

2020

Public Policy Response to Violence: Case Study of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

Emmanuel Baba Mamman
Walden University

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations>



Part of the [Public Administration Commons](#), and the [Public Policy Commons](#)

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.

Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by

Emmanuel Baba Mamman

has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by
the review committee have been made.

Review Committee

Dr. Timothy Fadgen, Committee Chairperson,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

Dr. Victoria Landu-Adams, Committee Member,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

Dr. Eliesh Lane, University Reviewer,
Public Policy and Administration Faculty

Chief Academic Officer and Provost
Sue Subocz, Ph.D.

Walden University
2020

Abstract

Public Policy Response to Violence: Case Study of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

by

Emmanuel Baba Mamman

MPA, University of Ilorin, 1998

BSc (Ed), Delta State University, Abraka, 1992

Final Study Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

September 2020

Abstract

The violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has generated an increased need for public policy responses. Nigerian authorities and community stakeholders have attempted myriad responses to the challenges created by Boko Haram. However, there is a poor understanding of policy frameworks for handling the Boko Haram violence on the immediate, medium-term, and long-term dimensions. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to improve the understanding of the public policy measures that may help to address the Boko Haram challenge. John Burton's theory of human needs provided a theoretical foundation for the study. Purposive sampling technique was used, which emphasized the relevance of participants' experiences and knowledge to the study. Rich data were obtained from archival documents and participant interviews from 12 public policy experts. Eight themes emerged from the analysis process of hand coding, categorization, patterning, detailed description, and interpretation of the data. The deductive thematic analysis approach for analyzing data was used. Key findings from this study revealed that a collaborative approach to public policy making and implementation by authorities in Nigeria is important for a successful counterinsurgency fight against Boko Haram. Recommendations include the need to mainstream research and intelligence in all counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram and having a properly articulated counterinsurgency policy for Nigeria with a conceptual clarity that involves both the use of security and peacebuilding components at the political, legal, economic, and civil society levels.

Public Policy Response to Violence: Case Study of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

by

Emmanuel Baba Mamman

MPA, University of Ilorin, 1998

BSc (Ed), Delta State University, Abraka, 1992

Final Study Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

September 2020

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to the glory of the Lord God almighty and to my wife, Mrs. Cecilia Amina Mamman, and my children, Edward, Evelyn, and Manasoko.

Acknowledgments

I am profoundly grateful to Dr. Timothy P. Fadgen, who patiently guided me in this dissertation process as my committee chair. I also immensely thank Dr. Victoria B. Landu-Adams, my committee member, and Dr. Eliesh Lane, the URR, for blending well with my chair and ensuring the quality of this dissertation. I wish to use this medium to express my special appreciation to my wife and children for their sacrifice all through the years that I have had to struggle for financial resources for this program. My appreciation also goes to Dr. Samuel Rumala and other family members for their financial and moral support. I am also grateful to all the participants in the study, for their time and cooperation toward the successful completion of the study.

Finally, I wish to thank my faculty members for ensuring that this program come through successfully.

Thank you all and God bless.

Table of Contents

List of Tables	vi
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study.....	1
Introduction.....	1
Background.....	2
Problem Statement.....	5
Purpose of Study.....	6
Research Questions.....	7
Theoretical Framework.....	8
Nature of Study.....	10
Definition of Terms.....	11
Philosophical and Practical Assumptions.....	13
Scope and Delimitations.....	15
Limitations of the Study.....	16
Significance of the Study.....	16
Summary.....	17
Chapter 2: Literature Review.....	20
Introduction.....	20
Synopsis of Current Literature on the Problem.....	21
Literature Search Strategy.....	24
Theoretical Foundation.....	25
Conceptual Framework.....	29

The Concept	29
Review and Synthesis of Studies Related to the Concept	32
Justification from Literature for Selection of Concept	36
Key Concepts and Benefits of the Framework	37
Concept of Public Policy	37
Violence as a Consequence for Public Policy Agenda	42
Boko Haram Insurgency	46
Literature Review Related to Key Concepts and Variables.....	49
Policies and Principles of Internal Security Management	49
Towards Nigeria’s National Security Policy and Administration	52
Counterinsurgency Policy Process in Nigeria.....	58
The Boko Haram Violence in Nigeria	63
Boko Haram Insurgency: A Causal Analysis	68
Types of Insurgencies in Nigeria	74
Nigerian Government Response to Boko Haram Violence	78
Boko Haram and the Increasing Cross Border Linkages.....	85
Review and Synthesis of Studies Pertaining to the Research Questions	98
Identified Gaps in Previous Research	102
Summary.....	103
Summary of Major Themes in the Literature	104
Known and Not Known in the Discipline Relating to the Theme of Study	104
Chapter 3: Research Method.....	106

Introduction.....	106
Research Design and Rationale	106
Rationale for Choosing the Research Approach.....	107
Role of the Researcher and Professional Relationships.....	109
Handling Researcher Bias.....	110
Methodology	110
Participant Selection	111
Unit of Analysis	114
Procedures for Data Collection.....	116
Data Collection	116
Data Analysis Plan.....	118
Evidence of Trustworthiness.....	120
Ethical Procedures	122
Summary.....	123
Chapter 4: Results	124
Introduction.....	124
Research Questions.....	124
The Setting.....	125
Demographics	126
Data Collection	126
Data Analysis	127
Evidence of Trustworthiness.....	134

Credibility	134
Transferability.....	135
Dependability	136
Confirmability.....	136
The Results.....	137
Emergent Theme 1: Impact of Boko Haram Violence on Welfare and Public Safety	137
Emergent Theme 2: Counterinsurgency Policies Adopted to Restrain Boko Haram Violence	140
Emergent Theme 3: Assessing the Efficacy of the Counterinsurgency Policies.....	143
Emergent Theme 4: Emphasizing Military Response Measures	149
Emergent Theme 5: Key Stakeholders in the Public Policy Development Process	151
Emergent Theme 6: Policy Implementation Challenges	152
Emergent Theme 7: Identifying Effectual Public Policy Options	156
Emergent Theme 8: Future Policy Research	159
Summary of the Results	160
Summary.....	165
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations.....	167
Introduction.....	167
Overview of Emergent Themes	168

Theoretical Background to Findings.....	170
Interpretation of Findings	172
Impact of Boko Haram Violence on Welfare and Public Safety	172
Counterinsurgency Policies Adopted to Restrain Boko Haram Violence	173
Assessing the Efficacy of the Counterinsurgency Policies.....	174
Emphasizing Military Response Measures.....	175
Key Stakeholders in the Policy Development Process	176
Policy Implementation Challenges	176
Identifying Effectual Public Policy Options	178
Future Policy Research	184
Limitations of the Study.....	185
Recommendations.....	186
Implications for Social Change.....	189
Conclusion	191
References.....	193
Appendix A: Interview Protocol.....	216
Appendix B: Interview Questions.....	218

List of Tables

Table 1. Overview of Radical Religious Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa	90
Table 2. Interview Excerpts and the Coding Process	129
Table 3. Analysis of Interview Topics Linked to the Research Questions	132
Table 4. List of Thematic Labels or Emergent Themes From the Interviews	133

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Introduction

The violence arising from the Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in deaths, severe population displacement, disruption of livelihoods, and acute food insecurity in Nigeria (Akpan, 2013; Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). In addition to the colossal loss of human lives and destruction of property suffered by especially people in the northern part of the country, the Boko Haram insurgency is having a crumbling effect on the economy of Nigeria. This violent disposition of Boko Haram has resulted in wanton destruction of innocent lives, and government efforts to address the situation do not appear to be yielding positive results (Aderonke, 2015; Botha, Ewi, Salifu, & Abdile, 2017). The Boko Haram violence is one of the greatest threats to the internal security of Nigeria (Onuoha, 2014). Boko Haram is guided by extreme ideology and is focused on establishing an absolute Islamic state in some parts of the northern states of Nigeria (Osuji, 2013). The Boko Haram's key objective is to destroy Nigeria's democratic institutions and impose sharia law on the citizens, using violence as its modus operandi (Onouha, 2013). Boko Haram opposes Nigeria as a secular nation, calling it *dagut* (evil) and not worthy of any loyalty (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013).

With Boko Haram, Nigeria has witnessed high incidences of violence and turbulence that have posed serious challenges to peace and security (Madau & Madu, 2013). People in Nigeria no longer feel secure and safe in their homes. They fear walking the streets even in their immediate neighborhoods. They fear that their children may be attacked, kidnapped or abducted by Boko Haram on their way to or from school. The

Boko Haram assaults and molestations of innocent people and the bomb blasts have been palpable (Madu & Madu, 2013, p.157). This study is an effort to improve the understanding of the public policy measures that will most effectively address the Boko Haram challenge. The study fills an important void in the responses to the Boko Haram crisis given the extent of the violence and its far-reaching implications for Nigeria's continuous existence as one indivisible sovereign nation. This chapter provides contextual information on the subject of this study, the problem statement and purpose of the study, and the research questions and the theoretical framework used for the study. Also included are the nature or design for the study, definition of terms, philosophical and practical assumptions for the study, and delimitations and limitations and the significance of the study.

Background

No single group has inflicted more violence on Nigerians than Boko Haram since the country's civil war of 1967 to 1970 (Botha et al., 2017; Madu & Madu, 2013). Boko Haram has been waging a sophisticated insurgency that initially targeted security personnel and then expanded to others (Onuoha, 2013). The insurgency has had a devastating impact on Nigerians' daily lives. Public safety has been challenged fundamentally and peaceful intercommunity relations have broken down (International Crisis Group, 2011).

With its violent escapades, Boko Haram was ranked by the Institute of Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index (2015) as the world's deadliest terrorist group; attacks in 2014 alone caused about 6,644 deaths, compared to the 6,073 deaths caused by the

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Another report indicated that Nigeria experienced the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever to be recorded in a given year: 7,512 deaths in 2014 compared to 1,850 deaths recorded in 2013, representing an increase of about 300% (Nigeria Security Tracker, 2014). The Boko Haram is believed to have killed between 20,000 and 35,000 people since its emergence in 2002; most of these deaths occurring after 2009 (CNN Library, Boko Haram Fast Facts, 2014). Because of the associated bombings and its other violent activities, the Boko Haram insurgency has stood out as a unique and ominous challenge. The April 14, 2014, abduction of about 200 girls from Chibok Secondary School near Maiduguri in Borno State—some of whom have still not been released—is one act by the Boko Haram that has drawn national and international outrage.

Violence by terrorist groups like Boko Haram have constituted a major security challenge to all countries, and in response, many international organizations and countries adopted a counterterrorism strategy (CTS) as a response to prevent and reduce its threats (Udeh, 2013). On November 30, 2005, the European Union (EU) developed a CTS based on four pillars—prevention, protection, pursuance, and response—to resolve the challenge of terrorism in the region (Council of European Union, 2005). Similarly, on September 8, 2006, the United Nations adopted a CTS designed to enhance national, regional, and international efforts to counter terrorism (United Nations, 2006). This included measures to prevent the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, U.S. authorities enacted the Patriot Act and other legislation and established the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate

antiterrorism functions (Udeh, 2013). To prevent terrorist acts on U.S. soil, in June 2011, the United States developed a National Strategy for Counterterrorism to build partnerships over security issues (Udeh, 2013, p. 307).

Udeh (2013) also noted that Morocco has a multipronged CTS to combat terrorism and thwart the efforts of the Algerian-based Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group. The Moroccan strategy gave the country victory over terrorism in North Africa because of its comprehensive nature with multiple objectives of achieving regional cooperation and eradicating slum (Udeh, 2013, p. 307). The political authorities and elites in Nigeria have been largely unable to curtail the violence of Boko Haram, and many people have viewed this as a failure of Nigeria's counterterrorism policies (Ojelade, 2018). National institutions and state and nonstate actors in Nigeria have yet to leverage collaboration, partnerships, and synergistic relationships (Institute for Peace & Conflict Resolution [IPCR], 2012) at policy formulation and implementation levels for maximum results.

Policy serves as the most potent political, legal, and administrative context and framework, within which organizations, governments, and other stakeholders can interact to achieve sustained peace and security (Mato & Olasupo, 2014). The security of people is endangered by violence (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2016). As noted by Ojelade, (2018), the spiral of domestic and societal violence in Nigeria needs to be stemmed through public policy that envisages a comprehensive multi-actor engagement framework. The more a society is able to control the spiral of violence, the higher the level of peace, social harmony, and development (IPCR, 2016b). Public policy

is expected to balance the objectives of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity to ensure harmonious coexistence and socioeconomic and political advancement. Quality policy decisions require planning (Fwa, 2011, p. 189) to achieve desirable outcomes for preventing violence in society. Providing security in a violence-prone society like Nigeria requires a locale-specific definition and understanding of policies that guarantee security and address the fears, anxieties, and aspirations of the people (IPCR, 2016b).

Problem Statement

The violence arising from the Boko Haram insurgency underscores the need to understand the public policy interventions that can address the root causes of the insurgency and to ameliorate its consequences and impact on citizens. Nigerian citizens are suffering the menace of violence from various episodes like ethnoreligious conflicts (IPCR, 2016b), extrajudicial killings, and indiscriminate shootings by Nigerian security forces (Elaigwu, 2014). Other forms of violence are Fulani pastoralist attacks, cultism and armed robbery episodes, kidnappings, and clashes by tribal or ethnic communities. The Boko Haram violence is widespread and is affecting the progress and peaceful coexistence of the people of Nigeria (Akpan, 2013; Elaigwu, 2014; Fafowora, 2013;).

The Boko Haram violence is deepening poverty, especially in the north, as schools close, factories shut down, and investors and traders leave (Ishaku, 2012). Also, the activities of the Boko Haram have had a negative effect on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria. Rene (2012) found that the World Investment Report (WIR) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development indicated that 2009–2010, when Boko Haram intensified its violent attacks, the FDI revenue to Nigeria fell to \$6.1 billion

(N933.3 billion) in 2010, with close to a 30% drop from \$8.65 billion (N1.33 trillion) in 2009, causing the Nigerian economy to lose N1.33 trillion FDI. The level of violence and insecurity caused by the Boko Haram insurgency is giving rise to palpable fear for the disintegration of the Nigerian federation. The insurgency has deepened social divisions not only in the north but across Nigeria (Elaigwu, 2014).

Although available literature reveals that most Nigerians believe that Boko Haram is best addressed at the community or local level, rather than at the national or federal level (Botha et al., 2017), many more people are divided on the public policy measures that best address the Boko Haram insurgency and its consequences. The use of data and analysis to make effective public policy decisions has not been well researched. Insufficient attention has been paid to understanding the public policy measures that can be adopted to stop the Boko Haram violence and reduce its impact on citizens. In conducting this research, I adopted qualitative case study approach to provide the Nigerian government and policy makers with useful analysis to improve the understanding of public policy measures to address the Boko Haram insurgency.

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study was to improve the understanding of the public policy measures that will prevent insurgent groups like Boko Haram from emerging and wreaking violence on the Nigerian people. The violence of the Boko Haram insurgency has generated an increased need for public policy directions (Barkindo, 2016; Okene & Olawale, 2013), and the central focus of this study is the impact such public policy measures will have regarding the protection of citizens and the guarantee of their

fundamental rights and privileges under the law. In this research, I examined the policy strategies or measures that have been adopted by Nigerian government or authorities to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

I held interviewing sessions with public policy experts with guided and open-ended questions. Interview participants for this study were mostly retired personnel who have been involved in making various policies pertaining to security, peace, conflict management and resolution, and good governance issues from organizations like IPCR, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, and the Institute for Security Studies. Other organizations include National Assembly, Victim Support Fund, the North East Development Commission (NEDC), Africa Institute of Public Policy, and the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research. Ten of the 12 participants lived in Abuja and the other two lived in Jos, the Plateau state capital. The results of this study can improve the understanding of which policy measures will best promote the security and welfare of people in Nigeria and help to sensitize the authorities on the importance of taking concrete steps in the area of formulating and implementing appropriate policies (Kpessa, 2011; Ozumba, 2014).

Research Questions

The central research question that guided the study is:

RQ1: What public policy measures are a solution to deal with Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

Successfully answering the stated research question will produce important lessons that will improve the understanding of the policy measures that can be taken to

stop the violent activities of Boko Haram and ameliorate the negative effects or impacts of the insurgency on the citizens. The following subquestions were used to help answer the overarching research question:

SQ1: What public policy strategies or measures have been adopted by Nigerian government or authorities to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

SQ2: Why has Boko Haram violence continued despite public policy initiatives meant to curtail it?

SQ3: How can/might future public policy initiatives mitigate the impact of Boko Haram violence on the people in Nigeria?

Theoretical Framework

Nigeria has witnessed large-scale violence since gaining independence in 1960. Some analysts believe that the central factors in all the cases of violence have been fallouts from the contradictions inherent in forging together different sectional interests into one united nation (Agbede, 2010, p. 63). Osuji (2013) noted that Nigeria is experiencing a new phase in its political system where there is emergence of violent extremist groups with strong feelings about how they should live their lives, relate with others, and what they think is a fulfilling existence. Perhaps this explains why Boko Haram has embarked on violence and destruction to satisfy its selfish aspirations (Akpan, 2013). For humans, violence is not natural, but rather a construct arising from social proclivities (Danielsen, 2005). So, given Nigeria's experience, the study of violence and

how it is managed should be the central focus of social change efforts within the framework of society.

For this study, I used John Burton's (1990a) theory of human needs to ground the research. Burton's theory provides a common understanding of the strategies in public policies that could be used to discourage individuals or groups from using violence to express their grievances or to satisfy their needs within the context of a social and political setting. For Burton, violent conflicts arise due to the inability of people to meet their needs. Applying the human needs theory (HNT) to political conflict situations, Burton observed that groups resort to violence as a means of seeking a redress when their efforts to meet their needs are frustrated. Burton believed that conflicts could be resolved when the system focuses on meeting the needs of the people in conflict. Burton (1990b) argued that the political system must have the capacity to cope or respond to the conflicts, strains, and violent episodes emerging from the environment.

This research on public policy measures to address the Boko Haram crisis took advantage of Burton's theoretical underpinnings to identify potential solutions for the problem in Nigeria. As with most terrorist groups, Boko Haram has been adept at evolving its strategies and developing justifications for its actions. The group continues to kill and maim, and its actions have shattered communities, displaced thousands, and caused mass migration, putting areas with limited resources under immense pressure. A genuine foundation for effective public policy must therefore seek to facilitate and sustain a culture with a proactive alert system that is a veritable tool to proactively sensitize, caution, and protect the people (Ozumba, 2014). Public policies must subsequently alter

the environment and the demands generated therein, as well as the character of the political system itself. Eneanya (2013, p. 233) found this environment to “consist of all those conditions and events external to the boundaries of the political system and the demands are the claims made by individuals and groups on the political system.” However, the extent to which the environment, whether internal or external, is said to have an influence on the policy-making process is determined by the values and ideologies held by the decision-makers in the system (Ekong, 2016).

Nature of Study

In research there is always the need to provide explanation and to do so with less ambiguity (Creswell, 2009). The explanation provided must give rise to some form of evidence consistent with the theoretical framework adopted for conducting the research. But this cannot happen unless there is a “plan or proposal to conduct research” and usually this would include “the intersection of philosophy; strategies of inquiry and specific methods” (Creswell, 2009, p. 5).

To conduct a study to improve the understanding of how public policy making and implementation can be used to address the incidences of violence arising from the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the qualitative method was most appropriate. Rudestam and Newton (2007) observed that “qualitative methods are linked to constructivist theory of knowledge because they focus on understanding experiences from the point of view of those who live them” (p. 35). Understanding the Boko Haram counterinsurgency policy development and implementation will provide a lead to policy direction that can facilitate better approaches for dealing with the Boko Haram

insurgency in Nigeria. This qualitative case study involved stating the questions and procedures, collecting data, analyzing the data, and interpreting or giving meaning to the data analyzed. The study was designed to improve the understanding of how public policy making and implementation will discourage violence and promote cohesion and harmony between decisions and actions on peace and security for all people living or residing in Nigeria (IPCR, 2016a).

Definition of Terms

Boko Haram: As used in this dissertation, refers to the description adopted by residents of Maiduguri where the group was believed to have been formed. *Boko* is a Hausa word meaning *Western education*, and *Haram* is an Arabic word figuratively meaning *sin* but literally meaning *forbidden*. Boko Haram has therefore been commonly translated as *Western education is sacrilege* or *Western education is a sin*. Some scholars believe that such interpretation will be more of a transliteration of the two words, which would be incapable of capturing the essence of what the original coiners had in mind (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013; Unumen, 2014;). The group earned its name due to its strong opposition to anything Western, which it believes has a corrupting influence on Muslims (Chotia, 2012). Ioannis Mantzikos, a Greek researcher on Islamic movements, observed that what the users of the word *Boko Haram* meant to convey is that “Western civilization” is forbidden and not that “Western education” is forbidden or a sacrilege. Mantzikos (2010) believed that when *Boko Haram* is translated as *Western civilization is forbidden*, it stresses the belief of the sect in the supremacy of Islamic culture over Western civilization (p. 58).

Counterinsurgency: Strategies or measures that are taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to insurgency attacks; techniques used by stakeholders for denying the insurgents the opportunity of using their tactics (Ewa, 2017).

Extremism: Rooted in faith-based tenets and carried out by groups or individuals. As used in this dissertation, it defines an individual's or a group's view or interpretation of teachings of a belief system. Terrorist acts have been carried out on religious grounds by extremists with the hope to either spreading or enforcing a system of belief.

Insurgency: A state of violent rebellion against any authority or leadership of a country through various acts of disruption and molestation in order to undermine its authority. In the Nigerian constitutional context, *insurgency* refers to the definition adopted by Okene and Olawale (2013) as “attack on defenseless civilians resulting in the massive loss of lives and properties, prevention of the flourishing domestic and foreign investments and investors and its linkages to murder, genocide and indeed treasonable felony” (p. 325).

Peace: Societal conditions that ensure relative social stability and order through the dispensation of justice, fairness, and opportunities for accommodation by formal and informal institutions, practices, and norms. Usually, peace is not the absence of conflicts but is about how conflicts are managed to ensure relative stability and law and order so as to enable human beings carry out their daily activities.

Policy: Guidance for action; may take the form of a declaration of goals or a course of action. It may also include a declaration of general purpose and as well as making declaration on authoritative decision. Mato and Olasupo (2014) refer to policy

“as a purposive course of action taken or adopted by those in power in pursuit of certain goals or objectives” (p. 45).

Public policy: A guide government has designed for direction and practice in certain problem areas. It is a relatively stable purposive course of action followed by government in dealing with some problem or matter of concern.

Security: Protection against internal and external threats and preserving sovereignty over territory. Once a government cannot guarantee security, rebellious armed groups or criminal gangs may use violence to exploit the security gaps.

Violence: The use of physical force, usually with the purpose of injuring or damaging the object of violence. It is the use or threat of physical act carried out by an individual or group of individuals against another individual or individuals and or property with the intent to cause injury or death to persons and or damage or destruction to property. Violence in this study includes various acts of killings, bombings, insurgency, terrorism, kidnappings, destruction or damage to properties, ethnoreligious violent uprisings, and conflicts.

Philosophical and Practical Assumptions

Within the context of the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria’s active participation in policy making toward commitment to human values and societal peace is a critical perspective that can be better confirmed through study, rather than through assumptions (Merriam, 2014). However, the philosophical elements and the meaning I attach to this research determines the methodological assumptions for the

research (Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Ponterotto, 2005;). Based on this, the following philosophical assumptions underlay this research:

- The negative image Nigeria has attracted both locally and internationally as a result of the violence of Boko Haram is a compelling reason that Nigeria must understand and develop strategies that maximize prospects for safety, peace, and security of lives and property.
- Improving the understanding of formulation and implementation of public policy measures to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is necessary for safety, peace, and security of lives and property in Nigeria.
- Given the continuous threats from Boko Haram, the philosophy that sees peace as a factor of progress and development should be promoted through the adoption of policy of dialogue based on factual experience and reason.
- The use of Burton's (1990) HNT is an appropriate theoretical framework to ground the study and underscore that efforts to address the Boko Haram crisis will benefit from the HNT principle of mediation in violent conflicts, reconciliation efforts, and nonviolent communication used in restorative justice structures across the world (Danielsen, 2005).

In terms of practical assumptions, it was assumed that by formulating and implementing relevant public policies, Nigerians will feel happy and be mobilized to contribute to violent conflict prevention, diversity management, and sustainable peace building. It was further assumed that the qualitative case study approach was the best suited method for investigating the public policies that will address the challenges of

Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Also, I assumed that the target participants for this research were Nigerians and public policy experts who would be able to provide useful information and insight on how policy making and implementation can be used to address the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria. Lastly, I assumed that the participants would answer the research questions openly, honestly, and in great detail.

Scope and Delimitations

This study was primarily concerned with how to improve the understanding of public policy making and implementation in order to effectively address the Boko Haram violence. The study addressed the gap in the formulation and implementation of public policies targeted at resolving the menace of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The study was bounded and limited to the types of public policies that may be considered for design and implementation given the context of efforts or attempts already made to resolve the Boko Haram crisis.

Interview participants were selected through purposive sampling limited to persons with relevant knowledge of the subject. This was to provide opportunity for a vigorous and exhaustive discussion with the participants. Saturation was attained as a result of the quality of the participants who were identified and sampled for the study. These participants comprised retired officials of institutions (both private and public) charged with tasks of policy advisory, policy think tank and policy formulation, and implementation on matters of peace, violence, and conflict resolution. Ten of the 12 participants lived in Abuja, and the other two lived in Jos, the Plateau state capital.

Limitations of the Study

Wilson-Genderson and Pruchno (2015) noted that there are limitations for all research. One clear limitation to this study was sample size. The sample size used was small because it was not feasible to engage the entire population of public policy experts across various agencies, establishments, and universities in Nigeria. Findings could only be generalized in view of the sample population. The target participants for this study were selected from peace and conflict resolution establishments; policy and strategic studies agencies, and reintegration agencies like the Victim Support Fund.

A second limitation was the lack of access to some information regarded as classified policy measures. The policy measures were regarded as intelligence or security issues. I could not access such information due to the sensitive nature of the research. However, I depended on open source information relevant to the study.

There was danger of potential bias because of the nature of the study. The study is a qualitative case study, which made the researcher the primary instrument for data collection, analysis, and interpretation (Creswell, 2013) The researcher must endeavor to remain neutral throughout the study (Apori-Nkansah, 2008). I ensured that the entire process of the research was rigorous, credible, and reliable.

Significance of the Study

This study filled an important gap in the search for solutions to the Boko Haram insurgency by offering empirically informed public policy recommendations to the Nigerian government and other stakeholders who have been involved in the fight against Boko Haram. The research will help policy makers in Nigeria develop alternative courses

of action conducive to peaceful resolution of conflicts involving terrorist violence (; Eneanya, 2016; Golwa & Alozieuwa 2012; Ogbeide, 2007).

The findings of the study may be useful to government ministries, agencies, and departments and nongovernmental and civil society organizations and resource individuals whose services could be complementary to national security efforts. Through a well-informed public policy effort, Nigeria's national security strategy should be able to achieve the coordination and utilization of all the available efforts and services for the attainment of national security goals. Lessons from the study will improve understanding of a public policy approach that will deepen and strengthen knowledge and insights for increased engagements of people in intercultural dialogues, conflict resolution, and postconflict peace building.

The UNDP in its 2014 Human Development Report (HDR) averred that "a core aspect of human development is having the freedom to live a life that one values" (p. 24). Nigeria must determine the policies and other related response measures that can help in addressing the seemingly unending spate of violence. Public policies in the form of rules, norms, strategies, and collective action can influence and determine the scope and efficacy of national responses to the unfortunate experience of the Boko Haram violence.

Summary

This chapter provides the introductory aspects to this study. I explained the case study approach adopted for the study, the background to the study, the research questions, as well as the design and approach to answering the research questions. Also included in this chapter were the limitations and significance of the study. The Boko Haram

insurgency started as a weak, disorganized, loosely coordinated, and inchoate movement (Akpan, 2013). Several versions existed at the emergence of the Boko Haram Islamist sect in Nigeria. Some people claimed the group was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri during the controversy over the introduction of Sharia in some northern states in 2002, and others have argued that the group predated Mohammed Yusuf (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013; Usoji, 2013). Regardless of its origins, the Boko Haram sect is a group that has emerged by the new wave of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria. The official name of the sect is *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'wati Wal-Jihad*, which means “people committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” (Unumen, 2014, p. 238).

The Boko Haram violence has taken a heavy toll on many Nigerians and many people residing in Nigeria. The colossal loss of human lives and destruction of property suffered, especially by people in the northern part of the country, and the crumbling effect of the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria’s economy is peaking (Ibrahim et al., 2015; Nigeria Security Tracker, 2014;). The safety of the citizens in the affected areas remains uncertain and it appears that security forces are struggling to quell the insurgency (Ewa, 2017).

The subsequent chapters follow a general layout. In Chapter 2, I examine, analyze, and synthesize literature on issues related to security and the threats to lives and property posed by Boko Haram violence. In Chapter 3, I discuss the methodology adopted for the study and outline the methods employed in data collection and analysis.

Chapter 4 includes the results of the study and Chapter 5 contains conclusions, recommendations, and social change implications from the results of the study.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine, analyze, and synthesize literature on issues relating to security and the threats to lives and property posed by violence, including their various sources, such as the Boko Haram insurgency and the challenges they pose to peace and stability, particularly in Nigeria. I also analyze the place of public policy in addressing societal problems. Included in this chapter are sections on the literature search strategy, the theoretical foundation for the study, an extensive review of literature on key concepts and variables relevant to the study, and a summary and conclusion for the chapter.

The Boko Haram Islamist sect has engaged in fearsome insurgency that has claimed the lives of thousands of people, displaced millions more, and destroyed properties worth billions of naira (Institute of Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index, 2015). The insurgency is an expression of violence and destruction that has been orchestrated to satisfy selfish aspirations (Akpan, 2013). The Boko Haram insurgency is characterized by mindless violence that undermines the freedom and way of life of Nigerians and the sovereignty of Nigeria. Unfortunately, the government of Nigeria has been criticized for its lack of a coherent policy to fight Boko Haram (Ojelade, 2018). The authorities in Nigeria are struggling to quell the Boko Haram violence (Ewa, 2017). The safety of citizens in the affected areas remains uncertain, resulting in severe humanitarian crises circumstances and producing millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and thousands of refugees (Ibrahim et al., 2015). The purpose of this study was to improve

the understanding of public policy making and implementation in order to effectively address Boko Haram violence.

Synopsis of Current Literature on the Problem

The Institute for Economics and Peace's (2015) Global Terrorism Index ranked Boko Haram as the world's deadliest terrorist group in 2014. Boko Haram's attacks in 2014 accounted for 6,644 deaths, against the 6,073 deaths caused by ISIS. These deaths were attributed to 453 Boko Haram attacks in Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria (Institute for Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index, 2015). The report also shows that Nigeria experienced the largest increase in terrorist deaths within 1 year: 7,512 deaths in 2014 compared to 1,850 deaths in 2013. This shows an increase of about 300% (Institute for Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index, 2015). In a 2016 report, the United Nations Children's Fund highlighted the impact of Boko Haram attacks on children, given the high-profile kidnapping of Chibok school girls. The report estimated that in 2015, 1.3 million children from Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon were displaced, an increase of over 60% from the previous year. The report also profiled 44 incidents of children used in suicide attacks in 2015 (United Nations Children's Fund, 2016).

The use of suicide bombers and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle-borne IEDs by Boko Haram reflects the magnitude of violence unleashed on the Nigerian people. Such dramatic violence generates widespread fear and is carried out at random (Enwere, 2013). Usually, major targets include buildings or locations that are important economic and political symbols, such as embassies, night clubs, restaurants,

media houses, churches, mosques, schools, and bus stations (Enwere, 2013, p. 239; Ishiaku, 2012, p. 144).

Agbibo (2014) noted that Boko Haram carried out brave attacks on many public places like schools, prisons, police stations, religious houses, media offices, and the United Nations office in Abuja. Maiangwa et al. (2012) reported that the attack on the headquarters of the Nigerian police in Abuja by Boko Haram was the first suicide attack in Nigeria. Some other prominent attacks by Boko Haram include the 2011 Madalla Christmas day bombing that killed 45 people, and the January 2012 coordinated attacks on three government offices in Kano, where over 185 people were reported killed (Maiangwa, 2013, p. 96).

The insurgency started with fearsome intensity in 2010, when Boko Haram split into factions, changed its operational tactics, and steadily resisted a comprehensive attenuation of its capacity to cause violence. Congressional Research Service (CRS, 2019), for example, reported that it was the Al-Barnawi faction, Islamic State of West Africa that was responsible for the kidnapping of over 100 school girls from Dapchi village in northeast Nigeria in February 2018. A series of devastating attacks on the Nigerian military bases in 2018—in which over 100 soldiers were reportedly killed—has been attributed to the Al-Barnawi-led faction (CRS, 2019, p. 10).

CRS (2019) further stated that the State Department designated both Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa as foreign terrorist organizations under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, and as specially designated global terrorists under Executive Order 13224.52. The foreign terrorist organization

designations, according to CRS (2019), aim “to assist U.S. and other law enforcement agencies in efforts to investigate and prosecute suspects associated with the group” (p. 10).

The CRS noted that in June 2012 the State Department had designated three individuals—Khalid Al-Barnawi, Abubakar Adam Kamar (both said to have links with AQIM), and Shekau—as specially designated global terrorists and in 2013 issued a \$7 million reward for information on the location of Shekau through its Rewards for Justice program (CRS, 2019). In 2013, the government of Nigeria formally declared Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist organizations. CRS reported that the British government in 2012 declared Ansaru as a *proscribed terrorist organization* and called the Boko Haram such in 2013. Boko Haram was added to the United Nations Al-Qaeda sanctions list in May 2014, and in December 2015, the State Department designated two more senior Boko Haram leaders as specially designated global terrorists, and the leader of Islamic State of West Africa, Barnawi, was added in February 2018 (CRS, 2019, p.10).

Boko Haram has been a major concern for policy experts in Nigeria. Policy should dictate security, political, religious, and economic and development considerations for the peace, stability, and progress of Nigeria (Ekong, 2016; Ojelade, 2018). Anyaegbunam (2012) stated that policy is a tool through which a state is steered. The violence of the Boko Haram insurgency underscores the objective basis for Nigeria to evolve a public policy response that addresses the root causes of violent extremism.

Policy serves as the most potent political, legal, and administrative context and framework, within which organizations and governmental functionaries and other

stakeholders can interact together to achieve sustained peace and security (Ozumba, 2014). The spiral of domestic and societal violence needs to be stemmed through public policy thrust. The more a society is able to control the spiral of violence, the higher the level of peace, social harmony, and development (IPCR, 2016a). Public policy thrust therefore is expected to balance the objectives of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in order to ensure harmonious coexistence and socioeconomic and political advancement (IPCR, 2016a).

