Walden University

College of Management and Technology

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Coet D. Conley

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2021

Abstract

Exploring Critical Success Factors for Military Professionalization of the United Arab Emirates Land Forces

by

Coet D. Conley

MPhil, Walden University, 2019

MA, American Public University, 2011

BS, Old Dominion University, 1988

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Management

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Abstract

Operational and tactical military leaders do not have enough information about how to professionalize land-based military force. The purpose of this exploratory case study was to examine how to professionalize land-based military forces. The conceptual framework that grounded the study were military diplomacy, the resource based theory of construct strategic management and principal agent theory. Interviews of 10 former senior U.S. military officers were conducted to identify objectives and their supporting critical success factors (CSFs) for the military professionalization program. Eight themes emerged from the coding categories related to critical success factors (CSFs): (a) discipline, (b) accountability, (c) technical expertise, (d) technical support, (e) education, (f) effective professional standards, (g) culture, and (h) desire to change. Recommendations for future research include (a) executing a detailed assessment of each of the CSFs and determine what would be required to measure each achievement, (b) repeating this study methodology in a different location with different study participants, (c) performing this study with an expanded participant pool. The study may contribute to positive social change by highlighting the respect for human rights, accountability under the law, and respect for civilian executive control of the military.

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my parents who gave their all so that I might do better than them. Rest in peace Coet and Mary Conley, “You done good!”

Acknowledgments

I want to take a short moment to acknowledge the support and patience of all those who have supported this effort over the past nine years: these include but are not limited to my wife, children, and the many instructors and mentors I have had along the way.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

The topic of this study is the exploration of potential objectives and critical success factors (CSFs) needed to serve as management tools for the military professionalization of the land-based military subprogram. This study may be the first step in establishing the framework required to provide project and program managers with measurement tools, such as defined objectives and CSFs required to manage a military professionalization project. The management literature indicates that the presence of identified objectives and their derived CSFs may not guarantee success for a project, but the absence of these management tools may hinder and/or prevent the project's success (Project Management Institute [PMI], 2019).

Potential social implications for this study include, but are not limited to

- improved management of a government-sponsored program, and
- improved Land Forces performance through a better managed military professionalization project.

This chapter is organized into an introduction, background, problem statement, purpose, research questions, conceptual framework, nature of the study, definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, the significance of the study, and a summary and transition.

Background of the Study

Some of the primary theories that helped to shape my study included the resource-based view theory (RBT) construct of strategic management (Rosenberg Hansen & Ferlie, 2016), defense diplomacy theory, or military diplomacy theory (MDT; Winger,

2014), and principal and agent theory (Biddle et al., 2017). Although this list is not inclusive of every possible applicable theory, each of the selected theories links well to each other in the context of this study, helping to define the context of the phenomena under study. First articulated in 1938, RBT has continued to receive critical assessment and adjusted to meet its users' needs and respond to its critics' voices (Chun, 2016; Hitt et al., 2016; Roos, 2017). One of its largest transitions occurred with the addition of the organization's requirement to exploit its resource advantage (Chun, 2016; Galvin et al., 2014; Hitt et al., 2016; Roos, 2017). Detractors of RBT claim it is too static and dependent on fixed economic models. These authors advocated other models, such as the dynamic capabilities view (Galvin et al., 2014; Mohamud & Sarpong, 2016). RBT provided a framework that is well suited for the explanation of the "integration of multiple, dissimilar resources to explain synergistic, differential effects on performance" (Kozlenkova et al., 2014, p. 2).

The second theory is the MDT, which is currently the only peer-reviewed formal theory directly addressing defense diplomacy (Baldino & Carr, 2016; Cooper et al., 2013; S. Fetic, 2013; Winger, 2014). As it is employed today, defense diplomacy represents a significant change in how the military is used to pursue soft power objectives since the Cold War (Baldino & Carr, 2016; Capie & Taylor, 2010; Cooper et al., 2013; Cottey & Forster, 2010; Drab, 2018, S. Fetic, 2013; S. G. Fetic, 2014; Winger, 2014).

Principal agent theory is the oldest of the theories directly addressed. Its tenets were noted in 1776 by Adam Smith when he described joint-stock companies (Bendickson et al., 2016). Contemporary writing on the theory is primarily focused on

resolving the agency problem, that is, how to overcome/prevent a situation where the interests of the principal and the agent are no longer in alignment (Bryde et al., 2019; Tumbat & Grayson, 2016).

Case studies are generally categorized into two broad groups, research case studies and teaching case studies (Darke et al., 1998; Lapoule & Lynch, 2018; Yin, 2018). Research case studies should be unbiased and factual, and they should assume a distanced perspective to provide results that can be used to further research (Breslin & Buchanan, 2008; Lapoule & Lynch, 2018). Several major criteria determine if a case study methodology is a suitable method for researching a phenomenon, including that the main research questions are focused on "how" or "why," the researcher has little or no control over behavioral events, the phenomenon is to be studied in its environment, and the phenomenon under study (the case) is contemporary and not entirely historical (Range et al., 2019; Yin, 2018). Critics have argued case study research at times fails to capture the full depth and complexity of the decisions made by management teams (Bridgman, 2011; Chetkovich & Kirp, 2001; Darke et al., 1998); Critics also note that case study research may not adequately capture action-based decision-making (Argyris, 1980; Desiraju & Gopinath, 2016).

Globally, government projects share several attributes. Chief among these are attributes focused on nonfinancial goals and failures caused by a lack of management and oversight (Chih & Zwikael, 2015; Furlong, 2015; Newcomer, 2007; Patanakul et al., 2016). Patanakul et al. (2016) noted six common characteristics of government projects and programs: (a) pursuing non-financial benefits, (b) being susceptible to political

environment and dynamics, (c) following a mandated project management process, (d) being a large and complex megaproject, (e) having a long product life cycle, and (f) dealing with multiple stakeholders.

The military professionalization program is an element of security assistance (SA). This specific program is conducted in 113 of the 158 countries participating in the SA program (Pompeo & Esper, 2019). The key elements of the definition of professionalism by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) appear to mirror many of the elements noted as requirements for professionalization by Huntington (1957); to wit: technical expertise (expertise), accountability (responsibility), and professional standards (corporates). Several voices claim the one-size-fits-all civilian control objective is not necessarily applicable to their nation's situation and advocated for a more nuanced approach (Bruneau, 2015; Bruneau & Matei, 2008; Szarejko, 2014; Travis, 2017; Uluçakar & Çaglar, 2016).

A useful management mechanism for projects and programs are CSFs (Oliveira & Damke, 2019). Critical success factors are the few key areas of action/activity where positive results are required for a manager to achieve his/her goal (Almarri & Boussabaine, 2017; Lin, 2017). The current trend in CSF identification is a combination of questionnaires, literature reviews, and case studies (Ferreira et al., 2019; Rockart, 1979). Of note in the literature on CSF identification methodologies reporting Rockart's qualitative, as well as individual, assessment with managers that are directed towards the identification and application of standardized CSFs across whole industries (Castanho et

al., 2018; Cha & Kim, 2018; Hietschold et al., 2014; Jiwat & Corkindale, 2014; Lin, 2017; Rashid et al., 2017; Resende et al., 2018; Yadav & Barve, 2018; Zhou et al., 2017).

According to staff members in the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the U.S. Army for Defense Export Controls (information gathered as part of the literature review), the management of the military professionalization programs currently only involves recording monies spent, and the numbers of people trained in the United States at formal schools (Nathan, 2017; Reyes, 2017). No assessment gauging actual progress against the professionalization goals is provided (Litvanas, 2017; Nathan, 2017; Reyes, 2017; Riospelati, 2017). This study seeks to shed light on the literature gap and is needed as a first step in providing information to the decision-makers by evaluating the program through the U.S. participants in the UAE.

Problem Statement

According to its 2016/2017 report to Congress, the U.S. DOS is responsible for overseeing and managing approximately 953.9 million dollars' worth of SA programming. This was comprised of nine programs with 28 subprogram areas. The most common subprogram area was military professionalization, assigned to 113 of the 158 nations (Pompeo & Esper, 2019). Globally, government projects share several attributes. Chief among these attributes are nonfinancial goals and failures caused by a lack of management and oversight (Chih & Zwikael, 2015; Furlong, 2015; Newcomer, 2007; Patanakul et al., 2016). As noted in the Rand report for the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, there is no robust systematic framework to provide feedback to the program and project managers (Moroney et al., 2014). The general management

problem is that the various program measurement *mechanisms* (see Definitions section) are not systematically framed (Newcomer, 2007; Patanakul et al., 2016). The specific problem is that military leaders do not have enough information on how to professionalize the land-based military forces (Biddle et al., 2017).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this exploratory case study was to examine how to professionalize land-based military forces. The case for this study was the professionalization of the land-based military forces. The population of interest included retired U.S. operational and tactical military leaders residing in the UAE. This is the first step to systematically frame the various program measurement mechanisms for the Land Forces program's military professionalization. Data were focused on the perceptions of some of the former field/general grade U.S. military members participating in the program's execution. Part of the study's goal is to identify potential CSFs required to accomplish the subprogram objectives.

Research Question

What information do operational and tactical military leaders provide on how to professionalize the land-based military forces?

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework that grounded the study was the elements interrelationality. The conceptual framework provides an author's current vision of a study's elements (what is being studied) and their interrelationships (Miles et al., 2014). The first element in the road map for this study was the problem itself: the general lack of

measurement mechanisms for large government programs (Chih & Zwikael, 2015; Furlong, 2015; Newcomer, 2007; Patanakul et al., 2016). This element (the problem) was derived from a review of the literature and informal conversations with senior government program managers, program participants, and over 20 years of personal experience managing large government programs and projects. This element's relationship to the rest of the study elements was its role as the study's progenitor. It is linked directly to the research question: What information do operational and tactical military leaders provide to professionalize land-based military forces?

I answered this question through interviews conducted with senior (i.e., field grade officers or above) U.S. program participants. The interview questions were vetted by a field study where a panel of experts in the field, who are personal friends, have iteratively reviewed my questions until they had all agreed the questions should meet the study's goal. The results of the interviews were transcribed and coded using NVivo software (Version 12).

The second and third elements of the study were the goals and objectives. The goals are identified from the literature and/or the initiating organization. Goals are the guidelines that explain what the program/project wants to achieve as an end state or final product. Goals serve as the baseline for identifying the study's next element, objectives (Whitmer, 2019). Objectives define the elements necessary to achieve a goal (Whitmer, 2019). When possible, they should be Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and have a Time associated with them (SMART; Bjerke & Renger, 2017). The goal of the case under study is well defined. However, there appear to be gaps in the published

literature regarding objectives. The research question addressed this by asking participants for their experiential-based recommendations for formal objectives based on the U.S. DOS definition of military professionalization, as it applies to land-based military forces.

The fourth element is the set of CSFs. The CSFs are those few key areas of activity where positive results are required to succeed (Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development, 2017; Osei-Kyei et al., 2017; Parmenter, 2015). Each objective will typically generate several CSFs. The CSFs are then deconstructed further to identify tasks and performance indicators. However, that is a step beyond the scope of this study. Each of these elements will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Figure 1 displays the elements and provides context for their relationship.

A qualitative analysis generates themes by organizing data into meaningful clusters to address the research questions (Stake, 2010). I will use a three-stage process to do this. The first stage is the precoding. Using NVivo software, I used the query command to develop an overview of the data. This entailed the development of a word frequency diagram or word cloud. A word tree diagram followed this to assist in establishing context. The second stage was coding, which I also performed using NVivo. Coding the material permitted the groupings of common aspects of the data and the development of themes. Individual and collective themes were identified through the establishment of consistent codes and nodes. The third and final stage was post coding, which is the formatting of the data and findings for presentation. I used the explore function of NVivo (Version 12) to develop the graphics to aid in presenting my findings.

Figure 1

Conceptual Framework



Nature of the Study

The nature of this study was qualitative. Qualitative research is consistent with exploring a field that has a dearth of theory. The research subject consisted of identifying CSFs traditionally derived through qualitative means (Castanho et al., 2018; Leidecker & Bruno, 1984). This research design was an exploratory case study inquiry using interviews with senior U.S. participants in the program and reviews of available open-source, U.S. government documents about its management.

McCaslin and Wison-Scott (2003) discussed the types of qualitative studies. These were narrative inquiry, grounded theory, ethnography, phenomenology, and case study. Narrative inquiry is focused on a single individual's life and, therefore, not applicable to this study. Grounded theory is used to develop a theory from the research, and as noted in the problem statement, there is a dearth of research on this topic. Ethnography focuses on the study of the culture of a group. Although culture certainly plays a part in any training or transformation project, it was not the focus of this study, so ethnography did not appear applicable. Phenomenology is a study of the lived

experiences of a group of people who have been part of an event. Although I drew on the lived experiences, those experiences were not the study's focus. Rather, the experiences are used by the participants to shape their answers to the research questions. A case study aims to analyze a current event within its real-world context (Farquhar, 2013; Yin, 2018).

Unlike experiments, a case study is called for when the researcher has little or no control over the event or the environment and where multiple forms of data are available (Hancock & Algozzine, 2017). Given that I had no control over the event in question, and little previous research has been conducted on the professionalization mission for the Land Forces, which is the population of interest, a case study appeared to be a valid design. Selecting the type of case study, single or multiple, can hinge on many variables. Although a multiple case study provides the most data (Hancock & Algozzine, 2017), the access and resources required for, a single person to collect and thoroughly analyze the data was prohibitive in this case. As this is a study in which I had access to data in the UAE that was previously not accessible, a single case exploratory (revelatory) study appeared to be a valid research approach (Yin, 2018). For data collection, I conducted semistructured interviews with retired senior (i.e., field grade officers or above) U.S. program participants, reviewed available management documents, and cataloged my observations (Yin, 2018). The interview questions were vetted by a field study where a panel of experts, who are personal friends, iteratively reviewed my questions until they had all agreed they should meet the study's goal. The results of the interviews were transcribed and coded using NVivo software for further analysis.

Definitions

Critical success factor: The few key areas of activity where positive results are required for a manager to achieve his/her goal (Osei-Kyei et al., 2017; Parmenter, 2015).

Culture: The belief systems and value orientations that influence customs, norms, practices, and social institutions, including psychological processes (language, caretaking practices, media, educational systems) and organizations (media and educational systems). Culture has been described as the embodiment of a worldview through learned and transmitted beliefs, values, and practices, including religious and spiritual traditions. It also encompasses living informed by the historical, economic, ecological, and political forces on a group (American Psychological Association, 2003).

Security assistance: Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by the DOS to be administered by the Department of Defense (DOD)/Defense Security Cooperation Agency (Scott, 2017a, p. 139).

Mechanism: In this study, the term *mechanism* encompasses management tools such as objectives and CSFs, as well as other management tools that are used for monitoring, controlling, and coordinating a project, program, or portfolio (Marina & Andrey, 2018).

Military professionalization: Through educational programs and technical support, foreign partners professionalize their military forces, ensuring that their force can develop and maintain the requisite capacity to effectively carry out its military mission through reliance on discipline, accountability, effective professional standards, and technical expertise. Besides, activities assist foreign partners so that their military forces reliably demonstrate consistent support for adherence to norms of human rights, support the concept of civilian executive authority/control of the military, and have the capacity for institutional and security sector reform (Cooper, 2017).

Assumptions

Assumptions are those entities, details, or situations that are unknown or uncontrollable. If they cease to be valid, then the effort itself fails. Therefore, assumptions should be minimized wherever possible (Scott, 2017b; Simon & Goes, 2012) Joint Publication 5.0 noted that a valid assumption is "logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue" (Scott, 2017b, p. 43). For this study, the following assumptions were made:

- that enough participants would be willing to share their experiences and opinions regarding measurable parameters for the military professionalization mission and possible adjustments to the U.S. DOS definition of military professionalization, as it applies to land forces
- that the participants recruited would provide interview responses that were truthful about their experiences and opinions regarding CSFs in the execution of SA programs

- that collected participant data would reach saturation in enough common areas to provide a list of potential objectives and CSFs

Scope and Delimitations

The chief delimitation of this study is that I determined the methodology and conceptual framework for this study. The delimitations, derived from my specific choices as the researcher, have defined this study's scope and boundaries (Simon & Goes, 2012). The scope of this single case exploratory case study consisted of semistructured interviews with former senior (field grade officers or above) U.S. program participants. Rather than an inclusive study of all U.S. SA programs' management, this study's scope was delimited to explore the management of the military professionalization sub-mission for the UAE.

The size of the UAE's military professionalization program has produced a relatively large potential participant pool of former senior U.S. military officers managing the program's execution. This presented a unique opportunity to gather freer participants to discuss their opinions, personal observations, and experiences compared to active-duty military personnel. Of particular note, due to UAE national security restrictions, I did not interview UAE nationals or any of their uniformed personnel as part of this study. These choices were matters of managing my time, travel funds, and simple convenience for all involved.

Depending on the participant responses, the findings may or may not be transferrable to another SA program. I will employ as much diversity as is available in my participant pool, provide as rich a narrative as possible regarding the data they

provide, and allow the readers to make their judgments regarding the transferability of this study's findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Limitations

A limitation of this qualitative single case study was the lack of access to U.S. government and military documents and personnel. Access to most U.S. military (.mil) websites is blocked in this region of the world by firewall protocols. This severely limited my ability to explore the most current/emerging documents governing/managing U.S. DOD involvement in military professionalization programs. I mitigated this lack of access by asking all participants if they knew U.S. military processes or protocols regarding military professionalization programs. None indicated they were aware of any support to this specific mission beyond the provision of formal school slots made available through the Foreign Military Sales process.

Regarding access to currently serving U.S. government officials and active-duty military personnel, I did not have the resources (i.e., time) required to process the necessary permissions associated with official U.S. government replies regarding ongoing diplomatic and SA programs. I sought to mitigate this by accessing several recently retired general grade officers with deep knowledge and experience in these programs. For security reasons, I did not have access to any UAE national or Land Forces personnel for interviews to develop a more holistic picture of the professionalization program. To mitigate this, I limited the project's scope to the U.S. management systems of the program. The lack of a deep pool of information to draw upon for this study is what drove me toward an exploratory versus a descriptive study. Given the paucity of

data relating to the CSFs for the land-based military forces professionalization, I specifically asked that the participants define the CSFs for the professionalization of land-based military forces and what recommendations they had for adjusting the U.S. DOS definition of military professionalization, as it applies to the specific population of interest for this study.

