

2020

## Counterterrorism Strategies Used by Local Law Enforcement Agencies and Emergency Management Departments

Todd Andrew Schneeberger  
*Walden University*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations>

---

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu](mailto:ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu).

# Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by

Todd A. Schneeberger

has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,  
and that any and all revisions required by  
the review committee have been made.

Review Committee

Dr. Melanye Smith, Committee Chairperson,  
Criminal Justice Faculty

Dr. Sean Grier, Committee Member,  
Criminal Justice Faculty

Dr. Carolyn Dennis, University Reviewer,  
Criminal Justice Faculty

Chief Academic Officer and Provost  
Sue Subocz, Ph.D.

Walden University  
2020

Abstract

Counterterrorism Strategies Used by Local Law Enforcement Agencies and Emergency

Management Departments

by

Todd A. Schneeberger

MA, University of Colorado, Denver, 2014

BS, Ferris State University, 1980

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

November 2020

## Abstract

For local law enforcement and local emergency managers, the threat of terrorist attacks in their communities is real. There are no anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies that are taught and used by local agencies. The purpose of this qualitative grounded theory study was to explore how small and midsize local law enforcement and emergency management departments prevent and interdict terrorism before it happens in their communities. Multiple streams theory and routine activities theory were used to guide the study. Data were collected from semi-structured interviews with 10 participants from small and midsize agencies in the Rocky Mountain region of the United States. Findings from constant comparative data analysis indicated that these agencies used a combination of intelligence gathering, information sharing, vulnerable target protection, and deterrence strategies to prevent terrorist incidents in their jurisdictions. Findings may be used law enforcement to prevent terrorist attacks, saves lives, and make communities safer resulting in positive social change.

Counterterrorism Strategies Used by Local Law Enforcement Agencies and Emergency

Management Departments

by

Todd A. Schneeberger

MA, University of Colorado, Denver, 2014

BS, Ferris State University, 1980

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

November, 2020

## Table of Contents

List of Tables .....	iv
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study.....	1
Problem Statement.....	7
Purpose of the Study.....	8
Research Questions.....	8
Theoretical Framework.....	9
Nature of the Study.....	11
Definitions.....	12
Assumptions.....	13
Scope and Delimitations .....	14
Limitations .....	15
Significance.....	16
Summary.....	17
Chapter 2: Literature Review.....	18
Literature Search Strategy.....	21
Grounded Theory.....	22
Historical Overview .....	23
A Local Problem.....	30
Terrorism and Crime Prevention .....	33
Current Approach.....	35
An Examination of Recent Terrorist Attacks in the United States .....	37

Boston Marathon Bombing.....	37
San Bernardino, California Shooting.....	40
Orlando Shooting.....	43
Anti-Terrorism Funding.....	47
Anti-Terrorism Approaches.....	48
Risk Assessment Model.....	49
Anti-Ecoterrorism Legislation.....	50
Summary.....	52
Chapter 3: Research Method.....	54
Research Design.....	55
Methodology.....	57
Instrumentation.....	61
Trustworthiness.....	63
Summary.....	64
Chapter 4: Results.....	65
Research Setting.....	66
Demographics.....	67
Data Collection.....	69
Data Analysis.....	72
Evidence of Trustworthiness.....	76
Results.....	77
Research Question 1.....	78

Research Question 2 .....	84
Research Question 3 .....	86
Summary .....	88
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations .....	89
Interpretation of the Findings.....	90
Limitations of the Study.....	97
Recommendations.....	98
Implications.....	101
Conclusion .....	102
References.....	104



List of Tables

Table 1. Counterterrorism Strategies Used..... 83

## Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

On June 12, 2016, a terrorist pledging allegiance to the Islamic terror group ISIS entered a night club in Orlando, Florida and killed 50 people (Ellis, Fantz, Karimi, & McLaughlin, 2016). Since the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, 92 terrorist attacks have occurred in cities around the United States, including New York, NY; Boston, MA; Fort Hood, TX; San Bernardino, CA; and Chattanooga, TN (Mueller, 2017). These terrorist incidents are reminders of the threat that is present in today's world. The emergency management system and law enforcement are responsible for dealing with terrorism.

In 1917 the United States passed the Army Appropriation Act, which in part developed and funded the first official government established emergency management system (Canton, 2007). This act put into place a network of state and local councils, under the guidance of the Council of National Defense, to deal with civil defense issues (Canton, 2007). The Council of National Defense remained in place with a few name changes until the end of World War II (Canton, 2007).

In 1950 the emergency management system changed with the passage of the Federal Disaster Act and the Civil Defense Act (Canton, 2007). The Federal Disaster Act reaffirmed the role of the federal government in national disasters, and the Civil Defense Act defined the role of local government in disaster preparedness (Canton, 2007). These pieces of legislation defined the roles in emergency management but kept cooperation between the federal, state, and local governments limited. The Stafford Act of 1974 allowed the state and local governments to request assistance from the federal

government during a disaster (Bullock, Haddow, & Coppola, 2016). This system of cooperation in preparedness and response was put in place to deal with disasters. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the federal legislators passed the Homeland Security Act and modified the Stafford Act in part to include terrorism as form of disaster that the emergency management system would have to deal with (Bullock et al., 2016).

Terrorist attacks including bombings, mass shootings, stabbings, and vehicle assaults have occurred in the United States and have been responded to and dealt with by local law enforcement agencies and their emergency management departments (Martin, 2017). The emergency management system and police at the state and local level need to be ready for these kinds of attacks. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 put into place the current laws and guidelines that terrorism prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery fall under (Bullock et al., 2016). The Homeland Security Act established the new Department of Homeland Security and included the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Prevention Framework (NPF; Bullock et al., 2016).

The NIMS was established to provide a consistent approach for all levels of first responders when preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a disaster including a terrorist incident (Bullock et al., 2016). NIMS does not address how emergency managers and law enforcement officers should prevent a terrorist incident before they occur. The NPF was developed to prevent terrorist attacks (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2013). The NPF is based on the idea that the best way for local and state governments to prepare for terrorist attacks is to provide intelligence to the DHS and to assist the federal authorities when they need it (DHS, 2013). The NPF does not include

techniques, strategies, policies, and procedures that state and local emergency managers and law enforcement members can use to make their own terrorism prevention plans.

There should be a comprehensive program specifically designed for state and local entities. The current prevention framework or plan revolves around the capabilities and cooperation of the federal government and does not help state and local jurisdictions prevent terrorist incidents or mitigate disasters in their communities (DHS, 2013). Other than intelligence sharing, the format of the NPF does not address anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies and techniques that can be used by local law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments (DHS, 2013). It is hard to gauge how effective the NPF is because intelligence that is sent from local law enforcement agencies to the federal law enforcement community is protected and not available for review.

After reviewing some terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, researchers found that federal law enforcement agencies had information about the terrorist or the attacks that was never disseminated to local agencies (Dearstyne, 2005). The Boston Marathon bombing, the San Bernardino shooting, and the Orlando night club shooting were carried out by terrorists who had been known to the Federal Bureau of Investigation prior to the attacks, but the information had not been disseminated to the local law enforcement agencies (Dearstyne, 2005). Bean (2009) looked at whether the current information sharing system helped local emergency preparedness agencies better prepare for an incident. Bean also looked at the information sharing system set up through the DHS and used an online survey of local emergency preparedness agencies that had contributed intelligence to the

system. Bean evaluated whether the local emergency preparedness agencies received information back from the DHS that helped them to prepare for an incident and found that the local agencies did not believe that they had received useful information from DHS.

Klinger and Grossman (2002) evaluated who would be responsible for dealing with terrorists on U.S. soil and determined that local law enforcement would be first to respond. Klinger and Grossman also assessed the capabilities of U.S. responders and determined that local law enforcement was not equipped or trained to deal with terrorism. The study involved a review of the kinds of terrorist attacks that were being conducted and how other countries responded to those attacks (Klinger & Grossman, 2002). Findings indicated that a more military style response was the most effective way to deal with terrorism and that local law enforcement did not have the military style capabilities (Klinger & Grossman, 2002). The study also indicated that the country of Israel uses their national military to police terrorism in the local communities (Klinger & Grossman, 2002) and that current federal laws will not allow the U.S. military to take over policing terrorism in the local communities (Klinger & Grossman, 2002). Policing terrorism is the job of local law enforcement (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2014). Local law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments should be trained on how to better deal with terrorism. The main provider for training related to terrorism is the federal government through the DHS (Haddow et al., 2014).

Currently the DHS (2013) offers only anti-terrorism and terrorism prevention training for first responders as a small part of the training that emphasizes response

preparedness. This training is offered free to law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments through the Center for Domestic Preparedness. The training focuses on intelligence gathering and information sharing (DHS, 2013). The DHS does not offer a training program for local and state law enforcement or emergency managers that is based on techniques and strategies that they can use to prevent and mitigate terrorism. There is no training or evidence-based strategies for local emergency managers and law enforcement officials to use to set up a comprehensive plan to prevent and interdict terrorist attacks before they occur.

The responsibilities of an emergency manager include looking at potential threats, natural or human, in their communities and conducting a risk analysis of those threats (Canton, 2007). For every potential threat, the emergency manager should prepare a plan on how to deal with the threat (Haddow et al., 2014). A comprehensive plan includes strategies that can be used to prevent the incident or to mitigate the damage done by the threat (Canton, 2007).

After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the federal government created the DHS to deal with human and natural threats (DHS, 2017). The DHS developed a strategy for dealing with disasters that occur on U.S. soil (DHS, 2017). The NIMS (2002) was put in place as a guideline for all local emergency managers to use when designing their disaster plans. As part of NIMS, the federal government put the responsibility of preventing, mitigating, preparing, responding, and recovering from incidents on the local emergency managers and first responders (D. W. Walsh et al., 2012). Another change the U.S. government enacted by issuing the National Response

Plan (NRP) was to classify terrorism as a hazard or threat that the emergency management system must deal with (D. W. Walsh et al., 2012). These changes made terrorism a local threat or hazard that requires the local law enforcement community and emergency managers to deal with. The NRP is the guiding document for the all-hazards emergency response philosophy (Bullock et al., 2016). The all-hazards emergency response philosophy places the responsibility to prepare and respond to all-hazards on the local emergency management departments and on local law enforcement (Bullock et al., 2016).

The current system places the responsibility of preventing, mitigating, preparing, responding, and recovering from terrorism on the local law enforcement agencies and the emergency management departments. The federal government has provided some training and equipment to state and local jurisdictions in the areas of preparation and response but has not provided training for anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies. In the current study, I explored terrorism prevention and interdiction strategies and techniques that are being used by small and midsize law enforcement agencies and their emergency management departments. A gap exists in the current terrorism prevention system and in the research related to anti-terrorism on what strategies should be employed by small and midsize agencies. This study addressed what anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies and techniques are being used by small and midsize departments, if any, and how these strategies could be combined to create a comprehensive anti-terrorism plan.

### **Problem Statement**

This study addressed a gap in the research related to anti-terrorism strategies and techniques used by small and midsize law enforcement agencies and their companion emergency management departments. In 2002 with the passage of the Homeland Security Act, the landscape related to dealing with terrorism changed forever (White & Collins, 2006). Law enforcement agencies and homeland security departments became responsible for mitigating, preparing, responding, and recovering from terrorist attacks (D. W. Walsh et al., 2012). The DHS (2016) does a good job of offering training related to the preparation and response for a terrorist incident but offers limited information and training on how to mitigate or prevent terrorism. The lack of training and evidence-based anti-terrorism techniques and strategies for local emergency managers and law enforcement to use to prevent terrorism causes their communities to be less safe (Martin, 2017). The DHS or other federal departments offer only anti-terrorism programs that are guided by the NPF and revolve around the local agencies gathering intelligence and sending it to the federal agencies (Bullock et al., 2016). These programs do not offer training or information on terrorism prevention strategies and techniques that are being tried by state and local agencies (DHS, 2016). Local emergency managers and law enforcement agencies need strategies and techniques that they can use to prevent terrorism in their communities. A gap exists for small and midsize law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments regarding what strategies and techniques could be used to create a comprehensive plan to prevent terrorism.



### **Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this qualitative study was to identify whether small and midsize law enforcement agencies and their emergency management departments are engaged in anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies, techniques, and training. If they are involved in anti-terrorism/counterterrorism actions, this study addressed what strategies and techniques are being used to prevent and interdict terrorism. It is possible that the anti-terrorism strategies and techniques that are being used by one agency may be used by other state and local governments to develop a comprehensive terrorism prevention plan for their jurisdictions. These techniques and strategies, once identified, should be researched in future studies as to their effectiveness to prevent terrorism. I used the grounded theory approach to explore and collect data about anti-terrorism/counterterrorism techniques and strategies that are being used to prevent terrorist incidents in small and midsize law enforcement agencies and their companion emergency management departments. The study addressed anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies and techniques that are being used in emergency management systems and law enforcement agencies in the Rocky Mountain region of the United States.

### **Research Questions**

There is a lack of evidence-based information about anti-terrorism techniques and strategies that can be used at the local level. It is not clear what local law enforcement and emergency management systems should do to deal with terrorism. There are many federal and state programs that help local law enforcement to prepare, train, respond, and

recover from terrorist incidents, but there are no programs to help local jurisdictions prevent terrorism (DHS, 2016). Three research questions were developed and addressed in this study. The purpose of this study was to identify and evaluate anti-terrorism/counterterrorism techniques and strategies and develop a comprehensive terrorism prevention plan for use by local emergency managers and law enforcement. The following research questions (RQs) were used to guide the study:

RQ1: What anti-terrorism techniques and strategies are currently being used to interdict and prevent terrorism?

RQ2: What techniques and strategies should local emergency managers and law enforcement agencies be implementing to prevent and mitigate terrorism?

RQ3: How can these techniques and strategies be combined to produce a comprehensive anti-terrorism program that can be used at the local level?

### **Theoretical Framework**

Theoretical frameworks are critical to studying, understanding, and creating public policy (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Well-developed theories can guide the thinking of the people who are producing new policies. Two theoretical frameworks were used in the current study: multiple streams theory in reference to public policy, and routine activities theory in relationship to criminology (see Kingdon, 2003; Sabatier & Weible, 2014; D. W. Walsh et al., 2012). Researchers in public administration might find applicable theories in multiple areas like public policy and criminology (Walden University, 2014).

Multiple stream theory looks at decision-making and policy changes based on three separate streams of influence: problem, policy, and politics (Kingdon, 2003; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). The theory states that when the three streams converge it is the best time to get something accomplished related to policy (Kingdon, 2003; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). My literature review indicated occasions in which the multiple streams theory was used in the formation of law enforcement policies and laws. Larkin (2013) used the multiple stream theory as the framework for analyzing how and why new criminal laws are made. Multiple stream theory is viewed as a framework that is critical to the development of new public policies and new public policy theories (Nowlin, 2011).

The criminological theory of routine activities theory is based on the concept that there are three conditions that must be present for a crime to be committed (A. Walsh, 2015). The three conditions are a suitable target, a motivated offender, and the lack of a capable guardian (A. Walsh, 2015). The criminological aspect of the current study was to identify strategies and techniques that can be used to detect future terrorists and prevent them from conducting their attack. Routine activities theory posits that the terrorist is the motivated offender who is difficult to change, but communities through public policy and law enforcement efforts can affect the suitable target and capable guardian (A. Walsh, 2015). This criminological theory is the basis for most modern crime prevention programs (A. Walsh, 2015). Crime prevention, including crime related to terrorism, as seen through the eyes of routine activities theory would have local law enforcement agencies trying to decrease the attractiveness of potential targets and increase the presence of a watchful guardian (A. Walsh, 2015). The routine activities theory was used

as a framework in terrorism-related studies. Pridemore, Chamlin, and Trahan (2008) is a study that uses routine activities theory as a framework to reviewed the impact on crime after a terrorist attack had occurred in a local community.

### **Nature of the Study**

The data collection for this study consisted of semi-structured interviews done with local police, county sheriffs, and emergency managers. The goal of the interviews was to identify terrorism prevention techniques and strategies currently being used and the impact those programs have on the agencies. The findings may be used to develop a comprehensive terrorism prevention plan that can be used at the local level. If a terrorism prevention plan is developed, it will be an unproven theory that will invite further research to evaluate whether it prevents terrorist acts and whether it is cost-effective for a jurisdiction. The qualitative approach in this study was the grounded theory approach. Grounded theory research is “meant to build theory rather than test theory” (Patton, 2015, p. 110). Grounded theory focuses on exploring actions and processes with the goal of theory construction (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2015).

This study addressed the actions and processes that are currently being used to prevent terrorism at the local level that will “provide a framework for further research” (Creswell, 2013, p. 83). A second approach that was considered was the pragmatic theory of truth. Pragmatic theory is based on the idea of finding practical and useful answers to solve problems (Patton, 2015). Pragmatic theory is used to look at the research problem and find ways to solve it or provide a direction on how to solve it (Patton, 2015). For the current study, pragmatic theory was used to look at the problem of a lack of terrorism

prevention techniques, strategies, and training for local jurisdictions and to find ways to address it at the local level. The study addressed terrorism prevention and counterterrorism strategies that can be used by other local agencies in their training programs. Both research approaches provided meaningful information related to the research problem and questions.

### **Definitions**

For the purpose of this study, the following terms were defined as follows:

*All-hazards approach*: Common sets of emergency preparedness and response procedures and practices that are applicable in any locality, and an economy of scale is achieved by planning and preparing for disaster in generic terms rather than for each unique type (Sylves, 2015).

*Anti-terrorism*: Official measures used to deter or prevent terrorist attacks (Martin, 2017).

*Counterterrorism*: Proactive policies used to eliminate terrorist environments and groups (Martin, 2017).

*Crime prevention*: Policies to prevent new criminal acts from occurring or reducing the number and severity of such acts (Bjorgo, 2013).

*Mitigation*: A sustained action to reduce or eliminate risk to people and property from hazards and their effects (Haddow et al., 2014).