Many problems affecting the vitality of a nation can be effectively tackled through sound policymaking involving both planning and implementation (Ogbeide, 2007, 2013; Ozumba, 2014). However, dealing with problems in a haphazard and unsystematic manner has proved ineffective and costly. There is consequently need to systematize policymaking to improve the quality of policy decisions (Fwa, 2011, p. 189). Quality policy decisions require that policy makers detect faulty reasoning and identify the worthiness of policy inputs as well as being able to suggest plausible policy alternatives. Screening policy inputs and the ability to foresee their prospective desirable and undesirable outcomes are important aspects of capacity in public policy response (Ozumba, 2014).

Literature Search Strategy

Given the required depth and focus of analysis on the problem of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and the increased need for public policy directions to ensure that the violence and other threats to peace and security are addressed, an interdisciplinary approach to the review of available literature was adopted. Literature from several

disciplines, such as policy, religion, government, political science, public administration, terrorism, and violent extremism, was reviewed. Relevant materials from databases such as ProQuest, Sage and Academic Research Premier, were searched. Books, monographs, conference proceedings, magazines, and related publications were also consulted.

Literature key search terms included *terrorism, violence, violent extremism, Boko Haram, insurgency, public policy, policy implementation, policy formulation, policy failure, religious radicalization, insecurity, terrorism financing, militancy, violent conflicts, conflict resolution, poverty, good governance, peace building, Islamic fundamentalism, clash of civilizations, Islamic revivalism, and frustration-aggression theory.*

Theoretical Foundation

The theory used for this study is HNT. Among one of the key theorists who propounded the HNT was John Burton. Burton (1990) argued that human conflicts emerge when people's efforts to meet their fundamental needs are frustrated. Burton (1990) listed such needs as (a) distributive justice, (b) safety and security, (c) belongingness, (d) self-esteem, (e) personal fulfilment, (f) identity, (g) cultural security, and (h) freedom. Danielsen (2005) reported that another HNT scholar, Rosenberg, stated that "violence is a tragic expression of unmet human needs, implying that all actions undertaken by human beings are attempts to satisfy their needs" (p. 6). This suggests that violence occurs when certain people do not see other ways to meet their needs or when they feel they are not receiving the understanding and respect for what they consider to be their needs.

Human needs theorists maintain that one of the primary causes of protracted violence is people's drive to meet their unmet needs, and when such needs are continuously not met, frustration sets in which eventually results in aggression (Adibe, 2012). Reflecting on earlier works of Gurr (1970), Davies (1973), and Margolin (1977) on the relative deprivation hypothesis, Nweze (2012) posited that every frustration leads to some aggression and every act of aggression results from prior frustration and that any feeling of frustration is perceptual and such a frustration must have reached a clinical point before overt manifestation of aggression (pp. 282–283). Nweze (2012) further argued that “much terrorist behavior is a response to the frustration of failure to meet various social, economic and personal needs and objectives” (p. 283). Agbiboa (2014) argued that the HNT of social conflicts holds that all human beings have basic needs they seek to fulfill and that failure to meet these needs could lead to an outbreak of violent conflict.

This explains why, in the context of Nigeria's experience of bad governance, sustained economic hardship and rising inequality have resulted in social frustration, and Boko Haram has been able to peddle the idea of Muslim revivalism, which has now become a serious challenge to all Nigerians, particularly northern traditional, religious, and political elites (International Crisis Group, 2014, p. 2). For some people, Boko Haram provides a ready answer to the poverty, injustice, and corruption in Nigeria (Gowon, 2012; Shettima, 2012; World Council of Churches, 2012; Zenn et al., 2018).

The rise of Boko Haram with its violent disposition to western values is a counterresponse to western civilization, which has fast eclipsed other civilizations,

including Islamic civilization (Ibrahim et al., 2015; Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). The trend that most world civilizations are adopting western values has infuriated Islamic fundamentalists. The Boko Haram has a sole motivation to overthrow the Nigerian state with its western values and then impose strict Islamic sharia law on the entire country (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013; Zenn et al., 2018).

The efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values are unacceptable to Boko Haram and motivates them to engage in violence and other terrorist acts against the state (Bagaji, Etila, Ogbadu, & Sule, 2012). Academic consensus identified these motivations to include seeking revenge for alleged grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution and the promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national or religious causes and objectives (Alemika, 2012, p.186).

Onyebuchi and Chigozie (2013) noted that U.S. historian Ira Lapidus called Islamic fundamentalism “an umbrella designation for a very wide variety of movements” (p. 207). Lapidus stated that among these movements, some are intolerant and exclusivist, some are pluralistic, some are favorable to science and some are antiscience, some are primarily devotional, and some are political. The others, Lapidus said, are democratic or authoritarian, and some others are pacific or violent. Lapidus concluded that the difference between a mainstream Islamist and a fundamentalist is “a political individual in search of a more original Islam” (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013, p. 207). Like Boko Haram, it is the extremist individual Muslims who employ physical force to defend Islam; today, they are referred to as *Islamic fundamentalists*. Boko Haram finds

justification for their acts of violence on the grounds that they are deprived of their needs for true and undiluted worship.

Applying the HNT will be useful to the assessment of the claims of the Boko Haram and help to identify what their needs truly are, behind their positions or desired strategies (Danielsen, 2005). The flexibility of the HNT and its advantage of applicability in all the levels of the society, for intra and interpersonal conflict, intergroup conflict and in an international setting will help policy makers on how best to handle the challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. In the view of Danielsen (2005), “in a world context where differences are accentuated, HNT attempts to unify human beings from different regions and cultures, creating a common understanding of who we are and how others need and feel the same way we do” (p.6).

The study on how to improve the understanding of public policy measures that are likely to prevent insurgent gangs like the Boko Haram group from emerging and wrecking violence on the Nigerian people will benefit from the HNT principle of mediation in violent conflicts, reconciliation efforts and nonviolent communication used in restorative justice structures in some countries of the world (Danielsen, 2005). Through the use of the theoretical framework of case study approach which offers the researcher the opportunity to gather or generate rich data (Creswell, 2013), attempts were made to answer the research question relating to public policy measures that are a solution to deal with Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework for this study is that operative and efficient public policy response mechanism for violence redress and reduction has the potential to end the mayhem of the Boko Haram insurgency and other related violence witnessed in Nigeria. Therefore, concerted efforts must be made to improve the understanding of the various measures that are put in place to halt the violence on the Nigerian public and as well as effectively ameliorate the dangerous impacts of the violence.

To effectively conduct this research, I used a qualitative case study approach to explore and describe the concepts found in the public policy response to violence, with a focus on the Boko Haram insurgency. The process of the research was based on data collected through an open-ended interview procedure (Creswell, 2013).

The Concept

Violence, mass deaths and injuries caused by terrorist attacks are often geared towards achieving a particular goal (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 2013). The rationale for improving the understanding of public policy measures that will end the Boko Haram violence is to be able to articulate security policies that will take all aspects of the national lives of Nigerians into consideration. There is need to look beyond the usual state-centric approach to a more holistic approach that includes human security, where the people are put at the center of national security policy (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 2013; Ewa, 2017). The public policy response mechanism for violence redress and reduction has the potential to end the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

The Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria, has been one of the most active conflicts in the world when considered in terms of the frequency of attacks, scale of killings and destruction of lives and property (; Botha et al., 2017; Ibrahim et al., 2015; Nigeria Security Tracker, 2014). The Boko Haram metamorphosed from a group of radical Salafi proselytizers to a terrorist organization that have engaged in a fearsome insurgency that has claimed the lives of thousands of people, displaced millions more, and destroyed properties worth billions of naira in local currency (Ibrahim et al., 2015). Boko Haram's ideology is part of a global Salafist Islamic ideological movement that seeks the imposition of its own interpretation of Islamic law.

Onuoha (2013), observed that Salafism seeks to purge Islam of outside influences and strives for a return to the Islam practiced by the "pious ancestors" of the early Islamic community. Onuoha stated that Salafism stresses adherence to a rigorist interpretation of the Quran and the Hadith and aims at reforming the personal behavior of every Muslim. He further stated that Salafism believes that it is the duty of every Muslim to advise other believers to change their ways of life, and they could use violence to bring about such radical change (Onuoha, 2013, p. 409).

With this goal in view, Boko Haram acquired military training from within and outside Nigeria and obtained such weapons like the General Purpose Machine Guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades, rocket launchers, AK47 rifles, SAM-7 anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles and bombs It also acquired the rudimentary technology of Improvised Explosive Devices (Alade, 2016; Ewa, 2017). Boko Haram used these weapons to launch a most ferocious, savage and terrorist war against Nigeria and its citizens, mapping out

the entire north eastern Nigeria as its immediate base and area of operation, and by middle of 2014, it had, in what seemed like lightening operations, conquered and brought under its control about 21,545 square kilometer of territory in north eastern Nigeria (Ewa, 2017). Ewa noted that Boko Haram's ultimate goal was to establish by means of a jihad, an Islamic state in the north east, and then use it as a base to conquer the rest of Nigeria and the West African sub-region. The subjugated territory was to be designated as Islamic State West African Province – an area to be developed as a province of ISIS (Ewa, 2017).

It has therefore become necessary that authorities and stakeholders in Nigeria make efforts to improve the understanding of the various policy measures that will constitute appropriate and adequate responses to the Boko Haram violence (Aghedo & Osunmah, 2012; Omale, 2013). Yoroms (2013) observed that the institutional responses to sensitive security issues like that of Boko Haram are not only weak but thwarted by established primordial inclination to cleavages that are sharply divided. That as a result of this sharp contradiction, state institutions only react to security issues based on policy impulse and not by rational or systematic policy approach (Yoroms, 2013).

Public policy response to Boko Haram violence must provide a holistic framework that includes both the soft and hard power approaches, and these approaches must be synchronized in a way that will spell out the duty and responsibilities of agencies and individuals involved in the counter insurgency efforts (Ojelade, 2018).

Review and Synthesis of Studies Related to the Concept

Obafemi and Galadima (2013) examined the natures, types and dynamics of insurgencies in Nigeria as well as the diagnostic review of the insurgencies, including their sources, causes and remedies. They observed that insurgency is a strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means, but by protracted asymmetric violence; ambiguity; the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains and densely populated urban centers); psychological warfare and political mobilization. Obafemi and Galadima posited that the insurgent groups use insurgency to express real or perceived discontent, and mainly with the aim “to subvert and alter the balance of power in their favor” (p. 2).

Obafemi and Galadima (2013) wrote that insurgent groups have emerged at different points in Nigeria’s political history. They listed some of the groups to include: the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND); the Odua Peoples Congress (OPC); Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); and the *Jama’atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda’awati wal-Jihad*” (meaning People Committed to the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad) commonly referred to as Boko Haram.

Ewa (2017) stressed the necessity for Nigeria’s national security efforts to be more dynamic and responsive to a certain range of problems and the issues in the counter insurgency operation. The author argued that it is against this background that national security would have to be repositioned and refocused in certain aspects, without necessarily making any fundamental shift away from its traditional approach to the management of threats to national interests by Boko Haram. In his view, counter

insurgency (COIN) should either be to defeat, persuade or humble insurgents to an agreement or compromise favorable to national interest, return the territory and population under contention to safety and normal life, and provide a sustained enabling environment for the government to carry out its obligations to the people (Ewa, 2017).

Ewa therefore advocated for the shift of emphasis from a militarily focused security oriented national strategy to a human need focused national security, being canvassed by the UN and the US as unsuitable for Nigeria, as it could produce dangerous contradictions to the nation. He argued that national security should not continue to focus on the use of military and security forces in the safekeeping of the nation (Ewa, 2017, p. 55).

Agbibo (2014) provided a brief literature that offers an insight to understanding the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It assessed the Boko Haram insurgency and identified the factors that gave rise to its emergence, and the ideology, demands and external links of the Sect. Agbibo also made a critical examination of the responses of the Nigerian government thus far and the opinion of Nigerians on the responses by government. For instance, in the Muslim north where the Boko Haram has been most active, there has been a demand for dialogue with the Sect, while in the south, the prevailing opinion is that there cannot be negotiation with terrorists until they end the violence that has killed thousands of innocent people (Agbibo, 2014).

Agbibo posited that a significant aspect of the campaign of violence in the north is the rigidity of the Nigerian military in dealing with the Boko Haram. He noted that resolving the crisis is not an easy task, but “resorting to the unidirectional tactics of

military crackdowns can only further complicate matters by militarizing the polity and escalating the violence” (Agbiboa, 2014, p. 44). He emphasized that there should be efforts to know which choices are strategic and sustainable enough to address the core factors that make Nigeria vulnerable to terrorism and to Boko Haram violence (p.48).

Okene and Olawale (2013) did a critique of the federal government’s counter insurgency strategies against Boko Haram and MEND. They examined the counter insurgency strategies adopted by the federal government of Nigeria in dealing with the insurgencies, with a view to ascertaining their efficacy or otherwise. They noted the inconsistency that characterized government’s attitude toward the insurgencies waged by Boko Haram and MEND. In the case of Boko Haram, for example, after what appears to be a successful crackdown on the Sect in 2009, the Nigerian federal government ‘went to rest’ and Boko Haram resurged with violent attacks in 2010. They stated that by the time the Boko Haram began to launch deadly attacks again, the federal government was caught unawares and had no immediate counter strategy to contain the sect. Consequently, and sadly, the government adopted a policy of denial by which it pretended that the attacks were not by Boko Haram since the Sect had been destroyed (Okene & Olawale, 2013, p. 327).

Okene and Olawale further noted that as the attacks became more overwhelming, audacious and recurrent, the federal government had to accept the fact that the Sect had once again become a threat to national security. They reported that it became clear to the federal government that the use of military force alone will not contain the sect and as a result, the government adopted a carrot and stick approach (Okene & Olawale, 2013)

However, Okene and Olawale argued that while the carrot and stick approach of the federal government cannot be faulted, its implementation had many flaws—there was so much disregard for human rights by the security forces, as during the counter insurgency operations, many innocent citizens were killed, many maimed and private properties destroyed. They observed that the excesses of the security forces cost them the cooperation and goodwill of the people and as a result the military were just groping in the dark in their operation against the Boko Haram (Okene & Olawale, 2013). They suggested that military and security tactics should be revised and reenacted to suit the environment and the strategies to be adopted should take into consideration the possibility for enduring peace and rehabilitation. This way, the military will win the hearts and minds of the civil populace (p. 338).

Akpan, Ekanem, and Olofu-Adeoye (2014) argued that the federal government's response to the Boko Haram insurgency which started in 2009 had not been pre-emptive or comprehensive, but instead a reactionary approach of always deploying security forces – an approach that often achieves little success. Consequently, Boko Haram gained advantage through the use of guerrilla warfare tactics of hit and run. They maintained that Boko Haram continued to attack innocent Nigerians by using improvised explosive devices, kidnapping and shootings.

Akpan et al. (2014) stated that the factors responsible for the limited performance of the Nigerian government in fighting Boko Haram was due to institutions of state that are usually weak. They listed such factors to include political instability, the brutal nature of security operations, poverty, economic disparity and porosity of the country's borders

(Akpan et al., 2014). They concluded that the federal government should undertake an assessment of its counter insurgency strategies in order to know the things that should inform government policies and how to effectively develop proactive strategies to counter Boko Haram insurgency (Akpan et al., 2014). They also suggested the need to discover errors in these responses and to strengthen the institutions of state so as to make them work effectively by formulating better counter insurgency policies (Akpan et al., 2014).

Justification From Literature for Selection of Concept

Violence caused by Boko Haram have remained the most conspicuous feature of contemporary Nigeria (Babalola & Ayuba, 2015). The Boko Haram have not only killed, maimed and abducted innocent citizens, it has also caused the destruction of a hitherto thriving socioeconomic life through its method of asymmetric warfare (Babalola & Ayuba, 2015). The Boko Haram has been attacking churches, mosques, motor parks, schools, markets, prisons, police and military installations, killing and displacing hundreds of thousands of people (Gwaza, 2015).

This magnitude of violence and its attendant threats to security of lives and properties have raised serious social and political concerns in Nigeria more than ever before (Madu & Madu, 2013), and this is the justification for this study. It is imperative that authorities in Nigeria and all stakeholders understand better the public policy measures that will end the Boko Haram violence. There is need to look beyond the usual state-centric approach to a more holistic approach that includes human security, where the people are put at the center of national security policy (Akpotor & Oromareghake,

2013; Ewa, 2017). The responses to terrorism have taken various dimensions at the national, regional and international levels (Ojelade, 2018; Okafor, 2015;). At the international level, for example, the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy, contained in General Assembly resolution 60/288, and its review, resolutions 62/272 and 64/297, provided the strategic framework and policy guidance in the collective efforts of the United Nations System on countering terrorist violence (Okafor, 2015).

In the World Health Organization (WHO) Global status report on violence prevention 2014, a key step for effective prevention of violence is to develop a national action plan. This way, countries will be able to articulate their priorities in line with how violence has negatively impacted them in the areas of health, economic viability and safety, and security. The action plan should also provide direction to policy-makers and others about what needs to be done and how best to achieve sustainable reductions in violence (WHO, 2014)

Key Concepts and Benefits of the Framework

A few key concepts have been used in this study, and they include: public policy; violence as an agenda for public policy discourse; and the Boko Haram insurgency.

Concept of Public Policy

Public policy is an important mechanism for moving a social system from one state to another (Sapru, 2012). It has assumed considerable importance in response to the increasing complexity of societal organizations and relationships. It is useful in understanding the ills prevailing in a society and helps people to cope with the future. It helps to shape the future (Ogbeide, 2007). Also, Sapru, reflecting on the usefulness of

public policy in understanding particular societal issues and preparing the people for the future in view of the identified issues, reminisced Gibson Winter's statement that "the problem of policy is ultimately how the future is grasped and appraised, and that the essential meaning of responsibility is accountability in human fulfilment in shaping of the society's future" (p. 10). In talking about public policy, we are referring to those areas that are classified or defined as "public" (Dye, 2014, p. 8). Public dimension is mostly denoted to as public ownership or control for the purpose of the public.

The concept of public policy therefore "presupposes that there is an area or domain of life which is not private or purely individual but held in common ... the public comprises that domain of human activity which is regarded as requiring governmental intervention or common" (Eneanya, 2013, p. 220). The implication is that all persons are affected by myriad of public policies in their daily lives. The range of public policy is wide, from the vital to the trivial. Public policies may deal with such areas as defense, environmental protection, health, education, housing, science and technology, peace and so on.

In modern political systems, public policies do not by and large, just happen. Rather, they are often designed to accomplish specific goals or produce definite results (Sapru, 2012). Nowadays, people expect their governments to do many things for them, which could be in the areas of the economy, health, security, infrastructure, education etc. Dye (2014) observed that there is hardly any personal or societal problem for which some group will not demand a government solution – that is, a public policy designed to alleviate personal discomfort or societal unease, as in the case of Boko Haram insurgency

in Nigeria, for example. For Dye, people or groups make demand on government because only government policies involve legal obligations, have universality and can extend to all people in a society (Dye, 2014). He argued that policies become public to the extent that they are adopted, implemented and enforced by some government institution. Dye concluded that because of government's involvement, public policies can be legitimate and generally acceptable for compliance by all citizens in a given society (p.8).

From the above view point therefore, public policies can be seen more as activities of government (Ozumba, 2014). In practice however, a government rarely has a set of guiding principles for all its activities. Important public policies are often made more explicit, particularly where the issue of a law, a regulation, or plan is involved (Mato & Olasupo, 2014). This therefore permits us to see public policy as a guide which government has designed for direction and practice in certain problem areas (Sapru, 2012).

Dye (2014) argued that because government does many things, public policy is whatever governments choose to do or not to do. Dye espoused that in the society; governments regulate conflicts; organizes society to engage in conflict with other societies; distributes great varieties of symbolic rewards and material services to members of the society and extracts money from society mostly in the form of taxes and levies (Dye, 2014). However, a cursory look at this definition would show a gap between what governments decides to do and what they actually do. Low-level actions like staff recruitment or grant of licenses, for example, may be excluded on grounds that they are

not regarded as policy matters (Eneanya, 2013). But the definition however shows policy as a decision of government.

Eneanya (2013) reminisced on various definitions of public policy thus: Public policy is deciding at any time or place what objectives and substantive measures should be chosen in order to deal with a particular problem (Dimock et al., 1983); Public policy is the strategic use of resources to alleviate national problems or governmental concerns (Chandler & Plano, 1988); and lastly, the definition by Freeman and Sherwoods (1968) who saw public policy as the response to the interest in improving the human conditions (Eneanya, 2013, p. 220).

These definitions link policy to purposive or goal-oriented action rather than just random behavior or chance occurrences. For Eneanya (2013) “public policies emerge in response to policy demands, or those claims for action or inaction as some public issue made by other actors, – private citizens, group representatives or legislators and other government officials or agencies” (p. 221). In response to policy demands, public officials make decisions that give content and direction to public policy.

In the Nigerian context, public policy would refer to the collective decision of the Executive Council of Government on matters which derive their primacy from the Constitution as provided for in the chapter on fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy (Mato & Olasupo, 2014, p. 49). It is a fact that society is ordered, steered and directed towards desired end or goals by the state through policies. This is so because a public policy would have a legally coercive quality (Kpesa, 2012) that citizens accept as legitimate, for example, citizens or residents must pay taxes or risk

fines or jail sentences. Public policies therefore play crucial role in the state and are equally instrumental to the development, or underdevelopment of any given state. It is about means and ends, which has to have a relationship to each other (Mato & Olasupo, 2014; Ozumba, 2014). Whereas, there has been no lack of public policies in Nigeria since independence, the paradox of public policy implementation has continued to militate and mar the realization of public policy objectives in the country (Ekong, 2016).

As a proposal for resolving public problems, public policies may emanate from groups, individuals, institutions and the civil service. Public policies may be expressed in legislative enactments, executive decrees or orders, government official statements, government budgets, judicial decisions, and sometimes political party manifestos (Mato & Olasupo, 2014, p. 49). Eneanya (2013) noted that in Nigeria, the Civil Service is a key factor in policy development and recommendation. That by their strategic location, awareness and functions, their recommended responses are often invaluable. While appropriate civil service agency or agencies does the preliminary studies of the problem, the available options and consequences of alternatives, the legislative bodies are the final arena of policy influence activity, where final attempts are made by varying interests to shape the content of policy (Eneanya, 2013).

But Mato and Olasupo, (2014) observed that the world is becoming complex, uncertain and unpredictable, and therefore developing policies has become difficult. For them, citizens are better informed, have rising expectations and are making growing demands for services tailored to their individual needs (p.173). A key policy issue such as citizen security and violence prevention would therefore require to be tackled effectively

through collective action and hence the need to improve the understanding of public policy measures that will best address the Boko Haram mayhem in Nigeria.

Violence as a Consequence for Public Policy Agenda

Violence in society has become a problem since the 20th century. Nearly 500,000 people are killed every year all over the world (WHO, 2014). Violence bedevils progress, peace and tranquility of any nation and indeed the world in time and space (Elaigwu, 2014). WHO (2014) noted that violence has for decades ruined the lives of people resulting to drug and alcohol addiction, depression, suicide, school dropout, unemployment, and persistent relationship difficulties. People suffer abuse, pains, exploitation, and manipulation as a result of violence being meted to them (WHO, 2014).

The word violence, as is commonly used, defies any precise or commonly accepted definition. But WHO (2014) refers to it as the “intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation” (p.2). Violence, as Robert Audi, comments, “is an unjustified use of force” (Alozieuwa, 2013, p.167). This means that there could be a legal and illegal appropriation of force/violence. However, in Audi’s view, legal violence is the prerogative of the state. Thus, Alozieuwa concluded that violence is considered illegal whenever it is committed by non-state agents. Alozieuwa found further explanation in Corsini’s definition that violence is the expression of hostility and rage through physical force directed against persons or property. It is aggression in its most extreme and unacceptable form, and most investigators conclude it has no therapeutic justification,

since there are most constructive and humane ways of expressing anger. Violence connotes rough treatment, use of bodily force on others, especially unlawfully, with the intention to hurt or harm. It is an act of human inflictions, resulting in physical, sexual, or psychological harm (Alozieuwa, 2013, p.168).

In Nigeria, the burden of violence has been heavy. For a long time, citizens have had to live with violence (Elaiigwu, 2014). In the northern parts of the country in particular, ethnoreligious or communal violence has led to the death of thousands of people, the destruction of property, and the displacement of millions of people from their homes. Young people have had their hands stained in human blood (Elaiigwu, 2014). Insecurity looms large in the horizon, and the average citizen is skeptical of assurances given by government. It therefore becomes imperative that Nigeria must come up with a comprehensive public policy that will guarantee a peaceful and violence-free environment necessary for harmonious coexistence and socioeconomic and political advancement of the citizens (IPCR, 2016b). The magnitude of violent conflicts Nigeria is witnessing is an indication of the need for all stakeholders to devise appropriate mechanisms for addressing violent conflicts. The main thrust of government response is to use the military to suppress violence, and this may only stop the violence in the short term and never address genuine underlying problems (Akinbi, 2015; Albert, 2017; Elaiigwu, 2014).

The UNDP stated in its 2014 HDR that “conceptions of security require a view of the human person that includes physical and psychological vulnerability, strengths and limitations, including limitations in the perception of risk” (p. 77). To this end, analysts

have argued that some risks appear to be intensifying, and this is especially true of Nigeria where from armed robbery and kidnapping, ethno-religious and communal violence, the country has now graduated to bomb-violence (Afoaku, 2017; Akinbi, 2015; Elaigwu, 2014). From the Niger-Delta bombs, Nigeria is now plagued by the Boko Haram bombs and street gun-fights with security agencies. Elaigwu (2014) observed that no town or place is sacrosanct: churches and mosques, schools, police stations, and even military barracks have become targets. Some schools in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states have been attacked, killing innocent children and rendering thousands of them without schools (p.29).

The UNDP HDR for 2014, quoting from its 1994 edition stated that “the world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives” (p.77). The people’s perception of threats should therefore offer feedbacks on policy efforts and shed light on the burden of fear in their lives. The HDR Report identified three broad issue-areas where policies and related measures would be of help in addressing violence and vulnerability of people in communities. The first area is the anticipation that policies should be made to prevent violent conflicts, improve economic stability, and reduce the impact of environmental shocks in the form of disease, disasters, loss of lives of loved ones and loss of livelihoods. The second is that better social and economic policies can advance core capabilities of people, which have the direct advantage of improving human resilience in the face of adversities “through better laws and norms and the protection of rights” (p. 78). The third broad area relates to requiring policies to reduce or overcome restrictions on opportunities and the exercise of choices- protecting choices (UNDP 2014

HDR). The report noted that policy response choices may also involve health insurance, social protection and active labor and job creation programs and that it is therefore important that the greater interest should be that public policies are capable of reducing vulnerabilities in the society (UNDP, 2014).

Eneanya (2013) noted that policy makers are often seen to make choices or feel compelled to act on a policy agenda which may be distinguishable from political demands generally. He argued that to achieve agenda status, a public problem must first be converted into an issue requiring government attention. The experience here however may be that the nature and scope of problems may be difficult to specify because they may be *diffuse* or *invisible*. So, the magnitude and complexity of a problem would depend upon its definition (Eneanya, 2013).

But for Cobb and Elder (1983), as reminisced by Eneanya (2013), there are two basic types of agenda: the systematic and governmental or institutional agenda. They stated that “systematic agenda consists of all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of governmental authority” (p. 297). Systematic agenda is essentially a discussion agenda, and most of the items are abstract rather than specific or detailed (Eneanya, 2013). Cobb and Elder further noted that institutional or governmental agenda on the other hand, has items that range from mandatory to discretionary and that discretionary items may be classified as either minor or major. Eneanya however added that major discretionary items on a legislative agenda, for

example, can include such matters as tax increases or reductions or disaster reliefs (p. 298).

In modern societies, many problems and issues will be competing for the attention of public officials, who may also have their own preferred ideas to push, but issues such as the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria can be rife for a pride of place on public policy agenda (Ojelade, 2018). While the return to civil rule remains a remarkable development in Nigeria, it is palpable that the country is witnessing a sustained militarized society under democratic governance. The critical objective of a counter-insurgency strategy (Ojelade, 2018) is to ensure sustainable security of all citizens and residents.

Boko Haram Insurgency

Boko Haram insurgency that started smoldering since 2002 erupted in the north eastern region of the country in 2009 when Nigeria was writing the epitaph of the Niger Delta insurgency with an amnesty program (Ewa, 2017). Hussaini (2017) also noted that the Boko Haram insurgency started precisely on July 26, 2009 when a dissident group led by Mohammed Yusuf, took up arms against the Nigerian government in a desperate move to enforce a self- acclaimed sharia legal system as a replacement to the system of government in Nigeria. Ibrahim et al (2015) noted that the Boko Haram insurgency had been characterized by high levels of destruction and violence against the population. That the insurgency is part of the menace of international terrorism threatening the contemporary world and its Nigerian dimension has become the deadliest terrorist movement in the world today.

They observed that schools have been a particular focus of destruction or damage by Boko Haram. That, in states such as Borno, the epicenter of the violence, schools were closed for over a year. In August 2013, about 882 classrooms were destroyed in Borno state. While in Yobe state, all schools were shut down between June-September 2013 and by March 2014, the Federal Government closed five Federal Government Colleges (Unity Schools) in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. In the Lake Chad area – in Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Nigeria – an estimated 1,100 schools were destroyed in 2015 alone (Ibrahim, et al, 2015).

Okene & Olawale, (2013); Ewa, (2017) posited that the Boko Haram insurgency is characterized by the use of sophisticated weapons like AK 47 rifles, rocket launchers, IEDs, and bombs. The ultimate goal of the Boko Haram has been to establish by means of jihad, an Islamic state in the north eastern Nigeria. They plan to use the state as a base to conquer the rest of Nigeria and the West African sub-region and then designate the subjugated territory as the Islamic State West Africa Province, which is to also be developed as a province of ISIS (Ewa, 2017).

Consequently, Nigeria's security forces have been faced with daunting challenges, made more intractable, by the novel tactics of suicide bombing and hit-and-run attacks by heavily armed insurgents who are able to strike targets at the times and places of their choice (Ibrahim et al., 2015). Ibrahim et al further stated that the religious ideology that informed the Boko Haram insurgency provides the movement with powerful motivation, making the insurgents fearless in their attacks and fearsome to confront. They noted that the religious ideology seems to make it easier to attract highly

dedicated recruits, willing to sacrifice their lives for what they believe to be the righteous struggle against what they regard as an ungodly political dispensation, whose agents have carried out the extra-judicial execution of their leaders and members (Ibrahim et al., 2015).

Although the security challenges created by the Boko Haram insurgency appeared to be formidable and daunting, the Boko Haram insurgency must be confronted, so that normalcy can be restored in the North East, thereby enabling millions of citizens affected by the insurgency to rebuild their lives and livelihoods. Therefore, Ewa (2017) suggested that as part of the implications and lessons, the government of Nigeria – which is the main provider of security – must know that Nigeria no longer has unchallengeable monopoly of the means, instruments and use of force and coercion, given the emergence of Boko Haram. The shared control of the means and instruments of force and coercion with the state by its real and potential enemies, portends danger because the power of the state is being gradually eroded (p.44). The Nigerian government must therefore rise to the challenge. Ewa argued that the Boko Haram insurgency have brought forth realities that will help Nigeria to determine whether or not her national security would be focusing more on human needs than on the safekeeping of the country through her military and security forces; or whether in the face of any military threat as posed by the insurgency, national security should respond by providing human needs or by protecting the people (Ewa, 2017).

Literature Review Related to Key Concepts and Variables

The review of literature relating to some key concepts and variables identified in the study is provided below.

Policies and Principles of Internal Security Management

Section 14 (2) (b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) states that, “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of Government” (p. 8). The Constitution has therefore saddled the Government with the responsibility of safeguarding people against all forms of threats.

The thrust of internal security policy of any nation would therefore be to create a safe and secure environment for the pursuit of peace, personal well-being, prosperity and development of citizens (Imobighe, 2013), and this pre-supposes the application of relevant measures necessary to maintain and restore law and order. Mbachu (2013), remarked that a policy on internal security is necessary for man to actualize his innate potentials, yearnings and aspirations in an atmosphere of peace and tranquility since peace is an important factor for development in any nation (p.21). Also, in the view of McNamara (1967), “security affects not only the attainment of human aspirations, but also the fundamental issue of national survival” found in Mbachu (2013, p.21). For human beings, a safe life, without fear, is one of the most basic aspirations.

In this sense, security must be seen to have a positive impact on the conditions of life of the individuals within the state, as well as provide them with the right environment for free interaction and for their individual and collective self-improvement and the actualization of their legitimate aspirations (Elaigwu, 2014; Imobighe, 2013; Nwolise,

2012). Imobighe argued that security affects not only the ability to satisfy needs, but also the fundamental issue of individual and collective survival as human persons, including societies and nations. It is about a safe and peaceful environment which makes freedom possible, and fear, danger, hostility, war, and violence absent (p. 4).

Nwolise (2012) posited that security can expand horizontally and vertically. He stated that horizontal security goes beyond the military to encompass economic, political, environmental, social, and other aspects, while vertical security on the other hand, goes beyond the state to incorporate and emphasize the individual and social groups, the state and humanity at large (Nwolise, 2012, p. 14). Hence policies and principles of internal security management must be capable of promoting improved public perception, trust, and confidence in the security agencies to rid the society of all forms of violence and insecurity. Internal security policy should necessitate a concerted, proportionate, open, flexible but effective application of political, economic, social, informational, diplomatic, intelligent law enforcement and military responses to insecurity caused by extreme violence (Mbachu, 2013).

The Boko Haram insurgency constitutes one of the greatest threats to internal security in Nigeria. In fact, in the words of former President Goodluck Jonathan, “it is incontestable that the insurgency waged by Boko haram, characterized by mindless violence, and which undermines our freedom, way of life and sovereignty, by far remains the greatest threat to our collective security as a nation” (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2014, p. 1). The violence and attendant insecurity of lives and property caused by Boko Haram is worrisome. Lives are continually lost due to preventable insecurity. Nigeria is

increasingly under threat. Other threats include the Fulani pastoralists attacks on rural farming communities; banditry in the north west zone; kidnappings for ransom across the country; militancy in the Niger Delta; the incessant community attacks in the north central zone; separatist agitations in the south east; and the pervasive corruption and poverty (Mbachu, 2013; Ojelade, 2018). For Mbachu,

These threats have not only challenged the monopoly of the state as primary provider of security and general well-being, but they have continued to act as a clog in the wheel of progress in Nigeria's democratic process and overall national security. (p. 167)

In Nigeria, the security sector is traditionally considered to comprise the military, police and intelligence agencies that are mandated by the state through national institutions, statutes, and policies to use force and violence to defend the state from external aggression and insurrection (Onu, 2013). Thus, it can be observed that in the current thrust of security policies, troops are often deployed to various parts of the country to monitor and maintain law and order (Ojelade, 2018). Although doing this has not exactly eliminated acts by misguided individuals or groups such as the Boko Haram Islamist sect to rise in violence against the society, it has succeeded in building resilience for and mobilization for public safety.

