability in affected communities (Lemyre 2005). This study used an organizing framework model derived from combining variables from the findings of previous researchers. Social capital is used a lens to assess community improvements through its internal and external capacities, and various related aspects of the collaboration (Chen et al. 2006; Patterson, Weil & Patel, 2009; Siembieda, 2001).

Social Capital

Capital is an economic notion used to express a surplus value in terms of the control of production means as monies and commodities exchange hands (Marx, 1933; Brewer, 1984). Consumption processes imply that laborers work in the production systems and their labor or commodity is paid with a wage, allowing them to sustain their lives. Capital is then perceived based on a surplus value, as a product of a process, an investment process, produced, captured and utilized. In this system, the dominant class controls the investment and captures the surplus value. Marx theory is often called a classical theory of social capital (Lin, 1999).

Mayunga (2007) used the concept of economic capital to denote financial resources such as savings, investments, or income that individuals use to maintain their livelihoods. This theoretical root of capital in social relations and social networks is at the foundation of qualitative analysis of social systems. Bourdieu (1986) saw social capital as an attribute of the individual that cannot be properly assessed away from the groups or networks in which the individual functions. The ability of the person to build strong connections through social capital, leveraging available network resources can determine the person's economic worth. During disasters, communities with strong economic

capital or a more stable economy show more resilience and capacity to recover than poorer communities (Buckle, 2001).

However, capital has another concept that have a major impact in disaster recovery efforts. The literature indicates that social capital, in its various aspects has played a major role in facilitating collective actions through mutual coordination and collaboration in post disaster contexts (Davidson, 2006; Green & Haines, 2002; Mayunga, 2007). In fact, social capital as a tool can help to assess a community's resilience to disaster and its capacity to address a collective concern adequately. The quality and quantity of existing social cooperation within a community may facilitate working together to achieve the common goals of recovery and reconstruction in a disaster area. Aldrich (2012) listed human capital, social capital and economic capital as important aspects to consider when estimating the rate of recovery in post disaster areas. More than the other factors, social capital is the most important tool when predicting successful recovery in the aftermath of a disaster.

Social capital can be defined in terms of mutual trust through social norms that bring benefits to collective action (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). This definition is specifically valid in post-disaster recovery environment to facilitate trust and consensus among networks of community members and leaders for effective cooperative behavior. This theoretical notion leads to the suggestion that social capital is conceptually rooted in social networks as well. Social capital becomes an asset to social networks, and can be measured in terms of resources availability and access (Lin, 1999, p. 37). Social resources become social capital depending on accessibility and utilization for effective

social or collective actions. Social capital in this case becomes a societal resource that has direct consequences in collaborative actions for many people (Putnam, 1995). Conversely, social capital can be viewed as a personal resource, which in turn, indirectly has social effects, impacting social order (Coleman, 1998; Bourdieu, 1986).

Although not concrete, human capital is also viewed as capital. However, more time may be needed to further solidify the findings of several studies and confirm the concept and its underlying methodology. Kristina (2002) discovered that social capital is capable of increasing bonding in, specifically at the community level. Communities use social capital as a glue to come together for collective action with the help of established agency rules. Further, Woolcock and Narayan (2000) found three distinct forms of social capital: bonding between friends, family members and community businesses, bridging which links people of different locations, ethnic and geographic backgrounds, and linking which ties communities and institutional leaders from banks, the police, schools, civil societies' organizations, NGOs, and government authorities. However, in order to build a sustainable environment with successful collective action, social capital needs to play an determining role.

Social scientists and practitioners have sought over the years to find common ground on the meaning of social capital in conjunction with its various theoretical frameworks. Debates and controversies on social capital have led to emergent theories captured from critical understanding social networks, viewing social capital as a valuable resource for networks (Lin, 1999). Ahn and Ostrom (2002) acknowledged causal relationship of social capital with other forms of capital, in that all forms of capital are

related on investments intended for higher returns jointly or individually. Social capital causal mechanisms are viewed as factors that favor inequality and the returns on investments (Ahn & Ostrom, 2002; Lin, 1999). The conceptualization is based on the idea that social capital is used to promote economic and political agenda in all aspects of social group interactions in a community. Social capital influences collaborative projects in several ways. Social capital is utilized as a conceptual framework in situations where communities come together to solve problems in a collective manner (Kapucu, 2006).

Justification for Selection of Concept

In general, social capital is a popular term that has affected social and economic endeavors as it is linked to the concepts of trust, social norms and networks (Aldrich, 2012, Mayunga, 2007). Social capital has both costs and benefits that can translate to a liability as well as an asset, and can have serious implications for democracy and poverty reduction (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). In post disaster environments, social capital plays an important role in that it allows people to utilize resources and networks as they interact with each other. Large local resources combined with government and international entities can help facilitate the recovery process and assist survivors in organizing the reconstruction phase (Aldrich, 2012). Collective actions constraints are minimized and survivors are likely to participate actively and remain in the community. In post-earthquake areas specifically, the literature shows that social capital plays a major role as an effective recovery process tool in successful recovery and rehabilitation programs (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004).

However, the same elements of trust and networks may weaken social capital in that they could be used to exclude and restrict others members in the community, developing opposition to the collective action (Browning et al., 2000; Portes & Landolt, 1996). Consequently, as social capital is becoming an acceptable theory in a growing number of studies, communities using the concept need to implement more aggressive ways to control utilization and manage outcome (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). In disaster recovery, local and international communities may bring a different side of social capital in the collaborative effort. Shaw (2003) found that even in the local community alone, actors may play different roles as a disaster goes through different stages of its cycle, varying from rescue, relief, recovery, and reconstruction. Nakagawa and Shaw (2004) discovered, based on multiple case studies on disaster cycle and social capital in similar communities, the communities with social capital were better equipped and provided more successful results in earthquake relief and recovery. Strong community leadership linked to social capital is essential for effective and successful collective action. Although each country experiences its own customs, culture and socio-economic backgrounds, the literature from many recent studies recognizes that across boundaries, when communities trust their leaders, social capital can be used effectively in post disaster areas to promote the recovery process (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004).

Uphaff (2003) suggested that social capital enhances mutually beneficial collaborative actions by promoting resources sharing. The policy framework can be presented in four-tier: community, local, state, and central governments, where people come together to increase social capital under a larger risk management framework

(Shaw & Shinna, 2003). The right community leadership and social capital are viewed as key assets for effective recovery in post-earthquake environment. In the case of Haiti, there is a fifth tier, social capital pulled from the international community, as many NGOs and foreign government entities played a major role in organizing the relief, recovery, and reconstruction stages. The IHRC was established as a collaborative inter-organizational entity made of local and international community stakeholders to plan and facilitate the recovery and reconstruction efforts. This study used SCT to analyze and examine the IHRC initiatives for community participation and leadership to plan and facilitate the recovery and rebuilding of Haiti after the earthquake.

Organizing Framework Design

In this study of the work of the IHRC in the post-earthquake recovery, I selected a framework to organize and test the phenomenon. The framework aimed at using social capital as a tool to measure community improvements, focusing on the roles of partnership and interpersonal trust as reciprocal relationships that potentially drive social capital. The goal was to test the impact of social capital on the success of the IHRC through community improvements. The concepts of trust and partnership can increase the value of social capital in favor of successful recovery initiatives (Putnam, 1993). Using these concepts can facilitate efficient recovery initiatives with coordinated and well-planned actions. Community leaders and policymakers are encouraged to consider the importance of social and community factors in post-disaster environments The framework considered the impact of both internal and external capacities in structuring the IHRC to plan recovery collective actions. Active participation of people in the

affected regions was needed to channel community improvements and achieve the actual outcome of the collaboration (Dynes, 2006). Through social capital, partnership agreements and trust were necessary to contribute towards community agreements and improve collaboration for successful outcome.

Areas of research in that regard included perceptions as to what role social capital played in post recovery contexts. Harmonious integration of social capital as a human networks tool to build the shared accountability mechanism of the IHRC was instrumental in finding leadership to address the necessities of the recovery effort (Uphaff, 2003). Key assertions were that recovery and long-term rebuilding efforts would be difficult because of the large scale of the destruction of central government infrastructure in Port-au-Prince and its suburbs and the loss of lives among important government employees. The IHRC needed to harmonize overlapping and conflicting goals, symbolize harmony, and coordinate the initial stage of the recovery to benefit the Haitian people (IHRC, 2011). However, these objectives do not outline detailed discussions and assertions about the process. The IHRC as an inter-organizational collective action umbrella with a joint accountability system had to leverage the human capital available to address the recovery challenges of post-earthquake Haiti.

Several institutions came together from the international community, local government, and the community of donors to build a prevalent organizational structure, the IHRC, with a mission to lead the recovery effort and to facilitate coordination and resource planning and allocation (IHRC, 2011). To the extent that social capital enabled the emergence of an effective leadership in collective action, this study investigated

whether the IHRC initiative accomplished the goals of the recovery. The social connections and broader community engagement of the IHRC can justify the opportunity for success in the recovery processes (Park et al, 2012). The study disclosed the lessons learned from the recovery response of the IHRC to the severe impact of the disaster.

Key Concepts and Benefits of the Framework

This study involved using several concepts linked to the SCT. They included: collaboration, inter-organizational collaboration, collective action, collaboratives, networks, partnerships, and accountability of the IHRC.

Collaboration

There is a conceptual murkiness linked to the word collaboration based on common knowledge. This study sought to clarify misconceptions, highlight various rationales, and focus the lens on a more appropriate definition. Collaboration finds its root in the Latin word, “collaboratus”, which means, “to work together” (Merriam’s Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 2005). This basic definition is a reference point for many researchers and scholars to interpret any endeavor that requires participants “to work together.” One of the dilemmas of this approach is that the activity may be complex and sophisticated, thus requiring more in-depth conceptual frameworks. Definitions must explicit to include all elements and characteristics of the collaborative activity. In that context, Johnson and Hollister (2002) defined collaboration as:

> A formal voluntary or mandated inter-organizational process which enhances the respective organizational capacities of participants; and utilizes a range of shared

> resources and inputs to achieve a common purpose by sharing risks, responsibilities, and rewards. (p. 16)

This definition is in line with the popular theory of collaboration that wants two or more organizations to work together to achieve a task that could not have been accomplished by one of the organizations alone (Oh, 2012; Wood & Gray, 1991). That task must be examined in light of its collaboration outcomes (Thomson & Perry, 2006), one of the three key dimensions of the theoretical framework that Gray and Wood's (1991) proposed as a prerequisite for a better understanding of collaboration. The three areas of the theoretical framework, antecedents to collaboration, the process of collaboration itself, and the outcomes of that process are not mentioned enough in many research studies (p. 13). Researchers in many instances mix all three aspects which makes it difficult to distinguish and analyze outcome variables. In this study, collaboration was examined through the IHRC in the post-earthquake context in Haiti, analyzing multi-dimensional model, examining antecedents, processes, outcomes, and finally, noting useful lessons learned.

Interorganizational Collaboration

Interorganizational collaboration involves a complex network of factors. In this study, the focus was on the effectiveness of cross-organizational collaboration with joint operation to address the challenges of reconstruction of post-earthquake Haiti. Specifically, the study investigated collaboration and actions through the IHRC, the joint accountability mechanism in place and the desirable values added, not provided by conventional reconstruction efforts. Missed opportunities and lessons learned were also

desirable goals of the study to address untested hypotheses and factual assumptions of critics.

Over the years, in many disaster areas, researchers have underlined the failures of taking a linear approach (Mileti, 1999), lack of communications (Luhmann, 1996), time constraints (Weick, 1993), lack of resources from leading organizations (Comfort, Oh, & Ertan, 2009), as major factors that can hamper effective responses. Inter-organizational collaboration provides a better alternative, allowing organizations to effectively communicate to create across the board knowledge, build collective capacity, establish effective communication, mobilize and share resources (Oh, 2012; Comfort, 2007). This approach allows stakeholders to manage complex challenges mixed with uncertain situations through joint operations and effective collaboration. The theoretical framework for this study was drawn upon several sources from the literature, ranging from, social capital, organizational collaboration, and network theory. Network analysis was used as an assessment tool to study the relationships among stakeholders in terms of their influence, strength, to deliver services through a common platform in an effective manner.

I this section, I examined many aspects of inter-organizational collaboration that required attention in the context of this study. These include collaborative network, social network, collective action, accountability, partnership, leadership and trust. A review of the literature on the major concepts has substantiated the systematic approach taken in this project.

In this study, the terms inter-organizational collaboration, inter-sector collaboration, and cross-sector collaboration are utilized interchangeably. Wolff (1997) defined inter-organizational collaboration as a formal relationship established among partner organizations from nonprofit, business and government sectors to achieve a common purpose. This inter-organizational relationship aims at bringing appropriate solutions to a major community problem, issue, challenge, or opportunity (Nambisan, 2009; Thomson et al., 2007; Waddock, 2008). An interactive process is initiated among the many organizations that are involved in the collaboration, building consensus between individual interests of partner organizations and the collective interest (Thomson et al., 2008). Interdependence among the partner organizations is an important element of cross-sector collaboration. Resource dependency, a concept well-known in the research community, has unveiled this reality over some time (Hudock, 2001; Pfeffer, 1997). Inter-organizational collaboration involves sharing leadership, norms and resources among partner organization to ensure successful collective effort. The IHRC was created based on this inter-organizational collaboration model.

Collective Action

When disasters occur, individuals and groups generally come together to act in the interest of the entire community (Olson, 1965, p. 5). The organization in this context furthers the interests of its members to maximize their economic advantages or reduce their financial exposure. This approach requires some type of collective action for coordination, resource planning and regulations. Over the past half a century, the literature on collective action has grown, providing new conceptual and analytical

frameworks that are necessary for scholars and scientists to further their research studies (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1987).

Collective action is viewed according to the theory of collaboration as action among several organizations that work together to achieve a common goal (Wood & Gray, 1991). In a collective action, a group of individuals voluntarily cooperates to act or takes initiatives that can potentially benefit its members or an entire community. Marshall (1998) defined collective action as group action in the pursuit of members' "perceived shared interests." Members work together either directly or through an organization to establish guidelines for sharing resources and managing adopted structures and predetermined practices. Collective action requires that people take actions on behalf of a common cause, make sacrifices over a defined period (Snyder, 2009).

Organizations shape the ways collective actions affect the outcome of actions taken on behalf of a community. The actions may take one of many forms as individuals participate with a "pursuit of rational self-interest" (Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009, p. 661) or can be voluntary groups, acting to achieve common group interests (Meinzen-Dick et al., 1999). While individuals work together to create collective action, an organization may make the task of working collectively more effective. Research has shown that the structure of collective action can vary depending on several factors. Collective actions may have different structures based on whether they are mandated or voluntary, funded or unfunded, and local or global. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) noted some common characteristics or traits to collective actions: the initiative of a group of individuals, common and voluntary actions, and the pursuit of shared interest.

The logic of collective action focuses on the traditional goals of organizations to minimize costs and increase productivity. As such, balancing the cost of coming together versus and individual potential rewards (Hornsey et al., 2006; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987), is a key element of strategy for most organizations. Transactions cost such as time and money must be evaluated through special lenses to determine potential benefits of collective action. There are non-economic factors that must be considered as well. Additionally, Olson (1965) investigated groups' behavior and concluded that individuals are self-interested and tend to interfere with the desire to work collectively, thus proposing a combination of the two factors for a competitive collective environment. Many studies investigate other incentives to include the necessity to comply with organizational guidelines (Etzioni, 1975), or adopting moral values (Thomas et al., 2009; Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009; Wright, 2009), or context (Ostrom, 2010), with social, cultural, and psychological aspects of the collective action. Ostrom (2010) added key factors that must be examined, including trust, reputation and reciprocity of member organizations.

As such, the literature in recent years has evolved to recognize various types of categorizations of collective action. Ostrom (2004) linked collective action with initiatives taken by formal organizations while identifying the need for researchers to pay more attention to informal collective action where local groups and individuals organize to plan local actions and solve short-term community problems. In this study, the focus was on formal collective action based upon the fact that the IHRC was created from many formal partner organizations, public and private, national, and international. In this

regard, the literature recognized the dynamic nature of organizations involved in collective actions, making institutional arrangements to collect and manage much needed resources (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). Additionally, understanding the contexts in which the arrangements for actions take place can play an important role in coordinating actions for shared interest and effective outcome.

The same authors suggest that besides the partner institutions and the benefits of collective action such as the potential to reduce transaction costs, researchers need to point out the critical importance of performance outcomes. To this end, several variables explain the feedbacks and co-movements of performance outcomes in collective actions. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) used structure, conduct and performance as key variables to analyze and evaluate collective actions in rural project development. Because the dynamic nature of collective action makes it difficult to measure, several authors have grouped related factors in several different categories such as characteristics of the groups and resources, arrangements among partner organizations, and the environmental context (Aggrawal, 2001; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004; Wade, 1988). Similarly, Davies, Blackstock, Brown, and Shannon (2004) adopted the same categories to build a framework on factors that directly affect collective action. Those categories are explored to identify and address important factors that favor successful collective actions and barriers that must be dealt with. In this model, the integration of available natural resources and knowledge are key factors to promote sustainability. The choice of participating groups or organizations, their size and homogeneity, and the rules that dictate their social interactions are

conceptually glued to the principles of social capital. In addition to these cited internal factors, there are external forces or agents impact collective actions in various ways.

Key Concepts Linked to the Work of the IHRC

In the context of disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts, outside organizations, local and international NGOs, national or foreign organizations often provide some form of assistance, and in many cases, play an important role in the success of collective initiatives. When initiating collective actions, internal forces often bring much needed financial support to cover high cost activities (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004; Mills et al., 2010). External forces encourage governments to participate in collective action to introduce legal guidelines, establish groups' rights and remove potential barriers that may hinder the success of collective action (Ayer, 1997). While the review noted both aspects, economic and non-financial aspects of collective action, other inherent aspects require in depth study, such as differences in collective actions structures, to include collaboratives, networks, and partnerships, each providing ways to improve group-based positions and actions as opposed to individual members working alone. In the case of the IHRC, collective action included rules on how to bring stakeholders together, to gather and utilize resources in the reconstruction environment in the post-earthquake Haiti (IHRC, 2011). In addition, the organization was responsible for identifying, coordinating, and encouraging the realization of projects that met the country's urgent priorities following the earthquake. A unique perspective was studied herein, mainly because the mandate of the IHRC did not cover implementation of the recovery projects, but instead, prioritized and enhanced coordination among partners and

implementers, utilizing the tools of collective action. Various models of collective action relationships such as collaboratives, networks, and partnerships that must be studied to understand how the IHRC engaged in collective actions to address the post-earthquake recovery issues.

Collaboratives

Organizations seeking to solve complex and challenging social issues are often compelled to build special relationships with various stakeholders across different sectors (Hoberecht et al., 2011). In a collaborative, the common objective cannot be achieved alone. Participating organizations are compelled to act in joint structures. Interdependence is increased among stakeholders (Ngamassi et al., 2004), while resources and decisions are shared jointly (Linden, 2002). The literature has underlined two main forms of collaboratives. Informal collaboratives do not require a contract on the relationship among organizations (Gazely, 2008) whereas in a formal collaborative, the contract dictates rules of the agreement (Guo & Acar, 2005). Additionally, informal contracts may be psychological in cases where agreements are not stated and the relationships are based on trust (Mandell & Keast, 2007; Shaw, 2003; Thomson & Perry, 2006). An informal collaborative may carry a lack of rules for exit, often the source of instability. In many instances, many collaboratives are built behind a funding relationship (Browne et al., 2004; Suarez & Hwang, 2008), a basis or incentive for participation. In other cases, exchanged or shared resources can be one main incentive for participation in collaborative action (Ngamassi et al., 2004; Sowa, 2009). Thus, organizations have a need to evaluate and balance both the costs and rewards of participating in a collaborative

effort. Emerson (1976) suggested that certain benefits stipulated on social exchange and economic theories underline the difference between actions based on funding requirement and those stemming from sentiment, habit or need.

Funding can bring stability in formal collaboratives (Louis, 2009; Suarez & Hwang, 2008). In many cases, the loss of funding can be detrimental to collaborative efforts, leading to premature end or early demise of collaborative efforts with great potential for effective community service (Alexander et al., 2003; Evans et al., 2007). When there is no cost for participation, organizations or important individuals may be compelled to leave the cooperative, thus leaving instability and risks behind (Seldon et al., 2006). It is best for organizations involved in collective actions to evaluate the nature of any interaction as well as the rules of any engagement.

There has been an increase in recent years of cooperative efforts to address social issues that are complex in nature (Ngamassi et al., 2004), showing mixed reports regarding their success and effectiveness (Sowa, 2009). While the key characteristics of a collaborative such as trust, understanding, shared mission and accountability are important to build a successful collaborative, they do not necessarily guarantee its success. Roger and Weber (2010), in their attempt to discover what makes a successful collaborative, analyzed four successful cooperatives and concluded that researchers do not know for sure what makes a cooperative successful.

Networks

Scholars have used the word network in the literature to mean various concepts such as groups of actors with different levels of cooperation, agendas, and approaches

with limited clarity (Isett et al., 2011). On a structural level, networks are made of a number of people or organizations with minimal economic resources and very little arrangement (Manring, 2007; Mandell, 2003). A lack of economic support weakens the integration of appropriate collaborative action in a network. Networks, in spite of their structural limitations, and similarly to cooperatives, have the ability to achieve complex endeavors that could not be achieved by a single organization alone (Provan & Milward, 2001).

Most recently, researchers have divided networks into three main groups: policy networks, collaborative networks, and governance networks (Isett et al., 2011). Policy networks are a group of organizations interested in obtaining public decisions on a shared specific policy issue. Collaborative networks are sets of organizations working together to provide a service, create goods or value in a way one single organization could not have done it alone. Governance networks focus on promoting public goods through policy making in a collaborative manner. When actors are decentralized, policy networks help decision makers in the planning and coordinating collaborative efforts (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Lubell et al., 2002; Meier & O'Toole, 2002). For the purpose of this study, analyzing the performance of the IHRC through its inter-organizational structure demanded a deeper understanding of the theory of collaborative networks and the accountability package that comes with it. If reconstruction was to take place successfully following the earthquake of January 2010 in Haiti, participation of organizations from various sectors through the IHRC was a necessity (IHRC). The IHRC used a collaborative network and a cooperative channel to provide a platform for reconstruction

planning and services while outlining institutional responsibilities through a joint-accountability mechanism.