*National Incident Management System (NIMS)*: A set of principles that provides a systematic, proactive approach guiding government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against,

respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity to reduce the loss of life and property and reduce harm to the environment (Haddow et al., 2014).

*Preparedness:* A state of readiness to respond to a disaster, crisis, or any other type of emergency situation (Haddow et al., 2014).

*Recovery:* The development, coordination, and execution of service and site restoration plans; evaluation of the incident to identify lessons learned; post incident reporting; and development of initiatives to mitigate the effects of future incidents (Haddow et al., 2014).

*Response:* Activities, laws, or policies applied in the immediate aftermath of a disaster to protect life and property, prevent secondary disaster effects, and reconstitute government operation (Sylves, 2015).

*Small to midsize law enforcement agency:* Any law enforcement agency that has 250 sworn officers or fewer. The 250 sworn officer number comes from evaluating cities and towns in the Rocky Mountain region of the United States and separating large cities from small and midsize cities. After separating the cities by size, the number of sworn officers is obtained.

*Strategy:* An action plan including available measures and resources to achieve a specified effect (Bjorgo, 2013).

### **Assumptions**

This study was based on the assumption that small and midsize law enforcement agencies are committed to preventing terrorism. I assumed that law enforcement agencies

and emergency management departments in small to midsize jurisdictions have, because of the current climate, developed and adopted strategies to prevent and mitigate terrorism. I also assumed that these small to midsize law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments have resources available to allocate for terrorism prevention. It may be that law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments are not actively engaged in anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies (Thacher, 2005). These assumptions were made based on the assertion that local law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments have an important role in anti-terrorism/counterterrorism prevention (Martin, 2017). For this study it was also necessary to assume that the terrorist threat was real in every jurisdiction, no matter the size, in the United States (see Martin, 2017). These assumptions were important aspects of the study and were based on the scholarly thought about the role of local law enforcement and terrorism (see Carter & Carter, 2009; Docobo, 2005; McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007).

### **Scope and Delimitations**

The purpose of the study was to investigate and identify the anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies that are being used by small and midsize law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments. The study's results may help similar agencies and departments understand what strategies are being used and could be used by them. The results may provide a basis for further research into the effectiveness of anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies. The current study's population was law enforcement agencies with 250 sworn officers or fewer that are located in the

Rocky Mountain region of the United States. This population was chosen because of the varied demographics (i.e., urban, suburban, and rural). The results of this grounded theory study were used to generate a new unproven theory about how small and midsize agencies are preventing terrorism in their jurisdictions. Because the anti-terrorism counterterrorism strategies have not been tested, the transferability of the results is limited, and these strategies can be tried with only anecdotal evidence of their success.

### **Limitations**

Grounded theory studies are conducted to explore and investigate a process or action (Creswell, 2013). The current study addressed the counterterrorism strategies being used by small and midsize law enforcement agencies. A limitation of this study was that I may have had preconceived ideas about counterterrorism efforts and what strategies are effective in preventing such incidents (see Creswell, 2013). The grounded theory data collection is based on an ongoing chain of collection and analysis (Holton & Walsh, 2017). This data collection approach can cause changes in the direction the study is going (Holton & Walsh, 2017). A limitation to this type of study is that the researcher may not be able to decide when a data collection has reached saturation (Creswell, 2013). A question of bias against the federal intelligence community could affect what anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies are considered by researchers. These limitations were addressed by conducting semi-structured interviews and by letting the data drive the findings of the study. This study was a fact-finding mission with no preconceived ideas of strategies currently being used for anti-terrorism/counterterrorism by small and midsize agencies.



### **Significance**

In 1992, the United States government changed the policy dealing with terrorist attacks and threats that happen inside the United States (D. W. Walsh et al., 2012). The current policy puts the responsibility of preventing, preparing, responding, and recovering from terrorism on local emergency managers and local law enforcement (D. W. Walsh et al., 2012). The federal government provides training and equipment for preparing and responding to terrorist incidents but has no program to train and equip local jurisdictions for the prevention of terrorism (Sylves, 2015). The first responder emergency management community has developed training and guidelines on how to prepare, train, and respond to terrorism (Bullock et al., 2016; Sylves, 2015). The United State federal government offers training on terrorism preparedness and response through the Center for Domestic Preparedness (DHS, 2016). Several textbooks have been written about how to prepare for and respond to terrorism from the law enforcement prospective and the emergency management perspective (Bullock et al., 2016; Dempsey & Frost, 2014; Sylves, 2015). A gap exists in the current emergency management system and in the training provided by the United States government on what techniques and strategies local jurisdictions should use to prevent terrorism and whether any of the anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies are effective in preventing terrorist incidents.

This study addressed anti-terrorism/counterterrorism techniques and strategies that are being used by small and midsize jurisdictions in the Rocky Mountain region of the United States. This study may support peace and security in local communities by helping them develop plans based on anti-terrorism/counterterrorism techniques and

strategies to prevent terrorist incidents and keep their communities safe (see Majchrzak, Markus, & Wareham, 2014).

### **Summary**

This qualitative grounded theory study was designed to investigate the anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies that small and midsize law enforcement agencies and their companion emergency management departments are using to prevent and mitigate terrorism. I used the ground theory approach to explain what anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies are being used (see Creswell, 2013). In the next chapter, I review research in the areas of terrorism, the role of law enforcement in terrorism, and a history of law enforcement and emergency management in the area of terrorism.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

Leaders being assassinated and communities being violently attacked in the name of a cause has been common throughout history (Martin, 2017). The modern era of terrorism has manifested in the form of attacks on New York City and Washington DC on September 11th, in the bombing of the Boston Marathon, and mass shootings in San Bernardino and Orlando. There have been approximately 92 terrorist attacks in the United States since the September 11, 2001 attack (Mueller, 2017). Any time there is a terrorist incident, it is a reminder that every community could fall prey to an attack. The emergency management system and law enforcement at the local level are responsible for dealing with terrorism.

Since the early 1900s, the United States has passed legislation that has established the emergency management system and funded numerous disaster relief situations. The Army Appropriation Act and the Council of National Defense are examples of laws that began to set up and design the emergency management system at the federal, state, and local level (Canton, 2007). In 1950, the Federal Disaster Act confirmed the federal government's role in dealing with national disasters, and the Civil Defense Act explained to local governments what their responsibilities would be in disaster preparedness (Canton, 2007). The next important piece of legislation was the Stafford Act of 1974. This law authorized local and state governments to request assistance from the federal government during a disaster (Bullock et al., 2016). The Homeland Security Act was passed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and changed the Stafford Act, in

part, to include terrorism as a disaster that the emergency management system would have to deal with (Bullock et al., 2016).

The Homeland Security Act formalized the all-hazards approach to emergency management and tried to standardize the preparation and response to terrorist incidents (Bullock et al., 2016). The Homeland Security Act also identified the NIMS and the NPF as the working guidelines for disasters (Bullock et al., 2016). NIMS set up an approach for first responders at the local, state, and federal level to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover from disasters including terrorism (Bullock et al., 2016). NIMS does not address how local jurisdictions should prevent terrorist attacks from occurring. The NPF addressed terrorism prevention (DHS, 2013). The prevention plan for local and state jurisdictions under the NPF is for local and state entities to provide intelligence to federal law enforcement agencies who will handle it (DHS, 2013). The framework does not include counterterrorism strategies that local law enforcement and emergency management can use to produce their own comprehensive terrorism prevention plan.

The current system of information sharing has been found to be flawed. In a review of terrorist attacks in the United States, Dearstyne (2005) found that federal law enforcement had information about potential terrorist incidents and never disseminated that information to local law enforcement agencies or emergency management departments. Bean (2009) evaluated the DHS information sharing system and found that local emergency management departments that had contributed intelligence to the DHS believed that they had not received useful information back from them.

Klinger and Grossman (2002) determined that local law enforcement agencies would be the first to respond to acts of terror in the United States . Klinger and Grossman also determined that local law enforcement was not equipped or trained to deal with terrorism in their communities. It is recognized that it is the job of local law enforcement to deal with terrorism (Haddow et al., 2014). The emergency management system has also assigned responsibility to local emergency management departments for identifying potential threats, natural or human (Canton, 2007). The local emergency management departments are supposed to conduct a risk analysis of the potential threats and prepare a plan for how to deal with the threats (Canton, 2007). The plan for each potential threat should include strategies on how to prevent the incident or to mitigate the damage done by the threat (Canton, 2007).

A gap in the research was counterterrorism and the strategies and techniques that small and midsize law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments can use to prevent terrorism. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the United States government passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which changed how the law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments dealt with terrorism (White & Collins,2006). The passage of this act made law enforcement agencies and homeland security departments officially responsible for preventing, mitigating, preparing, responding, and recovering from a terrorist attacks (D. W. Walsh et al., 2012). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the DHS, which coordinates the training for local law enforcement and emergency management professionals in the area of terrorism (DHS, 2016). The DHS and other federal agencies

designed a counterterrorism strategy called the NPF (Bullock et al., 2016). The terrorism prevention training for local law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments that is offered by the DHS and identified in the NPF is limited to intelligence gathering and disseminating the information to federal law enforcement agencies (Bullock et al., 2016). Local communities are less safe because of the lack of training in terrorism prevention strategies for local emergency management departments and law enforcement agencies (Martin, 2017). For small and midsize law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments, the training on counterterrorism strategies is limited even though some government officials state that the next major terrorist attack will occur in a rural community (Bullock et al., 2016). No comprehensive anti-terrorism plan exists for small and midsize emergency management departments and law enforcement agencies.

### **Literature Search Strategy**

The information that was used for this literature review on topics related to counterterrorism, terrorism, and crime prevention was collected through numerous Walden University electronic databases and some additional search engines that include but are not limited to the following: Criminal Justice Database, Political Science Complete, Sage Journals, SocINDEX, Taylor and Francis Online, Bloomsbury Open Archives, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Find Law, Homeland Security Digital Library, International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Legal Trac, Nexis Uni, Oxford Criminology Bibliographies, Political Science Complete, and Google Scholar. The following are search terms and phrases that were used to identify research reports

and other related information that was used in this literature review: *terrorism, terrorism prevention, anti-terrorism, counter terrorism, police counter terrorism, emergency management, local law enforcement terrorism, terrorism mitigation, crime prevention, crime prevention terrorism, Orlando shooting, Orlando nightclub shooting, Orlando Pulse shooting, Boston Marathon bombing, San Bernardino shooting, San Bernardino terrorist shooting, information sharing, and terrorism prevention strategies.*

The initial searches were conducted to locate studies that were performed between 2008 and 2018; these searches were done using keywords and keyword phrases. Additional searches were done to locate research and other information that would provide a historical perspective on this topic. All the searches involved the same methodology and the same databases. The searches produced numerous relevant documents including research studies, journals, books, articles, and dissertations. An example of the search methodology is a search in the Criminal Justice Database using the keywords *terrorism prevention* for the years 2008 to 2018. The results of this search were 4,113 items. When the search keyword was separated into two separate searches, the results were 1,5381 items for terrorism and 35,970 items for prevention. Applicable search results were evaluated for their accuracy, objectivity, and relevance to this study.

### **Grounded Theory**

This research study was based on grounded theory methodology. I developed a theory on how local law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments could prevent terrorism in their communities. Chapter 3 provides more information on how the grounded theory methodology was used to develop new ideas in this study. This

literature review included literature related to grounded theory approaches, terrorism as a problem, local jurisdictions responsibilities, and current prevention philosophies.

The grounded theory approach is different from other approaches because it moves beyond basic description of a topic and involves development of a theory (Creswell, 2013). The grounded theory approach is considered different, so the literature review is considered different. The literature review in most research approaches or methodologies is designed to articulate previous research that shows a gap that is going to be explored in the current study (Creswell, 2013). In a grounded theory approach, the literature review can hinder the basic premise of the study by stifling the researcher's ability to be open to discovering what theories and concepts the data present (Holton & Walsh, 2017). In a grounded theory study, the data collected drive the discovery of theories and should not be limited by an extensive literature review. The literature review can be used more effectively in the discussion section after the data have been collected and analyzed (Holton & Walsh, 2017).

### **Historical Overview**

The major religious texts that act as a written account of history describe floods, disease, earthquakes, and other disasters that have affected societies (Haddow et al., 2014). When societies responded to the disasters and then tried to change things to prepare for the next time they occurred, they were performing the tasks of an emergency manager (Canton, 2007). Most of the early emergency management duties were conducted by the community affected by the disaster. In 1803 the United States federal government passed a congressional act that gave a town in New Hampshire financial aid



after it had been destroyed by a fire (Haddow et al., 2014). This event was the first time that the U.S government became involved in a local community because of a disaster (Haddow et al., 2014). In the 1930s the U.S. government established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Bureau of Public Roads that, in part, helped with responding and recovering from disasters (Haddow et al., 2014). In 1936, the Flood Control Act was passed by the U.S. Congress and gave resources to states and local communities to design and build flood control projects (Haddow et al., 2014). In terms of emergency management, this act acknowledged that governments and communities could take preventive measures against natural disasters (Haddow et al., 2014).

One disturbing trend that has been part of emergency management since the beginning, is the idea to only prepare for the last disaster that has occurred (Canton, 2007). When a community has been damaged by a tornado, fire, or flood, all the preparation after that incident will be based on how to prepare for the next disaster of the same kind (Canton, 2007). Many communities throughout history have prepared for a similar disaster only to be devastated by some different event (Canton, 2007). In the aftermath of the use of the nuclear bombs that ended World War 2, the United States became thoughtful of how to prepare for and respond to a nuclear attack (Haddow et al., 2014). Government agencies like the Office of Civil Defense Planning, the National Security Resource Board, the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Office of Defense Mobilization took on the responsibility of preparing America for a nuclear attack (Canton, 2007; Haddow et al., 2014). These agencies eventually became the Office of

Civil Defense (Canton, 2007). Throughout the 1950's, civil defense was the main focus of the emergency management community (Canton, 2007).

The 1960s began with a series of deadly natural disasters in the form of hurricanes, earthquakes, and tsunamis (Haddow et al., 2014). The civil defense preparation did not prepare these communities for the disasters that affected them (Haddow et al., 2014). The federal government responded by creating the Office of Emergency Management that was supposed to deal with response and recovery from natural disasters (Haddow et al., 2014). The federal government still viewed emergency management as a reactive system. When crises occurred, they would pass a new act to deal with the individual incident and allocate money and resources to deal with the emergency (Canton, 2007). Prior to the 1970s, the U.S. Congress passed over 120 individual acts to deal with disaster relief (Canton, 2007).

Federal, state, and local governments had been expanding the emergency management focus to where most jurisdictions had overlapping and competing departments dealing with disaster response and relief. The passage of the Stafford Act of 1974 changed two important parts of emergency management. It combined several federal agencies into one and allocated money for disaster preparation and warning programs (Canton, 2007). In 1979, in an attempt to further consolidate the emergency management departments of the federal government, the president issued a presidential executive order establishing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (Canton, 2007; Haddow et al., 2014). The creation of FEMA combined the civil defense part of emergency management with the natural disaster part (Canton, 2007). It also

adopted the approach of dealing with disasters to include mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery known as the all-hazards approach (Canton, 2007).

Recorded history has documented acts of terrorism in the form of assassinations of leaders and violence against communities since the beginning of time (Martin, 2017). In the modern era, terrorist attacks seem occur regularly. Whether it is a bombing, shooting, or even using a vehicle to run people over, terrorism is part of our lives. Examples of recent acts of terrorism include in August 2017, in Charlottesville Virginia protesters clash leaving three people dead including some from a vehicle attack (USA Today Editors, 2017). In June of 2016, a gunman pledging allegiance to the Islamic terror group ISIS shot up an Orlando Florida night club killing 50 people in a terrorism act (Ellis, Fantz, Karimi, & McLaughlin, 2016).

Since the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, over 90 terrorist attacks have occurred in cities like New York, NY; Boston, MA; Fort Hood, TX; San Bernardino, CA; Chattanooga, TN and other U.S. cities and towns (Mueller, 2017). Many of these attacks occur in communities that are not considered large metropolitan areas (Census, 2012). In all of these attacks on U.S. soil the local law enforcement agencies and the other local first responders are the ones that must respond and deal with the situation. The DHS was created, in part, to help the U.S. prepare and respond to terrorist incidents (DHS, 2013).

The attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11<sup>th</sup> caused the federal emergency management system to develop a plan for the country. The Federal Response Plan (FRP) was designed because of a Presidential Directive as a plan to supplement the Stafford Act (Bullock et al., 2016). The FRP made two major changes to the emergency

management all-hazards system. The first was to change the order of the emergency management stages, by placing the mitigation stage at the end (Bullock et al., 2016). This change indicated that the mitigation stage was now a post incident stage instead of a stage to stop the incident from happening (Bullock et al., 2016). The second change was to add Prevention as an emergency management stage (Bullock et al., 2016). *Prevention* in this context is defined as “actions taken to avoid an incident or to intervene or to stop an incident from occurring, which involve actions taken to protect lives and property” (Bullock et al., 2016, p.507). The traditional all-hazards approach to emergency management has four stages and the FRP changed that to include a fifth stage of prevention. The emergency management community did not embrace the changes to the all-hazard stages of emergency management (Bullock et al., 2016).

In December of 2004, the federal government released the National Response Plan (NRP) to replace the FRP (Bullock et al., 2016). The new NRP dropped prevention as its own emergency management stage and combined the concept of prevention with the Mitigation stage (Bullock et al., 2016). The explanation was that changing back to what was the traditional all-hazards approach would keep consistency and clarity for the emergency management systems at all levels (Bullock et al., 2016). What this change back also did was to lessen the importance of prevention in the all-hazards, emergency management system.

As part of the war on terror the DHS has developed the National Prevention Framework (DHS, 2013). This framework identifies the responsibilities of the federal agencies to prevent terrorist attacks and how local entities can help prevent terrorism

(DHS, 2013). The anti-terrorism strategy outlined in the National Prevention Framework (NPF) for local law enforcement agencies is for them to gather intelligence and pass it along to the appropriate federal agency (DHS, 2013). The NPF also asks that local law enforcement agencies and local homeland security departments assist the federal agencies if they request it (DHS, 2013).

