

2020

Integrated Threat Management: An Alternative Approach to Regional Security System for ECOWAS

Farouck Mohammed-Bashar
Walden University

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations>



Part of the [Public Administration Commons](#), and the [Public Policy Commons](#)

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.

Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by

Farouck Mohammed-Bashar

has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by
the review committee have been made.

Review Committee

Dr. Marcel Kitissou, Committee Chairperson,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

Dr. Chizoba Madueke, Committee Member,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

Dr. Ian Cole, University Reviewer,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

Chief Academic Officer and Provost

Sue Subocz, Ph.D.

Walden University

2020

Abstract

Integrated Threat Management: An Alternative Approach to Regional Security System
for ECOWAS

by

Farouck Mohammed-Bashar

MPhil, Walden University, 2020

MS, Walden University, 2013

MA, University of Ghana, 2011

BA, University of Ghana, 2005

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

September 2020

Abstract

The onset of new and emerging threats to peace and security in West Africa has added another layer of threat to security in West Africa. There is a need for research on the interconnectedness among existing and new and emerging threats to security in the region. The purpose of this study was to explore the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS') approach to its regional security management strategy. The punctuated equilibrium theory and policy feedback theory were used to conceptualize the problem within the context of ECOWAS' policy inertia and the wide range of security and sociopolitical dynamics in the region. The research questions focused on assessing the effectiveness of ECOWAS' approach to security management in West Africa. The research was a qualitative exploratory case study based on a grounded theory design. Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to recruit 12 regional security experts from ECOWAS headquarters and regional peace and security institutions in Ghana and Nigeria. Data collection techniques included in-depth interviews and document analysis. The findings showed that the ECOWAS' security management strategy, which was effective during the internecine conflicts, was no longer successful with the advent of new and emerging threats to security in the region. Recommendations of this study include developing ECOWAS strategic concept for security management and drafting an ECOWAS framework for accountability. The study has implications for positive social change (e.g., improving perceptions of security among West African citizens) and policy making and professional practice (e.g., supporting an integrated conceptual approach to security management that is threat focused).

Integrated Threat Management: An Alternative Approach to Regional Security System

for ECOWAS

by

Farouck Mohammed-Bashar

MPhil, Walden University, 2020

MS, Walden University, 2013

MA, University of Ghana, 2011

BA, University of Ghana, 2005

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

September 2020

Dedication

I dedicate this study to my mother, Hajiya Hamamata Mohammed-Labbo, and my late father, Alhaji Ahmed Mohammed-Bashar, whose combined efforts and sacrifices saw me through my primary and secondary education. I also dedicate it to my wife Mariam Bashar, children, and siblings, whose family time was affected by this program. To my Ghana Military Academy intake mates, Major (Rtd.) Doctor Eugene Owusu-Afrifa and Colonel Doctor Timothy Baa-taa-banah, you were my sources of support and inspiration throughout this quest.

Acknowledgments

My utmost gratitude goes to the Almighty God for seeing me through this study. I am sincerely grateful to my committee chair, Dr. Marcel Kitissou, and committee member, Dr. Chizoba Madueke, for your invaluable guidance, mentorship, and strong resolve in navigating me through all the difficult moments I encountered in this journey. I thank Dr. Nafisa Mahama and Dr. Akorfa Ahiafor for your encouragement and assistance. I also acknowledge Dr. Emma Birikorang of Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Dr. Levinia Addae-Mensah from West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), and the military and civilian staff at the ECOWAS Commission for the support you provided during my data collection.

Table of Contents

List of Tables	v
List of Figures	vi
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study	1
Introduction	1
Background	2
Brief History of West Africa	4
Independent West Africa and the Vestiges of Colonialism	8
Formation of the Economic Community of West African States	9
ECOWAS Membership	10
ECOWAS Vision Aim and Objectives	12
ECOWAS Structure	13
Problem Statement	14
Purpose of the Study	16
Research Questions	16
Theoretical Foundation	17
Nature of the Study	18
Definitions	20
Assumptions	22
Scope and Delimitations	22
Limitations	23
Significance	24

Significance to Practice	25
Significance to Theory	25
Significance to Social Change	26
Summary and Transition	26
Chapter 2: Literature Review	28
Introduction.....	28
Literature Search Strategy	29
Theoretical Foundation	29
Literature Review Related to Key Variables and/or Concepts	31
Colonially Induced Identity Conflicts in West Africa	31
The Cold War and Peace and Security in West Africa	40
The Effects of the Post-September 11 Wars on Terror on Peace and Security in West Africa.....	46
ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture	49
Summary.....	57
Chapter 3: Research Method.....	59
Introduction.....	59
Research Design and Rationale	60
Role of the Researcher.....	61
Methodology	62
Participant Selection Logic	62
Instrumentation	64

Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection	66
Data Analysis Plan	67
Issues of Trustworthiness	67
Credibility	67
Transferability	68
Dependability	68
Confirmability	69
Ethical Procedures	69
Summary	71
Chapter 4: Results	72
Introduction.....	72
Setting	73
Demographics	73
Data Collection	76
Data Analysis	78
Evidence of Trustworthiness	81
Credibility	81
Transferability	82
Confirmability	82
Dependability	83
Results	83
Research Question 1	84

Research Question 2.....	92
Research Question 3.....	102
Summary.....	107
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations	110
Introduction.....	110
Interpretation of the Findings	111
Research Question 1.....	111
Research Question 2.....	116
Research Question 3.....	120
Limitations of the Study.....	122
Recommendations	123
Recommendations for Future Research.....	123
Recommendations for ECOWAS Headquarters.....	124
Implications	125
Implications for Social Change	125
Implications for Policy Making and Professional Practice.....	126
Summary.....	127
Conclusion	127
References.....	130
Appendix A: List of Acronyms	170
Appendix B: Invitation Letter to Participants.....	173

List of Tables

Table 1. Partitioned West African Ethnic Groups	8
Table 2. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents	75
Table 3. Summary of the Main Themes and Subthemes	80

List of Figures

Figure 1. Map showing how Africa was partitioned in the Berlin Conference, 1884-1885	6
Figure 2. Political map of ECOWAS countries	11
Figure 3. Map showing ECOWAS zones for Early Warning and Response Network	52

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Introduction

The security situation in West Africa keeps deteriorating. Both directly affected countries and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional organization with the remit for management for regional peace and security, are overwhelmed by the menace from terrorist actors and other entities. ECOWAS has, in the past, been successful in managing intrastate conflicts in the region through troop deployments and mediation (Akokpari, 2016).

However, with the inception of globalization and the post-September 11 world order, new and emerging security threats from terrorism, cybercrimes, and organized transnational and cross-border crimes have engulfed West Africa (Kieh & Kalu, 2013; Marc et al., 2015). Thus, the region faces two layers of security challenges. On one side are postcolonial and post-Cold War intrastate conflicts. On the other are new and emerging security threats instigated by globalization and September 11 that have, over time, intertwined and confounded the region's security threat variables (Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013).

ECOWAS, as the recognized regional institution with the mandate of ensuring regional peace and security, needs to have robust strategies to be effective (Akokpari, 2016; Marc et al., 2015). The main implication for social change for the study is the insight it provides on ECOWAS' effectiveness in ensuring regional peace and security. This knowledge may help policy makers and security professionals in developing a more cohesive approach to ensuring safety and security in the West Africa region. Another

impact this study may have is its replicability and adaptability by other regional organizations and national security institutions.

In this chapter, I provide a contextual overview of the geography and how the demography, history, and the political systems of West Africa have evolved. I reflect on the complex and buoyant social, political, commercial, and agricultural policy of indigenous West Africa, through the era of Trans-Atlantic trade and the partitioning of Africa. The discussion shows how these variables interrelate with world order and cataclysms to shape the region's troubling security landscape. The chapter also includes a discussion of ECOWAS' achievements and challenges and how it became a crucial player in the region's security management system. The chapter also includes the problem statement, purpose, research questions, theoretical foundation, conceptual framework, nature, definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance of the study.

Background

West Africa has experienced unique effects from a series of tumultuous global events from the days of slavery, colonialism, independence struggles, post-colonialism, the Cold War, post-Cold War, and globalization, to the current era of the post-September 11 Global War on Terror (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2017; Pham, 2014). Each of these cataclysmic events affected the region's security landscape in a peculiar way. When the Liberian civil war commenced in the 1990s, ECOWAS seized the initiative as a regional organization to send peace enforcement troops to the country. That marked the beginning of ECOWAS' interference in security matters in the region (Alao, 2017; Kabia, 2016).

Since then, ECOWAS has gotten intricately involved in security issues affecting member states. ECOWAS peace operations in the region include the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, La Cote D'Ivoire, Mali, and the Gambian political crisis (Hirsch & Hirsch 2018).

Although ECOWAS has had significant successes in the management of security in West Africa, the organization has so far operated only in the realms of peace operations and conflict mediation (Akopari, 2016; Lar, 2009; Odobo et al., 2017). As new and emerging threats to peace and security in the region worsen without a plausible regional approach, it became apparent that West Africa's security challenges were going to deteriorate further (Kieh & Kalu, 2013; von Soest, & De Juan, 2018). Even though the outcomes of the changing security dynamics were anticipated, ECOWAS' operational concept in managing security in the region remains problematic (Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013; Tejpar & de Albuquerque 2015).

The continuous worsening of the security situation in West Africa has debilitating effects on the already fragile humanitarian and economic conditions and fledgling democratic governance of countries in the region (Collier, 2017; United Nations Security Council, 2017). According to the United Nations Security Council Report (2012), the combination of the civil wars and the emergence of new threats to peace and security in the region "have significantly diminished human capital, social infrastructure and productive national development assets" (p. 2). Also, Human Rights Watch, in its briefing paper on West Africa to the UN Security Council in 2003 indicated that, there

were increased cases of sexual and gender-based violence and reprisal killings, among others, across the sub-region (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

In conducting this study, I sought to contribute an alternative approach to ECOWAS' conflict management strategies through a framework of integrated assessments of the two layers of threats to the region. An alternate approach can reveal the interconnectedness between the two threat layers for a nuanced evaluation to bring them under control (see New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, 2018). When the threats interactions are established, effective measures to address the problem can be deduced (FES Africa Department, 2017).

Brief History of West Africa

West Africa lies between latitudes 5° and 20° North and longitudes 16° West and 15° East on the globe (Maps of the World, 2017). It is bordered to the South by the Gulf of Guinea and to the North by the Sahara Desert. The region has an approximate area of eight million square kilometers (Food and Agriculture Organization Technical Papers, 1985). West Africa is ethnically diverse region with 17 countries and has a population of approximately 382 million (Economic Commission for Africa, 2016; Worldometers, 2018). The dominant groups in the region are Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, Akan, Ijaw, Mandinka, Ewe, and Wolof (Bloom & Sachs, 1999, p. 277; Michel & Zwang, 2006).

West African countries, with the exception of Cape Verde, are among those with the world's fastest population growth rate (Bello-Schünemann, 2017; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA], 2016, p. 5; Worldometers, 2018). According to United Nations (UN), Department of Economic and Social Affairs,

Population Division, as referenced by Worldometers (2018), West Africa is home to 5% of the world's population, with an annual growth rate of 2.69%. The region is rich with many natural resources. Some of these resources include gold, coal, diamond, aluminum, pozzolana, fish, timber, uranium, oil and gas, titanium, and iron ore (Al Jazeera, 2018; ECOWAS, 2015a).

Before the Trans-Atlantic trade and the partitioning of Africa in the nineteenth century, West Africa had a complex and buoyant social, political, commercial, and agricultural system (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2016). The region then had well-organized vast empires like the Songhay, Mali, Ghana, and Borno; states and many smaller chiefdoms and acephalous communities (Blakemore & Cooksey, 2017, p. 11; Davidson, 2014; Wilfahrt, 2018). Although relations among the various states were sometimes fractious due to territorial expansionism, cultural diffusion and commercial activities were vibrant. Technology transfer was fluid even beyond the Sahel to the Mediterranean and South across the forest to the coastal Atlantic areas (Hopkins, 2014).


The onset of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade by European merchants from 16th to the 19th centuries not only changed the interstate and intercommunal economic dynamics and also altered the socio-cultural stratifications in West Africa (Nwokeji, 2010). The trade flourished on both demand and supply sides. It also gave a stimulus to the culture of violence and internecine warfare to feed the lucrative industry (p. 201).

As the slavery industry thrived, competition and acrimony arose among the European nations who scrambled for territories in West Africa. Eventually, the Europeans agreed amicably to partition the region (but applied to the entire continent)

into spheres of influence, protectorates, colonies, and free-trade-areas at the Berlin Conference on February 26, 1885 (Chamberlain, 2016, p xii; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2011, p. 1; Pakenham, 2015, Sect 14). The colonial borders were capriciously drawn based on already acquired territories by the feuding European nations. They disregarded ethnic homogeneity, and the socio-political exclusivity of the various communities (Pakenham, 2015). Figure 1 includes a map that illustrates the partitioning of Africa as a result of the Berlin Conference.

Figure 1

Map showing how Africa was partitioned in Berlin Conference - 1884.



Note. Adapted from “The Berlin conference on Africa: 1884-1885,” by D.J.P. Waldie, 2019, *Timewise Traveller*, para 7. Retrieved from <https://www.timewisetraveller.co.uk/berlin2.html>

The creation of artificial barriers in the region restricted socialization among communities that were once together to the extent that, villages and families got separated from each other (Miles, 2014; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2011, p. 29). Different official cover names were even ascribed to the same ethnic groups in the region to distinguish them from their kin at the other side of the boundaries by the British and the French colonialists (Asiwaju, 1985). For example, the Yorubas in British Nigeria were called Nago in French Dahomey, the Fulanis in British colonies were called Peuls in French colonies across the region, and the Baydyarankes in French Guinea were called the Bambara in Portuguese Guinea (p. 3).

Also, thriving economic activities were negatively affected by customs charges and immigration documents required for crossing wares to a central market that served the once united community (Miles, 2015, p. 27). Traditional rulers around the border towns and villages, in some cases, ignored the imposed boundaries. They continued to mutually recognize original ownership of lands and farms overlapping into jurisdictions across borders in line with precolonial precincts and customary laws (Raunet, 2016). Table 1 includes a list of partitioned West African ethnic groups.

Table 1

Partitioned West African Ethnic Groups

Serial	Country*	Ethnic group
1	<i>Benin-Nigeria</i>	Adja, Yoruba, Borgu, Hausa, Fulani
2	<i>Cameroon-Nigeria</i>	Kanembu, Shua Arabs, Adamawa, Okoi, Wakura, Matakam, Gude, Veve, Jibu, Chamba, Ododop, Efik Mandara,
3	<i>Gambia-Senegal</i>	Wolof, Pular, Serer Mandinka, Jola, Karoninka, Manjago, Balanta
4	<i>Ghana-Togo</i>	Ewe, Agotime, Akposso, Konkomba, Aufo, Moba
5	<i>Ghana-Burkina Faso</i>	Mossi, Dagara, Sisala, Kusasi, Dyula, Birifor, Padon, Mankana, Bissa, Aculo
6	<i>Ghana-Ivory Coast</i>	Sanwi, Afema, Lobi
7	<i>Guinea-Sierra Leone</i>	Mende, Susu, Baga
8	<i>Nigeria-Niger</i>	Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri

*Former French colonies in Italics; Former British colonies are without emphasis.

Note. Adapted from “*Scars of partition: postcolonial legacies in French and British borderlands*,” W.F.S. Miles, 2014, Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1d9nmvp>

Independent West Africa and the Vestiges of Colonialism

The partitioning of West Africa and its subsequent colonization altered the existing socio-political mosaic by redefining the identity of the people in the region. The residual effects of arbitrary drawing of borderlines and superimposition of the various European value systems on the people through language acculturation were still at play in shaping the region's polity and economic arrangements (Harbeson, 2017; Asiwaju, 1985, p.213). Even as West African countries tried to ignore territorial

boundaries to forge free trade across their borders, they still grappled with lingering Francophone-Anglophone competition based regional trade union divide. (UEMOA, 2017; ECOWAS, 2016a).

Formation of the Economic Community of West African States

ECOWAS is a 15-member state regional organization for West African countries that aims to promote economic integration across the region. Although ECOWAS was established in 1975, it traces its antecedent to an agreement between President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and President Sékou Touré of Guinea to create a Union of Independent African States (UIAS) in 1958 (DeLancey, 1966). The UIAS was formed between 1961 and 1963 and later renamed the Union of African States (UAS) to include Mali in a Pan-Africanist move to create what came to be known as the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. The union's objective was to forge a common diplomatic representation and harmonized economic and monetary policies of the former British and French colonies (DeLancey, 1966; Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union-Union of the African States, 1962). Subsequently, President William Tubman of Liberia mooted a West African regional arrangement in 1964 with Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Adeleke, 1995).

All the initial attempts at forging an integration arrangement for the region failed. It was instead in April 1972 when the heads of state of Nigeria and Togo, General Yakubu Gowon, and General Nyasingbe Eyadema took a more serious approach by regenerating interest in the concept and following up with visits to countries in the region. They managed to get the consent of their counterparts toward establishing the

regional organization and that eventually culminated in the signing of 'Treaty of Lagos' on May 28, 1975, with a mandate of promoting economic integration in all fields of activity of the constituting countries (ECOWAS, 2016b, p. 6).

ECOWAS mandate was later expanded with a revised treaty in 1993 to strengthen political cooperation and accelerate the implementation of the economic integration policies among member states (UNECA, 2016). The agreement was followed up in the year 2000 by a Non-Aggression Protocol and a Protocol on Mutual Defense Assistance that led to the formation of an ECOWAS Standby Force (Okon & Williams, 2018, p.47; ECOWAS, 2015b, para 1). The new treaty set out goals of a common economic market and a single currency and restructured the organization to give effect to the revised objectives with the introduction of new institutions and specialized agencies (ECOWAS, 2016c).

ECOWAS Membership

ECOWAS membership was opened exclusively for West African countries with geopolitical and cultural ties (ECOWAS, 2016d). ECOWAS started as a 15-member state organization and was joined by Cape Verde Islands in 1977 to increase its membership to 16 encompassing the entire region. Mauritania, however, withdrew its membership in 2000 to join the Arab Maghreb Union making the organization revert to its original 15-member state status (Kamal-Deen, 2015, p. 20; UNECA, 2016). ECOWAS members, therefore, constitute the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Cape Verde, Guinea, and Niger (ECOWAS, 2016d).

Morocco, even though not geographically belonging to the region, formally applied in 2017 to join the union (Fabiani, 2018, para 5). "Morocco's bid, however, faced strong objections from several West African civil society organizations and economic interest groups" (para 6). Morocco's apparent rejection to be part of ECOWAS goes to confirm the close cultural and geopolitical underpinnings that define nature and membership criteria for the organization. Figure 2 shows the countries that are in ECOWAS.

Figure 2.

Political map of ECOWAS countries.



Note. Adapted from "The countries of western Africa," *Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.*

Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/place/western-Africa#/media/1/640491>

ECOWAS Vision Aim and Objectives

The primary aim of ECOWAS is to foster interstate economic and political cooperation among member states (ECOWAS, 2016b, para7). The organization is also committed to enhancing the socioeconomic development of its member states by promoting economic integration in all fields of activity in the region (USAID, 2016, p. 1). Before the partition of Africa and subsequent colonization, trade among the communities had been smoother with free movement of people and commodities as the region was considered the best in the world (ECOWAS, 2016b, p. 7). According to ECOWAS (2016b), about three percent of the region's population live outside countries of their origin among the community (p. 7).

Realizing the need to breach the artificial barriers to free movement of people and commodities in the region, ECOWAS Vision 2020 was adopted by a resolution in 2007 to reflect an "ECOWAS of People." This concept replaced the existing "ECOWAS of States" to give effect to a renewed impetus toward deepening interaction among people in the region (ECOWAS Vision 2020, 2010, pp 1&2). ECOWAS Vision 2020 seeks to: "To create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance and where people can access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation" (p.2).

The ECOWAS Revised Treaty had 15 objectives (2010, Art 3). The objectives led to the restructuring of a new structure to support, coordinate, harmonize, and promote

activities that was to facilitate the implementation of the organization's mandate while keeping the attainment of its vision alive and on track (Art 3).

ECOWAS Structure

ECOWAS has metamorphosed through three significant structural developments since its establishment in 1975. The first being in 1993 when the treaty was revised to widen the scope of its provisions and strengthen the organization's mandate with additional powers and provision commensurate resource requirements (UNECA, 2015, p. 35). The second was when the Executive Secretariat was transformed into a Commission in 2007 and given broader latitude and authority to fast-track the regional integration process (p.11). The third was the smart leveraging of the revised treaty to expand the technical commissions from four to eight and to operationalize them. Some of these technical commissions' remits require member states to surrender some political and sovereign authority. For example, West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), West African Monetary Institute (WAMI), the ECOWAS Brown Card insurance certificate, and ECOWAS passport and travel certificate (Abbey, 2016, para1; UNECA, 2015, pp 40&129).

ECOWAS runs on two branches; the Institution and Specialized Agencies. The institution comprises three arms of governance, namely, the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. The governance is driven by the executive and a Chairman of the Authority of Heads of State and Government at the apex of the structure. It also has a Council of Ministers and a Commission with a President, a Vice President, and 13 Commissioners as part of the executive body (ECOWAS, 2016c, p. 1).

The Community Parliament epitomizes the ECOWAS legislative body. It is composed of 115 seats. Each member state is guaranteed five seats, and the remaining 40 shared by the country's population ratio in the community. It comprises two wings, namely; the Bureau and the Secretariat. The Bureau has the Speaker, his Deputies, and the Secretary-General heads the Secretariat. The two represent the governing and administrative organs of the Community Parliament, respectively (Community Parliament - ECOWAS, 2018).

The Community Court of Justice is the third arm of ECOWAS' governance architecture. "It is composed of seven independent Judges who are persons of high moral character, appointed from among nationals of member states (Community Court of Justice - ECOWAS, 2012, para 2). It is responsible for the "interpretation and application of Community laws, protocols, and conventions" (ECOWAS 2016c, para 3). Over time, it has inspired confidence in the community of member states considered as the court of last resort (UNECA, 2016, p. 37; MyJoyOnline.com, 2017, p. 3).

Problem Statement

The problem addressed in this study was how to underpin the ECOWAS security management framework with assessments that integrate the interconnectedness of the existing and the new and emerging security threat layers in West Africa (New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, 2018; Willemse, de Bruijn, van Dijk, Both, & Muiderman, 2015). The new and emerging threats not only present another strand of security problem; they also inherently overlap and complicate the region's security threat variables (Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013). ECOWAS' security management

strategies have failed in addressing the problem effectively (Akokpari, 2016; Marc et al., 2015).

Many scholarly works have been done in the area of peace and security in West Africa (Dinshak & Walnshak, 2018). However, there is a lack of research on the nexus between postcolonial conflicts and new and emerging security threats. This gap was made manifest by the various context-specific and less coordinated conflict prevention frameworks that have failed to address the problem. The void has consequently allowed the threats to fester, mutate, and further complicate the threats to peace and security in the region (Aning, Okyere, & Abdallah, 2012; Annan 2014; Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013).

ECOWAS was initially established to foster interstate economic and political cooperation among member states. However, the organization added security management to its mandate to enable it to manage the growing threats to security in the region (ECOWAS, 1999; Francis, 2009). ECOWAS indicated its commitment to regional security management by conglomerating a force called ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to physically handle the threat with significant successes, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Cordesman, 2016; Kieh & Kalu, 2013; UN Security Council, 2011). ECOWAS has also attempted several diplomatic initiatives. These include the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Ammunition and other Related Materials in June 2006, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) in 2008, and the Political Declaration and a Common Position against Terrorism in 2013. ECOWAS' security management efforts notwithstanding, West Africa keeps experiencing a continuously deteriorating security environment.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to explore ECOWAS' approach to regional security management in West Africa. In addressing the gap in the literature, I explored the interconnectedness among existing and new and emerging threats to security in the region. Uncovering how the threats interrelate may enable a more nuanced analysis of the problem for the adoption of a better approach to the region's security management system.

I used a qualitative methodology, relying primarily on an intertextual analysis of documents on regional strategies, implementation plans, and political declarations. I collected documents from relevant institutions and conducted in-depth interviews on the phenomenon with practitioners from the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja and think tanks at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana. I also interviewed subject matter experts at the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) in Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone to assess the vulnerabilities of the region within the context of the threats. The interviews enabled me to evaluate the perspectives of academics, practitioners, and subject matter experts concerning existing and new and emerging threats in the region.

Research Questions

The overall research question (RQ1) was, how effective is ECOWAS' current approach to security management in the region? I also sought to answer two other RQs:

RQ2. How well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security problems that confront the region?

RQ3. What implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its current scheme of conflict management strategy?

Theoretical Foundation

I applied the punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), developed by paleontologists Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, and the policy feedback theory (PFT), which emanated from political science from the historical institutionalist tradition (Moynihan & Soss, 2014). PET is primarily about a policy change that is marked by “stability and incrementalism” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 55). This theory is most beneficial when making decisions that involve a paradigm shift in the way a region handles security matters. I applied PET in the study to create adequate space for an in-depth analysis of the two layers of threats and divergent viewpoints of subject matter experts and practitioners while ensuring the maintenance of a more focused and holistic security arrangement. Thus, considering the magnitude of the problem, the socioeconomic dynamics of countries involved, and their weak political will in subduing their interests for the betterment of the entire community, the application of PET was appropriate for the study (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

The PFT provides a framework of interrelated concepts, ideas, and principles. I formulated the framework and organized it systematically to clarify the political implications of critical aspects of governance, such as the promotion of civic engagement to prevent “unanticipated or unintended consequences of previous policy designs” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 124). PFT also facilitates deliberations by experts and

practitioners to enhance the synchronization of alternative options with imperatives of governance to engender political support for implementation (Mettler & Soss, 2014).

Organizational change management requires anticipation of the challenges that will be confronted and appropriate measures put in place (Carnall, 2018). Therefore, this study was premised on the policy of transparent engagement and feedback concept to enhance its rigor and thoroughness (see Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Also, the application of PFT has had a positive impact on the development of broader policy that is acceptable to all members of the regional community. (Moynihan & Soss, 2014). Using PFT and PET as the theoretical basis for the research enhanced a better understanding of the level of complementarity among ECOWAS' strategic concepts, doctrines, and policies and consequently improved the quality of the study's findings and analysis.