While collaboration is based on the theory that promotes collective action among two or more organizations to achieve a common goal not achievable by a single organization alone (Wood & Gray, 1991), it often requires an economic component (Shaw, 2003; Suarez & Hwang, 2008), a catalyst and a financial incentive for ongoing participation in the collaborative project. In addition to funding, organizations in collaboration share other types of resources as expressed in a study by Emerson (1976) where membership is explained in light of the popular social exchange theory. Accordingly, Agranoff and McGuire (2003) found that collaborative networks become cross-sectors arrangements that solve problems that could not easily be solved by one single organization with limited means. Through collaborative networks, those organizations analyze problems and bring solutions regardless of constraints such as time and resources (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003).

Stakeholders in collaborative networks are diverse and members join in from across jurisdictions and sectors to tackle problems and collect resources from governments, NGOs and the private sector (Lee et al., 2012). This joint action process has the advantage of designing policies that will trigger positive outcomes and enhance the well-being of entire communities (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). Although beneficial to addressing complex issues and promoting sustainable development, collaborative networks, in order to sustain their operations and functionality, demand commitment from stakeholders to achieve effective collaboration outcomes (Hoberecht et al., 2011).

Today, there is a growing number of scholars and practitioners who find the conceptualizations and theories of collaborative networks useful in conducting studies on organizations working together towards a common goal (Isett et al., 2011). Despite this rapid growth in the field of collaborative networks, the field is still in its infancy stage, forcing researchers to seek answers to many fundamental questions and challenges as set forth in this study.

Partnerships

The literature has shown that the terms "partnership" and "collaboration" are used interchangeably and yet, there is no unanimous agreement or consensus among scholars on how and when to use them in theory and in practice (Huxham, 1996, p. 7). For example, the partnership framework has disclosed government entities represented in various collective actions in the forms of cross-sector within the government, government-nonprofit or government-private sector relationships (Babiak & Thibault, 2009). The type of arrangement dictates the relationship between the partners. The partners established a goal with the appropriate structure with interdependent resources (Gazely, 2010), often negatively impacting success and sustainability (Alexander et al., 2003). Paradoxally, the absence of agreement among partners and differences in vision and purpose put at risk the potential for collaborative advantage (Babiak & Thibault, 2009; Huxham, 1996; Koschmann et al., 2012). Sadly, some partners are involved in the partnership to focus on their own agendas, ignoring the common interest or objective, promoting, in many instances, collaborative inertia (Huxham, 1996) instead of achieving collaborative advantage.

Amid the chaos following the 2010 Haiti earthquake, inter-sectorial partnerships that include public and non-profit organizations require a lead organization network to facilitate and manage time and quality measures (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011). Assessment of partnerships of this category must utilize both time and quality as key assessment measures for outcomes and accountability. In a disaster environment, time is of uttermost importance, especially in the initial phases, and quality demands highly skilled personnel and expertise. There are two key theories particularly linked to this context. Salomon (1995) described the voluntary failure theory, an important theoretical framework to study partnerships between governmental organizations and nonprofit organizations. Voluntary failure theory explains mainly the challenges of generating enough resources, often not readily available in disaster areas, and the lack of organizational experience adapted to extreme problem solving. Additionally, the theory of third-party government that addresses effort of the private sector, bulging partnerships with nonprofit and public organizations to deliver joint services through sharing key resources is important for effective service delivery in post disaster environments (Palomo-Gonzalez & Rahm, 2008).

The literature revealed that in a disaster environment, leadership may take the form of a shared governance network, a lead organization structure and an administrative organization (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Provan & Kenis, 2008). In the case of an administrative organization, one single organization takes exclusive control to manage the recovery process. The shared governance network gives the same status to each partner while in the lead organization structure; the lead entity takes the lead while other

organizations remain supportive of the entire process (Kenis & Provan, 2009, Nolte & Boenigk, 2011). There are advantages and drawbacks attached to each structure. Both structures lead organization structure and the administrative organization are hierarchical in nature and allow for better coordination, and yet are less flexible and contain extra layers of bureaucratic levels. Outcomes are often linked to the nature of community, the choice of the network type, and the partners involved (Mandell & Keast, 2008). Better coordination of resources enhances strength of the partnership by avoiding duplication and promotes efficiency and successful service delivery.

Historical Perspectives of the Disaster

The primary role of nation-states is to provide an effective method for delivering political or public goods and services within specific borders (Rotberg, 2004). In state of Haiti, even before the earthquake, the public services system was shady or non-functional, with non-existent, deteriorating, or neglected infrastructures. Autocratic leadership, weak institutions and civil society, lawlessness and other economic factors such as a low GDP levels per capita, high infants' mortality rate, and other comparable deficiencies, have steadily compromised Haiti's capacity to respond to national emergencies (Rotberg, 2004, p. 19). The country was portrayed as an endemically weak state with a lack of infrastructures accompanied with overwhelming human needs even before the earthquake (Goodwin, 2010; Rotberg, 2004; Silva, 2011).

Haiti's history is full of internal conflicts, with its pre-independence violent history linked to slavery with its wars for independence from France in 1804, to its post-colonial era associated with neo-colonial influences, greed and corruption of the elites,

and governance flaws that permeate until today its political, economic and social fabrics (Goodwin, 2010). The environment in Haiti that preceded the earthquake was not exclusively the consequences of the country's own doing, but a combination of situations exacerbated by post-colonial realities, military intervention, embargoes, international aid, and a lack of support from a Eurocentric racial discourse (Silva, 2011). Despite fighting for its freedom against slavery, in 1838, France forced Haiti to pay a total of $22 billion equivalent to today's value, to remain free (Goodwin, 2010). The former French slave owners demanded that the French government recuperated their losses, with tabulations that contain line items for each salve lost to the independence of Haiti. This money was estimated to be 10 times Haiti's annual revenues and could have been used to build the country's infrastructure and promote education and development in the early years of its birth. It took the government of Haiti nearly a century to repay the money from shark loans taken from a French bank with outstanding fees and interests.

When the earthquake hit on January 12, 2010, Haiti underdeveloped infrastructures allowed the killings of over 300 hundred thousand people and left hundreds of thousands more homeless in Port-au-Prince and its suburbs. In the absence of capable national institutions, the United Nations, the NGOs, the international lending agencies, what was left of the Government and local organizations, had to come together to bring relief, recovery, and plan the reconstruction of Haiti.

Need for Interorganizational Collaboration

The overall context of Haiti, prior to the earthquake of January 12, 2010, favors the need for inter-organizational collaboration in the post-earthquake Haiti. Various

organizations involved in post disaster context at different levels, local, national and international, have used inter-organizational collaboration as a management tool to address common challenges efficiently and avoiding duplication of efforts (Maldonado et al., 2009). Maldonado et al. (2009) found that depending on the arrangement, inter-sectorial collaboration entails a multi- level type of governance to affect collaborative outcomes positively or negatively. While the main goals of a joint disaster management entity may be to reduce redundancies, improve information sharing, and accountability, other aspects must not be neglected, including resistance to change, coercion by authorities, influence by actors, and disengagement of stakeholders. One or more of those factors often influence governance across multiple organizations. Nevertheless, networks theorists have devoted very little attention on a single organization created from multiple sectors to address dynamic and complex issues in a post disaster environment, as was the case with the HIRC.

Good governance is essential in post disaster contexts to provide effective performance on the organizational level. Maldonado et al. (2009) defined governance as "rules or processes by which organizations or projects are operated, regulated, and controlled" (p. 10). Inter-organizational governance is necessary to provide guidelines and arrangements for stakeholder organizations to deal with issues of collaboration such as control, power, and conflicts in a collective manner. The choice of an appropriate structure can be critical to inter-organizational success (Ittner et al., 1999) while providing a level of competitive advantage for the collaboration (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002). As such, the effects of inter-organizational governance must be

examined in light of those issues as well as the types of inter-organizational relationships employed.

In the context of globalization, businesses, non-profit and governmental organizations are compelled to work together to create new ways to assist communities in disaster management. Kloth and Applegate (2004) developed a model for building collaboration across organizations that can take one of five types of relationships. First, the continuum begins with organizations that may choose to work independently, with each having its mission, goals and boundaries. Secondly, coordination may be used across organizations that provide similar services towards a common goal while keeping their boundaries and yet, maintaining their distinct interests. Third, organizations may choose to cooperate to establish a plan to increase capacity, efficiency and using common and measurable benchmarks. Fourth, inter-organizational collaboration requires that boundaries are opened across organizations to share information, and resources to achieve common goals. Finally, integration is when organizations agree to merge because their goals and interests common and often intertwined.

The fourth relationship, inter-organizational collaboration, the focus of this study, requires that organizations "share control and accountability for their future with others over whom they have no direct influence" (Kloth & Applegate, 2004, p. 4). Collaborative capacity requires that each agency stakeholder contribute to support information sharing, planning, leadership and access to various resources relevant to a successful collaboration (Hocevar et al., 2011). This process allows for endless possibilities for stakeholders to guide and sustain collaborative activities for more effective collective outcomes. A

consensus must be found on the goals established and strategies, structures, and mechanisms put in place to build collaborative capacity and improve collaboration.

In major disaster areas, there are many challenges that are linked to stakeholder organizations. Establish clear communication channels, efficient strategies to leverage shared resources (Cogler, 2007; Kettl, 2003). Actors use resources such as technology and equipment that are often incompatible and not readily available, increasing the difficulties of the collaboration (Prizzia, 2008). As more data is revealed on the size and the depth of the disaster, collaborative action difficulty increases proportionally (Palomo-Gonzalez & Rahm, 2008). Therefore, a holistic approach is needed, practically placing accountability on the collaboration as a whole rather than the sum of its member organizations, for better results of disaster response and recovery efforts. In the post-earthquake Haiti, the IHRC, as an administrative organization to coordinate the recovery effort with a mandate that includes both time and quality (IHRC, 2011). A period of 18 months is allocated to the IHRC to complete its transitional recovery role and hand over the transition to the Haitian Development Agency (HDA) for completion. Qualitatively, the IHRC's goal was to design a new model for aid and development that is transparent, accountable, in line with the best interests of the Haitian people in the recovery effort. IHRC had to create a platform that reconciled all efforts where planning included Haitians and partners from all parties, nonprofit donors, civil-society and private organizations, and the public sector to prioritize development and sustainability in the affected regions.

Framework for Accountability

Over the most recent decades, accountability has become a fundamental concept in the study organizational behavior and performance. Yet, there exists several approaches to accountability. Several methods are used to hold organizations accountable for their performance (Boston & Gill, 2011). In this section I defined and conceptualized accountability, analyzed the organizational framework required for shared collaboration, examined the dilemmas of accountability in post-disaster contexts, and explored the political implications of accountability.

Defining Accountability

Edwards (2011) found that accountability is defined based on the context in which it is utilized. Additionally, knowledge of who is involved, the mission, and some established system for evaluations and feedbacks is vital when conceptualizing accountability (Ammete et al., 2004). As such, the literature has classified the concept in several ways to include democratic, social, hierarchical, vertical, and horizontal accountability. Democratic accountability deals with elections and citizens choosing representatives in different branches of government. Social accountability requires that citizens hold governments liable for their actions through civic engagement (Edwards, 2011; Malena et al., 2004). Edwards (2011) made the distinction that officials are held accountable based on a hierarchical approach. Upwards and downwards approaches confirm a vertical accountability. Additionally, horizontal accountability takes place when two or more organizations or leaders are responsible for achieving expected results and outcomes. In many cases, they create partnerships, collaborative actions or networks,

establishing shared, mutual or joint accountability among the stakeholders through complex and contractual accountability relationships (Edwards, 2011; Langford & Roy, 2009). Both responsibilities and outcomes are shared based on specific arrangements of the parties, often government, non-profit and private organizations for service delivery. The citizenry is also responsible for social accountability and is liable to hold governments and organizations responsible for their actions (Malena et al., 2004).

Conceptualizing Shared or Joint Accountability

The literature is full of examples of using shared methods for accountability when organizations come together to address a major issue. In joint or shared initiatives, accountability implies that partners are accountable to one another as well as the governing or central body overseeing the collaborative arrangement (Lenihan et al., 2003). Shared accountability brings a complex arrangement that does not remove, decrease, nor blur accountability, but instead strengthens it through requirements to ensure that the common goal is successfully achieved. Social systems require sets of rules derived from shared expectations and agreements to guide the behavior of all parties involved (Ammete et al., 2004). While shared expectations are important for social systems, accountability is what makes them viable. Without a sound accountability process in place, organizations are likely to fail. There was a need for a better understanding of accountability and its role in building effective collective action. Individual stakeholders in the IHRC needed to be accountable for their actions to keep social order, accomplished shared goals, and keeping behaviors in line with expectations.

In the case of the IHRC, shared expectations of the joint organizational structure required that partner organizations put in place procedures for shared accountability.

Dilemmas of Accountability in Post-Disaster Contexts

Formulating accountability policies to address collective action in disaster recovery contexts raises certain dilemmas for organizations involved (Van Zyl, 1999). In general, countries emerging out of major destructions like what took place in the aftermath of the massive earthquake of January 12, 2010 in Haiti, face both, the public demand for accountability and the dilemmas to introduce the right methods for accountability. In post-disaster areas, organizations do not like to make decisions regarding these issues in a vacuum, but instead based on the dictates of the cultural, political, and socioeconomic contexts and good governance (Labadie, 2008).

Accountability requires that organizations and their leaders are being called and held to account when "undertaking their functions or duties" (Mulgan, 2003, p. 15). The literature has presented accountability in various contested forms. While Mulgan (2003) defined the concept in a narrow view, Langlord and Roy (2009) expressed a broad view of accountability. When broadly looked at, accountability is a context dependent concept, leading researchers to investigate accountability in various ways, in relation to the contextual framework. Nevertheless, the notion of accountability and modern social accounting principles use trust as a central element to improve both organizational reputation and management (Swift, 2002). Sound accountability is a strategic way for organizations to build community trust and leverage stakeholder commitment.

Fraud and poor performance can be detrimental to an organizational setting. In a disaster recovery area, organizations, in order to be successful must pay attention to accountability for effective recovery and reconstruction. Labadie (2008) found that there are complex social justice and equity issues in post disaster areas regarding good governance. Accordingly, there are benefits and drawbacks associated with integrating adaptive auditing practices that can influence recovery and reconstruction activities in many ways. Craig (2004) explored the need to build a structure to improve the outcomes of collaborative efforts through better mandates. Such mandates must include the roles of each stakeholder, identification and utilization of available resources lined up with a proper shared accountability mechanism. Joint accountability platforms capable of sustaining specific outcome indicators on a regular basis are suggested for effective collaborative action. Coping with different stakeholders to address issues with various mandates, planning strategies and funding cycles is a source of major policy issues in collaborative networks (Craig 2004; Sullivan 2003). In the context of Haiti, the socio-economic and political contexts hampered planning and service delivery as major government buildings, including the national palace, were destroyed and local resources became scarce. In addition, main roads and airport were also destroyed, making it difficult for outside resources to enter recovery areas, compounding the complexity of accountability in the recovery efforts.

Shared Political Accountability

In post disaster environment, political accountability refers to the level of responsibility held by a political body with full knowledge of its impact on future election

outcomes or approval in the polls (Depoorter, 2006). When accountability is shared, different actors compete to provide relief, recovery or reconstruction services, potentially affecting the political standings of other actors. This assertion is based on the observation that during Hurricane Katrina in 2005, political actors at various levels of the US government took into considerations both public interests and impact of their actions on the electoral process (Depoorter, 2006; Posner, 2003). In post disaster areas, shared accountability can cause finger-pointing among political actors, create confusion in the public, and potentially reduce the level of overall accountability. Politicians are viewed as sellers of relief and reconstruction policies while voters are policy consumers in a disaster management supply and demand chain. In the case of the IHRC, shared accountability could not be measured simply in reference to competing national political actors involved in the reconstruction effort. Instead, the IHRC was established as a unique organization, made of Haitian and international stakeholders, with a mandate to plan and facilitate the reconstruction in the devastated areas in the aftermath of the earthquake. Shared accountability in this context was not subscribed among separate organizational entities, but within the IHRC organizational structures, with guidelines that specify role of each member organization that played a role in the collaboration.

Review of Conceptual Framework and Methods

This section investigates the literature and the conceptual framework underpinning the research study to highlight areas of focus. Additionally, it examines and analyses the theoretical and organizing frameworks employed with the methods used in conjunction with the assumptions that govern the study.

The study was grounded in the conceptual framework of joint accountability of the IHRC using SCT to answer the research questions in a post-disaster context of Haiti (Hollister, 2002). In addition to norms, values, and cultural factors, social capital requires considerations such as obligations, reciprocity, trust, and expectations from all parties involved in the collective action (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). Thus, this conceptual framework provides a tool to analyze the dynamics of collective action within the IHRC, describe the institutional arrangements for effective resource management and the implementation of collective strategies to plan and facilitate the recovery and reconstruction tasks in the post-earthquake Haiti.

Several case studies conducted in different socio-economic and cultural contexts and backgrounds have demonstrated that social capital is one of the key drivers to enhance successful disaster recovery and collective actions (Kapucu, 2006; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). Post-earthquake contexts studies of Kobe in Japan and Gujarat in India showed that communities that used social capital in assigning leadership roles in planning the recovery efforts were relatively more successful. Data collected and analyzed in those studies demonstrated that communities with the right leadership successfully used social capital in post-disaster recovery efforts and resulted in higher rates of both satisfaction and recovery speed. Collective action in this context enhances the work of competent community leaders involved in the planning, managing and execution of post-disaster initiatives (Davidson, 2006; Kapucu, 2006; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). Additionally, this approach facilitates communication in the collective decision-making process towards more effective actions. Communities that exhibit characteristics of a weak community do

not show adequate capacity to cope with the demands of disaster recovery. Social capital in collective action requires community leadership from various organizations such as NGOs, voluntary and religious organizations, voters associations, groups participating in sports and other recreational activities. The participation of a large body of the citizenry in public affairs is a key factor to measure social capital and its impact on successful collective action (Mayunga, 2007). Well-functioning communities can be beneficial to disaster response as they offer the potential to create meaningful partnerships with NGOs and government agencies.

Review of Methods

This study qualitative case study required a variety of research methods and designs. In general research methods reveal a scholarly inquiry derived from a theoretical and philosophical framework with processes and procedures that ground the study (Creswell, 2009). Even when processes are similar, research methods vary by virtue of theoretical assumptions and strategies of inquiry that underpin them. Such assumptions can be of various types. Ontological assumptions deal with the nature of reality or reality itself while epistemological assumptions seek for existing relationship or connection between myself and the inquiry. Axiological and rhetorical assumptions deal with the values and language of the study respectively. Finally, methodological assumptions are process and procedures that drive the inquiry. The quantitative method is known to be positivist, viewing reality based on observation, testing existing theories (Goulding, 2002). Qualitative research is humanistic in nature and favors an interpretative procedure.

Proponents of the quantitative research method claim that it is superior to the qualitative approach and vice versa. Goulding (2002) attributed the divide between the two camps to misconceptions on their origin, the framework that drives each, and maintain that each has strength and weaknesses. Nevertheless, each method has played its role in generating knowledge either separately or combined (Goulding, 2002; Trochim, 2001). The topic and questions under study are mainly guided by the nature of the topic under study and the questions that need to be answered (Creswell, 2009). Because this research study was exploratory in nature, the qualitative framework was the method of choice, as no variables were required to test the phenomenon of study. Instead, as a qualitative researcher I sought to describe, clarify and explain the human phenomenon under study (Polkinghorne, 2005). In this study, a case was examined and studied intensively in a specific context. Creswell (2009) advised the use of a case study to explore a case, and collect data from various sources, in a specific context. This case study used interview data to gather evidence on the IHRC and its work in the post-earthquake Haiti. A special lens was projected on the inter-organizational collaboration and shared accountability dynamics of the IHRC.

Summary

This analysis of literature demonstrated a comprehensive overview of main issues related to interorganizational collaboration and shared accountability of the IHRC. Additionally, I showed that in a post-disaster context, collaborative action and trust are required to build effective leadership for successful recovery efforts. Contextual socioeconomic, political, and cultural dynamics are important in terms of building

appropriate collaboration. Accountability mechanisms are dependent on recovery effort needs. Joint accountability has emerged as an important tool when key stakeholders work collaboratively during recovery efforts. Absent from the literature was the role of social capital in terms of creating unique organizations such as the IHRC. This research was intended to study this phenomenon, using a case study analysis of the IHRC in terms of its response to the January 12, 2010 disaster in Haiti. I used the qualitative research design and the SCT to analyze the collaborative nature of the IHRC. Additionally, I sought to use knowledge of those who lived through these experiences in order to understand this human phenomenon.

I sought to explore group relationships via social capital. I identified basic themes derived from studies conducted in different socioeconomic and cultural contexts. This approach demonstrated how social capital can be a key driver to enhance collective actions for successful disaster recovery initiatives. Overall, there was a consensus that social capital can play an important role in post recovery contexts. There was a need to study how social capital influenced the IHRC through shared accountability mechanisms to assist communities, promote harmony, and address disaster recovery issues.

The literature review included issues related to the use of social capital and shared accountability in disaster recovery contexts. This knowledge can be used for researchers conducting future studies regarding collective actions in post disaster areas. In Chapter 3, I discuss the research design, methodologies for data collection, management, and analysis.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

In this chapter, I address the research design and propose a systematic method of investigation for this study. I explain the methodology, my role as the researcher, data collection strategies, and detailed procedures for data analysis. Additionally, I explain the research sample and population, methods for data collection, management, as well as ethical considerations.