However, the framework does not identify anti-terrorism strategies that can be used at the local level to create their own terrorism prevention framework that could prevent an attack before it occurs (DHS, 2013). The NPF described plan for local police and homeland security departments revolves around intelligence being sent from the local jurisdictions to the federal agencies and then expecting the federal government to provide a plan for the local community (DHS, 2013). The NPF prevention plan does not include a comprehensive plan that local homeland security departments and law enforcement agencies can implement to protect their communities from terrorist incidents (DHS, 2013). After review of some of terrorist attacks on targets in U.S. locations, researchers found that federal law enforcement agencies had information about the terrorist or the attacks prior to the incident and that they never disseminated the information to local agencies (Dearstyne, 2005).

Klinger and Grossman (2002) conducted a study dealing with terrorism in the U.S., they used a case study approach to review terrorist attacks both in the U.S. and overseas. Klinger and Grossman reviewed terrorist incidents concentrating on the tactics and weapons used in the attacks. Klinger and Grossman found that local law enforcement agencies were not equipped or trained to deal with terrorism. The main provider for

training related to terrorism is the federal government through DHS (Haddow et al., 2014).

DHS offers training in terrorism related subjects to local law enforcement and homeland security personnel through the Center for Domestic Preparedness (DHS, 2013). DHS also provides training for emergency managers through FEMA and their Emergency Management Institute (FEMA, 2018). All the training through the Center for Domestic Preparedness center's around terrorism preparedness and response to an incident (DHS, 2017). A small part of the training the Center for Domestic Preparedness offers, is a section on anti-terrorism and terrorism prevention for first responders (DHS, 2017). The terrorism prevention portion focuses on local entities gathering intelligence in their jurisdiction and passing the information to a federal agency (DHS, 2017).

The training offered by FEMA is done both online and on site at the Emergency Management Institute (EMI). The EMI online training is limited to four categories of courses that include: NIMS, hazardous materials, incident response, and incident awareness (FEMA, 2018). The EMI offers over 400 different courses. There is not a single course about anti-terrorism/counterterrorism or terrorism prevention. A search of all the courses offered shows five courses that deal with prevention of any kind, one course that is an introduction to the national prevention framework and four courses that include preventing problems of logistics and communications (FEMA, 2018). A search for terrorism related courses shows only the NPF course referred to previously.

DHS does not offer a training program for local and state law enforcement or emergency managers that is based on techniques and strategies that they can do to

prevent and interdict terrorism. The Center for Domestic Preparedness and the EMI offer mainly courses on preparing for and responding to an incident (FEMA, 2018). If counterterrorism is part of a course the strategy covered is the information sharing strategy (FEMA, 2018). There is no terrorism prevention or training in counterterrorism techniques or strategies for local emergency managers and law enforcement officials to use to set up a comprehensive plan to prevent terrorist attacks before they occur.

### **A Local Problem**

The job of an emergency manager is to look at potential threats or hazards, natural or human, in their communities and prepare a plan on how to deal with the threat. There are four basic components of an emergency management program: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Haddow et al., 2014). *Mitigation* refers to continuous actions put in place to lower or eliminate the risks from hazards that affect people and property (Haddow et al., 2014). When the NPF added prevention as a fifth component it was defined as “The capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism” (DHS, 2013, p. 7). The emergency management component of *preparedness* is the “state of readiness to respond to a disaster or crisis” (Haddow et al., 2014, p. 101). The response component is the ability of the emergency management system and first responders to answer the emergency call (Haddow et al., 2014). The last component is recovery. Recovery is the process of rebuilding a community after an emergency event has occurred (Haddow et al., 2014).

The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11th changed forever the field of emergency management. The DHS came about by the U.S. Congress passing a law in

2002 that combined 22 federal departments and agencies into the DHS (DHS, 2017). The department began operation in March of 2003. The members of DHS have as one of its goals to develop a better way to safeguard the country against terrorism and to coordinate response to attacks (DHS, 2017). The members of the DHS changed two areas that have a direct effect on local emergency managements. The two changes are: a bottom up approach and terrorism as part of emergency management (D. W. Walsh, et al., 2012). The bottom up approach makes every emergency management incident a local event and only when an incident demands more resources than are available are the state and federal government to be called in (D. W. Walsh, et al., 2012). The other change was to classify terrorism as one of the hazards or threats that the emergency management system must mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover from (D. W. Walsh, et al., 2012) Preventing terrorism is a local emergency management and law enforcement problem (White, & Collins, 2006). It is the responsibility of local law enforcement to be the first responders to any incident in their jurisdiction including a terrorist attack. It is part of every law enforcement agency's responsibility to prevent crimes before they are committed. The changes that DHS made, and the first response responsibilities of local law enforcement has made terrorism prevention a local problem.

The emergency management responsibilities at local jurisdictions may be handled by a law enforcement agency, a fire department, or even a separate area of government. No matter where the emergency management department is located, the roles and responsibilities are the same. The emergency management department's role is to prevent, mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover from disasters both human and natural



(Canton, 2007; Haddow et al., 2014). To accomplish success in each one of these areas, it requires special strategies and techniques specifically designed to address that area.

It is the responsibility of the emergency management department to identify and implement these strategies and techniques (Sylves, 2015). Another role for an emergency management department is to assess the possible threats, both human or natural, that may occur in their jurisdiction and to make a plan on how to respond to that threat (Haddow et al., 2014). Once a plan has been designed it is the job of the emergency management department to train and then practice the strategies that will be used to execute the plan (Haddow et al., 2014). The training and practice can take many forms including tabletop exercise, computer generated incidents, and live response exercises. Maslen (1996) in his peer reviewed article, concluded that practicing an emergency response plan was more valuable than the plan itself. Nikolova (2011) found that training emergency responders with computer generated incidents “strengthened the individual and team readiness for crisis management”. In yet another article, security analysis proposed an anti-violence plan and tested it by way of table top exercises and real life exercises and found that training and practicing the plan increased the teams abilities in treat management (Peek-asa, Casteel, Rugala, Holbrook, Bixler, & Ramirez, 2017). The emergency management departments must work with first responders in every area of disaster management.

The law enforcement role is present in all five areas of disaster management (Dempsey & Frost, 2016). During the response and recovery phase of a disaster incident the role of law enforcement is protection of life, peace keeping, protection of property, reestablish order, and if necessary, conduct a criminal investigation (Dempsey & Frost,

2016). In the mitigation and preparation phases the law enforcement community is involved in planning and training for the possible disaster response (CDP, 2002). The one area that is in question is, what is the role of law enforcement in the prevention phase of a disaster plan? The current role identified in the NPF and in the instruction provided by DHS, is as an intelligence gatherer (DHS, 2013; CDP, 2002).

Bjorgo (2013) proposed a theory of using basic crime prevention strategies to prevent terrorism. There is no peer-reviewed research that evaluates the effectiveness of the use of crime prevention strategies to prevent terrorism.

There is a lack of training in evidence-based counterterrorism techniques and strategies for local emergency managers and law enforcement to use to prevent terrorism causes their communities to be less safe (Martin, 2017). The DHS does not offer training on terrorism prevention strategies and techniques being used by state and local agencies and these strategies have never been evaluated for effectiveness (DHS, 2016). Local emergency managers and law enforcement agencies are challenged to find techniques and strategies that will work for their jurisdictions that will help them prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from a terrorist incident.

### **Terrorism and Crime Prevention**

Preventing a crime from occurring is better and less expensive as opposed to trying to investigate an incident, solve it, make arrests, and prosecute the offenders (Peak & Sousa, 2018). “Terrorist violence is a serious form of crime that should be treated as such, applying the full repertoire of crime prevention mechanisms and measures” (Bjorgo, 2013, p.2). The current NPF does not treat terrorist acts as crimes that will be

dealt with by local law enforcement. The NPF is designed to encourage local law enforcement and emergency managers to act as intelligence gathering entities to help the federal law enforcement agencies to make federal terrorism cases (DHS, 2013). In a U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) report, it is acknowledged that the responsibility to prevent and respond to future terrorist acts rests on local police, fire, and emergency services personnel (Chapman, Baker, Bezdikian, Cammarata, Cohen, Leach, Schapiro, Scheider, & Varano, 2002). Bjorgo (2013) noted, terrorism can be viewed as a form of violent crime that will be responded to and dealt with by local emergency services, then the use of traditional crime prevention strategies should be considered.

Crime prevention in the modern era is partially based on the criminological theory of Routine Activities Theory (Barkan, 2013). Routine Activities Theory states that crime is the confluence of a motivated offender, a suitable victim, and a lack of a capable guardian (Barkan, 2013). Crime prevention strategies analyze these three elements and try and develop certain actions that can disrupt the commission of the crime (A. Walsh, 2015). A crime prevention strategy for the crime of residential burglary, will look at the residence as the suitable victim and will give homeowners ideas on how to make their home less desirable to the motivated offender. Bjorgo (2013) identified nine general crime prevention strategies that could be used to prevent terrorist attacks. Bjorgo (2013) included crime prevention strategies that dealt with the offender, the victim, and the guardian. Bjorgo (2013) outlined strategies to affect the motivated offender they are; establishing normative barriers to committing crime, reducing recruitment, deterring

crime through threat of punishment, reducing the rewards, incapacitation, and desistance and rehabilitation. The effectiveness of these strategies related to terrorist acts has never been studied but have been used in preventing other kinds of crime. Bjorgo identified two strategies that are common in the mitigation stage of emergency management; protecting vulnerable targets and reducing harmful consequences. Bjorgo's last strategy is disruption. *Disruption* in this context has to do with the capable guardian, emergency services, stopping the acts before they occur (Bjorgo, 2013). This strategy is what the current federal counterterrorism system is based on.

### **Current Approach**

The terrorist environment we now live in, has changed the mission of local law enforcement to include responsibility for day to day civil protection operations (Martin, 2017). These operations include intelligence gathering and terrorism prevention activities (Martin, 2017). The current local counterterrorism approach is based on the cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies. In reports prepared after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Boston Marathon bombing, investigators found that collaboration and information sharing between federal law enforcement agencies and the local departments was negligible (Martin, 2017). In both attacks, and others attacks since, the federal law enforcement agencies had information about the terror suspects and did not give this information to the local law enforcement agencies before the incidents had occurred (Martin, 2017). These federal agencies working on counterterrorism are described as homeland security bureaucracies (Martin, 2017). Martin (2017) commented on the current counterterrorism environment "the consequences can be quite dire if

homeland security bureaucracies are not flexible, efficient, and collaborative” (Martin, 2017, p233).

The 9/11 commission, which investigated the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, found that the FBI had intelligence information about foreign nationals enrolling in flight schools and in one case had information that one of these subjects only wanted to learn how to take off and fly the plane but did not need to know how to land (Martin, 2017). The same commission found that the CIA had identified some of the individuals that carried out the September 11 attacks as members of an Al Qaeda terrorist cell (Martin, 2017). This intelligence that was gathered by the two federal agencies was not disseminated to each other or to local law enforcement agencies in the areas where the information was focused on (Martin, 2017). In an investigative article done recently, it was found that both the terrorist who did the Orlando Florida night club mass shooting and one of the Boston Marathon bombers were on federal terrorist watch lists prior to their attacks (Lichtblan & Apuzzo, 2016). Lichtblan and Apuzzo (2016) found that the FBI had investigated both terrorist prior to their attacks but did not have enough evidence to arrest the suspects. Lichtblan and Apuzzo reported the FBI did not disseminate the intelligence about these terrorists to the local law enforcement agencies where they lived and ultimately conducted their terrorist attack. Lambert (2018) reviewed a report about the current counterterrorism intelligence sharing system, done by the “Criminal Justice Policy Review”, he discovered significant problems in the information gather and disseminating process between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Lambert identified two of the main problems are; a lack of intelligence gathering

capabilities in local law enforcement agencies and an unwillingness of agencies to pass intelligence to each other.

## **An Examination of Recent Terrorist Attacks in the United States**

### **Boston Marathon Bombing**

On April 15<sup>th</sup>, 2013 at 2:49 p.m., a bomb goes off at the finish line of the Boston Marathon and thirteen seconds later another bomb goes off a block away in front of the Forum restaurant on the marathon race route (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015). The bombs were placed to inflict damage on the race spectators and race competitors. When the smoke clears, three innocent people are killed and 282 are injured (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015). Throughout the rest of the day false reports of suspects being arrested or taken into custody swirl around the incident, but Boston Police deny any detentions or arrests (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015).

On the morning of April 16<sup>th</sup>, 2013, Jeff Bauman Jr., who was injured in the attack, gives a physical description of a suspect that he saw drop a backpack near him just before the explosion (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015). The Boston police and the FBI begin gathering surveillance videos from the areas where the bombs were detonated and review the videos for a suspect that was described by Bauman (Greenfield, 2013). A video is found showing two suspects with backpacks entering the area where the bombs were detonated and at 5:00 p.m. of April 18, 2013 the FBI releases the video to the media (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015). At 10:33p.m. MIT campus police officer Sean Collier is found in his patrol car shot to death it is later found that he was shot by the bombing suspects (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015). On April 19<sup>th</sup>, 2013 shortly after midnight two

suspects later identified as brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev carjack a Mercedes from the owner and take him hostage (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015).

During his time with the Tsarnaev brothers, they admit to him that they did the marathon bombing and had just killed a police officer (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015). At 12:15a.m., the Tsarnaev brothers stop the carjacked Mercedes to buy gas and use the owner's card for cash out of an ATM (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015). When the car is stopped and Dzhokhar goes into pay for the gas the owner jumps out of the car and runs away to another gas station and calls the police (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015). At 12:24 a.m., the police arrive and use the carjack victim's phone and vehicle satellite system to track the stolen vehicle (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015). At 12:50 a.m. police contact the Tsarnaev brothers in the street and get into a shootout, officer Richard Donohue is seriously injured (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015). Tamerlan Tsarnaev is shot during the confrontation and then run over by his brother as he is fleeing the area, Tamerlan dies from his injuries (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015). Throughout the day of April 19<sup>th</sup>, 2013 police conduct a house to house search for the remaining suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev who had abandoned the car and was presumed to be on foot (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015). Sometime after 6 p.m. a homeowner in the search area named David Hennebury checks a boat that he has stored in his back yard a notices blood and a human body in the boat and calls the police (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015). At 7:30p.m. police surround the boat and later Dzhokhar surrenders to police (Morrison, & O'Leary, 2015).

This case is an example of terrorism targeting spectators and participants at a sporting event. Many small and midsized law enforcement agencies and their companion

emergency management departments deal with sporting events in their jurisdictions. A review of the incident using the emergency management stages shows that first responders were prepared and trained in how to respond to a major incident and that they acted quickly and appropriately in their response. The recovery and mitigation stages include evaluating the incident and putting additional security measures in place for the next year's races. The mitigation efforts included additional security checkpoints, bomb sniffing dogs, uniformed police, security officers, firefighters, and emergency management teams all on scene of the race working in the crowds (Bauter, 2016). The increased security also included some high-tech measures to include equipment used to sense drones in the area and additional security cameras (Bauter, 2016). The one area that was not done well in this incident was the prevention stage.

When conducting the investigation into this terrorist incident Boston police found that Tamerlan Tsarnaev had been on the FBI terror watch list (Perera, 2013). The investigation uncovered information that Tamerlan Tsarnaev had met with a terrorist when he had traveled to Caucasus and that Russian intelligence officers alerted the FBI (Perera, 2013). The FBI opened a case on Tamerlan and even went to interview him (Perera, 2013). The problem came when the FBI chose not to tell the Boston police about the intelligence they had on Tamerlan (Perera, 2013). The Boston police had four officers assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and they were still not told about Tamerlan (Perera, 2013). The Boston Police Commissioner Edward Davis testified in front of a U.S. Senate hearing and said, "Information sharing between local police participants in FBI led JTTFs is still too often unidirectional" (Perera, 2013, p.1). Davis



said that the fact that the FBI kept the information about Tamerlan from the Boston police left them “blind” and put “officers at risk” (Perera, 2013, p.1). The terrorism prevention system based on intelligence being gathered by the FBI and then disseminated back to local agencies for their consideration, did not work in this case.

In the aftermath of the bombing, changes were made in the way that law enforcement and emergency management prepared for and responded to anti-terrorism security for large events (Bauter, 2016). In a report from the Department of Justice they recommend that “ the FBI consider sharing threat information with state and local partners more proactively and uniformly by establishing a procedure for notifying state and local representatives on JTTFs when it conducts a counterterrorism assessment of a subject residing in or having a nexus to a representative’s area of responsibility” (DOJ OIG, 2014). Sharing intelligence about potential threats allows local law enforcement to prevent, prepare, and respond to terrorist incidents.

### **San Bernardino, California Shooting**

On Wednesday December 2, 2015, in San Bernardino California two Islamic terrorist attacked a business training conference and office party (Keneally & Shapiro, 2015). The terrorists were identified as a husband and wife named Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik (Keneally & Shapiro, 2015). Farook worked for the San Bernardino County Health department who was hosting a daylong conference and holiday party (Keneally & Shapiro, 2015). At approximately 8:48 a.m. Farook arrived at the work conference being held at the Inland Regional Center (Keneally & Shapiro, 2015). At 10.37 a.m., Farook leaves the conference in a black SUV, but leaves behind a duffle bag

which is later identified as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) (Keneally & Shapiro, 2015). The IED malfunctions and does not go off. About twenty minutes later at 10:58 a.m., the black SUV returns and Farook and Malik get out in black tactical gear and begin shooting people inside and outside of the Inland Regional Center (Keneally & Shapiro, 2015). When the shooting stops, Farook and Malik leave the area in the black SUV leaving behind 14 people dead and 22 wounded (Keneally & Shapiro, 2015). Farook and Malik are identified as suspects in the shooting by an anonymous tip (Calamur, Koren, & Ford, 2015). Local law enforcement officers go by a house that Farook and Malik rented and saw the vehicle driving in the area (Keneally & Shapiro, 2015). At 3:09 p.m. officers try and stop the vehicle containing Farook and Malik (Cotter, 2016). A short pursuit takes place and ends when Farook and Malik stop their vehicle and begin shooting at the police (Cotter, 2016). Police return fire and kill both Farook and Malik (Cotter, 2016).

