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Nigeria and Boko Haram: Societal and Cultural Dysfunction Affecting Military Performance

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Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Abstract

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Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

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Abstract

Since 2009, the Nigerian military has been fighting the insurgent and terror group Boko Haram in the Northeast region of Nigeria. In 2016, the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) formed as an offshoot of Boko Haram and aligned with the remnants of ISIS. The Nigerian army has failed to defeat the insurgent groups and has, according to the research, committed abuses and atrocities, including extrajudicial killings, against the civilian population. The norms of military effectiveness, the normative theory of military performance and, the neorealist combat balance theory formed the theoretical basis for this study. The research questions addressed whether a nation's military reflected its society and if the dysfunction in that society affected military performance. This qualitative study utilized a grounded constructivist approach in gathering data from seven active duty and retired military senior leadership and academics. Data analysis revealed that a nation's military does mirror/reflect the society from which it emanated. The dysfunction found in society transfers to the military and is causally linked to battlefield failure and societal abuse. Specifically, this study identified the rabid dysfunction and corruption found within Nigerian society and linked societal dysfunction to army dysfunction. In addition, in a nation where tribalism dominates every aspect of life, this study found the army to be a tribe unto itself, further propagating the violent narrative against civilians. Positive social change may be possible if civilian and military leadership understands the dysfunctional social dynamic and its effects on State institutions, including the military, in a post-colonial African nation.

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Dedication

This study, my endeavor to rebuild my life from an automobile accident and multiple surgeries, and my educational goals could not have been possible without the complete support of my wife, Karen. She endured strife, heartbreak, disappointment at a life missed, and endured far more than spouses are required. This work is dedicated to my Karen, whose unwavering support helped drive me to complete my education and a new beginning.

I also wish to dedicate this work to my dad, Colonel Albert Petranick, who flew the B-52 during two combat tours in Vietnam. To the men he flew with, taking their final flight, forever a band of brothers. My mother, Theresa, who, like all S.A.C. wives, accepted the reality of S.A.C. first, spouses and families second.

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I would like to recognize those senior military leaders, educators, and PhDs who assisted me through the interview process. I was fortunate enough to be introduced to these men; as a military outsider addressing a global social, security, and military topic, their assistance and acceptance of me and my research project made my study.

I would like to thank Dr. Diedre Rogers, my mentor, who tore into my work and acted as my drill instructor pushing me to perform to the highest level possible. And finally, to Dr. John Grigg, my professor and mentor in History at the University of Nebraska-Omaha. For two-plus years Dr. Grigg pushed and vexed me, trying to turn me into a graduate scholar. Dr. Grigg impacted me personally, and it is with this work, I can say he achieved his goal, and I am forever grateful. And yes, Dr. Grigg, I know, it is not a study in History.

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Chapter 1:

Introduction to the Study

Since 2009, Nigeria has dealt with the radicalized Islamic sect Boko Haram, borne from Mallam Lawal's organization, Shabab Muslim Youth Organization, founded in 1995. Though the Nigerian military has been fighting Boko Haram since the group acquired a violent mandate in 2009, it has experienced limited success with offensives and operations using conventional warfare tactics. As such, Boko Haram continues to be a potent force. Further, while carrying out conventional warfare doctrine, the military has committed abuses against the Nigerian population and, along with the terror groups, is responsible for citizens fleeing to relief and relocation camps. (Amnesty International, 2016b; Human Rights Watch, 2016a).

The Nigerian army has the mandate from the political leadership to defeat Boko Haram and ISWAP and remove the groups from Nigeria. However, the military has failed to deny Boko Haram/ISWAP safe haven in Chad, Niger, and Cameroon and has failed to stop economic and material support from reaching the groups. The Nigerian military must be viewed positively by the population, not feared as much as the terror groups. In abusing the people, the government risks moving civilians to support the insurgency. Boko Haram has capitalized on this reality by claiming that it is fighting government corruption and population abuse carried out by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

This disunity within the social and political structure represents the complexity that is Nigeria. The state governments contradict the federal state and are not unified with the federal government on many topics (Abdulhamid & Chima, 2016).

There are also geographical and religious divides. The south (majority Christian) population lacks concern for those in the North struggling with Boko Haram. For the most part, the population is unconcerned with a nationalistic-patriotic paradigm. Nigeria lacks a collective nationalism or a national identity as a nation-state. There is the Muslim North, the Christian South, and the tribal system that holds sectarian loyalty.

Nationalism in Nigeria is found within local and regional ethnic, religious, and civic structures, denying a national identity and an avenue to Nigerian patriotism (Negedu & Atabor, 2015). For instance, the Northern States Elders Forum has accused Christian President Goodluck Johnathon of allowing Boko Haram to slaughter “good Muslims” in Northeast Nigeria (Doukhan, 2015). Though Muslims have opened their doors to the displaced and victimized despite the array of issues in Nigeria, this appears to be a localized phenomenon in northeastern Nigeria (Cohn, 2016).

The basis for this study lay in determining whether the dysfunction within the Nigerian population contributes to the issues found in the Nigerian Army that affect efforts to defeat terror groups. Identifying the issues to success and defining how a nation-state can fight an in-house insurgency would not only assist Nigeria but any state dealing with a homegrown insurgent or terrorist organization. In addition, social change occurs when the military successfully engages the insurgency and protects the civilian population while doing so.

This chapter includes a background on Nigeria and its social constructs, the threats that Boko Haram presents, the damage to the Nigerian population, and offerings from various scholars on how to end the Boko Haram insurgency from a sociological standpoint. The problem statement specifies the issue of dysfunctional societal influence

on military performance. Research questions are identified, and the conceptual framework addresses the complexity of Nigerian society. Additionally, operational terms and the nature of the study are identified. Assumptions, limitations, and delimitations are discussed. The significance of this study relates to the destruction of Boko Haram and the protection of the Nigerian people.

Background

Boko Haram is not the first militancy group Nigeria faced since gaining its freedom from Great Britain in 1960 (Awortu, 2015). Other groups have included the Maitatsine Islamic Fundamentalist sect in northeast Nigeria; the Yoruba ethnic Odua People's Congress in southwest Nigeria; the Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra, an Igbo ethnic group in southeast Nigeria; and the Niger Delta militants, which affects offshore commerce (E.A.D.W., 2016).

According to the U.S. Department of State (2017), approximately 40 Middle Eastern and African terror organizations exist. Boko Haram's strength has been estimated to be between 5,000 and 10,000 members, though numbers fluctuate (Warner & Hulme, 2018). Boko Haram had diminished in capacity and effectiveness, but this may be nothing more than the natural flow in the life cycle of an insurgency (Leach, 2016).

Boko Haram operates as a criminal organization under the veil of Islam. Boko Haram has used tactics to incite fear, gain power, and notoriety, including kidnapping schoolgirls and women to be used as slaves, wives for members, and offering many to the sex trade. Since 2009, the group has been responsible for killing more than 31,000 people in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The insurgency has led to 2.3 million people displaced, with 250,000 Nigerians fleeing to neighboring countries (Nichols, 2015). In

2011, before the national elections, Boko Haram, along with other radical Nigerian groups, promised to make Nigeria ungovernable by turning the Islamic people against democracy and proving the government corrupt and inept. This effort, if successful, would have allowed Boko Haram to establish a Caliphate (Mbah, Nwangwu, & Edeh, 2017). In 2016, Boko Haram affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, with the reported death of Abubakar Shekau, a new leader emerged in Abu Musab al-Barnawi with the blessing of ISIS. Shekau did not die, and the group splintered into two: the Shekau Boko Haram faction and the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) led by al-Barnawi.


Research has addressed the rise of Boko Haram and the military response; however, the literature is limited on how a country's population can influence the nation's military. However, though the research is limited, it has offered potential solutions to the conflicts related to Boko Haram. Barna (2014) proposed a sociological-based solution that included ending the social conditions that allowed Boko Haram to grow and thrive. In Nigeria, these solutions involve ending cultural impunity and human rights abuses, reforming the judicial system and improving the capacities of law enforcement, improving intelligence collection and analysis both internally and externally, addressing the governance deficit, ending corruption, increasing transparency of political decisions, increasing dialogue across all Nigerian ethnic and religious entities, and increasing federal and state cooperation (Barna, 2014).

Liolio (2013) also offered a guide in reforming government functions to an ideal level. If the insurgency is defeated, the underlying causes for its existence are still in

place, allowing for other groups to take its place. Thus, Liolio provided steps needed to vanquish corruption in Nigeria and found in figure 1.

Figure 1

Liolio's Corruption reform proposal.



Note. Redefining the Nigerian Polity Through Reforms. (Liolio, 2013)

Additionally, Transparency International (2016) offered five steps to address corruption: ending impunity, reforming public administration and finance management, promoting transparency and access to information, empowering citizens, and closing international loopholes in access to money laundering. Boko Haram exists due to social

conditions that include Nigeria's socioeconomic issues, religious belief system, external non-state actor influence, constitutional issues, the benefits content of the insurgency, and ideology (Idahosa, 2015, p. 26).

Unmar (2013) noted that providing employment opportunities and improving school enrollment and the justice system can address these conditions. A dialogue among involved parties could also lead to a national reconciliation (pp. 58-60; see also Liolio, 2013, p. 99). However, it would be difficult if not impossible to offer Boko Haram "soldiers" amnesty for murder, rape, kidnapping, slavery, and torture committed against an innocent population. The ability to affect diplomacy to resolve political issues is always favored, but abandoning the rule of law to effect change would set a dangerous precedent in fighting terrorism. Nigeria is not the only country dealing with Boko Haram, and it may be difficult for the populations of those countries to allow Boko Haram to escape justice.

In addition to the precedent that a diplomatic approach could set, reconciliation between the government and Boko Haram had been tried and failed. In 2012, various government and non-government organizations sought peace with Boko Haram through diplomacy, insisting that dialogue was the best way to address insurgency (Ahokegh, 2012, p. 53). However, Boko Haram has a sustained political life, bolstered by its close affiliation with ISIS and other African terror groups. Research has suggested that dialogue is not enough to address the terrorist groups and will only create more security concerns (Ahokegh, 2012, p. 53).

The problem with diplomacy is the religious authority that drives the insurgency. Conversion to the Salafist belief system is the only goal Boko Haram and ISIS are

interested in (Mitchell, 2016). Religious leaders target the young for radicalization, giving them an avenue to attack a system they believe harmed them (Onuoha, 2014). Youths join Boko Haram because they have limited education, little or no employment prospects, extreme economic deprivation, and they may come from broken homes; thus, the outlaw group provides a home, empowerment, camaraderie and belonging, and a purpose to their life (Lohman, 2010, para. 5).

Youth in Nigeria also join out of ignorance of religious teaching in that violence is the way of Allah (Agbiboa, n.d.). In political Islam, a way to redeem oneself in the eyes of Allah is through martyrdom, giving their soul to paradise. Thus, changing the conditions that allowed Boko Haram to flourish must be addressed by the Nigerian leaders and people if the insurgency is to be defeated. This study was needed to help explain the failure in dealing with a terror and insurgent from the standpoint of a nation's military fighting an inhouse insurgency.

Problem Statement

In the first half of 2017, Boko Haram carried out 43 attacks and killed more than 200 civilians (Intel, 2017; Kazeem, 2017). In 2018, 1,200 civilians were killed and 200,000 displaced due to Boko Haram. In June 2018, Boko Haram murdered 84 people in a double suicide bomb attack at a mosque in Mubi, Adamawa State. Numerous reports are documented, indicating little abatement in insurgent activity (Searcy, 2019). Attacks have continued unabated, with ISWAP attacking Nigerian Army installations with impunity (Searcy, 2019).

The Nigerian Army has not defeated Boko Haram and has abused and killed innocent civilians (Amnesty International, 2016). The military practices conventional

warfare tactics, including indiscriminate scorched earth tactics, sweep and detain operations (including innocents), and the population is both purposely and indiscriminately harmed or killed (Nossier, 2013, para. 12).

Further, in 2017, the *New York Times* reported mass rapes of women by Nigerian soldiers (Searcy, 2017). Existing literature has sought to address through quantitative means the effects of society and its culture on military performance (Fowler, 2016). However, though literature concerning the social dysfunction of Nigerian society on Boko Haram is prevalent, the literature and study of how societal culture can affect military performance is lacking.

Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency is not a conflict over geography but a conflict for the hearts and minds of the indigenous people. Public support for the Nigerian government and its counterinsurgency efforts provides for its democratic legitimacy and security. However, the Nigerian Army does not engage the population for its support; the military confronts the population and abuses, commits atrocities and deaths, including extra-judicial killings (Amnesty International, 2016a).

Extensive research has occurred in studying counterinsurgency operations of outside contravening nation-states and their actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Malaya, and Algeria (Galula, 1964; Gentile, 2009; Kilcullen, 2010; McMaster, 2009; Paul et al., 2010; Ricks, 2006, 2010). U.S. Army Field Manual *FM3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* was built on historical examples and academic studies.

As a result, population-centric warfare has been installed on the battlefield by the United States, Britain, Germany, France, and a host of North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) countries. However, research focusing on a nation-state dealing with an insurgency within its borders and the lack of support to the government by the indigenous population is lacking.

Additionally, the importance of societal structures, cultures, behaviors, and beliefs and their endemic dysfunction has been minimally addressed. Few studies explore a nation-state fighting an in-country insurgency. Instead, the bulk of scholarship has focused on an intervening country carrying out a counterinsurgency operation in a host country. It is here where societal structures, cultures, behaviors, and beliefs have been studied but only related to an intervening foreign army.

Nigeria

Though a sense of nationalism and patriotism would automatically enjoin populist support, Nigerians do not enjoy a nationalist identity or patriotism (Bello, 2013). In applying counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, the population in which the insurgency exists is considered the “prize” of war, but the support of the people is crucial (Gentile, 2009a). It is also essential that counterinsurgents identify the human and material resources necessary to succeed (Myklebust & Ordeman, 2013, para. 42). If support for Boko Haram came solely from the Nigerian population, then accepted population-centric rubrics could be employed.

The Nigerian government and military would not have to win the people over from supporting the insurgency but would need to educate the people on the importance of support for government actions and military operations. The military must consider the population as an asset and the prize in an insurgent war. However, education is not the only issue as cultural immersion. Due to tribalism, the Nigerian army would have to

enjoin the population for support. Therefore, this study focused on the Nigerian military and the effects of society and culture on military performance.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore whether social and cultural dysfunction might affect military performance. In addition, I hoped to identify the factors that prevent support for the Nigerian national government from the Nigerian population in the fight against Boko Haram. Initial research identified that no one group, sect, government agency, or religious group had worked together to better Nigerian society; therefore, a distinct and solidified national identity does not exist. Much of the Nigerian population, specifically the Muslim population, provides little tangible support to Boko Haram (Poushter, 2015). Any support by Muslims for Boko Haram emanates from the understanding that the group represents pure Islam and are believed “to be devout Muslims who uphold true Islam” (Khalil, 2017, para. 3 & 4). Therefore, in a successful counterinsurgency, the military should enjoin the population in the fight against terror. This study helped identify a path forward for the Nigerian military to embrace the population while fighting Boko Haram.

Research Questions

Research Question 1: How, and to what extent, does a nation’s military reflect or mirror the society from which the military was derived?

Research Question 2: How, and to what extent, can marked societal dysfunction affect or inhibit military performance in Nigeria?

Theoretical Framework

This study used several military function theories to explain the performance of the Nigerian army. Social constructs, such as conflict theory, can explain the rise of Boko Haram from a nonviolent youth group to a terror group based on political Islam. Muslim youth strive for balance and homeostasis in a system that cannot provide a pathway to achieve either. Islam provides a simple, successful life, and those who join experience a simple set of rules and a simple way of living, giving Allah what is due Allah. Additionally, this study lay within the rubrics of sociology in that all actions and counteractions are motivated by individuals' desire to affect their surroundings. Individuals act according to their interpretation of the meaning of their world (Segre, 2014); therefore, individuals assign meaning to what is relevant and essential.

As stated, this study is set in the framework of military function theories and whether a society can affect military culture and performance. Excessive accumulation of power by one state or coalition elicits the opposition of others, and it is in this context, the neorealist combat balance theory exists (Waltz, 1988). Neorealism states that if an army has a large force sufficiently equipped with the latest cutting-edge weaponry and adequate material to support the army during a conflict, then that force will win the battle.

Therefore, countries pursue an arms race to achieve superior, technologically advanced equipment and resources. An example of neorealism occurred during the Cold War when the United States and the USSR reached a stalemate in force. However, this theory is most appropriately utilized when opposing militaries participate in conventional warfare and has little application in asymmetric (insurgent) warfare.

In addition to the neorealist theory, the normative theory of military performance dictates that cultural norms influence its tactical behavior, determining military performance (Fitzsimmons, 2013). An army that is highly trained, educated, and led by a professional officer corps, trained in mission-based objectives over order-based behavior will achieve success on the battlefield. These attributes are present in the combat units, intelligence, logistics, support units, and command.

The norms of military behavior are understood in terms of how members behave and perceive behavior (National Research Council, 2014). The injunctive norm reflects group assessment of approved and disapproved conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990). In this regard, norms signify values or the shared belief system of a group (National Research Council, 2014). The descriptive norms of military behavior represent the oughtness or rightness of how a military responds to a situation. Contrary to the injunctive norm, the descriptive norm does not relegate morals or ethics to how a group acts. The descriptive norm indicates how a group member conforms to a group, usually through training, discipline, and leadership, and group dynamics drive this norm. (National Research Council, 2014).

If an injunctive norm is violated, group members may sanction the individual or individuals to correct the infraction. However, if a majority in a group violates an injunctive norm, the minority may simply ignore the offense. The desire to belong is a strong norm in and of itself. Group membership is valued, and people generally comply with group norms because compliance implies acceptance of an individual's group membership and consequent self-image. Therefore, societal dynamics and group functions sanctioned by society carry into society's institutions.

Nature of the Study

This study is qualitative with anthropological insights used to explain how the military has not successfully engaged Boko Haram and how the government and population have not adequately addressed social attitudes resulting in insurgency successes. Qualitative methodology with a grounded theory approach offered guidance in producing an end theory, therefore addressing remedies to the causes. The qualitative approach seeks to consider information collected and assign meaning to it using personal views, past experiences, and cultural backgrounds to construct and interpret the data gathered (University College Dublin, n.d.). Thus, qualitative research was utilized to explore and understand the meaning of individuals or groups and their relationship to a sociologically based problem (Creswell, 2013). Inductive reasoning offered the best avenue to address the two-pronged problem of societal dysfunction linked to military dysfunction.

I incorporated grounded methodology to build a narrative of societal and military dysfunction. Grounded theory is a qualitative method used to derive a theory about a phenomenon (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Creswell, 2009; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Walsh et al., 2015), which is more than just a qualitative method (Walsh et al., 2015). Grounded theory is justified by providing a rich, detailed, and carefully crafted account of the subject through research (Martin & Turner, 1986).

Theoretical sampling maximizes the ability to discover variations in concepts and fill categories in terms of properties and dimensions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The grounded approach includes the constant comparison of new data with emerging categories and themes and looking to different groups to develop theoretical sampling to

identify information differences (Creswell, 2009). Grounded theory adopts a constant comparative method in coding for conformity and coherence to ideas and evidence (Glaser & Strauss 1999).

Throughout the researcher's coding process, the researcher iterates between the data and the emerging theory (Charmaz, 2006). It is essential to use each phase of inquiry to raise the analytic level of the work within the study (Charmaz, 2008). It is not plausible to postulate a theory as to why the Nigerian military abuses the Nigerian population in the war against Boko Haram; however, identifying a thesis from a multitude of possibilities could assist future research in helping the military to defeat Boko Haram and apply warfighting techniques that protect the population. The grounded approach also helped discover obstacles in the Nigerian nation-state to identify paths to success in protecting the population and defeating Boko Haram.

Further, it is essential to study a subjects' social environment and condition (Sutton & Austin, 2015). The qualitative grounded approach with a constructivist view presented the best avenue to discover the disparities of social context relevant to the Nigerian Army to address the research problem. Constructivism is a theoretical concept that enables one to comprehend and gain knowledge (Fosnot, 2006).

Constructivism does not require a specific or definitive answer—merely the ability to obtain unbiased and factual information. The constructivist approach allows the researcher to understand human experience in an environment and understand that constructural reality comes from social experiences (Cohen & Manion, 1994; Mertens, 2014). Using a constructivist method in research allows humans to construct knowledge and meaning from experiential occurrences (Charmaz, 2008).

Data sampling in grounded theory is far less than any quantitative study. In general, grounded theory requires a range of 20–50 respondents to reach theoretical saturation. As will be explained in Chapter 3, this study addressed a relatively small population studied, the Nigerian Army. To address my interview sample group, I used a small hyper-homogeneous group of interviewees. Not only did I seek data and theoretical saturation, but I also sought to reach saturation of knowledge (see Bertaux, 1981).

In this study, a smaller qualitative interview population was acceptable, primarily because the researcher focused on a strict homogeneous group. I chose interviewees based on stringent parameters, including senior military leadership and military academics representing a small population with a small theoretical focus. Therefore, the interview group was small based on the ratio of the study group versus the interview group. The point of diminishing returns can occur quickly, which means that as the study proceeds, increasing data accumulation does not lead to additional information (Ritchie et al., 2013). Finding one occurrence of a data piece, or code, is enough to become part of the analysis framework (Mason, 2010).

If this were to be a quantitative study, a large cross-section of U.S. senior leadership could be surveyed on their military views, field operations, interaction with the public, and counterinsurgency operations. However, a quantitative study could not offer detailed insights into a path to identify if society and its culture affect military performance.

Additionally, trying to reach Muslim Nigerians affected by the military for a quantitative survey would be difficult as the northeast region does not have power, telecommunications, and the internet. Therefore, a qualitative study offered an

opportunity to understand the nuances in denial of support (the population) by seeking a small sample of highly educated, socially involved scholars and military experts who live and study the issues.

Data collection addressed social and cultural functioning in military behavior through interviews with senior military officers and academics. The senior military commanders and scholars interviewed understand the foundations of civilian influence on military behavior. The U.S. military and the Nigerian military are disparate; however, strategy, military performance, training, social performance, conduct, battlefield expectations, and behavior are universally accepted through military best practices, and proper conduct is the prerogative of various international organizations such as the UN, the Red Cross, and The Hague. I will further discuss the nature of the study in Chapter 2.

Operational Definitions

Ahlul Sunnawa Jama Ahhijra: Founded by Abubakar Lawan in 1995 and is believed to be the early precursor to Boko Haram. This group was non-violent and began as a youth group for disenfranchised and disenfranchised youth (Ori, 2013).

Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb: Located in Algeria, and has committed to attacking European and American targets. Originated from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat that affiliated with al-Qa'ida in 2006 (Steinberg & Werenfels, 2007).

Apostate: About the Islamic term as used by ISIS. A Muslim who does not follow the strict form of Islam as practiced by ISIS and al-Qa'ida, or a Westernized Muslim. Initially, part of Catholic doctrine recognizing a cleric who had left a religious order or a Catholic who abandoned the religion for a reformed theology (Mallet & Toussaint, 2012).

Asymmetric warfare: Describes warfare between two fighters who differ in military capability, funding, tactics, and strategy. Terrorism, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and irregular warfare are descriptions of asymmetric warfare rubrics used by small states and non-state actors (Tomes, 2004).

Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra: Two separate organizations with the same goal. The Bakassi Boys advocated anti-crime vigilantism in the Biafra state. They roamed the streets carrying out anti-crime attacks using machetes. They were so successful and popular that cities within Biafra invited them to police their towns. However, accused of extra-judicial killings, intimidation on behalf of the state, and extortion leading to the crimes they sought to end, they were disbanded only to reemerge in 2021. (Oronsaye & Igbafe, 2012; (Njoku, & Nzeagwu, 2021).

Boko Haram (“Jama” atu Ahlissunnah lidda’ awati Wal Jihad’): Known as the Muhajir Yousuf ayah sect, Nigerian Taliban, and The Group of Al-Sunna for preaching and Jihad. The group represents an ultra-radical sect based in Nigeria and was considered too violent for ISIS (Siollun, 2016).

Counterinsurgency: Incorporates the strategy, techniques, military, psychological, financial, social tactics, politics, and intelligence practices that governments utilize to combat an insurgency. Like the insurgency, the counterinsurgent must continually adapt to the changing social and battlefield requirements and threats. (U.S. Army, 2014).

Crimes against humanity: Defined as crimes inflicted on victims based on their group membership rather than individual characteristics—crimes committed against fellow nationals and foreigners. These are international crimes that override state

sovereignty and are committed by politically organized groups acting under policy. These crimes include only the most brutal and abominable acts of violence and persecution (Luban, 2004).

Ex parte Quirin: A case before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1942 and during World War II that upheld the jurisdiction of a U.S. military tribunal within the trial of eight German saboteurs in the United States. *Quirin* set a precedent for trial by military commission of any unlawful combatant against the United States on or off the battlefield (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S., 1942).

Fedayeen Saddam: A paramilitary group loyal to Saddam Hussein estimated to be 30,000 to 40,000 strong. The Fedayeen Saddam took up the fight after Iraq fell using unconventional tactics and guerilla warfare (Otterman, 2005).

Foreign internal defense: A term utilized to describe the approach in which an interdicting military provides offensive and defensive operations in a host country to defeat an aggressor such as an insurgency (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

Globalization: Globalization refers to the free movement, interaction, and integration of information, goods, and people between international boundaries. It is the procedure or action of global integration of a country's social world view relating to ideas, products, and cultural exchange (Al-Rodhan, 2006). In terrorism, globalization refers to the movement of ideas, strategies, and people between terror groups, the exportation, and importation of terrorist activities to all corners of the globe. In the modern context, it is the global dissemination and assimilation of radical Muslim terrorists into a common cause (Lutz & Lutz, 2015).

Guerrilla warfare: Irregular warfare using unconventional tactics by small groups of fighters who fight against a far larger force, usually government military forces (Van Creveld, 2000, p. 357).

Hausa-Fulani: Refers to the Hausa and Fulani tribes of western Africa. These two groups are referred to as Hausa-Fulani after the 1804 Fulani war. These two ethnic groups make up 29% of Nigeria's population and are associated with cattle as their main economic commodity. The Igbo and Yoruba tribes represent the majority within the Nigerian tribal system ("Hausa and Fulani people," n.d.).

Hors de combat: According to the International Red Cross, hors de combat prohibits "attacking persons who are recognized as *hors de combat*. *hors de combat* is: (a) anyone who is in the power of an adverse party; (b) anyone who is defenseless because of unconsciousness, shipwreck, wounds, or sickness; or (c) anyone who clearly expresses an intention to surrender; provided they abstain from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape" (ICRC, n.d.-g; IHL Database. (n.d.)

Infidel: One who rejects the truth of Islam, Allah as their God, and Mohammed as his prophet. ISIS uses Kafir to describe those who do not conform to the Salafist belief system (Fanani et al., 2020).

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL): The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Identified as Dawlat al-Islamiyah f' al-Iraq wa al-Sham or the moniker Da'ish (Daesh). The Islamic State is a Sunni Salafist insurgency and terror organization founded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Petranick, 2016).

Jamā'atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da'wati wal-Jihād: "People committed to the propagation of the prophet's teachings and Jihad," which is Boko Haram's Islamic name.

Mohammed Yusuf chose this name to replace Ahul Suwanna Jama Ahhijra, the name chosen by Abubakar Luwan. Boko Haram is the name given to the group by Nigerians (UN, 2016).

Jamā'atu Anṣāril Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān: Founded in 2012 and known as Ansaru; a militant Islamist splinter group of Boko Haram. Their leader is Abu Usmatul al-Ansari, who split the group away because of ideological differences in the interpretation of Islamic law. They also disapproved of Shekau's targeting of the Islamic population. Unlike Boko Haram, Ansaru targets Western interests in Nigeria who directly or indirectly support the government or military forces (Zenn, 2013).

Jus ad bellum: Applies to the conditions under which states may resort to war or the use of armed force in general. The prohibition against the use of force amongst States and the exceptions to it (the UN authorization for the use of force or self-defense) appears in the UN Charter of 1945 and represent the core ingredients of jus ad bellum (International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], 2015).

Jus in bello: A UN mandate that regulates the conduct of nation-states engaged in an armed conflict. International Humanitarian Law is applied with *jus in bello*; it seeks to minimize suffering in armed conflicts, mainly civilians, by protecting innocents from armed conflict to the greatest extent possible. It is the responsibility of the nation-state to ensure *jus in bello* (ICRC, 2015).

Maitatsine Islamic Fundamentalist Sect: Founded by cleric Mohammed "Maitatsine" Mara in 1945 Nigeria. Banished by the British, he returned in 1960 after independence. He was a Koranic scholar but rejected Mohammed and claimed himself to be the annabi, or prophet. The group Yan Tatsine consisted of Maitatsine's followers who

participated in the Yan Tasting riots over five years from 1980, in which 10,000 people died. One of the first radical groups in Nigeria (Adesoji, 2011).

Modernization: Modernization is how society progresses through transition, improving itself and people's lives. Advanced societies modernize and progress as technology and society dictate. In third world and developing countries, modernization occurs through outside forces seeking influence in the state (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997).

Movement for the actualization of the sovereign State of Biafra: Associated with Igbo nationalism and is a secessionist movement in Nigeria's Biafra state. They seek to make Biafra an independent country separate from Nigeria. They are considered an extremist group by the Nigerian government (Oronsaye & Igbafe, 2012).

Movement for Oneness and Jihad: Founded in 2011 by Hamad al-Khairi and Ahmed el-Tilemsi as a splinter group of al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. Responsible for much of the violence in Mali. In 2013, the group merged with the Masked Men Brigade to form Al-Murabitoun ("The Sentinels"). In 2015, the group realigned with al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb but in 2016 pledged allegiance to ISIS (START, 2015).

Occam's razor: Nature is simple, human action, and interaction is considered simple in underlying motivations and intentions. Human motivation can be attributed to seven theories, including self-actualization, self-determination, and the incentive theory (Whitbourne, 2011). Therefore, in sociology, simple motives generally explain results. The drive reduction theory states that humans reduce complexity to the simple to solve issues to balance homeostasis (Whitbourne, 2011). Complex interactions become simple

interactions as humans distill the complex to the simple to discover a workable solution that can best explain a functional and dysfunctional society, as society evolves from the human condition; therefore, the simplest solution or explanation is generally the most advantageous (Bishop & Shech, n.d.).

Odua People's Congress (Oodua Liberation Movement): Founded in 1997 as a militant sociocultural-economic organization to protect the Yoruba people. It clashed with the Nigerian government repeatedly over separatist demands. The Yoruba are some 25 million strong in Nigeria and conflict with the Hausa tribe (Oronsaye & Igbafe, 2012).

Population-centric asymmetric warfare: Conventional warfare or total war involved the destruction of the enemy and their surroundings. World War II was the last real conventional war. Asymmetric warfare is counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and population-centric refers to the people involved within the conflict zone. No longer is geography the primary motivator for war, but it is the hearts and minds of the people or population control and support. The object is to win allegiance and loyalty to the host government and intervening troops and deny the insurgents support (Gentile, 2009a).

Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization: Founded in 1995 by Mallam Lawal. Thought to represent the foundation from which Boko Haram emanated. Lawal founded this group to indoctrinate Nigerian youth into radical Islam and revolt against Western influence using peaceful means (Onuoha, 2014).

Transnational: Transnational refers to the spreading of or dissemination across international borders. In terrorism, ISIS and al-Qa'ida have taken to this model to recruit via social media, assimilate existing terror groups, expand their sphere of influence,

increase funding and arms purchases. In this way, the terror groups have acted as multinational conglomerates (Brown, 2017).

Wilayat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah: Wilayat is translated to mean “province.” Therefore, Wilayat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah is the West African Province of ISIS. For example, Wilayat al Yemen is the Islamic State’s Province in Yemen (Rahmani & Tanco, 2016).

Assumptions

I assumed that the specified individuals would participate in the interview process. Additionally, I believed the participants would provide insight into social and cultural effects on military performance. I also assumed that those interviewed would answer with complete honesty and integrity. This requirement goes to the honor and integrity of military officers. Therefore, the study depended on the honesty and integrity of the interviewees. Furthermore, I assumed that this research could provide a pathway for the Nigerian Army to recognize the negative issues associated with its military performance and move to correct deficiencies. In identifying the dysfunction within the Nigerian military, I hoped this study might provide a pathway to elicit ideas allowing the military to enhance performance and defeat the insurgency.

Scope of Delimitations

The scope of the study focused on Nigeria’s social constructs and their effect on the military. I interviewed senior military officers and military scholars who have a deep knowledge of leadership and societal influences on military performance. Participants were invited to participate in an interview for approximately 45 minutes to an hour, intimating their professional understanding of how military culture is affected by society and its civilian culture.

The interview questions were structured to identify and explore civilian influence's social and cultural influences in army culture. The limited boundaries included military performance and societal contributions to the dysfunction and divergence within the Nigerian culture. This study could also contribute to addressing military functioning across nations in general. The most relevant countries are in sub-Saharan Africa—colonial nations that have exhibited a tumultuous history of governance.

Limitations

Certain limitations affected this study. I limited the data collection to a specific and focused group of military and civilian individuals who had particular knowledge on how a population, its societal structures, and sociological realities and culture might affect military performance. Therefore, interviewees were chosen from within a specific parameter. Senior military officers participated from both the active duty and retired ranks. In addition, scholars with a Ph.D. and military service record participated in the interviews. These individuals carried advanced degrees in political science and history. Scholars with a Ph.D. in History study military doctrine, function, theory, application, and outcomes within the military educational complex, and have taught at Fort Leavenworth, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the War College at Carlisle Barracks, and the U.S. military academies.

Significance of the Study

Despite examples of counterinsurgency operations carried out by NATO countries and the United States, in light of new military doctrine and the advancements in counter-insurgent philosophy and applications, the Nigerian military has not defeated the terrorist and insurgent movement. The significance of this study lay in identifying the reasons

why the Nigerian army cannot end an insurgency. Additionally, the army has, according to various humanitarian organizations, including the Red Cross, been accused of human rights violations against the Nigerian civilian population. In identifying the root causes for abuses, I hoped that actions could take place within the military to advocate for change resulting in the army protecting and advocating for the population.

I hoped that this research would help guide the Nigerian military to make substantive changes to its internal belief system and doctrine, understanding that society affects the army in military performance, recruitment, training, and leadership. This study could assist in changing the paradigm of an ineffective fighting force that abuses civilians to a successful battlefield force that protects civilians. This reality would result in organizational credibility and strategic effectiveness, thereby affecting social change. This change, if effected, would provide for positive social change in varying degrees across Nigeria and its institutions.

National support for counterinsurgency operations flows from the people. Social, economic, political, and religious impediments affect the government's efforts to successfully confront and defeat Boko Haram. Though prior research had addressed these topics, they have not been discussed in an inclusive qualitative manner focused on the machinations of counterinsurgency. Despite dysfunction, Nigeria as a state is one of the more successful post-colonialization experiments in Africa. Suppose Boko Haram (and ISWAP) are successful in destabilizing Nigeria. In that case, additional African countries could be in peril, if not from Boko Haram, then from associated radical political or religious groups. In addition, the fight against the ISWAP may present a future existential threat to the United States. Should Nigeria fail, should the insurgents establish a

Caliphate in Nigeria, it would provide safe harbor and a training base for terrorists providing a global reach.

Summary

In Chapter 1, I explained the theories used to address the issues in Nigeria. In addition, it was essential to understand the military norms of operation, as military norms are connected to societal functioning. Therefore, the focus in this study included the realities of social dysfunction and the affected culture of the Nigerian military. This focus included leadership, doctrine, training, the moral and ethical belief system, and applying military culture and doctrine against Boko Haram and the Nigerian people, both of which could present as aberrations of social (military) cultural behavior.

Chapter 2 discusses the history and structure of Nigeria and its society, Boko Haram, and the Nigerian military. Understanding the contributory social, political, and military factors are essential to recognize endemic issues within the population. Chapter 2 also includes the explanations of the law of war, just war theory, humanitarian law, and the international rules of warfare, including conduct and expectation for a military force within a civilian population. The literature review studies Nigerian societal dysfunction and the continued military dysfunction in fighting Boko Haram. It is here where the research problem is exemplified.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

I examined the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and how the army has not defeated the insurgency. To understand Nigeria's problems, the country's diverse and complicated societal structures that stem from colonial imperialism. This includes tribalism that prevents a nationalist identity, unity, and patriotism (Okogu, & Umudjere, 2016). The literature review provides the nuances in revealing societal truths in a landscape of dysfunction.

The literature on military affairs and counterinsurgency tends to focus on the rise of Boko Haram. Chapter 2 examines the history of Boko Haram and its link to radical Islam. These sections include a deep and thorough description of the present-day Nigerian conflict, the Nigerian population and social structure, and a description of the Nigerian military as an organization.

The existing literature is limited on how nation-states address an "in-house" insurgency, and other available scholarly sources fill in these gaps. It is essential to understand the foundations, guiding principles, and parameters of counterinsurgency warfare to understand how wars are conducted in a moral and ethical structure. Because there is a lack of research around the Nigerian insurgency, other frameworks, including those from the United States, are necessary to understand this issue. Looking at insurgency experiences can give context to Boko Haram. This chapter also touches on the lessons learned by the United States during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars as they advanced the frameworks for understanding insurgencies.

The literature review also discusses military power, ability, and capability in a social and cultural context. A military can exhibit all the signs of a neorealist force with access to funding, the latest weaponry and doctrine, and material support. Still, if the soldier is the weak link in the chain, then military power becomes a false narrative. The chapter also discusses a variety of ethical issues that are faced when an insurgency occurs. Just war theory sets parameters in which a nation-state can legally enter warfare.

Yet despite the best efforts of commanders in enforcing rules of engagement, discipline, and providing a moral compass, soldiers can stray from the correct moral and ethical path. Nigerian military leadership has struggled meeting Boko Haram on the battlefield and has repeatedly refuted reports of population abuse (Adeakin, 2016).

Chapter 2 Structure

Chapter 2 is structured as follows. First is a discussion of the literature search strategy and the theoretical framework used for this study. I identify the keywords used within this research study. Related to the theoretical framework, I explore the social and cultural influences on military performance, military norms, and the dual-process theory as applied to battlefield control. I discuss Nigeria's social components, including tribalism and the Nigerian military and its actions in the field. It is this discussion that provides a cataloging of societal and cultural dysfunction.

I explain the beginnings of Boko Haram and its founding from a peaceful youth organization to the terrorist group linked to the Salafist Islamic religion. I also go in-depth on international law and conflict, the rules of war, responsibility to protect, and the just war theory that pertains to the Nigerian conflict, along with humanitarian law. This information allows the reader to understand how Nigeria relates to the international

community on military force. Finally, I address the social change advocated by this research study.

Literature Strategy

I began the literature review process by outlining significant study points within the scholarship, including social structures and war. This effort built a foundation for building a pyramid, increasingly narrowing and defining the focus until the subjects had been exhausted in information. This action mirrored the strategies offered by Bui (2014), who suggested that an initial wide-ranging approach would culminate in a narrowing of themes and phrases to obtain specific references. Additionally, Booth et al. (2016) helped to identify the relevancy and reliability of the research by identifying relevant research information, reliable sources, performing analysis, and the process of reporting and writing results.

I utilized digital databases including Google Scholar, JSTOR, Research Gate, Project MUSE, EBSCO, ERIC (ProQuest), Sage Publications, and WorldCat. I used the Walden University Library, the library at the University of Nebraska-Omaha, and Creighton University to acquire microfiche files and periodicals and acquire the necessary books to complete the study. Government sources included the Department of Defense, U.S. Army, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the UN, and the Nigerian Constitution database. Accessing Amnesty International, the International Red Cross, and Human Rights Watch provided information on ground conditions and realities in Nigeria, supported by reports from the U.S. Department of State, who utilized both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as vetted institutions to provide information included in U.S. Department of Defense and State Department reports on Nigeria. The

U.S. military, Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines provide its doctrinal manuals online and published through Amazon.com and national booksellers.

Keywords were essential to the literature review, and I used the following keywords. *African genocide, African insurgencies, African terrorism, African tribalism, Ahlul Sunnawa Jama Ahhijra, Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, apostate, asymmetric warfare, Auftragstaktik, Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra, Berliner Methodentreffen Qualitative Forschung Boko Haram, counterinsurgency, crimes against humanity, ethics in war, Executive Outcomes, Fedayeen Saddam, foreign internal defense, foreign external defense, Geneva Conventions, Geneva Protocols, guerrilla warfare, Hausa-Fulani, infidel, International Humanitarian Law, Islam, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), Jamā'atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da'wati wal-Jihād, Jamā'atu Anṣāril Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān, Law of War, modernization theory, Maitatsine Islamic Fundamentalist Sect, Mao Zedong, morals in war, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra, Movement for Oneness and Jihad, NeoRealist Combat Balance Theory, Nigerian Army abuses, Nigerian corruption, Nigerian graft, Nigerian military, Normative Theory of Military Performance, Occam's Razor as a social concept, Odua People's Congress, population-centric warfare, radical Islam, Salafist, Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization, Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection International, transnationalism, US Army Field Manual FM3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, and Wilayat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah.*

The search for these keywords provided additional secondary keywords, which narrowed the search for information. Keywords identified books and journal articles,

which led to a string of different literature sources, building and expounding each other. Once I realized that each topic was thoroughly addressed by not accumulating new information and that topics, codes, themes, and subjects had become redundant, I considered the topic saturated (see Strauss & Corbin, 1998).

Theoretical Framework

The issues surrounding Nigeria's insurgency are vast and complicated. No one theory could address dysfunction in Nigeria because the country suffers from sociologic disunity (Gbinije, 2015). Viewing a problem through more than one theoretical lens is essential to understand the full scope of the problem (Holton, 2009). Social function theories are applied to view society from differing points of a theoretical lens. Still, it would be conducive to design an alternative approach to explain the dysfunction in Nigeria and other post-colonial entities, but that is beyond this project's scope.