Nature of the Study

The study type was qualitative with grounded theory design. It was an exploratory case study based on a formative evaluation research methodology. I relied primarily on an intertextual analysis of documents on regional strategies, implementation plans, and political declarations by ECOWAS member states. The study began with an exploration of the prevailing security situation among member states to establish the current threats profile and the region's vulnerabilities to them. ECOWAS architecture and strategies for the management of its members' security were subjected to formative evaluation to assess their inherent challenges as well as the effectiveness and efficacy of their implementation process. This approach enhanced proffering alternative strategies and also helped in contextualizing aspects of social value (Kozleski, 2017).

I applied the purposive sampling and the snowball data collection technique for this study. I conducted in-depth interviews and document analysis to gather data. I performed both electronically and manually (for participants who declined electronic recording) recorded interviews through one-on-one, Semi-structured, open-ended questions with follow-ups. I also used field notes in conjunction with the interviews for keeping track of schedules, recording vital points for follow-ups, and facilitating better data management (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Participants for in-depth interviews were selected based on their knowledge, expertise, and experience on the subject matter, as well as their availability and willingness to provide the needed information (Maxwell, 2012).

The snowball technique created the flexibility for including two unanticipated participants whose contributions were useful to the exercise. According to Maxwell (2012), using multiple methods is a common feature of qualitative research. Duplicating sources enhanced information gathering on different aspects of the study, and yielded the triangulation to maximize strength and addressed the limitations of methods being applied. The snowball technique also allowed me to depend on my primary participants' experiences for recommendations on who else to engage as data collection progressed.

The critics of qualitative research argue that the methodology is not scientific enough for credibility compared to quantitative methods (Sarma, 2015). On the other hand, Marshall (1996) asserts that when a study seeks to answer humanistic "why" and "how" questions, qualitative studies do it better (p. 522). The exploratory nature of the research also influences the choice of qualitative methodology, requiring in-depth

interviews to gain insight into multiple angles and to assess different sides of the problem (Marshall, 1996, p. 253). According to Maxwell (2012), the research situation is also a determining factor in choosing a methodology for research.

Additionally, this study enhanced a detailed and nuanced understanding of the various groups that competed for space in security matters of the region. The qualitative research paradigm provides better options that afforded the needed degree of immersion into the study (Atieno, 2009). Also, the qualitative approach facilitated the synchronization and harmonization of multiple perspectives of the various national strategies and doctrines, respectively, for the application of best practices in conflict management.

Definitions

Following is a list of key terms used in the study and their definitions. Appendix A contains a list of acronyms used in the study.

Emerging security threats: New or mutated threats to security that may require an exclusive and nonconventional approach to manage. These include radicalization, extremism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, challenges to democratic governance, and piracy. The threats could be criminal, religious extremist, or political in nature (Cherkaoui, 2017, pp. 10, 19; Security Council Report, 2011, p. 1).

Integrated threat management: A comprehensive and nuanced approach to identifying and analyzing multilayered threats to regional security for timely implementation of appropriate preemptive and remedial measures for addressing the

menace (Korb, Duggan, & Conley, 2009; United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2016).

Operational control: The authority granted to a military commander in a UN peacekeeping operation to direct forces so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks (UN, 2009). Operational control statuses are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and military personnel, and to retain or assign tactical command or control of those units/personnel (UN, 2009).

Partition of Africa: A term, also known as “scramble for Africa” and the “Conquest of Africa,” which refers to the carving of the continent into European colonial territories during the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885. Between 1884 and 1914, the entire African continent except for Liberia, Ethiopia, and Somalia was shared among England, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Portugal, and Spain (Courtney, 2017, p. 1; Worldfacts, 2018, p. 2).

Peace and security architecture: The combination of structures, objectives, principles, and values, as well as decision-making and implementation processes that compose the entire conflict management framework of an organization (Degila & Amegan, 2019; Delegation of the European Union to Nigeria and ECOWAS, 2019).

Regional security system: A security architecture comprising military, police, intelligence, and diplomatic engagements that is used by regional institutions in managing security threats.

Tasking authority: The authority that is vested in specified senior appointments of UN peacekeeping operations to assign tasks to enable units (UN, 2009). Tasking authority includes the authority to deploy, redeploy, and employ all or part of an enabling unit to achieve the mission's mandate. The enabling units comprise aviation, engineering, logistics, medical, signals, transport, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units (UN, 2009).

Assumptions

I had several assumptions in conducting the study. I assumed that a substantial number of relevant ECOWAS headquarters staff would agree to be interviewed and offer their objective perspectives on issues to be raised during data collection. I also assumed that adequate funding would be available to cover travel fares and telephone bills, as well as fees and incidentals for the conduct of interviews and the collection of other forms of data. Finally, because of the unstable security situation at many parts of Nigeria, I assumed that the locations for my data collection will be safe for the exercise.

Scope and Delimitations

Even though ECOWAS is credited with some interventions in the security situation of West Africa, its successes have barely exceeded the dimension of troop's deployment to contain intrastate conflicts (Lucey, 2016; Rodriguez, 2018). West Africa's security situation has continued to deteriorate due to the intricate infusion of the new and emerging security threats with the existing interstate conflicts (Cherkaoui, 2017; Security Council Report 2011). This study specifically explored the interconnectedness among the

current and the new and emerging security threat layers in West Africa to enhance ECOWAS' security management framework.

Although this study made references to ECOWAS' accomplishments and challenges, it did not delve into the details of the organization's failures and successes in the region's security management. It also did not assess specific national or other supranational security management entities operating within the region. The study, however, focused on exploring how ECOWAS could coordinate and harmonize the plethora of security operations conducted by those national and supranational security management entities for a better systematically organized and thoroughness in managing the problem.

The theories applied in the study were the PET and the PFT. While the PET provided the basis for a policy change and paradigm shift needed to drive the study, the PFT enabled the generation of a systematic clarification of policy implications to the interrelated concepts and ideas (Mettler & Soss, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

Another related theory that would have been considered in the study is Innovation and Diffusion Models (IDM). The IDM enables studies to assess policy diffusion and draw inferences across political systems. IDM, however, works better when dealing with socioeconomic in well-established unions like the United States and possibly, the European Union (Heikkila & Cairney 2014).

Limitations

ECOWAS has English, French, and Portuguese speaking member states. Data collection was, however, primarily conducted in English. Interpreters were not used since

all participants, including those from non-Anglophone countries, opted to have the interview in English. Still, I had to make meaning out of their linguistic limitations by cross-checking with some of the respective non-Anglophone participants for clarity. ECOWAS has offices in each of the 15 member states; however, onsite data collection from ECOWAS staff for this study was conducted at the ECOWAS headquarters at Abuja, Nigeria.

Also, due to resource constraints, secondary data were collected from think tanks, regional institutions, and subject matter experts in Ghana and Nigeria only. A deliberate effort was made to get the respondents' perspectives to cover all the three linguistic segments of ECOWAS countries to include respondents from Francophone and Lusophone countries at the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja. Additionally, the study applied published works and open-source data for modular referencing, contextualization, and cross-evaluation with the UN, African Union (AU), and other regional organizations.

Significance

The onsets of the new and emerging threats to peace and security in West Africa have increased the vulnerability of the region to security risks (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Marc et al., 2015). This situation has heightened tension levels, and considering the fragility of the region's socio-cultural and geopolitical dynamics, the problem can deteriorate beyond the capacity of ECOWAS to manage. The uncertainty of the circumstance is not only inimical to good governance and development of democratic culture, but it is also a disincentive to infrastructural growth and local and foreign investments. The infrastructural growth is critical to moving the countries from the

doldrums of economic hardships (Annual Report of ECOWAS, 2016; Runde et al., 2016).

Significance to Practice

ECOWAS has made a significant impact on security management in West Africa. However, the organization's inadequate vulnerability assessments of the region, particularly from the perspective of the combined effects of the existing and new and emerging threats has affected its effectiveness as the security situation deteriorates relentlessly (Maiangwa, 2017; Tejpar & de Albuquerque, 2015). Thus, this study delved into the interconnectedness of the two layers of threats and integrated them to get a closer shot at the threat landscape for the development of more nuanced strategic options for ECOWAS to implement. The study was also aimed at contributing to the improvement of the ECOWAS approach to security management in West Africa to facilitate the creation of a conducive environment for regional and global trade and investments, development, and better living standards for the people (Harris, 2017; Runde et al., 2016).

Significance to Theory

The significance of theories in research includes enabling me to organize ideas for establishing the interconnections between the abstract and the wider importance of data generated to arrive at some conclusions (Neuman, 1997; Sunday, N D). This study applied the punctuated equilibrium and the policy feedback theories to advance compelling reasons for the need for a paradigm shift in ECOWAS' management of security threats in West Africa. This study, therefore, did not just provide an alternative to the organization's existing security management efforts but also proffered an effective

course of action in managing the problem (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

Significance to Social Change

ECOWAS, as a regional organization, serves as the first reference point for its member states on regional security matters (De Wet, 2014; Maiangwa, 2017). Since this study targeted the institutionalization of a more practical alternative for threat management for ECOWAS, it will have a significant region-wide impact for social change. Thus, ECOWAS member states will, apart from benefiting from the effective region-wide security architecture, can also extract applicable strategies and best practices to enhance their various national security policies.

Besides West Africa, other regional organizations with peace and security mandate on the African continent can adapt the study. These regional organizations include the South African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) (comprising countries from the Horn of Africa, the Nile Valley and the African Great Lakes) and the African Union (AU) (De Wet, 2014; Siradag, 2012). Consequently, this study could have significant implications for positive social change for substantial parts of Africa that share analogous security dynamics (Burgess, 2008; Mazrui, 1996).

Summary and Transition

Chapter 1 began by providing brief insight into the geography and demography of the region to locate the setting and provide an understanding of how the people interrelated across the region. The chapter then traced the history of ECOWAS by

delving into the antecedents of West Africa from the era of slavery through the partitioning of Africa into colonial territories by some European countries up to the independence period. Chapter 1 also introduced the nexus between the vestiges of colonialism and the challenges ECOWAS faced as a regional institution from its embryonic stage going forward (ECOWAS, 2016a; UEMOA, 2017). Additionally, ECOWAS formation, vision, objectives, and structure were also highlighted.

Chapter 2 has the available literature and unveiled the gap in the study. It was an exploratory case study based on the formative evaluation of the materials gathered. The chapter also outlined the strategy for the search of the literature and then thematically reviewed the significant works related to the primary research questions of this study.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

In Chapter 1, I outlined the background and context for the formation of ECOWAS by delineating Africa's geopolitical history from the period before the Trans-Atlantic trade through its partitioning into colonial territories by some Western European countries to the independence era. I also highlighted the transformation of ECOWAS from an exclusive economic block to successes in regional peace operations efforts (Adetula, Bereketeab, & Jaiyebo, 2016). Then, I underscored the emergence of terrorism, cybercrimes, and organized transnational and cross-border crimes in the region as another threat layer to the existing destructive conflicts. I went further to highlight the increasing mutation of the two layers of threat and the need to explore their interconnectedness in the region's security landscape (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Marc et al., 2015).

There is extensive literature on ECOWAS' roles in managing security in West Africa (Dinshak & Walnshak, 2018). However, studies on security management strategies the regional organization could employ remain limited. In this chapter, I review relevant literature that is germane to the topic to identify the gaps and inherent weaknesses. In this literature review, I discuss the thematic areas relative to the primary RQs of this study. These thematic areas included colonially induced identity conflicts in West Africa, the Cold War era and peace and security in West Africa, ECOWAS' involvement in managing peace and security in West Africa, the effects of the War on Terror on peace and security in West Africa, and ECOWAS's operational peace and

security architecture. Other themes discussed are the advent of an additional layer of peace and security challenges in West Africa, ECOWAS's Concept of Operations in the management of the new and emerging threats to peace and security in West Africa, and ECOWAS's challenges in its management of two layers of the threat to peace and security in West Africa. I also discuss the literature search strategy and provide more information on the study's theoretical foundation and conceptual framework.

Literature Search Strategy

I focused my literature search on peer-reviewed publications within a 5-year range of 2015 to 2019. I extended the search to the previous 10 years (up to the year 2009) for critical documents and peer-reviewed articles concerning ECOWAS policies and strategies and those of similar regional organizations. In this regard, I explored the Walden University Library, KAIPTC Library, University of Cape Coast, and University of Ghana databases and JSTOR for related materials to establish gaps in the literature.

I also consulted web search engines and databases such as Google Books and Google Scholar. Additionally, I also searched for books and articles from other online databases such as pdfdrive.net, Gutenberg.org, and archive.org. The keywords that I used for the searches included *conflict, ECOWAS, West Africa, management, regional, threats, organization, terrorism, transnational, peace, crime, and security*.

Theoretical Foundation

I combined the PET and PFT as the foundation for the theoretical framework for the study. Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould developed the PET, and the PFT originated from the historical institutionalist tradition of political science (Moynihan &

Soss, 2014). PET primarily addresses matters relating to a policy change marked by "stability and incrementalism" (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 55). PET is most beneficial when policy makers are taking decisions that involve a paradigm shift in the way a region handles security matters. The theory was applied in the study because it facilitates concurrent analysis of the two layers of threats and also accommodates exploration of divergent viewpoints of subject matter experts and practitioners while ensuring the maintenance of a more focused and holistic security arrangement. Thus, considering the need for paradigm shift for ECOWAS's response to nonconventional and asymmetric security threats, the application of PET was appropriate for the study (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

The PFT, on the other hand, provided a framework of interrelated concepts, ideas, and principles. The framework is formulated and organized systematically to clarify the political implications of critical aspects of governance, such as the promotion of civic engagement to prevent "unanticipated or unintended consequences of previous policy designs" (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 124). PFT also facilitates deliberations by subject matter experts and practitioners that enhance the synchronization of alternative options with imperatives of governance to engender political support for implementation (Mettler & Soss, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

Managing organizational change comes with many challenges. Therefore, I applied the concept of transparency in policy engagement and feedback afforded by PFT and PET to get security managers to participate in the study (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). The application of PFT may have a positive impact on the development of broader policy

that will not only be acceptable to all members of the regional community but will also resonate with political actors and leaders of member states (Moynihan, & Soss, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

Literature Review Related to Key Variables and/or Concepts

Colonially Induced Identity Conflicts in West Africa

The role of colonialism in shaping the sociopolitical mosaic of West Africa is epitomized by the turbulence that has bedeviled the region since the period of the struggles for independence (Aghemelo & Ibhasebhor, 2006; Davidson, 2014). From its “fuzzy and illogical geographical definition” (Davidson, 2014. P. 6), arbitrary border re-demarcations, through repressive colonial and neocolonial regimes by European imperial powers, the region was primed for a long journey of political instability, civil wars, and a weak economy and national institutional structures (Davidson, 2014, p. 6; Harbeson, 2017). Although ECOWAS’ roles in containing many of these tumultuous situations are recorded, the rippling effects and the follow-on activities of colonial interventionism in the region continue to hinder the organization's efforts.

Upsurge in self-determination and secessionist agitations.

Since the decolonization of sub-Saharan countries began in the 1950s, issues regarding self-determination have kept popping-up across the West African region (Whelan, 1992). The struggles for separate states by many groups signify dissatisfaction. In many instances, it results in the people’s rejection of the national and international boundary arrangements bequeathed to the region by the colonial enterprise (Small, 2017; Bannon and Collier, 2003). Apart from separatist agitations and identity conflicts,

xenophobic tendencies, especially nomadic herder-farmer conflicts, have increased monumentally in the region due to its arbitrary partitioning and colonization (Adams & van de Vijver, 2017; Kyereko, 2018).

Achankeng (2013) posits that African conflicts are not mainly problems of governance or institutional failures. And that, the conflicts are, in many cases, rooted in colonial factors. Achankeng (2013) also finds powerful countries and global and regional organizations complicit in perpetuating the mistakes of European imperialism on the continent (p. 34). Achankeng (2013) also blames the untidy decolonization and independence granting arrangements by the colonial powers that set the stage for many conflicts in the region. He cited the French and British Trusteeships merger in Cameroon as an example of how European imperialism fueled conflicts in Africa (p. 14). Colonialism, therefore, left fundamental problems of secessionism and identity in its trails. These externally imposed legacies have made it very difficult to resolve conflicts in West Africa without delving back into the nuances of the region's historical, socio-cultural, and geopolitical antecedents (Google Arts and Culture, 2014; Harbeson, 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012).

In assessing major secessionist movements in post-colonial Africa, Bereketeab (2014) points out serious inconsistencies. He especially cites the application of international law by the UN and the African Union to deal with self-determination issues. Bereketeab (2014) also examines Africa's major post-colonial separatist agitations. He highlights how the regional organizations' inconsistencies and inadequacies in managing them have rather complicated matters and also contributed to their escalation. Bereketeab

(2014), citing Trzcinski (2004) and Tuttle (2004); defined secessionism as "political withdrawal from an established state ... and includes territorial disintegration through severance of part of an existing state territory" (p. 7). The consent and recognition of the international community are, however, key to a successful secession. The successes of Eritrea and South Sudan and unsuccessful ones in the cases of Somaliland and Ambazonia in Western Cameroon epitomize this phenomenon (Oduah, 2017; Searcey, 2018). The roles played by global and international organizations like the UN, the OAU/AU, and ECOWAS in the scheme of things, therefore, make them intricately part of a problems-solutions duality conundrum of separatist conflicts in the region (Bereketeab, 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012; Oduntan, 2015).

Rise in farmer-herder conflict.

Olaniyan, Francis, and Okeke-Uzodike (2015), while examining management strategies of farmer-herder conflict in West Africa, argue that various governments have resorted to the expulsion of the herders since they were considered as non-indigenes in the country. That typifies the experience of the Fulani nomadic race in West Africa. The Fulani people live in every state across the West African subregion and maintain strong cultural bonds and ethnic connections, which cut across national boundaries (Gordon, 2000). The Fulani preserved their unique cultural identity regardless of their location. The zealous preservation of cultural identity coupled with their nomadic lives as pastoralists have made the Fulani people to be associated with being 'foreign,' regardless of the length of time they spent in many countries in West and Central Africa (Bukari, & Schareika, 2015; Mbah, 2017). Cattle are an essential part of the life of Fulani people, even those

who have taken to other professions still keep cattle (Mbah, 2017). Fulani came up as migrants who arrive in the country at specific periods for grazing and leave when conditions become better elsewhere. The Fulani herders mostly see themselves as moving through the land; hence, even those born in a particular country considered their stay as transitional and hardly regarded themselves as citizens (Kyereko, 2018).

Even though farmer-pastoralist conflicts had existed long before partitioning and colonization of West Africa, there were no citizenship problems for the Fulani. They were just required to pay tribute to the chiefs or overlords of the state or territory to move through or settle with their flock (Adebayo, 1995; Tonah, 2005). Even though the region had been partitioned during the colonial era, there was no full realization of statehood among the states as administrative control of the colonies was in the hands of the Europeans which in many cases, they exercised indirectly through the existing local chiefs and emirs (Hill, 2009). Issues that did not present a direct existential threat to their dominion such movement of the Fulani pastoralists were not an issue for them (Para 15).

Maiangwa (2017) captures the post-colonial conflicts as manifestations of identity issues in the form of ethnic mobilization, cultural "othering", and internal oppression of people simply seen as being "different" (p. 282). According to Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, as referenced by Maiangwa (2017), there was energy spillover toward internecine wars between many tribes and socio-political groups. The wars "contrived from perceived or real cultural differences that emerged with deleterious consequences for nation-building projects in several African countries" (p. 282). In Maiangwa's (2017) view, even though socio-economic, political, and environmental factors have reinforced the farmer-herder

conflicts in West Africa, it was the partitioning of Africa into colonial territories that has made it a difficult challenge to addressing the problem. Also, because of centuries of well-established cultural pattern of sedentary farming and unhindered and free-flowing nomadic lifestyle of pastoral herdsman across the region, the imposed geographical boundaries have become more disruptive and deepened identity and otherness tensions between the two groups (Blench, 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012).

It is noteworthy that the spirit of self-determination and a sense of statehood gathered momentum for decolonization in the 1950s and 60s. The movement kindled the enthusiasm on issues of identity, irredentism, and otherness among West African countries (Moritz, 2010; Tonah, 2002; 2006). This situation has negatively affected the pastoral Fulani herders who have traversed the region for centuries. However, it is not only the Fulani herders who have been objects of the discriminatory practices, but migratory groups of traders and artisanal greener pasture seekers have also suffered mass deportation because they are either considered not to belong or not citizens enough. For instance, referencing Akrasil, (2012) and Ibrahim (2012), Olaniyan, Francis, and Okeke-Uzodike, (2015) indicate how the post-colonial governments in Nigeria and Ghana, expelled pastoral herdsman from their Plateau State and Brong Ahafo Region respectively following clashes with plant farmers. Senegal similarly deported the herdsman out of the country.

OAU/AU and ECOWAS' dilemma of maintaining colonial borders.

The OAU/AU and subsequently ECOWAS have both encountered the dilemma of either maintaining or reversing the inherited colonial borders in West Africa. Soon after

the formation of OAU, the issues of removing colonial borders had generated serious arguments among the various contrasting ideological groups (the Brazzaville, Casablanca, and Monrovia Groups) before the Cairo Resolution was eventually passed (Zoppi, 2013). The OAU passed the 1964 Cairo Resolution that declared that "the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constituted a tangible reality" and that "all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence" (Organization of African Unity Secretariat, 1964).

Notwithstanding the Cairo declaration, the OAU was still not consistent with the issues of inherited colonial frontiers since the organization itself metamorphosed from a pan-African movement that championed the removal of all vestiges of colonialism from the continent (Murray, 2004; Zoppi, 2013). The OAU did not evenly manage self-determination disputes and irredentist movements across the continent. For example, the OAU overlooked the Pan-Somali activism for a separate homeland for all Somalis in the Horn of Africa (Gunn, 2017). Conversely, in 1982, 26 OAU member States recognized the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and subsequently admitted to the organization's Council of Ministers. Later in 1984, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) was seated at the OAU summit. Subsequently, Morocco withdrew its OAU membership in protest until its readmission in 2017 (United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996).

Small (2014) explores how President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana vigorously pursued an "unintended legacy" that has shaped Africa in a paradoxical circumstance of

retention of colonial frontier arrangements in the face of the struggle against imperialism and yearn for the right to self-determination across the continent (pp. 69-74). Small (2014) further points out that the concept of self-determination for African countries during the early independence era had the potential to upset the decolonization roadmap. He adds that Nkrumah astutely got the OAU to adopt the Cairo Resolution after setting precedents in his country and the Congo by nipping in the bud, tribal and religiously based political activism through the parliament and then getting the UN to prevent the Katanga secession (p. 73). Thus, while Nkrumah was struggling to keep the Katanga region as part of the Congo in the name of continental unity, he conversely engaged in a vigorous separatist scheme to decouple the then British Togoland Trust Territory for independent Ghana (Austin, 1963; Kah, 2016; Monfils, 1977).

Small (2014) further indicates how some African leaders declared the Congo crisis as a watershed in African history with the propensity for spreading and eventually undermining the OAU's agenda for continental reunification (p. 69). The leaders referred to the burning issues of separatism in Congo's (now Democratic Republic of Congo) Katanga and Kasai regions at the United Nations General Assembly. They got OAU's endorsement to block the secession (p. 69). There were many African leaders of the time, like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who strongly advocated for the OAU's adoption of Resolution AHG/Res.16 (I) in 1964 (Cairo Resolution) that declared the colonially inherited borders inviolable. This Resolution got reaffirmed as Article 4 (b) in para 3.3 of the AU Constitutive Act.

Considered Africa's doctrine of *uti possidetis juris*, West African countries have consistently applied the Cairo Resolution in settling the land and maritime border disputes from regional to global adjudicatory bodies. Landmark cases of land and maritime border dispute settlements include the International Court of Justice judgment of 2013 on the Burkina Faso-Niger land border dispute and the International Court of Justice Reports of Judgments of 1998 on the Nigeria-Cameroun land and maritime border dispute. Others include the International Court of Justice Judgments of 1986 on the Burkina Faso - Republic of Mali Frontier Dispute, the 1991 Maritime Delimitation dispute between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, and the 2017 International Tribunal for the law of the Sea judgment on Ghana- La Côte d'Ivoire maritime border dispute (Bekker and van de Poll, 2017; International Court of Justice, 2018).

The AU and ECOWAS adoption of the *Uti possidetis* doctrine in settling border and secession cases notwithstanding, losing parties to these disputes have hardly acceded to these judgments which they consider not based on their disparate heritage as a people but grounded on colonial imperatives (Heerten, 2017; Morgan, 2014). For instance, Heerten & Moses (2014) highlights the Nigeria-Biafra secessionist war as a pivotal period for yearning and struggling for self-determination by various groups who claim ethnic affiliations in the post-colonial history of West Africa (pp. 169-170). Heerten & Moses (2014) also imputes the crime of genocide against the people of Biafra. The blame is placed squarely on colonialism for bringing people with diverse cultures and mores together as a nation. The international community is culpable for its failure to hold the Federal Government of Nigeria in check and subsequently accountable for excesses

during the war, invoking the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs (p.175; Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000).

Indeed, there are many conflict hotspots in West Africa, where a couple of separatist groups continue to challenge the new *Uti possidetis* status quo (Whelan, 1992). The separatist groups in the region include a Tuareg ultranationalist - National Movement for the Salvation of Azawad of Northern Mali, the Ambazonia separatist of Cameroun, the Movement of Democratic Forces for Casamance (MFDC) of Senegal and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in Nigeria (Al Jazeera and News Agencies, 2018; Bax, 2017; Bereketeab, 2014; Lewis, 2012). The imposition of colonial boundaries by imperial Europe, reinforced by the adoption of Cairo Resolution by the ECOWAS, remain among the difficulties that hamper a lasting solution to many conflicts in the region (Oduntan, 2015; Vines, 2013). Also noteworthy is the existence of internecine conflicts in pre-colonial West Africa, yet, it was the region's partitioning and subsequent colonization that intensified and prolonged the conflicts. The long period of colonization also set the region up for continued exploitation of its resources for the development of metropolitan Europe (Afsi, 2009; Annan, 2014).