At the time of the San Bernardino terror attack, it represented the worst jihadist attack on U.S. soil since the attacks on 9/11 (Schindler, 2015). In the aftermath of this attack, it is important to review the five stages of emergency management and evaluate how they worked for this incident. The parts of the attack that would be considered Preparedness and Response, were done quickly and effectively by first responders. Local law enforcement agencies responded to the scene and used information to identify the suspects and begin a manhunt for the terrorist couple (Schindler, 2015). The terrorist couple were found, because law enforcement officers were looking for them near a house that had been identified as theirs (Cotter, 2016). The officers that were part of the shoot-out with Farook and Malik responded appropriately by stopping the suspect vehicle and

then shooting them when they presented a threat by shooting at officers (Cotter, 2016). In the final shootout, the suspects died, and two officers were injured (Cotter, 2016).

The Recovery stage included the follow-up investigation into the planning and radicalization of Farook and Malik. The investigation found a cache of weapons, ammunition, and bomb making equipment at two locations (Calamur et al., 2015). The investigation also identified a co-conspirator that had helped equip and plan the terrorist attack (Calamur et al., 2015). The Mitigation stage of the emergency management cycle is being covered by ongoing training for law enforcement officers that uses the incident and responding officer's actions as an example (Cotter, 2016). This training includes visualization techniques that help officers develop rapid reaction abilities for high stress incidents (Cotter, 2016). An independent after-action report confirmed the appropriateness of the response and subsequent investigation (Braziel, Straub, Watson, & Hoops, 2016). The report suggested additional training in the areas of building searches and bomb mitigation (Braziel, et al., 2016).

The emergency management stage that is not addressed in the aftermath of this incident is Prevention. Farook and Malik used social media for years prior to the attack to express their radical Islamic beliefs (Schlinder, 2015). Malik had written on public social media sites about her "ardent desire to wage jihad and seek martyrdom in the name of radical Islam" (Schlinder, 2015, p 1). When Malik was applying to immigrate to the U.S. her public social media writings were not reviewed (Schlinder, 2015). Malik received a green card to enter the U.S. with less screening than most people who apply for jobs or college (Schlinder, 2015). The U.S. Immigration Service missed identifying Malik as a

radical jihadist and therefore could not excluded her from entry into the country or at least alert the local law enforcement community of her presence. The local law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments did not have an opportunity to try and prevent the deaths of 14 people because of this attack.

The attack at the Inland Regional Center by Farook and Malik was handled with bravery and professionalism was one of the evaluations from a DOJ after action report (Braziel, et al., 2016). The report found three main areas that could be improved on; community policing, multi-agency training, and information sharing (Braziel, et al., 2016). The DOJ found that working with the community helped in the preparation and response to this incident and that expanding the cooperation will help in preventing, preparing, and responding to future incidents (Braziel, et al., 2016). The terrorist attack by Farook and Malik crossed over jurisdictional lines and involved a number of different agencies. The DOJ report praised the cooperation between local entities but suggested more multi-agency counterterrorism training (Braziel, et al., 2016). Tabletop training or mock scenario training involving many first responder agencies could help in preparation and response. The last area identified was the lack of information sharing between federal agencies and local agencies. The report noted that information about Malik's immigration status and social media activity was known by the federal law enforcement and was not disseminated to local law enforcement for their use (Braziel, et al., 2016).

### **Orlando Shooting**

Sunday June 12, 2016, at approximately 2:00 am, Omar Mateen parked the rented vehicle he was driving in a parking lot just north of the Pulse Nightclub in Orlando

Florida (Straub, Cambria, Castor, Gorban, Meade, Waltemeyer, & Zeunik, 2017). Mateen is armed with a Sig Sauer semiautomatic rifle and a Glock handgun (Straub et al., 2017). At 2:02 am, Mateen enters the nightclub through the south door and shoots his first victim just inside the door (Straub, et al., 2017; Lotan, Minchew, Lattery, & Gibson, 2016). An Orlando Police detective was working an off-duty job at the Pulse Nightclub and reported that there were shots being fired in the nightclub (Straub et al., 2017). The Orlando detective was outside the club in the parking lot and could see Mateen through the glass doors, shooting people inside the club. The detective shot several rounds at Mateen (Straub et al., 2017). At 2:03 am, on duty police officers began to arrive at the nightclub (Lotan et al., 2016; Straub et al., 2017). The police that were arriving had prior training on responding to an active shooter situation and formed an entry team to go into the Pulse nightclub (Straub et al., 2017). The first entry team entered the east side of the nightclub at 2:08 am and began rescuing people from inside the business (Straub et al., 2017). At 2:10 am the first entry team heard five additional gunshots from another part of the nightclub and a second entry team entered the business (Straub et al., 2017). At this same time a victim hiding in a bathroom stall, called 911 and reported that Mateen was in the bathroom (Straub et al., 2017).

This situation now became a barricaded gunman with hostages. The police on scene secured the bathroom and continued to evacuate people that they could (Lotan et al., 2016). The Orlando police department set up a Unified Command Center (UCC) to manage the numerous first responders from police, fire, and EMS that were arriving (Straub et al., 2017). The UCC used the Incident Command System model to coordinate

the incident. For the next three hours Mateen remained barricaded in the bathroom with hostages. Mateen talked with negotiator's and expressed his allegiance to the Islamic group ISIS and said that he had placed bombs in vehicles in the parking lot and around the inside of the nightclub (Lotan et al., 2016). At 5:02 am, the police SWAT team assault the area of the nightclub where Mateen is hiding. (Straub et al., 2017). Mateen gets into a shoot-out with the police at 5:15 am and is killed in the exchange (Lotan et al., 2016; Straub et al., 2017)). The incident is over and the terrorist Mateen is dead. Mateen shot 102 people, killing 49 of them (Straub et al., 2017).

A review of the Orlando Pulse nightclub shooting shows things done right and things done wrong. The response from the law enforcement agencies, the emergency management departments, EMS, fire departments, and medical personal was quick and appropriate based on their preparedness training (Straub et al., 2017). An independent after-action report praised the local first responders for their actions and communication during the incident (Straub et al., 2017). Even while the standoff was still continuing, victims were being evacuated and treated (Lotan et al., 2016). The recovery and mitigation stages of this incident were based on critiquing the preparation and response and found that the incident was handled the way it was supposed to be (Straub et al., 2017). The stage that was not handled correctly was the prevention stage.

The FBI had investigated Mateen twice in the previous two years as a possible terrorist (Chappell, 2016). Mateen was investigated in 2013, while working as a security guard at the courthouse, when he made threatening statements and pledged allegiance to Islamic terror groups (Chappell, 2016). The FBI investigated Mateen and found that he

was attending a mosque known for radical teaching and that he had traveled twice to Saudi Arabia in a ten-month time (Chappell, 2016). After interviewing Mateen, the FBI closed the case on him (Chappell, 2016). After a friend and fellow attendee of Mateen's mosque, conducted a terrorist attack using a suicide bomb, Mateen was again investigated by the FBI (Chappell, 2016). The investigation into Mateen ended when the FBI determined that he was no longer a radical threat because he had gotten married (Chappell, 2016).

During the two years and multiple investigations into Mateen, the FBI chose not to share any information to the Orlando Police Department about him. The FBI allowed Mateen to remain working as a security guard and allowed him to legally purchase the two guns used in the nightclub attack (Chappell, 2016). The local law enforcement community and emergency managers were not told about Mateen and did not have the opportunity to try and prevent him from conducting the nightclub shooting.

In the After-action report done by the U.S Department of Justice, they determined that the first responders were well prepared and responded in a way that saved lives and stopped the incident (Straub et al., 2017). The report also noted that "Local law enforcement officers, particularly those assigned to patrol work, are the most important resource for identifying, preventing, and responding to threats" (Straub et al., p. 121). In a different evaluation of the incident it was identified that the FBI had opened two separate investigations on the shooter for terrorism and did not advise or alert Orlando Police Department of the danger (Chappell, 2016). The lack of information sharing by federal

law enforcement, about a terrorist threat, to local law enforcement did not allow them to try and prevent the incident from happening.

### **Anti-Terrorism Funding**

One of the problems that plague many mid-sized and small state and local emergency management departments and law enforcement agencies is funding anti-terrorism programs. Smaller agencies struggle with allocating money to fund anti-terrorism strategies (Lambert, 2018). A review of the DHS and FEMA's funding information found that both agencies provide funding for state and local departments through federal grant programs (DHS, 2018; FEMA, 2018). DHS focused their funding around regional fusion centers and large urban areas that are considered high risk (DHS, 2018). A fusion center is a joint effort with federal, state, and local agencies exchanging information on possible terrorist and terror plots (DHS, 2018). In an evaluation on information sharing it was found that many local law enforcement agencies do not participate in the fusion centers and therefore do not pass information to them or receive information from them (Lambert, 2018). DHS had some grant programs for large urban areas that were not available for mid-sized or small agencies (DHS, 2018).

FEMA offered funding in three areas: disaster relief, training, and preparedness (FEMA, 2018). The disaster relief grants are for areas that have been affected by a disaster (FEMA, 2018). FEMA awards grants to those disaster areas to recuperate the costs of response to the disaster and to fund the recovery (FEMA, 2018). FEMA also funds training both at their site and at locations throughout the country (FEMA, 2018). The last area of funding available is in the form of preparedness grants. State and local agencies



can apply for grant money to help them prepare for a possible risk or threat (FEMA, 2018). Neither DHS or FEMA provide funding for prevention strategies or programs for midsized or small agencies.

### **Anti-Terrorism Approaches**

This study researched what is being done around the world to deal with terrorism. One approach being used in Spain is showing some reduction in terrorist activity from a domestic terrorist group. Spain has had ongoing terrorist activity since the late 1960's, mainly due to anti-government group named ETA (Benavente & Proto, 2014). This group has been responsible for close to 900 fatal attacks (Benavente & Proto, 2014). To combat this group and other terrorist threats, Spain has developed a criminal justice-based approach (Benavente & Proto, 2014). This approach is outlined in an article named "Combating the Terrorism of ETA with the Penal Model" by Benaventa & Proto.

The penal model is based on a couple of basic premises. The first is to change the laws and penalties to address specific terrorist related activities and to criminalize activities that are not usually associated with terrorism (Benavente & Proto, 2014). The penalties related to these offenses have been made harsh and without exception. The second is to suspend some of the suspected terrorist's fundamental rights by including these rights restrictions as part of the criminal law (Benavente & Proto, 2014). This criminal justice approach has provided Spain with a strategy that seems to be working by reducing the terrorist incidents related to ETA (Benavente, & Proto, 2014). Whether this approach is effective on other terrorist groups is not known, but it appears to be one strategy that shows promise.

The United States government has created some new criminal laws beginning in the 1990s to try and use a penal model to interdict terrorism. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Patriot Act are the main two federal laws that have been enacted to combat terrorism in the U.S. (Bullock et al., 2016; Martin, 2017). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act increased penalties for terrorist crimes and gave additional authority to the federal government to prosecute terrorist (Martin, 2017). One provision of the act added a regulation that allows government to track explosives more effectively (Martin, 2017). This regulation is similar to what the government did in regulating and tracking purchases of precursor chemicals that are used in the manufacture of Methamphetamines (Hess & Orthmann, 2010). These regulations assist in the investigation of the related crime, but have not decreased the criminal acts (Hess & Orthmann, 2010; Martin, 2017).

The Patriot Act was a law focused on increasing the federal government's authority and abilities to investigate and prosecute suspected terrorist (Bullock et al., 2016; Martin, 2017). Martin (2017) noted the Patriot Act did not have any new laws which criminalized behavior that could be used to interdict terrorism before it occurred.

### **Risk Assessment Model**

Another approach that needs inclusion in this essay is identified in a report describing research using a risk assessment model to identify potential Islamic terrorist. Kebell and Porter (2012) authored a report titled "An intelligence assessment framework for identifying individuals at risk of committing acts of violent extremism against the west" outlines that use of a risk assessment tool to identify potential terrorist

so that law enforcement can target them. The study is based on the concept that is currently used by law enforcement agencies to assess the risk of suspects and to predict certain criminal behavior (Kebbell & Porter, 2012). Kebbell and Porter takes the risk assessment concept and applies it to Islamic terror suspects. Kebbell and Porter identified a series of risk factors that they believe will forecast the next terrorist and violent terrorist attack. This list of risk factors is based on intelligence that agencies should already be collecting (Kebbell & Porter, 2012). Kebbell and Porter believe this approach will aid law enforcement in preventing terrorism. The study as designed had not instituted this approach at any specific agency and was not evaluated for its effectiveness in preventing terrorism (Kebbell & Porter, 2012). Researchers were theorizing about how this model could work but had no data on whether it does work.

### **Anti-Ecoterrorism Legislation**

The next approach is the use of strict anti-ecoterrorism federal legislation and sentencing to deter future incidents. Carson (2014) described in an article titled “Counterterrorism and radical eco-groups: A context for exploring the series hazard model” a study which used the rational choice theory of criminology as his theatrical framework and looked at the effects of stricter laws and punishment on ecoterrorism acts. Carson reviewed prior incidents of ecoterrorism and tracked the incidents before and after the passage of three main anti-terrorism laws. Carson concluded that there was a direct deterrence effect of the stricter laws and punishments to the amount and severity of ecoterrorist attacks.

In 1970 the federal government decided they needed a tool to fight organized crime in America and developed the Racketeering Influenced and Corruption Organizations Act (RICO) (Geary, 2000). This legislation was designed to give law enforcement a new tool that would allow for more prosecutions against organized crime figures (Geary, 2000). This increase in arrests, prosecutions, and harsher sentences was supposed to dismantle the criminal organizations and decrease the amount of crime (Geary, 2000). This concept of fighting specific crimes by enacting new legislation is one that is currently being studied and tried as a way to prevent and interdict terrorism (Benavente & Porto, 2014; Carson, 2014). In studies done in Spain and the U.S., the effect of new anti-terrorism laws that included harsher penalties were evaluated to determine whether they decreased the amount of terrorist activity or changed it in any way (Benavente & Porter, 2014; Carson, 2014). One area that both of these studies do not address is how the law enforcement professionals decide which potential terrorist should be targeted for the enforcement of the new laws.

In the past law enforcement agencies have used risk assessment tools to identify repeat offenders that should be targeted so they can be interdicted before they commit another serious crime (Spelman, 1990). This concept has been studied as a possible approach that law enforcement can use to identify which potential terrorist is most likely to commit a terrorist act (Kebbell & Porter, 2012). Kebbell and Porter identified numerous risk behaviors that indicated that the suspect would likely commit a terrorist attack and then provided a scoring matrix to assess the suspects potential. These studies

begin to show some approaches that should be evaluated further to see if they are applicable to preventing future terrorist attacks.

### **Summary**

This study is a qualitative designed study using a grounded theory approach. Grounded theory approach studies look at literature reviews differently than other approaches (Creswell, 2013). I explored new concepts related to anti-terrorism counterterrorism strategies and the literature review should not stifle or constrain researcher's thoughts on related topics (Creswell, 2013). A review of the literature does show an ongoing problem with terrorism and terror based incidents throughout the country (Martin, 2017). These acts of terror are occurring in every size community, in every region of the United States. This information makes terrorism a problem that affects every law enforcement agency and local emergency management department.

In 2002, in response to the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington DC the federal government changed many parts of how local, state, and federal governments are dealing with the terrorism problem (DHS, 2013). The Homeland Security Act established the DHS and identified roles and responsibilities related to the mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery from terrorist incidents (DHS, 2013). The DHS shifted the primary responsibility for dealing with terrorism to the local emergency management departments and the local law enforcement agencies (D. W. Walsh, et al., 2012). The DHS focused its approach for local law enforcement and emergency management departments on preparation and response and not on prevention. The few areas of prevention that the DHS addressed, consists of a small section in a terrorism

course for local law enforcement and emergency management personnel and in the NPF (DHS, 2013). The terrorism prevention strategy identified for local law enforcement and emergency management departments is to share information about possible terrorist or terrorist plots to the federal law enforcement agencies (DHS, 2013). The literature review identified that this strategy has not been consistently reliable. In after-action reports of terrorist attacks and in other research, it has been identified that on numerous occasions the federal law enforcement agencies had prior knowledge of the terrorist or the terror attacks and did not disseminate that information to the local law enforcement agencies or the emergency management departments (Dearstyne, 2005; Martin, 2017).

The results of some research shows that some anti-terrorism/ counterterrorism strategies are being tried and developed but none of these have been researched on their effectiveness or value to every community. Anti-terrorism/ counterterrorism strategies such as; the penal model, risk assessment model the anti-ecoterrorism model have all been reviewed as possible strategies that may allow local law enforcement and emergency managers to prevent terrorism (Benavente & Proto, 2014; Carson, 2014; Kebbell & Porter, 2012). There is a lack of research that identifies anti-terrorism/ counterterrorism strategies that should be used by local law enforcement and emergency managers. This study as designed in Chapter 3 identified what anti-terrorism counterterrorism strategies are being used by local law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments to prevent terrorism in their communities. I generated through this study information that can be used in future research to study what strategies are the most effective in making communities safe from terrorism.

### Chapter 3: Research Method

This study addressed whether small and midsize local law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments are doing anything to interdict and prevent terrorism in their jurisdictions. In the agencies that were participating in anti-terrorism/counterterrorism activities, this study addressed what strategies and techniques were being used. Finally, this study revealed anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies that could be researched for their effectiveness and applicability to small and midsize jurisdictions. I gathered data by conducting in-depth interviews with law enforcement and emergency management representatives from jurisdictions that are considered small midsize in the Rocky Mountain region of the United States. The interview questions were open-ended and addressed strategies and techniques that are being used to prevent terrorism.