The theoretical lens for this study rests with the norms of military behavior, the normative theory of military performance, and the neorealist combat balance theory. It is essential to understand the dysfunction Nigerian society represents to understand how the military might perform. The focus of this study was whether society could influence or affect military performance. Therefore, in this section, I explain various military theories regarding military performance. A link may be made (in conjunction with interview answers and their application to the research questions) between society and military function.

Social Control

Social control helps understand the dysfunction found in Nigeria. There are three modes of social control: personal, parochial, and public. Personal social control depends

on the person to conform to societal norms as the neighborhood lacks control (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). In northeast Nigeria, low income and high unemployment imbue mistrust and lack of communication among the community, leading young people to join radical Islam groups.

Parochial social control states that the neighborhood engages with certain aspects of social control but may not include youth engagement (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). Public social control offers total community engagement as the community and neighborhoods work as a group or found an organization to improve on and protect the community (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). This represents the village philosophy and idea of community involvement, engagement, and success. Community members are involved in schools, youth programs, community centers, additional community social structures and work to ensure youth success.

Social control exists in Nigeria, but only to the extent the tribe is involved. Historically, religion has a moral influence on the community, contributing to a locus of control-oriented toward a socially accepted morality. In context, this reality empowered individuals to have a degree of control over themselves within their society (Kirby, et al., 2000).

Further, society operates on shared values and a shared moral authority—a society that emphasizes order, stability, consensus, and equilibrium, or the homeostasis of the organism, will view societal problems as either deviance or a problem of social disorganization (University of Minnesota, 2019, chap. 7.1, 7.2). Institutions to which the individual belongs dictate “normal” sociologic function or deviancy. Thus, if society does

not match what is expected, there is pressure to conform and reintegrate with society (Obaro, 2014).

For instance, in a democratic nation, the military is subject to the will of civilian control. A democratic nation's founding documents, social and cultural norms, the rule of law, and international law guide the military to perform in an acceptable moral manner. The army is also guided by the political-civilian culture established in society. It is the lawmakers and the people of the nation who hold the military accountable. The military is subject to accountability and is expected to represent the nation's values and belief system.

Societal Traits and the Military

There is little scholarship on how a society can affect military performance. However, research has noted that society creates or allows for material power, translating to military power (Rosen, 1995). For instance, military performance in a democratic state may not be associated with material acquisition and wealth but may be decided on through a complex mix of culture, education, the rule of law, religion, societal involvement, political structures, and a national identity; thus, military power is dependent on military performance (Biddle & Long, 2004). Additionally, a nation's military has some freedom to isolate its members from society and install internal structures to govern their members (Rosen, 1995, p. 29). However, if the military is a mass, non-professional army with short terms of service, is large relative to society, fights wars with high casualty rates that force quick recruitment with no training time. If society's social structures are divisive, this can decrease the military's effectiveness (Rosen, 1995, p. 29). This paradigm is a direct reflection of the situation in Nigeria.

Research has indicated that society and culture matter to the military, although Western democratic culture is not conducive or optimal in battle (Fowler, 2016). For example, Afghanistan and Iraq provided the U.S. military the opportunity to embrace counterinsurgent warfare. But the establishment of strict rules of engagement protected civilians to the detriment of American and allied troops (French, 2015). The Taliban took advantage of this dynamic and showed that it is impossible to simultaneously protect civilians, achieve force protection, and achieve the physical elimination of insurgents (Zambernardi, 2010).

Further, though scholars acknowledge culture's influence in a social or economic environment, culture is absent in applying concepts of military power (Fowler, 2016). Leadership must account for culture in operational definitions of military power. Still, conceptual models are underspecified, exaggerating the effects of those factors commonly included—personnel quantity, equipment quality, economic development, and regime type. However, decision-makers cannot accurately assess an enemy states' martial capabilities and capacity without accounting for culture (Fowler, 2016). Research has suggested that the culture found within a mercenary force allowed a small, under-gunned force to defeat the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone (Fitzsimmons, 2013).

Regardless of societal influences, military power advances and implements state power in various ways both within and beyond the state's borders (Paret, 1989). Military power also confers created political power and its permanency. The nation's military organizations benefit from the national resources, which allows the political leaders to impose the nation's will on either an existing or potential enemy (Tellis et al., 2000, p. 134). It is the output level of military resources that transposes to military effectiveness.

However, the efficiency by which those resources are transformed guides military capability.

Material transformation is not the only parameter to guide military effectiveness or capability. Military doctrine, leadership, effective organization, the quality of soldiers, discipline, training, and adjunct support affect military capability (Tellis et al., 2000). However, if natural resources provide for military resources and corruption diverts those resources (e.g., in Nigeria's situation), then military effectiveness is negatively affected (World Bank Group, n.d.)

The military can accrue the best equipment and construct a successful military doctrine. Still, it is the human factor that uses the weapons, carries out orders, adds meaning to tactical and strategic initiatives, and ultimately overcomes the opposing army. Thus, it is inevitable that a military would suffer the abnorms of civilian society. Soldiers will commit crimes on and off the battlefield; therefore, it is incumbent on military leadership to provide and prosecute further training, education, and discipline to mitigate future negative behavior.

Counterinsurgency can only occur through Weberian state consolidation. The state and the military work to create a stable, orderly system supported by the population and then endorsed by legitimate violence (Weber, 1946). However, this is a well-formed [State] but complex task (Packwood, 2009). When a government is legitimate, the people understand and share in a level of confidence, accepting societal expectations and their government (Packwood, 2009). Trust in the government should transfer to trust in the military. However, the Nigerian people have neither confidence nor trust in the military

nor the government, as neither offers legitimacy (Ejimabo, 2013; Channels Television, 2021).

Military Norms

In addition to social theories, it is essential to discuss military norms. Norms are phenomena that influence behavior (Hechter & Opp, 2001), guiding how people should behave regardless of other values or ethics (National Research Council, 2014). Norms refer to the “oughtness” of behavior based on the moral belief about what should happen in a situation. In society, behavioral norms remain informal and are not codified into laws or statutes. However, norms give strict order to life and human interactions. (Anderson & Dunning, 2014, p. 1). Behavioral norms prevent life from becoming nasty, brutish, and dangerous on a wholesale level preventing chaos (Anderson & Dunning, 2014, p. 1).

Descriptive norms refer to people’s typical behavior or how they process reality (Anderson & Dunning, 2014, p. 2). Injunctive norms serve as standards or a social model to correct inappropriate behavior.

For instance, the injunctive norm reflects approved and disapproved conduct identified by the group or what most people think one should do (National Research Council, 2014). The injunctive norm relies on social pressure in guiding performance, tied to a collective outcome (Anderson & Dunning, 2014, p. 4). Descriptive norms are those norms that, regardless of morality, are defined by the group. This normative behavior allows group members to conform to the group. This normative behavior guides the expectations of how a group member will behave or act in specific situations and is tied to what the group is doing (National Research Council, 2014).

Neither is isolated or set in stone by the rules of normative behavior. For example, if a group of soldiers decides to ransack and pillage a village, a soldier who refuses to participate has violated the descriptive norm and has demonstrated the injunctive norm as prescribed by a lawful well-functioning society. Societal norms and moral values have superseded the needs and desires of the group (Anderson & Dunning, 2014, p. 4,5).

According to the National Research Council (2014), three mechanisms enforce norms and effectively influence group behavior. A rational self-interested person will conform to a standard if the expected sanctions are sufficient. The second mechanism refers to the internalization of norms, such as self-discipline. This represents the internal makeup of a person, an individual with high expectations or values and a moral set that is ingrained and unshakeable. Finally, the mechanism concerns how “norms develop based on the expectations of how others will act” (National Research Council, 2014, p. 26). The implication here is conditional conformity is based on realizing that it becomes a self-interest if all or most participants conform. This represents the individual’s expectation of what others will do to ensure homeostasis or equilibrium in a situation and within the group, or all for one, one for all.

The theoretical framework of norms pertains to the neorealist combat balance theory and the normative theory of military performance used by Fitzsimmons (2013) to understand how a highly disciplined and trained, but small and under-gunned mercenary force could defeat a far larger insurgency. The military of any nation develops its own culture based on the culture and social structure from the society from which it is drawn.

In addition, subsets of culture and norms within the military may exist down to the platoon level as soldiers create their own supportive and close environment within a

much larger force. Platoon level associations are symbiotic as each soldier depends on the other for support, camaraderie, and safety--security in a violent environment.

Dual Process

It is essential to discuss decision-making rubrics in the heat of battle or high-stress environments. Individuals have two information processing systems: fast and slow, which work together to formulate judgments and influence behavior. This condition involves the deliberative reasoning brain and the intuitive and emotional brain, which is often subconscious.

This is, of course, a simplification of the thinking process, and there is conflict as to whether individuals have “two different parallel processing architectures, or simply two different cognitive modes” (National Research Council, 2014, p. 27). Fast thinking (system 1) influences decisions through the immediacy of a situation. This process arises from a partly instinctual, partly learned, and often emotional response to stimuli. The slow process (system 2) is the rational, deliberative thinking process” (National Research Council, 2014, p. 27). However, the best result may occur when both work in sync to solve an issue.

It is essential to understand dual process as it affects men and women and their decision-making in battle. In battle, enlisted soldiers fight and are driven by training and discipline. However, any number of cognitive impairments, including fear, anger, information overload, loss of situational awareness, and adrenaline, can play a part in how soldiers respond to stress stimuli (Kahneman, 2011). This represents the type 1 response.

Officers provide type 2 control on the battlefield. This reality was understood as far back as the Napoleonic wars. It came to the forefront in the revolutionary war when British officers were sniped by the colonials to remove command and control. The British complained as officers kept the battlefield under control and prevented it from devolving into debauchery and depravity (Black, 1999). In Europe, the nobles from which the officer corps emanated agreed that officers were to be protected.

Any number of cognitive impairments may hinder system 2, including fatigue, personal issues, lack of situational awareness, fear, anger, and information overload. When these interfere with system 2 thinking, irrational and hurried decisions may increase and cause chaos. For this reason, the US Army maintains strict rules of engagement but allows junior officers to make decisions and adjust orders to complete the mission.

It is system 2, in conjunction with the military norms of behavior, which pulls the soldier back from harming civilians by shooting them for the loss of a Nigerian soldier in battle or running through villages setting homes afire and shooting anyone who flees the flames because they must be guilty (Nossiter, 2013).

Military Culture

Fitzsimmons (2013) noted the neorealist combat balance theory. An army that fields a large force, sufficiently equipped with the latest quality weaponry, determines the material combat balance between the two combatants, determining their military performance. The normative theory of military performance dictates that a military's cultural norms influence its tactical behavior, determining military performance (Fitzsimmons, 2013). Although Fitzsimmons studied a private small unit mercenary

army, the premise is testable when applied to a nation's army. The cultural norms of the military, taken and influenced by its society, affect military performance. Not in material, but the human interaction and actions on the battlefield.

The US Army is a prime example in which these two theories intermesh. The US army also maintains a culture of forward-thinking, highly trained, and motivated leaders and field troops. As demonstrated in Iraq after the surge and the implementation of counterinsurgency theory and tactics, army commanders and troops became agile, adaptable, competent, and wholly progressive in counterinsurgency tactics.

The US army is culturally trained in the German military principle of *Auftragstaktik*, and operations are grounded in mission-based tactics rather than the obverse in detailed order-based tactics. Field commanders and young officers are allowed the ability to take the initiative and leeway to make decisions in the field based on a changing battlefield environment to advance their mission. According to Fitzsimmons (2013), a "military's cultural norms influences its tactical behavior," which in turn "influences its military performance" (p. 3). This reality may point to conditions within the Nigerian Army that deny even the most mediocre effort in strategy and operational performance.

The Nigerian military's culture and doctrine are grounded in order-based operations that can deny military performance's normative theory (Onuoha, Nwangwu, & Ugwueze, 2020). In other words, in being an order-based organization, the Nigerian military cannot operate in the spirit of *Auftragstaktik* as the organization does not teach or train to complete the mission but rather to complete the order. Leaders and their

subordinates follow the order and stop activity when the order has been completed, even if the mission, operational, or strategic objective has not been achieved.

It appears that the Nigerian military is structured to present two faces. One face of the military performs foreign internal defense missions for UN Peace Keeping Operations and the Economic Community of West African States. These units are the best Nigeria has to offer and have performed admirably, winning accolades and awards from the foreign press and nation-states (Nigerian Army, 2017a; Nigerian Army, 2017b).

The second face the Nigerian army presents is that of internal dysfunction. This has involved forces who cannot stand in a fight with the insurgents, abuse the population, kill innocents, and demonstrate poor discipline while attempting a coup d'état discovered in May 2017 (Kumolo, 2017). In addition, Nigerian Army leadership has consistently focused allegations of wrongdoing and blamed incidents and atrocities on Boko Haram and the public when committed by Nigerian military personnel.

The military norms of behavior within the Nigerian Army are so affected by Nigeria's societal and cultural dysfunction that abnormalcy is the norm. The truth may be simple; the Nigerian Army is socially, culturally, materially, and professionally incapable of defeating a smaller under-gunned, and poorly led insurgent force. However, in the grand scheme, it may be that the insurgency is the force that is better led and fields superior firepower.

Nigeria as a Democratic State

Prior to 1960, Nigeria was a colony of Great Britain that provided the country's economic and security foundation. Nationalism existed in Nigeria, but only as a front against the British. Still, once Nigerians gained independence in 1960, the people

abandoned nationalism in favor of tribal affiliation, and nationalism reverted to a local and regional phenomenon within the tribes (Emeh, Ubaku, & Anyikwa, 2015).

Nigeria is a 21-year-old democracy, a federal republic, and is considered a fragile state (Fund for Peace, 2018). As with most African countries, colonial powers designated national borders without deference to cultural or ethnic realities, basing national boundaries on a rivers course, watershed, colonial convenience, straight lines through unpopulated areas, agreements between countries (Britain and France concerning Nigeria), the Congress of Berlin, and through the post-colonial Organization of African Unity (Herbst, 1989; Jones, 2015).

A sheik of the Shammar tribe can best sum up the reality of colonialisms' disregard for local cultural divisions; when asked why he smuggled sheep and benzine into Iraq from Syria, he responded by answering; "Why did you put the Syrian border in the middle of my sheep? We were here first" (Ricks, 2006, p. 61).

Figure 2 indicates the position of Nigeria relative to the African continent. Benin, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon border Nigeria. The colonial border system led to cultural, ethnic, and religious conflicts between a Muslim North and Christian South. In addition, conflicts exist between the Muslim Fulani, a cattle culture, and the agrarian Christian South. In addition, conflict exists with the Biafra delta people who desire political and economic independence (Biafra Free State, n.d.; Okeke, 2015).

Nigeria has over 250 diverse ethnic groups, encompasses 500 languages, and 185 million people spread through 36 states and the Federal Capital State (CIA, 2017). Nigeria extends over 58,689 square miles. Nigeria has the largest population in Africa and is also the richest, based on oil and natural gas production, primarily located in

Benin's Bight in the Delta state region noted in Figure 3 (CIA, 2017). Figure 3 indicates the position of each Nigerian state and its association with the countries of Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin. The Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, and Yobe states in the northeast are where the Boko Haram attacks are concentrated. Negedu and Atabor (2015) noted that before British colonial rule, the various ethnic tribes operated as separate and diverse political and religious systems.

Figure 2


Nigeria, located on the Bight of Benin, on the African Continent. (Betts, n.d.)



The British incorporated separate systems to exploit capital, and to manifest this, the British employed a divide and rule mentality to maintain British hegemony, create disunity, create disputes, and encourage ethnic suspicions, thus enforcing tribalism and conflict. The British used this asymmetric warfare tactic to prevent nationalism and keep the various tribes and sects separate, seeking providence and hegemony for themselves.

Figure 3

Map of Nigeria with Location of the 36 States.



Note. Most of the Boko Haram activity is in Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Kano, Gombe, and Jigawa states. (Administrative Map of Nigeria, open-source, n.d.)

War, in any form, has long been associated with the acquisition of land and resources. However, the British used a pseudo-population-centric asymmetric warfare tactic to defeat anti-colonial sentiment (Herbst, 1989). The British actively promoted internal conflict to control any nationalist intent as the population held grassroots power but could not unify to challenge colonial rule (Herbst, 1989).

When the British vacated Nigeria, they did not leave a plan or template in place for the new Nigerian government to follow. The government was left to “devise structural changes to cope with questions of unity and stability” and to overcome obstacles tied to introducing an overly complicated version of democracy to a diverse and illiterate population (Herskovits, 1980, para. 11). The British were kicked out, so the vacating government did not leave managing civil servants behind to assist in the transition. The ethnic divides, encouraged by the British, eventually crippled the new federation. As a result, a civil war broke out in Western Nigeria (Kobo, 2020). This reality followed a pattern in which every colony in Africa was left to its own machinations.

After the transition, the Nigerian central government was weak, ineffective, corrupt, and unable to adequately provide even the essential services to the people (Metz, 1991). It did not help that between 1960 through 1999, Nigeria experienced ten coup d'états led by various military leaders who believed they could do better (Siollun, 2009; Pulseng, 2016). After Nigeria achieved democracy in 1999 through the fourth republic, no successful coup d'états have taken place.

There have been four sitting civilian presidents of Nigeria, and the latest, Muhammadu Buhari, is a former army general and rival of Goodluck Jonathon, president from 2010 through 2015. Buhari has attempted to address the issues that plague Nigeria

and garner support for the war but has not succeeded. In 2015, he gave the military an order to destroy Boko Haram within three months, but this proved an impossible task (Chesa, 2015). After his re-election in 2019, he did not address the Boko Haram issue at all.

Nigeria is heavily grounded in the tribal system and offers a complex ethnic and cultural diaspora. Internal conflicts between Muslim and Christian, north versus south, rich-poor, communal violence, tribal isolation, rampant corruption, and Boko Haram are tearing the country apart. Because of this dysfunction, Boko Haram found a complementary environment in which to grow.

Western influences which constructed Nigeria worked to create disharmony during colonial rule. Kant (1784) noted that human beings desire peace and contentment yet cannot avoid continuous disagreement with each other; this is Kant's "unsociable sociability" (p. 4). Echoing Kant, Schneewind (1998) wrote, "We are self-preserving and quarrelsome beings, but we are also sociable. These two aspects of human nature make the problem of maintaining social order quite definite: how are quarrelsome but socially-minded beings like ourselves to live together" (p. 72)?

Nigerians live together through a precarious concoction of adversity, diversity, distrust, ancient ancestral ties, and tribal affiliations, and yet, as US Ambassador to Nigeria, William Stuart Symington, once noted; somehow, "whatever happens, Nigerians have a way of figuring out ways to live together" (Vanguard, n.d. para. 1).

Northern Nigeria is mired in poverty and the lack of opportunity with a poverty rate of 67%, the Northwest at 71.1%, and the Northeast, the focus region for Boko Haram, at 72.2% (Ahokegh, 2012). The rampant poverty and lack of opportunity

in the north allows Boko Haram to recruit Muslim men and children with the promise of political change, true Islamic enlightenment, and a life purpose.

In 2016, the Nigerian military declared Boko Haram 100% defeated and launched Operation Accord to address the violent Fulani. The Nigerian army had repeatedly claimed victory against Boko Haram only to continue insurgent operations (Mora, 2017). The Fulani remain active against Christians; however, consolidation between the Fulani and Boko Haram is unlikely as the terror and insurgent group are of Kanuri ethnicity. However, Boko Haram may influence the Fulani in radical Salafist Islam to cultivate a Sunni association (McGregor, 2017).


This ethnic reality shifted in Mali as young Fulani, traditional supporters of the Bamako government in balancing Tuareg and Arab power in Northern Mali, have been recruited by radical Islamic groups (McGregor, 2017). The issue is complicated, but the result of this confrontation between the herdsman and the farmer has depleted the already undermanned Nigerian military to address both the Fulani and Boko Haram.

The Fulani represent a danger aside from Boko Haram. The military's attitude towards the Fulani is questionable and suspicious at best. President Buhari is Fulani, and allegations have been raised that the government condones the military's actions against Christians in the north (McGregor, 2017). Figure 4 maps the location of the Fulani through Africa and Nigeria, and it is within the "middle belt" region where the two religions coexist that violence exists, and tensions run high. Contradictions abound in this African state. While having no constitutional authority, the Emir of the Kano state currently influences many Muslims in social, moral, and spiritual matters. The Emir,

Sanusi Lamido Sanusi II, has carried on his grand uncle's tradition of "chief government critic for life" (Perry, 2014, p. 13).

Figure 4

Fulani Diaspora through Africa and Nigeria.



Note. (Quiles, 2019).

The Emir is decidedly anti-corruption and believes that while politicians are temporary, the traditional leaders of Nigeria are the true leaders, not only in politics but in societal and cultural affairs (Perry, 2014). The Emir noted that greed and ineptitude mark the Nigerian government, and when the leadership fails, the state fails (Perry, 2014; Okoronkwo, 2015). The current president, Buhari, had been ill and had not addressed the reforms he promised during the election, spending much of his first term in England undergoing medical treatment.

The elites and wealthy in Nigerian believe the nation-state is too big to fail, and this perpetuates their unwillingness to face up to the country's issues and failures (Campbell, 2013). In an interview with Femi Kuli, a popular Nigerian musician and political activist, Femi lamented that "Nothing works, we have no education, no electricity [water], the roads are bad, and the airport is shit" (Perry, 2014, p. 31).

In every society, it is the political, economic, or social elites who guide society to prosperity (Smith, 2003a). The elites also attempt to maintain equilibrium in society for the good of all, but it is good for the wealthy and elites as they hold the power structure. However, in Nigeria, instead of the elites and affluent defining and molding society, instead of representing the core investment and producing a functional society, the elites wall themselves off from the Nigerian society and perpetuate their personal and isolated Nigeria with Porsche showrooms and Gucci Salons (Perry, 2014).

The state of the Nigerian democracy is tenuous at best. A thwarted coup d'état in May 2017 is the best evidence that Nigeria faces hurdles for a lasting and vibrant democracy. Add to the situation widespread corruption, tribalism, violence against women and children, including genital mutilation, and internal conflicts between tribes and ethnic groups mean that Nigeria may be hard-pressed to address a continuing transnational insurgency adequately. The politicians and the wealthy maintain the status quo to maintain their position and profitability (Dike, 2014). Society in Nigeria is dysfunctional, and the State as a whole is not at peace with itself.

Tribalism in Nigeria

Nigerian is not a nation-state. It is, at best, a frail nation on the verge of implosion. The UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (n.d.) used the

definition offered by Davis (1997) that a Nation-state “is one where the great majority are conscious of a common identity and share the same culture.” Tribalism, among other dysfunctional issues, denies Nigeria nation-state status. According to Walby (2003), “nations are much more often projects that are in the process of becoming something more, than they are actually realized in stable political institutions and command over territory” (p. 531).

Vail (1991) noted that nationalism was viewed as progressive and laudable in the modernization paradigm, while tribalism was viewed as retrogressive and divisive. However, tribalism persists, for ethnic particularism offers safety and security. According to Mehlika (2013), modernization is required for countries to influence and control their political, social, and economic development. Christian Southern Nigeria is far more modernized than the North, a reality not lost on the Nigerian people. Smith (2016) noted Pierce and explained that Boko Haram rose in the Borno state by taking advantage of tribalism's political, religious, and cultural separations (p, 565).

In addition, Smith (2016) described the “moral economy of corruption” in Nigeria as one in which the conduct of politicians and patrons is judged socially based mainly on how well power and (especially) money are employed for productive social and political purposes, rather than for purely selfish aggrandizement” (p. 565). Smith (2016) also noted that the population is nearly inoculated from corruption in that implicitly, “the moral economy associated with a politics rooted in patron-clientism mitigates class conflict and inhibits more widespread mobilization against corruption” (p. 565).

Nigeria is so corrupt that when Niyi Osundare gave a speech at a Save Nigeria Group conference, he stated, “we no longer blush at corruption. How did our nerves slide

into their present state of stupor? How did we plunge into this state of unconsciousness? Catastrophes that would shake normal societies to their very foundations hit and leave us unfazed. Tyrants in military uniform whipped us with scorpions; only a few of us protested (Osundare, 2012, para. 10). According to Osundare, “corruption is the grand commander of the federal republic” (heading).

A strong sense of nationalism in Nigeria is nonexistent and is tied to the inherent suitability of the localized tribal system. No single tribe has any stake in embracing and extending its nationalistic tendencies to accommodate other tribes. In this dynamic, complexity theory enters the equation as both a consolidator and disruptor of the nation-state, the state (local) and the “concatenation of cultural movements” denies unity (Kaufmann, 2017, p. 22).

Ogoku and Umudjere (2016) noted that the colonial system strengthened the tribal system across Africa and brainwashed Africans to believe they were less than full national and international community members. In addition, Ogoku and Umudjere (2016) wrote that “Africans are seen as murderers of fellow Africans, dehumanizing Africans, aiding and abetting against Africa, antagonizing African values and morals due to their self-acclaimed tribal supremacy” (p. 92). Ogoku and Umudjere (2016) offered that tribalism mandates the reality of a strong cultural or ethnic identity that separates and isolates one group from another through locational polity and economic inclusiveness; that identity drives the tribal-state to the exclusion of all else.

The imperial system from which colonialism sprang introduced inferiority to Africans, so the tribal system enabled tribal Africans to strive for superiority over other tribes. Therefore, African nation-building has been stymied by Africans' “mental slavery”


(Ogoku & Umudjere, 2016). It is true then that tribalism is isolationist and protectionist.

Figure 5 graphs the location and population percentage of the various Nigerian tribes.

The Hausa-Fulani are the largest tribe in Nigeria.

Figure 5

Map of Nigeria Identifying Tribal Dispersion



Note. This map indicates the major tribes in Nigeria. (Lamm, 2014).

Nationalism is present within the tribal system, carrying tribalism into national politics affecting the Nigerian people and national unity (Bello, n.d.; Tilde, n.d.).

However, the divides in Nigeria have not been addressed in the literature regarding the

effects of national unity and support for the government in fighting an insurgent and terrorist entity.

The Nigerian federal government also has issues with the Fulani; like the militants in Biafra who seek independence, the Fulani commit violence to ensure their motives are met in expanding their territory to graze cattle.

The Fulani drive their herds south in the post-harvest season to graze on the cultivated fields. However, for many reasons, including climate change, the Fulani have found it necessary to keep their stock south all year, destroying the fragile agricultural environment (McGregor, 2017). The Fulani and the Hausa-Fulani vigilante group *Yan Sakai* seek reprisals against whole villages and farmers with machetes and AK-47s. Violence against the agrarians mirrors the attacks by Boko Haram in both number and ferocity (McGregor, 2017).

The research demonstrated the Nigerian military, with government approval, enables the Fulani's destruction of Christians in the north. This enabling may signal an institutional problem in that military conducts operations enforcing domestic policy, allowing sectarian violence and the plausibility of genocide (Murray, 2017; McGregor, 2017). It is illegal in Nigeria for civilians to own guns; however, the Fulani are well armed with automatic AK-47s and other small arms. The Fulani have access to arms and ammunition. In contrast, the Nigerian Army in Northeast Nigeria had struggled to equip their troops with arms and ammunition to fight against Boko Haram (Ross, 2016).

As an emerging but fragile state, Nigeria has not enjoyed the fruits of nationalism as a means of bringing its disparate peoples together to affirm Nigeria as an advanced prosperous nation-state. Nigeria is a fragile state, with internal forces of disunity sowing

the seeds of dissolution (Fund for Peace, 2018). When Nigeria constructed its democracy-based constitution in 1999, politicians considered a parliamentary platform for the government. However, Nigeria adopted the American model of democracy, expecting a fully functional and operational society committed to democracy (Herskovits, 1980).

Nigeria's constitution mandates the separation of church and state. Unfortunately, the primary religious demographic, Christian and Muslim, believe it is their "turn" when presidential elections are held every four years, which leaves animosity simmering. And in fact, the presidency was rotated between Christian and Muslim through an informal system known as zoning. According to Muhumuza (2019), a Christian from the south is succeeded by a Muslim from the north. This has been widely recognized as the key to holding the country together. (para. 12).

Occult and Superstitions

Understanding the culture of Nigeria is essential to comprehend military performance. According to Chuter and Gaub (2016), "African militaries inevitably reflect the dominant cultural traditions and mores of their societies, as all armies do" (p. 33). The authors went on to explain that in sub-Saharan Africa, societies, along with their soldiers, are influenced by the belief in magic and superstitions, so much so that witchcraft and sorcery are believed to be authentic and prevalent in African societies, with Nigeria no exception (Waapela, 2016). The belief in the occult and its' effect on both the population and military is just one cultural facet not considered in the West.

Waapela (2016) wrote, "The intractable corruption in Nigeria and the docility of the Nigerian masses to rise and challenge the political elites' exploitation of their natural resources is strongly believed to have a spiritual dimension, aside from the many other

physical and social factors that may be advanced” (p. 1). The Nigerian people are believed to be “spiritually manipulated by the political elites.” So much so that they are unable to ask their “political representatives (councilors, assemblypersons, senators, the president or governor) basic questions that border on governance” (Waapela, 2016, p. 7).

Waapela (2016) continued asking questions of Nigeria; “Why is Nigeria so endowed with many natural resources, producing up to 2.6 million barrels of crude oil per day, and having about 82 million hectares of arable land still ranks amongst the poorest nations of the world? Why are meritocracy, accountability, transparency, competence, and integrity jettisoned in Nigeria, especially from 1999-date? Why is Nigeria among the few nations parading the highest number of church and mosque-goers in the world, still ranks as one of the most corrupt countries” (Waapela, 2016, p. 2)?

Spirituality and belief systems play an important role in Nigeria and can account for the inability to hold the government and the military accountable. According to Waapela, “the Nigerian masses have become inexplicably docile when they should kick, they temporize, when they are to smite, they smile” (p. 7). Waapela (2016) explained that when political elites use occult practices on the Nigerian masses, they do not show anger with their deplorable, pauperized state, nor do they frown at the corruption of their political elites (p. 8).

Western sensibilities have no place when studying Nigeria or any African nation. One must believe the occult to be very real because Nigerians think it is legitimate as it guides and controls their lives. Of particular note are the “witches” of Nigeria. Children known as skolombo or street children. The Christian south, epicenter of witchcraft and the occult, demonizes homeless children (Ellison, 2018).

Finally, the lack of professionalism within the Nigerian Army may be a symptom perpetrated by the fear of a coup d'état. The Nigerian Army, before 1999, represented a weak organization due to the military ruler constantly stripping the army of funds and men fearing a new coup d'état. In May 2016, the army rifted as many as 70 Nigerian officers and senior officers from the service due to "corruption and partisan politics" or, as the fired officers alleged, "sectional and political considerations" (SaharaReporters, 2016).

In May 2017, the Nigerian Army investigated coup d'état reports as politicians attempted to influence officers to take control while Muhammadu Buhari was in England undergoing medical treatment. Army leadership moved quickly to quash any thought of a coup d'état. Chief of Army Staff, Tukur Buratai, stepped forward and issued a stern warning to his officers to stay out of politics, which raised the specter of a coup plot (Hassan, 2017). This belief in retributive or preclusive action, the rifting of officers from the ranks, which has over five decades weakened the army's core.

In January 2019, 200 officers were compulsorily retired before the presidential election in February 2019. There were suggestions that this was done to ensure a smooth political transition and prevent trouble. The military railed against such suggestions and advised the media to verify information from the appropriate source before rushing to press to avoid fake news that is not credible and is misleading (Nigerian Voice, 2019).

The Nigerian Military

The Nigerian Army can be traced to the 1863 Glover Hausas, founded by Sir John Hawley Glover of the Royal Navy (Nigerian Army, n.d.). Various regiments operated in the separate North and South protectorates. In 1900, the corps became the Royal West

Frontier Force. In 1914, the British abolished the protectorates, and the Nigerian regimental system was born. Queen Elizabeth visited Nigeria in 1956, and in her honor, the Nigerian regiment became the Queens Own Nigerian Regiments. By June 1958, the Nigerian military forces became independent from Britain, and the Nigerian government acquired military control and responsibility. (Wyss, 2016).

After independence, the Nigerian Army became subservient to the civil administration. However, 33-years of military dictatorships depleted the army of training, professionalism, accountability, and operational effectiveness, and the people's trust (International Crisis Group, 2016). The Army was once the region's most potent, and Africa counted on Nigeria's army to be a regional stabilizing force.

Nigeria's Modern Army

The Nigerian Army appears to follow the praetorian model in civilian-military relations. Perlmutter (1969) explained that a modern praetorian state is "one in which the military tends to intervene and potentially could dominate the political system" (p. 383). Perlmutter noted that the praetorian state may "develop when civilian institutions lack legitimacy or are in a position to be dominated by the military," which is true in Nigeria (p. 383). The political system is weak, with weak and ineffective political parties that are considered low-level institutions. In Nigeria, tribalism is the political party and political system, and the National Assembly merely a symbol.

Perlmutter (1969) offered that praetorianism often occurs in nations that are in the "early and middle stages of modernization and political mobilization" (p. 384). Between 1960 and 1999, Nigeria was an underdeveloped state, so the army was "pushed into

political action when civilian groups and leaders failed to legitimize themselves (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 384).

Nigeria lacks a strong, cohesive, articulate, and vibrant middle class which lends society to ensure a praetorian government. Perlmutter (1969) also noted the conditions which are present lack the necessary universal symbols that generally bind a society together (i.e., “I am Igbo and live in a country called Nigeria”).

According to Perlmutter (1969), “the middle classes in most praetorian states are small, weak, ineffective, divided, and politically impotent” (p. 387). This condition is present in Nigeria, and its presence is “manifested in the class structure's polarization-the gap between the few rich and the many poor” (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 387).

Praetorian existence is explained by “low social cohesion, personal desires, and group aims frequently diverge, and the formal structure of the state is not buttressed by an informal one; institutions do not develop readily or operate effectively; social control is ineffective; and channels for communication are few” (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 385). It is here that Perlmutter mentions dissociation in a societal equation. In addition, “not only does the underdeveloped society as a whole lack unifying orientations, but its various sectors tend to be further fragmented and incapable of mounting unified action even for the narrower benefits of a particular sector” (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 386).

Perlmutter (1969) noted that the “salient characteristic of modern military organization in developing policies is their professionalism. The professionalism and institutionalization of the military entail the establishment of military colleges, specialized training, the formation of a unified professional group, and a national army” (p. 383). One can argue that Nigeria is a praetorian state merely because the government

uses the military to enforce local, regional, and national policy, negating the army's social and cultural impact against civilians. The military eschews any regard for the Nigerian Constitution when it harms, abuses, or kills innocent civilians and acts poorly on the battlefield, dispossessing any thought of humanitarian law or the law of war.

Praetorianism

The Nigerian military moved from the ruler-type praetorian model to the arbitrator-type in 1999 with the establishment of the fourth republic. Perlmutter (1969) noted that in a state with a low cohesive social structure, the praetorian model is characterized by fragmented boundaries and relations between civil and military authority, both seeking political power and relevancy, but the state ultimately retains civilian control. Additionally, the military is oriented to external threats and internal challenges. The arbitrator-type military tends to preserve military expertise, is conservative, and maximizes civilian power (Perlmutter, 1969).

According to Perlmutter (1969), there are distinguishing characteristics of the arbitrator-type army. The military accepts the existing social order, and once civilian disputes are settled, the army returns to its barracks or stands down. The army has no political organization and does not work to maximize army rule; if intervention is necessary, the army establishes a time limit for military intervention until an alternative and acceptable government is established. The military is concerned with their professionalism, sometimes overly concerned, and they operate from behind the scenes as a pressure group. Still, they have a low level of national consciousness, and they may fear civilian retribution.

In addition, professionalism is insisted upon and is codified in army doctrine and culture; promotions are determined by ability, expertise, and education (Perlmutter, 1969). According to Perlmutter (1969), the praetorian model negates professionalization principles, and the attributes of a professional army are not “inoculated or observed” (p. 391). Nigerian military officers are promoted many times based on tribal affiliation or the desire to enrich subordinates as their senior officers have been enriched.

Perlmutter (1969) noted that the army does not have a professional tradition because of this reality or has deteriorated, conferring the military a low level of national consciousness and identification. Therefore, the model Nigeria uses to enforce domestic policy by an army trained to kill and inflict mass damage; first and foremost, lends itself to the praetorian model. Prior to 1999, the Nigerian army operated as a praetorian ruler-type army with numerous coup d'état coup de etat taking place and the army's command general taking control.

The liberal model would have civilian authority in complete control of the military with clearly delineated lines of the civil and the military, continual civil-military competition accompanied by occasional but tenuous civilian control, and a military-oriented to coping with external threats and internal challenges to both the state and its existence simultaneously. In Nigeria, the fear of a coup d'état and independent actions of military abuse and atrocities negates the liberal model (Tellis, et al., 2000).

The Nigerian Army considers itself the jewel of Africa, and the leaders tout the training and professionalism brought to the Army after 1999. Although college students upon graduation are required to perform one year of civil service to the country (Simon, 2011b), the military is all-volunteer. The army is predominantly Muslim, but efforts have

moved forward to recruit Christians (Godwin, 2016). Enrollment into the military is coveted as it provides many in Nigeria with a route out of poverty and disenfranchisement. The age mandate from 18 to 22 years (26 if a tradesman) seems a bit short-sighted in enlistment and limits recruitment to only the youngest Nigerian male (Nigerian Army Recruit Portal, 2019). However, the training regimen is quite strenuous due to Africa's harsh conditions.

The Nigerian system is comparable to the US Military (only) in that the training is divided into three phases; Red, White, and Blue and is completed in ten weeks (US Army, 2017). From basic training, Nigerian soldiers move on to Advanced Individual Training, training for Military Occupational Specialties or their career assignment (Timaya, 2017). As with Western armies, during boot camp, the Nigerian training command instructs in morals and ethics on the battlefield (Timaya, 2017).

The Nigerian National Defence Academy in the Kaduna state trains the officer corps for the Nigerian Army and is considered the best military academy in Africa. The Academy is a descendent of the Royal Military Forces Training College, which existed before decolonization. Cadets enter the program and participate in a five year "Regular Combatant Course" (Nigerian Defence Academy, 2020)

In addition to the bachelor's program, the Academy also offers graduate and post-graduate degrees (Nigerian Defence Academy, 2020). The contents of the 5-year program are not known; it is more likely than not that training mimics British training. This would indicate that morals and ethics in combat are included as officers are the primary arbiters and enforcers of discipline and ethical behavior (British Army, 2020; Nigerian Defence Academy, 2020). According to GlobalSecurity.org, while the Nigerian Army is the

largest in West Africa, the reality is far from perception. When President Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military man, was elected in 1999, he feared the Army, so he proceeded to skeletonize the organization to prevent further coups (“Nigerian Army,” n.d.).

In 2016, the Army had an estimated 130,000 active-duty soldiers and 32,000 reservists (Sweeny, 2016). In 2019, the numbers reflected 120,000 active duty and 0 reservists (Global Fire Power, 2020). The army is ranked 47th globally, but this is a neo-realist number based on strength and material power, not ability or capability (Global Fire Power, 2020). Although a large and complex organization, the Army is understaffed for its obligations to the African Union, Economic Community of West African States, UN Peace Keeping Operations, and in addressing Boko Haram (“Nigerian Army,” n.d.).

Corruption has hampered the force in denying the acquisition of both basic and advanced weaponry. Transparency International stated that previous and fraudulent arms deals left the army without vital equipment, is insufficiently trained, and is low in morale and under-resourced (“Military Graft Undermines Nigeria's Fight,” 2017). Gone are the days when army officers were referred to as “dirties,” those who had enriched themselves during military rule, and the “cleans,” those who had not participated in using their office to enrich themselves (“Nigerian Army,” n.d.). Corruption plagues the army with those who still seek to enrich themselves. Because of these issues and their actions against civilians, the US had refused, through late 2018, to sell arms to the Nigerian military (Nigerian Army, n.d.).

Military Organization

The Nigerian Army consists of eight divisions, including one amphibious. The First Division is located at Kaduna, the command division known as the show division, to give visitors and heads of state a show of what Nigerian military power looks like (“7th Infantry Division,” 2019). This division does not represent the reality of army life in Nigeria. In 2013 headquarters established the 7th Infantry Division for the war against Boko Haram. So poor was the operational capability the General Officer Commanding was removed four times between 2013-2014 (“7th Infantry Division,” 2019).

In 2014, two mutinous actions occurred by soldiers who refused to fight against the insurgency. So grievous was the leadership that “junior officers are willing to be court-martialed, rather than continue to be sabotaged, humiliated, and killed by the corruption and incompetence of the top military command and federal government” (“7th Infantry Division,” 2019). It is the 7th ID, which has borne the brunt of attacks by ISWAP and Boko Haram in the years following. These are the soldiers who flee when ISWAP or Boko Haram attacks.

In 2017, Military.com ranked the Nigerian Army as the fifth worst military in the world (Stilwell, 2017). The Nigerian Army could not meet its obligation to protect civilians from insurgents and terrorists, so the government formed the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). Metz (2007) noted that “militias arise from a combination of need and opportunity” (p.15). The militia exists as the “state cannot address the basic needs of a specific group, particularly security, economic opportunity, and a basis for political identity” (Metz, 2007, p. 15).

Ross (2015) wrote that in Northeast Nigeria, the army was underequipped, their “armored vehicles don’t actually move,” and soldiers are known to “flee from battle with civilians as they tear off their uniforms.” “Run for your lives,” they were screaming as they fled, he said. “Boko Haram is coming!” The soldiers tore off their uniforms, put on civilian clothes, parked their army vehicle under a tree, and fled in a car (Searcy, 2019, para. 18).