Significance of the Study

This study is unique because it directly addressed a literature gap regarding understanding the military professionalization subprogram. To wit, it provided an evaluation of the program through in-country U.S. participants (Moroney et al., 2014). This study's audience includes parties interested in the efficient and effective management of the military professionalization submission. These may include local in-country contract personnel, host nation participants, and any other persons who undertake training missions with the U.S. government's approval. By reviewing the in-country U.S. participants' perceptions of the DOS mission definition, I was able to identify and recommend program objectives and some of their supporting CSFs. These data points are needed to systematically frame the various program measurement mechanisms at the Land Forces' operational and tactical levels (Moroney et al., 2014).

Significance to Theory

This study contributes to the body of knowledge addressing a knowledge gap about the CSFs for the professionalization of the land-based military forces. The study contributes to the empirical literature related to the management of government programs and the development of knowledge required to fill the identified gap in the literature

regarding the lack of a robust systematic framework to provide feedback to the program and project managers (Moroney et al., 2014) as well as the lack of research necessary to systematically frame the various program measurement mechanisms (Newcomer, 2007; Patanakul et al., 2016). Through the findings of this study, I added significant empirical data that addressed a lack in existing research. The body of knowledge in the field of research on professionalization in the military could be improved through the findings of this study, thus advancing scientific knowledge in the field.

Significance to Practice

This study's practical significance is providing information to those persons and/or organizations managing the military professionalization sub-mission. The primary reason for conducting the study was to identify potential program objectives and explore potential supporting CSFs required to accomplish them. This was the first step, to systematically frame the various program management mechanisms at the operational and tactical level for the military professionalization subprogram.

This study holds significant implications for persons and organizations that manage, organize, and/or participate in SA programs. As an example, the results of this study should provide the initial portion of a framework that will enable the stakeholders to measure progress towards the achievement of the professionalization objective (Almarri & Boussabaine, 2017; Castanho et al., 2018; Osei-Kyei et al., 2017; Serafino, 2016). This addresses the gap in the literature noted by Moroney et al. (2014). The study also provides important insights into the professionalization mission from the perspective of the program's in-country participants concerning how military professionalization

management might be improved. This addresses the literature gap noted by Newcomer (2007) and Patanakul et al. (2016). In a general sense, this study offers options to address management shortfalls common to government programs as noted by Chih and Zwikael (2015), Furlong (2015), Newcomer (2007), and Patanakul et al. (2016).

Significance to Social Change

This study's positive social change implications are at three levels, strategic, operational, and tactical. At the strategic level, the implications for positive social change include the potential to allocate public funds better to pursue national objectives. The practical improvement of the recipient nation's military forces and the professionalization of those forces may reduce war crimes and other atrocities. Besides, the professionalization of a recipient nation's armed forces may result in a more effective deterrent effect on any hostile neighbors. This could result in less conflict and fewer lives lost/lives disrupted through violence. From a U.S. perspective, an armed force that is more professional is a more capable ally and can more easily integrate into any coalition operations the United States and the recipient nation may participate in.

This study has implications for social change at the operational level through improved management techniques in translating strategic goals into tactical actions. Using a framework derived from reviewing the DOS mission definition using the lived experiences of some of the U.S. participants can frame key performance indicators (KPIs) to measure the achievement of strategic goals and ensure the establishment of achievable objectives at the tactical level.

At the tactical level, the implications for social change include the potential for enhanced morale and better job performance as the CSFs derived from reviewing the DOS mission definition using the lived experiences of some of the U.S. participants allow for the development and identification of KPIs that will enable mission participants to measure the achievement of their goals. Future researchers might use this study's findings as a foundation for developing KPIs to support the military professionalization mission further. This research's findings contribute valuable information to the person who participates in SA programs in general.

Summary and Transition

The topic of this study was the exploration of potential objectives and CSFs needed to serve as management mechanisms for the military professionalization of land-based military forces subprogram. The general management problem was that not enough research has been conducted to systematically frame the various program measurement mechanisms (Newcomer, 2007; Patanakul et al., 2016). The specific management problem was the gap in knowledge and understanding of the professionalization of the land-based military forces. An evaluation of the program through the in-country U.S. participants sought to narrow this gap (Moroney et al., 2014).

The research question aimed to provide information on *measuring* progress toward the military professionalization mission's achievement. The study sought to answer the questions of what are the measurable parameters for the military professionalization missions. Moreover, what are experienced officers' perceptions regarding possible adjustments to the U.S. DOS definition of military

professionalization? The study contributes to developing an integrated framework of metrics to measure and manage the military professionalization subprogram. The implications for social change include the potential to identify better program management tools, better accountability of the expenditure of U.S. tax dollars, and a more effective U.S. ally. In Chapter 2, I provide an examination of the literature regarding the management of military professionalization programs.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The research problem is that military leaders do not have enough information on how to professionalize land-based military forces (Moroney et al., 2014). The purpose of this exploratory case study was to examine how to professionalize land-based military forces. This is the first step to systematically frame the various program measurement mechanisms for the Land Forces program's military professionalization. The literature indicates that U.S. government projects share several attributes. Chief among these attributes focuses on nonfinancial goals and failures caused by a lack of management and oversight (Chih & Zwikael, 2015; Furlong, 2015; Newcomer, 2007; Patanakul et al., 2016). In this chapter, I will cover my research strategy, the conceptual framework, a literature review about case study methodology, military professionalization, project management mechanisms, establishing objectives, and determining CSFs.

Literature Search Strategy

For this literature review, I reviewed peer-reviewed scholarly articles, academic journals, and scholarly books. Additional sources researched were U.S. Government websites, U.S. DOD doctrinal publications, U.S. DOS publications, U.S. Congressional reports, and U.S. Code portions. My primary sources for my peer-reviewed research were online university library databases, which included EBSCO, ProQuest, JSTOR, and ABI Inform Complete. I accessed these databases through the Walden University online library and the American Public University online library, which I have access to as an alumnus of American Military University. Additionally, I used the Google Scholar search engine to identify items available to either the Walden or American Public University

systems. I also searched the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies database for similar research projects that might provide insight into the methods and resources I had not considered. I used the standard Google search engine available in the UAE for some initial background and broad research.

In the development of this literature review, I employed a multistep search strategy that utilized a broad to narrow search construct. I identified the key concepts of the study. These were *foreign security assistance, critical success factors, operational management, total quality management, the resource-based view of strategic management, military professionalization, agency theory,* and *transferring military knowledge.* I then determined that the keywords for these concepts were *Security assistance, international relations, military diplomacy, knowledge management, and knowledge transfer, International relations theory, history of defense diplomacy theory, defense diplomacy theory in international relations, defense diplomacy theory in military training, history of complexity theory, complexity theory in international relations, complexity theory in military training, systems theory, systems theory in international relations, systems theory in military training, agency theory, agent-principal theory, agency problem,* and *the resource-based view of strategic management.* I then reviewed whether synonyms, other terms, or variations of the keywords should be included in my searches. These included *international military training, military training as diplomacy, chaos theory in international relations, chaos theory and complexity theory, chaos theory and systems theory, chaos theory and international relations, foreign military assistance,* and *foreign military training.*

I then conducted the literature search, which involved entering the concepts, keywords/phrases, related words and phrases, and other terms and variations of the keywords and phrases into the online databases' user interfaces. This process produced a listing of articles that were then refined to exclude non-peer-reviewed academic journal articles. These results were then further refined by sorting them by date. Those older than 5 years were excluded, with some exceptions. The criteria for timeline exclusion exception included relevance to the topic, primarily determined by the number of times cited in other publications. A nonrepresentative sample of those papers that cited the original document was then conducted to identify my study's true relevance. Relevance to the study was determined by evaluating the title, reviewing the article's abstract, and reviewing the full document when required.

Conceptual Framework

The purpose of a conceptual framework is to represent how concepts and pertinent information related to the study are likely to be linked (Anderson et al., 2015). In this section, I discuss applicable theories and conceptual elements of the exploratory case study and summarizes the military professionalization program. I then discuss how I used the framework in my study. During this discussion, I provide key statements and definitions inherent in the framework and how others have approached the topic.

Theories

For my research, I have identified several theories to help frame and guide my research. These include the resource-based view theory (RBT) construct of strategic management (Rosenberg Hansen & Ferlie, 2016), defense diplomacy theory (Winger,

2014), and principal and agent theory (Biddle et al., 2017). Although this list is not inclusive of every possible applicable theory, the selected theories link well to each other in this study, defining the context of the phenomena under study.

Resource-based view theory provides a framework that is well suited for the explanation of the "integration of multiple, dissimilar resources to explain synergistic, differential effects on performance" (Kozlenkova et al., 2014, p. 2). The evaluation framework embedded in RBT consists of four parts: an assessment of the resource itself; a determination of the value of the resource; an assessment of the imitability of the resource by competitors; and an evaluation of the firm's organization to exploit the resource as a continued value proposition to the firm's clients (Chun, 2016; Roos, 2017). First articulated in 1938, RBT has continued to receive critical assessment and adjusted to meet its users' needs and respond to its critics' voices (Chun, 2016; Hitt et al., 2016; Roos, 2017). One of its largest transitions occurred with the addition of the organization's requirement to exploit its resource advantage (Chun, 2016; Galvin et al., 2014; Hitt et al., 2016; Roos, 2017).

Detractors of RBT claim that it is too static and dependent on fixed economic models. These authors advocated other models, such as the dynamic capabilities view (Galvin et al., 2014; Mohamud & Sarpong, 2016). Other researchers have noted that this construct reinforces the organizational aspect of a firm's ability to exploit a resource in the long term, which is a key element of RBT (Andreeva & Ritala, 2016; Galvin et al., 2014; Hitt et al., 2016; Roos, 2017). The conceptual framework for the ways and means,

or assets and methods, for the SA's execution, are addressed by RBT. The ends, or goals, of SA are addressed by defense diplomacy theory or MDT.

According to Winger's (2014) theory, "defense institutions of one country are peacefully used to co-opt the government institutions of another country to achieve a preferred outcome". A relatively new theory, MDT is currently the only peer-reviewed formal theory directly addressing defense diplomacy (Baldino & Carr, 2016; Cooper et al., 2013; S. Fetic, 2013; Winger, 2014). As it is employed today, defense diplomacy represents a significant change in how the military is used to pursue soft power objectives since the Cold War. (Baldino & Carr, 2016; Capie & Taylor, 2010; Cooper et al., 2013; Cottey & Forster, 2010; S. Fetic, 2013; S. G. Fetic, 2014; Winger, 2014). This theory is useful in its application to the study as it links the use of U.S. DOD assets to activities in another country other than war. The theory has application beyond the general strategic view of the nation-state to the nation-state. It is the theoretical underpinning for the use of military retirees as instructors at the program and project level as evidenced by the requirement for these retirees to obtain emoluments clause waivers and international traffic in arms regulations (ITAR) authorizations from the U.S. DOS as well as the U.S. DOD (Miller, 2019).

Principal agent theory is the oldest of the theories in this framework. Its tenets were noted in 1776 by Adam Smith when he described the perils of joint-stock companies as the companies' directors were separated from the owners and would invariably execute less diligence over their money than if it were directly managed by the owners themselves (Bendickson et al., 2016). Simply described, principal agent theory is

the use by one party (the principal) of another party (the agent) to perform a task. The agent's task performance will result in a reward or sanction by the principal (Bendickson et al., 2016; Bosse & Phillips, 2016). Contemporary writing on the theory is primarily focused on resolving the agency problem. That is, how to overcome/prevent a situation where the interests of the principal and the agent are no longer in alignment (Bryde et al., 2019; Tumbat & Grayson, 2016).

Elements of the Case Study

The key elements of an exploratory case study are as follows: (a) it is an analysis of a current event within its real-world context, it uses one or more data collection method (Farquhar, 2013; Yin, 2018), (b) the researcher has little or no control over the event or the environment, and (c) multiple forms of data are available (Hancock & Algozzine, 2017). Defining the context of the phenomenon then is integral to a viable case study. Understanding why the phenomenon is occurring is necessary to understand how it will occur and how it may be managed. The theoretical underpinnings I am using to help in framing the context of my study are principal and agent theory (Biddle et al., 2017), defense diplomacy theory (Winger, 2014), and the RBT construct of strategic management (Rosenberg Hansen & Ferlie, 2016). The military professionalization program for the UAE Land Forces, viewed as an extension of the U.S. SA program, represents a merging of the three theories as they are the development and peaceful exploitation of existing military resources seeking to shape a foreign nation's actions by providing more value than one's rivals (Almarri & Gardiner, 2014).

Military Professionalization of the UAE Land Forces Program

Military professionalization is one of 28 SA subprograms administered by the U.S. DOS. The definition of military professionalization (see Definitions) is expansive and appears to include many potential program objectives. The program is being executed concurrently by the United States through normal SA programs and by the UAE Land Forces through the employment of former U.S. military members serving as advisors at various levels throughout the enterprise. This employment of these advisors is done with the U.S. DOD and the U.S. DOS (Miller, 2019; VanDeuson, 2011).

Using the Conceptual Framework

The first element in the road map for this study is the problem itself; the general lack of measurement mechanisms for large government programs (Chih & Zwikael, 2015; Furlong, 2015; Newcomer, 2007; Patanakul et al., 2016). This element was derived from a review of the literature and informal conversations with senior government program managers, program participants, and over 20 years of personal experience managing large government programs and projects. This element's relationship with the rest of the study elements is its role as the study's progenitor. It is linked directly to the research question: What information do operational and tactical military leaders provide to professionalize land-based military forces? I developed an answer to this question through interviews conducted with senior (i.e., field grade officers or above) U.S. program participants. The interview questions were vetted by a field study where a panel of experts in the field has iteratively reviewed my questions until they agreed they should

meet the study's goal. The results of the interviews were transcribed and coded using NVivo software.

The next element of the study is the goals. The goals are derived or extracted from the literature and/or the initiating organization. Goals represent the highlevel guidance that explain what the program/project seeks to achieve as an end state or final product. Goals provide the foundation from which the study's next element, objectives are developed (Barber & Taylor, 1990; Carter, 2016; Whitmer, 2019). Objectives define the required elements needed to achieve a goal (Carter, 2016; Whitmer, 2019). When possible, they should be SMART (Bjerke & Renger, 2017; Carter, 2016). While the case study's goal is well defined; there appear to be gaps in the published literature regarding the program's objectives. The research question addresses this by asking participants for their experiential-based recommendations for formal objectives based on the U.S. DOS definition of military professionalization of land-based military forces.

Analysis of the objectives is done to develop the fourth element, the CSFs. Critical success factors are those few key areas of activity where positive results are required to succeed (Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development, 2017; Osei-Kyei et al., 2017; Parmenter, 2015). Each objective will normally generate several CSFs. The CSFs are then deconstructed further to identify tasks and performance indicators. However, that is beyond the scope of this study.

A qualitative analysis generates themes by organizing data into meaningful clusters to address the research questions (Patton, 2015). I used a three-stage process to do this. The first stage is the precoding. Using NVivo software, I used the query

command to develop an overview of the data. This entailed the development of a word frequency diagram or word cloud. A word tree diagram followed this to assist in establishing context. The second stage was coding. Coding of the data was performed using NVivo software. Coding the material permitted the groupings of common aspects of the data and the development of themes. Individual and collective themes were identified. This involved the establishment of consistent codes and nodes. This enabled the establishment of relationships between the nodes and perhaps the underlying meanings of those relationships; these are the themes. The third and final stage was post coding. Post coding is the formatting of the data and findings for presentation. I used the NVivo software to explore function to develop the graphics to aid in presenting my findings. Analysis, using the results of the software, helped to identify themes in the answers.

Literature Review

In this section, I will review the literature regarding key aspects of my study. This is done in subsections. These include but are not limited to the case study, the SA program, management of government programs, expectation management, goals and objectives, and program vs. project management. There is a detailed discussion of professionalization, covering what it is, why an organization would do it, and how to measure professionalization progress in an organization. I also review the literature on CSFs, KPIs, measures and metrics, and brief analysis of the U.S. DOS's available literature regarding their military professionalization program.

Case Study

Case studies are generally categorized into two broad groups, research case studies and teaching case studies (Darke et al., 1998; Lapoule & Lynch, 2018; Yin, 2018). Research case studies should be unbiased, factual, and assume a distanced perspective to provide results that can be used to further research (Breslin & Buchanan, 2008; Lapoule & Lynch, 2018). Conversely, teaching case studies are selected for presentation for specific reasons and with an actual end state in mind. They are curated to make certain points and portray certain types of activities to students (Breslin & Buchanan, 2008; Desiraju & Gopinath, 2016; Mesny, 2013). However, case study research has several critics that argue several points. A major point is a problem of generalizing results from a small or even a single case sample (Bengtsson & Hertting, 2014; Yin, 2018). Additionally, critics argue that case study research fails to capture the full depth and complexity of the decisions made by management teams (Bridgman, 2011; Chetkovich & Kirp, 2001; Darke et al., 1998). Critics also note that case study research may not adequately capture action-based decision-making (Argyris, 1980; Desiraju & Gopinath, 2016). Another major concern is the separation case study researchers may have from “real” business experience (Heiko et al., 2017).

Using the Case Study Methodology

Several major criteria determine whether a case study methodology is a suitable method for researching a phenomenon, including the following:

- The main research questions are focused on “how” or “why.”
- The researcher has little or no control over behavioral events.

- The phenomenon is to be studied in its environment.
- The phenomenon under study (the case) is contemporary and not entirely historical (Range et al., 2019; Yin, 2018).

The general goal of case study research is to exit the study with lessons learned or applicable implications for other, similar cases (Lapoule & Lynch, 2018; Range et al., 2019).

Security Assistance Program

Security assistance, as practiced by the United States, is not a single program. Instead, SA is an umbrella term covering several individual programs administered by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense (Brady & Satchell, 2016). The purpose of these initiatives is to conduct stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations in support of national security objectives; to include the objectives of the regional geographic combatant commanders and chiefs of mission (Pompeo, 2016). These programs are executed at the tactical level by many organizations from both the government and private sectors. The frameworks for executing the assistance programs vary at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the strategic level, the frameworks are organizational and legal. The organization with primary responsibility for the programs is the DOS (Pompeo, 2016; Serafino, 2016).