The research method was qualitative with a grounded theory design. The grounded theory approach focuses on actions or processes that occur over time (Creswell, 2013). In the current study, the actions and processes that were examined were the anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies and techniques used by small and midsize agencies. The grounded theory approach is used to develop a theory about the processes and actions (Creswell, 2013). I used the grounded theory approach to explain and understand small and midsize sized law enforcement agencies' and emergency management departments' approaches to interdict and prevent terrorism in their jurisdictions (see Creswell, 2013).

## Research Design

This study was designed to identify whether small and midsize law enforcement agencies and their emergency management departments are involved in terrorism prevention and interdiction actions. The study addressed what actions they are taking. Three research questions were used to guide this research:

RQ1: What anti-terrorism techniques and strategies are currently being used to interdict and prevent terrorism?

RQ2: What techniques and strategies should local emergency managers and law enforcement agencies be implementing to prevent and mitigate terrorism?

RQ3: How can these techniques and strategies be combined to produce a comprehensive anti-terrorism program that can be used at the local level?

By answering these questions, I identified anti-terrorism and counterterrorism techniques and strategies being used by small and midsize agencies. I also found some barriers that hinder small and midsize agencies' counterterrorism efforts. The data collection for this study consisted of semi-structured interviews with local police, county sheriffs, and emergency managers who represent small and midsize jurisdictions. A small to midsize law enforcement agency was defined as an agency with fewer than 250 sworn officers (see Reaves, 2015). The goal of the interviews was to identify whether terrorism prevention techniques and strategies are being used and what techniques and strategies are being deployed. These interviews included questions on the impact anti-terrorism/counterterrorism programs or lack of programs has on the agencies. The data were used to develop a comprehensive terrorism prevention plan that could be used at the



local level. This terrorism prevention plan is an unproven theory that will require further research to evaluate whether it prevents terrorist acts and whether it is cost-effective for a jurisdiction. The qualitative approach that aligned with this study's purpose was the grounded theory approach. The grounded theory approach is "meant to build theory rather than test theory" (Patton, 2015, p. 110). Grounded theory focuses on exploring actions and processes with the goal of theory construction (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2015). I investigated the actions and processes that are being used to prevent terrorism in small to midsize agencies to "provide a framework for further research" (Creswell, 2013, p. 83). A grounded theory approach is used to explain some action or process that the participants have experienced (Creswell, 2013).

I examined what, if any, anti-terrorism strategies and techniques are being used by small to midsize law enforcement agencies and their emergency management departments. Most quantitative and qualitative methods would not have provided an in-depth understanding of the anti-terrorism strategies being used in small to midsize jurisdictions. The qualitative method that included the pragmatic theory of truth approach could have provided some useful information but would not have explained the terrorism prevention techniques and strategies completely. Pragmatic theory is based on the idea of finding practical and useful answers to solve problems (Patton, 2015). Pragmatic theory practitioners look at the research problem and try to find ways to solve it or provide a direction on how to solve it (Patton, 2015). For the current study, the pragmatic theory approach would have involved looking at the problem of a lack of terrorism prevention techniques, strategies, and training for local jurisdictions and finding ways to institute a

program. Part of the problem with this approach was that there was no research on what terrorism prevention program should be instituted. I use the grounded theory approach to discover terrorist prevention techniques and strategies that are being used at the local level. I also found terrorism prevention and anti-terrorism strategies that may be applicable to other local agencies in their training programs. This study addressed what, if any, anti-terrorism/counterterrorism techniques and strategies are being used by small and midsize departments. The best research approach to accomplish this goal was grounded theory.

### **Methodology**

This study was qualitative with a grounded theory approach. The grounded theory approach allows researchers to examine actions and processes instead of studying topics and structures (Patton, 2015). The actions and processes studied were the anti-terrorism/counterterrorism techniques and strategies being used by small and midsize law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments. The gap in the research indicated that there is no one proven strategic plan used by most small and midsize jurisdictions to interdict terrorism. If such a strategic plan exists, other research designs could be used to test the effectiveness of the plan, but because no strategic plan exists, research needed to be done to develop it. Local law enforcement's role in interdicting and preventing terrorism is recognized as the most important part of a counterterrorism plan (Dempsey & Frost, 2014). The basic duties of patrol and investigations at local law enforcement agencies puts them on the frontline in the war on terror (Dempsey & Frost, 2014). The largest law enforcement agencies have the personnel and funding to create

special units to work on strategies and techniques to prevent and mitigate terrorism (Dempsey & Frost, 2014). The population of this study was small and midsize law enforcement agencies and their corresponding emergency management departments. These agencies and departments operate with smaller budgets and limited personnel and are not able to address terrorism the same way that larger departments and federal agencies can.

A small or midsize law enforcement agency was defined as any agency that has fewer than 250 sworn officers (Reaves, 2015). The emergency management departments were the departments that are in jurisdictions that have small to midsize law enforcement agencies. This study was conducted in the Rocky Mountain region of the United States. In the Rocky Mountain region, there is a historical similarity of law enforcement and emergency management, but the jurisdictions in this region vary in the demographics they serve. This would allow for more diverse raw data to be collected.

The choice of conducting a qualitative study instead of a quantitative study influences sampling decisions for researchers. In quantitative studies, researchers are often trying to get as close to a random sample as they can (Creswell, 2014). The best results and most generalizable quantitative studies include a random sample that represents the population being studied (Creswell, 2014). Qualitative researchers in most cases are not seeking a random sample; they are using a sampling strategy that best suits their study and is based on a basic premise known as purposeful sampling. Purposeful sampling is a process in which the researcher finds the most information rich cases that address the study's problem and questions (Patton, 2015).

Purposeful sampling can take many forms depending on what data are needed to answer the study's questions (Patton, 2015). Some purposeful sampling strategies involve a larger sample that provides a more superficial understanding of the phenomenon, and other strategies involve a smaller sample to provide a more in-depth view of the phenomenon (Patton, 2015). The decision to use a large sample or a small sample should be made according to which strategy provides the best data for the study. The sampling procedure that would provide the best data for the current grounded theory study was group characteristics sampling (see Patton, 2015). In a group characteristics sampling strategy, the researcher selects information rich cases that will provide data on important group patterns (Patton, 2015). In the current study, the cases were small and midsize law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments and the group patterns were the terrorism prevention strategies and techniques that they are using, if any. I used a variation of group characteristics sampling known as maximum variation sampling. This sampling style includes a variation of cases to be studied with the purpose of finding diversity and common patterns throughout the sample (Patton, 2015). In the current study, the variation of cases was the different law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments that were sampled. The variations manifested by the size, location, and demographic characteristics of each agency and jurisdiction they serve. Sampling a variety of agencies provided data about anti-terrorism/counterterrorism techniques and strategies that included differences and common patterns that the agencies are using.

The sample size is determined by several factors related to the study but is mainly based on what the researcher wants to know (Patton, 2015). For the current study, I conducted semi-structured interviews to obtain an appropriate amount of data, which meant I needed to interview a sample that provided enough information rich data to address the studies problem and questions (see Patton, 2015). In qualitative research, a predetermined number of participants is not necessary because the researchers should continue to sample until the data become redundant (Patton, 2015). I expected that 10 emergency management and law enforcement agencies would provide a sufficient amount of information rich data to answer the research questions and achieve the study's goals.

I began by identifying small to midsize departments in the Rocky Mountain region that represent different demographics. Factors like; agency size, location, average income, citizen racial make-up, presences of a college, and crime rate were noted when selecting the agencies. No agency will be excluded. These factors were evaluated to provide the most diverse sample population. I called the agencies and requested permission to speak with the individual or group that is tasked with working terrorism. Once contact was approved and made with these representatives, either a phone or in person semi-structured interview was conducted. I continued conducting interviews until the data collected became saturated. Saturation occurs when the collection of data no longer produces new data or generates new insights into the research questions (Creswell, 2014). In this study saturation occurred when the answers to the my questions produced the same data about anti-terrorism counterterrorism techniques and strategies.

### **Instrumentation**

The semi-structured interviews were conducted using broad open-ended questions, based on basic themes and topics related to anti-terrorism counterterrorism techniques and strategies. This open-ended questioning allowed me to follow the interviewee's train of thought and yielded more valuable data. This style of semi-structured interviewing does not use an established interviewing instrument. I conducted the interviews similar to interviewing a witness in a law enforcement related incident. One of the first steps of the interview is to prepare for each interview by gathering some background information (Inbau et al., 2011). In this study the background information consisted of basic information about the department and the community that it services. The background information also includes historical review of any terrorism related incidents that have occurred in that jurisdiction. The next step of the semi-structured interviews was the interview. The interview was conducted in a fact-finding format. The interviews were done either over the phone or in person. Questions centered around the agency's anti-terrorism counterterrorism strategies. I explored how the anti-terrorism counterterrorism strategies and techniques are implemented, payed for, and if they have produced any cases. The interviews were done as a conversation using follow-up questions to expand on the original answer until the topic had been fully examined. Every interview was based on the same basic anti-terrorism counterterrorism theme but contained different questions based on the agency's answers and approaches to terrorism. Some agencies may not have an anti-terrorism program. These agencies were interviewed

to find out why they do not have an anti-terrorism program and what factors influenced those decisions.

The purpose of these interviews was to gather as much data about anti-terrorism counterterrorism programs from the small and midsized agencies perspective. Every interview was either audio recorded and/or was recorded by taking notes. I did follow-up with agencies as additional information was needed. The agencies were encouraged to contact me if additional information was developed.

The data collected was coded and analyzed based first on the theme of whether or not an agency has an anti-terrorism counterterrorism program. This would have separated the data into two main categories, but all the agencies that participated in the study were engaged in some counterterrorism efforts. All of the agencies have some anti-terrorism counterterrorism strategies that they were using so, the themes were based on what strategies or techniques they are using and any limitations to their counterterrorism efforts. Each strategy or technique yielded addition themes or codes based on the cases that were generated by their use. After each interview is complete, the notes and audio tapes were reviewed, and I coded and categorized the information based on the themes developed. This study was not trying to prove one anti-terrorism strategy is more effective than another, so the data collected did not cause any discrepancies. Whether one agency reported success in a strategy, and another did not was handled as a matter of coding the data to reflect both experiences.

### **Trustworthiness**

Validity in a qualitative study is determined by the accuracy of the findings based on the view of the researcher and the participants (Creswell, 2014). This qualitative approach study, using the grounded theory method used triangulation, constant comparative analysis, and substantive validation to address issues of trustworthiness. Triangulation in a ground theory study is based on the openness to use all types of data sources which will limit the opportunity for perspective bias (Holton & Walsh, 2017). The different sources of data used, was determined by the agencies contacted and included any and all information about anti-terrorism counterterrorism strategies and techniques. The concept of constant comparative analysis is based on the idea that from the beginning of the data collection process the researchers are comparing and analyzing the data and that the data gradually builds the studies conceptual codes (Holton & Walsh, 2017). This concept follows an investigative style of gathering information. When investigating a case, the investigator does not know the outcome until they have processed the evidence and allows the facts and evidence to drive the direction of the case. The ultimate success of the case is based on the story that the evidence told. In this study, the use of constant comparative analysis allowed the data to drive the direction of the study. Creswell (2013) “Substantive validation means understanding one’s own topic, understandings derived from other sources, and the documentation of this process in the written study” (p. 248). A grounded theory study is an interpretive style study (Creswell, 2013). This style study continual interprets data and documents the process as you go through it (Creswell, 2013). The use of previous research, the interpretative data, and



prior topic knowledge gives substance to the study. The use of these validity concepts will help ensure the trustworthiness of the data collected, the analyzation of the data and the conclusions.

### **Summary**

This study was conducted by gathering information from small and midsized law enforcement agencies and their similar emergency management departments in the Rocky Mountain region of the United States about their anti-terrorism counterterrorism strategies and techniques. This information was gathered by agency historical data and semi-structured interviews with the current participant's in their anti-terrorism counterterrorism programs. As the data was collected, it was continually analyzed to direct which way the study moved toward the development of new concepts and theories related to anti-terrorism counterterrorism.

## Chapter 4: Results

With the adoption of NIMS in 2002, local law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments became responsible for preventing terrorism in their communities (NIMS, 2002). In this qualitative study, I used the grounded theory approach to identify counterterrorism strategies and techniques used by small and midsize law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments in the Rocky Mountain region of the United States. This study of anti-terrorism/counterterrorism prevention strategies was a fact-finding mission. The research questions were based on identifying counterterrorism strategies and techniques that were being used by small and midsize jurisdictions (RQ1). The study also addressed strategies and techniques that should be used in these jurisdictions to prevent and mitigate terrorism (RQ2). When the data collection were finished, the information gathered were used to provide guidance to small and midsize law enforcement agencies and emergency management departments regarding anti-terrorism/counterterrorism strategies and techniques that could be used as a comprehensive plan against terrorism (RQ3).

This chapter addresses how the data were collected, analyzed, and used to develop a theory. I explain how participants were recruited and what cooperating agencies were used. I used semi-structured interviews to gather data. The interviews were done with members from the cooperating agencies who, at the time of the interview, were working on counterterrorism issues within their agency. I also describe the cooperating agencies that participated in this study. The information is descriptive but does not identify the specific agency or interviewee. I explain how the interviews were conducted and how the

data were collected and analyzed. The data were coded into categories and themes and organized to develop a theory. This chapter also addresses the trustworthiness of the study, the data collected, and the results.

### **Research Setting**

Data were collected through the use of face-to-face interviews or interviews conducted over the telephone. The interviews were done with participants who work for midsize or small law enforcement or emergency management agencies. Each agency was selected based on their demographics. I contacted the agencies and explained the study and the requirements to participate in the study. The main requirement was to identify and make available a member of the agency who was familiar with and worked with the agency's counterterrorism program. The agency was given a letter of cooperation for review and authorization. Cooperating partner agencies provided the names of the individual participants who had the information needed for this study and made them available to me. Midsize and small agencies have limited personnel resources. In this study, the individual who authorized the cooperation of their agency was also the agency representative who had the most knowledge of their agency's counterterrorism program. The agency representative therefore became the study's participant. The participants were given a consent form to review, and they consented to the interview prior to the beginning of the interview. Because the agency representative who agreed to be a cooperating agency was also a study participant, there was no pressure from members of the agency to participate in the study. Every cooperating agency and every study participant had been involved in a counterterrorism situation for that agency. I did not

identify any conditions at the cooperating agencies or with the participants that would have influenced my interpretation of the data and the subsequent results.

### **Demographics**

In this qualitative study using a grounded theory approach, I interviewed current representatives of small and midsize law enforcement agencies and emergency management agencies. The agencies selected to participate were from different areas in the state of Colorado. The agencies were considered cooperating research partners, and their representatives were considered participants. The agencies were selected by their size and location. I wanted to include a variety of agencies that represented different demographics. The size of the agency was the first consideration. The study was delimited to small and midsize agencies. Small and midsize agencies were identified as agencies with 250 sworn officers or fewer. The agencies were classified as law enforcement or emergency management. Participants from six law enforcement agencies consented to interviews. Half of the participants work for agencies that have more than 50 sworn officers but fewer than 250 officers. These agencies are considered midsize. Half of the participants work for small agencies that have fewer than 20 sworn officers. In the Rocky Mountain region, law enforcement agencies are divided by location in the region. Communities in the mountain areas have different populations and different demands on the law enforcement agencies. Two of the law enforcement agencies, one small and one midsize, were from the mountain region. Four law enforcement agencies were from the urban front-range communities.

Each of the cooperating research partner law enforcement agencies selected their potential participant. The participant was contacted by me and given the confidential choice to participate or decline to participate. The agencies were not advised of the decision of the participants. The participants were chosen by their agencies because of their knowledge of their agencies' counterterrorism efforts. At three of the law enforcement agencies, two small and one midsize, the chief or sheriff chose to be the participant. This was significant because it represented one of the findings described in the results and conclusion sections of this study. Individual demographic information of the participants was not relevant to this study and was not collected because the focus of the interviews was on the agencies' counterterrorism programs, not the individual participants.

Emergency management agencies differ from law enforcement agencies based on their job descriptions. Emergency management agencies focus on the prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from the terrorism hazard (Haddow et al., 2014). Emergency management agencies are smaller in number of personnel because they concentrate on the hazard threats only. The emergency management agencies were selected based on the size and location of the communities they serve. Four emergency management agencies were used as cooperating research partners. Small communities do not have their own emergency management agencies; instead, they cooperate with other neighboring communities and work with a regional emergency management agency. The emergency management agencies interviewed in this study were all regional agencies that represented both small and midsize communities. The participants were identified in the

same way they were for the law enforcement agencies. The cooperating research partner emergency management agencies designated a representative with knowledge of their counterterrorism program as a potential participant. The participants were contacted by me and were given the confidential choice to participate or not. The choice to participate was not made known to the agencies. Four emergency management agencies consented to be interviewed. One emergency management agency represented a mountain region, and three were from urban front-range areas. All of the cooperating research partners and their designated participants voluntarily provided the data used in this study.

### **Data Collection**

The goal of this study was to identify counterterrorism strategies and techniques used by small and midsize law enforcement and emergency management agencies to prevent terrorism incidents in their communities. I interviewed 10 participants from 10 different cooperating partner agencies. The data were collected by conducting semistructured interviews with participants. Each participant was a representative from a cooperating partner agency and had knowledge of the cooperating partner's counterterrorism prevention program. The data were collected using similar steps: a meeting with the cooperating partner agency, a meeting and interview with the participant, and a follow-up interview with the participant. I contacted potential cooperating partner agencies in one of three ways: telephone, email, or face-to-face. In the first contact with the potential cooperating partner agencies, I introduced myself, briefly explained the study, and set up a meeting with willing agencies. One emergency management and four law enforcement agencies were first contacted by telephone. The

first contact for three of the emergency management agencies was done by email. The last two law enforcement agencies were first contacted by an unscheduled walk-in meeting. The meetings with the cooperating partner agencies were done either by phone or in person. The meetings with three of the emergency management and two of the law enforcement agencies were done over the telephone. A copy of the cooperating partner letter and participant consent form was sent to the agencies by electronic mail. The cooperating partner meetings for the remaining five agencies, one emergency management and four law enforcement, were done in person. I explained the nature of this study and what would be requested by me if the agency agreed to be a cooperating partner. When an agency agreed to be a cooperating partner, the letter of cooperation was explained, and the cooperating agency authority signed the letter. The electronic mail version of the letters was sent back to me signed over electronic mail. The individual from the cooperating partner agency who signed the letter identified the representative from the agency who had the knowledge about the counterterrorism program and would be the potential participant. In every cooperating partner agency, the designated participant was also the person who had authorized the agency to be a cooperating partner. The participant consent form was explained. When the participant voluntarily agreed to participate, the consent form was signed. Five participants (three emergency managers and two law enforcement participants) were contacted and interviewed over the telephone. These participants were sent a copy of the consent form over electronic mail and returned the signed copy of the consent form the same way. Four law enforcement participants and one emergency manager participant were interviewed face-to-face. The

participant interviews were done in locations that were comfortable and confidential for the participant.

