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The United Nations' Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Policy, Preference, or Politics

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Abstract

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by

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MA, St. Mary's University, 1998

BA, University of Texas – San Antonio, 1993

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

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Abstract

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a three-pillar document that was unanimously approved and adopted at the 2005 World Summit Meeting by members of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to serve as a guideline for addressing mass atrocity crimes. The research problem concerned the successful implementation of the third pillar, a key fixture of R2P, which allows the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to use forceful measures, as a last resort to address mass atrocity crimes. However, a climate of division within the UNSC has led to inaction. Using the R2P doctrine as a theoretical framework, the purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine the third pillar, in crisis related situations, such as Syria beginning in 2012. The research questions addressed the application of the third pillar in crisis related situations involving mass atrocity crimes, specifically in Syria. This study used a qualitative case study framework to collect, examine, and analyze secondary data on R2P. This data was coded using a descriptive coding strategy, where similar words, phrases, and ideological beliefs were analyzed and developed into major themes for synthesis and analysis. The results found an inconsistent application of the third pillar, resulting in policy inaction, and even failure of public administration to achieve consensus within the UNSC. The implications for positive social change include recommendations for procedures on successfully implementing the third pillar, if the UNSC fails to act. The potential public policy modification would allow victims of mass atrocities crimes the opportunity to achieve safety and security, in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Charter's common purposes and principles.

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this study to the following people: First, to my son, Dariaus, who is my inspiration. Thanks for being you. A father could not ask for a better son! Second, I would also like to dedicate this study to my parents, William, and Cynthia Ruth. Thanks for stressing the value of education to me and giving me the opportunity to live a diverse life. Finally, I would like to dedicate this study to my wife, who has had my back, supported me, and encouraged me throughout this process. I literally carry a piece of you with me, wherever I go! A special thanks to the rest of my family and friends for their support, as well.

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I would like to acknowledge those members of my committee who lent their time, knowledge, and expertise to help me complete this study. First, Dr. Clarence Williamson (Chairman), thanks for believing in me and supporting me throughout this process. Your encouragement, mentorship, and constructive criticism was invaluable. Thanks for keeping me on-task, focused, and committed. Additionally, I would like to acknowledge Dr. Carolyn Dennis for having enough faith in me to accept the invitation to be a part of my committee. Thanks for the encouragement and feedback. Thanks to Marko Kljajic from the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect for initially responding to my emails and agreeing to participate via online interview. Finally, I owe huge thanks to all those individuals and organizations that are mentioned throughout the study for providing valuable data that greatly assisted me in completing this study.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a three-pillared document that emerged

from the World Summit meeting in 2005 within the United Nations. The R2P is a

guideline for protecting civilians in failed or failing states. The R2P doctrine united the

member states in the United Nations by declaring that "all state governments have a

responsibility/obligation to protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes,

ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity" (Gholiagha, 2015, p. 1074). After the

tragedies in Rwanda and Kosovo, Kofi Annan—then acting Secretary-General—issued a

challenge to the member states of the United Nations stating that "humanitarian

interventions are unacceptable and considered a knock-on sovereignty" and questioning

how the UN should "respond to mass atrocities, particularly after the failings of the

UNSC [United Nations Security Council] in Rwanda and Kosovo?" (UN Department of

Public Information, 2012, p. 1). In 2001, in response to Annan, the Canadian government

created the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS),

which established the guidelines previously mentioned for protecting the citizens of

member states (ICISS, 2001). In 2004, Annan endorsed the "emerging norm of R2P"

through the panel on *High-Level Threats, Challenges and Change* (UN Department of

Public Information, 2012, p. 1). Annan acknowledged the existence of a collective

international responsibility and posited that the UNSC should be an authoritative body

only as a last resort, if mass atrocities have occurred and a state has failed in its

responsibility to protect its citizens, either willingly or unwillingly. The panel identified

some basic criteria to legitimately authorize the use of force by the UNSC: (a) the

seriousness of the threat, (b) last resort option, and (c) a proportional response (UN

Department of Public Information, 2012). Additionally, all member states accepted the

principles of R2P and agreed that if a state has manifestly failed to meet their

responsibilities, then all states (i.e., the international community) have the responsibility

to protect these people threaten by mass atrocity crimes when all peaceful means have

been exhausted. In 2012, Syria eventually met the criteria of a failed state according to

the three pillars of R2P. Additionally, after exhausting all peaceful means (i.e.,

diplomatic and humanitarian), the international community, via the UNSC and in

accordance with the UN Charter (1945), should have acted collectively in a "timely and

decisive manner" at the beginning of this crisis (p. 2).

According to the UN Security Council (2011), the three pillars of R2P are as

follows:

1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations

   from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing,

   and their incitement.

2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist

   States in fulfilling this responsibility.

3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate

   diplomatic, Humanitarian, and other means to protect populations from

   these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the

   international community must be prepared to take collective action to

   protect populations, in accordance with the UN Charter. (pp. 3–4)

In this study, the researcher analyzed the implementation of Pillar 3—the use of force

when all peaceful means have failed—to answer the posed research questions. The

implementation of Pillar 3 was the most contested principle of the R2P doctrine during the Syrian crisis. The Russians and the Chinese used their veto power to block all resolutions proposed by the West on Syria (Grover, 2015). Grover suggested that this gamesmanship was a stall tactic on the use of force, where no peaceful means were an option. Kolmašová (2016) further explained that a lack of consensus on what constituted an adequate response, as well as limited prospects of a successful outcome, have prevented an international response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria. The UNSC was polarized along ideological lines, the permanent three (i.e., United States, United Kingdom, and France) versus the permanent two (i.e., Russia and China), could not achieve a vote of consensus, especially after the Libyan experience. After analyzing the intervention in Libya, Kolmašová concluded that the Libyan case had two fundamental differences from the Syrian case: (a) no national/strategic interests by China and Russia; where the Russians and Chinese challenged the West on what they believed to be regime change; and (b) no regional support for the Gaddafi regime. If Pillar 3 were to have legitimacy and legality, one of the main criteria was to achieve consensus by the permanent five members (P5) within the UNSC: The United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia. The UNSC needed to act in a collective manner to maintain peace and security. All other member states rotate on the UNSC; however, they did not have permanent statuses, and thus have no *veto power*. Coen (2015) noted that invoking Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine required that all permanent members, either through abstinence or actively voting for implementation, agreed on the merits of the intervention. Although consensus was achieved in the Libyan crisis of 2011, but consensus on the use of Pillar 3 in Syria (2012) was not attainable. Lombardo (2015) suggested that the UNSC

was paralyzed in adopting a resolution because Russia and China issued a veto. Nevertheless, R2P is the doctrine promoted within the international community as the guideline for intervening to protect civilians at risk for mass atrocity crimes and crimes against humanity.

At the World Summit in 2005, the UN universally recognized the need to respond collectively to crises involving mass atrocities. The R2P doctrine emerged as a guideline for the UN to respond collectively to crises that threatened the international peace and security. There were four problem areas addressed by the outcome document: (a) sustainable development (social, economic, and other related fields), (b) peace and collective security, (c) human rights and the rule of law, and (d) strengthening of the UN by enhancing its authority to respond to the challenges of time. Peace and collective security, part of the common purposes of the UN Charter, are at the core of the R2P doctrine. S. W. Lee (2012) explained:

> R2P is not just one concept, but rather a cluster of ideas centered upon a sovereign states' responsibility to protect its people. (a) Each state has a responsibility to protect its citizens (pillar one); (b) The international community has an obligation to ensure states honor this responsibility (pillar two); and (c) If a state manifestly fails in their duties, the international community may use all necessary means to provide this protection (pillar three). (p. 252)

Furthermore, the stated shared interests of the UN Charter (1945) showed the need for maintaining international peace and security. Chapter 1 of the UN Charter explains the "common purposes and interests" of the UN, and the common theme is to maintain peace and security (S. W. Lee, 2012). The R2P doctrine emerged as the vehicle through which

the UN fulfilled its obligations under the UN Charter (1945) to maintain peace and

security within the international community. Given the historical dynamics of

international relations, the state is looked upon as having exclusive rights to sovereignty.

Due to the R2P dynamic of focusing on fundamental human rights as being sovereign,

rising complexities have hindered the implementation of Pillar 3 in most of the ongoing

global crises.

The current system of international relations has defined the world in terms of

nation-states consisting of borders, although it is the people that make up these nation-

states, which the R2P doctrine is primarily concerned. The R2P doctrine challenged state

sovereignty as the central focus in international relations, shifting the focus to the

individual. T. H. Lee (2014) explained that the purpose of R2P is to undermine the

principle of exclusive sovereignty and the notion that no other state has the right or

responsibility to interfere in how it treats its people, especially by force. Individual rights,

particularly basic human rights, should not be minimized by the notion of state

sovereignty. Power—specifically within the international realm of "Real Politiks"—

obscures any challenges to state sovereignty, even if it means capitulation to mass human

atrocities. Grover (2015) explained:

> At what point those human rights violations (threatened or actual) are egregious
>
> enough to warrant UN Security Council involvement via the use of authorized
>
> threats of or use of force to prevent and/or end such international atrocity crimes
>
> is of course very much colored by political and strategic State interests. Hence, as
>
> we all know, the international community has since World War II tolerated many

mass atrocities of varying scales in diverse States on more than one continent. (p.

1115)

The literature showed evidence of the international community's acceptance of the R2P

doctrine. The R2P emerged from the 2005 World Summit, where leaders of all member

states formally accepted the concept of protecting their populations from the four core

crimes against humanity (UN General Assembly, 2005). In addition, if a state manifestly

fails to provide protection and other means do not appear to render a peaceful solution,

then the international community should act collectively in a timely, decisive manner to

use all available means to protect the civilian population in question (UN General

Assembly, 2005).

The research demonstrated that a gap exists in the literature on the policies and

procedures to implement Pillar 3 when the UNSC failed to achieve consensus on using

force to protect civilian populations from failed nation-states. This allows the pain and

suffering of civilian populations, such as in Syria, to continue. Bellamy and Williams

(2006) cited a lack of appropriate and tested military doctrine on how to perform the

tasks of civilian protection. Libya is the only case on record where the international

community has agreed to use force collectively to protect—thereby intervening

militarily—in a state with a functioning legitimate government. T. H. Lee (2014)

explained that traditionally, nation-state leaders would only intervene on behalf of their

own citizens or the citizens of their allies, within another country's sovereign territory.

The emergence of R2P, along with the increase in states failing to meet the criteria of

providing safety and security to their citizens, the implementation of Pillar 3 emerged as

the only viable option to prevent/stop mass atrocities from continuing. Pillar 3,

theoretically, should prevent further suffering and mass loss of life in most crisis-related situations, such as Syria.

Through an exhaustive review of the literature, this researcher discovered a gap which promoted the implementation of Pillar 3 to bring safety and security to civilians when a crisis has reached an impossible conclusion, such as in Syria. This researcher examined Pillar 3—the collective use of force—of the R2P doctrine by using the Syrian crisis as a case study, while briefly comparing the Libyan case, in the context of the research. Additionally, the researcher expanded on the literature seeking to protect civilians, based on the common purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Also, the researcher expanded on the literature of the R2P doctrine, which promotes the protection of fundamental human rights.

In the following sections, the researcher discusses the background of the Syrian crisis and the inability of the UNSC to reach a consensus implementing R2P, as well as previous research on the doctrine. Additionally, the researcher presents the study's research questions, as well as the procedures for data collection and data analysis. Finally, the researcher provides a discussion on the study's implications for positive social change to conclude the chapter.

Background

The R2P evolved from the concept of human security and humanitarian intervention. In 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan approved of this emerging norm, explaining a collective international responsibility remained to intervene—if necessary, militarily—to protect civilians when a state has failed in its duties to do the same (UN General Assembly, 2005). After the 2005 World Summit, R2P emerged as the guideline

for addressing crimes against humanity and mass atrocities, stressing the need to maintain peace and security. Nuruzzaman (2013) stated that the theoretical significance of the R2P doctrine lies in initiating a change in basic assumptions from the right of intervention to an obligation to intervene.

The literature exposed a conflict among many researchers' interpretations of Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine. For example, Berti (2014) questioned whether the true principles of R2P were rooted in the decisions to intervene and explored how the decision to use force in Libya affected Syria. Lappin (2014) analyzed the legal basis for military intervention in Syria and the precedents of using force by the international community. Cubukcu (2013) examined the R2P doctrine from these three perspectives: (a) legal, ethical, and political implications; (b) historical and moral implications; and (c) distrust and polarization within the UNSC. T. H. Lee (2014) compared the unilateral actions of the United States and Russia, in Syria and Crimea respectively, as illegal under international law. Conversely, R2P was used to measure legal intervention by the UNSC. Marrone (2015) examined the relationship among state responsibility, the international community, organizations, and civilians being impacted by devastation. Sloan (2014) examined the evolution of the role of the UNSC as peacekeepers, as opposed to military interventionists, even though the UNSC possessed the ability to use a strong offensive force. Thakur (2013) explained the third pillar of the R2P, describing it as "understandably contentious" (p. 61). Both Sloan and Thakur examined the conditions in both Libya and Syria to distinguish how different conclusions occurred, despite similar conditions.

Grover (2015) explained how semantics have allowed for the continuation of the mass loss of life and other atrocities to plague Syrian civilians, and how those who have veto power used language to continue to deny the use of force when there was no peaceful solution found. Furthermore, Grover (2015) stated that using veto power was an "act of aggression itself" (p. 1112). These examples conveyed the complexities of implementing Pillar 3, including legal concerns, moral indignation, P5 polarization, and the lack of regional support—particularly in the Middle East. These complexities have historically impeded the implementation of the R2P doctrine, thereby allowing for the continuation of mass death and suffering in countries such as Syria.

These varying views have allowed for political friction within the international community, especially the UNSC. Bellamy and Williams (2006) analyzed the challenges of working through the subsystems and coalitions of the security council, and how these challenges have created political discord within the international community on using military force. Consequently, these challenges have stagnated the implementation of Pillar 3 by allowing unrest and instability to flourish in the Middle East, particularly in Syria. Grover (2015) indicated that life-or-death consequences existed for Syrian civilians because of members of the UNSC used veto power to stall the action by force where no peaceful options could end the mass atrocities.

The R2P doctrine, as promoted by most member states in the UN, sought to advance the common ideological purposes and principles of peace and security for all. This doctrine indicates the need for collective intervention to stop the mass atrocities in Syria. For these reasons, the researcher conducted this study and identified the potential inconsistences of policy formulation and implementation.

Problem Statement

Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine suggested that when all diplomatic and peaceful means are exhausted to resolve a crisis, such as in the case of Syria, then using force as a tool for intervention by the UNSC should be a viable option. The use of force as an intervention tool, however, has been a point of contestation between members of the UNSC concerning matters related to Syria. Several studies revealed that implementing Pillar 3, particularly in the case of Syria, was controversial and complex. For example, Bailey (2014) posited that implementing Pillar 3 in Syria is contentious because there are no belligerent acts on both sides. Kildron (2012) stated that Syria was not a good candidate for Pillar 3 because the four criteria needed for success (i.e., an international mandate, a coalition of the willing, regional support, and a credible opposition force) were not present. Coen (2015) explained that the only way to protect the civilians in Syria was to classify them as refugees, thereby making them eligible for protection under R2P.

Other researchers provided a different perspective on implementing Pillar 3 in the Syrian situation. Grover (2015) argued that the implementation of R2P by threat or force is justified when it comes to the purposes of the UN Charter (1945). Vanhullebusch (2015) articulated that military intervention through Pillar 3 should be implemented through regional organizations, as backed by the UNSC. Kolmašová (2016) suggested that the failure to act in Syria was not a failure of R2P, but of the imperfect actors and institutions charged with its implementation.

The conflict in Syria placed the peace and security of the Syrian people—as well as the nation's immediately in the proximity of this crisis—in grave danger. Mass migration created border concerns in Jordan and Turkey, internal displacement

engendered inhumane living conditions, and the use of chemical weapons exacerbated the suffering of the Syrian people. Coen (2015) suggested that the world was witnessing the greatest refugee crisis since World War II, where conflict, violence, and human rights violations have displaced millions of people, primarily due to the ongoing civil war in Syria. In addition, the number of fatalities was at least 560,000, with 6.7 million refugees and 6.2 million people who were internally displaced. According to the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), Syria had the largest number of people forcibly displaced by any conflict in the world; as of 2020, an estimated 12 million Syrians continue to remain in dire need of humanitarian assistance (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2019).

Although R2P was guided by the three pillars to prevent/stop mass atrocities in states with leaders who fail to meet their responsibilities to protect their citizens, the achievement of consensus to implement Pillar 3 within the UNSC has allowed the crisis to manifest (Bellamy & Williams, 2006, p. 497). Norooz (2015) cited several areas in the world where civilian populations were at risk of mass atrocities and living in failed states. According to the three pillars of R2P, Syria is a failed state; therefore, the problem is a lack of study on policy by the UN to implement Pillar 3 when the UNSC fails to achieve consensus, and when all peaceful/diplomatic means have been exhausted, allowing the crisis to persist. In addition, the literature conveyed that a gap exists on implementing Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine. Overall, the problem that the current researcher aimed to examine was the inability of the UNSC to implement Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine fully and consistently, which authorizes the use of force to protect civilians from further suffering and mass atrocities. The researcher addressed this gap by analyzing the voting

records of the five permanent members (P5) of the UNSC, websites, videos, prior interviews conducted by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other documents that have impacted the implementation of Pillar 3 in Syria to determine whether there were viable policy alternatives to achieving consensus in the UNSC on implementing Pillar 3 on a case-by-case basis.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to impact positive social change by examining the implementation of Pillar 3 in a crisis-related situation, such as Syria. This purpose was vital, given that Syria has experienced mass atrocities between 2012 to the present, and continues to experience the disruption of peace and security within the international arena. The crisis in Syria has been described as a good example for using military force to protect Syrian civilians from further mass atrocities in accordance with the UN Charter (1945). The preamble of the UN Charter establishes the common interests and purposes of the UN. The preamble mentions three areas of common interests: (a) "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, (b) to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, and (c) to establish the conditions under which justice and the respect for obligations from treaties and other sources of international law be maintained" (p. 2). In addition, the preamble states that armed force should not be used unless to in the preservation of common interests. Grover (2015) suggested that the preamble of the UN Charter indicates that fundamental human rights and the right of self-determination of all peoples were central to and a significant part of the pre-existing axiomatic "common interests" stated in that preamble (p. 1114). Grover further suggested that stopping or preventing the continuation of the mass atrocities occurring in Syria is in the common

interests of the UN. Grover alleged that the protection of the fundamental human rights and human dignity of all peoples are foundational to international peace and security, which is not inconsistent with the purposes of the UN Charter (1945). These protections are articulated as core purposes, or common interests.

The purposes and principles of the UN Charter (1945) are declared in its Chapter 1, Article 1. Each successive section in Chapter 1 explains how this achieved, with emphasis on cultivating international peace and security through peaceful means. If all peaceful means have been exhausted and UNSC consensus seems an impossible conclusion, the use of force should be a viable option, according to the common purposes/interest of the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security. The last paragraph of Article 1, Section 7 authorizes the enforcement measures stated in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (1945). Chapter 7 of the UN Charter outlines the actions that may be taken, specifically by the UNSC, to address threats, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Article 42 of Chapter 7 states that if all peaceful and diplomatic means prove inadequate, then forceful measures may be undertaken by air, sea, or land forces as necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security (UN Charter, 1945, p. 9). Consequently, the R2P doctrine, specifically Pillar 3, was addressed in the problem statement of this study; the researcher proposes the expansion of policy to guide the UNSC decision-making process on using force to stop mass atrocities in the future.

Research Questions

The research questions spurred the collection of credible information on the complexities of implementing Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine to stop/prevent mass atrocities in the case of a failed nation-state—in this case, Syria. The identification of some of these

complexities within the UNSC, where vetoes were used by a member of the P5 to disrupt consensus. Consequently, the researcher identified and explored the alternative policy(ies) on implementing Pillar 3 when there is non-consensus in the UNSC. The research questions were as follows:

RQ1: Was R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related human endeavors?

RQ2: Did the application of R2P result in negative outcomes?

RQ3: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis in Syria?