Various works of literature discussed have deliberated on several aspects of the problem and ECOWAS' roles in regional conflict management. That notwithstanding, the writers fell short of delving into detailing the two-pronged nature of the problem and how their interconnectedness affects the efficacy of the various intervention measures implemented by ECOWAS. Although, writings on significant influences of the vestiges of colonialism on the region's conflict dynamics have helped in understanding the roots

of the conflicts in the region, how existing threats combine with the new and emerging ones to complicate matters have not been considered. This study delves into the problem with a bifocal standpoint to ensure a more nuanced evaluation of the problem.

The Cold War and Peace and Security in West Africa

At independence, countries in West Africa were contending with the effects of twin external phenomena of neo-colonialism and the Cold War. There are no records of armed kinetic exchanges in the West African region directly attributable to the Cold War superpower wrangling during the period. However, the relationship between countries in the region and their internal political systems was, to no small extent, defined by the phenomenon (Spies, 2018; Hetch, 2011; Harris, 2017). For example, during the Biafra War, countries from both the West (United Kingdom) and the East (Soviet Union) took turns to provide materiel support to the Federal Government side thereby contributing to the high levels of casualties recorded (Heerten & Moses, 2014; Ugochukwu, 2010;). The Cold War that began just after the Second World War led by two great allied powers – the United States and the Soviet Union also operated in symbiosis with countries that have neo-colonial and hegemonic interest to complicate the security situation in West Africa (Pateman, 2003; Lewis, 1967). The fragility of newly independent states in West Africa made them vulnerable to the cataclysmic tentacles of the Cold War East-West divide (de Sousa, 2016; Olympio, 1961).

Regionally, the East-West ideological blocs were replicated in West Africa in general, precipitating the formation of two prominent groups known as the Casablanca Group and the Monrovia Group. The Casablanca bloc was led by Kwame Nkrumah

(Ghana) with Sékou Touré (Guinea), and Modibo Keita (Mali) as other West African members with King Mohammed V (Morocco) as the North African member. The Casablanca group was Eastern and socialist-oriented with the Pan-Africanist agenda. The Monrovia bloc, on the other hand, included West African countries like Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Dahomey (Benin Republic), Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), and Niger. Unlike the Casablanca bloc, the Monrovia bloc was a pro-Western nationalist group that advocated a gradualist approach to the continental union. The two opposing blocs eventually came together in conjunction with other continental interest groups like the Brazzaville Group, an association of former French colonies to found the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (Hetch, 2011; Genge, Kornegay, & Rule, 2010).

The East-West ideological rivalry of the Cold War-era trickled down to the domain of national political divides of many countries in West Africa. Both blocs were guilty of going as far as supporting one-party regimes as epitomized by the administrations of Presidents Nkrumah of Ghana and Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire by the East and West respectively. Those alliances came on as the critical destabilizing factor in the region's security and governance system (Amanor-Lartey, 2015; Aning, & Bah, 2009; Campbell, 2011; Dumbuya, 2008).

In Ghana, for instance, while President Nkrumah was known to have his ideological leaning towards the former United Socialist Soviet Russia led Eastern bloc, the main opposition political party of the country claimed allegiance to the US-led Capitalist West. The bitter rivalry between the Nkrumah administration and the

opposition group, the subsequent overthrow of the government, and the eventual handover of power to the pro-Western opposition political party pointed to a possible scheme in which the United States was complicit (Mwakikagile, 2015; Pateman, 2003). Also, during the Nigerian Civil War, President de Gaulle of France is cited for having alongside the apartheid South Africa to have assisted the Biafra side while the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Algeria supported the Federal troops (Pateman, 2003; Stent, 1973).

While referencing Komer Report (1965), Mwakikagile (2015) indicated that Robert W. Komer, a US National Security Council staffer advised his bosses as follows: "we may have a pro-Western coup in Ghana soon. Certain key military and police figures have been planning one for some time, and Ghana's deteriorating economic condition may provide the spark" (p. 109; Lee, 2001). Mwakikagile (2015) minced no word in blaming the Nkrumah overthrow squarely on the US government as the allegations that it "created or exacerbated the conditions that favored a coup and did so for the express purpose for bringing one about" (109).

Additionally, Nwakikagile (2015) considered the American Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) intricate contribution to the violent coup to ouster Nkrumah as an epitome of the Western governments and intelligence agencies collaboration during the Cold War in perpetuating "the most tragic events in the history of post-colonial Africa" (p. 118). Nwakikagile (2015), however, concedes that domestic some existing socio-economic factors galvanized local resistance that spurred the coup leaders into action but with the West's covert facilitation and support. Also linked, was, the security and intelligence support the United States provided the capitalist-oriented opposition leader,

Dr. K.A. Busia. Dr. Busia was appointed the Chairman of the National Advisory Committee by the military regime that toppled the Nkrumah administration and got subsequently elected the prime minister of Ghana in an election supervised by the same military government (p. 176-179).

On the other hand, in de Sousa (2016), the author recounts Cuba and Soviet Union's involvement in African Marxist movements with political and military support during the Cold War era to counterbalance Western dominance in the region. Many African decolonization movements exploited the Cold War to advance their causes, and the Soviet-led Eastern bloc offered a veritable alternative. For many such movements, it was not necessarily about their quest for the Marxist ideology. It was more about the diplomatic leverage, financial assistance, and the military support they could gain from the Eastern bloc to enable them to break away from the yoke of colonialism and also to withstand the overhanging menace of neo-colonialism (Scarnecchia, 2018). Therefore, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many African countries switched toward the West for democratic governance, capital investment, and technological support. (Bassist, 2018; Cascais, 2017)

Scarnecchia (2018) explores the interplay of global, regional, and national interests of the Cold War era on the African continent. The author gives a bifocal assessment of the complex Cold War relationships from "the perspectives of both the Cold War powers and that of Africans" (pp. 383-390). Scarnecchia also delved into the turf war that characterized the era among the various competing interests and interactions from the independence struggles through the post-independence neocolonial phases.

While referencing Lee (2010) and Byrne (2013), Scarnecchia (2018) indicated a successful attempt at creating a third ideological bloc that aligned to neither of the Cold War divides (East and West). The leaders of the new bloc were "Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, President Sukarno of Indonesia, and Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana" (p. 384). This move by these influential third world leaders was not taken lightly by the Cold War powers. Both the Soviet Union and the United States especially saw their interest in the region threatened by the Non-Aligned Movement. For instance, Scarnecchia (2018), argued about how the East-West Cold War rivalry impacted on security in Africa that, "the Americans were always in the driver's seat, while the Soviets watched from the sidelines as events in the Congo unfolded according to the US scenario" (as cited in Mazov, 2010, p. 177).

Indeed, Watts et al. (2018) have asserted that "in attempting to ensure that partners in Africa remained aligned with the United States rather than the Soviets, the United States might well have aggravated domestic political tensions and ultimately increased the incidence of civil wars on the continent" (p. 83). Marc et al. (2015) particularly pointed to the United Kingdom and France as critical players in post-Cold War conflicts in West Africa (as cited in N'Diaye, 2011). France's refusal to gracefully accept Guinea's (Conakry) quest to staying out of its (France's post-colonial) community epitomized the kind of neo-colonial machinations the former colonial master had hatched. Guinea's fractious decolonization process led to France imposing economic blockade and political isolation of Guinea (Du Bois, 1963; Marc et al., 2015).

There is no gainsaying that the various African leaders and political elites exploited the fog of the Cold War to advance their quest for continental decolonization. However, their achievements came at a very high price because, while they focused on attaining independence, the superpowers had a longer-term neo-colonization plan. They used their economic influence, global political clout, and superior intelligence network and military power as leverage to pursue their objectives (Marc et al., 2015; Nkrumah, 1965). Marc et al. (2015) argue that the superpowers encouraged and in some instances, established puppet regimes in the region which were left weakened and exposed to threats of rebellion when they became irrelevant in the post-Cold War period (as cited in Luckham, 1982; N'Diaye, 2011). Marc et al. (2015) sum it up as follows:

Support to states with very strong ties to the former colonial power—such as Houphouët-Boigny's Côte d'Ivoire, Samuel Doe's Liberia, and Gnassingbé Eyadéma's Togo, gave authoritarian leaders carte blanche to exercise repressive means of control. The end of the Cold War triggered the collapse of central authority in many West African countries, either directly or indirectly. As unconditional backing ended overnight, the supply of arms, military assistance programs, funding, and other interventions dried up (p.10).

Certainly, the Cold War has contributed immensely to the deterioration of the security situation in West Africa in diverse ways. A region bursting with post-independence freedom got entrapped in the labyrinth of the Cold War complexities that have left its security systems precariously off-balanced (Harris, 2017; Hetch, 2011; Spies, 2018). Even though a couple of writers and subject matter experts have sought to expose

the impact of the phenomenon in the region, they have come shy of proffering how to manage it within the context of the ECOWAS security architecture. Conversely, the Cold War undercurrents in the regional threat mix have not had adequate consideration in ECOWAS' existing security framework.

The Effects of the Post-September 11 Wars on Terror on Peace and Security in West Africa

The declaration of the Post-September 11 War on Terror by US President G.W. Bush Jr. represented another era in the history of West Africa when the region again became a prey to global powers' dictates. President Bush did not mince words when he proclaimed what became popularly known as the "Bush Doctrine" in the aftermath of the terror attacks. In his speech after the attacks, President Bush cited Niger, a West African country as a source of significant quantities of uranium for Saddam Hussein's alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Dockrill, 2006; Jervis, 2003). According to Dockrill (2006), the African uranium connection was attributed to Britain's intelligence dossier by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN Security Council and subsequently by President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address. The allegation was, however, discredited by the International Atomic Agency (IAA) to the UN (as cited in Frankel 2003, A15).

The IAA rebuff notwithstanding, the West African region did not escape becoming another operational theatre for prosecuting the "Bush Doctrine" of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Since the region was tagged and there was no-turning-back on already prepared grand strategic plans. Browne (2018) cited the commander of US

special operations in Africa, Major General Marcus Hicks, as saying that, "ISIS and al Qaeda represent major threats and are growing in strength in West Africa" (Para 1).

Incidentally, this statement was made in Niger during EXERCISE FLINTLOCK 18, joint military counterterrorism operations involving troops from Africa and western countries (Para 2).

In Akanji (2019), the author analyses ECOWAS' terrorism experience within the context of the post-September 11, mainly Western collaboration with different governments in the region in combating the menace. Akanji (2019) also examines the strategies employed and the responses of the various actors with a focus on ECOWAS' challenges, especially in most affected countries - Nigeria and Mali. He delved into the various ECOWAS initiatives toward conflict management and the regional body's collaborative efforts with both regional and international state and non-state actors in combatting terrorism (p. 101).

According to Akanji (2019), some ECOWAS member states refused to cooperate with it in conducting security operations. He also indicates that, member states' failure to honor their financial obligations impacts on effective functioning of the organization's security management system. Externally, Akanji attributes ECOWAS' primary challenge to the overbearing influence of the African Union and the United Nations on regional and subregional initiatives. The main problem is primarily on decisions on the use of force; thus, foreclosing unilateral but timely and critical military interventions (p. 106). However, Akanji's attention was on ECOWAS' internal and external challenges in dealing with the problem. Akanji also examines the ECOWAS counterterrorism

strategies but within the context of the organization's existing protocols, treaties and agreements thereby limiting the scope of the study and consequently, overlooking the interrelationships with other threats to the region's security

Zimmerer (2019) also tracks the metamorphosis of the conflict in the Sahel region of West Africa from the launch of the Post-September 11 War on Terror to the period when it became a full-blown terror dominated crisis. Zimmerer described the effects of the response from West African security forces, the UN, and the French to the conflict as "little discernible progress" with the threat rather growing and becoming more complex (p. 1). Zimmerer assesses the relationships among the terrorist groups in the region, their intentions and capabilities, external links to Al Qaeda, and the motivations for their eventual merger to form a new group called Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM). However, because it is also terrorism focused, the study failed to appreciate the pre-September 11 security dynamics and, consequently, missed the existing conflict undercurrents that have inhibiting/aggravating significances for a triangulated analysis of the problem. Thus, apart from the intent and capabilities, the inhibiting/aggravating circumstances would have constituted a third factor in the report if the study was not skewed toward terrorism.

Goerzig (2019) contextualizes the research on Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group's learning into meso and macro levels influencing factors from tactical and strategic perspectives. Goerzig described the "meso-level influences concept as cooperation and ultimate merging with Al Qaeda, and macro-level influences as

government action" (p. 1). With this, Goerzig posits that the concept of "counterterrorism often does not lead to what was intended and instead aggravates problems" (p. 1).

In justifying this stand, the author made references to previous counterterrorism studies that failed to pose questions on the construct and instead, adopting it, thereby not only failing to lead to the intended objectives but also aggravating the problems (p. 1). Goerzig argues that violence and radicalization may not necessarily be characterized by terrorism, especially in the Islamic Maghreb. She explains that terrorist learning could also lead to moderation in their attitude and that, "the sustainable answer to the question of the political implication of this is not how to boost counterterrorism measures but how to redefine them." (p. 2). While referencing Ranstorp & Normak (2015) and Rasmussen and Hafez (2010), Goerzig expatiates on terrorists' proclivity to non-escalatory innovation when the appropriate conditioning factors are put in place. (p. 3).

Several studies have been conducted on the effects of the United States' declaration of the (GWOT) on peace and security in West Africa. That notwithstanding, the various researchers have, in many cases, focused on terrorism and its associated factors or made cursory references to other aspects of the region's peace and security dynamics. Each has an area of concentration within its peculiar terrorism and counterterrorism narratives in all the literature referenced in this chapter.

ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture

The initial ECOWAS treaty of May 1975 made no provision for military intervention in interstate and intrastate conflicts among member states. However, realizing the need for regional peace and security, the organization entered into various

protocols and agreements to deal with problems of insecurity. These include the June 1977 Agreement on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Defence (ANAD), the April 1978 Non-Aggression Protocol, and a Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence signed in Freetown on May 29, 1981 (Agbu, 2006; ECOWAS, 1999; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2018). These agreements and protocols provided the impetus for the initial military intervention operations carried out by the organization in Liberia and subsequently, in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Gambia (Agbu, 2006; ECOWAS, 2015c).

Following ECOWAS' involvement in peace and security matters, it became necessary for the organization to structuralize. The structuralization did not only enable ECOWAS to leverage its peacekeeping and peace enforcement capacities, but it also enhanced its mandate implementation capabilities and operational reach in responding to increasing demands from the international community and civil society for democratization (Aning, & Bah, 2009; Francis, 2009). Based on its successes and lessons learned, ECOWAS decided to move on from its state of an ad-hoc and apparent reactive approach to quelling conflict to a more structured approach to managing regional peace and security (Aning, & Bah, 2009; Francis, 2009).

Consequently, in 1993, as the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone intensified, ECOWAS revised its treaty by introducing Article 58 for the establishment of regional peace, stability, and security system. The call was for all community members to actively participate in the region's peace and security matters to ensure "timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts" (ECOWAS, 1993, Art 58). ECOWAS

then signed a Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution; Peace-keeping; and Security in 1999 to empower the organization "to control the flow of small arms and light weapons." (ECOWAS, 1999, Arts. 50 and 51; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016).

Core to the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture is the concept of the Early Warning System, also known as the ECOWARN. To give effect to the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security Chapters IV and V of the protocol made provisions for an early warning system. While Chapter IV covered the establishment of a headquarters based Observation and Monitoring Centre and subregional Observation and Monitoring Zones, Chapter V defined the conditions for application, the authority to initiate action, and the procedures for implementing the mechanism (ECOWAS, 1999, Arts. 23-27). The Early Warning mechanism was established to augment member states' alert systems to enable affected countries to identify and provide an initial response to the crisis proactively and to also disseminate information swiftly among other member states ahead of subregional intervention (IOM, 2016; Wulf & Debiel, 2009; Bashir, 2015). ECOWARN, per the 1999 Protocol, established two operational branches that comprised an Observation and Monitoring Centre in Abuja, Nigeria, and four-zone offices across the subregion.

The zones are as follows: Zone I - Cape Verde, Senegal the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and The Gambia with headquarters in Banjul. Zone II - Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Niger, with the office in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Zone III - Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Liberia, and Sierra Leone has its office in Monrovia, Liberia. Zone IV - Benin, Nigeria, and Togo with the headquarters in Cotonou, Benin (Bashir, 2015; Odobo et al., 2017; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2018). The zonal various observatory groupings and the headquarters-based Monitoring Center for the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network are shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3

Map showing ECOWAS zones for Early Warning and Response Network.



Note. Adapted from “The ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network,”

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Retrieved from

<http://www.oecd.org/swac/theecowasearlywarningandresponsenetwork.htm>

The ECOWARN concept looks good on paper and has indeed made a significant impact by sounding early alerts of a potential crisis in the subregion like that of Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Cote D'Ivoire (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2018; Bashir, 2015; ECOWAS, 2017). However, the anticipated end-state for the establishment of ECOWARN as captured in the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol was as follows: "a subregional peace and security observation system that will prevent conflict under Article 58 of the Revised Treaty" is fraught with challenges (ECOWAS 1999, Chapter IV, para 1; Odobo et al., 2017; USAID, 2019). The United States government has come up with a program for Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa (REWARD) as part of its Early Warning and Response Partnership (EWARP) initiative to support ECOWAS (ECOWAS, 2018; USAID, 2019). However, the United States' support is in conflict data analysis with a focus on electoral violence in selected countries (Niger, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Togo) in the region (USAID, 2019).

Also significant in ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture was the adoption of a Code of Conduct to backstop the implementation of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons that was declared in October 1998 in Abuja, Nigeria. The Moratorium aimed to "facilitate the resolution of violent conflict, enhance peacebuilding measures, step-up arms control, and curb the proliferation of light weapons" in the region (ECOWAS 1999; UN, 1999; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016, para 2). ECOWAS established the Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) to give effect and serve as an enforcement mechanism for the implementation of the Moratorium. The

PCASED defined the Code of Conduct and a Plan of Action covering nine thematic areas (Ayissi & Sall, 2005).

From November 30 to December 1, 2000, "the ministers of OAU member states met in Bamako, Mali, to develop an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons" (African Union Peace and Security, 2012; Organization of African Unity, 2000, para 1). This initiative was in line with ECOWAS' acquiescence to other international treaties, protocols, and agreements signed by its member states as part of the continental and global organizations. For example, the 2000 Bamako Declaration was adopted as a common position for ECOWAS and AU under the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (POA) (Alusala, 2017; Olvera, 2013; United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs; 2016).

Following recommendations of the 2002 evaluation report of a study conducted by independent experts on the 1998 ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons, the regional group in June 2006 adopted the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (Berkol, 2007, p. 1; ECOWAS, 2006). This convention aimed to make the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons a legally binding instrument since there many cases of non-compliance by member states due to the voluntary nature of the Moratorium (Berkol, 2007, p. 1; Coulibaly, 2007, p. 4).

There is no gainsaying about the numerous achievements that have emanated from the various agreements, treaties, protocols, and memoranda of understanding (Lucey, 2016; Ayissi & Sall, 2005). That notwithstanding, while some of these security arrangements have remained mere paper works many of them have only been partially implemented (Bolarinwa, 2015; Coulibaly, 2007; Okunade & Ogunnubi, 2018, pp 2-6). Understandably, there are abundant literature and ECOWAS documents on frameworks and agreements on how the security threats in the West African region could be managed. However, a perspective on the two-pronged approach to managing the preexisting internecine conflicts and the new and emerging threats like terrorism, cyber, and organized transnational criminal activities in the region is unexplored. Thus, the nexus between the two layers have remained unaddressed while persistent conflicts and the emergence of new security threats bedevil the region (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Marc et al., 2015; UN News, 2019).

Okere, (2015), for example, evaluated the ECOWAS conflict management and peacekeeping interventions in West Africa to draw lessons for a more robust regional peace and security system (p. 30). While he commended ECOWAS' peacekeeping records, he criticized the organization's failure to halt the growing violence in the region. He cited "political will to act, political cohesion and clear mandate" as preconditions for any successful peacekeeping endeavor (p. 30). He went further to proffer conflict prevention as a better and cost-effective approach to conflict management (p. 43). In this literature, Okere narrates the various peacekeeping and peace enforcement interventions ECOWAS has undertaken and concludes that alone is not enough as a strategy and that

the region's peace and security landscape remains fragile (p. 42). One major gap in this literature is its focus on ECOWAS' management of security threats posed by the post-Cold War domestic conflicts while overlooking the new and emerging sources of insecurity like terrorism and violent or organized crimes across the region (Berkol, 2007; ECOWAS, 2006, pp.6&7).

In exploring the security dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), Tar and Mustapha (2017) assessed the historical, economic, and geopolitical antecedents for the formation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and its roles in the region's security imperatives. Characteristically, the LCBC's focus has been diverted by the threat posed by the Boko Haram terrorist group in the area. While referencing Kagwanja (2006), Tar and Mustapha (2017) asserted that the LCBC's war on Boko Haram insurgents in the LCB region could be described as an extension of the US-led global war on terror (p. 100). Tar and Mustapha lauded the efforts of the LCBC's Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF is a politico-military entity that has the blessing of the African Union's Peace and Security Council to support other supranational and regional organizations on the continent (p. 109).

Tar and Mustapha (2017) referred to Chapter Eight of the United Nations Charter as a provision that empowers regional organizations to act to deal with security challenges confronting them. He also highlighted the importance of local bodies' take-over of security roles to fill the gap left by the United Nations' inability to address that deficit, (p. 100). Chapter Eight, of the United Nations Charter, specifically provides that:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations (Article 52, para 1).

Tar and Mustapha identified the importance of a comprehensive security framework as a viable option for addressing regional security issues. However, their focus on political engagements and deployment of "more boots on the ground" left socio-economic factors and the roles of many stakeholders like civil society groups and think-tanks out of the equation (p. 115; Alagappa, 1995). Besides, the much-eulogized MNJTF in the literature has rather weakened the resolve of more experienced and formidable ECOWAS in dealing with the threat. Thus, even though the formation of LCBC allowed for better focusing, the MNJTF superfluously overlaps regional efforts, thereby allowing the problem to fester.

Summary

This chapter began by establishing the literature search strategy and then went straight to the primary research questions of this study. The chapter also established the gaps in the various literature discussed. Additionally, the chapter revealed the inherent weaknesses of the reviewed literature in dealing with the problem within a context of relevant themes with due consideration to the primary research questions of this study.

Chapter two also emphasized the need for centralizing the two layers of threats to peace and security ECOWAS' analytical process. The conceptual framework

underpinning the study was the PET and PFT. While the application of PET will create adequate space for an in-depth analysis of the two layers of threats and integration of divergent viewpoints, the PTF allows for the study of interrelated concepts and synchronization of alternative options.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

In conducting this study, I sought to explore the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS') approach to regional security management in West Africa. ECOWAS has undertaken both diplomatic and military strategies to address conflicts in the region with significant success. Due to changes in global security dynamics, West Africa is confronted with an additional layer of the threat posed by terrorism, cybercrime, and organized transnational and cross-border crimes (Akokpari, 2016; Marc et al., 2015).

ECOWAS' strategy of conventional military deployment and mediation had been effective in the past (Akokpari, 2016). Yet, the regional body is astounded by rising threat levels (Marc et al., 2015). This phenomenon could be attributable to ECOWAS' failure to engrain the interventions in a detailed assessment of the complex interactions between the two layers of security threats in the region (New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, 2018). I applied the qualitative method to explore the threat interconnectedness and its impacts on the region's security.

I restate the RQs in this chapter and also justify the methodology. In addition, I describe the recruitment procedure for the research participants and the data collection and analysis techniques that were applied. I also discuss my role as a researcher and show how I addressed ethical concerns and issues regarding credibility, trustworthiness, and protection of participants.

Research Design and Rationale

The overall question for the research was, how effective is ECOWAS' current approach to security management in the region? The other RQs were as follows:

RQ2. How well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security problems that confront the region?

RQ3. What implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its scheme of conflict management strategy?

This research involved a nuanced study of ECOWAS' security threat strategy vis-à-vis the two layers of threats confronting the West African region. According to Creswell (2009), although the primary research methods are qualitative, quantitative and mixed approaches, researchers are influenced by their worldview in which one to choose. Motivated by the constructivist worldview, I was able to draw from my varied experiences in managing security issues at national, regional, and global levels to drive the study (see Petersen, & Gencel, 2013). Considering the complexities and multiplicity of the study, my constructivist worldview enhanced my understanding of the phenomenon as the study progresses (see Adom, Yeboah, & Ankrah, 2016).

I used the qualitative approach with grounded theory. The qualitative approach enabled me to explore the various perspectives of practitioners, subject matter experts, and peace and security institutions across the region regarding the problem (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2016). The study was an exploratory case study based on a formative evaluation research methodology.

The study began with an exploration of the prevailing security situation among member states to establish the current threats profile and the region's vulnerabilities to them. ECOWAS architecture and strategies for the management of its members' security were subjected to formative evaluation to assess their inherent challenges as well as the effectiveness and efficacy of their implementation process. This approach helps security practitioners to harmonize the various national doctrines for conflict management strategies to be using existing best practices. This approach enhances researchers' ability to proffer alternative strategies and contextualize aspects of social value (Kozleski, 2017).

Role of the Researcher

Researchers are considered as instruments, especially in qualitative studies, because of their intricate roles in data collection, analysis, and interpretation (Chenail, 2011; Creswell, 2013; Turato, 2005). These characteristics manifest in how researchers' backgrounds, interests, and values influence their recruitment of participants, the options they consider, and the decisions they make at each stage in shaping the study (Creswell, 2014; Fink, 2000; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). Sutton and Austin (2015), citing Strauss and Corbin, indicated that, unlike quantitative research, the qualitative approach enables researchers to have a better appreciation of the "hows" and "whys" of the phenomenon, particularly during in-depth interviews.

As the researcher, I had the responsibility of deciding on the data types and sources employed in this study. I also chose the methods of analysis applied, where to lay emphasis, and the angle of interpretation to give to the data. All these circumstances

made me susceptible to inherent bias, which I made a concerted effort to mitigate and, where possible, avoid altogether (see Sutton, & Austin, 2015). As a qualitative researcher, I acknowledged my sociocultural circumstances as a citizen of West Africa and my military, UN security, and peacekeeping backgrounds, which could potentially shape my worldview and perspectives on the region's security matters generally. Throughout the research process, I strove to minimize the effects of those biases on the credibility of the data analysis, findings, and conclusions of the study.

