2020

American National Identity and Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era

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Abstract

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Public Policy Administration

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August 2020

Abstract

There is a correlation between American grand strategy and post-Cold War national identity. Congressional leaders, policy makers, scholars, and observers have noted that the United States lacked a coherent grand strategy for the immediate post-Cold War era. However, President Bill Clinton built a grand strategy of selected engagement predicated it on the historical values of modern American national identity. Through published national security data, speeches, and observations of strategic choices, this research compared President Clinton's actions in the international arena to a grand strategy typology. Further, through the theoretical lens of constructivism, an assessment of President Clinton's national identity construct, and its correlation with his strategic use of national power, was conducted. This research may be beneficial to ongoing defense threat reduction research on predictive factors of national activity. This research may also facilitate positive social change by enabling policy makers, scholars, the U.S. electorate, and political observers to better understand the importance of presidentially constructed national identity and its impact on grand strategy. For instance, presidential debates may evolve to include inquiries about a candidate's perspective on national identity and how that ideational construct would influence strategic planning and operations during their tenure. Americans may then be able to better estimate the potential national security implications of their electoral choices.

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Dedication

This research effort is dedicated to Jesus Christ, who teaches me to make a difference in this world, sometimes one person at a time, or here, whole nations. This study is also dedicated to my children: Normlica, Dima, and Norman James, Cesar, Mario, Ma'elm, Cris, Mahrael, and Miaelle, whom I hope will be inspired to challenge themselves, each other, and strive for their best. Do something different, do something strong, do something courageous, to grow yourself, and someone else… even nations.

Thank you, Norman Jr., ("Minnie Me") for challenging me, encouraging me, and forgiving me for the lack of playtime- there are yet more fish to in front of us! Thank you Normlica, my darling daughter, for your patience and persistence. And thank you Normlica, for trying to follow in my footsteps, for trying to catching up to me and making me go farther faster. Thank you, Dima, for pushing me to be better than myself, for watching me to see what kind of Dad I'd be. Hopefully, prayerfully, I've set a good example.

Thanks to Cesar, Mario, Ma'elm, Cris, Mahrael, and Miaelle, who waited, however impatiently, for me to find the time to invest in the invaluable experience of playtime- NOW we can go outside and run around!

Thank you, Marilyn, the love of my life, for encouraging me with your warm smile, patient love, and endless enthusiasm; and for keeping our blended family centered on Christ.

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to Dr. Milen, Dr. Ross, and Dr. Frampton for their patience, dedication, and guidance; for actually helping me get this done.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

American national identity and grand strategy are essential to U.S. national security, achievement of international goals and objectives, and to the many nations that aligned with the United States during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Analyzing national identity encourages reflection on the use of the four components of state power: diplomacy, information, military, and the economy (DIME), to achieve national security ends (Huntington, 2004). This research was conducted to examine how American national identity influenced U.S. grand strategy and international activities during the Clinton Administration. This research is important because President Clinton, as the first American post-Cold War leader, inherited a national security environment without great power threats, with almost unlimited international political capital, and with undisputed national power (Hyland, 1999). The grand strategy Clinton employed, and the national identity he used to justify that strategy, helped explain America's world purpose at a pivotal moment in modern world and national history. American national identity provided a salient and compelling element of national discourse as the president faced the opportunity to redefine America's purpose in a new world order.

Background of the Study

National identity uses a group's "individuality and distinctiveness" to differentiate them from others and unite them as a unit (Huntington, 2004, p. 21). Identity is influenced by group experiences, shared history and values, and often shaped and expressed through group leader articulation. By identifying the president as the "official" articulator of American national identity, there is a reduced validity and influence of

competing narratives from other political sectors (Beasely, 2004; Brands, 2014; Kupchan, 2010; Metz, 2010). National identity is an important causal factor of American behavior, especially as it relates to military action (Coles, 2002; Huntington, 2004; Lixin, 2010). Additionally, national identity explanations are often revised and publicized in preparation for military conflict because it can help stimulate public support by crafting the collective consciousness to produce interpretive frameworks that support the intended policy (Coles, 2002, p. 588).