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for this study was the doctrine of the R2P itself. In December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was formed by the Canadian government in response to then Secretary-General Kofi Annan. After the humanitarian crises in in the late 1990s, Annan presented the UN members with the question of when, how and why responding to humanitarian crises would be in accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN (UN Charter, 1945, p. 1). The ICISS (2001) found the following:

That sovereignty not only gave a State the right to "control" its affairs, but it also conferred on the State primary "responsibility" for protecting the people within its borders. It proposed that when a State fails to protect its people – either through lack of ability or a lack of willingness – the responsibility shifts to the broader international community. (p. 1)

This framework (i.e., R2P) established the guidelines for the use of military force as an intervention tool to protect citizens at risk of mass atrocities. In addition, the researcher used the R2P framework to investigate the complexities of implementing Pillar 3 (i.e., the use of military force) by UNSC in a case, such as Syria. In Chapter 2, the researcher discusses this framework in the review of the literature by analyzing the history and traditions of nation-states, sovereignty, and protecting vulnerable populations.

Nature of the Study

The researcher selected a qualitative methodology approach to guide this study. Qualitative research seeks to explore phenomena through individuals' personal experiences. Patton (2015) explained that the first contribution of qualitative inquiry is illuminating meanings and exploring how humans engage in meaning-making. A qualitative design allowed for the use of a case study approach to examine the actions of the UNSC in Syria. This led to an inability to reach a consensus on resolutions that called for the use of force, by the international community, to protect the Syrian civilian population from continued mass atrocities. Yin (2009) defined case study research as the study of a case within a real-life, contemporary context or setting.

Definitions

The researcher used the following terms and definitions frequently in developing and conducting this study. These terms enhanced the understanding of the challenges facing the international community in the historical context of sovereignty, with the emerging doctrine of R2P. Historically, sovereignty focused on the nation-state, while the R2P doctrine emphasizes individual sovereignty through the protection of civilians when mass atrocities occur.

Collective security: Collective security is a system of maintaining world peace and security by concerted action on the part of the nations of the world (Thakur, 2016).

Exclusive sovereignty: T. H. Lee (2014) explained exclusive sovereignty as the idea that a sovereign state has autonomy within its own territory, and that no other state has the right or responsibility to interfere in how it treats its people, especially by force of arms.

Internally displaced person (IDP): IDP describes an individual who has not crossed an international frontier, but has fled their home, for whatever reason (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014).

Jus cogens: Lappin (2014) defined the actions of using chemical weapons on the Syrian population, as *jus cogen* norms that amount to a crime against humanity, from which no state may derogate in its actions.

Just war theory (JWT): Parsons (2013) stated that war under certain conditions can be morally justified. There are three principles parts of JWT: (a) *jus ad bellum*, the justice of resorting to war; (b) *jus in bello*, just conduct in war; and (c) *jus post bellum*, justice at the end of war. Norooz (2015) explained that JWT needs two conditions to be satisfied, to justify intervention: (a) the right reasons and (b) mass loss of civilian life.

Nation-state: The term nation-state conjoins the political entity of a state to the cultural entity of a nation from which it derives its political legitimacy to rule and its status as a sovereign state (Guibernau, 2013).

Popular sovereignty: Grover (2015) referred to sovereignty being derived from the people, not something automatically given to those in charge. Popular sovereignty is

in direct contestation with the notion of state sovereignty because power lies with the people, instead of the regime.

Refugees: This term describes people who have crossed an international frontier and are at risk or have been victims of persecution in their country of origin (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014).

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine: R2P is the enabling principle that first obligates individual nation-states and then the international community to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The idea is that sovereignty is not a privilege, but a responsibility (UN Regional Information Center for Western Europe, 2017). Ainley (2015) defined R2P as follows: "Human life, human dignity, human rights raised above even the entrenched concept of State sovereignty" (pp. 37–38).

Sovereignty: Sovereignty refers to the right of each state to manage domestic affairs free from external interference (Bailey, 2014). Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (1945) described sovereignty as "territorial integrity and political independence" (as cited in Bailey, 2014, p. 109).

State responsibility: State responsibility is defined as the obligations a state has to the international community to maintain peace and security (Borelli, 2017). Internal focus is the responsibility on the part of the state to protect its own people, while external focus is the responsibility of the international community to act when the host state is unwilling or unable to do so (Bailey, 2014).

Westphalian system: This global system is based on the principle of international law that each state has sovereignty over its territory and domestic affairs, to the exclusion of all external powers, and that each state is equal in international law (Teschke, 2002).

Assumptions

Assumptions are statements that the researcher presumes to be true, but which are unverifiable (Merriam, 2014). The key variable was assumed for implementing Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine as achieving consensus within the UNSC, resulting in the collective action to forcefully intervene on behalf of the civilian population in Syria, thereby creating a sense of legality and legitimacy within the international community about the intervention.

The researcher used what Creswell (2013) called "thick or complex description" (p. 1094). Thick description is where the researcher gives detailed accounts of the participants or setting. In this case, the researcher used prolonged engagement and persistent observation of the data, triangulation of the data sources, peer review or debriefing, and clarifying researcher bias (see Creswell, 2013). To ensure trustworthiness or reliability, the researcher used interceding agreement on the research study. In addition, the researcher used multiple sources of data for triangulation.

To ensure quality, the researcher used four criteria: substantive contribution (i.e., the study contributes to overall understanding), aesthetic merit (i.e., the researcher succeeded aesthetically by inviting interpretive responses, and finding whether these were creative, complex, and not boring), reflexivity (i.e., the researcher held himself accountable for biases), and impact (i.e., the emotional and intellectual effect on the researcher; Etherington, 2004; Tracy, 2019). The researcher tried to understand how to

implement Pillar 3 when there was no consensus in the UNSC and mass atrocities continue to cause severe suffering on a civilian population (i.e., Syria). The researcher addressed his self-awareness and self-exposure and held himself accountable by stating his biases upfront. The researcher reflected upon those biases more thoroughly and reported the results.

Scope and Delimitations

The scope of this study included the civilian population of Syria, where the population is caught in the middle of a civil war, proxy war, and the war on terror from the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2012 to the present. Global governance and humanitarian intervention were closely related concepts that were not investigated in this research. Although each concept advocates for some form of protection for civilians at risk for crimes against humanity, each fall short in stating there is a distinct responsibility of states to provide protection for their citizens.

In this study, the researcher focused on the lack of UNSC cooperation and cohesion on the implementation of Pillar 3. The UNSC is divided along P3 (United States, United Kingdom, and France) and P2 (Russia and China) lines, where the differences in ideology (political, economic, environmental, and strategic) have contributed to discord. The researcher used triangulation to provide a rich data set on the lack of cooperation and cohesion in the UNSC by examining and collecting data from multiple sources. These sources included email interviews, observations from websites, and analysis of public documents (e.g., voting records and speeches). The researcher used NVivo software for coding, keywords, and journal notes on R2P to establish themes and patterns for transferability.

Limitations

This study was limited by the complexity of achieving consensus within the UNSC for implementing Pillar 3 in situations where mass atrocities are being committed, particularly in Syria, 2012 to present. Coen (2015) suggested that based on the political dynamics within the UNSC, using coercive force in Syria was not a viable option. Coen further suggested that invoking Pillar 3 requires that all members of the P5 to agree by actively voting or abstaining on the merits of intervention. Conversely, Grover (2015) articulated that those P5 members using their veto power to obstruct the implementation of Pillar 3 are using stall tactics based on semantics and these tactics can result in life-or-death consequences. These complexities revolved around the national interests and ideological beliefs of P5 members and how they were inclined to change on a case-by-case basis, thereby limiting the researcher's ability to generalize the findings.

While the researcher engaged in an exhaustive and prolonged research process, the large volume of data, as well as the crisis in Syria, continues to be debated within the UNSC to this data; therefore, it is likely that valuable data was omitted. Furthermore, the unique international experiences, alliances, and national interests of each participant, factored into their perspective on the R2P phenomenon, which resulted in decreasing their ability to achieve a consensus on the implementing Pillar 3 in Syria. National strategic interests had the single greatest impact on implementing Pillar 3 in crisis related situations. There was only a single case (Libya) where the UNSC achieved consensus to implement Pillar 3 measures, limiting its potential dependability and transferability.

There may have been potential biases from the researcher. The researcher's education, experience, and culture are rooted in Western ideology, which may differ

significantly from the data collected from the participants. The researcher's personal experiences with different cultures and education in politics and international relations have provided him with a well-rounded outlook into the limitations of his knowledge that may have biased this study. The strategies that the researcher used to address these biases were triangulation, reflexivity, and persistent prolonged engagement of the research data. In Chapter 3, a researcher presents a more detailed discussion of these techniques.

Significance of the Study

The significance of the study filled a gap in the literature by understanding and promoting policy and procedure that allows for the proper implementation of Pillar 3 when consistent with the purposes and principle of the UN Charter (1945), specifically in terms of the maintenance of the international peace and security. If all other diplomatic and peaceful gestures were exhausted, then the UN still has an obligation to render solutions to mass atrocity crimes being committed. Leaders require alternative policies allowing for the UN general assembly to organize regional organizations, regional states, or coalitions of the willing to implement Pillar 3 with a majority of support from UN/UNSC member states, despite a veto from a P5 member. The policy impact may involve being able to bypass the UNSC when it fails to achieve consensus on implementing Pillar 3 to stop or prevent mass atrocity crimes form occurring or continuing, as it has in Syria.

The UN Charter (1945) explained how faith in fundamental human rights, dignity, and equal rights of all people are in the common interests of the international community, and that "save in the common-interests" force should not be used. Mass atrocities that violate the common-interests clause and disrupt international peace and security should

not have a one-size-fits-all resolution. Thus, these may require forceful intervention. The crisis in Syria revealed how UNSC inaction has contributed to the continuation of suffering by civilians in Syria. By expanding policy on implementing Pillar 3 to include regional countries, regional states, coalitions of the willing, and powerful states that act in the interests of the UN Charter, future crisis of mass atrocities may be preventable or deterred. Grover (2015) stated that although the UNSC was designated as the body authorized to implement Pillar 3 and to maintain international peace and security, it is the "UN Charter that is the ultimate guide for each member state in fulfilling the purposes and principles of the UN" (pp. 1118–1120).

The knowledge from this study contributed to existing policy and expanded the decision-making process of implementing Pillar 3 giving authority to the UN general assembly, on a case-by-case basis, when the UNSC does not meet its R2P obligations because of P5 veto power. The UN Charter (1945) preamble made it clear that resorting to war was a potentially necessary and legitimate option in certain circumstances (Grover, 2015).

Significance to Practice

In this study, the researcher advanced a policy toward the acceptance by the international community, the UN, and the security council, all of whom needed to be collaborators in the responsibility to protect vulnerable populations in the future, thus living up to their obligations under the UN Charter (1945) of promoting human dignity. With the emergence of the acceptance of fundamental human rights on the rise, and the credible threat of collective action by the international community to confront those states

who "manifestly fail to protect their populations," maintaining international peace and security was paramount (UN Charter, 1945). This can prevent mass migration, mass displacement, and mass atrocities, thus lessening the burden on neighboring states and providing for the human dignity of those at-risk populations (UN Charter, 1945).

Significance to Theory

The researcher aimed to advance the acceptance of Pillar 3 by the international community, the UN, and the security council, all of which need to be collaborators in the responsibility to protect vulnerable populations in the future. The impact allowed those at-risk civilians to seek safe havens that will be established by the intervening forces, thereby giving them access to the necessities needed to be secure. In addition, Kildron (2012) suggested advancing policy based on what he called the Libyan model, outlining that four criteria should be met before intervention is appropriate. These criteria include the following: (a) there must be an international mandate calling for intervention, (b) there must be a broad coalition to protect civilians, (c) there must be presence of regional support, and (d) a credible opposition force must already be on the ground (Kildron, 2012). These four criteria were used as a guideline to expand on existing policy that may be used by the UNSC or the UN general assembly when considering implementing Pillar 3 in the future.

Significance to Social Change

The implications for positive social change of this study meant safety and security to many civilians who face mass atrocities and crimes against humanity, as defined by the UN Charter (1945). Additionally, the findings may increase the support and acceptance

for the use of force to prevent/limit mass human atrocities, which would serve the greater good of the international community by promoting peace, stability, and security. In this study, the researcher examined the literature for the UN to explore instituting policy that will allow other member states to act, when the UNSC was unable to reach a consensus. The positive social impact would allow displaced civilians the opportunity to seek safe havens, where they would receive medical supplies, food, water, and shelter. Furthermore, establishing safe havens would be beneficial to neighbor states, where mass migration has had a negative impact on these states' economic, political, and environmental well-being, thus influencing safety and security of these displaced individuals by creating a burden on the host countries.

Summary

In this chapter, the researcher provided the introduction, background, problem statement, and purpose of the study. This researcher conducted a qualitative case study on the UNSC and the implementation of R2P, using the Syria crisis as a case study and example. Additionally, the researcher provided an overview on the contents of the research question, assumptions, and limitations of the study. Finally, the researcher concluded the chapter with the significance of the study and the implications for positive social change, through expanding the R2P doctrine in future crises, that threaten international peace and security. Chapter 2 includes a detailed analysis of the literature on the R2P doctrine, presenting alternative views on using force, particularly in Syria. In Chapter 3, the researcher provides a detailed explanation of the research plan for this study. Chapter 4 includes the results and the analysis of data. In Chapter 5, the researcher

discusses the interpretations of the findings, limitations of the study, implications for positive social change, recommendations for future research, and conclusions.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The problem that the current researcher aimed to address was the inability of the UNSC to implement Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine, which authorizes the use of force, in this case, to protect Syrian civilians from further suffering and mass atrocities since 2012. The lack of cooperation and cohesion in the UNSC has allowed the crisis in Syria to continue, despite exhausting what appears to be all efforts under Pillar 1 and 2. Grover (2015) surmised that members in the UNSC use their veto power to prevent action by the UNSC, which is an act of aggression toward the Syrian people, particularly when all peaceful means have been exhausted.

Traditionally, the intervention into the internal affairs of a state by another state was not an accepted practice, within the international order. Usually, these types of actions were only taken when a state had a personal stake in the matter; therefore, forceful intervention was done only on behalf of those citizens of the intervening state who were at risk, or it was done on behalf of the allies of the intervening state, or to protect the property of the intervening state. Bellamy and Williams (2006) found that historically, these obstacles coalesced to produce a default policy environment that was strongly averse to forceful intervention. Mistrust was also a key element in the traditional international order for non-interventionist and the principles of exclusive sovereignty of the state. T. H. Lee (2014) articulated that mistrust existed between states as to real

intentions. National self-interests, coercion to implement political agendas, economic

agendas, and strategic alliances are some conditions that created this mistrust. Syria was a

prime example of the phenomenon. All the conditions were present, according to the R2P

doctrine, to proclaim Syria a failed state. The national interests of Russia, China, and the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), however, as well as a lack of political will

and public support, have led to a lack of real solutions being implemented in Syria. In the

interim, Syrian civilians continue to suffer mass atrocities, while the international

community remains reluctant to use force to stop/prevent further loss of life and

continued suffering. Thakur (2013) found that although successful, the Libyan operation

proved to be controversial among emerging powers, and the Syrians have paid the price

for this controversy. Consequently, the UNSC allowed the Syrian crisis to continue

because of the failures and consequences of the use of force in Libya, and a lack of

strategic policy on forceful intervention moving forward. In this chapter, the researcher

provides an overview of the literature search, analyzes R2P theory regarding the Syrian

crisis, and examines the complexities of implementing Pillar 3 in Syria in the current

framework of the UNSC.

Literature Search Strategy

The researcher gathered the articles used in this study from multiple sources.

Most of these sources stemmed from the database of the Walden University Library,

along with Google Scholar. There was no specific date range used in the search process,

but specific attention was paid to articles within the 5-year range of acceptance; however,

articles that addressed the historical significance and development of constructs related to

this study were used. Databases listed by names were used in the Walden University

searches. These searches focused on R2P, humanitarianism, and human security. The

databases included Homeland Security Digital Library, Political Science Complete,

Military & Government Collection, International Security and Counter Terrorism

Reference Center, Expanded Academic ASAP, ProQuest Central, Sage Journals, Thoreau

Multi-Database Search, and United Nations Public Administration Network. In Google

Scholar searches, the researcher focused on all sources related to the R2P principle,

including books, articles, websites, videos, and organizations. When searching Google

Scholar articles, the researcher limited the scope to peer-reviewed articles to ensure

additional credibility. The following keywords/phrases were used, either individually or

in combinations, to find articles relevant to R2P and Syria: human security; economic

development; protecting civilians; Libya; Syria, mass atrocities, four core crimes against

humanity; UN Charter and the use of force; preventive security; international relations;

national security; world poverty; just war; humanitarianism and the use of force;

intervention and the use of force; global chaos, world hunger; Arab Spring; UNSC and

the responsibility to protect; UN resolutions on Syria; State sovereignty vs individual

rights; human dignity; and maintaining international peace and security. The scope of the

literature as previously mentioned, focused on articles of the past 5 years, except for

information which provided a historical context. The areas with limited current research

available are identified in statements throughout the study.

Theoretical Foundation

The theoretical foundation of this study was the doctrine of R2P. The R2P

doctrine includes three principles that guide the international community on protecting

civilian populations who are vulnerable to or currently suffering mass atrocities. There

are few established theories on protecting individuals where their human rights are considered to have been violated. Marrone (2015) examined the impact of R2P regarding human security and human rights, where the global community has a responsibility to protect civilians during conflict and post-conflict. The doctrine of R2P has evolved from other theories that have emphasized protecting vulnerable populations and their fundamental human rights: human security, humanitarian intervention, and global governance. Hobbes (2010), Locke (1947), and Bodin (1992) explained their thoughts on social contract theory, and the League of Nations (1920–1946) attempted to avert conflict and maintain peace and security (as cited in Shapiro, 2010). The intent behind the R2P doctrine—holding nation-states accountable to the international community for the maintenance of peace and security—was not the first attempt by the international community to hold nation-states accountable. The R2P doctrine was the theory that emerged within the most recognized international authority—the UN—to address those breaches of the peace contrary to the common purposes and principles of the UN General Assembly (2005).

The treaty of Westphalia of 1648 established nation-states in a world where every nation was governed either by an absolute monarch, tribal chief, or a theocratic hierarchy (as cited in Toavs, n.d.). Westphalian sovereignty was based on the concept of a sovereign state, governed by a sovereign ruler, that was based on establishing prejudice in international affairs against interference in another nation's domestic business (Toavs, n.d.). Nevertheless, the world has evolved to include governments that are more representative of the people, including political bodies (i.e., U.S. Congress, parliament, etc.), regardless, if they are a democracy, monarchy, republic, dictatorship, or some other

type of political entity. Consequently, the nation-state became the primary medium by which people identified themselves within the international community. The treaty of Westphalia stood as the precursor to future international treaties, and to the development of international law in general (Toavs, n.d.).

Philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were some of the earliest seminal thinkers to believe that nation-states, or the sovereigns thereof, had some type of responsibility to protect its citizens (Shapiro, 2010). Hobbes (2010) believed in the rights of individuals and in the equality of all men, and he subscribed to the notion that the contract that exists between men and the prevailing authority, only holds true, as long as, the authority can provide protection (Shapiro, 2010). Differing from Hobbes (2010), Locke (1947) believed that rulers only derive their authority through the consent of the people, as power is delegated and can be removed for violating the terms of that trust (Shapiro, 2010). Nevertheless, these early philosophers believed that protection of individual rights were a part of the social contract between the prevailing sovereign authority and their people.

The League of Nations (1919–1946) is one of the more well-known attempts by the international community at cooperation or collective security to maintain peace and security throughout the world. The three main objectives of the League, as stated by the UN Office at Geneva (n.d.), were (a) to ensure collective security, (b) to assure functional cooperation, and (c) to execute the mandates of peace treaties (p. 3). In the History of the League of Nations, the United Nations Office at Geneva (n.d.) explained the following:

Born with the will of the victors of the First World War to avoid a repeat of a

devastating war, the League of Nations objective was to maintain universal peace

within the framework of the fundamental principles of the Pact accepted by its

Members: to develop cooperation among nations and to guarantee them peace and

security. (p. 1)

Despite some early successes, however, the League of Nations could not prevent events

that led to World War II and the eventual demise of the League.