The U.S. DOS, while capable of managing the strategic requirements, does not have the requisite expertise within its organization to execute all the tasks associated with the various SA programs. For this, the U.S. DOD and contracted companies provide support (Serafino, 2016). For civilian companies, the Arms Export Control Act and

Executive Order 1363 are manifested in the ITAR. The ITAR defines in explicit detail what constitutes arms trafficking and specifically notes countries where the transfer of weapons, weapons technology, or *military knowledge* is banned (Freebody, 2013; Miller, 2019; Trope, 2006). Understanding the legal authorizations is essential as it establishes the primary framework for which entities are allowed to do what, when it is permitted to be done, and for whom it is permitted to be done (Miller, 2019).

The Military Professionalization Program

According to the U.S. DOS's report to congress on SA, nine effective programs with 28 subprogram areas are being executed worldwide. The most common subprogram area was military professionalization. The military professionalization mission has been assigned to 113 of the 158 participating nations (Pompeo & Esper, 2019). As mentioned previously, this study's scope is limited to a single aspect of a single subprogram of the 128 subprograms the U.S. DOS assigns in its role as SA portfolio manager. Having outlined the legal framework, I will now identify some local participants, stakeholders, and general roles in the subprogram.

Major Program Stake Holders in the UAE

This section will list some of the major stakeholders in the UAE Land Forces military professionalization program. Knowing the stakeholders is a critical step in managing any program (PMI, 2019). Each of the stakeholders has distinct and separate roles to play in the program. These roles have implications for managing the program and maintaining compliance with U.S. legal and regulatory requirements under ITAR.

U.S. Department of State

Represented by the U.S. Embassy to the UAE. They are the knowledge owner and distribution manager. The U.S. DOS is the responsible government department for administering SA programs (Cooper, 2019). Described as the Principal in the principal-agent relationship vis-à-vis the UAE (Bendickson et al., 2016; Bryde et al., 2019; VanDeuson, 2011)

U.S. Department of Defense

Knowledge creator and a primary agent of knowledge transfer. Due to its size and expertise, the DOD is the primary global executor of SA programs at the DOS (O'Keefe, 2019). Members of the DOD are sub-assigned to DOS Embassies to assist in the oversight and execution of SA programs (O'Keefe, 2019; Work, 2016)

U.S. Central Command

A regional Combatant Command, U.S. Central Command is the organization responsible to the U.S. President for military matters in the command's area of responsibility (AOR) (Dempsey, 2017). U.S. Central Command at times provides workforce and materials for SA programs as well as joint training and development programs with the UAE (Pompeo, 2016, 2018)

The UAE

The host country of the military professionalization subprogram. The UAE is the recipient and end-user partner nation of the knowledge transfer. Described as the Agent in principal-agent relationship vis-à-vis the United States (Bendickson et al., 2016; Bryde et al., 2019; VanDeuson, 2011)

UAE Land Forces

Targeted organization for military professionalization mission. Described as the Principal in principal-agent relationship vis-à-vis Knowledge International and Knowledge Point LLC (Bendickson et al., 2016; Bryde et al., 2019; VanDeuson, 2011)

EDGE

A UAE Public, Private Partnership (PPP) umbrella corporation.

Knowledge Point LLC

A UAE based company owned by EDGE, Knowledge Point LLC is the administrator of contract execution, and primary employer of subject matter experts (SME) used to execute the military professionalization mission for the UAE Land Forces (VanDeuson, 2011)

Knowledge International

A U.S. based company owned by EDGE. Authorized by the U.S. DOS to engage in the UAE Land Forces military professionalization program (among others). Knowledge Point SME are seconded to Knowledge International for the execution of the military professionalization mission in order to satisfy the ITAR requirement for a U.S. based firm to conduct knowledge transfer (Miller, 2019). I would be described as the Agent in a principal-agent relationship vis-à-vis both the United States and the UAE Land Forces (Bendickson et al., 2016; Bryde et al., 2019; VanDeuson, 2011).

Managing Government Programs

Globally, government projects share several attributes. Chief among these focuses on non-financial goals and failures caused by a lack of management and oversight (Chih

& Zwikael, 2015; Furlong, 2015; Newcomer, 2007; Patanakul et al., 2016). Patanakul et al. noted six common characteristics of government projects and programs (2016). These include: (1) pursuing non-financial benefits, (2) being susceptible to political environment and dynamics, (3) following a mandated project management process, (4) being a large and complex megaproject, (5) having a long product life cycle, and (6) dealing with multiple stakeholders (Patanakul et al., 2016). Some have noted that the standard triumvirate of cost, schedule, and quality are not practical measures for government project success (Koops et al., 2017). They note that cost is the number one priority followed by schedule, with quality the lowest of the three priorities of the managers they surveyed. However, they did note that there may be a cultural element involved in their findings and that the key to project success was cooperation between the government managers and contractors executing the project.

The U.S. Government has implemented several measures in an attempt to manage its programs better. The most enduring has been the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 (Ho, 2007). The Government Performance and Results Act requires the linkages of an organization's mission, long-term goals, and short-term performance goals. If goals are not met, then a plan that outlines how the organization will achieve its goals is required (Ho, 2007).

Expectation Management

Meeting customer expectations is critical to project success (McLean & Antony, 2014; Nicolae et al., 2013). Expectations are more aligned with the customers' vision of

the outcome than with the particular product or service identified to the provider (Bayram et al., 2019; Ika, 2009; Nicolae et al., 2013).

Nicolae et al. specifically noted that,

> Customer expectation will be influenced by his or her perception of the product or service and can be created by previous experience, advertising, hearsay, awareness of competitors, and brand image (2013, p. 92).

This was reinforced by Ehsan et al. (2018) to examine customer satisfaction based on expectations being met in a blind product test. Wolverton et al. (2019) outline nine types of expectations. These expectation types and their meanings are displayed in Table 1.

Table 1

Types of Expectations

Type of expectation	Definition of expectation
Ideal	The perfect level of service for which a customer could wish
Wanted	The desired level of service that a client believes can be delivered
Deserved	The level of service a client believes they are worthy to receive
Should	The level of service a customer believes they ought to receive given a perceived set of costs
Adequate	The level of service a customer considers acceptable
Minimally acceptable	The lowest level of service the client feels must be performed
Intolerable	The level of service that the client will not accept
Worst imaginable	The level of service that exemplifies a client's worst-case scenario
Predicted	The level of service that demonstrates how well the vendor met the client's expectations of how they believed the vendor would perform on their next interaction based upon the vendor's past performance regarding the overall outsourcing arrangement

Note. From "Outsourcing success in the eye of the beholder: Examining the impact of expectation confirmation theory on IT outsourcing," by C. C. Wolverton, R. Hirschheim, W. C. Black, and J. Burleson, 2019, *Information & Management*. (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2019.103236)

Project success then would seem to hinge not only on achieving goals and objectives but framing those goals and objectives with the client to ensure better customer satisfaction with the outcomes (Ika, 2009; Wolverton et al., 2019). This, in turn,

is done through establishing and managing the expectations of what the client's vision of the outcome is, versus what they specify they want in a requirements document (Ika, 2009; McLean & Antony, 2014; Nicolae et al., 2013; Wolverton et al., 2019). Disconnects between expectations and reality are the root cause of agency problems (Bryde et al., 2019; Tumbat & Grayson, 2016). Developing the program's goals and objectives with the client can prevent diverging expectations (Chabursky, 2005).

Culture

Culture is a critical aspect of implementing change (Appelbaum et al., 2016; Boonstra, 2013; Gehman & Soublière, 2017; Murray et al. , 2017). Cultures are not monolithic and contain within them subcultures that view themselves as individual groups with different norms and behaviors from other subcultures within the more incredible culture from which they spring (Boonstra, 2013; Murray et al., 2017). Over time, cultures and subcultures become more formal and transition from Gemeinschaft organizations based on personality and individual charisma to Gesellschaft organizations built on documented processes and procedures (Greenfield, 2013). The United States attempts to change its SA program participants' culture using knowledge transfer through various SA programs and International Military Education and Training (IMET; Bruneau, 2015; Howell & Lind, 2009; Szarejko, 2014; Townsend, 2015). National culture differences directly impact the ability of, and the effort required to, implement cross-culture changes, and the more closely aligned the participants' national cultures, the more efficiently the change occurs (Kattman, 2014; Kirsch et al., 2012). Southwest Asia countries are particularly noted for their resistance to change (Kirsch et al., 2012).

Security assistance programs force this process through the requirement placed on U.S. forces to professionalize program recipient forces (Cooper, 2017)

Information and Principal Agent Problems

When agents act on asymmetric information vis-a-vis the principal, there is an increased chance of developing an agency problem (Bryde et al., 2019; McTigue, et al., 2020). Especially when the outcomes being generated by the agent do not match the expectations of the principal (client) (Bendickson et al., 2016; Bosse & Phillips, 2016). A primary method to reduce this issue is frequent communication to ensure both parties are using the same information and expectations are aligned (Bryde et al., 2019; Tumbat & Grayson, 2016). Besides, when an agent, acting on behalf of a principal, has divergent goals from the principal, a principal-agent problem exists (Bendickson et al., 2016; Bosse & Phillips, 2016; Bryde et al., 2019; Tumbat & Grayson, 2016). Resolving/preventing this issue is the topic of thousands of publications with 2,185 articles retrieved from EBSCO for the simple string "principal-agent problem." A general approach for resolving/preventing principal-agent problems requires the alignment of desired outcomes between the parties (Hotte et al., 2016; Rittinger, 2017).

Goals and Objectives

There is some ambiguity in the literature regarding the relationship between goals and objectives. McComb and Green stated that goals are "the clear, concise objectives for the team" (p8, 1999). In their assessment of performance-based management, defined as "systematic, regular and comprehensive capturing, measurement, monitoring and assessment of crucial aspects of organizational and individual performance through

explicit targets, standards, performance indicators, measurement, and control systems" (Diefenbach, 2009, p. 894), van der Hovek et al. (2018) use "the object or aim of an action" taken from Latham and Locke (2013, p. 4), focused on the ethical use of goals (generally associated with the financial performance of private organizations, Shinkle et al. (2019) note some characteristics of goals that seem familiar across the literature.

- Goals are usually established by top-level management
- Goals reflect the desired outcome for the organization
- Goals are used to direct the effort of the organization and
- Goals may be used to evaluate the organization's performance.

Though not explicitly defined, the Project Management Institute's discussion of goals in the 6th edition of the *project management body of knowledge* implies a more nebulous approach with less defined goals and associated more closely with strategic outcomes. This is in contrast to the use of the term objectives. PMI clearly defines the term objective in the *project management body of knowledge* as,

> An outcome toward which work is to be directed, a strategic position to be attained, a purpose to be achieved, a result to be obtained, a product to be produced, or a service to be provided (PMI, 2019, p. 4).

Using a more hierarchical approach of supporting goals with objectives appears to be a more common approach as evidenced in the American Fisheries Society's definition of the two,

> Goals are ideals, major accomplishments, ends, or states of affairs to be achieved. They direct a manager's planning, development of strategies, and direction of

> their organization's activities. Objectives operationally support goals and are measurable, verifiable statements of intermediate tasks that must be accomplished for goal attainment. (Barber & Taylor, 1990)

The U.S. DOD states,

> Goals indicate overarching aims, while objectives are generally narrower and more specific in their scope and timeframe for completion. Program objectives articulate how to accomplish program goals (Carter, 2016).

Objectives are sub-elements of goals and represent the goal's operationalization mechanisms (Carter, 2016; Ceresia, 2011; Izhar et al., 2017; Simon, 1964). For this study, the nested, supporting the relationship between goals and objectives, will be used. It is essential to clearly understand the differences between goals and objectives as the asymmetry between stakeholders may lead to agency problems (Carter, 2016; McKeon, 2017; Work, 2016).

Aligning Goals Through ITAR

Controlling the proliferation of military technologies to unfriendly governments and other entities is a priority of the U.S. Government and the U.S. DOS. The primary mechanism used to manage this is the ITAR. Mentioned briefly elsewhere in this study, the ITAR provides specific guidance on what constitutes arms, what constitutes a transfer, and whom and in what conditions a transfer is permitted (Cook, 2010; Cooper, 2019). There is some debate in the literature regarding the effectiveness of ITAR versus the cost to businesses that are forced to comply (Freebody, 2013; Maser, 2014; Seifert & Rallo, 2015). Some note that ITAR has become so burdensome that companies are not

conducting R&D on leading-edge technologies as it is too difficult, costly, and time-consuming to comply with ITAR's export controls (Seifert & Rallo, 2015). This lack of R&D has led to the development of the foreign capability to fill the void left by the gap in available U.S. advanced technology manufacturing (Cook, 2010; Freebody, 2013; Seifert & Rallo, 2015). ITAR is not limited to hardware. It also governs the export of knowledge and training (Dumas et al., 2002; Miller, 2019; Trope, 2006). A company such as Knowledge International that wishes to conduct training for international students (regardless of location) must first obtain an export license for that information (Miller, 2019; Rice, 2011).

It should be noted that export in this context means exposing a foreign national to the information (Cooper, 2019; Miller, 2019; Rice, 2011). This exposure can include showing a foreign national a piece of equipment or presenting information regarding an item, process, or procedure at a conference or even at a cocktail party (Cheadle, 2005; Miller, 2019; Trope, 2006). In all of these cases, the person, through their company, is held liable for the disclosure (Freebody, 2013; Miller, 2019). The penalties for unauthorized disclosure can be severe and may include monetary fines, disbarment from trading in the material/information, and imprisonment (Cook, 2010; Miller, 2019). Examples of ITAR enforcement include recent settlements between the United States and Boeing, which resulted in a 15 million dollar payment for breaches of ITAR while L3 corporation forfeited 13 million dollars for violations (Rice, 2011).

All companies that wish to export information, knowledge, or hardware are required to submit, in detail, what they wish to disclose, to whom they wish to disclose it,

how they plan to disclose it, who will do the exposing, and why they need to expose it (Cook, 2010; Miller, 2019; Trope, 2006). These disclosure applications are sent to the U.S. DOS's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) (Miller, 2019; Pompeo, 2019). The mission of DDTC is to "ensure exports of defense articles and defense services advance U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives (Pompeo, 2019)". At the DDTC, the applications are reviewed, and in a collaborative process between the company, the recipient nation, and the U.S. Embassy for that country, they are adjusted to ensure the disclosure aligns with U.S. national security and foreign policy goals and objectives (Miller, 2019; Pompeo, 2019).

Program vs. Project management

A project delivers a defined deliverable on a set date (PMI, 2019; Pompeo, 2016). A program is a collection of related projects which are, when grouped, of benefit to the organization as a whole (PMI, 2019; Pompeo, 2016). The primary differences between the management of projects and the management of programs are in scale and the relative disconnection from the program manager's task execution vs. the relative closeness to the project manager (PMI, 2019). This can sometimes lead to disconnects between expected results and actual results or a principal agency problem (Bryde et al., 2019; McTigue, et al., 2019). This problem is described as when the project manager (agent) is performing at the behest of a program manager (principal), but project deliverables are not meeting the program managers expectations for cost, quality, and schedule (Bendickson et al., 2016; Bosse & Phillips, 2016).

U.S. Department of State Program Management Mechanisms

The U.S. DOS develops, manages, and evaluates its programs through a four-phased process called managing results (Richardson, 2019). The process is executed in four phases. These phases are planning, budgeting, managing, and learning. Planning is conducted at three primary levels; The DOS and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) co-develop a strategic plan that lays out their goals, objectives, and performance standards to meet the President's priorities (Richardson, 2019). Besides, the DOS and USAID regional bureaus develop 4-year plans for their respective regions based on the DOS/USAID Joint Strategic Plan at the country level. The U.S. Embassies review and integrate all of the senior level goals, objectives, and performance standards into their own 4-year Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). The goals and strategies of these plans or ICS are supposed to reflect a whole of government approach concerning advancing U.S. priorities within the host country. The ICS serves as the filter through which all U.S. agency actions and activities are reviewed for compliance and applicability (Richardson, 2019). These management practices should reduce agency problems as outlined previously (Bosse & Phillips, 2016; Rittinger, 2017).

The second phase of the process is budgeting. The process DOS and USAID use to align resources (people and money) with the goals outlined in their plans. The budget is developed in a multi-stage, bottom-up approach that sees the individual missions and bureaus submit their prioritized funding requests aligned with their planning goals. The DOS consolidates and prioritizes these requests against their joint strategic goals and submits them to the U.S. Congress as part of the President's budget. The third phase of

the process is simply referred to as Managing. Managing itself has two major elements. These are program design and performance management and foreign assistance standard indicators. Under program design and performance management, our study's scope limits us to exploring the Security Sector Assistance Performance Management Framework. This framework outlines the required elements of any DOS/USAID program plan. The required elements include a section explaining how the goals and objectives of the program align with the ICS goals and objectives, a security sector assessment that outlines "context, conditions, capabilities, and risks on the ground (Richardson, 2019, p. 12)", how the plan expects to achieve its goal(s). This performance management plan must include the following:

- A logic model, Logic models, are usually a graphical depiction of the logical relationships between the resources, activities, outputs, and outcomes of a program.
- Development and explanation of relevant strategic (context), capability, and performance indicators at the objective and subobjective levels, including targets, benchmarks, and milestones for each;
- A monitoring framework including anticipated data sources and a collection plan to track progress toward targets and objectives, and means of verification,
- Reporting requirements and feedback loops (Richardson, 2019, pp. 12-13)

Finally, the plan must show the conduct of regular strategic progress reviews. It should be emphasized that this is a strategic level program management plan and does not

emphasize details of execution beyond a requirement for budget justification and goal alignment with the ICS, which is itself a high-level document (Richardson, 2019). These requirements mesh very well with existing literature for best practices of project and program management (Abdi & Kaddoura, 2011; Barnes et al., 2000; Kharat & Naik, 2018; PMI, 2019).