Regrettably, as observed by Onu (2013, p. 88), Boko Haram has instilled widespread insecurity across Nigeria and has increased tensions among ethno-religious groups in the country. Onyebuchi and Chigozie, (2013) stated that the Boko Haram is against democracy as a system of government; believes it is unlawful for Muslims to subject themselves to constitutional governments; does not believe or support political parties and has as its major strategic goal to destabilize, degrade, and finally destroy the Nigerian nation (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). The Boko haram considers Muslims who

believe in Nigeria and work for the Nigerian government to be legitimate targets of attack. Also, the group believes that Islamic scholars, who hold opinions different from theirs (Boko Haram), are hypocrites (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013).

Worse still, they reject peaceful coexistence with Christians and Non-Muslims, and states that Muslim civilians who die or lose property as a result of the Boko Haram war are making sacrifices for Islam (Golwa & Alozieuwa, 2012). This is perhaps why the sect has continued to target civilians going about their daily lives. People cannot know who among their fellow subway or bus or airplane passengers, or those standing next to them in a crowded spot or sitting next to them in a restaurant, is preparing to launch an attack. This therefore imposes a sense of fear and insecurity on the people (Golwa & Alozieuwa, 2012, p. 82).

Towards Nigeria's National Security Policy and Administration

Nwolise (2004), believes that security is central to the survival and actualization of state policies and development, and that these are largely determined by the level of prevailing security stratagem both internally and externally. Creating secure lives in a complex, turbulent world entails hard work, and research shows that security building activities are often plagued with risks. Some of the risks could be transnational; with insecurities associated with war, environmental problems, crime, etc.; and also, with individualization and ideological tendencies favoring individual freedom at the expense of sacrificing security (Iwu & Oko, 2013, p.285). The onus for national security therefore is to protect people and institutions and create an atmosphere that is conducive for the pursuit of the aspirations of the people (Elaiwu, 2014). It includes all strategies adopted

for the preservation of a nation's sovereignty and her continued economic and socio-political values and development (Elaigwu, 2014).

Since the Nigerian civil war of 1967 – 1970, Nigeria has been facing both latent and manifest threats of disintegration and possible extinction as a sovereign state (Mbachu, 2013). The numerous internal ethno-religious conflicts, armed attacks, kidnappings, assassinations, bombings and the Boko Haram insurgency, has constituted great threats to Nigeria's security as a nation (Mbachu, 2013, p.168). Mbachu suggested that in view of these real and potential threats to internal security, efforts should be made to constantly review and discuss solutions.

The fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy in chapter two of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides that the primary purpose of government is the security and welfare of all persons within the polity (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). By this, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is responsible for the safety of all Nigerians, and that all persons within Nigeria, whether locals or foreigners, are free from fear of anxiety in any part of the country. The Constitution ensures that the security apparatus is such that whenever any crime is committed, apprehension, detention and subsequent trial are done speedily (Nwogu, 2011, p.43).

Thus, for Nigeria, the national security policy gave rise to the grand strategy for national security. Mbachu (2013, p.169) observed that this strategy provides direction and an institutional framework for the overall conduct of state policy including strategies for

achieving national security. Mbachu (2013, p. 169) listed the objectives of national security policy to include:

- Securing the territorial integrity of Nigeria through internal and foreign policy objectives
- Promoting the stability of the West African sub-region, Africa and the world at large by engaging in peace support operations
- Combating criminal activities like oil bunkering, cross border banditry and religious fanaticism that make Nigeria vulnerable to terrorist attacks
- Developing and improving the economy of Nigeria so as to create employment, achieve food security and improve the standard of living of citizens, and
- Strengthening of Nigeria's democratic institutions and values to ensure stability.

Mbachu (2013) added that this grand strategy should be about using all elements of national power in peace and war to actualize national objectives related to national security. He stated that it is an overarching concept that guides how nations employ all the instruments of national power to shape world events and achieve specific national security objectives. For him, this strategy must provide a broad direction for all the elements of national power toward achieving a more secure and prosperous future for the nation. A well-formulated grand strategy must transcend war and acquire an enduring quality that is above the period of relative peace and war (Mbachu, 2013 p.169).

Buttressing the assertion that the search for security can be universal, Akpan (2013, p. 31) observed that almost all countries, except for Costa Rica and Iceland, maintain military forces and commit up to 30% of total economic output (GNP) for arms,

dedicated to maintain internal security and to starve off external threats. Akpan (2013) stressed that governments must therefore maintain armed forces to deter or cope with crime, rebellions, secessions, coups and the possible threats from other state or non-state actors such as terrorist groups against the lives of their citizens and their private activities; and against territorial integrity of a country or its values and way of life.

In Nigeria, the active involvement of the military to contain violence, given her peculiar circumstances, is vital. Defense and security intellectuals have long recognized that productive participation in formulation and implementation of national security policy is a key responsibility of modern military professionals. To this, Mbachu (2013), said, “the ability of military experts to give wise advice and get it listened to by policy-making officials depends in great measure on their possessing sufficient knowledge in key non-military fields and in seeing issues in a broad perspective” (p.169).

However, there are certain strategic institutions in Nigeria that directly or indirectly manage the formulation and implementation of the nation’s security policies. There are such institutions as the Nigeria Police Force that was created for the primary purpose of maintenance of law and order and for the provision of general security (Mbachu, 2013). Other such security agencies include: The State Security Service (SSS); the National Intelligence Agency (NIA); the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint Intelligence (JIB; Mbachu, 2013, p.180).

But because no government in the world has the capacity to provide 100% security for her people, corporate Private Security Organizations (PSOs) have begun to exist on the security landscape in many countries including Nigeria (Osuji, 2013; Udeh

2013, Mbachu, 2013). For fear of crime and awareness that public police cannot efficiently control crime alone, private security personnel are highly visible in many countries, guarding businesses, homes and neighborhoods. At individual levels in Nigeria for example, many households engage the services of “*mai-guards*” (local guardsmen) as private watchmen (Osuji, 2013). Mbachu (2013), argued that security has thus become a major part of the Nigerian economy, because looking at the best-informed estimates,” there had been between 1,500 and 2,000 PSOs in Nigeria, employing in excess of 100,000 people” (p.25).

Abrahamsen & Williams, (2005) adduced various reasons for the emergence of private security organizations in Nigeria. They noted that the State and the formal security organizations like the Police are mostly too weak to provide adequate protection and security for majority of its citizens; monopoly on the use of force no longer lies with the Police and other security organizations; and that it is the tradition in many societies in Africa to engage the services of non-formal security organizations. Furthermore, it is believed that the emergence of PSOs can be linked to lack of adequate resources; corrupt practices; widespread political interference in security matters by government functionaries; resources manipulation; and poor human and resources management (Nwolise, 2013). The activities of these private security organizations are however overseen by the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC). The enactment of the NSCDC Act in June 2003 by the National Assembly allows the implementation of private guards’ matters to be policed, monitored and reported by the NSCDC so as to ascertain compliance to stipulated rules and regulations (Osuji, 2013).

The caveat for the permission of activities of the PSOs notwithstanding, the Nigeria Police is as a matter of policy, the lead statutory agency responsible for the conduct of internal security in Nigeria (Osuji, 2013). It has therefore been empowered to carry out effective internal security predicated on law enforcement philosophies that are driven by seamless technology-enabled intelligence. However, in the event of a large-scale breakdown in the management of internal security challenges, such as the mindless violence orchestrated by the Boko Haram Islamists, the military is brought in through an invocation of statutory provisions (Udeh, 2013).

But the HNT holds that national security should go beyond the management of military threats to accommodate human related problems (Adedoyin, 2013). Ewa (2017) observed that human needs school of thought believes that non-military issues such as poverty, unemployment, safety from hunger, disease, repression, harmful disruption of daily life, food security, community, political and environmental security are within the domain of national security.

He argued that national security is inherently dynamic and selective, and that outside its traditional focus on the safety of the nation, it could bring into its domain for ad hoc attention, any human problem adjudged through threat analysis to be real or potential threat to the nation. He concluded that it is not however necessary to bring all human problems into the realm of national security, arguing that human problems which do not constitute threats to the country should be attended to by the appropriate agencies of government (P.47).

Counterinsurgency Policy Process in Nigeria

Based on its experience in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the government of the United States defined counterinsurgency as a “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes” (US State Department, 2009, p.20). Ewa (2017) reinforced this perspective by reflecting on the definition provided by R. Scott Moore who earlier saw counterinsurgency as an:

Integrated set of political, economic, social and security measures intended to end and prevent recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of insurgency in order to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability (p.46).

Insurgency in all its forms and manifestations constitute one of the most serious threats to peace and security in Nigeria – in its overt manifestation, it is largely a bestial warfare (Osakwe & Umoh, 2013; Ewa, 2017). A solution to insurgency should therefore focus attention to the people in the locale in which the insurgency is rooted and carried out (Osakwe & Umoh, 2013). Osakwe and Umoh argued that there is need for a competition for the allegiance of the people since the local population forms ground zero for both insurgency and counterinsurgency. That failure to woo and court the local population will invariably lead to the loss of valuable psychological ground which is the most potent battle field in insurgency and counterinsurgency operations (p.391). Ibrahim et al (2015) christened the States and Local Governments directly affected by the Boko Haram insurgency as the Ground Zero of the crisis. In their view, the Boko Haram insurgency poses a direct threat to the sovereignty of Nigeria and the security of citizens,

making the Federal Government and its Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and the states and local governments frontline actors in the crisis (Ibrahim et al., 2015).

Like some countries, and the United States of America, Nigeria operates a presidential system of government comprising the executive, legislature and the judiciary. In Nigeria, these three arms of government are involved in the policy process (Anyaeibunam, 2012). The executive arm which is made up of security agencies, public servants, and civil servants executes, enforces and coordinates government policies to ascertain that they are implemented as designed or planned (Anyaeibunam, 2012, FGN, 1999). The legislature (National Assembly) makes the law and may overrule any decision from any of the security agencies by repealing laws, and this may affect implementation (Eneanya, 2013; Ozumba, 2014). The judiciary interprets policies especially when it comes to their specific application (Eneanya, 2013). The National Assembly plays significant roles in appropriating funds for the counterinsurgency operations as prescribed by the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Anyaeibunam, 2012).

Developing a counterinsurgency policy towards Boko Haram is a commitment towards achieving peace, and security, and reduction of the threat of terrorist violence (Ojelade, 2018). An effective counterinsurgency strategy should provide a framework for tackling the Boko Haram threat and serve as an institutional system that brings all key stakeholders in government and civil society organizations together in a collaborative approach to take preventive, repressive and restorative measures for fighting the threat (Omale, 2013).

Anyaegbunam, (2012) observed that the policy process involves the issuance of a policy statement which usually describes the intention of a government which may be in the form of presidential orders, administrative rules and statutes, regulations, legislative statutes, and court opinions. He explained that the policy process involves a combination of inputs from the three arms of government; the legislature, executive, and judiciary thus making them vital in the policy process (Anyaegbunam, 2012). The magnitude of the Boko Haram violence made it necessary for the government of Nigeria to adopt some policy measures to combat the sect (Ewa, 2017; Dasuki, 2013; Idowu, 2013).

However, there is a need to make a holistic review of the functions of the arms of government in the policy process so as to have an in-depth understanding of the counterinsurgency policy process in Nigeria (Ewa, 2017). Akinola & Tella, (2013); Akpan et al., (2014) stated that section 305 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria allows the president to make some orders which may or may not need the consent of the National Assembly. That the President can declare a state of emergency anywhere if he discovers a threat to the security and peace of the country. But for Anyaegbunam, (2012), the declaration must secure the approval of the two-thirds majority of the parliament and where such proclamation fails to receive the support of the two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, it ceases to exist.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 provides that a state of emergency may be declared for 6 months in the first instance and if peace or normalcy is not restored, the President can extend it for another 6 months with the approval of the National Assembly (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Adibe

(2014), recorded that in May 2013, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states which was extended two times but rejected by the National Assembly when a third extension was sought. Boko Haram's continuous attacks after the emergency rule dictated the need for a fresh request for the extension of the emergency rule (Dasuki, 2013). Unfortunately, the request for extension of the emergency rule was not approved by the National Assembly due to the result of an evaluation of the earlier ones through an oversight function (Dasuki, 2013).

In an attempt to destroy the Boko Haram, the federal government as a policy measure, suspended telephone communication in three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. This was done through the military, which took the responsibility to implement, monitor and evaluate the policy (Onapajo, 2017). Other policies were adopted through presidential directives and administrative rules and regulations. Such policies included the relocation of the military command center, deployment of troops, and the establishment of IDP camps (Campbell, 2014; Akinbi, 2015).

Ozumba (2014) observed that the legislature has important roles to play especially as it relates to passing annual budgets, making laws, ratification of treaties and the approval of declaration of state of emergency by the President Etc. Also, the passage of the Terrorism Prevention Acts of 2011 and its amendment of 2013 were other significant roles of the legislature in the counterinsurgency policy process (Dasuki, 2013; Onuoha, 2014). Udeh (2013) noted that the enactment of Terrorism Prevention Acts 2011 and 2013 became appropriate in view of the need to attack Bok Haram terrorist group with

inputs from the statutory bodies such as National Defense and Security Council; Ministry of Justice; and security agencies.

Ewa (2017), remarked that counterinsurgency efforts have reinforced the relevance of collective security and regional cooperation to Nigeria's national security. He argued that without the collective diplomatic and military efforts of neighboring countries like Cameroon, Niger and Chad, it would have been difficult for Nigeria's counterinsurgency to achieve the present level of seeming success in the fight against Boko Haram. He stressed that the goal of counterinsurgency should be either to defeat, persuade, or humble insurgents to an agreement or compromise favorable to national interest, return the territory and population under siege to safety and normal life, and provide a sustained enabling environment for the government to carry out its obligations to the people (Pp.52-53).

The idea of collective security and cooperation in fighting Boko Haram resonated with US military assistance for regional efforts to counter Boko Haram (CRS, 2019). The CRS stated that, "bilateral counterterrorism cooperation increased in the aftermath of the 2009 bombing attempt of a US airliner by a Nigerian national, but was constrained during the Jonathan Administration despite US concern over the rising Boko Haram threat" (p.20). To strengthen its security arrangements, the government of Nigeria coordinated alongside the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation Administration and the International Civil Aviation Organization (CRS, 2019). CRS noted that Nigeria's cooperation with the US Department of Defense expanded over the years, thus making Nigeria a participant in the State Department's Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism

Partnership (TSCTP), a United States interagency effort that aims to increase regional counterterrorism capabilities and coordination (Pp. 20-21). It is instructive to note that Nigeria has played a significant role in peace and stability operations across Africa, and the United States has provided her with security assistance that is devoted to improving its peacekeeping capabilities (CRS, 2019).

The Boko Haram Violence in Nigeria

Violence, mass deaths and injuries caused by terrorists are basically geared towards achieving an end, and within a state system, the end can only be but a political goal (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 2013, p.71). The Boko Haram insurgency marks another phase in the recurring pattern of violence in Nigeria. The growing spate of killings, bombings, kidnappings and abductions associated mostly with the “*Jama’atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda’awati wal-Jihad*” (meaning People Committed to the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad) commonly referred to as Boko Haram is worrisome. In their quest to impose sharia in some parts of Nigeria, several people have been killed, displaced or orphaned (Botha et al., 2017).

In one of the first recorded violent attacks, Boko Haram attacked the village of Kanamma, which was located about a mile away from the area the group was then camping. They attacked local government installations and killed about 30 people on December 29 2003 (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012, p.102). This attack also coincided with a raid on a police station in a near-by Geidam, which Cook (2011, p.4) said, “was to obtain weapons for further destabilization.”

Other earlier recorded Boko Haram violent activities included those of 7 January 2004; 23 September 2004; and 10 October 2004, when the sect attacked a police station with AK-47 assault rifles in Damboa, attacked police stations in Gwoza and Bama, killing 4 Policemen and losing 27 members, and attacked a convoy of 60 Policemen at Kala-Balge on Lake Chad, respectively (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012, p.102). During the attack at Kala-Balge, 12 Policemen were taken hostage and later executed. In response however, the federal government dispatched military troops in a counter attack which left several of the sect members dead (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012, p.102). The series of onslaughts by the security forces resulted in the killing of scores of the group's 'foot' soldiers. Sheik Mohammed Yusuf, the then leader of the group, was also captured and later killed in police custody (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 2013).

However, Adamu (2013) saw this counter attack on the group as an assault and argued that it was this action by the Nigerian security forces and the many subsequent state sanctioned killings of the various members of the sect that made them resolve from July 2009 to metamorphose into a hard-core militia whose modus operandi borrows heavily from Al-Shabab of Somalia and GIA of Algeria which centers around fighting the government with any means they consider necessary (Adamu, 2013, p.119).

Adamu (2013) remarked that this resolution was followed by a series of increased sniper attacks on security forces (police stations, police and military check points), with increased use of both IEDs and ready-made bombs that are dropped near security patrol points. These bombs were then remotely exploded. Also included in the violence were targeted killings of individuals considered by the sect to have either betrayed them or

provided support to the security forces to prosecute them (Adamu, 2013, p.119). Adamu further noted that all these was done to create a climate of fear in Maiduguri and which later spread to Bauchi (p.120).

In September 2010, under the sect's new leader, Abubakar Shekau, the sect's strategy shifted from direct attacks on security personnel with small arms to use of IEDs on government installations, public and private gatherings including targeted assassinations of political and religious leaders (Adewumi, 2014, p. 5). Adewumi found out that the group resorted to act of suicide bombings, and among the earliest ones, were the bombing of the Police Force Headquarters and the United Nations Office in 2011, which no doubt, jolted the security apparatus of Nigeria and signaled the undeterred resolve of the group to scale their violence (p. 5).

Adamu identified Alhaji Mohammed Manga and Mohammed Abul Burra as the suicide bombers that bombed the Police Force Headquarters and the United Nations office respectively (Adamu, 2013). Five people including Mohammed Manga, lost their lives in the bombing of the Force Headquarters while Burra and twenty-two other people were killed in the attack on the United Nations office (Adamu, 2013, pp. 120–121).

Despite the implicit and sometimes obvious successes of the security agencies in curtailing the insurgents, the group has remained emboldened. Agbiboa (2014) recorded that between 2011 and 2013, the intensity of the attacks and bombings had increased, which included targets such as religious gatherings, churches, mosques, and schools. Profiled killings of prominent and vocally isolated Islamic scholars and attempted eliminations of revered traditional rulers were also prominent within this period

(Agbiboa, 2014). The attacks became too numerous that has made the Nigerian state to lose track of the number of deaths.

Agbiboa (2014) also reported that Boko Haram splinter group, the Ansaru (meaning vanguards for the protection of Muslims in Black Africa) attacked and killed two Nigerian soldiers from among the troops that were going to Mali on January 19, 2013. The group claimed this attack was a revenge for the French-led intervention in Mali and for the atrocities committed by the West in Afghanistan (Zenn, 2014, p. 26). The Ansaru also kidnapped and killed seven foreign workers in February 2013 in the north east of Nigeria and blamed the deaths on the then joint Nigerian-British military operation that was seeking to free the hostages (Agbiboa, 2014).

Agbiboa reported that the media in Nigeria also attributed to the Ansaru group of the Boko Haram, the killing of four Chinese nationals, three Indians, and one Ghanaian in Borno, including the May 2011 kidnap of two Europeans in an Italian construction company in Kebbi state, northwestern Nigeria, who were murdered in a botched rescue attempt in 2012 (Agbiboa, 2014). Hassan, (2014) also made notes on Boko Haram violence. He recorded that the attacks by the Boko Haram on the military and mosques in Maiduguri in 2009 resulted to the death of over 700 persons. He further noted that the January 2012 attacks in Kano led to the death of at least 185 persons, while in September 2013, 40 soldiers died from the Kasiya forests in an attack in Borno state, and in April 2013, about 200 people were killed in Baga community in Borno state (Hassan, 2014, p.1).

What is obvious from these attacks is that Boko Haram has included the general public as targets of its violent attacks, and it is to be noted that targeting civilian population meets the US State Department's notion of terrorism as premeditated violence against non-combatant audience (Agbibo, 2014). It can be seen that the sect has included in its strategies to kill Christians and security personnel including all those who collaborate with security officials as well as Muslim clerics who criticize Boko Haram activities. Other of their strategies also include robbing banks; threatening southerners and non-Muslims to leave northern Nigeria; and burning down of secular schools (Adibe, 2012). All of this is to inflict maximum violence on the populace, traumatize the citizenry and impose an atmosphere of siege. Also, attacks on particular ethnic groups and places of religious worships are a carefully designed strategy to plunge Nigeria into sectarian crisis (Golwa & Alozieuwa, 2012, p.82).

Pieria and Serrano, (2014) found out that the attacks since early 2014 have been particularly venomous, with the sect targeting remote villages, markets, hospitals and schools. They stated that one of such attacks include that of February 24 2014, where attackers killed about 43 male students of Federal Government College, Bunu Yadi in Yobe state. Their report indicated another attack, which occurred in Konduga, a village of about 35 kilometers from Maiduguri, in which Boko Haram abducted 20 female students at Government Girls' Science College and five female street traders in an attack that caused the death of more than 53 people (Pieria & Serrano, 2014). As a result of that attack, the Federal Government closed down five federal colleges in the three states of

Adamawa, Borno and Yobe - the states where state of emergency was declared (Pieria & Serrano, 2014, p.1 4).

Some analysts have argued that the factors influencing these attacks arose from the manner that the operators of the Nigerian State handle national issues, and also, that the scale of the attacks is a possible indicator that the sect has operational contact with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Nwogu, 2011). Nwogu added that the shared Hausa ethnicity and conservative form of Islam also made it possible for radical Islamists to freely move across Nigeria's borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroun (Nwogu, 2011, p.48).

Boko Haram Insurgency: A Causal Analysis

Nigeria is bedeviled by political, economic, religious and social crises that are threatening her continued corporate existence as a nation (Elaigwu, 2014), and the Boko Haram insurgency is one of the manifestations of these crises. The challenge is that the security and sovereignty of Nigeria, public order and citizen security are continuously threatened by terrorist violence. Alemika (2013), noted that the Boko Haram insurgency has assumed what sociologists referred to as "social problem." He stated that "sociologists describe social problem as an undesirable condition created by dysfunctional social, political and economic structures that is pervasive, persistent, and destructive in consequences, and which is not effectively controlled by existing prevention and control mechanisms and actions" (p.181).

Boko Haram insurgency is a social problem precipitated by political, economic and religious motivations (Agbibo, 2014; Akinbi, 2015; Onuoha, 2013; Osuji, 2013).

But in the context of Nigeria, religious motivation appears to be highest (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). The sect's teachings were initially Salafis, whose ideology believes in sacrosanct Islamic order that has not been tainted by western culture and doctrines of other Muslim groups like the Sufis and the Shiites (Nwogu, 2011, p.48). Salafis believe that Islamic revival can only come about by purging foreign influences from the doctrine and emulating the early generations of Muslims. Alonge (2012) stated that Boko Haram believes that women, for example, have become 'loose' because westernization and secularization encouraged it. That Boko Haram often argue that rather than make people enlightened and holy, western education and its associated civilization was churning out thieves, whores, and gangsters because they are being taught the culture and ways of the West, including its lewd language, dressing and apparent godlessness (p.49).

While there are several arguments for the motivation and fueling of the insurgency, it appears that the pursuit of the religious ideology remains dominant. In rejecting western education, the sect sought to impose sharia across all Nigerian states (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). It is worthwhile to note that religion-inspired violence appears to be highest under certain circumstances, which in most cases, are true of Nigeria. Alemika (2013) stated these circumstances such as when:

- There is little or no cross-cutting relations and loyalties among people in a community.
- A society is made up of two or three dominant religions with large followers. In such context, religion tends to be divisive with potential for inter-religious violence (Osuji, 2013).

- Socio-economic and political grievances are expressed in religious terms. This can result to prolonged or recurring devastating violent conflicts.
- Societies where being an adherent of a given religion gives economic and political advantages due to the way and manner the affairs of government are conducted, and
- The religious groups have different levels of disposition to violence and terrorism (Alemika, 2013, pp. 190–191).

Nigeria is a country with the sixth largest Muslim population in the world. It is the world's largest country to have approximately equal numbers of Christians and Muslims (Kwanashie, 2013, p.165). Many people feel that the secular nature of Nigeria is an idea that the Boko Haram is not comfortable with, and hence the drive for Jihadist movement that is leading them to attack churches, public schools and other symbols of faith it deems apostate (Kwanashie, 2013, p.165). Obadofin (2012) expatiated on this when he stated that religion is linked to terrorism and has political undertone. He explained that the Islamic fundamentalists who received training as suicide bombers are indoctrinated to believe that if they kill unbelievers, great reward of paradise awaits them, including access to very young ladies that are capable of giving sexual satisfaction (p.35).

Some scholars however attribute the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency to widespread disenchantment of citizens with the Nigerian state arising from its failure to meet its obligations to the people, and the perception that state policies are implemented only to advance private interests for personal accumulation (Akpan, 2013; Albert, 2017;

Barkindo, 2016). There is extensive opinion and evidence to suggest that the citizens are getting a raw deal from the State (Nwogu, 2011, p.50).

Kwanashie (2013) argued that the vast majority of Nigerian citizens live on less than \$2 per day while corrupt elites siphon off millions of dollars. He pointed out that widespread poverty provides a fertile ground for insurgency, stressing that a large pool of citizens that are marginalized and pauperized are easy to mobilize and indoctrinate to join any form of insurgency. He added that when a segment of the population sees no hope in the system and cannot identify with the goals and aspirations of the nation, then it would be difficult to extract any loyalty and patriotism that is required of citizens (Kwanashie, 2013, p.161).

While poverty and economic marginalization does not automatically lead to insurgency, evidence from history suggests that this can easily lead to frustration of the affected segment of the society thus making them to be aggressive (Adibe, 2012). For Adibe, the frustration-aggression hypothesis, otherwise known as frustration-aggression displacement theory supports this assertion. Reflecting on the work of Dullard and his colleagues, Adibe asserted that frustration causes aggression and when the source of the frustration cannot be challenged, the aggression gets vented on an innocent target (p.56). Akpan, (2013) also observed that there is widespread feeling that the Boko Haram insurgency is a product of frustration of the segment of the society due largely to the way and manner government business is conducted. That the level of disaffection among different sections of the population gave rise to racial manifestations and fundamentalist ideologies like Boko Haram to thrive and wreak havoc in Nigeria.

However, Okpara (2013) argued that the existence of frustration does not always lead to aggression, given that frustration may have other consequences, which may include instigation to certain kind of aggression. The author stated that frustration-aggression theory does not very much account for the reason for violence by Boko Haram because most of the victims of Boko Haram attacks are ordinary people who are already victims of the social conditions that Boko Haram claims to be fighting to change (p.232).

A further argument is that bad as the insurgency may be, there is always a constituency that benefits from or expects to benefit from it (Kwanashie, 2013). Often, this segment of the society finds that the outcome of a particular insurgence will be to their advantage or that the process of counter insurgency benefits them. To this, Kwanashie (2013) noted that “when this constituency is large, the effort to combat the insurgency is often difficult” (p.146).

There are diverse arguments for and against this assertion with respect to Nigeria’s Boko Haram insurgency. Some people argue that many Muslims in Nigeria like what is happening because according to them every Muslim is enjoined to carry out Jihad (World Council of Churches, 2012), while others argue that arms dealers [and even some officials of government’s security top hierarchy] are happy because of the economic benefits they are corruptly getting from the insurgency (Kwanashie, 2013). The result is that there is a tacit acceptance, collusion or indifference to the insurgency by a sizeable segment of the society (Kwanashie, 2013, P.146).

Adesoji (2011) added that partisan politics and a culture of political patronage are also playing significant roles in the sustenance of the Boko Haram insurgency. The

competition for political power as a means of resource allocation has meant that the ethnic elites within the Nigerian state have had to fall back on what can and will enhance their prospects for capturing and retaining power for their immediate constituency.

Perhaps that is why Fafowora (2013) argued that the Boko Haram insurgency is a product of political and social process that failed to ensure an even development in Nigeria, with the north trailing far behind the south in economic and social development. Fafowora sees the insurgency as a symptom of a deep-seated malaise that can be traced to the colonial policies adopted by the colonial masters, when the northern leaders surreptitiously among other forms of negligence, failed to invest in the education of their people. He argued that the army of uneducated youths, today, provides a ready pool from which the Boko Haram could make its recruits (Fafowora, 2013, p.8).

The above assertion can be corroborated with what Enwere (2013) wrote on the factors responsible for civil insurgency in Nigeria. Enwere stated that “the failure of the state to provide the greatest benefits to the greatest number of citizens either in their individual or collective pursuits of happiness is another factor which generates the violent outbreak of civil insurgency in Nigeria” (p.241). Arguing further, he averred that the political and economic environment in which Nigerians live as well as the failure of the state to meet its obligations to the people are the factors responsible for civil insurgency in Nigeria, the genesis of which he traced to the Aba Women’s riot of 1929, when the women protested against a ferocious tax system by the colonial masters and a group of disgruntled peasants and radical clerics and slaves, otherwise called, the *Mahadest* revolutionary sect (p. 242).

Types of Insurgencies in Nigeria

Groups that cannot achieve their political objectives through conventional means, adopts insurgency as a strategy. These groups do this through asymmetric violence, use of complex terrain, use of psychological warfare, political mobilization, killings and massive destruction of properties (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 2013). In the history of states, insurgencies are not new. They date back to ancient times, as far back as the old civilizations of the Greek city state and the Roman Empire, when the rulers of these ancient civilizations often had to face the challenges of insurgencies, insurrections and revolts (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 2013). In Nigeria, various insurgent groups have emerged at different times in the course of her political history. Akpotor & Oromareghake (2013) and Fadile, (2013) listed these groups to include: the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND); Movement for the Emancipation of the Ogoni People; the Odua People's Congress (OPC); Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); and the Jama'atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Boko Haram).

In trying to describe the types of insurgencies experienced in Nigeria, Akpotor and Oromareghake (2013) observed that the insurgency in the Niger Delta region is an unfinished business of Isaac Adaka Boro's militancy to that of Saro Wiwa of the Ogoni and on to the one led by Tony Engurubu. They added that the insurgency by MASSOB and OPC is the consequence of the civil war of the First Republic and the aborted Third Republic denial of M.K.O Abiola's electoral victory. To him the Boko Haram insurgency

is the climax of pre-independence anti-south riots in Kano, and on to the 1966 crisis; the civil war; and the Sharia crisis in the 1977- 1978 Constituent Assembly debate (p.73).

Others are Egbesu Boys; Bakassi Boys and the Maitatsine religious sect that operated in Kano, Borno and Adamawa states in the 1980s. Ochoeche (2013, p.351) observed that these groups often have uncontrolled access to illicit arms and their modus operandi include hostage taking, assassination, burning properties, looting, raping and maiming of their victims. Fafowora (2013) noted that there has been a surge in both the tempo and range of global insurgencies and terrorism, and sadly, Nigeria is one of the latest to be added to the list of countries affected by sectarian insurgencies. He stated that, “of some fifteen countries surveyed in 2011 by the US Department of State for Terrorism, Nigeria ranked fifth. It also ranked fifteenth in kidnappings reported, and since then, the tempo of terrorist attacks and kidnappings has greatly increased” (p.1).

Nigeria’s population is largely dominated by three ethnic groups: The Yoruba; Igbo and Hausa-Fulani. These groups are dominant in the West, East and North of Nigeria respectively. However, there are over 250 other ethnic groups of diverse population sizes (Fafowora, 2013). Populations in which insurgents seek support are usually heterogeneous, cutting across many ethnic groups such as the case of Nigeria. Alli (2013) corroborated this when he remarked that Nigeria witnessed serious security challenges during the fourth Republic which manifested in the rise of ethnic pressure and agitations for self-determination by various groups like the Arewa Youths Congress (AYC); Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND); Odua Peoples’ Congress

(OPC); and the Ijaw Youths Congress (IYC). These groups have engaged in terrorist activities against the State (Alli, 2013, p.481).

Ker (2013) noted that the insurgents use six different methods with which they seek support or make recruitments from these ethnic groups, and these include charismatic attraction; esoteric appeals; exoteric appeals; terrorism; provocation of government counter-terrorism; and demonstration of potency (Ker, 2013, p.212). Ethnic cum separatist violence that contains elements of terrorist insurgency also finds expression in the activities of MASSOB and lately IPOB. The IPOB is an Igbo ethnic militia advocating for secession from Nigeria. Since its formation, IPOB has engaged in several bold strategies and tactics to press its case as the leading movement of the agitation for the self determination of the Igbo people. IPOB finds its origin and foundation around the conditions of the Igbo in Nigeria and the circumstances in which it became part of the Nigerian federation. Nwala (2012) revealed that MASSOB (now IPOB) has been lamenting the manner in which the Igbo people were forcefully brought into a federation in which they are rejected, victimized and killed recklessly (p.42).

He reported that the MASSOB is arguing that the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria without due consultation with the people was a contraption of the British to serve British interests. In trying to forge an ethnic agenda, therefore, Mr. Ralph Uwazurike (leader of MASSOB), is calling on Igbos to turn their back on the fake democracy that is denying them their fair share of the 'national cake' (Nwala, 2012). Occasionally, the group would apply the weapon of civil disobedience by sporadically hoisting the Biafran flag in cities like Aba, Okigwe and Onitsha in the South Eastern

region of Nigeria. Often, the Nigeria Police Force immediately de-hoist such flags (Opukri & Etekpe, 2013, p. 364).

However, unlike the other insurgent groups, Obafemi & Galadima (2012) observed that the Boko Haram sect is dangerously exploiting Nigeria's precarious sectarian fault lines to fracture the country. They argued that the Boko Haram insurgency is a product of a political and social process that seeks to remove the secular system of government and establish Islamic sharia law in the country, and that it is loosely modelled on the Algerian Islamist group turned Pan-Maghreb jihadi organization AQIM. The group has an ideology similar to the one espoused by al-Qaeda with nearly coincidental goals and objectives as well as employs conventional terrorist tactics (Obafemi & Galadima 2012).