In 2014, Nigeria commissioned the Nigerian Army Special Operations Command through the assistance and training provided by the US. However, SOF is designed for a focused and particular military mission skill set (“Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC),” 2014). It may be difficult to understand why a specialized unit was established when regular army units lack leadership, logistical support, competence, training, and lack food, weapons, and ammunition in the field.

Nigerian Military Budget and Operations

The Nigerian defense budget from years 2000 through 2008 was 3% of government expenditures. From 2009 through 2014, expenditures rose 7.2% but were still underfunded compared to the Gross National Product (International Crisis Group, 2016, p i). Corruption runs rampant through the civilian and military sectors. From 2007 through 2014, Sambo Dasuki, a retired Nigerian Army Colonel and former National Security Adviser to the President of Nigeria, allegedly diverted 2 billion dollars meant for military arms, supplies, and ammunition (The ScoopNG, n.d.). This action caused field forces to run short on ammo, weapons, uniforms, supplies, training, and pay, leading to mutinies and Boko Haram’s control of the North (The ScoopNG, n.d.).

President Buhari, disturbed by the reports, wrote: “The findings made so far are extremely worrying considering that within the same period our troops were in desperate need of ammo/equipment” (The ScoopNG, 2016, para. 13). The report indicated that the independent audit showed a “total extra budgetary intervention” for arms, excluding grants from state governments, amounted to over \$5 billion. Of the 513 contracts, 53 were “failed contracts” worth more than 2 billion dollars (The ScoopNG, 2016).

National legislators also divert money from the military budget through the appropriation process to serve tribal needs, private business dealings, and personal interests (International Crisis Group, 2016). The military is understaffed; operational planning is inadequate. Bloated padded payrolls serve ranking officers, and a weak auditing system contributes to the Nigerian military's morass (International Crisis Group, 2016).

The Nigerian military participates in regional peacekeeping, stretching an already undermanned force and budget. In addition, the military is dealing with over two dozen internal security operations, the largest being Boko Haram (International Crisis Group, 2016). Training is woefully inadequate, facilities are insufficient in number, staffing poor, and the Nigerian Army is mired in conventional warfare doctrine (International Crisis Group, 2016).

In 2020, the Nigerian Army budget was noted to be 2.1 billion dollars U.S. The military fielded 129 fixed-wing and rotary aircraft. The army accounted for 258 tanks, 1750 armored personnel carriers, 363 self-propelled and towed artillery, and 38 rocket launchers. The navy had a ship complement of 75 small patrol vessels (Global Fire Power, 2020).

The Nigerian army, the “Jewel of Africa,” is not, as the military is “badly governed, under-resourced, and virtually adrift in policy and doctrine” (International Crisis Group, 2016, para. 2). If Nigeria’s armor does not run, if troops lack arms, ammunition, training, logistical support, food, where does 2.1 billion dollars U.S. go (International Crisis Group, 2016, para. 2)?

According to the International Crisis Group, “Dubious procurement practices, fraudulently bloated payrolls, poor financial management and weak auditing systems at the national security adviser’s office” further degrade the force as funds are diverted at the headquarters level to private or non-military purposes (International Crisis Group, 2016, para. 4). Reports from the field indicate that soldiers went into battle against Boko Haram with inadequate weaponry and ammunition, while some soldiers carried no arms (Ross, 2015).

In 2019, Nigeria ranked the 144th least corrupt country out of 176 countries assessed. From 1996 through 2018, Nigeria’s corruption rank averaged 121.48, with the highest rating in 2005 (Trade Economics, 2019). 2019’s mark is slightly better than the 2005 level, indicating corruption mitigation had not worked. As a comparison, Russia and Ukraine, the most corrupt countries in Europe, carry a rating of 138 and 120 comparatively (Trade Economics, 2019).

The Nigerian military has experienced failure on the battlefield and in attempting to manage a regional war. As 2020 is upon Nigeria, the army has been fighting Boko Haram for 11-years with little chance of resolution. The military remains corrupt, and leadership, logistical support, and appropriate doctrinal applications for soldiers in the field appear non-existent.

As far as addressing Boko Haram as a conventional army, Tellis, et al. (2000) noted through the institutionalist approach; the military, like all organizations, is driven by institutional well-being. In Nigeria, this translates to officers and senior leaders' assuring personal and professional well-being; they seek to maintain the status quo by ensuring their positions in the army are solid and lucrative. Therefore, innovation does not exist and, if it did, may not be successful. In the end, the leadership would be more driven with the internal distribution of status and power than with organizational goals. In this paradigm, new ideas are perceived as threatening (Thompson, 1969). This approach describes the Nigerian military.

In contrast is the professionalist approach, which views the military as an organization driven by protecting state security. The professionalist is optimistic and understands that the organization will innovate successfully and learn, initiating positive change (Tellis, et al., 2000). The US military, as well as NATO armies, are professionalist organizations.

The Nigerian Constitution and the Military

The Nigerian constitution offers primary direction to the civilian government on military use for internal and external issues. The constitution states: "The president shall be the head of state, the chief executive of the Federation, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Federation" (Constitute, 2021, p. 59). "The powers of the president as the commissioner-in-chief of the armed forces of the Federation shall include the power to determine the operational use of the armed forces of the Federation" (Constitute, 2021, p. 94). Additionally, the 1999 Constitution in Article 214 (1) ended localized police forces and installed a national police force: "There shall be a police force for Nigeria,

which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and ... no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof” (Ekeh, 2010; Constitute, 2021, p. 92).

The Constitution states the Federation shall, subject to an Act of the National Assembly made on that behalf, equip and maintain the armed forces adequately to effectively defend Nigeria from external aggression, maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air. The military should suppress insurrection and restore order and perform such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly (Constitute, 2021, p. 93).

Section 3 gives the president the authority to assign the military to confront and eradicate Boko Haram on Nigerian soil. The Nigerian constitution also stipulates that: The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a State based on democracy and social justice principles. Accordingly, it is declared that: Sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government through the constitution derives all its powers and authority. The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government. The participation by the people in their government shall be ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution” (Constitute, 2021, p. 15). Expressly, the protection of the people from corruption and abuse is noted in section 15(5) in that “The State shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power” (Constitute, 2021, p. 15). The Constitution also states, “Every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person, and accordingly--No person shall be subject to torture or inhumane or degrading treatment” (Constitute, 2021, p. 23). In 2015, the Nigerian Assembly passed the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, which “prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment

of arrestees; however, it failed to prescribe penalties for violators” (U.S. Department of State, 2017, p. 5).

Based on humanitarian agency claims, recorded video footage, eyewitness accounts, and reports, and documents provided by the government, the Nigerian Army and the CJTF have violated multiple tenets of the Nigerian constitution (Amnesty International, 2014, 2016b; Human Rights Watch, 2016a, 2016b). Within this context of human rights, the actions by the military become concerning regarding the treatment of citizens in Northern Nigeria.

Understanding the Nigerian Army

Chuter and Gaub (2016) attempted to explain African armies for the European Union, whose members have poured funds into Africa to project their expectations and concepts on the Africans. European Union conceptualizations and desires have little to do with the realities found in Africa, as independent states use the funds and assets as they see fit. Ghuter and Gaub (2016) noted that African armies are dissimilar from each other, let alone from Western armies, as each colonial power formed native armies for their particular colonial strategies.

The colonial powers built substantial military or paramilitary native forces, led by white officers and used against the African populations. This may be part of the legacy and why the Nigerian Army harms and abuses the home population. It was a learned concept and wholly acceptable while serving under the British.

In general, and according to Chuter and Gaub (2016), “African armies have evolved mainly by trial and error, and their missions include, in different places, public order, gendarmerie-style operations, border policing, and even development and


infrastructure tasks” (p. 12). Armies in Africa have become involved in counterinsurgency, counterterrorist operations, peacekeeping missions, and control intelligence gathering and analysis in many countries (Chuter & Gaub, 2016). These armies carry out these missions even though they are conventionally based and were established to address asymmetric warfare. The armies of Africa were decidedly built on the neo-realist theory of power projection using conventional warfare tactics and strategy.

The Nigerian Army operates under resource constraints; poorly maintained military equipment, inadequate infrastructure, and armament is degrading while soldiers live and work under challenging conditions. This is not a Nigerian problem but affects all African national armies (Chuter & Gaub, 2016).

Figure 6 identifies the civilian trust factor for African nations concerning their armies. Nigeria is ranked near the bottom in trust from the civilian population. In synch with the civilian view of the military, Nigerians do not approve of military rule. The people want democracy but may have little understanding of what makes a democracy work for the benefit of the people.

Figure 6

Level of Popular Trust Toward the Army and Attitudes to Military Rule.



Note. (Chuter & Gaub, 2016, p. 32).

Boko Haram

Boko Haram was founded as a decidedly local phenomenon with transnational radical Islamist influences. Boko Haram's early form sprang from the Maitatsine, an Islamic fundamentalist sect who, in the 1980s, recruited children and teens. The roots of Boko Haram can be traced to 1995 when Abubakar Lawan founded the non-violent movement Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra (Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization) in Maiduguri, the capital of the Borno state (Onuoha, 2012).

In 2002, Lawan left Nigeria to study in Saudi Arabia. Mohammed Yusuf took control and renamed the group Jamā'atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da'wati wal-Jihād (people committed to propagating the prophet's teachings and Jihad) (Ekanem, Dada, & Ejue, 2012). Yusuf provided education and jobs to the marginalized youth but increasingly radicalized the group through the early 2000s (Agbiboa, 2015).

An essential factor to their and other radicalized Islamic groups' growth and appeal is the spread of globalization. Gansler (2013) defined globalization as the "long-term, largely irreversible phenomenon involving the political, cultural, and economic merging of geographically dispersed groups and shares the idea that transportation and communication technologies are pervasive and consequential" (p. 2). Globalization expanded recruiting economic viability and spreading the radical ideology. It increased the global national and economic hierarchies, leaving underdeveloped nations struggling to achieve the same level of financial independence as developed nations.

Globalization within the radical Islamic diaspora became a reality as al-Qa'ida spread its message throughout the Middle East, Europe, Africa, the Far East, and

Muslims worldwide. ISIS took the mantle away from al-Qa'ida after the US military disseminated the group in the early to mid-2000s. Boko Haram affiliated with ISIS expanding the globalized network of like-minded Jihadi groups. With the affiliation with ISIS, goals have changed.

ISIS demanded that Boko Haram stop its terror campaign against Muslims and adopt a focused campaign against Christians, the military, and the democratic government to establish the African caliphate. Therefore, Boko Haram has become a transnational terror enterprise and has increased its presence with the advent of globalization. Table 1 notes the differences between the localized historical insurgency model and globalization.

In 2009, Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād, led by Yusuf, conducted a violent uprising against the Nigerian state. Yusuf was captured and summarily executed by the Nigerian government, and his followers were imprisoned. However, instead of dissipating the sect, the group enjoyed a resurgence and adopted a ruthlessly violent demeanor (Bunker & Dilege, 2017).

Table 1

Conventional Localized Insurgency Versus Globalization

	<i>Conventional insurgency</i>	<i>Global insurgency</i>
Insurgent goals:	Specific overthrow of local government	Complex, thematic, overthrow of global order
Power source:	Support from the local population	Global support from like-minded individuals
Center of Gravity:	Local population	International influence on communications, funding, recruiting, travel, and leadership
Organizational structure:	Hierarchical, tribal, or group	Networked, connected, interknitted, flatter organization leadership: many capable leaders
Insurgent primary tactic:	Guerilla warfare, terrorism	Hybrid warfare, international terrorism and support

Insurgent motivation: Deprivation, disenfranchisement	A strong grievance, a change to world order
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Note. Ellington, 2013, p. 85.

In 2010, Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau attacked the state prison in Bauchi and freed 105 followers and 600 additional prisoners ("Boko Haram Attack' Frees Hundreds of Prisoners," 2010). Boko Haram refined its skills and training through a close association with al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. In March 2015, Shekau announced the groups' affiliation with ISIS/ISIL.

Shekau changed the group's name to Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya (Islamic State of West Africa). Better known as Boko Haram, which means, depending on the translation, "Westernization is sacrilege, Western education is a sin," or "Westernization is forbidden" (Murphy, 2014; Tilde, n.d.). In addition, Shekau reached out to al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb to enhance Salafist affiliation.

In late 2016, reports emerged that Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram's leader, was killed in an air attack. However, in 2017, the Nigerian government confirmed that Shekau was still alive and possibly hiding in Nigeria's Sambisa Forest (Gaffey, 2017). Newly affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), ISIS dictated that Abu Musab al-Barnawi, son of the late Mohammed Yusuf, assume control to realign the group with the ISIS ideology of fundamentalist Islam (Zenn, 2018).

Abu Sa'ad, Abubakar Shekau's second in command before his death in 2013, preached to followers, primarily teenagers, that victory lay in martyrdom, that killing the apostate and infidel was the only true way of redemption before Allah. Martyrdom was the goal, not a life on earth, and to serve Allah, is to become a martyr for his cause

(Perry, 2014). Perry (2014) interviewed a Nigerian general who stated that he had never seen anything like it, that Boko Haram fighters walked into the barrage of return gunfire, casual, committed, and unconcerned for their safety; they “simply walk into death” (p. 3).

Boko Haram is an insurgency that focuses on terrorizing the population. They employ terrorist actions by carrying out suicide attacks, detonating car bombs, and terrorizing the people of four nations. Mass kidnappings are prevalent, entire villages have been eradicated, and the stated goal is to destabilize the Nigerian government (Suleiman & Karim, 2015).

Boko Haram emerged because of poor governance, economic hardship, inequality, and corruption (Suleiman & Karim, 2015). A Nigerian Bishop stated that Boko Haram existed as a resistance movement about corrupt rule rather than an Islamist political movement (Suleiman & Karim, 2015). The literature indicates that while these beliefs are partly true, Boko Haram exists as a force for political Islam. Political Islam combines polity and religion to create a dynamic that captures the imagination and respect of the “true Muslim” and drives the people to support and become active in the insurgency. Yet, Boko Haram attracts its membership because of poverty, economic marginalization, social and regional inequality, and inadequate national governance (Briscoe & van Ginkel, 2013).

The Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Lands (*Jamā'atu Anṣāril Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān*), better known as Ansaru, or al-Qa'ida in the Lands Beyond the Sahel, operated as a splinter group from Boko Haram and operated in the Kano state, the homeland of the Hausa-Fulani people. Ansaru coordinated its operations with al-

Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Ronen, 2014).

Unlike Boko Haram, Ansaru did not target Muslim innocents but “fight” against mainstream Islam and representative Western values. Ansaru’s mandate included defending the interests of Islam and Muslims in Africa and is not confined to Nigeria (Ronen, 2014). Ansaru’s activities occurred in Northern Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Although Ansaru has become somewhat dormant, members spread propaganda and may evolve into a third Boko Haram faction or join ISWAP.

Boko Haram refers to the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, a doctrinal study provided by Allah to “rectify the mistaken beliefs, misunderstandings, and misconceptions Muslim have accumulated for over 200 years” (Richardson, 2014). The writings held within the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd present the “purity” of Islam and justifies their terrorism on both apostates and infidels.

Chibok

In 2014, the Chibok schoolgirl's abduction by Boko Haram awoke the world to the problem of the terrorist group. Boko Haram soldiers attacked the Chibok Girls School, killing 30 instructors and staff; the radical group abducted 276 girls ranging from 16 to 18. Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram leader, stated that the girls were kidnapped to be wives for his men, sex slaves, and sold on the black market. (Dorell, 2014).

The world community came to the aid of Nigeria with the hashtag campaign #BringBackOurGirls. Michelle Obama stated that “In these girls, Barrack and I see our daughters” and joined the campaign (Perry, 2014, p. 14). The social media campaign did nothing to help the girls and appeared to be nothing more than a feel-good response, but

it did raise the global profile of Boko Haram, the effect they had long desired (Perry, 2014). On Boko Haram and the Chibok girls, Femi, a Nigerian celebrity, asked, “Where is the military? They have the highest budget; where is the money” (Perry, 2014, p. 31)?

In the guise of Chibok, on February 19, 2018, Boko Haram attacked the girl’s school at Dapchi, in Northern Nigeria, Boko Haram’s fertile hunting ground. The group kidnapped as many as 100 girls, and there was evidence the Nigerian Army failed to prevent the attack. “The Nigerian authorities have failed in their duty to protect civilians, just as they did in Chibok four years ago. Despite being repeatedly told that Boko Haram fighters were heading to Dapchi, it appears that the police and military did nothing to avert the abduction” (Amnesty International, 2018, para. 8). Counterinsurgency tactics would have included the placing of soldiers in or around Dapchi to protect civilians. Isolate and protect the population is a first-tier requirement in counterinsurgency.

In 2021, a spate of kidnappings occurred; 317 girls were kidnapped from the Government Girls Secondary School in the town of Jangebe, in the northern state of Zamfara (Maclean, 2021). The terror group kidnapped 40 boys and adult teachers from a boy’s school in the Niger State, with one child killed. In December 2020, the Katsina State saw 300 boys kidnapped. According to the *New York Times*, kidnap-for-ransom has become a cottage industry (Maclean, 2021).

Figure 7 provides context in understanding the region in which Boko Haram operates and the relative locations of Chibok and Dapchi. Nigerians do not take to bad news, and owing to the culture, many in Nigeria refused to believe the girls’ schools had been attacked. Defeating the insurgency is crucial as Nigerians suffer at the hands of the terror organization. Two of the most horrific acts carried out by Boko Haram included the

2015 attack on Baga, Doron Baga, and 16 surrounding villages in the Borno state. This after the military attacked Baga in 2013, burning the village to root out Boko Haram sympathizers. It was estimated that 2,000 people were killed in the Baga region, primarily women and children (Amnesty International, 2015; Segun, 2015, Deblasio, 2015).

Figure 6

Location of Chibok and Dapchi




Note. Abuja is the capital of Nigeria (BBC News, 2018c).

Figure 8 is a 2017 map of Northern Africa and the sub-Saharan showing the influence of multiple terror groups. The routes of human and contraband trafficking are noted, indicating that these groups are working with each other. This map does not show that Boko Haram is active in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Al-Shabab is active in Somalia, with al-Qa'ida active in Mali, Algeria, and Libya. However, since 2013, these groups have expanded, and ISIS has made incursions into these regions.

Figure 7

Map of Africa's Militant Islamist Groups.




Note. 2017 map of Africa that notes the various locations of terror groups and the routes for the drug trade which fuels terror. (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2020)

Figure 9 maps the operational area of Boko Haram inside Nigeria. The majority of attacks have occurred around the Borno state capital of Maiduguri. Boko Haram operates in this area as it offers a quick escape to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger for a safe haven.

The region is vast and ungoverned, and conventional warfare tactics are moot in protecting civilians and defeating the insurgency.

Figure 8

Boko Haram Activity in Nigeria



Note. From *The brutal toll of Boko Haram's attacks on civilians* (Ali, 2017).

The documented events prior to 2016 represent Boko Haram as led by Abubakar Shekau. As noted previously, on August 19, 2016, Shekau and his senior leadership were identified as being killed in an airstrike by the Nigerian Air Force. As a result, ISIS elevated Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Yusuf's son, to the leadership post. Shekau (reported alive) denied Barnawi's appointment and Shekau refuted ISIS although he did not rescind his bayat (oath of allegiance to a leader) to al-Baghdadi (Kelly, 2019a). Shekau's ruthless brutality, his definition of apostasy, the targeting of Muslims, and the enforcement of his

version of Takfir led to the change (Takfir is the controversial practice of one Muslim declaring another a non-believer, or Kafir) (Kelly, 2019a).

Boko Haram then split into two factions. Shekau led his loyalists while Barnawi led the new faction Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). However, in early 2019, and apparently due to internal strife, ISIS appointed Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al-Barnawi as governor of ISWAP. There is a marked operational difference between the two groups. ISWAP targets Nigerian government installations and the army. Shekau's faction attack soft targets within the civilian population. It is ISWAP who is the larger and more active faction (Kelly, 2019a).


On December 6, 2018, and January 14, 2019, respectively, attacks were carried out in Rann, 175 km (110 miles) northeast of the Borno state capital, Maiduguri. As the attacks began on the internal displaced persons camp, army forces in both instances fled. At the same time, the attackers set fire to shelters and a United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) clinic erected to assist and house people made homeless by the conflict (Kelly, 2019a). Seventeen civilian casualties were documented, while 10,000 civilians fled (Kelly, 2019a). The attack was attributed to ISWAP; however, it turned out the Shekau faction was responsible.

Both factions are referred to as Boko Haram, and the media has difficulty differentiating which actions taken by the insurgents are attributable to which group. However, ISWAP, using the preferred ISWA identifier, attacks only hard targets. ISWA represents an existential threat to the existence of Nigeria. Boko Haram is working to create its Caliphate in northeastern Nigeria. However, it is unlikely the two factions would merge as ideological differences differ significantly.

According to Omar Mahmood, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies in Addis Ababa, “There are ideological divides with Shekau that remain unbridged, especially regarding the determination of who is and is not a civilian” (Kelly, 2019b).

Figure 9

Progression and Split of Boko Haram in 2016



Note. Based on Kelly (2019b).


In 2019, the attacks on Rann and Baga demonstrated the differences between the two groups. Shekau destroyed Rann and ran civilians down, killing them, while ISWA allowed people to leave Baga unharmed (Kelly, 2019b). Boko Haram attacks soft targets, civilian targets, while ISWA focuses its efforts against the Nigerian Army, protected national government institutions and local government offices.

ISWA shuns attacks against the population as they try and cultivate support, something Boko Haram was never concerned with achieving. ISWA's attacks are

pinpointed to military and government installations and not within the disseminated population. Figure 11 represents attacks carried out by both the Shekau faction and ISWA. The Shekau faction has been most active from 2016 through 2019. However, ISWA's attacks are pinpointed to military and government installations and not within the disseminated population.

Figure 10

Attacks Carried Out by ISWA and Boko Haram Shekau Faction 2016–2019



Note. Attacks carried out by both ISWA (dark grey) and the Boko Haram Shekau faction (Orange) from 2016 through 2019. From (Acled, 2019).

Attacks have been increasing from the Northeast zone to the south and the west. The United Kingdom has warned against traveling to Nigeria as terrorism has hit “public places where crowds gather have been targeted, including places of worship, markets, shopping malls, hotels, bars, restaurants, football viewing centres, displacement camps, transport terminals, government buildings, security, and educational institutions” (GOV.UK, 2021).

Radical Islam

Sunni and Shia are two main sects in Islam. Sunni makes up between 80% and 85% of the Muslim diaspora. Both sects have radicalized members and organizations and Iman’s who preach violence against the West. The Shia make up 10% to 16% of the Muslim population (Pew Research Center, 2009).

Khalil (2017) estimated that 10% -15% of the Muslim population are extremists and Islamic conservatives (potential extremists) consist of about 30% of the Muslim population who live in Muslim-dominated countries. The remaining 50% of the Muslim population are spread among different cultures and civilizations and lie within the global community, rather than the Islamic community, which influences their beliefs (Khalil, 2017). Khalil (2017) noted that extremism is not confined to a country dominated by the Muslim faith and can emerge from the global diaspora.

In understanding an insurgency or radical movement is crucial to understand the culture, political belief system, and religious belief system that drives these groups. Terror groups that operated in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Baader-Meinhof (Red Army Faction), Peruvian Shining Path, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Italian Red Brigades, were leftist political groups bent on disrupting or vanquishing

the sitting capitalist government in the nation-state they operated. Today, much of terrorism is based on radical Political Islam.

The world has labeled al-Qa'ida and ISIS as radical Islamists. However, the Islamic belief system espoused by these groups, especially Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the former leader of ISIS, is considered by followers to be the pure and true Islamic representation of the religion. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi grounded this movement as political in establishing the Caliphate or Islamic nation-state.

al-Qa'ida and ISIS look to the 7th century for their “radical” belief that Islam is the only true religion. In the 7th century, the prophet Mohamed created Islam, conquered Makkah, and swept the idols from the Ka'aba, leaving the black building, the Ka'aba, as the center of Islam. ISIS had stated that it would like to sweep the idols from the Ka'aba and destroy the building (Romey, 2015).

The broader Islamic faith believes the meteor was placed there by Abraham and Ishmael, representing the covenant between the people and Allah. ISIS and Boko Haram claim to represent the pure form of Islam, practiced in the method Allah and Mohammed destined. The groups follow the Salafist (Salafiyyah) belief system, which is a violent form of Wahhabism (Al-Muwahhidun), an austere practice of Islam that insists on a literal interpretation in the Qur'an.

While ISIS and Boko Haram do not represent most Muslims, Khalil (2017) stated, “it is not unreasonable to claim that ISIS represents the essence of Islam like no other and that it is the perfect embodiment of the early era of Islamic history that followed Prophet Mohammad's migration to Medina” (para. 5). It is in this structure that ISIS and Boko Haram “serves as an honest and authentic mirror that reflects the face of Islam” (Khalil,

2017, para. 5). ISIS and their associates believe the purest form of Islam existed during the Prophet Muhammad's era, and, in the period after the Prophet's death, the four Caliphs reigned.

Who ISIS Represents

ISIS, Boko Haram, and ISWAP believe their actions, regardless of how barbaric or criminal, are condoned by Allah and accepted through the Salafist belief system while following Islamic law and teachings (Khalil, 2017). The burning, crucifying, beheading, the slaughtering of humans, Muslim and Christian, and the dropping of homosexuals from rooftops are simply a means to an end. According to Khalil (2017), some Muslim scholars find it difficult to dispute this ultra-pure belief system once practiced by the founder of Islam.

Iyad el-Baghdadi (no relation to Abu Bakr el-Baghdadi, the former ISIS leader), a prominent proponent of Middle East democracy, stated that “The dominant paradigm of Islam is rule-based. It's a rule-centric Islam. It's not values centric. This plays very well with ISIS because ISIS can just use the same rules and arguments that the establishment scholars use” (Williams, 2015, para.4).

Iyad el-Baghdadi noted that the Salafist belief system offers something to many young people they are not getting from mainstream Imans and religious scholars tied to authoritarian regimes (Williams, 2015). The young feel they are not getting answers or are given wrong or nebulous answers to spiritual questions. ISIS provides simple rule-based solutions which are easy to understand and follow. Baghdadi stated, “You can't beat a simplistic answer, rather just answering with another question. Because life is a question, but these guys just want answers” (Williams, 2015, para. 4).

ISIS represents Salafist Muslims and practices a strict interpretation of Islam (Olidort, 2015). Comparisons between the radical violent Salafist movement and Wahhabism, founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and is representative of ultra-conservative Sunni Islam practiced mainly in Saudi Arabia have been made; however, they are both part of the same ultra-conservative movement, although Salafists consider being called “Wahhabi” derogatory (Olidort, 2015). However, terrorism experts had identified Wahhabism as one source for global terrorism (Senate, 108th Cong., 2003).

When the CIA had completed their interrogation of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, which included waterboarding, Mohammed began to offer information. However, it was not through interrogation; Mohammed began to hold “classes” on the Sunni Salafist Muslim belief system and doctrine (Mitchell, 2016). According to Sheik Mohammed, the Western view of peace is far different than the Salafist Muslim. It was Sheik Mohammed who gave the Western world an abject lesson in radical Sunni Islam.

Sheik Mohammed explained that unlike the definition of “Western peace” between nations and peoples, peace for the radicalized Salafist Muslim means one of three things; death to the infidel or apostate, subjugation of the infidel in which a tax is paid to Islam, or conversion to Islam (Mitchell, 2016). The radical Muslim believes the end is coming for Western civilization when Islam destroys all non-believers and ushers the return of the Mahdi, the eschatological redeemer of Islam who will appear for several years before the Day of Judgment and rid the world of evil. Peace to the Salafist means complete control and strict adherence to Sharia by every living human.

According to its followers, Sharia is the one true Muslim religious, legal, and political belief system, and those who practice fervently can approach near-mystical

status. Khalid Sheik Mohammed referred to those who follow this ideology as “True Muslims” (Mitchell, 2016). Radical Islamists use the true form of Sharia to justify killing the infidel or apostate and is a sacrifice to Allah. Allah condones the killing of infidel and apostate women and children.

According to Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Western women birth the infidel, and their children represent the future of Western influence. Therefore, the children must die. Democracy is the enemy of Islam because only Allah dictates how people live and are governed (Mitchell, 2016). The radical Shia (Iran) and the Sunni Salafist are theologically disparate but share the same belief that infidels and apostates must be eradicated or enslaved. This is the path the Iranian theocrat (Shia) is currently following.

Faithful, true Muslims believe that there are no innocents, men and women who fund the governments who fight the Muslims by paying taxes, are as guilty as their soldiers. Children give comfort to the infidel father and mother and, therefore, should be eradicated (Mitchell, 2016). Allah mandates true Muslims convert, kill, or enslave every human being; it is their focus, their calling, their job, and is grounded in their devotion to Allah (Mitchell, 2016).

On democracy and Western freedoms, Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s leader, wrote, “The disease is unbelief, and as Allah says, disorder is worse than killing (Qur’an 2:191)...Everyone knows democracy is unbelief, and everyone knows the constitution is unbelief, and everyone knows that there are things Allah has forbidden in the Qur’an and forbidden in countless hadiths of the Prophet that are going on in Western schools...We haven’t forbidden anything; we haven’t told the Muslim community to abandon anything, we simply stand on the path of truth” (Thurston, 2016, p. 16).

Finally, a “truce” in Western terms refers to a cessation of hostilities and restoring peace and harmony, if short-lived. The True Muslim believes a truce is for regrouping, training, planning, then springing into action against the enemy (Mitchell, 2016). And, while peace is considered the goal in any conflict, to the True Muslim, peace means uniting the world under the flag of Islam and imposing Sharia law (Mitchell, 2016).

International Law and Conflict

It is challenging to access confirmed and corroborative literature on the abuses carried out by the Nigerian Military and National Police Force against the Nigerian population. However, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented human rights violations in countries across the globe for decades. Both humanitarian groups are on the ground in Nigeria, documenting the military's actions, Boko Haram, and the CJTF, established to fight Boko Haram.

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports are accepted as reliable, and the US Department of State uses the reports as confirmed evidence of violations (US Department of State, 2016). In 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry used information from an Amnesty International report to press for human rights in Nigeria (Gordon, 2013). Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports are incorporated into State Department memos, position papers, and official reports (US Department of State, 2017).

The violence perpetrated by Boko Haram began in 2009, and according to a 2012 Human Rights Watch report, the Nigerian government established a Civilian Joint Military Task Force (CJTF) to supplement the military. This civilian group has killed Boko Haram suspects and civilians (The Home Guard, 2016). Human Rights Watch

obtained civilian testimony that the CJTF has used excessive force, physical abuse, extortion, theft from civilians, rendition (forced disappearance), performed extrajudicial detentions and killings, and recruited child soldiers (US State Department, 2016).

CJTF members are the local civilians who can be viewed in the Amnesty International video (2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=GA7SIbvEO64) assisting the Nigerian military in extrajudicial killings. The victims are suspects and not combatants. According to Amnesty International, the CJTF have little training and are poorly armed, using machetes and locally sourced weapons. While this is a loosely organized militia, the members appear to act as vigilantes.

The video purportedly documents extrajudicial killings of potential suspects. In addition, military soldiers are seen ordering civilians, the CJTF, to kill civilians (Amnesty International, 2014). The military personnel are identifiable as Nigerian military due to the insignia on their battle dress. It is illegal in Nigerian for anyone but military soldiers to wear camouflage (Criminal Code Act, Chapter 77, 110). One stated reason was the ability to acquire camouflage uniforms for impersonation. If found, the clothing is immediately confiscated, and the individual arrested (Criminal Code Act, Chapter 77, 110).

International law is clear on civilians fighting within their country. Civilians have the right to bear arms to meet a foreign invader and protect their home and family. However, The CJTF was established and sanctioned by the Nigerian government. Therefore, the CJTF is a State-sanctioned institution and is subject to the Law of War, international law, and International Humanitarian Law (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck,

2005). According to the *Economist*, the CJTF membership approached 26,000, with 1800 members receiving a salary of \$50.00 US a month (The Home Guard, 2016).

Luban (2004) noted that crimes committed against fellow nationals, whether carried out by civilian or military personnel, are considered international crimes and humanitarian crimes. The Nuremberg Charter Article 6(c) codified that international law crimes committed by a nation-state against its residents represented an intrusion into state sovereignty (Luban, 2004, p. 94; Nuremberg Charter, 1951).

However, Articles 7 and 8 of the Nuremberg Charter Article 6(c) deny nation-state sovereignty as the Articles abolish sovereign immunity and the superior orders defense (Luban, 2004). The Nuremberg Articles override the claim of domestic authority and immunity. Therefore, when a state participates in crimes against humanity against its nationals, “criminality overrides state sovereignty, turning them into international crimes” (Luban, 2004, p. 95). When a nation-state commits crimes against humanity against fellow nationals, those actions represent a pure case under the law; that is, those violations are also war crimes (Luban, 2004).

Finally, Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter identifies two archetypes in crimes against humanity jurisprudence. The first type includes “crime of the murder type;” murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation (to a ghetto or slave camp), and other inhumane acts” (Luban, 2004, p. 95). Subsequent statutes added (en)forced disappearance, sex crimes against women, torture, and “imprisonment in violation of fundamental rules of international law” (Luban, 2004, p. 95).

Article 6(c) second type of crimes against humanity includes the “crimes of the persecution type.” These are related to racial, religious, ethnic, or political persecution.

They include deprivations in the right to citizenship, marrying freely, arrest and confinement, beatings, mutilation, torture, slave labor, confiscation of property, and denial to obtain an education, practice a profession, and teach (Luban, 2004).

Boko Haram can target a civilian population to extract taxes, forced recruitment, kidnap slaves, hate for the apostate, or out of a distorted god condoned radicalism representing political Islam. The Nigeria military may target the population as the simplest way to eradicate the insurgency living among the people. Therefore, counterinsurgents attempt to separate the people from the insurgency to protect civilians and reduce the opportunity for crime against humanity.

Luban (2004) also wrote that no assertion could be made that small-scale, government-inflicted abuses or atrocities remain the business of the nation-state, whether the government attacks a small community or individual as a matter of deliberate policy, or wanton individual dereliction of duty, each example carries the same weight. According to Luban (2004), the main animating idea in identifying and outlawing crimes against humanity, chiefly, is that humankind is interested in preventing and punishing the grievous crimes governments inflict on nationals, whether large or small.

The research was devoid of any example or evidence that abuses against the Nigerian population by the military (specifically in the fight against Boko Haram) were motivated by hate, religious belief, tribal affiliation, or ethnic identification; however, this cannot be ruled out as causation. More likely than not, in flailing about the bush to fight Boko Haram, the Nigerian Army simply kills those they believe are associated with the group.

It appears abuses were carried out because the Nigerian military was and is grasping at conventional war tactics in the fight against Boko Haram; however, this does not relieve the Nigerian government of responsibility. If this is the fact, then the Nigerian military is not absolved of any legal jurisdiction in that the Nigerian government is responsible for potential crimes against humanity (Luban, 2004).

In the Nigerian conflict, the Joint Civilian Task Force is a representative of the Nigerian government, and in fact, some in the task force receive pay from the government. In this case, the JCTF is held to the same international standard as a government representative and is a “politically organized group acting under color of policy,” making the group liable to international law (Luban, 2004, p. 95).

However, what cannot be ruled out is the premise, as Luban offered, that a culture’s moral baseline is inclusive of violence and blood feuds are an accepted societal norm (Luban, 2004). Rorty (1993) noted that most people “live in a world in which it would be just too risky--indeed, would often be insanely dangerous--to let one’s sense of moral community stretch beyond one’s family, clan, or tribe” (p. 125). For such people, the claim to the right of a moral baseline in violence eschews crimes against humanity. However, it is the right and the international community's responsibility to set the standards for crimes against humanity, and the claim of cultural norms is not excused (Luban, 2004).

Boko Haram eschews any worldly law and convention. They follow their interpretation of Islamic Law and the Qur’an. While Boko Haram excludes itself from Western laws, the Nigerian military is held accountable to international law, including international humanitarian law. It is incumbent in the civilian and military leadership to

ensure the army follows the international community's laws and conventions pertaining to war and conflict.

The Rules of War

Carl Von Clausewitz noted that war is an extension of diplomacy, the imposition of one nation-state's will upon another, and that war was simply a duel but on an extensive scale (von Clausewitz, 1832). Like duels, there are rules to guide war, including distinguishing between "civilians and combatants with attacks directed only against combatants" (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005, p. 198). Additionally, "Attacks must not be directed against civilians. Civilians are persons who are not members of the armed forces. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians" (p. 198).

Using civilians to commit acts of war, murder or torture, denial of quarter, extrajudicial killing is illegal, immoral, unethical, and violates the international rules of law governing combat (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005). Civilians are considered unlawful combatants. The civilian militia must be trained by the armed forces and subject to the same rules of engagement, the laws of war, and humanitarian laws as militaries, including wearing a uniform, which signifies their combatant status. In addition, a militia must wear signifying uniforms of service to denote their combatant status.

One of the most widely cited rules of war is the Geneva Conventions. First adopted in 1864, the international community has accepted the conventions as a guide for war. The First Geneva Convention, in 1864, sets rules on how to deal with sick and injured combatants, including the creation of the Red Cross-Geneva (ICRC, n.d.a; Abrams, 2001).

The Second Convention adopted in 1949 included the “amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked member of armed forces at sea” (ICRC, n.d.b), and the Third Convention addressed the treatment of prisoners of war (ICRC, n.d.c). The fourth convention addressed civilian safety during war (ICRC, n.d.d). The first Geneva protocol, adopted in 1977, addressed the protections afforded victims of armed international conflicts.(ICRC, n.d.e). Subsequently, Protocol II dealt with protecting victims in non-international armed conflicts (ICRC, n.d.f).

Teaching combatants the international laws of war are required by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and not doing so is a breach of international law (Detter, 2007). Even if a state does not instruct soldiers on the laws, the soldier cannot use the ignorance defense if charged with war or humanitarian crimes (Detter, 2007). A state’s understanding of these rules must meet international conventions. In addition, a nation-state or non-state actor who was not a cosignatory to international charters or laws is not relieved in the responsibility of lawful and humanitarian conduct on the battlefield (Detter, 2007). Terrorists and insurgents are considered unlawful combatants under *Ex parte Quirin*, which determined that unlawful combatants are subject to the same rules as soldiers, including capture, detention, trial, and punishment by military tribunals (Detter, 2007).

In 2003, with the dawn of the “new war” on terrorism and insurgencies, the Red Cross decided that civilians could fight for one’s country and that terrorists and unlawful combatants be afforded the same rights as lawful combatants (Detter, 2007). However, in 2005, the Red Cross reversed its position, writing “that if civilians directly engage in

hostilities, they are considered “unlawful” or “unprivileged” combatants or belligerents (Detter, 2007).

As an example of implementing international law, the US military’s Law of War Manual, *FM27-10*, was produced using the Geneva Conventions, The Hague Conventions, ICRC, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and various additional sources related to international law to address the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims (Department of Defense, 2015).

All told, the Law of War manual uses 120 years of international history, research, and settled law to establish parameters by which the US military operates in war. *FM27-10* is appropriate for this study as the US and the British military work closely in creating military doctrine. The Nigerian army traces its roots to the British, including its military doctrine. The British army advises the Nigerian military in training in the fight against Boko Haram (Ministry of Defence, 2016).

The law of war is an international law and is explained by US doctrine from the Department of Defense Law of War Manual (Department of Defense, 2015, Chapter 8). All countries are expected to follow the Law of War. FM3-24 and other US army doctrinal manuals expound on the law of war and are repeated in the British, German, Australian, and French doctrinal manuals as excepted international law.

The Law of War denotes the reality in military law that as soon as a combatant becomes severely wounded, surrenders, or is captured, they become *hors de combat*, and no military purpose is gained in continuing the attack on that individual or unit (Department of Defense, 2015). The Law of War states, “Thus, the principle of *humanity*

forbids making enemy combatants who have been placed hors de combat the object of attack” (Department of Defense, 2015, p. 59).

The Law of War states that there are generally two classes of individuals contained within the enemy state, combatants and civilians. Therefore, it is imperative that separation between civilians and combatants exist. Certain types of persons do not fit into the civilian or combatant designation. These include spies, mercenaries, child soldiers, and civilians who directly participate in combat (ICRC, 2011). However, a civilian has every right to take up arms to fight an invading force, or if they must defend their life, the lives of their family, or property from combatants.

The internationally accepted Rule of Distinction requires nation-states to distinguish the armed forces from the civilian population. Distinction denoted the protected class from the unprotected class on the battlefield. Using camouflage is consistent with distinction because foliage is not a protected category and because civilians generally do not wear camouflage (Department of Defense, 2015), which explains the illegality of wearing camouflage in Nigeria (See Section 251 of the Nigerian Criminal Code). The Rule of Distinction applies to the CJTF, who are specifically not considered legal combatants and are not distinct in their appearance from the civilian population.

The Law of War, the Geneva Conventions, and the International Red Cross do not address the treatment of nationalized civilians by the home country. It is assumed that a nation-state would do whatever possible to protect its citizens. According to the Geneva Conventions, the Law of War states that nationals who are in the care of their state are not protected persons. This idea yields to the rule of international law in that the Geneva

Convention does not interfere in the conduct of the state with its nationals (Department of Defense, 2015). However, international humanitarian law is not precluded, and it is here the Responsibility to Protect intercedes in domestic affairs.

However, the Law of War addresses the civilian population of the enemy state. The civilian population of an enemy state is a protected class. Specifically, the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocols I and II protect civilians from harm from an intervening army (Department of Defense, 2015).