This study involved providing a better understanding of shared accountability mechanisms of the IHRC to address recovery needs and plan the reconstruction of Haiti in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake on January 12, 2010. Research questions were used to establish the scope and the breadth of the study:

RQ1: How did Haiti coordinate post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction tasks through the joint accountability mechanism of the IHRC?

RQ2: What kind of relationships existed between community leaders, the Haitian government, and international partners working with the IHRC?

RQ3: What was the role of the IHRC in outcomes of recovery collaboration efforts?

The study led to a better understanding of the earthquake in Haiti and how the IHRC addressed reconstruction needs through a joint accountability mechanism. Various partners concurrently shared responsibilities via the IHRC, identifying strategies, bringing together resources, and leading efforts for reconstruction. I sought to elucidate some important aspects of the work of the IHRC.

Additionally, the public in Haiti had its own perceptions regarding to what extent the IHRC was able to carry out its mandate and effectively lead reconstruction endeavors. This chapter includes an explanation of the comprehensive qualitative research design approach as well as the underlying methodology that grounded the study. This allowed me to address the IHRC and its operations via extensive data collection, descriptions, and in-depth analysis of findings that were relevant to post-earthquake reconstruction efforts in Haiti.

Research Design

In this section, I explain the rationale for the research design selected for this study. I justify the research methodology, address methods of inquiry, describe sample and population selection, and explicate procedures that were employed to collect, manage, and analyze data. This chapter includes information about ethical considerations and the role of the researcher, attendant biases, and ways to protect participants.

Research Method of Inquiry

I adopted an exploratory case study approach using the qualitative research design to understand the work of the IHRC in the post-earthquake context of Haiti. Creswell (2009) described qualitative research as a means for exploring and understanding meanings individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. The research involved emerging questions and procedures, data collected in participant settings, data analyses that involve inductively building from particulars to general themes, and interpretations of meanings of data.

Traditionally, qualitative research is employed in studies where the topic requires exploration because existing theories cannot fully explain the phenomenon, variables cannot be clearly and distinctly identified, or a detailed analysis is needed (Creswell, 2009; Singleton & Straight, 2005; Trochim, 2001). The researcher studies field notes, conversations, photographs, interviews, and records in their natural settings using an interpretative and naturalistic approach, making sense of terms and interpreting events for meanings (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). During a qualitative research inquiry, the researcher collects and interprets data and finds associated meanings. Participants in the study are encouraged and empowered to share their stories, for a better appreciation and understanding of the problem without restrictions. Bogdan and Biklen (2007) defined a qualitative study as a type of inquiry that involves collecting and describing data in natural settings and applying an inductive approach to understand and analyze situations.

In this study, the qualitative research method guided this inquiry. While the literature demonstrated numerous examples of shared accountability in disaster areas involving national organizations, in the case of the IHRC, the contextual or collective mechanism was different mainly because national and international stakeholders came together and create this unique entity to exclusively plan and coordinate the reconstruction efforts (IHRC, 2011). The case study method of inquiry was exploratory in nature and different from an explanatory research method.

Justification of Methodology

Qualitative research methodologies include ethnography, grounded theory, case studies, phenomenology, and narrative research (Creswell, 2007, 2009; Denzin &

Lincoln, 2012). Several factors warranted use of a case study methodology in this study. Creswell (2009) defined a case study as a strategy of inquiry that allows the researcher explores in depth a program, event, activity, process, or one or more individuals. I used a case study design approach to investigate the dynamics of the IHRC and its joint accountability mechanisms, using the SCT as the theoretical framework.

In ethnographic research the researcher targets an intact cultural group in a natural setting and collects data over an extended length of time, substantially through observations and interviews (Creswell, 2009). The researcher describes and interprets cultural behaviors with no interest in investigating the culture. I did not seek to study the culture of any group of individuals.

The grounded theory research method involves extracting a theory based on findings (Creswell, 2009). The researcher compares data with emerging categories, analyzing similarities and differences via theoretical sampling strategies. I did not seek to generate a theory, but instead build a detailed account of the phenomenon in the real world setting based on a planned investigation.

Phenomenological research involves identifying the essence of human experience regarding a specific phenomenon through descriptions of participants and a deeper understand of lived experiences (Creswell, 2009). Phenomenology develops a method and a philosophy to develop patterns of meanings from the research participants over a prolonged engagement period. I assumed that using this approach in the study of the IHRC was likely to omit relevant and important information. For example, information regarding the laws that created the IHRC and other records that provided a complete

account of the phenomenon was fundamental for this inquiry. Phenomenological research did not fit the aim of this study.

In a narrative study, the researcher must study the lives of individuals and asks them to provide stories about their lives (Creswell, 2009). Individuals disclose their stories and at the same time, stories about them are revealed, analyzed and understood (Pinnegar & Daynes, 2006). The researcher collects, analyzes and reports data in a chronological way with a logical narrative and a framework that make sense. A narrative research approach of the IHRC was not necessary as the inquiry is not simply about the lives of the individuals, but instead sought to discover the depth of the initiatives and mechanisms put in place to facilitate an effective reconstruction endeavor.

To conduct this study, I had a choice between survey questionnaires or interviews as methods for data collection. Each had both advantages and inconveniences, depending on the nature of the inquiry and the participants that are engaged in the study. Singleton and Traits (2005) found that survey questionnaires are cost effective and better suited against researchers' bias. Consequently, because of the nature of this project, I avoided the use of survey questionnaires. Instead, I used interview questions to collect data in this research inquiry. As stated, a network of various local actors from the civil society, the government, and representatives from the international community, formed a unique organization, the IHRC. The mission of the Commission was to facilitate the recovery effort through shared accountability management, was an emerging phenomenon. There was a need to learn directly from the experiences and viewpoints of participants, asking

follow up questions when further clarification was needed (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1987).

I planned and asked the interview questions in advanced in the same order to all participants, to determine if the partner organizations worked harmoniously to effectively carry out the mission of the IHRC. Daymon and Holloway (2011) warned the researcher regarding the restrictions that can prevent exploring different meanings of the object of the investigation. A survey questionnaire would not lend itself to such flexibility. Additionally, it is not customary in the Haitian society for researchers to use survey questionnaires to collect data from informants in a research study, as they are often costly and time-consuming (Kolbe & Muggah, 2010). Furthermore, most research studies that used survey questionnaires collect statistical data for quantitative analysis. Qualitative research seldom makes use of survey questionnaires. On the contrary, Haitians are familiar with interviews and marketing researchers use them to study consumer preferences, shopping and voting patterns (Stone, 2010).

A case study within the qualitative tradition is the most appealing and suitable methodology for this research inquiry. A case study was preferred to, ethnography, grounded theory, phenomenology and narrative as its underlying characteristics provided a better modus operandi to this study as stipulated. The study of IHRC in the post-earthquake Haitian contexts fell within the traditions of a qualitative research case study. Furthermore, because the research questions start with how, why, and what, a case study design appeared to be more appropriate to answer them.

Sample and Population

This section explains sampling procedures, size, and strategies employed for the selection of participants and access to inquiry.

Sampling Procedures

The earthquake of January 12, 2010 devastated most of Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, and its suburbs. Residents of this region from 2010-2013 are identified as potential candidates for the study. In addition, the target population consisted of members of the international community, NGOs, and other foreign partners that played a role in the IHRC and its effort to plan the reconstruction. Sampling is referred to the method use to select participants who are relevant to an inquiry (Polkinghorne, 2005), and "have experienced or are experiencing the phenomenon that is being explored" (Rudestam & Newton, 2007, p. 106). Using sampling, in the case study tradition, grants to the researcher the leeway to capture the full complexity of the participant's experience. Instead of using generalization, I used the findings to extract a better understanding of the phenomenon under study.

The question of sampling in this study pertains to method of data collection and analysis and requires attention. Stake (1994) distinguished two approaches to case study methodology: the intrinsic casework where the case is selected a priori to the study and the instrumental or collective casework, which forces the researcher to select one or more cases among other many alternatives for the study. The intrinsic approach fit with the pre-selected case study of joint accountability mechanism and inter-organizational collaboration in post-earthquake Haiti through the IHRC. Miles and Huberman (2009) suggested some criteria that are worth investigating for a better planning of sampling or

case selection in a qualitative inquiry. Consequently, the sampling strategy was constructed from the conceptual framework of social capital in a post-disaster context within the post-earthquake environment in Haiti.

In this case study, once the reference population was identified, three main sampling strategies were of interest: criterion sampling, purposeful sampling and snowballing sampling (Patton, 2002; Polkinghorne, 2005). Whereas criterion sampling increases the chance for the researcher to select information-rich cases and key informants to illuminate unresolved issues under inquiry, purposeful sampling maximizes variance that may be detected among selected cases or participants. In utilizing criterion sampling, I focused on the selection of those participants who best match certain requirements of the qualitative research inquiry. For example, I selected those organizations and individuals more suited to provide valuable information of the work of the IHRC for qualitative data collection and analysis. Key informants were individuals that played a key role in the creation and operations of the IHRC.

Purposive sampling allows the researcher to stratify the sampling from the reference population in ways that produce samples that are small, sequential, and facilitate analytic generalizations linked to the conceptual framework. Purposive, non-probability or purposeful sampling, suggests that the researcher chooses participants who facilitate understanding of the phenomenon (Rudestam & Newton, 2007). Furthermore, the researcher is open to assess alternative sampling strategies as long as they are relevant to the conceptual framework and the research questions, apt to generate rich information on the phenomenon of study, and likely to improve generalizability of findings (Miles &

Huberman, 2009). The results of this qualitative study can provide understanding of the phenomenon of interest in the study, but not the description of how individuals and groups experienced it (Creswell, 2009; Singleton & Straits, 2005; Trochim, 2001). I purposely selected participants that are experienced and relevant to the research study.

The research created a complete list of informants, potential participants in the study. The study made use of snowballing strategy, a technique that allowed the researcher to discover hidden key informants and to develop research samples from acquaintances of those key informants (Polkinghorne, 2005). Affiliated links provided other participants from existing ones that could not otherwise be accessible. The snowball samples provided unbiased estimates. I expected establishing a sampling frame for the IHRC's experiences in Haiti to be a difficult task, as key informant individuals will not be recognized entirely from the start. Therefore, participants well connected, with many important links with the IHRC officials, were more likely be recruited into the initial sample. Creswell (2007) advised the researcher to use any of the aforementioned sampling approaches in a qualitative case study. This study used more than one strategy to recruit responders, including criterion, purposive, and snowballing samplings or theory-based sampling to allow the collection of knowledge from experts, so that their experiences can be assembled to establish a conceptual framework model on collaborative network and shared accountability though the IHRC.

Based on the selected sampling methods, I selected participants or key informants that could provide useful information for the study. Key informants comprised a number of national officials, community leaders, and international experts who were responsible

to design policies and planning for the IHRC. I contacted them by telephone, email, social media networks in addition to references from friends and acquaintances. Obtaining informants contact information was not a difficult task because I am well-known in the Haitian community. Informants' viewpoints and experiences were vital to advance the discussion about the IHRC. In addition, the study included testimony from the officials of the IHRC, and the way they carried out their mission. I questioned civil society stakeholders and members of the private sector to gather relevant insights for a more thorough understanding of the experiences of the IHRC. The civil society stakeholders are important members of the affected communities who facilitated the creation and operation of the IHRC. They include civil rights organizations, labor and trade organizers, environmentalists, or community organizers. I selected these stakeholders because of their knowledge of the community and their direct or indirect participation in facilitating or opposing the IHRC experience. Several categories of informants provided a variety of experiences for a more holistic picture of the phenomenon and facilitated validation and collaboration of qualitative case study research findings (Creswell, 2007).

Sample Size

Josselson and Lieblich (2003) proposed saturation as an important indicator for the researcher to stop data collection. That is when findings start to become repetitive or redundant. At this stage, saturation becomes the key determinant of the sample size. However, saturation is never complete since each new informant may a have something unique to add to the results (Rudestam & Newton, 2007). To the contrary, in many

instances, it is the researcher that becomes saturated. Yet, the more details, the better, as it is important to collect as much data as possible to capture the breadth and depth of the phenomenon without the possibility of becoming overwhelmed . In general, more detailed interviews and transcripts require a lesser number of participants. This study proposed a sample size in the range of 30-35 interviews to guide the inquiry. I admitted to the difficulty to anticipate with accuracy a sample size because of the many challenges and restrictions mentioned. Nevertheless, I estimated this sample size with respect to the research questions and the suggestion of Rudestam and Newton (2007) who advised a range of 5-30 participants in the contexts of this research inquiry. This sample size includes the views of several different levels of experiences, to favor collection of results that were diverse and inclusive. While making sure that most, if not all, perceptions are uncovered, I tried to avoid too large data sample that can become either repetitive or superfluous (Mason, 2010). I collected, examined, and familiarized himself with the data to find any new element that will add to the overall story. In this case, saturation was not a serious concern in that new element of new data does not become counter-productive.

Access to Participants

The researcher anticipated that gaining access to participants were crucial in the data collection process. In order to collect data from the experiences of the informants and gain access to archival papers and field observation, I created rapport with the informants. Informants were identified from leaders who had been actively engaged with the IHRC in planning and carrying out its mandate. Additionally, stakeholders from member organizations and public officials who had some experience with the IHRC were

selected as informants. I used all available means such as telephone calls, emails, personal contacts, social media networks, and letters to reach potential participants and collect relevant data. To avoid biases, I used both internal and external validity. For external validity, I prioritized rich, in-depth, and detailed descriptions of the collected data in favor of transferability and reliability. External assessment was important in allowing the findings to transferrable elsewhere. While I was not responsible for transfer of findings, I provided information to facilitate external assessment when needed. Using purposeful sampling favors the use information-rich cases, allowing the researcher to decide which purpose the informant is to serve in the study.

I built trust and stress on the importance of the inquiry, and invite participants to cooperate. I explained to the participants how gratifying or rewarding collaboration may turn out to be for the entire community. I disclosed the aim of the study to key informants and clearly explained the reason for their participation to them. I assured anonymity and confidentiality of participants throughout the process and thereafter. Additional benefits of participation were disclosed as well. Key informants who showed interested used this opportunity to participate and use their knowledge and experience to publish on the IHRC and its effort in the reconstruction contexts. Their experiences contributed to the future by allowing decision makers to learn from past mistakes and compel them to put in place contingency plans for post-earthquake reconstruction management. For participants who may be survivors of the earthquake, possible emotional risk was mitigated in reminiscence of extreme destructions that may still be fresh in their mind. I accommodated the research participants, allowing them to withdraw from the study freely

at any time with no retribution. I made sure that participants completed the consent forms prior to each interview (Creswell, 2007; Creswell, 2009; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). With these measures in place, I built trust with each participant and professionally gain access and collect relevant data results.

Data Collection and Instruments

Interviews

Interviews are considered as one of the primary means for data collection in phenomenological studies (Creswell, 2007; Polkinghorne, 2005; Seidman, 2006). The survey interviews I conducted, provided data extracted from the experiences of the participants. Through interviews, I collected in depth experiential data from key informants. I collected findings related to the formation, operations, management, and the role of the IHRC in the aftermath of the Haitian earthquake recovery process. I applied a cross-sectional strategy, to conduct interviews with respondents within a narrow interval of time. I did not use a variety of interviews strategies. I conducted only individual interviews and no focus group interviews. I used in person interviews as well as telephone, email or social media technologies such as Skype or WhatsApp for flexibility and convenience. Intensive interviewing techniques allowed me to seek detailed information regarding the phenomenon under study, to control the sequence of questions, to probe for details and to clarify misunderstandings and ambiguity (Singleton & Straits, 2005). Because this research inquiry on the IHRC was a new phenomenon, information collected required clarity and accuracy to be useful. Body language observation and contextualization were very important for the analysis stage (Hall & Rist, 1999) when the

interviewee was present. This observation was not however possible in the emailed interviews as the target participants could not be viewed and observed. I was mindful of the tone of voice and cultural traits during the interviews. The facts that I am of Haitian origin, speak the participants' languages, and is familiar with the Haitian culture expedited the interview process.

I found ways to build trust and create rapport with prospective participants to emphasize the value of the study and underline ways in which the interview process may benefit them. I used personal contacts, telephone calls, email, social media networks, and letters as needed to present himself as student and learner of the rebuilding and reconstruction process to build better rapport. I explained the importance of the study to participants and the reason why I selected them to participate in the study. I ensured anonymity of the participants and confidentiality during the study and thereafter and that knowledge or experience of the participants regarding the IHRC provided crucial information about the reconstruction process. Their views and opinions contributed to a better understanding of the creation and management of the IHRC. I had a franc discussion with prospective participants to explain any possible risk of participation, including the possibility of bringing back sad memories of the earthquake. I informed participants of the right to stop the interview at any point or withdraw from the inquiry at any time without consequence. These approaches allowed direct consent with informants and secure their commitment prior to conducting interviews. These policies helped to establish good rapport and build trust between the inquirer and informants to facilitate data access.

Documents

Once data become available, I identified and grouped primary and secondary sources, analyzing socioeconomic and political aspects of the IHRC during the period of 2010 through 2013. The accountability mechanism in place to manage and facilitate the reconstruction effort in the post-earthquake Haiti is an event of the past, requiring available data from credible sources, with the knowledge that time may have diminished the memory of the witnesses and survivors. I targeted main sources of available data, including public or private documents, information from mass media, and archival data. In this study, I selected the sources for data collection from the government, private institutions, NGOs, and the IHRC. I collected, reviewed, and analyzed the records to discover the rationale for the use of the IHRC and its shared accountability mechanism as a tool to facilitate the reconstruction of Haiti in the aftermath of the January 12, 2010 earthquake. The documents provided an overall better understanding of the phenomenon.

Observation Field Notes

Field notes are necessary to collect summaries of daily observations and keep them in a journal. Creswell (2009) found that field notes are credible sources of data collected during researcher's visit. When all the information observed cannot be collected during field visits, the researcher is advised to wait and record observation soon after leaving the settings, to minimize recall issues (Singleton & Strait, 2005). Field notes are inexact notes that represent various "levels of textualization set off by experience of the researcher" (Maanen, 1988, p. 223). For example, Emerson et al. (1995) noticed that in

the past, little attention was paid to field notes in qualitative research. This study used interviews data guided by the research questions. I did not use field notes in this study.

Methods of Data Analysis

Data Management, Analysis, and Report

Following data collection using the data sources underlined in the previous section, I used a comprehensive data management and analysis strategies as deemed necessary. In a case study, Creswell (2009) advised the researcher to use step-by-step data management procedures to read, describe, classify, interpret and represent data. Data analysis begins with the process of learning from the data instead of using preconceived notions regarding the subject matter (Roper & Shapira, 2000). Initially, I focused on data management, organized and sorted interview data previously collected. I created folders and files and systematically develop a system of codes, using letters, symbols, and numbers to represent, locate, retrieve and analyze data. Reading and memoing is a technique that involves taking notes on the margin while reading, giving additional meaning, reflective of the findings. This case study produced a sizable quantity of data that is represented by words and ideas, rather than numbers and statistics. In spite of possible overloading, I took the time to read over and over all the collected interviews documents and notes in search for new, hidden, or additional meaning, prior to developing codes. Coding was divided into two comprehensive cycles based. In the initial cycle, I used a holistic approach to decipher and organize larger size data. In the secondary coding cycle, I used a more structural approach, with labels and indexes to break down and categorize the data, using themes or constructs for meaning. Finally, I

regrouped codes with similar ideas, compare and contrast emerging categories of codes to develop new categories, and provide a deeper understanding of the role of the IHRC in the post-earthquake reconstruction context. I used NVivo 12, a powerful qualitative data analysis computer program to manage coding, data analysis, and reporting aspects of this inquiry.

I used NVivo 12 in the coding phase of the qualitative inquiry. It helped to classify, sort, and arrange the qualitative findings of this study such as notes, audio recordings, and software documents such as Microsoft Word. I examined relationship between data, to discover themes, visualize data through drawings and charts. I reviewed each interviews transcript and initially obtained a context for the content of each meeting, giving each individual a unique identifier to keep the names confidential. I identified and noted trends in all interviews.

The data analysis protocol comprised several steps, including pre-coding, coding, grouping codes into categories, and finally examining relationships among all those categories. I initiated the pre-coding step at the same time with data collection, using the interview transcripts. I read and reviewed all the transcripts in order to identify and underline key points such as words and phrases linked to research questions. I highlighted red flags such as never and always, and I asked questions such as who, what, when, why and how to write questions and memos that were used during data analysis. Codes are concepts or meaning derived from the transcripts (Creswell, 2009). When a participant answers a question regarding a particular issue, I assigned a code to the text.

I used manual coding at first and then, run NVivo 12 software to create the same code name in entire transcripts. For example, in a case where an interviewee talked about recovery funds that spent in his community, I created a code called "funds allocation." If the transcript does not have a lot of information pertaining to the code, I did not consider that code. If other interviewees talk about funds allocation, I integrated the code. At that point, "funds allocation" will become a collection of what those interviewees answered regarding allocation of funds in the recovery process. This technique allowed me to explore and analyze the answers by reviewing the code. NVivo 12 was very useful in this process, using word frequency query. I generated reports using the most frequently used words or phrases employed in the code. I reiterated this process until no new findings was extracted from the transcripts, reaching a saturation phase (Creswell, 2009; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). Matching and comparing the codes facilitated grouping into categories and make them more suitable for analysis. Various categories and subcategories of codes emerged and compared with identified key factors in a consistent manner. At this point, I was able to explore various relationships that emerged from connections between categories.

Ethical Concerns

Quality of the Report

There are many ethical challenges that are pertinent to qualitative research studies. In order to properly address them, I proceeded with an in-depth analysis of the case study, supported by quotes from participants and interpreted data within the framework of the IHRC and its mandate. As multiple audiences were selected, I kept

them in mind during the write-up procedures, making sure that tall details are heard, understood and recorded. Creswell (2009) acknowledged that there are several formats to report a case study research inquiry. The aim of the study must serve as a guide in deciding which structure best fit the report. Finally, I was able to balance the narrative of the study based on the size of data collection, and the extent of data analysis and interpretation.