Taken together, the use of violence by MEND, OPC, MASSOB and IPOB, Boko Haram and other insurgent groups in Nigeria to draw the attention of government to repressed grievances suggests issues that are potentially dangerous for the continuous survival of Nigeria as one indivisible sovereign state, and can be likened to what Regan, Frank and Aydin (2010) referred to as the conditions of civil war in a State. From the Regan's Interventions in Civil Wars (ICW), civil war refers to "armed combat between groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities" (Aydin, 2010, p. 54). To use one or two or a combination of these explanations to look at the case of insurgencies in Nigeria, it can be argued that there is a war in Nigeria with the OPC creating the sparks; the MASSOB and IPOB turning them into flames; the Niger Delta

insurgents feeding the flames and the Boko Haram raising the bar of these bloody encounters (Akpan, 2013, p.67).

Nigerian Government Response to Boko Haram Violence

Nigeria's experience shows that micro-nationalism and religion- inspired violence has become more vicious and better organized (Ibrahim et al., 2015). Forms of violence ranging from kidnapping, hostage-taking and assassination to bombing have grown in sophistication. Opukri and Etekpe (2013) observed that Nigeria experienced the first terrorist act in 1985 when Dele Giwa, a Nigerian journalist was killed through a letter bomb. They noted that this was followed by the Maitatsine religious uprising in 1987; the Niger Delta crises in the 1990s and now Boko Haram (Opukri & Etekpe, 2013). The Boko Haram evolved from a sect that waged poorly planned 'hit and run' attacks on state security establishments to one that increasingly uses IEDs, targeted assassination, drive-by shooting and suicide bombings in its violent campaign (Agbiboa, 2014).

Towards this, Onuoha (2013), agreed with the 2011 Global Terrorism Index report released by the Institute for Economics and Peace that Nigeria ranked seventh among the countries most affected by global terrorism following violent attacks by Boko Haram. The Global Terrorism Index, which is a comprehensive attempt to account for direct and relative impact of terrorism in 158 countries in terms of its effect on lives lost, injuries and property damaged, showed Nigeria ranked only marginally better than Somalia, the other sub-Saharan African country in the top 10 (p.407).

The implication of this is for Nigeria to set in motion the processes of achieving active peace and perfect security. The many conflicts and crises in the country, including

the Boko Haram insurgency should be used as facilitator of the much-desired peace and security (IPCR, 2016b). Threats delineate the character of the security question, and the security needs define the nature of defense doctrine, which determines the dynamics of defense strategy, and while trying to achieve these, efforts must be holistic rather than the often trial-and-error approach (IPCR, 2016b). For Nigeria, this response strategy has not worked. Akpan (2013) argued that:

If one is lost in a forest, trial and error could be a useful procedure. But trial and error applied to dispute or conflict situations, in which the quality of life and life itself may be at stake, is unacceptable (p.29).

The counter-terrorism measures adopted by the Nigerian government in tackling the Boko Haram insurgency have not yielded much result (Ojelade, 2018). Unnumen (2014) found out that government responses to the activities of Boko Haram have been a mixture of good and bad. To him, the good initiatives implemented include accepting to negotiate with the members of the sect when they come out to identify themselves; initiating a program to integrate the almajeri education system into the formal school system; and setting up a panel to investigate the root causes of violence in the north eastern Nigeria. Unnumen identified other good measures as the invitation to all northern leaders, including former heads of state, to a round table meeting aimed at finding lasting solutions to the Boko Haram problem; increased budgetary funding to security; signing into law the terrorism prevention Act; enhanced border security with neighboring countries; declaration of state of emergency in some of the affected states; and sending some members of the security forces to the United States for training in counter terrorism and bomb disposal (Unnumen, 2014, p.242).

On the bad initiatives, Unumen observed that demolishing buildings suspected to be owned or used by members of the sect, and in some cases whole communities is counterproductive. He noted that while doing this, relations of suspected members of the sect, including their wives, brothers, parents and children have been arrested and detained for long periods for offences they did not commit. He observed that the demolition of houses and communities used by suspected terrorists are usually preceded by gun battles lasting hours between the inhabitants and the Nigerian security operatives and as a result, women, children and other vulnerable groups often get caught up in the crossfire or even killed (Unumen, 2014, p.242). Fafowora (2013, p.17) assessed this response strategy and noted that the Nigerian security forces have failed in their attempt to effectively tackle the Boko Haram terrorists in spite of the fact that they have stepped up their activities and operations in the north east. He concluded that the application of military force to counter the Boko Haram by the authorities have being without much success.

But Onuoha (2013, p.423) in his view argued that the deployment of special security forces as offensive against the sect had been partly successful. He observed that the use of military patrol vehicles equipped to detect hidden bombs and other weapons within a radius of 50 meters is a response strategy that has worked well. With this strategy, the vehicles are put on the roads in suspected Boko Haram hideouts in densely populated areas of the city, and once bombs or weapons are detected, security operatives move into the area to effect arrests and seize weapons. He reported that, “many leaders of the sect had been arrested in this way” (P.423). Considering the fact that the Boko Haram has defied the action of the security forces and that countering the sect with force alone

may not yield the desired results, the Nigerian federal government considered some other response strategies, such as former President Obasanjo- led peace initiative; the Ibrahim Datti Peace Meeting and the setting up of Ambassador Usman Gaji Galtimari Committee, among others (Opukri & Etekpe, 2013, p.374).

Opukri & Etekpe reported that the President Obasanjo Peace Meeting with the family of Late Mohammed Yusuf (the generally acclaimed founder of Boko Haram) took place on 15 September 2011. But that earlier on in the day, Obasanjo had joint peace meetings with the *Jamatul Nasril Islam*, (JNI); Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN); and *Plateau State Leaders of Thought* in Jos. Opukri & Etekpe stated that Obasanjo pleaded with Yusuf's family to prevail on Boko Haram members to sheathe their sword and to stop the spate of bombings nationwide (p.374). Assessing this gesture however, Okene and Olawale (2013) saw this as failed intervention apparently because the Obasanjo led delegation did not visit the members of the sect but only limited themselves to the family members of the erstwhile leader, Mohammed Yusuf. The Sect members felt provoked and therefore rejected the intervention (p.336). Again, the federal government initiated a peace move through Ahmad Salkida (a veteran journalist) and Dr. Ibrahim Datti. Unfortunately, it failed in its objective to placate the sect. The reasons for this failure according to Okene and Olawale (2013) were the hawkish stance of some people in government who believed that reconciling with the sect was a doubly reprehensible and dishonorable course. These people were opposed to any form of discussion with Boko Haram and this lack of will killed the Datti initiative (p.337)

In August 2011, the federal government inaugurated the Committee on Security Challenges posed by Boko Haram, led by Ambassador Usman Gaji Galtimari (Onuorah, 2011). Onuorah commented that the Report decried the general failure of effective and coordinated intelligence gathering and its deployment to forestall attacks by Boko Haram. The Report also condemned the alarming rate of poverty and illiteracy in the North –East region of Nigeria; massive unemployment of youths; existence of private militias established and used by politicians who later dump them; presence of large number of *almajeris* (street children) who are easily used to ignite and sustain violence; influx of illegal aliens resulting from porous and unmanned borders; and failure of government to deliver social services (Onuorah, 2011). The Committee recommended that the federal government should consider the option of dialogue and negotiation to contain the insurgency, after which the members of the sect should be rehabilitated. But that the dialogue should be contingent upon the sect’s renunciation of all forms of violence and surrender of arms (Onuorah, 2011).

A careful look at the recommendation shows that it appears to suggest that another amnesty program should be declared for the Boko Haram terrorists in the manner Late President Yar’Adua did for the Niger Delta militants. Opukri and Etekpe (2013) however saw this recommendation as defective because the circumstance under which militancy emerged in the Niger Delta was not the same as Boko Haram. They argued that whereas the Niger Delta militants were advocating for the implementation of fiscal federalism and resource control, resource ownership and management as enshrined in the

1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, nobody exactly know the grievances of Boko Haram insurgents (Opukri & Etekpe 2013, p.375).

To respond to terrorist violence, Albert, (2017) observed that the federal government has begun to invest in the military to enhance its capability in not only to resist external aggression but to also counter internal security threats, seeing that, like in most other countries, coercive power and military force play fundamental roles in the management of security (Albert, 2017). They ensure maintenance of national security by reinforcing adequacy of military capability and mobility. But more than this is the need for swift response by the authorities to stop terrorist acts through a well-coordinated intelligence gathering where the terrorists will be vulnerable and exposed before they bomb their target (Bappah, 2016; Ojelade, 2018).

On the military efforts, Hussaini (2017) observed that after the resurgence of Boko Haram activities in 2010, the government of Nigeria adopted series of measures to contain the threat. He identified the first measure as the creation of Joint Task Force (JTF) in 2011, with membership drawn from various security agencies like the Military, Police, Immigration, Customs and the State Security Service. The JTF adopted measures such as imposition of dusk to dawn curfew; ban on the use of motorcycles; stop-and-search operation along township roads throughout the country; cordon-and-search operations on suspected hideouts of the Boko Haram members; and the mopping up of non-military rifles (Hussaini, 2017).

Hussaini also noted that in May, 2013, the federal government declared and enforced a six months State of Emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, to

improve the efficiency of military operations. This measure was renewed three times until 2015 (Hussaini, 2017). However, on August 25, 2013, the Nigerian Army Headquarters disbanded the JTF and created Nigerian Army Seven Division led by Major General Obidah Ethan (Hussaini, 2017). He reported that this development was followed by the creation of more military formations, deployment of more troops and logistics for effective operations against the terrorists. That before the insurgency, Borno state, for example, had only 21 Armored Brigade and 4 Battalions in Biu, Bama, Maiduguri and Monguno towns. But this increased to two Military Divisions, seven different Brigades and many Battalions, all overseen by the Theatre Command. Also, President Muhammadu Buhari ordered the relocation of the Command and Control Centre of the Military operation from Abuja to Maiduguri, to add impetus to the containment efforts of the military (Hussaini, 2017). He stated that one key achievement in the containment efforts was the implementation of the decision of African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council Committee meeting held on 29th January, 2014, in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia, in which the Committee ratified the formation of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) by members of Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) made up of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin Republic (Hussaini, 2017).

Assessing the functionality of MNJTF, Albert (2017) identified its key mandate to include the prevention of Boko Haram from having free access to the borders of member states of LCB; increasing the number of troops; transferring the management of the force to the Lake Chad Basin Commission; the relocation of the headquarters of the MNJTF from Baga in Nigeria to N'Djaména in Chad; and giving the position of the Force's

commander to Nigeria (Albert, (2017). He observed that following General Buratai's appointment as Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff in July 2015, Major General Illiya Abbah (another Nigerian) was appointed as new Commander of the MNJTF. General Buratai was appointed as the Commander of the MNJTF in May 2015 (Albert, 2017). These changes were to reinvigorate the MNJTF and refocus it for a better performance in the fight against Boko Haram.

Albert noted that the key assignment of the MNJTF in the fight against Boko Haram was to secure the borders between the LCB countries, and having secured the borders, each of the member countries is expected to flush out Boko Haram from its territory. In Nigeria, for example, the force responsible for the flushing of Boko Haram was code named, *operation lafiya dole* (peace by force). This is the force fighting the insurgents in various parts of north-eastern Nigeria, most especially the Sambisa forest (Albert, 2017). While it cannot be said that this security arrangement is not entirely without its challenges, it has indeed significantly contributed to the degrading of the capacity of Boko Haram. In Nigeria particularly, Albert recorded that:

The operations of the MNJTF have limited the activities of Boko Haram to the vast Sambisa forest, and their supply lines from neighboring countries have been totally cut off and that their capacity to launch suicide attacks on Nigerian cities has been drastically curtailed (p.126).

Boko Haram and the increasing Cross Border Linkages

The Boko Haram insurgency started as a weak, disorganized, loosely coordinated and inchoate movement (Akpan, 2013). But research has shown that it has transformed to a group that has the capacity to pose serious threats to the peace and stability of Nigeria. As observed by Obafemi & Galadima (2013), "it has developed the capability for

strategic terrorism, strategic intelligence and the building of wide-ranging linkages to subvert the Nigerian state” (p.3).

Boko Haram’s proficiency in the use of explosives and operational tempo as well as its tactical sophistication and aggressiveness indicate some external support. As observed by Fafowora (2013), some of the leaders of the sect are believed to have received their military training on the use of arms in Pakistan and the Yemen. Also, assessing key factors contributing to the success of an insurgency, Ker (2013) alluded to the external support Boko Haram is getting from international terrorist organizations like the Al Shabab of Somalia and AQIM and the Sahel region. He reported that Boko Haram has international links and sympathy - it is enjoying assistance in monetary, weapon, medical and training support. Sanctuaries are provided in which the sect train, stockpile arms, plan operations and escape home government retribution (Ker, 2013). While the sect initially relied on donations from members, its links with Al Qaeda has opened it up to more funding from groups in Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the Al Muntada Trust Fund, and the Islamic World Society (Ker, 2013, p.217).

The Report by Crisis Group (2014) confirmed the links by Boko Haram with a host of other radical groups including the Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. The report indicates that Boko Haram’s links with foreign Islamist groups were strengthened following the 2009 military crackdown on the sect. Surviving sect members escaped through Chad and Niger to Somalia, Algeria, and reportedly, Afghanistan, where they joined other Islamists and received guerrilla training. This included Mohammed Nur, who is accused of masterminding the 26 August 2011 bombing of the UN building in

Abuja that killed 26 people. He fled to Somalia and reportedly joined Al-Shabab, through which he is alleged to have made contact with AQIM. He returned to Nigeria a year later (International Crisis Group, 2014, p.24).

In fact, scholars such as Botha (2008), Cilliers (2015), Lohmann (2011), Werenfells (2015), and Stern and Berger (2015) share common views on the roles that groups in Algeria such as the *Groupe Islamique Arme* (Armed Islamic Group, GIA); Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC); which later metamorphosed to AQIM played in the spread of violent Islamic extremism and terrorism. These terrorist groups relied on their experiences and connections with Osama Bin Laden when he was operating in the Sudan to build strongholds in their areas of operation. The participation of some Moslem youths from the Sahel region in the Afghanistan war that ended in 1989 further provided grounds for radicalization and the desire to ascribe the status of caliphate to some countries (Okafor, 2015).

Although the Algerian government led by Abdelaziz Bouteflika managed to maintain stability in the country, the influences and support provided by these Algerian extremist groups have been far reaching. Okafor (2015) observed that the GSPC, for example, provided training base as far back as 2004 for new members from Chad, Sudan, Libya, Mali and Mauritania in the Tibesti mountains of northern Chad as part of its regional expansion strategy, and was also providing firearms trainings for the Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria.

Nweze (2013) observed that since the turn of the 20th century, terrorism and insurgency have become the new wave of crime in many countries of the world, with

Nigeria now being included, due to Boko Haram activities. Nweze (2013) noted that terrorist group movements gravitate around different social, political and ideological concerns and criteria, and that extremist terrorists like the Hamas and Al Qaeda are on the rise, particularly given Islamic fundamentalist movement since the 1980s and 1990s (Nweze, 2013). He stated that religious fundamentalist movements are trying to push extremist views and have, as a result, taken to violence in order to achieve their religious perceived goals. That these terrorists “see their objectives as holy war and therefore infallible and non-negotiable” (p.270).

Alao (2014) explained that the reason why the terrorists are increasingly coming together in operational activities is because of their belief that they are fighting a holy war. He observed that about 100 members of Boko Haram were in April 2012 reported to have been involved in an attack on the Algerian embassy in Gao, Mali (Alao, 2014). That the Movement that spearheaded this attack was the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), another active militant organization that broke off from AQIM and announced its goal of spreading jihad across West Africa (Alao, 2014). He added that, in November 2011, the deputy foreign minister of Algeria - one of the countries where AQIM operates - stated that intelligence reports showed there was coordination between Boko Haram and AQIM (Alao, 2014). Alao also observed that, in June 2010, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud of AQIM had declared that his group would provide Boko Haram with weapons, support and training to build strategic depth in Africa. That, as most of the cross-continent connectivity was going on, many African radical groups have

sent members to participate in actions in places like Yemen and Afghanistan (Alao, 2014).

Table 1 below provides an overview of radical religious groups in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 1

Overview of Radical Religious Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa

Name of organization	Doctrine/belief espoused	Recruitment base	Sources of funding	Extent of spread	Associated violent incidents
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	Largely the same of the international Al-Qaeda. Although initially suspected, links with Al Qaeda was confirmed in 2006 by Al Qaeda's Second in Command Al Zawahiri	From all the states in the Sahel region. Main base in Northern Mali	Ransom money, drug and cigarette smuggling	All the countries in the Maghreb. Believed to have between 600 and 1000 members. Suspected to have links with Nigeria's Boko Haram	The December 2007 bombing of the UN offices in Algiers. Also known to have kidnapped and killed Aid workers, tourists. Kidnapping for ransoms.
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa	Splinter group from AQIM, allegedly because it wants to create a voice for Black African members of AQIM. It looks up to Black figures like Usman Dan Fodio as sources of inspirations and wants to ensure the spread of radical Islam across West Africa.	Youths across Mali and other Sahelian states	Taking hostages for ransom. (For example, exchanged 2 Spanish and 1 Italian hostage for \$18 million in 2012) Smuggling	Across West Africa but aspiring greater association with groups in Algeria and Mali	Suicide bombing of the Algerian National Gendarmerie regional command center in downtown Ouargla in June 2012 and the Tamanrasset suicide attack in March 2012.

Ansar Dine	Wanted the imposition of Sharia law across Mali.	Largely from unemployed youths across Northern Mali and other Sahelian states	From AQIM and through smuggling	Predominant in Mali, especially in the Tuareg Homelands	Destroyed the Sufi tombs in Timbuktu. Also known to have blocked humanitarian convoys.
Boko Haram Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Ladda'awatih wal- Jihad	Complete repudiation of Western education and civilization	Youths mainly from north-eastern part of Nigeria but increasingly from neighboring states like Niger and Chad	Ransom, External funding from Middle East, Allegations too that they are being supported by wealthy Nigerian Muslims	Mainly across the states in northern part of Nigeria with occasional attacks on the capital city, Abuja.	Various bomb explosions including spectacular targets like the UN building, Police Headquarters and Churches.
UAMSHO (Uprising or Awakening in Swahili)	Created to contest the Union of Zanzibar with Tanganyika to form Tanzania in 1960. Now uses Islamic revivalism as a means of ensuring cohesion	Zanzibar in Tanzania	Not known	Largely limited to the Zanzibar region	Most recent action was the spilling of acid on the faces of two young British tourists in July 2013

National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad	Wants to protect the interest of the Malian Tuareg population. The group was swelled with the return of Tuaregs from Libya.	Largely Northern Mali	Initially through criminal activities. The sources of funding now seem to have reduced and this has affected the effectiveness of the organization	Largely among the Tuareg population. After its military losses, many of its forces joined the Ansar Dine and MUJAO	The shooting down of Malian Air Force MIG 21jet in January 2012
Battalion Sworn in Blood	Believed to be breakaway from AQIM	Across Sahel region	Holding hostages, drug and cigarette smuggling.	Across Sahel region	Claimed to be behind the attack on the Tigantourine gas complex

Table 1 Overview of Radical Religious Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa (continued)

Name of organization	Doctrine/belief espoused	Recruitment base	Sources of funding	Extent of spread	Associated violent incidents
Hizb Islam	Was linked with Al-Shabab until Fallout in 2012. Leader of Hizb, Shekh Hassan Dahir Aweys is considered as the father of militant Islam in Somalia and is currently in jail.	Operate in South Somalia	Extortion and kidnapping	Only Somalia	Kidnapping of French soldiers

Al Shabaab Xarakada Mujaahidiinta Alshabaab	Formed as a result of the collapse of the Somali State and it emerged from the Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, a militant Salafi extremist group. Officially declared allegiance with Al Qaeda in February 2012	Originally started from Somalia but activists have joined from other regions. There are also believe that radicals may be coming from Europe to join the group as evidenced in the attempt by one of those involved in the murder of a British Soldier in July 2013 in London and the involvement of Samantha Lewthwaite (popularly known as the “White Widow” in the Nairobi Mall attack.	Kidnapping, Piracy, support from other bigger groups, Smuggling The Somali diaspora, extortion of local businesses. There are also allegations that key foreign states like Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Iran, and Qatar, are supporting.	Has spread to neighboring states like Kenya and Uganda. It is however believed that the group has lost influence in Somalia especially against the background of the military activities of AMISOM. It is also believed that it has close links with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.	Various Suicide bombings including on AU Military base in Mogadishu, assassinations of key government functionaries. Attack on Uganda during the World Cup and the September 2013 attack on the Kenyan Mall.
Oromi Islamic Liberation Front	Creation of an Islamic State in East and South of Ethiopia	Ethiopia	Not known	South of Ethiopia	

Source. Abiodun Alao, 2014.

Further to the above assertion is the cause by the terrorist groups to fight for the propagation of their beliefs. Alao (2014) believes that this cause still unites them (terrorists). He argued that while many of the radical groups across the world may have differences over the best approach to fight what they see as a “common enemy”, most seem to be united in the conviction that the West and some of the values it represents, presents a potent force that should be confronted (Alao, 2014). He found out that many of these groups (obviously, not all) are beginning to put aside doctrinal differences to unite against what they see as the valid threat that appears determined to exterminate them. That, indeed, the recognition that the forces determined to silence them are strong and resolute, has explained the increasing determination of many of the radical groups to come together and create a form of unity that cuts across regions (Alao, 2014). Alao observed that the resolve of the radical groups to come together and create a form of unity was further facilitated by the “one-size-fits-all” policies often adopted by the international community as a response to radicalization (Alao, 2014).

From the above review therefore, it can be seen that there is an increase in religiously inspired groups employing terrorist tactics to achieve their aims. But Adibe (2012) argued that modern terrorism is color and religion blind, and that can be seen in case of the Weathermen group in the US. Adibe observed that the Weathermen group was formed when the *New Left* iconic group, *Students for a Democratic Society*, was dissolved in 1969. That the FBI had in fact designated the Weathermen group as a terrorist group in 2004. Weathermen embraced terrorist tactics – from rioting to the setting off bombs to register their opposition to the Vietnam War (Adibe, 2012, p.5).

To buttress the assertion that the motive behind terrorist violence may not be entirely religion, He argued that the groups, which use religion to perpetrate terrorism are often on the fringe of the religion they claim to promote, stressing for example, that “Muhammad Atta, the architect of the 9/11 attacks in the USA, and the Egyptian hijacker who was driving the first plane, was a near alcoholic and was drinking *vodka* before he boarded the aircraft” (Adibe, 2012, p.5). Adibe reasoned that alcohol would be strictly off limits for a highly committed Muslim. The experience in Nigeria, where Boko Haram terrorists, rape, abduct and impregnate teen girls, further attests to views that they (sect members) are not true Muslims committed to the teachings of Islam.

A trend that now seems noticeable is the desire of publicity by insurgent groups, in order to gain global attention. Alao observed that all the groups seem to have realized that their publicity interest is served when they take steps that attract global attention. For example, not long after Al Shabaab gained global prominence with its attack on Westland, Nairobi, Kenya, Boko Haram in Nigeria kidnapped over 200 school girls from Chibok, near Maiduguri. Also, the Nairobi Mall bombing of September 2013 was fashioned against the Mumbai attack of November 2008. This was later officially confirmed when Al-Shabaab *tweeted* saying: “Remember Mumbai ... it is going to be a long ordeal in Westgate” (Alao, 2014, p.12).

The Report of the Crisis Group (2014) also explained the ease of Islamic radicalization diffusion following the military crackdown that led the sect members to disperse and moved into Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The report indicated that Nigeria expelled dozens of Boko Haram members in July 2009, some of whom are Nigerian

nationals. They went to settle in the south of Niger where they established bases safe to them and conducive for recruitment of new members (Crisis Group, 2014). Also, porous borders and shared ethnicity made it easy for the sect to move into these countries. The Report revealed that the Nigerien security services consider the group as a threat to Niger's stability even much more than AQIM and reportedly prevented some attacks and captured many couriers carrying money and messages between AQIM, MUJAO and Boko Haram (Crisis Group, 2014, p.25).

The Crisis Group reported that Cameroun could not afford any lukewarm approach, because the kidnap cases of French citizens in March and November 2013 was a demonstration of Boko Haram's presence in Cameroun. Sect members were reported to live in the cities of Kousseri, Kolofata and Mokolo and are suspected to engage in criminal activities to finance the movement. Boko Haram was allegedly said to have distributed extortion letters (written in Hausa and Arabic languages) to traders in the far north of Cameroun demanding that the *May Sava* authorities implement Sharia and stop working with westerners (Crisis Group, 2014, p.26).

Going from examples from other regions, it is likely that the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria will continue to try as much as possible to exploit external linkages to express its dissatisfaction against the state. As noticeable in Asia, insurgent groups are inclined to exploit local dissatisfaction to further advance activities against the state (Crisis Group, 2014, p.26).

Review and Synthesis of Studies Pertaining to the Research Questions

In the course of this review, I discovered a number of studies that revealed some public policy measures, that when properly formulated and implemented by authorities and stakeholders, will most likely address the challenges of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. However, the studies did not state the ways and means that are available through which strategic responses can be directed to achieve resolution of the Boko Haram crisis rather than management or containment of the crisis as is currently the case.

The Boko Haram insurgency is loosely modelled after the Algerian Islamist group that metamorphosed into Pan-Maghreb jihadi organization AQIM. The Boko Haram has an ideology similar to that of the AQIM, where its goals and operational tactics involves the use of conventional terrorist tactics (Obafemi & Galadima, 2012).

Onyebuchi and Chigozie, (2013) quantified the level of violence the Boko Haram insurgency has brought upon Nigeria. They argued that the rise of Boko Haram with its violent disposition to western values is a counter response to western civilization that has eclipsed Islamic civilization, giving rise to civilizational conflicts that are often noticeable among Muslims and non-Muslims. Onyebuchi and Chigozie suggested that since this clash of civilizations has become imperative, there is need for the Nigerian government to come up with urgent measures and to mobilize its security architecture to curb the wanton destruction of lives and property by Boko Haram.

Udeh (2013) discussed the issues, challenges and prospects of fighting Boko Haram through the adoption of Counter Terrorism Strategy (CTS). Udeh stated that as a response to acts of terrorism, international organizations and countries adopted a CTS to

prevent and reduce the threats of terrorism. Particularly, he noted that the European Union (EU), for example, developed a CTS on November 30, 2005, based on 4 pillars of prevention, protection, pursuance and response in order to address the challenges of terrorism in the region (Udeh, 2013, p.307). Also, Udeh indicated that on 8 September 2006, the UN adopted a CTS that was designed to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism. He listed these efforts as measures that include addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, preventing terrorism and combating terrorism. He stated that there were some 14 other counter terrorism international conventions in developed countries under the auspices of the UN and its specialized agencies. The conventions were to assist in building a safer world against international terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda and Taliban (Udeh, 2013, p.307).

Although the study showed that the Nigerian government, the military and other security agencies have made remarkable efforts to contain the violence of Boko Haram, it was found out that legislation, technology and socioeconomic development are major issues of effective CTS and the combating of Boko Haram in Nigeria (Udeh, 2013, p.308). Assessing the evolutionary trajectory of the Boko Haram and the tactical repertoire of state responses, Onuoha (2013) observed that the Boko Haram has evolved from a sect that poorly waged hit-and-run attacks on security establishments in 2009 to one that increasingly uses IEDs, targeted assassinations, drive-by shooting and suicide bombings in its violent campaign. Onuoha noted that the Boko Haram attacks had initially focused on security agents such as the police, soldiers, civil defense and prison officials but later extended to include public infrastructure, schools, places of worship,

community and religious leaders, politicians and other civilian targets that had nothing to do with the government (Onouha, 2013, p.407).

Onuoha stated that the Nigerian government's response had been 'all-stick' approach which had recorded modest successes, anyway. However, because of its global Salafist Islamic ideological stance, which imposed on them the duty to purge the society of evil influences even at the expense of their own lives, the Boko Haram had been a difficult force to contend, thereby posing significant threat to national and international security. Onuoha suggested that to effectively counter the threat posed by Boko Haram, the Nigerian government will need a "robust combination of use of force and political dexterity" (Onuoha, 2013, p.409).

Ojelade (2018) provided insight on the development and implementation of counter terrorism policy towards Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria during the 2009 – 2015 period. The study provided a better understanding of how the counter terrorism policy might be developed and implemented for effective fight against the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. Ojelade recommended the development of a holistic strategy involving both hard and soft approaches to fight Boko Haram. Rather than engage in inter agency squabbles and tuff protection among agencies, he advocated for collaboration between stakeholders in the security sector and key community leaders in the north east as crucial for a successful counter terrorism effort (Ojelade, 2018).

Botha et al. (2017) provided a deeper insight to the understanding of Boko Haram from the perspective of ordinary Nigerian citizens. The study provided analyses of perspectives of cross section of citizens with particular focus on the political context of

Boko Haram and the dynamics surrounding its existence. Most Nigerians believe that the Boko Haram crisis escalated because of the failings of politicians who are also considered to be the financiers of the group. Also, Botha et al, identified the factors that influence the decision of people to join Boko Haram to include poverty and unemployment, group affinity (like family members, ethnic kinship and the *almajiri* system of Islamic schooling). The others are lack of education and the religious institutions that they frequent (Botha et al., 2017).

They advocated that given the complexity of Boko Haram, there is need for multidimensional and multi-layered interventions that address the root causes as well as the symptoms of violent extremism. They argued that the Nigerian government cannot do this alone, and that military solutions had proved to be inadequate. They suggested a committed and strategic partnerships that includes civil society and community role players, academic institutions, the private sector, regional and continental partners like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its institutions, the African Union (AU) and its institutions, international partners (the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU. The other suggested strategic partners are the international development partners such as the US, UK and France etc. (Botha et al, 2017, p.76).

Albert (2017) provided a cursory insight to the task of security management on regional basis as a response measure to the Boko Haram crisis, when the countries in the Lake Chad Basin – Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad – established the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The idea of establishing the MNJTF followed a reasoning that the problem of Boko Haram is not solely that of Nigeria. Albert undertook a critical

assessment of functionality regime of the MNJTF and came up with the conclusion that the member countries need to work collaboratively with one another in order to be able to fight a common enemy. He lamented that Nigeria is suspicious of Cameroon and Chad, which are in turn, suspicious of Nigeria, and the lesson is “that African states need to work on their relations timeously to enable them have smooth working relationship when they have to face a common enemy” (p.131).

Identified Gaps in Previous Research

From the above literature and the other works that have been reviewed, the observation made by Barkindo (2016) that the Nigerian government is driven by the assumption that the Boko Haram sect is “a gang of ignorant, poverty-stricken fanatics who have twisted Islamic theology for personal gain” (p.73) and as a result, the easiest way to handle the crisis is to use military force is worthy of attention. Although some scholars have argued that the use of military force as a main response to the Boko Haram insurgency will not easily resolve the crisis (Agbibo, 2014; Albert, 2017; Okene & Olawale, 2013; Onuoha, 2013), the military efforts have recorded remarkable achievements. Fwa (2017) noted that on assumption of office by President Muhammadu Buhari in May 2015, quick modifications were made within the military, and the present counter insurgency operation was put in motion. Fwa stated that the COIN operation, code-named, *Operation Lafiya Dole* (Peace by Force) within three months of its launch, succeeded in effectively pushing out Boko Haram from all its bases within the Nigerian territory. However, it seems that the counter insurgency literature is yet to fully integrate

the theory of human needs to address the problem of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, and this is a gap.

For instance, Ibrahim et al. (2017) stated that the Boko Haram sect comprises many actors with different motivations and who have followed various pathways of joining the insurgency, making tracking and combatting them very difficult. Lack of clear understanding of the strategies and ideological principles employed by different leaders of the sect, for example, will have serious security implications both at the domestic, regional, and international levels. Zenn et al. (2018) argued, “that whereas Boko Haram maybe considered vicious, ruthless, and sadistic, there is a need to carry out a comprehensive study of the group while engaging with it” (p.24) They stated that this will make it possible for the security agencies to understand the strategies of the group and ascertain the nature of the group’s ideology and its historical justification for attacks as well as the narratives it uses for mobilization and recruitment. Therefore, it is important that the government of Nigeria, government of countries in the West African sub region, security analysts and scholars do not regard Boko Haram as uninformed or unexperienced. Specifically, such understanding should not form the basis of a policy approach for resolving the Boko Haram crisis.

Summary

Violence caused by Boko Haram remains an ominous challenge in contemporary Nigeria. Boko Haram had unleashed a most ferocious, savage and terrorist violence against the Nigerian state and people. The violent activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria have seriously eroded security. Its violent operations have led to incalculable loss of lives

and properties. The devastating socio-economic effects of the killings and bombings by the sect has destroyed economic and commercial activities with many people relocating away from the north east to other places.

With its violent escapades, Boko Haram has become a franchise for some small Islamic extremist groups that are known to exist in Northern Nigeria (Akpan, 2013). Taking inspiration from the Boko Haram, these groups see the possibility of escalating their local conflicts with sophisticated guns and bombs, making Boko Haram a big label for different command groups. A good example is the Fulani herdsmen and bandits who are known to always carry out attacks by invading villages and ambushing of unsuspecting innocent people in some parts of Northern Nigeria, killing, maiming and destroying properties in the process.

Summary of Major Themes in the Literature

This chapter provided the introduction and synopsis to the literature on the Boko Haram violence, the strategy adopted for the search of literature, and the theoretical foundation of the study. It examined, analyzed and synthesized literature on key concepts and variables relating to security and violence, and the threats violence pose to lives and property of people, particularly the Nigerian society. It also analyzed the place of public policy in addressing societal problems.

What is Known and Not Known in the Discipline Relating to the Theme of Study

Literature reviewed in this study provided overwhelming information on Boko Haram insurgency and the myriad of measures taken by authorities and stakeholders in Nigeria to address its challenges. However, there is lack of proper understanding of how

to develop short, medium- and long-term policy frameworks on handling the issues relating to Boko Haram and the violence that is being unleashed on Nigerians. There is a high disconnect between national security decision making and the actual feedback from intelligence. Botha et al (2017) noted that understanding the rationale or logic behind the existence of Boko Haram and its continued survival is key to understanding the choices they make and why they act in the way they do.