Defining Professionalization

To accomplish a task, one should define what one is trying to accomplish (Scott, 2017b). In this section, I discuss professionalization and how the literature defines it. In their discussion of Portuguese nonprofit organizations, Carvalho et al. (2016) stated the professionalization of an organization is, "understood as the move away from a well-intended amateurish approach towards a more formalized, 'professional' and, it is expected, a more effective mode of operating" (p. 79). In his influential work, Abbott noted that professions require an academic course of study, a means to validate the individual's mastery of the knowledge, a designation such as Certified Public Accountant (CPA) or Project Management Professional (PMP) in the case of professional accountants or project management professionals, a code of ethics governing their behavior, and a professional society (1988). The works of Thomas and Thomas (2014) and Smoyak (1989) dissected the attributes and traits of professionals and discussed the same general requirements as Carvalho and group, but refined both the ethics requirements and the rewards granted by society to members who adhere to the standards of the profession (Thomas & Thomas, 2014). Of particular interest for this study is the ethical employment of the knowledge, or in the case of the military, power. The literature

is universal in its specification of ethics as a requirement for professionalism (Carvalho et al., 2016; Christensen, 2015; Paton, Hodgson, & Muzio, 2013; Pongpearchan, 2016; Thomas & Thomas, 2014).

Viewed by many as a definitive guide on professionalization, Wilensky noted in 1964, the requirements for the professionalization of an organization are as follows: the development of the organization's identification (linkage) to a body of knowledge; creation of an association of a group of the practitioners to discuss common problems; the creation of specific training and education schools and a university to provide defined and specifically oriented training to practitioners; establishment of the institution by *public regulation;* and the establishment of a formal code of ethics (Maestripieri, 2016). The Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) Professional Bond report noted "the ethical use of organizational resources, a fundamental sense of responsibility, increasing global activities, and working toward the bettering of our civil societies as additional factors of professionalization" (Yang & Taylor, 2013, p. 258).

Also, they noted the path to professionalization in public relations requires,

> Higher education; establishment and membership in professional associations; codes of ethics; systems of accreditation; ethical information flows in society; and organizational allocation of resources to public relations (2013, pp. 258-259).

One of the nuances being missed in many of the authors' discussion is the difference between being in a profession and performing professionally (Doyle et al., 2016). Doyle et al. noted that *professionalization* is something done "to" someone, while *professionalism* is done "by" a person (2016). They define a profession as an

organization who work within a common practice, have demonstrated mastery of a theoretical body of knowledge and ethical code of standards, control accession to the organization, and exercise control/regulate the performance of its members' work. In his work on international humanitarian aid, James defined four criteria for a profession. These were: specialization of knowledge; establishment of the profession as a livelihood; organization and institutionalization; and legitimacy and authority. He noted that most professions set as goals the acquisition and monopolization of specialized knowledge. His explanation of why organizations do this follows two threads. First, he related the level of complexity in a given field requires the linkages between theory and application in order for the practitioner to perform competently. His example of this is the medical field. His second thread is market maintenance. By regulating and controlling the supply of practitioners, the organization influences the cost and supplies of the service (James, 2016; National Academies Press, 2013; Wu, 2017).

This construct was supported by Waaijer (2015) and his analysis of German academia and post-doctoral employment. A recent push for professional status by the group known as knowledge workers has led to a discussion in the literature of how a profession is defined in an environment that is so dynamic that the body of knowledge is ill-defined and so diverse that the establishment of a definitive body of knowledge its membership should master is not possible (James, 2016; Serrano del Pozo & Kreber, 2015; Szkudlarek & Romani, 2016).

In work regarded as the foundational document in the U.S. Military's professionalization, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military

Relations by Samuel Huntington (1957) are provided with the standard requirements a professionalized military officer corps. These are expertise, responsibility, and corporates. Paraphrasing Huntington's definitions, expertise is the functional knowledge gained through education and training that separates the professional from the layman. Responsibility is the duty to apply those functional skills on behalf of the state selflessly. Corporateness is the sense of belonging to an organization larger than themselves and that they are a group apart from laypeople. He noted that this is achieved through group discipline and training (Huntington, 1957, pp. 7-18). Huntington posited the overarching goal of a professionalized military is objective civilian control. This means the military, more specifically the officer corps, is a-political and does not participate, beyond the provision of advice, in strategic or national political decisions (Szarejko, 2014; Toronto, 2016; Uluçakar & Çaglar, 2016).

Janowitz made a counter-argument to Huntington's views in 1960 that rather than segregate the professional military in order to enhance professionalism and ensure objective civilian control, the military should be thoroughly integrated into society in order to achieve the same goal of objective civilian control (King, 2016; Szarejko, 2014; Uluçakar & Çaglar, 2016). While Huntington's work provides a best-case theoretical perspective, Janowitz offers a pragmatic, realist approach. Both, however, agree that civilian control's primary mechanism is well-established officer professionalism within the military (Feaver, 1996). The most debated issue in Huntington's and Janowitz's approaches is the shared conclusion that a professional military equates to civilian control (Feaver, 1996; King, 2016; Szarejko, 2014; Uluçakar & Çaglar, 2016).

According to a review of the FY 2015-2016 report (Pompeo & Esper, 2019), military professionalization is the most common single task for SA activities. 112 of the 174 countries received training ostensibly targeted at professionalizing their militaries Pompeo & Esper, 2019). They are known as program element PS.8.2: Military Professionalization and Institutional Reform. The critical elements of the U.S. DOS's definition of professionalism appear to mirror many of the elements noted as requirements by Huntington; to wit: Technical expertise (expertise), accountability (responsibility), and professional standards (corporateness). The requirement to "support the concept of civilian executive authority/control of the military (Cooper, 2017)" appears to be a direct linkage to objective civilian control articulated by Huntington (1957).

Why Professionalize?

Several reasons have been suggested for militaries to professionalize. Ostensibly militaries are professionalized just as civilian organizations professionalize. They seek to improve their quality, regulate their membership, enhance the nation's trust in the organization, establish a monopoly on the skillsets in question, increase the status of both the organization and its members in society, establish and regulate the behaviors of its members, and to better organize and regulate itself (Huntington, 1957). Huntington stated, "A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state (p. 84)". Both Huntington and Janowitz posited that the force's professionalization ensures objective civilian control (Szarejko, 2014; Toronto, 2016; Uluçakar & Çaglar, 2016). In its mission

definition of Military Professionalization, the U.S. DOS definition includes, "assist foreign partners so that their military forces reliably demonstrate consistent support for adherence to norms of human rights; support the concept of civilian executive authority/control of the military; and have the capacity for institutional and security sector reform" (Cooper, 2017).

The U.S. DOS is an adherent to Huntington's professionalization construct and assumes professionalized militaries are automatically under objective civilian control (Huntington, 1957). Toronto notes that a state may professionalize its military about its economic sophistication and capability. He noted that a state might professionalize its military as a status symbol (Toronto, 2016). The literature suggests a general concurrence that the state sanctions a professional organization (Huntington, 1957; Szarejko, 2014; Toronto, 2016; Townsend, 2015; Uluçakar & Çaglar, 2016) and that military professionalization improves long term national stability (Butler et al., 2012; Carvalho et al., 2016; Doyle et al., 2016; James, 2016; Kunneman, 2016). Authors such as Szkudlarek & Romani stated that no professional organization requirement in a "modern democratized world" exists (2016). This is a contrary opinion when the vast majority of the literature indicates such an organization is a prerequisite for the establishment of a profession (Butler et al., 2012; Carvalho et al., 2016; Doyle et al., 2016; James, 2016; Kunneman, 2016).

Within the domain of the U.S. driven professionalization of militaries, several voices claim the one-size-fits-all civilian control objective, advocated by the U.S. DOS, is not necessarily applicable to their nation's situation. These authors advocated for a more

nuanced approach, such as posited by Feaver (1916) and Travis (2017) (Bruneau, 2015; Bruneau & Matei, 2008; Szarejko, 2014; Travis, 2017; Uluçakar & Çaglar, 2016). These authors noted that professionalization is no guarantor of civilian control, and organizations may have loyalties greater than the current government (1996a). These authors then would align themselves with Clausewitz's Trinity of the Military, the Government, and the People (Bruneau, 2015; Szarejko, 2014; Travis, 2017; Uluçakar & Çaglar, 2016), thus segregating the military as a separate primary societal construct.

In addition to the reasons just cited, an organization may be directed to professionalize in order to provide benefit to the state, or as is the case of religious philanthropy in China, to ensure transparency, through state oversight, and reduce perceived or actual threat or maleficence (Bruneau & Matei, 2012). Members of the established professional organization share common knowledge and credentials, both internally and externally. Members of professionalized organizations are in many cases able to reach common understanding despite cultural or language difficulties because of their shared knowledge (James, 2016; Larson, 2014; O'Brien, 2015; Wu, 2017).

How to Professionalize

Consolidating the requirements for the establishment of a professional organization, the following are provided:

- A professional organization is state-sanctioned (Doyle et al., 2016; Vorst, 2017; Waaijer, 2015).

- A professional organization has an established body of theoretical knowledge (Butler et al., 2012; Carvalho et al., 2016; Doyle et al., 2016; James, 2016; Kunneman, 2016).
- A professional organization ensures that its members have mastered its theoretical body of knowledge (B. A. Christensen, 2015; Doyle et al., 2016).
- A professional organization has a method to regulate the induction and the discipline of its members (B. A. Christensen, 2015; Doyle et al., 2016).
- A professional organization has an established code of ethics (Christensen, 2015; Doyle et al., 2016; Huntington, 1957).

In addition to the above, the U.S. DOS web definition noted professional military organizations have

> the capacity to effectively carry out its military mission, through reliance on discipline, accountability, practical professional standards, and technical expertise. Demonstrates consistent support for adherence to norms of human rights; support the concept of civilian executive authority/control of the military; and have the capacity for institutional and security sector reform (Cooper, 2017).

How then do we succeed at professionalization? On its face, professionalization represents an organizational change. The management literature has little on implementing military professionalization but has many examples of organizational change. In their work Managing Successful Organizational Change in the Public Sector, Fernandez and Rainey (2006) developed a literate consensus that provided eight factors for successful government organizational change. These were:

1. Ensure the Need: Make sure the change is required and not just for its own sake.
2. Provide a Plan: A change plan has goals, objectives, and methods to measure their achievement.
3. Build Internal Support for Change and Overcome Resistance: Change is inherently about people and adjusting their motivations, attitudes, and expectations.
4. Ensure Top-Management Support and Commitment: It is recommended that a singular respected high-level leader champion the change.
5. Build External Support: Political and external stakeholder support is critical to ensure proper resourcing.
6. Provide Resources: Most changes have a cost and require trade-offs of resources.
7. Institutional Change: For the changes to be permanent, they must become part of the organization's members' everyday routines.
8. Pursue Comprehensive Change: Change must occur at all levels of the organization.

Measuring Professionalization Programs

There is a dearth of academic literature on measuring military professionalization programs (Ross, 2018b; Toronto, 2016). From the western perspective, primary professionalization measures appear to revolve around establishing civilian oversight and other mechanisms for civilian control of the military (Engels, 2017; Zulean, 2004).

Others note that the military's role in other countries does not fall readily into the Western (American) model of strict separation and civilian primacy (Kríz & Stixová, 2012; Szarejko, 2014). Ross (2018b) notes there are no established methods to measure progress beyond "check-in-the-box" methods where a student will attend an American military school and by default carry some bit of professionalization back with him/her where it will spread amongst their home organization. Other reports indicate that program managers do not have enough information to make recommendations for ways to enhance or change existing mechanisms (Biddle et al., 2017; Moroney et al., 2014). It has been noted that an evaluation of the program through the U.S. participants residing in the UAE may help to resolve this problem (Moroney et al., 2014).

Defining Critical Success Factors

What are the critical success factors? The critical success concept was refined from the success factor concept of McKinsey & Company, by Professor Jack Rockart at the MIT, Sloan School of Management (Bullen & Rockart, 1981). Critical success factors are the few critical areas of action/activity where positive results are required for a manager to achieve his/her goal (Almarri & Boussabaine, 2017; S.-W. Lin, 2017). For this study, they are part of a hierarchy of management tools that begin with goals supported by objectives (Barber & Taylor, 1990), themselves supported by CSF, which is monitored using KPIs (Castanho et al., 2018; Wibowo & Wilhelm Alfen, 2014; Zou et al., 2014). The hierarchy is depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2

Management tool hierarchy



Critical success factors can be equated to the course objectives that support a program objective (Christensen, 2015; Davis, 2015; Jaynes, 2015; Jiwat & Corkindale, 2014; Kunneman, 2016; Osei-Kyei et al., 2017; Parmenter, 2015).

Identifying Critical Success Factors

Rockart discussed the details of the CSF construct in a 1979 Harvard Business Review article. In this article, which contains an extensive assessment of the four primary information management constructs, Rockart stated that CSFs are qualitatively derived from overarching objectives or goals. A discussion is then conducted on establishing metrics and measures for the CSFs (Gluga et al., 2013; Mawer, 2017; Tractenberg et al., 2010). CSF identification's current trend is a combination of questionnaires, literature reviews, and case studies (Rockart, 1979). Of note in the literature' CSF identification

methodologies is the trend away from Rockart's qualitative and individual assessment with managers and toward the identification and application of standardized CSFs across whole industries (Castanho et al., 2018; Cha & Kim, 2018; Hietschold et al., 2014; Jiwat & Corkindale, 2014; S.-W. Lin, 2017; Rashid et al., 2017; Resende et al., 2018; Yadav & Barve, 2018; Zhou et al., 2017).

Evaluating Achievement of Critical Success Factors: KPIs

The achievement of CSFs is measured through the use of KPIs. KPIs are metrics used to assess either the achievement or non-achievement of a CSF (Castanho et al., 2018; Wibowo & Wilhelm Alfen, 2014; Zou et al., 2014). The metrics are either objector or subjective and are evaluated as true or false; was it achieved or not (Kumaraswamy et al., 2017; Ponte et al., 2017). The identification of KPIs is made after the CSFs have been identified and used to determine CSF achievement progress (Bullen & Rockart, 1981; Gawankar et al., 2015; Ionescu, 2015; Parmenter, 2015). KPIs should be SMART; they should be "specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound (Kuhfahl et al., 2018, p. 37)."

Defining Metrics and Why They are Important

The importance of implementing measures across the management domain is generally recognized, as evidenced in words attributed to Peter Drucker, what gets measured gets managed, and it is essential to measure the right things as that is where the effort of the organization and its management will be directed (Jørgensen, 2016; McNerney et al., 2016). This would appear to be borne out in the management of SA programs as measures of effort regarding monies spent and numbers of people trained for

SA programs are reported to Congress (Pompeo & Esper 2019). However, no assessment gauging actual progress against the professionalization goals is provided (Litvanas, 2017; Nathan, 2017; Reyes, 2017; Riospelati, 2017). Without metrics for goal attainment and the linkages to their supporting resources, management of the programs are hamstrung, and there is a probability the projects will fail (Barnett, 2015; Hadad & Găucă, 2014; Minassians, 2014).

Measures vs. Metrics

According to the U.S. Governments National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency website,

> There is overlap between measures and metrics. Both can be qualitative or quantitative, but what distinguishes them is important. Measures are concrete, usually measure one thing, and are quantitative in nature (e.g., I have five widgets). Metrics describe quality and require a measurement baseline (I have five more widgets than I did yesterday). …measures are useful for demonstrating workloads and activity, and metrics are useful for evaluating compliance, processes effectiveness, and measuring success against established objectives (Conigliari, 2019; Pompeo, 2016).

For a project, the current standard measures are quality, cost, and schedule., also known as the Iron Triangle. To create metrics, the measures are paired with another aspect, such as time, budget, or established requirements, for example (cite). As we have already noted, many argue this is an inadequate array of tools to measure project success and mostly inadequate for measuring a government project (Conigliari, 2019; Pompeo, 2016). To use metrics to measure success, according to the CIO, we must have

established objectives. Those objectives should support the client's goals and mesh closely with their expectations (PMI, 2019). The literature indicates a failure to align goals and expectations has a high probability of resulting in a client's perception of project failure (PMI, 2019).

Analysis of the Mission's Objectives

The scope of this study is limited to the mission of military professionalization. The definition I will be using is from the U.S. DOS. In this portion, we will begin to dissect the definition. The first section deals with the military mission. The web site states, "The organization must have the capacity to effectively carry out its military mission, through reliance on discipline, accountability, effective professional standards, and technical expertise." This portion of the definition would seem to align readily with those elements of a professional organization about knowledge, mastery of the knowledge, ability to consistently perform the tasks associated with that knowledge, and the ability of the organization to establish and enforce standards (Butler et al., 2012; Carvalho et al., 2016; Doyle et al., 2016; James, 2016; Kunneman, 2016).

Next, "The organization and its members demonstrate consistent support for adherence to norms of human rights (Cooper, 2017)." This section of the definition addresses the most commonly noted aspect of a professional organization, ethics (B. A. Christensen, 2015; Doyle et al., 2016; Huntington, 1957). However, this portion of the definition is also listed as a separate mission and is a reasonably common mission for SA, being assigned to 50 separate national programs (Pompeo & Esper, 2019). This is very much an American attribute of civil-military relations (Kríz & Stixová, 2012; Szarejko,

2014; Uluçakar & Çaglar, 2016). The final portion of Military professionalization's definition is "…have the capacity for institutional and security sector reform (Cooper, 2017)." This is also a separate task for 34 SA programs (Pompeo & Esper, 2019b). Each of these program goals is already included in the original task of military professionalization, and hence, already assigned to each of the SA program managers (Pompeo & Esper, 2019b).

No explanations are on the DOS website or in the reports to Congress on how the missions are assigned for the various countries, nor are any explanations on why sub-elements of the military professionalization mission are assigned as redundant separate missions provided. This represents a significant gap in the literature. Besides, missing entirely from the DOS definition of professionalization, but common in most other requirement frameworks for professionalization, are high-level education requirements, most appropriately for recipient nations' officer programs. Notwithstanding the redundant nature of the DOS SA recipient nation tasking, how is the attainment of the goal measured? According to representatives of the U.S. Army and the U.S. DOS, they are not measured. Desired attributes are listed as supported based on the attendance of SA recipients at a U.S. residential school, and ethics are evaluated based on asking the individual if they have personally participated in any human rights violations (Nathan, 2017; Reyes, 2017; Riospelati, 2017).