Serious ethical issues were raised in the conversation of qualitative researchers over evidence-based research and underlying standards necessary to guide researchers when conducting and evaluating qualitative research studies (St. Pierre, 2006). Fundamentally, the value of qualitative work is linked to the politics and ethics of evidence. Lather (2006) acknowledged that ethical concerns linked to the evidence-based model cannot be ignored if matters of equity and social justice are to be addressed. Denzin and Lincoln (2011) provided a checklist of four criteria to evaluate and validate qualitative findings: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.

Credibility raises the issue of trust in the research inquiry. If the qualitative research findings can be trusted, then they are valid, reliable, confirmable, and can be generalized. Generalizations allows the findings to be replicated and can be used to further test the evidence and enhance existing theories (Towne, Wise & Winters, 2005). If those findings are found not credible, the other three criteria cannot be justified. At the heart of the issue is the idea that the inquirer can influence evidence findings and bring a lack of trust in the inquiry process. Threats to credibility such as trust can be diminished if the researchers adopt transparency, describe the established process for interpreting

each claim, and provide whenever necessary, alternative explanations for various interpretations (Anfara et al., 2002; Goulding, 2002). This approach can be used as a warrant for the research findings, clearly defining sampling frame, population, observations and contexts. These important indicators are used to determine credibility or internal validity, thus facilitating generalizations, dependability, and transferability or external validity (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Transferability requires that the research inquiry provide enough information to facilitate external assessment as to the possibility of transferring findings elsewhere. Dependability answers the question as to how reliable are the research findings and whether or not changes in contexts and domains did not affect such findings. Confirmability is directed to objectivity, making sure that procedures are documented in order to assess and confirm all findings (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Trochim, 2001).

There is no consensus on one acceptable method to validate qualitative research data. Nevertheless, qualitative findings can be authenticated (Fielding, 2004). McReynolds et al. (2001) maintained that while the terms validity and reliability are commonly used in the quantitative tradition, qualitative researchers prefer the terms trustworthiness and authenticity when validating qualitative research findings. In this study, I required credibility to ensure that the findings are in consonance with informants' perspectives and beliefs based on experience. Detailed characteristics favored transferability of the details of the IHRC experience and allow possibilities for external assessment of the transferred findings. While I did not make the decision, I provided necessary information to facilitate assessment if needed. I used the process of

conformability, requiring the availability of procedures of data collection to better confirm research findings (Trochim, 2001).

To ensure validity, a system for verification and quality of findings was established (Creswell, 2009) that includes an ongoing search for data convergence, multiple sources of the same data, member checking and peer review to verify findings. This approach enabled me to collaborate interpretations and assertions of findings from different sources or informants. I employed mathematical diagrams to show participants' initial or preliminary findings and shared this data with key informants to verify mutual experiences. Professionals in the field who experienced the IHRC were solicited for peer review, to collect comments and feedback for the study. These measures improved the overall quality standard and ensured validation of the study (Creswell, 2009; McReynolds et al., 2001; Patton, 2002).

Researcher's Role

In qualitative research inquiries, Maxwell (2005) identified the researcher as the primary research instrument. I conducted this research inquiry from beginning to the end, and carried out various stages of the study including, data collection, data management and analysis, data interpretation, and report writing. I traveled to Port-Au-Prince, the capital city of Haiti to conduct some interviews, searched for relevant documents, and visited several sites. I personally recruited all informants, processed consent permission forms prior to conducting all interviews and document collection. I made use of emails, telephones, social media technology, Internet messages, and in some cases initiated personal contacts to reach participants and collect data. Tape recorder, notes and memos

were helpful during personal interviews to help collect data for analysis and reporting. The fact that I am very familiar with the Haitian culture and fluent in French and Haitian Creole facilitated communication and improved the data collection process. My educational background and culture facilitated access to the participants and relevant sites of this study in Haiti.

To begin conducting the study, I received approval from the Institutional Review Board. Data collection and analysis began immediately thereafter, until the final report was ready.

Researcher Bias

As the main instrument in all stages of the inquiry, I was in close proximity with the data, increasing possibilities for bias. Maxwell (2005) warned against main validity threats such as researcher's bias and reactivity. I took several measures to deal with subjectivity issues. Because of potential for bias, I applied a high level of objectivity through all stages of the inquiry process. Goulding advised peer review and participant checking to increase credibility. I integrated participants' reviews of preliminary data into the report. In addition, I carefully compared data from multiple sources to help matching similar findings and compare conflicting accounts, in search for more credible outcomes. I took these steps in order to reduce researcher's subjectivity and enhance objectivity. Regarding reactivity, the researcher made sure that all positive or negative findings are included in the reported with maximum objectivity.

Participant Protections

In this research study, participants were protected to ensure success of the inquiry. The purpose of the study was clearly explained, with details given as to the use of the interview data, field notes, and collection of documents. I carefully assured all participants that they could back out at will of the research inquiry at any moment. Because the IHRC was there to address the disaster recovery challenges, I had in mind participant's sensitivity and emotions during interviews. I safeguarded the anonymity, privacy, and confidentiality of all informants from beginning to the end of the study, thus, securing the safety of all research participants.

The researcher represents the primary instrument in the data collection process. I was in close proximity with the research findings. Because the study was exposed to researcher's bias in that context, I maintained a high level of consciousness throughout the process, to reduce possibilities of bias and apply objectivity. The researcher's bias must be articulated in relation to the participant's involvement from data collection to analysis and conclusions. I used triangulation or multiple methods of data collection and analysis to strengthen internal validity as well as reliability. I shared preliminary findings with a few interested participants to encourage feedback collection while the data analysis process became accessible to selected participants to increase trust and credibility. I purposely took these measures to reduce or eliminate researcher's bias in this qualitative inquiry.

Summary

This chapter included a review of the qualitative theoretical methodology and design for this research inquiry. I designed a methodological framework to collect, manage, and analyze data regarding the IHRC and ways in which the organization emerged and operated as the key facilitator of reconstruction projects in post-earthquake Haiti. No previous study provided an examination of procedures employed by the IHRC and operations in the post-earthquake context of Haiti. I explored ways in which the IHRC embraced tasks of planning and facilitating earthquake recovery and reconstruction projects. A case study design was the most suitable methodology for a deeper understanding of the topic. Chapter 4 contained data analysis and findings, as well as data collection procedures. Data provided meaningful answers to research questions and offered a lens for identification of factors capable of influencing public policies for community resilience and sustainability. In Chapter 4, I outlined findings for this study in a logical manner. I presented findings and concluded with a detailed analysis of themes extracted from interview data.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

This chapter includes findings of this inquiry involving using joint accountability mechanisms in the post-earthquake recovery context of Haiti. I examined internal and external operations of the IHRC using research questions. More effective community participation could improve work of the IHRC and strengthen progress and economic sustainability for the Haitian people. These research questions guided the inquiry:

RQ1: How did Haiti coordinate post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction tasks through the joint accountability mechanism of the IHRC?

RQ2: What kind of relationship existed between community leaders, the Haitian government, and international partners working through the IHRC?

RQ3: What was the role of the IHRC in terms of outcomes of recovery collaboration efforts?

This chapter is structured to demonstrate how data were generated, collected, recorded, and analyzed to obtain study results. I also addressed structural analysis strategies based on generating emerging themes to discover and extract meanings from interview transcripts. I presented findings for consideration.

Research Setting

I selected the case study method to explore in-depth conceptual underpinnings of this research inquiry. This chapter includes a detailed analysis of interview transcript data. In February 2017, I traveled to Port-Au-Prince to collect data for the study. I recruited participants mainly in Port-Au-Prince and its suburbs. Additionally, I selected

participants in other locations around the country and in the diaspora, mainly individuals who had some level of experience with the earthquake, but had migrated in the years following the disaster. I managed to collect interview data for the latter group via email or phone calls. I was flexible in allowing participants to select which method was best for conducting interviews. I used pragmatism when collecting interview transcript data. The data collection process depended on participants who willingly provided information based on their knowledge and experiences. I identified knowledgeable people to maximize possibilities of locating rich data. Most people I contacted responded positively, while a few others opted out.

I selected participants by virtue of their professional roles, expertise, or experiences with the IHRC. I faced the obligation to reduce the number of participants from the initial list of 40 to 31 for two main reasons. At first, a few individuals were not available and declined to participate in the study at the last minute. Second, after realizing data reached saturation and the learning curve exponentially dropped, I reduced the sample size to 31 participants. I conducted 31 interviews via telephone, email, or in person. After the 31st interview, I no longer found new information.

Demographics

The IHRC Commission had an 18-month mandate beginning March 2010 to carry its social and financial responsibilities. All operations were transitioned to the Haitians stakeholders at the end of the mandate in October 2011. Participants in the study needed to have some knowledge of the work of the IHRC. Participants included Haitian public officials, IHRC officials, and civil society actors. The civil society actors were people

from civil society organizations such as activist groups, cooperatives or community organizations, who work to heal the community, assist the powerless and vulnerable populations in times of trouble. Participants were people who either participated in relief efforts following the earthquake or experienced the disaster in some other form. I deliberately selected these participants for the study based on their involvement as either key actors with experiences working with the IHRC or key witnesses who are knowledgeable of its work. These participants presented diverse perspectives on the subject. I ensured I acquired in-depth information from those who were in key positions to deliver it.

I did not include detailed descriptions of participants to avoid the possibility of their identification. I collected data from 31 participants divided into two main groups: 15 key actors and 16 key witnesses. Key actors were participants who played a role in running day-to-day activities of the IHRC or worked closely with one of the IHRC stakeholders. The study participant list comprised nine Haitian public government officers (PGOs), seven international donor officials (IDOs), nine Haitian civil society actors (CSAs), and six representatives of the IHRC (IHOs).

Among the group of 15 key actors, there were four PGOs, four IDOs, four CSAs, and three IHOs. Among the group of 16 key witness participants, there were five PGOs, three IDOs, five CSAs, and three IHOs. Among participants, I interviewed two members of the Ministry of Planning who were familiar with the work of the IHRC, two former senators who participated in IHRC vote sessions, two former ministry cabinet members of GoH, one former HRF representative, two former donor officials, one former member

of the World Bank (WB), one current employee of the International Development Bank (IDB), two members of a local union, three human right activists, and one journalist in a popular radio station in Port-au-Prince. Many participants experienced the earthquake firsthand. There were three participants from the Haitian Diaspora who traveled to Haiti to aid in the days following the disaster. All participants had knowledge or experience with of the work of the IHRC and provided valuable interview data to advance this inquiry. I made sure all participants met these criteria in order to partake in the study.

Table 1

Summary of Participants' Sectoral Characteristics

Participants	KAs	KWs	Total
PGOs	4	5	9(29.0)
IHOs	3	3	6(19.4)
CSAs	5	4	9(29.0)
IDOs	4	3	7(22.6)
Total	16(51.6)	15(48.4)	31(100)

A key actor is someone who participated actively in the work of the IHRC while a key witness is someone who observed and gave firsthand evidence of the operations of the IHRC. In all, 31 respondents participated in the study. Table 1 shows the spread of participants. It indicates there were almost an equal number of participants who identified themselves as Key Actors versus Key Witnesses. There were 16 Key Actors or 51.6% of the respondents and 15 Key Witnesses or 48.4 of the respondents. Public Government Officials and Civil Society Actors each represented 29% of the total number of

respondents, nine respondents each. International Donors represented 22.6% and 19.4% were IHRC Representatives.

Table 2

Summary of Gender Distribution

Participants	Male	Female
PGOs	6(19.35)	3(9.69)
IHOs	4(12.9)	2(6.45)
CSAs	7(22.58)	2(6.45)
IDOs	6(19.35)	1(3.22)
Total	23(74.19)	8(25.81)

Table 2 demonstrates that more males participated in the study versus females. It shows a clear disparity in the gender distribution category. Twenty three men and eight women participated in the study. I learned from one participant that because of a history of non-participation of women in government, the Haitian Congress voted a law requiring a quota of 30 percent at least of females to be appointed in government positions or authorized to participate in election contests. However, the gender disparity was noticeable across all participants' groups, including the IDOs and the IHOs, members of the Haitian diaspora or the international community. Based on these facts, I presumed that there were fewer females than males participating in the public affairs of Haiti at the time. That observation is reflected in the earthquake reconstruction effort in general and in the work of the IHRC specifically.

Data Collection

I commenced the data collection process immediately after the Walden University IRB approval (see Appendix C). An initial visit to Port-Au-Prince in March 2017 was key in the process of making first contact with potential key actors and important witnesses. Upon arrival in the Capital city, I was introduced to the Executive Director of Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH), a civil rights organization providing its service in Haiti with a mission to promote human rights and good governance. The director acquiesced to collaborate and help advance the study. He submitted a list of names for interview consideration. This was the very first step in the snowballing strategy adopted, requesting possible names of those who were familiar with the phenomenon to gradually identify potential participants. Simultaneously, I put together a list of old acquaintances and took the time to introduce the study to each individually, in the search for possible informants. I used telephone, email, Facebook, Tweeter, WhatsApp, and Messenger information technology to gather contact information on people that can either participate or suggest potential informants. The objective was to create a purposeful sampling, through various criteria, informants, and confirmatory sampling methods to find participants that can provide in-depth information to advance the study.

I coded the name of each informant using letters and numbers in order to avoid possible identification. For public/government officials, I used the code PGOs, listed as them as PGO1, then PGO2, followed by further numbers. There were nine public government officials in all. I coded the IHRC officers as IHOs, and listed as IHO1, IHO2

followed by further numbers. There were six IHRC officers in all. I coded civil society actors as CSAs, and listed as CSA1, CSA2 followed by further numbers. There were nine Civil Society Actors in all. Finally, I used the codes IDOs, and listed as IDO1, IDO2… and so on for international donor officials. There were seven international donor officials in all.

Following the selection process, I immediately made initial contact with participants and introduced the study either by phone or the use of social media as mentioned. Once both sides agreed, I sent the consent form to each informant via email or meet with them depending on the interview strategy agreed upon. After I received the signed consent forms, I used the interview protocol to collect answers to 15 questions and additional comments from each participant whenever necessary. I formulated the interview questions to answer all three research questions of the study. It was quite difficult to gain access to the IHRC officials as the organization had already wrapped up its work and folded up at the time of the interview. In those cases, I relied solely on old acquaintances and other informants to find the names, phone numbers and email addresses to get in touch with a few of them who ended up participating in the inquiry. There were potential participants who refused to participate altogether for fear of being exposed or identified. I quickly realized that it was critical to build trust with people to maintain the chain of cooperation. Many of the informants wanted to know more about me in spite of the fact the consent form was very explicit on both, the purpose of the research and the researcher himself. Two participants declined to sign the consent form and agreed to provide answers to the questions in the study. As a general feedback, most

informants found the research inquiry useful and provided their cooperation as they shared their experiences. In a few occasions, some officials declined to grant the interview fearing their intervention may lack objectivity. Later, one of them happened to be very cooperative in provided relevant information from the ministry of Cooperation and Planning of Haiti.

When contacting many actors of the Civil Society for the interview, I discovered a level of passion to reveal their experiences with the IHRC. The former IHRC officials exhibited great emotion and desire to discuss IHRC issues. Many public officials were composed and showed confidence about their participation in the study. One of the UN officials appeared to be frank and diplomatic when contacted to partake in the study. Many PGOs who were still in public office expressed reservation and fear regarding their participation. The interviews were structured in a mixed structure, with a majority of closed-ended than open-ended questions. I prepared all 15 questions ahead of time in order to guide participants in providing necessary responses for data analysis. I kept track of a journal with phone numbers, email addresses, social media accounts, and notes on each potential participant contacted for the study. Additionally, I collected many documents related to the statutes, reports, and proceedings of the IHRC. Although I could not find exact transcripts of meetings, but related reports were available. I used them as a lens for better direction and clearer understanding of the data collection and analysis process.

I used QRS NVivo 12 software to organize and analyze the interview data. I brought my experience and training as a computer software engineer to manage, sort, and

extract meaning and identify patterns from the codes. Sorting through unstructured collected data to break it into usable pieces while categorizing themes and patterns for meaningful examination is the essence of data analysis (Beaudry & Miller, 2016).

I developed a description of the case based on the interviews data recorded. This approach allowed me to inform the reader and provide him/her with a deeper understanding of the case study, using category, aggregation, patterns and generalization. This analytic framework facilitated the development of constructs that I used to answer research questions and provide detailed description of meanings that emerged from the study. I used categorical aggregation of the ideas expressed in the interviews to associate them to meaning. I arranged similar ideas expressed and used NVivo 12 to code and arrange them to form meaning. I identified common elements, focused on observing their repetition to establish a categorical aggregation. Patterns or themes that linked the categories allowed me to create an analytical framework, one that helped to organize and understand the findings. The use of direct interpretation helped me to find meaning from responses to questions or ideas expressed in the interview data. The code from the interview transcripts produced patterns by aggregating the recurrence of ideas, making assertions and conclusions from the entire data collection. I used my interpretation of the data, based on in-depth analysis to bring understanding to the phenomenon under study. This qualitative interpretation of the data collected is aimed at positioning readers to make their own assertions and conclusions to the findings.

Two major events took place, which might have influenced the context of the study. Firstly, in 2016, the renowned Haitian movie producer Raoul Peck, made a popular

movie *Mortal Assistance* in which he depicted the failure of the IHRC and a score NGOs working in Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake. Secondly, following the release of the movie, many interviews took place on local radio, television and newspapers where records of former IHRC actors acknowledged publicly the ineffective and in-operational ways in which the organization failed to address in a serious manner the priorities of its mandate to facilitate the reconstruction process for the Haitian people. Interview transcripts data showed relative support to this negative appreciation of the IHRC's contribution to the reconstruction effort.

These factors have altered the context of the study, influenced the attitudes of the public towards the IHRC and probably affected the views expressed by certain participants.

Table 3

Relationship Between Research Questions and Associated Interview Questions

Research Questions (RQ)	Relevant Interview Questions (IQ)
RQ1: How did Haiti coordinate the post-earthquake recovery tasks through the joint accountability mechanism of the IHRC?	IQ2: Did you approve of the shared accountability structure of the IHRC? IQ5: What other alternatives to the joint accountability mechanisms could have been utilized? IQ9: Do you agree or disagree with this statement? The IHRC encountered legal, financial, and cultural problems. IQ15: Is the IHRC still in existence?
RQ2: What kind of relationship existed among community leaders, the Haitian government, and international partners working through the IHRC?	IQ1: How would you rate the overall experience of the IHRC? IQ7: What was the nature of the working relationship between the IHRC and the community? IQ8: Do you agree or disagree with this statement? The IHRC cooperated with the Haitian government in resources sharing and planning. IQ11: To your knowledge, did the IHRC and the Haitian Government experienced any form(s) of tension?
RQ3: What was the role of the IHRC in the outcomes of the recovery collaboration effort?	IQ3: Why do you think Haitian and international stakeholders created and engaged the IHRC? IQ4: Was the IHRC an effective tool in the recovery context. IQ6: When do you think it is appropriate to use joint accountability mechanisms like the IHRC? IQ10: Do you think the IHRC experienced corruption issues? IQ12: Did the work of the IHRC meet expectations of stakeholders? IQ13: Was the Haitian population satisfied with the work of the IHRC? IQ14: Was the outcomes of the recovery process was influenced by the IHRC?

Figure 1

Distribution of the Relationship Between Research and Interview Questions



Data Analysis

Through coding, I developed an analytical process to categorize interview transcripts and to facilitate the analysis procedure. As such, I developed the conceptual abstraction of data and potentially proceeded to its reintegration thereafter as a theory (Creswell, 2009). Through substantive coding, I worked with interview transcripts directly, using the auto-coding concept in NVivo to fracture and analyze the data, extracting similarities and differences to discover core categories and themes at the end. Subsequently, through selective coding of data the core and related concepts became saturated. I used constant comparison of incidents or indicators to evaluate the code. By doing so, I developed new perceptions used for further coding. I repeated the process until I achieved saturation. I analyzed the interview transcripts through detailed description, direct interpretation, as well as categorical aggregation, extracting and analyzing indicators to establish patterns and facilitate the emergence of naturalistic

generalization (Stake, 1995; Stake 2002). I used a constant comparative approach in the coding process to discover enough emerging ideas in a gradual manner.

Table 4
Interview Excerpts

Excerpts	Code extracted from the response
Participant 12 (P12) response to the question as to whether or not the shared accountability structure of the IHRC was suitable to the reconstruction endeavors	
The shared accountability structure of the IHRC was well intended to advance the goals recovery as it brought multiple sectors together for a common cause. A distributed leadership approach could have made the task of administering projects and funds more manageable and beneficial to the Haitian people. Such approach could have diminished resistance, and avoided potential boycotts from donors. Actors in the international community and local actors found an opportunity for proper balance and fairness, to apply diplomacy and effective management skills to ensure a successful recovery process.	➢ Stakeholders came together for effective management of recovery projects ➢ Need for Consensus building for coordinated actions coordinated action ➢ Collective leadership was needed ➢ Joint accountability can improve resource utilization and avoid conflict
P12 response to the question regarding corruption issues	
There were accusations of nepotism, where contractors refused to go through the normal bidding process to obtain IHRC contracts on selected reconstruction projects.	➢ Abuse of power in the leadership ➢ Accusation of corruption ➢ Lack of transparency eroded public trust
P12 response to the question regarding tension between the Haitian Government and the international community by virtue of their coexistence in the IHRC	➢ Facing Dilemma and confusion ➢ Uncoordinated Actions and lack of productivity
There were delays in the disbursement of funds purposely as a strategy of influent members of the IHRC to weaken the government. That explains the constant delays in project execution.	➢ Togetherness and Independence do not always work ➢ The Impact of the work of the IHRC

The excerpts displayed in Table 4 exemplify what coding strategy I used in all the responses obtained from 15 questions asked to every participant. I used the excerpts in the left column of table 4 to exemplify the strategy used to extract code from P12 regarding three different questions. The second column of the table displays codes extracted from each response. The same strategy is used for the entire transcript to create code and extract meanings.