Kundnani (2015) suggested the need for policy makers to understand the reasons why people engage in acts of terrorism before they develop or implement counterinsurgency policies. Also, Richardson (2011) stated that government can effectively tackle terrorism only when it has understood the factors that caused it. The literature review indicates that responses to the Boko Haram should be a combination of soft and hard approaches (Okene & Olawale, 2013; Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013; Barkindo, 2016), which to some extent, the Nigerian government is doing. But improving the understanding of these approaches for better results, is important to this study. The steps used for the collection of relevant information from executive officers and very senior personnel from peace and conflict resolution establishments; policy and strategic studies agencies; and reintegration agencies like the Victim Support Fund were outlined in chapter 3. These people are policy experts with relevant knowledge and ideas on the violence perpetrated by the Boko Haram Islamist sect in Nigeria.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

In this chapter, I describe the research design and the rationale for this study, my role as researcher, the methodology employed, participant selection, unit of analysis, data collection procedures, and my plan for data analysis. Also included in this chapter is a statement that the research conducted is credible and trustworthy. Issues of guiding ethics and the handling of researcher bias during research are also discussed in this chapter.

The purpose of this study was to improve the understanding of public policy measures necessary to prevent insurgent groups like Boko Haram from emerging and wreaking violence on Nigerian people and how such policies should be formulated and implemented such that every member of society would be assured of protection and guaranteed fundamental rights and privileges under the law. By formulating and implementing relevant public policies, Nigerians will be assured of their safety and security.

Research Design and Rationale

The central research question that guided this study was:

RQ1: What public policy measures are a solution to deal with Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

Successfully answering the stated research question availed the opportunity to improve the understanding of the policy measures that could be taken to weaken the Boko Haram operations and ameliorate the dangerous effects or impacts of the

insurgency on the citizens. In the process, answers to some sub questions related to the overarching research question were provided. The subquestions were:

SQ1: What public policy strategies or measures have been adopted by Nigerian government or authorities to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

SQ2: Why has Boko Haram violence continued despite public policy initiatives meant to curtail it?

SQ3: How can/might future public policy initiatives mitigate the impact of Boko Haram violence on the people of Nigeria?

Rationale for Choosing the Research Approach

For a study that sought to improve the understanding of public policy measures necessary to prevent insurgent groups like Boko Haram from emerging and wreaking violence on Nigerian people, a design I found useful was the qualitative method. Rudestam and Newton (2007) observed that “qualitative methods are linked to constructivist theory of knowledge because they focus on understanding experiences from the point of view of those who live them” (p. 35) This qualitative study involved stating the questions and procedures, collecting data, analyzing the data, and interpreting or giving meaning to the data analyzed. The study was designed to improve understanding of the public policies that will end Boko Haram’s violence and promote cohesion and harmony between decisions and actions on peace and security for all people in Nigeria. The study of violence and how it is managed should be the central focus of social change efforts within the framework of society (IPCR, 2016a). This framework

should be about the public policy measures that could be implemented to stop acts of violence against Nigerian people and residents.

I used the case study approach for this study. The case study approach uses detailed mechanisms (in-depth interviewing) to derive conclusions about what best influences a phenomenon of study. Creswell (2013) observed that, “it builds inductively from individual statements into emergent themes and assumes that anything is good for observation” (p. 157). The lens offered by this framework is apt and useful for addressing the issue of violence caused by the Boko Haram insurgency.

The research design made it possible for me to identify the conditions that give rise to social violence in Nigerian society and to conclude that the aggression of Boko Haram is a product of frustration, religious messianism, and terrorism (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). The design also made it possible for me to find out how the phenomenon of Boko Haram in Nigeria and its violent activities in some parts of northern Nigeria can be stopped. Furthermore, the case study approach enabled me to critically assess the philosophy behind the acts of violence perpetrated by the Boko Haram. Yin (2014) stated that a case study is an “empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 18). From this perspective, the researcher can study an event, object, or phenomenon that is part of an open system and that interacts with and is influenced by its environment. According to Yin (2014), a qualitative case study provides an in-depth understanding of the context and conditions of a problem and the attempts made to address it. This qualitative case study enabled me to

make policy recommendations on how to address not only the problem of Boko Haram but also the entire economy, which will provide the panacea to overcome terrorism in Nigeria.

Role of the Researcher and Professional Relationships

I was the researcher and the primary instrument of data collection (Creswell, 2013) in this study on improving the understanding of public policies that can be formulated and implemented to stop or reduce the incidences of violence by the Boko Haram Islamist sect in Nigeria. To obtain the relevant data required for a study, a researcher must be resourceful and possess a great deal of experience in research (Apori-Nkansah, 2008). There was need for me to undertake a desk review of secondary data using books, newspapers, academic articles, and journals. I conducted in-person, in-depth interviews with study participants in Abuja and Jos; recorded and transcribed interview proceedings; served as participant observer; and collected and analyzed relevant data.

I made personal contact with many people across the various segments of Nigerian society to introduce the topic. My employment at IPCR in Abuja for over 19 years as a researcher working on issues of peace, conflict management and resolution, and policy advisory was an added advantage in the study. Working in this area has led to numerous interactions with public policy experts, intelligence and counterterrorism experts, UN and international humanitarian and development workers, traditional and religious leaders, and members of many civil society organizations in Nigeria. To eliminate bias in the recruitment of participants for this study, I adopted a purposeful sampling technique.

Handling Researcher Bias

In qualitative research, the researcher must recognize the tendency of bias (Goulding, 2002) and must therefore guide against it. In this study, I was mindful that any bias would affect the objectivity of the study, especially given the issue of Boko Haram. In Nigeria, so many people share different sentiments about Boko Haram. Some respondents may have overt or covert sympathy or loyalty to the Boko Haram sect because Boko Haram engages in covert operations where most of their members cannot be open and public (Botha et al., 2017). However, to address bias in responding to questions by respondents, I engaged respondents with professional backgrounds and leanings relevant to the theme of the study to aggregate and validate their responses.

I was the primary instrument for data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2013), and as such maintained an open mind throughout the entire process of the research. I shared the results of preliminary findings of the research with selected participants and then incorporated key comments and observations into the report. Efforts were also made to corroborate the findings using multiple data sources such as interview reports, academic journals, archival documents, and organizational websites to enhance the credibility of the research.

Methodology

In research there is always the need to provide explanation and to do this with less ambiguity. The explanation provided must give rise to some form of evidence consistent with theory, but this cannot happen unless there is a “plan or proposal to conduct

research”; usually this would include “the intersection of philosophy; strategies of inquiry and specific methods” (Creswell, 2011, p. 5).

This research is a qualitative case study of how to improve the understanding of public policies that could be formulated and implemented to bring to an end the Boko Haram insurgency and its violent activities in Nigeria and how effective policy making and implementation can address its impact in the immediate, short-term, and long-term dimensions. Policy addressing the problem of violence needs to be impactful (Ojelade, 2018). The study design was structured along the following areas: (a) participant selection, (b) unit of analysis, (c) instrumentation, (d) procedures for data collection, and (e) plan for data analysis.

Participant Selection

The participants for this study were selected from peace and conflict resolution establishments, policy and strategic studies agencies, and reintegration agencies like the Victim Support Fund. Participants included executive officers, senior personnel of their respective organizations, and retired personnel. Participants were public policy experts who were able to provide useful information and insight on how effective policy making and implementation could be used to address the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria. These participants were selected based on their experience with public policy formulation and their ability to give expert opinion on the Boko Haram issue under study.

The sample population consisted of 12 participants after initial prequalification of 24 participants from the identified organizations. The sample comprised of mostly retired personnel and a few others who are still serving. I selected retired employees because of

undue pervasive political influence on public bureaucracy in Nigeria. Appointments and promotions to the headship positions in many of the public bureaucratic organizations in Nigeria are based on political patronage and loyalty. Therefore, officials appointed or promoted on such circumstances are morally bound to subject their views, decisions, and actions substantially to the wishes, preferences, control, and endorsement of their political masters (Ugwuanyi & Chukwuemeka, 2013). Obtaining objective views or responses on sensitive topics like Boko Haram from participants who are not yet retired from service can be an arduous task. Public officials often must make due consultations and obtain consent from relevant political authorities before they can take certain decisions or actions (Ugwuanyi & Chukwuemeka, 2013). Participants in this category will bare their minds on the research topic with some form of hesitation and the quality of data may be poor (Polkinghorn, 2005).

The sampling technique was purposeful and elitist (Apori-Nkansah, 2008; Berger et al., 2004; Creswell, 2013, pp. 154–156; Maxwell, 2013; Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014, pp. 31–32). The choice of purposive sampling technique was informed by the need to ensure that relevant persons who have experiences significant to the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria and who are the most appropriate to provide information for the study. This gave me the opportunity to obtain diverse descriptions of experiences for a detailed account on the Boko Haram phenomenon. I was guided by the fact that for a case study, diversity in perspectives is always a hallmark (Creswell, 2013).

A two-tiered approach to participant selection was adopted. Services of key informants from prominent public bureaucracies like the IPCR and the National Institute

for Policy and Strategic Studies were engaged to identify participants who met the selection criteria. Goulding (2002) observed that key informants are those individuals who can provide valuable information and insight into the study and who are also able to identify others with relevant information on the subject of the research. The selection criteria were as follows:

- Individuals with experience of public policy formulation and the ability to give expert opinion on possible measures that could be taken to resolve the Boko Haram crisis;
- People who can understand, speak, read, and write English to the extent that they will understand the research or interview questions; and
- Participants who have valid communication addresses or locations that will be easily accessible to the researcher for purposes of contact and follow up.

The second approach was the use of a snowballing technique (Ellard-Gray, Jeffrey, Choubak, & Crann, 2015), where participants in the first tier were requested to make recommendations or identify individuals they thought or knew to have knowledge or experience on the Boko Haram insurgency. These are persons who have experienced the phenomenon of Boko Haram in its richness and variety and would therefore be able to present its account in great depth and breadth (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). I then proceeded to interview the participants to attain data saturation. Gergen, Josselson, and Freeman (2015) observed that in qualitative research, saturation is a shared theme, and its importance lies in giving full expression to the values the researcher desires to advocate through the research. In other words, saturation concerns addressing satisfactorily, all the

features of the phenomenon being studied to the extent that no additional insights are needed (Morse et al, 2014).

To achieve saturation, I engaged in in-depth, semistructured interviews with the participants. The interviews span between 45-60 minutes and were digitally recorded. The recordings were later transcribed verbatim and kept in files in password protected computer that was kept solely by the researcher. I also kept contemporaneous handwritten notes as complements or add-ons. Each interview had its own data set (Moustakas, 1994). I shared the transcripts with the participants for their comments and review.

I treated discrepant cases discovered in interview data and documents through quality check and verification or interrogation of data. Creswell (1998) recommended searching for convergence of information from treating discrepant cases arising from multiple data sources. Data from the semi-structured interviews were validated by use of epoche technique (Moustakas, 1994). Epoche or bracketing is a process in which investigators set aside their experiences, as much as possible, to take a fresh perspective toward the phenomenon under study. Researchers use the epoche technique to increase academic rigor and eliminate all preconceived notions about the subject of the research (Moustakas, 1994).

Unit of Analysis

In order to give sufficient depth and breadth to the problem of violence caused by the Boko Haram insurgency, the unit of analysis that was studied (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015) was policies. Policies are activities of government, which can be specific or

general in nature. Generally, policies contain certain goals or objectives that may either be expressed in implied or clear terms. A public policy may be narrow, covering a specific activity. A public policy may also be applied to all people in a country or it may be limited to a section of its people, and policies have outcomes that may or may not have been foreseen (Sapru, 2012).

Thus, for public policies which are subject of this research, efforts were made to improve the understanding of the various measures that could be adopted as a solution to the Boko Haram crisis. What policy strategies or measures have been adopted by Nigerian government and why is it that the insurgency has continued despite the many policy measures adopted? The goal was to “gather comprehensive, systematic, and in-depth information” (Patton, 2002, p. 447) on the problem under study, for analyzing the data, and to arrive at public policy recommendations that will be a solution to the Boko Haram crisis

This therefore was the basis for the purposive sampling that was used for this study. The participants that were interviewed were limited to individuals that are relevant to the study. The focus was on peace and conflict resolution establishments; policy and strategic studies agencies; and reintegration agencies like the Victim Support Fund. The selected agencies are: IPCR; National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies; Nigeria Institute for International Affairs; Centre for Public Policy Alternatives; Nigeria Institute for Social and Economic Research; and the Victims Support Fund. Two (2) persons were selected and interviewed from each of the organizations mentioned, making twelve (12) persons all together

Procedures for Data Collection

Considering that the purpose of this research was to improve the understanding of public policies that could be formulated and implemented to stop or reduce the violence by the Boko Haram Islamist sect in Nigeria, the data collection instruments used include interviews using a voice recorder, electronic mails, field notes, archival materials and agency or organizational websites.

Interviews were conducted to obtain information from respondents. Interviews have the advantage of allowing respondents speak freely and the interviewer can probe further into other matters arising in the course of the interview (Creswell, 2013). In-depth interviews were conducted with regards to research questions and objectives of the study. Respondents were interviewed based on the research question(s).

This is a wide range of written materials which includes policy documents, annual reports, minutes of meetings, etc. Given availability of data, the researcher made use of primary and secondary source materials from Government White Papers; Commissions of Inquiry Reports; Archival Materials; and Research articles and journals.

Data Collection

Before starting the process of collecting data, I obtained necessary approvals; first from the Committee and then from the University Institutional Review Board (IRB). It is important to point out that to ensure a good research, the researcher must be skillful, sensitive, and able to safeguard methodological integrity of the entire research process (Patton, 2002, pp. 4 - 5). The participants were identified, selected (through purposive sampling method), and interviewed using in-depth interviews.

The sample population include executive officers and very senior personnel from peace and conflict resolution establishment; policy and strategic studies agencies; and reintegration agencies like the Victim Support Fund who are individuals with relevant knowledge and ideas on the violence perpetrated by the Boko Haram Islamist sect in Nigeria. A sample size of 12 participants from the agencies was sufficient for the purpose of the research (Creswell, 2013, Pp. 156-157). The smallness of the sample size was to give convenience of the study and to limit the range or number of strategies, since the participants are public policy experts who already have experience of the subject of the research that was to be conducted (Miles et al., 2014, p. 31–32). These strategies include choosing location, gaining access to it and sampling, interviews, or actual collection of data, recording data, and on to data storage.

Ihenacho (2018) found out that “a combination of small sample size and a purposeful elitist sample is possible and convenient in a qualitative research design” (p. 83). Maxwell (2013) and Miles et al. (2014) also observed that the sampling technique and the quality of data will not depend on the number of cases or on the largeness of the sample size apparently because the research case is unique enough to deserve a purposive sampling. Interviews were conducted in the places suitable to the participants for purposes of confidentiality. Earlier appointments were made with them, and the interview lasted for about one hour with each respondent.

Access to the research sites and to the participants did not require special permissions from any authority and there was no need to engage the services of a “gate-keeper” or intermediaries (Creswell, 2013) to facilitate the access. Desk review of

secondary data using books, newspapers, academic articles and journals were undertaken. Data were stored in the primary form in which they were recorded, such as audiotapes, camera pictures and field notes (Patton, 2002). Data were organized and transferred into storage devices such as computer hard disk and an external hard drive. This gives room for effective back up of data (Creswell, 2013).

Data Analysis Plan

This section concerns the strategy put in place by the researcher to analyze the data that was collected for the research. Data in this study comprise recorded interviews and transcribed materials; written personal experiences or perception obtained during the research; and documents pertaining to transactions or information on the case (Miles et al., 2014). In qualitative research, data analysis begins as soon as data collection starts (Goulding, 2002). The researcher took inventory of the data collected and made sense of the whole (Patton, 2002).

Creswell (2013) recommended four types of data analysis for case studies as follows: Categorical analysis, which allows the researcher to focus on the various instances found in the data to get meanings that are relevant to the issue (see Stake 1995). The second type of data analysis is the direct interpretation, where the researcher focuses on a particular instance from the data and tries to draw conclusion without reference to other instances through “pulling the data apart and putting them back together in more meaningful ways” (Stake, 1995). A third type of data analysis is to establish patterns and categories to see a “correspondence between two or more categories” (Creswell, 2013,

p.199). Lastly, Yin (2009) proposed a type of data analysis that uses “cross-case synthesis as analytic technique” (Yin, 2009, cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 199).

However, in an effort to improve the understanding of public policy measures that may bring the violence of the Boko Haram to an end, this research adopted the deductive thematic analysis approach (Yin, 2014). Deductive thematic analysis is used for “identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns or themes within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.79). The approach allows the researcher to familiarize with data generated from the interviews; code the data and generate themes from it. The approach is also useful in reviewing the themes, defining, and naming the themes and writing up the reports. It focuses on the various instances found in the data to get meanings that are relevant to the theme of study (Pearse, 2019). The steps involved in deductive thematic analysis are: 1. Considering sampling and design issues. 2. Developing the code manual (this entails labeling, defining and describing when the theme occurs). 3. Validating or testing the reliability of the code. 4. Summarizing data and identifying initial themes. 5. Applying the template of codes and additional coding. 6. Connecting the codes and identifying themes. 7. Corroborating and legitimating coded themes (Boyatzis, 1998; Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). I conducted a thorough reading of the data and carefully made notes or memoing of the important facts, figures and themes encountered in the reading. Themes that were standing out were extracted and ideas that are similar were grouped to form categories as a way of initial coding of data. This continued until a saturation point where categories that could be applied to the research question was reached, to facilitate or enable a proper understanding (Apori-Nkansah, 2008).

After the data were coded and meaningful categories formed, interpretation of the complex field data was made from the patterns arising from the categorization of data (Apori-Nkansah, 2008). The interpretation of data made it possible to draw conclusions, make assertions, and descriptions that led to the better understanding of how to formulate and implement public policies that will stop the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria. In doing the analysis of data for the study, I used the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) which has been recommended by Miles et al. (2014) for the management of data for a qualitative research. Specifically, the Atlas.ti and Microsoft Excel software were used in the study for the analysis of data. Reasons for the choice of this software are its compatibility with other data analysis tools, handiness, ease of use and secure data storage (Ihenacho, 2018).

Overall, I was guided by the procedure identified by Creswell (2013), which includes: data management; reading and memoing; description; classification and interpretation; and representation. Use of tables were applied to present information and results of the research for easy understanding.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

To ensure that this research is trustworthy, I reported the findings as accurately as possible to reflect the magnitude of the violence caused by Boko Haram in Nigeria and the need to formulate and implement public policies that will not only stop this violence in the immediate or short-term, but also on long-term basis. I ensured that the process is rigorous. The methods used were rigorous enough to comprise member checking, peer debriefs and results confirmation (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002). These

methods were rigorous, and that allowed the findings and conclusions to be considered trustworthy (Murphy & Yelder, 2010; Roberts, Priest & Traynor, 2006).

This approach made it easy for me to handle the data, in view of my understanding of the field and research experience. Thematic analysis of patterns in the data via a bottom-up process that involves repeatedly reading of the material, the generation of initial codes, and subsequent identification of themes, via a process of continual review and reflection was undertaken (Apori-Nkansah, 2008). I ensured that the findings of the research are in consonance with the perspectives and beliefs of the participants, to give room for the research to be reliable and valid, and substantiated by credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability (Creswell, 2013).

To ensure credibility, I used more than one method in line with the advice by Patton (2002). The responses of the participants were captured and analyzed to truly legitimize the credibility of the outcomes (Ihantola & Kihn, 2011; Trochim, 2001). The use of different methods further helped me to substantiate or triangulate the findings of the study. Merriam (2014) explained that transferability pertains to the extent that the findings of the research can extend beyond the boundary of the study. It requires detailed description of what the participants experienced during the study (Apori-Nkansah, 2008).

I described in detail the experiences of the participants in this study. This will be useful in similar studies especially in view of kidnappings, banditry and Fulani pastoralists' attacks that are the other forms of violence also witnessed in Nigeria. I ensured that this research is dependable by developing codes and thematic categories in

line with the conceptual framework that underlies this study by use of computer assisted applications and Excel to determine consistency in all the areas of the study.

To achieve confirmability of this study, I used a structured and detailed narrative report (see Trochim, 2001, as cited in Apori-Nkansah, 2008). This meant a report with details that described, with quotes from participants and my interpretation that gave away my peculiar insights with respect to public policy measures that could be taken to end the Boko Haram violence I also used a structured and detailed narrative report that favor substantial analysis, interpretations and conclusions (Merriam, 2014) to further ensure the trustworthiness of this study.

Ethical Procedures

Creswell (2013) suggested that researchers should envisage likely ethical issues that could surface in the course of the study and should plan how to appropriately deal with them. To conduct this research, I obtained the IRB approval. The approval code is 02-20-20-0313086. Consent forms were prepared and each participant was required to read and sign it accordingly. The participants were selected based on their understanding, knowledge and experience on public policy issues relating to violence prevention; peace, security and governance.

I explained the rationale for the study to the participants. I allowed each participant to participate in the study without being deceived or coerced. I established good rapport and effective means of communication with the participants so as to achieve in-depth discussion. The identities of the respondents were kept anonymous and confidential before, during and after the field work, and I undertook to be objective and

remained so throughout the research. Data generated were protected through backup procedures on daily basis to avoid loss. I, as the researcher, was the only person that had access to the data. The research data will be preserved in a locked cabinet only accessible to the researcher for a period of five or so years after the approval of the final dissertation.

Summary

This chapter examined how qualitative case study approach was used to undertake a study on how to improve the understanding of public policy measures that are needed to prevent insurgent gangs like the Boko Haram group from emerging and wrecking violence on the Nigerian people. The research design discussed in the chapter was useful in exploring the system of Boko Haram through a detailed and in-depth data gathering involving multiple sources of information such as observations, interviews, audio visual materials, documents and reports. The lens provided by the research design adopted for this study was helpful for the identification of a range of factors that are likely to strengthen public policy making and implementation.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to improve the understanding of public policy measures that will help address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. In this study, I discussed how to improve the understanding of the public policies that will help end Boko Haram violence and promote cohesion and harmony between decisions and actions on peace and security for Nigeria. The study of violence and its management should be the central focus of social change efforts within the framework of society (IPCR, 2016a). For this study, this framework is about the public policy measures that could be implemented to deter Boko Haram from acts of violence unleashed on the Nigerian people and residents.

Research Questions

Considering the extent of the Boko Haram violence and its far-reaching implications for Nigeria's corporate existence as an indivisible sovereign nation and the need to develop alternative courses of action conducive to peaceful resolution of conflicts involving terrorist violence, I asked an overarching research question as follows:

RQ1: What public policy measures are a solution to deal with Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

The following subquestions were asked:

SQ1: What public policy strategies or measures have been adopted by Nigerian government or authorities to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

SQ2: Why has Boko Haram violence continued despite public policy initiatives meant to curtail it?

SQ3: How can/might future public policy initiatives mitigate the impact of Boko Haram violence?

The Setting

Abuja and Jos were the cities in Nigeria where interviews for the study were conducted. Personal in-depth face-to-face interviews were conducted between February 25, 2020, and March 31, 2020. Abuja is Nigeria's federal headquarters and is located in the Federal Capital Territory in the north central geopolitical zone of Nigeria. It has a population of 776,298 as shown by the 2006 Nigerian population census results. The bombing of the United Nations office and the police headquarters were Boko Haram's first two major attacks in Abuja. Boko Haram later carried out other attacks on Abuja that led to the death of many people (Dasuki, 2013). Abuja is important to this study because as a government seat, many policy measures targeted at addressing the Boko Haram crisis have been developed there.

Jos is the capital of Plateau state, one of the 36 states of Nigeria. Jos has a high elevation of 1,280 meters and one of the coolest climates in Nigeria. It is home to Nigeria's National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies. At the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, foremost policies are developed by top-class technocrats of high intellectual capacity who conceptualize and anchor the development and implementation of policies critical to Nigeria's national development.

Demographics

The participants selected for this study were individuals who possess a great deal of knowledge and work experience in public policy and have carried out research in certain areas of public policy. They have been commentators and analysts on public policy issues and taught courses in the field of public policy. They have been exponents of great ideas on nuances of public policy making and implementation. As policy experts, they proffer ideas that help to shape debate on policies that can impact societies.

Twelve participants took part in the face-to-face open-ended in-depth interviews. The phenomenon of the study was a relatively unexplored area of research and, as such, the sampling method used for the recruitment of participants was elitist in nature. In such circumstances, emphasis is more on experience with policy issues than representativeness (Polkinghorne, 2005). All the participants met the set criteria for participation.

Data Collection

The process of data collection began upon receipt of Walden University IRB approval. The selected public policy experts were contacted to schedule interview appointments. The interview sessions were scheduled to last for 1 hour with each participant. However, most of the interviews lasted between 45 and 50 minutes. The interviews involved 12 participants in line with the sample size proposed. The purposive sampling strategy was adopted. I contacted the participants through telephone and email to enable me to send consent forms and schedule appointments for the interviews. The participants communicated their consent to participate in the study through telephone. Thereafter, an interview was conducted with each participant at locations chosen by

them. In this case, the interviews took place in their offices. I enjoyed maximum cooperation of the participants throughout the interviews. They all spoke confidently and freely. They spoke from experience.

The interview process was guided by the interview protocol I developed (Appendix A). I recorded the interviews with the use of an audio recorder. The participants allowed me to record the interviews. I listened to the play back of the recordings several times and later transcribed them. I also did member checking to ensure that all the participants' responses during the interviews were correctly captured. The transcripts were saved as an MS Word document in a dedicated laptop. To enable the participants to confirm the accuracy and correctness of the information recorded, I sent the document through email, while hard copies were made available to those participants who had difficulty accessing the Internet. The participants were requested to provide feedback on the recorded information within 48 hours in case any changes were required. There was no complaint from any participant and I thus concluded that they were happy with the content of the transcripts. I will keep the saved data for 5 years before discarding them.

Data Analysis

To analyze the data collected for this study, I adopted the data analysis approach outlined in Chapter 3. Yin's (2014) deductive thematic analysis approach for analyzing data was used. Analysis was guided toward a search for ideas that were relevant to providing answers to the stated research questions. Semistructured, face-to-face, in-depth interviews; field notes from the interview observations; and reviews from archival

documents were the instruments used for data collection in this study. These sources of data were used to answer the research questions outlined for the study.

I reflected on the data that were collected to raise questions on issues, create categories, and describe and organize data into themes. I then assigned a code to all the 12 participants; I gave each participant a pseudonym, for example P1, standing for Participant 1 through P12, for Participant 12, to ensure they were shielded from any form of identification. I asked the participants the questions in Table 4 in an effort to answer the research questions on the public policy measures that can be a solution to the challenge of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. This task was undertaken to demonstrate transparency in the data analysis process specified by Anfara, Brown, and Mangione (2002). Table 2 shows a first excerpt of participant interviews.

Table 2

Interview Excerpts and the Coding Process

P1 Response to question on why the use of military force is the most prominent public policy response to Boko Haram violence	Code distilled from response
<p>Because of the massive deaths and destruction of properties arising from the Boko Haram violence, the use of military force to quell the violence will not be out of place. The military force itself is an act of violence which aims at compelling the Boko Haram to stop its violence. However, Nigeria should not mobilize its military out of anger. Government should do this only when it is beneficial and withdraw the military when it is not beneficial. Also, government should note that fighting wars should be governed by political considerations. But I think given the level of violence of Boko Haram, using military force is appropriate. However, the government should be mindful of the intimate connection between force and diplomacy.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection of lives and property is the primary purpose of government • Need to halt human suffering • Use of appropriate force is necessary • Without security, peace and/or law and order, all other functions of the state cannot be carried out
	Use of military force as policy response
P1 response to question on impact of Boko Haram violence	
<p>The Boko Haram has caused massive deaths and distorted the way of life of many Nigerians and affected livelihoods with many businesses and schools shut down. The bombings of Churches by Boko Haram have pitched Christians against Muslims in some states. It has polarized societies and negatively impacted on national integration.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public safety has been greatly affected • Social and economic activities reduced to abysmal low levels • Education of children in the north east greatly jeopardized • Killings and massive displacement of people witnessed
	Impact of Boko Haram violence on lives and property

Only the first excerpt is shown here because of space, but this coding process was performed for all the responses to each of the interview questions given by the 12 participants. I ensured that all the participants were asked the same set of questions during the interviews, although there were instances where the responses provided by some participants elicited more probing questions. The probing questions enabled me to better clarify and understand the responses of the participants. The participants were asked questions that covered all the areas expressed in the research questions.

Large volume of data was expected to be gathered and managed, therefore a list of all the data collected was developed and then organized into files in line with the topics and themes. I then created codes using letters and numbers to represent the topics and themes and kept them in folders for easy retrieval and analysis. The data was read thoroughly and for several times so as to gain new insights until I reached saturation stage, where no further meaning or insight emerged. The codes developed were further re-grouped to form ideas and new categories. I compared and contrasted the categories to develop new perceptions that could be possibly used to form further codes. I did this repeatedly until the data got saturated. The categories were applied to the research questions on improving the understanding of public policy measures that can be taken to stop or end the violent activities of Boko Haram, and ameliorate the negative effects or impacts of the insurgency on the citizens. Analysis was guided towards a search for ideas that were relevant to providing answers to the stated research questions.

As such, I drew up relevant codes from terms and ideas contained in the transcripts. I did initial categorization after listening to the audio recordings for 5 times

and reading through the transcribed interviews, field notes and documents. I also compiled and organized all the responses to the interview questions by the interviewees. I transcribed the interviews on Microsoft word, and typed them into Excel spreadsheet on different files. The typed documents were then stored into a big file, to enable me bring out the groups and the themes.

Data was organized with the use of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) recommended by Miles et al. (2014). Also, Atlas.ti was used. I used this software because of its compatibility with other data analysis tools and its handiness and ease of use. This software was used for coding, organization and storage of data. Field notes and archival documents on Boko Haram insurgency were reviewed, thus making the confirmation of some of the information obtained during the interviews possible. With this, issues of trustworthiness and the replication of findings and further analysis (Yin, 2014) becomes easily feasible. Sinkovics & Alfodi (2012) also recognized the use of CAQDAS in promoting trustworthiness through effective and efficient data management and treatment.

The emerging themes were then separated, identified and categorized. Connection was also established between the themes by appropriately wording and phrasing them so as to properly understand them. I developed 11 topics based on analysis of the interviews. The topics were based on thoughts in terms of responses of the participants to the interview questions and their link with the research questions. Table 2 below shows the frequency and percentage of the respondents' responses to the different interview topics

that were generated. The topics were derived from the interview transcripts that directly addressed the research questions as in table 3 below.

Table 3

Analysis of Interview Topics Linked to the Research Questions

Topics from interviews	Number of occurrences	Percentage of occurrences
Concern over Boko Haram violence in Nigeria	12	10.9%
Impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on lives and property	12	10.9%
Need for public policy measures that will mitigate the impact of the Boko Haram violence on society	10	9.1%
Previous public policy responses to the Boko Haram crisis	8	7.3%
Successes of the policy responses	5	4.5%
Failures of the policy responses	8	7.3%
Use of military force as best public policy response to the Boko Haram violence	10	9.1%
Making policy responses more effective	12	10.9%
Critical stakeholders in the development and implementation of policy strategies for Boko Haram crisis	8	7.3%
Implementation challenges of policy responses to the Boko Haram insurgency	6	5.5%
Public policy responses that will resolve the Boko Haram crisis	12	10.9%
Required future policy and academic research on Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria	5	4.5%

I listened again to the audio recordings and tried to gain a broader perspective of the participants' interviews and their expert opinion. Yin (2014) postulated that the philosophical and worldview of the participants are very important in research studies. I therefore undertook reviews of the transcripts, audio recordings and notes of the interviews of the participants and came up with 8 thematic labels (Table 4) that are

critical to the overarching research question regarding the public policy measures that can be a solution in the efforts to deal with Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Table 4

List of Thematic Labels or Emergent Themes From the Interviews

SN	Emergent themes/thematic labels	Corresponding research questions
1	Impact of Boko Haram violence on welfare and public safety	RQ1 and SQ3 and their related follow-up questions
2	Counterinsurgency policies adopted to restrain Boko Haram violence	SQ1 and its related follow-up questions
3	Assessing the efficacy of the counterinsurgency policies	RQ1 and SQ1 and their related follow-up questions
4	Emphasizing military response measures	RQ1 and SQ2 and their related follow-up questions
5	Key stakeholders in the policy development process	SQ1 and its related follow-up questions
6	Policy implementation challenges	SQ2 and its related follow-up questions
7	Identifying effectual public policy options	RQ1 and its related follow-up questions
8	Future policy research	SQ3 and its related follow-up questions

Though there were some findings from literature and some archival materials on the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, data obtained from the research questions for this study enabled me to discover relevant themes that significantly contributed to the findings on improving the understanding of public policies that will be a solution in the efforts to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. There is need to tackle the menace of Boko Haram by deployment of comprehensive combination of strategic measures that a government can adopt in a conflict situation.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

Although ancillary data was collected through the consultation and review of relevant literature and archival documents, main data for this study was obtained through face to face open ended in-depth interviews with 12 participants. The interviewees were public policy experts who have carried out researches in certain areas of public policy and have been exponents of great ideas or views on nuances of public policy making and implementation. Yin (2014) observed that interviews provides one of the best approaches to data collection in qualitative research. In this study, I adopted various strategies that helped to prove that the result of the study is credible, transferable, dependable, and confirmable. Trochim (2001) believed that in qualitative research, the findings should be evidenced through the processes of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.

Credibility

In qualitative research, it is important that the researcher establish the credibility of the collected data and the phenomenon being studied, to ensure trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Research credibility is a situation where participants in the study find the results of the study to be true and credible reflection of what happened in the field (Venkatesh et al, 2013). Researchers in qualitative study are therefore required to establish that the results of their research are consistent with the beliefs and perspectives of the participants.

Therefore, in this study, I adopted the process of member-checking by requesting the participants to review the materials or transcripts to establish the accuracy of the

results (Moustakas, 1994). Furthermore, I ensured the credibility of this study by adhering to the appropriate steps of maintaining the highest levels of academic standards and ethics. I strictly adhered to the Walden University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) research guidelines. The study was approved by Walden University IRB through the approval number 02-20-20-0313086. The approval expires on February 19, 2021. Multiple data sources such as interviews, analyses of documents and reflection field notes were used to promote triangulation and thus achieve internal credibility and consistency (Copeland & Agosto, 2012). During the interviews, I ensured that I ask probing questions to achieve clarity of information provided by the individual participants. Phrases such as: Please can you tell me more on this; please what do you mean, were used. Lastly I checked with the participants to re-confirm that the analyzed data represents the accuracy of views on the understanding of public policy measures that will be a solution to the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria.