The location of the five participants who were interviewed over the telephone was not known to me. Four of the other five participants were interviewed in a private office located at the cooperating partner agency's facility. One emergency manager participant chose a neutral meeting location away from the cooperating partner facility. Most of the participants provided the necessary data in one interview. Three participants (one emergency manager and two law enforcement participants) were contacted a second time for follow-up data. These follow-up interviews were voluntary and were done over the phone and electronic mail. The other participants did not require follow-up interviews.

The participant interviews varied in length of time based on the amount of the data each participant had about their agencies anti-terrorism counterterrorism strategies. The duration of the participant interviews was between one hour and three hours. I collected the data from each interview by recording the answers to the interview questions in the form of handwritten notes. These notes were not an exact transcription of the participant's answers, but were notes based on the pertinent information given. An unusual circumstance was surprisingly present during each of the participant interviews, each participant wanted to share specific names of suspects and locations of incidents as examples of the anti-terrorism counterterrorism strategies. The circumstances was handled by helping participants relay the information without the specific names or locations and when the circumstance occurred the data was recorded without the mention of the specific names and locations.



## **Data Analysis**

“The challenge with qualitative data analysis lies in making sense of massive amounts of data” (Patton, 2015). The data analysis for this study began the minute the data collected started. I began analysis by using the constant comparative analysis method. This method has researchers analyzing data continuously as it is being collected (Holton & Walsh, 2017). With every interview I conducted, I collected data and analyzed that data. The first two interviews were done in close time proximity to each other. The constant comparative data analysis was used after each interview. Some concepts and codes started to emerge as I was able to compare the data collected in those first interviews. “The purpose of constant comparative analysis is to see if the data support and continue to support emerging concepts” (Holton & Walsh, 2017). The constant comparative analysis method entails coding the data after each interview (Holton & Walsh, 2017). This open coding was done by analyzing data that was written in my field notes and writing memos about important codes that emerged. This open coding in the first interviews, allowed me to code many themes, some that later proved to be important and some that proved to be less important to this study. The important themes which were developed in the early interviews allowed me to start selective coding. Selective coding is where the researcher begins to delimit coding to the core themes and concepts (Holton & Walsh, 2017).

The first two interviews were done at two law enforcement agencies. These interviews produced similar information about the counterterrorism strategies that they are using. Some of the themes that emerged in the earlier interviews were; intelligence

gathering, protecting vulnerable targets, information sharing, deterrence, lack of resources, lack of training, and federal information sharing. As the interviews continued, four of these themes became reoccurring concepts that showed up in one form or another at all the agencies interviewed. The emergence of these concepts allowed me to selectively code and analyze the information. Every agency that participated in this study used these strategies as the main parts of their counterterrorism program. Different agencies reported differing amounts of success in using these strategies. The four anti-terrorism counterterrorism strategies which were identified as themes in this study and then emerged as core concepts, answer research question #1 (RQ1).

The four core concepts that are being used as counterterrorism prevention strategies emerged as themes from coded information that was analyzed from the descriptions of actions the participants identified as being used by their agencies. Each participant interviewed acknowledged personally using these strategies. The concept of intelligence gathering is used in two ways. First, agency personal were gathering intelligence on potential suspects for their own use. Officers obtain intelligence on members of their community everyday while working. The cooperating partner agencies in this study all have in place a system for officers to report intelligence. The intelligence is disseminated to all members of the agency for their safety and awareness. Second, intelligence gathered is used to create a plan of action. Most participants described specific incidents where intelligence gathered at their agency led directly to a prevention action taken by the agency. One participant described intelligence that they had developed about a domestic terrorist group that was going to attend a motorcycle rally

that was occurring in a neighboring jurisdiction. The intelligence gathered indicated that the terrorist group intended to instigate violence at the rally to cause fear for the surrounding communities. One participant from a small agency described this as “We make our own intelligence network”. The agency that developed the intelligence worked with other effected agencies to increase uniform police presence at the rally to act as a deterrence to the terror group’s violent plans. The terror group attended the rally but did not instigate a violent incident.

The core concept of deterrence can be manifested in a verity of ways. Most of the cooperating partner agencies used this prevention strategy either by increasing a police presence at threatened events or locations or by helping protect vulnerable targets. Three participants explained their use of deterrence as a repeat offender style strategy. The repeat offender strategy identifies dangerous suspects and through the use of surveillance follows them until they violate any law (Spelman, 1990). The suspect is arrested for the violation and stopped from doing a potential terrorist act. This method acts as a specific deterrence to the terror suspect and as a general deterrence to the other potential terrorist. In the cases that this strategy was used, a suspect had been incarcerated for a previous terrorism related offense. When the suspect was released from incarceration and returned to the community, they were being monitored. As intelligence emerged that they were still interested in committing a terrorist act, the repeat offened strategy was initiated, and the suspect was arrested. A participant from a small law enforcement agency recounted an incident where a terror suspect that had been in jail for threatening President Bush was released back to the community still threatening political violence. “We knew he was into

drugs, so we followed him until we could arrest him for a drug offense” the participant said. The agencies which use deterrence as a strategy, arrest the suspects for non-terrorism related offenses which stopped them from committing an act of terror and deterred others in the same situation.

The prevention strategy of protecting vulnerable targets was a core concept used by every cooperating partner agency. This concept, prevention strategy, is based on the idea that agency personnel will identify vulnerable potential terrorism targets and will work with them to increase security (Bjorgo, 2013). This core concept acts as deterrence to some suspects because the location is no longer vulnerable and aids in the apprehension of other suspects because of the increased security. The four emergency management participants use this strategy as their main strategy. The emergency managers spend a lot of their counterterrorism efforts working with public and private managers of locations to help them institute physical, electronic, and manpowered security measures. This counterterrorism strategy is consistent with the emergency management philosophy of mitigation (Haddow et al., 2014). One emergency management participant said, “I spend a lot of my time working on securing critical infrastructure”.

The last of the core concepts identified is information sharing. Information sharing is used by every cooperating partner agency in this study. Information sharing was used in three ways. Agencies that developed intelligence or information that was important to counterterrorism efforts shared the information with their own department personnel, usually in the form of oral and written briefings. All cooperating partners

shared information with neighboring agencies. The small and mid-sized agencies that acted as cooperating partners cited the limited department resources as a main reason they actively networked with other small and mid-sized agencies in their area. Information sharing with these neighboring agencies allows the agencies to share resources to address the situation. The information was also shared with the state and federal agencies. In Colorado, and other states, the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) has been renamed to Fusion Centers (DHS, 2020). The approach is the same, these Fusion Centers act as a clearing house for terror-related information. The Colorado fusion center trains officers from local agencies to act as Terrorism Liaison Officers (DHS, 2020). These Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO) act as the contact person to share terrorism-related information. All the cooperating partner agencies had shared information with a TLO. The core concepts identified during the participant interviews coincide with counterterrorism strategies that the cooperating partner agencies are currently using.

### **Evidence of Trustworthiness**

Constant comparison analysis, Triangulation, and Substantive validation were all used as strategies for study credibility. Prior to data collection through participant interviews, I did not have any information or bias about what strategies small and mid-sized law enforcement and emergency management agencies were using to prevent terrorism. Constant comparison analysis allowed me to evaluate and code counterterrorism strategies and additional related data into codes, themes, and core concepts from the first interviews until data collection completion. The constant comparison of data allowed me to identify data that matched patterns from other

participates and to find data that did not match the others. All the core concepts developed were clear because of the constant comparison of data as it was collected.

Triangulation of the data sources was achieved by the selection of the agencies used as cooperating partners. I started with a basic idea of types of different cooperation partner agencies that I wanted to contact. Demographic information like law enforcement or emergency management, small or midsized, urban or rural, was used to identify agencies to be contacted. After the first interviews, a different perspective became evident. In the Rocky Mountain region there is a difference between how agencies deal with emergency management and law enforcement based on whether they are located in the front range, the mountains, or on the western slope. These are area designations based on their relationship to the Rocky Mountains. Triangulation of sources allowed me to adjust to include the perspectives of agencies in all areas. The counterterrorism strategies used by small and midsized emergency management and law enforcement agencies is the area that is lacking in the current research and is what this study is investigating. There are research studies that have looked at preventing terrorism and terrorism impacts at local levels. These studies were used to provide Substantive validation to this study. As data was collected, I used knowledge gained from these other studies to provide an understanding of the data and its validity.

## **Results**

This research study is designed as a fact-finding mission to identify counterterrorism techniques and strategies being used by small and midsized emergency management and law enforcement agencies to prevent terrorist incidents. The study was

approached as an investigation, seeking answers to the research questions. During the investigation, new information was found related to why certain strategies were used or not used as part of agencies counterterrorism efforts. The use of constant comparison analysis allowed the coding of data, development of themes, and the creation of core concepts that resulted in answers to the research questions.

### **Research Question 1**

The first research question is: what anti-terrorism counterterrorism techniques and strategies are currently being used to interdict and prevent terrorism? The interviews with the participants resulted in; four themes, core concepts, strategies, which were being used to prevent terrorism. The strategies are; intelligence gathering, information sharing, protecting vulnerable targets, and deterrence. These strategies were used by every cooperating partner agency in similar ways. The identification of these strategies came as a result of coding the information and identifying themes from the participant's interviews and developing core concepts based on the themes.

**Core concept Theme 1.** Intelligence gathering was the main strategy used by the law enforcement agencies. Intelligence gathering can be done in both a formal and informal way. The law enforcement participants acknowledged informally gather intelligence as a regular part of their job. The informal intelligence gathering is done by recognizing suspects from past incidents and intelligence and making a mental note of what they had seen. This intelligence is passed along from officer to officer by word of mouth. The participants admitted that this type of informal intelligence gathering happens every day and is a valuable counter terrorism strategy. Formal intelligence gathering is

done using the agency's intelligence system. These formal systems are regulated by best practice procedures and case law. One midsized law enforcement agency participant said, "We have one investigator assigned to collect and evaluate intelligence". When intelligence is gathered it is put into an intelligence report and reviewed by the officer in charge of the intelligence system. Formal intelligence can only be kept if it is crime related. Intelligence stored in the official system can only be disseminated on a "need to know" basis. "Need to know" is based on law enforcement officers showing that the intelligence would be important to an ongoing situation or case. This formal intelligence can be passed along to other agencies using the same standard. All the participants identified gathering intelligence both formally and informally as a technique and strategy used as part of their counter terrorism efforts. One participant relayed an incident where individuals working for their agency had developed intelligence about a terror suspect and their plan to attack a local organization. "We found out where he was and what he wanted to do and made a plan to stop him" the participant said. The intelligence proved to be accurate and the agency was able to interdict the suspects plan and prevent the attack. Intelligence is a valuable strategy in a counter terror program. "An optimal outcome is to be able to anticipate the behavior of terrorist and thus to predict terrorist incidents" (Martin, 2017).

**Core concept Theme 2.** Information sharing, as a counter terrorism strategy, was done by all of the agencies by sharing information with other members of their own agencies and with outside agencies. Participants said that the information shared was valuable based on how specific the information was and how timely the information was.



All the participants gave examples of information sharing within their own departments leading to prevention efforts and arrests. One cooperating partner agency developed information related to an employee of a vulnerable target business that was planning to attack the business. “We found out she wanted to attack her place of business” the emergency management participant recounted. The information was shared with agency members and the attack plan was thwarted. Information sharing amongst outside agencies was used by all cooperating partner agencies with limited information flow between some agencies. The participants described information sharing with other local agencies as cooperative and equal. The biker rally example, earlier described, shows cooperation of specific and timely information leading to a positive prevention situation. When the information sharing was done with the state or federal agencies the information was more one sided. All participants had given information to the Terrorism Liaison Officer in their area to be processed and distributed by the Fusion Center. In every agency, except one, the Fusion Center never shared information back to the original agency. This lack of information sharing from the state and federal agencies led to an additional core concept that was identified during this study. All participants expressed the value of information sharing as part of their counter terrorism preventing strategy.

**Core concept Theme 3.** The criminology theory of Routine Activities theory describe that a crime, terrorist incident, cannot be committed without three elements: a motivated offender, a suitable target (victim), and a lack of a capable guardian (A. Walsh, 2015). The prevention strategy of protecting vulnerable targets addresses two of the three elements. The idea is to implement strategies and techniques that increase the risk of

detection and make it more difficult for motivated offenders to commit their crime (Bjorgo, 2013). All of the participants used this strategy as part of their prevention program. The participants and members of their agencies identified potential targets in their jurisdictions and worked with them to make them a less suitable target. The emergency management participants used this strategy as their main strategy. One emergency management participant described a vulnerable target that they worked with after the target had received a credible terrorist threat. "I did a risk assessment on the property" they said. The participant evaluated the business and recommended barriers at the entrances, increased video surveillance, employee screening, and other measures. The target business put into place the added security and have not had a terrorist attack.

**Core concept Theme 4.** The last strategy that the participants identified that they use is deterrence. This core concept included different techniques used by different cooperating partners based on the specific threat. The prevention strategy of deterrence was used only to address a specific person or event. The participants told me of individual incidents where intelligence gathering and information sharing lead to a situation that needed prevention. Based on the specific information, the members of the cooperating partner agencies developed a plan to deter the suspect from carrying out the terrorist act. In some cases, the strategy was to arrest the suspect for anything that they could prior to the terrorist act, including parole probation violations, witnessed new crimes therefore deterring them from the terrorist act. One participant described targeted interviews with the suspects that made them aware that their plan was known by the

agency. Another participant described adding additional security to a special event that was being targeted. The additional security deterred the suspects from their terrorist act.

The purpose of this study was not to gauge the effectiveness of the counter terrorism strategies or the amount of times each strategy was used, but instead this study was identifying which strategies and techniques were being used. Table 1 shows the different prevention strategies and how important the strategy is to the cooperating partner agencies overall counter terrorism efforts.

Table 1

*Counterterrorism Strategies Used*

Agency	Counterterrorism strategies
Law enforcement midsize	Intelligence gathering, main strategy, used to create plans that use target protection, deterrence and information sharing.
Law enforcement small	Intelligence and information sharing, main strategies. Sometimes use target protect and deterrence with other agencies assistance.
Law enforcement midsize	Intelligence, main strategy. Used to create action plan utilizing target protection and deterrence. Only used information sharing if it helped of affected another agency.
Emergency management midsize	Target protect, main strategy. Information sharing done with other emergency managers included intelligence and deterrence as part of the first two strategies
Law enforcement small	Intelligence, the main strategy. Uses intel to create plans utilizing deterrence and target protect. Shared information if it affected other agencies.
Emergency management midsize	Target protect, main strategy. Uses deterrence as part of target protection. Intelligence and information sharing with the Fusion center.
Emergency management midsize	Target protect, main strategy. Deterrence used as cyber security, Intelligence and information sharing with local agencies
Law enforcement small	Information sharing, main strategy. Used to create plan using deterrence. Target protect, intelligence only as parts of other plans
Emergency management midsize	Target protect, main strategy. Intelligence and information sharing done daily. Deterrence done with area law enforcement
Law enforcement midsize	Intelligence, main strategy. Information shared with neighboring agencies. Both are used to create plans using deterrence and target protection

**Research Question 2**

What techniques and strategies should local emergency management and law enforcement agencies be implementing to prevent and mitigate terrorism? The results of this study identified four counter terrorism strategies and techniques that were being used.

**Core concept Theme 5.** The study also identified a core concept that all agencies dealt with when deciding on how to prevent terrorism. This core concept is a limit on the resources, both manpower and funds, available to be used on counter terrorism efforts. Most of the counter terrorism techniques and strategies found in the literature that are being used or have been used either do not apply to small and midsized agencies or require additional manpower to dedicate to the technique. Large cities, states, and countries have adopted an anti-terrorism counter terrorism approach of changing laws to address terror related activities. The “Patriot Act” is an example of the United States federal government’s use of this counter terrorism technique (Martin, 2017) (Bullock, Haddow, Coppola, 2016). Small and midsized agencies could work with their local governments to change local ordinances, but by statute these ordinances cannot have strict penalties. The ordinances would not act to deter the criminal behavior. Another technique that is used as an anti-terrorism counter terrorism technique is to impose stricter punishment for terror related crimes. This is also not something small and midsized agencies have available to them.

A risk assessment model was purposed to identify and target potential terrorist in your jurisdiction. This model is based on an evaluation of risk factors that have been

identified as factors leading to the creation of a terrorist (Kebbell, & Porter, 2012). This counter terrorism technique allows agencies to identify potential terrorist and interdict them before they can carry out an attack (Kebbell, & Porter, 2012). The risk assessment model has been used in other areas of criminal justice, such as in Corrections, with positive results (Siegel, & Bartollas, 2014). This risk assessment model requires a manpower commitment to review intelligence, identify potential suspects, investigate the risk factors, and conduct an interdiction when appropriate. A participant from a midsized law enforcement agency said, “We have limited resources to activity work these cases alone”. These risk assessment techniques are conducted by officers assigned to do nothing but the assessments and related investigation (Siegel, & Bartollas, 2014). Small and midsized emergency management and law enforcement agencies do not have the manpower to dedicate officers to do risk assessment investigations.