Despite these early successes, the League of Nations could not prevent the

invasion of Manchuria by Japan, nor the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy in 1936, nor that

of Austria by Hitler in 1938. The powerlessness of the League of Nations to prevent

further world conflict, the alienation of part of its member states, and the generation of

the war itself added to its demise from 1940 (UN Office at Geneva, n.d.). Although the

League of Nations sought to prevent conflict through cooperation and collective security,

the crises that led up to World War II helped to return some nation-states (i.e., Germany,

Italy, and Japan) back to the traditional system of defensive alliances and power blocs

(UN Office at Geneva, n.d.). By the end of World War II, the Allies were determined to

create a new organization, the UN, which had many similarities to the League of Nations.

In sum, after World War I, the international community established the League of

Nations for nation-states to have a forum to communicate their grievances to avoid

conflicts that might lead to another war.

On June 26, 1945, the UN was created by the Allies after their victory in World

War II. The preamble of the UN states the common purposes and principles of the

organization, which bore many similarities to that of the League of Nations. The first

sentence of the UN Charter (1945) cites the goal "to save succeeding generations from

the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind"

(p. 2). The League of Nations discussed the "avoidance of a repeat of a devastating war"

(UN Office at Geneva, n.d., p. 1). Each document discusses the maintenance of peace and

security through cooperation and collective security. The UN Charter (1945) charged the

UNSC with providing that collective security. Chapter 7 of the Charter specifically

discusses the actions available to the UNSC when there are breaches of the peace. At the

conclusion of the Cold War, discussed earlier, those breaches of the peace began to be

recognized more in the form of individual fundamental human rights. The mass atrocities

committed in Bosnia and Rwanda ignited the beginnings of a change in thinking where

individual sovereignty, at times, would challenge the notion of state sovereignty. These

events resulted in fierce debate about the responsibility of the international community,

according to the common purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

> Walzer positioned Just and Unjust Wars as a challenge to the arguments made
>
> both by realists and by international lawyers within those debates, urging that the
>
> commitment to state sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force in
>
> international relations must give way in situations where those principles hamper
>
> the defense of human rights or self-determination. (Orford, 2013, p. 83)

After these crises in the 1990s, the Department for International Development in Security

recommended the development of "a more effective international system" in Chapter 5

(UN Charter, 1945). The two points of emphasis were the following:

> (a) Since the Cold War, the UN plays a vital role in promoting global security,
>
> and despite taking on a larger role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, there have
>
> been failings in preventing/stopping 'large-scale ethnic cleansing and genocide;
>
> and (b) The international community must act to protect ordinary people from

catastrophic suffering and violence. Although protecting citizens is the primary

duty of each state, the international system must be able to respond when states

fail in their responsibilities to protect ordinary people. (UN Charter, 1945, p. 17)

Shortly after these crises of the 1990s, the ICISS (2001) issued the R2P report to Annan.

This report was designed to address those failings mentioned by the Department for

International Development to protect "ordinary people" from mass atrocities (UN Office

at Geneva, n.d.).

The R2P was universally accepted by the members of the UN at the 2005 World

Summit (UN General Assembly, 2005). At this summit, leaders established the outcome

document. Through the UNSC, the members of the international community will assume

the responsibility to protect through peaceful (i.e., diplomatic) means. When such

peaceful means fail, however, the UNSC must be prepared to take collective action in a

timely and decisive manner, according to the UN Charter (1945).

The major theoretical proposition for R2P is the protection of civilian populations

in failed or failing states, where human rights and human dignity have been violated. The

R2P states that the international community has a duty to the civilians living in failing

states, as opposed to the traditional notion of sovereignty. In addition, the use of force

may be required if all other peaceful means have been exhausted.

The shifting of paradigms from state-centered to individual-centered rights, based

on the common purposes listed in the preamble of the UN Charter (1945), lie at the core

of the R2P doctrine. Grover (2015) argued that the implementation of R2P by threat or

use of force is justified when it is consistent with the purposes of the UN Charter (1945).

It appears that the UN, in accordance with R2P, place the rights of individuals above the

rights of exclusive state sovereignty, where states have failed or neglected to fulfill their responsibilities to maintain the international order of peace and security.

In summary, R2P is not only a viable principle; but one which goes to the heart of the international rule of law, the intent and meaning of the UN Charter (1945) and the credibility of the UN as a mechanism for the promotion of human rights and the achievement of international peace and security (Grover, 2015). The current researcher used the R2P theory as the basis for examining Syria and the use of force, focusing on Pillar 3 and how the UNSC, through veto power, has failed to achieve consensus on forceful intervention to stop the mass atrocities and human rights violations in this crisis.

The crisis in Syria continues to be a strain on the international community. If unaddressed, this crisis is likely to lead to mass migration, internal displacement, and excessive human rights violations that have breached the peace and security in the region, subsequently creating instability and chaos within the international system. Theoretically, the R2P charges individual states and the international community to maintain peace and security, as outlined in the three pillars of the R2P doctrine and in accordance with the common purposes of the of the UN Charter (1945). Grover (2015) articulated that all member states must protect the fundamental rights as stated by the common interests of the UN Charter (1945). As defined by R2P, Syria should be classified as a failed state. After exhausting most, if not all, peaceful means to end this crisis, implementing Pillar 3 and allowing the UNSC to use force should have been the next step taken to end the suffering of the Syrian civilian population. The UNSC established precedence with R2P in the Libyan crisis. Despite similar circumstances, however, the reaction by the UNSC in Libya and the subsequent reaction in Syria were different. The researcher examined the

effects of not implementing Pillar 3 in Syria to protect the civilian population from further/continued mass atrocities.

The research questions asked the following:

RQ1: Was R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related human endeavors?

RQ2: Did the application of R2P result in negative outcomes?

RQ3: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis in Syria?

The research questions both challenge and build on the policies and procedures of implementing the R2P doctrine. First, the research questions challenged the existing protocol of consensus within the UNSC to authorize the use of force. Current UN Charter regulations only justify forceful interventions for two reasons: (a) self-defense, individually or collectively, or (b) UNSC authorization of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. T. H. Lee (2014) referred to this as *bifocal orthodoxy*, which denies any role of custom in defining *jus as bellum* (i.e., right to war).

The R2P created expectations for nation-states to uphold their responsibilities to provide safety and security to their citizens. If a state manifestly fails in those same responsibilities, then that responsibility should be assumed by international community. Additionally, if all peaceful means have been exhausted, then the UNSC's use of force is deemed justifiable; this establishes that forceful interventions should not reside only in cases of self-defense (UN Charter, 1945). Crises that place civilians are at risk due to mass atrocities and continually disrupt international peace and security, such as the situation in Syria beginning in 2012, fall under the umbrella of Pillar 3 measures.

Furthermore, the research questions challenged the UNSC voting process on authorization to use force, by examining the use of veto power by the P5 members. Grover (2015) explained that the use of the veto by Russia and China, in the Syrian crisis, is an act of aggression. Grover contended that the continued abuse of this power allowed the status-quo to persist in Syria, which is fundamentally against the common interests of the UN, as stated in the UN Charter's goal to protect the human rights and dignity and maintain peace and security. Second, the research questions build upon R2P by examining additional policies and procedures for implementing R2P. Odeyemi (2016) suggested that the presence of certain criteria can improve prospects for success. This author applied this criterion in the Syrian case and to future crises in protecting civilian populations at risk for mass atrocities. In addition, the research questions build on the existing theory by analyzing the use of 'veto power' to prevent collective action by the UNSC, thereby, allowing crisis of mass atrocities to go unchecked by the international community. Vanhullebusch (2015) argued for regional forces or other coalitions of the willing to be authorized to use force to implement no-fly zones, safe zones, and other limited military strategies, to provide protection. In conclusion, the study, via the research questions, challenged and build upon the existing theory by examining the bifocal orthodoxy approach, the voting process, and the use of veto power by the P5 to determine the implementation of Pillar 3 to protect future populations at risk of mass atrocities.

Conceptual Framework

The researcher examined the concept of an improved implementation of the R2P doctrine. The R2P doctrine comprises three principles that guide the international community on protecting civilian populations who are vulnerable to or currently

suffering mass atrocities. For this study, the concept focused on the failure of the UNSC to achieve consensus to implement the use of force, specifically in Syria, despite the crisis reaching an impossible conclusion of peace, without the international community intervening to protect at-risk populations from mass atrocities. Due to the complexities of interests by the P5 members of the UNSC, consensus—which is currently a requirement of Pillar 3 to use force—has not been achieved. Russia and China have opposed any type of military intervention in Syria. Their opposition stems from the outcomes of the intervention in Libya. Morris (2013) stated that UNCS members, namely Russia and China, have used the failings associated with NATO's means of implementation of force in Libya, as justification to veto collective action in Syria. Grover (2015) suggested that by using their veto power, Russia and China have led the UNSC to fail implementing Pillar 3 by the means necessary to end ongoing mass atrocities, which is an act of aggression in and of itself (p. 1113). In this chapter, the researcher explores the concept known as Pillar 3, forceful collective intervention, and examines the complexities associated within the UNSC to achieve consensus on implementing force in Syria to protect civilians, which has allowed for the crisis to persist.

Synthesis of the Literature

The R2P is the lens that researchers have used to view the crisis in Libya, which is similar to the crisis in Syria. Norooz (2015) argued that his article on the intervention in Libya sheds the light on the crisis through the lens of the R2P. The conflict in Libya began as a peaceful opposition to the Gaddafi government; however, Gaddafi reacted by using violence against the opposition, which responded in kind, leading to full armed conflict. The city of Benghazi—the largest in Libya—fell under the control of the

opposition leadership, which came to be recognized as the Transitional National Council.

Gaddafi employed his special forces to retake the city using rhetoric on par with rhetoric

uses in the Rwandan crisis. Alarmed by such talk and witnessing the emergence of

human atrocities, regional organizations deemed these crimes against humanity. Norooz

(2015) found that the regimes behavior could amount to "crimes against humanity" (p.

106), and the European Union described this as "a violation of human rights" (p. 106).

The United Nations tried several diplomatic measures to quell Gaddafi's behavior,

including passing Resolution 1970, which acknowledged Libya's responsibility to protect

its citizens; however, Gaddafi continued his attacks. Eventually, the International

Criminal Court (ICC) issued a statement to the regime condemning its actions, and even

found grounds to charge the Libyan Gaddafi regime guilty of mass atrocities crimes. The

ICC was viewed by the international community, particularly the UN, as mirroring R2P.

Ainley (2015) explained that both had comparable purposes: to engage crimes and

atrocities through preventing, protecting, and prosecuting to calm the way international

politics were conducted and to end the impunity. Kofi Annan suggested that the

"expectations of human rights, human dignity, and human life, were to rise above the

traditional concept of state sovereignty" (as cited in Ainley, 2015, p. 37). Consequently,

global recognition of R2P, in the 21st century included the absence of fear and want.

Nevertheless, Ainley concluded that both R2P and the ICC are in crisis. This crisis exists

because of the cost of intervention, insufficient political will, lack of majority support, its

unpopularity, and it is a hard-public sale. These issues have prevented a consensus, which

has legitimatized the deployment of force based on R2P. In an article about the swinging

pendulum, Morris (2013) reinforced this concept by examining the voting conducted on

implementing Resolution 1973 to intervene in Libya and the ongoing debate on using

force in Syria. Morris (2013) found there was no opposition to the implementation of

Resolution 1973:10 votes for and five abstained. Russia, China, and India, although

acquiescing in the Libya vote, chose to use their veto power in the debate on Syria.

Russia, China, and India have been skeptical of the West's use of R2P as a regime change

strategy. Morris (2013) described their feelings as "embers of long-held suspicions over

trustworthiness of western powers with neo-imperial proclivities" (p. 1280).

        In conclusion, there are certain requirements for R2P to be implemented. These

included mass loss-of-life, proper intentions, domestic and regional support, and a legal,

moral, legitimate agent (UNSC) to exercise this concept. Each article specifies a reason

R2P, in concert with the ICC in one article, has failed to live up to expectations. Morris

(2013) suggested that Pillar 3, which identifies the right to use force in exceptional cases

(e.g., Syria), should be removed as an option after acknowledging that "[the] use of force

is a core concept in responding to mass atrocities" (p. 1283). Ainley (2015) explained

how R2P and the ICC should refocus their strategies, even though the UNSC must

address the conflict in Syria. Ainley described both R2P and the ICC as being in crisis,

and by refocusing their strategy on moving toward producing institutions that make

conflict less likely, by promoting good governance, economic prosperity, and state

responsibility, while building better justice systems to deter crimes of mass atrocities.

The conclusions of Norooz (2015) aligned with those of Ainley (2015). Norooz (2015)

suggested a gap in the three pillars, designated by the UN, for state responsibilities, as

missing a fourth pillar. He calls this missing pillar, the responsibility to rebuild. Norooz

(2015) paralleled Morris (2013) in stating that it would be expensive, unpopular, and lack

the political will. By not addressing this missing pillar in Libya, critiques of the R2P will continue. Researchers should address the disarmament, national reconciliation, and the recovery, as suggested by Norooz (2015). Moreover, the socioeconomic, political, and environmental drawbacks of intervention may have reduced or eliminated the rise of terrorist organizations, such as Daesh or ISIS.

Literature Review

The R2P was the theoretical lens this study employed to analyze the crisis in Syria. The R2P is a three-pillared doctrine designed to hold UN member states to a certain standard, regarding the safety and security of its citizens. The first two pillars address prevention by declaring that (a) each sovereign state has a responsibility to protect civilians within its borders, and (b) the rest of the international community has a responsibility to ensure that each sovereign state lives up to this responsibility (T. H. Lee, 2014). For the current study, the researcher analyzed the third pillar only. To answer the research questions, the researcher presented a literature review of a historical background about the complexities of using force as an intervention tool, especially when there is non-consensus within the UNSC. Additionally, the researcher examined the inconsistent application of Pillar 3 by comparing the cases of Libya and Syria. Finally, the researcher examined the many sides of the R2P debate, as well as the complexities, based on the legal, moral, and legitimate arguments of implementing Pillar 3 in Syria through the UNSC.

Historical Background

The review of the literature revealed the history of the international community as it relates to the notion of sovereignty and protecting vulnerable civilian populations. Philosophers Hobbes (1668/2010), Locke (1947), and Bodin (1992) promoted the safety and security of the civilian populations associated with their respective government (Shapiro, 2010). Hobbes (1668/2010) was a believer in the right of the individual; the natural equality of all men, and the artificial character of the political order (Toavs, n.d.). In *Leviathan*, Hobbes (1668/2010) stated that the contract that exists between men and the prevailing authority, only holds true if the authority can provide protection. it is at this point, when protection cannot be provided, that the contract/agreement is no longer viable (Shapiro, 2010). When protection cannot be provided, the contract/agreement is no longer viable (Shapiro, 2010).

Locke (1947) believed that the ruler (authority) only derived their authority from the consent of the people. Because power is delegated by the people, it can also legitimately be removed for violating the terms of the people's trust (Shapiro, 2010). Furthermore, Locke (1947) reckoned, "The government is the trustee which functions for and is responsible to the people who create the trust" (p. 46).

Bodin (1992) suggested that sovereignty would remain absolute while in the hands of the authority (individual or group); however, Bodin also indicated the sovereign could not confiscate personal property without just cause, thereby seemingly acknowledging individuals' rights. Bodin emerged after the threat of Westphalia in 1648 established a new system of political order based on nation-states governed by a

sovereign (individual or group). This process established a prejudice in international affairs against interference in another nation's domestic business. Bodin was considered the first source on the modern concept of sovereignty (Toavs, n.d.).

Through this analysis of philosophers, it is clear that considerations of individual rights and their protection, has been a concern throughout history. The literature indicated sovereignty and the rights of individuals have come into contestation with the concept of sovereignty. Hobbes not only believed in the notion of absolutism of sovereignty, but he was also a proponent of the right of the individual and the natural equality of all men (Toavs, n.d.). Hugo Grotius, considered to have laid the foundations of international law, argued for the protection of non-combatants during times of war, as well as presupposing certain fundamental human rights, such as the right to life, food, and medicine (Toavs, n.d.). In addition, Hugo Grotius argued for what may be considered humanitarian intervention, he that states might be able to act on behalf of individuals who were victims "of injuries which … excessively violate the law of nature or of nations regarding any person" (Apple & White, 2007, para. 2).

In summary, the early notions of sovereignty, based on influential philosophers of that time, took into consideration the rights of individuals. Locke (1947), Hobbes (2010), Bodin (1992), and Grotius all mentioned—to some degree—the individual and their place in the international system of order. Hobbes believed in the natural equality of all men, while Locke (1947) believed the government should be responsible for and to the people who created their trust. Grotius—moving forward for the purposes of this study—had the most influential thinking of sovereignty.

Grotius (Toavs, n.d.) considered individuals to be actors within the international

society. He wrote extensively on human law, a precursor of what is today known as

international human rights law (as cited in the Apple & White, 2007). Individual human

rights, and how they are perceived, in terms of sovereignty within the international order,

is revealed by the literature in the following sections of the literature review.

There were several related theories to R2P that were analyzed in this study, as

they relate to sovereignty and protecting civilians. Barqueiro et al. (2016) examined

Humanitarian Intervention and Human Security in the historical aspects of trying to

protect civilians from mass atrocities and human rights violations. Bailey (2014)

surmised that the governments, according to customary international law, should act to

prevent mass atrocity crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law (p.

110). Vanhullebusch (2015) compared human security and humanitarianism by

examining how the Arab League could provide military force, while respecting the

fundamental standards of humanity, according to the common purposes and principles of

the UN Charter (1945).

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era of confronting mass atrocities

associated with genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. No longer

divided by the polarization created by the alliances of U.S./NATO vs the Soviet

Union/Warsaw Pact, the international community needed to find strategies to confront

these crises, that usually fell along the continuum of this polarization. One example of

this is, the Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserts the Soviet Union's authority/rights to

intervene in the internal affairs of those states that comprise the socialist bloc

(Romaniecki, 2016). Another example of this was the containment policy of the United

States (Truman, Nixon, and Reagan doctrines); after World War II, the United States became fully interventionist. U.S. interventionism was motivated primarily by the goal of containing the influence of communism (Yoon, 1997).

The Brezhnev Doctrine of intervention to protect the self-determination of socialist countries in the face of capitalist threats and the Reagan Doctrine advocating the legitimacy of pro-democratic invasion were met with protest and skepticism (Orford, 2013, p. 94). Gholiagha (2015) stated that following the end of the Cold War, the UNSC "authorized the use of force to protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq," becoming the "first event of shifting politically from a policy of non-interference" (p. 1075). Traditionally, the intervention into one state's internal affairs by another state was not an accepted practice, within the international order. T. H. Lee (2014) suggested that these types of actions were only taken when a state had a personal stake in the matter, and these states intervened only on "behalf of its citizens, who were at-risk, or on behalf of its allies, or to protect its property" (p. 235). As new crises occurred and the international order collapsed based on polarization, the concept known as humanitarian intervention emerged. The researcher examines this construct in the following section.

Humanitarian Intervention

There have been numerous attempts to define humanitarian intervention, but there is no consensus. Hood (2015) stated that although several scholars have attempted to define humanitarian interventions, "consensus for a universal definition has proven difficult" (p. 616). Hood (2015) further articulated some examples of these definitions:

(a) The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is defined as the responsibility

imposed on the international community to protect nationals of another state from

inhumane and cruel treatment within their state, (b) Humanitarian intervention is

meant to protect fundamental human rights in extreme circumstances; it is not

meant to protect or promote civil and political rights, and (c) The use of armed

force by a state (or states) to protect citizens of the target state from large-scale

human rights violations there. (p. 616)

In the context of the current study, the researcher used the working definition of

humanitarian intervention by Blackford (2014), who defined humanitarian intervention as

"the threat or use of force across state borders, without permission, by a state or a

coalition of willing states, aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations

of fundamental human rights" (p. 7).

Humanitarian intervention emerged as the primary strategy to combat mass

atrocities after the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, several crises were deemed a

threat to the security and peace of the international community. Gholiagha (2015)

contended that the 1990s were characterized by both successes and failures to protect

individual human beings from mass atrocities and severe human rights violations. In

Kosovo, Rwanda, and Somalia, the UNSC adopted resolutions recognizing the need for

interventions based on some type of humanitarian claim. Gholiagha (2015) further

explained the following:

Resolution 794 justified the use of force in Somalia on humanitarian claims. In

Rwanda Resolutions 918 and 925 authorized UN assistance, but fell short to call

the crisis a 'genocide' due to the reluctance of the U.S. and some European states.