Methodology

Participant Selection Logic

The setting for this research was in West Africa, a diverse region with English, French, and Portuguese as national languages among the various countries. ECOWAS is represented proportionately by its member states regarding population size and other internal democratic mechanisms. In qualitative research, sample size and multiple sourcing are vital in collecting and analyzing data (Creswell, 2013; Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2016).

I selected participants from KAIPTC, the ECOWAS headquarters, the WANEP office, and the Nigerian National Defense College (NDC) in Abuja, Nigeria. Both KAIPTC and WANEP are known industry players in regional security in the region. I selected participants from the two institutions to obtain their perspectives. I also recruited participants to reflect the national languages of countries in the region. I did so by ensuring that members from countries across the various lingua franca, regional peace, and security institutions and think tanks were involved in the data collection process.

A qualitative study calls for continuous refocusing and redrawing of study parameters during fieldwork (Miles et al., 2014). Emmel (2013) also asserted that qualitative sampling as a process will require the researcher to make a series of implied decisions that could necessitate making adjustments along the way. In line with Shank (2002) and Patton (2012), I applied the nonprobability sampling technique in choosing participants for data collection. I used the purposive sampling technique to create a quota system in recruiting members for the various aspects of the data collection.

I anticipated having at least 20% female participants to ensure a reasonably balanced gender representation and perspectives; however, I attained 16.7%. The participants comprised practitioners at the ECOWAS headquarters at Abuja, Nigeria, security experts, practitioners, and think tanks from the region's peace and security institutions in Ghana and Nigeria. The criteria ensured diversity and the triangulation of data collected and facilitated a comprehensive analysis of the problem.

Unlike the quantitative method, which places much premium on sample size for statistical significance, qualitative research does not emphasize the importance of a large sample size in determining the validity and reliability of the research findings (Merriam, 2009). Marshal (1996) emphasized taking a cue from the RQs in deciding on the appropriate size of a sample for a qualitative study (p. 523), while Yin (2016) and Creswell (2013) asserted that the sample size must equally reflect the purpose and goal of the study. I made provision for approximately 15 participants in all: 10 primary participants with room for an additional five participants to contain the snowball effect. I, however, interviewed a total of 12 participants; once I attained the data saturation point, I

ended the interview process and shifted efforts to the collection of documents to triangulate the process.

I conducted interviews with practitioners from the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, Nigeria. I used face-to-face, in-depth interviews to seek Intellectual perspectives on the phenomenon from the KAIPTC in Accra, Ghana. Also, subject matter experts at WANEP offices in Nigeria and Ghana were interviewed to assess the vulnerabilities of the region within the context of the threats. The in-depth interviews also created platforms to evaluate the perspectives of academia, practitioners, and subject matter experts concerning the existing and new and emerging threats in the region.

Instrumentation

The choice of appropriate instruments facilitates focusing on the research objectives and also enhances the data collection and analysis process (Trigueros, Juan, & Sandoval, 2017). Three main data collection instruments were used in this study. These comprised the application of interview protocol, documents, and I as the researcher. This combination of instrumentation brought about the convergence and corroboration of data needed to enhance triangulation and confluence of evidence (Bowen, 2009).

The interview protocol application enables the researcher to conduct an in-depth exploratory within the context of the research purpose and questions to enhance the quality of responses (Yin, 2016; Kvale & Brinkman, 2009). I adopted what Castillo-Montoya (2016) proffered as a four-phase Interview Protocol Refinement (IPR) process:

“Phase 1: Ensuring interview questions align with research questions,

Phase 2: Constructing an inquiry-based conversation,

Phase 3: Receiving feedback on interview protocols

Phase 4: Piloting the interview protocol.” (p.812).

I followed the four-phase IPR for both face-to-face and telephone interviews to enhance the interview protocol's reliability and, consequently, improve the quality of the interview data (p.811; Jacob & Furgerson, 2012; Trigueros, Juan, & Sandoval, 2017).

Document analysis will form a significant aspect of my data collection. According to Bowen (2009), documents are interpreted to give voice and meaning to the data. Frey (2018) adds to the importance of document analysis in arriving at answers to specific research questions. I used the following eight-step process offered by O’Leary as cited by Triad (2016) to guide the document analysis:

1. Gather relevant texts.
2. Develop an organization and management scheme.
3. Make copies of the originals for annotation.
4. Asses authenticity of documents.
5. Explore the document's agenda, biases.
6. Explore background information (e.g., tone, style, purpose).
7. Ask questions about the document (e.g., who produced it? why? when? type of data?).
8. Explore content.

Due to the semi-structured of the study’s interview process, I, as the researcher, also was a major instrument. Considering myself as an instrument enabled me to be continuously conscious of my potential biases during the data collection (Pezalla,

Pettigrew, & Miller-Day, 2012). I also recognized the central role I play in selecting documents, respondents, venues, and the amount of time to apportion to each data collection exercise (Xu & Storr, 2012; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2016).

Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection

I commenced participants' recruitment for the study upon obtaining the Walden University Institutional Research Board approval. I applied purposive sampling with a snowballing technique for selecting participants (Maxwell, 2012; Biernack & Waldorf, 2013). I used purposive sampling to create a quota system to allocate at least 20 percent of the participants to women to ensure diverse gender perspectives; however, I achieved 16.7 percent.

I started by recruiting my research assistants in Nigeria and Ghana, who partnered me to coordinate the interview schedules. Interview venues were the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja and the KAIPTC in Accra. I sent e-mails to the various institutions for the conduct of the interviews to arrange for contact persons, as well as my preference in the participants (male, female, and linguistic backgrounds) and possible use of facilities. Appendix B contains the invitation letter sent to participants.

I obtained participants' consent, discussed confidentiality issues, and followed my interview protocols to address ethical concerns. There were no payments made to participants. I, however, made honorarium available as a gesture to participants where it did not contravene the participants' values or their institution's code of ethics (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Creswell, 2013).

Data Analysis Plan

The data I collected were primarily electronically recorded interviews and documents. Field notes and data were gathered from follow-ups on interviews and used informal discussions to gather supplementary data to fill gaps during the analysis. I used the NVivo qualitative software to extrapolate themes, subthemes, and sub-subthemes for the analysis. The Nvivo software, also known as the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), helped me to organize and analyze the audio files (Creswell 2013).

Issues of Trustworthiness

Credibility

Patton (2015) describes credibility as an analog of internal validity. He explains that, even though the construct (internal validity) may not meet the rigorous standard for establishing causality in a qualitative approach as it does in quantitative/experimental designs, causal analysis can generate the hypothesis (p 601). The broader latitude for subjectivity in qualitative research tends to create a condition for dilution of the credibility of the study. A lot then hinge on the researcher, as an overbearing instrument to be rigorous and thorough in the conduct of fieldwork to establish the credibility of the study (Patton, 2015, p.15). I used the nonprobability sampling method of data collection by applying purposive sampling with a snowballing technique in a qualitative research methodology, which I consider appropriate for enhancing the credibility of this study (Burkholder, Cox, & Crawford, 2016).

I also adhere to the requisite protocols laid down by Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB)'s approval for the study regarding participants' evaluation, instrumentation, and data evaluation and interpretation (Yin, 2016; Kvale & Brinkman, 2009). I further deepened the study's credibility through triangulation by employing diverse data collection sources like in-depth interviews, field notes, and document analysis (Creswell, 2014).

Transferability

Issues of transferability in qualitative research, according to Ravitch & Carl (2016), deal with "how qualitative studies can apply or transferable to broader contexts while still maintaining their context-specific richness" (p.189). They postulate that "the primacy placed on fidelity to participants' experiences in qualitative research makes it pertinent to note the exclusive and contextual nature of findings" (p. 189). Nonetheless, citing Guba (1981), Ravitch & Carl (2016) maintain that the concept of transferability and the parallel notion of external validity can be attained through the provision of adequate information and descriptions of data to allow cross-contextualization based on available factors (pp. 188-189). Apart from providing a detailed description of the data, I applied the purposive sampling technique. The technique enhanced transferability by placing the data in context (DeVault, 2017).

Dependability

Miles et al. (2014) consider dependability as "the consistency and stability of the study over time". Dependability in qualitative study refers to the stability of the data and is similar to the quantitative concept of reliability (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

In ensuring dependability, I explicitly described my role and status as a researcher, fine-tuned my research questions, and aligned them with the design. I also subjected the study to peer review (Miles et al., 2014). Besides, I shared relevant portions of the data with participants for their review and responses to ensure accuracy. I then streamlined the interpretation and analysis for further review by subject matter experts in the industry and institutions in Nigeria, Ghana, and the United States.

Confirmability

Confirmability seeks to establish adequate objectivity in a research environment where the researcher's personal bias does not overshadow the respondents' experiences and preferences (Moon et al., 2016; Ravitch, & Carl, 2016). In this study, I realized that my background as a West African and a security scholar-practitioner at KAIPTC and in United Nations peacekeeping could generate some issues of positionality and philosophical perspectives and made an effort to address those (Moon et al., 2016). Therefore, I have provided a vivid account of the various processes I applied to address potential biases. I correctly identified those concerning my epistemological and ontological preferences. I also established trustworthiness by subjecting the study to peer review by experts and even through the Walden University's rigorous auditing of the findings to ensure their consistency with data collected and aligned with the interpretations and conclusions.

Ethical Procedures

This study explored sensitive areas concerning doctrines and strategies ECOWAS is employing to manage security in West Africa. There was a high likelihood of ethical

issues coming up during the research. I sought participants' informed consent and instituted measures to safeguard their anonymity to ensure that their job security jeopardizes by their participation in the study. I assigned each participant a nickname and a number to cover their tracks (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). I also instituted measures that enabled the set-limits and confidentiality for participants to be respected and their safety ensured by agreeing with them on a convenient time and venue that suited them for their interviews. (Sanjari, Bahramnezhad, Fomani, Shoghi, & Cheraghi, 2014). In this case, I provided participants adequate information regarding the project, how their input was to be recorded and used, alerted them of their rights of withdrawal at any time from the process, and got them to sign consent forms.

I applied the grounded theory to this study. The implication was that I was intricately involved in every stage of the research process. I was mindful of my prejudices as a researcher and, thus, made a conscious effort to avoid unduly bringing my influence to bear on the study by upholding a high ethical standard throughout. I sought for IRB clearance and guidance at the various stages research process. I also applied for approval from the Walden University Ethics Committee to authenticate the process. Approvals from national ethics committees of countries where I interviewed the participants (Ghana and Nigeria) were unnecessary. To further ensure adherence to ethical standards, I requested reviews from other researchers with varied backgrounds to equip me with alternate viewpoints as the study progressed.

Summary

The ECOWAS' security management framework had been successful in containing the threat of armed conflicts in the region until the inception of additional threats of terrorism, cybercrime, and organized transnational and cross-border crimes in the region (Marc et al., 2015). The regional organization's security management strategy lacks a detailed assessment of the complex relationships between the two layers of security threats in the region (New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, 2018).

This chapter justifies my choice of a qualitative approach to explore the interconnectedness of the two layers of security threat to contributing to ECOWAS' regional security strategy. I have given details of my data sampling and collection strategy and also indicated my justification for the selection criteria for respondents. Furthermore, I have stated how I addressed ethical, trustworthiness, and participants' protection issues (Creswell, 2014). In chapter 4, I explained what data were collected and analyzed to answer the research questions.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to explore the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS') approach to regional security management in West Africa. This study was necessary because of the continuous deterioration of the security situation in West Africa; the ECOWAS security management approach remains ineffective (Akokpari, 2016; Marc et al., 2015). I conducted interviews to elicit the perspectives of 12 participants comprising security management practitioners, subject matter experts, and research academicians.

The research proffers an alternative security management framework for ECOWAS in its regional security approach for West Africa. The results provided a basis for fashioning an operational framework for a synchronized threat management architecture that ECOWAS headquarters, in collaboration with subject matter experts and institutions of excellence, could further expound as part of measures for addressing the persistent security problems in the region. The study is also replicable by other regional and continental organizations seeking to expand their security management strategies.

In this chapter, I discuss the research setting, participants' demographics, data collection process, and data analysis. I provide evidence of trustworthiness using credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability constructs. I then present the interview results and findings thematically and provide a summary of the chapter at the end.

Setting

I researched ECOWAS headquarters and selected key security institutions in West Africa. ECOWAS headquarters and WANEP head office have staff members across the subregion. ECOWAS is the regional organization that manages regional security in West Africa and is represented proportionately by its member states regarding population size and other internal democratic mechanisms. The WANEP is a peacebuilding organization that has national networks with over 500 member organizations across the region. KAIPTC is a regional institution of excellence that conducts academic research on security issues in West Africa. The Nigerian NDC is the highest echelon military training institution and a Centre of Excellence for strategic-level training for peace support operations in West Africa. Therefore, I collected data directly from the natural settings in Ghana and Nigeria, where these institutions operate. This approach allowed me to focus on making meaning from the participants' viewpoints within their environment.

I recruited three Francophone and two Anglophone participants at the ECOWAS headquarters to reflect the region's sociocultural dynamics generally. The purposeful selection was to ensure adequate representation of participants from countries across the two dominant lingua franca in West Africa. Regional peace and security institutions and think tanks were also engaged to provide perspectives external to ECOWAS headquarters in the data collection process.

Demographics

I interviewed 12 participants comprising five security management practitioners from ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, two subject matter experts from

WANEP headquarters in Accra, Ghana, and one at WANEP country office in Abuja, Nigeria. I interviewed three research academicians from KAIPTC and, based on recommendation, went further with one participant from the NDC. Interviewees comprised 33.3% military and 66.7% civilian staff in total from the various institutions, which, based on their backgrounds, provided diverse angles to the problem. The participant pool also comprised 66.7% Francophones and 33.3% Anglophones across the region. No Lusophone was available for an interview due to unavailability. The study targeted not less than 20% of female participation. However, I achieved 16.7% female participation.

Most of the participants (58%) had doctorates, while 33% and 8% were masters and bachelor degree holders, respectively. I also realized that 75% of respondents had worked for more than five years with their various institutions. Participants' depth of knowledge, experience, and diverse gender and geopolitical backgrounds provided more profound insight into the phenomenon. Still, they also widened the spectrum of data analysis and nuanced interpretation of results. I assigned each participant a nickname to ensure confidentiality. Detailed demographic characteristics of respondents are shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Description	Frequency	Percentage	Valid percentage	Cumulative percentage
Lingua Franca				
French	4	33.3	33.3	33.3
English	8	66.7	66.7	100
Portuguese	0	0	0	100
Professional status				
Military	4	33.3	33.3	33.3
Civilian	8	66.7	66.7	100
Length of service with institutions				
0-5 years	3	25	25	25
6-10 years	3	25	25	50
11-15 years	5	41.6	41.6	91.6
16-20 years	1	8.4	41.6	100
Academic background				
Bachelors	1	8.4	8.4	8.4
Masters	4	33.3	33.3	41.7
Doctorate	7	58.3	58.3	100
Gender				
Female	2	16.7	16.7	16.7
Male	10	83.3	83.3	100

Data Collection

I applied a stratified sampling method with purposive sampling and snowball data collection techniques using in-depth interviews, field notes, and document analysis to gather data for this study. Participants were stratified to get perspectives from industry practitioners, think tanks/subject matter experts, and academia. Hence, participants were purposefully selected among practitioners from the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, think tanks/subject matter experts from WANEP, and academic researchers from KAIPTC. Upon recommendation, two more participants from the ECOWAS Commission and an academic researcher from the NDC were also interviewed in concurrence with the snowball technique.

I had each participant sign a consent form after explaining the purpose of the study and intended social change. Although nine (75%) respondents instantaneously volunteered to participate, three (25%) needed up to two days to declare their consent. I scheduled dates and locations for the interviews with the participants and also made them aware of their rights to opt out of the exercise at any time they wished. I retrieved each participant's completed consent forms before I conducted the interviews.

At the beginning of each interview, I verified each participant's identity, introduced myself, and restated the purpose of the research and the social change I sought to achieve. I then thanked each of them for participating in the study and reiterated interviewees' rights and confidentiality as contained in their completed consent form. I also requested participants' consent to use a voice recorder for the interview with further

confidentiality guarantees. I explained that I intended to ensure that I captured their responses accurately for data analysis.

After agreeing to set terms, attaining consents, and establishing that respondents were comfortable with the process, I discussed the interview protocol and research questions with them. I alerted participants when I wanted to start recording before commencing the interviews. Two participants objected to being recorded but agreed to notes taking. The recorded interviews lasted between 25 and 30 minutes, while those that declined recording were between 45 and 60 minutes. The interviews were conducted in a relaxed atmosphere to enable participants to freely express their thoughts, provide their expertise, and share their experiences on each question. I asked follow-on questions when needed for clarification, eliciting further information, and getting respondents on track. At the end of the interviews, I thanked participants and agreed to get back to them whenever necessary.

I transcribed the interviews, printed hard copies, and filed the information hierarchically in separate Microsoft word documents in identifiable folders. I reviewed the transcripts for coherence and flow and then extracted themes and analyzed the content, using the NVivo 12 transcripts. I backed-up each file on a separate pen-drive. I then duplicated all the data on an external hard-drive as a second level back-up to ensure the protection of the documents from possible losses and malicious software attacks. I then locked-up the hard and electronic copies of the data in a safe that only I can access. Additional access control protocols I used for the soft copies included passwords and identification questions to ensure that only I can access the files.

Although I anticipated that some data collection challenges like getting the relevant staff for the interview, some heads of departments' failure to respond to formal Letters of Cooperation requests for data collection substantially stalled the process. There was a particular case in which my phone calls, getting proximate representatives to follow-up, and even sending WhatsApp messages were unsuccessful. Nonetheless, I received warm reception and cooperation upon traveling to the various offices to have a face to face talks on the project with them. I also received a lot of staff who volunteered to participate. The passion and zeal of interviewees from the ECOWAS Commission were particularly noticeable during the data collection exercise.

Data Analysis

I used NVivo 12 software to transcribe the audio data gathered from the interviews into text. I then did a thorough perusal of the transcripts to understand the meaning and flow of the sentences to have a better appreciation of participants' perspectives. I further matched each interview with my field notes and related documents I collected. Subsequently, I integrated the entire data and conducted in-depth, line-by-line scrutiny to ensure coherence and to help me ascertain the central themes.

An overarching question on the effectiveness of ECOWAS' current regional security management approach inspired data collection. That was followed by two supporting questions regarding ECOWAS' preparedness and challenges as research questions 2 and 3, respectively. However, all three interview questions were interconnected and mutually reinforcing in attaining the purpose of the study. The three RQs were as follows:

RQ1. How effective is ECOWAS' current approach to security management in the region?

RQ2. How well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security problems that confront the region?

RQ3. What implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its current scheme of conflict management strategy?

I conducted another level of search and synthesis of the interview and documentary data to identify themes and subthemes in consonance with the three research questions. I subsequently evaluated the results to establish the main themes, subthemes, and sub-Subthemes before appropriately segregating and classifying them for the analysis. In all, I found five main themes, 14 subthemes, and two sub-subthemes. I identified "Coordination" as a crosscutting construct and has been sub and sub-subthemed across all the main themes. I conducted intertextual triangulation of the data (interviews, field notes, and documents) to capture the diverse perspectives. I reviewed the data's findings and then related them to the themes and the research questions as part of the data analysis process. A summary of the main themes, subthemes, and sub subthemes is shown in Table 3.

Table 3

Summary of the Main Themes and Subthemes

RQ	Main theme	Subthemes	Sub-subthemes
RQ1	Theme 1: Effectiveness of ECOWAS	a. Successful interventions b. Unsuccessful interventions c. Involvement of CSOs	Nil
	Theme 2: Integrated Threat Management	a. Integrated approach b. Coordination mechanisms	Nil
RQ2	Theme 3: ECOWAS' Preparedness	a. Force generation b. Decentralization of national response mechanism c. Lack of supranational sanctioning instrument d. Coordination mechanisms	Nil
	Theme 4: ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture	a. ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework b. Early warning mechanisms c. ECOWAS Standby Force	Nil
RQ3	Theme 5: Mandate Implementation Challenges	a. Nonadherence to existing agreements and protocols b. Funding c. External interference	i. Direct interference ii. Indirect interference

I collated all responses to each RQ from all the 12 participants and attached their associated field notes, related documentary support, and references; and saved them in separate folders. I then named the envelopes as "Research Question One," "Research Question Two," and "Research Question Three." Afterward, I scrutinized each RQ folder to identify common phrases and key-words-in-contexts. As part of my technique for a search for missing information, I also included "integrated threat management" as part of follow-on questions to delve deeper into interviewees' understanding of the security management process.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

Credibility

I applied the purposeful stratified sampling method with a snowball data collection technique to ensure the credibility of the data collected. The purposeful stratified sampling method enabled me to collect data in the form of interviews that came from key industry players in security management in West Africa. Thus, I purposefully recruited higher caliber knowledgeable and experienced security professionals from established institutions in the region for the interviews. In applying this criterion, I attained the following results:

- a. Seventy-five percent of respondents have worked for more than five years with their various institutions.
- b. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents were Ph.D., 33% Masters, and 8% Bachelor's degree holders.

I went further to adopted two levels of triangulation to establish confidence in the truth of the results and to enhance my attainment of a broad understanding of the phenomenon and comprehensive and well-developed research findings. The first level of triangulation I used was through stratification of data sampling sources into academia, subject matter experts, and practitioners. Therefore, I selected a key regional security institution, each among the academia (KAIPTC and later added the NDC), subject matter experts (WANEP), and practitioners (ECOWAS) for data collection. Secondly, I applied a multiple-source data approach where I utilized interview data, field notes, and materials from the various institutions and open sources.

Transferability

The study focuses on the management of security problems by a regional bloc in Africa ECOWAS. Apart from the African Union, this study is replicable in other subregional bodies like the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the East African Community (EAC), and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). Consequently, I have provided detailed background and contextual information that prompted the study and the step-by-step procedures I followed in conducting the research. Even though the research primarily dealt with regional security issues in West Africa, security managers worldwide can adapt it to suit their security settings.

Confirmability

I aimed at ensuring a high degree of neutrality in the findings for this study. Therefore, before data collection, I tabulated a checklist of researcher and interviewer

biases that could potentially skew the findings. I used multiple data sources, open-ended question techniques, follow-on questions, and getting participants to review the results of their responses. I also maintained field notes that contained my reflections on each research setting and the traits and mannerisms of respondents throughout the data collection process.

Dependability

I began ensuring dependability by following standards set by the IRB at each stage research process. Besides, I applied the Walden University Ethics Committee's recommendations and audit techniques for establishing dependability in the study. I further sought peer reviews from other researchers with a diverse academic and institutional background to equip me with alternate perspectives to guarantee dependability as the study progressed. I also provided a vivid description of the processes involved in the study to enable future researchers to replicate identical studies in other subregions or at the continental level and still yield similar results.

Results

In this chapter, I analyzed the results of 12 interviews and reviewed documents from the data gathered. I used the NVivo software to cluster and organize the interview data, excerpts of documentary materials, and the field notes into five themes, 14 subthemes, and two sub-subthemes. I applied a thematic analysis framework to review the main themes and subthemes to answer an overarching question regarding ECOWAS' effectiveness and two supporting questions relating to the organization's preparation and implementation challenges in its current approach to security management in the region.

Adopting the thematic analysis framework enabled me to deal with crosscutting thematic discussions that overlapped the research questions. While I guarantee participant's anonymity, I also take ultimate responsibility for the analytical exercise and interpretations expatiated in the themes and subthemes that emanated from their (participants') shared knowledge, experiences, and perspectives in this study.

Research Question 1

RQ1: How effective is ECOWAS' current approach to security management in the region? I identified a total of two main themes, and six subthemes in RQ1. Each theme has three subthemes. Theme 1 - "effectiveness of ECOWAS" had the following subthemes: successful interventions, unsuccessful interventions, and involvement of CSOs. Theme 2 was "integrated threat management." Theme 2 had the following subthemes: threat integration, the framework for threat integration, and coordination mechanisms.

Theme 1: Effectiveness of ECOWAS. The question on the degree of effectiveness of ECOWAS generated different responses from respondents. Perspectives picked regarding the organization's effectiveness in security management during the interviews centered on how successful, or unsuccessful ECOWAS interventions had been, and the involvement of regional and subregional groups and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

Successful interventions. Respondents also varied in their understanding of what constitutes success from which to assess ECOWAS' effectiveness. While some considered success from the end-state viewpoint, others looked at the processes.

Participant 9's comments on the effectiveness of ECOWAS operations were from a lifesaving perspective. He conceded that "although ECOWAS had stuttering beginning regarding the organization's failure to secure UN assent before it intervened in Liberia, many people would have lost their livelihoods. Also, the UN assenting to the mission later indicates ECOWAS' proactivity." Participant 11 saw ECOWAS as very effective, considering the frameworks and the mileage it has gained in its integrated multi-stakeholder approach to get things done. According to Participant 7, "ECOWAS is among the most successful organizations in terms of its leadership in sustaining relative regional stability." He added, "Yes, the organization might have some challenges with terrorism and related issues; we must also appreciate the strategies, frameworks, and plans of action ECOWAS has crafted and pushing to get them through under the prevailing circumstances."

Participant 5 assessed ECOWAS' effectiveness mainly from the angle of the organization's successes in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and diplomatic engagements and sustaining democracy. He expressed worry about narratives that seek to suggest ECOWAS had not been successful. He admitted institutional challenges but also asked the following rhetorical question: "What do you imagine the security situation would have been in West Africa without ECOWAS?" The following comment from him is also significant:

Pick ECOMOG, for instance, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts, ECOMOG did a lot of good work in these countries till the UN came in. Take Cote D'Ivoire; I think ECOMOG was part of the force that went in earlier in

support of the UN, and now we see Cote D'Ivoire enjoying a semblance of peace.

Also, look at the recent situation in The Gambia; ECOMOG went in timely, and in conjunction with diplomatic engagement, President Yahya Jammeh was compelled into exile to pave the way for the president-elect to be sworn-in.

Participant 10's position on the theme is that ECOWAS is primarily an intergovernmental organization with the remit to coordinate and facilitate member states' affairs. He, therefore, thought ECOWAS should be held responsible for implementation failures. He espoused that, "Just like UN or any other Inter-Governmental Organization... most of the things that it (ECOWAS) does, it does with either the concurrence or with the support with member states." Participant 7 expressed a similar opinion when he said: "Everything done at the headquarters emanates from the member states." Like Participant 10 and Participant 7, Participant 9 made the same point with the following allegory: "The ECOWAS Commission is like a vehicle with member states as joint car owners and drivers; they maintain the vehicle, determine where to go and at which speed."