War is immoral and unethical. However, war is inevitable based on the human condition and diplomatic failures within the international community. As such, the international community attempts to guide nation-states through the moral and ethical considerations in the waging of war. *Jus ad bellum* is used to establish a threshold of gravity of offense sufficient to justify military force (Kretzmer, 2013). *Jus in bello* establishes the conduct pursued in war by the warring factions, just as *jus gentium* (law of nations) establishes the laws of society people accept throughout the international community (Kretzmer, 2013).


The literature on morals and ethics in war is derived from international law and International Humanitarian Law from which the Geneva Conventions were constructed. Lawful and humane conduct in war is expected. However, these international laws are based on Western law and sensibilities. The Muslim world also follows the rules of war based on Sharia law, *Usal al-fiqh*, or Islamic jurisprudence. Islam is primarily a political system but contains and administers a legal code. The Islamic legal code is called Sharia (Shariah), meaning “the way.” The source of the Sharia is the Qur’an and the Sunnah (also found in the Al-sīra al-Nabawiyya [Sira] and the Hadith) (Warner, 2017).

Since Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims disagree on which Hadith to use, they have slightly different Sharia systems. As such, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is represented at the UN, and Sharia is noted to be complementary to the UN Charter in that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation “reaffirms the commitment of its member (Islamic) states, to the UN Charter and fundamental Human Rights, the purposes and principles of which provide the basis for fruitful cooperation among all people” (Ali & Rehman, 2005, p. 343).

Non-state actors, like Boko Haram, ignore any Western-influenced law, including the accepted laws, tenets, and conditions put forth by the Muslim faith and endorsed by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, taking from the Qur’an a narrative that suits their 7th-century Salafist belief system (Khalil, 2017).

Figure 11

Majority Muslim Sharia states in Nigeria



Note. (Lewis, 2011)

With new tactics and weapons developed since the late 1800s, ethics and morals became ever more critical in warfare. The use of chemical and biological weapons is denied by *jus in bello*. It violates the discrimination and proportionality clause and the international ban on chemical weapons by the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (Orend, 2000). The Geneva Conventions guide *jus in bello*, which protects civilians and calls for proportionality in war. The 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations sought to outlaw war, but this proved to be impossible.

The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, established in 2005 by the international community at a world summit, sought to ensure the international community prevented genocide and other gross forms of human rights abuse (ICRtoP, 2017). Responsibility to protect requires nation-states to protect their citizens from mass atrocities. If unable to do so, the international community should assist the nation-state in fulfilling its obligation.

Responsibility to protect represents an “emerging norm” and a political instrument (ICRtoP, 2017) pertaining to war. Though not international law, this has replaced the international policies in UN resolution 50/172 in not interfering in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation (UN, 2005). Rwanda, Darfur, and Kosovo brought to light that civilian populations cannot be left to genocide or mass killing while the world turned its collective back (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007).

However, according to Gentile (2009b), Responsibility to Protect is expeditionary, and like counterinsurgency, if military force is applied to protect civilians, more often than not, the force ends up killing those it was designed to

protect. As the Nigerian insurgency continues, these policies and emerging norms should be enforced but are willfully ignored.

In viewing the Nigerian Army and their summary executions of suspected Boko Haram members (2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=GA7SIbvEO64). Sharia may provide the battlefield remedy in cutting off heads post-battle or after capture. However, the Nigerian Army is held to international law and the Geneva Conventions, and as such, Sharia is not justifiable in guiding the army.

Just War Theory

Just War Theory is part of an all-encompassing international group of laws and theories which guide the application and processes of war. Operating in their home country does not relieve a military from auspices of Just War, the Law of War, International Humanitarian Law, the Geneva Conventions, or Right 2 Protect (ICRC, n.d.-h). Just War Theory or *jus ad bellum* dictates that a nation-state must provide a legitimate reason for going to war. These rules focus on specific criteria for what makes a war just. Article 51 of the UN Charter clarifies: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations” (UN, n.d.a., Article 51). The world community has set the parameters for going to war.

The three most influential documents which guide the international community include the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact, the 1945 London Pact, and the UN Charter. Beyond inherent self-defense, the UN Charter requires nations to seek a diplomatic solution and, if not possible, requires UN authorization to initiate force (UN, n.d.b).

There exist six criteria under *jus ad bellum*, which determines a Just War. All six criteria must be met to affirm a nation's moral right to wage war (UN, n.d.b):

1. **Just Cause:** There must exist just cause to implement the last resort in diplomacy. Protecting the innocent and re-establishing order are two just cause factors.
2. **Proportionate Cause:** The cause must be proportional to the offense. A nation-state cannot go to war because a nation burned its flag; however, if an aggressor state steals land (Russia into the Crimea) by attacking the nation-states, a proportional response is required and allowed. The offender can be removed from the territory, and this is when escalation usually occurs.
3. **Right Intention:** The nation-state, in seeking war, can address a wrong and bring lasting peace to the area.
4. **Right Authority:** In the late 20th century, the UN has been the arbiter in confirming a nation-state has the authority to launch a war. However, sovereign nation-states generally hold that in self-defense, no authorization is needed. There are cases in which the nation-state went on the offensive, destroying men and equipment to deny future incursions. The 1990 Kuwait war stands out as an example of right authority by removing the offending nation-state from Kuwait and destroying the offending military's ability to fight.
5. **Reasonable Prospect of Success:** War is an unknown. The nation-state must assume a specific relative position of victory to ensure a better situation would exist after the war was won.

6. Last Resort: Diplomacy is always the preferred method of settling disputes. Violence can only ensue after all moral and legal efforts have been exhausted (Lazar, 2016). Under *jus in bello*, three criteria exist for the imposition of violence to achieve a political means. As follows:

1. Discrimination: The conduct by combatants must be ethical and moral. The rights of civilians must be protected. Civilians must not be targeted in a targeted attack. This line has blurred in counterinsurgent operations as the insurgency is entangled with the civilian population, and belligerents use civilians as human shields.
2. Proportionality: The principle of using no more force than is necessary is in play. A nuclear nation could not use a tactical nuclear device to respond to an infantry attack. The lives of all on the battlefield, even the enemy, must be considered. However, proportionality is pragmatic.
3. Necessity: Collateral damage within the civilian population is permissible *only* if, in pursuing an objective, the least harmful means feasible are chosen (Lazar, 2016). Necessity is guided by: “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack to avoid, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. (ICRC 1977) Geneva Convention, Article 57, 2(a)(ii); Lazar, 2016).

Nigeria’s War: The Rules of War and International Humanitarian Law

Nigerian Army Action

International humanitarian agencies moved to build internal displaced persons camps for those Nigerians attacked and those affected by Boko Haram. However, it was

the Nigerian airforce who bombed an internal displaced persons camp. The Nigerian air force later apologized for the error, but according to Murray (2017), this was not the first time “errors” have occurred, suggesting the attack was deliberate. The camps have been attacked repeatedly by the Nigerian military, and Murray (2017) noted the military gets away with atrocities because the world is simply not interested.

Murray (2017) described an attack on a village elder and a group of villagers by the Fulani in which army troops observed as 13 were killed. “When challenged after a massacre, soldiers often claim that they didn’t receive any orders — or had been commanded not to intervene” (para. 9). This may be more a state than a federal issue. When performing security tasks in a state, the state’s civilian leadership guides the army. However, the army's actions against Christian civilians mirror the actions against civilians in the states dealing with Boko Haram (Murray, 2017). Murray (2017) suggested that it was indeed a plan of the Nigerian federal government to remove Christians from Northern lands (para. 13).

The Fulani, like Boko Haram, are a serious threat to Nigerian stability. In 2016, Baroness Caroline Cox, a member of the British House of Lords and president of Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust, traveled through the Jos Plateau State to address humanitarian rights for the Christians (Daily Mail, 2016; Hart Publications, 2016). The Fulani targeted Cox for assassination in an attempt that failed. In the attack, the Fulani dressed in all black and yelled Allahu Akbar (God is Great), mirroring ISIS in their ferocity and ruthlessness (Daily Mail online, 2016).

The Nigerian Army conducts Foreign Internal Defense operations across Africa to assist the Economic Community of West African States, ECOMOG, and various UN

missions such as UNIFIL, UNMIL, and UNIMID (Adeniyi, 2016). The Nigerian military had acquitted themselves professionally in these missions (e.g., Firsing, 2014). However, the Nigerian military is not held to the same level of professional operation and responsibility on the home front fighting Boko Haram. Over the years, peacekeeping demands have diluted the effectiveness of the Nigerian Army at home fighting Boko Haram (Firsing, 2014).

In December 2011, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency that restricted or suspended constitutional guarantees for six months in 15 areas of four Northern states (Human Rights Watch, 2012). The state of emergency failed to increase security, and Boko Haram continued attacking civilian targets (Human Rights Watch, 2012). In 2012, the administration issued enhanced emergency powers to the security forces. Boko Haram increased its activity and eventually carried out more attacks than in 2010 and 2011 combined (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Boko Haram suspects held in detention were not charged and therefore are not accorded a speedy trial as directed by the Constitution. Nigeria would have the authority to hold these suspects as combatant prisoners of war, but Nigeria had not officially declared war on the insurgent group. In 2014, African leaders met in France to formulate a plan to eradicate Boko Haram after the Chibok School kidnapping.

Cameroon's President Paul Biya stated, "We are here to declare war on Boko Haram." At the same time, Idriss Deby of Chad said it would be "total war" (Africa Leaders Declare 'War' on Nigeria Boko Haram, 2014). The declaration of war was necessary as Boko Haram was not a nation-state but an insurgent entity and non-state actor. However, Boko Haram could be construed as a nation-state under Political Islam.

These public declarations can be construed as a binding declaration of war but only indemnifies Cameroon and Chad (Department of Defense, 2015).

Military doctrine is designed to prevent civilian casualties through rules of engagement. However, according to Human Rights Watch (2012) and Nigerian civil activists, the CJTF's abusive actions against civilians enhance Boko Haram's narrative of fighting government brutality. Community members and leaders are subjected to abuses that ultimately denies cooperation with security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2012). This is another tenet of counterinsurgency that the populace can provide intelligence, local knowledge, and material support to the intervening forces.

The Nigerian Network on Police Reform found that between 2008 and 2012, the Nigerian security forces extrajudicially killed 7,198 people (Campbell, 2013). John Campbell (2013), former US ambassador to Nigeria, wrote that the police are so hated in the country, and that hatred motivates Boko Haram to murder police officers and security forces at a high rate. This thinking represents a misunderstanding of Boko Haram; it is not that the group hates the police, the police represent the state, the only authority in Islam is Allah, so any entity of the secular nation-state is an affront to Allah and must be eradicated (Mitchell, 2016).

The police are as much an enemy of Boko Haran as are the Christians and the Muslim apostate. As a result, reports indicated that the Nigerian government responded to Boko Haram with a disregard for international human rights law using torture, incommunicado detention, rendition, arbitrarily arrests, forced disappearances, and extra-judicial killings (Amnesty International, 2016a).

Although Boko Haram utilizes brutal methods against the civilian population, the Nigerian military cannot respond in kind against Boko Haram suspects or the population. Doing so nullifies the Nigerian constitution, the rule of law, international law, and the government's moral authority. A 2016 report issued by the US State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, noted that extrajudicial vigilante killings represented a serious human rights violation (US State Department 2016). It was the government of Nigeria, along with the military, who established and set into motion the operational mandate for the CJTF (Amnesty International, 2016).

In May 2016, 737 suspected Boko Haram fighters or supporters were sent to the prison in Maiduguri. They were charged for being “incorrigible vagabonds,” which indicated that no real connection to Boko Haram had been established (Amnesty International, 2016a). According to Amnesty International, women in the internal displaced person's camps were exploited for sex by both the army and the CJTF for money, food, or the ability to leave the camps (Amnesty International, 2016a).

Through collected eyewitness accounts, Amnesty International reported that thousands of young men, women, and children were arrested as they returned to the repatriated towns of Banki and Bama in the Borno state (Amnesty International, 2016a). The arrests reportedly were based on profiling and not evidence. In the same vein, thousands were arrested fleeing Boko Haram atrocities, and those arrestees were not allowed contact with family members or lawyers (Amnesty International, 2016a).

At the GIWA military barracks detention center in Maiduguri, cells were filled beyond capacity while disease, dehydration, and starvation claimed 240 lives, including twenty-nine children and babies (Amnesty International, 2016b). In February 2016,

soldiers opened fire on approximately 200 members of the Indigenous People of Biafra who had gathered for a prayer meeting at the National High School in Ada, Abia State killing seventeen and injuring scores (Amnesty International, 2016a).

In March 2014, after a Boko Haram attack on the GIWA military barracks detention center, the military executed 640 detainees (Amnesty International, 2016a). Further contained in the Amnesty International report are additional military and national security forces' reports of torture, extrajudicial killings, and unauthorized detentions. In addition, humanitarian agencies accused the CJTF of recruiting children, primarily teenagers, to fight Boko Haram (Okeowo, 2014).

The lesson for Nigeria from Mao Zedong is this; "It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element, cannot live" (Tse-tung, 1961, p. 93). Mao's quote does not pertain to Boko Haram but to the Nigerian military, who treats the population as their enemy. While the CJTF has exercised brutal treatment against Boko Haram suspects, fighters, and civilians; the sanctioned government, represented by elected and appointed officials, condone crimes against humanity as it serves their purpose of confronting Boko Haram leading to the need to evaluate both groups' actions during the insurgency (Okeowo, 2014),

In 2013, Boko Haram attacked the town of Baga, Borno State, Nigeria. The Nigerian military moved in to confront the terror group, and reports indicated the army used a scorched earth policy on the town. The army simply walked through the town, burning buildings as they attempted to flush out Boko Haram fighters (Nossiter, 2013).

In the end, the army had torched some 2000 mostly thatched roofed homes and businesses, and 200 inhabitants were killed (Nossiter, 2013). The soldiers shot civilians

as they ran out of the conflagration. Mohammed Muhammed, a 40-year-old taxi driver, gave eyewitness testimony, “People running into the flames, I saw that. If they didn’t run into the flames, the army would shoot them” (Nossiter, 2013, para. 12).

Isa Kukulala, an eyewitness, stated, “They (soldiers) poured petrol on the properties. At the same time, they are shooting sporadically inside the fire. They took a small child from his mother and threw him inside the fire. This is what I have witnessed” (Nossiter, 2013, para. 13). Eyewitnesses to the atrocities include refugees, survivors, relief workers, and observers from other towns. Kole Shettima, chairman of the Center for Democracy and Development in Ajuba, the capital of Nigeria, stated, “People are tired of the excuses the military is giving, and that’s why they are demanding an investigation. This time it’s different. There is a crisis of legitimacy in the military” (Nossiter, 2013, para. 7).

Kashim Shettima, governor of Borno State, upon reaching Baga, stated, “They’ve (the army) not adhered to the rules of engagement when you burn down shops and massacre civilians, you are pushing them to join the camp of Boko Haram” (Nossiter, 2013, para. 9). Baga represented a vindictive and retributive action against civilians for reportedly assisting Boko Haram, although evidence was not produced to that effect. This is precisely what counterinsurgent tactics and doctrine are designed to prevent. The army attacked the town because one of their own had been killed by Boko Haram near the village.

After the attack, the army responded. Brigadier-General Chris Olukolade, director of defense information, “angrily rejected” the accounts of residents and others. Olukolade stated, “The burning, the killing is done by Boko Haram, not by the soldiers. Anybody

blaming the soldiers must be a sympathizer with Boko Haram.” He said that “Boko Haram was using the houses to shoot out at soldiers” (Nossiter, 2013, para. 16).

Brigadier General Austin Edokpaye stated that the soldiers used restraint and “soldiers were ambushed by the insurgents and that a soldier was killed, and the terrorists were shielded by the community members” (Channels Television, 2013, para. 5). The army denied torching the village, blaming the action on Boko Haram. General Olukolade’s assertion that if the population accuses soldiers of abuse or committing atrocities, then “they are Boko Haram sympathizers” denies the truth and prevents the military from accepting responsibility, looking inward to assess doctrine address serious operational issues. It is this attitude that denies appropriate and forward-thinking leadership.

Finally, Alhadji Adamo, a retailer in the Baga market, recounted, “I saw them (soldiers) putting fire on people’s houses. They are the security of the state. They have no right to kill anybody. They are supposed to protect the people” (Nossiter, 2013, para. 22). The Nigerian Army believes that if civilians run when the army approaches, then the civilians must be Boko Haram. This is not the reality on the ground; civilians run because they fear the soldiers. This fact was reported in 2015 through the media and eyewitness accounts (Nossiter, 2013; Wojtanik, 2015).

The Nigerian Army has boasted of successful operations and announced three times that the army had defeated Boko Haram (Kazeem, 2017; Mora, 2017). Army public relations officers apply positive rhetoric to their messaging. In September 2017, the army announced they had defeated the insurgent group in Operation Lafiya Dole (Maina,

2017). This operation proved to be more difficult than thought, and Boko Haram remained active.

Nwachukwu noted that this operation came on the heels of Operation Rescue Finale, which routed the insurgents out of its tactical headquarters at Camp Zeiro in the Sambisa forest and out of its spiritual headquarters in Alargarno (Maina, 2017).

Nwachukwu also noted that it “is very crucial to set the record straight by making it crystal clear that contrary to opinions, the Boko Haram terrorist group does not hold or control any local government area in Borno state or the northeast as claimed in the interview” (Maina, 2017, para. 4).

However, in October 2017, the UN reported that Boko Haram still held three local government enclaves (Goodwin, 2017). Eventually, international organizations turn a deaf ear to overheated rhetoric and false information provided by the host government, introducing a level of skepticism and distrust in official government positions. The population, conditioned to hear and not believe government rhetoric, turns a blind eye to events.

The Nigerian military conducts massive sweep operations to stop Boko Haram and to gather intelligence. However, as noted in this literature review, prisoners are treated poorly, abused, the sick are left to suffer and die, with no substantive intelligence gathered. Women and children are taken without deference to due process. It had been reported that between 2011 and 2015, 7000 men and boys had died at GIWA prison (Human Rights Watch, 2016b). In June 2013, 1400 bodies were sent from the jail to the mortuary, with an untold amount simply buried by the military (Human Rights Watch, 2016b). A full accounting of the Nigerian prison system and its conditions can be found

in the British Home Office report, “Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Prison conditions” (Home Office, 2016).

The outcome of a Nigerian military sweep operation led to civilian imprisonment at the GIWA military barracks prison in which “cells were filled beyond capacity while disease, dehydration, and starvation” claimed 240 lives, including 29 children and babies (Amnesty International, 2016, pp. 10-15). David Rieff (1992), from an observation in the Bosnian-Serbian war, noted, “To the Serbs, the Muslims are no longer human, Muslim prisoners, lying on the ground awaiting interrogation were driven over by a Serb guard in a small delivery van” (p. 94). This is the threat of dehumanization, and Africa is long a witness to dehumanization (Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Central African Republic, and Darfur).

Abuses and atrocities also plague the population un-involved in the Boko Haram fight, indicating a systemic problem in military training, discipline, and the imposition of moral and ethical clarity in conducting operations. In 2016, in Zaria, Kaduna state, the military attempted to pass a convoy through protestors linked with the Islamic Movement in Nigeria, a Shi’ite minority group (Amnesty International, 2016).

Some of the protestors carried machetes, knives, and batons. After failing to negotiate an opening in the road, the army opened fire on the civilians killing seven. Later, the military returned to Zaria, hunted down the Shia, and executed 347 people. The State government then confessed to secretly burying the bodies in a mass grave (Amnesty International, 2016). In 2019, reports between 2015 and 2017 indicated the Nigerian military “killed hundreds of mostly Christian ethnic Igbo civilians advocating for self-determination” The army’s response stated that they had killed “terrorists” during

“Operation Python Dance” (Smith, 2019, para. 11). However, it is difficult to justify the killing of women and children as “terrorists.”

With the onslaught of ISWA attacks, the military has demonstrated poor performance. In December 2018, ISWA seized the entire town of Baga, a hotly contested town in northeastern Nigeria. It took the multi-national force from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon to remove the terrorists. 100 soldiers were killed out-right when ISWA stormed a military base. In addition, the group captured a large cache of weapons and ammunition.

ISWA attacked an army base causing the soldiers to flee, and when the soldiers returned to recover the bodies, they were hit again, sustaining a high casualty count. In these cases, it may be leadership that is the problem. Military doctrine indicates that a force should not return to a battle scene without using counteroffensive tactics or prepared to meet an ambush. According to Carsten (2019), army bases and towns by the dozens have sustained attacks since mid-2018. A recurring theme in many of the attacks is soldiers fleeing the base for ISWA to ransack and loot.

Because of the increased operational tempo by ISWA, the Nigerian Army has moved into “super camps” for better protection; noted to be a Vietnam area strategy and considered a failure in counterinsurgency doctrine; soldiers should be out among the population, engaging, cultivating (friendship and trust), and protecting. As a result of this change, ISWA attacked the towns Gubio and Magumeri, took control, and burned government buildings, killing those identified as government workers. Babagana Zulum, Borno state governor, stated that it would “create a vacuum the insurgents could exploit with the army leaving” (Campbell, 2019, para. 1).

Unprotected towns are raided, insurgents manage roadblocks, and have more unrestrained movement across the bush. The army is ambushed at will by ISWA, and soldiers have vacated a large swath of northeastern Nigeria, leaving key roads open to attack. Humanitarian workers have pulled out, leaving a disaster for humanitarian aid; in addition, the army removed humanitarian NGOs from many areas to intimidate the organizations (Dewast, 2021). The military has forsaken 223,000 people in the area. In June 2019, 30 civilians were killed by the Shekau faction in a suicide bombing at Konduga village in the Borno State. However, it is Boko Haram-ISWA who has determined operational tempo and had taken momentum.

In December 2018, Lieutenant-General Tukur Buratai announced (again) that Boko Haram had been defeated and was nothing more than a band of criminals. This narrative, like those pronouncements before, had no foundation. This even though Boko Haram insurgents had a few weeks earlier overrun the 157 Task Force Battalion in Metele, killing 53 soldiers and removing caches of weapons and four tanks (BBC News, 2018a).

Nigerian soldiers are under immense stress, and morale is low (Admin, 2020). This has led to continued population abuse. Children are victims of army brutality. According to the UN, between January 2013 and March 2019, Nigerian armed forces detained over 3,600 children, including 1,617 girls, for suspected involvement with non-state armed groups. Children described beatings, overwhelming heat, frequent hunger, and being packed tightly in their cells with hundreds of other detainees “like razor blades in a pack,” as one former detainee said (Human Rights Watch, 2019, para.10).

Prior to launching an attack on Jakana and Mailok in January 2019, ISWA informed the inhabitants to flee the coming fighting (The Defence Post, 2019). The Nigerian Army does not inform civilians of coming or current conflicts and allows civilians to stay in harm's way. According to army sources, this is done to prevent tipping off Boko Haram. A July 2018 attack on the base at Jillli was devastating. The base held 734 soldiers and was overrun. The base commander and 63 soldiers made it out to a nearby town, leaving hundreds missing, captured, or dead (Postings, 2019).

ISWA has understood how the Nigerian Army operates. Military bases and camps are open to attack, and many times the attacks cause troops to flee. The group's activity also corresponds to seasonal changes. The insurgent operational tempo increases from June to September, when the rainy season is active. This prevents the army from navigating washed-out roads (The Economist, 2020).

Media from over the world have reported on the problems in Nigeria. Multiple reports are documenting ISWA attacks against the military. The Nigerian Army expects Nigerian news outlets to report events positively, favoring the army. On January 7, 2019, the army raided *The Daily Trust*, a Nigerian newspaper, and arrested two reporters. The army banned UNICEF and accused them of training "spies" for Boko Haram. In addition, in 2018, the Nigerian military attempted to ban Amnesty International for reporting that "3,641 people had died in clashes between farmers and herders in Nigeria since 2016." The army called the report "fictitious" ("Nigerian Military Calls for Amnesty International Ban," 2018).

According to Postings (2019), "Nigerian forces are overstretched and lack initiative, often face multiple attacks on bases; inflicting casualties, causing damage, and

sapping morale, with each time increasing the risks defenders will not be able to stave off the next assault (para. 39). Nigerian Army failure and civilian abuse continue to this day. The US opened arms sales to the country despite Nigeria's human rights record. President Trump continued the \$363-million-dollar sale of the Super Tucano A-29 and provided an additional \$600-million-dollars for defense. Delivery of the Super Tucano should have occurred in 2019; however, delivery has been pushed back to 2021-22 (Onuah, 2017; Sirota, 2019).

In September 2019, reports indicated that Boko Haram, more likely ISWA, had obtained sophisticated drones armed better than the Nigerian Army after continuous raids on brigade bases (Searcey, 2019). Boko Haram does not simply appear walking out of the bush but travel in trucks fitted with heavy machine guns and RPGs to attack government troops.

The army is under material stress; arms are scarce, as is ammunition. Armor and tanks have fallen into disrepair, and soldiers must scavenge for food, water, housing, even a bed to sleep on; and many units have not received their pay for months at a time (Postings, 2019). Army infrastructure does not exist, and logistics consists of whatever the field soldier can cobble together. In 2021, the conditions for the army and soldiers had not changed. While the army is entrenched in their super camps (a Vietnam-era tactic) and large towns, Boko Haram owns the countryside. ISWA also controls four out of ten zones adjacent to Lake Chad (Searcey, 2019).

Counterinsurgency is expensive, and justifying the expense to a nation requires understanding and support from the governed. It is the people who justify the government and provide legitimacy; therefore, an insurgency cannot offer a better or viable means to

govern. Notably, the population provides a crucial avenue to gather intelligence about Boko Haram and other internal forces threatening Nigeria. If the population fears the military and refuses to engage, civilian assistance, including intelligence, field support, and comfort, is forfeit.

Internal issues tend to focus on the extreme variances in social structure, with an increasing number of writings in the literature devoted to the Boko Haram issue (The Conversation, 2018). Tribalism maintains a firm hold on social and political structures. However, Boko Haram does not represent all Muslims; however, it represents Islam to many. Boko Haram (Shekau faction) kills Muslims at will unless they support the terror group. Therefore, it is still possible for the government and the Army to cultivate trust, camaraderie, and the soulful (within the people) purpose of bringing peace to Nigeria.

Nigeria's Use of Vigilantes

The use of a vigilante force to augment a nation-state's military is unethical, immoral, and violates international law; however, one can understand the frustration of the Nigerian people and the raids against them by Boko Haram. According to Okeowo (2014), Shettima, the Borno State governor, stated the CJTF was doing commendable work identifying and arresting Boko Haram members and that any abuses committed were most likely "the fault of the military on joint exercises" (para 31).

Shettima described the CJTF as "almost a divine intervention" but stated that one could not rule out "some infractions from some overzealous members" (Okeowo, 2014, para. 31). In 2013, Kalli, who leads an 8,000-member CJTF militia unit, turned his 18-year-old nephew over to security forces and watched the military execute him. According to Kalli, "I saw him with AK-47s, so that proves he's a Boko Haram member" (Okeowo,

2014, para. 33). However, the CJTF does provide military intelligence. Kalli recalled, “You know, I’m tired of this thing,” he said. “We gave the security forces everything--- information about the camps, where they are, and they’re not doing anything” (Okeowo, 2014, para. 41).

Vigilantism is a deviation from socially acceptable ethics and the law, but as Luban (2004) asked, “how can we be certain which situationally induced moral beliefs represent the baseline, and which represent the deviations? Why not suppose that murderous attacks on supposed blood enemies of one’s ethnic, racial, or religious group, encouraged by community leaders and moral authorities, *do* represent some people’s moral baseline” (pp. 137-138)?

In 2017, the UN Development Programme developed an agreement with the Nigerian government to train CJTF members and former Boko Haram members on reintegration into society. According to the UNDP (2019), “training was conducted to provide a basic level of civic understanding and build capacity in critical skills that will allow members of CJTF and vigilante groups to improve their civil and social engagements and to function better in civilian life” (para. 2). However, this program was accomplished in the Plateau State, where Boko Haram activity has ceased, and not in any area with activity still progressing.

Social Change

Social change is a change in the social structure or the order of a society. Social change may include changing social behaviors, social institutions, symbology, behavioral rules, value systems, or the social environment (Barkin, 2016). Social change is not

stagnant but evolutionary. The Nigerian military, as are all militaries, is a social institution.

The military of a democratic nation-state should mirror the society it emanates in that society guides the culture and behavior of its army (Rosen, 1995). If society is not unified towards a goal and dysfunctional, the military will follow suit. However, the Nigerian army could lead social change in Nigeria by adopting counterinsurgency concepts grounded in protecting the population. Chapter 2 demonstrated the need for social change in Nigeria in both society and the army.

For example, in 2006, the US military, under the guidance of General David Petraeus, initiated a complete realignment of how the US Army and Marine Corps prosecuted the war. Counterinsurgency is grounded in social theories, and the US military realized the need to change to effect social change. A shift occurred from conventional warfare tactics to counterinsurgency tactics on a theater-wide basis. It was not an overnight phenomenon as education and training needed to permeate the senior officer corps down to the platoon level private. In addition, intelligence gathering, logistics, and planning were required to shift to the new counterinsurgency paradigm.

Strategy and operational tactics changed the military structure, changing the thinking and application of war execution and social dynamics. The US military evolved in Iraq and Afghanistan to meet the challenges brought by insurgency and terrorist warfare. Those actions implemented by David Petraeus implemented social change for Iraq. Civilians were protected and gradually turned to the coalition's side while supporting the Iraqi government.

Vilfredo Pareto observed that social change occurs when the elites of society become decadent, and a new elitist replaces them (Smith, 2003a). In Washington, David Petraeus and General Jack Keane convinced the army command structure, the president, and the Pentagon (the elites) that counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine could end dysfunctional and failed war efforts by replacing conventional doctrine to win the peace.

Petraeus convinced the “elites” in Iraq, the tribal elders, city mayors, councils, Imams, and neighborhood leaders to trust the US army through change of deed. Therefore, the example (or experiment) had been set to influence future wars. Nigeria may require an elite, someone with the perseverance to change how the army operates and implement reform.

Marshall McLuhan (1994) wrote, “We live mythically and integrally, but we continue to think in the old, fragmented space and time patterns of the pre-electric age” (p. 2). Societies are a living, breathing, complex system(s) struggling to maintain homeostasis, evolving through a web of complexity, lacking any single influencing driver to induce change. Evolution moves in chaos and includes transformation, bursts of growth, collapse, randomness, disruption, and novelty (Xu, Yang, & Li, 2013).

Kotter’s eight-step model explains transformational change. It is a well-defined well-delimited effort in which a leader establishes a new end state goal and moves the organization to that end goal (Webster, n.d.; Kotter, 1996). Kotter’s model requires the ability to create a sense of urgency to identify resistance and treat it as obstacles to be overcome or suppressed (Webster, n.d.; Kotter, 2008). A single Nigerian soldier recognized the need for change in advocating for a “Quick Reaction Force (QRF) or constant patrols,” and that leadership placed soldiers at a post to remain stagnant

(Akinola, 2017, Postings, 2019). The soldier stated, “that’s why Boko Haram insurgents have space to move around” (a Maoist philosophy) (Akinola, 2017). The understanding of this reality is a component of asymmetric warfare and has proved a successful tenet of US Army doctrine noted in *FM3-24*.

In the case of Nigeria, military change may lead to social change in that Boko Haram must be addressed in counterinsurgency terms. However, the army is a product of society, so to change society is to change the army. US counterinsurgency doctrine was developed for the US military and, as such, is not a remedy for a force structure represented by the Nigerian Army. US military doctrine reflects how an interdicting military force successfully approached an insurgency in a host country.

However, *FM3-24* is easily transferrable to a country fighting an in-house insurgency; one needs only an intelligent understanding of how to do so. There are best practices and tactics in counterinsurgency that should be adopted by a force representative of the Nigerian Army. The watchword in counterinsurgency is adaptation, and Nigeria must adapt. In doing so, the Nigerian military can follow the success realized by the US military in Iraq when changes were made to doctrine. Ultimately, social change is afforded when the Nigerian population is no longer treated as the enemy but as an asset to be protected.

Summary

Chapter 2 provided an exhaustive study of the literature; the realities of Nigeria, the military, and the social and cultural structure so crucial in understanding the African country. Nigerian society and army “society,” its actions and operations, were studied to assess whether they may be tied to one truth, that a dysfunctional, corrupt society may

indeed beget a dysfunctional, corrupt military. Chapter 2 also presented a history of conflict within the country and the failures and abuses wrought upon the population by the army (citations over ten years and breaking with APA convention). This was done to demonstrate a pattern of military abuse, dysfunction, and failure.

The Nigerian military may attempt to operate under rules of engagement that follow the Nigerian Constitution. However, as demonstrated, the activities of the Nigerian Army fail in this endeavor. The Nigerian Army is guilty of humanitarian crimes in the treatment of the indigenous. A discussion of the Law of War, Just War Theory, and International Humanitarian Law advanced the moral and ethical understanding of how a well-educated, trained, disciplined, and competently led army operates.

To fully understand the epistemological reality of Nigeria, it was necessary to study the complexities of war, the social constructs that drive men to act and understand the legalities of violent action. Military norms, culture, and leadership thinking on the battlefield were discussed to identify the processes for thinking under stress and identify normal and abnormal functioning by soldiers under pressure. I addressed the recent 10-year Nigerian history to demonstrate a pattern of army action.

To understand Boko Haram and ISWA, the chapter discussed the foundations of Islam to understand their culture, ethnic and religious belief system, and socio-economic-political factors which drive the insurgency. The US military experienced a moral and ethical drift in Iraq until the military changed its thinking and tactics to counterinsurgency, viewing the population not as the “playing field” of war but as partners who should be engaged and not confronted as the enemy.

The literature presents accepted rules of law governing war which Nigeria follows. Nigeria is a cosignatory of the Geneva Conventions I-IV and Protocol I and II. Protocol II addresses the population and victims of an internal conflict. Therefore, the military understands its obligations on the battlefield towards civilians, combatants, and non-combatants. Morals and ethics have a place on the battlefield and are enforced through the Law of War, Just War Theory, International Humanitarian Law, and the Geneva Conventions. Because Nigeria is fighting an in-house insurgency, it does not give the army leeway or relieve them of their obligation through international law to treat the population as required according to the Nigerian constitution.

This study would add to the literature by addressing how a nation fights an in-house insurgency. It would also add to how a military is affected by the society from which it emerged. Many articles have addressed Nigeria and Boko Haram; however, a study does not address why the army acts against the Nigerian people and fails on the battlefield. This study can act as a leap forward in understanding post-colonial African nations heavily imbued with tribalism and how it can affect military performance.

Chapter 3 explains the scientific protocol for the research. In Chapter 3, I address the research design for the study. The central phenomenon and research tradition are reviewed, as is the role of the researcher in conducting the study. I also discuss how I plan to manage ethical concerns and bias from the researcher's role and the research study participants. I explain the population used for the study and the procedures by which the participants would participate. In addition, protection and security for the participants and measures are described. I explain data management and storage,

emphasizing safety, confidentiality, and security. Finally, how I plan to data-mine and analyze the information is addressed to produce the outcomes for this study.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore whether social and cultural dysfunction might affect military performance denying success on the battlefield and abusing the Nigerian civilian population. In addition, this study hoped to identify the endemic obstructing agents which negate full and unfettered support for the Nigerian national government from the Nigerian population in the fight against Boko Haram. The Nigerian military has not defeated Boko Haram, but their use of conventional tactics has exposed the Nigerian population to institutional abuse, atrocities, and death.

Specifically, and to the previous paragraph, this study sought to understand if and how civilian society and culture affect military performance. In that vein, this study also sought to determine if the Nigerian military could defeat Boko Haram through a doctrinal shift to counterinsurgency warfare. In adopting a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, the army would reconsider its interaction with the population and change from a confrontational relationship to population engagement.

This change would foster goodwill and cooperation, increase intelligence gathering capabilities, encourage civilian support in the field through tangible contributions, and unite Nigeria through fostering dialogue, thus assisting in vanquishing disunity, tribalism, and religious conflict. In addition, there is evidence that adopting a population-focused counterinsurgency doctrine reduces abuses, atrocities, and deaths among the population.

Prior research on counterinsurgency has focused on formulating and implementing US Army *Field Manual FM3-24 Insurgencies and Countering*

Insurgencies (Cancian, 2017). In addition, NATO countries also undertook academic endeavors to addressing counterinsurgency. Research has been conducted on historical insurgencies to ascertain best practices and formulate current counterinsurgency practices, including the shape-clear-hold-build strategy (FM3-24, 2014). In this qualitative study, I sought to understand Nigeria and its deviant machinations, which affect the Nigerian military, its fight against Boko Haram, and those actions which harm and denigrate the population.

Chapter 3 addresses critical foundations embedded in the study, such as how the qualitative grounded approach affected the study design, the purpose of the study, the central phenomenon, and the efficacy of performing qualitative interviews within a specifically identified population to gather data for analysis and interpretation to offer an outcome to the research questions. The chapter describes the participating subjects, sample descriptions, sample size, and recruitment methods to provide a thorough understanding of the participants in the research.

This chapter also detailed the data analysis plan, trustworthiness and provided in-depth information on the participants and any ethical considerations regarding the safety of interviewees. All interviewees volunteered for this study, and considerations were made through the informed consent to ensure participants knew that foreign terror entities could have far-reaching assets and safety was a primary concern. However, those subjects interviewed understood the risks involved, and confidentiality was a crucial concern.

Research Design and Rationale

The research questions were simple. They were designed to affect the interview questions that dealt with the social and cultural relationships and associations between the

civilian population and military performance. US military action in Iraq has been heavily studied both before the surge and after. The US exhibited the same operational troubles in Iraq that have occurred in Nigeria. If the military abuses its power by following a failing doctrine, innocents are harmed and die. More importantly, is the possibility that the Nigerian Army is indeed a reflection of the absolute dysfunction in Nigerian society. Therefore, the research questions reflect those realities and include:

RQ1: How and to what extent does a nation's military reflect or mirror the society from which the military was derived?

RQ2: How and to what extent can marked societal dysfunction affect or inhibit military performance in Nigeria?

Rationale

The rationale for this study and the methodology used lay in performing deep research of Nigeria to determine the dysfunction and the possible societal relation to military performance. To do this, I used a grounded constructivist approach to tell a detailed and complete narrative. A grounded constructivist places a priority on a studied phenomenon instead of the methods used to study it (Charmaz & Bryant, 2010). Grounded theory has demonstrated that it is appropriate for studying "people's understandings of the world and how these are related to their social context" (Charmaz 2001). For example, and used in this study, how does societal behavior affect the military performance of an army? The methodology used provided a pathway to discover answers as to the problems found in Nigeria. Therefore, focused interviews were done to accumulate deep, detailed, and meaningful data.

It was incumbent on me to choose the most appropriate research design to address the identified problem. The literature review identified a sampling of issues within the country. Still, the problem in this study lay in the Nigerian Army's conflict with Boko Haram and its interaction with the population, both of which have been potential failures because of military doctrine; or the combined culture of doctrine, leadership, discipline, and training within the military. The core issue could be that the same dysfunction found in society transfers to the military, denying appropriate performance.

I established the research design to question whether society and its culture influenced the military. Interviewing US military professionals produced direction in understanding if and how much a nation's military is affected by society. If the entirety of the Nigerian Army continues to follow a conventional doctrine and if the army culture is mired in conventional thinking, Boko Haram will continue to exist in one form or another. Therefore, I chose the qualitative method with a constructivist view to search for causation and effects.

The interviewees selected for this study offer the best hope of obtaining information to answer the research questions. The questions are noted in the appendices and were constructed to provide an open-ended platform that could allow for question-answer and follow-up, depending on the interviewee's answers.

Central Phenomenon

Galbin (2014) explained social interactions were found in external relationships as external forces influence and shaped an individual's view of the world or phenomenon. Patton (2015) described social constructionist concepts concerning social structures, which are understood through individual and collective perceptions. The Nigerian Army

is a single unit shaped by internal constructs and societal realities when answering the issues may lay in external concepts and truths. There are no individuals in an army, and as such, the unit acts as one individual attempting to carry out doctrine and complete a task. It is army culture, philosophy, and training that shapes the individual to act as one with others as an army unit (US Army. Regulation 600-100, 2017).

Thus, the central phenomenon in this study is how the “individual” (Nigerian Army) was affected by society, and in turn, the political structure, which is a societal entity. To follow successful counterinsurgency doctrine, the army must act as one in doing so. Therefore, the institution is responsible for its success or failure. If the Nigerian Army adopts counterinsurgency changes in operations, it must also do so in every part of the army, from logistics to intelligence. It may be possible to effect social change by protecting the population and defeating the insurgency.

Research Tradition

Joint operating doctrine describes irregular warfare as “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” (Department of Defense, 2017). Research on counterinsurgency had come from the insurgency historiographies through studying David Galula, Mao Tse-tung, Che Guevara, Castro, and foreign counterinsurgency operations in Algeria, Malaya, Vietnam, and Thailand, forming the basis for *FM3-24*.

Gumz (2009) stated that authors on counterinsurgency have focused on what he called the ‘modern era’ of insurgency, which is a largely extra-European narrative that begins with 1945 and involved the colonial empire and third world national liberation

movements. Irregular warfare has existed since the war has existed. Robert Rogers and Francis Marion practiced irregular warfare long before army doctrine existed.

Insights had been gleaned by using O'Neill's *Insurgency and Terrorism* and Hammes' *The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. Kilcullen's numerous articles and books on counterinsurgency provide a modern look at global insurgencies. Nagl wrote a ground-breaking dissertation later turned book titled *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Much has been learned from the US-NATO effort in Afghanistan and Iraq.

A vital contribution to irregular warfare was the Philippine counterinsurgent effort from 1899 through 1913 when General John Pershing implemented population-centric tactics and turned away from violent tactics and strategies. Despite the recent and vast studies of irregular warfare, the focus has centered on a country that interdicts into another country to defeat an insurgency.