Transferability

To ensure transferability of this study, I carefully documented and described the entire research process. Lincoln & Guba (1985) observed that transferability of research is possible where the findings of a study can be easily applied in another qualitative study. I provided a concise description of the sampling methods adopted for the study, the collection and analysis procedures for the data, the research purpose, research design and the findings to the participants. I also explained the selection process adopted for the participants, including the interview and member-checking procedures employed. The use of member-checking assisted me to assess the approval of the participants of how I

interpreted the findings and derived meanings from the interviews (Yilmaz, 2013). Member-checking was done to allow the participants to confirm the accuracy of their experiences that I recorded. I re-stated and summarized the participants' views and statements and requested them to check if they were correct interpretations. I also provided the detailed explanation of the subject of the study to give room for external assessment on whether or not the findings of the study could be transferred elsewhere. In this study, I provided detailed characteristics of the qualitative case study of improving the understanding of public policy measures that are a solution in the efforts to deal with the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Dependability

Hesse-Biber & Leavy (2006) noted that dependability in qualitative research is part of trustworthiness normally used to show research integrity. In research, dependability is shown if the procedure for choosing, validating and applying research strategies and methods provide rationalization or the basis for the study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In this study, I followed the ethical guidelines of constant review. I developed codes and thematic categories in line with the conceptual framework that underlies this study by use of computer assisted applications and Excel to determine consistency in all the areas of the study. All the recordings, field notes, transcribed documents and the disk used for storage will be kept for 5 years after the study to ensure dependability.

Confirmability

Confirmability describes the correctness and objectivity of data (Abend, 2013). It is the level of neutrality exhibited by the researcher in reporting the findings of the study

as arising from the participants' account without imputing researcher's biases or interests (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). To achieve this, I did a detailed documentation of the procedures implemented to corroborate and substantiate the findings (Trochim, 2001). I did member-checking and re-checking the data during the process of collection of data. I asked the participants to appraise the summary of my interpretation of their responses to corroborate whether I accurately reported the real meaning of the statements they made. I also carried out a thorough authentication (quality check) in order to de-emphasize hunches and deal with concrete issues established in the study (Stake, 2005). I remained objective and unbiased and avoided prejudices to allow the findings of the study to reveal the views and experiences of each of the participants. I allowed the responses of the participants to underpin the study.

Results

Eight emergent themes were derived from the coded interview transcript of participants' responses to the interview questions. The themes were generated from the analysis of interview topics linked to the research questions (Appendix B). The initial hand-coding that was done aided the emergence of the themes. I adopted the deductive thematic analysis approach (Yin, 2014) for analyzing the data. Analysis was guided towards a search for ideas that were relevant to providing answers to the stated research questions. The themes are as presented below.

Emergent Theme 1: Impact of Boko Haram Violence on Welfare and Public Safety

Participants expressed concern that Boko Haram violence have had a devastating impact on family and daily lives of Nigerians. They stated that public safety has been

challenged fundamentally and peaceful inter community relations have broken down. The participants explained that Boko Haram activities have resulted in killings of large numbers of people in northern Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. It has created tension among Christians and Muslims in Nigeria and has significantly reduced agricultural and commercial activities in the affected states, leaving negative impacts on the economy of those states. It has also seriously affected education of young people, particularly girls, in the north east zone of Nigeria. The participants explained that due to Boko Haram's incessant attacks on schools and subsequent abduction of female students, many schools in the north east are forced to close down. Many of the participants linked the abduction to health issues such as dementia, hypertension, depression and sudden death suffered by some parents of some of the abducted school girls. P1 particularly observed that education and educational activities came to a total halt in the affected states, and that, that was against the backdrop of the doctrine of the insurgents which earned them the name, "*Boko Haram*", meaning "*Western Education is forbidden*".

P 2 noted that, "the activities of Boko Haram have resulted in massive killings of innocent civilians, including worshippers in churches and mosques; school children and their teachers; and market men and women in many towns and cities in the north" (P2, 15 March, 2020). P3, while commenting on the adverse impacts of the Boko Haram violence on Nigerians, observed that since the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East escalated in 2009, Boko Haram has unleashed systematic terror on Nigerians in the region, particularly Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, leading to population displacement of people from their homes; deprivation; hunger; and widespread poverty. P4 also affirmed

that aside social dislocations and displacement, Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in loss of lives of thousands of people and the destruction of property worth millions of US dollars, and that there is general atmosphere of distrust; fear and frenzy especially between northern Christians and Muslims, and between northerners and southerners that are resident in the north.

One of the problematic developments in urban centers in northern Nigeria arising from the Boko Haram insurgency is the increased segregated settlement patterns in communities along ethno-religious lines. As P5 remarked:

The Boko Haram insurgency has forced people to adopt new patterns of segregated settlements within towns and cities. Christians moved to Christian dominated areas while Muslims moved to Muslim dominated areas. Some families (though on mutual arrangement), were forced to exchange houses in apparent bid to move away from areas of the city in which they did not feel safe to live. They had to leave because they were afraid that in the event of any attack, they will be ready targets (P5, 15 March, 2020). P6 stated that “the actions of Boko Haram have increased fear amongst Nigerians;

interrupted development; frightened investors and alarmed Nigeria’s neighbors ... the rise in the violent activities of Boko Haram has brought about adverse effects on population, especially on women and children” (P6, 17 March, 2020). This is evident in the increased number of widows and orphans in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states.

While the overall impact of the insurgency on the society is devastating, women are singled out for the extra burdens they are forced to bear. Women have been brutally attacked and killed, right at their door steps. In many instances, women have had to flee their homes in search of basic necessities of life like food, shelter and healthcare for themselves and their children.

P8 observed that thousands of family units have been lost as a result of the insurgency. He explained that during attacks on communities, individual family members scamper for safety in different directions, and in the event where the head of the family dies, the minors in the family are separated because they cannot provide credible explanation to link them up with their family members. He stated that such children are often registered as unaccompanied children in IDP camps.

In response to the questions on this theme, all the participants agreed that the Boko Haram insurgency has essentially endangered public safety, security and peace of the people. They expressed concern that the insurgency has retarded economic growth and development, and undermined the Nigerian state and her democracy. They noted that the Boko Haram insurgency violates the fundamental human rights to life, human dignity, liberty and freedom of religion, conscience and thought. In their view, “the insurgency constitutes crime against public order and humanity” (Study Participants, 18 March, 2020).

Emergent Theme 2: Counterinsurgency Policies Adopted to Restrain Boko Haram Violence

This theme pertains to the policy measures adopted by the Nigerian authorities and community stakeholders to enhance the safety of people and to curtail the threats of violence from Boko Haram. Majority of the participants stated that a key measure was use of military force. The participants explained that when the Boko Haram insurgency started, a special military task force was created, and its area of operation covered the three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. The task force had its headquarters in

Maiduguri and comprised personnel of the military, Department of State Services (DSS), the Immigration and Customs Services and the Police. During the interview, P2 particularly stated that the “creation of the task force was to put resources together in order to prevent the duplication of efforts and give room to free flow of information among the security forces” (P2, 20 March, 2020). P3 observed that the government of President Goodluck Jonathan, in its attempt to contain the Boko Haram violence, established a new military division (7th Division) in Maiduguri. It was this military division that supervised the formation of the Civilian Joint Task Force – a volunteer group that assisted the military in the fight against Boko Haram.

All the participants explained that military and police check points were mounted in the North East and in many other parts of Northern Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory by the federal government. The government also declared a State of Emergency and imposed curfew in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. P1 and P3 particularly highlighted the closure of Nigeria’s borders with neighboring countries of Cameroun, Niger and Chad. The participants also added that in order to provide legislation upon which the fight against the Boko Haram would be based, the government passed into law the Terrorism Prevention Acts of 2011 and 2013.

All the interviewees also referenced the regional cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroun, Chad and Niger that gave birth to the establishment of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF was formed as a counterinsurgency policy measure to enable the countries in the region to jointly contain the threat and violence of Boko Haram. P6 and P8 commented that the creation of the program on Countering Violent

Extremism (CVE) “was a laudable initiative” (P6 & P8, 20 March, 2020). The CVE Program was domiciled in the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). The program has key objectives to reduce incidences of radicalization and violent behavior especially among young people; modifying the behavior of extremists; and countering the narratives of terrorist groups as well as promoting the core values of the Nigerian nation. The participants explained that the program has three elements of counter-radicalization, de-radicalization and strategic communication. They noted that the counter-radicalization focuses on community engagement, education and community-based projects targeted to prevent and reduce the recruitment of people for radicalization. De-radicalization seeks to reintegrate the repentant Boko Haram fighters back into the society through vocational training. The third component of the program is strategic intervention, where the government offers a counter narrative to the violent extremism by presenting moderate Islamic views or messages to the public based on core values of the Nigerian nation.

The participants also stated that in 2013, the government of former President Goodluck Jonathan adopted a strategy of dialogue and negotiation with the Boko Haram group. A committee was set up to engage in discussion with the leadership of the group with a view to ending the violence and provide a framework for the disarmament of the Boko Haram fighters and adequately compensate the victims of the insurgency. This idea to engage in negotiation with the Boko Haram did not receive the support of many Nigerians.

Majority of the participants observed that in 2014, the government of Nigeria developed a National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST) document. The document

provides guidelines on how to address the violent attacks of the Boko Haram. It describes the Nigerian government's counterterrorism strategy in a simple, straight forward, achievable and time bound style. The NACTEST is a presidential directive that brings about synergy among all the agencies engaged in fighting terrorism. It contains hard and soft approaches to fighting terrorism. It defines the responsibilities of the various agencies of government and how their activities are to be discharged under the umbrella of the Office of the National Security Adviser (Dasuki, 2013). The participants also highlighted the establishment of the NEDC in 2017. They stated that the NEDC has 11-member Board with a Presidential mandate to be the focal organization to assess, coordinate, harmonize and report all the intervention programs and initiatives that the federal government or any of its ministries and agencies are involved in, in the region. P10 observed that "the NEDC is expected to ensure coordination and sustainability of all development programs. It is expected that all development programs will put into consideration peace and conflict sensitivity in their design and implementation" (P10, 20 March, 2020).

Emergent Theme 3: Assessing the Efficacy of the Counterinsurgency Policies

The participants provided opinion and explanation on the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency measures adopted by the federal government to contain the Boko Haram violence. The complexities of the Boko Haram crisis compelled the involvement of many actors, and this required effective coordination of all stakeholders for a successful result. The participants stated that an outstanding success point in the fight against the Boko Haram is the creation of Joint Task Force (JTF) in 2011. The members

of the JTF were drawn from various security agencies, comprising the Military, Police, Customs and the Department of State Security Service (DSS) personnel. The participants noted that measures adopted by JTF includes the imposition of dusk to dawn curfew; ban the use of Motorcycles; Stop-and-Search Operation along township roads; Cordon-and-Search Operations on suspected hideouts and Mopping of non-military rifles from the communities. P1 particularly remarked that “these measures provided an effective feat against Boko Haram terrorists” (P1, 21 March, 2020). P2 sees the Order to relocate the Command and Control Center of the JTF from Abuja to Maiduguri as a good measure. At inception of President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration in 2015, the Command and Control Center of the JTF was ordered to move from Abuja to Maiduguri and this yielded tremendous success of military operations.

In the course of the interviews, many of the participants explained that a landmark achievement in the counterinsurgency effort was the implementation of the decision of African Union (AU) Peace and Security Committee meeting held on 29th January 2014 in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia, in which the Committee ratified the formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) by members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), comprising Nigeria, Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Benin Republic. The MNJTF is a regional cooperation between Nigeria and her neighboring countries of Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin Republic, established to jointly combat the threat of Boko Haram terrorism. The participants noted that the paramilitary component of the theater command of the MNJTF played a supportive role in enforcement. The

paramilitary component was deployed to overlook liberated communities where they discharged some perfunctory roles.

All the participants also referenced the complementary roles of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in the containment efforts to the Boko Haram violence. In July 2013, a group of spirited youths in Maiduguri organized themselves into a task force to complement the military operations. The participants observed that the youths launched a fierce resistance against the wanton killings and destruction of property by Boko Haram. The Borno state government immediately seized the initiative and coordinated the activities of the group, trained them for three weeks and put them on monthly stipend of ₦15,000.00. Armed with local knowledge of the terrain and antecedents of Boko Haram in various areas within Maiduguri, the CJTF successfully complemented military operations in ending the violence of Boko Haram in Maiduguri metropolis. According to the participants, “the CJTF was able to pursue Boko Haram members out of Maiduguri” (Study Participants, 21 March, 2020). The CJTF got a legislative backing under the Borno State Vigilante and Youth Empowerment Agency Law of 2015.

Majority of the participants believed that the counterinsurgency measures had a significant impact in containing the Boko Haram violence. Specifically, they applauded the National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST) document developed in 2014. The document contains various measures employed to fight the Boko Haram. Most of the participants opined that, put together, the various measures outlined in the NACTEST document are capable of successfully ending the Boko Haram insurgency. A key component of the Strategy is interagency collaboration of all the security agencies

involved in the fight against Boko Haram. The participants recognized and maintained that interagency collaboration would assist in resolving the challenge of individualistic approach of the security agencies, that sadly, affected the counterinsurgency efforts. The participants argued that interagency collaboration had the potential of ensuring an all-encompassing counterinsurgency approach that would prevent the attitude of turf protection and rivalry among the security forces – a situation that resulted in little or no cumulative success in the fight against Boko Haram.

On the flip side, the participants explained why the Boko Haram violence have continued in spite of the counterinsurgency policies adopted for fighting it. They stated that a major weakness of the federal government counterinsurgency operations was the blatant disregard for human rights by security forces. P12 particularly stated that the security forces are often arbitrary in their operations, which sadly, often led to killing of some innocent citizens and destruction of private properties. In his words, “these excesses of the security agencies have cost them the good will and cooperation of the people” (P12, 21 March, 2020). With the denial of cooperation of the civil populace, the security forces are most of the times, groping in the dark, in their fight against Boko Haram. P12 went further to say that the absence of civil authority backstopping for the military in recovered territories is an undoing of the efforts of the security forces.

All the participants referenced the split of Boko Haram into factions as another factor. The Boko Haram had split into factions, and this often altered its operational tactics which enabled it to steadily resist a comprehensive attenuation of its capacity to cause mayhem. The participants were also unanimous in their view that corruption is a

challenge in the counterinsurgency fight against the Boko Haram. They stated that necessary funds are often diverted, leaving just a little for the fight of the insurgency. Funds that would have been used for procurement of necessary artillery are often diverted to private use. Ironically the Boko Haram fighters are often better equipped with more sophisticated equipment. The participants also added that acutely corrupt governance aids extremist organizations like Boko Haram to not only being able to motivate indignant citizens to join them, but also by providing a haven and logistical support for them for a fee.

Another factor most of the participants pointed out as responsible for the seeming inability of the government to end the Boko Haram insurgency is the philosophy behind the Boko Haram operations. The participants revealed that the Boko Haram philosophy is that of, “a people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”. In rejecting what it considers to be the corrupting influence of western civilization, Boko Haram seeks to restore Nigeria, starting with the Muslim north, to a strict Islamic state, and as a result, consider themselves or Muslims who die or lose property in the course of this struggle to be making sacrifices for Islam. Boko Haram is preaching to their followers that if they die in this struggle, Allah will reward them with paradise. In the words of P10, “this philosophy is what is propelling them, and also the reason many of them are ready to be killed or operate as suicide bombers” (P10, 21 March, 2020).

The participants believed that apart from the internal tacit support from some wealthy and influential northern politicians (both inside and outside of government), the Boko Haram also has series of external linkages and connections through which they

receive funding; training; military equipment; and logistics support. P7 specifically stated that it is most probable that Boko Haram funding comes from a wide range of sources, including donations made by wealthy Nigerians from the north; Governors; Senators; Muslim communities in Europe; Monies from drugs and arms trafficking; and foreign terror groups within and outside the African continent, mostly in form of *Zakat*. The participants observed that the continuous sources of funding for the Boko Haram is a strong reason that it has been difficult for the Nigerian government to decimate them.

Another problematic area in the counterinsurgency fight is interagency rivalry and competition noticeable among the security agencies involved in the fight. All the participants observed that rather than operate on joint problem solving collaborations, what exist is that the various paramilitary, intelligence and military institutions involved in the counterinsurgency fight, often sadly expend more energy on turf protections which resulted in open confrontations and institutional rivalries with consequent intelligence failures that often gave advantage to the Boko Haram. The participants noted that the personnel of the various services lacked knowledge of the processes and cultures of the agencies with which they must collaborate while funding and management of budgets constitute problems. They stated that this condition has deepened interagency rivalry and thus made collaboration toward a common goal difficult. In the words of P11 for example:

The various policing, intelligence, and military institutions expend more energy on claims of hierarchical superiority and mandate wars which sometimes resulted in open confrontations and institutional rivalries. Instead of a united, virile and formidable security community, jurisdictional claims, professional envy, seniority struggle, and interagency enmity have whittled the potential gains of energy that should ensure effective management of national security challenges (P11, 21 March, 2020).

Emergent Theme 4: Emphasizing Military Response Measures

Majority of the participants stated that the military responses to the threat presented by the Boko Haram insurgency is no doubt the best in Nigeria's circumstance. They anchored their argument on the premise that, "given that the Boko Haram regularly step its violence beyond accepted norms of conflict, it is therefore required of the government counterinsurgency forces to also step beyond their conventional methods of managing regular warfare" (Study Participants, 21 March, 2020). P1 particularly stated that because of the massive deaths and destruction of properties arising from the Boko Haram violence, the use of military force to quell the violence is not only normal but very appropriate. He noted that the protection of lives and property is the primary purpose of government, and reasoned that there is need to put a stop to human suffering being experienced. P1 concluded by saying that, "without security and peace, or law and order, all other functions of the State cannot be carried out" (P1, 21 March, 2020).

P5 applauded the military measures the Buhari administration took immediately it came to power in 2015. He noted that President Buhari took series of military offensives that included the transfer of Command headquarters from Abuja to Maiduguri; increased deployment of military troops; change of military commanders; increased defense budget; increased air power; partial deployment of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF); and tackled the corrupt practices that had brought low morale to the military. P5 affirmed that the impact of these measures was, "a weakened Boko Haram" (P5, 21 March, 2020).

In his response, P10 argued in favor of military response and postulated that insurgency and counterinsurgency should reflect a reciprocal relationship. He stated that given the style and magnitude of Boko Haram violence, there is need for Nigerian government to do what is called, “balance of terror” by deploying appropriate military force. The Boko Haram fighters in Nigeria are known to have less conventional military capacity than the federal government forces and so tend to use guerilla tactics to inflict damage without allowing their fighters to be engaged by equal or larger government forces. Tactics such as bombing, use of IEDs; raids; ambushes; assassinations and sabotage are at the forefront of their methods. They take advantage of mobility, stealth, deception and surprise to weaken, discredit or paralyze government forces. Boko Haram try to manage the tempo and intensity of their activities to permit a level of effort they can sustain indefinitely (see Osake & Umoh, 2013).

Most of the participants indicated their support for use of military force against the Boko Haram, while P12 went further to identify three doctrines upon which counterinsurgency operations could be based, for maximum results. The doctrines are Confrontation, Building and Transfer, which he said, “are to be carried out by a combination of an assault force, a support force and a security force” (P12, 21 March, 2020). P12 reasoned that since the JTF counterinsurgency force draws forces from the Police, State Security Service, Navy, Air Force, and the Army, it is required that they should be organized under an Assault Force (1st squad), Support Force (2nd squad) and Security Force (3rd squad) for strategic and tactical operations with a special uniform irrespective of the security unit they represent. In his words:

The Military Assault Force is required to confront secured bases and deny Boko Haram their sanctuaries. The Support Force is required to build the host community, Thereafter the transfer would be made to the civil Security Forces to checkmate criminality. A combination of these three holds the possibility of frustrating the Boko Haram (P12, 21 March, 2020).

Emergent Theme 5: Key Stakeholders in the Public Policy Development Process

Participants were requested to share information on their knowledge of the critical stakeholders that participated in the development and adoption of the various public policy measures that were outlined over time, to address the Boko Haram crisis. Their responses showed that some persons in the executive and legislative arms of government took part in the development and implementation of many of the various measures outlined to resolve the Boko Haram crisis by the Nigerian government. The interviewees reported that stakeholders in the executive arm of government were made up of high caliber personnel from Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defense; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs. According to the participants, experts from other critical Agencies and Departments such as the Armed Forces, Intelligence, Judiciary, the Police, Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), and the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) were brought together as experts on the basis of their experience, knowledge and specific task to be performed in the course of the development and implementation of the policy measures.

The participants explained that the stakeholders from the legislature were made up of legislators from the Senate and the House of Representatives. Stakeholders from this group were “specifically the members of the Security and Intelligence Committees of both the Senate and the House of Representatives who made useful inputs into the Terrorism Prevention Bills at the Committee and Plenary stages” (Study Participants, 25

March, 2020). The participants also revealed that other groups of critical stakeholders in the Boko Haram Counterinsurgency Policy Development Process included traditional rulers, members of Professional bodies, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), Faith Based Organizations, Women and Youth groups, who also made inputs during the drafting and subsequent amendment of the Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011 and 2013.

Emergent Theme 6: Policy Implementation Challenges

The participants identified a number of challenges in the efforts to implement the various public policy measures that were outlined to deal with the Boko Haram crisis. A first major challenge the participants identified is the prevalence of poverty and unemployment in Nigeria. The participants argued that while there is no empirical evidence to show a direct relationship between poverty and extreme violent conflict, poverty exacerbates violent conflict in the sense that disenfranchised youths, who are jobless and hungry will naturally fill the ranks of Boko Haram in search for food and fulfilment. They explained that the same is true of high rate of unemployment. In their view, while unemployment does not automatically result in insurgency, evidence from history suggests that the existence of this segment of society provides a veritable manpower for insurgency (see Kwanashie, 2013). Specifically, P1 noted that “Boko Haram members are largely drawn from disaffected youths, frustrated university students and jobless or unemployed graduates among them” (P1, 25 March, 2020).

Closely related to poverty and unemployment is the issue of corruption that has become so endemic in the public life of many people in Nigeria. The participants

observed that corruption in Nigeria has led to tacit acceptance, collusion or indifference by a sizeable segment of the society to issues of Boko Haram insurgency. They expressed that this segment of the society believes that the outcome of the Boko Haram insurgency will, one way or the other, be to their advantage or that the process of the counterinsurgency will benefit them. In the words of P 2 for example, “there is always a constituency that benefits or expect to benefit from the insurgency, and when this constituency is large, the efforts to combat the insurgency is often difficult” (P2, 25 March, 2020). He noted that sadly, this is the case with the counterinsurgency efforts against the Boko Haram. There have been very grave allegations of corruption against government officials conniving with military authorities to siphon or divert into private pockets, the funds meant for fighting the insurgency.

Another major challenge mentioned by most of the participants is the less than adequate equipment and training of the personnel involved in the counterinsurgency operations. The participants stated that the JTF tends more to carry on the fight as if they were battling conventional enemies. They explained that the psychology of suicide-driven terrorism (as with Boko Haram), aided by advancements in technology such as use of Improvised Explosive Devices, present a rather different equation of asymmetrical warfare, and that this demands a new line of operational training, equipment, and military-public relations policy. The participants stated that suicide bombing makes a new decade of terrorism too deadly as the actors are mind-set to destroy, kill and even kill themselves. That, it is in a sharp contrast with professional soldiers in battle, who “fight, run away, and live to fight again”. The government and its security forces need to

understand the psychology of the Boko Haram fighters. They need to understand that suicide-driven terrorism in Nigeria is a vicious warfare, advertised and perpetuated by extreme violence. Attempts to counter it by brute force and violence alone will only serve the purpose of its perpetrators (see Akpuru-Aja & Ibebunjo, 2013).

Majority of the participants also highlighted the fluid nature of the Boko Haram insurgency, which makes it difficult to differentiate the sect members from the civilian population in their immediate areas of operation as another challenge to the counterinsurgency measures. P4 noted that the fluid nature of the Boko Haram often makes it difficult to track and arrest them or even to combat them without inflicting sort of collateral damage on the communities. The attacks by the Boko Haram are usually carried out by small cells, using hit and run operational strategy which tends more to frustrate the Nigerian security forces, who are usually not professionals in counterinsurgency combat. Again, the Boko Haram do not have uniforms or any distinguishing dress code or easily identifiable members. Boko Haram members launch attack and run easily to mix with civil population in the communities. In the words of P4, “it remains a challenge on how the armed forces would confront the Boko Haram with force in built up areas, without unacceptable damage on the civilian population” (P4, 25 March, 2020). P6 observed that Boko Haram have infiltrated the rank and file of government officials, the intelligentsia, religious scholars and leaders, politicians and sadly, security agencies, making confronting them to be difficult due largely to leaked strategies and sabotage. P6 stated that, “there is problem of human shield” (P6, 25 March, 2020). The human shield nature of the insurgency is the fluid nature of the Boko Haram

that makes it difficult to distinguish them from the other civilian population made up of politicians, government workers, Islamic religious leaders and the masses who may also be apologetic to the Boko Haram or afraid to take action against members of the group for larger religious and political considerations. Most times, it is not easy for the security forces to fight the Boko Haram without recording casualties among the civilian population.

The participants also expressed the possibility of very strong external links or networks between Boko Haram and terrorist Islamic groups in Mali, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan and Afghanistan as another challenge in the containment efforts of the Nigerian government. P8 specifically indicated that:

The link between Boko Haram and Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is rumored to be very strong. According to a statement purportedly signed by one of its leaders named Abu Mus'ab Abdel Wadoud (which appeared on Islamic websites that often carry statements from groups using the Al Qaida name around the world), AQIM had offered to give Muslims in Nigeria training and weapons to fight their Christian counterparts. Abu Mus'ab Abdel Wadoud was quoted to have said, "we are ready to train your people in weapons, and give you whatever support we can, in men, arms and ammunitions to enable you defend our people in Nigeria" (P8, 25 March, 2020).

It is worthwhile to note here that in 2008, Reuters reported that Al Qaida Islamist militants renewed their threat to bomb targets in Nigeria (Reuters, 2008). Also it was reported that Osama Bin Laden stated that Nigeria, one of the world's biggest exporters of Crude Oil, was as ripe for Jihad (see Akpuru-Aja & Ibebunjo, 2013).

Most of the participants also reported the highly explosive mix of ethnocentrism, religion and politics as another major challenge to tackling Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The participants explained that Nigeria is divided along ethnic and religious lines, and this has resulted to a situation where highly placed northern leaders, Islamic

clerics, politicians and the intelligentsia often work at cross-purposes, and rather than act as proactive National Security Vanguard, they unfortunately often act as ethno-religious crusaders and bigots. The participants noted that officials at various tiers of government are usually afraid to take any action against the Boko Haram for reasons of religious and political considerations. P11 stated, “indeed, political leaders often use religion as a pivot to project themselves into political offices and prominence” (P11, 25 March, 2020).

Emergent Theme 7: Identifying Effectual Public Policy Options

The participants identified a number of public policy measures that will most effectively address the challenge of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, given the measures so far taken and the myriad of challenges experienced in the course of implementation of those measures. Most of the participants advocated for use of enhanced technology in the fight against Boko Haram. They explained that enhanced technology could assist Nigeria’s counterinsurgency operations to overcome Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in the country. They suggested that technology in the areas of criminal records and identification systems, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Technology, Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking, Noise Sensors that detect explosives, Fingerprint Scanning and Continuous Information Gathering and Sharing among others, could be deployed for counterinsurgency efforts.

The participants advised the Nigerian government to accelerate the pace of technological development of the country through engineering and technology acquisition from countries such as China, Israel, United States of America and Germany among others. Efforts to enhance technology needs to effectively integrate the private

sector participation in technology acquisition. In this regard, it is important for the Nigerian government to encourage private sector involvement in funding of technology (see Udeh, 2013).

The participants identified Increased International Cooperation as another policy measure that will resolve the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. They stated that Boko Haram is a major potential terrorist threat affecting Nigeria and other countries in view of its affiliation with Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. It is on record that Nigeria's National Security Adviser (NSA) has been working with other African governments, European and Middle Eastern governments to build cooperation against Boko Haram (see Udeh, 2013). P11 observed that "increased international cooperation against terrorism generally and Boko Haram in particular, is a good prospect for Nigeria's counterinsurgency efforts" (P11, 25 March, 2020). P2 and P4 advocated for the strengthening of UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CTS). In their opinion, "the CTS promotes democracy, dialogue and good governance that will tackle the root causes of radicalization" (P2 & P4, 25 March, 2020). The UN CTS has a Plan of Action (PoA) including measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat terrorism; and measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism. The participants noted that the UN CTS gives hope for a united global commitment to fight and defeat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes.

All the participants expressed desire for good governance in Nigeria. They explained that good governance is an important factor in the fight against the Boko Haram in Nigeria. They expressed concern that the root causes driving the Boko Haram membership will be better addressed through good governance. In their view, “good governance in all tiers of government in Nigeria will promote socio-economic development, national cohesion and integration, achieve poverty reduction, employment generation and youth empowerment” (Study Participants, 25 March, 2020). P12 added that good governance will encourage peaceful resolution of conflict, promote dialogue and inclusiveness, and enhance service delivery.

Most of the participants emphasized the establishment or creation of what they called “Infrastructure for Peace” as one effectual measure that could be deployed to address the Boko Haram crisis. Infrastructure for Peace is a network of interdependent systems, resources, values and skills held by government, civil society and community institutions that promote dialogue and consultation; prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society. The participants explained that societies with strong Infrastructure for Peace are resilient, and has different groups of people that are able to engage constructively to address potential causes of conflict as in the case of Boko Haram. They stated that Infrastructure for Peace entails establishing effective local, community and national institutions that can engage and collaborate to deal with conflict challenges in an inclusive and peaceful manner. P12 specifically explained key components of Infrastructure for Peace to include “Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, Ceasefire and Peace Agreement Monitoring, Peace Education, Insider and

Third-Party Mediation; and Conciliation, Donor Support and Technical Assistance; and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Restorative Programs” (P12, 30 March, 2020).

P7 advocated an All Stakeholders Approach that involves the public, security agencies, international community, private sector and civil society working together to combat Boko Haram and enhance Counter Terrorism efforts in Nigeria. He stated that “political will, broad leadership and policy commitment towards building a strong network and consensus around peace and conflict management will yield desired results in the efforts to fight Boko Haram” (P7, 30 March, 2020).

P11 advocated for the policy of continuous intelligence gathering as part of frantic efforts to contend with the challenge of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. That government and relevant security agencies should increase covert operations in strategic spots like schools, motor parks, markets and all similar spots across the country. He claimed that technology led intelligence has not been accorded the needed attention and stated that “the establishment of Strategic Command Centers that include all network service providers and security agencies be stationed in all police posts including borders and roadblocks in the country” (P11, 30 March, 2020).

Emergent Theme 8: Future Policy Research

The participants observed that there was need to provide policy makers with pragmatic, action-oriented policy options that will most effectively address the problem of the current insurgency and any future armed insurgency in Nigeria. Most of them claimed that the counterinsurgency policy of the federal government failed to recognize the significant role of intellectuals and members of the academia. They believed that

policy research could provide complementary role of analysis and research support in addressing the threat of Boko Haram and to develop theories as well as making suggestions that will give better results. In the words of P12 for example, “policy research has the potential of ensuring an all-encompassing counterinsurgency approach that would prevent the preference of military approach, that so far seem not to have achieved desired results” (P12, 30 March,2020).

The participants explained that making policy decisions on Boko Haram requires the understanding of many inputs such as the views and wishes of people in the affected constituency, stories or experiences of people, and the existing policies. They claimed that policy research will make counterinsurgency towards Boko Haram active and will result in distinct collaborative responsibilities of intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination. The participants expressed that policy research will determine how to properly mitigate the negative impacts of the insurgency both in the immediate and long terms as it relates to the provision of the necessary conducive environment for humanitarian intervention like reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration programs for the victims of the insurgency.

Summary of the Results

The violence arising from the Boko Haram insurgency underscores the need to improve the understanding of the public policy interventions that should address the root causes of the insurgency, as well as ameliorate its consequences or impacts on the citizens. As with most terrorist groups, Boko Haram has been adept at evolving its strategies as well as developing justifications for its actions. It continues to kill and maim.

Its actions have shattered communities, displaced thousands and caused mass migration, putting areas with limited resources under immense pressure.

The violent disposition of the Boko Haram has resulted in wanton destruction of innocent lives and the efforts of the government to address the situation appears not to be yielding the desired results (Botha et al., 2017; Aderonke, 2015). Also, the Boko Haram violence has presented one of the greatest threats to the internal security of Nigeria (Onuoha, 2014). The sect is guided by extreme ideology and is focused on establishing an absolute Islamic state in some parts of the northern states of Nigeria (Osuji, 2013). A genuine foundation for effective public policy must therefore seek to facilitate and sustain, amongst other measures, a culture of proactive alert system which is a veritable tool to proactively sensitize, caution and protect the people (Ozumba, 2014).

The spiraling of domestic and societal violence in Nigeria needs to be stopped through public policy that envisages a comprehensive multi-actor engagement framework (Ojelade, 2018). The more a society is able to control the spiral of violence, the higher the level of peace, social harmony and development (IPCR, 2016a). Public policy thrust is therefore expected to balance the objectives of efficiency, effectiveness and equity in order to ensure harmonious coexistence and socioeconomic and political advancement. Providing security in a violence prone society like Nigeria requires a locale-specific definition and understanding of policies that enables security and address the fears, anxieties and aspirations of the people (IPCR, 2016a). Thus, improving the understanding of the Boko Haram counterinsurgency policy development and implementation will

provide a lead to policy direction that can facilitate better approaches for dealing with Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

From the lens of the participants, the public policy measures that have been adopted by the Nigerian government are embodied in emergent themes 2, and 6, while the impact of the Boko Haram violence is covered in theme 1. The participants explained that in order to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency, the federal government of Nigeria embarked on series of measures like use of military force; formation of MNJTF; development of National Counterterrorism Strategy; amendment of Anti-Terrorism Act; and border closure with neighboring countries. Other measures, according to the participants, are declaration of state of emergency; establishment of the North East Development Commission; and mounting of security check points on major roads and strategic locations across the country.

A key issue is the role of the military in the counterinsurgency. The participants noted that a purely military means is bound to be counterproductive. It is the view of the participants that there is need to foster closer cooperation among the military, police and civil government especially for gathering and sharing of intelligence. They believed that a political solution will be ideal, but that the political and economic irritants must be first identified and removed. However, some of the participants are of the view that counterinsurgency measures should be strict and brute because the Boko Haram do not also value the lives of the people they unleash violence on.

The participants also noted that apart from lives that have been lost and properties destroyed due to the violence of Boko Haram, economic activities have been stalled in

the affected areas. Banks in some of those areas have been forced to close. Petrol/gas stations and day to day economic activities of law abiding citizens in places like Maiduguri and Damaturu among others, have been adversely affected. There is a glaring lack of development.