Unsuccessful interventions. Similar to the successful intervention subtheme, respondents pointed out that ECOWAS was not successful to some extent in its management of regional security interventions. Several comments made in this subtheme centered on the new and emerging threats to security in the region. These included ECOWAS' handling of the Boko Haram terror crisis, the terror crisis in the Sahel and Maghreb regions of West Africa, the thriving transnational organized crime, and cybercrime in the region.

While explaining probable reasons for ECOWAS' inability to manage the Boko Haram terror crisis in the region well, Participant 10 stated that the AU came in with the MNJTF because the crisis transcended ECOWAS boundaries into The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Participant 9, on the other hand, stated that: "Not only MNJTF must ECOWAS be concerned about; but also, the presence LCBC, and G5 Sahel in the region that has bred unnecessary rivalry and competition for preponderance among the various groups; each of which claims to be fighting terrorism." Participant 4 was rather straightforward on the matter when she stated: "You see that ECOWAS has not been very effective in dealing with the threats because there were other stakeholders who have multiple interests."

Participant 6 expressed disappointment that "Despite ECOWAS' initial successes in its application of 'carrots and stick' strategy; in other words, combining diplomacy with the use of force, the organization is gradually losing steam." He explained that:

Take the crisis in Guinea Bissau, for example. The ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB) presence in that country was to act as a strong deterrent, dissuading any military intervention and providing a safe and secure environment. Although the country has not exploded, if you go to Guinea Bissau, there is chaos. So sometimes, the success of ECOWAS in some of the member states depends on the context.

Involvement of regional and subregional groups and CSOs. All the interviewees acknowledged the peace and security roles played by CSOs in West Africa. Participant 5 stated that "ECOWAS depends so much on the CSOs for expertise in

human security. They also rely on the CSOs' ability to reach remote areas in the region for information and sensitization programs." He placed his opinion in context with the statement below.

I will say that there have been ups and downs in the effectiveness of the ECOWAS security management strategy in West Africa. For instance, when we look at ECOWAS engagement with civil society organizations, it is clear that they provide many decisive indicators for determining the type of mission to be launched. For example, when planning for an intervention, the question of whether the organization should carry out political, peacekeeping, peace enforcement missions, or any of those will be required to be addressed. These are critical decisions, and the CSOs' inputs reflect the reality on the ground.

Participant 6 indicated that the involvement of CSOs is so vital to ECOWAS' effective security management. Therefore, he called on ECOWAS to "increase its engagement with the CSOs, especially from the planning stage through implementation to monitoring and evaluation." He cited the "grassroots" roles played by CSOs in support of ECOMOG, especially during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars. Participant 6, however, indicated that:

The CSOs have challenges in generating funds from the region. A substantial component of their funding comes from other organizations outside the region, which might have their interest and agenda they might be pushing. These can drag ECOWAS into some sort of conflict of interest.

Theme 2: Integrated Threat Management. The concept of integrated threat management generated exciting discussions. Discussions on the concept came up when the topic was introduced or when respondents were asked about the concept as part of follow-on questions to determine interviewees' views on ECOWAS' application of integrated threat management process. Integrated threat management has been defined in this study as a comprehensive and nuanced approach to identifying and analyzing multi-layered threats to regional security and timely implementation of appropriate pre-emptive and remedial measures to address the menace. Some of the prominent issues that emerged during discussions on this theme included further clarifications of the concept and any clear distinction between the threat integration approach the study was advancing and ECOWAS' institutional integration approach. The integrated threat approach and coordination mechanisms emerged as subthemes.

Integrated threat approach. Out of all the 12 respondents, only Participant 9 indicated familiarity with the concept of integrated threat management. During the data collection, it was apparent that although respondents comprehended an integrated threat approach, it was within the context of stakeholder agencies and institutions working together in a coordinated manner. For example, Participant 11 cited a "lack of information sharing among stakeholders and inadequate interagency interactions" as part of the significant problems the ECOWAS commission was using integrated approach concept to address. Participant 11 also understood the interconnected nature of the new and emerging threats to security in the region but agreed he was not aware of a framework where all the security threats and drivers were put together on a matrix for

analysis. Participant 11 went further to indicate that “the threat integrated approach will be a highly beneficial concept if adopted to complement what ECOWAS has.”

Participant 8’s initial reaction on the integrated threat approach model as a security analysis tool for ECOWAS was

As I said, everything in ECOWAS is integrated. There is no way you can remain in your country and say that you are analyzing if you do not know what is happening in your neighboring countries. For example, in terms of analysis, somebody in Burkina Faso may not be interested in what is happening in Ghana. If you have 15 national early warning and response in each national mechanism, it will help feed into the regional security architecture.

With further probing questions and prompts regarding the thrust of the integrated threat approach concept, Participant 8 stated that “This integrated threat approach will fit very well in the ECPF. I am pretty sure those responsible for the ECPF will be keen to take your ideas on this model for inclusion. That will be great.”

Participant 5 acknowledged the importance of the concept as a useful security management tool, said that “With the inherent complexity and fast-changing threat elements in West Africa's security space, the integrated threat management in this context will surely be an indispensable tool for ECOWAS to be ahead of the menace." Likewise, Participant 9 indicated that "The concept is long overdue. Seriously, it is a 'must-have' for the ECOWAS Commission. They are responsible for the ECOWAS doctrine on security. The integrated threat approach must be fully incorporated to match the current security threats in the region." Participant 9 went on by lamenting that “Even the existing system

of integration at institutional and agency levels within ECOWAS and between ECOWAS and its close partners in the region's security management suffers from a lack of cooperation and inefficient coordination mechanisms."

Participant 1 referred to the ECPF as "the 'mother document' that encompasses all doctrinal and integration matters. However, the document seems to be a work in progress. It is not detailed enough, lacks a precise plan with assigned departmental and individual accountability" Participant 1 also noted that

The absence of an integrated threat approach limits ECOWAS' ability to conduct planning to manage or to meaningfully contribute toward those new and emerging threats to security in the region. Now externally led institutions like the G5 Sahel and the MNJTF have a better grasp of these threats posed by violent extremist groups in the region. They are in full control.

Coordination. Interviews conducted pointed to the need for an efficient coordination mechanism at various levels to ensure effective implementation of the threat integration concept. Participant 9 stated that an "effective coordination mechanism is a vital component for any framework to operate. He added that,

I think this (coordination) may involve developing a matrix to support it. Security analysts can then use the products from threat integration to assist decision-makers in understanding each threat's *modus operandi*, critical vulnerabilities, and how they interrelate in the operational space. Getting this right will enhance the analytical process. You get to appreciate the security environment better for options to be generated to deal with the problem.

According to Participant 10, "in an integrated approach, coordination is everything." Thomson further indicated that it is not enough to roll out a high sounding framework without backing it up with appropriate coordination instruments to guide its implementation." He also added that "every integrated approach hinges on information sharing. Let me also clarify that every coordination measure will require information sharing among the stakeholders to be effective. Participant 10 concluded that "The ECOWAS Commission may need to be deliberate about its (coordination) implementation, or the integrated approach will also count among the list heap of documents awaiting attention at the headquarters."

Participant 12 explained that ECOWAS must pursue the threat integration idea and enhance its coordination mechanisms to avoid operational confusion. She declared that "Post integration matters that especially arise could derail the whole efforts. We can avoid interagency and thematic confusion by establishing effective coordination measures that focus all efforts toward attaining the overall objective." For Participant 8, "focus on tangible and achievable goals cuts out unnecessary and makes it easier for planners, role players, and decision-makers to pull their capacities and capabilities together to contain the threat."

Research Question 2

RQ2: How well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security problems that confront the region? I identified two main themes and seven subthemes in RQ2. Theme 3 – ECOWAS' preparedness has the following subthemes: force generation, decentralization of national response mechanisms, Lack of Supranational Sanctioning

Instrument, and coordination mechanisms. Theme 4 - ECOWAS peace and security architecture has the following subthemes: ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, early warning mechanisms, and ECOWAS standby force.

Theme 3: ECOWAS Preparedness toward Managing Regional Security. All respondents interviewed also testified to the regional organization's ability to use military and diplomatic means to address conflicts in the region. ECOWAS preparedness toward those interventions was, to a large extent, attributed to the institution's ability to generate force and its decentralized national response mechanism. The respondents were equally unanimous in acknowledging that the organization was fraught with problems that hindered its preparatory efforts such as lack of potent supranational sanctioning instrument, and weak coordination system.

Force generation. The force generation subtheme referred to ECOWAS' preparatory arrangements in the context of its ability to generate a representational force across member states whenever it anticipated the application of force to address problems. According to Participant 4, the United Nations Charter, the United Nations principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the Constitutive Act of the African Union made legitimate for ECOWAS to use force as part of its conflict management strategy. Participant 4 also postulated that the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) was given effect by a Plan of Action (PoA) that, among other arrangements, activates the deployment of the ECOWAS Stand-By Force (ESBF).

In Participant 5's view, the ESBF has been successful in no small extent because of the commitment of a handful of member states who have continuously played lead

roles in troop deployments. Participant 5 cites how ECOMOG's Nigerian led preemptive deployments in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Guinea Bissau, and the Gambia saved the region from catastrophic civil wars. Both Participant 5 and Participant 3 asserted that, in most cases, the timely intervention of the ESBF had worked. However, participant 6 was emphatic that ECOMOG's intervention activities were not applied evenly across all countries. For example, Participant 6 compared how ECOWAS used military forces to pressurize President Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia out of power whereas, the same organization overlooked similar cases involving Guinea and Togo. Participant 6 also capped his assertion with an example in a rhetorical question that "For example, how do you expect President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo to allow an organization he was leading to intervene in his country?" Therefore, it became evident during the study that ECOWAS' resolve to apply military force in member states had been selective. Thus, the level of each country's military and diplomatic clout determined how it managed its security problems.

Decentralization of national response mechanisms. The need to decentralize the various national response mechanisms also came up during the interviews. Participant 7 indicated that the regional level frameworks depended so much on the information feeds they received from the member states. He, however, revealed that virtually all member states have a centralized national response system that does not facilitate the easy acquisition of inputs from the suburban areas across the region. Participant 9 indicated that having a decentralized national response network that had links with the regional architecture will see the information acquisition process down to grassroots levels,

enhance policy development, and also facilitate the planning and implementation of programs.

Participant 11 extolled ECOWAS Commission's determination to ensuring interagency coordination among member states. He also indicated his satisfaction with ECOWAS' cooperation with multilateral institutions toward a speed response to conflicts in the region. Participant 11 added that through the West African Police Information System (WAPIS) program, member states, ECOWAS Commission, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the European Union (EU) were collaborating in a centralized data sharing arrangements to hinder criminality in the region. Participant 12 agreed with Participant 11 but also pointed out that the centralized option for the WAPIS program faced take-off delays due to technical, administrative, and financial constraints. Hence, a decentralized option was, thus, pursued as a stop-gap measure.

Lack of potent supranational sanctioning instrument. The interviews revealed that many intervention initiatives were frustrated by leaders and representatives of member states who thought their parochial interests would be unfavorably affected. In Participant 11's view, ECOWAS lacked a robust supranational sanctioning mechanism for whipping defaulting member states. He cited Nigeria's arbitrary border closures in defiance of the organization's agreements and protocols.

Participant 6 asserted that leaders with clout among the organization's membership mostly exhibited defiance and impunity. Participant 10 mentioned "Nigeria, Togo, Guinea, and Guinea Bissau as some of the countries that have exhibited that

nonconformist posture without being appropriately sanctioned." Participant 10 further posited that:

ECOWAS interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and Mali succeeded because their respective leaders - Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, Foday Sankoh, Yahya Jammeh, and Capt Amadou Sanogo either did not or might have lost favor among the influential members of the organization at the time.

Coordination mechanisms. The concept of coordination as a critical component in the successful conduct of planning and preparatory works kept popping up in all the interviews. All the respondents held the view that ECOWAS, as a regional organization, ECOWAS needed a robust coordination mechanism that could galvanize member states to support its preparatory activities. Data gathered indicated that ECOWAS' coordination role was central to the planning and preparation of the region's security management arrangements. However, for coordination to be effective, it needed to end with each component fulfilling its obligations and responsibilities toward achieving the common goal. For instance, Participant 6, while lamenting the organization's coordination problems, indicated that "ECOWAS is just a secretariat, they can only coordinate." Participant 10 affirmed Participant 6's position when he stated the following: "as much as possible, what ECOWAS can do is to play facilitating the role of giving that kind of coordinating platform, but it is the member states who ultimately call the shots."

Participant 9 stated that "many ECOWAS Commission's major planning programs are thwarted by disinterest from some key member states. In this case, all the coordination activities are nip in the bud." He also added that "one of the reasons for

transforming the ECOWAS Secretariat into ECOWAS Commission was to de-emphasize winding conventions and protocols by enhancing the Commission's ability to coordinate decisions from the ECOWAS Authority without passing them through lengthy national ratification processes." He, however, quizzed, "but what do we see going on now?" It is the same Heads of Governments who paralyze the process through other means like withholding troop contributions and deployments, slow-paced diplomatic accesses, and squeezing funds for the commission's preparatory works." He concluded.

Theme 4: ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture. Under this theme, respondents discussed ECPF. The ECPF included early warning mechanisms, ECOWAS' anti-terrorism plan, and ECOWAS' management of intraregional and cross-regional initiatives. All the respondents acknowledged that, despite all the security management mechanisms, the ECOWAS peace and security architecture continued to face many challenges. In this regard, Participant 3 stated that "ECOWAS as an institution may have to play its role, but there are obvious implementation challenges with some of these documents. There are also lots of issues with resources; member states' political will especially." Participant 9 indicated that:

Ironically, some of these security management mechanisms represent the same issues that confront the ECOWAS security architecture. Consider the difficulties ECOWAS goes through with member states any time it has to mobilize troops from its rapid response standby force. Also, look at the struggle it undergoes in mobilizing funding and logistical support to kick-start its counterterrorism plans.

The mountain of problems it has in dealing with various rival counterterrorism groups across the region will help you understand my point.

ECOWAS conflict prevention framework. In ECOWAS' strife to addressing the difficulties it has with managing security issues in the region, it, in January 2008, crafted the ECPF to guide its conceptualization, implementation, and evaluation of conflict prevention protocols, agreements, and instruments. The documents included the 1977 Accord on Non-Aggression and Defence (ANAD), The 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence (PMAD); The 1993 Revised Treaty of ECOWAS; The Declaration of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons; and The 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping, and Security. The ECPF articulates measures for implementing the provisions of the 1999 Mechanism with a focus on conflict prevention, human security, and peacebuilding.

Participant 5 listed some of the related ECPF objectives include: Mainstreaming conflict prevention into ECOWAS' operational mechanism; deepening conceptual understanding of conflict prevention; strengthening member states' and CSOs' conflict prevention and peacebuilding capacity; and enabling ECOWAS' planning and execution capabilities in proactive, integrated conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies. Participant 5 also took a more in-depth insight into what he thought the human security aspect of what the ECPF was to achieve and concluded:

If you look at current or modern security issues, we are looking at issues of human security. If I say human security, I mean people-centered security,

whereby we are looking at people's needs. In terms of the ECOWAS security management system, there has to be a drastic shift from the state-centered approach to the human-centered approach. We can make a lot of progress in managing our security system when we address people's needs.

In the same light, Participant 12 indicated that "ECOWAS has demonstrated some capacity to apply a combination of military and non-military approaches to preventing, mitigating, or containing conflicts in the region." She cited ECOWAS' use of a combination of military threats and diplomatic engagements to force Captain Amadou Sanogo of Mali and Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia to hand over power without furthering conflicts in 2012 and 2016 respectively. However, she added her voice to the human security imperatives the ECPF is meant to highlight by asserting:

The ECPF seeks to ensure regional security from the grassroots; hence, the phrase "from an ECOWAS of States to an ECOWAS of the people" became the organization's key slogan. Accordingly, ECOWAS designed the framework to focus more on human security with an emphasis on conflict prevention through a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy.

Early warning mechanisms. According to Participant 8, ECOWAS mainly operates a dualistic Early Warning system comprising internal and external sources for getting timely information on threats to security in the region. ECOWAS established its internal Early Warning system as part of Article 58 of the revised Treaty and the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security. The external sources comprised the organization's

partnership with the ECOWAS member states, other regional organizations. The external sources also included Civil Society Organizations like WANEP and the Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa (REWARD), which is part of a broader U.S. Government Early Warning and Response Partnership (EWARP).

The information on the ECOWAS Early Warning System was corroborated by Participants 1, 2, and 6. Participants 6 and 1 were unanimous in the ECOWAS Early Warning System's effectiveness. They also added that the existing cooperation among the various stakeholders was being coordinated by the WAPIS. WAPIS is a data-sharing institution created in 2010 under the auspices of the European Development Fund to monitor transnational crime and terrorism in West Africa.

The ECOWAS standby force. The ECOWAS standby force is one of the critical components of the ECPF. Participant 9 assessed the long-standing capacity problems of ECOWAS, and instead demanded ECOWAS to explore the possibilities in deepening its security cooperation with the AU on the African Standby Force (ASF) to mitigate its challenges. Participant 9 eulogized the successes of the ESF among other Regional Communities' standby for arrangements and clarified that:

The ESF is the ECOWAS component of the ASF and is under the Operational Control of the African Union. Per the AU policy doctrine, each Regional Community on the continent was to compose a regional standby contingent, comprising multidisciplinary military, police and civilian components, ready to be deployed to intervene in critical security situations. The ESF may need to leverage on the standby arrangement with the ASF to enhance its capacity.

Participant 7 was with the opinion that the Standby Forces concept needed an overhaul to make it more effective. He called for better coordination measures and stakeholder cooperation to facilitate cross-regional support among the various Regional Communities. He illustrated that:

If, for example, ECOWAS needed troop or logistical assistance for imminent deployment, they should contact SADC directly without passing through the AU bureaucracies." "Although this might require some bilateral arrangements among the Regional Communities, it will ease a lot of pressure on them and their troop-contributing countries.

Participant 2 began by stating that ECOWAS' preparedness toward internecine conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone was especially commendable. However, he lamented that "the organization's overdependence on external support, lead-nation, and a few regular troop-contributing countries; while a bulk of the member states stood aloof, engendered fatigue among these particular group of stakeholders." He expressed his reservations about the ESF's ability to contain new and emerging security threats. He indicated that "ECOWAS needs to do something very drastic to be able to turn the tide in its favor. Also, in line with Participant 7's viewpoint, Participant 2 said that.

Even though ECOWAS has many security-related protocols and agreements, deep operational experience, and better security management record when compared with other Regional Communities on the continent, the evolving nature of threats in the region has overwhelmed those capacities. The organization has bitter experiences with handling the Malian crisis, management of terrorist threats in the

region, and the lusterless external donor support. ECOWAS may, therefore, have to review its support base to include bilateral arrangements with sister Regional Communities on the continent to enhance the ESF's capacity.

Research Question 3

RQ3 - What implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its current scheme of conflict management strategy? This RQ had one theme, three subthemes, and two sub-subthemes. The subthemes comprised non-adherence to existing agreements and protocols, funding, and external interference. The theme of external interference had direct interference and indirect interference as sub-sub-themes.

Theme 5: Mandate Implementation Challenges. Respondents cited the mandate subthemes like non-adherence to existing agreements and protocols, funding, and external interference as some of the factors militating against ECOWAS' ability to implement the action plan for its conflict prevention framework.

Nonadherence to existing agreements and protocols. ECOWAS' adopted the ECPF in its quest to operationalize the 1999 Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security. Member states' adherence to existing security protocols and agreements was considered as vital to mandate implementation by all respondents. Participant 6 summed it succinctly as follows:

I think, for me, if you read the various protocols or mechanisms, for instance, on peacekeeping, conflict management, and all that, you will realize that it is clear. In terms of the strategy, I think my issue is probably with their implementation.

Even when you take the ECPF, it is clearly defined, and it is good that it is not just ECOWAS itself going out there to implement all these strategies but also about the involvement of key stakeholders – the member states.

Participant 10 indicated that "the protocol that set up of the security architecture are all available, but the implementation largely also rests with member states." He also expressed disquiet at some member state leaders who were so influential in the region that they could frustrate any effort by ECOWAS when they felt implementation could threaten their interests. Participant 10 also mentioned Guinea, where many attempts by ECOWAS to mediate electoral disputes were rejected and eventually postponing the elections. Participant 9 expressed similar sentiments by stating that, "one single most troublesome challenge to ECOWAS' mandate implementation is the apathy of some member states' and even sometimes, the mightier ones who deliberately outmaneuver the organization and obstructing its efforts.

Funding. The low financial capacity of governments in the region has hampered their ability to support ECOWAS' programs. For instance, Participant 5 indicated that many countries in the West African community could not honor their financial obligations to ECOWAS because of their low financial capacities. Participant 9 submitted that "The region's low economic base is part of the reasons for its inability to finance ECOWAS programs adequately. Governments would normally prioritize their internal security over funding the organization."

Notes taken during the interviews generally pointed to a direct correlation between ECOWAS funding problems and its ability to implement programs. Participant 4

expressed the view that “implementation of new frameworks by ECOWAS has been hindered by the organization's inability to generate funds.” Participant 2 indicated that the funding problems have resulted in ECOWAS, soliciting for financial assistance from entities outside the region like the UN, EU, AU, and more affluent countries like the United States and some in Europe. Participant 2 added that most of this support either failed or came with donor conditionalities that were not favorable to the organization's core objectives.

Participant 4 summed-up the effects of ECOWAS' weak financial capacity on its ability to implement mandates. He said, "We can have all the robust measures or whatever, but if we don't have the internally generated funds to implement them, they will just be on the shelves, and nothing will happen." Thus, the prevailing fragile economic circumstances among ECOWAS member states have contributed to their inability to fully fund the organization's budget. The state of affairs has compelled ECOWAS to depend mainly on unreliable foreign support and conditionality, which ultimately affects effective mandate implementation.

External interference: The ECOWAS region has a long history of foreign interference in its internal affairs. Interviewees made references to external intrusion as an inhibiting factor in ECOWAS' mandate implementation. Generally, respondents made two significant allusions to foreign interventions affecting ECOWAS' programs. These have been sub-subthemed as direct interference and indirect interference. The two constructs are, however, not wholly distinct from each other. They are interrelated and

are manipulated by the perpetrators in a mutually reinforcing manner to achieve their objectives.

Direct external interference. Direct external interference referred to instances of unsolicited physical deployments of military and paramilitary troops, and intelligence services by countries outside the ECOWAS region. Participant 9 stated that "By directly deploying combat military units to Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, and perhaps, Burkina Faso, and Niger, France is undermining ECOWAS' mandate in the region; those deployments are also tantamount to a regional invasion." He added that "I don't care whether they sought the consent of the individual countries or not; that's another matter altogether."

Participant 8 deplored the establishment and operations of the French-led G5 Sahel infantry forces in the West African Sahel region and declared that it undermines the trust people have in ECOWAS as the preeminent organization with the mandate to deploy troops across the region.

Indirect external interference. Indirect external interference referred to covert and overt activities as well as wide-ranging networks of security cooperation established by foreign nations with ECOWAS member states. Participant 12 described indirect external interference as "exploitative and more fatal to ECOWAS mandate implementation than the physical deployments of troops in the Sahel or the Maghreb regions; since this is how they (foreign powers) weaken the cohesion of the union." Participant 8 saw the external interference in West Africa as reminiscent of the power play of the Congo. He further explained that "In this ECOWAS region, however, I see the competition for preponderance between France and Nigeria. While Nigeria might represent ECOWAS'

interest, France is engaged in protecting its neocolonial interest." Participant 8 further indicated that "Although there are others like the United States, the United Kingdom, and even China involved, these countries' intrusion is not as pervasive as that of France. The effects of their activities on the region's stability are enormous."

Participant 10 explained his view on external interference as follows: "G5- Sahel is being funded and spearheaded by France. Some of the countries involved in G5 Sahel are not even part of ECOWAS. ECOWAS has no control, and it has no troops in the Sahel." Participant 10 went on to add that, "Countries like France and others have their interest that dictates some of the policies. Whether those policies affect ECOWAS or not, they don't care. It's only about achieving their aims." Participant 2 explained his notion of indirect external interference when he said, "look at the information of the G5 Sahel. You can also link that to our colonial history where France and some member states have post-colonial arrangements binding them to channel resources to G5 Sahel rather than ECOWAS."

Participant 5's comment on the interference was about how former colonial masters extended their rivalries than in Europe to Anglo-Franco-Lusophone divide in West Africa. He indicated that "this divide has become pervasive. It has therefore made it difficult for member states to have consensus on matters of common interest." Regarding the colonial divide, Participant 9 said that "You see, the seed of division sowed by France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom in the region have gain roots, and they continue to nourish it to sustain their exploitative activities." He added that "Some of

these European countries see ECOWAS as a stumbling block and would do anything to degrade its influence in the region."

Summary

In this chapter, I discussed the setting for the research, the demographics, data collection, and data analysis. I provided the outcomes of the analysis of 12 interviews conducted and documents reviewed from the data gathered. Using the NVivo software, I established five main themes, 14 subthemes, and two sub-subthemes for the analysis. I also applied a thematic analysis framework to identify themes and interpret the data collected.

In RQ1, participants testified to ECOWAS' effectiveness in its use of military and diplomatic means to address conflicts in the region. Participants indicated that, while ECOWAS' ability to generate expeditionary force was comparably more effective than other regional communities on the continent, the organization's effectiveness in the management of new and emerging threats to regional security needed improvement. Also, three respondents stated that ECOWAS is required to be empowered with a more potent supranational sanctioning instrument to be able to bring recalcitrant leaders to order. Five participants admitted that adopting an integrated threat concept will enhance ECOWAS' security management and also advocated for a more pragmatic coordination system to improve the organization's effectiveness in the region's security management.

RQ2 sought responses to ECOWAS preparedness in managing new and emerging security problems in the region. Participants mentioned the ECOWAS Commission as the critical branch at the ECOWAS headquarters that was mandated by the peace and

security provisions of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty to manage regional security. Participants highlighted the contrast between ECOWAS' better preparedness toward interventions in internecine conflicts and its lackluster approach toward the new and emerging threats to security. The ECOWAS' overdependence on external support, a lead nation like Nigeria, and a few regular troop-contributing countries engendered resource fatigue among these particular groups of stakeholders.