In Algeria, it was the French who fought against decolonization. Vietnam involved the French and eventually the US in practicing insurgent warfare against the Communists. Vietnam served as the example of the US Army's halfhearted attempt to accept the reality of an unconventional conflict and was not discussed until the US had to develop counterinsurgency doctrine in the early 2000s. Malaya found the British fighting the Communists and represents the only example of victory for the interdicting force. As such, Malaya has been heavily studied by the US and other countries. However, the Malaya insurgency campaign contained certain specificities and realities which allowed colonial victory.

Gumz (2009) noted that “virtually all who write on COIN view the historical narrative through the lens of a rigid constructural dichotomy between irregular war and the conventional. In publishing counterinsurgency doctrine, the US military has made the unconventional conventional. War is made and remade by those entities who participate. In addition, it is the technology, environment, and social realities which dictate how war is fought, the idea that conventionality may be left to history represents short-sighted thinking. New is the conventional turning to the unconventional and irregular, never accepting defeat. Iraq and Afghanistan brought this idea to the forefront.

Although a quantified method, the history of measurement theory was used to construct the latest *FM3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*. Engelhard (1991) noted that the central task in the history of measurement theory is to examine progress. By looking back, the US military has projected itself and its doctrine forward. While a quantitative concept, the progress witnessed through the historical significance of a revamped *FM3-24* cannot be understated with its application in Iraq. Historical records were analyzed, and the best practices used in each insurgent conflict were coopted and made relevant to the 21st century.

Current counterinsurgency thinking can be applied to Nigeria; however, the insurgency represents a unique problem in a unique environment. Any counterinsurgency doctrine must come from the viewpoint of a flawed national military fighting a less than capable in-house insurgency. However, each insurgency is an independent construct of war. No two are alike. To compare Iraq or Afghanistan to Nigeria is a non-sequitur. While counterinsurgency is decidedly a population-focused model and the Nigerian

population and the dysfunction found therein denies the military complex the functional ability to address Boko Haram.

Role of the Researcher

Initially, I requested permission from Walden University to conduct a research study. I received approval, and I proceeded to begin the study by writing the proposal. I was the researcher for this study and, therefore, the instrument of record. I collected all the data and was the sole instrument of data collection. According to Xu and Storr (2012), in a qualitative research study, “the researcher as an instrument is an accepted and acceptable stance” (p. 3). Pannucci and Wilkins (2011) stated that the instrument decided how the interview questions were structured. I was the instrument that determined how the information was collected and recorded. I needed to ask neutral interview questions that did not reflect bias to achieve a particular answer or support an agenda. My role as the researcher for this study included following the policies and research procedures of Walden University and accepted research practices advocated by the APA and HIPAA. The interviews were conducted in a professional and timely manner.

Reflexivity

Patton (1990) noted that reflexivity referred to disclosing personal information about the researcher to enhance transparency and increase study credibility. Therefore, in the interview process, I revealed my relationship with the study and the central topics. I had no vested interest in Nigeria or the US Military. I did not have a professional connection with any of the interviewees. At the time of this study, I did not work within the U.S. government or the U.S. military.

Sampling

Population

For this study, I chose to enlist military experts in the US. The US military maintains a cottage industry of scholars and experts used to examine doctrine, procedures, culture, leadership, and a host of other facets within the military-industrial complex. I utilized professional command officers and PhDs who study war to act as interviewees for this study. It is impossible for any command officer or academic could understand every culture, including Nigeria. However, two participants did serve in Nigeria and had first-person experience with Nigerian army command and army units. Armies over the globe act, train, and function in a professional manner affecting leadership, discipline, training, the understanding of ethics and moral responsibility in battle, and all must answer to the Geneva Conventions, The Law of War, the U.N.'s R2P, and the Rules of War. The Nigerian army follows the traditions of the British army, the former colonial force that held power over Nigeria.

The US set the standard for counterinsurgency operations in the publication of *FM3-24*, adopted by NATO countries as the published doctrine intermeshed with their military doctrine. *FM3-24* provides a best-practices guide to counterinsurgency and is continuously reviewed, commented on, and if new information or case studies are discovered that affect doctrine, revised.

The participants carried either doctoral degrees in their field of expertise or had decades of military training, education, and experience. The initial interviewees represented purposeful sampling as I identified those military officers with strategic leadership education and experience. I did not seek tactical, operational, or strategic

expertise. But expertise on military culture, performance, social constructs, and leadership.

As for sampling size, Ritchie et al. (2013) suggested that within a qualitative research study, the sample size is usually primarily small due to the phenomena that need only to appear once to be part of the analytical map. The point of diminishing returns can occur rapidly depending on the type and how complex the issue is.

Diciccio-Bloom and Crabtree (2006) referred to the process of diminishing returns as the event horizon of data saturation and signals that data collection was at or nearing completion. Guest et al. (2006) viewed data saturation as occurring within the first twelve interviews, and after that number, significantly few new phenomena were likely to emerge. Gonzalez (2009) noted that sample size is generally driven by the desire or need to reveal the main variants of the phenomenological approach. Gonzalez (2009) suggested that small survey samples of less than twenty are considered typical.

Creswell and Creswell (2018) offered that sample size within the qualitative method lay in studying a few individuals or cases. I had planned for ten interviews. However, saturation occurred early in the interview process, so seven interviews were conducted. Since those interviewed had all served in the US military, saturation occurred early; the interviewees participated in the same training, doctrinal instruction and were culturally aligned to the US military's culture and academic standards. Thinking among the interviewees was linear and provided a clear path to coding.

Strauss and Corbin (1998) noted that saturation occurred when new information proved "counter-productive" and that when 'the new' is discovered, it does not necessarily add anything to the overall story, model, theory or framework" (p. 136). The

researcher must decide at what point saturation occurs; generally, no new information is gleaned from the data or literature. It is in this way that data saturation occurs.

Illenberger and Flotterod (2012) noted that snowball sampling allowed existing relationships to forge new relationships. I blended criterion, purposeful, and snowball sampling to understand better the population I was trying to access and to provide an all-encompassing sample for the study. I sought individuals who could best contribute to the research and then sought their advice on further candidates for interviews. Two interviewees did provide contacts with the knowledge that I was seeking. Based on my research prerogatives, these interviewees were appropriate to assess the Nigerian situation and offer scholarly direction to identify the issues within Nigerian society and the military.

The interviewees were recruited through email and phone calls and asked if they would be interested in expanding on social/military relational research due to a country dealing with an endemic insurgent threat. I knew of three participants by reputation and had read accounts of actions in Afghanistan involving two of the participants. I am a civilian and had no working relationship or professional connection with any participant. I was fortunate in that I connected at a Walden residency, and that individual offered to put me in touch with an individual I desired to interview. The participant guided me to contact additional interviewees. I was contacted one individual through a friend but did not know him prior to meeting him for an interview.

The participants in this study were also data instruments, imparting collected experiential expertise and education to answer the research questions. Using a qualitative

approach, I obtained critical data from a select group of individuals during the interview process. I sent the potential interviewees an informed consent for signature.

Sampling Strategy

I decided the sample size would be at least six to eight interviewees. If new information presented itself at eight interviews, I would expand the interview pool. The interview group represented a specific group of people who had been trained in the US military and served. Therefore, understanding the realities of military culture, doctrine, and performance would be quite linear and focused within the group. Consequently, I expected saturation at an early point in the interview process.

Sampling consisted of a theory-based construct. Those interviewed provided the researcher with an idea and the data to understand how society and the military function in an environment. According to Patton (1990), criterion sampling could be used for participant selection because it allowed for a predetermined criterion of importance. Therefore, those Americans interviewed could discuss how a society and its culture could drive military function and performance. Military function includes combat and doctrine, training, behavior, discipline, and military functioning within a foreign and domestic population.

Sample Size

The number of interviews conducted in a qualitative grounded study to be 15 to 40 interviewees has been suggested. Crouch and McKenzie (2006) proposed no less than 20 participants in a qualitative research study assists the researcher in building and maintaining a close relationship, thereby improving on and encouraging an open and

frank exchange of information. This procedure can help mitigate some of the bias and validity threats inherent in qualitative research.

Consequently, many qualitative research studies' sweet spot sample size is 15 to 20 homogeneous interview participants (Crouch & McKenzie, 2006). Glaser and Strauss combined accumulated data and data analysis into one category until saturation before moving on to a new category. As understood in grounded theory, a category is a conceptual element under discovery (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

The type of saturation the researcher is aiming for may not be theoretical saturation. Bertaux (1981) introduced the concept “saturation of knowledge” (p. 37). Bertaux noted that researchers learn a great deal from the first interviews, which quickly decreases knowledge discovery as the interviews progress. Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006) proposed that saturation often occurs around 12 participants in homogeneous groups. Creswell (1998) noted 20-30 interviews were enough for saturation. Creswell indicated that 5 to 25 interviews would suffice for a phenomenological study, and Morse (1994) suggested at least six interviews.

Morse (1994) suggested that in using grounded theory, 30-50 interviews were enough. However, in an article written in 2000, Morse also recommended: “that the more useable data collected from each person, the fewer participants needed” (p. 2). Morse (2000) invited researchers to consider study parameters and included “quality of data, the scope of the study, the nature of the topic, the amount of useful information obtained from each participant, the number of interviews per participant, the use of shadowed data, and the qualitative method and study design used” (p. 3).

Lincoln and Guba proposed the criterion of informational redundancy guide that sample size determination, that is, sampling can be terminated when no new information is obtained through data collection. Morse (2015) added, “whilst saturation is the most frequently invoked ‘guarantee of qualitative rigor,’ it is the one we know least about” (p. 587). Sandelowski recommended that qualitative sample sizes be large enough to provide a “new and richly textured understanding” of the study phenomenon but small so a “deep, case-oriented analysis” is produced.

Patton (1990) noted that “qualitative inquiry typically focuses in-depth on relatively small samples, even single cases ($n = 1$), selected purposefully” (p. 169). That “sample size adequacy, like all aspects of research, is subject to peer review, consensual validation, and judgment” (Patton, 1990, p. 186). Once I reached the fourth interview, the following three interviews provided no new knowledge and ended data collection.

The “senior” officer corps represents 0.012% of all army personnel and is incalculable against the US population (Duffin, 2021). Therefore, the interview sample size was purposeful and focused. According to Vasileiou, Barnett, Thorpe, and Young (2018), “choosing a suitable sample size in qualitative research is an area of conceptual debate and practical uncertainty” (para. 1). Vasileiou et al. (2018) noted that research showed that reporting and justifying sample size was often poor if not absent in most qualitative studies. Vasileiou et al. (2018), in addressing the issue, noted that researchers should report “transparent study-specific reporting” (para. 3,4).

My group was homogenous, almost homologous in nature, but not in the usual sense. As an example, a homogeneous group may consist of interviewing CEOs from different companies. However, each CEO was educated and trained in various and

different higher institutions of learning. Each CEO led an organization whose culture and operations would differ. Therefore, they are homogeneous by identity as a CEO, but not in education, training, experience, or the company they each operated. While educated in differing higher education institutions, including the military academies, my participants represented a true and strict homogeneous group. Their training, education, and experience focused on this study's topic, so slight deviation from the study's questions and subsequent answers could be anticipated.

I decided to use the Strauss and Corbin (1998) concept of interviewing until saturation reached, instead of interviewing a more significant number of individuals to reach an arbitrary and proposed saturation number such as 20 for a grounded study. I interviewed for Bertaux's "saturation of knowledge," and I interviewed until I was sure that "no new properties, dimensions, or relationships emerge during analysis" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 143).

Bertaux's (1981) saturation of knowledge was deemed appropriate for my study due to the research questions asked and the extensive knowledge base required of the interviewees who participated. I openly coded each interview when completed and maintained an understanding of emerging themes, keywords, and ideas as first-round coding was ongoing. Initially coded interviews were added to the data set; then, axial coding ensued.

Military Education

Each interviewee had participated in US military basic training and AIT. Each participant was a serving line officer in the US military and, as mandated by rank, attended all required schools within the military educational complex as their promotions

mandated. For example, U.S. army colonels attend war college or a senior staff college equivalent to study joint warfare and war. The majority of army colonels receive postgraduate level senior and joint professional military education at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, prior to promotion.

According to the US Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, the Command and General Staff School “provides Intermediate Level Education (ILE) for US Army and sister service officers, interagency representatives, and international military officers” (US Army Combined Arms Center, 2019a).

Intermediate Level Education is a nearly year-long graduate-level academic program that includes military history, leadership and leadership philosophy, military planning and strategy, and the decision-making process both in combat. One of the essential learning attributes in the program is the grasp of critical thinking (Command and General Staff Foundation, 2019a).

The US military provides for a Master of Military Arts and Sciences degree through a graduate master’s program at the School of Advanced Military Studies. This program is offered to ILE students representing mid-career field-grade officers preparing for battalion command or staff positions at the division, brigade, or battalion level (Command and General Staff Foundation, 2019b).

The School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics provides Army officers “continuing education towards developing the Scholar-Warrior-Leader from first lieutenant to selection for major. The result is mastery of branch-specific technical and tactical skills, staff processes in battalions and brigades, direct leadership and command competencies, and initial broadening opportunities” (US Army Combined Arms Center, 2014b).

The School for Command Preparation “provides advanced instruction for lieutenant colonels, colonels, and command sergeants major who have achieved brigade or battalion command selection. Courses are taught individually according to the “special topics unique to the assumption of command at the levels indicated” (Command and General Staff Foundation, 2019b). The US military places a premium on advanced education and scholarship. Indeed, there is a cottage industry of academics and infrastructure to meet the goal of a highly educated military.

In this study, I achieved saturation early at the fourth interview. I continued with three additional interviews based on differing educational participation and senior leader status. Therefore, I used the Glaser and Strauss concept of achieving saturation over quantity of interviews and Bertaux’s saturation of knowledge. It was the strict hyper-homogeneous profile that allowed for seven interviews.

Selection Criteria

One of the most substantial reasons I chose seven interviews dealt with the military education of each senior leader. The selection criterion for this study lay in that each participant either had professional expertise within military doctrine, training, and discipline and or had experienced combat fighting an insurgency, either in Afghanistan or in Iraq. One interviewee, a senior command general officer, spent four years in Nigeria leading American Special Forces and had an acute understanding of Nigerian society.

The ideal sample size of this study was determined to be six to eight interview candidates. Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006) argued that purposive sampling techniques had been successfully employed in research. They noted that qualitative studies which

utilized twelve participants were found to have maintained research integrity in numerous studies. This study used a purposeful sampling technique in choosing participants.

Multerud, Siersma, and Guassora (2016) offered that the sample size should be driven by informational power, achieving saturation depended on the “goal of the study, sample specificity, the use of established theory, the quality of the dialogue, and the analysis strategy” (p. 1753).

Selection criteria involved senior military command officers and PhDs with a military career who understood military function, theory, and performance. They were connected to a system 230 years in the making that delineates similar, harmonious thinking and understanding of operational performance, culture, function, and discipline.

As noted earlier in this study, American military officers and military educators cannot understand every culture (or multiples of cultures) in every country across the globe. However, every nation has an army that shares specific shared ideas on training, doctrine, education, and professionalism that makes a nation’s army a successful entity. There is no “secret sauce” used to produce a high-functioning professional army. It is a combination of military culture, discipline, training, appropriate doctrine, expert leadership, and the proper utilization of human resources and equipment.

In addition, society and its culture determine the existence of the military and how it functions. In interviewing the candidates, I determined it would be possible to glean themes and ideas from the data to understand how a society and its culture affect military performance and function.

Instrumentation

I was the researcher for this study and formulated the interview questions for the interviewees. In this way, the interview questions acted as the data collection instruments. The information sought for this study was unavailable elsewhere and not collectible through quantitative research. I determined that interviews with individuals accessing their area of expertise offered the most reliable way of data accumulation.

I designed the protocol for the interview process. The interviews were conducted via internet conference or in person, and the interviewee chose their location to provide comfort, safety, and convenience. The interviews were semi-structured to allow for a free flow of information.

Although not ideal, interviews occurred using an online conference instrument as each interviewee was located throughout the US and across the globe. The target collection period for the interviewee was 45 to 60 minutes in one interview session. If not possible, then a second interview session would be scheduled. After the interview, I asked each participant if it would be conducive for me to contact them for a follow-up if needed. The interviewee could decline further follow-up without prejudice.

To assist in formulating the interview questions, I utilized the Survey/Interview Validation Rubric for Expert Panel - VREP© found in Appendix A. (Simon & White, n.d.). The interview questions, as noted in Appendix B, were developed to be neutral and non-biased. Questions were formulated to assist in answering the research questions. The research questions mapped with interview questions can be found in Appendix C.

To ensure the interviewee answered adequately, I required qualification, elaboration, and other non-directive probes such as “Can you tell me more about that?”

Bachman and Schutt (2017, p. 186). I developed the interview questions to inquire about specific aspects of society and culture, extrapolating how they might affect military functioning.

Several questions appear to be redundant but are not. They were designed as a self-validation tool to check and validate answers. These questions were specific in assessing if appropriate military functioning could occur if the population were dysfunctional and experiences an abnormal societal existence compared to well-functioning democracies.

Data Collection

Data collection occurred using email and teleconference, specifically ZOOM®, a business video conferencing platform; this provided a secure path to collect video and audio data from the interviewee. The interviews occurred with the interviewee at the location of the interviewee's choice to allow for security, safety, and comfort.

To safeguard data collection, ZOOM® records video and audio and backs up the conference data in both hard drive and in the cloud, which is secured. ZOOM® is HIPAA compliant and uses a host of security measures to ensure privacy and security. According to ZOOM®, "HIPAA compliance is based upon the HIPAA Security Standards rule published in the Federal Register on January 25, 2013 (45 CFR Parts 160, 162 and 164 Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards; Final Rule)" (ZOOM®, 2018). In addition, security is ensured through Advanced Encryption Codes (AES) with a 256-bit encryption key. HMAC-SMA-1 message authentication codes secure transmitted data.

The instigator of the meetings provides a unique password for the interviewees to log into ZOOM® using their chosen email address (ZOOM®, 2018). Interviewees were

advised of the parameters for the interviews. All information collected was stored on the researcher's secured computer backed up by the secure digital backup service "IDrive®."

According to IDrive, information is stored in the digital cloud, which according to IDrive®, is secured by the latest 256-bit AES encryption and accessible only by me through a self-contained encryption key. Any download of information without my encryption key would be unintelligible. Informed consent was obtained from the interviewees before the interviews to ensure the interviewees were aware of the environmental, digital, and time conditions.

Interview Procedure

The procedure for the interview included the initial contact with the interviewee requesting participation. Once an agreement was reached, the necessary informed consent was forwarded to the interviewee to be read, signed, and returned. Both participants agreed upon the interview date and time. An email would be sent out to the interviewee one week prior to the interview with instructions on how to access ZOOM® with their email, and I would then provide the password to enter the meeting in this email.

One interviewee opted for a face-to-face interview, and he drove from Fort Leavenworth to Omaha to meet me for the interview. It was held at a relative's home, where he was comfortable. In this case, all procedures were followed as described, and the interviews recorded using my computer. Three interviewees opted to provide written answers to my questions, and again, all procedures were followed. In these cases, follow-up questions, if any, were handled via email. It should be made clear that classified information was not discussed or offered.

The interview questions were presented randomly to prevent patterning and anticipatory answers by the interviewees. I devised a table found in Appendix C to demonstrate which interview questions pertained to which research question. Once the meeting began, I explained the procedure, including recording both voice and video through ZOOM®. The interviews were scheduled to run at forty-five minutes in length, but no hard time limit was enforced to allow for completion. The participants were asked only the pre-prescribed interview questions. However, follow-up questions were not restricted.

At the end of the interview, I thanked the interviewee, asked if there were any questions or concerns, and a request was made to perform a follow-up interview if needed. However, the interviewee was asked to be available in the future for questions or clarifications throughout data analysis. In this case, all signed documents for participation would still be in effect. It was also explained that even though we had completed the interview, the interviewee could withdraw from the study at any time.

I transcribed the recorded interviews using the online transcription software “Transcribe®.” This transcription software proved to be the most reliable and precise in translating the recorded word. The interviews, once transcribed, were downloaded to my computer, and no copy was left in the online portal. Only I had access to the translating program as a two-step authentication protected it. After I checked the correctness of the transcription against the recording, the interviewee received the hard copy transcription for review. If the interviewee found no issue with the transcription, the interviewee did not need to return the copy, which they could then keep or destroy at their discretion.

Data Collection Management

The requirements for data collection and storage are significant throughout all study designs. ZOOM[®] stores collected data to be accessed by the instigator of the meeting for future reference. Storage also occurred through a personal recorder held by me in a secured drawer in my office. All recorded data is stored on a separate encrypted hard drive specifically dedicated to this study. Transcription of recorded interviews occurred through a computer software program, and human interaction with the recordings did not occur.

Three interviewees provided written answers to the interview questions. These emails and their attachments were removed from the emails and stored on my computer. I downloaded the written documents into a specific file on my laptop. I maintained the only copies of hard data. As required by Walden University, I have kept in a secured fashion all audio recordings, video recordings, hard copies, and transcripts for a minimum of five years. The research study data, including the participants' identities, are stored on a USB drive and stored in a safe.

Data Analysis Plan

It was Lincoln and Guba (1985) who remarked on the qualitative method, “Not very much can be said about data analysis in advance of the study” (p. 241). Data analysis solely depends on the data collected; too little and the research is for naught, too much, and the researcher is mired, lost in incomprehensible data streams. Therefore, the amount of data obtained is restricted to the research questions posited and should eschew unsubstantiated opinion and conjecture given by the interviewee. Data should be

adequate and appropriate for the researcher to provide substantiated answers to the research questions.

Triangulation can affect the analysis, and, in this study, triangulation was achieved using interview answers provided by multiple interviewees, interview analysis, and real-world demonstrations of military philosophy and societal-military conditioning. The sources provided triangulation, not the application of different methods. Senior officer leadership, senior NCO leadership, interviewing a sergeant major, interviewing a Ph.D. in political science and history, studying military history, policy and war. Each offered triangulation by differing points of view and in the structure of their prospective careers.

Data triangulation was applied using historical records, government documents, and interview responses to achieve triangulation in the study. Triangulation in qualitative research aims to increase the veracity, integrity, and credibility of the results. Triangulation is a three-dimensional view from every angle possible, considering the positives, negatives, and alternate views of a subject. If the information accumulated results in a culmination of data that agrees with itself, the triangulation has confirmed the data.

Triangulation leads to confirmability within the study. For confirmability, it was necessary to update information as time moved forward. Nigeria is involved in an active war, and events occur, and truths can change. As a result, and as the study went forward, I informed my committee of changes to realities of life, life-changing events within Nigeria, and data or scholarship which may have changed as used in the foundation for this study. Simon (2011a) noted that a researcher should follow the initial coding into

more elaborate codes and linkages to produce a formal data analysis. Analysis should continue and all questions resolved until theoretical saturation is achieved. When no new themes, questions, or issues arise in a category, the category is established and validated (Simon, 2011a).

According to Krippendorff and Bock (2008), the most significant harm in data analysis can come from human error. Researcher bias can skew the results and understanding of the phenomenon. The misinterpretation of data, the intentional misalignment of data, or a skewed conclusion can provide an incorrect answer. Content analysis should be carried out in a structured format to provide non-bias conclusions. Qualitative research is subjective, so the interpretation of the data lay in the researcher to complete. Therefore, triangulation is best applied to achieve truth in this framework.

A researcher must adhere to factual determinations of meaning in the data. A qualitative researcher must adhere to the facts presented by the data received from the interviewees to produce answers to the research questions. Interpretation is a dangerous word, and it implies the researcher could assign meaning based on their understanding of data which could introduce bias and error (Bowling, 2005). Interpretation of fact should be the route taken as facts and truths cannot be smeared by erroneous bias.

Intentional bias goes to honesty and is a different concern, to imply bias to guarantee a specific result. Therefore, in the qualitative method, multiple interviews are done to acquire information streams providing linear themes and ideas from unique isolated sources to understand the research question.

According to Bernard and Ryan (2014), analyzing data involves five complicated tasks and include: “discovering themes and subthemes, describing the core and peripheral

elements of themes, building hierarchies of themes or codebooks, applying themes—that is, attaching them to chunks of actual text, and linking themes into theoretical models” (p. 54).

Data collected through the interview process is coded to reveal themes, patterns, linearity, divergence, and discrepant information. According to Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014), initial coding is done to break down information and assign the data to “broad chunk” categories. The second round of coding then breaks down the broad chunks, refining and defining the data's focused explanation. Here is where patterns and themes become apparent.

Manual coding allows the researcher to immerse themselves in the data, become intimate in analysis, enabling the flow of themes and patterns to emerge. Inductive coding creates codes based on the qualitative data assembled and is less fraught with bias. I used constructivism to create a narrative from thematic coding. I planned to manually code the interview data from initial coding to creating nodes and reportable results.

Manual data extrapolation runs the risk of researcher bias, finding themes and patterns which are hard to justify and confirm but are accepted as they may fit the researcher's narrative. However, awareness of bias issues and inductive reasoning lessened the opportunity of bias to present itself. The researcher must still code and then assign unbiased meanings to the coding. Utilizing a double extrapolation method fits the explanation provided by Miles et al. (2014), describing this technique as summarizing data through basic response topics and identifying common and key phrases or word

applications for their significance. Multiple coding avenues would be fruitful to ensure a correlation of data.

Trustworthiness

A qualitative research study is assessed for the value it provides to the field of study. The study should reflect a high degree and academic vigor. Qualitative studies are known to be interpretive and are more vulnerable to issues impacting trustworthiness. Therefore, I made every effort to ensure the trustworthiness and credibility of this study. This study was completed using a research lens focused on credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.

Internet sourcing dominates accessibility to literature and research. However, the researcher must take care in using any information provided on the internet. What may appear as vetted or peer-reviewed information may simply be someone's opinion. Therefore, care was taken to vet internet sourcing used for this study. Unless the information was tied to a university, a peer-reviewed journal, a vetted news organization, or an expert in a particular field, the information was not used as a foundation of fact, merely to continue searching for authenticated, vetted, and factual information.

According to Shenton (2004), trustworthiness in a qualitative study is suspect, especially from positivists, because their view of validity and reliability cannot be addressed in a naturalistic study. Humans become the source of conflict and provide information on the conflict. Therefore, Shenton (2004) offered Cuba's constructs of trustworthiness using credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability, which differs from the positivist view of internal validity, external validity/ generalizability,

reliability, and objectivity. Cuba's Four Criteria for Trustworthiness is noted in Table 2 below, and I became cognizant throughout this work of presenting a trustworthy study.

Table 2.

Guba's Four Criteria for Trustworthiness

Quality criteria	Possible provision made by a researcher
Credibility	Adoption of appropriate well recognized research methods. Development of early familiarity with the culture of participating organizations. Random sampling of individuals serving as informants. Triangulation via the use of different methods, informants, and sites. Tactics to help ensure honesty in informants. Iterative questioning in data, collection dialogues. Negative case analysis. Debriefing sessions between researcher and superiors. Peer scrutiny of the project. Use of "reflexive commentary." Description of background, qualifications, and experience of researchers. Member checks of data collected, and interpretations/theories formed. Thick description of the phenomenon under scrutiny. Examination of previous research to frame findings.
Transferability	Provision of background data to establish the study context and detailed description of the phenomenon in question to allow comparisons to be made.
Dependability	Employment of "overlapping methods." In-depth methodology description to allow the study to be repeated.
Confirmability	Triangulation to reduce the effect of investigator bias. Admission of researchers' beliefs and assumptions. Recognition of shortcomings of methods and potential effects. In-depth methodological description to allow the integrity of research results to be scrutinized. Use of diagrams to demonstrate "audit trail."

Note: Shenton, 2004, p. 73.

Credibility

Some degree of bias is nearly always present in a qualitative study. How it effects the result is the researcher's responsibility and should approach null in conclusion (Gerhard, 2008). The interviewees for this study were drawn from two specific areas, the military, and the military educational complex. As such, credibility was achieved simply by interviewing individuals who swore an oath to serve the country and uphold the Constitution. In addition, the individuals who functioned as senior leadership studied war at the graduate or Ph.D. level or taught within the military educational complex.

Credibility involves utilizing different data sources within the same method. To help ensure credibility, I used the provisions suggested by Cuba in Table 2, including “adoption of appropriate well-recognized research methods, development of early familiarity with the culture of participating organizations (and individuals), adoption of appropriate well-recognized research methods, triangulation via the use of different methods, informants, and sites, tactics to help ensure honesty in informants, iterative questioning in data, collection dialogues, a thick description of the phenomenon under scrutiny, and, the examination of previous research to frame findings” (Shenton, 2004, p. 73). In addition, study participants would be encouraged to review interview data they supplied as a member checking procedure, also suggested by Cuba.

A researcher cannot use one interview to validate evidence as it is impossible to triangulate, even if triangulation involves matching against additional source material. Triangulation exists within the constructs of the interview process in which information is validated among those interviewed, and multiple interviews must be done to complete triangulation and saturation.

Creswell and Miller (2001) offered eight separate validation strategies for the

qualitative researcher: prolonged engagement and persistent field observation, triangulation, peer review, and debriefing, negative case analysis clarifying, member checking, providing a rich, thick description, and external audits. Triangulation was utilized to provide the primary validating construct for this study.

It is beneficial to use multiple streams to construct credibility, and I accepted each interview for what it offered, not expecting or wanting congruent and linear answers to provide credibility. However, if the answers were harmonious and linear, then the interview process could be non-biased.

Each interviewee worked in their specific area of expertise and acquired an advanced education. In this study, the military experts I used are well known within the military-industrial complex and actively participated in the Iraq or Afghanistan theater of operations, providing counterinsurgency guidance to command officers. This reality confirmed the credibility of the experts used to comment on military matters.

Additionally, the Ph. D.s interviewed were retired senior officers in the US military and either studied warfare and its components or taught at the various military academic schools. This fact provided credibility for their participation. I interviewed an officer with less senior status and experience; however, he was familiar with civilian-military interactions and cultural interactions in a conflict zone. He was attending school at the US Army War College at Fort Leavenworth at the time of the interview. Therefore, as an army officer engaged in advanced military scholarship, credibility was established.

A credible interviewee provides for a credible interview and data. The credibility of interviews and findings was enhanced using rich descriptions provided through interviews enhanced by follow-up questions, member checking, clarification of

interviewee or researcher bias where appropriate. I achieved triangulation between interviewee responses and confirmed facts and accounts and negative case analysis where applicable to disclose abhorrent or disconfirming information. Wrong answers were not considered because every answer contributed to the study. In the interview process, there were no wrong answers. In the interview process, and I was determined to follow whatever path the research provided. Disagreeable information was not viewed as being faulty but simply as providing a different approach to knowledge.

Transferability

Transferability refers to the degree to which the results of qualitative research can be generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings (Trochim, 2006). By interviewing a select group of experts who participated in, have taught, and have commanded using state-sponsored and accepted military doctrine and have followed the Law of War and the Rules of War on the active battlefield allowed for a transference path in like situations.

According to Trochim (2006), the qualitative researcher can enhance transferability by offering an intimate view of research context and assumptions. It is then relevant to a researcher to transfer the results to their study, making sensible judgments on transfer (Trochim, 2006). I achieved transferability through Cuba's proposals, including the "provision of background data to establish the context of the study, and detailed description of the phenomenon in question to allow comparisons to be made" (Shenton, 2004, p. 73).

Chapter 2 provided the history and context of population-centric counterinsurgency operations. It is not a factor that "Westernized" military doctrine can

be transferred to a sub-Saharan African country to realize success. It is the fact that state armies are responsible for and carry out activities that are acceptable to the world community, represented by the United Nations and global human rights organizations.

Dependability

In the quantitative realm, reliability is viewed from the assumption of replicability and repeatability. The qualitative researcher uses dependability instead of the quantitatively applied reliability rubric and requires the researcher to account for an evolving environment and context within the research. Therefore, the researcher documents change within the study and how these changes affected the researcher in moving forward in the study (Trochim, 2006).

Cuba suggested to achieve dependability; researchers could install the use of “overlapping methods” and an “in-depth methodology description to allow the study to be repeated” (Shenton, 2004, p. 71). Lincoln and Guba stressed the almost dependent nature between credibility and dependability and argued that in practice the “the demonstration of the former goes some distance in ensuring the latter” (Shenton, 2004, p. 71). Therefore, the study began with a rich and detailed review of the literature and environment in which the study lay, followed by a rich and complex narrative of the research process and outcomes.

Confirmability

Confirmability refers to the researcher's unique perspective on a study and whether the study's results could be corroborated or confirmed by outside researchers (Trochim, 2006). In this study, the researcher continuously checked for changes in the philosophy, doctrine, and the study of counterinsurgent doctrine. Assessing the

theoretical foundations for this study became a continuous obligation. Additionally, the Nigerian military history and operational standing occurred through primary resources for operational doctrine and tactics changes and whether actions were considered to adjust for the Nigerian civilian community. The latest and most up-to-date philosophies and doctrine were monitored as counterinsurgency is an evolving doctrinal model.

Addressing legitimization is a concern for the study. According to Benge, Onwuegbuzie, and Robbins (2012), legitimization issues should be addressed pragmatically and is justified when sufficient research is conducted to validate results. Benge et al. (2012) offered the qualitative legitimization model to assist in significantly mitigating validity and verification in the research, with credibility sustained in the research study addressing “applicability, consistency, neutrality, dependability, and or credibility of interpretations, and conclusions within the underlying setting or group” (p. 69). Interviews with military experts on the Nigeria problem should produce results that are closely aligned. However, if an interviewee presented answers which sway far and wide from the consensual quorum, it can be considered either an anomaly or a rationale for further exploration.

There exist internal and external threats to legitimation and credibility. Internal threats consist of bias from the researcher, the interviewees, miscommunication, misinterpretation, or skewed observations (Benge et al., 2012). External credibility represents “the confirmability and transferability of findings and conclusions,” or the ability of outside researchers to review and test the validity and produce the same findings throughout the strategies of trustworthiness put forth by Cuba (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016, p. 235). Constant themes presented for each of the four quality criteria of

credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability included the use of a rich and detailed narrative, overlapping methods, triangulation, member and peer review, and the rejection of bias.

Finally, the researcher obtained trustworthiness in that the researcher would self-regulate for bias, obtained a peer to review the work, the research, and outcomes. In addition, the dissertation committee assessed the study at a peer level. The researcher had no preconceived idea on how the research would evolve or conclude. It was in this format that honest, non-biased data collection, analysis, and reporting were achieved.

I followed Cuba's example in table 2, and chapter 2 represents an exhaustive description involving every parameter involved in the Nigerian story. The credibility of reporting was done by cross-checking facts with additional sources. Information was taken from eyewitness accounts found in the Amnesty International Reports, reports from Human Rights Watch, and independent news reporting agencies.

I derived data triangulation from the literature review, interviews with military experts, and member checking. The selected participants also added triangulation when all facets of study and research provided an accepted, trustworthy narrative.

Ethical Procedures and Participant Protections

I received approval to conduct research from the Institutional Review Board on 05/30/2018, and my study was assigned # 05-30-18-0545414. An extension to continue research was obtained from the IRB on 06/18/2019 and 08/17/2020. Hesse-Beiber (2016) noted that researchers should anticipate ethical issues and use standardized format and guidelines to mitigate credibility concerns. I represented Walden University as a doctoral candidate and researcher. I understood and adhered to the criteria presented

by the Institutional Review Board for Ethical Standards. To ensure ethical practice, I adhered to data collection policies, interview protocols, obtaining informed consent and permissions, the guidelines regarding the recording of interviewees, and the transcription process.

According to Fritz (2008), all researchers are responsible for ensuring participants are “well informed about the purpose of the research they are asked to participate in, understand the risks by participating in the research, understand the benefits of participating in the research, and should feel free to make independent decisions such as withdrawing for the study without any fear of negative consequences” (p. 5).

To ensure ethical practice, I followed the five principles of research ethics by the American Psychological Association and noted on page 170 (Smith, 2003b). The recommendations are to discuss intellectual property, including copyright, frankly, and be cognizant of plagiarism (Smith, 2003b). Although APA is related to psychiatrists and medical practice, a researcher must be mindful of the multiple roles a researcher can play and the roles of the interviewed (Smith, 2003b). No individual should have undue influence over the study, and neither the interviewee nor interviewer should use the study for-profit or expect compensation. Following informed consent, rules are essential for protecting both the interviewer and interviewee (Smith, 2003b).

The interviewee should be made aware of all the study's parameters and how their input is utilized. If parameters change during the study, the interviewee should be informed and the informed consent updated, for informed consent is not static but a process. The interviewee signed the informed consent “I agree” on the subject line or in

the body of the returned email. Each interviewee was identified by name on the informed consent. Should the interviewee desire to change their participation status over the life of the active study, they had every right to do so. I would have informed the interviewee that I would need to obtain new informed consent if any study parameter changed.

Respecting privacy and confidentiality is the hallmark of any study, and this aspect ensures the patency of the research and the protection of the participants (Smith, 2003b). There are limits to confidentiality, and the interviewee should understand who will be viewing the raw data and interview transcripts. In this study, I and my committee chair were the only individuals who viewed the raw data or knew the interviewees' identities.

The researcher must be aware of “federal and state laws” pertaining to any research study. If a study crosses international borders, the researcher must be aware of local laws which may affect the researcher-subject-interviewee relationship (Smith, 2003b). The researcher must apply “practical security measures” to protect, acquire, and store data and evidence.

Security is applied to protect participants and the accumulated data (Smith, 2003b). Protection was provided by keeping the identity of the interviewees confidential, known only to me. Data was secured on a password-protected laptop. As my computer is backed up to the cloud, the data stored there is encrypted and accessible through a 2-step verification system using IDrive®. Several interviewees voluntarily offered their permission to publish their names in the study. I explained this was against protocol and confidentiality must be maintained.

Once Chapter 4 had been written, the information in the cloud was deleted and unobtainable. The data was located on my computer and, once the study was complete, transferred to a thumb drive for archiving in a secured location. Finally, the APA recommended “utilizing ethics resources” during the study, especially if one is in doubt or requires direction on ethical conduct (Smith, 2003b).

The APA recommends using the Belmont Report, which “provided the ethical framework for ensuing human participant research regulations and still serves as the basis for human participant protection legislation,” as well as the APA’s guide to Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (Smith, 2003b, p. 56). This is a complete ethical guide covering ten research and ethical practice areas, and I used the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct to guide this study. These principles include:

1. **Beneficence and Nonmaleficence:** To strive to protect the rights and welfare of those they work with professionally.
2. **Fidelity and Responsibility:** The moral responsibility to help ensure that others working in their profession also uphold high ethical standards.
3. **Integrity:** should never attempt to deceive or misrepresent.
4. **Justice:** the responsibility to be fair and impartial.
5. **Respect for People's Rights and Dignity:** should respect the right to dignity, privacy, and confidentiality of those they work with (Smith, 2003b, p. 56).

Bias

I took precautions to avoid the actual or perceived influence or bias in performing interviews and examining findings. Data collection consisted of one-on-one interviews

recorded on my laptop's hard drive and notes taken. Intentional bias is easy to identify if the researcher is aware of it; however, unintentional bias is more difficult to perceive. In this study, I was aware that my concern for the people of Nigeria could have created unintentional bias, which could have affected data collection, analysis, and interpretation.

A non-biased approach to seeking the truth would have far more meaning than a researcher's emotional or professional concern. Interview bias can affect interview data collection, analysis, and interpretation, so the researcher must always be aware of bias, including self-induced bias (Pannucci & Wilkins, 2011).

Self-awareness in correcting for bias is a researcher's prime responsibility to safeguard the efficacy of the study. Therefore, the interview questions were constructed to remove any bias, and the effort was made through coding to negate infused researcher bias. In addition, external bias can come from the interviewee during the interview process if the interviewee attempts to sway the argument located in the study.

Multiple interviews were done to assess any anomaly in accrued information and watch for bias interjection from an interviewee. If required, follow-up questions are also helpful to clarify intent and meanings from the interviewee and perform all follow-up questions.

The interviewee could end the interview at any time, for any reason. The interviews would be scheduled based on an agreement between the participants and generally followed the interviewee's schedule. No time frame for interviews was mandated, and interviews proceeded in their own good time; however, for scheduling purposes, it was suggested to the interviewees that the interviews should not take more than forty-five minutes to one hour.

A transcript record of the interview was provided to the interviewee to assess for accuracy and returned to the interviewee for any changes or clarifications. A request for potential follow-up was made to the interviewee at the interview's conclusion, and I asked if contact through email was acceptable.

Creswell (2009) noted that specific inclusions must be made available in the informed consent. These inclusions consisted of a summary of the research study, the reason for interviewee selection, an overview of the research, the purpose of the study, the procedures for the interview process, the volunteer agreement, notification of risk-benefit in participating; this was an uncompensated study, confidentiality, consent statement, contact information, and finally, the need to have a printed name, signature, and date of consent.

Creswell (2009) provided the substance for the Interview Protocol Form. It should include the date, place, time, identification of the interviewee and interviewer, a brief description of the study, a confidentiality agreement, informed consent, and finally, the interview questions. Include the date, place, interviewer, interviewee, and briefly describe the research study, confidentiality, and informed consent followed by the interview questions.

It was incumbent on me to ensure the interviewees understand that I represent Walden University as a student and that I had no connection to the military or a corporation that may benefit from this study. However, I informed the interviewees the study might be written as a journal article, but this was strictly a scholarly endeavor. There was the possibility that during the interview process, the researcher could receive a name to interview by an interviewee for this study (snowball sampling). In this case,

the name was confidential, and contact was made in the same format as with all other initial interviewees. Continuation into data collection from the research study proposal occurred after approval from the Walden University Institutional Review Board. Ethical considerations take on a “do no harm” modality with interviewee participation.