Critical Success Factors for the Achievement of Military Professionalization

As of this writing, no official CSFs are published for measuring the achievement of the military professionalization mission assigned by the U.S. DOS to the various SA organizations (Reyes, 2017). This represents a significant gap in the literature.

KPIs for Military Professionalization

As of this writing, no official KPIs are published for measuring the achievement of any CSFs relating to the military professionalization mission assigned by the U.S. DOS to the various SA organizations (Litvinas, 2017; Nathan, 2017; Reyes, 2017; Riospelati, 2017). While a small number of non-peer-reviewed commentaries on the subject, such as Ross's concise commentary (2018a), the lack of quality academic writing represents a significant gap in the literature.

Similar Studies

Little literature regarding the development of CSF for SA programs exists. However, civilian management literature is rife with examples of the process and case studies on developing and identifying CSFs and their attendant KPIs. A simple search of the EBSCO database for critical success factors returned more than 17,000 articles. Refining this search to peer-reviewed articles culled the literature to 12,810. They are further limiting the return to 5 years old or younger, left 4,818 articles relating to the topic.

A review of the current literature indicates a trend in CSF identification methods is a combination of questionnaires, literature reviews, and case studies (Litvinas, 2017). Many then conduct expert interviews to review their findings (Castanho et al., 2018;

Wibowo & Wilhelm Alfen, 2014; Zou et al., 2014). This moves away from Rockart's qualitative and individual assessment with managers (Castanho et al., 2018; Kumar & Shrivastava, 2017; S.-W. Lin, 2017; Ofori-Kuragu et al., 2016; Yadav & Barve, 2018). A movement toward identifying and applying standardized CSFs across whole industries appears to be underway rather than the tailored approach initially advocated by Rockart. This could be attributed to the utility of the CSF construct and its applicability across multiple disciplines instead of just information management for executives (Hietschold et al., 2014; Kumar & Shrivastava, 2017; Rashid et al., 2017; Resende et al., 2018).

A growing method of structuring problems and providing visualization is Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL). It is used to verify and integrate expert opinions, provide graphic portrayals of complex problems' interrelationships, and gain popularity as a decision tool across multiple disciplines. It is best used when large numbers of CSFs exist, and prioritization is required (Bullen & Rockart, 1981; Earl & Scott, 1999; Hietschold et al., 2014; Jennex, 2005; Krishnan et al., 2004; Rockart, 1979; Yadav & Barve, 2018). This approach did not apply to this study, but as the body of knowledge on the topic increases, and should detailed studies on the topic continue, and large numbers of CSFs be identified, it may be integrated into the future research methodology.

Summary and Conclusions

In reviewing the literature on the various significant points of the study, several themes did emerge. The utility of ensuring any project with multiple stakeholders undergoes a process by which the stakeholder's goals are aligned (Barber & Taylor,

1990; Carter, 2016; PMI, 2019). Goal alignment can reduce agency problems and ensure that the stakeholders have reasonable expectations (Bendickson et al., 2016; Bosse & Phillips, 2016. Reasonable expectations improve the likelihood of project success (McLean & Antony, 2014; Nicolae et al., 2013). Professionalization is a significant undertaking with significant organizational benefits and has several not insubstantial perquisites (Feaver, 1996; Huntington, 1957; McLean & Antony, 2014; Nicolae et al., 2013). The establishment of goals, supporting objectives, implementing systematic mechanisms for achieving the objectives, and measuring their achievement, are project/program management best practices (Barber & Taylor, 1990; Carter, 2016; PMI, 2019). The literature gap is that executors of the programs do not have enough information to make recommendations for ways to enhance or change the management mechanisms (Biddle et al., 2017; Moroney et al., 2014, 69). It is hoped that this study has provided some of the information noted as a gap by the program managers. In Chapter 3, I outline how I collected the data.

Chapter 3: Research Method

The purpose of this exploratory case study was to describe the perspectives of retired operational and tactical military leaders on how to professionalize land-based military forces. This is the first step to systematically frame the various program measurement mechanisms for the UAE Land Forces program's military professionalization. This research was accomplished through collecting and analyzing the data from the former field/general grade U.S. military members participating in the program's execution. The study's goal was to identify potential CSFs required to accomplish the subprogram objectives. This was the first step, to systematically frame the various program management mechanisms at the operational and tactical level for the UAE military professionalization subprogram. This chapter contains discussions of research design and rationale, the role of the researcher, methodology, participant selection logic, instrumentation, procedures for recruitment, participation, and data collection, the data analysis plan, a discussion of trustworthiness, to include credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability, ethical procedures, and a chapter summary.

Research Design and Rationale

The research question addressed in this study was this: What information do operational and tactical military leaders provide on how to professionalize the land-based military forces? This question aimed to provide information on *how* to measure progress toward the military professionalization mission's achievement. The nature of this study was qualitative. Qualitative research is consistent with exploring a field that has a dearth of theory. The research subject consisted of identifying CSFs that are traditionally

derived through qualitative means (Castanho et al., 2018; Leidecker & Bruno, 1984). This research design was an exploratory case study inquiry using interviews with senior U.S. participants in the program and reviews of available open-source, U.S. government documents about the program's management.

McCaslin and Wison-Scott (2003) discussed the types of qualitative studies. These are narrative inquiry, grounded theory, ethnography, phenomenology, and case study. Narrative inquiry is focused on a single individual's life and, therefore, not applicable to this study. Grounded theory is used to develop a theory from the research, and as noted in the problem statement, there is a dearth of research on this topic. Ethnography focuses on the study of the culture of a group. While culture certainly plays a part in any training or transformation project, it was not the focus of this study and did not appear applicable. Phenomenology is a study of the lived experiences of a group of people that have been part of an event. Although I drew on the lived experiences, those experiences were not the study's focus. Preferably, the experiences were used by the participants to shape their answers to the research questions.

Unlike an experiment, a case study aims to analyze a current event within its real-world context (Farquhar, 2013; Yin, 2018). A case study is called for when the researcher has little or no control over the event or the environment and where multiple forms of data are available (Hancock & Algozzine, 2017). Given that little previous research has been conducted on the UAE Land Forces professionalization mission, I have no control over the event in question, and I had multiple forms of data available, a case study was a valid methodology. Selecting the type of case study, single or multiple, can hinge on

many variables. While multiple case study provides the most data (Hancock & Algozzine, 2017), the access and resources required for a single person to collect and thoroughly analyze the data was prohibitive in this case. Because this was a study in which I have access to data in the UAE that was previously not accessible, a single case exploratory (revelatory) study was a valid course of action (Yin, 2018).

For data collection, I used semistructured interviews conducted with retired senior (i.e., field grade officers or above) U.S. program participants, reviewed available management documents, and cataloged my observations. The interview questions were vetted by a field study where a panel of experts iteratively reviewed my questions until they all agreed they would meet the study's goal. The results of the interviews were transcribed and coded using NVivo software for analysis.

Role of the Researcher

My role as the researcher was to identify, contact, and interview study participants. In addition, as is customary in a single-case case study, I provided my observations of the phenomenon (Hancock & Algozzine, 2017; Yin, 2018). Once I had collected and analyzed the data, I synthesized the inputs and produced a written report that faithfully reflects the study participants' data and literature sources. In my analysis, I identify significant statements, patterns, and categories that may reveal themselves (Leavy, 2014). My focus was to capture the participants' inputs and perceptions related to identifying measurable parameters, objectives, or CSFs through their interactions during our interviews. I have had peer relationships with many of the intended members of my participant pool. I have intentionally not discussed any of my research with them as I did

not want to color any of the inputs I received from them. I have personally participated in SA programs with over 30 different nations. Although I have participated in many SA programs, I have never participated at the strategic level where the measurement of national goals was required, nor have I knowingly participated in any directed measurement activities related to U.S. State or Defense Department reporting on SA programs to the U.S. Congress. Although I have opinions of some measurable parameters, objectives, and CSFs, I understand that I may not possess the task's total view. Therefore, I used expert panels as often as possible to mitigate any of my personal bias in this study. I used NVivo qualitative analysis software to reduce further any researcher subjectivity and bias (Cochrane, 2013).

Methodology

The goal of using and describing sound methodology is to provide a framework for a study that will be rigorous, valid, replicable, and transferable (van Manen, 2016). This section includes a description of the methods used to conduct these activities.

Participant Selection Logic

The participant pool was former senior military officers who have participated in the U.S. military professionalization subprogram in the UAE. The primary criteria for participant selection were as follows:

- The persons will have participated in U.S. military professionalization subprogram in the UAE.
- Participants had to be a former senior officer (field grade or above) of the U.S. military.

The pool of potential participants included residents, former military members currently participating in SA programs, and non-resident, former U.S. military personnel who have participated in SA programs in the UAE. The targeted sample size was 20 participants, with a minimum of six participants to be interviewed (van Manen, 2016). Data saturation is defined as the point at which further data collection is counterproductive to resource expenditure (Mason, 2010; Merriam &Tisdell, 2015). Data saturation may occur early in a study with relatively high homogeneity levels (van Manen, 2016). Given the limited scope of this study and the relatively high anticipated homogeneity of the participant pool, saturation could occur early in the project's data collection phase (Mason, 2010).

Based on this potential outcome, I conducted a preliminary assessment of the data after the first six interviews to determine whether data saturation had occurred before the entirety of the first 20 participants were interviewed. However, it was unclear whether saturation had occurred, so an additional four interviews were conducted, after which I determined that saturation had occurred. Upon receipt of the Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, I published the IRB approved flier and informed consent letter on a social media site that many retired U.S. Army expatriates living in the UAE frequently visit. Participants contacted me to volunteer to contribute to the study. Within 48 hours of posting to the social media site, I received multiple requests to participate. Interviews with 10 participants were conducted before I determined I had reached data saturation. This IRB-approved approach eliminated any perception of coercion to participate. Interested parties contacted me by email, where I confirmed their

eligibility and then provided a copy of the informed consent letter, containing a more detailed description of the study and the exact questions to be asked of any participant. Participants then acknowledged that they consented to participate in the study, and an interview was scheduled. In addition to interviews, I provided my observations of the phenomenon and data from available management documents, such as formal reports and accessible government websites.

Instrumentation

This section covers the mechanisms used to collect the study data and rationalize their use. I collected data using in-depth interviews with the study participants and from official U.S. government documents and websites available to the public. As the sole interviewer, I was the primary data collection instrument. I conducted interviews using questions grounded in the literature and vetted by industry experts in a field test. I performed in-depth interviews with the participant pool as the literature indicated this is an effective method of single-case exploratory case study data collection (Hancock & Algozzine, 2017; Yin, 2018). Several individual information collection and management aids were used to manage the data and guide the interviews. First was the interview protocol sheet, a modification of the protocol sheet used by in Edwards's (2015) Walden dissertation, *Exploring Critical Success Factors of the Redesigned Military Transitioning Program*. The dissertation was chosen as a study of active and retired U.S. military personnel and mirrored, in many ways, my study's general participant pool.

The interview protocol provided a standardized methodology for conducting the data collection interviews, helped to ensure data trustworthiness, and aided in removing

personal bias and information from the interview process as described by Stake (2010), Edwards (2015), van Manen (2015), and Seidman (2013). I followed the same protocol for each participant's interview. The interview process consisted of three semistructured questions designed to allow the participant to share their views of what the measurable parameters for the military professionalization mission in the UAE are as well as their perceptions regarding possible adjustments to the U.S. DOS definition of military professionalization, as it applies to the UAE land forces. The questions are based on the U.S. DOS's definition of military professionalization. They are intended to answer the research question: What information do operational and tactical military leaders provide on how to professionalize the land-based military forces?

The research question aimed to provide information on *how* to measure progress toward achieving the military professionalization mission. The interview questions were designed to allow the participant to identify program objectives and the supporting CSFs for the military professionalization subprogram. Besides, the interview questions allowed the participants to identify those areas they feel are not addressed by the DOS definition and which their experiences indicated should be included and removed. A voice recorder was employed to ensure that the entirety of participants' statements was captured to facilitate accurate data collection during these interviews. Questions used within the protocol have been validated using a field test comprised of several senior (Colonel or above) retired officers who formed a panel to ensure the interview questions could answer the research question.

Field Test

A field test asks a panel of experts to evaluate interview questions as contained in the interview protocol sheet, assess whether they are clear, and are likely to result in responses related to the research question. A field test of the interview questions was conducted between July 12 and 15, 2018. The panel comprised four retired senior U.S. Army officers in the grades of Colonel (O-6) and Major General (0-8). Each panel member is a personal friend and had at least 30 years of experience in the military, and has worked with Afghan, Iraq, and UAE military units. The test was conducted via e-mail and comprised three iterations of receipt, integration, and reevaluation of the protocol and questions based on the panel's advice.

Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection

This study used a single data collection instrument for semi-structured interviews to address the research question. Besides, available relevant documents about the management of the military professionalization subprogram were reviewed and analyzed. Finally, my observations of the subprogram were coded and analyzed.

Recruitment

The purpose of this single-case exploratory case study was to explore CSFs for the military professionalize the land-based military forces. By reviewing the DOS mission definition using some of the U.S. participants' lived experiences**,** I used purposeful sampling. The criteria for participant selection are

- the person is a retired Field or General Grade Officer.

- the person either is or has participated in a training program with the UAE Land Forces.

The participants' pool included residents, former military members currently participating in SA programs, and non-resident former U.S. military personnel who have participated in SA programs with the UAE Land Forces. The targeted sample size is 20 participants, with a minimum of six participants to be interviewed (Mason, 2010; Merriam &Tisdell, 2015). At least 50 prospective participants known to me personally currently reside in the UAE. Upon authorization by the IRB, an invitation was posted in an online chat group frequented by former U.S. Service Members that are participating in the various UAE Land Forces training programs. Members of the chat room who wished to participate in the study acknowledged to me via email they had read and understood the consent form posted in the online chat room with the advertisement.

Data Collection

I only scheduled interviews with volunteers that consented to participate in the study. I collected data through in-person interviews and Zoom teleconference software. In-person interviews were conducted in locations that were convenient for the participant. The environment was noncontroversial, quiet, safe, well-lit, and comfortable. These locations included quiet restaurants with a private space or a private conference room. In all cases, my primary concerns were the safety and privacy of the participant. To that end, and in compliance with UAE COVID-19 protocols, any participant could have elected to conduct an online interview, and one participant did. Each participant was scheduled for an interview of approximately 30 to 60 min. In-person interview audio was recorded

using a digital voice recorder. Online interviews were audio-recorded using a digital recording device. I took notes during the interview and transcribed those notes.

A transcript of the interview and my notes were provided to each participant via email for their review, correction, or clarification as needed. Participants were invited to share any thoughts they may have after the interview with me via email or a subsequent recorded interview. Upon completion of the study, I will create a one to two-page summary of the results. This summary will be written in lay-person language, include a summary of the problem and a discussion of the data and conclusion. This summary will be sent to all participants.

Data saturation is defined as the point at which further data collection is counterproductive to resource expenditure (van Manen, 2016). Data saturation may occur early in a study with relatively high homogeneity levels (Mason, 2010; Merriam &Tisdell, 2015; van Manen, 2016). A preliminary assessment of the data was conducted after the first six interviews to determine if data saturation had occurred. The results were inconclusive, and an additional four participants were interviewed. After the 10th interview was completed, an additional assessment was performed, and I determined that saturation had occurred.

During the data collection process, I also wrote my answers to the questions I asked the participants, because I have personal experiences of participating in military professionalization programs with over 30 different countries in the past 30 years. These personal experiences, which I purposefully reflected on and bracketed in my attempt to reduce personal biases during the research, still represent a research resource I drew up

on to gain some perspective on both the participants' answers as well as helping to shape follow-on questions during the interview to get as much usable information from the participants as possible.

Data Analysis Plan

I inherently played a significant role in collecting and managing the data for this study, and it proved useful for me to iteratively review and analyze the role I played in the study. This included my past and current participation in any aspect of the subject area. Once interviews were completed, I transcribed them using NVivo speech to text software. I verified the transcript of all interviews against the recording to ensure validity. This assisted in my immersion in the data and helped ensure the participant became my focus (Giorgi, 2012; van Manen, 2016). Transcripts were then provided to the participants for their review to ensure the validity of the content. No additional interviews with the participants were required.

A qualitative analysis generates themes by organizing data into meaningful clusters to address the research questions (Stake, 2010). I used a three-stage process. The first stage was the precoding. Using NVivo software, I used the query command to develop an overview of the data. This entailed the development of a word frequency diagram and word cloud. This was be followed by a word tree diagram to assist in establishing context. The second stage is coding. This involved the establishment of consistent codes and nodes. This enabled the establishment of relationships between the nodes and the underlying meanings of those relationships; these were the themes. The final stage was post coding. Post coding is the formatting of the data and findings for

presentation. I used the NVivo explore function to develop the necessary graphics to aid in presenting my findings. Coding of the data was performed using NVivo software. Coding the material permitted the groupings of common aspects of the data and the development of themes. The interpretation of the themes allowed for interpretive analysis and some generalization of how the participants view the phenomenon.

Issues of Trustworthiness

The following sections outline how I addressed issues to ensure the trustworthiness of the study's results. These include credibility, transferability, and dependability. Besides, I discuss confirmability and ethical procedures. The purpose is to provide details on how each of these areas is addressed in my study.

Credibility

Credibility is how confident the researcher is in the truth and accuracy of the study findings. To ensure credibility I used analyst triangulation, member checking, and data saturation to ensure data credibility. Analyst triangulation is having another analyst review the findings. This helps mitigate any researcher bias. Member checking is providing the data, conclusions, and interpretations of the study participants. This allows them, should they wish, clarify, and correct what they provided and provide additional information if necessary (Giorgi, 2012; Smith et al., 2009).