Another anti-terrorism counter terrorism technique that is similar to the risk assessment model is to try and reduce recruitment. This technique has been a mainstay in crime prevention for years. The idea is to change the social and economic factors that lead many, especially young adults, to associate with criminals and then commit crime themselves (Bjorgo, 2013). This crime prevention technique is being used to try and stop the recruitment of individuals to terrorist groups and causes. Small and midsized agencies do not have the resources to make the changes to the social and economic factors in their communities.

The last area found that is being used to fight terrorism is to rehabilitate terrorist who have been caught and convicted of criminal acts. Rehabilitation of terrorist and

criminals is usually met with skepticism. Does it work and at what cost? That is a question for other research. This technique is not applicable to emergency managers and law enforcement officers because they do not deal with the rehabilitation of convicted offenders.

### **Research Question 3**

This study is designed to find out what counter terrorism strategies and techniques are being used by small and mid-sized agencies. The third research question asks, how can these techniques and strategies be combined to produce a comprehensive anti-terrorism program that can be used at the local level? The techniques and strategies identified in this study can be separated into two categories, ongoing efforts and specific efforts. Ongoing efforts are strategies that agencies are involved in every day. Intelligence gathering and information sharing should be an ongoing counter terrorism strategy. Specific effort strategies are strategies that are used when a specific threat has been identified. The specific threat does not mean that an attack has been identified as emanate. It does mean that a person or group been identified as a possible threat. It can also be that a specific location has been identified as at risk of being attacked. These two categories of techniques and strategies can be used together as a counter terrorism anti-terrorism plan. Agencies that encourage ongoing intelligence gathering and then share that information with other agencies, can use that information to target specific individuals or groups to deter terrorist acts, and can work to strengthen vulnerable targets. The techniques and strategies that can be used to accomplish any of the four counter

terrorism strategies is broad in scope and can be individualize to each agency and the personal that they have available.

The last result that I found during this study was two core concepts that were not part of directly answering the research questions. The first core concept was the overwhelming limitations that were on small and midsized agencies because of lack of funding and limited manpower. These agencies do not have individuals that can be reassigned away from the basic day to day tasks to just work a counter terrorism strategy. The small and midsized agencies need their managers and officers working the normal job tasks and when they have time, they can work counter terrorism techniques. If actionable intelligence or information shared from another agency identifies a specific threat, then resources can temporarily be assigned to work that specific threat. These agencies are limited on what counter terrorism efforts they can participate in based on manpower and money.

**Core concept Theme 6.** The second core concept is an old story between local agencies and state and federal agencies. There is a lack of information sharing form the state and federal agencies to the local agencies. All of the participants said that they have sent information to the state and federal Fusion Center and have not received information back. One participant recalled a terror suspect that they had given information to the Fusion Center about and the federal agency did not even advise the local agency that they had come into the jurisdiction and arrested the suspect. The local agency had to hear about the arrest in their town from a citizen. Another participant described a terrorist that was on the active watch list moving into their jurisdiction and being watched by state and



federal officers and never being told that the suspect was living there. One participant had an example of an incident where the state and federal officers coordinated an operation in their jurisdiction and included the local agency in the operation from the beginning. The majority of the cooperation partner agencies believe that the information flow from the federal and state agencies was non-existent. “We send stuff to them and get nothing in return” one midsized agency participant said. The participants said that when they did ever get information from the Fusion Center is was not specific enough to that action on, but instead was more like a newsletter with only generic information.

### **Summary**

The data collection I conducted using the constant comparison approach produced codes and themes that led to four core concepts related to counter terrorism strategies and techniques being used by the cooperating partner agencies. The data also showed two other core concepts related to the limitations that small and midsized emergency management and law enforcement agencies work under in their efforts to address terrorism. The core concepts that I identified from the data, provided the results that answered the research questions. The results I obtained will allow certain conclusions to be drawn and recommendations to be made that will help small and midsized emergency management and law enforcement agencies to better address the threat of terrorism in their communities.

## Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

When terrorist attacked Orlando, Florida; Chattanooga, Tennessee; and San Bernardino, California, the first evaluation of the incidents was based on the response from the local emergency management and law enforcement agencies. The focus on those incidents would eventually turn to what could have been done to prevent them. For small and midsize agencies, the existing literature on prevention strategies and techniques is lacking. The current study's purpose was to identify counterterrorism strategies and techniques that are being used by small and midsize emergency management and law enforcement agencies. I conducted a qualitative study with a grounded theory approach including semistructured interviews with participants from small and midsize emergency management and law enforcement agencies in the Rocky Mountain region of the United States. By identifying the counterterrorism strategies and techniques some small and midsize agencies are using, and by disseminating the information to other agencies, I hoped to help small and midsize emergency management and law enforcement agencies prevent terrorist incidents in their communities. This study was conducted to provide tools to small and midsize communities so that they can be safer.

I found four counterterrorism prevention strategies and techniques being used by the cooperating partner emergency management and law enforcement agencies: intelligence gathering, information sharing, protecting vulnerable targets, and deterrence. Each of these strategies and techniques were used by all of the cooperating partner agencies that participated in the study. Each of the participating agencies had examples of how they used the strategies and techniques to prevent incidents, which made their

communities safer. I also found two other important findings that were not counterterrorism strategies or techniques during the data collection. Lack of information sharing by state and federal agencies and the impact of limited resources available to small and midsize agencies were present and affected all of the cooperating partner agencies. The lack of information sharing from state and federal agencies is a persistent theme found throughout the recent history of terrorist incidents in the United States.

### **Interpretation of the Findings**

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001, the federal government created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2017). The DHS added terrorist attacks as one of the threats and hazards that the emergency management and law enforcement communities must deal with (D. W. Walsh et al., 2012). The DHS also adopted a bottom-up approach to dealing with threats and hazards (D. W. Walsh et al., 2012). This approach indicated that when a threat or hazard appears, it is the responsibility of the local emergency management and law enforcement agencies to deal with it (D. W. Walsh et al., 2012). If an incident demands more resources than the local emergency management and law enforcement agencies have, then the local agencies must ask for state and federal help before they can assist (D. W. Walsh et al., 2012). The federal government made dealing with terrorism a local problem, yet they provided limited direction on how to do that. The federal government through the CDP (2002) and the EMI provides training for local emergency management and law enforcement personnel (FEMA, 2018). The CDP and EMI training, along with the DHS Federal Response Plan, describe the counterterrorism prevention plan for local

emergency managers and law enforcement officers as one of gathering intelligence and sharing the information with the federal agencies (DHS, 2017).

The results of the current study indicated that local emergency managers and law enforcement officers are using four counter terrorism strategies and techniques to deal with the threat of a terrorist incident occurring in their communities. One of the strategies and techniques is intelligence gathering. Intelligence gathering has always been part of law enforcement and emergency management. The local agencies obtain intelligence every day while conducting their daily business. The local managers and officers hear and see things that constitute intelligence while they are working with members of the community. In some cases, a confidential informant will provide intelligence on potential threats or hazards to the community. The state and federal government's idea about intelligence gathering related to terrorism is to pass it along to the state and federal agencies and let them deal with it (DHS, 2017). The bottom-up approach identified in the National Response Plan would indicate that acting on intelligence gathered about potential terrorism at the local level is the local emergency management and law enforcement agencies' responsibility until it becomes bigger than their local resources can handle. All of the cooperating partner agencies have a system in place to train managers and officers on gathering intelligence and have someone who evaluates the intelligence gathered. The cooperating partner agencies have used intelligence that was gathered to successfully prevent incidents from happening. The effective gathering of intelligence is the basis for the use of two other counterterrorism strategies that are being used: protecting vulnerable targets and deterrence. All counterterrorism efforts at the

local level begin with intelligence gathered by the local agencies. Most of the cooperating partner agencies in this study responded to gathered intelligence by first sharing the information with other members of their agency, then neighboring agencies, and if necessary with the regional Fusion Center.

The value of intelligence is based on what actions can be done because of the information. Local emergency management and law enforcement agencies use the intelligence information as a starting point to create a prevention plan. The cooperating partner agencies gave me examples of how intelligence information was used to make a plan that they believe prevented an incident from occurring. The participants divided information sharing into three categories: agency, neighboring agencies, and state and federal agencies. All of the participants were involved in information sharing in each of the above categories. Information shared inside their agency was the most common and took place on a daily basis. Interagency memos, emails, shift briefings, and word of mouth were all used to pass along intelligence information. The participants were involved in cases in which intelligence information was used to start an investigation into a threat against an event, person, or vulnerable target. This information was shared with the agencies that were also affected by the threat. In some cases, the neighboring agencies worked together to mitigate the threat. The participants passed along information to the state and federal agencies through the regional Fusion Center on a regular basis. In only one cooperating partner agency did the state and federal agencies work with the local agency to investigate the threat and execute a plan to prevent it. This state and federal cooperation occurred one time with one of the partner agencies and had not occurred any

other time. In four cases that participants remembered, state and federal agencies were given information that they investigated and took action on in the local agencies' jurisdiction without contacting the local agency. In one case, members of the federal agency made an arrest of a terror suspect based on information shared from the local agency and never contacted them to let them know what was going on. The participants had numerous examples of successful information sharing within their agencies and with neighboring agencies. The prevention plan that was executed by five agencies, based on information developed by one cooperating partner agency and shared to the others, to prevent terrorist violence at a biker rally was a great example of how small and midsize agencies shared information that led to a prevention strategy that worked. The participants said that intelligence gathering leads to information that can be shared, which allows them to use other counterterrorism strategies and techniques to prevent incidents. The participants gave examples of the information shared that were threats to physical targets. The action plan used in these cases was to work with the target to help protect it.

The concept of protecting vulnerable targets goes back to the beginning of modern emergency management. In 1979 a presidential executive order created FEMA (Canton, 2007). FEMA adopted an emergency management approach called the all-hazards approach (Canton, 2007). This all-hazards approach separates emergency management into sections. One of the sections is mitigation. Mitigation is "a sustained action to reduce or eliminate the risks to people and property from such hazards and their effect" (Haddow et al., 2014, p. 72). Protecting vulnerable targets as a counterterrorism strategy falls under the mitigation area of emergency management and has also been used

as a crime prevention technique. The literature reviewed for this study indicated that protecting vulnerable targets is both a crime prevention and emergency management strategy (Bjorgo, 2013; Haddow et al., 2014). The criminology theory of routine activities is considered the foundation of modern crime prevention (A. Walsh, 2015). One of the main tenants of routine activities theory is that crime will not be committed if there is a capable guardian present (A. Walsh, 2015). In the current study context, the capable guardian is the security around the vulnerable target. All of the participants identified using this strategy. In most cases, the participants used this strategy by working with potential targets to increase their physical security including barriers, guarded checkpoints, cameras, and alarms. In some cases, the participants helped to increase procedures to better control individuals who were at their location. In one incident a credible threat was identified to a local church. The participant and other members of the agency arranged for a uniformed police presence at the location until the threat was over. All of the participants had numerous examples of when they used this technique to protect vulnerable targets in their communities. The participants used this strategy and technique in response to specific threats or to secure vulnerable targets to deter incidents from occurring.

The last counterterrorism strategy that was identified in this study was deterrence. As data were being coded, I noticed each of the participants describing incidents in which they used intelligence information and then took action to stop a terrorist incident. In many of the cases, the suspect or suspects were not arrested for terrorism. The participants arrested them for other non-terrorism-related crimes. In some cases, arrests

were not made, but actions were put in place that deterred the suspect from continuing with the terrorist incident. Deterrence in this study refers to all actions taken by members of the cooperating partner emergency management and law enforcement agencies to stop or deter the terrorist incident from occurring. One participant had been given information from a neighboring agency about a suspected terrorist living in their jurisdiction. The shared information indicated that the suspect was planning to attack local politicians. The participant and their agency used a risk assessment model, similar to what was presented in the literature review, to assess the real danger of the suspect and then used a repeat offender strategy to surveil and arrest the suspect. The repeat offender strategy was used to stop or deter suspects from committing terrorist incidents by indicting them before they could carry out the incident. Some participants said that they would increase police presence at targeted events to deter the terrorist incident. One participant contacted the individual that was the target and encouraged them not to attend an event. The participant also contacted the suspect and let them know that the target was not going to be there. Neither the target nor the suspect attended the event and there were no incidents. Each of the participants had cases where they used intelligence information that was developed by their agency or shared from a neighboring agency, to take action against an individual or group that stopped a suspected incident from occurring. This core concept, counterterrorism strategy includes all of the action plans that are being used to prevent incidents from occurring.

Two other core concepts emerged during this study, limitations based on lack of resources and lack of information sharing from the state and federal agencies. The basic



concept of the bottom up philosophy in emergency management is that all hazards are a local situation until they become more than that agency can handle on their own (D.W. Walsh et al., 2012). A core concept that emerged at every cooperating partner agency was the limitations on what they could investigate and what preventative measures they could employ. Each partner agency had a case that started local but had to be referred to the state or federal agencies because of lack of resources to follow up on. One participant told of an incident that they had developed intelligence on a local suspect and had made a plan on how to interdict the suspect but did not have the local resources to execute the plan. The participant contacted the Fusion Center with all of the information including their plan and never heard another word until the suspect was arrested. Most of the participants acknowledged that they have the knowledge on how to work these counterterrorism cases, but that the agencies lack money, manpower, and equipment. A small or midsized agency must rely on neighboring agencies or state and federal agencies to get the resources necessary to execute some counterterrorism strategies. This lack of resources was identified as a factor on what counterterrorism strategies were considered applicable to each of the participants and their agencies. Most of the literature acknowledges that dealing with terrorism is a local situation, but none of the literature explains how small and midsized agencies are going to do it with limited resources.

The 9/11 commission identified many factors that contributed to the U.S. intelligence agencies, emergency management agencies and law enforcement agencies not being able to stop the terrorist attacks that occurred on the day (Martin, 2017). One of the biggest factors was the lack of information sharing between local, state, and federal

agencies (Martin, 2017). In many terrorist incidents since 9/11, federal agencies had intelligence information about the suspects that was not shared with local agencies prior to the incident (Martin, 2017). The last core concept was found in the literature and still appears to exist. All of the participants had stories of local suspects that were the object of a counterterrorism investigation in which the federal agencies involved did not share information. In many of the participant's examples, suspects were arrested by the federal agency in the local jurisdiction without advising the local agencies that they were conducting an operation. The participants all had sent information to the Fusion Center and in every case, except one, never received information back. The participants all said that occasionally their department would receive a newsletter type communication from the fusion center containing generic information that was not worth much. The literature is full of studies and documentation of the lack of information sharing from federal agencies to the local agencies. The participants identified that it is still a problem and, in some cases, worked with other neighboring local agencies instead of trying to work with the federal agencies. I found while collecting the data that with the small and midsized agencies that participated information sharing from the federal agencies to the local agencies was still a problem.

### **Limitations of the Study**

The design and approach, Qualitative design, Grounded Theory approach, use in this study, allowed me to look at this study as an investigation or a fact-finding mission. One of the limitations that can occur in any investigation is the attitude of the investigator, researcher that they already know what happened. Through experience of

being involved in a similar situation the researcher, investigator jumps to the conclusion about what happened. In this study, I had no preconceived notions on the counterterrorism strategies and techniques that were being used by small and midsized agencies. The current lack of information on this subject allowed me to view the data collected without any idea of what counterterrorism strategies are being used. The data was collected by conducting semi-structured interviews. I had some broad open-ended questions that addressed the topic. The rest of the interview questions were driven by the participants. The data collected was analyzed using a constant comparison methodology. After each interview, I coded the main points and began to identify reoccurring themes. These codes, themes, and core concepts were all developed based on the interview information not by any preconceived ideas. The one core concept that emerged that did not surprise me, was the concept of the lack of information sharing from the state and federal agencies to the small and midsized agencies. The existing literature and my experiences had identified this core concept as a problem in past incidents. The data collected about this core concept was driven by the participants and their experiences. The four counterterrorism strategies and two other core concepts that emerged were being used by all of the cooperating partner agencies. Saturation was reached when the same four strategies and two concepts were being used by each new partner agency interviewed.

### **Recommendations**

Terrorism prevention is a role that the emergency management and law enforcement agencies that participated in this study work on regularly. They gather

intelligence daily and when a credible threat is identified they make a plan to try and prevent it from occurring. The current literature shows that the counterterrorism training resources available to small and midsized agencies is limited to a small portion of other training and consists only of instruction on information sharing with the federal agencies. The training offered is comprehensive in how to prepare and respond to a terrorist incident but lacks any meaningful counterterrorism prevention instruction. A recommendation is that researchers develop a training program geared only toward counterterrorism strategies and techniques for small and midsized agencies offered for free through the current training system. Research would evaluate the interest from agencies, the value of the training to the agencies, and use of the information by the agencies after the training.

The participants representing the cooperating partner agencies identified some strategies that they currently employ to prevent incidents from occurring. All the agencies were using the same four strategies identified as core concepts in this study. Do these strategies work? Are they effective in preventing terrorist incidents? Does the use of these strategies make these communities safer? The cooperating partner agency participants use individual cases as proof of the strategy's effectiveness. When a situation arises in their jurisdiction, they respond and use one or more of the strategies to address that situation. The cooperating partner agency's only gauge of whether the use of the strategy and technique was effective is did the suspected incident occur. A recommendation is to study the effectiveness of these four strategies and techniques as individual strategies and as a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.