Finally, when I coded the data. I removed all names from the data to remove any bias I might encounter by knowing the interview data came from a Ph.D., a general officer, or an officer who served in Nigeria. I also did not realize until after coding which interview question pertained to which research question. This again removed bias to provide for precise, unadulterated analysis. I simply wanted each data set to stand on its merit.

Ethical Protection of Participants

Participant protection is of paramount concern. I wrote the proposal to account for the safety of each participant, and the participants were asked to volunteer. The legal mandates of the Constitution ultimately guaranteed the safety of those participants in the US and abroad.

Each participant signed an informed consent authorization based on Creswell’s (2009) inclusion list, which consisted of a research study summary, the reason for participant selection, the purpose of the study, procedures for the interview process, a volunteer agreement clause, the risks and benefits of participation, compensation, contact information, consent statement, the name of the participant printed then signed with the date of consent, and the printed name.

The interviewee understands their participation, and subsequent interview analyses are kept confidential. Only specific members of the dissertation committee may

be made privy to the information with the understanding that interviewee participation is confidential and not shared outside the confines of the dissertation process. All paperwork that identified the participants, including the informed consent and participation forms, will be kept secured and available only to the committee if required.

Procedures.

The following procedures were performed to ensure ethical function and collection of data. The procedures noted guided the researcher in obtaining authorizations to collect and analyze voluntarily offered data from the interviewee instruments and to win Walden University IRB approval for the study.

Forms were constructed to ensure compliance with ethical and legal requirements and protect the interviewee, the interviewer, and Walden University. Walden University IRB approval for this research study was received in May 2018 and reaffirmed in May 2019. As such, initial contact was made after IRB approval using email and phone calls to assess the ability of the proposed interviewee's participation in the study.

Follow-up emails were sent to further explain and expound on the study and requirements to ensure the participant was comfortable with the process. Upon agreement to participate in the study, arrangements were made with the interviewee or their representative on a date, time, and location. Where possible, I attempted to schedule a face-to-face interview. If this were not possible, ZOOM[®], a business internet conference provider, would be used. ZOOM[®] offers real-time face-to-face interaction via internet connection. The interview proceeded only if the consent had been signed and received. One week before the interview, the interviewee was contacted, and the interviewee's availability and interview date, time, and venue (ZOOM[®]) were confirmed.

The day before the interview was scheduled, a third email was sent out, and a phone call was made to the interviewee to establish a personal connection and rapport. The authorization to interview, authorization to be recorded, and the informed consent, was obtained from the interviewee prior to the interview. I provided my cell number to the interviewee in case of a connection issue with ZOOM®. This occurred in two of the interviews and was resolved quickly through a phone call.

Once the interview began, the interviewer stated the purpose of the study, the procedures for the interview, confidentiality, recording parameters, and how the information presented would be transcribed and archived. I stated the interviewee was free to stop the interview at any time. The interviewees could withdraw at any time. All data collected from the individual who withdrew was destroyed.

The interview was constructed to allow for a free flow of information and accommodate a complete transfer of data and information from the interviewee. Once the questions had been answered, and both the interviewer and interviewee were satisfied that no further questions or conversation was needed, the interview ended with the grateful appreciation of the interviewer.

A request was made of the interviewee for further contact if follow-up questions were needed or clarification of an already answered question. In this case, original consents and instructions would still be in force. The post-interview discussion included a request for the interviewee to review the transcribed interview document and 72 hours allotted for transcription. The transcription document would be sent via email and returned via email if the interviewee had a question or felt they needed to clarify or change a response.

Recorded interviews were stored in a thumb drive for security, with only the researcher having access. In this study, no interviewee thought it necessary to return the transcript for clarification or change. If the interviewee had contacted the researcher to clarify a statement, all consents remained in effect. The name of the interviewee was not included in any document to maintain confidentiality. Each interviewee was assigned a number that corresponded with their specific transcript.

Time was taken, as much as deemed appropriate by the researcher, to transcribe and produce a transcript of the interviews; however, transcriptions occurred within the 72-hour time goal. An attempt was made to have each interview transcribed within seventy-two hours while the interview was fresh in the participant's mind. The final interview transcripts were collated, and the coding process began. Interviewees also had a choice to submit written answers to the questions. This was done to facilitate time management for the researcher and the interviewee. If a respondent felt more comfortable writing responses or required a written format because of their work and professional schedule, they were accommodated. The written questions were sent via email, and the answers received by email.

This process allowed for data collection using manual coding towards completing Chapter 4 and providing results for Chapter 5. A formal letter was sent to each interviewee thanking them for their participation. In addition, once Walden University accepted the dissertation as complete, the collected data move was securely archived.

Summary

This qualitative study aimed to explore Nigerian society's social and cultural

dysfunction and its potential effects on Nigerian military performance. In Chapter 3, I laid out the methodology by which this study was conducted. I discussed essential foundations embedded in the study, such as how the qualitative grounded approach affected the study design, the purpose of the study, the central phenomenon, and efficacy of performing qualitative interviews within a specifically identified population to gather data for analysis and interpreted to offer an outcome to the research questions. The chapter described the population, sample descriptions, sample size, and recruitment methods to understand the participants utilized for data collection thoroughly.

This chapter also detailed the data analysis plan, trustworthiness and provided in-depth information on the participants and any ethical considerations regarding the safety of interviewees. All interviewees volunteered for this study, and considerations were made through informed consent to ensure participants knew that their identities were protected. It is improbable that any foreign actor who means harm would ever have the opportunity to target an interviewee in any way. However, that reality, no matter how remote, was accounted for. Chapter 4 examines the research collected and provides a detailed, in-depth narrative to explain the findings after completing multilevel coding.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

The foundation for this chapter was collecting data from primary and secondary sources to understand the problems and failures of the Nigerian Army. Understanding the issues and concerns within Nigeria allowed me to formulate a problem statement and research questions. The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore whether social and cultural dysfunction might affect military performance in denying success on the battlefield and causing the Nigerian army to abuse the Nigerian civilian population. This foundation of study resulted in two research questions:

RQ1: How and to what extent does a nation's military reflect or mirror the society from which the military was derived?

RQ2: How and to what extent can marked societal dysfunction affect or inhibit military performance in Nigeria?

Chapter 4 is structured as follows: I describe the setting, demographics, and data collection. My in-depth manual analysis of respondent answers allowed me to have a complete and immersive understanding of the material. I address each research question and the subsequent patterns and themes provided by the coding to support the findings. To report the results, I decided to utilize the themes I discovered through coding. I formulated three themes, and they are (1) society influences military performance, (2) failure in military performance, and (3) tribalism influences military performance. A summary of the findings is presented prior to Chapter 5.

Setting

There were three different interview settings. Four interviews were conducted

online using the ZOOM® business meeting platform. The interviews were recorded using both audio and video through ZOOM® and transcribed using the Transcribe® transcription software. This software was found to be highly accurate in reporting the recorded voice. Slight correction was needed when compared to the recorded material.

One interview occurred via a face-to-face meeting and was audio recorded on my computer using the Microsoft® recording program. This interview was transcribed using Transcribe® transcription software. I conducted the face-to-face interview in the interviewee's home, a location he chose after traveling from his duty station. Two respondents, at their request, provided a written transcript of their interviews, and these were transmitted to me via email. This effort produced a detailed and complete discourse on the interview questions to the point that no follow-up questions were required.

Demographics

For this study, I chose military professionals of senior rank: lieutenant colonel and above and Command Sergeant Major and Sergeant Major for NCOs. The US military is a closed society, and as such, I had great difficulty recruiting participants for this study. However, I met a retired Army colonel at a Walden residency, and he offered to introduce me to colleagues with whom he had served. He had access to high-ranking officers, both retired and active duty. He vouched for my ability, discretion, and that I could be trusted as a researcher, leading to eight respondents for this study.

I interviewed two lieutenant colonels (ret), who held a Ph.D. in history and political science who studied military history and the political challenges of conducting warfare. Two Generals, a brigadier (ret) and a major general (active duty), were interviewed. The major general had a long and distinguished record of leadership and an

acute understanding of command responsibilities not only to the DoD but to civilians impacted by military operations, efforts, and policies abroad. The brigadier was experienced in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and spent four years in Nigeria working with the Nigerian Army through AFRICOM.

I interviewed a command sergeant major (ret) with a 30-year career working with the indigenous forces and their civilian counterparts to fight the Taliban and al-Qa'ida. He had a unique understanding of nation-building and the quality of fighting force. He was fluent in army doctrine, especially counterinsurgent tactics and methodology, and the importance of the host country's social and cultural dynamics.

I interviewed a retired colonel who had also spent multiple tours in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa. This participant had a unique understanding of counterinsurgency and the importance of civilian involvement in counterinsurgent philosophy. He understood military-civilian-political dynamics and the necessity of society and their participation in counterinsurgency support and tactics. And finally, I interviewed an officer from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He attended school at the Army War College but had a history of command and was knowledgeable in civilian-military operations. Every army officer is fluent in civilian-military relations, which came to the forefront with the insurgent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

After data collection was complete during the study, I lost one interviewee as he withdrew from the study. Saturation occurred at the fourth interview; however, I felt that seven interviews provided surety that no new information would be generated. I am prevented from disclosing if the eighth interview validated the accumulated data. I

utilized all seven interviews in coding and produced a coding book that allowed me to catalog responses and integrate coding easily.

Data Collection

I interviewed seven participants, with each interviewee having undergone similar training and military education over their decades of service.

Six of the seven interviews lasted approximately one hour, with the identified 5th (individual) interview occurring over multiple sessions and lasting about 3 hours. Each interview provided thoughtful, complete, and in-depth answers. The interviews produced approximately 86-pages of coded material.

In this study, men comprised the interview cohort and provided the data. Therefore a zero-gender variation in the sample. No variations did not occur using ZOOM[®] other than the necessity to complete one interview over two sessions. Variations did not happen with written submissions. In the end, I did not require data clarification from the written submissions, nor did I have any follow-up questions.

Data Analysis

Strauss and Corbin (1998) proposed that theoretical saturation occurred when “no new properties, dimensions, or relationships emerge during analysis” (p. 143). Glaser and Holton (2004) noted that “the analyst develops several workable coded categories, he/she should begin early to saturate as much as possible those that seem to have explanatory power” (p. 54). Strauss and Corbin’s theoretical explanation of saturation was met with seven interviews.

Tabor (2013) noted that grounded theory “is only considered ready for publication once theoretical saturation is reached. That is when new data collection (indicated by

theoretical sampling) does not lead to any further changes to the theory, as the scheme of categories and their properties and relationships fit new data without further modification” (p. 103). Again, seven interviews provided theoretical and saturation of knowledge, as identified by Bertaux (1981).

Before I began the coding process, I deidentified any information that might provide the interviewee's identity, using only a number. I also removed any names supplied in an interview. Therefore, I did not know whose interview I was coding. This allowed for confidentiality and mitigated bias.

I began coding using the manual open coding method. I copied each response for the first interview question into a word document. I read through each answer to question one to get a feel for content and flow. I then read through each question while listening to the recorded response. It was through this process that I understood emotional inflections in the response. Emotion does creep into qualitative research. An interview question invoked emotion from the interviewees. However, emotion cannot enter the scientific analysis. The emotion produced came directed at the lack of appropriate functioning and professionalism so ingrained in each interviewee. Face-to-face interviews were done (Zoom) to recognize the affect portrayed by the interviewee to the interviewer.

I coded each response using a pen and different colored highlighters to highlight keywords, themes, phrases, and opinions. I looked for consequential passages that represented an idea. I began to pull these out and memoed, assigning meaning to the notations. I assigned “theory,” “concept,” “code,” or “theme” to items that may be representative of a more significant idea throughout each answer. I looked for both overt and underlying patterns.

When I had completed coding question one, I assembled all keywords, ideas, and themes into a table and then visualized an answer to the interview question. More importantly, how the answer related to the specific research question for which it was designed. Once I completed the two-step method, I axially coded the data by connecting codes (concepts and categories).

According to Scott and Medaugh (2017), “axial coding requires researchers to continually modify and reshape their emerging conceptual framework as more data is examined” (p. 1). According to Allen (2017), axial coding accounted for “behaviors, events, activities, strategies, states, meanings, participation, relationships, conditions, consequences, and settings” (p. 80). I found this helpful as I discovered synonyms, like ideas and concepts expressed differently by different interviewees.

I presented the data and its interpretation as a scholar, devoid of emotion and bias. I decided through coding what was important and relevant in interpreting the answers. The first review of the accumulated data offered the path forward to pull every data nuance from the interviews, distilling the information out as the second and third analyses continued. In chapter 4, I presented a plethora of interviewee quotes to provide grounded theory analysis in providing a deep, rich, and detailed understanding of the problem.

Because of the nature of interviewees, their “hyper-homogeneous” nature, coding was relatively straightforward and uncomplicated. Responses to the interview questions were quite linear and provided a solid foundation to understanding the research questions. In the end, coding produced three primary themes to answer the research questions. There was a multitude of codes to combine to produce themes. The theme, society influences military performance, was taken from the following codes: army subservient to civilian

government and people, democracy in jeopardy, society reflected in military, societal traits affecting army, affect military performance, civilian culture into the military, society influences the military, poor civilian control part of culture, tribalism, external and internal cultural influence, civilian and cultural Influence, poor culture and societal values (inadequate or non-existent morals and values), anarchy, population involvement, government and societal credibility, systemic civilian violence, societal acceptance of institutional corruption, corrupt society, military corruption_(endemic in all government entities), people of the country are responsible, elected officials, societal influence, military cannot separate from society (societal beliefs and values).

The theme, failure in military performance, produced the following codes: army cannot enforce domestic policy, army a tool for foreign political policy, leadership, moral and ethical behavior, inadequate training, poor leadership, poor discipline, poor military behavior, army assists in humanitarian actions, army trained to kill, heavy-handed tactics. army could disavow civilian leadership, coup d'état, army breaks laws—will do anything to maintain order, (lack of) discipline, values, professional military, training and instruction, moral and ethical armies involved in atrocities, education to achieve a professional military, attributes of a professional and successful military, commanding officers, chain of command.

And finally, the third theme and the theme presented as a revelation added validity to the first two themes: tribalism affects military performance. The codes included: tribalism, army a tribe, tribalism and sectarianism, act as a tribe, Nigerian army a tribe. However, this was not the tribalism as found so entrenched in Nigerian society. But tribalism is found in the army as a standalone and internal societal structure. This

finding is discussed in depth in the results section. Coding produced a coding book of approximately 86 pages in length, and documents my journey to identify themes

Evidence of Trustworthiness

A research study's value is demonstrated through trustworthiness and academic rigor. Qualitative research studies can suffer from a lack of transparency in justifying sample size. I explained the rationale behind the sample size used for this study and the qualifications of the data collection participants. In addition, qualitative studies can be viewed through the lens that quality may suffer due to the accumulation of unstructured data and the interpretation and analysis of that data. It is up to the researcher to interpret the data and report findings. After all, a quantitative study is based on numerical science and does not suffer from interpretive findings.

Credibility

Credibility addresses the linearity between the participant's views and the researcher's representation of them. To ensure this, I followed the coding rubric and coded only the data that directly impacted the research question. I triangulated the data based on the data received from each interviewee, the research noted in Chapter 2, and those documents, both government and private, used in chapter 2 to explain Nigerian social realities. I also member checked the data accumulated through interviews; no interviewee returned the interview manuscript for correction. The data collected represented phrases, ideas, words, codes, and themes culled from each member into a combined thematic understanding of the data accumulated. In addition, questions were structured to determine validity in responses. For example, two aligned interview questions are noted below:

1K. Nigeria has well-documented issues, both past, and present, of corruption, tribalism, ethnic conflicts, kidnapping, “godfatherism” (political patronage), media manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power hegemony, female subjugation, illiteracy, and economic disparity. Based on your military training, experience, and advanced education, use your command experience, education, and training. How is it possible for a nation’s army to isolate itself from society’s ills, exclusively acting as an independent institution of success? Please explain.

And.

1M. Based on your military training, experience, and advanced education, use your command experience, education, and training. Do you believe that if a nation’s army sprang from an exclusively dysfunctional society, where corruption is endemic, rampant, and pervasive, where tribalism rules the culture, sectarian violence is pervasive, political and civil accountability is non-existent and is on the verge of social and cultural failure; could field a professional and successful army? Please elaborate.

I would have expected to see data from the closely aligned and comparative answers, establishing an intuitive member checking narrative. All seven interviewees answered the two questions comparatively. As for credibility and recognizing bias, I was the instrument for interpreting the information, reminding myself that discrimination could be present and guarding against it. In residency 4, I had been asked by a peer, a student from Nigeria, “how can you not have bias” after researching Boko Haram. Boko Haram operates based on their understanding of Salafist Islam, and the group leads a

simple life guided by simple rules provided by the prophet Muhammed and Allah. Boko Haram does what they do, and I understand them.

To be honest, I found bias in my understanding of the Nigerian Army. An army of a democratic nation should stand as a force for good, help citizens, and restore balance by addressing a horrible violent uprising. The standing army of a democratic nation should exist to serve the people, not to add to the population's misery and insecurity. I constantly checked my writing, mindset, and interpretation in analysis to fend off any implied or explicit bias in understanding this bias.

The student then rechallenged in asking me, "How can a white man with no knowledge of my country possibly carry out a study of Nigeria. He missed the point of scholarship and research. Through this study, I learned to understand Nigeria. I have not lived the culture or social constructs. However, I utilized research and data collection to point to a solution based on accepted professional military operations and functioning.

Transferability

Trochim (2006) noted that transferability referred to the extent the results of a qualitative research study could be transferred (generalized) to other settings or contexts. This study dealt with a democratic nation and the nation's social dysfunction. Nigeria is a near post-colonial country and has existed in its fourth republic form for 21-years. I assumed this study could apply to any democratic nation, especially when assessing post-colonial African states, tribalism, or studying the societal effects on military performance. The transferability of this study should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, as is the norm for qualitative studies (Tobin & Begley, 2004).

Dependability

Tobin and Begley (2004) stated that to achieve dependability, “researchers could ensure the research process is logical, traceable, and clearly documented” (p.91). The research process lies in the theoretical foundation built upon providing a rich and detailed explanation of the problem and subsequent evidence in Chapter 2. The interview questions were constructed based on the evidence discovered on Nigerian societal dysfunction. The data accumulated directed the answers to the research questions and provided no further bearing on the study or any outlying issue.

Confirmability

According to Guba and Lincoln (1989), confirmability is established when credibility, transferability, and dependability are achieved. Coding the data was a long and arduous task and provided a clear path to understanding the data. Axial coding fine-tuned the data so that interpretations and conclusions could be made without bias and erroneous researcher input.

Results

The results of this study provided three themes to answer the research questions. The results were reported by theme instead of the research question. While coding, I discovered a unique framework that I had missed during the literature review and subsequent research. This idea led to an exceptional understanding of the Nigerian Army and their immersion in a tribal environment, and therefore I included tribalism as a coded theme.

Theme 1: Society Affects the Military

Theme 1 was based on answers to interview questions, 1B, 1C, 1D, I, 1K. I asked interview question 1A to identify if a nation's army should be used to carry out or enforce domestic policy. This question pertained to research questions 1 and 2, and all seven respondents answered that yes, the army should not be used to enforce domestic policy. While the officers and Ph. D.s interviewed represented a western-centric school of thought; this reality applies to any state military. Much negatively can occur between the army and the civilian population, which denigrates and harms the manner of a democratic nation. Chapter 2 notes the terrible interactions between the military and the people in attempting to counter an insurgency.

The interviewees, veterans, and active duty understood that the US does not use its regular army to enforce domestic policy. European nations are reluctant to use their armies against the people. This mandate falls to the national guard or law enforcement. In Western countries, the use of the military to enforce domestic policy is rare and frowned upon. The US and their NATO allies understand the unique roles and responsibilities play on the international scene.

To that point, in 2000, Condoleezza Rice advised President Bush: "The president must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society" (Rice, 2000, p. 53). The army, as an organization, is designed to be an effective killing machine. This is true of any nation-state army. Two respondents discussed the Kent State shooting as an example when army troops are used

against civilians. In that case, the national guard troops were poorly trained, had no clear rules of engagement, lacked discipline, and suffered poor leadership.

All respondents reported that it was not appropriate to use the nation's standing army for domestic policy. Terrorism is a law enforcement mandate. However, countering an insurgency is a military function. Boko Haram is considered a terror group as they focus their attacks on the civilian population. ISWA is an insurgency group as they focus its attacks on the military and government institutions. Each has its mandate to establish a caliphate in the Northeastern region of Nigeria.

Unfortunately, using the army to fight Boko Haram was necessary as the national police force is corrupt, underequipped, undertrained, undermanned, and is a ghost law enforcement agency devoid of a real presence in Northeast Nigeria (Campbell, 2018a). According to the data, the reasons for not using the army domestically included harm to the public, a potential threat to the sitting government owing to Nigeria's history of military coups, and the possible abuse to the democratic system in general.

All participants indicated that a nation's military is reflective of a nation's society. The society that exists in a military organization is grounded in the society and culture of the nation. That is the point; the military is a representative and caretaker of the people, much like Nigeria's president and national assembly. The army exists to serve the people through the rights and guidelines provided by the constitution. Additionally, the military embraces the culture and belief system of the country. Respondent 2 stated:

If a society has strong leadership, if the laws are strong and the structure is in place to administer those laws, and strong expectation[s] are made in

how society acts, then the answer is yes, the army is a reflection of the society.

Because Nigeria does not have strong national leadership, the country's laws are tossed aside by a corrupt government. The people do not demand accountability; they do not expect their government and army to do better. The army exists to serve the people and should follow the rule of law and the constitution. The army is not an island unto itself in the middle of chaos; an army is designed to restore order from chaos, and a military reflects the members' norms, values, and cultures. Respondent 3 offered:

The military does not strip anyone of their culture, their belief system, or their heritage. After all, we soldiers live among civilians. We eat with them, party with them, go to church with them, play with them and help them as they help us. We are them, and they are us.

Military Culture

The results indicated that the military of a democratic nation adopts its culture based on the culture and societal influence of the nation. Society is a strong motivator affecting military performance both on and off the battlefield. Respondent 1 stated:

As an example, if you view the US or France through the political lens of republicanism and as a republic, you find high functioning societies and militaries. Britain is also a high functioning society that fields a strong and high functioning army but is a constitutional monarchy and exists without a particular founding document. What do I mean by 'high functioning?' It is a nation and political system entrenched in the law, accountability to the people is strong, has processes and methods that ensure open and honest

functioning, and maintains a high moral and ethical code. On the other hand, Nigeria and from what I have read and seen, appears to be a low functioning society with a low functioning military where the rule of law is a burden, corruption runs rampant, and society is disengaged in the political, economic, and societal systems.

Respondent 3 offered on Nigeria:

Countries with low-developed law enforcement, such as Nigeria, and I use Nigeria because I served there, must depend on their army to keep the peace, not always successful because the Nigerian Army has been accused of abuses. In the end, it is not a good idea for the army to be used to enforce domestic policy. The potential for harm against the people and institutions is far too great. It also should not happen because political factions may use the army against the people in general to enforce their will.

Respondent 3 continued:

Recruits enter the [Nigerian] military indoctrinated in society's culture; in boot camp, they are stripped of their civilian mentality and introduced to military culture. However, soldiers are not stripped of their cultural traits, religion, or societal belief system, including tribalism.”

A significant component for the military in a democratic society is civilian authority's control over the military. In Nigeria, this comes from the Nigerian constitution and is a crucial anchor for society. It is the responsibility of the national assembly, the president, and the people to provide oversight to army actions. The Nigerian military is

responsible for being accountable to the people and takes its directives from civilian control as found in the constitution. However, this is tenuous and is a concern based on Nigeria's history with military coups.

Structuring Military Culture

Analysis indicates that, first and foremost, military culture is taken from civilian culture, the founding documents, leadership, the rule of law, and expectations the international community places on a nation. The army enforces and reinforces societal expectations on moral and ethical behavior taught from a young age by parents, schooling, mentors, athletics, and religious experiences. The army is not expected to teach foundational moral and ethical behavior, rather carry on societal expectations to the military and reinforce the importance of expected correct behavior.

Society carries the burden of maintaining and ensuring the nation's military culture represents the country. Parents and teachers are the first authoritarian figures to impart knowledge of acceptable social behavior. The military is a lethal weapon trained to kill, and moral and ethical values are continuously taught and reinforced in high-functioning armies. Army leadership, including NCOs, are solely responsible for the moral and ethical performance of the military. Respondent 6 stated:

“It is the repetition of seeing it in your leaders, expecting it from one another. If that's honesty and trust, for instance, it would undoubtedly emphasize repetition as the key to pedagogy there.”

A proper military makes every effort to train in ethics, morals, and rules of engagement to guarantee lawful behavior. The NCO corps has daily contact with the

soldier and is responsible for reinforcing discipline, morals, ethics, and a positive attitude.

According to Respondent 1:

Morals and ethics are taught; these two components are not intrinsic in the upbringing of anyone. They must be taught, which starts young and at home. Parents are the first teachers to impart knowledge of acceptable social behavior.

However, Nigerian society is fragmented, attributable to the societal reality of tribalism, creating protectionism and isolationism. As the norms of social functioning are different across the world, African society does not replicate nor identify with Western society. Nigeria is unique even among its African brothers, a tenuous democracy with tribalism affecting and sometimes negating democracy. To say the Nigerian army must operate on a particular moral and ethical plane is not guaranteed by the world order or any country and resides in post-colonial thinking. One society's brutalism could be another's norm; "that a culture's moral baseline is inclusive of violence and blood feuds are an accepted societal norm" (Luban, 2004, p. 138).

From the outset, soldiers are taught discipline, what rules of engagement mean, the ethics and moral behavior expected on the battlefield and in peacetime; this is universal. Respondent 5 stated:

My military instruction included the foundational concept that I was entering a profession as elite as that of doctors or lawyers, but one entrusted with the capability to kill. And that Officers are consistently reminded of army values and morals which emanate from the nation.

Respondent 1 added on moral and ethical values:

A society that follows the founding documents follows civilian leadership, is grounded in the law, and has high moral and ethical expectations produces an army that follows suit [US]. [Our] Congress has mandated additional training on social issues such as human trafficking, suicide prevention, illegal discrimination, and sexual assault. The cumulative effect of this training emphasizes the morals that we are expected to uphold.

To answer the actions of the Nigerian Army operating against the people, Respondent 7 elaborated on the training he received to define his understanding in the use of force and the rules of engagement which are utilized for “Operational Law discipline” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).

Every year for over thirty years, I have received instruction on the Laws of Armed Conflict (a collection of international treaties and domestic law) that define the limits of how I can employ lethal force.

Military Corruption

In their interview, Respondent 5 eschewed the top-down model of command and control that made the situation in Afghanistan worse and untenable. Instead, he believed the bottom-up model made for a far better fighting force:

Let the NCOs train and lead their men and decide what is needed daily to create a successful fighting force and deny corruption. You have that kind of organizational structure, that kind of corruption in a government; it will extend itself inside all the institutions. And that's why I have been a huge critic of top-down programs because they feed that corruption and at the

expense of where the problem is and where we need to apply resources to, and that's the bottom-up level.

Respondent 5 went on:

[M]y views about feeding top-down because it feeds corruption, you don't build the house from the roof down, you built it from the bottom up, and that applies to local governance connected to national governance. And the biggest mistakes we made in Afghanistan were trying to turn it into a western society and two, trying to turn its military, its police, and its government into western-style and investing all kinds of money up there. It perpetuated an already corrupt system... it took functional corruption inside Afghanistan and turned it into a booming business where it was no longer functional anymore; it just took care of the people at the top at the expense of everybody else.

Respondent 5 was correct about Afghanistan, and it translates to Nigeria. In Nigeria, corruption at the top affects the serving line soldier and inhibits satisfactory function. However, Nigeria fosters corruption at every level. Nigeria uses the top-down command model. This is made evident by the fact that the army uses order-based tactics (Onuoha et al., 2020). Junior officers are not provided leeway to use initiative in battle. Any initiative, any change in an order, must emanate or be approved through command.

American and British Special Forces have served in Nigeria, training the army in tactics through a seven-week course emphasizing “offense and defensive tactics such as reacting to contact, countering an improvised explosive device, and seizing an objective” (Sheehan, 2019, para. 5). The translation from training ground to the Northeast battle

zone is lost. The American and British instructors must adjust to the Nigerian army's command and leadership style; however, the Nigerian army does not adjust to new training and doctrinal influences.

Civil to military corruption. As Respondent 3 noted,

An army is tied to society, and military culture is based on that society. It is not possible to isolate an army from those social issues you described” (interview question 1k, 1m). Although the issue of ‘cleans’ and ‘dirties’ was done away with before the fourth republic, respondent 5 reported that: A corrupt government, a predominantly corrupt government, a government that doesn't espouse values and ethics, violates laws of war, putting people in positions, and I've heard it said in Nigeria. In the police and the military, everybody takes their turn inside commands designed to get them wealthy; they leave, somebody else comes in, designed to get them rich. I saw it in Afghanistan too.

Corruption permeates every aspect of the Nigerian government. Nigeria is ranked 145 out of 188 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (Krek, 2019, para. 4). It is especially hideous when the population accepts the condition as the status quo and does not challenge the norm (Ubi, Ecko, & Ndem, 2012).

The top-down corruption pattern is evident in Nigeria and noted when the defense minister absconded with 2 billion dollars meant to fund the military.

On social issues, Respondent 3 stated: I know the society which you describe (Nigeria). As I said prior, an army is tied to society, and military

culture is based on society. It is not possible to isolate an army from those social issues you described.”

Respondent 7 went so far as to state: The international community should not let such a country have an army without oversight. Military aid and training could be used as an incentive to adjust the army’s culture, but that would not be enough.

Could the Nigerian Army escape the social ills that surround the organization?

According to Respondent 1:

I believe that it would be impossible in this context to produce a professional and successful army. A nation’s army is the society. It is not possible to separate the ills of society, especially ills that are so pervasive. Every individual who joins the military has been immersed in society for at least 18 years, if not more. They take with them what their parents have taught and their situation of growing up. Tribalism would seem to [be] a serious stumbling block in military leadership, discipline, and unit cohesion, both on a large divisional level to the platoon level.

Respondent 1 went on to state:

The military can't escape societal norms, which I am talking about, societal norms that transfer to the army. Society lives and breathes inside a national organization. Society and its influences permeate every aspect of military operations and culture. Separation or extraction of deeply embedded abnorms of social behavior is not possible.

Respondent 7 was blunt in saying: No. No. No. No. I think it would probably be a basket case. Militaries generally are microcosms of their larger culture, of the parent culture. I think that military would be bad news. Respondent 3 stated on the army in Nigeria:

The only way for an army to be free from those issues is if the army were tied directly to the state or to a dictatorial or oligarchical regime in which the military is held above the population and cared for. The military owes their allegiance to the ruler or political party and is taken care of as a tool of the state.

Summary of Theme: Society Influences Military Performance

The data answered the first research question; “How and to what extent does a nation’s military reflect/mirror the society from which the military was derived?” The respondents were quite clear that it was a flawed idea to use a nation's military to carry out or enforce domestic policy. The harm that could be perpetrated on the civilian population was simply too great, and in Nigeria, civilian harm has been documented. Having an army operating within the confines of the country could open the door to military hegemony in politics and provide a threat to the sitting government.

The army of a democratic nation is subservient to the civilian government and the people. As far as effectiveness and performance, the army must be free from the overwhelming societal dysfunction as and according to the data, militaries generally are microcosms of their larger culture. The data produced the idea that the military follows the actions and desires of the population and civilian leadership in how they perform on

the battlefield. An army also mimics society in action, so dysfunction produces dysfunction.

According to the respondents, the army cannot isolate itself from society; to somehow escape societal norms, societal norms transfer to the military. The only armies not tied to the people are the armies of the dictator and the many authoritarian regimes that exist. In those structures, the army serves the state and its system and is frequently used against the people to enforce the edicts of the ruling party.

Therefore, a nation's army is the society, and according to respondent 3 who stated,

it would be impossible in the context of Nigeria to field a successful and professional army. The army is tied to society; its culture, belief system, and military culture are derived from the parent society; thus, it is impossible to isolate an army from those negative social issues ingrained in the population.

As far as corruption, all the respondents agreed that corruption was an indelible problem. The government structure, a structure that allows, if not encourages corruption, extends itself inside all state and many private institutions. In this corrupt atmosphere, the government does not espouse the values and ethics required to prosecute a just war.

Corruption is overwhelming in both the civilian sector and in the military (Banini, 2020). According to Banini (2020), military corruption denies success on the battlefield. Banini (2020) stated, "corruption in the defence sector weakened the military's capacity to respond to security threats swiftly" (p. 131). Soldiers fighting Boko Haram do so without adequate weapons, without adequate transportation, or armor. Air support does

not exist, and when used is poorly executed, killing civilians. Troops must scrounge for food and a place to sleep. Morale is low, as is the will to fight.

The Nigerian Army, without government or societal control and intervention, violates the law of war, humanitarian law, and its constitution. In the obverse, a government that follows and adheres to the country's founding documents follows civilian leadership, is grounded in the law, and has high moral and ethical expectations produces a highly successful army and creates an army the people can trust and depend on.

Finally, the army recruits officers, the enlisted, and the soldier from a society that has been underperforming and ill-performing their entire lives. A population in which tribalism is the central anthropological-socio-political system has learned and endemic societal traits and culture based on the Muslim or Christian religion, tribalism, and centuries of expectations. Respondent 5 noted that “army recruits are immersed in society in their formative years. A nation does not remove learned traits or learned societal culture from army recruits.”

This is especially true in a tribal system where tribalism is revered. Therefore, societal traits and culture are present within the military, and the two realities are joined. According to five respondents, it is impossible to remove the abnormal societal characteristics (tribalism, sectarianism, lawlessness, godfatherism, patronage, media manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power hegemony, female subjugation, high crime rates, illiteracy, economic disparity, unemployment, high child mortality, and poor educational opportunities) unless those societal structures are replaced; by an army

which may represent a new tribe for the soldier. The tribal system is explained further in the third theme.

Theme 2: Failure in Military Performance

The following interview questions provided the second theme, Failure in Military Performance: 1E, 1F, 1G, 1H, 1I, 1J, 1M. Theme 1 identified how society and the military are inexorably linked in dysfunction. Therefore, the question then becomes how that linked dysfunction affects military performance. If the research to answer RQ1 had demonstrated that society and its military are not connected, and the army was not a reflection of society, RQ2 would have been nulled.

According to the literature, Nigeria is exclusively dysfunctional, where corruption is endemic, rampant, and pervasive, where tribalism rules the culture, sectarian violence is pervasive, political, and civil accountability is non-existent and is on the verge of political, economic, social, and cultural failure (Globalvoices, 2020; Kinnan, 2020). The Nigerian military has matched the dysfunction of society by being utterly ineffective against the insurgent groups.

It has been documented throughout the eleven years of conflict that the Nigerian Army has little concern for human rights (Campbell, 2018b). Therefore, there must be a cause for the unsolicited harming of innocents, the extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram suspects, and the burning and pillaging of entire villages.

Data indicated that if a society does not have a history of respecting human rights, then the fight will be unconstrained by Western norms. There is little chance for a military member to overcome the societal tendencies from which they are immersed. On this, respondent 7 stated: “If recruits are sourced from a corrupt society with little respect

for human rights, soldiers are nothing more but armed thugs carrying out murder.”

Respondent 1 stated on army action:

[The] Nigerian constitution means nothing to the people or the military, and you know what they say a behavior a lot of times is how you act when no one else is looking. The honor portion of it, having a military organization believe in a set of values that instill honor and the sanctity of life, is a very difficult thing in certain combat circumstances; cruelty occurs in any culture. It can occur. Maybe some are more prevalent than others.

Determining causation for the Nigerian Army to commit acts of violence may be embedded in the culture, tribalism, and poor military performance. Military performance would include leadership, training, discipline, and potential self-acknowledgment of a tribalistic environment.

Lack of Professionalism

To answer two interview questions, I had the interviewees view an Amnesty International Video and a *New York Times* article on Nigerian army abuses, extrajudicial killings, and wanton violence against the population. This video produced emotion from four of the interviewees when they watched the video. This reaction was due to the men being professional soldiers and sickened by what they viewed.

This video represented a singular incident caught on tape. However, research indicated the video was not representative of an isolated incident. The army had a long history of abusing and killing civilians, as reported by the UN, relief agencies, and humanitarian groups. The US State Department stopped providing arms based on

humanitarian reports. The video was shown to the interviewees to obtain responses and provide assessments on military performance. Respondent 3 offered:

This looks like anarchy; these are not professional soldiers but armed thugs carrying out murder. Respondent 3s incredulity continued. When I served in Nigeria training their soldiers, we were not allowed to accompany them into the field. Now I think I know why. Respondent 3, to no one in particular, trying to wrap his mind around what he saw: Where was the leadership on this incident? Did they condone this? This is not professional, nor does it represent what it means to be a soldier by anyone's measure.

Although the video represents one incident, many cases of abuse and killings are associated with the insurgent conflict and societal violence affecting all of Nigeria (Murray, 2017; McGregor, 2017). No Nigerian state has been free of army abuse and misbehavior. In response to an incident in 2019 nearly identical to the 2014 Amnesty International video, the Nigerian Army vowed to apprehend the soldiers responsible in the video acting to commit extrajudicial killings of suspected Boko Haram terrorists (SaharaReporters, 2019, para. 1).

The results of watching the video produced statements from the coding from the respondents such as “lack of professionalism, poor or absent leadership, lacking any morals or ethics.” Several respondents noted a breakdown in society, and all respondents bemoaned the absolute lack of professionalism demonstrated by the soldiers. Coding

indicated that anarchy, tribalism, a complete lack of discipline, and a lack of control and supervision were present.

Military Performance

How society and its dysfunction might affect military performance was identified as a theme in coding. The interviewees provided material related to the performance they witnessed by the Nigerian Army. General responses included the fact that army members exhibited zero regard for the law, no regard for the army as a professional organization, and absolutely no regard for the people. All respondents noted the abject lack of discipline and leadership in the video.

The more professional the army, the fewer issues of violence and corruption you have. Respondent 1 stated:

This represents anarchy by an organization specifically tasked with preventing anarchy. I am seeing potential war crimes and these soldiers are no better than the enemy. Respondent 6 noted: There's no difference between them and the rest of the crowd that's there. What I see are soldiers who are nothing more than vigilantes and thugs, with little to no discipline in the unit or the military.

Each interviewee discussed the lack of discipline and leadership demonstrated in the video and article. Respondent 1 noted: "Discipline is nonexistent, societal values are non-existent." Respondent 5 stated: "A complete lack of discipline, structure, the soldiers are acting just like the terrorists we know Boko Haram to be." On both media files, Respondent 1 noted: "These soldiers lack leadership, unless their immediate leadership was involved, making the scenes all the worse."

Respondent 6 observed: “no seemingly tactical leadership other than one guy with a machete and now turns to people.” (the people are urging and driving the actions of the soldiers). Finally, in disgust, Respondent 6 said: “they're ill trained; they don't truly know how to do even what they're doing other than murdering people.” The interviewees decried the lack of professionalism and the absence of leadership. Two interviewees thought using a primitive weapon (machete) by army members to kill smacked of tribal influence.

Affecting Military Behavior and Performance

At question are the norms of military behavior. The norms of the military are affected by society. This fact is made clear in the following description and evidence provided by the interviewees. The interviewees continued to comment on the video and news article. The insurgent battlefield is located not along static lines but within the population. Respondent 1 stated:

Military power is no longer tied to material power but power granted by the people. In an insurgency, the people are the goal in victory. It is the people who grant legitimacy to either the nation’s army or to the insurgency. Respondent 1 then concluded: The norms of military behavior are not present when viewed through the YouTube video. This is extra-normal in military behavior. Those soldiers remind me more of the Nazi SS than a democratically grounded army.

Respondent 2 made an interesting observation of Nigeria and African armies in general: I guess the point I'm trying to make is that in other armies and other cultures, getting hit on the head, or getting hit with an open fist, or

whatever slapped up or whatever. It's just something that happens. I think we've kind of maybe advanced as a society, and we can't really expect, some might say third world nations, to be all nice, I guess.

Respondent 2 intimated that:

African armies or third-world nations simply have a differing view on violence than the higher developed Western system. That ancestral and cultural systems hundreds of years old have not advanced to the level seen in highly developed countries. Therefore we who study Africa may not be able to assign causation or blame for violence.

From the answer provided by Respondent 3: A nation's military is always a professional organization. A nation's military lives and breathes doctrine, the rule of law, and the imposition of discipline." Respondent 3 stated that based on the video: I do not see leadership, discipline, or the effects of training. The norms of behavior expected for a professional military are sorely lacking. These are not professional military soldiers but lawless thugs who are nothing but vigilantes. The culture within this army must be one of unaccountability and morass.

The Respondent (3) went on to say: ...if these are Boko Haram, the military is required to protect them, treat them fairly, and bring them to justice. These soldiers violated the law of war and any international convention regarding non-combatant prisoners.

Respondent 7 referred to their answer for question E, which answered if the army is reflective of the democratic society: If recruits are sourced from a

corrupt society with little respect for human rights, only a purposeful training and indoctrination program has any chance of creating a professional military force. Without such inculcation of professionalism, there is no chance for a military member to overcome the societal tendencies from which they were drawn.

Training and Leadership

The data accumulated on military performance pointed to leadership, training, and culture within the army. In the end, five out of seven respondents noted it was leadership, training, and discipline which alter the norms of military behavior. These lapses contribute to poor military functioning against Boko Haram and ISWA and how the army treats the population.