In addition, in Bosnia, Resolution 819 which called for the protection of civilians in the town of Srebrenica, by establishing a safe haven, saw over 7000 men and boys killed. (p. 1076)

These chains of events started when the UNSC decided to protect Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq in 1992. Gholiagha (2015) found that Resolution 767, which was the first resolution that the security council avowed, ensured that "grave violations within country or severe emergencies can be evaluated as a threat to peace or international security" (p. 1075). Saddam Hussein used biological and chemical weapons on the Kurdish population, thereby causing gross violations of their right to be safe and secure. Nevertheless, these goodwill actions, did not come without consequences, which would eventually cause concern within the international community by some states. Gholiagha found that questions started to emerge from these humanitarian interventions by the international community and the focus was on consensus. Kosovo, which was a unilateral act led by NATO, was questioned because it lacked UNSC authorization. Somalia, where operation Restore Hope advanced humanitarian claims, was unanimously authorized by the UNSC, but was ran mostly as a NATO operation led by the United States. In Rwanda, there was little international political will, after the events in Somalia, and the reluctancy to intervene resulted in genocide against the Tutsis. Orford (2013) explained that humanitarian intervention is not a doctrine that "responsible states" wanted to adhere to because it was capable of "uncontrollable abuse" (p. 94). The looming issues among old rivals of the Cold War began to surface, calling into question the legality and legitimacy of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Orford explained that both the Brezhnev doctrine and the Reagan doctrine both sought to protect the right to intervene

on behalf of their social ideological beliefs and were both met with skepticism and protest. In short, the literature has shown that some emerging states have identified humanitarian intervention, in terms of imperialism and colonialism. P. K. Lee and Chan (2016) surmised the following:

> Based on the history of abuse by Western powers during the ages of imperialism and colonialism, where Westphalian ideology of state centered sovereignty in international relations lie at the center of international relations, humanitarian intervention should not be used to impose regime change. Colonialism has had an adverse effect on the reaction, on the use force as an intervention tool, by China and India. Lee (2015) explained that through their historical trauma and post-colonial colonial identity, "the use of force by powerful states against inferior states has caused China and India much consternation." (p. 181)

In Kosovo, Rwanda, and Somalia, the UNSC adopted resolutions recognizing the need for interventions based on some type of humanitarian claim. Resolution 794 justified the use of force in Somalia on humanitarian claims. In Rwanda, Resolutions 918 and 925 authorized UN assistance, but fell short to call the crisis a 'genocide' due to the reluctance of the United States and some European states. In addition, in Bosnia, Resolution 819—which called for the protection of civilians in the town Srebrenica by establishing a safe haven—resulted in the deaths of over 7,000 men and boys (Gholiagha, 2015). In the next section, the researcher examines colonialism and the impact that it has had on the ideology of the BRICS nations toward R2P.

Colonialism

Colonialism has had an adverse effect on the ideology of intervention by India and China. Having been victims of colonialism, both nations have frown upon using force to intervene in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. Ferdinand explained that both nations, having formed an Asian axis of sovereignty share similar views on national sovereignty and human rights, further stating that they "never" vote for resolutions or motions that are critical of human rights records by other states, calling them "high priority dissenters" (P. K. Lee & Chan, 2016, p. 386). Earlier, authors revealed several cases of humanitarian intervention after the end of the Cold War, mostly by Western powers who have some association with colonialism. China and India, due to prior experiences, tend to view these interventions in terms of their own interaction with the West. Miller (2013) explained their encounters with colonialism as a collective trauma, leading to a deeply ingrained mentality of victimhood and a resultant anti-colonial post-imperial ideology. They have attributed their countries "past poverty, underdevelopment, social disorder, and violence to colonial exploitation and encroachment" (P. K. Lee & Chan, 2016, p. 180). Colonialism has had an adverse effect on the reaction of the use force as an intervention tool by China and India. P. K. Lee and Chan (2016) explained that through their historical trauma and postcolonial colonial identity, "the use of force by powerful states against inferior states has caused China and India much consternation" (p. 180).

In sum, colonialism has influenced the ideological view of both China and India for using forceful intervention as a tool for protecting individuals at risk for mass

atrocities. Based on the history of their interactions with Western powers, both nations had an inferiority complex that led to their current ideology on intervention. P. K. Lee and Chan (2016) argued that present-day China and India would share a "national identity of post-colonial, re-emerging powers, that were not possessed by other BRICS nations" (p. 3).

The UN Charter

In this section, the researcher reviews the contestation generated by the UN Charter (1945) toward the R2P doctrine, as well as the semantics used to justify opposing points of views of scholars. Grover (2015) suggested the following:

Here follows then a tentative, but perhaps in some ways audacious attempt at just such semantic gamesmanship in support of R2P as not only a viable Principe; but one which goes to the heart of the international rule of law, the intent and meaning of the UN Charter and the very credibility of the UN as a mechanism for the promotion of human rights and the achievement of international peace and security. (p. 1112)

As revealed by Grover (2015), the literature was in support of using Article 2 of the UN Charter for using R2P as a mitigating factor to use force to stop mass atrocities in Syria. Grover suggested that implementing R2P by force, if necessary, is permissible under the means permissible per the UN Charter Article 2(4) as it served the purposes set out at Article (1) and (3) relating to safeguarding the rights and freedoms of the peoples of a state. These purposes underpinned the sovereignty of that state. Conversely, Stahn (2013) argued that using force under any condition, as per the UN Charter (1945), would require

either the notion of self-defense or collective security (consensus within the UNSC).

Regarding Syria, Stahn (2013) stated that humanitarianism was invoked as entitlement to

justify action that is "punitive" in mature, outside the realm of self-defense or collective

security. Grover (2015) and Stahn (2013) had opposing views on Article 2(4) of the UN

Charter (1945).

Article 2(4) stated that all members should refrain in their international relations

from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of

any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN (Grover,

2015). Grover (2015) argued that the purposes of the UN were written in Article 1 of the

UN Charter (1945). In Article 1, the UN Charter (1945) stated that to maintain

international peace and security, collective measures should be taken to prevent threats

and other breaches of peace, and these actions should be done in the conformity with the

principles of justice and international law (p. 3). Grover (2015) argued that despite what

Article 2(4) expressed in the form of refraining from using force against another state,

using force in Syria would be inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. Grover suggested

that in the UN Charter preamble—respecting the fundamental human rights of all human

beings—may lead to war in certain circumstances. Grover suggested that armed force

should not be used, saved for the common interest. Grover concluded that this focus on

the "common interests" was justified in the semantics of Article 1 and Article 2. Grover

(2015) explained the following:

> The threat to the Syrian people by the Assad regime triggers the pre-existing
>
> 'common interest' to preserve and protect those human rights; and the fact that
>
> Article 2(4) requires, by implication, that any threat or use of force be consistent

with the UN Charter purposes and principles which in fact includes protection of

jus cogens norms including those related to fundamental human rights. (p. 1114)

In contrast to Grover (2015), Stahn (2013) alleged that invoking the protection of

fundamental human rights in Syria indicated the humanitarian intervention model is used

to employ the use of force to protect civilians in Syria. Humanitarianism was invoked as

entitlement to justify action that is "punitive" in nature, outside the realm of self-defense

or collective security (Grover, 2015, pp. 1115–1117). Grover (2015) and Stahn (2013)

differed in their interpretations of the UN Charter (1945) and using force. Stahn (2013)

believed in the traditional manner of self-defense and authorization by the UNSC only in

a collective manner to use force against another member. Conversely, Grover was willing

to use keywords (i.e., common interests and purposes and principles) to broaden an

interpretation of when using force could be justified.

Overall, authors have discussed three points of contestations that divided the

international community on using force. First, colonialism influenced the thinking of the

BRICS nations—two of which hold veto power within the UNSC (China and Russia). P.

K. Lee and Chan (2016) concluded the following:

That the shared norm of opposing US hegemonic intervention with a hidden

agenda of regime change is shaped by a "collective historical trauma" and "post-

imperial ideology" as a result of their painful colonization at the hands of Western

imperialist powers between the eighteenth and twentieth century. (p. 20)

After the end of the Cold War, humanitarian intervention emerged as the primary tool to

combat mass atrocities regarding fundamental human rights issues. Somalia, Rwanda,

and Bosnia were immediate challenges to international peace and security; thus,

intervening through force was justified under the humanitarian intervention model. Russia and China, however, became weary of the escalating unilateral action by the West. Plakoudas (2015) articulated that Putin is striving to transform the international system into a multipolar world where the United States will share power with Russia and other powers (e.g., China), rather than operate unilaterally. In addition, researchers have disclosed that the more powerful states in the West, led by the United States and its NATO allies, tend to see regime change as part of the intervention strategy, which only added to the skepticism of the BRICS. P. K. Lee and Chan (2016) explained that because of their 19th-century historical trauma and common postcolonial identities, powerful states' use of force against inferior states has caused China and India much consternation.

The literature showed the interpretation of the UN Charter (1945) has caused much contestation within the international community. Grover (2015) insisted that such "sematic gamesmanship" (p. 2) has life-or-death consequences. Conversely, Stahn (2013) argued that Article 2 indicated, "All members must refrain from using force or the threat of using force against any state or in any manner inconsistent with purposes of the United Nations" (as cited in Grover, 2015, pp. 1115–1117). The remaining debate lies in the interpretations of the purposes of the UN.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The literature disclosed that the origins of R2P materialized from the humanitarian crisis that occurred in 1990s, such as Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. These crises have shown the international community's failures regarding taking appropriate actions to protect civilians at risk from these atrocities. Thakur (2013) articulated that

people in developing countries would suffer if mass atrocities were committed and outsiders would refuse (or fail) to help, or if geopolitical or commercial interventions were disguised as humanitarian ones. In 2000, the Canadian government established the ICISS (2001). The Commission was directed to build a consensus to determine what the criteria should be for intervention. Discarding the humanitarian intervention label, the Commission introduced the concept of the R2P. Three components were introduced in outlining the concept: (a) Responsibility to Prevent, (b) Responsibility to React, and (c) Responsibility to Rebuild. The Commission sought to answer the questions on intervention being legitimate. Intervention shifted from a simple right to a right and a duty to intervene. The ICISS (2001) introduced six criteria for military intervention and established the UNSC as the ultimate authority to "legitimize such intervention" (p. 1); however, it did not exclude the possibility of regional organizations or a contingent of willing powers undertaking this action as well. The R2P emerged from the UN General Assembly (2005). Having evolved from the concepts of human security and humanitarian intervention, R2P became the talking point for the UN when it came to protecting civilians from mass atrocities. Nuruzzaman (2013) stated, "[The] theoretical significance of the R2P doctrine lies in initiating a paradigm shift from the right of intervention to an obligation to intervene" (p. 59).

This review of the literature revealed the concept of challenging international beliefs and of using force as an intervention tool to protect civilian lives. Odeyemi (2016) professed extensive literature on R2P and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) existed, but researchers had yet to engage in the discussion fully for success on "military intervention for humanitarian reasons" (p. 123). Norooz (2015) explained that

the international military intervention in Libya was not about bombing for democracy or killing Muammar Gaddafi. Legally, morally, politically, and militarily, this action has only one justification: protecting the country's people (Norooz, 2015). Continuing with the theme of lacking implementation strategies for using military force to intervene when protecting civilians—Pillar 3 of R2P—Bellamy (2014) explained the following:

> Together, these points suggest that while the use of force and other coercive measures against states remains controversial, the Security Council's inability to reach consensus on a timely and decisive response to the crisis in Syria prior to 2013 stemmed more from considerations derived from the situation in Syria itself than from more generalized opposition to RtoP provoked by the NATO-led intervention in Libya. (p. 27)

Summary and Conclusions

Responding with the use of force to address mass atrocities was at the heart of the R2P doctrine and is the most controversial of the three pillars. Morris (2013) claimed that even proposals for "soft" Pillar 3 responses to humanitarian crises might meet with Chinese and Russian disapproval—or at least acquiescence. Hood (2015) concluded that Article 2(1) of the UN Charter (1945) recognized that sovereignty was not an absolute bar to intervention if the underlying intent is to prevent human atrocities because human rights violations raised moral concerns and questions about the very legitimacy of that sovereignty (p. 613). Hood (2015) challenged those individuals who would argue that the UN Charter (1945) would call for nonintervention instead of the use of force. Grover (2015) analyzed the UN Charter (1945) by declaring support of R2P as not only a viable principle but also one which goes to the heart of the international rule of law, the intent

and meaning of the UN Charter, and the credibility of the UN as a mechanism for the promotion of human rights and the achievement of international peace and security. This debate was the major theme of the literature—using force as an intervention tool—where there was a lack of strategy, international will, and consensus over the evolving definition of sovereignty. Grillo and Pupcenoks (2017) tested whether people would believe that humanitarian interventions should be conducted on a multilateral basis and whether the United Nations should play a role in that process. The current researcher aimed to address the gap in literature and extend the knowledge in the discipline by examining the implementation of Pillar 3 when there is no consensus in the UNSC.

In Chapter 3, the researcher provides details of the methodology used to conduct a qualitative research study to address the identified gap. Chapter 4 includes the results and the analysis of the data, implications for positive social change, and recommendations for future research. Finally, in Chapter 5, the researcher discusses the key points to consider as conclusion for the study and provides a synthesis of the findings.

Chapter 3: Research Method

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine the implementation of Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine in a crisis-related situation, such as Syria beginning in 2012. This investigation was vital, given that Syria is where mass atrocities continue to disrupt peace and security within the international arena. In addition, the researcher analyzed the complexities involved in achieving consensus within the UNSC on implementing Pillar 3, which allows for the use of military force to protect civilian populations from mass atrocities. The researcher examined the international system of order, where the UNSC is seen as the sole actor that maintains peace and security. In accordance with the UN Charter (1945), this process may be achieved using force, if necessary, to preserve/protect fundamental human rights based on common purposes and interests. Furthermore, the goal expanded on the policies and procedures that guide the UNSC's decision-making process on using force to stop mass atrocities. This chapter contains the research methodology and design for the current study. The details include the participants, instruments, research procedures, data analysis, and ethical considerations. The researcher conducted this study to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: Was the R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related human endeavors?

RQ2: Did the application of R2P result in negative outcomes?

RQ3: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis in Syria?

Research Design and Rationale

The researcher used a qualitative case study research design to analyze the complexities of the process of achieving consensus within the UNSC to implement Pillar 3 and protect civilians in Syria from further mass atrocities. Grover (2015) explained how the use of veto power by some member states has allowed mass atrocities to continue. Furthermore, in order to use force to intervene in the internal affairs of a state, the international community requires the UNSC to collectively authorizes this action, either by voting for/against or abstaining. The accepted norm within the international community is not to intervene in the internal affairs of a state unless the state has been classified as failed/failing according to the first two principles of the R2P doctrine. At this point, the UNSC can be tasked to vote on a resolution to use force as an intervention tool; however, there must be a consensus where nine out of the 15 members vote in favor and there is no veto by a P5 member (Lappin, 2014, p. 143).

The qualitative method allowed for the use a case study approach. The researcher analyzed the conditions that have led to mass atrocities in Syria and determined how the Syrian government has failed in its responsibility to protect its citizens. Furthermore, the researcher explored ways that each P5 member of the UNSC has found that Libyan civilians have fallen under the protection of Pillar 3—and not the civilians in Syria, even though they each seem at the same risk level for harm. Patton (2015) found that the first contribution of a qualitative inquiry would involve a researcher illuminating meanings and how humans would engage in meaning making (i.e., making sense of the world).

Role of the Researcher

The role of the researcher for this study was to choose the methodology and design that best enabled the study to be conducted in an accurate and credible way. The researcher chose a qualitative case study design as the best method. Patton (2015) stated that the first contribution of qualitative inquiry involves "illuminating meanings and how humans engage in meaning making- in essence, making sense of the world" (p. 5). As the primary research tool, the researcher used the R2P doctrine as the theoretical lens to conduct research, thereby examining the actions of the P5 members in the UNSC toward the crisis in Syria. In addition, the researcher employed the R2P doctrine to analyze the history and evolution of sovereignty and its impact on the international community, particularly for addressing mass atrocities and fundamental human rights with using force as an intervention tool. The primary unit of research included the P5 members of the UNSC, and their interactions and engagements with one another in exercising their responsibilities to maintain peace and security within the international community regarding mass atrocities.

The researcher acquired the skills to conduct the research through numerous years of practical and professional experience with research. The researcher designed this qualitative case study according to the Institutional Review Board's (IRB) regulations at Walden University. The researcher used numerous data bases from various sites/sources to collect and gather all the data needed. As an observer, the researcher analyzed the voting records of the P5 members on resolutions put forth by the UN and UNSC to address the crisis in Syria. The researcher analyzed videos, websites, and other

documents to identify the actions of each permanent member of the UNSC regarding the use of their veto power and implementing Pillar 3 in Syria.

The current researcher had no personal or professional relationships with the participants (P5 members). The participants were representatives of their respective countries and were assumed to be responsible to their respective governments. Any personal biases were stated up front in this study and allowed the researcher to own his perspective, according to Rudestam and Newton (2015). As stated earlier, there were not any issues with power relationships in this study. The researcher did not have any direct contact with any of the participants, and only used secondary data to determine the policy beliefs/actions of each participant about using force in Syria to protect the civilian population that is at risk for further acts of mass atrocities.

The other potential risks of this study were founded in the institutional bias of the UNSC, where ideology and alliances skewed documents and other information to fit narratives of the P5, where contestation exists. These risks included participant biases (e.g., strategic interests), institutional biases (e.g., the UN's push to normalize the R2P doctrine), documents, videos, and websites. These risks may have been purposefully written to skew the reported results and prove that the use force in Syria is a viable option in preventing further suffering and harm to the civilian population.

Participant Selection Logic

The population for this study was comprised of the five permanent security council members: United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. Although the UNSC has 15 members at any given time, these five members are the only nations with permanent status; the other 10 members serve on a rotating basis. The five

permanent members are endowed with veto power; thus, they can prevent any action or

resolution on collective intervention, as part of the R2P doctrine. The criteria for the

population in this study was to have veto power within the UNSC, and only the five

permanent members have this power. The rationalization for examining this population

was that it only takes one member to prevent the use of collective action or obtaining a

consensus. A comparison-focused sampling strategy was used to review voting records,

analyze video interviews, and examine the strategic interests of each P5 member. The

researcher observed and examined websites and documents that supported each

participant's view on using force in Syria to protect civilians. Syria was the only case

study used in this dissertation. Syria was a classic case for Pillar 3, based on the criteria

set forth in the R2P doctrine; however, Pillar 3 was not implemented, even though Syria

met all the stated criteria.

For the procedures in this study, the researcher used online research to identify

and analyze each participants actions, statements, and other relevant behaviors on UNSC

resolutions on the crisis in Syria beginning in 2012. Saturation occurred when the

researcher collected all the information on implementing Pillar 3 in Syria, where only the

members of UNSC were viewed as having legal and legitimate authority to collectively

use force to intervene in the Syrian crisis.

Instrumentation

The collected data consisted of observation sheets, videos, and websites where

NGOs such as the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the Canadian

Centre for the Responsibility to Protect have promoted the implementation of Pillar 3 for

Syria. Archived documents of voting records and proposed resolutions on Syria will be

analyzed. Observation methods of a non-participatory nature were used to examine and analyze all information related to the UNSC and the use of force in Syria. The researcher used a researcher produced observation sheet to analyze voting records on proposed resolutions by the UN on Syria. In addition, the researcher used sources from three NGOs: (a) the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2019), (b) the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (n.d.), and (c) the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (n.d.). These sources contain videos, interviews, and presentations on the UNSC and implementing Pillar 3 in Syria. Finally, the UNSC was used as a source to examine the collective actions of the P5 members on their individual actions on the Syrian crisis. For the data collection instruments, the researcher used all the data sources to answer the research questions by showing the complexities within the system of the UNSC, which did not allow for consensus to be achieved to use force as a resolution in Syria. The researcher assumed that by using multiple data collection methods (i.e., triangulation), and validity measures, the content was established. The researcher used multiple streams of data collection and triangulation to answer the research question, which contributed to alignment, as well as with reliability and ethical issues. Finally, the researcher used a qualitative method to attach personal quality to the research through reflexivity and evaluation.

Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection

As previously mentioned, data were collected from the voting records of the permanent members of the UNSC with veto power. These records were available through multiple sources online, as well as on the UN website. The data were made available for public viewing on how each member voted on all proposed resolutions on Syria. Russia

has vetoed 12 resolutions on Syria. Only five permanent members of the UNSC exist: France, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and the United States. These P5 members are the only members with veto power, and therefore comprised the entire population. Based on this criterion, this population supplied all the necessary data needed to conduct the study. The researcher used multiple sources of secondary data for triangulation: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, the ICISS, the UNSC, and the UN General Assembly. The researcher examined these sources of secondary data to find the policy actions and beliefs of the P5 members on using force as a policy tool to prevent/stop mass atrocity crimes in Syria. Through informed research, the researcher also found that qualitative sampling was small and purposeful. Patton (2015) explained that qualitative inquiry typically focuses on relatively small samples, even single cases. In sampling purposefully, the researcher intentionally selected a sample to improve the focus on what was being studied, thereby strengthening the research. The duration of data collection continued until the researcher reached saturation from the examination of the various sources. The researcher used a purposive strategy to collect the data. Patton suggested that the logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information rich cases for in-depth analysis. The sample size of this strategy depended on the purpose of the study, the questions, and the design. All did align to focus the study and provide information that was thick and rich. According to Patton (2015), "Purposeful sampling is when information rich cases shine a light on the questions being studied" (p. 264). Small sample sizes in a qualitative study are often essential, as the analysis of large datasets could easily become overwhelming. Maxwell (2013) pointed

out that data for a qualitative study could include virtually anything that a researcher might see, hear, or that is otherwise communicate to a researcher while conducting the study. A large sample size, coupled with large amounts of data, would not have provided the rich thick information needed with purposeful sampling.

Patton (2015) articulated that qualitative inquiry has no rules for sample size, and it depends on "what you know, what is the purpose, the stakes, the usefulness, the credibility, and available time and resources" (p. 3). The current researcher employed a criteria-based strategy of the population for all the data. The population was comprised of the five permanent security council members with veto power: United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. The researcher used a criteria-based strategy to analyze all available voting records, the members' ideological beliefs, as well as their geopolitical self-interests to either employ or not to employ the mechanisms of Pillar 3 to protect the civilian population in Syria, even though they have been employed in Libya. The Syrian case was examined in-depth, and the emergent theory of the R2P was used to analyze the conditions that have led to Syria being labeled as a failed state under the R2P premise. In addition, the Libyan case was examined briefly to compare why the UNSC invoked Pillar 3 in Libya and not in Syria, despite many similarities.

The researcher selected cases to compare and to learn about the factors that explained the similarities and differences of each case, as it relates to R2P (Patton, 2015). One of the many important aspects of a qualitative research study is the collection of data. Creswell (2013) noted that qualitative researchers often "learn by doing" (p. 6). The entire process was iterative, and the data collection was "custom built, revised, and choreographed" (Huberman & Miles, 1994, p. 20) during this process. The researcher

employed strategies to organize, collect, manage, and store this information in completing the dissertation process more efficiently. The researcher used coding as the primary strategy for this project.

The researcher used coding to develop themes/patterns to create categories on voting for members of the UNSC. Coding is the process by which qualitative researchers describe and assign value to the data. Creswell (2013) argued that forming codes or categories represents the heart of qualitative data analysis. Coding involves taking the data and forming smaller categories of descriptive information. Qualitative coding involves the use of a word or a short phrase that summarizes the data. Coding was the critical link between data collection and their explanation of meaning (Creswell, 2013). The researcher used evaluation coding as a first cycle coding method to determine the ideology of each P5 member, and how this has influenced their perspectives on using force to protect the sovereignty, regarding fundamental human rights and dignity of civilians in Syria. Coding was used to evaluate the members' voting records on Syrian resolutions in the UN. The researcher used pattern codes and themes, specifically causes/explanations, as a second coding strategy to summarize the findings.

Data Analysis Plan

The researcher used secondary data as the main source of information gathering. Rudestam and Newton (2015) articulated that secondary data constitute a valid source of data for a research study, and many excellent studies have been conducted using data that has previously been collected. Those sources of secondary data comprise online resources, such as the United Nations Department of Public Information; the United Nations Regional Information Center for Western Europe; the UNOG Library, Records,

and Archive Unit; NGOs (e.g., the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the

Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect); documents (e.g., the UN Charter and

the World Summit Outcome Document); and resolutions from the UNSC, where each

member of the population had a record of their votes on military intervention in crises

like Syria. In addition to obtaining voting records, there were existing video interviews,

conferences on R2P recorded and available for viewing, recorded meetings on UNSC

conferences/meetings, and a wealth of other documents and digital sources from these

secondary sources.

Coding is a process used to organize and make sense of large amounts of

qualitative data (Creswell, 2013). Data analysis in qualitative research comprises a

researcher preparing and organizing the data for analysis; then reducing the data into

themes through a process of coding and condensing the codes; and finally representing

the data in figures, tables, or a discussion. Creswell defined coding as the process by

which qualitative researchers would describe and assign value to the data. In addition,

Creswell found that forming codes or categories is the goal of qualitative data analysis,

and when engaged in coding, the researcher is interpreting and analyzing the data.

The researcher employed this strategy to analyze and explain the data to answer

the research questions by considering similar words and phrases to examine whether

those member states were consistent in their themes when voting on resolutions on cases

other than Syria, or whether their tone differs with each case and their voting position

changes, despite similar conditions. The researcher used journaling to record observations

made while reviewing video content, interviews conducted by NGOs and other

organizations that have a history of discussing R2P, or other archived documents made

publicly available. The researcher also coded the observational notes from journaling by looking for similarities and differences in words and phrases in each case and comparing them with Syria.

In sum, the researcher used secondary data as the main source of gathering information for the study. The researcher employed two coding strategies to analyze, describe, and explain the data: descriptive and analytical/theoretical coding. In descriptive coding, the researcher described what was in the data, and during analytical/theoretical coding, the researcher developed codes about why what was occurring in the data might be happening (Gibbs & Taylor, 2005). These two coding methods allowed the researcher the best opportunity to describe, analyze, organize, explain, and interpret the data. The researcher used the available tools provided by NVivo software during the research process. Additionally, the researcher purchased two external hard drives to store all the research data and serve as the primary backups. The researcher stored the research throughout a digital network created through the years (i.e., multiple computer devices, desktop, laptop, and tablet; multiple storage devices, internal drives, external drives, and USB drives; and cloud storage and email). These strategies enabled the researcher to complete the data collection and analysis process effectively and efficiently.

Reliability

Rudestam and Newton (2015) suggested that reliability concerns the replicability of the study under similar circumstances. The researcher used secondary data that can be easily retrieved and viewed from online sources listed in the references section.

Additionally, coding was used to find themes and patterns that arrive at similar conclusions (Rudestam & Newton, 2015).

To ensure trustworthiness or reliability, the researcher used triangulation. Maxwell (2013) defined triangulation as collecting data from a diverse range of individuals and settings, using a variety of methods. The researcher mentioned multiple sources used above (i.e., UN website, videos, and NGOs), as well as specific methods for collecting the data (purposeful and comparison focuses sampling) and saturation of the data collected. Additionally, reflexivity and reactivity were used to address the researcher's bias. These biases were stated up-front for the audience to know and understand. Maxwell explained that eliminating the researcher's influence is impossible, but the goal is to understand this influence and use it productively. Finally, the researcher used prolonged contact or intensive, long-term involvement while engaged in the observation of the data, videos, interviews conducted online by secondary sources, and other documents. The researcher observed these repeatedly to determine the varying viewpoints of different experts on the R2P theory.

Validity

Rudestam and Newton (2015) stated that "all research bears the responsibility of convincing oneself and the intended audience that the findings are based on critical inquiry" (p. 131). The process of validation involves presenting a thoroughly sound research study that is grounded in reliable and credible information. In this study, the researcher measured validity in terms of the transferability, dependability, and confirmability of the data; each of these terms are discussed in greater detail below.

Transferability

Creswell (2013) defined validation as the process of evaluating trustworthiness, reported observations, interpretations, and generalizations. In addition, validating an argument or research process means showing it is well founded and sound, whether the results can be generalized to a larger group. Conversely, when a procedure or result is reliable, it means that researchers can depend on it (i.e., rely on it).

The researcher used rich data to provide a detailed analysis of the R2P doctrine, specifically Pillar 3. Thick description implies the description of behavior as well as the context that gives it meaning (Creswell, 2013, p. 133). Thus, the descriptions of the participants or setting under study was sufficiently detailed to allow for transferability to other settings. The collection of data provided a full picture of the complexities encountered by the UNSC to implement force in Syria. The researcher used a literary review matrix for literature collected during the study, and a journal for notetaking for analyzing videos and websites as secondary data. The researcher used numbers when examining the voting records of the population. Maxwell (2013) suggested that numbers can be used to report *quasi-statistics*, or simple numerical results. Using numbers is an important quality of the research to analyze the ideological policy beliefs of the population as they are expressed through their voting record on each resolution presented on Syria.

Dependability

To achieve dependability, the researcher used the criteria of adequacy and appropriateness of the data. The researcher collected, analyzed, and defined data through saturation. Rudestam and Newton (2015) referred to this process as "adequacy" (p. 133). The researcher used multiple sources of data to achieve saturation (i.e., voting records of the P5 members of the UNSC, websites that promote R2P, videos, and other documents). The researcher used triangulation to ensure dependability. The researcher cross-checked and corroborated R2P regarding Syria through different NGOs that have promoted the use of R2P in Syria. The researcher used the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, and the European Center for the Responsibility to Protect to cross-check and corroborate information and data on Syria and R2P. Lastly, the researcher used first and second coding to produce reflective journaling notes.

Confirmability

To ensure confirmability, the researcher employed strategies such as reflexivity, and contradictions that have resulted in intensive research. Rudestam and Newton (2015) defined reflexivity as the critical self-reflection component that illuminates the researcher's potential biases and assumptions. The researcher kept personal notes on his thoughts and observations during the study about the potential effects of the data. Finally, the researcher used triangulation to examine the pros and cons of the R2P doctrine by using multiple sources. These sources have shown different perspectives of using Pillar 3 (i.e., forceful intervention) in Syria. The researcher examined those perspectives to

achieve an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of implementing Pillar 3 in Syria. Throughout the research, the complexities of implementing or achieving consensus in the UNSC was discussed, as well as the contradictions of implementing R2P in Libya and not in Syria. Finally, all data were gathered from secondary sources and confirmed through online websites, documents, organizations, and video interviews.

Ethical Procedures

The purpose of the IRB was to assure that the potential benefits of the research, outweigh the potential risks. In addition, the IRB assures the researcher was in full compliance with all relevant regulations and laws (Rudestam & Newton, 2015). The IRB ensures that the stakeholders fully consent and are fully informed about any ethical issues or concerns that could potentially be harmful (Rudestam & Newton, 2015). This researcher examined the policy and procedures of the R2P as it relates to the third pillar of the Secretary General's 2009 report (A/63/677; UN General Assembly, 2005). The researcher examined the conditions in Syria to see why the UN Security Council, due to multitude of complexities, did not authorize using force in this case, but authorized the use of force in the Libyan case, despite similar conditions.

The ethical issues of this study primarily reflect the researcher's bias and influence toward the data. Merriam (2014) explained that clarifying researcher bias from the outset of the study was important so that the reader understands the researcher's position or any biases or assumptions that impact the inquiry. To address this bias, the researcher took a holistic account of the data. Creswell (2013) explained that by identifying the many factors and complexities of using force as an intervention tool in Syria, all the data will paint a larger picture. The researcher introduced these complexities

throughout the study by examining, analyzing, and reporting the many sides of the Pillar 3/R2P debate. Furthermore, the researcher used inductive and deductive logic to analyze all data.

The researcher determined that the risks included, but were not limited to, the assumption of bias due to P5 ideology, geopolitical interests, and history on nation-state sovereignty versus fundamental human rights. Finally, there were ethical concerns due to institutional bias, where documents, videos, and websites have been purposefully skewed to reflect member states' ideology and geopolitical interests. These interests reported results to show the use of force was/was not a viable intervention tool to combat mass atrocities. The benefit of this study expanded or improved the decision-making process, current policy, and selection to implement Pillar 3 to protect civilian populations who were at risk of mass human atrocities.

To make sure that this study passed the initial IRB review, the researcher ensured alignment with Walden's IRB requirements by carefully going over each section of the IRB application. In addition, the researcher completed the required course work from CITI to use secondary data for the research study. Because of the nature of the study, ethical concerns for human participants were not applicable. Furthermore, because all data collected were already published for public view, there were no ethical considerations for protection or confidentiality. The researcher enhanced the confidentiality of the results by using multiple internal/external storage devices, as well as an external cloud to store all the data used for the research.

Summary

In Chapter 3, the researcher discussed the methodology of the study, including the techniques that guided data collection and data analysis. This chapter also included a discussion of the researcher's role, the population, and the instrumentation, as well as the procedures to ensure credibility, dependability, validity, and transferability. Chapter 4 includes a discussion of the results of the data analysis. In Chapter 5, the researcher presents implications for social change and recommendations for future research based on the current findings.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine the implementation of Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine. Pillar 3 is an intervention tool used by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), when all peaceful means have been exhausted in a crisis-related situation, such as in Syria during 2012 (Grover, 2015; Kolmašová, 2016; Vanhullebusch, 2015). This goal is important to address, because Syria has experienced mass atrocities that continue to disrupt peace and security within the international arena. As defined in the UN Charter and in accordance with the R2P doctrine, Pillar 3 measures are a last resort option to maintain or restore peace and security within the international community. For this research, the research questions were leveraged to address the research problem, as follows:

RQ1: Was R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related human endeavors?

RQ2: Did the application of R2P result in negative outcomes?

RQ3: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis in   Syria?

In Chapter 3, the research design, rationale, validity, and ethical and methodological considerations were explored and presented. In Chapter 4, the researcher presents an in-depth discussion of the research setting, demographics, data collection, and data analysis process. The data collection details include the collection and analysis procedures used to evaluate actions of the P5 members in the UNSC, the UN, experts on R2P, NGOs, and all other online resources related to R2P, and

specifically, the implementation of Pillar 3. Additionally, the researcher examined

relevant existing data on Syria, R2P, and the UN/UNSC resolutions from 2015-2020.

The researcher also highlights categories/codes, themes, and patterns that were revealed

through the analysis and coding process using a software package, Nvivo 12. Finally,

this chapter includes a detailed discussion of the results of this study and how these

results helped to answer the research questions and research problem.

Setting

For this study, the researcher used a purposeful criterion sampling strategy to

collect data from the five permanent members of the UNSC (P5) because they have veto

power. This veto power enables each of the permanent five members to nullify any

resolutions or actions proposed by the UNSC. The research was conducted using

secondary data to answer the research questions; therefore, there were no direct factors or

influences effecting the population, or the results that were analyzed and interpreted.

Upon receiving approval from the Walden Institutional Review Board (IRB), the

researcher began the online collection of data from the five permanent members of the

UNSC on resolutions concerning the crisis in Syria, beginning in 2012. Additionally, data

was collected from three NGO's, who specialize in R2P. Other online sources were used

that provided videos, interviews, and documents related to answering the research

questions. Finally, the researcher used additional online websites such as the Global

Policy Forum and the Global Center on Cooperative Security to collect, examine, and

analyze data for the purpose of answering the research questions and addressing the

research problem.

Demographics

The researcher selected a criterion-based purposeful sampling strategy to identify the members of the UNSC that could single handedly prevent the UNSC from acting in a decisive manner (employing force) to prevent or stop mass atrocities. The UNSC is constructed around the P5 (permanent members of the UNSC). As previously mentioned, the P5 is comprised of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. These five nations were allies during World War II, and they possess the world's top five nuclear arsenals. Because each of these nations are endowed with the power to unilaterally reject any proposed resolutions or actions put forth by the UNSC, and thus nullify any attempts at consensus (i.e., veto power), they were the focus of this study. The researcher examined the Libyan crisis as a source of reference because it is the only case on record to employ Pillar 3 through a consensus in the UNSC. All the data collected for this study revolved around these five nations which held veto power. The researcher collected data from experts on R2P, NGOs, and other documents pertaining to R2P.

The implementation of Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine is solely dependent on the P5 members coming to a consensus. Figure 1 shows the deep division within the UNSC, particularly the P5, at the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2012. The chart not only shows the failure of the UNSC to adopt a resolution condemning the Assad regime of violently suppressing anti-government demonstrators, but it previews how the division within the UNSC continues to this day, preventing the implementation of R2P, and resulting in the continued pain and suffering for those civilians at risk for mass atrocities, particularly in Syria.

Figure 1

UNSC Voting Members on UN Resolution in 2012

Quality of Governance: Friends & Foes of Syria *(WGI 2010)*

Note. Chart includes Syria and both countries vetoing UN Security Resolution on Feb. 4th, 2012 (Russia and China), as well as 8 of the 12 countries that supported the resolution that failed to be adopted. All permanent members of UN Security Council included in this chart. Governance data source: Author's calculations, from the Worldwide Governance Indicators," by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, October 2011 – www.govindicators.org

Note. Retrieved from https://govindicators.org.

In addition to collecting data from the P5, data were also collected from three

NGOs that advocated for and employed experts on the R2P doctrine. These were the

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the Canadian Centre for the

Responsibility to Protect, and the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect.

The Global Centre for the Responsibility to protect was established in 2008, and its

mission statement is to make R2P a reality by advocating and advancing R2P around

three specific principles: (a) clarifying R2P, (b) advocating for R2P implementation, and

(c) strengthening and institutionalizing R2P (GCR2P, 2019). The Canadian Centre for the

Responsibility to Protect (n.d.) is based out of the University of Toronto; it is "a non-

profit, non-partisan research organization which aims to promote scholarly engagement

and political implementation of the R2P principle" (http://ccr2p.org/mandate, para. 1).

The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (n.d.) was founded in 2009

by representatives of eight regional and international NGOs; their mission is to bring

together coalitions of NGOs, regionally and internationally, to promote consensus for

R2P.

Dr. Simon Adams, Executive Director at the Global Centre for the Responsibility

to Protect and an expert on the R2P doctrine, conducted online video interviews, spoke at

conferences on R2P and the Syrian Crisis, and published articles on R2P, where his

analysis and expertise contributed to answering the research questions, while addressing

the research problem. The Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the

International Crisis Group, the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect,

and the Global Policy Forum each published articles, held conferences, and participated

in international events focusing on the R2P doctrine. Additionally, each NGO

participated at conferences held by the UN General Assembly on the importance of R2P

and its role in protecting vulnerable populations to maintain international peace and

security.

Data Collection

After receiving approval from the IRB (01-23-20-0151870), the researcher began

the collection of secondary data by examining sources online. The researcher started with

searching the UN website for all available articles, videos, and previously recorded

interviews and conferences that pertained to Syria and the R2P doctrine. Upon examining

the UN website, the researcher found a link that specifically referenced the UNSC, and

then searched the UNSC page for resolution pertaining to Syria. Several resolutions were

found, but the researcher focused on those from the past 5 years. The researcher

identified only one resolution—Resolution Resolution 2209 (2015)—that referenced

collective forceful action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The United Nations

Security Council Resolution 2209 condemns any use of chemicals as a weapon in the

Syrian Civil War and threatens to use force if chemical weapons are used again in the

conflict. The resolution was passed with 14 in favor, with one abstention from Venezuela

(UN Security Council, 2015). The representative from Venezuela stated:

> He had abstained because the vote prejudged the results of the ongoing OPCW
>
> investigation. That inquiry should first conclude, to determine
>
> responsibility. Syria was a victim of armed groups that fueled hatred and
>
> violence, and that also had major military capacity (www.un.org, 2015, para. 6).