Another core concept identified during this study was the lack of information sharing from the state and federal agencies to the local small and mid-sized agencies. The literature is full of evaluations and after-action reports done after terrorist attacks occur. The findings in many of these evaluations and reports is that the federal agencies had intelligence information about the terrorist and or the attack and did not share the information with the local agencies. In the case of the Boston Marathon bombing the suspects were on the FBI terrorist watch list and the emergency management and law enforcement agencies in the Boston area were not notified (Lichtblan & Apuzzo, 2016). In the case of the San Bernardino California terrorist shooting, a husband and wife team kill 14 people and wound 22 at a business gathering (Cotter, 2016). In an after-action report made by the U.S. Department of Justice it was reported that federal agencies had information about the wife's illegal immigration status and credible threats that they made against the community (Brazier et al., 2016). This information was not shared with the local agencies (Brazier et al., 2016). In Orlando Florida, a terrorist shoots 102 people and kills 49 of them in an attack at a local night club (Straub et al., 2017). After the attack was over it was found that the FBI had been investigating the terrorist shooter for the past two years as a terrorist threat but did not share that information with the local agencies (Chappell, 2016). All of the participants in this study had cases where intelligence information was shared with the state and federal agencies through the Fusion Center and never heard anything back. In many of those cases the state and federal agencies worked the information without letting the local agency know. In some cases, the participants found out after the federal agencies took action in the local jurisdiction that the federal

agencies were working a terrorist threat. All the participants had examples of cases where the federal agencies had information about a suspect that was not shared and was only given to the local agencies after a suspect was arrested. A recommendation is that research be conducted on whether terrorist threat intelligence information is being shared from the state and federal agencies to local agencies. The research could separate the results based on the size of the local agencies. All of these recommendations are based on the gap in the literature and the results of this study. The findings of these recommended studies could provide important contributions to this area of community safety.

### **Implications**

The U.S Constitution gives the responsibility of providing us with public health and safety to the individual states (Haddow et al., 2014). In 2002, the DHS was created in direct response to the terrorist attacks that took place on 9/11 (Bullock et al., 2016). DHS classified terrorist acts as hazards and the responsibility of the local emergency management and law enforcement agencies (Bullock et al., 2016). Terrorism as defined is “the threaten or actual use of force or violence against human or property targets...” (Martin, 2017, p 7). It is the responsibility of the local emergency management and law enforcement agencies to keep their communities safe from terrorism. Small and midsized agencies have limited budgets and manpower to address terrorism in their communities, but it is still their responsibility. This study answered the question of how these small and midsized emergency management and law enforcement agencies were trying to prevent terrorist incidents and keep their communities safe from terrorism. The cooperating partner agencies are using the counterterrorism strategies and techniques that are

identified in this study to fulfill their duty of keeping their communities safe from terrorist incidents. The experience of these cooperating partner agencies on the use of these counterterrorism strategies and techniques can act as a blueprint for other small and midsized agencies to use to better protect their communities. This study also found that there is still a problem with the intelligence information sharing from the state and federal agencies to the local agencies. This finding should spur additional research studies to be done on the information sharing problem. This study can act as a catalyst to other small and midsized emergency management and law enforcement agencies to explore other counterterrorism strategies and techniques that they use, even with their resource limitations. This study did not test the effectiveness of the use of these counterterrorism strategies and techniques, but all of the participants had anecdotal evidence of individual cases where the use of these strategies and techniques made their communities safer. One of the goals of the study was to find out if these small and midsized agencies were using any counterterrorism strategies and techniques. The results showed that all of the cooperating partner agencies were engaged in some counterterrorism efforts. The hope is that small and midsized agencies will read this study and start their own counterterrorism program. If the small and midsized agencies were already participating in counterterrorism strategies, this study can provide information about additional techniques and strategies that can help them prevent terrorism in their communities.

### **Conclusion**

The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001 ushered in a new era of anti-terrorism counterterrorism thinking. There have been many terrorist attacks on the

U.S. soil since September 11, 2001 and some of those attacks have occurred in small and midsized communities. The first to respond is the local agencies. Changes in the federal agencies' rules related to terrorism have made terrorist incidents a hazard that should be prevented, prepared for, responded to, recovered from, and mitigated at the local level. This change puts local emergency management and law enforcement agencies on the front line on how to deal with terrorism. Small and midsized agencies have limited budgets and manpower to deal with these responsibilities. The results of this study show some counterterrorism strategies and techniques that these small and midsized agencies are using to prevent terrorist incidents in their communities. Every small and midsized emergency management and law enforcement agency has the responsibility to prevent terrorist incidents in their jurisdiction, now they have some strategies and techniques that may help them accomplish that goal. This study's results showed that there is an ongoing problem with the information sharing from the state and federal agencies to the small and midsized agencies. This should inspire new research into this information sharing situation. I found that all of the partner agencies that participated in this study were using; intelligence gathering, information sharing, vulnerable target protection, and deterrence as counterterrorism strategies and techniques to prevent terrorist incidents in their communities. All small and midsized emergency management and law enforcement agencies could use these strategies and techniques to prevent terrorism. It is exciting to see that small and midsized emergency management and law enforcement agencies are engaged in and actively working anti-terrorism counter terrorism strategies to prevent incidents and make their communities safe.



## References

- Barkan, S. (2018). *Criminology: A sociological understanding* (7<sup>th</sup> ed). New York, NY: Pearson Education Inc..
- Bauter, A. (2016). Boston Marathon 2016: Security changes you can see all around. Retrieved from <https://patch.com/.../boston-marathon-2016-security-changes-you-cant-see-all-around>.
- Bean, H. (2009). Exploring the relationship between homeland security information sharing & local emergency preparedness. *Homeland Security Affairs*, 5(2).
- Bellavita, C. (2005). What is preventing homeland security? *Homeland Security Affairs*, 1(1).
- Benavente, M. C., & Porto, T. M. (2014). Combating the terrorism of ETA with the penal model. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 62(3), 269-288. doi:10.1007/s10611-013-9465-7
- Bjorgo, T. (2013). *Strategies for preventing terrorism*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bodrero, D. D. (2002). Law enforcement's new challenges to investigate, interdict, and prevent terrorism. *Police Chief*, 69(2), 41-49.
- Braziel, R., Straub, F., Watson, G., & Hoops, R. (2016). Bringing calm to chaos: A critical incident review. Retrieved from <https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/file/891996/download>
- Bullock, J. A., Haddow, G. D., & Coppola, D. P. (2016). *Introduction to homeland security* (5th ed). Waltham, MA: Elsevier Inc.

- Calamur, K., Koren, M., & Ford, M. (2015, December 3). What happened in the San Bernardino shooting. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from [https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/...shooter...san\\_bernardino](https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/...shooter...san_bernardino).
- Canton, L. G. (2007). *Emergency management: Concepts and strategies for effective programs*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons Inc.
- Carson, J. V. (2014). Counterterrorism and radical eco-groups: A context for exploring the series hazard model. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 30(3), 485-504. doi:10.1007/s10940-013-9211-4
- Carter, D. L., & Carter, J. G. (2009). Intelligence led police: Conceptual and functional considerations for public policy. *Criminal Justice Policy Review*, 20(3). doi:10.1177/0887403408327381
- Census. (2012). U.S. Census data. Retrieved from <http://www.census.gov>
- Center for Domestic Preparedness. (2002) Training. Retrieved from <http://www.cdp.dhs.gov>
- Chapman, R., Baker, S., Bezdikian, V., Cammarata, D., Cohen, D., Leach, N., ... Varano, R. (2002). Local law enforcement responds to terrorism lessons in prevention and preparedness. COPS Innovations: A closer look. Washington. DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
- Chappell, B. (2016). Orlando gunman had been taken off watch list. Retrieved from: <https://www.npr.org/.../orlando-gunman-had-been-taken-off-watch-list-fbi-director-com>.
- Cotter, H. R. (2016). Lessons from the San Bernardino terror attack timeline. Retrieved

from <https://www.policeone.com/.../245726006->.

Creswell, J. W. (2013). *Qualitative inquiry & research design: Choosing among five approaches* (3rd ed.) Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Creswell, J. W. (2014). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications

Dearstyne, B. W. (2005). Fighting terrorism, making war: Critical insights in the management of information and intelligence. *Government information quarterly*, 22(2), 170-186.

Dempsey, J. S., & Frost, L. S. (2014). *An Introduction to Policing*. 7<sup>th</sup> ed. Clifton Park, NY. Delmar Cengage Learning.

Department of Homeland Security. (2013). *National Prevention Framework*. Retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov>.

Department of Homeland Security. (2016). Preventing Terrorism. Retrieved form <http://www.dhs.gov/topics/preventingterrorism>.

Department of Homeland Security. (2017). Creation of the Department. Retrieved form <http://www.dhs.gov/creation>.

Department of Homeland Security. (2018). Grant Programs. Retrieved form <http://www.dhs.gov/keywords/grantprograms>.

Docobo, J. (2005). Community policing as the primary prevention strategy for homeland security at the local law enforcement level. *Homeland Security Affairs*, 1(1)  
Retrieved from  
<http://ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1265>

818404?accountid=14872.

DOJ OIG. (2014) Unclassified Summary of Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings. Prepared by the Inspectors General of the: Intelligence Community, CIA, DOJ, DHS. Washington DC.

Ellis, R, Fantz, A, Karimi, F, & McLaughlin, E. (in press). Orlando Shooting: 49 Killed, Shooting Pledged ISIS Allegiance. Retrieved from <http://www.cnn.com>.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2018). Training, Grant Programs. Retrieved from <http://www.fema.gov/grant-programs-directorate>.

Geary, W. R. (2000). The creation of RICO: Law as a knowledge diffusion process. *Crime, law and social change*, 33(4), 329-367.

Greenfield, R. (2013). Why Hasn't the FBI's Facial Recognition Technology Found the Boston... *The Atlantic*, Apr 18, 2013. Retrieved from <https://www.theatlantic.com/.../archive/...facial-recognition...boston-bombing/316131/>.

Haddow, G. D., Bullock, J. A., & Coppola, D. P. (2014). *Introduction to Emergency Management*. 5th ed. Elsevier Inc. Waltham. MA. Reprinted by Butterworth-Heinemann.

Hess, K. M., & Orthmann, C. H. (2010). *Criminal Investigation*. 9<sup>th</sup> ed. Clifton Park. NY. Delmar Cengage Learning.

Holton, J. A., & Walsh, E. (2017). *Classic Grounded Theory: Applications With Qualitative & Quantitative Data*. Thousand Oaks. CA. Sage Publications Inc.

Inbau, F. Reid, J. Buckley, J. & Jayne, B. (2011). *Criminal Interrogations and*

*Confessions*. 5<sup>th</sup> ed. Burlington, MA. Jones & Bartlett Publishers.

- Karimi, F., Shoichet, C., & Ford, D. (in press). ISIS: San Bernardino Shooters Planned Attack, FBI Says. Retrieved from <http://www.cnn.com>.
- Kebbell, M. R., & Porter, L. (2012). An intelligence assessment framework for identifying individuals at risk of committing acts of violent extremism against the west. *Security Journal*, 25(3), 212-228. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/sj.2011.19>.
- Kellman, B. (2001). Biological terrorism: Legal measures for preventing catastrophe. *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy*, 24(2), 417-488. Retrieved from <http://ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/235187450?accountid=14872>.
- Keneally, M., & Shapiro, E. (2015). Detailed San Bernardino Documents Reveal Timeline. *ABC News*. Retrieved from <https://abcnews.go.com/US/detailed-san-bernardino...reveal-timeline-shooter.../story?>
- Kingdon, J. W. (2003). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*. New York, NY. Longman Pub Group.
- Klinger, D. A., & Grossman, D. (2002). Who should deal with foreign terrorists on U.S. soil?: Socio-legal consequences of september 11 and the ongoing threat of terrorist attacks in America. *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy*, 25(2), 815-834. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/docview/235188434?accountid=14872>.
- Lambert, D. E. (2018). Addressing Challenges to Homeland Security Information

- Sharing in American Policing: Using Kotter's Leading Change Model. *Criminal Justice Policy Review*, 29. Doi: 10.1177/0887403418786555.
- Larkin, P. J., J. R. (2013). Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization. *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy*, 36(2), 715-793. Retrieved from <http://ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1350374089?accountid=14872>.
- Lichtblau, E., Apuzzo, M. (2016, June 13). Orlando Gunman Was on Terror Watchlist, F.B.I. Director Says. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com>.
- Lotan, G. T., Minshew, C., Lafferty, M. & Gibson, A. (2017). Orlando nightclub shooting: Timeline of events inside Pulse. Orlando Sentinel. May 31, 2017. Retrieved from: <https://www.orlandosentinel.com/...orlando-nightclub-shooting/os-orlando-pulse-nightclub-s...>
- Majchrzak, A., Markus, M. L., & Wareham, J. (2014). Special Issue—Call for Papers—ICT & societal challenges. *MIS Quarterly*, 1-3. Retrieved from <http://www.waldenulibrary.org>.
- Manski, C. F. (2011). Policy choice with partial knowledge of policy effectiveness. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 7(2), 111-125. doi:<http://dx.doi.org.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/10.1007/s11292-010-9116->
- Maslen, C. (1996). "Testing the plan is more important than the plan itself". *Information Management & Computer Security*, 4(3), 26-29. Retrieved from <https://ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login?url=https://search-proquest->

com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/docview/212365276?accountid=14872.

Martin, G. (2017). *Essentials of terrorism: Concepts and controversies*. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks. CA. Sage Publications Inc.

McDavid, J. C., Huse, I., & Hawthorn, L. R. L. (2013). *Program Evaluation and Performance Measurement: An Introduction to Practice*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks. CA. Sage Publications Inc.

McGarrell, E. F., Freilich, J. D., & Chermak, S. (2007). Intelligence-Led Policing: As a Framework for Responding to Terrorism. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 23(2). sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1043986207301363.

Meyer, S. (2013). Impeding lone-wolf attacks: Lessons derived from the 2011 norway attacks. *Crime Science*, 2(1), 1-13. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/2193-7680-2-7.

Morrison, S., & O'Leary, E. (2015). Timeline of Boston Marathon Bombing Events. *Boston.com*, Jan 5, 2015. Retrieved from <https://www.boston.com/news/local.../timeline-of-boston-marathon-bombing-events>.

Mueller, J. (2017). *Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases*. Ohio State University, Political Science. Columbus OH.

Nikolova, I. (2011). Computer assisted exercises management environment for civil security. *Information & Security*, 27(1), 147-159. Retrieved from <https://ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/docview/1017670797?accountid=14872>.

NIMS. (2002). National Incident Management System, Federal Emergency Management

Agency. Retrieved from: <http://www.fema.gov>.

Nowlin, M. C. (2011). Theories of the policy process: State of the research and emerging trends. *Policy Studies Journal*, 39, 41-60. Retrieved from <http://ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/859875297?accountid=14872>.

Patton, M. Q. (2015). *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods*. 4<sup>th</sup> ed. Thousand Oaks, CA. Sage Publications Inc.

Peak, K. J., & Sousa, W. H. (2018). *Policing America: Challenges and Best Practices*. 9<sup>th</sup> ed. New York, NY. Pearson Education Inc.

Peek-asa, C., Casteel, C., Rugala, E., Holbrook, C., Bixler, D., & Ramirez, M. (2017). The threat management assessment and response model: A conceptual plan for threat management and training. *Security Journal*, 30(3), 940-950. doi:<http://dx.doi.org.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/10.1057/sj.2015.14>.

Perera, D. (2013). Boston Police Commissioner Decries Lack of Info Sharing From Feds. *Fierce Homeland Security*, Jul 14, 2013.

Pridemore, W. A., Chamlin, M. B., & Trahan, A. (2008). A test of competing hypotheses about homicide following terrorist attacks: An interrupted time series analysis of september 11 and oklahoma city. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 24(4), 381-396. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10940-008-9052-8>.

Reaves, B. A. (2015). Local Police Departments: 2013, Personnel, Policies, and Practices. *Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin*, May 2015. Retrieved from: <https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf>.



- Religion of Peace (ROP). (2016). *Jihad Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.religionofpeace.com>.
- Rudestam, K. E., & Newton, R. R. (2015). *Surviving Your Dissertation: A Comprehensive Guide to Content and Process*. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks. CA. Sage Publications Inc.
- Sabatier, P. A., Weible, C. M. (2014). *Theories of the Policy Process*. 3rd ed. Boulder. CO. Westview Press.
- Schlinder, J. R. (2015). The Intelligence Lessons of San Bernardino. *Observer*. Dec 14, 2015. Retrieved from <http://www.observer.com/2015/12/>.
- Spelman, W. (1990). Repeat Offender Programs for Law Enforcement. *Police Executive Research Forum*. Washington DC. Retrieved from <https://vitalsource.com>.
- Simeone, M. (2008). Integrating virtual public-private partnerships into local law enforcement for enhanced intelligence-led policing. *Homeland Security Affairs*, 4. Retrieved from <http://ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1268730232?accountid=14872>.
- Straub, F., Cambria, J., Castor, J., Gorban, B., Meade, B., Waltemeyer, D., & Zeunik, J. (2017). Rescue, Response, and Resilience: A Critical Incident Review of the Orlando Public Safety Response to the Attack on the Pulse Nightclub. Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Department of Justice. Washington. DC.
- Sylves, R. (2015). *Disaster Policy & Politics: Emergency Management and Homeland Security*. Thousand Oaks. CA. Sage Publications Inc.

- Thacher, D. (2005). The local role in homeland security. *Law & Society Review*, 39(3), 635-676. Retrieved from <https://ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/docview/226924932?accountid=14872>.
- USAToday editors. (2017). Deadly car attack, violent clashes in Charlottesville: What we know now. Retrieved from: <http://www.usatoday.com>.
- Walden University, School of Public Policy and Administration. (2014). *Theoretical frameworks in SPPA*. Retrieved from <http://www.waldenulibrary.org>. Org.
- Walden University. (2010). *Research design: Some thoughts on the research process*. Retrieved from <http://www.waldenulibrary.org>.
- Walsh, A. (2015). *Criminology: The Essentials*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks. CA. Sage Publications Inc.
- Walsh, D. W., Christen, H. T., Callsen, C. E., Miller, G. T., Maniscalco, P. M., Lord, G. C., & Dolan, N. J. (2012). *National Incident Management System: Principles and Practice*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Sudbury. NJ. Jones Bartlett Learning.
- White, R. & Collins, K. (2006). *The United States Department of Homeland Security: An Overview*. Boston. Ma. Pearson Custom Publishing.
- Wood, G. (2015). What ISIS really wants. *The Atlantic*, 315(2), 78-94. Retrieved from <http://theatlantic.com>.