Respondent 7 remarked that the video indicated “a breakdown in civil society and a lack of professional leadership.” Another respondent (4) noted that,

I think we touched base on the leadership aspect of things, but the training aspect is that they might not even have any type of moral ethic-type training. Respondent 4 continued, But it's kind of the training aspect of it, leadership. The military norms, it's...(pause)... how you put it? I think it is not expected. It is not normal for that kind of conduct to happen. I believe that lack of leadership, training, accountability, and discipline are to blame.

From Respondent 5, who commanded in Africa:

You're looking at a military that's lost complete control of its junior officers. There's probably a lot of defections there. There's probably a lot

of AWOLs; there's probably a lot of people that have left. They have absolutely no control over this Northern environment from Maiduguri to Bama and in all the areas in between.

In speaking of military behavior, societal failure, and the stresses brought about by cultural, military failure, respondent 5 added (about the US troops training the Nigerian Army): “We have to do things that teach them the right way to take care of people inside their country. And it's the large reason why Boko Haram and ISIS West Africa exists there.”

The *New York Times* article drew specific responses from the interviewees. I had asked about the professionalism, internal culture, and actions demonstrated by the Nigerian Army in committing atrocities against the population. On the contents of the article, Respondent 7 stated: “I can’t draw any conclusions from the article.” However, the respondent did add: “Atrocities are committed in war, even by armies of a moral country. The response of the government and military leaders to those atrocities is more indicative of the culture than the atrocities themselves. Respondent 3 added: “It is difficult to believe that anyone could open up on unarmed civilians, let alone a soldier.”

Respondent 3 added, I read this passage (from the article). As more combatants from Boko Haram have been hiding within the civilian population, the line between who is civilian and who is not has been blurred.” This is the reason counterinsurgent doctrine exists, to protect civilians and turn the tide of supporting the insurgency.

Respondent 1 offered a stinging rebuke of the army:

...that innocent civilians pay the price for an inept and unprofessional army. What I read from the article is an army out of control, flailing against an enemy. I noticed that when the army provided explanations for the deaths and abuses, they pointed to the civilians, cults, criminals, and Boko Haram as the cause.

The army does not own what they do, even though President Buhari, in the article, pledged to stamp out corruption, promised to clean up the abuses (Searcy, 2017). So, while the army denies, the civilian leadership vows to clean up abuses.

Respondent 1 then offered:

What is clear from the article is the pattern of abuse and killings by the army over the years. The article discussed the Baga massacre from 2013, which matches the current abuses by the army. The article is from 2017, but I have read of the same abuses in 2019. The pattern continues. It is hard to argue with patterning. The army is out of control and practices anarchical violence, flailing about the countryside and lacking a strategy.

A hedge against this behavior could well be training and education. All respondents reported on the importance of education from the bottom up. It is not enough to train and educate the officers; the enlisted and soldiers must be exposed to continuous training and education. The Nigerian Army suffers from poor leadership, discipline, training, and many additional problems associated with a poor example of professionalism and existing as an unsuccessful army.

I asked what it required to be a highly successful army. There are certain social, cultural, and expectational norms adherent to a professional army. Respondent 1 offered:

This is simple. A well-functioning, professional, and successful army adheres to the rule of law. The army is disciplined, follows orders, carries out the expectations put forth by the civilian leadership and the population. They train consistently and are schooled on a regular basis in all aspects of behavior and in military professionalism.

Respondent 1 stated: Aberrancies in behavior are dealt with swiftly with follow-up training to prevent repeats. Above all, discipline is followed and enforced. Through military norms of behavior, soldiers keep their comrades accountable for proper conduct.

Respondent 2 stated: Yeah, I think the big thing, I guess, if this is norms and expectations, is for people, is for soldiers, military personnel to be mission-oriented and be willing to do what it takes to perform the mission.

Unfortunately, the Nigerian Army operates under an order-based leadership system, not a mission-based system. Completing the mission is not taught to officers or their men. Once the objective of the order is achieved, activity may stop (Onuoha et al., 2020).

From the responses in general, and I am paraphrasing, a single personal failure could begin a tidal wave, and expectations are high for a soldier to perform. One soldier could start to abuse civilians, and a tribal mob mentality ensues. Professionalism, training, and discipline negate negative behavior. Most of all, any professionally trained and disciplined soldier invested in the group would instead take a bullet than abandon his comrades and friends on the battlefield. A single personal failure by a Nigerian soldier who runs from battle causes a tidal wave of soldiers to abandon their post. Fear, although

irrational, is a powerful motivator. This goes to leadership and training, which then disavows discipline on the line.

This is the same military behavior that soldiers follow on the battlefield to enhance the battle experience. Trust among soldiers in battle is crucial, that comrades will not cut and run when it gets tough; they stand side by side against overwhelming odds. A successful, aggressive, well-trained army is a force multiplier, fighting as a singular entity to achieve success.

To these ideas, respondent 6 stated: I think trust is a hallmark of an effective unit, and obviously, the door swings both ways. If the commander can't trust his guys and they can't trust him to have their backs, then effectiveness breaks down. The trust is built, I think, from a disciplined work ethic that ensures that they're doing the right thing when no one's watching.

The respondent went on: We spend a tremendous amount of time training, but he (the soldier) has to demonstrate that expertise in the application of his responsibilities. So that nexus forms between discipline, trust, and hard work that allows a unit to be highly effective.

Respondent 4 stated: "I really think it's driven by a top-down leadership structure, but also, when I first got in, there's a set of morals and values that are instilled or expected out of you." Respondent 7 offered the viewpoint of respect:

The underlying cultural norm should be one of respect for others. Most importantly, respect of all the joint and coalition partners and respect extending to civilians and even the enemy. The problem arises when the

need for respect is balanced against the need to kill the enemy. This involves a certain level of dehumanization to accomplish state-sponsored taking of life.

It does take a certain amount of dehumanization to kill. However, that dehumanization cannot extend to the population or captured prisoners. To this idea, Respondent 3 offered:

A well-functioning army is an army of discipline, training, a solid command and control structure, and an army that is focused on education. Training and education lift an army out of mediocrity and allows an army to perform at a high level.

It is command and control which ultimately has the responsibility for their soldiers and their actions in combat. Rules of engagement exist to protect the soldier as well as civilians and noncombatants. Respondent 5 offered this in closing:

What you have, first and foremost, is a value and ethics system that allows the military to be able to employ good order and discipline. The chain of command understands that it works for the people inside their command as opposed to the other way around. You see less drug and alcohol problems. You see less AWOL problems. You see less desertion problems, and you find high morale. If recruits are sourced from a corrupt society with little respect for human rights, soldiers are nothing more but armed thugs carrying out murder. In Iraq, as the war dragged on and the standards for enlistment got lower, that's when we started having some of these same issues.

Respondent (5) discussed a higher level of thinking towards command. We have to develop this idea of servant leadership in accountability and responsibility in our senior leaders for the people below us. Importantly, and in an ending statement 5 noted: trust is the biggest force multiplier in the military at all levels. And when that is sacrificed, in my experience, that is what undermines the good order and discipline and the functioning that you need in a military unit. The character of the individual that matters. It's that person's ability to understand what is right and what is wrong and to hold their ground on that.

Trusting your comrades, trusting in your ability and the ability of the army to support you in a firefight by providing layered forms of intervention (i.e., artillery support, close air support) allows the soldier to stay in place and fight an overwhelming force on the attack. It was made clear by the data accumulated that there are multiple threads of contribution to military function and performance.

Leadership, military culture, training, discipline, and quality of recruitment play an integral part in military performance, whether in large or small units. Leadership, training, and discipline mitigate if not remove the irrationality of fear. These attributes affect the normative theory of military performance and the injunctive norms that dictate military performance. There are a host of additional considerations. Pertaining to performance and action, the military of any country is not an isolated monolithic organization but an organization with multiple strings of influence (including civilian oversight).

Counterinsurgency Doctrine

In general, Nigeria and African countries may be accountable to different ideas on morals and ethics due to tribalism, an ingrained ancient anthropological culture, or sectarianism. To understand counterinsurgency, I constructed an interview question to uncover whether the Nigerian situation was a mimic of 2006 Iraq when US troops were indiscriminately killing Iraqis when fighting the rising insurgency (Ricks, 2006). What is occurring in Nigeria is more likely than the Nigerian Army leadership's inability to fight the insurgency. Thus, the field troops do not have a tactical plan to address the issue.

Conventional warfare tactics do not work when addressing an insurgency. David Galula, a French officer, fought in Algeria and formulated one of the first counterinsurgency doctrines. One of the first attempts at counterinsurgency can be traced back to General John Pershing and his efforts to quell the 1901 Moro insurgency in the Philippines. In countering an insurgency, the garnering the people's consent is the essential asset to conduct a successful campaign. It is the people who provide the government and the army with legitimacy. Respondent 3 stated:

Field troops do not know who the enemy is, so they may shoot at everyone because they don't want to be shot or attacked. It is entirely possible that Nigerian Army troops attack and kill civilians because they simply do not know how to conduct intervening actions.

Respondent 5 noted:

Yes, absolutely. I give Petraeus a lot of credit, one for what he did in Iraq. And in these rural kinds of areas where bottom-up security really matters more than top-down security, bottom-up really matters; this is what you end up getting. And so, yes, the conventional approach does not work...

same thing with the counter-terrorism approach. The top-down counter-terrorism approach does not secure areas. It kills bad people. Good should be part of the strategy. But it doesn't secure areas.

Respondent 6 said: Yeah, if you could say it. I'm trying to get my arms around it. I don't believe it's a fair comparison unless I'm mistaken that what U.S forces were doing in Iraq is comparable to the, I guess, wanton slaughter of random civilians in Nigeria.

As an aside, in an interview, Ricks described the treatment of Iraqis by US troops. "...some soldiers in Baghdad decided that the best way to deter looters was to make them cry--and they sometimes did this by threatening to shoot the children of looters, and even conducting mock executions" (Nissley, 2006, para. 8)

Respondent 6 stated: [I]f you're treating everybody as a combatant, then regardless if they are or certainly in those circumstances are not, then order and discipline breaks down, mission direction is lost. Any sanctity of life then in what you're trying to achieve, which is tied to every military operation in accomplishing ultimately the political objective is lost. So, it's even in trained, disciplined armies at times because of the stresses associated with combat. I guess degrees of violence and the rapidity or the rapidness in which it unveils itself can certainly lead one to believe that there's a value breakdown.

Respondent 1 indicated: "I would say what is viewed in the video is more related to personal accountability, training, discipline, leadership, and the lack of a moral and ethical base." Respondent 1 did not believe Iraq and Nigeria were identical platforms

with insurgency issues. Instead, he believed the Nigerian issue was related to his answer of “personal accountability, training, discipline, leadership, and the lack of a moral and ethical base.”

The discussion on Iraq and Nigeria provided an uncomfortable moment for a few interviewees. They did not seem interested in discussing Iraq. However, the difference between the Nigerian Army and the US Army is that the US military command recognized the problem and moved as quickly as possible to remedy the situation.

I sought to identify if the Nigerian Army may be experiencing what the US did in 2006 with frustration, adrift in doctrine, applying conventional warfare strategies to an insurgency, and identify whether civilians' damage might represent an association between the two armies. In the end, the interviewees simply did not have enough information to fully confirm that Nigeria might reflect what occurred in 2006 Iraq.

The data indicated that the Nigerian situation was reflective of a poorly performing army attempting to combat an insurgency. From the historical record, it was clear that what occurred in Iraq represented a change in warfare from a conventional platform to counter-insurgency. While first struggling with the change and how to prosecute counterinsurgency, the US made mistakes and committed a moral drift. However, the “surge” and change of tactics remedied the situation. Therefore, there is no tangible connection between 2005 Iraq and Nigeria in addressing an insurgency.

Nigeria uses conventional tactics and cannot make the doctrinal change to counterinsurgency either out of incompetence, leadership failure, or simply the command staff incapable of correctly prosecuting asymmetric warfare. The US dealt with tribalism

in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the Nigerian Army is tribal, totally standing on its own in military performance. Luban (2004, p. 117) offered:

To criminalize acts of a government toward groups in its own jurisdiction, and thus to pierce the veil of sovereignty through international criminal law, is tantamount to recognizing that the cancerous, auto-polemic character of crimes against humanity represents a perversion of politics, and thus a perversion of the political animal.

Initial Military Training

War is the implementation of political policy through violent means. Training and education appeared to be a foundation by which the army flourishes on the battlefield. The Nigerian Army puts its recruits through a nine-week boot camp. After boot, the recruits are sent to Advanced Individualized Training (AIT) to learn their specific job. From AIT, the soldier is sent to their unit, which may be involved in combat in the Northeast.

However, there is little evidence the Nigerian Army continuously trains and educates the troops in the field. Even on the battlefield, training should be mandatory and ongoing. Successful armies conduct after-action debriefings to discuss performance and to make changes in tactics and performance if necessary.

Training continues if doctrine changes or the operational theater exhibits a shift in combat nature. For example, in 2019, the Nigerian Army moved from disseminated bases and town fortifications to “super camps” (Wolf, 2020). The super camp change delivered entire localized populations to the insurgents as the army abandoned towns (Wolf, 2020). The army changed its tactical doctrine to confront the insurgents in a new way, but

education and training must adapt to and provide for the new plan for super camps. Moving to a super camp but carrying on the same doctrine denies any intention of a conventional shift to counterinsurgency. The super camp became an extension of conventional warfare failure (Carsten, 2019).

Participants were asked whether a 90-day basic training boot camp is enough to instruct recruits in appropriate discipline, military culture, expectations, and moral and ethical responsibilities in combat? The following evidence was garnered from the data. Respondent 1 suggested that:

90 days of basic training is a start, an introduction to the concept of the profession of arms. That training must continue throughout their military career and be exemplified by their senior non-commissioned officers (most importantly) and the commissioned officers in their chain of command. Only in continuing to emphasize proper and moral conduct will a recruit grow to understand that no matter the societal norms before they entered the military, this level of professionalism is the new expectation.

Respondent 3 added:

We teach soldiers how to function at a minimum level. These soldiers are not yet ready to be deployed and fight a battle. It is an introductory course at best, and no army is ready to fight straight out of BT. I should note that the US army tries to be selective. Morals and ethics are constantly taught because a soldier can be easily swayed to do poorly in the fog of war. Therefore, the military enforces rules of engagement which makes warfighting easier for the individual soldier.

In disagreement, respondent 4 stated:

Yeah, I think 90-days is good. There might be some social proof that 90 days is or isn't, but I can tell you from my experience that 90 is enough time to establish again what the expectations are the morals and the ethics expected within the military. However, respondent then 4 added: But I also think it doesn't permanently change somebody's thought process and beliefs. It's enough to just make them cognizant that this is where the military stands. And if you don't want to, in a sense, play ball or conform to that, then we don't want you in this organization. Yeah. And yeah, that gets to the frequent amount of training that we receive just to reiterate that this is still part of our culture, practiced morals and ethics.

Respondent 4 believed that a 90-day training regimen was acceptable but then reiterated the fact that frequent training is a must to perform as an organization, and if that was not possible, “we don’t want you in this organization” (Respondent 4).

Respondent 6 had a different take as he actively commanded a training program in Afghanistan. He offered:

No. And I guess the question can become more complex if we're going to go to another country and try to implement a 90-day boot camp and create an entity, a security force that possesses our own military's values, it won't happen. The ALP example that I provided, the Afghan Local Police example, I think is evidence of that. If it's taking us 15-months to get our local police trainees who were going through a six week how to shoot a

gun, wear a uniform, those kinds of things walk in formation, riding in a truck.

Respondent 5 then offered that it took just as much time to train and to get the recruits to stop stealing from the local [Afghan] population, stay awake during nighttime guard sifts, not to use drugs and abuse detainees.

Respondent 3 stated that it took a tremendous amount of time to overcome native cultural values and instill a comprehensive inculcation of a set of professional military values.

Respondent 1 stated that: a ninety-day boot camp is designed to move a civilian into the military. The program is an introductory endeavor to all aspects of the military. The one item most enforced during boot camp is discipline.

Respondent 1 went on to say for AIT: Depending on the MOS, such as infantryman, as an example, these soldiers are further instructed in small and large unit tactics, firearms, heavy weapons, and various other aspects of operations.

Respondent 2 offered: That's a good question, 90 days. Oh wow. I would say at least possibly. I think with basic training, you just get some of it. Then you go onto your advanced individual training, and you're going to get some there too, usually. Then when you get to your unit, hopefully, you're not thrown into the fray right away but kind of eased into things. Now with Murphy's Law and how things go in life, especially in the military, it can happen that you don't get the training you need. For instance, when I

deployed to Bosnia and Iraq, they gave me a nine-millimeter handgun, Beretta pistol. Well, I'd never fired one before. I'd fired other pistols before, so I wasn't too worried. But they didn't have the training for me there at home station in Heidelberg and Stuttgart.

Respondent 3 agreed simply by stating:

A 90-day basic training course is just that. Basic. We teach soldiers how to function at a minimum level. Bootcamp is an introduction and formulates the beginnings of military behavior. Appropriate military behavior is consistently taught and reinforced. Training cannot stop after 8 months of training. (boot + AIT).

From respondent 2: I believe the key statement here is: Hopefully, you're not thrown into the fray right away, but kind of eased into things. Young inexperienced soldiers who are put into battle cannot function as expected. Fear is real, and it is an irrational construct of the mind. For the army, one avenue to decrease or eradicate fear is extensive training to build skill and confidence. In battle, the fog of war amplifies and contributes to that fear. Soldiers might run from battle, experience fears, panic, and forget their training.

It is unknown why Nigerian soldiers flee the battlefield, tearing off their uniforms as they run (Al-Jazeera, 2020; Ogundipe, 2019; Ross, 2015). However, fear and lack of trust in the army to have their backs must be a strong motivator and the fact they may not trust their comrades to stand with them. The answers I received indicated discipline, leadership, training, and the lack of, induce this battlefield behavior.

Society, the Army, and Failure

In March 2020, the Emir of the Kano State, Lamido Sanusi, was removed by the state for “disrespect to lawful instructions” (Campbell, 2020). Many believe this was done to quiet his objections to government corruption and ineptitude (Campbell, 2020). Nigerian is highly corrupt; in fact, the country suffers from not only corruption, but tribalism, ethnic conflict, kidnapping, lawlessness, godfatherism, which is political patronage, media manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power hegemony, female subjugation, high crime rates, illiteracy, and economic disparity, unemployment, high child mortality, and poor educational opportunities among many other social function problems. Although addressed earlier, I asked an additional question; Considering these social issues, is it possible for the army to isolate itself from society's ills exclusively acting as an independent institution of success?

Respondent 5, who served in Nigeria, made the following statement:

No, I don't think so at all. I think from a civilian view, anything that the military does is going to be a direct representation of the government. So, Nigeria is worse today than it was in June of 2017. It is bad today, and the military has not been able to separate itself from its rogue NCOs, its rogue enlisted people. Even when you have good division commanders and good battalion commanders that are trying to do the right thing, they're existing inside a system in Nigeria that has gone to hell in a handbag, and we're partly at fault for that. We had it going in the right direction, and then we left, and we left them to their own devices, and they weren't ready to be left to their own devices.

Respondent 5 continued: “I think we're seeing a collapse of military behavior. Yeah, Nigeria. It's a terrible thing. It's a terrible thing to read about, to watch, to see the videos like you showed. Not in a country that has all those problems, I don't think.” Respondent 3 added:

As in the previous response concerning social problems. In a democracy, it is not possible to separate or isolate the military from the people. Society is the anchor for the military. A high-functioning society that expects a high-functioning army will see that they have one. A society that suffers from the social issues listed cannot, by the nature of a democracy, carry a successful military.

Respondent 3 continued:

For the Nigerian Army to perform at a high functioning level, the army would have to isolate completely from society, root out any of society's ills, be funded to a high level, have a military education system second to none, weapons systems second to none, discipline, cohesiveness, a strong moral and ethical compass, and enjoy a strong civilian control system which expects excellence. None of this is possible, so the army languishes alongside the corrupt civilian and political structure fumbling their way through war.

Respondent 7 offered the example of Egypt as an example of an army that existed in the same social and political climate as Nigeria. 7 stated: “This has taken decades of professional military training with the U.S. and military-to-military interactions that have explicitly or implicitly emphasized professionalism.”

Respondent 4 added on the military reflecting society:

Is it possible? I guess anything is possible, but probable, I would say probably not. Here, it asks (interview question) about the religious beliefs, terrorism, tribalism, and if you're getting an organization that has all these problems, and I mean, it's very hard to weed it out, to not have an influence on the way business is conducted. I, and in that case, yeah, you could say that it would be a very, a pretty accurate (societal) reflection. (Yeah).

Respondent 6 added: I would say the characteristics you described, I would say no. It's just, it's seemingly an impossible task when the society is so fractured and dysfunctional to solidify it under a unified entity.

Respondent 1 stated:

I can refer to my answer I gave for 1K. It is not possible for a military to isolate and separate itself from the society it emerged from and the society which supports the military and sends its young men to fight. Society's ills and abnormal functioning follow from organization to organization throughout society. The army is no exception. It's just, it's seemingly an impossible task when the society is so fractured and dysfunctional to solidify it under a unified entity.

Respondent 2 discussed the conditions in 1989 Romania when Ceausescu formed his Praetorian Guard and gave them extra favors, paid them well, provided them with better food, what have you, similar to North Korea. That is how an oligarch enjoins army loyalty to protect the dictator. But as far as the democratic state of Nigeria, he (2) stated:

As far as Nigeria goes, and this kind of goes back to the previous question of societal impact on a military, whether the army could overcome all the negatives in society, and with the culture, and operate or act as an independent institution of success. Okay. Yeah, I would think Nigeria is, I hate to use the term, but a basket case in so many respects, that I don't think an army is going to be able to rise above that.

Societal constructs affect how the military functions; if society is dysfunctional, then so will the military. Boot camp and AIT are the basic training courses used to create a soldier. However, you have a command system and a training system mired in the mediocrity that society imposes on the army.

Responsibility and Oversight

In a democratic nation, who bears the ultimate responsibility and accountability in how a military conducts itself? Senior leadership accepts responsibility on the battlefield for how their soldiers act. They are also responsible for their soldiers in peacetime, expecting appropriate behavior. However, in a democracy, responsibility does not end with army control. Respondent 5 suggested that the commanders, “those closest to the operation, have the responsibility on how the unit operates. It is the responsibility of elected officials to maintain oversight, to make sure that the senior military leadership is taken to task on what they're doing.”

Respondent 5 also offered:

Oversight's one thing, providing advice and guidance, giving them information, resources, working for them so that they can do their job better. Respondent 3 noted that: there exists a chain of command in

accountability. A military conducts itself through the will of the people.

The people elect their government representatives, who in turn administer the military.

Respondent 7 was blunt: “In a democratic nation, that responsibility lies with the population. An easy answer is to blame the politicians, but in a democracy, the people get the government they deserve.” Respondent 4 discussed who bore the ultimate responsibility in that it was society. It was the society that understands what is happening in both peacetime and war.

Respondent 6 said: “I would fully endorse our system that the military has to ensure the liberty of the people it's protecting the entity has to answer to those people or political leadership as our country does.” Respondent 1 provided an enlightened argument:

In a democratic nation, and strictly pointed to democracy, civilian political control is the hallmark of civilian-military association. Since civilian authorities take their power from the people, it does befall the people of a nation to expect their military to function in a manner befitting societal expectations.

When discussing Nigeria, respondent 1 stated:

Military leadership must hold those under their command accountable, followed by the civilian authority holding the leadership accountable. If this does not happen, then it must be the people of the country to demand accountability.

Respondent 1 discussed the reality of Nigeria, stating:

In Nigeria, it would appear the army is a domestic threat to the people. It appears the people do not have a voice; their people are simply humans caught in a terrible war and are abused by both sides. Sometimes, humanity is lost. They do not have a voice to demand better of their army.

Social dysfunction negates oversight of army function. The Nigerian tribes are anthropologically inclusive and strive for national hegemony but tranquility in the tribe. If the tribe has reached a positive level of functioning in the system, then they do not bother with the country. For example, if the Hausa-Fulani live in peace and have a hegemonic control system, then the tribe is at homeostasis. They do not engage other tribes to reach the same level of harmony, which would be a nationalistic narrative.

Summary of Theme 2: Failure in Military Performance

Failure in military performance was intrinsically tied to societal dysfunction. The data made it clear how a dysfunctional society can affect military performance. The results are summarized through respondent 5:

For the Nigerian Army to successfully function when society is so fractured and dysfunctional is an impossible task. It is not possible to solidify the army under a unified entity and fight in a professional manner. It is not possible for the army to isolate and separate itself from the society it emerged from. It is society that sends its young men to fight, young men who have been exposed to society's ills their entire life. Society's ills and aberrant behavior follow through an organization to organization throughout society, and the army is no exception.

Recruits are sourced from a corrupt society with little respect for human rights. In this situation, only a purposeful training and indoctrination program throughout a military career can create a professional military force. Without the continuous inculcation of professionalism, there is no avenue for any military member to overcome the societal tendencies from which they were drawn. In a democracy, it is not possible to separate or isolate the military from the people. Society represents the anchor and foundation for the military and for all societal organizations.

All respondents noted that a well-functioning and successful army has discipline, training, education, a solid command and control structure, and a staunch moral and ethical belief system. Through training, discipline, education, and a culture of excellence, demanding the highest of professional performance, an army is lifted out of mediocrity and despair. The army has many weapons; they are a lethal killing machine, and in the end, the Nigerian people are at the army's mercy.

In a democracy, the army is a representative of the government and the people. Respondent 5 was clear on the Nigerian Army and rogue NCOs he witnessed in 2017 and stated that it was bad. The situation has not changed. The army had rogue NCOs then, and he believes the army still has rogue NCOs.

Respondent 6 tied Afghanistan and Nigeria together as he had seen similar conditions in Afghanistan and applied those witnessed conditions to Nigeria. In the Amnesty International video and the *New York Times* article, the respondents were vocal about the abject lack of discipline and leadership.

The Nigerian constitution and the Geneva Conventions specifically direct that noncombatants are treated fairly and without compromise. The Nigerian constitution also

protects the rights of all Nigerians. Respondent 1 discussed the Nigerian constitution in that it means nothing to the people or the military. He offered, and I paraphrase, that it is easy to conduct behavior when someone is looking, but actual behavior comes when no one is looking. It is here that the rogue NCO problem comes into play. It is the NCO who is directly commanding the soldiers. If he is terrible, then the norms of military behavior are jeopardized if not lost. The norms of military behavior are not present when viewed through the YouTube video. This is extra-normal in military behavior.

Response to the video, which represents a singular event, specifically included that the video represented anarchy by an organization tasked explicitly with preventing anarchy. Respondents agreed that potential war crimes were committed and the soldiers were no better than the enemy. To respondent 5, the soldiers appeared to be thugs and vigilantes, completely lacking discipline and proper military culture.

According to respondent 5, army members demonstrated a complete lack of discipline, structure and acted like Boko Haram. In addition, the soldiers lacked leadership unless the leadership on the ground was involved, which makes the actions even more deplorable. Respondent 6 discussed (paraphrasing) and relating to counterinsurgency that no one knows who the real enemy is. In rounding up people and executing them, they are ill-trained. The soldiers do not know what they are doing other than murdering people. The tribal narrative began to emerge from the data from secondary descriptions such as this.

In conjunction with tribalism is corruption, not in a monetary sense, but sociological patterns. One would assume then the elements of corruption are there as well

so that they do not know if they are killing a terrorist organization or are they being hired to or told to go out and eliminate a rival faction of people.

It then becomes apparent in viewing the video and reading the New York Times article that there is a pattern of army abuse and killings. This is further confirmed through the historiography in Chapter 2 documenting the years of army abuse and killing. In this way, innocent civilians pay the price for an inept and an unprofessional army.

These types of military maneuvers demonstrate the army has lost control of its NCOs and junior officers, an army out of control and flailing at an enemy they do not understand. In the end, it represents a collapse of military behavior, a complete abdication of the normative theory of military performance and the norms of military behavior.

This reality goes to leadership, training, discipline, and oversight. Each is a part of the greater holistic approach to army function and success. The incidents presented here and in chapter 2 indicate that leadership, training discipline, and oversight are sorely lacking, making for an army out of control. Additional data exists as background information and contextual data, confirming the validity of the data collected reported here.

Sun Tzu wrote that everyone depends on the arts of war. This is a lesson for Nigeria in that military strength begins with a single soldier, and unity is crucial. A united nation is strong, a divided nation is weak. A united army is strong, a divided army is weak. A united force is strong, a divided force is weak. A united unit is strong, a divided unit is weak. United men are strong, divided men are weak (Tzu, 2004, p. 42). So goes the nation of Nigeria. If Nigerian society is fractured and weak, then there is absent control over the army, citizens will die by the army's hand and Boko Haram.

Theme 3: Tribalism and Military Performance

I identified a third theme, Tribalism and Military Performance. Tribalism presented as somewhat of a revelation in the coding. The tribalism narrative emerged as a completely organic subject offered by the respondents. I did not structure any interview questions to inquire about tribalism or its possible influence on the army. Four respondents brought up the tribalism theme in that the army operated as a tribe, implementing tribal actions (violence) against the people. If tribalism is a main animating factor in the negative actions of society, then undoubtedly, that concept transfers to the military. The soldier does not view a citizen as Nigerian or a victim, but simply an individual from a competitor or antagonist tribe who must be dealt with. If you are not with the army, you must be with Boko Haram.

Four respondents organically suggested tribalism as causation for deviant military performance. As stated in chapter 2, tribalism rules Nigerian society, and sectarian violence is prevalent across the country. Tribal imperatives drive much of the violence as tribes seek hegemony over a competing tribe; an example is the Muslim Fulani fighting against the Christian farmers in the Sahel to control lands to graze cattle (Murray, 2017; McGregor, 2017).

The data indicating the Nigerian Army is a tribe unto itself. The respondents indicated that the military's actions mimic a tribal mentality of it is them or us. In fact, one respondent noted: “The army operates as its own tribe and carries out punishments based on some anthropological narrative of violence...This is tribalism as practiced by the army.”

As noted earlier, respondent 6 offered:

And one would assume then, the elements of corruption are there as well so that they don't know if they're killing a terrorist organization or are they [army] being hired to or told to go out and eliminate a rival faction of people. (sectarian violence).

Tribalism is the principal foundation of Nigerian culture. Long before the colonial powers carved up the African continent to fulfill their imperialistic mandates, the African tribal system had a thriving, prosperous, social, cultural, political, and economic success story. Tribalism continues to be the overriding cultural and structural component of society. In viewing the video and reading the *New York Times* article describing additional abuses documented in Nigeria, respondent 5 stated:

It's leadership, and its discipline, it's tribal tensions. It's historical violence against each other that is now left unchecked without governance to maintain security. Tribalism is global; it is a narrative that transcends national boundaries and Western conceptions.

Respondent 4 tied Afghanistan and Nigeria together as he had seen similar conditions in Nigeria while serving there:

[In] leveraging the Pashtunwali code (Afghanistan), the tribal affinity that the people have, and having them we're recruiting from those bases.

Allowing them to be in a formalized security force but still working under the belief, they're protecting their tribe, their families, and themselves in local areas. And that's part of the reason I think the Afghan army has struggled a great deal because coming in, we didn't understand any of it arguably of their culture, values. We just grabbed whoever we could

regardless of tribe and ethnic affiliation and put Pashtuns in Hazaran areas and Hazaras in Pashtun areas. And we ignore those differences and the tribal differences within the Pashtun tribe itself, and that ultimately caused those soldiers to be strangers in those areas that there's- Even in their own country and the people wouldn't talk to them. They knew they were different, and so they couldn't make inroads very easily at all, even though they were Afghans trying to win over the people.

Respondent 1 referred to the video in discussing tribalism:

The fact that the populace is condoning this behavior is even more disturbing. Today, it might be Boko Haram suspects; tomorrow, it could happen to the very Nigerians cheering the activity on.

Westerners do not understand the tribal condition which exists across the Middle East and Africa. Westerners understand the concept of tribalism, but cultural realities are lost when applied to the daily machinations in living a life. It is not possible to know if Nigerian army brass understands their tribalistic environment, and it cannot be assessed if a tribal army is by nature assumed from society or is actively encouraged by army leadership and culture.

The army has repeatedly demonstrated its penchant for moving against the population. This was noted in Chapter 2 when, after Boko Haram had killed a soldier, the soldier's comrades torched the town and shot anyone trying to flee the flames. This had the earmarks of acting as a tribe. If army units feel threatened by the population, the army will take adverse, punitive action if the populace is seen as Boko Haram supporters.

It cannot be underestimated the hold tribalism has on the Nigerian people and the army. Isolated in their country and viewed as a violent arbiter of policy, the army has assumed a tribal identity and views the population as an uncooperative enemy element.

Summary of Theme 3: Tribalism as a Theme

This theme provided food for thought in reassessing the first two identified themes. Tribal culture dominates Nigeria and predominates the military. So disjointed is the thinking that any group, tribe, or organization could feel the army's violence. As it is structured and applied in Nigeria, Tribalism may be as dysfunctional as any of the country's disorders. In fact, tribalism may be a foundational aspect of dysfunction contributing to a national narrative of cultural insolvency.

The interviewees recognized tribal realities in watching the videos and in reading the *New York Times* article. Four of the interviewees believed the Nigerian army was tribal in its application of violence towards the population. The interviewees had witnessed tribalism in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and it took the US army quite some time to come to grips with how to approach the tribal theater. Tribalism presents a political quagmire. The condition presents one of the most challenging and convoluted diplomatic enterprises as any leader bent on national and state-to-state cooperation. Each tribal state has specific and usually diametrically opposed views on cooperation, tribal needs and desires, and leadership, and this reality makes Nigeria a fragile state.

Summary of Chapter 4

In chapter 4, I presented three themes culled from the codes identified from the data. Tribalism presented as a unique idea in describing army action. The data revealed that societal dysfunction and function, in general, are carried over to the institution of the

army. If not a direct mirror, the army reflects Nigerian society; as such, ancient violent narratives are found in society and are carried out by civilian groups and the army.

A nation's army should be a force for good to protect the country's people; that is their first and foremost mandate. Nigeria is a republican democracy with a constitution centered on the population. However, Nigeria seems to forget that the country is mired in a dissociative political, economic, religious, social, and military system.

The data and analysis presented in Chapter 4 provided a clear path to discuss the findings, form conclusions, and make recommendations for further study in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 uses the data to explain the sociological outcomes of military function compared to existing theories, including the normative theory of military performance and the neorealist combat balance theory.

Chapter 5: Discussion

Introduction

Since 2009, the Nigerian Army has been fighting Boko Haram, a once peaceful youth community group founded in 1995. The Nigerian Army has failed to adequately address the insurgency of Boko Haram and ISWA, formed in 2016, and a splinter group from Boko Haram. Incontrovertible documentation and eyewitness accounts of army abuses, including extrajudicial killings of Boko Haram suspects, false imprisonment, Fulani attacks bordering on genocide (Stanton, 2020), and the murder of civilians, demonstrates an army out of control and unprofessional.

I conducted this study to identify base causation for Nigerian military actions and offer recommendations for moving forward. Counterinsurgency carries the moniker of “The Long War” (Berger, 2009). However, countering insurgencies cannot become a never-ending war. Countless lives can be saved, and the suffering can end by acting on appropriate military doctrine with strategic and tactical initiatives.

I asked whether the military of a democratic nation reflected or mirrored the society from which it emerged. I asked this question because Nigerian society is dysfunctional (Fagbadebo, 2019). Nigeria has long documented issues of basic sociological maladies where corruption is endemic and pervasive; tribalism supersedes national unity and democratic rule, ethnic conflict and sectarian violence are pervasive (Fagbadebo, 2019, p. 58).

Nigeria suffers from media manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power hegemony, female subjugation, illiteracy, severe economic disparity, and political and civil accountability is non-existent (Fagbadebo, 2019, p. 59). The socioeconomic and

political issues have been present in Nigeria for centuries. The British played the tribes against each other to prevent a movement from forming to declare nationalism. That conflict and animosity exist today as each tribe competes for hegemony.

Interpretation of Key Findings

Based on the data, the Nigerian military mirrors Nigerian society. The issues may be complicated and abundant, but in reflecting the society from which the Nigerian army emanates, Boko Haram will continue to be a scourge on the land causing death and destruction.

The patterns of social, economic, and political dysfunction found in Nigerian society are the same patterns denying positive military performance. The social disorders found in Nigeria, which were responsible for the founding and rise of Boko Haram, are the very reasons why the army is a failure. The society of a nation is directly reflected in the nation's military. The military cannot extract itself from societal influence. The analysis of data revealed this fact. All respondents concluded that a nation's military *is* the society in which it is immersed.

Therefore, if a society is high functioning, that is; where the rule of law is adhered to, where accountability is present in every aspect of society, where corruption is not tolerated and dealt with when discovered, where the people are engaged in every aspect of society and government, and the military understands that it is subservient to the people the rule of law, and the civilian government, then the army will be high functioning as well.

A successful and high functioning army has high standards and supports an educational and training system designed to maintain and improve on professionalism,

maintains a high level of discipline; not through coercion, but through their culture and professional expectations, and practices a mission-driven leadership program of self-accountability expected not only of officers but of NCOs and the basic soldier. Finally, the army understands the law of war, the rules denoting combat, and instills rules of engagement on the battlefield to protect civilians.

On the contrary, the Nigerian society is dysfunctional where the rule of law is not adhered to, accountability is lax if not absent, where corruption is endemic and tolerated, where the population is not engaged in every aspect of society and government. The military does not understand or ignores that it exists to serve the people and the civilian government.

The Nigerian Army is an unsuccessful low functioning organization that does not display high standards, where education and training are inadequate or non-existent, thereby negating professionalism. Discipline is lacking, sometimes enforced through coercion, and the leadership uses military doctrine designed not to enhance army performance but to hinder success. The army does not practice a mission-driven leadership program of self-accountability expected of officers and NCOs and the basic soldier.

This is the crux of RQ2. Nigerian society affects military performance negatively, negates the normative theory of military performance, and abolishes both the injunctive and descriptive norms within the military environment. In this reality, aberrancy becomes the norm.

Tribalism isolates and protects tribes while seeking hegemony over other tribes negating nationalism, essential in the national consciousness. The wealthy Christian

South is not engaged with the Muslim North, viewing Boko Haram and ISWA as a Muslim problem. In discussing a tribal army, it may be true then that religion propagates tribalism based on the Muslim faith, dominant in the army. In 2016, the army made a move to recruit more Christians into the officer corps. The Muslim Rights Concern criticized this move (MURIC), stating that “it gave undue military advantage to Christians thereby endangering the lives and properties of Muslims nationwide” (Godwin, 2016, para. 4).

The army may indeed be a tribal entity. In a society dominated by tribal protectionism and isolationism while striving for hegemony over neighboring tribes, the army becomes a tribal unit to facilitate operating amongst the various Nigerian tribes. This has been evident recently in Nigeria when the army threatened to move against Lagos and Abuja protesters. Spokesperson for the Army, Sagir Musa, stated, “The NA [Nigerian Army] hereby warns all subversive elements and trouble-makers to desist from such acts as it remains highly committed to defend the country and her democracy at all costs” (Ewokor, 2020, para. 7). The protestors were protesting the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a police unit known for debauchery and brutality. (Jones, 2020). The army seemed to forget that the people exist in a democracy and were exercising their constitutional rights.

The tribal army was ready to inflict violence and death on the protestors (Jones, 2020). Therefore, the army should not be allowed to enforce domestic policy. According to Orjinmo (2020), “Nigeria's army has a bloody history quelling civil disobedience” (para. 10). The army is a lethal hammer, and to the hammer, everything is a nail.

Corruption is endemic, pervasive, and is accepted as a social construct.

Corruption then flows to the Nigerian Army as the army is a social institution within the national structure. This research documented the performance issues of the army.

Command may have a pristine headquarters in Abuja where dignitaries and foreign soldiers are entertained and impressed by rows of spit and polished soldiers, but the reality in the Northeast war zone is far different.

Military corruption, specifically in the Nigerian army, takes the form of inadequate supplies, poor or non-existent logistical support, poor leadership, diversion of funds, a mechanized force that is not mechanized as units lay in disrepair. Tanks, which have little use in counterinsurgency operations, are merely 40-ton paperweights. Troops suffer from inadequate supplies, including basic weapons and ammunition, mercenary tactics (accepting funds from corporations to protect their assets), and propaganda designed to enhance army credibility. These actions deny the neorealist theory of combat balance.

The research indicated that training appeared to be sorely lacking. The Northeast is undermanned, and Nigerian soldiers are outgunned, outmaneuvered, outled, and their pay is pilfered right from the battlefield (Kelly, 2020). These conditions form the basis for systemic organizational (military) corruption.

There may be a reality that the insurgents are better armed and better led by ISWA leaders, which changes the dynamics of the normative theory to the benefit of the insurgents (Searcy, 2019). ISWA does not carry the baggage of society. Their soldiers function on a simple premise; to serve Allah and follow Islamic law and its rules.

The army abuses civilians, and the troops fire entire villages to remove Boko Haram (Amnesty International, 2020). Civilians are thought of as the enemy and not an asset to be protected. For the army, this is the extreme form of tribal social ostracization. The Nigerian people are the primary source of intelligence in a country without sophisticated intelligence-gathering methods. When soldiers look at civilians, they do not see people or humans; they do not see Nigerians; they see an impediment to their job.

In Nigeria, the “social” army mirrors the “social” society. The military of a democratic nation adopts its culture based on the cultural and societal influence of the nation. It is impossible for the Nigerian army to adequately address the insurgency using current conventional military strategy or tactics. The army is culturally and professionally neutered to perform at a high level.

The army cannot advance counterinsurgency theory or action because leadership lacks creative thinking and has demonstrated a monolithic thinking regimen. For example, in 2020, the army decided to create “super camps” in the Northeast (Wolf, 2020). In these super camps, the army has a base from which to operate and offers a safe haven and a defensive structure.