All participants responded to the same questions. The open-ended questions allowed the participants to elaborate and provide meaningful responses for better clarification and understanding. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the questions of the interview protocol covered all aspects of the study research questions. I used categories to developed codes until saturation was reached. I directly applied those categories to the research questions to discover more insight on the work of the IHRC to facilitate reconstruction projects with the objective to improve the lives of the citizenry specifically in the earthquake affected areas, and countrywide. I oriented the data analysis process to discover ideas and concept that can elucidate stated research questions and provide a better understanding of the case study.

I extracted relevant codes from themes and categories, compiled and organized all the responses in a logical manner. Initially, I used Microsoft Word to transcribe all 31 interviews. Among the participants, 13 were fluent in the English language and as a result, those interviews were conducted in English. I created two versions of the interview protocol, one in English and the other in French (Appendix A). After I completed the interview process, I then proceeded to translate the 13 interviews conducted from French into English, as I am very fluent in both languages. I recorded each interview in a Microsoft document file and stored in a folder. This process facilitated the data migration process into NVivo, using its Import features. Once in NVivo, I created a New Project with 31 files representing 31 interview transcripts ready for coding, manipulation, extraction and organization. I mainly used the Node and Explore features of NVivo to create nodes and manipulate the data files to identify, extract and categorize emerging themes before establishing connections among them for better meaning and understanding. At this point, concerns over trustworthiness of findings through analysis became apparent.

This method allowed me to establish five main topics based on transcripts data analysis. Table 5 below shows both frequency and percentage of participants' responses to the identified topics created from interviews. Interview topics or themes with underlying subthemes from the interview transcripts that addressed each research question.

Table 5

Emergent Themes, Subthemes, and Links to Research Questions

No	Emergent Themes	Subthemes	Research Questions
1	The structure of the IHRC	Together and Independent Legal Framework	RQ1
2	The shared accountability dilemma	Collaboration issues Institutional Power Vacuum Lack of Harmonization	RQ1 and RQ2
3	Uneasy Alliance and Cooperation	Tension in the alliance A Government inside the Government Unharmonious Relationships Cultural Barriers	RQ2
4	Fitness of Mechanism and Suitability Issues	Public Confusion Dilemma Incompatibility of International Intervention in Local Contexts Accusation of Corruption and Influence Peddling	RQ1 and RQ2
5	Impact of the IHRC	Impact of Collaboration	RQ3

While the initial manual coding enabled me to become familiar with the data, NVivo 12 facilitated a quick navigation through the interview transcript files, extract the codes from groups of participants. This process helped me identify themes from exploring the codes and extract additional meanings from the experience of the participants regarding the recovery and reconstruction endeavors of the IHRC.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

In Chapter 3, I elaborated strategies and appropriate procedures to follow in order to guarantee trustworthiness of the study. I reported all findings as accurately as possible to reflect the perceptions and experiences of the respondents regarding the joint accountability approach of the IHRC to address the recovery and reconstruction issues in

the aftermath of the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti. I applied the qualitative aspects of trustworthiness such as credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability rigorously and carefully to ensure neutrality and reliability of the research findings.

Credibility

Credibility involves validating the data collection process and associated research findings (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). At first, I used purposeful sampling to ensure careful selection of research participants. I selected participants based on their experiences with the IHRC so that collected data became relevant to the inquiry. I perceived them as people who possessed knowledge regarding the operations of the IHRC and its shared accountability mechanism. Additionally, through peer review and member checking, I enhanced credibility of the research findings. I strictly adhered to the principles of confidentiality when I used the service of an academic with neutral interest in the study to review some of the interview transcripts.

Transferability

Transferability is the ability to apply with ease the findings of one qualitative research inquiry to another (Lincoln & Guba, 2017). In order to ensure transferability for this study, I carefully recorded and safeguarded documentation regarding the entire research process. I carefully disclosed a clear description of procedures regarding the sampling method, data collection and analysis, research purpose, design and findings to each respondent. I took the time to explain participants' selection method and the interviews' data collection process to all participants. While the sample size is not large enough to facilitate generalization of the research findings, the insights that the

participants provided came from direct contact with the IHRC. I believe the interview transcripts data recorded will remain unchanged even if participants were to answer the same questions repeatedly. This approach contributed to the dependability of this inquiry.

Dependability

At every step of the study, I consciously followed the proposed guidelines, assuring that I omitted nothing in the process, which could compromise the reliability and validity of the research study. My transcript data findings were consistent with my data analysis and coding strategies. Research findings from data analysis provided similar results whether generated from hand codes or using the NVivo software codes. They were consistent every time. This discovery encouraged me to recode my findings from earlier codes in a more presentable NVivo and Microsoft Word Formats. Additionally, I employed the service of another researcher to double check my observations and the findings remained unchanged.

Confirmability

To establish confidence in the findings of the study, researchers often have to combat in a consistent manner the concept of researcher bias. To adhere with the principle of confirmability, I documented all procedures applied to generate and confirm the findings. This allowed me to isolate my personal biases or personal interests in order to avoid influencing the results of this inquiry. I reached the study conclusions from findings extracted strictly form the data collected from respondents via the interviews. I employed the assistance of another research to review my codes and confirm that generated themes came from collected data. Finally, I enjoyed the rapport created with

most of the participants and I collected and analyzed quality data through a process that guaranteed the trustworthiness of the research findings.

Study Results

I set out to inquire about the IHRC activities in the aftermath of the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti. I intended to determine whether the shared accountability structure of the Commission addressed effectively the issues of the recovery and reconstruction as per its mandate. After interviewing 31 respondents who experienced at various levels the work of the IHRC saturation was reached. Participants responded to 15 interview questions, formulated from three research questions. I proceeded to organize, analyze and code the interview data and five main themes emerged from the process. The themes are divided into subthemes and are as follows:

Emergent Theme 1: Structure of the IHRC

This theme emerged from RQ2 and IQ2, IQ3, IQ9, and IQ15.

I wanted to discover and understand the integration process of the different stakeholders within the structure of the IHRC to plan the recovery in the post-earthquake Haiti. Analyzed interview transcripts and related documents demonstrated that the Commission was structured to facilitate coordination of various representatives from several institutions, namely the government, the civil society organizations, the international community and public and private sector institutions. Participants' opinions also reflected the desire of an important sector in the international community and Haitian nationals to work side by side, as two faces of the same coin to facilitate the reconstruction effort. They planned to work collaboratively to prioritize the needs of the

recovery and to improve living conditions in the devastated regions and over Haiti as a whole. A number of the participants thought the Commission intended to operate as a well-oiled machine to push reconstruction projects through a well-structured and organized pipeline. Others said that the effort did not provide the expected outcome. The participants expressed the position that there was a lack of cohesiveness in the structure of the IHRC. As a result, the planning and coordination of projects emanated from many different and often opposing ideological underpinnings. As suggested, both internal and external dynamics in building collaboration must be integrated to better address disaster recovery challenges (Berke et al., 1993).

Two subthemes emerged from the analysis of the findings related to the structure of the IHRC: togetherness and independence and Inadequate Legal Framework.

Togetherness and Independence

The IHRC was the culmination of efforts from the Government of Haiti, Civil Society Actors, and key donors from the international community. A joint leadership of former Prime Minister of Haiti, Jean-Max Bellerive and former President Bill Clinton presided over the Commission with the mandate to plan and facilitate the recovery and reconstruction projects to improve living conditions of Haitians through projects that reflect economic development at the time, and sustainability for the future.

Many participants expressed that the creation of the IHRC was another attempt of the international community to undermine the leadership of the Haitian government despite the effort of several donors to buy in the Haitian citizenry. PGO3 and CSA1 indicated that the government was under pressure from the international community to

accept the IHRC proposal as a pre-condition for donors' funds release for reconstruction projects. PGO4, IHO2, and IDO1 declared that the IHRC brought donors and public officials together under one entity, but individual organizations acted independently. They complained regarding a lack of coordination and joint planning. IHO4 affirmed that the Commission members were obligated to work together, and yet each remained independent and loyal to his/her respective stakeholder. IDO1 said:

> Several bodies of the Commission never perceived together as working hand in hand to achieve any grandmaster plan. Instead, the idea of independence required an important correction… The Commission could not find common grounds on project selection as well as prioritization of funds.

GPO1 declared at one point, things got so out of control that many Commission members conducted meetings in subcommittee to select project and prioritize funds on behalf of powerful donors, leaving the Haitian counterparts in the dark. PGO6 and IHO4 believed that local governance issues such as accusations of corruption, a need for decentralization, and a lack of trust between government authorities and the local population complicated the recovery process, and negatively affected the collaboration. CSA2 declared that local government officers did not play important roles in the decision-making process. In March 2011, things got so much out of control that 12 Haitian members of the IHRC wrote a formal letter to complain on marginalization inside the IHRC reported on participant. Fundamentally, they outlined that the Haitian members of the IHRC were there to endorse the decisions of the Director and the Executive

Committee and were not allowed to work collaboratively on project reviews and approval that will benefit the main goal of reconstructing a devastated country. They said:

> The 12 Haitian members present here feel completely disconnected from the activities of the IHRC. There is a critical communication and information shortage at the Information and Communication Center on the part of the Executive Secretary and even more from the Executive Committee. In spite of our role in the governance structure of the institution, we have so far received no follow-up on the IHRC activities…In general, contact is only established one day before the board meetings. Board members have time neither to read, nor analyze, nor understand--and much less to respond intelligently--to projects submitted at the last minute, despite all the complaints expressed and promises made on this subject.

This letter, written and delivered in October 2010, almost six months after the IHRC was enacted called for a special meeting with the Co-Chairs of the board in an attempt to remedy the situation. At this point, of the four and half billion dollars on funding pledged at the donors' conference, only two billion has been approved for selected projects without full participation of the Haitian side.

CSA2, PGO2, and PGO3 said that local grassroots and community organizations were completely left out of the process. He added that these organizations are essential to any plan to promote economic development and sustainability for the country. CSA1 observed that this practice of domination existed prior to the earthquake. The dominant stakeholders in the international community used the IHRC as a scapegoat to render the

republic more vulnerable, weaken the government and marginalize the inter-Haitian movement that abruptly emerged in the aftermath of the disaster. PG3 saw in the IHRC operation an affront to the collective dignity and character of an entire nation. PGO3 quickly pointed out that often, projects selection and financing were not made collectively. Joint planning was almost inexistent prior to selecting and executing recovery projects. IDO2 indicated that in many instances, the bidding guidelines were ignored and reconstruction projects were assigned to contractors based on recommendation from key donors.

However, participants said many members of the Commission did not perceive the work of the Commission in a similar fashion. CSA7, CSA5, CSA9, PGO3 and IHO4 acknowledged that even among the international actors, there were division and ongoing fight for power grab. Fractions used personal influence to channel funds to specific projects. IDO3 affirmed that bidding and winning contracts were based mainly on who you know instead of what you know for lack of clear and transparent guidelines. IDO1 said:

> Those who represented the United States in the Commission had control over the decision-making process on matters regarding funds allocation. This stranglehold was apparent through various entities, mainly the Clinton Foundation, which was quite active in reconstruction related matters.

It is apparent that this concept of independence did not work well within the framework of the IHRC. This conceptual framework of working together and yet being independent did not provide sufficient guidelines to avoid conflict of interest

undermining the overall effort. IDO3 and IDO concurred that perhaps, a proper legal and regulatory framework guiding the IHRC could have protected the interests of those for whom it was created. This could have provided criteria and guidelines for good governance within the organization. Many participants suggested that the absence of an adequate legal framework affected the work of the planning body.

Inadequate Legal Framework

In the Aftermath of the disaster, an estimated 17 % of the Haitian civil service members died and most government and ministry buildings either destroyed or damaged. According to GPO4, this situation created a political desire from the government to request the assistance of International Donors. At the request of the Haitian Government following an agreement with key international donors, the Haitian Congress voted to enact the IHRC in March 2010, to provide a platform, the IHRC, for reconstruction project planning and selection. All partners in the collaboration did not work together in order to achieve the main objectives to identify, plan, and finance reconstruction projects. IHOs unanimously stated the Commission faced the challenges of finding adequate office space to conduct its operations, recruiting capable staff in addition to funds that were pledged and not readily available. They added that logistics problems, shortfall in staffing and budget trouble affected the readiness of the IHRC to give results as expected. They noted that in spite of minimal progress made, it was difficult for the IHRC to operate in full capacity for the reasons stated.

IDO2 stated:

> When the IHRC mandate ended, projects selection now went to the Prime Minister of Haiti. At one point, we (the HRF) had a balance of over $100 million sitting in our cash register with no specific request for funding in a six months period. While the money was there to finance reconstruction projects, surprisingly we did not receive formal demand to finance reconstruction projects from local government… and in the meantime, money is sitting in the banks, and people are suffering. A situation that did not make us proud at all.

IHO1, CSA3, CSA7, and IHO4 acknowledged that the IHRC made great stride to establish important governance structures and procedures, and the Commission remained inadequately operational from beginning to end of its mandate. As IDO1 put it, the Commission made an effort to set up the organization in a very challenging environment. IHO4 said although the country has a history of failed state heritage compounded with its destroyed and damaged governmental structures following the earthquake. These were not the main reason for its inoperability.

PGO3 and IHO1 outlined that the operations of the IHRC were hampered for two main reasons. First, major delays in hiring qualified people to staff the Commission and the essential mistake of not defining with clarity the role of each partner in the planning body. IDO2 stated that there was a problem in the Haitian circle not defining what their project funding priorities were. For example, IDO2 further noted that when GoH requested 18-month funding that intended for debris removal while the Commission approved 7 times more funding for projects in other areas such as agriculture, ignoring the

priorities outlined by the Haitian government. IDO5 stated that the absence of adequate legal guidelines negatively influenced the work of the Commission.

Emergent Theme 2: Shared Accountability Dilemma

This theme emerged from research questions one and two and interview questions one, two, three, five, seven, eight, nine, 11 and 15. Many participants raised concerns that the shared accountability mechanism in place was inadequate, allowing the Commission to police itself. They said the Commission's complex work relationships required necessary safeguards to produce expected results. They added the lack of an external or downward accountability system created confusion inside the IHRC. Accountability in this context was viewed as the means that the partner organizations would use to report to a defined higher authority and bear responsibility for collective actions (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Jenkins & Goetz, 1999). Three subthemes emerged from the analysis of the findings related to the shared accountability dilemma of the IHRC: collaboration issues, international power vacuum and lack of harmonization.

Collaboration Issues

IHO2, IHO6, IDO2 and PGO2 questioned the absence of an upward accountability mechanism working with the Commission. In this case, CSA7 affirmed that an independent accountability entity was in need to oversee the work of the Commission. "Downward" accountability in this case would guaranty the capacity to open up scrutiny to the beneficiaries (Murthy, 2001; Peters & Pierre, 2000). In this case, all stakeholders of the alliance would be represented in the accountability system to secure transparency and efficient management. Hence, CSA3, CSA7 and CSA4 brought a

different argument stating that the IHRC needed to be accountable to its constituents. They commented that "the people" that the NGOs serve should have the "legal authorities" to call them "accountable for their values, performances and roles" as civil society actors. "The Dilemma for the IHRC is that in reality, it is a hybrid Commission, a multi-donor entity controlled by the Haitian government, civil society actors and international stakeholders and does not fit either the upward or the downward accountability approaches" (CS3, CSA7, August 20, 2017). The IHRC's accountability mechanism was neither upward, nor downward. CSA7 said:

> The shared accountability system of the IHRC did not have the legal capacity to evaluate with effectiveness performance, responsibility and authority of the Commission and the authority to define who can call whom to explain and rectify wrongdoings and finally dictate the boundaries and directions of the reconstruction process.

He added that the IHRC failed in its mission to provide transparency and accountability in its operations. In this context it did not do much to redress the negative perception of the public in its activities when accusations of mismanagement occurred. PGO1 acknowledged that the monitoring and auditing aspects of the reconstruction projects were not transparent in the midst of serious accusations and allegations of pervasive corruption so common in Haiti. The minimal communication to the public on the operations of the IHRC and that potentially stalled progress and undermined donors' confidence in the recovery initiatives. The majority of participants shared the opinion that the IHRC failed to establish an effective control framework to oversee internal

operations, monitor projects performance and communicate reports to both its constituents and beneficiaries. Most participants agreed that the joint internal accountability of the IHRC presented a serious institutional power vacuum and roles overlapping which are worth clarifying. Many participants felt the IHRC failed the mission to review, approve and coordinate selected construction projects. One of the key reasons is that real leadership was lacking from the Commission. GPO2 and CSA9 pointed out the IHRC did not "project harmonization in pooling resources together" and making timely and sound decisions to "select and fund the right projects." While one of the goals of establishing IHRC was to avoid overlapping of initiatives, the opposite just happened. IHP3 stated:

> There was a period of inaction as the government was relying on the Commission to execute and vice versa. In fact, we did not know who the real driver was… At one point, we had a balance of nearly $100 million in cash and no request for funding for about six months…the money was there to fund reconstruction project, but no formal proposal from the Haitian Government…in the meantime funds remain in the bank and was not used for the citizens interests. This was not something to be proud of.

This outpouring of international support with the right governance approach could have been beneficial to people in the devastated areas said GPO1. He negatively outlined the absence of clear guidelines that delineated responsibilities of each partner involved in the reconstruction effort. As such, a power void emerged with a general sense that no specific institution was in charge of the reconstruction task. IHO2 and GPO3 observed

that neither the GoH nor the IHRC exhibited the leadership required to take control of the chaotic atmosphere of the reconstruction. The lack of trust between representatives of key international donors of the IHRC and important Public Government officers exacerbated the situation. Additionally, serious human capital deficit compounded the problem, leaving the IHRC short of staff and the Government amputated with key cabinet members.

Institutional Power Vacuum

Out of 31 participants, 21(67%) shared that the IHRC failed to achieve its mission and that after many promises, nothing of significance was done on the ground. According to many participants, mainly the PGOS and the CSAs, representing the Haitian sectors of the Commission, the actions of the IHRC have made the Haitian Republic much more vulnerable after wasting billions of dollars on false promises. They accused the Commission of killing the spirit of the inter-Haitian solidarity movement that took place immediately after the earthquake. They believed the creation of the Commission was an affront to Haitian dignity and wished that the IHRC directly passed its budget to an organ of the GoH.

Participants outlined that tensions were extremely high when the outbreak of cholera break in the spring of 2011, intensifying critics for the lack of progress on the ground, amidst accusations that the Commission did not respect the action plan which recommended engaging the Haitian Stakeholders to enhance capacity building, and promote transparency and accountability in all reconstruction projects. PGO5 said:

> The words dialogue and communication were non-existent. We were kept in complete darkness and did not know what was going on when funds were approved for many projects. Many key bilateral and multilateral donors controlled the Commission important decisions…and the worse thing is that most documents on internal regulations were in English and there was no translation done in French and Creole to facilitate us. This was a deliberate plot to trick those who favor a Haitian control over the effort.

IDO5, a representative of the World Bank in the Commission, indicated that the IHRC favored the English language; there was no consensus not to translate internal documents both in Creole and in French, the Official languages of the GoH. IHO1 took more of an apologetic position, confining that many similar mistakes can be attributed to an inadequate legal framework, neglecting certain cultural and socio-economic considerations of the Haitian society. IDO3 simply found a lack of harmonization in the IHRC, because members and stakeholders had different and often conflicting expectations of the IHRC.

Lack of Harmonization

Most participants shared the position that the operational approach of the Commission to the reconstruction projects lacked harmonization. The priorities of many donors in the international community were not in accordance with those of the GoH. PGO2, CSA2, CSA7, and PGO8 noted in the aftermath of the earthquake, the GoH did not have the resources to remove the rubble and expected the IHRC to address this problem in the recovery stage to pave the way for deeper reconstruction projects. They

wrote there found no agreement on the GoH's proposal. The IHRC decided to side with the donors ignoring the true necessities of the moment and the priorities of the GoH. CSA2 said:

> We need to do some serious reflection regarding international aid and the way it is utilized in the developing countries such as ours…My impression was the aid was not intended to bring much success and the donors have their own agenda, different from what is needed on the ground. And in many instances their agenda did not coincide with that of the GoH and the people they were there to help… the resulting was a catastrophe and this is exactly what we witnessed here.

IHO2, PGO1 and IHO4 said that in rare cases where the IHRC wanted to plead in favor of GoH and convince donors to side with their priorities, there was confusion to decipher what they were. They concluded the priorities of the GoH lacked specifications in the Action Plan of the IHRC. Participants acknowledged that often, the GoH's priorities were broad and inclusive with no precise guidelines for project selection criteria and requirements. While budget for approved projects were established, there was not appropriation strategy that dictated funds allocation per sector. There was no strategic plan for all sectors on the GoH side as well as on the donor side. IHO1 wrote:

> For example, while the Health Ministry has a detailed plan for its sector, the most needed sector, housing, did not prioritize a strategy for the reconstruction. It appeared as if the GoH had a policy of learning as you go and, they did not invest enough resources on planning and prioritizing… in addition there was no strategy for debris removal or energy.

Many participants concurred with this finding and found the lack of specificity in selecting priorities on the GoH side and the tendency of donors to prioritize sectors that were not in harmony with the GoH created tensions and complicated the work of the IHRC. CSA5 stated that dissension in the mist of the IHRC encouraged discord with the GoH.

Emergent Theme 3: Uneasy Alliance and Cooperation

This theme emerged from research question two and interview questions one, seven, eight and 11. Regardless of the nature of a collaborative relationship, it does not succeed by luck. However, the nature of a relationship dictates the type of careful considerations required in order to address underlying issues and ensure successful outcome (Hagen, 2002; Samii et al., 2002). In this context, compatibility, capability and commitment are key characteristics when selecting alliance partners. Horton (1998) advised that it is best to ensure advantages of a relationship outweigh its risks prior to getting involved. Important stakeholders of the Commission, specifically the GoH and key Donors, anticipated mutual benefits of this alliance would exceed the costs and drawbacks. Most Participants' interview data revealed that in reality the results of the IHRC's operations were not as positive as planned. The findings from most respondents revealed the reconstruction goals and objectives did not materialize as expected. The Commission had a mission to prioritize and increase harmonization by pooling resources together from proven international donors, locally capable partners, and the GoH to meet the strategic financing needs of the reconstruction process. Participants' opinion is

divided on several issues regarding the level of collaboration and cooperation among IHRC partners as shown in the Table 6.