RQ3 related to the implementation challenges that confront ECOWAS in its management of regional security problems. Especially the new and emerging threats to peace and stability. Responses from theme five mainly addressed this research question. Generally, responses from interviews and documents analyzed recognized ECOWAS' successes, especially; containing civil wars in the region. Participants also acknowledged the various regional initiatives from both member states and CSOs in strengthening ECOWAS' resolve to manage the security challenges.

All 12 participants acknowledged the organization's failure to replicate its renowned ability to manage civil wars and also admitted its inability to address the new and emerging threats to security like violent extremism, terrorism, cross-border crimes, cybercrime, and transnational organized crime plaguing the region. It appeared that the adoption of integrated threat management as an analytical concept could give impetus for operationalizing the ECPF and consequently enhance ECOWAS' ability to mitigate the threats to regional security. It also emerged from the responses that the coordination measures to facilitate effective implementation of the ECPF were inadequate. Participants

admitted the need for additional physical coordination mechanisms with a framework for accountability at all levels of responsibility to ensure its effectiveness.

In Chapter 5, I provided my interpretations and findings from the themes as they related to the research questions. I then discussed the limitations of the study and made recommendations for adoption by ECOWAS and future studies. I also discussed the study's implications for social change.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

Although ECOWAS has successfully combined military deployments with diplomatic engagements to contain internecine conflicts that bedeviled some member states, it has continued to grapple with the sustenance of the region's fragile peace and democratic experiments. The emergence of new and emerging threats to peace and security has added another layer of security threat to the existing internecine conflicts. The twin threats of internal conflicts and new and emerging security threats have thrown ECOWAS' strategies off-balance, rendering it ineffective (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013). The worsening security situation in West Africa has denigrated the quality of life of its citizens (Kieh & Kalu, 2013; von Soest, & De Juan, 2018).

The purpose of this study was to explore the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS') approach to regional security management in West Africa. The research was a qualitative exploratory case study. I used purposive and snowball sampling techniques. I relied on in-depth interviews and intertextual analysis of documents. I recruited practitioners from the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, think tanks/subject matter experts from WANEP, and academic researchers from KAIPTC and NDC. The study's focus was on understanding the ineffectiveness of ECOWAS' approach to the region's security challenges.

The study revealed that although ECOWAS had adopted an integrated approach concept, it was within the cooperation and coordination of stakeholder agencies and

institutions. No existing data indicated ECOWAS' application of the integrated threat management concept, nor was such a proposal found in any literature, thus justifying the relevance of the research. Therefore, this study has proffered the application of integrated threat management as a potent operational concept for handling the region's security setting's growing complexity.

Interpretation of the Findings

The study was qualitative with a focus on formative evaluation research methodology. The methodology enhanced the depth and rigor in analyzing the themes emerging from responses on ECOWAS' effectiveness, preparations, and implementation challenges in its approach to regional security management. I applied the PET and PFT to conceptualize the problem in the context of ECOWAS' security management strategies in a wide range of regional and sociopolitical circumstances.

I applied the thematic analysis framework in reviewing the main themes and subthemes to answer the RQs. Adopting the thematic analysis framework enabled me to substantiate crosscutting issues from responses to the RQs. I identified two main themes and six subthemes for RQ1; two main themes and seven subthemes for RQ2; and one central theme, three subthemes, and two sub-subthemes for RQ3.

Research Question 1

RQ1 was, how effective is ECOWAS' current approach to security management in the region?

Theme 1: Effectiveness of ECOWAS. Responses gathered on the effectiveness of ECOWAS in regional security management indicated that the organization has been

successful in dealing with member states' internal conflicts but unsuccessful in managing the new and emerging threats to security afflicting the region. Apart from responses from the interviews, there were commentaries from academia, security experts, and practitioners on ECOWAS' effectiveness in shifting or adjusting strategies to contain security problems in the region (Odobo et al., 2017; Lar, 2009). Other researchers also established that ECOWAS was the only entity with strong organizational capacity and the mandate to conduct peace operations across the region (Odobo et al., 2017). Findings from the data gathered for this study, however, indicated that the organization needed to rethink its response to asymmetric security threats like violent extremism, transnational organized crimes, and terrorism that continue to ravage the region. Theme 1 had the following subthemes: successful interventions, unsuccessful interventions, and involvement of CSOs.

I identified two main perspectives for respondents' assessments of the accomplishment of the successful intervention subtheme. While one view centered on the intervention processes, the other was aligned to the mission's end-state to evaluate its success. Although both the process and the end-state criteria provided a sound basis for assessment, it is the former that determines the worth of the latter in peace operations. Hence, the process becomes weightier in evaluating ECOWAS' effectiveness. In explaining the standards required for assessing what constitutes successful intervention peace operations in Africa, Rodriguez (2015) indicated that experts have associated the most successful peacekeeping missions with effective political strategies, clear goals, and expectations, and were well trained and funded.

Responses for the unsuccessful intervention subtheme mainly consisted of ECOWAS' lackluster handling of new and emerging security threats in the region. The Boko Haram terror crisis, the terror crisis in the Sahel and Maghreb regions of West Africa, the thriving transnational organized crime, and cybercrime in the region came up as problems that ECOWAS had failed in addressing. Some of the reasons assigned for ECOWAS' failures included the ineffectiveness of its conflict management strategies, interferences of powerful foreign countries in the region's security affairs, and the overlapping nature of the crisis beyond the organization's jurisdiction.

All the reasons adduced for unsuccessful interventions subtheme sounded reasonable; however, the most emphasized was ECOWAS' ineffectiveness in conflict management strategies. The PET states that organizational structures are characterized by stability and incrementalism; stability referred to a long period of the relatively unchanged form (stasis), and incrementalism, a radical change over a short period (Desmarais, 2019; Sabatier & Weible, 2018, p. 55). By inference, ECOWAS' period of stasis (while managing intrastate and election-related conflicts) was punctuated by new and emerging security threats that require the adoption of the appropriate conflict management strategy to handle.

Respondents called on ECOWAS to increase the involvement of CSOs and improve its engagement of regional and subregional groups operating in the region's peace and security space. The call was right since information acquisition is a critical factor in the planning and execution of security operations. CSOs such as WANEP and REWARD have the reach and access to vital information on security-related matters in

the region up to the grassroots level. Forging greater collaboration with them can enhance the triggering of early warning of imminent threats to peace and security and improve ECOWAS' operational planning process.

Theme 2: Integrated Threat Management. Just having a plan does not provide an adequate guarantee for the successful conduct of security operations. It is the employment of an appropriate concept for the planning process that ensures the plan's thoroughness and credibility. It emerged during the data collection that ECOWAS had not been practicing the integrated threat management approach as part of its regional security planning strategy. It also appeared that the system of integrated approach practiced by the ECOWAS Commission pertained to creating stronger bonds among military, police, and civilians in the planning and execution of operations. For example, ECOWAS had programs for strengthening interagency collaborations like the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy and WAPIS.

Additionally, the integrated approach as envisaged in the key objectives of the ECPF reiterated the thrust toward the interagency approach. ECOWAS crafted the counterterrorism strategy to give effect to aspects of the ECPF. The ECOWAS counterterrorism strategy also recognized “the linkages between terrorism and other forms of criminality, including trans-national organized crimes” (ECOWAS, 2016f, preamble, para. 13). Indeed, literature has established connections between these new and emerging threats as one layer and the existing destructive conflicts as another (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Cherkaoui, 2017; Marc et al., 2015; Security Council Report 2011; UN News, 2019). Therefore, it is surprising that ECOWAS failed to notice the nexus between

the two layers of threats to regional security for inclusion in the ECPF and the ECOWAS counterterrorism strategy.

In planning and strategizing for security operations, continuous analysis of the threat factor is a vital step. Planners must, therefore, keep focus continually on the threat and avoid distractions. Setting up interagency networks and coordination systems will help in the efficient mobilization of resources and information sharing. Such networks and coordination systems cannot replace or diminish the importance of a threat-focused process in security management.

It emerged from the data collection that ECOWAS lagged in having a determinative coordination instrument that will guide the implementation of the organization's frameworks and strategies. Even the best plan can fail if coordination derogated. Besides that, issues regarding information sharing and interagency competition came up as severe drawbacks to the organization's existing coordination arrangements. Considering ECOWAS' stakeholder dynamics, both the conduct and the implementation of the integrated threat management products will depend on an enduring coordination arrangement to be effective. On that account, the integrated threat management approach will require a simultaneous improvement of the existing coordination measures to make it operational.

RQ1 was the overarching question for the study. The main objective of the question was to ascertain how effective the ECOWAS approach has been in managing the complex security threats confronting West Africa. It emerged that although ECOWAS had succeeded in containing intrastate conflicts, it has been unsuccessful in its

response to the nonconventional security threats that continued to devastate the region. Although ECOWAS had rolled out the ECPF, a counterterrorism strategy, and some interagency integration arrangements to contain the problem, it appeared that it failed to consider the nexus between the two layers of threats in the entire scheme. The PFT provides a framework of interrelated concepts, ideas, and principles. ECOWAS needs to incorporate integrated threat management as part of the conceptual approach to enhance the effectiveness of its security management strategy.

Research Question 2

RQ2 was, how well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security problems that confront the region?

Theme 3: ECOWAS Preparedness toward Managing Regional Security.

Successful implementation of security plans hinges on how thorough the preparation stage was carried out. Discussion on the theme revolved around ECOWAS' ability to deploy troops, decentralization of national response mechanisms, lack of supranational sanctioning instrument, and coordination mechanisms. Respondents unanimously assessed ECOWAS' preparation toward regional security management as a mixture of successes and failures.

On the organization's ability to generate expeditionary force to maintain or restore peace and security across the region, it was realized that ECOWAS was comparatively successful in intrastate conflicts than in the new and emerging threats to regional security. Planning is not only a prerequisite for the conduct of security operations; it traverses the entire process since there must be a continuous reevaluation of the situation. The

planning stage dovetails into preparation, so without its constant evaluation, a gap created can reduce the effectiveness of the preparatory phase of the operation. The planning-preparation gap became apparent as many interventions rolled out by ECOWAS to manage the region's security failed to suppress the new and emerging threats that have overwhelmed substantial parts of the area.

The study results revealed that the centralized nature of national response mechanisms among ECOWAS member states hampered smoother preparations toward the execution of the organization's operational mandate. Also, the weak bond between national response networks and ECOWAS Commission led to delays and, sometimes, abortive security missions. ECOWAS realized the gap and introduced the WAPIS and ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy interagency coordination programs and initiatives like the ECOWAS Vision 2020 - a people-centered and people-driven document to reduce the state-centric tendencies among members. ECOWAS Commission, the implementing department of ECOWAS-led security missions, relies heavily on national institutions for technical, administrative, and financial support for preparatory activities. The ECOWAS Commission would have to fashion out a mechanism to sustain the momentum of the initiatives it has rolled out toward enhancing integration.

It emerged from the study that member states' egoistic attitude and neglect to honor conventions, protocols, and agreements contributed to ECOWAS' inability to carry out some missions. Instances, where some countries could decide not to comply with the organization's resolutions or cooperate with the ECOWAS Commission, they undermine

the entire security management process by honoring their contribution toward planned missions. The need for a potent supranational sanctioning instrument must be taken seriously. ECOWAS can check those acts of impunity by applying the instrument to sanction defaulting member states.

Coordination is the fulcrum for all preparatory activities. For coordination to be effective, it needs a sound planning doctrine that is understood and committed to by all stakeholders, proper communication channels, and a functioning framework for accountability at all levels. Even though ECOWAS had some coordination arrangements in place, they lacked those qualities. Respondents lamented that member states' commitment to ECOWAS' security management activities was not enabling. Also, the lack of functioning accountability framework allowed security architecture players and other stakeholders to abdicate responsibilities since they could easily shift the blame elsewhere.

Theme 4: ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture. The ECOWAS revised treaty of 1993 incorporated issues on security, conflict resolution, and giving the primary responsibility for the full and effective implementation of strategy with member states. The 2019 ECOWAS Counterterrorism Action Plan also maintains the primary responsibility for implementing the plan with member states (ECOWAS, 1993; ECOWAS, 2019c). Although ECOWAS has developed additional strategies and frameworks like the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 and the ECOWAS Counterterrorism Action Plan, all those initiatives were mostly a regurgitation of previous arrangements. There were no significant shifts that strengthened the ECOWAS

Commission's remit in security management. Consigning the ECOWAS Commission to coordination roles while assigning the responsibility for implementation to member states have contributed to many instances where the member states pick and choose which security threat needed urgent attention.

It emerged from some of the documents reviewed that some ECOWAS governments' neglect, mistakes, and complicities in the spread of terror threats and violent extremism by groups like the Boko Haram, AQIM, and other criminal and terror affiliates operating in the Sahel region (Feldman, 2009; Okolo & Akubo, 2019). Also, doctrinal differences among the member states will pose enormous challenges for ECOWAS in coordinating nonconventional operations because countries in the region have unique tactics, techniques, and procedures for asymmetric conflicts. Additionally, some member states were identified as members of external organizations like G5 Sahel, MNJTF, and the LCBC, thereby complicating the chain of command and operational procedures. The implication is that member states will encounter challenges relating to operational doctrine, conflict of interest, and command and control, which are critical elements in leading the implementation of strategies.

The ECOWAS Commission stands in a better position to plan, coordinate, and lead the implementation of peace and security operations. The PFT provides a framework for managing interrelated concepts, ideas, and principles to deal with "unanticipated or unintended consequences of previous policy designs" (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 124). The ECOWAS Commission needs to be given Operational Control and Tasking Authority statuses for all mission execution components to enable it to employ the peace

and security architecture under a unified command and control to implement its mandate effectively. The ECPF will need to be enhanced with a threat-focused conceptual approach in standardized operating procedures as well as synchronizing the headquarters and the ESBF elements' efforts.

Research Question 3

RQ3 was, what implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its current scheme of conflict management strategy?

Theme 5: Mandate Implementation Challenges. The susceptibility of West Africa to the cataclysmic global security setting has contributed to the region's fluid security threat landscape. Consequently, ECOWAS has, over the years, rolled out one peace and security initiative after another to deal with the problems found in its planning and implementation reviews. It was, thus, not unexpected when respondents readily pointed out weaknesses in the existing peace and security architecture that needed rectification.

Although respondents cited problems like non-adherence to existing agreements, funding, and external interference, it surfaced that the ECOWAS Commission needed to review its operational frameworks and conceptual approach to match the ever-growing challenges to the region's security. Every diplomatic environment must anticipate nonconformities for appropriate measures to be put in place to deal with them. Member states' non-adherence to agreements and protocols could, hence, be addressed by developing convincing conflict management alternatives that can mitigate and eventually contain the problem.

Respondents indicated that funding ECOWAS missions were one of the major challenges the institution faced. There are several reasons for ECOWAS' funding problems, including the region's low economic base that has made weaker member states incapable of meeting their financial obligations to the organization and donor fatigue or failures. ECOWAS will continue to encounter funding problems so far as the region's weak economy combines with the double-layered threats to peace and security to form a vicious cycle lingers. Also, the ECPF has 14 sets of key issue areas of focus referred to as 14 Components (Atuobi, 2010).

ECOWAS objectives were too many. Considering the complexities of the security setting of West Africa, a focused approach could be accomplished through a piecemeal or limited objective approach. For example, the ECPF implementation could be in phases, and each phase allotted a set of key focus areas for accomplishment. The limited objective approach will also facilitate thoroughness and enhance financial prudence.

ECOWAS' overreliance on donor support to fund its programs and operations is not sustainable. The organization will continue to encounter financial difficulties since the funding problems have become intractable, and donors get demotivated when they don't see results. Similarly, Nigeria, which usually volunteered lead-nation role for most ECOWAS peace operations missions and bearing the bulk of the organization's bureaucracies at its headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, is saddled with combating the Boko Haram terror group. ECOWAS headquarters needs to consider a more effective security management strategy to motivate donors and find efficient means to get recalcitrant member states to honor their financial obligations. ECOWAS may also collaborate with

the UN to support its missions with enabling units like logistics, transport, aviation, engineering, and Explosive Ordinance Disposal.

The fragility of West African economies and the countries' colonial history are contributing to the region's susceptibility to external influences of various forms. Respondents indicated that the external interferences affecting ECOWAS' security management system appear directly and indirectly. ECOWAS' dependence on external donor funding support for the conduct operations while also blaming foreign interference for its operational failures sounds paradoxical. ECOWAS needs to realize that, in international diplomacy, the saying that "there is no such thing as a free lunch" and *quid pro quo* are enduring principles. ECOWAS and its member states need to find ways to reduce donor dependency syndrome by widening its internal funding sources and ensuring a prudent financial system.

Limitations of the Study

The study type was a qualitative exploratory case study based on a formative evaluation research methodology. The study focused on the effectiveness of ECOWAS' regional security management approach in the face of the further complications created by the emergence of new and emerging threats to security in West Africa. Although the study delved into the details of the subject matter, it has some unavoidable limitations.

First, West Africa is linguistically diverse with French, English, and Portuguese as major national languages. However, I used English to collect data throughout the process from participants, including those from non-Anglophone countries at ECOWAS headquarters. The situation could have affected the quality of the response since the non-

Anglophone participants would have been better expressing their views in their respective national languages. To mitigate the problem, I carried out more follow-on questions with the non-Anglophone participants to get into details with them and to also enable them to clarify their views.

Second, the study would have benefitted from the diversity of the region if I had visited ECOWAS offices in one or two more countries. I would have preferably selected one Francophone and one Lusophone country each for a visit. However, due to financial constraints, I was only able to travel to Ghana and Nigeria for the data collection. To make up for the dialectal deficits, I purposively skewed my interview schedules by shortlisting and prioritizing respondents from Francophone and Lusophone countries at the ECOWAS headquarters.

Recommendations

There are twofold recommendations for this study. The first segment pertains to recommendations for future research, and the second, related to ECOWAS headquarters. However, some recommendations may apply to both sides.

Recommendations for Future Research

Although this study addresses a gap in the literature, there are other areas of equal importance that need scholarly intervention to augment ECOWAS' security management strategy. Firstly, future research can delve into a new Strategic Concept for the ECOWAS security management system. With ECOWAS implementing integrated interagency security management initiatives, there is the need to adopt a new strategic concept to strengthen its strategic foundations and relationship with member states, partners, and

competing organizations engaging in peace operations in the region. A new strategic concept will create the platform for strategic reorientation and consensus-building among stakeholders in the light of the growing complexity in the region's security environment.

Another potential area for future research is the ECOWAS framework for responsibility and accountability. Although ECOWAS has adopted several protocols, agreements, conventions, and memoranda of understanding, it grapples with a clear and coherent framework that guides effective management of responsibility and accountability at all levels. The responsibility and accountability framework will facilitate organizational consistency in evaluation, prompting, and sanctioning systems to stimulate responsible and accountable ethics.

Recommendations for ECOWAS Headquarters

It was part of the study's objectives to contribute to improving ECOWAS' security management capabilities. Aside from future research, it is pertinent also to proffer some recommendations for ECOWAS headquarters. ECOWAS needs to:

- Incorporate the integrated threat management as part of the conceptual approach to enhance the effectiveness of its security management strategy.
- Cut down on headquarters bureaucracies and emphasize on threat-focused response to its security management architecture.
- Increase the involvement of CSOs.
- Promote positive engagement and collaboration with other international and subregional entities operating in the region's peace and security space.

- Reduce donor dependency syndrome by activating alternate funding arrangements, widening its internal funding sources, developing a plan for getting all member states to honor their financial obligations, and ensuring prudent financial system.
- Improve the existing coordination measures to make it operational.
- Establish a functioning responsibility and accountability framework for all key appointments at all levels in its security management system.
- Seek Operational Control and Tasking Authority statuses for all mission execution components to enable it to employ the peace and security assets under a unified command and control system for effective mandate implementation.

Implications

Implications for Social Change

The security situation in West Africa continued to worsen as new and emerging threats to peace and security added another layer of problems to the existing internecine conflicts that have denigrated the quality of life in the region. The purpose of this study was to explore the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS') approach to regional security management in West Africa. The main implication for positive social change for the study will be a region with an effective security management system that guarantees its citizens' hope and aspirations. A secured West Africa will provide confidence for the inflow of international engagements, facilitate interstate exchanges, and energize commercial and socio-cultural activities among its citizens.

Implications for Policy Making and Professional Practice

The study was conducted based on ECOWAS' inability to effectively manage the growing complexity of the security situation in West Africa. However, the commensurability of regional security management systems makes the study receptive to replications outside the context within which it was conducted. Thus, the study has implications for policymaking and professional practice for other regional security organizations and homeland security professionals.

Policy making. Due to the increase in global security threats, many regional organizations have added regional security management to their remits or supported responsible institutions to contain the menace. It was evident from this study that while member states were given the responsibility to implement the mandate, the ECOWAS Commission was only assigned a coordination role. This policy decision needs to be reversed since splitting command and control in security operations often leads to confusion in planning and execution. It is also paradoxical for member states from whom the problems emanate to be the same with the primary responsibility to implement mission mandates to manage the impasse. Therefore, the responsibility for mandate implementation should be taken from member states and assigned to the ECOWAS Commission. Then a framework for accountability could be established for the Commission to be answerable to member states on mandate implementation.

Professional practice. The study challenges the ability of staff officers at the ECOWAS Commission and other regional and national security management departments to adopt an integrated conceptual approach that is threat-focused. Adopting

an integrated doctrine will add another security paradigm to the existing initiatives of the regional and various national security institutions. The study will also inspire professional security officers to explore the threat-focused concept for further prospects in the security management industry.

Summary

In this chapter, I started with an introduction in which I provided a brief insight into the background to the problem, highlighted the purpose of the study, and described the research methodology and data collection process. I then presented the interpretation of findings using themes that emerged from each RQ and also submitted the limitations of the study and how I addressed them in the course of the study. I proceeded to proffer recommendations for future research, proposals for ECOWAS headquarters and indicated the implications the study can have on social change, policymaking, and professional practice.

Conclusion

West Africa faces two layers of threats to peace and security in the region. The first layer of threat to security is the intrastate conflicts based upon which ECOWAS quite successfully added regional security remit and its original mandate of promoting regional economic integration. The second layer of threat to security is the new and emerging themes like violent extremism, terrorism, cross-border crimes, and transnational organized crimes combined with the intrastate conflicts to complicate the region's security dynamics.

This qualitative research focused on ECOWAS' effectiveness in managing twin threats and threats. I drew the findings from this study from face-to-face in-depth interviews and intertextual analysis of documents using the thematic analysis framework. I applied the purposive sampling and the snowball data collection techniques to recruit 12 participants from the academia, subject matter experts, and practitioners who volunteered for the study from KAIPTC and WANEP in Ghana, and ECOWAS Headquarters and NDC in Nigeria.

The study established that ECOWAS had drafted security policy documents and frameworks, adopted several agreements and memoranda of understanding and rolled out an integrated interagency security management system to strengthen coordination and information sharing among its agencies and partners. Similarly, several documents lauded ECOWAS as the best performing regional security organization in Africa, considering its peace operations success, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, the study revealed that the organization grappled with mandate implementation challenges emanating from member states' non-adherence to existing agreements, funding, and external interference. The study also uncovered that ECOWAS does not operate a threat-focused conceptual approach like the integrated threat model as part of its regional security management architecture.

The study proffered recommendations for future research and proposals for ECOWAS headquarters. The recommendations for future studies were: new Strategic Concept for ECOWAS security management system, and ECOWAS framework for responsibility and accountability. The ECOWAS headquarters' recommendations

included incorporating the integrated threat management as part of the ECOWAS conceptual approach, emphasizing threat-focused response, improving CSOs' involvement, and collaborating with other entities operating in the region's security management space. The main implication for positive social change for the study will be an effective regional security management system that guarantees the hopes and aspirations of its citizens and provides the confidence for the inflow of international engagements for improved living conditions.