The population has been encouraged to join the army in the super camps for protection. This is Vietnam-era thinking. Boko Haram now roams free in the countryside, attacking villages and towns at will, knowing the army is ensconced in their super camp. Instead of serving the people of the country, the Nigerian Army operates as a self-serving entity.

The Nigerian Army does not practice the social and cultural norms and expectations found in a well-functioning, professional, and successful military. The

dysfunction of Nigerian society directly and negatively affects the norms of military behavior. No individual, institution, or population holds the Nigerian military responsible or accountable—the military acts at will without accountability or repercussion.

The Nigerian Army practices nearly every social ill found in Nigerian society and noted in this study. This situation then denies the norms of military effectiveness and denies the normative theory of military performance through illicit and unprofessional behavior. Each respondent indicated that the army could not break away from its societal parent and function independently as a socially accountable and professional organization.

The norms of military behavior are directly affected by societal influence. In Nigeria, both the injunctive and the descriptive norms become skewed in their application to military function. I noted the military norms of behavior earlier in this study. This is the oughtness of behavior, the positive expected behavior of military units and their members. They reflect a group assessment of approved and disapproved conduct, and it is the shared belief system of a group. In this regard, norms signify values or the shared belief system of a group.

Both the injunctive and descriptive norms of military behavior are bastardized by the actions and culture of the army, which is inculcated by society. The basic principle that soldiers fight for each other and not one soldier would abandon their comrades in a firefight is not purely a Western prerogative but exists through discipline, training, and the innate desire to be with your buddies and support each other (Gaub, 2014).

The warrior ethos provides this idea; that the mission comes first, a soldier never quits, does not accept defeat, and never leaves a fallen comrade (Shinseki, n.d.). These

four ethos are derived from the army values of loyalty, duty, respect, honor, selfless service, integrity, and personal courage (Shinseki, n.d.). These attributes represent the professional soldier and are not isolated to the American army but are present in every successful military across the globe.

Every army worth its salt strives to be professional, for professionalism drives performance. One cannot forget, the origins and structure of the Nigerian Army lay within the culture, expectations, and “values” of the British Army. Army values drive the soldier to perform as the organization expects.

To understand Boko Haram and ISWA through this lens. The Salafist soldier shares a common religion in a specific form, and Political Islam and not public policy guide them. They consider themselves brothers and soldiers under Allah. They have a common god, a common belief system, and a common objective. The Salafist answers to the one, Allah, and would gladly die in his name. The Salafi-Islamists in Nigeria would give the country to Allah.

The data analysis for RQ1 overwhelmingly concluded that the army of a democratic nation reflects the parent society. Previous military and academic studies have indicated that superior material, technology, tactics, and institutions were responsible for increasing success on the battlefield (Fitzsimmons, 2013). Sun Tzu (2004) wrote that “Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue” (p.34).

When a society is corrupt, and that corruption extends to the military, the military is poorly sourced and denied material, the military suffers a lack of technology, poor maintenance, and vehicle availability, poor leadership, monolithic strategy, tactics, and compromised institutions deny the army success on the Nigerian battlefield. The data drove the theoretical applications as I assigned meaning to the state of Nigerian society.

The ills of society transfer to the military, and in that light, I assigned the realities of the Nigerian Army to the neorealist combat balance theory. In 1995, Rosen offered that society contributes to military power, which is then dependent on military performance. This specific paradigm falls in line with Nigerian society and its effect on military performance.

The neorealist combat balance theory indicated that an army that denies soldiers superior material support hampers success on the battlefield (Fitzsimmons, 2013). Nigerian social dysfunction induces corruption, which leads to the absence of oversight caused by civilian/political apathy, tribalism induces political patronage, leading to corruption in the military. This paradigm induces failure in material support due to the diversion of monies and resources and validates the military combat balance theory.

The normative theory of military performance has more credence in this study related to the combat norms of the military based on a performance aspect of the Nigerian army. Highly trained, motivated, and disciplined troops can adapt, overcome, and persevere through adversity, including being hampered by the failure to provide material support. These troops know how to fight and remain motivated when material supplies are limited or non-existent. This was a component of Fitzsimons's study. It is the

normative theory that explains how well a soldier can perform, no matter the size of the unit.

This starts with the injunctive and descriptive norms of military behavior. Hoare (2008) provided a structure to explain how small military units can perform successfully in response to these theories. A singular soldier is taken in the context of their military culture, which in turn drives military effectiveness. Add an additional soldier who shares the same culture and the same military effectiveness, and so on. Combining the soldiers into units who share the same culture and effectiveness produces an interaction or force multiplier that accounts for success.

This same formula can account for an unsuccessful army based on their military culture, the military effectiveness of the soldier whose interaction does not lead to a force-multiplying paradigm, and here is where the Nigerian Army resides. The norms of military behavior are found in the normative theory of military performance. The six parameters of Hoare's (2008) foundation for military effectiveness were explained in the theoretical framework. The interpretation of data for RQ2 was focused on Hoare's parameters of military performance. I viewed these attributes in conjunction with the normative theory of military performance.

While I did suggest that the neorealist combat balance theory applied to this study related to the quantity of force and equipment, the normative theory of military performance demonstrated to be the overriding theory as it dealt with the human quotient considering the norms of military behavior and how humans perform in combat.

Both research questions were answered by the data collected from the interviewees. For RQ1: Society affects military performance. In a severely dysfunctional

society grounded in tribalism, societal issues dominate the military to the point of performance failure. RQ2; Because of the dysfunction and tribalism found in the Nigerian army, civilians are abused, killed, and are fodder for both Boko Haram, ISWA, and the Nigerian army. In addition, civilian support and intelligence gathering are hampered by army actions.

Theoretical Framework and Findings

The theoretical frameworks tie into the norms of military behavior as society struggles to maintain homeostasis in functioning. Military behavior and performance are negatively affected by the abnorms found in society as these abnorms flow into every institution in the country. Therefore, military performance is causally related to societal constructs. Fitzsimons's theory and findings focused on small unit strategies and tactics, specifically a private military company, or the mercenary.


I utilized Hoare's (2008) ideas and philosophy on combat performance. I also used Fitzsimmons's study of mercenary units and their ability to perform in battle. While the Nigerian army is a far larger monolithic force, the theories and ideas of both Hoare (2008) and Fitzsimmons (2013) apply to this study. The neorealist combat balance theory states that an army that fields material superiority with a never-ending supply stream should win the day. The normative theory applies to the cultural performance of the soldier.

Counterinsurgency, known as asymmetric warfare, is small unit warfare. No matter the size of the Nigerian Army, it is the army's small units that are involved in battle. It is their interactional competence that requires scrutiny. As noted in Chapter 2, the Nigerian Army has conducted large-scale operations, but even in those situations, the

army does not achieve success. Fitzsimmons (2013) identified the Neorealist Combat Balance Theory in which material superiority determines combat balance or supremacy.

Figure 12

Neorealist Combat Balance Theory.



Note: Fitzsimmons, (2013), p. 45.

The Hoare and Fitzsimmons theories can be assigned to a larger organization for it is the sum of its parts; the team, the squad, the platoon, and finally, the company, a unit sized from a few dozen to 200 men (US Army, 2021). In the context of operations, it is the military system that assigns relativity to what is significant and small and how large and small interact and mesh on the battlefield. The Nigerian military is a large force but fails in small unit conflicts. They also fail in large unit conflicts of company strength and higher.


Fitzsimmons (2013) concluded that to ensure combatant military performance, the military must field both quantity and quality and that every combatant would make full and optimal use of the material capabilities. Fitzsimmons also noted that the combatants would have to perform optimally in combat to guarantee a successful outcome, validating the theory. Fitzsimmons studied mercenary forces, but this, in turn, could be applied to standing armies. Military operations are based in small unit operations which, affects the

more expansive combat theater. Combat and army operations depend on small unit movements and competency in battle.

Nigeria cannot provide proper materials to the forces combating Boko Haram. Even if Nigeria were to supply the troops with the best materials available and sufficient quantities, Nigerian soldiers fail to utilize Hoare's (2008) six positive constructs for military effectiveness, do not perform optimally, and negate the combat balance theory. Chapter 2 indicates the insurgent forces may, in many cases, be better equipped than army units. It is here that adverse societal effects become evident in affecting military performance. Figure 14 demonstrates society's negative contribution to the neorealist combat balance theory. Society's negative impact on the Nigerian military is apparent.

Figure 14

Effects of social dysfunction in the neorealist theory of combat balance.




Dysfunction breeds dysfunction in both material superiority and military culture. Dysfunction, abnormal social and military behaviors, and structures affect the neorealist balance theory. The normative theory of military performance explains the failure in culture, combat actions, and soldier competence. Fitzsimmons (2013) demonstrated that the normative theory explained military performance in his study, while the neorealist theory did not explain military performance. However, the lack of material support to the army in the field does deny efficient and substantial performance; this has been demonstrated in this study with a more significant national force.

A soldier without a weapon, ammunition, food, air support, mechanized ground units, and armor simply cannot perform on the battlefield. Quality of manpower determines military performance based on the six norms of military culture. Fitzsimmons cited Hoare's (2008) norms of military effectiveness to explain what is required for optimal functioning.

Hoare (2008) suggested that positive experiences in military effectiveness would appear like this; an army would exhibit the following positive constructs in performance. They would exercise creative thinking. Conduct decentralized decision-making. Encourage personal initiative. Practice the free transmission of accurate military information—practice and train in technical proficiency. Encourage and promote group loyalty. Fitzsimmons agreed with Hoare that these positive constructs create a positive and successful military culture (Fitzsimmons, 2013). Therefore, the normative theory of military performance suggests:

Figure 13

Normative Theory of Military Performance.




Note: Fitzsimmons, (2013, p. 25).

Social dysfunction adversely affects military culture and, therefore, military effectiveness. As discovered through data analysis, a military cannot overcome the abnorms found in society as those abnorms become ingrained in the military culture. This is the foundation for the normative theory of military performance. Based on societal dysfunction and the cultural traits transferred to the military, a military must impart mechanisms to address drift or failure in the norms of military effectiveness. Continuous training, discipline, and practical applications in discipline and competence are mandated by a successful army to maintain a high functioning level.

Figure 14.


Hoare's six positive constructs for military effectiveness.



Note: Hoare, M. (2008). *Congo Mercenaries*.

Figure 17

Nigerian social and military dysfunction denying success through the Normative Theory of Military Performance.



Theoretically, social dysfunction and its supportive theories affect the norms of military performance and deny both the neorealist theory of combat balance and the normative theory of military performance. Social dysfunction also bastardizes the injunctive and descriptive norms of the military environment and skews the moral, ethical, and expected norms of military behavior. This study presents solid evidence that society affects military culture and performance and is one feature that denies army success in Nigeria.

Fitzsimons's (2013) predicted that if a military unit exercised creative thinking, conducted decentralized decision making, encouraged personal initiative, practiced the

free transmission of accurate military information, trained in technical proficiency, and encouraged and promoted group loyalty would carry out significant tactical innovation, would have little difficulty in meeting unexpected threats and developments on the battlefield, would have little trouble adapting to unexpected weapons or tactics by their adversary, they would learn quickly from their mistakes and take action, and would utilize very simple but effective tactics (p. 34).

A military unit that did not exercise creative thinking, decentralized decision making, personal initiative, practiced the free transmission of accurate military information, trained in technical proficiency, and encouraged and promoted group loyalty would act in the obverse of a successful professional unit and would have great difficulty on the battlefield (p. 34).

Limitations of the Study

This study had clear limitations, as noted in Chapter 1. I used senior military officers and those of high academic standing. This was a limitation in the sample population. The sample was limited to seven participants due to the sample group's hyper-homogenous standing, which led to theoretical and knowledge saturation at interview four. An additional three interviews were done to ensure no new information was introduced. Data collection was limited to seven participants. This study was limited to the social effects on military performance; strategic and tactical operations and operations in the field were not part of data collection or this study other than demonstrating poor military performance and failure related to societal influence.

The Amnesty International video and the *New York Times* article documenting Nigerian Army abuses and killings were limited to Nigeria and this study only. The video

represented one piece of evidence, and the interviewees were limited to viewing the one video. Both were standalone documents but offered a representation of Nigeria on nearly a regular basis (Amnesty International, 2021).

I limited the study to explore only the interaction and effects on military culture and performance based on a single national democratic society. The impact on military performance by society is directly applicable to the fight with Boko Haram and ISWA, therefore limited to the Nigerian theater of operations. This study would not necessarily correspond to Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Somalian Army.

Recommendations

It is recommended that research be conducted on low performance or third-world armies to identify performance issues. The vast amount of literature addresses the militaries of high-power high functioning militaries. Therefore, future research should focus on militaries of low power, low functionality, and illiterate systemic structures that may affect military performance.

The modern battlefield, even a conventional battlefield, is far more nuanced than the older Soviet-era model tank versus tank at the Fulda Gap. Countering insurgencies adds an entirely new and complex methodology, and little is known how the armies of low function--low power or post-colonial armies perform. Continuing research is called for in post-colonial nations fighting insurgencies. The Congo has been unstable for decades; Nigeria is currently unstable, with Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Sudan, and Somalia fighting terrorism and insurgents. Africa is tribal, and that dynamic plays into political and military functioning.

There is little research on tribalism as applied to military functioning and operations. The Nigerian Army contingent includes the Fulani, the Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, and various smaller tribal representations. It was not suggested in the literature which tribe, if any, dominated the Army. It could be assumed that since the Hausa-Fulani represent about 30% of the Nigerian population and are in the Sahel and North, the Hausa-Fulani might make up most army personnel (CIA, 2020). The Fulani are a nomadic warrior tribe, one of the fiercest in Africa (Hadithi Africa, 2019). The Hausa-Fulani identity came from the migration of the Fula indigenous peoples into Hausaland in about the fifteenth century (Bosch, Calafell, & Pérez-Lezaun, et al., 2000).

A path for research lay in understanding the Nigerian Army in far more detail. Little is known about the dynamics that tribalism brings to the army. Little is also understood about the religious makeup of the army and whether it is predominantly Muslim or if friction exists between Muslims and Christian negating proper function. Research in this area would assist in understanding how the army functions based on a religious context.

Multiple respondents suggested during data collection that the Nigerian army operated as a tribe unto itself. This would be a fascinating thread to follow and an excellent subject for future research. However, this study demonstrated the beginnings of understanding the role tribalism plays and offers a highly likely causation for army action. The Nigerian Army operates as a tribe in a land where tribalism dominates; it may further explain army actions in the field. Nigerian soldiers may trade one tribe for another, the “other” being the army.

Tribalism could exist in a multi-threaded explanation as to the incapability found within the army. This study explains military performance and effectiveness and why Boko Haram is often viewed as a better fighting force over a national army. This study also answers why the army abuses the population to the point of killing and the scorched earth destruction of Nigerian villages and towns. In these cases, tribalism may be a motivating factor.

In addition, the army is protective of its structure and reputation. Army spokespeople continuously deflect criticism and causation of adverse events onto other aspects of society. Army personnel explains abuses and killings by blaming everyone from cultists to entire villages for army behavior instead of army units and personnel, indicating army tribalism in action. No army conducts operations without fault or sterility. However, propaganda from army personnel would leave one to believe they are perfect in every aspect of operations. This includes continued army rhetoric on defeating Boko Haram, and protectionism is a key component of tribal existence.

Finally, I came across a paradigm in the research of Nigeria. Although I did not use conflict theory, disorganization theory, the structural-functional theory, or any other social function theory in this study, I studied these theories in detail to assist in understanding Nigerian society. No matter the social implication of a theoretical concept, there appeared to be a reality predominating every aspect of Nigerian society.

In Nigeria, and I suspect additional African post-colonial tribal nations, a theoretical structure can be described as disassociation. In Nigeria, every social construct, entity, condition, and organization operated as a singular entity seeking political, societal, and economic hegemony over religious groups, societal groups, and tribes. The tribe

remained the guiding force in everything Nigeria. It would be conducive to studying the idea of “divergence” or “dissociation” in a society dominated by tribalism or moved towards a tribalistic environment.

Societal, religious, political, and economic entities sought to gain power for hegemony. No singular agency in Nigeria worked together to provide a unified front, a national consciousness, and any attempt to assist in the homeostasis of Nigerian society.

Implications

Positive Social Change

It is difficult to identify and implement positive social change. This study exposed the societal effects on military performance of a significant post-colonial African nation. This study offered insight into why the Nigerian Army cannot defeat a far smaller insurgent force. If the military could somehow separate itself from societal dysfunction, which is deeply ingrained, if the army recognized its subservience to a democratic people, and if the army were to institute reforms designed to protect the people and ensure success on the battlefield, then positive change could occur.

Identifying the actual problem of failure is a step forward. It is incumbent upon military leadership to understand the profoundly ingrained issues within the organization and admit issues exist. It is doubtful this fundamental leadership responsibility will happen so that the status quo will continue. In addition, this study brought insight into military performance and explains why the Nigerian military cannot defeat Boko Haram, ISWA, and why they treat the population as the enemy.

It was not within the scope of this study to discuss the steps required to effect change to army culture or operations. The army is mired in self-preservation, self-

aggrandizement, and maintaining political and societal hegemony in the state. The army cannot change operations or tactics without first changing the theoretical and operational culture. After researching the Nigerian army over the past three years, it is reasonable to believe army leadership does not have the intellectual ability to establish new thinking, new doctrine and readily address the existing structural problems.

However, I will add that starting small, as with a platoon-sized change in culture, training, discipline, trust, tactical understanding, confidence building, treating soldiers with respect, which means on-time pay, food rations, plentiful weaponry, and working equipment, could eventually turn around a company, a brigade, or a division (Shamir, 2000; Henderson, 1985).

However, this must be met with a change to the entirety of the organizational culture. Ricks (2006) noted that this was the course chosen by the US military in Iraq. Initially, change came from retraining small units that were actively involved in daily combat. Units deployed from the U.S. were trained prior to theater deployment, and change came as a requirement to a changing battlefield. This was not a focused change limited to frontline units, every component of army operation changed with the emphasis placed on combat operations.

However, Nigerian army command must first admit they have an issue and a problem in culture, organizational function, and tactical ability. To admit to problems and incompetence is not a sign of failure, but to ignore those problems and incompetence is a failure. Leadership must think creatively. If leadership cannot find their way forward, then bring military experts into train leadership.

Leadership involves strategy, and every military has its innate organizational abilities to fight a war. The Nigerian army could practice the methodology of “relentless pursuit,” an African bush tactic introduced by Eaben Barlow and Executive Outcomes in 1995. When contact occurs, army units go on the offensive and hunt the insurgents to ground until destroyed. There are no static lines of combat in an insurgency; the army should operate “where the enemy is not,” putting the insurgents on defense, unable to carry out offensive operations, and constantly looking over their collective shoulders.

These ideas require a fighting force of high caliber, imaginative motivation, doctrine, and training. The needed additional caveat is the unconditional support of the populace to provide intelligence and support. The Nigerian army has limited intelligence gathering capabilities as they are not a technology-driven fighting force. To abuse and kill civilians negates the best and usually only source of intelligence available.

According to O’Brien (2016), “doctrine provides the lingua franca for military planners and thinkers to discuss the military problems they face effectively” (para. 2). The Nigerian army should study the doctrinal and cultural changes made by the US, Britain, France, and a host of international armies fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior to the drawdown, the US and NATO had great success in the country. It existed in the paradigm of Western-centric ideology and warfighting doctrine tempered with tribal and cultural understanding, but Nigerian military leaders understand African-centric methodology. The Nigerian army should then tailor those learned experiences to their specific organizational intellect, capabilities, and competencies; to then change operational and tactical proficiencies for use in Nigeria.

Military education is crucial and should be housed in an ongoing framework in culture doctrine, creative thinking, and tactics. The Nigerian people deserve to be treated with respect and dignity; this is the foundation of counterinsurgency tactics. Win the people, then use population support to assist in defeating the insurgency.

It simply takes one commander to practice the ideas taken from counterinsurgency doctrine to make positive social change. The question would remain if the army could overcome societal influence and strong anthropological narratives pertaining to tribalism and religion to make the necessary changes. In the end, this study dealt with a nation's society and how societal dysfunction might influence military performance. To discuss operations or tactics is ultimately a non sequitur as the army's performance is heavily influenced by societal dysfunction.

Conclusion

I initiated this study to understand why the Nigerian army cannot adequately meet Boko Haram and ISWAP on the battlefield and realize success. In addition, to understand why Nigerian citizens are abused and killed. One can understand the motivations of the insurgent groups; however, the army's mandate through the constitution lay in protecting every national citizen.

Since 2011, Boko Haram was identified as an emerging threat when the Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence released their Boko Haram Emerging Threat report to the *U.S. Homeland* (King, 2011). According to Kulungu (2019), the threat posed by Boko Haram (ISWAP) is more crucial today. I interviewed senior military personnel with leadership, combat experience, and scholarly expertise to identify failure causation and answer the research questions.

This study identified the immense societal dysfunction found in Nigeria, with tribalism the main animating issue. Societal function affects military performance. The data and analysis revealed that the military operates as a dysfunctional organization with little hope of defeating the insurgencies. In addition, the Nigerian army is not immune from international law or the Geneva Conventions in how the army deals with the Nigerian people, the enemy, and non-combatants.

The international community will not act against these insurgent and terror groups until they become a threat to the West or if they were found to be responsible for a terror attack. This is an unfortunate situation as Nigerian civilians, many of whom are in poverty and destitute, must wait in perpetuity for help. Humanitarian organizations are on the ground in Nigeria; perhaps the only avenue for the world to know of abuses and killings at the army's hands. But these groups and their members are in harm's way, targets for Boko Haram. Boko Haram and ISWA are local and regional concerns, but an intervention will eventually have to be made as an emerging threat to the world.

Before 9/11, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida were ignored by the West and were viewed as a local and regional threat and not considered a threat to the homeland. This failure cannot be allowed to reimagine with Boko Haram or ISWA providing a haven for the training of transnational terror groups.

In addressing the dysfunction found in Nigerian society, societal structures must be dismantled, and the societal system remade or at least enhanced. This is a problematic situation as money and hegemony among the Nigerian tribes drives the social will. Overcoming entrenched tribalism will not occur, so the various tribes must come together

to fight the insurgency. However, this would take a transformational leader and a willingness to confront the issues throughout Nigeria.

I would expect to have another 11-years of conflict with corresponding deaths and destruction. However, the conflict may never end. Throw in a potential coup d'état by the military, and the status quo is continued. In the meantime, this study has provided some understanding of why the Nigerian army is a failure and why the army will not change. I noted that throughout history, democracies had shown a prevalence in winning wars. This success was due to “democracies' superior human capital, civil-military relations, and cultural background” (Biddle & Long, 2004, p. 541). This is not the case in Nigeria, which fails in those societal requirements. It is society that must offer the first signs of change to affect the norms of military behavior.

To add a note of optimism, the experts interviewed for this study to a person indicated that strong leadership is required in both the civilian political sector and in the military. However, an army requires a high level of stewardship and direction, not in the western tradition, but for what would work for the Nigerian army. However, increased guidance and sharing past experiences from insurgent wars may help Nigeria turn the corner. Army leadership must be open to assistance. There are few successful counterinsurgent wars. The British in Malay, NATO and the Americans in Iraq, and the Pershing initiative in the Philippines. To present a positive experience, I wrote on the Moro insurgency of 1896, and it can be found in Appendix D.

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Appendix A

Survey/Interview Validation Rubric for Expert Panel

- VREP©

By Marilyn K. Simon with input from Jacquelyn White

<http://dissertationrecipes.com/>

Criteria	Operational Definitions	Score				Questions NOT meeting standard (List page and question number) and need to be revised. <i>Please use the comments and suggestions section to recommend revisions.</i>
		1=Not Acceptable (major modifications needed)	2=Below Expectations (some modifications needed)	3=Meets Expectations (no modifications needed but could be improved with minor changes)	4=Exceeds Expectations (no modifications needed)	
		1	2	3	4	
Clarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The questions are direct and specific. • Only one question is asked at a time. • The participants can understand what is being asked. • There are no <i>double-barreled</i> questions (two 					

	questions in one).					
Wordiness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questions are concise. • There are no unnecessary words 					
Negative Wording	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questions are asked using the affirmative (e.g., Instead of asking, “Which methods are not used?”, the researcher asks, “Which methods <i>are</i> used?”) 					
Overlapping Responses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No response covers more than one choice. • All possibilities are considered. • There are no ambiguous questions. 					See attached document
Balance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The questions are unbiased and do not lead the participants to a response. The questions are asked using a neutral tone. 					Along with “negative wording” – some questions assume positive experiences of co-teaching

Use of Jargon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The terms used are understandable by the target population. • There are no clichés or hyperbole in the wording of the questions. 					
Appropriateness of Responses Listed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The choices listed allow participants to respond appropriately. • The responses apply to all situations or offer a way for those to respond with unique situations. 					N/A – open ended questions
Use of Technical Language	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The use of technical language is minimal and appropriate. • All acronyms are defined. 					
Application to Praxis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The questions asked relate to the daily practices or expertise of the potential participants. 					
Relationship to Problem	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The questions are 					

	<p>sufficient to resolve the problem in the study</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The questions are sufficient to answer the research questions. • The questions are sufficient to obtain the purpose of the study. 					
Measure of Construct: A: Dialogue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The survey adequately measures this construct. <i>Dialogue involves interaction and conversations between teachers, can occur formally or informally, is substantive, and involves discussion of instruction, curriculum, and other aspects of running a classroom.</i> 					See attached
Measure of Construct: B:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The survey adequately measures 					See attached

Decision-making	this construct. <i>Decision-making includes considering alternatives, examining evidence, and deciding what to do based on the data presented.</i>					
Measure of Construct: C: Taking Action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The survey adequately measures this construct. <i>This involves actions that the team takes related to improving classroom practices in order to enhance student learning.</i> 					See attached
Measure of Construct: D: Evaluation of Practice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The survey adequately measures this construct. <i>Evaluation of practice involves teachers reviewing data and reflecting on their practice.</i> 					See attached

Appendix B

Interview Questions

1A. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, do you agree or disagree that a democratic nation's (regular) army be used to enforce domestic policy? Please explain your answer.

1B. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, do you believe that a nation's military is a reflection/mirror of the society from which it sprang from both socially and culturally?

1C. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education. Does the military of a democratic nation adopt its culture based on the culture and societal influence of the nation? Please explain.

1D. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, could you explain how a nation's military culture is developed? As a young officer and throughout your career, how were you instructed in morals, values, and ethics in carrying out military orders?

I will show you a video obtained by Amnesty International (2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=GA7SIbvEO64) and referenced by the US State Department, which shows actions by the Nigerian Civilian Joint Task Force and the Nigerian Army. I would like your thoughts after the video, and I will ask you questions. In this video, Nigerian Army members are overseeing the extrajudicial executions of suspected Boko Haram members.

1E. Based on your military training, experience, and advanced education, what do you believe are the causes (lapses) for incidents like this in which military personnel participate in torture or extrajudicial killing?

1F. In 2006, US troops in Iraq were killing and abusing Iraqi citizens. Understanding the moral and ethical drift encountered in Iraq by US troops using conventional warfare (the reason Petraeus installed population-centric warfare doctrine). Could you extrapolate (based on the video) using your military training, experience, and or advanced education that in using conventional war practices, the same population abuse could be occurring in Nigeria by the Nigerian Army against civilians?

1G. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education and using your command experience, education, and training, can you assess the culture, training, leadership, and military norms of behavior demonstrated in this video?

I would like you to read the following *New York Times* Report on Nigerian Army abuses titled “They Told Us They Were Here to Help Us.’ Then Came Slaughter.”

. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/world/africa/nigeria-civilianmassacre.html>

1H. I would like to get your opinion after reading this article and based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education and using your command experience, education, and training; on the professionalism, internal culture, and actions demonstrated by the Nigerian Army as shown in this article?

1I. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, use your command experience, education, and training. Can you explain the social and

cultural norms and expectations found in a well-functioning, professional, and successful military?

1J. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, and using your command experience, education, and training. Do you believe that a 90-day basic training boot camp is enough to instruct recruits on appropriate discipline, military culture, expectations, and moral and ethical responsibilities in combat? Please explain.

1K. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, and using your command experience, education, and training. Do you believe that if a nation's army sprang from an exclusively dysfunctional society, where corruption is endemic, rampant, and pervasive, where tribalism rules the culture, sectarian violence is pervasive, political and civil accountability is non-existent and is on the verge of social and cultural failure; could field a professional and successful army? Please explain.

1L. In a democratic nation, who is it (group, individual, institution, or population) that bears the ultimate responsibility and accountability in how a military conducts' itself in both peacetime operations and wartime operations? Please identify and explain why?

1M. Nigeria has well-documented issues, both past, and present, of corruption, tribalism, ethnic conflicts, kidnapping, "godfatherism" (political patronage), media manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power hegemony, female subjugation, illiteracy, and economic disparity. Based on your military training, experience, and advanced education, use your command experience, education,

and training. Is it possible for a nation's army to isolate itself from society's ills, exclusively acting as an independent institution of success? Please explain.

Appendix C

Mapping Research Questions with Interview Questions

<p>RQ1--How and to what extent does a nation's military reflect or mirror the society from which the military was derived?</p>	<p>1A. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, do you agree or disagree that a democratic nation's (regular) army be used to enforce domestic policy? Please explain your answer.</p> <p>1B. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, do you believe that a nation's military is a reflection/mirror of the society from which it sprang from both socially and culturally?</p> <p>1C. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education. Does the military of a democratic nation adopt its culture based on the culture and societal influence of the nation? Please explain.</p> <p>1D. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, could you explain how a nation's military culture is developed? As a young officer and throughout your career, how were you instructed in morals, values, and ethics in carrying out military orders?</p> <p>1K. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education, and using your command experience, education, and training. Do you believe that if a nation's army sprang from an exclusively dysfunctional society, where corruption is endemic, rampant, and pervasive, where tribalism rules the culture, sectarian violence is pervasive, political and civil accountability is non-existent and is on the verge of social and cultural failure; could field a professional and successful army? Please explain.</p>
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<p>RQ2--How and to what extent can marked societal dysfunction affect or inhibit military performance in Nigeria?</p>	<p>1E. Based on your military training, experience, and advanced education, what do you believe are the causes (lapses) for incidents like this in which military personnel participate in torture or extrajudicial killing?</p> <p>1F. In 2006, US troops in Iraq were killing and abusing Iraqi citizens. Understanding the moral and ethical drift encountered in Iraq by US troops using conventional warfare (the reason Petraeus installed population-centric warfare doctrine). Could you extrapolate (based on the video) using your military training, experience, and or advanced education that in using conventional war practices, the same population abuse could be occurring in Nigeria by the Nigerian Army against civilians?</p> <p>1G. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education and using your command experience, education, and training, can you assess the culture, training, leadership, and military norms of behavior demonstrated in this video?</p> <p>1H. I would like to get your opinion after reading this article and based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education and using your command experience, education, and training; on the professionalism, internal culture, and actions demonstrated by the Nigerian Army, as shown in this article?</p> <p>1I. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education and using your command experience, education, and training. Can you explain the social and cultural norms and expectations found in a well-functioning, professional, and successful military?</p> <p>1J. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education and using your command experience, education, and training. Do you believe that a 90-day basic</p>
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	<p>training boot camp is enough to instruct recruits on inappropriate discipline, military culture, expectations, and moral and ethical responsibilities in combat? Please explain.</p> <p>1L. In a democratic nation, who is it (group, individual, institution, or population) that bears the ultimate responsibility and accountability in how a military conducts' itself in peacetime operations and wartime operations? Please identify and explain why?</p> <p>1M. Nigeria has well-documented issues, both past, and present, of corruption, tribalism, ethnic conflicts, kidnapping, "godfatherism" (political patronage), media manipulation, citizen apathy, terrorism, religious power hegemony, female subjugation, illiteracy, and economic disparity. Based on your military training, experience, and or advanced education and using your command experience, education, and training. Is it possible for a nation's army to isolate itself from society's ills, exclusively acting as an independent institution of success? Please explain.</p>
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Appendix D

The Philippine Moro Insurgency

I have included this description of the Philippine Moro insurgency as an example of only one of two tremendously successful counterinsurgent campaigns in history. The other being the British-Malaya counterinsurgent campaign against the Malayan National Liberation Army, the military wing of the Malayan Communist Party.

The Philippine Moro campaign was not referenced much in contributing to modern counterinsurgency doctrine; however, there was a common thread to successful counterinsurgent operations. Army counterinsurgent doctrine is built on historical study, so the inclusion of the Moro campaign is relevant to the discussion.

The US government claimed the territories of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. The military governance in the Philippines and specifically the Moro province, which had remained neutral in the Spanish-American war, led to an insurgent revolt against American “occupation.” The Moro campaign, which lasted from 1899 to 1913, represented the first time the US conducted a counterinsurgency campaign outside the US and within an Islamic society.

The Bates Agreement, signed in August 1899, allowed for indirect rule over Moro Mindanao and its neighboring islands (Sulu Archipelago) in the southern Philippines by the Moro sultans, provided that the Moro’s acknowledge American sovereignty. The initial plan for the Moro area allowed for each military governor to establish a system of

governance associated with economic development and educational initiatives to pacify the Moro population. Initial military operations were meant to support these activities.

However, security threats and violent opposition made this strategy unworkable, and pacification by nation-building failed. It was left to General John J. Pershing to implement a disarmament policy to disarm the population and end Moro resistance. Subsequent military campaigns ended the Moro insurgency so that the civilian enhancement policy could finally be put into place, and the Moro areas were returned to civilian control in 1913. Each military governor of the Moro Province and three began their commands with different strategies for pacifying the Moros. The military government eventually adopted a strategy that relied on military force, but only after eight years of military governance focused on civil affairs and economics had failed to achieve results.

General Leonard Wood (1903-1906) established the initial strategy of the American military government. Wood's strategy focused on establishing a system of governance for the province. Wood believed that one firm military defeat would be enough to end all resistance, so he approached every act of resistance as if it were the last. Unfortunately, General Wood had it wrong as there was always one more battle around the corner until he was confronted with the Battle of Bud Dajo in the spring of 1906.

General Tasker H. Bliss (1906-1909) focused his strategy on the economic and educational development in the province. Bliss believed that Bud Dajo was the decisive

battle to end the Moro's ability to offer martial resistance. He implemented security operations around the protection of and promotion of economic development. Bliss withdrew his forces out of contact with much of the population to be less confrontational. The tactics used by Wood and Bliss failed because neither felt that military intervention was needed to overcome the resistance. When Bliss returned his forces to the garrison environment, the Moro leaders were encouraged to ignore and disregard American military power.

General John J. Pershing (1909-1913) was himself a Moro Datu, given this honor on his first deployment during the 1899 Philippine insurrection, and was the last military governor of the Moro province. Pershing was able to end the Moro resistance utilizing both indirect and direct-action campaigns. The Moros, located in isolated areas, exploited two weaknesses within the American governing structure. Only those Moros adjacent to and within proximity to American forces became loyal to the Manila government and enjoyed the economic benefits.

The second weakness came out of the first; the US failed to address the Moro leadership in those areas and win them. A third issue concerned the Sultans, or Datu as they were known. The Datu's main power behind the resistance, but the Moros could not sustain a long-drawn-out military campaign; they had neither the men nor arms to do so.

No single Datu held sway over the others to influence policy, and defeating one Datu did not affect the other tribal members. Each Moro leader had to be conquered individually, and that never occurred until Pershing initiated his disarmament campaign.

Pershing arrived in the Moro province seeking to further the region's economic development and continue the work of improving conditions for the Moros. Pershing believed that good governance focused on economic and educational development. However, shortly after his arrival, reality set in when he learned firsthand that security was nonexistent.

Pershing implemented a host of civil affairs actions along with security changes to pacify the province. Pershing met regularly with the local leaders to discuss issues, and he ordered his subordinates to do the same. Pershing ordered the garrisoned troops into the field to interact with the indigenous peoples and, in some cases cohabitating with them to build trust. Pershing passed acts that continued to remove exemptions and bring the Moro province further in line with the administrative system for all the Philippines. Pershing continued to enhance the educational system.

Pershing also updated the Moro Exchange system and began industrial trading stations in the interior area. Pershing personally insisted on steps to improve labor practices by plantation owners, and Pershing was aware of the level of animosity between the Moros and the Filipinos, admitting that the Moros resented the Filipinos far more than the Americans.

Pershing integrated more Moro leaders into the provincial government, and Moro leaders acted as deputy district governors and reinforced American authority even when acting within their traditional role. During Pershing's tenure, the most significant legal

and governmental change was the passage of a provincial disarmament law that went into effect in September 1911.

However, only in 1913 did the violence become so pronounced that it was reported in the official reports. Violence to that point had been sporadic and low intensity. 1910 had brought about a redistribution of military forces within the Moro Province. Two additional battalions of Philippine scouts were added to the Moro province (Miller, 2009, p. 130).

Pershing utilized the increase to disseminate the troops into the province to man company-sized stations. In the rest of the Philippines, the scout and military troops were consolidated into battalion-sized or larger garrisons to cut costs. The extra troop strength allowed Pershing to establish four additional outposts in the troublesome Lanao district, assign a battalion to secure Davao, and establish eight new stations along the Cotabato River Valley ((Miller, 2009). Pershing's approach can be seen from an excerpt of instructions given to the Philippine scout companies for their operations: "At regular intervals of not less than three months, if practicable, detachments will be sent to the principal localities, including rancherias and villages of influential wild men, to remain for short periods. During their stay at such places, and, in fact, always, both officers and enlisted men should use every endeavor to create and maintain friendly relations with the inhabitants, especially the Moros and wild people, to the end that the latter may be brought under governmental influence and control" (Miller, 2009, p. 131).

Pershing recommended a permanent regimental headquarters in Jolo, a brigade headquarters in the Lake Lanao region, and another regimental headquarters in Zamboanga. He established several smaller camps at Keithley and Overton. Pershing increased the number of combat available troops within units that gave him more forces to interact with the population (Miller, 2009). Pershing's increased Philippine troop readiness to a perpetual war footing status. Troop strength was increased from sixty soldiers in a company to 150. Pershing cut regimental headquarters staff by half, so the ratio of field troops to support staff was increased. Pershing designed military operations to augment civil authorities in maintaining order and control and eliminating pirate or outlaw bands. In 1909 the Subano ethnic group occupied and fortified a position in the hills not far from Zamboanga.

A constabulary force was sent to investigate and attacked, taking casualties. Major J. P. Finley, the district governor of Zamboanga, took charge of military troops and put down the uprising. Finley did not use brute force to put down the revolt, and he moved slowly to avoid any hostile action (Miller, 2009, p. 135).

Finley believed that if the troops acted in a nonaggressive manner and were friendly to the Subano people, he could establish trust and confidence between the indigenous people and the US government. Finley wanted to end the conflict without bloodshed by convincing the Subano that the US and Philippine governments were genuinely interested in their welfare.

Finley's strategy worked, and the Subano returned to their homes and aided the American forces in capturing and testifying against the Moro instigators of the rebellion (Miller, 2009, p. 136). The Subano operation demonstrates Pershing's overall strategy in using troop presence to provide security without relying on actual military force to eliminate resistance.

Throughout 1912, vigorous patrolling by army, scout and constabulary units carried out disarmament. When patrolling units came across a Moro carrying a weapon, any weapon, the units attempted to talk the Moro into giving it up. Much of the time, however, the Moro chose to flee or fight. Pershing made sure that his field soldiers understood the meaning of a weapon to the Moro. Disarming a Moro meant damage to his honor, and he would feel the emasculation of having his weapon taken away (Miller, 2009, pp. 142-143).

Aggressive patrolling deterred organized resistance for most of that year. A minor engagement near Jolo in January of 1912 resulted in no U.S. fatalities, but twenty attacking Moros were killed when radical Moros engaged a column of four U.S. companies. The first violent resistance occurred in Jolo in November and December 1911 when 1300 Moros opposed to disarmament occupied the crater of Bud Dajo, scene of the earlier 1906 battle. Pershing personally led a force of 1,000 Regular Army, Scouts, and Constabulary troops to deal with the situation (Miller, 2009, pp. 143).

Negotiations by Pershing resulted in all but 300 of the resisters giving up and returning to their homes. After Pershing received guidance from the Philippine Governor-

General, Newton W. Gilbert, it was decided that Pershing could neither directly assault the crater nor use artillery to shell the crater's defenders to prevent a repeat of the political fallout accompanied the earlier 1906 Battle of Bud Dajo.

Pershing sealed off the crater and played a waiting game to compel the surrender of the remaining resisters when their supplies were exhausted. The Moro defenders were forced to attempt a breakout from the crater, and after several unsuccessful attempts, the majority surrendered (Miller, 2009, pp. 143-144).

General Pershing practiced indirect action missions in civil affairs actions before civil affairs had a name. Military force was tempered and judiciously applied, and all-out battles were few and far between. Heavy troop presence in trouble areas with the troops eschewing all-out violence and practicing peaceful interaction won the day.

Finally, the Moro leadership and hardcore insurgents took the hilltop at Bud Bagsak, kidnapping 6,000 to 10,000 local villagers. The unarmed population was persuaded it was safe to return to their homes, but the core insurgent group refused any effort at a peaceful resolution. As a result, Pershing ordered a heavy assault against the insurgents. The Moro leadership was killed with 300 to 500 Moro insurgents (Miller, 2009, pp. 145).

While Pershing worked hard at peaceful cooperation and a means to quell the insurgent population, he was not hesitant to use overwhelming force when called for. It may have taken thirteen years, but peace was established by winning the hearts and minds of the population, proving that providing a reason to trust the political process was

far better than trusting the insurgents. Pershing engaged the population and built a society but was not afraid to use force when required. Pershing knew the Moro from a previous assignment to the province, and he did not want lifelong insurgents and tempered his policies to prevent future insurrections.