Table 6

IHRC Categorical Relationships Data Summary

Participants	Cordial with Community it Serves		Uneasy Relationship with GoH		Encountered Legal/Financial/Cultural Problems		Was there Tension in the Alliance?	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
PGOs	3	5	3	5	5	4	5	3
IHOs	2	4	4	1	3	2	5	1
CSAs	3	5	1	6	6	3	6	2
IDOs	3	2	5	2	4	2	6	1
Total	11	16	13	14	18	11	18	7

Table 6 displays responses from all participants who responded to those questions in four categories. 31 participants expressed their opinions on the type of relationship that existed within the IHRC. Regarding the relationship with the Commission and the community, 27 participants replied. On the issue related to the conflicting and uneasy relationship with the Haitian, 28 participants gave their opinions. In total, 29 participants had an opinion of various the legal, financial, and cultural issues of the IHRC while 25 participants answered the question related to the issue of internal tension.

Figure 2

Distribution of Categorical Relationships Data



Figure 2 is a bar graph showing the categorical repetitive data describing different topics relative to the work relationship of the IHRC. Four subthemes emerged from the analysis of the findings related to the uneasy alliance and cooperation inside the IHRC: cultural barriers, overlapping boundaries, unharmonious relationships, and tension in the alliance.

Cultural Barriers

This study found that the IHRC did not have a cordial working relationship with the community it served. Many participants acknowledged that cultural barriers were at the roots of this problem. IHO2, a union organization representative, member of the Commission stated that it was recommended to the Commission to provide training to facilitate dialogue in the relief and recovery effort. He revealed that early on, the Commission planned to bring the media, the GoH, the donors' community, and the civil

society together for a training program under the technical guidance of the Ministry of Culture and Communications. IHO5 concurred with IHO2 that this program did not materialize. As a result, many of the decision makers had no formal education about the culture of the people they served. CSA2, CSA4 observed that they were no plan to safely rescue, preserve, and safeguard the country's valuable art items, artifacts, architectural and museum collections. IDO6 explained that lack of patience and flexibility, compounded with a lesser concern for timeliness, and the Haitian customs and culture to some extent, largely influenced the collaboration and work relationship.

The findings indicated that the Commission did not have a cordial relationship with the community. CSA8 underlined that criticism came from the "lack of consultation with the Haitian population" in general and that the relationship "was not at all cordial." He revealed that no one in the Haitian civil society should be surprised of such behavior as there is common practice of foreigners ostracizing Haitian nationals in the affairs of the States way before the earthquake. He added that the chaos created by such ineffective ways of spending the funds on projects not approved by the community exacerbated the crisis, thus making the situation on the ground more difficult for the GoH to manage. Direct input from communities could have given the IHRC better acceptation and would have been a great way to get people involved from the beginning. PGO5 said this could have been a "very good head start" for the Commission.

Overlapping Boundaries

The uneasy relationship between the IHRC officials and the GoH created an ambiguous situation. Many participants expressed their main concern on the IHRC over

the fact that it was functioning like a shadow government, exercising power behind the scenes, outside the control of either the GoH or its representatives inside the IHRC. Such approach helped to create a toxic environment which negatively affected the success of the recovery initiative. The absence of leadership on the GoH side, compounded with the lack of vision of the IHRC officials exacerbated the situation. CSA1 commented:

> The absence of enlightened leadership drove Haiti into its current situation of being very dependent on the international community. How do we as a nation reestablish sovereignty and set up reconstruction programs when others in the international community are making decisions that are mostly irrelevant to the real problems on the ground. We could not rebuild that way and I predicted that we would fail.

PGO1 and PGO3 said the Commission had been under fire from the beginning and in many instances under accusations of ignoring the priorities of the GoH contrary to its charter recommendation.

However, the framers of the Commission anticipated such issues and created it with a structure capable of addressing such issues. At the top level of the IHRC was the board of Directors, co-chaired by the current Haitian Prime Minister at the time, Jean-Max Bellerive, and former United States President Bill Clinton. Immediately under the co-chairs, are the Board of Directors members, with at least half of the members being Haitians, and the other half made of representatives of donors, who pledged each at least $100 million to the recovery funds over a period of 2 years or the sum of $200 million to be used as debt relief. The non-voting members of the board came from sectors such as

the NGOs, the Haitian Diaspora, and the Organization of the American States. Many participants complained about accusations of influence peddling, a blatant deception in the eyes of the local and international observers alike. IHO3 said that those from GoH who were close to the Clinton Foundation did not complain about the situation as it benefited them personally. Participants cited many powerful lobby organizations, that used to finance previous political campaigns and rewarded with juicy contracts from the recovery projects in return. PGO3 said some GoH Officials, "traitors" as she called them, showed no shame associating publicly with those open violations from the international community, knowing their actions will negatively affect the reconstruction effort.

Unharmonious Relationships

A sizeable number of participants believed there was an uneasiness in the work relationship among multiple sectors in the IHRC Commission. Participants mainly noted difficulties among the IHRC and local Communities, Public or Government Officials, and Issues among International Donors inside the IHRC.

To the question pertaining to whether or not the IHRC has a cordial relationship with the community that it served, the great majority of participants responded negatively. It was clear that many people in the affected communities where IHRC's selected projects were executed did not approve of the work of the Commission. CSA9, a member of the Haitian diaspora in the United States who got involved early in recovery effort way before the IHRC, described the relationship between the Commission and the Haitian community as uneasy and difficult. According to her:

> The recovery effort and the rebuilding effort lacked the voice of the Haitian community (in Haiti and abroad) in all aspects of the initiated projects. But rather, they offered their voice, but one often heard that their voices were not considered in a "meaningful" way. The methodology was flawed. The voice of those mostly impacted and most marginalized was not captured – solutions were imposed on them – not constructed with them. These people were the most affected and impacted by the designed solution. Although great efforts were made by the Haitian diaspora to provide expert feedback to those leading rebuilding efforts there was no follow-up on how these recommendations were later shared and used meaningfully during discussions of the rebuilding effort. Long standing Haitian NGOs were not given the support to continue humanitarian work they have done for years prior to the earthquake and continued after the earthquake.

Further, CSA9 added that using a joint accountability system was misleading, as the Haitian side of the Commission did not have much to say in project selection and approval for financing, as sectors of priorities identified by the community were neglected or abandoned. CSA2 indicated that the voice of the Civil Society representatives in the Commission was not heard. Consequently, she added key cultural, legal and financial elements were neglected in the process because the Haitian side did not play its role, as it should.

IHO4 underlined the lack of collaboration between Haitians and foreigners inside the IHRC. He underlined the fact that Commission members from local communities wanted to speak with one voice, but did not have the means to do so. He underlined the

fact that inside the IHRC headquarters, “there was no room for community members to meet and discuss sectors and project that should be prioritized and things were different for their foreign counterparts.” ID5 agreed with this finding and added that key donors were provided with all available resources to “call the shots” whenever they felt the need. IH3 and IH5 concurred it was unfortunate that the most “important voices were not heard,” those of people who “experienced the disaster firsthand” and who will continue to live in affected areas when all is said and done.

IHO6, a communicator representing the GoH in the Commission, quickly pointed out that projects initially submitted by the GoH were put aside to favor approved projects from sectors prioritized by key international Donors. He wrote:

> The Haitian Government was in dire need for a strategic national plan to build permanent housing, create lasting jobs, and resettle displaced people out of the Capital. These were sectors of priority identified by the Government, which were not always in sync with the plan of the international community… One clear example is when the GoH submitted a project for debris removal. The International donors refused to pay for this project and instead, they wanted to prioritize selected projects from other sectors such as Education and Agriculture. This practice created a stall in the Commission and eventually, the Donors prevailed. “Qui finance commande”: This decision among others retarded the work of the IHRC, helped to establish an uneasy and difficult relationship, and eroded trust among Government Officials and Key international Donors inside the

Commission. Browbeating by the International donors was common practice and creating an environment of fear, which impacted progress in the Commission. Many participants shared similar stories to demonstrate the lack of collaboration between GoH Officials and International Officials. CSA2, believed that there was a struggle for control among the International Donors. She added there were those from the GoH who took advantage of this situation of this conflicting relationship as they channeled private contractors to win bid illegally.

IDO7, a United Nations Official said the Haitian State was not ready to be an equal partner in the reconstruction process and they were out of resources. She added that The Haitian State did not have the organizational and institutional capacity to equally share key roles and be an equal partner in the reconstruction process. The other side of the coin was found in the opinion of IDO5, who said the GoH was not interested in accessing the funds for the reconstruction for fear of accusation of corruption. He concluded that was the reason why they appealed to the multi-donor approach for help. For IHO4, the relationship was harmonious and things could have been better if there was a better legal framework that specified proper guidelines for all aspects of the recovery efforts. CSA6, a prominent attorney in the Port-au-Prince voiced his disappointment with one of the cochairs of the IHRC, and said that legally, there were contracts that were deemed irregular and prejudicial to the interests of the Haitian State. A “Haitianization and decentralization of reconstruction process should have been done to stop the bleeding.” He added.

CSA6 concluded with the well-known Haitian proverb that promote “a grain is better than a bread” or “help me to fish, do not give me a fish” was not part of the vision and a rational for a better future for all Haitians in the international Donor circles of the IHRC. However, some participants said that conflicts among important donors created an atmosphere not conducive to conducting reconstruction operations with transparency and fairness. CSA4, and CSA5, a medical doctor in health private sector and a political party representative declared that the Government of Haiti lost the control for the reconstruction process. They added that free reign was given to many well-connected contractors close to the Clinton Foundation and its associates. IDO2, a French National working for the IDB, noticed that foreigners controlled how the money was to be spent. She added “They were the dictating force from the Donors, creating a channel of influence inside the IHRC, without which, no project can be approved.”

Participants acknowledged a serious problem regarding funds allocation. When IHRC reviewed and approved reconstruction projects, some donors directly financed selected projects based on the priorities of the home country. PGO3 and PGO8 voiced their opinions against the practice of directly financing projects, bypassing the Commission. They agreed this practice created conflict and division inside even among Donors with conflicting priorities and agendas.

Participants identified several areas of difficulties and shortcomings in the working relationship of the IHRC: legal and regulatory difficulties, financial shortcoming and cultural barriers negatively influenced the work of the Commission. IHO2, IHO3, and IHO5, all members of the Commission acknowledged that the legal and regulatory

framework of the IHRC was inadequate. According to IHO3, there were difficulties for the Haitian Congress to vote for the law that enacted the IHRC. He added the law was voted with imperfection and internally, the Commission had to create step-by-step additional guidelines.

Tension in the Alliance

Most key witness participants did not report any form of tension between the GoH and the IHRC. However, Key actors almost unanimously reported one or another form of tension in the alliance. As detailed, participants described tension or difficulties among donors, tension between the GoH and Donors Officials, tension between the Civil Society Actors and Donors Officials, and tension between Civil Society Actors and the GoH Officials.

IHO4 observed tension fighting among donors regarding the decision-making promises. First, participants IHO6, CSA2, CSA4, CSA5, and CSA6 viewed conflict between key international Donors and the GoH, noting that Government projects submitted for review to the IHRC often conflicted with donors' priorities. Instead, the Commission was influenced to approve selected projects from sectors identified by certain important donors. Some donors acknowledged tension between the United States sector and other less influential contractors. For example, local firms that have ties the Clinton foundation were accused of winning illegal bids. CSA2 and PGO3 explained the nature of the tension between the GoH and the Civil Society Officials and underlined their irresponsibility and failure to protect the population against corruption and mismanagement of the reconstruction funds.

Many participants accused members of the GoH of participating in the corruption scheme under the guidance of certain affluent donors. ID7 and ID5 identified areas of difficulties between the GoH and key foreign donors, noting how the latter ostracized the Haitian sectors. Finally, PGO2 and PGO1 expressed existing tension between the population and the Commission. They mentioned that community activists at some point, mobilized local organizations in large numbers to protest the IHRC and pressured the Haitian congress not to renew its mandate that ended on October 21, 2011. Several participants concluded tension in the alliance interfered with progress and as a result, the Commission had little to show for its accomplishments.

Emergent Theme 4: Fitness of Mechanism and Suitability Issues

This theme emerged from RQ1 and RQ2 and interview questions 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 15. One participant did not answer these questions. Out of the 30 participants who expressed their views on the fitness of the IHRC mechanism, 16 conveyed a negative opinion on it while 14 felt the reconstruction process benefited from it. Out of 30 participants who commented on the suitability of the IHRC, one half of the participants felt it was appropriate and the other half spoke about inadequacy. Out of 30 participants who spoke about the incompatibility of the IHRC in local contexts, nine felt it was appropriate and 21 did not approve of it. Out of 30 participants who spoke about a dilemma or confusion, five acknowledged positively and 25 responded no. Out of the 30 participants who spoke about the impact of the collaboration effort, 14 said yes and 16 disagreed.

Table 7 and Figures 3 through 7 show the categorical repetition data regarding outcomes of the work of the IHRC. Reasons obtained from participants to rationalize their respective views are discussed below.

Table 7

Categorical Repetition Data: IHRC Initiative Outcomes

Participants	Fitness of Mechanism		Suitability		Incompatibility in Local Contexts		Dilemma & Confusion		Impact of Collaboration	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
PGOs	4	4	5	3	1	7	0	8	4	4
IHOs	2	4	2	4	3	3	2	4	3	3
CSAs	2	7	3	6	1	8	1	8	2	7
IDOs	6	1	5	2	4	3	2	5	5	2
Total	14	16	15	15	9	21	5	25	14	16

I organized the responses into five categories. As shown in Table 7, 30 participants provided answers to the question related to the outcome of the IHRC initiative. Opinion is evenly divided over the issue of fitness, suitability and impact of the collaboration. It is important to note the difference between the CSAs and the IDOs. While the majority of CSAs thought the IHRC tool was not fit and suitable for the recovery effort, almost all the IDOs responded positively. This is an important contrast among the Haitian civil society representatives and the international donors. Additionally, majority of respondents, 21 in all, concluded that the IHRC was not incompatible to the local context of Haiti while 25 respondents said that there were no dilemma and confusion in the operations of the Commission. All eight PGOs agreed on the absence of dilemma and confusion while seven PGOs concluded there was no incompatibility issue.

Figure 3

Participants Responses Regarding IHR's Outcome on Five Topics



Participants who took positions in favor of the Commission pointed out there was urgency on the ground to act fast and the GoH was not capable to do so. Resources were lacking as many government buildings collapsed and tens of thousands of government employees perished. They felt the IHRC was suitable to the situation pointed out the urgent situation on the ground, and the need to provide shelter, food, and medical assistance, food, shelter, and rebuild schools, public buildings and roads. The demand for assistance was huge and as such, the Commission appeared to be an attractive reconstruction mechanism to address such pressing issues.

I used Figures 4 through 7 to show how each group of participants responded to questions related to the outcome of the IHRC.

Figure 4

Visualization of PGOs' Opinions on the Outcome of the IHRC



Figure 4 shows responses categorized into five yes and five no. A majority of participants who were PGOs, seven in all, pointed out that the initiative of the IHRC was compatible in the local context of Haiti. They believed that the IHRC was there to assist a government that was weakened in the aftermath of the earthquake and its presence was much needed. Only on Public Government Officer sided with the incompatibility aspect of the Commission's initiative. Additionally, all the PGOs objected to the notion that the Commission created dilemma and confusion.

Participants answered the question on the issue regarding suitability with additional comments. Opinions were divided over justification of the shared accountability mechanism, the IHRC as an appropriate answer to address issues of recovery and reconstruction in Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake. PGO3 and PGO5 believed that putting the Commission in place was the right decision at the right time and

in the right place. They used the weakness of the state and the level of destruction on the ground as the main reasons for their position. PGO1, PGO4, and PGO8 said "a national or civil society entity should have been in charge" of the reconstruction. PGO4 added the Government should have been in charge, citing the example of the earthquake that hit Northern Pakistan on October 8, 2005, where a government recovery agency oversaw the reconstruction.

Figure 5

Visualization of IHOs' Opinions on the Outcome of the IHRC



Participants who were IHOs showed a balance in their responses to the IHRC's relationship with the community and its outcome. Participants are evenly split on the issue of incompatibility as well as the overall impact of the collaboration. Two third of participants believed the Commission was not the best policy choice for the reconstruction. IHO1 and IHO4 opined that the "lack of fluidity and harmonization made

the Commission unfit and unsuitable" to address the needs of the reconstruction. There were others who spoke of the Commission with appreciation such as IHO2, IHO5 and IHO6. They felt the Commission had the ability to address the challenges of the reconstruction and cited an increase in communication could have made things a lot better. IHO5 described the state of people in the devastated areas and the gradual improvement that took place with the work of the Commission.

Figure 6

Visualization of CSAs' Opinions on the Outcome of the IHRC



The majority of participants among the CSAs found the IHRC unfit and unsuitable for carry out the tasks of the reconstruction. They complained the work of the Commission was not inclusive and excluded segments of the population. They found the Commission incompatible with the need of the population in the local context of Haiti. Among them, CAS8 and CSA9 said the Commission did not speak with one voice for all.

CSA9 said: “The Commission could have been purged to replace the bad apples as they showed zero passion for those who needed the help the most.” He added that the Commission could have been substituted altogether with a more suitable national or government body. Only CSA3, CSA1 and CSA5 answered yes to the suitability question. CSA1 believed it was the right structure for the task of reconstruction in very difficult environment.

Figure 7

Distribution of Civil Donors’ Opinions on the Outcome of the IHRC



Participants from the group of important Donors Officials showed appreciation for the work of the IHRC and almost a full majority found the Commission suitable. A majority of participants answered positively to the questions regarding fitness and sustainability ID1 said:

> I approved of the work of the IHRC and I believed then it was the right reconstruction tool, capable of bringing all donors under the same umbrella to coordinate and plan reconstruction process. The presence of the HRF played a key role in the projects approval and funds distribution which could have been a daunting task for the Commission… and all this work was done under the direction of the Haitian Government with the pledge of building back better.

ID2 stated: "To know that we assisted the number of people that we did was satisfying." AD9 stated the fact that the government actually called for help and most project were selected by the government and submitted for review. ID7 said:

> It is unfortunate that criteria that we used for projects selection and our sectors of choice were often in conflict with those of the Government… and so, the Commission was fit and suitable to the reconstruction atmosphere. More coordination was needed to fit the Commission into a well-designed national plan for recovery and reconstruction, considering the needs of people in the devastated areas with guidance from the Government of Haiti and its people.

In effect, international donors who participated in the study had a more positive view of the work of the Commission, citing that without their intervention, things could have been much worse.

Those participants welcome that idea of an alliance made of GoH officers, the CSAs and important IDOs, observed the government's incapacity to help and the willingness of both donors and civil society actors to act. They cited the broad consensus created as a compelling reason to give the Commission the mandate necessary to carry

out its mission. They cited the potential of the Commission to mobilize and gather scarce resources to construct an effective reconstruction tool to assist the population with the hope to rebuild better.

Many participants acknowledged their anticipation that creating the Commission was not the right call because they perceived it as a covert way for the international community to intervene illegally one more time in the internal affairs of an independent country. They cited historical precedents and multiple foreign interventions in the past the humiliated Haitian nationals and influenced the national dignity of which they are proud. Additionally, participants cited the work of many international donors and NGOs working in Haiti prior to the earthquake with very poor results. Finally, the GoH itself did not have credibility and was on a defensive from accusations of corruptions of all sort. For any of any combination of the cited reasons, many participants found that the creation of the Commission was not suitable to be in charge of the reconstruction initiatives.

Three subthemes emerged from the analysis of the findings related to the Fitness of Mechanism and Suitability Issues of the IHRC: public confusion dilemma, incompatibility of international intervention in local contexts, and accusations of corruption and influence peddling.

Public Confusion Dilemma

For PGO1, public confusion was never an issue in the approval and execution of reconstruction projects. All PGOs acknowledged that there was no confusion from the public as far as who was in charge. They were of the position that the IHRC was created under the request of the Haitian Government and the leadership of the Commission resided inside the government. PGO2, a ministry of planning representative in the Commission, said:

> The Government was in charge and the prime minister Bellerive as a co-chair of the Board had the authority to ensure that the Commission worked as per the mandate and that all legal and financial provisions were in place for an efficient coordination and excellent work relationship of local and local members of the alliance.

CSAs took a 180 degrees phase shift regarding this position. Except CSA7, they all found that there was confusion among the Haitian public to identify who was in charge. CSA1, CSA3 and CSA4 acknowledged that when projects stalled, it appeared that no one from the government took responsibility while the work of the IHRC was not transparent. CSA5 and CSA9 commented on the lack of communication between the actors and the public was left in the dark.

IHO1, a key donor representative accused the government of giving international NGOs licenses to operate in parallel with the work of the IHRC, often working on the same projects and not defining the role of each partner. That created a dilemma for the Commission that in some instances have stopped all funding and request for the

government intervention prior to resume work. In some instances, the GoH never interfere and the projects execution stalled or never resumed or completed. IHO3 and IHO4 complained about a lack of consensus among the partners. They underlined a lack of the public's participation in the review and selection process. IHO6 and IHO2 found information was available on the process of project selection and the legal and financial framework was well establish to avoid confusion. Perhaps we could have done a better job at "finding consensus on prioritizing sectors."

IDO1, IDO2, IDO4, IDO7 and IDO5 did not acknowledge any confusion with the public. Instead, they blamed the Haitian stakeholders for not following the guidelines of the IHRC to inform the public on its many achievements. IDO6 noticed the legal guidelines of the IHRC were incomplete and that was a dilemma for the Commission. He affirmed that many in the international community had prioritized sectors for investment way before the Commission was established and it was difficult to find consensus. He added that "the priority" of the Government and the Civil Society actors "were often not in harmony with ours." The GAO report was in agreement with this finding and many in the Haitian population were confused on who was in charge.