The researcher continued to conduct an exhaustive search for resolutions related

to Syria and R2P (Pillar 3) from 2015 to 2020 but could not find any other resolutions

that addressed the use of force as a viable option or discussed any military options under

chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The researcher used Resolution 2209 as the lone indicator

for analyzing the UNSC and how they approached the use of force as an intervention tool

in Syria. In addition to searching for Syrian resolutions on the UN website, the researcher

used the Google Scholar search engine to search for Syrian resolutions by the UN/UNSC

from other online sources, including documents, charts and tables, and videos. The

researcher examined and analyzed 16 resolutions from 2015 to 2020 that were voted on

in the UNSC concerning Syria. Outside of Resolution 2209, mentioning Chapter 7

options for using chemical weapons by the Assad regime against Syrian civilians,

Resolution 2249 called for member states to take all necessary measures to combat

terrorism within Syria. This call to action, however, was not deemed a collective organized military action under Pillar 3. Figure 2, retrieved from the UNSC website, illustrates the most recent resolutions that have prompted the use of veto power by each of the P5 members.

Figure 2

Issues that have Prompted the Most Vetoes in the UNSC

When Syria is the lone issue, Russia and China have used their veto power exclusively. Figure 2 also demonstrates the deep political/ideological divide within the UNSC and why consensus on R2P/Pillar 3 has been an impossible conclusion. Additionally, the division within the UNSC is displayed in Figure 2, where it shows Russia and China are aligned on most of the issues presented in Figure 2, and the U.S., France, and the U.K. are also aligned. The polarization of the UNSC, as stated early in the study between those two factions (P3 vs P2), is illustrated in figure 2. Therefore, making consensus non-

existent, particularly on issue dealing with Syria, where Russia and China are the only nations to use their veto.

Next, the researcher searched previously mentioned NGO website for interviews, statements, conferences, and other documents created by experts. Dr. Simon Adams of the GCR2P spoke at several conferences held on R2P and conducted interviews on the doctrine, specifically mentioning the Syrian Crisis and the need for the international community to fulfill its responsibilities to the Syrian people using the guidelines of R2P. Additionally, several published videos, articles, and statements were found on the UN/UNSC websites where the failures of R2P were examined and discussed amongst experts. The pros and cons of military intervention, the impact of Russian and Chinese veto's in Syria, the lessons learned from intervening in Libya, and the future of R2P were the subjects analyzed. Furthermore, the websites of the following were to collect data: the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the International Crisis Group, the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, and the Global Policy Forum, all provided critical information on the Syrian crisis and R2P. Some of this information included comments and analysis on R2P from previous UN Secretary General's Ban Ki-moon and Kofi Annan, as well as current Secretary General Antonio Guterres. The case for military intervention was examined, along with the legal foundations of intervening under R2P in a nation with a recognizable functioning government. Finally, data was collected and analyzed on the general philosophy of R2P moving forward. Preventive diplomacy was examined by Dr. Adams where he focused in on the first two principles of R2P, when conducting interviews. Articles that emphasized R2P 2020, where UN member states were called on to embrace the five policy priorities of: Prevent; Protect;

Resist; End Impunity; and Empower. The researcher concentrated on those secondary sources that referenced R2P, Syria, and Libya. However, the researcher did find several videos and other documents with experts discussing the failure of the UNSC to take appropriate action pertaining to R2P in Syria. Finally, the researcher analyzed documents that outlined and discussed military intervention, preventive diplomacy, and the selectivity of using or implementing Pillar 3.

<div align="center">**Data Analysis Plan**</div>

As previously mentioned earlier in this study, Creswell (2013) stated that data generated by qualitative methods are voluminous and can be overwhelming. As indicated earlier in the data analysis plan in Chapter 3, the researcher used NVivo 12 to assist with collecting, organizing, coding, and storing the data for this study. NVivo was used as the primary mechanism to analyze, code, and determine themes/categories/patterns. Additionally, all videos, documents, interviews, and observations were imported to NVivo, where they were assigned a category by file name, and subsequently analyzed under nodes created by the researcher to code the data.

The researcher then coded the data using the coding tool under NVivo 12 by creating nodes to describe the data. Miles et al. (2014) suggested that "a descriptive code assigns labels to data to summarize in a word or short phrase…eventually providing an inventory of topics for indexing and categorizing" (p. 73). Each node was given a name to code the data. The researcher created five nodes to code the data, where the researcher looked for similar words, phrases, and ideological beliefs on sovereignty, human rights, intervention, and R2P. The researcher then analyzed the documents by highlighting, within each article, the words, and phrases that the researcher found to be similar within

each node and then were coded. Additionally, the researcher transcribed the videos where experts from NGOs were interviewed or were discussing R2P as part of a panel/conference. The researcher created observation sheets on some of the videos and photos where there was no narrator. Finally, the researcher used NVivo 12 to create word trees, word clusters, and charts from the data. This data included the using key words and phrases such as: Syrian resolutions, failure of R2P, humanitarianism, military intervention in Syria, UNSC and R2P, UNSC and Libya, UNSC and Syria, R2P, the Responsibility to Protect, UN mandates on military intervention, UNSC voting patterns on R2P, and the UN Charter and R2P. Observations sheets were created from the analysis of videos, articles, and documents found on various websites, including GCR2P, and the CCR2P: (1) The ACT Code of Conduct and the UN Security Council, (2) R2P 5 years 5 vetoes, Simon Adams on R2P, Syria, and the reform of the Security Council, (3) Syria: Nine Years of Atrocities, Impunity, and Inaction, and (4) 6 key point of military intervention in Syria.s

The five nodes/codes are as follows. Under the node of UN/UNSC resolutions from 2015-2020, the researcher was looking for all the resolutions that were brought forth on the Syrian crisis during this specified time-period. The researcher found 11 such resolutions that addressed the crisis in Syria. As previously mentioned in the Data Collection Section, only two of those resolutions—2118 and 2209—directly mentioned any collective action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, thus suggesting implementing Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine. Under the node of military intervention, the researcher imported documents, charts, videos, and articles discussing or examining calls for and against using force as tools for intervention in the Syrian crisis. The third node was

interview and analysis of experts concerning the R2P doctrine. The researcher examined the NGOs' websites, UN/UNSC conferences on R2P, and videos interviewing Dr. Simon Adams, Kofi Anan, and others who spoke to the principles of R2P, and the complexities of implementing the R2P doctrine. Under the fourth node, international peace and security, the researcher examined data that discussed the purposes of the UN, as the accepted entity of the international community, that has the legal, legitimate, and moral authority to maintain peace and security. Finally, the use of diplomacy was examined within the data to justify if the use of force was warranted under Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine. Pillar 3 is a last-resort option, as stated in the doctrine of R2P, and all measures of diplomacy should be exhausted before measures under Pillar 3 are considered by the UN/UNSC.

In summary, the researcher created five nodes to code all the data collected and analyzed to answer the research questions. The node/codes were placed into categories, where themes/patterns were revealed. These themes/patterns consisted of: (a) the use of veto power by P5 members in the UNSC to protect their national interests; (b) the failure of R2P, specifically in Libya and the effects of implementing pillar 3 after Libya; and (c) inaction by the UNSC in Syria based on the failures in Libya.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

Patton (2015) declared that the challenge of qualitative analysis lies in making sense of massive amounts of data; therefore, in this qualitative case study design, the researcher employed triangulation strategies to analyze the secondary data that was examined from all available online sources listed in chapter 2. The researcher shared the results within this study through various measures (i.e., charts, tables, quotes from

experts, and summations of observations/transcripts). The researcher examined and

analyzed secondary data from multiple sources and specified the methods for collecting

the data until determining that saturation had occurred. Finally, the researcher engaged in

an exhaustive and prolonged research of the data, including watching/observing videos,

reading documents, taking notes on interviews by experts on R2P, and analyzing

resolutions from the UNSC/UN on R2P. This was repeatedly done in an intensive manner

to experience different points of views on R2P.

Transferability

The researcher provided thick description of the data, first by coding the data

collected to develop themes by associating themes, which were used to answer each

research question. The data collected painted a full picture of the complexities involved

in achieving consensus within the UNSC to implement Pillar 3. The researcher used all

the resources stated in Chapter 3 and did not deviate from the research methodology;

therefore, transferability remains viable.

Dependability

The researcher achieved saturation of the data through the coding process. The

researcher collected, analyzed, defined, and coded the data until themes/patterns were

revealed in the results, and repeated. Multiple sources were used from online resources

(e.g., UNSC/UN websites, NGO websites, online interviews, conferences, videos, other

documents). Triangulation was implemented to ensure dependability (interviews by

different experts, different perspectives of using force as an intervention tool, and

analysis of ideology of implementing pillar 3 in Syria based on P3 vs P2 in the UNSC),

and the results were shared through tables, charts, quotes, and experts' analysis. First and second coding techniques were used to determine nodes within NVivo, which helped to analyze the data and provide themes. Finally, the researcher used journaling and transcription to create tables summarizing the findings.

Confirmability

The researcher ensured confirmability by utilizing the strategies stated in Chapter 3. The researcher used multiple sources to reveal the results provided by the data. Pillar 3 was analyzed and examined by all relevant secondary sources from the UNSC, experts, NGOs, and all other documents related to R2Pin the modern era. Different perspectives were reported in the results, as evidenced in the tables, charts, and quotes presented in the findings. Also, the researcher examined Libya as the sole case of implementing Pillar 3 by the UNSC. The Libyan case was used to examine the complexities of applying R2P, which have resulted in inaction in Syria, despite their similarities. Finally, the data reported in the results are from all the secondary sources stated throughout the study and are therefore confirmable through those online resources.

Results

The results of this study are presented in the sections below. The findings from the data are separated according to each research question, and the themes that were revealed from the coding of the data are presented using the previously mentioned secondary sources. These secondary sources, after conducting the data analysis process,

revealed three major themes, mentioned above, that were purposefully organized by the researcher to align each research question with each theme.

Research Question 1

RQ1 asked: Was R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related human endeavors? The theme that emerged to answer this question, was the constant use of the P5's veto power—particularly the United States, Russia, and China—to protect their national interests/security. First, the researcher would like to define, for this study, the timeline for R2P in terms of modern crisis-related human endeavors. Earlier in this paper, the researcher mentioned the crises of the 1990s. These crises, which included Kosovo and Rwanda, were undertaken under the banner of Humanitarian Intervention (HI) Although R2P evolved from HI, the R2P doctrine established principles that held nation-states primarily responsible for the protection of their citizens. Sovereignty is seen as two-fold (state versus the individual). Humanitarian Intervention placed emphasis on nation-states rights, while R2P places an emphasis on individual rights, and, therefore, challenges the old norms of sovereignty when it comes to addressing mass atrocities. Dr. Simon Adams (2017) articulated the following:

> I do not believe in humanitarian intervention. There was a lot of time, political sweat, pain, and suffering behind the great humanitarian intervention debates of the 1990's. R2P essentially came out of the attempt to develop concepts and way's which transcend the old mentality of humanitarian intervention. This is an

important point of distinction. I do not think the two are interchangeable. R2P

transcends humanitarian intervention. (pp. 1-2)

Additionally, Lopez (2015) stated that humanitarian intervention, which involves the use

of armed force to protect civilians at risk of mass crimes, has generated a great deal of

controversy due to major failures in the 1990s and questions regarding the effectiveness,

motivations, legality, and legitimacy of interventions (p. 122).   For the purposes of

analyzing and interpreting the results of this study, the R2P framework is only applicable

to those crises that meet the criteria of the four core mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war

crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing), after the 2005 World Summit

Meeting, where the R2P doctrine was universally adopted by all member states in the

UN.

Figure 1 in the demographics section of this chapter revealed the deep division

within the UNSC at the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2012. This figure illustrates the

division by pointing out the use of 'veto power' by Russia and China on matters

concerning intervention and R2P, after Resolutions 1970 and 1973 invoked the use of

force in Libya. The chart further showed the polarization between the United States,

France, and United Kingdom (P3) and Russia and China (P2) based on the use their veto

power to protect their interests in the Middle East. Unfortunately, this trend has continued

to impede the UNSC's ability to invoke or implement the principles of R2P in many of

the crises that have emerged since Libya. Lopez (2015) indicated that many have

questioned the wisdom and effectiveness of the intervention. Lopez (2015) further

suggests in an interview with Thomas Friedman (2015), that for the UN to renew hope in

the future of R2P, it must address the failures of R2P in Libya (pp. 119-138). Libya was the first and only case to achieve a consensus in the UNSC to invoke Chapter 7 measures.

In *When the UNSC fails, the UN fails* (GCR2P, 2016), the video begins with the inscription that P5 members of the UNSC have the right to veto but with this also comes responsibility to provide alternative options. Suggestions were made by the following individuals with professional knowledge, experience, and expertise: (a) Mary Robinson, Elder, former President of Ireland, and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, articulated that the UNSC was setup to be the leader on peace and security, and when it fails, the consequences are terrible. (b). Salil Shetty, Secretary-General of Amnesty International, explained that the UNSC was created to prevent mass atrocities, unfortunately, they have consistently failed the world from Rwanda to Syria. (c). Kofi Annan, Chair of the Elders, and former UN Secretary-General, stated:

> That it should be incumbent upon a member state, if it uses a veto, to present an alternative. You cannot put down a veto, paralyze operations creating a stalemate and not propose a way forward. When they are divided and cannot agree on a resolution, the crisis tends to fester. (GCR2P, 2016, p. 52).

The data revealed, after the Libyan crisis, that the tone of Russia and China changed dramatically in terms of using R2P, particularly Pillar 3 measure (2016) suggested that there were different outcomes in the UNSC for Libya and Syria. The practical implications of the situation in Libya (i.e., no national/strategic interests by China and Russia, no regional support for the Gaddafi regime, etc.) allowed for consensus, abstentions by Russia and China, to allow for military intervention. The opposite was true for Syria; therefore, no consensus was achieved. Furthermore, after the

intervention in Libya leading to regime change, the Russians and the Chinese began to think of R2P, particularly Pillar 3, as a tool for Western imperialism. Lee and Chan (2016) concluded that China and India's response to the Crisis in Syria was based on the history of abuse by Western powers during the ages of imperialism and colonialism (pp. 180-181). Moreover, to illustrate China's selective attitude toward Pillar 3, in 2011-2012, When the UNSC was debating to invoke Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to endorse military intervention in various countries in Africa and the Middle East (Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, Mali, and Syria), China acquiesced in all cases except in Syria (Lee & Chan, p. 179). After abstaining to vote against intervention in Libya and understanding how NATO changed the mission from protecting civilians into regime change, Russia has since made every effort to block all UNSC resolutions on Syria that has been put forth by the United States and NATO. The following is a summary that Odeyemi (2016) provided on Russian/Chinese vetoes at the beginning of the Syrian crisis:

> In October of 2011, Russia and China vetoed a resolution that condemned Syria's crackdown on anti-government forces. In February of 2012, they vetoed a resolution proposed by the League of Arab States, supporting a peace plan calling for a cease in violence. In July of 2012, Russia/China vetoed a resolution calling for Chapter VII measures demanding the Syrian government stop hostilities or face sanctions. Finally, in May of 2014, they vetoed a resolution referring the case in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). (p. 136)

The data presented by Odeyemi (2016) suggested a trend by the Russians and Chinese— with the support of India, Brazil, and South Africa—to contest the other permanent members of the UNSC in Syria. Odeyemi (2016) further suggested that the BRICS

(Brazil, Russia, India, China, & South Africa) nations were ubiquitous in recent debates as a symbolic counterbalance to Western dominance of the international order (p. 128). Lopez (2015) cited Genser's statement that "Western powers made a huge mistake by pivoting so rapidly to regime change, which wasn't justifiable under R2P and wasn't justifiable under the resolution" (pp. 228-229). To date, Russia—with the backing of China—has vetoed 14 UNSC resolutions on Syria since the beginning of the conflict. Averre and Davies (2015) suggested that the Russians felt that R2P should focus entirely on the first two pillars as a means of protecting vulnerable populations. Pillar 3 was viewed as a tool for the West to promote democracy and regime change. They ultimately concluded, however, that the Russian position was hypocritical when it came to using force, as an intervention tool, in Crimea and the Ukraine when it suited their interests. Russia has blocked 13 resolutions primarily concerning humanitarian efforts to ease the pain and suffering of Syrian civilians. As previously mentioned, Resolutions 2118 and 2209 were the only resolutions that called for Chapter 7 and Pillar 3 measures to be applied in case of continued chemical weapons use/attacks by the Assad regime. Table 1 illustrates the vetoed resolutions on Syria and the nations who did not support each of these resolutions (Russo, 2017).

Additionally, as seen in Table 2, Russo (2017) enumerated resolutions passed in Syria. Many of the resolutions align with Russian interests, backed by China, to try and maintain the sovereign integrity of the Assad regime over Syria. This data revealed the inconsistencies of the implementation of Pillar 3 in modern related crises. Political interests, ideology, and national security concerns have created complex conflicts and polarization within the UNSC, where Libya has been the only modern-day crisis to

receive a vote of consensus to use force as an intervention tool. All other crises have

failed to achieve consensus, because of the use of the veto. Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, Mali,

Crimea, Ukraine, Myanmar, and Syria all have fallen victim to the UNSC's failure to

consistently apply R2P when civilians have the potential to become the victims of mass

atrocity crimes. The use of the veto has led to a pattern of non-consensus within the

UNSC to uphold its obligation to maintain international peace and security. Russia's and

China's use of their veto power to stall action has resulted in the continuation of mass

atrocities, specifically in Syria. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

(2020) concluded that:

> Throughout the past nine years the UN Security Council has consistently failed to
>
> uphold its responsibility to protect the Syrian people. Fourteen vetoes by Russia
>
> (including eight with China) have undermined international efforts to hold
>
> perpetrators on all sides accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity
>
> (p. 1).

Salil Shetty (2016), Secretary-General of Amnesty International, has called for the P5

members of the UNSC—particularly the United States, Russian, and China—to stop

using the veto to protect themselves and focus on protecting civilians who are dying in

large numbers. Further, he stated that, it is high time that these governments put the

protection of people over their narrow political interests (GCR2P, 2016, 2.53). Lopez

(2015) articulated that:

> Ultimately… decisions about intervention will continue to be made in an ad hoc
>
> fashion by political leaders balancing national interests, legal considerations,
>
> world opinion, perceived costs, and humanitarian impulses – much as they were

prior to the advent of R2P. (pp. 119-138)

The use of the veto has led to R2P being applied inconsistently by the UNSC (P5). Their national political and security interests have led those members, particularly the United States, Russia, and China, to apply their veto power in a contradictory manner in some modern-day crises in parts of Africa and the Middle East.

Research Question 2

RQ2 asked: Does the application of R2P result in negative outcomes? The theme associated with answering this research question was, the failures of R2P after Libya. The examination of the data for the Libyan crisis was used to answer this research question. Libya was the only case where R2P, specifically Pillar 3, had been applied. Resolution 1973 was adopted on March 17, 2011, authorizing the use of all measure necessary to protect civilians, including establishing a no-fly zone. Ten UNSC members voted on this resolution, with five members abstaining. More importantly, there were no votes against the resolution by any of the P5 members, and thus consensus was achieved. This allowed for Pillar 3 to be implemented for the first time under the UNSC. Lopez (2015) stated that the Libyan case remains an anomaly as the only Arab Spring uprising that sparked swift action by the international community and led to an armed intervention (p. 3). The UNSC has failed to act in any other crisis, meeting the requirements of pillar 3, with forceful intervention.

Libya was the most frequently used word in this theme. Of the 13 files/nodes, and 31 references coded in this theme, Libya or Libyan was mentioned more than 70

times. Syria or Syrian was the next most frequently used word, at 40 times. Nevertheless,

Libya is the only case where Pillar 3 was legally and legitimately employed to protect

civilians who were at risk for mass atrocities. Feikes (2017) articulated that the U.S. and

NATO intervened in Libya in 2011 due to fears of a massacre of innocent civilians in

Benghazi at the hands of dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Gareth Evans (2002, as cited in

Lopez 2015), one of the architects of the R2P doctrine, stated that "the campaign in Libya

has done grave, possibly even irreparable, damage to R2P's prospects of becoming a

global norm" (pp. 119-138). The data continued to reveal, through the failure of R2P,

additional analysis of documents on the effects of R2P in Libya. Peta (2017) suggested

that R2P is inherently problematic, indicating that states do not intervene to stop/prevent

human suffering, but rather to achieve a strategic objective. Peta (2017) continued to

suggest that once a state intervenes and achieves their strategic objective within a

country, they have no obligation to stay and help rebuild, and thus can leave the country

in even worse shape than prior to intervention. Peta's analysis confirms that the

application of R2P has created some negative outcomes, specifically in Libya as the lone

case for the implantation of the R2P doctrine (Peta, 2017).