Transferability

While transferability is not necessarily a hallmark of exploratory case studies, the use of thick descriptions allows the readers to determine for themselves the applicability of transferability (Shento, 2004; van Manen, 2016). A thick description provides a

detailed account of the researchers' experiences during data collection. I have made detailed comments regarding my data collection efforts for this study regarding the cultural and social contexts surrounding my data collection efforts. This allowed for detailed descriptions of where the interviews occurred, when they occurred, such as after work (which can affect the participant's general mood), and other aspects of data the collection event that should help provide a more detailed understanding of the data collection setting. This detailed accounting of the environment should help the reader understand the context of the data collection effort and perhaps any particular biases that might impact the participants' responses to the interview questions. This will permit outside researchers to make their own transferability decision (Stake, 2010).

Dependability

Dependability is how close to the established process standards the study has been performed. The significant evaluation areas are the study's concept, data collection processes, participant selection logic, interpreting findings, and reporting the results. All of these aspects should be clearly explained in the body of the study to enable repeatability. The most common method to ensure dependability is the dependability audit. Maintaining adequate research notes, explaining methodologies and selection criteria in the study's body are the vital elements in ensuring an auditor can assess the study's dependability (Shento, 2004; van Manen, 2016).

Confirmability

Confirmability is the level of neutrality in the study's findings. I provide detailed documenting of the processes and procedures used for data collection and explain why

decisions were taken to follow specific paths when alternate paths were available (Stake, 2010; Shento, 2004).

Ethical Procedures

Before data collection begins, the data collection and analysis plan must undergo review and receive approval from the Walden University IRB. The IRB process is in place to ensure research efforts sanctioned by the school conform to the University's ethical standards and federal guidelines. I submitted a request for IRB authorization after the oral defense, and the approval of my proposal by the IRB was received on August 12, 2020, approval number 08-12-20-0331836, which expires on August 11, 2021. According to the Walden University IRB website,

> The IRB process collects enough specific information to document that the study's benefits outweigh the costs and that the procedures comply with federal regulations and university policies. The board evaluates the IRB application based on how well the following ethical principles are upheld:
>
> Beneficence: Maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms
>
> Justice: Fairly distribute benefits and burdens of research
>
> Respect for Persons: Acknowledge participants' autonomy and protect those with diminished autonomy (Harris, 2018, p. 1).

As the researcher, it was my responsibility to ensure ethical research standards, as noted by the National Institutes of Health, are adhered to (Harris, 2018). Informed consent procedures and ensuring all participants' confidentiality are critical ethical considerations that are important and applicable to this study (Stake, 2010). A consent

form provides participants with the information needed to inform them of collecting information from them, how the information is expected to be used, the initial questions that will be asked during the interview, and how the collected data will be managed. Management includes ensuring the confidentiality and security of the information collected (Stake, 2010).

The consent form advises study participants of the study's procedures and information regarding the risks and benefits of the study. Because the interviews focused on former senior military service members, the participants were all adults over 21 years of age. I informed all of the participants their participation in the study was strictly voluntary, and they could cease their participation at any time. Besides, I inform them that any information they provide and their participation in the study will remain confidential and known only to me. I changed the participants' names to a unique participant identifier, which I assigned to each participant. A digital voice recorder was used for recording the responses of the interviewees. I transcribed the data from the recorder. I have placed the data on a password-protected computer in my home. Audio recordings will remain in a locked cabinet in my home office, and I will destroy them after 5 years. As a researcher, I communicated the purpose and the relevancy of the study to participants. I treated each participant with dignity and respect. I have no subordinates or supervisors participating in this study. No incentives used to induce participation. As noted previously, I have conducted a period of introspection to bracket my bias in this study.

Summary

In this chapter, I have discussed the research methodology I used in my single-case exploratory case study. I have discussed how I collected and analyzed the data I obtained from my observations, relevant available management documents, and information from the semi-structured interviews with former senior U.S. service members participating in the subprogram in the United Arab Emirates. I have provided my study's research question, the research design and rationale, a discussion of the study's nature, and details on my role as the researcher. Besides, I provided insights into my methodology, details on my participant selection logic, instrumentation, the field test used to aid in instrumentation development, procedures for recruitment, participation, and data collection, my data analysis plan, issues of credibility transferability, dependability, confirmability and the ethical safeguard procedures for the study. In Chapter 4, I will discuss my analysis of the data.

Chapter 4: Results

The purpose of this exploratory case study was to examine how to professionalize land-based military forces. The specific problem is that military leaders do not have enough information on how to professionalize the land-based military forces (Moroney et al., 2014). This research was accomplished through collecting and analyzing the perspectives of some of the former field/general grade U.S. military members participating in the program's execution. The study's goal was to expand existing literature on the CSFs for the U.S. DOS's military professionalization programs. The research question was the following: What information do operational and tactical military leaders provide on how to professionalize the land-based military forces?

This chapter contains discussions of the research setting, demographics, data collection actions, data analysis processes and procedures, and evidence of trustworthiness to include a discussion of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. I also discuss the study results, and at the end, I provide a summary, which includes answers to the research question and an introduction to Chapter 5.

Research Setting

All participants in this study were volunteers and made themselves known to me after posting the IRB approved study flier on a social media page that many former U.S. military members visit frequently. With the flier, I posted the informed consent letter, which included the questions that would be discussed during the interview. Instructions were provided on how to contact me should they decide to participate in the study. This IRB approved process ensured that all participants were recruited passively and could

only participate if they actively engaged with me. As the participants asked to participate via email, I coordinated available times and locations of their choice. All but one of the 10 participants elected to have a face-to-face interview. One participant elected to conduct the interview using Zoom videoconferencing software.

The nine face-to-face interviews were conducted in restaurants with private rooms/areas that prevented anyone else from overhearing or, in most cases, from seeing our interview. The one interview conducted via Zoom had no interruptions or evidence that any other member of the participants' household heard or saw the interview progress. Interview times ranged from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. The participants established all interview times in order to accommodate their work/life schedules. Interviews ranged in duration from 15 to 65 minutes. The average was 33 minutes or 25 minutes if the longest and shortest interview times are discounted. Each of the participants was energetic in their answers to the questions and gave the impression they viewed this study as an opportunity to voice their opinion on the programs they were participating in.

Demographics

Demographic data relevant to the study were compiled and are displayed in Table 2. Participants were assigned unique identifier numbers to preserve anonymity. Due to the small community of advisors in the UAE, certain elements such as the participants' former military rank and specific current position are not included in the table to preserve the confidentiality of their participation in the study.

Table 2

Participant Demographics

Participant	Years of military experience	Levels of experience	Gender	Current position
1	>20	Operational/Tactical	Male	Advisor
2	>20	Strategic/Operational/Tactical	Male	Advisor
3	>20	Strategic/Operational/Tactical	Male	Advisor
4	>20	Operational/Tactical	Male	Advisor
5	>20	Operational/Tactical	Male	Advisor
6	>20	Operational/Tactical	Male	Advisor
7	>20	Operational/Tactical	Male	Advisor
8	>20	Operational/Tactical	Male	Advisor
9	>20	Strategic/Operational/Tactical	Female	Advisor
10	>20	Strategic/Operational/Tactical	Female	Advisor

Participants were listed as Participant 1 through 10. At the time of the study, 40% of the participants occupied advising positions that addressed strategic, operational, and tactical level decisions, whereas 60% of the participants occupied advising positions that addressed operational and tactical level decisions. All of the participants were retired U.S. Army Field or General Grade officers, each with over 20 years of military experience. Twenty percent of the participants were women. Per the Walden IRB requirements, none of the participants were categorized as vulnerable. All participants were residents in the UAE at the time of the study.

Data Collection

Data were collected using three methods: semistructured interviews, personal observations, and a review of available literature.

Interviews

Upon receipt of IRB approval, I began recruiting study participants for interviews for my study using the IRB-approved flier. Participants contacted me to volunteer to contribute to the study after I published the IRB approved flier and informed consent letter on a social media site that many retired U.S. Army expatriates living in the UAE frequently visit. Within 48 hours of posting to the social media site, I received multiple requests to participate. Interviews with 10 participants were conducted before I determined I had reached data saturation.

Interviews were conducted using the IRB-approved interview protocol sheet to help ensure consistency in data collection. Interview durations were planned for 30 min to an hour. A total of 333 min of recorded transcripts were collected with an interview average of approximately 33 min. However, there were two outliers, with one interview lasting only 15 min and one lasting 65 min. The 15-minute interview resulted from the participant bringing a prepared script where he had typed out answers to the questions, which I had provided in the informed consent letter. He was satisfied that his presentation reflected his answers to the questions, and he read the document into the digital voice recorder for later transcription and subsequent coding. The most extended interview was with a strategic level advisor who was very passionate about the topic and provided profound and detailed answers to all of the questions. Only one interview was not conducted face-to-face. That specific interview was conducted using Zoom videoconferencing software.

Understanding the prohibition against video recording interviews, I used the same digital recorder I used for my face-to-face interviews to record the audio of the Zoom interview, and no video recording was made. All nine of the face-to-face interviews occurred in restaurants with private rooms/areas that prevented anyone else from overhearing or, in most cases, from seeing our interview. My primary concern was to ensure participant anonymity.

All 10 of the interviews were recorded using a digital audio recorder. I subsequently transcribed all of the interviews using the NVivo automated transcription service. Aside from a participant bringing a prepared script for the interview, all other aspects of the interview process remained aligned with the IRB-approved data collection plan described in Chapter 3. All of the participants displayed high levels of passion for the professionalization projects they were participating in and for my study. After each interview, I transcribed the recorded data into a Word document. This document was sent by email to the participant for review. Four of the participants had minor adjustments they wanted to make to the transcripts, but no one desired to change any critical content. I provided transcripts to each participant within 48 hours of their interview and received responses within a week of their receipt of the transcripts.

Personal Observations

During the data collection process, I also wrote my own answers to the questions I asked the participants because I have personal experiences of participating in military professionalization programs with over 30 different countries in the past 30 years. These personal experiences, which I purposefully reflected on and bracketed in my attempt to

reduce personal biases during the research, still represent a research resource I drew upon to gain some perspective on both the participants' answers as well as helping to shape follow-on questions during the interview to get as much usable information from the participants as possible.

Document Review

During the study's development, the review of U.S. Government authored reports was a critical factor in shaping this study's design. It was a review of U.S. DOS reports that served as the progenitor of the study. All documents were open-source, unclassified, and releasable to the general public. No classified or otherwise restricted documents were used.

Data Analysis

Upon completing member-checking of the transcripts, I began coding the data both manually and using NVivo. In coding, I used short descriptive words or phrases to capture the essence of a segment of data (Saldana, 2015). Coding was done cyclically with several iterative reviews of transcript data to identify and translate the participants' comments into usable information. I used both an inductive and deductive framework for data analysis. The deductive coding structure was based on the conceptual framework and existing open-source literature. The deductive construct helped identify relevant text and frame the data effort toward answering the research question (Saldana, 2015), and the deductive framework elements were based on the interview questions and the U.S. DOS's definition of military professionalization.

I lumped (as per Saldana, 2015) each of the participants' answers under a code for Question 1 ("What do you think are the critical elements required to achieve the DOS definition's stated goals for military professionalization and why?"), Question 2 ("What critical elements, if any, are missing from the DOS definition of military professionalization, and why do you think they are required?"), and Question 3 ("What elements, if any, should be removed from the DOS definition of military professionalization, and why?). I established codes under Question 1 based on the required elements outlined in the DOS definition. These included discipline, accountability, practical professional standards, technical expertise, technical support, and educational programs. Responses to Questions 2 and 3 were processed more inductively as the questions lacked the more ridged framework available in Question 1. For these questions, I "split the data" (as per Saldana, 2015) as I conducted several cycles of review through the transcripts.

After the initial categorization pass, the second pass was a more traditional inductive method where I developed a summative word or phrase for each segment of text. Upon completion of this "ground-up" manual coding effort, I grouped similar codes into categories. I then reviewed the categories and determined emergent categories to add to the initial group derived from the literature. These were culture and a desire to change. I then coded the consolidated transcript with my computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software, NVivo. Coding offered greater flexibility in visualizing the data and managing individual code, categories, and grouping for thematic analysis (Saldana, 2015). Coding categories were developed from analysis of the codes, the conceptual

framework, and the literature. The categories were further reviewed using thematic analysis to determine overarching themes. Table 3 reflects the coding category themes and examples.

Table 3

Coding Category Themes and Examples

Participant	Interview excerpt	Categories	Theme
			Critical success factors
2	So, I think anytime you say the word professional or professionalization, you have to have the word discipline. Otherwise, it's the mob with guns. So, I think that's essential in the factors and I think it's something that is measurable probably in degrees. In about five or six areas that you could pick and then grade a force in its discipline, as a total score, if you wanted to, on whether their military have professionalization.	Discipline	
7	I think there are several categories. You've got accountability for monetary expenditures, accountability for equipment and all the logistical support, that the command knows what their resources are, where they're being allocated, where they're being utilized. Then, accountability to the government, that military operations and military conduct would be subject to the government, in terms of following policies, guidelines.	Accountability	
3	Technical expertise comes along with training, and then being able to exercise that training, not just classroom training but continual training as part of their job.	Technical Expertise	
4	The next bit of military professionalism is technical support. For national level technical support to a foreign military establishment, that authorized technical support comes from two important areas. One, the authorized use, the unrestricted use of Department of Defense material from all Department of Defense joint capability areas.	Technical Support	

Participant	Interview excerpt	Categories	Theme
1	...how serious they take education. I remember in Time Magazine 1985, the cover when it was still a printed periodical, exclusively a printed periodical, there was a November edition of, I want to say 1987, and it had a picture on the cover of a lieutenant colonel and a captain from the 82nd airborne and both of them were going through a master's program. And the article was about how it was not uncommon to have officers of junior field grade and senior company grade pursuing advanced degrees, and what that meant was not only were they devoted to their craft, but they were also devoted to understanding that there was a greater, more significant world than just the military.	Education	
3	Okay. You've got to be able to put guidelines and expectations in place so that they know what the standards are. And that starts with the leadership, to be able to establish the guidelines, the policies, the procedures. Establish standards of what is expected of them so that they know. They're not guessing what they're supposed to do, they know exactly what's expected of them and they know what the standards are. There's no confusion.	Effective Professional Standards	
10	For example, it's okay, some countries value loyalty over telling the truth, because I've got to protect my senior or I've got to save face, I've got to save face for the organization, and sometimes that value and that culture has priority over what we would say, "But we asked you, was the bridge built to standard?" And, "Oh yes. The bridge is fine. The bridge is correct." Whereas, you knew the bridge wasn't built to standard. The bridge collapsed. "Yes, but I had to save face."	Culture	

Participant	Interview excerpt	Categories	Theme
10	"In their definition is help foreign partners professionalize their military forces. And then that has to start with that foreign partner wanting that help."	Desire to change	Objectives
3	To develop and maintain this capacity to carry out its military mission through these four elements here. Discipline, accountability, effective professional standards, which could include a lot, and technical expertise.	Capacity to carry out its military Mission	
10	Reliably demonstrate consistent support for adherence to norms of human rights. Okay, there's the discipline, discipline of human rights. Wow, I never saw that aspect of the adherence to norms of human rights. I know that... I'd never saw how that ever happened, adherence to norms of human rights.	Reliably demonstrate consistent support for adherence to norms of human rights	
9	Rule of law is when guns rule everyone loses. You're going to lose. Whoever's got the most guns... And even then they're going to be subordinated. So I think it's a concept of the United States, particularly, to ensure that... And it's like the turnover of the administration is one of the most civilized in the world, where they have a parade and then the leading person greets them. That doesn't happen everywhere.	Support the concept of civilian executive authority/control of the military	
4	The last bit of military professionalism, is a capacity for security sector reform. The joint definition of, the joint DOD definition of security sector reform, is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security and justice. For us, for those DOD officials, the capacity for security sector reform requires transformation, again, of all joint capability areas, but also reform in the areas of safety and justice.	Capacity for institutional and security sector reform	

Not all participants had the same levels of experience or knowledge regarding the study topic, leading to discrepant replies to the interview questions compared to other participants. During the interviews, I would rephrase the questions to a like area of expertise to gain as much relatable data as possible, which allowed me to build a broader data set for analysis.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

Credibility

There were no deviations from the planned actions in Chapter 3. Credibility is how confident the researcher is in the truth and accuracy of the study findings. To ensure credibility, I used analyst triangulation, in that I had another analyst review the findings of the study. This helps mitigate any researcher bias. I performed member checking by providing transcripts of their interviews to the participants for their review and making changes as they deemed necessary to ensure data validity (Giorgi, 2012; Smith et al., 2009). I checked for data saturation by using word cloud diagrams generated in NVivo and comparing transcripts.

Transferability

While transferability is not necessarily a hallmark of exploratory case studies, the use of thick descriptions allows the readers to determine for themselves the applicability of transferability (Shento, 2004; van Manen, 2016). A thick description provides a detailed account of the researchers' experiences during data collection. I have made detailed comments regarding my data collection efforts for this study regarding the cultural and social contexts surrounding my data collection efforts. This allowed for

detailed descriptions of where the interviews occurred, when they occurred, such as after work (which can affect the participant's general mood), and other aspects of data the collection event that should help provide a more detailed understanding of the data collection setting. This detailed accounting of the environment should help the reader understand the context of the data collection effort and perhaps any particular biases that might impact the participants' responses to the interview questions. This will permit outside researchers to make their own transferability decision (Stake, 2010).

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Confirmability

Confirmability is the level of neutrality in the study's findings. I provide detailed documentation of the processes and procedures used for data collection and explain why decisions were taken to follow specific paths when alternate paths were available (Stake, 2010; Shento, 2004).

Study Results

This single case exploratory case study derived data from three primary sources. These primary sources were open-source, unclassified literature, and personal experiences as a participant in SA programs for over 30 years, and in-depth interviews with retired U.S. Army General and Field grade officers who have participated in military professionalization projects for the UAE. The results presented are organized by source. First are the results derived from the readily available open-source, unclassified literature. The next are the results of the interviews present by themes derived from thematic analysis. My personal experiences have been minimized wherever possible to avoid biasing the study.

Literature

As noted in the Rand report for the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, there is no robust systematic framework to provide feedback to the program and project managers (Moroney et al., 2014). The general management problem is that the various program measurement mechanisms (see definitions) are not systematically framed (Newcomer, 2007; Patanakul et al., 2016). The specific problem is that military leaders do not have enough information on how to professionalize the land-based military forces (Moroney et al., 2014). This study's research question was: What information do operational and tactical military leaders provide on how to professionalize the land-based military forces? The research question aimed to provide information on *how* to measure progress toward the achievement of the military professionalization mission. The study's

goal was to identify potential CSFs required to accomplish the U.S. DOS's military professionalization subprogram objectives.