Incompatibility of International Intervention in Local Contexts

PGO2 is the only one participant from the group of Government or Public Officers who openly said yes to the question of incompatibility of the incompatibility of international direct intervention on local contexts such as the one presented in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti. PGO2 cited the need for the Government to access funds that were not readily available and "the weakness and lack of capacity of the state

to effectively manage the efforts of the recovery alone." All other participants in this group responded negatively, they cite questions related to state independence and the constant effort by international actors to undermine the actions of the government. PGO5 cited the lack of trust as a major issue in international interventions in local contexts. In the case of Haiti, it was not different. He anticipated the work relationship to be one sided and under exclusive control of the international donors. Trust in the relationship.

IHOs Participants were equally split on the question of incompatibility of international intervention in local context. IHO1, IHO2 and IHO4 favored international contribution as they called it. IHO1 said:

> The IHRC had a special structure and represented a rare model in the world, where the Actors inside the Commission were designated jointly by the Haitian authorities and international actors. What was special about the IHRC resided in behavior of the so-called 'friends of Haiti' countries did not just hold Haiti's hand and decide for Haiti. Instead, they sat down with the country at a table, and planned a joint Commission to facilitate the reconstruction effort.

These participants said the IHRC was not a unilateral intervention of the international community and in that sense, it was a smart policy to build cooperation between PGOs, CSAs and IHOs for an effective disaster intervention. IHO3, IHO5, and IHO6 opined against International participation in local contexts. They viewed such intervention as a means for control and domination. In that sense, IHO5 described the IHRC as a "structure for occupation established by key actors of the international community with the collaboration of local actors."

Except CSA2, all CSAs found all international interventions to be incompatible to local contexts and in the case of the IHRC, they pointed out the urgency on the ground was not a valid reason to enter into a blind international intervention. Notwithstanding that the GoH did not have the capacity to act alone, they should have created a national reconstruction entity and seek for financing with a multi-donors approach. They rejected any justification for an international intervention of foreign entities into the affairs of an independent state. CSA5 said:

> Lack resources, destruction of many government buildings, and the death of ten thousands of government employees, were insufficient grounds to justify national humiliation and alienation of your own people…In the midst of this chaotic situation, a national recovery and reconstruction body was necessary under local Government's direction to fulfill its obligation to assist a population in need. The government of Haiti had no constitutional authority to request the intervention of international actors to be directly involved… and this joint accountability framework was an excuse to hand over control to negative forces in the international community.

CSA7 said the worse thing is that no national independent audit system was in place "to oversee the application of performance, anti-corruption and good governance principles."

IDO1, PGO3, and PGO9 voiced their opinions to say the Commission was compatible in the Haitian local context. They pointed out the urgent situation on the

ground, and the need to provide shelter, food, and medical assistance, food, shelter, and rebuild schools, public buildings and roads. PGO3 said:

> The demand for assistance was huge and as such, the Commission appeared to be an attractive reconstruction mechanism to address such pressing issues. The idea of international help gave birth to the alliance that created the IHRC. Government Officers, Civil Society members and important International Donors, observed the Government's incapacity to help decided to get involved in a joint relationship to provide efficient recovery assistance to the Haitian people. We must not forget that thousands of people from the international community died in the earthquake and that changed the national nature of the assistance.

They cited the broad consensus that was created under the GoH's leadership as a compelling reason to demonstrate that creating the Commission in this context was the best course of action. PGO9 noticed there was a potential of the Commission to mobilize and gather scarce resources to construct an effective reconstruction tool to assist the population with the hope to rebuild a better way. Four other participants disagreed with this position and found the Commission out of touch with the real needs of the Haitian people. They indicated that the mere presence of Commission reduced the capacity of the government to govern effectively and provide necessary solutions to the reconstruction problems. According to PGO2 and PGO8, the initiatives of the Commission weakened the Government of Haiti in its constitutional duty to serve its people.

Accusations of Corruption and Influence Peddling

IHO3 disclosed that on one side, the GoH lost credibility from accusations of corruption that predated the earthquake. He added that this is probably why the GoH asked the intervention of donors to add credibility to the process. IHO4 said many NGOs and international financial institutions were accused of bringing their own experts to Haiti to take the money back to the original country and for that matter, trust from the public was limited. IHO4 said the legal framework of the IHRC did not include specific guidelines and legal provisions on credibility and trust issues from Donors, the GoH, and local communities.

IHO2 noted that because the legal framework was deficient, members of the Commission had to operate in gray areas in many circumstances. IHO5 recognized the lack of coordination was caused mainly from not having the proper regulatory guidelines for leaders to follow.

CSA1 underlined the lack of legal guidance within the structure of the IHRC. It allowed the more powerful members, certain donors from the international community to abuse their power and make unilateral decisions in approving and finding several projects. ID7 and IHO2 blamed accusations of mismanagement on the lack of clarity in the laws governing the day-to-day operations of the IHRC. PG9, PG7, and PGO2 shared the opinion that there were no serious legal issues for the IHRC and that it was guidelines and procedures were dictated in the charter authorizing the creation and work procedures for the IHRC. CSA3 and CSA8 believed even the laws voted by the Haitian Congress and approved by the GoH were illegal and the creation of the Commission is “another attempt

of the international community to undermine the independence of Haiti" which they claimed, was obtained from the "blood of their ancestors." ID1 concluded that uncertainty about the mandate of the IHRC created a serious legal issue, especially for projects whose completion projection expanded beyond the 18 months mandate of the Commission. IDO4 added there was indication from key members of the Haitian Senate not to vote in favor of renewing the mandate of the IHRC once it expired.

IHO4 believed the Commission had trouble raising funds to finance the multitude of projects in line. He added that despite the hard work of the Commission to give international donors appearance of confidence, in many instances, they did not follow through with their pledge commitment. PGO1 and PGO5 concurred that donors failed to deliver on their promises. IHO3 reported they were projects that started and never completed for lack of fund. He concluded that in some instances, projects could not be delivered on time and remain incomplete for either the lack of funds or late funds disbursement. IHO3, a Haitian National who serve on the Commission, blamed the Haitian Government for not doing what governments do to protect their citizen. Instead, He outlined the fact that the GoH became accomplice of the international community in robbing their own country. Participants voiced their opinion that the main issues guiding the IHRC were financial in nature in accordance with its mission to approve and facilitate funding of reconstruction projects. In that regard, ID2 cautiously indicated that there were difficulties in approving projects for funding, as it was difficulty finding common ground on the amount of money to spend and identifying projects that meet conflicting priorities. ID4 and ID5 abounded in a similar direction, confirming financial conflict among sectors

within the Commission, delaying projects execution. In some instances, PGO3 stated that entire packages of projects were put aside to satisfy priorities set by key sectors when common grounds could not be found.

The findings revealed that the IHRC instituted the policy of not including in its review the extent to which a selected project is projected to secure funding. However, this review policy in part created a gap between projects committed funds and projects cost estimate. PGO5 and PGO6 stated that projects were not always in line with the Government's sector strategy as indicated clear guidelines. CSA7 noticed that must show apparent social benefits, but the potential to promote economic development and sustainable change was lacking.

Emergent Theme 5: Impact of the IHRC

This theme emerged from RQ3 and interview questions 4, 6, 10, and 12-14. One of the key issues that arose from the exchanges with participants relates to the impact of the work of the Commission on the overall reconstruction. Table 7 and figure 3 showed the opinions were evenly split on this issue. Two subthemes emerged from the analysis of the findings related to the impact of the IHRC: impact of collaboration and conceptual considerations.

Impact of Collaboration

IHO3, a former member of the Commission and member of the international community said:

> The international community responded to the earthquake by rushing in relief resources and making various assets such as helicopters, land vehicles, field

> hospitals, engineering equipment, tents, temporary housing, and water filtration plants at the disposal of the Commission to help earthquake-affected communities. We would like to thank everyone involved and who provided priceless help to the stricken people Haiti in these very difficult times.

IHO1 said that the work of the Commission saved lives in the short term and provided a means for many to get back on their feet and rebuild their own communities. IHO1 said:

> We build schools, repaired roads, support agricultural projects and provided many small businesses the support they needed to get back on their feet. It was unfortunate that much of the pledge did not materialize by the end of the mandate of the Commission. “It is so sad that it was work in progress.

Most CSAs concluded it was anticipated that creating the Commission was not the right call and as usual, the work of the international community was not going to produce any dividend. CSA1, CSA4, CSA7, and CSA8 all agreed that the issue of corruption and lack of transparency affected the outcome of the Commission. Waste and looting were also very common in many work sites established by the IHRC. The securitization of the process was not taken in charge neither by the government not by the Donors and the presence of the police was insufficient to prevent or stop those who repeatedly broke the laws. CSA5, and CSA2 explained hope the work of the Commission saved communities of people who required assistance. CSA2 said: “We benefited positively, and they did the best they could knowing the circumstances.”

Most PGOs were also divided on this issue. PGO1, PGO2, PGO5, and PG7 acknowledged the work of the Commission on the ground and assessed a positive impact overall. Without the contribution of the international community, and specifically key donors of the international community, scores of people could have been homeless until today. They were grateful to the bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and concluded that the country is better off today although Congress, under serious pressure from segments of the population did not extend the mandate of the Commission. PGO6 and PGO9 cited past historical events and multiple foreign interventions in the past that humiliated Haitian nationals and negatively affected the national dignity. Additionally, PGO8 cited the work of many IDOs and NGOs working in Haiti prior to the earthquake with very poor results.

Participants who were former donors overwhelmingly agreed that the impact of the Commission was positive. They cited many projects that they accomplished with the Commission. IDO4 and IDO7 said that key outcomes and impact were overall positive. Interview data showed participants were divided on the realizations of the Commission's reconstruction initiatives. They acknowledged that there was an effort made to get the job done, but the objectives were not met. They affirmed a feeling of dissatisfaction on the work of the Commission expressed from all stakeholders involved in the reconstruction effort. IDO1 stated that the large international humanitarian pledge from donors was estimated at $10 billion over 10 years. However, only a small portion of that fund were disbursed by March 2011. He added while baseline data was not collected to show projects' impact on the ground, the IHRC had approved projects for $3 billion which

represent 30% of donors' pledge. Many participants who are accustomed to the work of the Commission concurred that no one was in a position to provide a true accountability of the work of the IHRC at the time. The Commission was under fire from critics who accused members of not taking the necessary steps to publish ongoing transparency and accountability reports that demonstrated the status of all approved projects. For some participants, this was a missed opportunity for Haiti to address the devastations of the earthquake and establish the foundations for real social change in the country as a whole.

Conceptual Considerations

When considering the Haitian experience, participants shared the position that a joint or shared accountability mechanism should be used only in situations where carefully selected conditions are met. All stakeholders must be involved in the conceptualization at the onset and participate concurrently in its elaboration. Proper legal guidelines must be established and all red tapes must be anticipated to avoid delays and frustration. There should be an independent body to oversee all operations and arbitrate situations of conflict and misunderstandings. There should be a system in place to facilitate communication, take the media onboard by giving access and sharing international data so they can inform the public. Projects should not be reviewed and approved based on donors' pledge, but on funds that are already collected. Stakeholders should have equitable rights in selecting projects and sectors of priority. Appropriate mechanisms should be put in place to track funds project allocation and the publication of this data should be available for transparency and accountability. The political will must be present at the community level, not just from central government and key donors, as it

will guide stakeholders to find people-centered solutions. The path of recovery should belong to the people who live in the communities, not to outsiders. To avoid duplication of projects, all local and international NGOs, private organizations and donors must be registered with the state and their work must be recorded and frequently updated. The creation of a shared accountability mechanism such as the IHRC is appropriate when proper conditions such as the ones mentioned are met, and audit and scrutiny must be rigorous and independent. In the alternative or ideally, there should be a full-time permanent disaster management entity, with disaster preparedness strategies and adapted contingency plan for a swift and effective response. The most important lesson learned is that ad hoc response will not work in every case.

Other Considerations and Issues

Findings were divided regarding outcomes of recovery and reconstruction initiatives of the IHRC in the aftermath of the earthquake. On one side, many participants believed the IHRC Commission facilitated the reconstruction efforts in ways that saved lives, provided food and shelter, rebuilt schools, churches, government building and roads, and secured important investments in healthcare in agriculture. Most felt the Commission did not do enough when considering the pledge of billions of dollars and said openly the international community and the GoH have collaboratively mismanaged reconstruction funds or wasted a great opportunity. Several participants argued that the totality of the funds promised were never delivered and most projects suffered for lack financing. There were funds pledged that never came for projects that were approved in reconstruction pipeline. Opinions were also divided on the suitability and fitness of the

Commission to facilitate the reconstruction process. They acknowledged that using such an international mechanism for many participants in a local context is not always the best solution. The majority did not share the idea that the Commission created a perception of public confusion and dilemma. Finally, opinions were divided on the impact of the work of the Commission to facilitate the review, approval and funding of reconstruction projects.

One thing is for sure, the magnitude of the disaster required attention from all, and somehow, in the absence of a national or government agency with the capacity to act, the socio-economic dynamics at the time necessitated the creation of the IHRC. Mandates and all legal guidelines should have been integrated into the overall reconstruction plan in a systematic fashion. In addition, people who lived in the devastated areas and those who lost love ones should have had a direct way to provide input in the decision-making process with an independent mechanism to regulate and oversee the day-to-day operations for transparency and accountability.

Summary

Chapter 4 includes procedures that were adopted and findings extracted from collected data. I used the research questions to create 15 interview questions and guide the research discovery process. Analysis of interview data from 31 respondents provided rich and contextual data involving participants' experiences with the IHRC. Insights received from participants revealed practices of the IHRC and their impact on the recovery process in the aftermath of the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

I used interview questions 2, 3, 5, 9, and 15 to find meaningful responses to RQ1. Three themes resulted from participants' responses to this question: structure of the IHRC, the shared accountability dilemma, and fitness and suitability issues. Participants acknowledged that the role of stakeholders in joint collaborations was not clearly defined by the IHRC. Second, there was an insufficient legal framework to deal with complaints and deceptions. Finally, findings indicated that there was a lack of consensus regarding project selection and means to facilitate project coordination among representatives of civil society organizations, the international community, and public sector institutions. Findings also showed a lack of desire in the international community and Haitian nationals to work side by side to facilitate the reconstruction effort. Many participants acknowledged that the plan to work collaboratively to prioritize recovery needs and improve living conditions of the Haitian people in affected regions did not fully come to fruition.

I created interview questions 1, 7, 8, and 11 to answer RQ2. I extracted three themes: uneasy alliance and cooperation, the shared responsibility dilemma, and fitness and suitability issues. I explored the nature of the relationship that existed between various stakeholders of the IHRC. Participants expressed concerns regarding lack of cooperation that negatively affected effectiveness of the IHRC's structure. Participants expressed concerns regarding dominance of the international faction and indicated that the structure of the IHRC was not suitable to address challenges of recovery. Many participants blamed deficiencies on the mandate and jurisdiction of the IHRC in terms of failing to anticipate legal, financial, and cultural problems and provide matching and

adapted solutions. Participants were divided on issue of tension within the Commission. Finally, in spite of several challenges, work relationships provided certain benefits. Participants disagreed about the exact nature of the work relationship inside the Commission. There was no unanimity on this issue. Many participants felt the relationship was cordial, while others complained about uneasiness inherent in this cooperative relationship.

I created interview questions 4, 6, 10, 12, 13, and 14 to answer RQ3. My objective was to discover the role of the IHRC in terms of outcomes of recovery collaboration efforts. Again, the work of the IHRC did not positively influence communities as per its mandate. Findings indicated that in spite of many instances of success, the overall effectiveness of the IHRC was questionable. Participants acknowledged accusations of corruption, mismanagement, lack of communication and transparency compounded by a cultural predisposition for xenophobia in the Haitian society that exacerbated negative perceptions and affected the work of Commission.

This chapter included a description of the interview process as well as demographics of study participants. I described the selection process, my role as the researcher, and data collection and analysis processes. I used NVivo 12 to extract codes, identify patterns, and create emergent themes to answer the research questions. I carefully showed evidence of rigor during the research process in order to guarantee trustworthiness of study results and findings. In Chapter 5, I interpreted findings and discussed results and limitations of the inquiry. Finally, I explored implications of the study for social change and provided recommendations and a conclusion.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

This study was intended to provide a better understanding of experiences of participants regarding the IHRC and its shared accountability policies in the aftermath of the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti. In order to achieve this goal, I collected, analyzed, and examined interview transcript data from 31 participants to discover how stakeholders engaged the IHRC to facilitate recovery efforts. In this chapter, I incorporated, synthesized, and evaluated findings in relation to research questions and the purpose of the study. I discussed limitations and proposed recommendations for future research. I also addressed social change implications.

I used a qualitative case study methodology. I interpreted findings from analysis and examination of participant transcript data to provide conclusions in this chapter. Conditions inherent to the magnitude of the devastation in the aftermath of the earthquake, difficulties of the recovery process, and factors that influenced opinions of participants compelled me to use the qualitative case study methodology. I collected transcript data from 31 participants to analyze and understand the shared accountability mechanisms of the IHRC. I carefully selected participants, PGOs, IGOs, IHOs and CSAs to acquire diverse experiences and knowledge regarding the Commission. Participants provided answers to 15 interview questions derived from three main research questions. I used multiple choice and open-ended follow-up questions to gather a complete set of answers. Participants shared their experiences and data were collected, and analyzed using manual coding and NVivo 12 to extract meanings. The analysis process resulted in

five themes that produced findings and conclusions on shared accountability mechanisms of the IHRC in Haiti. This knowledge can contribute to literature in a wider context.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. Initially, I present an overview and interpretation of findings. I then address limitations of the research study, provide key recommendations for future research studies, and reveal implications for social change. This study was grounded in the conceptual framework of SCT to analyze the structures that made up the IHRC and emphasize the social dimension of the recovery challenge. Information from this study can be useful in terms of addressing global social change. I present practical information in order to lead to informed decisions, and further implementation of policy designs.

Interpretation of Research Findings

After acquiring a deep understanding of the literature, I proceeded to collect, analyze, and extract meaning from interview transcript data of 31 participants. Participants were individuals who had knowledge of or were experienced with the IHRC's joint accountability approach in terms of addressing recovery needs. Although there was a large body of literature on post-earthquake recovery initiatives, there was a lack of information about shared accountability mechanisms, involving the IHRC in its disaster recovery initiatives. The literature review in Chapter 2 explained the gap and need for further research regarding use of multinational joint accountability mechanisms in post disaster environments. This study contributed to the existing body of knowledge on earthquake recovery and reconstruction. Knowledge acquired from this study can be used to guide decision makers in places with similar socioeconomic conditions and

contexts. I used findings to construct five main themes, from which I extracted meanings and conclusions for the study.

Discussions of Findings for RQ1

RQ1: How did Haiti coordinate post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction tasks through the joint accountability mechanism of the IHRC?

Reconstruction collaborative effort through the shared accountability mechanism of the IHRC were uncoordinated, unplanned, and conflicted.

I constructed interview questions 2, 3, 5, 9, and 15 from RQ1. Main themes 1 through 3 emerged from all participant responses to those five interview questions. Themes involved structure of the IHRC, the shared accountability dilemma, and uneasiness and lack of cooperation inside the Commission. Many participants expressed negative opinions regarding the organizational structure of the IHRC. Two subthemes emerged as a result. First, participants complained there was influence peddling on the board of the Commission. The assumption was that the board members of the IHRC came together to carry out one mission, which was to address collectively recovery needs and reconstruction in the aftermath of the earthquake. In reality, each sector had its own priority and unanimity was lacking on project selection and execution. Many participants concluded that the concurrent existence of those various sectors inside the IHRC was counterproductive. Often, representatives of each sectors appeared to work together while projecting an image of independence from the Commission's mandate. Many of the institutions that created the IHRC were governed by opposing ideologies, creating a lack of trust and tension.

There were divisions inside the IHRC. On one side, representatives of the GoH and the CSAs complained that their counterparts representing the international community managed the Commission unilaterally, undermining the common mandate they shared. Most participants denounced this behavior as it affected the moral and work environment inside the Commission. Additionally, accusations of mismanagement affected how the people in the community perceived and cooperated with the Commission. The issue was compounded when many local organizations voiced being left out in the recovery process. This situation affected unity among the different sectors inside the IHRC and brought confusion and mistrust among the Haitian populace. Tension existed on the local front as well. CSAs blamed the GoH for their apparent unwillingness to face their international partners and plead for better budget planning and funds allocation and appropriation. The Haitian population did not perceive the work of the IHRC in a positive manner as words of mismanagement spread and impacted the overall effort.

I addressed lack of an adequate legal and logistical framework to carry out the mission of the alliance. When the IHRC was created in March 2010, 3 months after the earthquake, there was no clarity regarding responsibilities and duties. Participants acknowledged blame shifting in difficulties to oversee performance and apply sanctions when necessary. Stakeholders came together to create this joint agency collaboration without carefully integrating mechanisms to address joint working issues that were vital for the realization of reconstruction projects. It became clear that many responsibilities remained undetermined. Participants addressed ambiguous accountability issues inside

the Commission, which created conflicts among key partners, undermining reconstruction efforts. When sectors compete for por project execution, the GoH's selection was often neglected over the priorities of more powerful international donors. Many participants acknowledged that some donors had preferences for reconstruction projects that did not coincide either with needs on the ground or the will of local authorities. Haitians inside the Commission that were animated with nationalistic sentiment complained regarding this matter.

In spite of the fact that Haitian Congress authorized the creation of the IHRC from almost a deadlock vote, it was clear that the mandate was minimal and did not cover all aspects of its operations. Participants expressed great concerns from the Commission's officials, making decisions with no matching provisions and guidelines in the law. Additionally, participants revealed that because of the magnitude of the destruction, finding qualified workers, adequate office space and supplies influenced projects selections, priority and execution.