References

- Aall, P., & Crocker, C. A. (Eds.) (2016). *Minding the gap: African conflict management in a time of change*. Retrieved from <https://www.cigionline.org/publications/minding-gap-african-conflict-management-time-change>
- Abbass, M. I. (2014). No retreat no surrender conflict for survival between Fulani pastoralists and farmers in Northern Nigeria. *European Scientific Journal*, 8(1), 331-346. <https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2012.v8n1p%25p>
- Abbey, E. E., (2016). Vehicle owners to obtain ECOWAS Brown Card effective June 1. *Graphic online*. Retrieved from <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/vehicle-owners-to-obtain-ecowas-brown-card-effective-june-1.html>
- Abubakari, A., & Longi, F. Y. T. (2014). Pastoralism and violence in northern Ghana: Socialization and professional requirement. *International Journal of Research in Social Sciences*, 4(5), 102-111. Retrieved from <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/PASTORALISM-AND-VIOLENCE-IN-NORTHERN-GHANA%3A-AND-Abubakari/bd1bbba241bc9ad9c82a37d1e9a8aba8e67de9c8>
- Achankeng, F. (2013). Conflict and conflict resolution in Africa: Engaging the colonial factor. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 13(2). Retrieved from <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/view/101863>
- Adams, B. G., & van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2017). Identity and acculturation: The case for

Africa. *Journal of Psychology in Africa*, 27(2), 115-121.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/14330237.2017.1301699>

Adebayo, A. G. (1995). Jangali: Fulani pastoralists and colonial taxation in Northern Nigeria. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 28(1), 113-150. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org>

Adeleke, A. (1995). The politics and diplomacy of peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS operation in Liberia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33(4), 569-593. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00021443>

Adetula, V. A. O., Bereketeab, R., & Jaiyebo, O. (2016). *Regional economic communities and peacebuilding in Africa: The experiences of ECOWAS and IGAD* (Policy Dialogue no. 12). Retrieved from <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1068566/FULLTEXT01.pdf>

Adeyemi, E. (2015). *Terrorism and transnational security threats in West Africa: A global perspective* [Kindle ed.]. Retrieved from <https://www.amazon.com/Terrorism-Transnational-Security-Threats-Africa-ebook/dp/B0794PMYN2>

Adom, A., Yeboah, A., & Ankrah, A.K. (2016). Constructivism philosophical paradigm: Implication for research, teaching and learning. *Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences*, 4(10), 1-9. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309413398_CONSTRUCTIVISM_PHILOSOPHICAL_PARADIGM_IMPLICATION_FOR_RESEARCH_TEACHING_AND_LEARNING

- Afisi, O. T. (2009). Tracing contemporary Africa's conflict situation to colonialism: A breakdown of communication among natives. *Philosophical Papers and Reviews*, 1(4), 59–66. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/40237061/Tracing_contemporary_Africas_conflict_situation_to_colonialism_A_breakdown_of_communication_among_natives
- African Union Peace and Security. (2012). *Bamako declaration on an African common position on the illicit proliferation, circulation, and trafficking of small arms and light weapons*. Retrieved from <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/bamako-declaration-on-an-african-common-position-on-the-illicit-proliferation-circulation-and-trafficking-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons>
- Agbu, O. (2006). *West Africa's trouble spots and the imperative for peace-building*. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/252853403_West_Africa's_Trouble_Spots_and_the_Imperative_for_Peace-Building
- Aghemelo, A. T. & Ibhasebhor, S. (2006). *Colonialism as a source of boundary dispute and conflict among African states: The World Court Judgement on the Bakassi Peninsula and its Implications for Nigeria*. Retrieved from <http://www.krepublishers.com/02-Journals/JSS/JSS-13-0-000-000-2006-Web/JSS-13-3-000-000-2006-Abst-Text/JSS-13-3-177-181-2006-346-Aghemelo-A-T/JSS-13-3-177-181-2006-346-Aghemelo-A-T-Text.pdf>
- Akanji, O. O. (2019). Sub-regional security challenge: ECOWAS and the war on terrorism in West Africa. *Insight on Africa*, 11(1), 94–112.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0975087818805842>

- Akokpari, J. (2016). Military intervention in Africa's conflicts as a route to peace: strengths and pitfalls. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*. 10(12), DOI: 10.5897/AJPSIR2016.0930
- Alao, A., (2017). *The burden of collective goodwill: the international involvement in the Liberian civil war*. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315240909>
- Al Jazeera and News Agencies. (2018). Suspected rebel fighters kill dozens of Tuareg in Mali. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/suspected-rebel-fighters-kill-dozens-tuareg-mali-180429075636520.html>
- Alusala, N. (2017). Amnesty just one step towards silencing the guns. *ISS Today*. Retrieved from <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/amnesty-just-one-step-towards-silencing-the-guns>
- Amanor-Lartey, E. T. (2015). *A historical overview of ECOWAS intervention in sub-regional conflicts: The case of Sierra Leone*. Retrieved from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273354826>
- Annan, N. (2014). Violent conflicts and civil strife in West Africa: Causes, challenges and prospects. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 3(1), <http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.da>
- Aning, K., & Bah, A. S. (2009). ECOWAS and conflict prevention in West Africa: confronting the triple threats. *Center on International Cooperation*. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/c%20C3%20B4te-divoire/ecowas-and-conflict->

prevention-west-africa-confronting-triple-threats

- Aning, K., Okyere, F., & Abdallah, M. (2012). Addressing emerging security threats in post-Gaddafi Sahel and the ECOWAS response to the Malian crisis. *International Security Sector Advisory Team*. Retrieved from <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Addressing-Emerging-Security-Threats-in-Post-Gaddafi-Sahel-and-the-ECOWAS-Response-to-the-Malian-Crisis>
- Aning, K., & Pokoo, J. (2014). Understanding the nature and threats of drug trafficking to national and regional security in West Africa. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 3(1), Art. 8, doi: <http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.df>
- AP World History Collaborative Review Project. (2011). *Analyze the impact the Berlin conference (1884-1885) had on Africa during this era and the following era*. Retrieved from <https://sites.google.com/a/guhsd.net/ap-world-review-2011/topics/d3>
- Asiwaju, A. (1985). *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic relations across Africa's international 1884-1984*. Retrieved from https://books.google.com/books/about/Partitioned_Africans.html?id=0Wr6GUxdelcC
- Atieno, O.P. (2009). *An analysis of the strengths and limitation of qualitative and quantitative research paradigms*. Retrieved from http://www.scientiasocialis.lt/pec/files/pdf/Atieno_Vol.13.pdf
- Atuobi, S. (2010). *Implementing the ECOWAS conflict prevention framework: Prospects*

and challenges. (Policy Brief 3). Retrieved from

https://issat.dcaf.ch/ser/download/31912/448494/policy_brief_2010_no_3.pdf

Austin, D. (1963). The uncertain frontier: Ghana-Togo. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1(2), 139-145. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/159025>

Ayissi, A., & Sall, I. (Eds.). (2005). *Combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa*. Retrieved from

<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:VdFVPHmTDosJ:www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/combating-the-proliferation-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons-in-west-africa-handbook-for-the-training-of-armed-and-security-forces-326.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=il>

Bamfo, N. (2013). The political and security challenges facing 'ECOWAS' in the twenty-first century: Testing the limits of an organization's reputation. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 3(3). Retrieved from

<https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Political-and-Security-Challenges-Facing-in-the-Bamfo/8c18ed726e60c83b07cf86f9913aceda5d6339c2>

Bannon, I., and Collier, P. (Eds.) (2003). Natural resources and violent conflict: Options and actions. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43(1).

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X04210771>

Bashir, M. (2015). The challenges of building regional security architecture: An appraisal of ECOWAS early warning system. *Humanities and Social Sciences Review*, 04(01). Retrieved from

<http://www.universitypublications.net/hssr/0401/pdf/DE4C552.pdf>

Bassett, T., & Straus, S. (2011). Defending democracy in Côte d'Ivoire: Africa takes a stand. *Foreign Affairs*, 90(4), 130-140. Retrieved from

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23039613>

Bassist, R. (2018). Russia in Africa. *Ifriqiya*, (4)1. Retrieved from

<https://dayan.org/content/russia-africa>

Bax, P. (2017). Secessionist crisis in Cameroon risks sliding into a rebellion. *Bloomberg*.

Retrieved from [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-27/secessionist-crisis-in-cameroon-risks-sliding-into-a-rebellion)

[27/secessionist-crisis-in-cameroon-risks-sliding-into-a-rebellion](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-27/secessionist-crisis-in-cameroon-risks-sliding-into-a-rebellion)

Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (Eds.) (2017). The globalization of world politics: An

introduction to international relations. Retrieved from

[https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-globalization-of-world-politics-](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-globalization-of-world-politics-9780198825548?cc=sy&lang=en&)

[9780198825548?cc=sy&lang=en&](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-globalization-of-world-politics-9780198825548?cc=sy&lang=en&)

Bazeley, P. (2009). Analyzing qualitative data: More than identifying themes. *Malaysian*

Journal of Qualitative Research, 2(2), 6-22. Retrieved from

[http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.471.2240&rep=rep1&t](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.471.2240&rep=rep1&type=pdf)

[ype=pdf](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.471.2240&rep=rep1&type=pdf)

Bekker, P. & van de Poll, R. (2017). Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire receive a strict-

equidistance boundary. *American Society of International Law*. (21)11. Retrieved

from [https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/11/ghana-and-cote-divoire-](https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/11/ghana-and-cote-divoire-receive-strict-equidistance-boundary)

[receive-strict-equidistance-boundary](https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/11/ghana-and-cote-divoire-receive-strict-equidistance-boundary)

Bereketeab, R. (2014). *Self-Determination and secession: African challenges: Self-*

determination and secession in Africa. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315762906-1>

Berkol, I. (2007). *Analysis of the ECOWAS convention on small arms and light weapons and recommendations for the development of an action plan*. Retrieved from http://archive.grip.org/en/siteweb/images/NOTES_ANALYSE/2007/NA_2007-04-01_EN_I-BERKOL.PDF

Blakemore, K., Cooksey, B. (2017). *A Sociology of education for Africa.*

<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315412733>

Blench, R. (2012). The expansion and adaptation of Fulbe pastoralism to sub-humid and humid conditions in Nigeria. *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, (34) 197-212.

<https://doi.org/10.3406/cea.1994.2047>

Bolarinwa, J. O. (2015). The ECOWAS free movement protocol: Obstacle or driver of regional integration? *Sage Journals*. 7(2).

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0975087815580731>

Bowen, G. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative Research Journal* 9(2):27-40. <https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027>

Browne, R. (2018). US warns of growing African terror threat. *CNN*. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/19/politics/africa-isis-al-qaeda-threat/index.html>

Frey, B. (2018). Document Analysis. *The SAGE encyclopedia of educational research, measurement, and evaluation*, 1(4). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.

DOI: 10.4135/9781506326139

Bukari, K.N. & Schareika, N. (2015). Stereotypes, Prejudices and Exclusion of Fulani Pastoralists in Ghana. *Pastoralism*, Vol 5(1). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

<https://doi.org/10.1186/s13570-015-0043-8>

Burgess, S., F. (2008). *US Africa command, changing security dynamics, and perceptions of us Africa policy*. <https://doi.org/10.21236/ada539969>

Burkholder, G. J., Cox, K. A., & Crawford, L. M. (2016). *The scholar-practitioner's guide to research design*. Laureate publishing. [Kindle ed.].

Campbell, H. (2011). Gbagbo and the Ivorian Test: Moving beyond Anti-imperialist Rhetoric. *Pambazuka News*. Retrieved from <https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/gbagbo-and-ivorian-test-moving-beyond-anti-imperialist-rhetoric>

Campbell, S. P., Hartnett, M. (2005). *A framework for improved coordination: Lessons learned from the international development, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, humanitarian and conflict resolution communities*. Retrieved from <https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/missions/framework.pdf>.

Cannon, B. T., Pkalya, D. R., & Maragia, P. (2017). *The international criminal court and Africa: Contextualizing the anti-ICC narrative*. <https://doi.org/10.5553/AJ/2352068X2016002001001>

Carnall, C. (2018). *Managing change*. DOI: 10.4324/9781315122779

Cascais, A. (2017). How Russia's revolution shaped African history. *DW.Com*. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/how-russias-revolution-shaped-african-history/a-41195536>

Castillo-Montoya, M. (2016). Preparing for interview research: The interview protocol refinement framework. *Qualitative Report*, 21(5), 811-831. Retrieved from

<https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol21/iss5/2>

Chamberlain, M. (2016). *The scramble for Africa*.

<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315833668>

Charmaz, K. (2006). *Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative analysis*. <https://doi.org/10.7748/nr.13.4.84.s4>

Charmaz, K. (2019). *Grounded theory*. Retrieved from

<https://guides.temple.edu/groundedtheory>

Chenail, R. J. (2011). Ten steps for conceptualizing and conducting qualitative research studies in a pragmatically curious manner. *Qualitative Report*, 16(6), 1715-1732.

Retrieved from <http://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol16/iss6/13>.

Cherkaoui, M., (2017). *Emerging security challenges in North and West Africa*.

Retrieved from http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/emerging-security-challenges-in-north-and-west-africa/

Collier, P. (2017). Security threats facing Africa and its capacity to respond. *Prism*, 5(2).

Retrieved from https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-2/PRISM5-2_Security_Threats.pdf

Community Court of Justice – ECOWAS. (2012). *About us*. Retrieved from

http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=5

Community Parliament – ECOWAS. (2018). *Structure of the parliament*. Accessed:

Retrieved from <http://parl.ecowas.int/en/about-us/>

Cordesman, A. H. (2016). *Comparing estimates of key trends in the uncertain metrics of*

terrorism. Retrieved from https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/160208_key_trends_metrics_terrorism_corde sman.pdf

- Coulibaly, M. (2007). *From moratorium to a convention on small arms: a Change in politics and practices for the 15 member countries of ECOWAS*. Retrieved from <https://oxfamlibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/112514/fp2p-cs-from-moratorium-convention-small-arms-ECOWAS-140608-en.pdf;jsessionid=3D8003E0C567719F78365267A6F802A0?sequence=1>
- Courtney, F. (2017). *The partition of Africa*. Retrieved from <https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/partition-africa/>
- Creswell J.W. (2009). *Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. [Third ed.]. SAGE Publications.
- Creswell, J. W. (2013). *Qualitative inquiry & research design: choosing among five approaches*. [Third ed.]. Sage Publications Ltd.
- Creswell, J. W. (2014). *Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. SAGE Publications. [Kindle ed.].
- Creswell, J., & Miller, D. (2000). Determining validity and qualitative inquiry. *Theory into Practice*, 39(3), 125-130. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com>
- Davidheiser, M. & Luna, A. M. (2008). From complementarity to conflict: A historical analysis of Farmer-Fulbe relations in West Africa. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*. 8 (1) 2008, 77-104. Retrieved from <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/view/39421>

Davidson, B. (2014). *West Africa before the colonial era: A history to 1850*.

<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315840369>

Degila, D. E., & Amegan, C. K. (2019). *The African peace and security architecture: An*

African response to regional peace and security challenges. Retrieved from

<https://graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/challenges-african-peace-and-security-architecture>

DeLancey, M. (1966). The Ghana-Guinea-Mali union: A bibliographic essay. *African*

Studies Review, 9(2), 35-51. doi.org/10.1017/S0002020600038890

Delegation of the European Union to Nigeria and ECOWAS, (2019). *Support to*

ECOWAS peace and security architecture and operations. Retrieved from

https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/nigeria/56232/support-ecowas-peace-and-security-architecture-and-operations-epsao_en

De Sousa, A. N. (2016). *Between East and West: The Cold War's legacy in Africa: 'Red*

Africa': From a generation of cinematographers to the end of apartheid - Africa, Cuba and the Soviet Union. Retrieved from

<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/02/east-west-cold-war-legacy-africa-160214113015863.html>

Desmarais, B. A. (2019). Punctuated equilibrium or incrementalism in policymaking:

What we can and cannot learn from the distribution of policy changes. *Research and Politics* 1(6). <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168019871399>

De Vault G. (2017). *Establishing trustworthiness in qualitative research*. Retrieved from

<https://www.thebalance.com/establishing-trustworthiness-in-qualitative-research->

2297042

De Wet, E. (2014). The evolving role of ECOWAS and the SADC in peace operations: A challenge to the primacy of the United Nations Security Council in matters of peace and security? *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 27(2), 353-369.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156513000599>

Dinshak, L. D., & Walshak, D. (2018). ECOWAS and human security in West Africa: A review of the literature. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 23(12), 75-82. DOI: [10.9790/0837-2312027582](https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-2312027582)

Dockrill, S. R. (2006). Dealing with fear: Implementing the Bush doctrine of preemptive attack. *Politics & Policy*, 34(2) 344-373. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2006.00017.x>

Du Bois, V. D. (1963). Thaw in the tropics: France and Guinea move toward a rapprochement. *West Africa Series*, 6(2). Retrieved from <https://webguinee.net/blogguinee/documents/france-and-guinea-rapprochement-1963/>

Dumbuya, P. A. (2008). ECOWAS military intervention in Sierra Leone: Anglophone-Francophone bipolarity. *Journal of Third World Studies*; 25(2); Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292384414_ECOWAS_military_intervention_in_Sierra_Leone_Anglophone-Francophone_bipolarity_or_multipolarity

Economic Commission for Africa. (2016). *The demographic profile of African countries*. Retrieved from <https://www.uneca.org/publications/demographic-profile-of-african-countries>

ECOWAS. (1993). *Revised treaty of the Economic Community of West African States*.

Retrieved from <https://www3.nd.edu/~ggoertz/rei/rei260/rei260.23tt1.pdf>

ECOWAS. (1999). *Protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention,*

management, resolution, peace-keeping, and security. Retrieved from

<https://www.grin.com/document/157547>

ECOWAS. (2006). *ECOWAS convention on small arms and light weapons, their*

ammunition and other related materials. Retrieved from

<https://www.grin.com/document/157547>

ECOWAS. (2015a). *Ensuring a successful organization of the first edition of the*

ECOWAS mining and oil forum and exhibition. Retrieved from

<http://www.ecowas.int/ensuring-a-successful-organisation-of-the-first-edition-of-the-ecowas-mining-and-oil-forum-and-exhibition/>

ECOWAS. (2015b). *West African police challenged on ECOWAS vision 2020: African*

standby force. Retrieved from [http://www.ecowas.int/west-african-police-](http://www.ecowas.int/west-african-police-challenged-on-ecowas-vision-2020-african-standby-force/)

[challenged-on-ecowas-vision-2020-african-standby-force/](http://www.ecowas.int/west-african-police-challenged-on-ecowas-vision-2020-african-standby-force/)

ECOWAS. (2015c). *ECOWAS gets AU's commendation on peacekeeping operations in*

Africa. Retrieved from [http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-gets-aus-commendation-](http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-gets-aus-commendation-on-peace-keeping-operations-in-africa/)

[on-peace-keeping-operations-in-africa/](http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-gets-aus-commendation-on-peace-keeping-operations-in-africa/)

ECOWAS. (2016a). *ECOWAS member states discuss how to unlock transit challenges*

along the main trade corridors in West Africa. Retrieved from

<http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-member-states-discuss-how-to-unlock-transit-challenges-along-the-main-trade-corridors-in-west-africa/>

- ECOWAS. (2016b). *History*. Retrieved from <http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/history/>
- ECOWAS. (2016c). *Governance structure*. Retrieved from <http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/governance-structure/>
- ECOWAS. (2016d). *Member states*. Retrieved from <http://www.ecowas.int/member-states/>
- ECOWAS. (2016e). *The commission*. Retrieved from <http://www.ecowas.int/member-states/>
- ECOWAS. (2016f). *ECOWAS counter-terrorism strategy*. Retrieved from <https://edup.ecowas.int/key-resources/ecowas-counter-terrorism-strategy/>
- ECOWAS. (2017). *ECOWAS strengthens capacity of its early warning directorate on governance and human rights*. Retrieved from <http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-strengthens-capacity-of-its-early-warning-directorate-on-governance-and-human-rights/>
- ECOWAS. (2018). *Experts begin validation of the ECOWAS early warning gender integration manual*. Retrieved from <http://www.ecowas.int/experts-begin-validation-of-the-ecowas-early-warning-gender-integration-manual/>
- ECOWAS. (2019a). *Stakeholders call for support of the ECOWAS conflict prevention framework*. Retrieved from <https://www.ecowas.int/stakeholders-call-for-support-of-the-ecowas-conflict-prevention-framework/>
- ECOWAS (2019b). *Regional development gets major boost with the launch of ECOWAS peace and security architecture*. Retrieved from <https://www.ecowas.int/regional->

development-gets-major-boost-with-the-launch-of-ecowas-peace-and-security-architecture/

ECOWAS (2019c). *2020-2024 priority action plan for the eradication of terrorism in the ECOWAS region*. Retrieved from

<https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:wPA0cjYxpp0J:https://www.ecowas.int/governmental-experts-meet-on-action-plan-to-curb-terrorism-in-the-ecowas-region/+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=il>

ECOWAS Commission. (2015). *Political affairs peace and security*. Retrieved from

<http://www.comm.ecowas.int/departments/political-affairs-peace-security/>

ECOWAS Commission. (2016). *ECOWAS common external tariff: Achievements,*

challenges, and prospects. Retrieved from http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Annual-Report-2016_English-Fina_Final.pdf

ECOWAS Revised Treaty. (2010). *Establishment, composition, aims and objectives and fundamental principles of the community*. Retrieved from

<http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Revised-treaty.pdf>

ECOWAS Vision 2020, (2010). *Towards a democratic and prosperous community*.

Retrieved from <http://www.spu.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/VISION-RVF-in-English-for-web.pdf>

Elowson, C., & MacDe, J. (2010). *ECOWAS capabilities in peace and security: A*

scoping study of progress and challenges. Retrieved from

Emmel, N. (2013). *Sampling and choosing cases in qualitative research: A realist approach*. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781473913882>

- Eze, C., B. (2016). The Role of CSOs in Promoting Human Rights Protection, Mass Atrocities Prevention, and Civilian Protection in Armed Conflicts. *Global Responsibility to Protect*. 8(2-3):249-269. <https://doi.org/10.1163/1875984x-00803009>
- Fabiani, R. (2018). *Morocco's difficult path to ECOWAS membership*. Retrieved from <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75926>
- Feldman, R. L. (2009). The root causes of terrorism: Why parts of Africa might never be at peace. *Defense & Security Analysis*. 25(4).
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14751790903416707>
- FES Africa Department, (2017). *Expert workshop on the interactions between security threats in the Sahel. Bamako, Mali*. Retrieved from <https://www.fes-pscc.org/e/expert-workshop-on-the-interactions-between-security-threats-in-the-sahel/>
- Fink, S.A. (2000). The role of the researcher in the qualitative research process: A potential barrier to archiving qualitative data. Retrieved from <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1021/2201>
- Food and Agriculture Organization Technical Papers. (1985). *The climate zones of West Africa*. Retrieved from <http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/x6543e/X6543E01.htm>
- Francis, D. J. (2009). Peacekeeping in a bad neighborhood: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in peace and security in West Africa. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 9(3). Retrieved from <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/view/52180/40806>

- Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union (Union of African States). (1962). *International Organization*, 16(2), 443-444. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300011206>
- Ghana News Agency. (2009). Structure for ECOWAS Standby Force approved. Retrieved from <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Structure-for-ECOWAS-Standby-Force-approved-173414>
- Gibson, J. (2001). Measuring chronic poverty without a panel. *Journal of Development Economics*. 65(2):243-266. DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(01)00136-5
- Giorgi, A. (2009). *The descriptive phenomenological method in psychology: A modified husserlian approach*. Retrieved from <https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2009-17646-000>
- Goerzig, C. (2019). *Terrorist learning in context – The case of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, critical studies on terrorism*. DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2019.1596623
- Google Arts and Culture. (2014). *An exhibit on the British creation and colonization of Nigeria*. Retrieved from https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/ARi_MKdz
- Guba, E. (1981). Criteria for assessing the trustworthiness of naturalistic inquiries. *Educational Technology Research and Development*, 29 (2), 75-91. Retrieved from <https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:qg8693jCnQ8J:https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8d32/23ed3c76cc4066ec894b5aca51c4f4028b7e.pdf+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=il&client=firefox-b-e>
- Gunn, J.P. (2017). The Ewe in West Africa: One Cultural People in Two Different

Countries (Togo/Ghana) 1884-1960. *Journal of History Studies*, 9(3), DOI:
10.9737/hist.2017.541

Hammersley, M., & Atkinson, P. (1995). *Ethnography: Principles in practice*. Retrieved from
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332416181_Ethnography_Principles_in_Practice

Harbeson, J. W. (2017). *Postcolonial sub-Saharan African politics*.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199846733-0057>

Harris, G.T., (2017). *Why Africa matters to US national security*. Retrieved from
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Why_Africa_Matters_to_US_National_Security_0524_web.pdf

Heerten, L. (2017). *The Biafran war and postcolonial humanitarianism: Spectacle of suffering*. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316282243.001>

Heerten, L. & Moses A. (2014). The Nigeria–Biafra war: Post-colonial conflict and the question of genocide. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 16(2-3), 169-203.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2014.936700>

Heikkila, T., & Cairney, P. (2014). *Comparison of theories of the policy process*. Retrieved from <https://paulcairney.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/heikkila-cairney-proof-24-4-17.pdf>

Hill, M. (2009). *The spread of Islam in West Africa: Containment, mixing, and reform from the eighth to the twentieth century*. Retrieved from
https://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/the_spread_of_islam_in_west_africa_containm

ent_mixing_and_reform_from_the_eighth_to_the_twentieth_century

Hirsch, J.A., & Hirsch, Y., (2018). *Stock trader's almanac 2018*. Retrieved from <https://www.bookdepository.com/Stock-Traders-Almanac-2018-Jeffrey-Hirsch/9781119384267>

Hopkins, A. (2014). *An economic history of West Africa*.