The management literature indicates that identified objectives and their derived CSFs may not guarantee success for a project. However, the absence of these management tools may hinder and prevent the project's success (PMI, 2019). Interviews were conducted with 10 retired General and field grade officers that have or are currently serving as advisors supporting the Military professionalization mission in the UAE. They were asked to assess the U.S. DOS definition of military professionalization and provide their input on what they viewed as the objectives and supporting the program's CSFs.

A Systematic Framework

For this study, goals, objectives, CSFs, and KPIs are part of a systematic hierarchy of management tools. The hierarchal framework begins with goals that are supported by objectives (Barber & Taylor, 1990). CSF supports the objectives, monitored using KPIs (Castanho et al., 2018; Wibowo & Wilhelm Alfen, 2014; Zouet al., 2014). The hierarchy is depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3

Hierarchal Framework of Management Tools



Goals

The military professionalization program, known as PS 8.2 in the DOS hierarchy of program management, is one of three subprograms under program area PS.8: Strengthening Military Partnerships and Capabilities. PS. 8 is one of the supporting programs supporting the DOS mission of Peace and Security. This program architecture is portrayed in Figure 4.

Figure 4

U.S. Department of State Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure



Note. Derived from "Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions" by R. C. Cooper, 2016. (https://2009-2017.state.gov/f/releases/other/255986.htm#PS92)

Interviews

Three structured interview questions asked the participants to review the DOS definition of military professionalization and institutional reform and then tell me what they thought the program's objectives and CSFs were. They were then asked to identify if they would add any objectives or CSF to the definition. The final structured question was to identify if there were anything in the definition they would remove. A thematic analysis of the transcripts of the interviews was conducted, and the two themes from that analysis are presented with supporting quotes below.

Theme: Objectives

All 10 participants agreed that the military professionalization program objectives were contained in the U.S. DOS definition. These objectives were:

Ensure the Host can Carry out its Military Mission.

Participant 1: (Is this an objective?) "Absolutely. It is."

Participant 3: "I had assumed that this was their main goal to…to develop and maintain this capacity to carry out its military mission."

Participant 4: "You need to assess the development of the capacity to carry out its military mission."

That the Host Reliably Demonstrates Consistent Support for Adherence to Norms of Human Rights.

Participant 2: "So the goal (objective) is human rights."

Participant 6: “It has some limitations in there regarding human rights, then civil control of the military, and the institution of security sector reform. You can see the goals in there.”

Participant 7: “I think that would be a goal for the State Department.”

Participant 9: “So then you have the goals (objectives), which are human rights.”

Participant 10: “Adherence to norms of human rights. And support the concept of civilian authority, control of the military. Yes, definitely.”

Others noted that while an objective, it might be too restrictive in certain countries, culturally insensitive, and placed us at strategic disadvantage compared to international competitors such as The Peoples Republic of China.

Participant 6:

> The technical stuff, that’s definition, tanks, helicopters, big guns, and then because of our issue with human rights and Leahy vetting, we can’t give that to them as fast as they want. So that causes a strategic imbalance between countries like Iran, China, and us, so they’ll go to China because there’s no human rights clause.

Participant 8:

> Well, again, we’re talking about a value structure, and I think it’s difficult if you’re going to impose values as opposed to having others have their own value structure to be recognized and accepted. Our norms about human rights and about the treatment of individuals is different from country to country.

That the Host Supports the Concept of Civilian Executive Authority/Control of the Military.

Participant 2:

And so, in a place like the Dominican Republic, where you have education and you can grow a democratic society that has responsible civilian leadership, then that absolutely applies. If they don't meet that, or they don't have that civilian executive authority to be able to support, then maybe it's a place we don't spend money on professionalization. If they don't even have responsible civilian executive authority, maybe it's a place we shouldn't go.

Participant 8:

So whereas it's an ideal to have civilian control of the military, if you want to be effective in getting something done, you may have to look at that standard and see just how important it is to what you want to have accomplished. So I think that's kind of a slippery slope to go down that idea of having this kind of universal mandate on something that applies to all countries because again, you can have it and it can be, "Hey, this is the way it is," but I think you're going to get different ways of executing an order to accomplish that.

Participant 9:

Well, that's just... Rule of law is when guns rule everyone loses. You're going to lose. Whoever's got the most guns... And even then they're going to be subordinated. So I think it's a concept of the United States, particularly, to ensure that... And it's like the turnover of the administration is one of the most civilized

in the world, where they have a parade and then the leading person greets them. That doesn't happen everywhere. That doesn't happen everywhere. That's very civilized, and that's very rule of law, no matter how much you don't like it. And you're not forced to go to the parade, and you're not forced to go to the big gathering to celebrate it, but it happens and it happens in a civilized manner. And when it doesn't, it's scary. That's rule of law.

That the Host has the Capacity for Institutional and Security Sector Reform.

Participant 3:

Internal review, and it would be good to have some type of third-party review to be able to check and have the freedom to report without repercussions. If you could do it with an internal review, a department that has no repercussions for reporting exactly as it is, then great. But you may need a third party that has independent eyes on it and then they can provide an independent assessment.

Participant 9: "Being able to assess where you're failing. Honestly, look at that and look at what needs to change, again, in a very civilized manner and honestly assess, are we meeting our national goals or not?"

Participant 10:

When I think security sector reform, I think of policing. I think of maybe cyber security, I think of, if we've got a power plant, I think of that kind of security of your assets like nuclear plants, electrical grids, that's what I'm thinking of security sector. But it also is the people, it's also cities, it's roadways, it's institutional to me would be... I'm thinking institutional could also be education.

Theme: Critical Success Factors

To paraphrase the definition, CSFs are what must be accomplished to achieve an objective. If you do not accomplish a CSF, you will not achieve the objective. All participants agreed that embedded in the definition where most of the CSFs required to achieve the objectives. Several participants thought one or two more CSFs should be added. The most common was the inclusion of the consideration of culture.

Discipline. All participants agreed that the creation and maintenance of discipline in a military organization was a CSF for all of the objectives. All but one participant defined discipline as doing the right thing without being told.

> Participant 2:
>
> Without discipline and accountability, human rights can be difficult. And I think with our U.S. background, we've seen an undisciplined force, others and some of our own, as we came out of the Vietnam War. Drugs rampant and non-commissioned officers that didn't enforce any standards. We've seen a military that's not disciplined. It was very hard to get any of the other aspects after that in placed, if you didn't have some form of discipline. So, I think anytime you say the word professional or professionalization, you have to have the word discipline. Otherwise, it's the mob with guns. So, I think that's essential in the factors and I think it's something that is measurable probably in degrees. In about five or six areas that you could pick and then grade a force in its discipline, as a total score, if you wanted to, on whether their military have a professionalization.
>
> Participant 3:

> You've got to be able to train the soldiers to do what is right on their own without having to tell them. You have to train them what is right, and then they've got to be able to do what is right on their own.

Participant 8:

> Discipline is being able to do something without anyone telling you to do it, knowing what has to be done, having the ability to focus on something internally without someone being able to tell you to do it. So basically it's internalizing a focus on accomplishing a mission or accomplishing the job. So it's more of something that's, it's from within, than being directed. And so that's where I would think, that's what my definition of discipline.

Accountability. All of the participants agreed that accountability would take many forms and focus on a few significant areas. These were personal accountability and organizational accountability. Both of these categories would also include fiscal and equipment accountability.

Participant 1: "One telling scale (for professionalization) would be if they can have a system of accountability... And it would be in all things like their military justice system."

Participant 2:

> Personnel accountability and... Personnel accountability at work. Have you get a force that shows up? Do they show up on time? That's the personnel accountability. Do you know how many people you have? Equipment accountability, particularly in items that, for instance, the United States has given

another country and says, "You must retain accountability, you cannot resell, you cannot lose, you cannot... " And so equipment, people accountability, personnel accountable. Equipment, people, and then some kind of fiscal accountability. Is the money being siphoned off somewhere else?

Participant 9: “My observation is that maybe accountability should be emphasized.”

Technical Expertise. All participants agreed that technical expertise was the ability of an individual or organization to perform specific tasks; these tasks range from tuning an engine to assaulting a fortified position.

Participant 2:

And then technical expertise is, how do you do your mission? How sophisticated are you? How far have you gotten into the C4I business? How much can you integrate fires? How much can you bring your 12 enablers in as a brigade commander or battalion commander? I can see gradable standards in all those. It’d certainly take a military mind and not a pure Foreign Service officer.

Participant 3: “Technical expertise comes along with training, and then being able to exercise that training, not just classroom training but continual training as part of their job.”

Participant 8: “Well, again, are you qualified to do what you’re supposed to do?”

Technical Support. All 10 of the participants agreed that technical support was provided by the United States, or an agent authorized through ITAR, and was as varied as the technical expertise in its breadth and depth of definition.

Participant 4:

The next bit of military professionalism is technical support. For national level technical support to a foreign military establishment that authorized technical support comes from two important areas. One, the authorized use, the unrestricted use of DOD material from all DOD joint capability areas. And secondly, the authorized advice and mentoring from trained and experienced DOD professionals, and in some cases, those that support DOD directly to the foreign military establishment.

Participant 10: “As I look at it, I’m going to help you be professional so that you can effectively carry out your military mission as defined by you.”

Education. All of the participants were passionate and even adamant about the importance of education. Education, at all levels, was noted as a necessary lynchpin to achieving any of the objectives. All participants noted education needed to be continuous and span entire careers. It needed to be more than simple training within the military. The participants noted the education needed to link the military profession with the rest of society.

Participant 1:

It’s not just a profession of arms understanding, but also a greater understanding of how you fit in to the larger society. If they can take a more aggressive approach to certifying and educating their officers beyond their military school system and understand the benefit they get out of mixing in with society, as well as other higher order of institutions, that tells me that they have, first of all, a force that

can handle somebody who either has to leave for a short period of time the actual rigor of military duty, but also someone who is self-disciplined enough they can dedicate that additional time.

Participant 2:

It really has to start both with education up and down the chain, and senior leaders that talk about it and are applying it every day, all the time. And education, how does it play a part in those pieces that we talked about? As well as in tandem with human rights, civilian support, civilian executive authority, and institutional and security sector reform. The answer to the question, from my point of view, is that leadership has got to have executive education on why that's important and what the obverse of it leads to when you don't have those. And then throughout the ranks, certainly Officer and Senior NCO education, simultaneous education programs throughout, which really has to retrain the trainer, monitored by someone who's competent to know whether they're getting off-track at a little bit at each level.

Participant 4: "The second area of military professionalism focuses on educational programs. By definition, the way I see it, that's to prepare leaders to fight from small units to top level headquarters, through professional development and education."

Effective Professional Standards. While all 10 participants agreed this was a CSF for all the objectives, some took issue with the word "effective." They stated it made the phrase too ill-defined without context. The word effective added a layer of

complexity that some felt did not belong or would make it unreasonably difficult to measure.

Participant 2:

I think it's interesting they put effective, because effective is variable for every country. I could see those in professional standards of a particular level of knowledge, not necessarily what some countries use where a school grades your professional standard, only a school, not your operational experience, not the jobs you've been in, so you have to balance that professional standard. In parts of our military, it's a series of tests that you have to pass every year. You have an aviation background; you have to do the four different things to be able to continue to fly every year and that's your effective professional standards.

Participant 3:

You've got to be able to put guidelines and expectations in place so that they know what the standards are. And that starts with the leadership, to be able to establish the guidelines, the policies, the procedures. Establish standards of what is expected of them so that they know. They're not guessing what they're supposed to do, they know exactly what's expected of them and they know what the standards are. There's no confusion.

Participant 6:

So how do you measure that? How do you give money to that? How do you say that, okay, this guy went from lieutenant to captain and the Ethiopia... And the Uganda people's defense forces and we put them through these schools and now

> he understands how to be a good leader, so we have effective... You can't. In fact, you're making this hard. It's hard to measure. How do you do that?

Culture. All 10 participants felt the culture was a very important aspect of professionalization that was not addressed by definition. Many felt culture plays too big of a role in framing all the objectives not officially accounted. Many felt it was the largest impediment to implementing any change and not acknowledging it would impact any program.

Participant 2: "They (South Korea) have a set of institutions that go to school and understand both our doctrine and how they have to change it for their terrain and their culture."

Participant 3: "Because you're communicating cross-culture. It's not Western standard of discipline. What does discipline mean in the Arab world?"

Participant 5:

> And you can't dictate it because the United States and most countries are notoriously bad at cross-culturally communicating things, and any number of historical studies can show you that. So, you have to work collaboratively with them to determine these achievable things. And you can define that through a line of effort or an end state.

Participant 6: "Well, you have got to build something that changes, that transforms the mind and the culture to make that happen."

Participant 7: “I also think they need to be consistent with the culture, in terms of standards of performance, standards of appearance, standards of behavior outside of military life.”

Participant 8:

> Everyone has their own value system, and I don’t mean to say that the State Department should impose values in terms of their lens, but they should recognize that whatever country that they’re dealing with, that there is a value system there that should be respected and should be adhered to. So, are we going to impose certain norms and then expect others to adhere to those norms? And if they don’t adhere to those norms, does that mean that they’re not being effective?

Participant 10:

> In other cultures, they may not understand the value of having a strong military, that is, Afghanistan, tribal, where you’ve got one person who’s the tribesman and he’s in charge, and he’s the one who decides whether or not you’re going to fight or not, and he’s the one... I guess before it’s a professionalized force, but he’s the one who decides what the culture of our tribe is to be... Bring them in and try to work it out peacefully.

Desire to Change. Eight of the 10 participants noted that the desire to change was a prerequisite. That without the desire to change, the program would fail. The literature is replete with examples of organizations being forced to change with no desire at any organization level to do so. This almost always fails, and in many cases, the organization (business) fails. The participants noted during the interviews that to be successful, the

host had to want to change. Most especially the leadership of the organization. Without the support of the leadership, they noted, the effort was doomed to failure.

Participant 10:

In their definition is help foreign partners professionalize their military forces. And then that has to start with that foreign partner wants that help. You have got to have a heck of a lot of patience, and I think that you have to have buy-in from that foreign country. A major impediment is that, is the desire of the host nation, of the foreign partner to want that (professionalization).

Participant 2:

And so, the Koreans were very eager to follow the American model. So, they were very eager to have a military academy that looked just like our military academy. They have a set of institutions that go to school and understand both our doctrine and how they have to change it for their terrain and their culture. They certainly are a more disciplined army than we are. They have taken discipline to another level, that's cultural. They have a very close-knit State Department, foreign affairs military aspect that goes on. A lot because they always wanted our support against the North Koreans and the Chinese and the Japanese. And so, they had a reason, a desire, a want that melded those, the State Department's mission and professionalization. Commitment. If you don't have it at that level, if they don't have that light come on to why they need to change their organization... You're here, this is all. Not going to be understood, not going to happen.

Participant 3: “The problem is some strong cultural tendencies, and they stand in the way of change.”

Summary

In this chapter, I have presented the literature and thematic analysis of 10 interviews to answer my central research question: What information do operational and tactical military leaders provide on how to professionalize the land forces? The study’s goal was to identify potential CSFs required to accomplish the U.S. DOS’s military professionalization subprogram objectives. The results of the thematic analysis indicated two themes: objectives and CSFs. The objectives were: (a) ensure the host has the capacity to carry out its military mission, (b) the host reliably demonstrate consistent support for adherence to norms of human rights, (c) the host supports the concept of civilian executive authority/control of the military, and (d) the host has the capacity for institutional and security sector reform. The CSFs were: (a) discipline, (b) accountability, (c) technical expertise, (d) technical support, (e) education, (f) effective professional standards, (g) culture, and (h) desire to change. In Chapter 5, I present the findings’ interpretation, discuss the study’s limitation, and make recommendations for future research areas. Additionally, I discuss the findings’ implication of social change, theory, practice, and provide my conclusions.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

The purpose of this exploratory case study was to examine how to professionalize land-based military forces. The specific problem is that military leaders do not have enough information on how to professionalize the land-based military forces (Moroney et al., 2014). This research was accomplished through collecting and analyzing the perceptions of some of the former field/general grade U.S. military members participating in the program's execution. The study's goal was to identify potential CSFs required to accomplish the U.S. DOS's military professionalization subprogram objectives. The results of the thematic analysis indicated two themes: objectives and CSFs. The objectives were to ensure that (a) the host has the capacity to carry out its military mission, (b) the host reliably demonstrates consistent support for adherence to norms of human rights, (c) the host supports the concept of civilian executive authority/control of the military, and (d) the host has the capacity for institutional and security sector reform. The CSFs were (a) discipline, (b) accountability, (c) technical expertise, (d) technical support, (e) education, (f) effective professional standards, (g) culture, and (h) desire to change.

Interpretation of Findings

The findings of this single case exploratory case study confirm and extend current knowledge in the discipline. In this section, I review the study's findings. I support my interpretations with evidence from the interviews with the 10 retired U.S. Army General and Field Grade Officers, applicable concepts from the conceptual framework, and relevant peer-reviewed literature presented in Chapter 2. The findings' interpretations

highlight aspects of the data that emerged during the study that confirms and extends the discipline's knowledge.

Conceptual Framework

Several significant theories were identified as part of the conceptual framework for this exploratory case study. These include the RBT construct of strategic management (Rosenberg Hansen & Ferlie, 2016), defense diplomacy theory (Winger, 2014), and principal and agent theory (Biddle et al., 2017). As it applies to this case, RBT and Winger's defense diplomacy theory. These theories are useful in application to the study as they link the use of U.S. DOD assets to activities in another country other than for war. The theories have applications beyond the general strategic view of a nation-state to a nation-state and provide the theoretical underpinning for military retirees as instructors at the program project-level is evidenced by the requirement for these retirees to obtain emoluments clause waivers and ITAR authorizations from the U.S. DOS and the U.S. DOD (Miller, 2019).