The research findings led to the conclusion that governance inside the IHRC did not have a suitable structure to address the needs of the recovery efficiently. According to Mayunga (2007), in post disaster contexts, social capital, the underlying theoretical framework for the study, facilitates collective actions through mutual coordination and collaboration. Social capital was not mobilized and integrated enough in the structure of the Commission. A majority of participants expressed both frustration and deception for lack of social compact and implication in decision making process of the IHRC. Additionally, many participants suggested this situation could be rooted in the poor

governance heritage of the country (Kwon & Kim, 2014). Others linked it to the refusal of the international sectors of the Commission to allow the balance of interests among the stakeholders to promote effective utilization of resources contrary to the teachings of Fudin and Rahayu (2019).

The literature review of chapter 2 suggested that public participation increases the likelihood of obtaining better results in community initiatives, strengthens both the community and democratic institutions (Brody et al., 2003; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Putnam, 1995). It makes sense to say that the lack public integration and participation in the decision-making process created situations of conflict that justify the lack of performance and reduction of expected positive outcome. The next question analyses the dilemma of the joint accountability aspect of the IHRC.

Discussions of Findings for RQ2

RQ2: What kind of relationship existed among community leaders, the Haitian government, and international partners working through the IHRC?

Participants acknowledged that joint accountability was a dilemma that hampered the work of the Commission.

I constructed interview questions 1, 7, 8, and 11 from RQ2. Main Themes 2, 3, and 4 emerged from 31 participants' responses to those four interview questions. Themes 2, 3, and 4 revealed participants opinions regarding the shared accountability dilemma, the uneasy alliance and cooperation and fitness of mechanism and suitability issues inside the alliance respectively. Question 2 established that the joint accountability mechanism of the IHRC did not fit well with its objectives. The mandate of the Commission was to

materialize the ideals and vision of the reconstruction. Most participants acknowledged the lack of harmonization in the shared accountability mechanism put in place inside the Commission. Billions of dollars in pledge did not materialize. The IHRC was incapable of pulling resources together from donors and partners to meet its strategic goals.

The findings of question 2 raised the concern that many participants the joint accountability approach incompatible promoted values that were not easy to reconcile. Each international donor acted to satisfy the objectives of its donating country while the Haitian actors became frustrated overtime. Participants appreciated the theoretical aspect of the collaboration, as the IHRC was meant to perform as a well-oiled machine. Cultural differences engendered unwarranted controversies and tensions at a time when coordinated and harmonious coexistence was imperative. Actors in the collaboration could not play their respective roles as this created tension and hampered progress. This particular problem has other consequences. Many participants voiced their opinion of the existing power vacuum inside the IHRC. The situation exacerbated to a point where, the Commission did not have any identifiable authority in charge. Each sector acted independently and questions from the public remained unanswered. This generated confusion and mistrust from the Haitian public that was culturally accustomed to abuse from its public servants.

Even prior to the earthquake, Haiti had always been a victim of rogue governments and institutional abuse and authoritarianism. It was important for policymakers of the Commission to understand that a joint accountability mechanism in the Haiti context should envisage and consider historical and cultural dynamics

associated with harmonization and coordination. Participants raised the issue of a lack of consensus over project selection and execution. In many instances, international donors pressured other Commission members to implement unilaterally certain projects, bypassing the selection process. This was done in many cases in the interest of well-connected and powerful lobbyists and donors, ignoring the mandate of the strategic plan.

For the Commission to achieve the recovery goals, there was a necessity to balance the interests of the different stakeholders for effective utilization of available resources. The justification for the shared accountability model was found in the premise that the GoH was not capable of addressing the needs of the recovery alone. As presented in the literature review, shared accountability plays an important role when building social capital to address disaster recovery challenges. While social capital is tantamount to access resources and capabilities to plan the recovery and reconstruction stages (Coleman, 1988; Uzzi, 1996), inter-organizational collaboration, through joint-accountability, requires that organizations share control and accountability for recovery projects (Kloth & Applegate, 2004). Participants revealed that the IHRC did not develop the collaborative capacity required to manage the recovery as planned. Each agency stakeholder did not contribute to support information sharing and planning to access to various resources relevant to a successful collaboration (Hocevar et al., 2011). The findings concluded that funds were not disbursed on time for important projects, and often the money never came. Furthermore, participants said there were influence peddling and accusation of corruption among members of the Commission.

The process did not allow possibilities for stakeholders, with one voice, to guide and sustain recovery projects for more effective collective results. Participants acknowledged that the main dilemma resided in a lack of consensus on goals, strategies, structures, and mechanisms established to build collaborative capacity inside the IHRC for better results. Additionally, stakeholder organizations did not establish clear communication channels, efficient strategies to leverage shared resources to positively affect recovery outcomes. It sufficed to conclude the joint accountability mechanism of the IHRC did not provide adequate operational structures to efficiently address the recovery initiatives. The next question discusses the outcome of the recovery effort.

Discussions of Findings for RQ3

RQ3: What was the role of the IHRC in the outcomes of the recovery collaboration effort?

A majority of 18 participants acknowledged that the IHRC was a missed opportunity and that it did not deliver its promises in the recovery effort.

I constructed interview questions 4, 6, 10, 12, 13 and 14 from RQ3. Main theme 5 emerged from 31 participants' responses to those six interview questions. Theme 5 raised issues regarding the impact of the IHRC collaboration in the recovery and proposed key conceptual considerations. Based on question 3 findings, participants expressed their disappointments in the work of the IHRC in general and the lack of cooperation among the different sectors in particular. The Board of the IHRC had a role to monitor adherence to organizational objectives and making sure the continuous performance of the Commission throughout the recovery and reconstruction process (GOA Report, 2011).

The majority of participants acknowledged the lack of efficiency and performance of the Commission due in part to a lack of cohesiveness and various other challenges. Among these challenges, they mentioned delays in funding, lack of planning and resources. Fragmented authorities and unenforced policies inside the IHRC created tension that jeopardized the sustainability of many reconstruction projects. Additionally, factors such as finding skilled workers or experts in the aftermath of the earthquake destructions affected the effectiveness of the effort.

Many participants, especially those from the international community mentioned the long-standing weakness in the Haitian institutions that complicated the overall effort. Namely, they put the blame of the GoH limited legislative, institutional and regulatory capacity to efficiently control and manage a recovery effort based on the many constraints and changes of the devastation. Participants close to the top the Haitian sectors of the IHRC openly blamed foreign members of the board for unilaterally imposing their will on the Commission. They overlooked the pressing needs in the country to satisfy the interests of powerful donors in the international sectional sectors, they said. International influence or politics had a major influence in the policy choice and projects implementation of the IHRC. As explained, when the work of the Commission started, the joint-accountability mechanism as established to address the needs of the recovery effort. Participants stated that no serious effort was made to plan and implement projects according to the expressed will of those survived the disaster. There was not a sufficient effort made to integrate the people who witnessed what happened and best understood the needs of the reconstruction. Participants also

recognized that the absence of a single national entity to oversee projects selection, planning and execution processes erected as a major obstacle to progress.

The absence of a strong framework to guide the effort of the reconstruction through the IHRC was partly responsible for the lack of success, conceded some participants. The joint-accountability mechanism that was put in place did not provide enough guidelines to orient the action plan of the reconstruction. It did not establish the boundaries of each sector as they worked collaboratively towards the same goal. There were too many assumptions on the part of the framers of the Commission. The questions as to how to work together and who must oversee the cooperation had no answers in the mandate. There was no strategy put in place to foresee and overcome major cultural and strategical differences among members of the Commission. The boundaries for defined responsibility and operational, social and economic costs were not drawn. As a result, the suitability of IHRC's mechanism in terms of its shared responsibility emerged as a major factor impacting the outcome of the reconstruction endeavor.

Question 3 also answered the issue pertaining to the reasons why the international community participated in the effort. Mainly, participants expressed concerns regarding the level of devastation and the loss of lives, which had no precedent in this region of the world. At the same time, many participants acknowledged the fact that the inefficiency of the Commission and its lack of effective results constituted an opportunity loss. The IHRC could have taken steps to ensure planning, monitoring, and evaluation of reconstruction activities. Additionally, the GoH could have work closely with the IHRC in order to make it more operational. The IHRC could have integrated feedback from

local communities into projects implementation and execution. Projects funding could have been more in line with the realities on the ground as the priorities were not well identified. Haitian priorities invited the Commission to invest more of its funds to debris removal, while attention was focused on other sustainable projects such as agriculture, thereby slowing down the speed of the reconstruction. A strategic plan could have been developed to clary priorities prior to projects planning and implementation.

The findings of this study revealed that the IHRC was a missed opportunity for Haiti to recover from the earthquake's devastation. Additionally, participants noted they could have used the structures of the reconstruction to address governance issues and promote economic development and sustainability for the entire country.

Governance networks focus on promoting public goods through policy making in a collaborative manner (Isett et al., 2011). These networks take different shapes depending on the field of endeavor, the community in question, and the leadership in place. Participants noted that the absence of good governance and the right leadership accelerated the failure of the Commission to deliver on its promises.

Kenis and Provan (2009) said in a disaster environment, leadership may take the form of a shared governance network, a lead organization structure and an administrative organization. For an administrative organization, one single organization manages the recovery process. In the case of shared governance network, each partner organization has the same status while in the lead organization structure, the lead partner takes the lead with the support of the other partner organizations during the entire process. Obviously, there are advantages and inconveniences attached to each structure. Stakeholders must

carefully study the context of the disaster to select a structure that is adapted and effective. Mandell and Keast (2008) said outcomes are often linked to the nature of community, the network type selected, and the stakeholders involved.

In post disaster Haiti, the IHRC was created under these guidelines with the objectives to obtain maximum results. Participants acknowledged that because the already weakened institutions of Haiti were destroyed and the culture of good governance was absent. Creating the Commission with a shared accountability structure was presented as an opportunity to achieve maximum results. However, they noted that factors associated with neo-colonial influences, a culture of greed and corruption of the elites, and governance flaws turned the Commission into a missed opportunity and contributed to the lack of positive end results.

Limitations of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative inquiry was to explore the shared accountability mechanism of the IHRC and provide a better understanding of its public policy approach and implementation in addressing the needs of the recovery in the post-earthquake Haiti. I collected, analyzed and interpreted data from 31 participants to discover findings and draw conclusions. Just like other studies that use opinions and perceptions of participants, this study has its limitations. I approached the study with neutrality to avoid any bias and remain objective throughout the process.

Another limitation was the sample size of 31 participants compared to the entire population affected. While this sample may appear to be restrictive, the emphasis placed on participants' experience and knowledge of the phenomenon compensated for its size.

The earthquake resulted in an estimated death toll of 230,000 people and affected the millions of others. Therefore, the focus was on the public policy measures that could be adopted to save or improve lives.

Additionally, there were limitations inherent to the sensitive and vulnerable nature of the matter. To remedy this situation, I had to build trust, finding ways to stress on the importance of the inquiry, when inviting participants to cooperate (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1987). Many participants considered some information confidential and were timid in answering certain questions for fear of being recognized. Finally, there was a cultural element involved as many participants of Haitian origin do not cultivate the habit of participating in studies of this nature. I was able to circumvent all these challenges and used reliable and efficient qualitative research design and data collection methods.

Recommendations

Although the conceptualization of the IHRC was inspired by conditions on the ground, the findings suggested that its implementation did not fully consider and factor in the Haitian cultural and socio-economic conditions. As a result, the joint accountability mechanism of the IHRC, in many instances, collided with local perceptions and expectations. Nevertheless, the study provided a lens for a better understanding of the role of the IHRC in the post-earthquake recovery effort. The discipline and rigor applied to the data collection and analysis methods gave assurance that the findings of this study can be extended to other research inquiries in Haiti and produced similar results. Generalization in this context might work, especially if the sample size is increased to

allow more voices to be heard. A larger sample size can produce more noticeable patterns, thus providing better support for generalizing the findings.

To ensure transferability, further research must consider the cultural, geographical and historical challenges of Haiti that are in many ways unique and unparalleled. Additionally, further scholarly research inquiries would require the use of the quantitative method of study with multiple data strands to facilitate triangulation of findings and produce more insightful and robust conclusions. This approach would provide an additional level of analysis, with a range of tools to enhance data manipulation and supplement the ability to validate data interpretation as the study evolved.

The findings showed the absence of good governance did have an adverse effect on disaster preparedness and recovery in Haiti. Future research in this field can explore ways in which local good governance can add significant value to shared accountability in disaster management in light of threats such as hurricanes and earthquakes that constantly loom over Haiti.

Implications for Social Change

Throughout the entire study, it was obvious that the conceptualization of the IHRC did not fully factor in the internal or local conditions. It was clear that the IHRC, from the start, ignored perceptions and expectations, directly linked to local conditions. The joint accountability mechanism put in place was dependent on the people, their culture and customs, the geographical location of the regions affected, and the communities. All these factors influenced in some fashion the work of the Commission and the outcome of the recovery in general. In the case of the IHRC, it was considered

too foreign and not adapted to the realities of the local context. Many participants acknowledged that there were major differences in international organizational norms versus local standards. For example, many Haitians became apathetic and complacent towards the process because of lack of understanding of cultural practices put in place by the international faction of the Commission. In such contexts, the international community should seek to welcome and integrate local cultural elements into the process in cases of disaster recovery and reconstruction. This practice could lead to a conceptualization blended with local concerns in the context of countries that match the outlook and profile of Haiti.

A traditional approach in the case of the January 12, 2010 earthquake could not have been utilized. When disaster strike, the affected country put in place its own recovery mechanism and often has the capacity to receive foreign assistance and dispatch it accordingly. In the case of Haiti, a joint accountability mechanism was proposed and justified with two main reasons: the level of devastation that took place and the weakness of the governmental institutions at the time. Most of government buildings had been destroyed and thousands of government workers died during the earthquake. Managing the aftermath of the earthquake became a challenge for the IHRC as recruiting competent staff became a major issue. It was revealed that this was one of many challenges the IHRC had to face. In addition, participants acknowledged that because Haiti was considered the poorest nation in the western hemisphere, local government and leaders in the private sectors had difficulties to gather enough resources, financial and human capital, to address the challenges of the disaster. It would benefit the people of Haiti to

establish a permanent structure to address recovery and reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of disasters.

Lastly, in recent years, Haiti, just like many other countries in the Caribbean, has been a victim of a wide range of natural disasters such as drought, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods and landslides. Unlike its neighbors, the potential for major destruction and the loss of live there is more catastrophic. The environmental, physical location and socio-economic conditions exacerbate the situation and help create a vicious cycle that make Haiti one of the most vulnerable nations in the global stage. As a result, Haiti needs to educate its people on disaster prevention and preparation and establish a permanent and effective entity to address post disaster management. That new entity must be tasked the creation of more solid and permanent infrastructure, urban planning with disaster proof building codes. The fragility of its health system must be integrated inside a strategic plan for disaster preparation and recovery.

Based on participants findings, there should be a reassessment of the organizational structure to allow a shift in the management style where the developing country would take the lead of the initiative. In the case of Haiti, such change was not easy, considering the amount of devastation that took place and the history of resistance and power struggle that existed between Haiti and its more powerful foreign partners and donors. Such approach would encourage new relationship with external actors, and as a result, creating a paradigm shift to promote economic development and long-term sustainability. Such practice would encourage the perspective that capacity development is an indigenous process and with the support of the foreign stakeholders, the concern

country would develop its own projects based on its culture, tools, guidelines and strategies.

Conclusion

This exploratory case study inquired on the experiences of the IHRC and its shared accountability mechanism in the aftermath of the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti. I showed the challenges involved in applying shared accountability for recovery and reconstruction situations in a post disaster context. Additionally, it confirmed the public's apprehension regarding division in the rank of the IHRC. Participants acknowledged that the lack of clear guidelines with the mandate of the IHRC was the main source for tension among the different sectors. In addition, cultural and strategical differences among members of the Commission made it difficult to find common grounds and achieve the goals of the recovery. The findings also suggested that there were a shortage of social compactness and financial capital, which created major challenges in the cooperation. Haiti was a nation in crisis and the proposed joint collaboration of the IHRC was an appealing solution at the time. While admitting there were some progress made in addressing the needs of the recovery, it suffices to say that the framework of the IHRC, examined through the lens of socio-economic, political, cultural, and historical differences of its members, failed to deliver for the Haitian people. These findings of the study offered a clearer understanding of what took place and a better appreciation of the ineffectiveness of the work of the IHRC. In conclusion, policy considerations should be made to serve the overall interest and well-being of the population living in the country directly concerned. In the future, it will be important to evaluate the need for joint

accountability, the tensions in a shared collaboration vis-a-vis allowing full capacity development to the concerned nation. That approach implies a shift where donors would have significantly a diminished role in the interventions and greater emphasis placed on facilitation.

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Appendix A: Interview Protocol

A Case Study of Joint Accountability Mechanism and Inter-organizational Collaboration in Post-Earthquake Haiti

Time of Interview:

Date:

Place:

Interviewer:

Interviewee:

Position of Interviewee:

Project Purpose: I will use the study to seek a better understanding of the joint accountability model as a transitional recovery and reconstruction tool by examining the implementation of the IHRC in the post-disaster context in Haiti.

My main objective is to understand how the IHRC identified priorities, mobilized local and external resources, enhanced coordination and implementation of actions, and practiced joint accountability mechanism and inter-organizational collaboration for transitional recovery and reconstruction in the post-earthquake Haiti. I hope to share both the benefits and drawbacks of aspects of the IHRC experience.

Questions:

1. Describe your understanding of the IHRC experience.
2. What do you think about how the IHRC was set up? (Give reasons for your answer).

3. Why do you think Haitian and international stakeholders created and engaged the IHRC?
4. What are your thoughts on the use of the IHRC as a tool to rebuild devastated areas in the post-earthquake Haiti?
5. What other alternatives to the joint accountability mechanisms could have been utilized?
6. When do you think it is appropriate to use joint accountability mechanisms?
7. What was the nature of the working relationship between the IHRC and the community?
8. What is your observation about the IHRC cooperating or not cooperating with the Haitian government in resources sharing and planning?
9. Do you think the IHRC encountered legal, financial, and cultural problems? Give reasons for your answer.
10. Do you think the IHRC experienced corruption issues during projects execution? If so, what were the nature of the problem?
11. To your knowledge, did the IHRC and the Haitian Government experienced any form(s) of tension between them by virtue of their concurrent existence? If so what was the nature of the problem.
12. Did the work of the IHRC meet expectations of stakeholders? Was there progress made?
13. Was the Haitian population satisfied with the work of the IHRC?
14. How much of the outcomes of the recovery process was influenced by the IHRC?

15. Is the IHRC still in existence? If not, what brought it to an end?

Reminders:

Address special thanks to each interviewee.

Assure the interviewee that the responses will remain confidential.

Inform the interviewee that a copy of the interview transcript will be available.

Leave the door open for follow-up interviews.

Appendix B: Preliminary Code

I read all interview transcripts to identify the main themes or experiences identified by respondents. Preliminary Codes were developed below, based on the research questions and existing literature, which were applied to the interview findings and revised to add emerging codes as analysis proceeded.

Table B
Meaning of Potential Emerging Codes

Code	Meaning
Incompatibility	A state where the various stakeholders that constitute the IHRC are not in tune with each other
Independent	The IHRC acting as an autonomous entity
Harmonization	Measures (legal and administrative) for collaboration among the IHRC stakeholders
Challenges	Difficulties linked with the work of the IHRC
Impact	The effect of the policies of the IHRC on the affected communities
Social Capital	Civic engagement from all stakeholders
Division	A split in strategies on how to proceed among government entities and international organizations of the IHRC
Benefits	Value added towards reconstruction and sustainability
Transitional context	The socio-economic, political, and cultural dynamics that influenced the IHRC
Community Improvements	Amelioration of the condition of living of people in affected communities

Internal Capacities	Local government, civil society, and communities' influence on the creation, design, and implementation of the IHRC
External Capacities	International influence that accounted for the creation, design, and implementation of the IHRC
Antecedent to Collaboration	Community factors (such as trust, resources) that preceded the work of the IHRC
Collaboration Process	The way the various stakeholders worked jointly inside the IHRC
Collaboration Outcomes	Policy results measured against IHRC proposed benchmarks
Management Issues	Issues surrounding the IHRC and its stakeholders on issues related day-to-day operations
Tensions	Anxiety among local populace and politicians by the presence of the IHRC
Controversy	Arguments about the nature of the IHRC and its accountability method or lack thereof
Marginalization	Local community organizations feeling powerless against the IHRC authorities
Political Climate	The environment that influenced the decisions of the IHRC

Appendix C: Recruitment Letter

Dear [Subject Name]

Thank you for your interest in being a participant in my Dissertation research investigating the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC); the joint accountability and transitional mechanism that was set up in the post-earthquake Haiti to address the needs of the recovery and reconstruction efforts. This research aims at contributing to the understanding of the phenomenon of addressing community recovery and reconstruction issues in the aftermath of major disasters in countries with similar contexts.

All information collected will be confidential, and your identity will be protected at all times. Your participation is strictly on voluntary basis, and you may choose to withdraw from the interview process at any time.

For this study I am seeking a participant who meets one of these conditions:

- ✓ Was a resident in Haiti between 2010 and 2013
- ✓ Was/or is a Haitian public official
- ✓ Was an IHRC official
- ✓ Was/is a Government official associated with the IHRC
- ✓ Is knowledgeable about the IHRC
- ✓ Was an international official involved in the setting up of the IHRC
- ✓ Was/or is a Civil Society Actor involved with IHRC
- ✓ Participated in any the IHRC projects directly or indirectly

If you meet the above criteria and have a desire to participate in this study, please return the
response slip at the bottom of this page in the addressed, stamped envelope, or contact me by phone (703-400-2516) or (509-36029392) or email (Jude.Jean-Gilles@waldenu.edu). After I receive your reply, I will contact you to arrange a date and time for our interview. If you don't wish to participate, no one will contact you, and your anonymity will remain protected.

Thank you for considering participation in this study.

Sincerely

Signed

Jude Jean-Gilles

RESPONSE SLIP

Yes. I am interested and available to participate in your study. Please reach me to make proper arrangement for an interview or to provide additional details.

Name……...

Phone number or email address: ……