<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315835792>

Human Rights Watch. (2003). *The regional crisis and human rights abuses in West Africa: A briefing paper to the U.N. Security Council*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/06/20/regional-crisis-and-human-rights-abuses-west-africa>

International Court of Justice. (2013). *Frontier dispute of Burkina Faso/Niger:*

Declaration of Judge Bennouna. Retrieved from <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/149/149-20130416-JUD-01-01-EN.pdf>

International Court of Justice. (2018). *List of all cases*. Retrieved from <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/list-of-all-cases/introduction/desc>

International Court of Justice Judgments. (1986). *Case concerning the frontier dispute:*

Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali judgment of 22 December 1986. Retrieved from <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/69/6449.pdf>

International Court of Justice Reports of Judgments. (1998). *Advisory opinions and orders case concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon versus Nigeria): Preliminary objections judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1998*. Retrieved from <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/94/judgments>

- International Crisis Group. (2016). *Implementing peace and security architecture (III): West Africa crisis group Africa report*. Retrieved from <https://media.africaportal.org/documents/234-implementing-peace-and-security-architecture-iii-west-africa.pdf>
- International Organization for Migration. (2016). *Guidelines to protect migrants in countries experiencing conflict or natural disaster*. Retrieved from <https://micicinitiative.iom.int/guidelines>
- International Peace Institute. (2016). *Pursuing coordination and integration for the protection of civilians*. Retrieved from https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/1902_Pursuing-Coordination.pdf.
- International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. (2017). *Judgment: Dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean*. Retrieved from https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/C23_Judgment_23.09.2017_corr.pdf
- Jacob, S., & Furgerson, P. (2012). Writing interview protocols and conducting interviews: Tips for students new to the field of qualitative research. *Qualitative Report, 17*(6), 1-10. <https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol17/iss42/3/>
- Jaye, T., Garuba, D., & Amadi, S. (Eds.) (2011). *ECOWAS and the dynamics of conflict and peacebuilding*. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvk8w0dp>
- Jervis, R. (2003). Understanding the Bush doctrine. *Political Science Quarterly, 118*(3), 365-388. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30035780>

- Kabia, J. M. (2011). *Regional approaches to peacebuilding: The ECOWAS peace and security architecture*. <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/REGIONAL-APPROACHES-TO-PEACEBUILDING-%3A-THE-ECOWAS-Kabia/9a93a0b262045c67f924d4f17770e3338acff235>
- Kabia, J. M. (2016). *Humanitarian intervention and conflict resolution in West Africa: From ECOMOG to ECOMIL*. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315587592>
- Kah, H.K. (2016). Kwame Nkrumah and the Pan-African vision: Between acceptance and rebuttal. *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* 5(9). Retrieved from <https://seer.ufrgs.br/austral/article/viewFile/65783/39005>
- Kamal-Deen, A. (2015). *Maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and challenges*. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004301047>
- Keenan, J.H. (2010). *Africa unsecured? The role of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in securing US imperial interests in Africa, critical studies on terrorism*. DOI: 10.1080/17539151003594186
- Kieh, G.K., & Kalu, K. (2013). *West Africa and the US war on terror*. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203104828>
- Korb, L., Duggan, S., & Conley, L. (2009). *Integrating security: Preparing for the national security threats of the 21st century*. Retrieved from <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2009/11/16/6917/integrating-security/>
- Kozleski, E.B. (2017). The uses of qualitative research: Powerful methods to inform evidence-based practice in education. *Research and Practice for Persons with*

Severe Disabilities. 42(1), 19–32. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1540796916683710>

Kvale, S. & Brinkmann, S. (2009). *Interviews: Learning the craft of qualitative research interviewing*. Retrieved from <https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2008-15512-000>

Kyereko, D. O. (2018). *Regional migration in West Africa: Attitudes and perceptions toward migrants in Ghana*. Retrieved from <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000266052>

Lar, J.T. (2009). *The ECOWAS SSR agenda in West Africa: Looking beyond normative frameworks*. Retrieved from <https://www.kaiptc.org/kaiptc-publication/the-ecowas-ssr-agenda-in-west-africa-looking-beyond-normative-frameworks/>

Lee, P. (2001). *Documents expose U.S. role in Nkrumah overthrow*. Retrieved from <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Documents-Expose-U-S-Role-in-Nkrumah-Overthrow-53367>

Lewis, D. (2012). *Casamance conflict is unhealed sore for Senegal*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-senegal-casamance-idUSTRE81O09C20120225>

Lewis, K. S. (1967). *How America toppled Nkrumah*. Retrieved from <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/001132557300600404>

Lincoln, Y. & Guba, E. (1985). *Trustworthiness*. Retrieved from https://class.waldenu.edu/bbcswebdav/institution/USW1/201670_27/XX_RSCH/RSCH_8110/artifacts/USW1_RSCH_8110_Week08_trustworthiness.pdf

Lucey, A. (2016). *How ECOWAS has got peacebuilding right*. Retrieved from <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-ecowas-has-got-peacebuilding-right>

- Luckham, R. (1982). French Militarism in Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*, 9(24), 55-84. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/3998043
- Maiangwa, B. (2013). West Africa's terrorist challenge and the dynamics of regional response. *Insight on Africa*, 5(1), 1-18. DOI: 10.1177/0975087813515979
- Maiangwa, B. (2017). "Conflicting indigeneity" and farmer-herder conflicts in postcolonial Africa. *Peace Review*, 29(3), 282-288. Retrieved from <https://doi-org.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344527>
- Marc, A., Vergee, N., & Mogaka, S. (2015). *The challenges of stability and security in West Africa*. DOI: 10.1596/978-1-4648-0464-9
- Marshall, M. N. (1996). Sampling for Qualitative Research. *Family Practice*, 13(6), 522-526. <https://doi.org/10.1093/fampra/13.6.522>
- Maxwell, J. A. (2012). *Qualitative research design: An interactive approach*. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/43220402_Qualitative_Research_Design_An_Interactive_Approach_JA_Maxwell
- Mays, T. M. (2003). African solutions for African problems: The changing face of African-mandated peace operations. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 23(1). Retrieved from <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/353/552>
- Mazrui, A., A. (1996). *The new dynamics of security: The United Nations and Africa*. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40209474?seq=1>
- Merriam, S. B. (1988). *Case study research in education: A qualitative approach*. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473957602.n7>

- Merriam, S. B. (2009). *Qualitative Research: A guide to design and implementation*.
Retrieved from
https://books.google.co.il/books?id=tvFICrgcuSIC&pg=PR1&hl=iw&source=gsbs_selected_pages&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false
- Mettler, S. and Soss, J. (2014). *The consequences of public policy for democratic citizenship: Bridging policy studies and mass politics*.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592704000623>
- Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou E. (2011). *The long-run effects of the scramble for Africa*. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w17620>
- Michalopoulos, S. & Papaioannou, E. (2016). The long-run effects of the scramble for Africa. *American Economic Review*, 106 (7), 1802-48.
<https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20131311>
- Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldana, J. (2014). *Qualitative data analysis: a methods source book*. Retrieved from <https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/qualitative-data-analysis/book246128>
- Miles, W. (2014). *Scars of partition: postcolonial legacies in French and British borderlands*. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1d9nmvp> .
- Miles, W. (2015). *Hausaland divided: Colonialism in independent Nigeria and Niger*.
<https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801470103>
- Moon, K., Brewer, T. D., Januchowski-Hartley, S. R., Adams, V. M., and Blackman, D. A. (2016). *A guideline to improve qualitative social science publishing in ecology and conservation journals*. *Ecology and Society* 21(3) 17.

<https://doi.org/10.5751/es-08663-210317>

- Morgan, A. (2014). *What do the Tuareg want?* Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/what-do-tuareg-want-20141913923498438.html>
- Monfils, B.S. (1977). A multifaceted image: Kwame Nkrumah's extrinsic rhetorical strategies. *Journal of Black Studies*, 7(3), 313-330. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2783710>
- Moustakas, C. (1994). *Phenomenological Research Methods*.
DOI:[10.4135/9781412995658](https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412995658)
- Moynihan, D.P., & Soss, J. (2014). Policy feedback and the politics of administration. *Public Administration Review* 74(3). DOI 10.1111/puar.12200
- Murray, R. (2004). Human rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511494031>
- Muyangwa, M. & Vogt, M. A. (2000). *An assessment of the OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution: 1993 – 2000*. Retrieved from https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/oau_conflict_1993_2000.pdf
- Mwakikagile, G. (2015). *Western involvement in Nkrumah's downfall* [1st ed.]. New Africa Press. Retrieved from https://books.google.com.gh/books/about/Western_Involvement_in_Nkrumah_s_Downfal.html?id=U9GsBwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y
- MyJoyOnline.com (2017). *Is Ghana in double standards in submission to regional*

courts? Retrieved from <http://m.myjoyonline.com/marticles/news/is-ghana-in-double-standards-in-submission-to-regional-courts>

Hamalai, L., & Obodan, M. (2015). *40 Years of ECOWAS – 1975-2015*. National Institute for Legislative Studies. Retrieved from <https://nils.gov.ng/book-reviews/view/9>

New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness. (2018). *Analysis: 2018 terrorism assessment*. Retrieved from
Retrieved:https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54d79f88e4b0db3478a04405/t/5a95d2b824a6942348f536aa/1519768252506/ThreatAssessment2018__Interctv_FN_L6.pdf

Neuman, W., L. (1997). *Social Research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches*. DOI: 10.2307/3211488

Nkrumah, K. (1965). *Neo-colonialism, the last stage of imperialism*. Retrieved from <https://politicalanthro.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/nkrumah.pdf>

Nwokeji, G. (2010). *The slave trade and culture in the Bight of Biafra: An African society in the Atlantic World*. Cambridge University Press.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511781384>

Odobo, S. O., Andekin, A. M., & Udegbonam, K. (2017). Analysis of ECOWAS institutional framework for conflict management. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 8(6), 2039-2117. Retrieved from

<https://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/mjss/article/view/10117/0>

Oduah, O. (2017). *50 Years on: Nigeria's Biafra secessionist movement*. Retrieved from

<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/50-years-nigeria-biafra-secessionist-movement-170529151102396.html>

Oduro, A., & Aryee, I. (2003). *Investigating chronic poverty in West Africa*.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1754440>

Oduntan, G. (2015). *International law and boundary disputes in Africa*.

<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203776841>

Ofem, O. O., & Inyang, B. (2014). Livelihood and conflict dimension among crop farmers and Fulani herdsmen in the Yakurr region of Cross River State.

Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(8), 512-519.

<https://doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n8p512>

Okere, L. I. (2015). *ECOWAS Conflict management and peace-keeping initiatives in West Africa*. Retrieved from

<https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JLPG/article/download/22547/22922>

Okoli, A. C., & Atelhe, A. G. (2014). Nomads against natives: a political ecology of herder/farmer conflicts in Nasarawa state, Nigeria. *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, 4(2), 76-88. Retrieved from

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:pyvc2wnDZCMJ:www.ajcrnet.com/journals/Vol_4_No_2_February_2014/11.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=lb

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:pyvc2wnDZCMJ:www.ajcrnet.com/journals/Vol_4_No_2_February_2014/11.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=lb

Okolo, B.I. & Akubo, A.A. (2019). *Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria: Implications for National Security and Restorative Justice*. Retrieved from

<https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/boko-haram-insurgency-in-nigeria/>

Okon, E.N., & Williams, D.U. (2018). Burundi and Gambia: regional security and rapid deployment capability: The utility of the African standby force. *Conflict Studies Quarterly*, (24) 40-70. <https://doi.org/10.24193/csq.24.4>

Okunade, S K., & Ogunnubi, O. (2018). *A “Schengen” agreement in Africa? African agency and the ECOWAS protocol on free movement.*

<https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2018.1530128>

Olaniyan, A., Francis, M., and Okeke-Uzodike, U. (2015). The cattle are ‘Ghanaians’ but the herders are strangers: Farmer-herder conflicts, expulsion policy and pastoralist question in Agogo, Ghana. *African Studies Quarterly*, 15(2) 53-67. Retrieved from <http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq>

O’Leary, Z. (2014). *The essential guide to doing your research project* (2nd ed.). SAGE.

Olonisakin, F. (2009). ECOWAS and civil society movements in West Africa. *IDS Bulletin*, 40(4). DOI:10.1111/j.1759-5436.2009.00029.x

Olvera, G.M.B. (2013). The Security Council and the illegal transfer of small arms and light weapons to non-state actors. *Mexican Law Review*, 6(2). Retrieved from https://ac.elscdn.com/S1870057816300130/1-s2.0-S1870057816300130-main.pdf?_tid=17f9d54c-c1b3-462f-9e41-f2fc39212ba1&acdnat=1550354956_cde77044c35708036d7880274282af3c

Olympio S. E. (1961). *African problems and the Cold War*. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/1961-10-01/african-problems-and-cold-war>

- Onuoha, F.C. & Ezirim, G.E. (2013). Terrorism and transnational organized crime in West Africa. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268575311_Report_Terrorism_and_Transnational_Organised_Crime_in_West_Africa
- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2018). *The ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network*. Retrieved from <http://www.oecd.org/swac/theecowasearlywarningandresponsenetwork.htm>
- Organization of African Unity. (2000). *Bamako declaration on an African common position on the illicit proliferation, circulation, and trafficking of small arms and light weapons*. Retrieved from <http://20012009.state.gov/t/ac/csbm/rd/6691.htm>
- Organization of African Unity Secretariat. (1964). *Border disputes among African states AHG/Res. 16.I*. Retrieved from https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:tE0AKBaE6i8J:https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9514-1964_ahg_res_1-24_i_e.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=lb
- Osakwe, C., & Audu, B. (2017). The Nigeria-led ECOMOG military intervention and interest in the Sierra Leone crisis: An overview. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 8(4). DOI: 10.2478/mjss-2018-0079
- Osifo, O. C. (2013). The Effects of coordination on organizational performance: An intra and inter perspective. *Asian Journal of Business and Management*, 1(4). Retrieved from <https://ajouronline.com/index.php/AJBM/article/view/400>
- Pakenham, T. (2015). The scramble for Africa. Retrieved from

<https://books.google.cf/books?isbn=0349141932>

- Pateman, R. (2003). *Residual uncertainty: Trying to avoid intelligence and policy mistakes in the modern world*. University Press of America.
- Patton, M. Q. (2002). *Qualitative evaluation and research methods* [3rd Edition]. Sage.
- Patton, M.Q. (2015). *Qualitative research & evaluation methods: Integrating theory and practice*. Retrieved from <https://study.sagepub.com/patton4e>
- Petersen, K., & Gencel, C. (2013). *Worldviews, research methods, and their relationship to validity in empirical software engineering research*. DOI: 10.1109/IWSM-Mensura.2013.22.
- Pezalla, A. E., Pettigrew, J., & Miller-Day, M. (2012). Researching the researcher-as-instrument: An exercise in interviewer self-reflexivity. *Qualitative research QR*, 12(2), 165–185. DOI: 10.1177/1487941111422107
- Pham, J.P. (2014). *Russia's return to Africa*. Retrieved from <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/articles/russia-s-return-to-africa>
- Raunet, N. (2016). *Chiefs, migrants, and the state: Mobility in the Ghana-Togo borderlands*. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303018086_Chiefs_Migrants_and_the_State_Mobility_in_the_Ghana-Togo_Borderlands
- Ravitch, S., & Carl, N. (2016). *Qualitative research: Bridging the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological*. SAGE Publications. [Kindle ed.].
- Rodriguez, R. (2015). *Peace Operations in West Africa: What makes a peace operation successful?* Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/peace-operations->

africa

- Rodriguez, R. (2018). *Peace operations in West Africa: ECOWAS successes and failures in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau*. Retrieved from <https://worldmediation.org/peace-operations-in-west-africa-ecowas-successes-and-failures-in-liberia-sierra-leone-cote-divoire-guinea-and-guinea-bissau/>
- Rudestam, K. E., & Newton, R. R. (2007). *Surviving your dissertation: A comprehensive guide to content and process*. <https://doi.org/10.1086/602715>
- Rudincová, K. (2015). When colonial borders still matter: The emergence of South Sudan. *JAHPS*. (1)1 89-115. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273804240_When_Colonial_Borders_S till_Matter_The_Emergence_of_South_Sudan
- Runde, D.F., Savoy, Conor M., Rice, C.F. (2016). *Global infrastructure development: A strategic approach to US leadership*. Retrieved from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-infrastructure-development>
- Sabatier, P. A., & Weible, C. M. (2014). *Theories of the policy process*. [Kindle ed.]. Routledge
- Sabatier, P. A., & Weible, C. M. (2018). *Theories of the policy process*. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429494284>
- Sambo, M., A. (2020). Liberia's post-1990 ECOMOG incursion: An assessment of Anglophone – Francophone dichotomy. *Journal of International Studies*, 13 47-66. <https://doi.org/10.32890/jis2017.13.4>

- Sandner, P. (2018). *West Africa: Fulani conflict getting worse*. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/west-africa-fulani-conflict-getting-worse/a-43679371>
- Sanjari, M., Bahramnezhad, F., Fomani, F. K., Shoghi, M., & Cheraghi, M. A. (2014). Ethical challenges of researchers in qualitative studies: The necessity to develop a specific guideline. *Journal of Medical Ethics and History of Medicine*, 7(14). Retrieved from <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4263394/>
- Sarma, S. K. (2015). Qualitative research: Examining the misconceptions. *South Asian Journal of Management*, 22(3), 176-191
<http://tapmi.informaticsglobal.com/id/eprint/64>
- Scarnecchia, T. (2018). Africa and the Cold War. In Worger, W. H., Ambler, C., & Achebe, A. (Eds.), *Companion to African History* 10.1002(97) 383-399.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119063551.ch20>
- Searcey, D. (2018). *Cameroon on brink of civil war as English speakers recount unbearable horrors*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/world/africa/cameroon-election-biya-ambazonia.html>
- Security Council Report. (2011). *Emerging security threats in West Africa: Special research report*. Retrieved from <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/lookup-c-glkwlemtisg-b-6740225.php>
- Seligman, L. (2020). *In West Africa, U.S. military struggles for scarce resources as terrorism threat grows*. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/24/in-west-africa-u-s-military-struggles-for-scarce-resources-as-terrorism-threat-grows/>

- Shank, G. (2002). *Qualitative research: A personal skills approach*. Retrieved from <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Qualitative-Research%3A-A-Personal-Skills-Approach-Shank/3a67e3bc9cb9f080354d0fde416321f11f0bda2e>
- Siradag, A. (2012). *African regional and sub-regional organisations' security policies: Challenges and prospects*. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321867654_African_Regional_and_Sub-Regional_Organisations%27_Security_Policies_Challenges_and_Prospects
- Small, A. (2017). An unintended legacy: Kwame Nkrumah and the domestication of national self-determination in Africa. *African Human Rights Law Journal*, 17(1), 68-88. Retrieved from <https://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2017/v17n1a4>
- Spies, Y. K. (2018). *African diplomacy: The encyclopedia of diplomacy*. DOI: 10.1002/9781118885154.dip10005
- Staeger, U. (2016). Africa–EU relations and normative power Europe: A de-colonial Pan-African critique. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 54 (4). Retrieved from <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/jcms.12350>
- Stent, A. (1973). The Soviet Union and the Nigerian Civil War: A Triumph of Realism. *A Journal of Opinion*, 3(2), 43-48. DOI: 10.2307/1166627
- Sterio, M. (2015). Self-determination and secession under international law: The new framework. Retrieved from https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1858&context=fac_articles
- Sunday, C., E. (N D). *The role of theory in research*. Retrieved from

<https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:BojpPLCd6ggJ:https://www.uwc.ac.za/Students/Postgraduate/Documents/The%2520role%2520of%2520theory%2520in%2520research.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=lb>

- Sutton, J., & Austin, Z. (2015). Qualitative research: Data collection, analysis, and management. *Canadian Journal of Hospital Pharmacy*, 68(3), 226–231
DOI: 10.4212/cjhp.v68i3.1456
- Turato, E. R. (2005). Qualitative and quantitative methods in health: definitions, differences, and research subjects. *Revista de Saude Publica*, 39(3). DOI: 10.1590/s0034-89102005000300025
- Tar U. A., & Mustapha M. (2017). The emerging architecture of a regional security complex in the Lake Chad Basin. *Africa Development*. 42(3). Retrieved from <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ad/article/view/167097/156534>
- Tejpar, J. & de Albuquerque, A. (2015). *Challenges to peace and security in West Africa: The role of ECOWAS*. Retrieved from https://www.foi.se/download/18.7fd35d7f166c56ebe0bb38f/1542369060258/Challenges-to-Peace-and-Security-in-West-Africa_FOI-Memo-5382.pdf
- Tonah, S. (2002). Fulani pastoralists, indigenous farmers and the contest for land in northern Ghana. *Africa Spectrum*, 37(1), 43–59. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40174917?seq=1>
- Trigueros, R., Juan, M., & Sandoval, F. (2017). *Qualitative and quantitative research instruments research tools*. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323014697_QUALITATIVE_AND_Q

UANTITATIVE_RESEARCH_INSTRUMENTS_Research_tools/citation/download

- Uchechukwu J., Agbo N., Lenshie, J., & Boye, R. (2018). West Africa: From peacekeeping to peace enforcement. ECOWAS and the regulations of regional security. *Conflict Studies Quarterly*, (22), 18-35. DOI:10.24193/csqr.22.2.
- Ugochukwu, F. (2010). The Nigerian civil war and its media - Groping for clues. *Media War & Conflict*, 3(2) 182-201. DOI: 10.1177/1750635210360083.
- United Nations (1999). *West African states adopt code of conduct on light weapons, launch regional arms register and database*. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19991227.afr199.doc.html>
- United Nations (2009). *Policy: Authority, command and control in United Nations peacekeeping operations*. Retrieved from https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:zrn3Tw37cgYJ:https://policy.un.org/sites/default/files/authoritycommandandcontrolinunpkos_2008.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=il
- United Nations Department of Public Information (1996). *The blue helmets: A review of United Nations peacekeeping*. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/minurs_b.htm
- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2016). *ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States*. Retrieved from https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/int_progr_ri_inception_cowaseng.pdf

- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2016). *ECOWAS - Peace, security, stability, and governance*. Retrieved from <https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/ecowas-peace-security-stability-and-governance>
- United Nations General Assembly (1956). *The Togoland unification problem and the future of the trust territory of Togoland under British administration: Reports of the United Nations plebiscite Commissioner and of the Trusteeship Council*. Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1286215/files/A_C-4_SR-561-EN.pdf?version=1
- United Nations News, (2019). *More attacks, 'persisting security challenges' threaten progress in west Africa, Sahel*. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1030182>
- United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (2016). *Program of action on small arms and its international tracing instrument*. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/programme-of-action/>
- United Nations Security Council. (2017). *Security Council Presidential Statement concerned about terrorist threat in West Africa, Worsening humanitarian situation*. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12922.doc.htm>
- United Nations Security Council Report. (2012). *Special research report No. 1: Emerging security threats in West Africa*. Retrieved from https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:uXTRNUV_HvcJ:https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/lookup-c-glkwlemtisg-b-

6740225.php+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=il

United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. (2016). *An integrated approach for the realization of the sustainable development goals and the priority areas of the international community and the United Nations system*. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/h2.pdf>

USAID. (2019). *Reacting to early warning and response data in West Africa*. Retrieved from <https://www.usaid.gov/west-africa-regional/fact-sheets/reacting-early-warning-and-response-data-west-africa-project-reward>

USAID. (2016). *Regional partner in economic growth: ECOWAS*. Retrieved from <https://www.usaid.gov/west-africa-regional/fact-sheets/regional-partner-economic-growth-ecowas>

Vanagas, R., & Stankevič, J. (2014). Impact of coordination for organization process. *Intellectual Economics*, 2(20). <https://doi.org/10.13165/IE-14-8-2-08>.

Vines, A. (2013). A decade of African peace and security architecture. *International Affairs*, 89 (1). <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-2346.12006>

von Soest, C., & De Juan, A. (2018). *Dealing with new security threats in Africa*. Retrieved from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/gf_afrika_1802_en.pdf

Vrey, F., & Mandrup, T. (2017). *The African standby force: Quo vadis?* <https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928357575>.

Watts, S., Johnston, T., Lane, M., Mann, S., McNerney, M. J., & Brooks, A. (2018). *Building security in Africa: An evaluation of US security sector assistance in*

Africa from the Cold War to the present. <https://doi.org/10.7249/rr2447>

West Africa Network for Peacebuilding. (2013). *Organizational profile*. Retrieved from https://www.wanep.org/wanep/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=7&Itemid=11

Whelan, A. (1992). Self-determination and decolonisation: Foundations for the future. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 3(4), 25-51. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30001796>

Wilfahrt, M. (2018). Precolonial legacies and institutional congruence in public goods delivery: Evidence from decentralized West Africa. *World Politics*, 70(2), 239-274. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887117000363>

Willemse, K., de Bruijn, M., van Dijk, H., Both, J., & Muiderman, K. (2015). *What are the connections between Africa's contemporary conflicts?* Retrieved from <https://www.thebrokeronline.eu/what-are-the-connections-between-africa-s-contemporary-conflicts/>

World Facts. (2018). *What was the scramble for Africa?* Retrieved from <https://www.worldatlas.com/what-was-the-scramble-for-africa.html>

Worldometers. (2020). *Western Africa population live*. Retrieved from <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/western-africa-population/>

Worldometers. (2018). *Western Africa population live*. Retrieved from <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/western-africa-population/>

Wolff, S., & Dursun-Ozkanca, O. (2012). Regional and international conflict regulation: Diplomatic, economic and military interventions. *Civil Wars*, 14(3).

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2012.706948>

Wulf, H., & Debiel, T. (2009). Conflict early warning and response mechanisms: Tools for enhancing the effectiveness of regional organizations?

<https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01604007>

Wyss, M. (2017). France and the Economic Community of West African States:

peacekeeping partnership in theory and practice. *Journal of Contemporary*

African Studies, 35(4), 487-505. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2017.1348600>

Xu, M. A., & Storr, G. B. (2012). Learning the concept of researcher as instrument in qualitative research. *Qualitative Report*, 17(21), 1-18. Retrieved from

<http://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol17/iss21/2>

Yembilah, R. & Grant, M. (2014). The political ecology of territoriality: territorialities in farmer-herder relationships in Northern Ghana. *Geo Journal*, 79 (3), 385-

400. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-013-9509-7>

Yin, R. K. (2016). *Qualitative research from start to finish*. [2nd ed.].

<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fcsr.12144>

Zimmerer, M. (2019). *Terror in West Africa: A threat assessment of the new*

Al Qaeda affiliate in Mali, critical studies on terrorism.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2019.1599531>

Zoppi, M. (2013). The OAU and the question of borders. *Journal of African Studies*, (2) 1&2, 43-62. Retrieved from

https://www.academia.edu/6404364/The_OAU_and_the_question_of_borders

Appendix A: List of Acronyms

ANAD	Agreement on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Defence
ASF	African Standby Force
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations.
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWARN	ECOWAS Early Warning System Response Network
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
EIMS	ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy
EPSAO	ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture and Operations
ESBF	ECOWAS Stand-By Force
EU	European Union
EWARP	Early Warning and Response Partnership
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
IAA	International Atomic Agency
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRB	Institutional Review Board
JNIM	Jama' at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin
KAIPTC	Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Center

LCB	Lake Chad Basin
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
NDC	National Defence College (Nigeria)
NILS	National Institute for Legislative Studies (Nigeria)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PCASED	Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development
PET	Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
PFT	Policy Feedback Theory
POA	Programme of Action
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
REWARD	Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa
SADR	Saharan Arab Democratic Republic
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
UAS	Union of African States
UEMOA	Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine
UIAS	Union of Independent African States
UN	United Nations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WAEMU	West Africa Economic Monetary Union
WAMA	West African Monetary Agency

WAMI	West African Monetary Institute
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding
WAPIS	West African Police Information System
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
POLISARIO	Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro

Appendix B: Invitation Letter to Participants

Dear ... (name of participant)...

My name is Farouck Mohammed-Bashar. I am a PhD student of Public Policy and Administration with specialization in Homeland Security Policy and Coordination at Walden University of the United States of America. My research topic is “Integrated Threat Management: An Alternative Approach to Regional Security System for ECOWAS” I obtained your contact information from the Head Office, West African Network for Peacebuilding. I wish to invite you to participate in this study as a respondent. If you agree to participate, I will arrange an interview at a time and neutral public location of your convenience. The interview would last for about 45 minutes and will be formal. My goal in this study will be to get answers toward establishing the reasons for the challenges of ECOWAS’ approach to the region’s security management with a view to proffering an alternate approach. I can assure you that I will share the results of the study with you. In addition, please note participation in this study is optional, and you may withdraw at any point of the process.

I have provided further details of the study in the attached consent form. Your signature on this form means you understand the information I presented and you want to willingly participate. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any further clarification.

Thank you.

Farouck Mohammed-Bashar