After the United States and its NATO allies achieved their strategic objective of

protecting Libyan civilians and then reverting to regime change, under the veil of R2P,

they abandoned the newly installed government of Libya without the necessary political

and socio-economic foundations to prevent chaos from returning. Peta (2017) declared

that in achieving their strategic objective, NATO dismantled Libya's state apparatus and

left the country in a more vulnerable position than it was under Gaddafi's rule. As a result

of NATO's intervention, Libya is now on the verge of genocide. Table 3 is a summation

that the researcher created from the analysis of experts on R2P and its failures in Libya.

Table 3 illustrates how each of these individual experts express how the application of R2P eventually failed the Libyan people, resulting in negative outcomes, which have left Libyan civilians in a worse position than before the R2P mandate. In a personal interview, Genser (2012) articulated:

The ethicality of the intervention under R2P extends beyond Gaddafi's fall to the trends in post-war Libya, where there have been few positive developments. Since the end of the war in October 2011, Libya has been plagued by economic instability, widespread violence and insecurity and threats to political transition processes (p. 12).

The application of R2P, specifically Pillar 3, in Libya initially fulfilled its stated goals. When those goals were averted into regime change, however, the international community—led by those states who are permanent members in the UNSC and NATO allies (United States, France, and United Kingdom)—failed to apply what many R2P experts are now touting as the fourth pillar; the Responsibility to Rebuild. Duncan Pickard, nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center and former Libya country director for Democracy Reporting International, observed that unlike its neighbors, this country had to effectively start from scratch: "Libya had nothing to work with – no institutions to draw from, no legal continuity with the past." (Lopez, 2015, p. 131). Additionally, Mattia Toaldo of the European Council on Foreign Relations suggested that support for Libya's transition was limited and should have included efforts

to build the legitimacy of institutions and political actors, promote reconciliation among former combatants, encourage national dialogue and address the worsening economic conditions (Lopez, 2015, p. 131). Nevertheless, the pattern of R2P failures laid out by these individual experts has provided detailed evidence of the negative outcomes that have befallen Libya, which is the only case, where R2P has been applied by the UNSC.

Two nodes/codes were created in Nvivo to analyze articles, interviews, and videos of experts and their analysis of the impact of R2P in Libya. The themes that were analyzed consisted of: (1) the failure of R2P and (2) the inconsistent historical application of R2P. Individual analysis of statements by selected experts were highlighted in Nvivo, where word clouds and word trees were examined. Table 3, a Summation of R2P and its Failures in Libya, was created by the researcher as an illustration, concluding the analysis of a few experts on how R2P failed in Libya.

Research Question 3

RQ3 asked: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis in Syria? The theme provided by the data was inaction by the UNSC in Syria from 2015 to present. Furthermore, the data provided evidence that R2P has not been applied consistently since its inception in 2005. While analyzing the data to answer the first research question, it was revealed that overall, R2P has not been consistently applied through all modern- day crises. The use of the 'veto' provided evidence that after Libya, the UNSC has failed to reach a consensus to fully apply R2P on any case, particularly Syria, with consistency.

The BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have used their regional influence, as well as the veto powers of Russia and China to foster inaction within the UNSC, consequently, resulting in the continuation of pain and suffering for Syrian civilians. Lee and Chan (2016) professed that both Russian and China tend to reject U.S. liberalism and the advancement of Western ideals of regime change under the auspices of democracy in the form of R2P. Averre and Davies (2015) declared that Russia prefers the status-quo of the international order, where human rights are secondary to the international norm of state rights, lending to the concept that the actions of Russia, appear to undermine the basic principles of R2P. These differences in ideology, as it pertains to sovereignty, have fueled the complexities over implementing/applying R2P (Pillar 3) in Syria. Russo (2017) voiced that the case of Syria has revealed the depth of political and ideological differences among UNSC member states related to the implementation of R2P's third pillar, calling into question its effectiveness as an international norm.

After examining the use of pillar 3 measures in Libya, the negative outcomes, appear to have affected how the UNSC has engaged the crisis in Syria (Dr. Adams, 2017 & Lopez 2015). Although there are many similarities between the two cases (Libya/Syria), the lessons learned from the post-conflict in Libya, and the apprehension of most of the members in the UNSC, except for Russia, to commit resources, particularly military, has stagnated R2P's effectiveness. Feikes (2017) expressed that by not deciding to act in Syria, the U.S. and its NATO allies opened the door to a Russian intervention on behalf of the Assad regime. The GCR2P has suggested that the UNSC

has failed to: (a) end indiscriminate air strikes, (b) end the use of illegal weapons, and (c) ensure humanitarian access.

The data further revealed that inaction in Syria was due to a lack "prospects of success" (Kildron, 2012 & Odeyemi, 2016). As previously mentioned, there are four criteria, additionally put forth by Kildron (2012), that should be present when considering military intervention. If these criteria are met, then the chances of the mission being successful increase. These conditions were presented but not in Libya and not in Syria. Table 4 contains the four criteria for success that were based on the forceful intervention in Libya.

Table 4 explains how Libya met all four criteria and therefore, the chances of a military intervention by NATO, should be successful. Kildron (2012) explained that military intervention is not a "Panacea for all humanitarian intervention and should only be explored in cases with high probability of success" (p. 36). Kildron (2012) also concluded that the criteria stated in the Libyan model needed to be in place, to achieve the goals of a successful intervention via force. According to the Libyan Model, therefore, Syria was not a good case for Pillar 3 measures under the R2P mandate, because it does not satisfy any of the four criteria needed for a successful intervention. There is no international mandate that allows for the implementation of Pillar 3 under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Russia and China have used their veto power to block all resolutions that discussed the use of force within the UNSC, thereby nullifying consensus. Barber (2019) stated that the Security Council has not been able to do much on Syria. Barber (2019) further suggested that with limited exceptions, the UNSC has failed to impose any of the tangible measures that the UN Charter says it may employ to

give effect to its decisions. This political and ideological divide in the UNSC created the impossibility of obtaining an international mandate to use R2P, to protect Syrian civilians. Barber (2019) also communicates this by declaring that the Security Council cannot take meaningful action in any conflict where the interests of an aggressor align with those of one of the five permanent members – in other words, most conflicts. Bellamy (2014) and Morris (2013) both concluded that the pursuit of narrow national interests by the P5 made it impossible to apply R2P in the Syrian case.

The Syrian crisis seems to have international acknowledgement on the need to protect civilians that are suffering from mass atrocities and need humanitarian assistance. For the reasons mentioned above, however, a broad coalition supporting intervention to protect civilians has been unable to manifest. The division within the UNSC has not allowed for a broad coalition to form. Differences in ideology, political will, and skepticism after the Libyan crisis has caused inaction in Syria and allowed for the crisis to continue. Odeyemi (2016) articulated that when a house is divided, such as the contest between the Sino-Russia (P2) alliance and the United States–France–United Kingdom P3 alliance over R2P intervention in Syria, that division within the UNSC, leaves civilians who are at-risk for mass atrocity crimes, un-protected, as are Syrian civilians in this case (p. 122). Topal (2013) continued along this theme of inaction by declaring that Security Council could not—and does not have the ability to take action, due to the opposition of China, and especially Russia. Topal (2013) further cites that the lack of shared political decisiveness among member states result in the UN possessing an unsustainable structure incompatible with the conditions of our times (p. 2). The opposition of Russia and China,

along with the regional influence of India, Brazil, and South Africa (BRICS), have not allowed for the formation of a broad coalition under the criteria of the Libyan Model.

The third factor in the Libyan Model, regional support, was also revealed in the data to be another missing part in the prospects of success criteria. The data has shown that there is no regional support to implement R2P in Syria. Iran has a vested interest, along with Russia, in keeping Assad in power. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, U.S and Israel, would like to see Assad driven from power. Dragovic and Iron (2017) declared that regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia "have a vested interest in influencing the postwar settlement to their own advantage" (p. 67). The Arab league has not been able to declare its support for any group in Syria, thus providing further proof of regional support being non-existent. Vanhullebusch (2015) suggested that in the present Syrian crisis, member states of the Arab League are equally trying to profile themselves when supporting one or the other rebel factions fighting the Syrian government and paramilitary forces. The data concludes that regional support in the Syrian case has not been identified, due to multiple actors with varying interests, either for or against the Assad Regime.

The final criteria stated in the Libyan model calls for a credible opposition force on the ground in Syria, where a coalition would not have to employ their own ground forces to ensure success, however, the examination of the Syrian Crisis showed that there were too many actors on the ground in Syria, pursuing their own interests. These actors included: Russia, Turkey, forces loyal to Assad, Iran, Hezbollah, Gulf States, Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurds, ISISL, and Jordan. Feikes (2017) stated that all have had boots on the ground at one time or another (intpolicydigest.org). Coen (2015) to conclude

that Syria has evolved into a protracted civil war and the center of the largest refugee

crisis in the post-World War II era. The situation in Syria has prompted Dr. Simon

Adams (2020) to declare that "Not since the peak of the Cold War has the UN Security

Council appeared so bitterly divided and incapable of decisive action" (p. 1).

Summary

In summary, when answering the research question of whether a historically

consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis in Syria, the data revealed that

Libya is the only official case to employ R2P. The Libyan model sets forth criteria for

other situations to be successful, particularly when intervening forcefully. Syria does not

satisfy any of the stated criteria for reasonable prospect of success. Dragovic and Iron

(2017) concluded that the only way to achieve lasting peace in Syria is to establish new

states where the people have common interests and purposes based on their cultural

characteristics.

The first research question (RQ1) asked: Is R2P applied consistently across all

modern crisis-related human endeavors? The theme that emerged from the data was the

constant use of veto power to nullify the consistent application of R2P across all modern

crisis related human endeavors. Data from experts, tables, and charts were used to

demonstrate how members of the P5 in the UNSC used their veto to prevent or stop the

implementation of R2P principles. Thereby, allowing for inconsistencies to emerge from

the initial case of R2P being implemented in Libya and not in Syria despite numerous

similarities.

The second research question (RQ2) asked: Does the application of R2P result in

negative outcomes? The theme associated with answering this research question rests on,

the failure of R2P after the Libya Model. The data revealed, after an exhaustive

examination of the mistakes made in Libya after using force, that negative outcomes

plagued the nation, despite the strategic objectives being met. Leaving a void where some

experts and nation-states perceived Libyan civilians as being worst off than before the

intervention. The initial objective of protecting civilians, quickly turned into regime

change. This change prompted concern from Russia and China, who now viewed R2P as

an instrument of the West to advance their national and political interests. This situation

also sets the tone for future battles in the UNSC over the implementation and application

of R2P to future crises.

The third research question (RQ3) asked: Would a historically consistent

application of R2P help alleviate the crisis in Syria? The theme of inaction by the UNSC

in Syria emerged to answer this question. The Libyan model was used to determine the

prospect of success. The criteria set forth in this model was applied to other crises to

determine whether the UNSC would be successful in Syria when applying R2P. The data

revealed that Syria did not possess the four requirements to have a successful intervention

force. There was no international mandate, no broad coalition in support of intervention,

no regional support from the Arab league of states or the African Union, and finally, no

credible ground/oppositional force. Syria has many nations involved on the ground, each

serving their own political, economic, and strategic interests, ultimately, creating an

atmosphere of division within the UNSC, resulting in inaction based on the criteria set

forth in the Libyan Model.

In the next chapter, the researcher discusses the interpretation of the findings. This

chapter also includes the limitations of the study, recommendations for future research on

R2P, and the implications for positive social change that R2P can have on populations at risk for mass atrocities. Finally, the researcher provides a summary to conclude the study.

**Chapter 5: Discussions, Conclusions, and Recommendations**

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to positively impact social change by examining the implementation of Pillar 3 by the UNSC in a crisis-related situation such as Syria. This goal was vital to examine, given that Syria has seen mass atrocities continue and it also continues to disrupt peace and security within the international arena. The nature of this study was a qualitative methodology and a case study design. The researcher examined multiple perspectives from multiple secondary sources on the R2P doctrine, thereby utilizing triangulation to improve the trustworthiness of the study. The researcher collected the data using a purposeful sampling approach and employed a criterion-focused sampling strategy to answer the research questions based on the secondary data. The data collection involved the analysis of the voting patterns/behavior of the five permanent members of the UNSC who possessed veto power. This was done by examining UNSC resolutions on Syria from 2015 to 2020. The researcher analyzed information-rich interviews and testimonies of experts on the R2P doctrine, along with documents and publications from the NGOs mentioned throughout this study. The study was conducted to address the identified gap in the literature and to expand on the policy or policies that guide the UNSC's decision-making process on using force to stop future mass atrocities (i.e., the implementation of Pillar 3).

As a result of the analysis of the secondary data for this research study, the researcher validated the findings of those results involving R2P and the complexities of implementing/applying Pillar 3 to the Syrian crisis. The UNSC has been regulated to stalemate status, as Russia and China have used their veto power to block any resolutions that discuss using force on any level. This inaction—as well as a lack of consistent

application of R2P across all modern-day related crisis—has allowed the continuation of mass atrocities in Syria to persist. Figure 3 illustrates how the United States, Russia, and China have used their veto power since 2011.

Figure 3

Use of the Veto by UNSC Members Since 2011

The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2020) stated that for 9 years, the UNSC has consistently failed to uphold its responsibility to protect the Syrian people.

Figure 3 illustrates that the use of the veto by Russia and China has risen considerably since 2011, with the conflict in Syria accounting for the bulk of these. Since 2011, Russia has cast 19 vetoes, 14 of which were on Syria. Eight of the nine Chinese vetoes during this period were regarding Syria, and one was on Venezuela. The remaining Russian vetoes since 2011 were against two resolutions related to the conflict in Ukraine, one on the 20th anniversary of the genocide in Srebrenica, one on sanctions against Yemen, and one on Venezuela. The United States has cast three vetoes since 2011, all of them regarding Israel/Palestine issues. France and the United Kingdom, not shown on the chart, have not vetoed any resolutions on Syria during this period (2011 to present).

This study also produced important findings about R2P and the effects that the application of the doctrine has had on emerging nation-states (BRICS) and their motivation for blocking UNSC action on Syria, based on their shared experiences with the implementation of R2P in Libya by the United States and its NATO allies. One of the primary motivations of China, along with India, was the abuse of Western nation-states during the ages of imperialism and colonialism (Lee & Chan, 2016). Additionally, these two nation-states tended to still lean toward a state-centered ideology of sovereignty and were skeptical of R2P being used by the West as a form of regime change. Russia held a similar position, believing that R2P should focus entirely on the first two pillars, while suggesting that implementing Pillar 3 should only be done as a matter of self-defense. Contrary to their beliefs on implementing R2P in Syria, however, Russia and China have different opinions on the use of force in other crises. China has consented to using force in Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, and Mali, while Russia has consented to the use of force in Libya and has militarily intervened directly in Crimea and Ukraine. Furthermore, the current

investigation generated findings on the negative effects R2P had in Libya, where after the initial objectives of protecting Libyan civilians were modified into regime change, the people of Libya were deemed to be in a worst position than before the intervention. The final findings from the data reflected reasons for inaction by the UNSC in Syria. These inactions revolved around the notion of "reasonable prospects of success" and national political and strategic interests.

Interpretation of the Findings

Regarding the research questions, the findings within this research study mostly support the current literature on R2P, particularly implementing Pillar 3. Patton (2015) declared that "Qualitative interpretations begins with elucidating meanings [while] Interpretation involves going beyond the descriptive and attaching significance to what was found" (p. 570). The three research questions shaped the procedures of this study, including the data collection, analysis, and interpretation procedures that the researcher used to answer these questions.

The first research question of this study focused on whether R2P has been consistently applied to all modern crisis-related human endeavors. The theme that emerged from the data was the constant use of the veto by the permanent members of the UNSC. The findings related to this theme confirmed what the current literature has suggested. The implementation or application of R2P, especially Pillar 3, is a complex undertaking due to the national interests of the permanent members (P5) in the UNSC. The results confirmed the deep political and ideological divide within the UNSC, which has been delegated authority to exercise Pillar 3 measures, where the use of the veto confirm the inconsistencies in applying R2P to modern crises. Grover (2015) likened this

division to a semantic game with life-or-death consequences. Additionally, Grover suggested that "those who are human rights advocates need to play this game more skillfully to save civilian lives" (2015, p. 1112). The interpretation of this statement is that individuals and organizations, such as the NGOs mentioned throughout this study, continue to examine, and develop policy that addresses mass atrocities, but have alternative ways of implementing or applying R2P, other than, exclusively through the UNSC. Dr. Simon Adams (2015) called this "institutionalizing the norm" (p. 3). In his interview with STAIR, Adams discussed how the GCR2P is currently working/training with African military and police leaders on protecting civilians and their human rights, stating, "Every day we are trying to learn lessons from Central African Republic or South Sudan, Nigeria, or Syria and improve the implementation of R2P" (p. 3).

After UNSC implemented Pillar 3 in Libya, Russia and China used their veto power to further their national interest, and to put a check on what they perceive as the West expanding their influence in the same manner as during imperialism and colonialism. Most of their vetoes have come on Syrian resolutions, contesting any U.S.-, French-, or UK-led resolutions calling for the use of force. Russia continues to use its veto to protect the Assad government from any resolutions that rebuke his violent treatment of civilians, including the use of Chemical weapons. The GCR2P (2020) stated that since the launch of their military offensive in 2019, the Idlib campaign has been an exercise in organized cruelty as Syrian ground forces and Russian airstrikes have deliberately targeted schools, markets, hospitals, and displacement centers to terrorize the civilian population. In pursuing their national interests, the Russians are committed to using force to in Syria to protect their ideological belief of state-centered sovereignty but

use their veto to block resolutions suggesting individual sovereignty based on human rights. China has followed the same premise as the Russians, using their veto eight times in alignment with Russia on Syrian resolutions. National interests did not seem to motivate the Chinese in Syria as much as the Russians, but a long history of colonializations has caused skepticism, along with an ideology that their countries' past poverty, underdevelopment, social disorder, and violence can be attributed to colonial exploitation and encroachment (P. K. Lee & Chan, 2016).

The use of veto by these two nations on R2P-related crises is their way of protecting their national strategic interests and maintaining checks on the West—led by the United States—from increasing their influence on smaller, weaker nations. Topal (2013) confirmed this by suggesting that:

> Security Council could not, and does not have the ability to, take action due to the opposition of China and especially Russia. This picture painfully reveals that the problems of disproportionate representation, the granting of veto power to a limited number of member states, and the lack of shared political decisiveness among member states result in the UN possessing an unsustainable structure incompatible with the conditions of our times. (p. 2)

The use of the veto has been confirmed by modern researchers to hinder the consistent application of R2P across all modern crisis-related human endeavors.

The second research question focused on R2P and negative outcomes when it is applied to a crisis. The theme that emerged focused on the only case where R2P has been applied and met all the criteria to use force as an intervention tool. The 2011 case of Libya under the Gaddafi government was deemed a failed state by the UNSC, and a vote

of consensus was achieved to apply Chapter 7 measures in the form of Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine. Led by the United States, a multilateral force implemented strategic objectives to take 'all necessary measures' to protect Libyan civilians, including a no fly-zone, freezing assets, and an arms embargo. After examining the data and analyzing the results, the researcher concluded that it was not only confirmed, but that knowledge was extended as well, reinforcing the suggestions of previous scholars. Some experts have agreed that mistakes were made in Libya, as well as regrets to foreign policy decisions (i.e., R2P) that led to instability and eventual regime change (Adams, 2015; Peta, 2017; Rieff, 2011).

Libya was left in a state of chaos after the initial objectives of protecting Libyan civilians turned into regime change. Dr. Simon Adams (GCR2P, 2017) declared his criticism of the application of R2P in Libya, positing that the mandate had been overstretched. Genser's (2012) statement can be interpreted as declaring the international community has an ethical responsibility to rebuild and abdicating this responsibility has left Libya in chaos due to economic, social, and political instability. Due to the negative outcomes resulting from the use of force, Libya was essentially starting over, where there were no legal or legitimate institutions remaining. After overseeing the regime change following Gaddafi's death, the United States and its allies left the area, leaving the ITNC to deal with the aftermath (Genser, 2012). These findings suggest that there should have been a commitment by the international community to help rebuild, while maintaining peace and security; however, the transition after the intervention was deemed limited. There have been murmurings that R2P fell short amongst R2P scholars and a certain leader (Obama) of the multinational force implementing R2P in Libya. The same critics

have suggested that should have been a post-conflict effort by the international community to stay and help rebuild Libya, in terms of re-establishing socio-economic institutions, promoting peace and restoring relations among combatants. Additionally, addressing the deteriorating economic and political conditions. These individuals have called for a fourth pillar being applied to the R2P doctrine: The Responsibility to Rebuild (Adams, 2015; Friedman, 2015; Lopez, 2015).