As noted in the literature and by multiple participants, neither the U.S. DOS nor the DOD has the assets to implement, execute or monitor in detail fully the military professionalization programs around the world (Pompeo, 2016; Serafino, 2016). Instead, when requested by the host, contractors, retirees, and former military personnel are made available to transfer the knowledge and technology in place of direct interaction with active-duty U.S. military personnel (Freebody, 2013; Miller, 2019; Trope, 2006). This then confirms the use of principal and agent theory.

To resolve the *agency problem* or disconnect between the principal and the agent (Bryde et al., 2019; Tumbat & Grayson, 2016), ITAR sanctioned organizations are required to submit annual reports detailing their actions with the host country (Cooper, 2019). Participants indicated that to their knowledge, while actions are reported, such as days worked, numbers of personnel trained, topics covered, and so forth, no measurement of progress against a standard or collection of criteria leading to goal achievement is recorded or reported. When I asked, "Do you know if the U.S. DOS measures military professionalization for the UAE?" Participant 3 answered, "I do not know. I have no ... I haven't seen any evidence of it." In response to the question, "How does the DOS measure it? You're not aware that they do," Participant 6 replied, "Nope." To my questions, "Is your performance graded or evaluated?" and "Have you been given any metrics against which to base your performance?" Participant 7 stated, "Not that I am aware. No."

These findings seem to confirm that this program follows many other government programs in its focus on non-financial goals and a lack of management and oversight (Chih & Zwikael, 2015; Furlong, 2015; Newcomer, 2007; Patanakul et al., 2016). Participants also seemed to confirm initial information uncovered during the literature review, that no metrics for measuring the mission beyond numbers of people trained and the costs associated with that training were reported (Pompeo & Esper, 2019). The participants also seem to confirm the Rand report for the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, that there is no robust systematic framework to provide feedback to the program and project managers (Moroney et al., 2014). The management literature

indicates the presence of identified objectives and their derived CSFs may not guarantee success for a project, but the absence of these management tools may hinder and/or prevent the project's success (PMI, 2019).

All of the study participants noted that establishing written and published standards is a critical element for success. For this study, goals, objectives, CSFs, and KPIs are part of a systematic hierarchy of management tools. The hierarchal framework begins with goals. Goals are supported by objectives (Barber & Taylor, 1990). The objectives are themselves supported by CSFs. The CSF is monitored using KPIs (Castanho et al., 2018; Wibowo & Wilhelm Alfen, 2014; Zou at al., 2014).

Objectives

Through the dissection of the U.S. DOS definition of Military Professionalization (Cooper, 2017), participants identified four program objectives and eight CSFs applied to each of the four objectives. The objectives identified from the DOS definition were:

Ensure the Host Has the Capacity to Carry out its Military Mission. This seems to confirm James' (2016) assertion that professionalization in a given field requires the linkages between theory and application in order for the practitioner to perform competently. This objective also seems to confirm Carvalho et al. (2016), who stated the professionalization of an organization is, "understood as the move away from a well-intended amateurish approach towards a more formalized, 'professional' and, it is expected, a more effective mode of operating" (p. 79).

That the Host Reliably Demonstrates Consistent Support for Adherence to Norms of Human Rights. This objective seems to confirm the literature is a near-

universal specification of ethics as a requirement for professionalism (Carvalho et al., 2016; Christensen, 2015; Paton, Hodgson, & Muzio, 2013; Pongpearchan, 2016; Thomas & Thomas, 2014).

That the Host Supports the Concept of Civilian Executive Authority/Control of the Military. This objective seems to confirm Huntington's work, which provides a best-case theoretical perspective, and Janowitz's pragmatic, realist approach. Both authors agreed that civilian control's primary mechanism is well-established officer professionalism within the military (Feaver, 1996; Szarejko, 2014; Toronto, 2016; Uluçakar & Çaglar, 2016).

That the Host has the Capacity for Institutional and Security Sector Reform. This objective confirms Laudal et al.'s (2017) assertion that the organization's capability for change needs to be reviewed as part of the change process. This objective also confirms that requirements for expectation management of outcomes as project success then would seem to hinge not only on achieving goals and objectives but also on framing those goals and objectives with the stakeholders in order to better ensure their satisfaction with the outcomes (Ika, 2009; Wolverton et al., 2019).

Critical Success Factors

The eight CSFs advocated for by the participants are described in the following subsections.

Discipline. All participants agreed that creating and maintaining discipline in a military organization was a CSF for all of the objectives. All but one participant defined

discipline as doing the right thing without being told. This seems to confirm Huntington (1957) and Christensen (2015).

Accountability. All of the participants agreed that accountability would take many forms and focus on a few significant areas. These were personal accountability and organizational accountability. Both of these categories would also include fiscal and equipment accountability. This seems to confirm Christensen (2015), Doyle et al. (2016), and Huntington (1957).

Technical Expertise. All participants agreed that technical expertise was the ability of an individual or organization to perform specific tasks; these tasks range from tuning an engine to assaulting a fortified position. This seems to confirm the works of Huntington (1957), Butler et al. (2012), Carvalho et al. (2016), Doyle et al. (2016), James (2016), and Kunneman (2016).

Technical Support. All 10 of the participants agreed technical support was provided by the United States, or an agent authorized through ITAR, and was as varied as the technical expertise in its breadth and depth of definition. Nevertheless, all agreed it would be required for success and confirmed a consensus of the management literature on change compiled by Fernandez and Rainey (2006). One of the eight factors they noted for successful change is building external support.

Education. All of the participants were passionate and even adamant about the importance of education. Education, at all levels, was noted as a necessary lynchpin to achieving any of the objectives. All participants noted education needed to be continuous and span entire careers. It needed to be more than simple training within the military. The

participants noted the education needed to link the military profession with the rest of society. This seems to confirm the requirement for general education and specific training for an organization to be regarded as professionalized according to Huntington (1957), Butler et al. (2012), Carvalho et al. (2016), Doyle et al. (2016), James, (2016), and Kunneman, (2016).

Effective Professional Standards. While all 10 participants agreed this was a CSF for all the objectives, some took issue with the word significant. They stated it made the phrase too ill-defined without context. The word effective added a layer of complexity that some felt did not belong or would make it unreasonably difficult to measure. The requirement for professional standards seems to confirm the literature as noted by Huntington (1957), Christensen (2015), and Doyle et al. (2016).

Culture. All 10 participants felt the culture was an essential aspect of professionalization that was not addressed by definition. Many felt culture plays too big of a role in framing all the objectives not to be officially accounted for. Many felt it was the largest impediment to implementing any change, and not acknowledging it would impact any program. These points seem to confirm the literature that indicates culture is a critical aspect of implementing change (Appelbaum et al., 2016; Boonstra, 2013; Gehman & Soublière, 2017; Murray et al., 2017).

Desire to Change. Eight of the 10 participants noted that the desire to change was a prerequisite. That without the desire to change, the program would fail. The literature is replete with examples of organizations being forced to change with no desire to do so at any organizational level. This almost always fails, and in many cases, the organization

(business) fails. The participants noted during the interviews that to be successful, the host had to want to change. Most especially the leadership of the organization. Without the leadership's support, they noted that the effort was doomed to failure, which confirms the literature indicating a high-level buy-in requirement and support for organizational change to occur (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006).

These findings extend the actual knowledge by providing needed next steps in systematically framing the various program measurement mechanisms for the military professionalization of the Land Forces program. This study has provided a partial evaluation of aspects of the military professionalization program through the U.S. participants resident in the UAE and extends knowledge by contributing to answering the specific problem of the study by providing information to the leaders and managers overseeing the program (Moroney et al., 2014).

Limitations of the Study

A limitation of this qualitative exploratory single case study was the lack of access to U.S. Government and Military documents and personnel. Access to most U.S. military (.mil) sites is blocked in this region of the world by firewall protocols. This severely limited my ability to explore the most current documents regarding U.S. DOD involvement in military professionalization programs. Regarding access to currently serving U.S. government officials and active-duty military personnel, I did not have the resources (time) required to process the necessary permissions associated with official U.S. government replies regarding ongoing diplomatic and SA programs. I was hopefully

able to mitigate these limitations by accessing several recently retired General Grade Officers with in-depth knowledge and experience in these programs.

For security reasons, I did not have access to any UAE national or Land Forces personnel for interviews to develop a more holistic picture of the professionalization program. To mitigate this, I limited the project's scope to the U.S. management systems of the program. The lack of a deep pool of information to draw upon for this study drove me toward an exploratory versus a descriptive study, given the paucity of data relating to the UAE Land Forces professionalization's CSFs. I specifically asked that the participants define the CSFs for the professionalization of the UAE Land Forces and what recommendations they had for adjusting the U.S. DOS definition of military professionalization, as it applies to the UAE.

Recommendations

The purpose of this exploratory case study was to describe the perspectives of retired operational and tactical military leaders on how to professionalize the land-based military forces. Qualitative single case exploratory case studies are not usually generalizable. (Carminati, 2018; Yin, 2017). The specific problem is that military leaders do not have enough information on how to professionalize the land-based military forces (Moroney et al., 2014). This study assessed objectives and CSFs for the military professionalization mission based on the U.S. DOS's definition. This study was of limited scope and duration. Several areas could benefit from expanding this research.

The first is a recommendation for further study to execute a detailed assessment of each of the CSFs and determine what would be required to measure each achievement.

Each of the measures and metrics developed would need to be SMART; they should be "specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound (Kuhfahl et al., 2018, p. 37)."

Another recommendation would be to repeat this study methodology in a different location with different study participants. It is hoped that by researching with different participants and a different location, one might remove biases that may not have been visible to the researcher and further validate the findings as generalizable. These locations might include a more mature military such as South Korea or a less mature military such as Estonia.

The next recommendation for further study is to perform this study with an expanded participant pool that would include the non-commissioned officers that are also executing these programs globally. Widely regarded as the "backbone" of the U.S. Army, a cadre of retired non-commissioned officers might offer a significantly different view on professionalization and what constitutes a CSF. Evaluating the views of this broader and experientially different pool of participants could either validate the findings or expand the base of knowledge with more perspectives (Farquhar, 2013; Yin, 2018).

Additionally, the conversion of the study into a more grounded approach with structured surveys could serve to expand on the study's findings by expanding the depth and breadth of the participant pool as well as serve to transition the research effort toward a more grounded theory approach (McCaslin &Wison-Scott, 2003). To expand on the findings of this single case exploratory case study, it is recommended future researchers begin the task of identifying the measures and metrics required to develop the KPIs

necessary to monitor the achievement of the CSFs (Castanho et al., 2018; Wibowo & Wilhelm Alfen, 2014; Zou et al., 2014).

All these recommendations have focused on leveraging the existing study or merely replicating it in another location. Future researchers may wish to mitigate this study's weaknesses by changing the participant pool entirely and seeking to interview active-duty military personnel and U.S. DOS employees that should shed more light on the details of the processes within the two respective U.S. Government Departments. Another recommendation for future study would be to access foreign national participants in the programs to see if their perceptions match their American counterparts. Based on my observations, many of the interactions between the governments and the U.S. Departments responsible for military professionalization are secret, and access to any of the dialogs is severely restricted.

To this point, the recommendations have been focused on looking down or across the enterprises. A recommendation for the future study also includes looking up at the overall program. From a management perspective, is it rational? As noted in Chapter 2, several voices claim the one-size-fits-all civilian control of the military objective, advocated by the U.S. DOS, is not necessarily applicable to their nation's situation. These authors advocated for a more nuanced approach (Bruneau, 2015; Bruneau & Matei, 2008; Szarejko, 2014; Travis, 2017; Uluçakar & Çaglar, 2016). These authors noted that professionalization is no guarantor of civilian control, and organizations may have loyalties greater than the current government. A more nuanced approach might include the development of levels of professionalization. This approach might require a detailed

assessment of the overarching programs and developing an incremental change management plan for participating nations. This would almost certainly need to assess the impact of culture on the military professionalization mission as noted by all 10 of this study's participants; culture was an essential aspect of professionalization that was not addressed by definition. Many felt culture plays too big of a role in framing all the objectives not to be officially accounted for. Many felt it was the largest impediment to implementing any change, and not acknowledging it would impact any program; this is also borne out in the management literature where culture is viewed as a critical aspect of implementing change (Appelbaum et al., 2016; Boonstra, 2013; Gehman & Soublière, 2017; Murray et al., 2017).

This approach might lead to an assessment of the program participant motivations for participation and a reflection of those motives against the RBT construct of strategic management (Rosenberg Hansen & Ferlie, 2016); this might permit the U.S. Government program managers to pinpoint actual competitive advantages. Then, leverage those advantages for more significant impact and exploitation as a resource advantage (Chun, 2016; Galvin et al., 2014; Hitt et al., 2016; Roos, 2017). Finally, a recommended area for future study is a more in-depth analysis of the ITAR feedback mechanisms. Participants and reports to the U.S. Congress indicate a more robust relationship between the U.S. DOS and program executors should be established.

Implications

Implications for Positive Social Change

This study's scope was limited to outlining the objectives and CSFs contained in the U.S. DOS's definition of Military Professionalization. It was focused on identifying management tools needed for the successful management of the Military Professionalization programs. Reviewing the program objectives that the participants identified and their accompanying CSFs indicates the program's exceptional potential for positive social change if successfully implemented. All of the objectives and CSFs have implications at the individual, organizational, and national levels. There were four program objectives identified with the potential for positive social change. These were:

1. Ensure the host has the capacity to carry out its military mission.
2. That the host reliably demonstrates consistent support for adherence to norms of human rights.
3. That the host supports the concept of civilian executive authority/control of the military.
4. That the host has the capacity for institutional and security sector reform.

Eight discreet CSFs were noted that each impact positive social change by their requirement to be achieved to accomplish the four previously stated objectives. These CSFs were

- discipline
- accountability
- technical expertise

- technical support
- education
- effective professional standards
- culture
- desire to change

This study's implications for positive social change are at three levels, strategic, operational, and tactical. At the strategic level, the implications for positive social change include the potential to allocate public funds better to pursue national objectives. The practical improvement of the recipient nation's armed forces and the professionalization of those forces may reduce war crimes and other atrocities. Besides, the professionalization of a recipient nation's armed forces may result in a more effective deterrent effect on any hostile neighbors. This will result in less conflict and fewer lives lost/lives disrupted through violence. From a U.S. perspective, an armed force that is more professional is a more capable ally and can more easily integrate into any coalition operations, the United States and the recipient nation may participate in.

This study has implications for social change at the operational level through improved management techniques involved in the translation of strategic goals into tactical actions. Using a framework derived from reviewing the DOS mission definition using the lived experiences of some of the U.S. participants can be used to frame KPIs to measure the achievement of strategic goals and ensure the establishment of achievable objectives at the tactical level. At the tactical level, the implications for social change include the potential for enhanced morale and better job performance as the CSFs derived

from reviewing the DOS mission definition using the lived experiences of some of the U.S. participants allow for the development and identification of KPIs that will enable mission participants to measure the achievement of their goals. Future researchers might use this study's findings as a foundation for the development of KPIs to further support the military professionalization mission. This research's findings contribute valuable information to the personnel that participates in SA programs in general.

Implications for Theory

The problem under study was an exploration of elements required to systematically frame the various program measurement mechanisms and provide knowledge and understanding about the military professionalization program by evaluating the program through the in-country U.S. participants. This study provides recommendations for formal objectives and the supporting CSFs for the military professionalization program of the land forces. The study's goals were met by collecting and analyzing the perceptions of senior U.S. participants in the program.

The themes that emerged from the collected data included reviewing the U.S. DOS mission definition to develop recommended objectives and a review of those same recommended objectives to develop supporting CSFs. The identification of potential objectives and CSFs are necessary steps to help systematically frame the various program measurement mechanisms at the operational and tactical level for the military professionalization subprogram of the Land Forces. This study contributes to the body of knowledge addressing the phenomenon of the military professionalization program by capturing and analyzing the perceptions of these programs' in-country participants.

The study contributes to the empirical literature related to the management of government programs and the development of knowledge required to fill the identified gap in the literature regarding the lack of a robust systematic framework to provide feedback to the program and project managers (Moroney et al., 2014) as well as the lack of research necessary to systematically frame the various program measurement mechanisms (Newcomer, 2007; Patanakul et al., 2016). Finally, the study contributes by providing knowledge and understanding about the military professionalization subprogram in the UAE through evaluating the program through the in-country U.S. participants (Moroney et al., 2014).

Implications for Practice

This study's practical significance is the provision of information to those persons and organizations managing the military professionalization sub-mission within the UAE. The primary reason for conducting the study was to identify potential program objectives and explore potential supporting CSFs required to accomplish them. This was the first step, to systematically frame the various program management mechanisms at the operational and tactical level for the military professionalization program.

This study holds significant implications for persons and/or organizations that manage, organize, and/or participate in SA programs. As an example, the results of this study should provide the initial portion of a framework that will enable the stakeholders to measure progress towards the achievement of the professionalization objective (Almarri & Boussabaine, 2017; Castanho et al., 2018; Osei-Kyei et al., 2017; Serafino, 2016). This addresses the gap in the literature noted by Moroney et al. (2014). The study

also provides essential insights on the professionalization mission from the program's in-country participants' perspective concerning how the management of the military professionalization might be improved. This addresses the literature gap noted by Newcomer (2007) and Patanakul et al. (2016). In a general sense, this study offers options to address management shortfalls common to government programs as noted by Chih and Zwikael (2015), Furlong (2015), Newcomer (2007), and Patanakul et al. (2016).

Conclusions

The reformation of a military organization is a significant undertaking in time, effort, and money. The U.S. DOS is responsible for the execution of the military professionalization mission under the auspices of the SA program. To date, the literature has indicated these programs lack a formal and systematic approach to their management. Analysis of interviews with the retired U.S. military personnel executing the mission in the UAE revealed eight CSFs they believe are necessary for the military professionalization mission in the UAE to succeed. These were discipline, accountability, technical expertise, technical support, education, effective professional standards, culture, and desire to change. The development and measurement of these CSFs in a formal systematic approach toward the management of military professionalization programs can provide synergistic rewards to its users at all levels of the government, military, and society. A professionalized military is respected and admired, both at home and abroad. The successful implementation of a military professionalization program requires a significant commitment from all involved parties, a willingness to assess any shortfalls

honestly, and a long term, multi-generation commitment to improving the force and its service to the society.

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