Emergent Themes 3 and 6 embodies the reasons for the seeming inability of the federal government to end the Boko Haram violence. The participants believed that governance crisis in Nigeria over the years especially since the return to civil rule in 1999 has led to failure of government to deliver quality service to the people, thus precipitating high level of discontent, poor infrastructure, poverty and unemployment. They argued that bad governance constitutes a big challenge to combating Boko Haram. The participants stated that corruption is a big threat to counterinsurgency fight against Boko Haram. They also noted that the guerilla tactics often used by Boko Haram is a drawback to counterinsurgency efforts because guerilla tactics is not easily amenable to conventional military engagements.

Other drawbacks to the counterinsurgency efforts explained by the participants are, under-funding of insurgency fight; inadequate fighting equipment; lack of training for personnel involved in the fight against Boko Haram; support to the Boko Haram by wealthy and influential people both within and outside the government; Boko Haram's many sources of funding and wide network including external links with other Islamic terrorist organizations like AQIM and Al Shabab; interagency rivalry and competition among security agencies involved in the counterinsurgency fight; and the Boko Haram philosophy, which seeks the imposition of its interpretation of Islam and desire to purge

Islam of outside influences. Boko Haram treats anything western as completely un-Islamic. It considers western influence on Islamic society as the basis of the religion's weakness. Hence Boko Haram's declaration that conventional banking, taxation, jurisprudence, western education and indeed all western institutions are infidel and as such must be avoided by true Muslims, even at the expense of their lives (see Onuoha, 2013).

Participants' perspectives on the policy measures that they believe to be potential solutions to containing the challenge of Boko Haram insurgency are embodied in emergent themes 5, 7 and 8. The participants were unanimous on the need to apply the cardinal principle of good governance at all tiers of government in Nigeria. They expressed that government at all levels should perform their social contract with the people through the rights-based approach to governance. That government must pursue balanced development based on the principles of equality of all citizens and communities, and prevent manipulation of power by officials for pecuniary gains. The participants enthused that good governance will involve all such concrete steps as the formulation of appropriate policies and their implementation; accountability and transparency; adherence to democratic principles and practices and the rule of law.

Closely related to good governance is the establishment of national Infrastructure for Peace, that provides a holistic framework for coordinating and channeling national institutions, structures, mechanisms and resources towards effective and sustainable peacebuilding and conflict management. The participants explained that Infrastructure for Peace is an initiative for an overarching framework for understanding, enabling,

empowering and coordinating appropriate policies, institutions and structures that are necessary to support peace in Nigeria. Other measures under these themes include deployment of technological infrastructure like CCTV, GPS tracking, Noise Sensors and Finger Scanning; Continuous Intelligence Gathering; De-radicalization programs for youths; Increased International Cooperation and the institution of an All-Stakeholder Approach to counterinsurgency operations. The participants suggested that Policy Research should be encouraged in all institutions of higher learning and relevant research institutes, where people will read, research and report policies, the outcome of which should feed into policy making for future engagements that seeks to mitigate the negative impacts of the insurgency.

Summary

Chapter 4 is an account of how I conducted the research. It contains the context of the study as well as the findings with respect to the research questions. The findings of the study are from the data that was gathered from interviews with 12 participants. The purpose of the study was to improve the understanding of the public policy measures that will be a solution in the efforts to address the challenges of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Eight themes emerged from the data analysis, including 1. Impact of Boko Haram violence on welfare and public safety. 2. Counterinsurgency policies adopted to restrain Boko Haram violence. 3. Assessing the efficacy of counterinsurgency policies. 4. Emphasizing military response measures. 5. Key stakeholders in the public policy development process. 6. Policy implementation challenges. 7. Identifying effectual public policy options, and 8. Future policy research.

Significant finding mirrors the favor of good governance as a pivotal policy to contain Boko Haram in Nigeria. The findings point to the fact that the solution to the continuing spate of Boko Haram violence in Nigeria cannot be solely by use of military force. Force can only quell the violent insurgency but will not address the fundamental forces that propel it in the first place. The Nigerian state by its present nature and form is weak. It has been weakened over the years by corruption, nepotism, sectionalism, tribalism and gross ineptitude in the management of national resources (Kwanashie, 2012). Weak institutions, self-centered political class, religious fanaticism, greed and crass materialism has undermined the ability of Nigeria to address the basic needs of the people and further undermined its ability to end the Boko Haram insurgency.

In Chapter 5, I explained the findings of the study and discussed how the themes support literature. Also, included in Chapter 5 are the identified limitations of the study, implications for social change, the recommendations and conclusion.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to aid in better understanding the public policy measures that will help to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The study was based on the proposition that having a better understanding of public policy measures targeted at resolving the Boko Haram crisis will not only help end the Boko Haram violence, but will also promote cohesion and harmony between decisions and actions on peace and security for all people in Nigeria. I used the qualitative case study approach. I considered the case study approach suitable based on the purpose of the study and the type of research data involved. Again, this approach was adopted because it allowed room for use of multiple sources of data for the building of a comprehensive representation of the views and statements of the public policy experts on the violence of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Hoon (2013) observed that a case study approach makes it convenient for researchers to examine phenomena in an in-depth and holistic way, using a few cases or a single case.

I used three major sources of data for the research, which included participant interviews, archival documents, and my observational field notes. I selected the participants specifically for their experience and knowledge of the subject of the research. Semistructured, open-ended interviews were used to capture the views and statements of the participants. Findings of the study are in relation to (a) the impact of Boko Haram violence on welfare and public safety, (b) counterinsurgency policies adopted to restrain Boko Haram violence, (c) assessing the efficacy of counterinsurgency policies, (d)

emphasizing military response measures, (e) key stakeholders in the public policy development process, (f) policy implementation challenges, (g) identifying effectual public policy options, and (h) future policy research.

Overview of Emergent Themes

Eight themes emerged from the study after a careful analysis of the data. I used the themes to derive meaning to the findings as follows:

- The impact of the violence of Boko Haram was a high concern. The themes that emerged from several responses from the participants in the study showed resultant death of many innocent people, including women and children; disruption of academic, social, and economic activities; destruction of property and internal displacement of people; and the undermining of religious harmony between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, but particularly in the north.
- Due to the disastrous impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on the people in Nigeria, the federal government adopted a number of public policy measures not only to contain the violence but also to mitigate the negative impacts of the violence through strategic programmatic interventions like food, shelter, medicals, and other forms of humanitarian assistance to victims in various IDP camps across the northeast.
- The efficacy of several public policy measures that have been adopted by the Nigerian government to curtail the violence of the Boko Haram remain a great concern. The participants expressed that much still needs to be done.

- Use of military force as a policy of containment to the Boko Haram violence deserves a boost that should come with some reform such that citizens' human rights are respected and efforts are ensured to minimize or avoid collateral damage during military operations.
- Analysis of the responses of the research participants revealed that certain critical stakeholders were involved in the Boko Haram counterinsurgency policy development process. The themes that emerged from the responses of the participants revealed a collaborative framework of critical stakeholders that included senior government officials from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Emergency Management Agency, members of the armed forces, the Office of the National Security Adviser, members of the legislature, traditional and religious leaders, and members of civil society organizations.
- The counterinsurgency policies against the Boko Haram experienced many implementation challenges. The themes derived from the participants' responses revealed that these challenges account for the Boko Haram violence continuing despite the public policy measures taken by the government to end it. The challenges include governmental corruption, ethnicity and religion, lack of adequate funding of the counterinsurgency operations, and Boko Haram's many sources of funding.
- Good governance and the adoption of a holistic framework for peace, conflict resolution, and national reconciliation were derived from the analysis of themes

from the various interview discussions on the public policy measures that have the greater chances of ending the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Many other significant statements of the participants with respect to effectual public policy measures include continuous intelligence gathering and the use of modern technology to fight Boko Haram.

- There is a need for future policy research. This theme emerged from the statements of the study participants who believe that research plays an indispensable role in the development of policy. In addressing issues of terrorist violence, studies that inform policy on the nature, types, dynamics, and drivers of terrorist actions and their interrelationships are vital.

Theoretical Background to Findings

The Boko Haram insurgency has led to a humanitarian crisis comparable to the one experienced during the Nigeria-Biafra civil war of 1967–1970 (Botha et al., 2017; Madu & Madu, 2013). Boko Haram have attacked churches, mosques, schools, government offices, police and military barracks, markets, and other public places. With these attacks, communities have been severely stressed by the increasing threats to security, causing daily physical and psychological shock. Many women have been killed, widowed, raped, or kidnapped by Boko Haram to become sex slaves, cooks, and conveyors of munitions. A few women rescued from Boko Haram camps returned pregnant, traumatized, disoriented, and generally unwell (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012).

Given the counterinsurgency operations, the concept of national security has come under two schools of thought, namely, the state-centric school of thought and the

human needs school of thought (Burton, 1990; Imobighe, 2010). The State-centric school looks at national security simply as military and related responses to the threats against the nation. For this school, national security entails a formidable military build-up for the protection of the nation and defense of its territorial integrity (Imobighe, 2010).

Furthermore, this school is of the view that national security is the capability of the state to deter potential aggressors, or should deterrence fail, bring any conflict to a conclusion favorable to the state (Imobighe, 2010).

The Human needs school, on the other hand, holds the view that national security should go beyond the management of military threats to accommodate human related problems (Adedoyin, 2013). Thus, this school posits that non-military issues such as poverty; unemployment; safety from hunger; diseases; repression, harmful disruption of daily life, food security, personal security, community, political and environmental security are within the domains of national security (Ewa, 2017). This thought is in concert with the idea of the United Nations, which sees human needs centered security as paramount to the concept of the overall national security (Ewa, 2017). National security is inherently dynamic and selective. Outside its traditional focus on the safety of the nation, it could, at any given time, bring into its domain for ad hoc attention, any human problem adjudged through threat analysis to be real or potential threat to the nation. The violence of the Boko Haram insurgency falls into the category of human made problems that constitutes threat to security of the Nigerian state and its residents.

Human-made problems devolve to human security. The broad concept of human security was first outlined in the 1994 HDR from the United Nations Development

Program (UNDP). The Report argued that human security rests on two pillars: freedom from want and freedom from fear (UNDP, 1994). The broader view of human security includes food security, adequate shelter, security from poverty and threats to human dignity. It is in this context that the findings of the study should promote better understanding of the public policy measures that will be a solution in the efforts to end the Boko Haram crisis.

Interpretation of Findings

Impact of Boko Haram Violence on Welfare and Public Safety

Many participants during the study research interviews described the outbreak of Boko Haram insurgency in 2009 as the worst kind of security challenge to the Nigerian nation. The data confirmed the literature that the attacks by the Boko Haram in the north east region continue to cause deaths, displacements, destruction of livelihoods and violation of human rights. Many of the victims, mostly women and girls, have been raped, abducted and forcibly married, while basic services, notably schools and health facilities are being systematically destroyed in the region (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). In relation to the literature review, it is conceivable that the views and experiences of the participants affirm what Nwolise (2013) observed when he stated that Boko Haram violence is destroying lives and property; increasing the North-South schism; killing commerce and education in the North; and sending the North back to the dark ages. It will be recalled that in July 2013, the Boko Haram massacred several Ibadan traders who went to Monguno area of Borno state to buy wares, stealing their N25 million naira to finance their insurgency. They also set a school hostel ablaze in Yobe state, heartlessly

roasting tens of innocent school children and their teachers in the same month (Nwolise, 2013).

On May 18, 2020, Boko Haram insurgents attacked Dapchi, a town in Busari local government area of Yobe state. Reports has it that Boko Haram burnt down many houses and thereby causing a high displacement of people. Dapchi first came into national light on February 19, 2018, when Boko Haram abducted 117 female students from a secondary school in the town. While a few of the students died in captivity, the others have been released except Leah Sharibu, the only Christian girl who refused to renounce her faith and is still being held till date (The Cable News, May 2020). It is expected that many of the negative impacts of the Boko Haram insurgency can be effectively tackled through sound policy making involving planning and implementation (Ozumba, 2014). Dealing with challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency in a haphazard and unsystematic manner has proved ineffective and costly, and this was well pointed out by the participants.

Counterinsurgency Policies Adopted to Restrain Boko Haram Violence

Counterinsurgency measures occurred in response to the attacks from the Boko Haram. As pointed out by the participants, the federal government of Nigeria adopted several strategies to fight Boko Haram, confirming the literature that counterinsurgency policy was initiated in response to Boko Haram attacks (Ojelade, 2018; Osakwe & Umoh, 2013; Udeh, 2013). The Boko Haram attacks delineates the character of the security question, which determines the dynamics of defense strategy. It therefore remains an obligation for authorities in Nigeria to adopt policies or take measures to

prevent aggression by protecting the state, its core values and interests from internal and external threats. For Nigeria to wage a successful war against Boko Haram violence, it must define a policy that will meet political purposes, and credible enough to alter positions of the targets in the long run.

Such a policy would be a combination of both counter and anti-terrorism strategies (Ochoeche, 2013). This include the operationalization of the National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST) as a working template for countering terrorism. The NACTEST contains 7 sections including forestalling terrorism, securing the public and key national infrastructure, and identifying terrorists and their sponsors.

Assessing the Efficacy of the Counterinsurgency Policies

From the perspectives of the participants, although much still needs to be done, the counterinsurgency policy towards Boko Haram has to some extent impacted the fight positively. Boko Haram no longer place claim to any territory in Nigeria. The findings confirm the literature that many of the Boko Haram members have been killed and some of them have been arrested and tried in courts (Adibe, 2014; Onuoha, 2014). It must however be emphasized that Boko Haram has not been decimated as claimed in certain quarters by some government officials in Nigeria. The security forces are still having a hard time in the containment efforts against the Boko Haram. The military continues to suffer heavy casualties while Boko Haram attacks on villages or communities in the affected states of the north east is yet unabated. No one knows the next port of call for the Boko Haram members and when they would strike. There is palpable fear and the

economic activities in the area is still near absent, as investors continue to stay away from the area (Botha et al., 2017).

Emphasizing Military Response Measures

The findings were that the use of military intervention as a policy is warranted, given the large-scale loss of lives and human suffering occasioned by the Boko Haram insurgency. Military force is one critical instrument that provides the sword for policy makers, and the military itself is an instrument of conflict resolution and foreign policies of nations. More often than not, the use of military force is required to tackle, prevent, preempt and deter through force, the Boko Haram from achieving their premeditated violent attacks on soft targets. Some of the study participants argued that military operations required to be strict and brute because the Boko Haram do not value the lives of the people they often inflict violence on.

As noted by Opukri and Etekpe (2013), coercive power and military force play fundamental roles in the management of insurgency. They ensure maintenance of national security by reinforcing adequacy of military capability and mobility. However, concern exists that heavy-handed use of military power is likely to be counterproductive (Osakwe & Umoh, 2013). A direct relationship should exist between the appropriate use of force and successful counterinsurgency. Thus, when military force is used, it must be precise, discriminating and accurate. Osakwe and Umoh (2013) noted that the military role in counterinsurgency in Nigeria has resulted in heavy but avoidable collateral damage made possible by the overwhelming preponderance of military force and poor

intelligence. Experience has shown that the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is sustained by good intelligence, high morale, secure bases and outside assistance.

Key Stakeholders in the Policy Development Process

The study result showed that a number of critical stakeholders engaged in collective security duty to develop and adopt some public policy measures targeted at ending the Boko Haram violence. Membership of these stakeholders were drawn from the Nigerian public, legislature, security agencies, international community, private sector operators, traditional institutions and civil society, working in synergy to fight the Boko Haram and enhance counterinsurgency efforts in Nigeria. This collaborative effort was evidenced in the literature review where Akpuru-Aja and Ibebunjo (2013) remarked that with collaborative spirit, there is need for the National Security Adviser (NSA) Office to liaise with other stakeholders in lieu of security duties to develop modalities on central Coordinating Intelligence Fusion Center. With this, each agency will be at liberty to access peculiar intelligence related to duty performance, and willing to collaborate with other relevant agencies.

Policy Implementation Challenges

In spite of the different public policy measures that have been adopted to fight Boko Haram, its attacks are still continuing due largely to challenges experienced in the course of implementation. The study confirmed that the general failure of effective and coordinated intelligence gathering and its deployment to forestall attacks was a high point in the implementation challenges to counterinsurgency fight against Boko Haram. Closely linked to weak intelligence gathering are poverty and illiteracy in the North East

Nigeria; massive unemployment of youths; existence of private militias established and used by politicians who later dump them; presence of large numbers of *almajeri* children (traditional Quranic education pupils) who are easily used to ignite and sustain violence; influx of illegal aliens resulting from porous borders and unmanned borders; and corrupt government characterized by weak social contract with the people. All these, in the view of Opukri and Etekpe (2013), “have made terrorism fashionable” (p.385).

Literature review alludes to the fact that the modus operandi of the Boko Haram sect has led some people to conclude that there have emerged Political Boko Haram, Religious Boko Haram, and Criminal Boko Haram (Udeh, 2013). Effective and properly coordinated intelligence should easily find out the people in the various groups and develop mechanisms that will prevent persons in any of the groups to execute their subversive agenda.

Nigeria, like most nations of the world, has both foreign and domestic intelligence outfits: The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the State Security Service (SSS), respectively. Elsewhere in the world, and like in Nigeria, most nations have their intelligence outfits, but the nature of each agency varies according to the political cultures, legal systems and bureaucratic styles of each country (Akpan, 2013). The UK has the Secret Intelligence Service (M16) as its foreign intelligence arm and the Security Service (M15) as the domestic intelligence. The US has the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as its foreign intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the domestic intelligence. Russia has the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) as its foreign intelligence and the Federal Security Service as its domestic intelligence. France has the

General Directorate for External Security (GDES) as its foreign intelligence and the General Intelligence (RG) as its domestic intelligence. Germany has the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) as its foreign intelligence and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BFV) as its domestic intelligence. All these services have to be very efficient in order to safeguard the national security of the various states (Akpan, 2013).

The participants in the study also pointed out that the bourgeois (ruling political elites) have not helped the counterinsurgency fight against Boko Haram by resorting to the ethnic and or religious sentiments in keeping their hold on political power and allowing Boko Haram terrorism to flourish in Nigeria. For example, it took some northern leaders a long time to speak out in condemnation of the activities of Boko Haram. The leaders spoke out, only when it became obvious that Boko Haram did not mean well for anybody irrespective of religious, ethnic, social, and political affiliation. Others kept mute because they fear reprisal attacks or failure to continue to gain or enjoy whatever advantage (Nweze, 2012). Instead of condemning the criminal acts of Boko Haram in unequivocal terms, many of the Islamic religious leaders and political elites from the north tacitly supports the activities of Boko Haram,

Identifying Effectual Public Policy Options

From the perspectives of the participants' responses, the study discovered the public policy measures that are capable of ending the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, if implemented. The public policy measures are Good Governance; Mechanism of an Infrastructure for Peace; Use of Modern Technology; Continuous Intelligence Gathering;

Increased International Cooperation; and the Cooperation of all Stakeholders in the fight against Boko Haram. Critical among these measures, is the policy of good governance. Good governance involves concrete steps like the formulation of appropriate policies and their implementation; accountability and transparency; adherence to democratic principles and practices; and adherence to the rule of law. The participants stressed that good governance is an important element in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria. Good governance in Nigeria will facilitate peaceful resolution of conflicts and promote socio-economic development, national cohesion and integration. Enthronement of good governance in all tiers of government will facilitate poverty reduction, employment generation and youth empowerment. As observed by Udeh (2013), governance deficits over the years in Nigeria and particularly in the north east has generated high unemployment among the youths, and poverty in the midst of plenty. The lack of good governance has led to failure of government to deliver quality service to the people, thereby precipitating high level of discontent, poor infrastructure and unemployment.

The Mo Ibrahim African Governance Index Report for the year 2018 ranked Nigeria 33 position out of 54 countries in Africa. The Report in its assessment of Nigeria on transparency and accountability, rule of law and human rights, human development and health infrastructure had a poor verdict on the overall quality of governance and leadership. Nigeria was also ranked 14 out of 178 countries, in the 2019 Global Failed State Index Survey released by the Fund for Peace – a US based organization. The countries worse than Nigeria are Zimbabwe, Guinea and Chad. Out of the 120 negative marks evaluated, Nigeria scored 98.5. Areas of poor performance include mass

movement of refugees and internally displaced people; chronic and sustained human flight; uneven economic development; poverty; sharp or severe economic decline, progressive deterioration of public services; and violation of human rights and rule of law. It should be expected that when a state fails, there would be a number of internal forces contesting to replace the state in some aspects. When a state is incapable of protecting its citizens, groups would emerge to offer such protection. When a state is perceived by its people as being unjust, forces will emerge to challenge perceived injustices. The Nigerian state has failed to drive society and the economy in a progressive manner towards a just and egalitarian trajectory (Kwanashie, 2012)

Given the lens of good governance, such critical issues often requiring to be checked, like poverty, unemployment, and corruption are a common sight. Reduction of poverty is a fundamental principle of governance that should be addressed. This is because poverty has been identified as a cross-cutting issue in most conflicts. Poverty is the foundation of insecurity dilemma in Nigeria, and as Adam Smith, one of the architects of capitalism, once said, “no society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which by far the greater part of the numbers are poor and miserable” (Akpan, 2013, p.37).

More than three quarters of Nigerians are poor and miserable. These are reflected in short life span, malnutrition, low literacy rate, social insecurity and uncertain future. Millions suffer from conditions of absolute poverty and poverty trap (Akpan, 2013). The World Poverty Clock gave an insight into the state of poverty in Nigeria. In June 2018, it named Nigeria as the world’s poverty capital. With an estimated Nigerian population of

over 206 million, more than half of the people live on less than \$1 per day (Sahara Reporters, June 5, 2019). The exploitation of poverty situations by political and economic actors and community leaders have triggered, escalated and sustained many crisis, including insurgency and terrorism.

Unemployment is a source of conflict, especially in the context of rising cost of living and large array of unemployed young people. Good governance should be able to resolve it through, the promotion of job-creating enterprises and opportunities by government and private sector; skills acquisition programs of government, civil society and the private sector; and the provision of accessible quality education, rather than certificate allocation.

Transparency at all levels of governance will reduce corruption-induced violent conflicts in Nigeria, including the Boko Haram insurgency. Transparency International (the global anticorruption watch dog) in its 2019 Report, ranked Nigeria 146 out of 180 countries with a score of 26 out of 100. The Report placed Nigeria as the second most corrupt country after Equatorial Guinea in the West African Region. The unprecedented levels of corruption in Nigeria have permeated into the fabrics of national lives of many people. Records of misappropriation and embezzlement of common wealth by custodians of public offices in the country, that have been exposed are mind-boggling. Imobighe (2013) saw corruption as a big security problem, because it robs the country of huge developmental resources it could put to good use, like providing industries or starting unemployment benefit to mitigate the discontent spreading across the country.

The study participants also saw the instrumentality of a National Infrastructure for Peace as capable of resolving the Boko Haram crisis. The Infrastructure for Peace is a new approach in peacebuilding which gained momentum after locally led and participatory peacebuilding practices tended to yield effective results in some countries beset by violent conflicts. It underpins the ideas of conflict transformation and emphasizes on under-girding the politically negotiated settlements at top level by peacebuilding efforts at the grassroots (Adimula, 2019). Reducing the likelihood of violence requires adopting a strategic approach, strengthening local and national institutionalized processes, and the building of dialogue and mediation skills.

Thus, Infrastructure for Peace engages all levels of society and connects peacebuilding tracks to form a platform for constructive relationship between relevant stakeholders. It reflects an inclusivity that challenges the traditional notions of official peace actors, incorporating local and grassroots actors in addition to conflict parties and other state actors. By linking these stakeholders, Infrastructure for Peace facilitates greater communication, collaboration and coordination between diverse stakeholders to increase collective action (Adimula, 2019). Available literature revealed that many Nigerians believe that Boko Haram crisis is best addressed at the community or local level, rather than at the national or federal level (Botha et al., 2017).

It thus can be said that the mechanism of an Infrastructure for Peace readily provides a platform for discussion on Boko Haram as it pertains to mediation, dialogue, negotiation and reconciliation, which can happen at both the community and national levels. There is no doubt that the state of governance determines the degree to which a

country could be safe from terrorism. As argued in the 2006 National Security Strategy document of the United States, “weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants and international criminals” (Alli, 2013, p.478).

Organized Intelligence has been a 21st century growth industry, and most governments now have it as a permanent institution. It is a significant part of the modern state and a factor in government’s success and failure. It is part of the power of information rooted in the belief that to be forewarned is to be forearmed. Responses from the study participants confirmed that security agencies in Nigeria are portrayed as inefficient and incapable of handling the Boko Haram crisis because of poor intelligence collection and analysis techniques. Good democratic governance prioritizes and engage in several intelligence collection disciplines aimed at providing support for policy makers in their choice of response mechanism.

As noted by Opukri and Etekpe (2013), the Intelligence Collection Disciplines (ICD) are normally divided into two technical and non-technical means. The technical forms of intelligence disciplines include Signal Intelligence (SIGNIT), Image Intelligence (IMINT) and Measurement and Signatories Intelligence (MASINT). The non-technical intelligence disciplines on the other hand, include Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). The participants observed that the security agencies in Nigeria have abandoned these disciplines, including analyzing intelligence reports and rather relying more on stop-and-search device that is yielding no positive results. There is

a huge disconnect between national security decision making and the actual feedback from intelligence. This inability of the Nigerian government to win the fight against Boko Haram over the years has eroded the confidence of the people in the government, and again, this reinforces the perception that the Nigerian state has failed. The inability of the Nigerian state through its security sector, to have a central database on vital registration and information of citizens makes it difficult to track people within the country.

Future Policy Research

Issues and cases of terrorism have been on the increase in many countries of the world. Africa has been particularly vulnerable to terrorism, which in the past decade, have resulted in unimaginable casualties and human misery, and contributed mostly to the spread of poverty, disease, malnutrition, starvation, socioeconomic decline and moral deterioration (IPCR,2016a). From the responses of the study participants, it was found out that research and analysis in public policy making is paramount to the sub-regional security and collective defense arrangements in Africa and particularly Nigeria, especially given the dimensions and shadowy nature of the Boko Haram insurgency. The participants agreed that policy research is needed both now and in the future, in view of the Boko Haram threats and the repertoire of approaches and techniques available for assisting policy makers in effective policy making process.

It is believed that Nigeria can improve on her performance through more in-depth study of the nature of human conflicts, leading to a sound understanding of conflict situations, including terrorism and insurgencies, their historical causes as well as the dynamics and social forces that trigger them. To this end, policy research provides

guidance about how particular techniques or measures can be explored to assist decision makers in the task of public policy making and implementation. In fact, research has remained the fulcrum of exploits in all spheres of human endeavors recorded in the developed world. It has contributed immensely in shaping and sharpening counterinsurgency strategies and has equally helped to keep the operations well focused. (Okafor, 2015). This is why the US government, for example, attach importance to the works of RAND Corporation, USA, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies in the University of Massachusetts. These agencies provide counterterrorism policy recommendations that are derived from empirical research (Okafor, 2015).

Limitations of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to improve the understanding of public policy making and implementation in order to effectively address the crisis of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The study employed the use of a semi-structured open-ended questions to collect and analyze data obtained from the individuals who provided expert opinion and statements on the public policy measures that could be used to address the Boko Haram menace. A sample of 12 public policy experts was used to obtain rich data and in-depth information about their opinion of the phenomenon of the study.

A first limitation was the limitations that could be attributed to research methodology adopted for the case study method, which made the researcher the primary instrument of data collection, analysis and interpretation (Creswell, 2013). Given this circumstance, there is the tendency of bias by the researcher. However, I struggled to

remain neutral throughout the study, thus putting a check on such limitation (Apori – Nkansah, 2008).

A second limitation was that the sample size was small, which did not make it easily feasible to engage the population of public policy experts in the various agencies, establishments and universities across Nigeria. The sample size appeared to be restrictive due to the purpose of the study. However, emphasis was on participants' experience and knowledge of the subject matter. Boko Haram's activities have resulted in the deaths and displacements of many people and the focus was on the public policy measures that could be adopted to end the carnage.

Also, further limitations were imposed, due to the sensitive nature of the study. Policy measures were regarded as intelligence or security issues and information on them tend to be classified. I was able to navigate this challenge by relying on the open source information and interviews with the public policy experts.

Recommendations

This study is an effort to aid better understanding of the public policy measures that will be a solution to the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. The study critically examined the various public policy measures that have been adopted by the Nigerian government to address the Boko Haram insurgency and identified important gaps in the responses, given the extent of the violence and the fact that the violence is yet unabated in spite of the many measures adopted by government to end it.

My findings from the study showed democratic good governance directly linked to the provision of public goods and utilities, accountability, transparency, supremacy of

the rule of law, a diminution of corruption in governments at all levels, egalitarian economic arrangements, and effective protection of human rights as key elements underlying policy measures that will most effectively address the menace of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Good governance is an important element in combating terrorism in Nigeria. Good governance at all levels of government would therefore need to be deliberately enthroned and practiced. Future research in this area could explore how good governance will guarantee coherence and harmony between decisions and actions on peace, conflict management and resolution, and other official policies of Nigeria in the light of continuing threats from Boko Haram.

Counterinsurgency should not be seen as a blunt military effort that focuses solely on capturing and killing high value targets. An important part of counterinsurgency in Nigeria demands a greater reliance on non-military force. My findings revealed that the exercise of military power should be used to create the space for political progress. While tackling armed insurgents, increasing efforts should also be channeled to economic, social and infrastructural development in the affected areas, in the bid to win the hearts and minds of the local people.

A good example to borrow from, is the one that involved the use of an international level of analysis, as in the case of Iraq during the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration recognized, “that non-military issues were important and that infrastructure mattered” (Spear,2008, p.398). This led the United States to an intended reconstruction as a marshal plan for Iraq by providing clean water, communications, sanitation and power, with intention of winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people

(Osakwe & Umoh, 2013). Future research will reveal mechanisms for specific reconstruction programs for the communities in the north east and how to create acceptability and common ownership in view of the massive destruction of infrastructure by the Boko Haram and also by the security forces during the counterinsurgency fight.

A significant issue that the study brought to the fore was the issue of interagency collaboration among the security agencies in the counterinsurgency fight against Boko Haram. It is obvious from the findings that every security agency is important in the counterinsurgency, in its own way. Every agency is required to play its role very well before counterinsurgency could succeed in its objectives. Understanding the relationships between the various agencies is important as it could bring about better productivity and high morale at work. These healthy relationships are crucial to the success of counterinsurgency operations, and attention should be paid to it. There is need for research to explore whether there are healthy relationships among the security agencies involved in the counterinsurgency efforts and any new findings could help to improve the working relationships among the agencies.

The study found out that counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram is not accorded the deserved attention by the Nigerian government. Maintaining a functional security sector for counterinsurgency in Nigeria will require specialized training and adequate and timely release of funds for maintenance of men, materials and equipment. This must be given priority attention. My findings showed that the security sector involved in the counterinsurgency should be insulated from whatever economic, political and social problem the country is going through as only then can the combat readiness of

the security agencies in times of emergency can be guaranteed. The findings of this study will be useful to the Nigerian government in the area of resource allocation, terrorism combat preparedness and exigency planning.

Implications for Social Change

A better understanding of public policy making and implementation has the potential to end the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency and contribute to positive social change in Nigeria. The potential implications for social change of this qualitative case study is that the critical examination of the various public policy measures that have been adopted by the Nigerian government to address the Boko Haram insurgency can lead to the creation of the foundation for good governance, national stability and development in Nigeria. It can lead to improvement in service delivery, enhanced de-radicalization and reduction of violent extremism among Muslim youths; and reduction of interagency quarrels and turf protection among the security forces. The study has the potential to lead to a policy direction that can facilitate greater effectiveness in responding to the threat of Boko Haram insurgency.

Findings from the study also underscore the need for authorities in Nigeria to adopt a collaborative approach in policy implementation. Results from the study provided evidence of how a collaborative approach is required to regularly identify and respond to emerging threats to peace. This can be achieved by working with both formal and informal entities. Usually, a top-bottom approach where the state makes policies on peace and security and excludes informal, civil society and private entities is ineffective. Findings from the research will potentially enhance the understanding and effective

collaboration between the state and non- state actors. Non-state actors and the private sector need to be engaged and given the opportunity to articulate their concerns with government and should be involved in the planning and implementation of identified responses. By bringing together a wide range of actors to find practicable solutions to the problem of threats, and working jointly to address them, long lasting peace partnerships will be established and advanced across the country.

Further, the findings in this study could be applied to support the needed reforms in the on-going fight against corruption in Nigeria. The results from the study offered evidence of how the Boko Haram sect espouses an ideology that is receptive to most Muslim youths, given the widespread public corruption and the dire socioeconomic situation in Nigeria. Pervasive malfeasance, especially in the public sector, provides a key around which Boko Haram ideologues have framed their anti-secular ideology. The Nigerian government must therefore demonstrate strong commitment and political will in the fight against corruption by repositioning institutions such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offenses Commission (ICPC) to wage a more vigorous fight against corruption. This will contribute to neutralizing and deconstructing the appeal of Boko Haram violent ideology. This way, this research will contribute to alignment of policy and practice and create a more enabling environment for good governance tasked with delivery of social services that removes the vulnerabilities of citizens.

The study filled an important gap in literature in the search for solutions to the Boko Haram insurgency by offering empirically informed public policy

recommendations to the Nigerian government and other stakeholders that have been involved in the fight against Boko Haram.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to improve the understanding of the public policy measures that will be a solution in the efforts to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency. I adopted a qualitative research approach for the study. Purposive sampling technique was used. 12 participants were recruited for the study. The participants were sampled and selected based on their experience and knowledge on policy issues relevant to the study. Data collection was carried out in Abuja and Jos, Nigeria, by means of interviews and observational field notes.

In this research, I critically examined the various public policy measures that have been adopted by the Nigerian government as a response to the challenges of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The outcome of this study would be of benefit to the efforts to improve understanding of the policy measures that could be used to combat Boko Haram terrorism. This study revealed that the strategies that Nigeria, like any other country, could adopt for fighting terrorism should be flexible and innovative to respond to the constantly changing challenges. The findings showed that for Nigeria to succeed in fighting insurgency at any level, it has to have a policy on counterinsurgency. A well-articulated counterinsurgency policy for Nigeria should have conceptual clarity, and fashioned to involve both the use of security components of the country as well as the use of political, legal, economic, civil society and other peacebuilding instruments (Ochoeche,2013). The focus of such a policy is attainment of the vital security interests

of the country through the creation and existence of a safer environment. It should be dynamic enough to read future trends in terrorism.