In summary, the application of R2P in Libya—being the only case on record—has resulted in negative outcomes that have left Libya in a perpetual state of chaos. Tharoor (2020) declared that "Libya has become a global scramble for power and prestige in a multisided chess match" (para. 1). The failures/negative outcomes of R2P in Libya have led to civil war and further de-stabilization in the region. Currently, two of the permanent members of the UNSC (France and Russia), along with various regional nation-states, are fighting for control in Libya. This will only extend the pain and suffering of Libyan civilians, resulting in what Tharoor (2020) termed "the Syrianization of Libya" (para. 12). Nine years after the adoption of Resolution 1973, authorizing the use of force under the R2P doctrine, Libyan civilians are in a worse position than before the intervention.

The final research question of this study, research question three, focused on Syria, and if R2P had a history of being applied consistently, would this have help to alleviate this crisis. The theme that the data revealed was inaction by the UNSC. The findings revealed that there is an emerging group of nations (BRICS)—primarily Russia, China, and India—that are using their regional influence, coupled with the veto power of Russia and China, to foster inaction within the UNSC. Their ideological beliefs on sovereignty tend to run contrary to those of their Western counterparts (Odeyemi, 2016).

The effects of colonialism, imperialism, liberalism, and regime change, as well as the belief that the West uses R2P to advance this notion, have impacted their view of the R2P doctrine (Averre & Davies, 2015; P. K. Lee & Chan, 2016; Russo, 2017). For these nations, sovereignty is still state-centered, and force should only be taken for self-defense purposes. This state-centered approach, along with their skepticism of R2P, particularly Pillar 3, after Libya, has created a divide in the UNSC on Syria, where achieving consensus is not a viable option, and further creates stagnation (Coen, 2015).

The data revealed that failures in Libya have allowed Russia to block any consensus to take collective forceful action in Syria, and that sanctions the Assad regime for using force against civilians. By not taking action, the UNSC opened the door for Russia to intervene militarily on behalf of Assad. No action was taken to prevent/stop air strikes against civilians, to stop/prevent the flow of illegal weapons, or to ensure access to humanitarian aid (Feikes, 2017). The acquiescence to Russian influence in Syria by the P3 (United States, France, and United Kingdom) have decreased possibilities of R2P having success on any level. Kildron (2012) compared Syria to Libya and applied the Libyan model based on the four requirements for R2P to be successful, determining that Syria was not a good candidate for R2P. Libya had distinct differences from Syria, in terms of waging a successful military campaign (Table 4). Furthermore, Syria presented the UNSC with more complexities when considering applying R2P. Factors including Russian unilateralism, no credible opposing force against Assad, and mass atrocities being committed on all sides have contributed to inaction by the UNSC (Odeyemi, 2016). Also, China has approached intervention under R2P as a continuation of Western colonialization and imperialism. China fears that the powers in the West, led by the

United States, would infringe on sovereignty, and threaten weaker states into regime change. P. K. Lee and Chan (2016) suggested there are three reasons for China's dissent on R2P: (a) colonialism, (b) strong versus weak states, and (c) the UNSC primarily consists of Western powers. Although it appears that China has no strategic interests in Syria (Kildron, 2012), they have voted with Russia on Syrian matters in the UNSC eight times.

On the other hand, Russia's and China's approach to R2P in Syria is contradictory to other crises, where their national strategic interests vary. Their military interventions in Ukraine and Crimea are contradictory to their rhetoric in Syria. The Russians claim that R2P should focus entirely on the first two pillars as a means of protecting vulnerable populations. In addition, Pillar 3 is viewed as a tool for the West to promote democracy and regime change. In the Ukraine and Crimea, they have unilaterally intervened using force (Averre & Davies, 2015). China has promoted the application of R2P in Africa but refused to do so in Syria. The multi-layered complexities that are present in Syria confirm the current scholarly conclusions that there is not a reasonable prospect of success. Syria does not meet the four criteria of the Libyan model. These re-emerging powers (BRICS) and their belief in the reasonable prospects' criterion will be counted on to advance R2P in Syria (see Odeyemi, 2016).

Theoretical Framework Implications

The R2P is a relatively new concept, and the implications of the findings indicate that future research is needed on the implementation or application of the doctrine to current crisis and those that may occur in the future. Adams (2015) declared the failure of the UNSC to end the ongoing atrocities in Syria, highlighting aspects of the norm that

still need further developing, to address the challenges that still lie ahead. The Responsibility to Protect is an accepted norm in the international community, every member state of the UN voted in favor of the doctrine in 2005; however, there is a preponderance of evidence in the research implying that the conflict exists over implementation/application. Adams further posited that there is not a single state in the UN that would say they disagree with R2P. He says that they have won the "abstract of ideas;" therefore, the remaining debate is on implementation (Adams, 2015, p. 12).

The failure of R2P will continue to revolve around implementation. This framework emphasizes the first two pillars, and the third pillar is a last resort option. Nevertheless, as emerging crises in Syria, Libya, and other parts of Africa and Asia continue to disrupt international peace and security, the debate around implementation will continue to produce inaction. In all these cases, there is nowhere that falls outside the realm of R2P. It is just a question of figuring out what the crime is, who is perpetrating it or is at imminent risk of perpetrating it, and how it should be stopped (Adams, 2015).

Limitations of the Study

To understand the limitations of this study, the researcher began with identifying his predispositions and biases while collecting and interpreting the data (Patton, 2015). Other limitations were due to the high volume of secondary data, resulting in the analysis being extremely time-consuming. Patton (2015) declared that "limited resources, time, and complexities of the real world do not yield easily to our design parameters" (p. 244). The complexities of implementing Pillar 3 under the R2P doctrine limited the actions taken by the UNSC to prevent or stop mass atrocities, not only in Syria, but in most modern-day crises.

The scope of the research was limited to role of the UNSC and its inability to obtain a consensus to apply Pillar 3 measures in Syria. Additionally, this study further limited by the using only one case (Libya) where Pillar 3 was implemented, to compare to their actions in Syria. The current findings, therefore, may not be generalizable or transferrable to other crises without further study. The findings also lack generalizability due to the complexities of achieving consensus within the UNSC, based on the differences of national strategic interests and political ideology of the P5.

Recommendations

Considering the results of this study, the researcher has determined that a few recommendations are necessary. First, the researcher explored the implementation/application of Pillar 3 through the UNSC, the only entity that is currently given the authority to implement the use of force as an intervention tool, finding that inaction due to complexities led to the abdication of their responsibility to maintain peace and security, according to the principles of the UN Charter. Future research efforts, therefore, should involve the examination of alternative organizations that could apply/implement Pillar 3 measures to stop/prevent mass atrocities. Regional organizations and the UN General Assembly should be examined as those alternatives. Barber (2019) claimed that the Security Council is not the only organ in the UN system with responsibility for international peace and security. The General Assembly has a secondary responsibility for international peace and security and has committed to acting on it when the Security Council fails. This was not present when examining the current body of literature. Regional organizations and coalitions of the willing were mentioned in the literature, but not on an extensive basis as being alternatives to UNSC inaction.

Second, the researcher focused only on Pillar 3, where the assumption was, that if Pillar 3 was on the table, then the first two pillars had not been met by the state in question. Therefore, transferring that responsibility to the international community. Future research should expand on the R2P doctrine to include adding a fourth pillar, the responsibility to Rebuild (Adams, 2015; Dragovic & Iron, 2017; Vanhullebusch, 2015). Rebuilding would focus on the necessary social, economic, and political measures needed for a recovery that seeks to prevent the recurrence of mass atrocities.

Finally, future researchers should look to expand the ACT Code of Conduct, where 112 nations have signed this draft resolution, calling for the UNSC permanent members to withhold the use of their veto power against a credible draft resolution that is intended to stop or prevent mass atrocities and to take timely and decisive action (GCR2P, 2017). Only two of the permanent members in the UNSC have signed the mandate (France and United Kingdom); the United States, Russia, and China have yet to comply. Additionally, these three members have utilized their veto power regarding the most concerning issues in the Middle East. The signatories of the Code of Conduct further declare that "voting to block action to prevent mass atrocities is an affront to our common humanity" (GCR2P, 2015). It is recommended, therefore, that future researchers target the expansion of this mandate to those remaining P5 members, as well as the remaining 83 General Assembly members who have yet to sign. The France/Mexican Initiative also calls for the suspension of the veto by the P5 in cases of mass atrocities. This declaration focuses only on the P5 members, but 103 member states already support the initiative (GCR2P, 2020).

Implications

Positive Social Change Implications

The current findings reflected difficulties with implementing or applying R2P to modern-day crises, particularly in Syria. The researcher's recommendations and other actions could facilitate positive social change by confirming the literature on the complexities of implementing Pillar 3, as well as, by adding knowledge through procedure on how to implement or apply R2P in crisis related situations, when the UNSC fails to act. The UNSC is currently the sole authorized entity allowed to implement or apply the use of force to maintain peace and security within the international community. Crises that put civilians at risk for mass atrocities, infringements of their human dignity, and violations of their fundamental human rights are associated with failed states, according to the principles of R2P.

The implications of this study suggest that positive social change should not be dependent on one particular entity (i.e., UNSC). There is a demonstrable history of inaction by the UNSC when force is needed as an intervention tool to prevent/stop mass atrocities. When other governmental entities, including the UN General Assembly, regional organizations, and coalitions of the willing, in addition to non-governmental organizations, realize the complexities within the UNSC have created a division that more than likely leads to inaction, then alternative policy measures should be instituted to give authorization to implement or apply Pillar 3 to regional states or coalitions of the willing under the direction of the UN General Assembly. Non-governmental organizations, such as the GCR2P, continue to promote policies on prevention, but

a successful transition of authorization is crucial to implementing Pillar 3 where civilians are at risk for mass atrocities, mass displacement, or mass migration, resulting in a continuation of loss of human life and dignity.

As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, the overall positive social impact would allow victims of mass atrocities the opportunity to seek safe havens, where they would receive medical supplies, food, water, and shelter. Furthermore, establishing safe havens would be beneficial to neighbor states, where mass migration has had a negative impact on these states' economic, political, and environmental well-being.

Methodological and Theoretical Implications

The methodological and theoretical implications of researching the implementation of Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine, has inferred the need for future research. The findings have suggested the follow up on the ACT Conduct code and the French/Mexican initiative on veto restraint. In his interview with STAIR, Dr. Adams (2015) claimed that these two important initiatives are directly related to the failures of the UNSC in Syria. The assessment of the development and impact of veto restraint could be observed on a case-by-case basis, while NGOs could persistently engage UN member states on R2P policy and training, as Dr. Adams (2015) indicated:

> The framework is useful, as it places the emphasis on the preventive aspect of R2P, where "institutionalizing the norm," involves advocacy with the UNSC on crisis situations, providing advice on policy, and bilateral support for governments. (p. 10).

This researcher recommends, therefore, that future scholars should continue to study the impact of veto restraint in crisis related situations, and the implementation of Pillar 3 measures by alternative means to understand and improve the responses by the international community. The continued existence of inaction by the UNSC, based on the findings in this study, will impact the future of R2P, specifically in crisis-related situations where all diplomatic means have been exhausted.

Conclusions

In this qualitative case study, the researcher examined/analyzed the R2P doctrine, specifically the implementation of Pillar 3, in the context of Syria. This crisis met all the requirements of the R2P doctrine to classify Syria as a failed state. There were brief comparisons between the Libyan case and the Syrian case to assess the implementation of R2P, using force, because Libya is the only case on record, where the UNSC achieved consensus to use force as a tool for protecting civilians against mass atrocities.

Secondary data were used as the primary source for collecting data. Multiples sources were used to obtain voting records, video interviews, documented interviews, conferences, meetings, videos, documents, charts, tables, and other digital resources. The researcher used this wealth of information-rich data to understand the complexities associated with implementing R2P in a crisis such as Syria. The findings confirmed that R2P has not been consistently applied across all modern crisis-related human endeavors. Permanent members, specifically Russia and China, have used their veto power to prevent proposed resolutions from implementing R2P measures in Syria, but have selectively allowed R2P to be used in other crises. Additionally, the application of R2P in Libya—the only case on record—was confirmed to have had negative outcomes. The

mistakes made in Libya have left civilians worse off today than they were 9 years ago

after the implementation of Resolution 1973. Lastly, current researchers have affirmed

that a historically consistent application of R2P would not have helped to alleviate the

crisis in Syria. Syria presented the most complexities of any of the crises examined in this

study. Syria did not meet the criteria presented in the Libyan model, outlining the

reasonable prospects for conducting a successful intervention, based on Pillar 3 of the

R2P doctrine.

     As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, the emergent doctrine of R2P serves as a

guideline for the international community to address mass atrocities. Universally adopted

at the 2005 World Summit Meeting, R2P has three pillars that define the responsibilities

for protecting the civilian populations of nation-states. The UNSC is the sole entity that is

authorized to use forceful measures to protect civilians, if a state manifestly fails to keep

their citizens safe and secure from mass atrocity crimes. In Chapter 2, the researcher

detailed relevant literature that addressed the principles of the R2P doctrine, and how

sovereignty (i.e., state-centered versus individual-centered) inferred the complexities

associated with implementing Pillar 3 to address mass atrocity crises, particularly in

Syria. In Chapter 3, the researcher outlined the methodology and design used to answer

the three research questions. Chapter 4 included the analysis of the data and the findings

from the data. Finally, in Chapter 5, the researcher discussed the interpretations,

implications, and recommendations for future research to examine new policies and

procedures that are necessary to prevent the use of the veto by P5 members in the UNSC/

These policies and procedures could prevent or reduce the inconsistency of the

application of R2P, resulting in inaction and negative outcomes when addressing mass

atrocities that interrupt international peace and security.

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Appendix A: Tables

Table 1

Vetoed Security Council Resolutions Related to Syria

Date	Agenda Item	Against	Abstentions
November 17, 2017	Renew mandate of JIM for 30 days	Russia, Bolivia	China
November 16, 2017	Condemns use of chemical weapons by Syrian Army. Taking note of JIM findings Renew mandate of JIM for 12 months	Russia, Bolivia	China, Egypt
October 24, 2017	Renew mandate of JIM for period of 1 year	Russia, Bolivia	China, Kazakhstan
April 12, 2017	Condemns use of chemical weapons. Access to the OPCW FFM and JIM to all relevant information to investigate attacks	Russia, Bolivia	China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan
February 28, 2017	Acknowledges findings of JIM report; use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Armed Forces and ISIL Calls for Tribunal to prosecute guilty parties. Sanctions against identified individuals	Russia, China, Bolivia	Egypt, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan
December 5, 2016	Ceasefire (excluding attacks against ISIL). Unhindered humanitarian access	Russia, China, Venezuela	Angola
October 8, 2016	Demands end to aerial bombardments of and military flights over Aleppo. Unimpeded humanitarianism access, including by observing cessation of hostilities (res.2268		

(2016))

May 22, 2014	Refers situation in Syria to the ICC	Russia, China	None
July 19, 2012	Renewal of UNSMIS under Chapter VII Condemns violations of human rights Syrian authorities. All parties commit to cessation of hostilities and implementation of six-point plan	Russia, China	Pakistan, South Africa
February 4, 2012	Condemns Violence against civilians carried out by Syrian authorities. Supports League of Arab States' decision to facilitate Syrian-led political transition. Calls upon Syrian authorities to allow safe and unhindered access for humanitarian assistance	Russia, China	None
October 4, 2011	Condemns use of force by Syrian authorities against civilians. Allow unhindered humanitarian access. Inclusive Syrian-led political process Calls on states to exercise restraint in sale of arms to Syria. Considers options under Article 41 of the Charter (Sanctions)		

Table 2

Passed Security Council Resolutions Related to Syria

t	ıda Item	entions

133

Date	Resolution	Summary	Against
...ember 19, 2017	...S/2393	Provisions of cross-border humanitarian assistance Calls for implementation of Syrian-led political transition	...via, China, Russia
...ember 31, 2016	...S/2336	Russia/Turkey facilitated ceasefire in Syria	...e
...ember 21, 2016	...S/2332	Renews authorization of relief delivery across conflict lines. Reiterates call for Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition; stresses the Syrian people will decide the future of Syria	...e
...ember 19, 2016	...S/2328	Unhindered access for the monitoring of evacuations from Aleppo's eastern districts Unhindered access for provision of humanitarian assistance	...e

:mber 17, 2016	:S/2319	Extends mandate of JIM for 1 year	:
ber 31, 2016	:S/2314	Extends mandate of JIM for 18 days	:
uary 26, 2016	:S/2268	U.S. and Russia facilitated cessation of hostilities (as co-chairs of the international Syria Support Group (ISSG))	:
:mber 22, 2015	:S/2258	Renews (for 12 months) 2014 decision to allow passage of aid into the country	:
:mber 18, 2015	:S/2254	Sets roadmap for peace process, UN-facilitated talks between government and opposition members. Outline of nationwide ceasefire	:
:st 7, 2015	:S/2235	Condemns the use of chemical weapons (allegedly used since the adoption of S/RES/2209 (March 2015)	:

		Establishes OPCW JIM to investigate	
ch 6, 2015	S/2209	Condemns use of chlorine gas weapon. Threatens to take Chapter VII actions if non-compliance with Resolution 2118 (2013) which endorsed the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons program	zuela
mber 17, 2014	S/2191	Renews authorization for humanitarian access across border	e
14, 2014	S/2165	Directs humanitarian relief across additional border crossings. Establishes monitoring mechanism to monitor loading of humanitarian nature	e
uary 22, 2014	S/2139	Demands all parties allow delivery of humanitarian assistance. Intent to take	e

		further steps in case of non-compliance	
ember 27, 2013	S/2118	Endorses destruction of Syria's chemical weapons program. In event of non-compliance imposes Chapter VII measures	e
20, 2012	S/2059	Renews mandate of Syria Observer Mission for 30 days	e
l 21. 2012	S/2043	Establishes UNSMIS Observer Mission for period of 90 days (300 unarmed military observers)	e
l 14, 2012	S/2042	Authorizes advance team to monitor ceasefire (up to 30 unarmed military observers) Urges implementation of Envoy's Six-Point Proposal	e

Table 3

Summation of R2P and its Failures in Libya

Expert analysis on R2P in Libya	Conclusions on the failures of R2P in Libya
Dr. Simon Adams: Executive Director (GCR2P) 2017 Interview with Natasha Hosford (STAIRS) St. Anthony's International Review	There will be defeats, setbacks, and mistakes. As for the specifics of Libya, I was fiercely critical of the way some states overstretched the R2P mandate in Libya (pp. 7-14).
Thomas Friedman in an interview with Giselle Lopez (2015)	Thomas Friedman, President Obama claimed that one of his biggest regrets with regard to foreign policy is his lack of foresight with the Libyan intervention: "I think we underestimated… the need to come in full force… the day after Gaddafi is gone… at that moment, there has to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild [a society] that didn't have any civic traditions." (p. 121).
Lopez (2015) claims in the article 'Responsibility to Protect at a Crossroads: The Crisis in Libya	explores the context in which the decision was made to intervene in Libya, the nature of the intervention and the instability that has followed the fall of the Gaddafi regime (p. 122).

Table 4

Four Criteria for Success to use Force as an Intervention Tool (Libyan Model; Kildron, 2012)

Criteria for success	Explanation for the use of force in Libya

An international Mandate	Resolution 1973 gave authorization to the UNSC to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Consensus was achieved in the UNSC: ten for, zero against, five abstentions.
A broad coalition to protect civilians	There was a Multinational coalition led by the U.S. African Command and included France, Italy, Great Britain, and surrounding Arab nations.
Regional Support	Jordan, Qatar, and Kuwait each lent support to the no-fly zone with military aircraft, providing additional regional legitimacy to the coalition's mission
A credible opposition force that already has a ground game.	Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC), recognized by NATO, maintained a credible ground force with a geographically defendable position, provided air power a definable objective and a visible force to support from the air.