The study also included the need to mainstream research and intelligence in all counterinsurgency operations. Research and intelligence will provide the needed data and informed recommendations that would make counterinsurgency operations effective and efficient. There is need to undertake a critical evaluation of the content of the particular policy responses with emphasis on substantially relying on special operations which are always based on good, credible and timely intelligence. Also, research should be able to add value to intelligence especially in providing empirical analysis of the various facets of the Boko Haram such as the background, motivations, operational environment and sustenance factors, among others.

It is based on good and timely intelligence that the Nigerian state will be able to disrupt and destroy the Boko Haram by attacking their leadership command, control and communication structures; and material support and finances. Furthermore, the battle of winning hearts and minds will be made easier in counterinsurgency operation when policies, programs and interventions are based and developed on intelligence (Okafor, 2015). The findings of the study also showed that the military operations have attracted mixed reactions with some stakeholders, who emphasized the need for the Nigerian government to combine the operations with an enhanced efforts and initiatives to addressing the root causes of Islamic extremism and radicalism especially in the North East region of Nigeria.

References

- Abend, G. (2013). The origins of business ethics in American universities, 1902–1936. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 23, 171–205. doi:10.5840/beq201323214
- Abrahamsen, R., & Williams, B. (2005). The globalization of private security: Country report: Nigeria. *Proceedings of the Conference on International Politics, and the Economic and Social Research Council* 1–8.
- Adamu, A. U. (2013). Insurgency in Nigeria: The Northern Nigerian experience. In O. Obafemi & H. Galadima (Eds.), *Complex Insurgencies in Nigeria* (pp. 77–139). Jos, Nigeria: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies.
- Adedoyin, A. (2013). The changing concept of security and its implications for Africa. In V. A. Isumonah, M. O. Oyeboade, & O. Adams (Eds.), *Nationalities, Identities and Terrorism: The Nigerian Experience*. Ibadan, Nigeria: John Archers Publishers.
- Aderonke, M. (2015, August). Terrorism and counter-terrorism in contemporary Nigeria: Understanding the emerging trends. *Journal of Policy and Development Studies*, 9(4), 128–146. doi:10.12816/0016780
- Adibe, J. (2012). *Negotiating the Nigerian-nation. Essays on state, governance and development*. Abuja, Nigeria: Adonis & Abbey Publishing Company.
- Adibe, J. (2014, May 14). Boko Haram in Nigeria: The way forward. *Africa in Focus*. Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/05/14/boko-haram-in-nigeria-the-way-forward/>
- Adimula, A. R. (2019). The roles of women and youths in peacebuilding in fragile local communities: Ekiti South Senatorial District in focus. In B..T. Bakut & J. P.

Ochogwu (Eds.), *Implementing the infrastructure for peace in Nigeria and advancing the frontiers of peace*. Abuja, Nigeria: Institute for Peace & Conflict Resolution

Afoaku, O. G. (2017). Islamist terrorism and state failure in northern Nigeria. *Africa Today*, 63(4), 21–42. doi:10.2979/africatoday.63.4.02

Agbede, A. R S. (2010). *Nigeria and the challenges of effective security* (Vol 1.). Ibadan, Nigeria: Netview Books.

Agbiboa, D. E. (2014). Peace at daggers drawn? Boko Haram and the state of emergency in Nigeria. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37, 41–67.
doi:10.1080/1057610X.2014.853602

Aghedo, I., & Osumah, O. (2012). The Boko Haram uprising: How should Nigeria respond? *Third World Quarterly*, 33(5), 853–869.
doi:10.1080/01436597.2012.674701

Akinbi, J. O. (2015). Examining the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria and the quest for a permanent resolution of the crisis. *Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences*, 3(8), 32–45. Retrieved from www.eajournals.org

Akinola, A., & Tella, O. (2013). Boko Haram terrorism and Nigeria's security dilemma: Rethinking the state's capacity. *International Journal of Innovative Social Sciences and Humanities Research*, 1(3), 70–78. Retrieved from <https://seahipaj.org/index.php/journals/education-social-sciences-and-arts/ijisshr/>

Akpan, F., Ekanem, O., & Olofu-Adeoye, A. (2014). Boko Haram insurgency and the counter-terrorism policy in Nigeria. *Canadian Social Science*, 10(2), 151–155.

Retrieved from <http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/css/index>

- Akpan, O. (2013). *War and conquest without Weapons: Understanding and overcoming the Boko Haram challenge in Nigeria*. Abuja, Nigeria: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd.
- Akpotor, A. S., & Oromareghake, P. B. O. (2013). Terrorism and insecurity in the Nigerian state: The challenge. In O. Mbachu & U. M. Bature (Eds.), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (pp. 67–86). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.
- Akpuru-Aja, A., & Ibebunjo, B. O. (2013). Combating a new decade of insurgency in Nigeria: A perspective. In O. Mbachu & U. M. Bature (Eds.), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (pp. 473–492). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.
- Alade, S. I. (2016). *Terrorism, insurgency, national security major themes*. Annual Distinguished Lecture Delivered at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Alao, A. (2014). *Emerging trends in global insurgency: Lessons for Nigeria*. Paper presented at the UNDP Organized Strategic Stakeholders' Dialogue on Peace & Security in the North East of Nigeria, Gombe, November 12–13, 2014, unpublished.
- Albert, I. O. (2017). Rethinking the functionality of the multinational joint task force in managing the Boko Haram crisis in the Lake Chad basin. *Africa Development*, *XLII* (3), 119–135. Retrieved from <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/>
- Alemika, E. E. O. (2013). Insurgencies in Nigeria: Causes and remedies; the sociological

dimension. In O. Obafemi & H. Galadima (Eds.). *Complex insurgencies in Nigeria* (pp. 181–200). Jos, Nigeria: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies.

Alli, W. O. (2013). State failure, terrorism and Al Qaeda as strategic threat in Nigeria. In O. Mbachu, & U. M. Bature, (Eds.), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (pp. 473 – 492). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.

Alonge, A. (2012). Solving the Boko Haram menace, Retrieved from <http://adebayoalonge.wordpress.com/2012/03/11/solving-the-boko-haram-menace>,

Alozieuwa, S.H.O. (2013). Violence as a bargaining tool for political ascendancy in a multi-ethnic society: The Nigerian experience. In O. Mbachu & U. M. Bature (Eds.), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (pp. 165 – 186). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.

Anfara, V. A., Brown, K. M., & Mangione, T. L. (2002). Qualitative analysis on stage: 294 Making research process more public. *Educational Researcher*, 31(7), 28-38. Doi.org/10.3102/0013189x031007028

Animasaun, G.A. (2012). The military and internal security operation in Nigeria's forth republic: Rethinking security for positive peace in Maiduguri, Nigeria. *The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies* 44(2), 113-134. Retrieved from <http://www.peaceresearch.ca>

- Anyaeibunam, E.O. (2012). Law making and the enabling legal framework in Nigeria: A critical overview. *NIALS International Journal of Legislative Drafting (NIJLD)*, 1(1), 54-73. Retrieved from <http://www.nials-nigeria.org/journals/legdraft>
- Apori-Nkansah, L. (2008). *Transitional justice in post conflict contexts: The case of Sierra Leon's dual accountability mechanisms*. (Doctoral dissertation). Walden University. UMI Number: 3291475
- Ayidin, A. (2010). Where do states go? Strategy in civil war intervention. *Journal of the Peace Science Society*, 27 (1): 47 – 66
- Babalola, D. & Ayuba, C. (2015). The military versus Boko Haram in Nigeria's war on terror: The contending issues, in *African Journal of Peace and Human Security*, Vol. 1. No. 1, 2015
- Bagaji, A.S.Y., Etila, M.S., Ogbadu, E.E., & Sule, J.G. (2012). Boko Haram and the recurring bomb attacks in Nigeria: Attempt to impose religious ideology through terrorism. *Cross-cultural Communication*, 8(1):33-41. doi: 10.3968/j.ccc.1923670020120801.1370
- Bappah, H.Y. (2016, June). Nigeria's military failure against the Boko Haram insurgency. *African Security Review*, 25 (2), 146-158. doi: 10.1080/10246029.2016.1151799
- Barkindo, A. (2016). How Boko Haram exploits memory and history. *Africa Research Institute*. Retrieved from <https://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/publications/boko-haram-exploits-history-memory/>

- Botha, A. (2008). *Terrorism in the Maghreb: Transnationalisation of domestic terrorism (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 144).*
- Botha, A., Ewi, M., Salifu, U., & Abdile, M. (2017). *Understanding Nigerian citizens' perspectives on Boko Haram [Monograph]. ISS Monograph, 196.*
- Boyatzis, R.E. (1998). *Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and code development*, Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications.
- Braun, V. & Clarke, V. (2006). "Using thematic analysis in psychology", *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 77-101
- Burton, J. (1990a). *Conflict: Human needs theory*. Palgrave: Macmillan UK.
- Burton, J. (1990b). *Conflict resolution and prevention*. St. New York: Martins Press.
- Campbell, J. (2014, November). *United States policy to counter Nigeria's Boko Haram*. (Council for Preventive Action Council Special Report No. 70). Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org>
- Chothia, F (2012). Who are Nigeria's Boko Islamists, in *BBC News Africa*, January 11
Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501>,
- Cilliers, J. (2015). Violent Islamist extremism and terror in Africa. *Institute for Security Studies*, Paper 286:64-84
- CNN Library (2014). Boko Haram fast facts. *CNN*. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/>
- Cobb, R. W. & Elder, C. D. (1983). *Participation in American politics: The Dynamics of agenda-building*. California: Johns Hopkins University Press
- Congressional Research Services, 1February. (2019). Nigeria: Current issues and US

- policy. *Congressional Research Services*. Retrieved from <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33964.pdf>
- Cook, D (2011). The rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, *CTC Sentinel*, September 2011, p4
- Copeland, A. J. & Agosto, D. E. (2012). Diagrams and relational maps: The use of graphic elicitation techniques with interviewing for data collection, analysis, and display. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 11, 513-533. Retrieved from www.ejournals.library.ualberta.ca
- Council of European Union (2005). *The European Union counter-terrorism strategy*; November 30, 2005
- Creswell, J. W. (2007). *Qualitative inquiry & research design: Choosing among five approaches* (2nd ed.). India, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Creswell, J. W. (2013). *Qualitative inquiry & research design: Choosing among five approaches* (2nd ed.). India, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Creswell, J.W. (2009). *Research Design. Qualitative and mixed methods approaches. Third edition*. India: SAGE Publications Inc.
- Danielsen, G. (2005). Meeting human needs, preventing violence: Applying human needs theory to the conflict in Sri Lanka. *Research Gate*. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265024624_Meeting_Human_Needs_Preventing_Violence_Applying_Human_Needs_Theory_to_the_Conflict_in_Sri_Lanka
- Dasuki, M. (2013, July 18). The fight against terrorism and Piracy. *The Nation*. Retrieved from <https://issuu.com/thenation>

- Dimock, M.E., Dimock, G.G.O. & Fox, D.M. (1983). *Public administration*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Dye, T. R. (2014). *Understanding Public Policy* (14th edition). Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.
- Ekong, S. (2016). *Nigerian policy on child labor: An evaluation of the education sector preparedness for effective policy implementation*. (Doctoral dissertation). Walden University. UMI Number: 3746360
- Elaigwu, J.I. (2014). *Security and peace. The imperatives for national development in Nigeria*. Abuja: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd.
- Ellard-Gray, A., Jeffrey, N. K., Choubak, M., & Crann, S. E. (2015). Finding the hidden participant: Solutions for recruiting hidden, hard-to-reach, and vulnerable populations. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1609406915621420>
- Eneanya, A. N. (2013). *Policy research, analysis and public policy-making*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Printery
- Eneanya, A. N. (2016). *Policy research, analysis and public policy-making*. Vol. III. Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Printery
- Enwere, C. (2013). State terrorism and the rise of civil insurgency in Nigeria: A conceptual perspective. In O. Mbachu & U. M. Bature (Eds.), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (pp. 237 – 249). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.
- Ewa, I.O. (2017). Insurgency, counterinsurgency and national security. *In African*

Journal for Security and Development, Vol. 2. No.2 Institute for Security Studies,
Abuja

- Fadile, B. (2013). Insurgency in Nigeria: The Odua People's Congress example. In O. Obafemi, & H. Galadima (Eds). *Complex Insurgencies in Nigeria (pp. 19 - 26)*. Jos, Nigeria: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies.
- Fafowora, O. (2013). Understanding Insurgencies in Nigeria: Nature, Types, Dynamics and the Way Out: Keynote Address. In O. Obafemi, & H. Galadima (Eds). *Complex Insurgencies in Nigeria (pp. 01- 18)*. Jos, Nigeria: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies.
- Federal Government of Nigeria. (2014). *National Security Strategy*, Abuja.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). Chapter II, Section 14b *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with Amendments*.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with Amendments*.
- Fereday, J. & Muir-Cochrane, E. (2006). "Demonstrating rigor using thematic analysis: A hybrid approach of inductive and deductive coding and theme development", *International Journal of Qualitative Methods, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 80-92*.
- Frankfort- Nachmias, C., Nachmias, D., & DeWaard, J. (2015). *Research methods in the social sciences (8th ed.)*. New York: Worth.
- Fwa, K.L. (2011). Public policy making and the roles of the legislature in managing civil and military policies in Nigeria. In O. Mbachu, & A.A. Sokoto, (Eds), *Nigerian defense and security: policies and strategies (pp. 183 – 225)*. Kaduna, Nigeria:

Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.

- Gergen, K. J., Josselson, R., & Freeman, M. (2015). The promises of qualitative inquiry. *American Psychologist*, 70(1), 1-9. Doi:10.1037/a0038597
- Golwa, J. P. & Alozieuwa, S. H.O. (2012). Perspectives on Nigeria's security challenges: The Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency Compared. In J. Adibe (Ed) *Terrorism in Africa*. African Renaissance. Vol. 9 No. 1
- Gowon, K. (2012). "Injustice, not poverty caused Boko Haram insurgency", *Point Blank News* Retrieved from: <http://pointblanknews.com/pbn/news/injustice-not-poverty-caused-boko-haram-insurgency-gowon/>
- Gwaza, P. A. (2015). Trans-Nationalization of terrorism in the sahel region: An analysis of peace and human security issues. *In African journal of peace and human security*, Vol. 1. No. 1, 2015
- Hesse-Bieber, S. N. & Leavy, P. (2006). The practice of qualitative research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Hoon, C. (2013). Meta-synthesis of qualitative case studies: An approach to theory building. *Organizational Research Methods*, 16, 522-556.
Doi:10.1177/1094428113484969
- Hussaini, K. S. (2017). Managing crisis in an insurgent environment. In African Journal for Security and Development, Vol. 2. No.2 *Institute for Security Studies*, Abuja
- Ibrahim et al, (2015). New Hope: Presidential coordinating committee on north east interventions (PCNI). December, 2015: *Tapestry Consulting*. Unpublished.
- Idowu, A. A. (2013). Security laws and challenges in Nigeria: The Boko Haram

Insurgency. *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 8(1), 118-134.

doi:10.1080/19361610.2013.738395

Ihantola, E. & Kihn, L. (2011). Threats to validity and reliability in mixed methods accounting research. *Qualitative Research in Accounting and management*, 8(1), 39-58. doi: 10.1108/11766091111124694

Ihenaco, E.C. (2018). *Advancement of social service delivery through cross-sector partnerships in Nigeria*. (Doctoral dissertation). Walden University. UMI Number: 10980789

Imobighe, T. A. (2010). An overview of the theoretical issues in African security, in R.A. Akindele, & B.E. Ate (Eds), *Beyond conflict resolution: Managing African security in the 21st Century*. Lagos, Nigeria: Vantage Publishing

Imobighe, T. A. (2013). Dimensions of threats and national development challenges in Nigeria in O. Mbachu, & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism (pp. 03 – 19)*. Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.

Institute for Economics and Peace (2015). *Global terrorism index 2015*. Retrieved from <http://economicsandpeace.org/reports/>

Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (2012). *National peace policy for Nigeria*. Abuja, Nigeria: IPCR

Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (2016a). *National action plan for 2016 strategic conflict assessment of Nigeria*. Abuja, Nigeria: IPCR

Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (2016b). *Strategic conflict Assessment of*

- Nigeria. Consolidated and zonal reports.* Abuja, Nigeria: John Archers.
- International Crisis Group. (2011). “Nigeria’s elections: Reversing the degeneration”? *Africa Policy Briefing*, No 79, 24 February. Abuja.
- International Crisis Group. (2014). Curbing violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram insurgency. *Africa report. No. 216. April 2014.* Retrieved from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.aspx>
- Ishaku, J (2012). *The Road to Mogadishu: How Jihadist terrorism tears Nigeria apart.* Jos, Nigeria: IMPACT.
- Iwu, H. N. & Oko, C. O. (2013). Political economy of kidnapping in Igboland, South East Nigeria. In O. Mbachu & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A Study in terrorism and counter-terrorism (pp. 237 – 249).* Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.
- Ker, D. I. (2013). Diagnostic review of insurgency in Nigeria: The cultural dimension, in O. Obafemi & H. Galadima (Eds). *Complex Insurgencies in Nigeria (pp. 201-219).* Jos, Nigeria: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies.
- Kpessa, M.W. (2011). The politics of public policy in Ghana: From closed circuit bureaucrats to citizenry engagement. *Journal of Developing Societies*, 27: 29.
DOI: 10.1177/0169796X1002700103
- Kundnani, A. (2015). *A decade lost: Rethinking radicalization and extremism.* London, United Kingdom: Claystone.
- Kwanashie, M. (2013). Diagnostic review of insurgencies in Nigeria: sources, causes, and

remedies – the economic dimension in O. Obafemi H. Galadima (Eds). *Complex insurgencies in Nigeria* (pp. 141- 180). Jos, Nigeria: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies.

Lincoln Y. S. & Guba, E. (2000). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluences. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (2nd ed., pp. 163-188). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). *Naturalistic inquiry*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Lohmann, A. (2011). *Who owns the Sahara? Old conflicts, new menaces: Mali and Central Sahara between the Tuareg, Al-Qaida and organized crime*: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Abuja

Madu, S.N & Madu, B.N. (2013). National security in Nigeria and psychological trauma among victims. In O. Mbachu& U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A Study in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (pp. 157 – 164). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.

Maiangwa, B. (2014). Soldiers of God or Allah: Religious politicization and the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 5 (1), pp. 58–66.

Maiangwa, B., Ufo O., Ayo, W., & Onapajo, H. (2012). Baptism by fire: Boko Haram and the reign of terror in Nigeria. *Africa Today*, 59 (2), pp. 41–57.

Mantzikos, I. (2010). The absence of State in Northern Nigeria: The case of Boko Haram, *African Renaissance Vol 7 No. 1* 57-62

Mato, K. M., & Olasupo, M. A. (2014). *Political economy of public policy making in*

Nigeria. Implication for sustainable development. Ibadan, Nigeria: Omotosho Printers.

Maxwell, J.A. (2013). *Qualitative Research Design. 3rd Edition.* Sage Publications, Inc: USA

Mbachu, O. (2013a). The Dynamic laws and principles of internal security management in Nigeria. In O. Mbachu & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A Study in terrorism and counter-terrorism (pp. 21 – 43).* Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.

Mbachu, O. (2013b). The management of national security in Nigeria. In O.Mbachu & A.A. Sokoto (Eds), *Nigerian defense and security: Policies and strategies (168 – 181).* Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.

Merriam, S.B. (2014). *Qualitative research: A guide to design and implementation (2nd Ed).* San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons

Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M. & Saldana, J. (2014). *Qualitative data analysis; a method sourcebook (3rd ed.)* Thousand Oaks: CA: Sage

Morse, J. M., Barrett, M., Mayan, M., Olson, K., & Spiers, J. (2002). Verification strategies for establishing reliability and validity in qualitative research. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 1(2)*, 13-22. Retrieved from <http://www.ualberta.ca/~ijqm>

Morse, W.C., Lowery, D. R., & Steury, T. (2014). Exploring saturation of themes and spatial locations in qualitative public participation geographic information systems research. *Society and Natural Sciences, 27*, 557-571.

Doi:10.1080/08941920.2014.888791

- Moustakas, C. (1994). *Phenomenological research methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Murphy, F. J. & Yelder, J. (2010). Establishing rigor in qualitative radiography research. *Radiography*, 16(1), 62-67. Doi: 10.1016/j.radi.2009.07.003
- Nigeria Security Tracker 2014 at www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483.
- Nwala, T.U. (2013). Insurgency in Nigeria: The MASSOB experience. In O. Obafemi H. Galadima (Eds). *Complex insurgencies in Nigeria (pp. 27- 61)*. Jos, Nigeria: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies.
- Nweze, A. (2013). Diagnostic overview of insurgent and group terrorists activisms in Nigeria: Psychological dimensions. In O. Obafemi H. Galadima (Eds). *Complex Insurgencies in Nigeria (pp. 27- 61)*. Jos, Nigeria: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies.
- Nwogu, K. (2011). Boko Haram and 2011 bombings in Nigeria. In O. Agbo (Ed) *Survey of Nigerian affairs 2011*; NIIA Press, Lagos
- Nwolise, O. B. C. (2012). *Spiritual dimension of human and national security*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Faculty Lecture of the Social Sciences, University of Ibadan
- Obadofin, S. (2012). Boko Haram: The necking bombs. *The Nation*. May3:35
- Obafemi, O.& Galadima, H. (2013). *Complex insurgencies in Nigeria (pp. - xvii)*. Jos, Nigeria: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies.
- Ochoeche, S. A. (2013). Counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria in the twenty first century. In O. Mbachu & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism (pp. 343 – 359)*. Kaduna,

Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.

Ogbeide, U. (2007). *Public policy making and evaluation in Nigeria. theories, strategies and techniques*. Lagos, Nigeria: Amfitop Books.

Ojelade, S.O. (2018). *Counterterrorism policy towards Boko Haram in Nigeria during 2009-2015*. (Doctoral dissertation). Walden University. UMI Number:

Okafor, G. I. (2015). The imperative of research and intelligence in counter-terrorism in the Sahel region. *In African Journal of Peace and Human Security, Vol. 1. No. 1*, 2015

Okene, A. A., & Olawale, I. (2013). National security and insurgency in Nigeria, 1999-2012: A preliminary assessment of Federal Government strategy of containment. In O. Mbachu & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism (pp. 323 – 340)*. Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.

Okpara, E. (2013). Militancy, terrorism and the nigerian state. In O. Mbachu & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism (pp. 227 – 236)*. Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.

Omale, D.J.O. (2013). Terrorism and counter terrorism in Nigeria: Theoretical paradigms and lessons for public policy. *Canadian Social Science, 9(3)*, 96-103. Retrieved from: <http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/css/article/view/j.css.1923669720130903.2916> DOI:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/j.css.1923669720130903.2916>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/j.css.1923669720130903.2916>.

- Onapajo, H. (2017, Jan. /Feb.). Has Nigeria defeated Boko Haram? An appraisal of the counter-terrorism approach under the Buhari administration. *Strategic Analysis*, 41(1), 61-73. Doi: 10.1080/09700161.2016.1249177
- Onu, G. (2013). Terrorism, insecurity and challenges of development in Nigeria. In O. Mbachu & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (pp. 87 – 100). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.
- Onuoha, F. (2013). Boko Haram: Evolving tactical repertoire and state responses. In O. Mbachu & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (pp. 407 – 434). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.
- Onuoha, F. (2014). Boko Haram and the evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria. In M. Pérouse de Montclos (Ed.), *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*, 151-191. Enscheda, Netherlands: Ipskamp Drukkers
- Onuorah, M (2011). “Presidential panel urges dialogue with Boko Haram, wants Sect to disarm”, *The Guardian*, September 27, pp. 1-2
- Onyebuchi, E.E. & Chigozie, C.F. (2013). Islamic fundamentalism and the problem of insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram phenomenon. In O. Mbachu & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (pp. 201 – 223). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.
- Opukri, C. O. & Etekpe, A. (2013). Domestic response to terrorism in a global world: The

- Nigerian experience. In O. Mbachu & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (pp. 201 – 223). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.
- Osakwe, C. & Umoh, U.E. (2013). The military and counter insurgency operations in Nigeria. In O. Mbachu & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (pp. 49 – 66). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.
- Osuji, K.C. (2013). Internal security threat to Nigeria: A personal perspective. In O. Mbachu & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (pp. 49 – 66). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.
- Ozumba, L. N. (2014). Multi-sectorial assessment of policy implementation in the Nigerian socio-political system. *Journal of good governance and sustainable development in Africa*, 2(1), 113-122. Retrieved from <http://rcmss.com/index.php/jggsda>
- Patton, M.Q. (2002). *Qualitative research and evaluation methods*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Pearse, N. (2019). *An illustration of deductive analysis in qualitative research*. Kidmore End: Academic Conferences International Limited.
doi:<http://dx.doi.org.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/10.34190/RM.19.006>
- Pieri, Z.& Serrano, R. (2014). Insurgency prolonged: Nigeria's lack of strategic adaptation and the rising Boko Haram death toll. *In West Africa Insight. Special*

- Edition: Boko Haram* (pp. 12 - 19). May 2014 Vol. 4 No.2. Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD).
- Polkinghorne, D. E. (2005). Language and meaning: Data collection in qualitative research. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, 52(2), 137-145.
- Ponterotto, J. G. (2005). Qualitative research in counseling psychology: A primer on Publications. *Qualitative research* (2nd ed., pp. 163-188). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Rene, H. (2012). "Insecurity in Nigeria: A bad signal to investors?" *Wes Society*. Retrieved from:
<http://www.wessociety.com/News/WES%20News/Topic%20of%20Week?Insecurity%20Investment.aspx>,
- Richardson, C. (2011). Relative deprivation theory in terrorism: A study of higher education and as predictors of terrorism. Unpublished Thesis (Senior Honours). New York University. Politics Department.
- Roberts, P., Priest, H., & Traynor, M. (2006). Reliability and validity in research. *Nursing Standard (through 2013)*, 20(44), 41-5. Doi: 10.7748/ns.20.44.41. s56
- Rudestam, K. E., & Newton, R. R. (2007). *Surviving your dissertation: A comprehensive guide to content and process* (3rd Ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Sahara Reporters (2019). 91.8 Million Nigerians are extremely poor, says World Poverty Clock at <http://saharareporters.com/2019/06/05/918-million-nigerians-are-extremely-poor-says-world-poverty-clock>
- Sapru, R. K. (2012). *Public Policy formulation, implementation and evaluation*. Sterling

Publishers Private Limited: New Delhi

- Shettima, K. (2012). "Boko Haram: Borno Governor blames insurgency on poverty,
Retrieved from: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/07/boko-haram-borno-gov-blames-insurgency-on-poverty/>
- Sinkovics, R. R., & Alfoldi, E. A. (2012). Progressive focusing on trustworthiness in qualitative research: The enabling role of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). *Management International Review*, 52, 817-845.
Doi:10.1007/s11575-012-0140-5
- Spear, J. (2008). Counterinsurgency. In Williams, P. D (Ed), *Security studies: An introduction*. New York: Routledge
- Stake, R. E. (2005). Qualitative case studies. In N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.). *The sage handbook of qualitative research* (3rd ed., pp. 443-466). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Stern, J. & Berger, J.M. (2015). *ISIS: The state of terror* (William Collin: India p.177)
- The Cable. (May 18, 2020). Many houses on fire as Boko Haram hits Dapchi
- Trochim, W. M. K. (2001). *The research methods knowledge base* (2nd Ed.) United States of America: Atomic Dog Publishing.
- Udeh, C.S (2013). Boko Haram and counter-terrorism strategy in Nigeria: An exploratory anatomy. In O. Mbachu & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism* (pp. 307 – 322). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.
- Ugwuanyi, B. & Chukwuemeka, E. (2013). *The obstacles to effective policy*

implementation by the public bureaucracy in developing nations: The case of Nigeria. *Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*. 2. 59-68. 10.12816/0001218.

UNICEF (2016). Beyond Chibok. *Unicef.org Media Files*. Retrieved from http://files.unicef.org/media/files/Beyond_Chibok.pdf

United Nations (2006). Global counter-terrorism strategy: New York

United Nations Development Programme (2014). Sustaining human progress: Reducing vulnerabilities and building resilience. *Human Development Report 2014*. New York: UNDP

United Nations Development Programme (2016). Human development for everyone. *Human Development Report 2016*. New York: UNDP

United States Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State (2009). U.S Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 6,12.

Unumen, J.O. (2014). Boko Haram movement in Nigeria and Its implication for national security. In U.M. Nwanko, C.I. Anaere, J.M. Ayuba, O. Akinwumi, L. Olurode (Eds), *Towards peace, security and sustainable development in Africa* (pp. 233 – 245). Berlin-Germany: Mediateam IT Educational.

Uzodike, U.O. & Maiangwa, B (2012). Boko Harm terrorism in Nigeria: Causal factors and central problematic. In I. Adibe, (Ed) *African Renaissance Vol 9 No 1*, 2012

Venkatesh, V., Brown, S. A., & Bala, H. (2013). Bridging the qualitative-quantitative divide: Guidelines for conducting mixed methods research in information systems. *MIS Quarterly*, 37, 21-54. Retrieved from www.misq.org

- Werenfells, I. (2015). Going 'global': Jihadism in Algeria and Tunisia", in G. Steinberg A. Weber (eds.) *Jihadism in Africa* (Stiftung Wissenschaft Politik Paper, June.
- WHO, (2014). Global status report on violence prevention, 2014. *Status Report*. Retrieved from https://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/status_report/2014/1579_VIP_Infographic_lowres_051214.pdf
- Wilson-Genderson, M., & Pruchno, R. (2015). Functional limitations and gender differences: Neighborhood effects. *The International Journal of Aging and Human Development*, 81(1–2), 83–100. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0091415015614843>
- World Council of Churches (2012). "*Poverty and injustice drive Nigeria's sectarian violence.*" Retrieved from: <http://nigeria.news24.com/National/News/Poverty-and-injustice-drive-nigeria's-sectarian-violence-20120711>
- Yilmaz, K. (2013). Comparison of quantitative and qualitative research traditions: Epistemological, theoretical, and methodological differences. *European Journal of Education*, 48, 311-325. Retrieved from www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com
- Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case study research: Design and methods (4th ed.)*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Yin, R. K. (2014). *Case study research: Design and methods (5th ed.)*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Yoroms, G. (2013). Terrorism, counter-terrorism and national security in Nigeria. In O. Mbachau & U.M. Bature (Eds), *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study*

in terrorism and counter-terrorism (pp. 307 – 322). Kaduna, Nigeria: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited.

Zenn, J. (2014). Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region October 2014, Volume 7, issue 10 at: <https://ctc.usma.edu/boko-haram-recruitment-financing-and-arms-trafficking-in-the-lake-chad-region/>

Zenn, J., Kassim, A., Pearson, E., Barkindo, A., Hassan, I., Pieri, Z., & Mahmoud, O. (2018). *Boko Haram beyond the headlines: Analyses of Africa's enduring insurgency*. Retrieved from <https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines.pdf>

Appendix A: Interview Protocol

Central Research Question

What public policy measures are a solution to deal with Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

Sub questions

What Public policy strategies or measures have been adopted by Nigerian government or authorities to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

Why has Boko Haram violence continued despite public policy initiatives meant to curtail it?

How can/might future public policy initiatives mitigate the impact of Boko Haram violence on the people in Nigeria?

Interview Questions with Research Questions

Research Questions	Interview Questions
<p>Central Research Question What public policy measures are a solution to deal with Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How has the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency impacted on people in Nigeria? 2. How concerned are you about the impacts of the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency on lives and property in Nigeria? 3. From your experience, how do you think the challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency should be addressed? 4. One of the most prominent public policy response to the Boko Haram violence is the use of the military. What in your opinion make the use of the military so common? 5. If you could identify one public policy measure that you think will most effectively address the Boko Haram violence, what would it be and why?

<p>Sub Question 1 What policy strategies or measures have been adopted by Nigerian government or authorities to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The crisis of the Boko Haram has had devastating effects on Nigeria, what in your opinion has been the efforts or measures taken by the government and stakeholders to resolve it? 2. What do you consider to be the factors that influenced the adoption of the public policy measures you have identified? 3. Who, in terms of individuals, agencies and organizations, were the critical stakeholders that participated in the development and adoption of the policy strategies or measures for addressing the Boko Haram crisis? 4. What would you say the government of Nigeria has done to implement some of the counterinsurgency measures you identified?
<p>Sub Question 2 Why has Boko Haram violence continued despite public policy initiatives meant to curtail it?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. In your opinion, would you say that the various measures taken by the Nigerian government to address the Boko Haram challenge has been generally effective or ineffective, and why? 2. What in your view, are the implementation challenges of the various policy measures you have identified? 3. What are your suggestions for making public policy response to Boko Haram violence more effective?
<p>Sub Question 3 How can/might future public policy initiatives mitigate the impact of Boko Haram violence on the people in Nigeria?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. In what ways will the implementation of the various public policy measures recommended for dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency reduce the negative impacts of the Boko Haram violence on the people? 2. If you are the President of Nigeria and given the myriad of responses so far deployed to addressing the Boko Haram insurgency, what would you do differently to assuage the Nigerian people over the negative effects of the Boko Haram crisis?

Appendix B: Interview Questions

-
1. How have you been impacted by the Boko Haram violence/insurgency in your family, and how about the general society?
 2. Could you identify the impacts of the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency on lives and properties?
 3. From your experience, how do you think the challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency should be addressed?
 4. One of the most prominent public policy response to the Boko Haram violence is the use of the military. What in your opinion make the use of the military so common?
 5. If you could identify one public policy measure that you think will most effectively address the Boko Haram violence, what would it be and why?
 6. The crisis of the Boko Haram has had devastating effects on Nigeria, what in your opinion has been the efforts or measures taken by the government and stakeholders to resolve it?
 7. What do you consider to be the factors that influenced the adoption of the public policy measures you have identified?
 8. Who, in terms of individuals, agencies and organizations, were the critical stakeholders that participated in the development and adoption of the policy strategies or measures for addressing the Boko Haram crisis?
 9. What would you say the government of Nigeria has done to implement some of the counterinsurgency measures you identified?
 10. In your opinion, would you say that the various measures taken by the Nigerian government to address the Boko Haram challenge has been generally effective, and why, or ineffective, and why?
 11. What in your view, are the implementation challenges of the various policy measures you have identified?
 12. What are your suggestions for making public policy response to Boko Haram violence more effective?
 13. In what ways will the implementation of the various public policy measures recommended for dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency reduce the negative impacts of the Boko Haram violence on the people?
 14. If you are the President of Nigeria and given the myriad of responses so far deployed to addressing the Boko Haram insurgency, what would you do differently to assuage the Nigerian people over the negative effects of the Boko Haram crisis?
-