Presidents have used national identity to justify grand strategy shifts for decades. Grand strategy is the coordination of all national resources for a political goal (Liddell Hart, 1991, p. 322). Grand strategy also helps prioritize national interests and allocate resources to support policy choices. Grand strategy is essential to the projection of national power because it helps ensure the whole of government coordination of national resources for national security interests (Art, 2003). This coordination helps prevent individual government agencies from inadvertently working at cross purposes with each other on global issues while increasing the efficiency of collaborative actions.

American National Identity and Grand Strategy in the 20th Century

The onset of WWI provided President Woodrow Wilson the opportunity to revise American national identity from that of premier republican example and global model of democracy to defender-of-liberty and world leader (Lixin, 2010). The first phase of Wilson's national identity redefinition emphasized America's military and economic strength along with the growing perils in the European community. Relying on American exceptionalism as an enduring component of American identity, Wilson explained the

importance of American involvement to secure and protect national values of freedom and liberty for all: “We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind” (Wilson, 1917, para. 34). By using the power of the president’s national influence, Wilson effectively revised American national identity and reoriented its grand strategy to support that new identity infused with the moral obligation to spread democracy (Mead, 2005).

National Identity and Grand Strategy in the Modern Era

President Woodrow Wilson declared American foreign policy based on morals, strong ideals, and the spread of democracy (Department of State Historian, 2019). U.S. involvement in World War II and sustained world leadership during the bipolar Cold War era signaled a significant national identity shift from passive democracy icon to active defender of and advocate for democracy (Boys, 2015, p. 8). This transition included the grand strategy shift from quasi-isolationism for matters outside the Western hemisphere to internationalism and interventionism, but only during the war era (Brands, 2016; J. L. Gaddis, 2002). After World War I, Congress rejected Wilson’s national identity and American participation in the League of Nations (Boys, 2015, p. 95). However, during World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt revised American national identity to support a new grand strategy that prepared the nation for a new world era, the Cold War (Deudney & Ikenberry, 2012).

Franklin Roosevelt’s “fireside chats” transformed presidential speeches into personal narratives from the president to the average Americans in their “living room”

(Biser, 2016). Narratives were an effective communication tool because they helped the president's message seem as though it was just one average American talking with another about matters of State (Biser, 2016). The golden age of radio enabled the president to connect with the average American efficiently and directly. President Roosevelt used these narratives not only to inform the public, but also to influence public opinion in support of his initiatives. Of specific note was his 14th fireside chat, held on September 3, 1939, which informed Americans of the ongoing European war and introduced his "national policy" of support for the Allied Powers. Specifically, he explained the concept of collective security, binding American security with that of other nations thousands of miles away (Roosevelt, 1939). Roosevelt also invoked American Judeo-Christian values as core aspects of national identity and justification for not only defense of the American homeland but the projection of American power to protect victims of international aggression (Roosevelt, 1939). President Roosevelt did not declare war in this narrative; however, he revived a national identity that prepared the country for generations of American global leadership (Biser, 2016).

President Truman reemphasized Roosevelt's American grand strategy and national identity to continue America's international leadership role. First, President Truman asked Americans to unite behind him as he projected American values of individual freedoms, human rights, civil liberties, and the expansion of representative government (Truman, 1945). Second, he equated American national security concerns with the extension of American values of freedom from coercion and subjugation in his 1947 speech advocating aid to Turkey and Greece in their fight against the growing

communist threat (Truman, 1947). The Truman Doctrine solidified American international leadership in the new bipolar world, with materiel support for those specifically countering communist insurgents (Truman, 1947). The Marshall Plan and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enshrined this strategy in world history.

President Dwight Eisenhower codified American grand strategy through the Solarium Project at the U.S. State Department. George Keenan and others on the U.S. State Department's policy planning staff produced what would be called the grand strategy of Soviet "Containment." While "containing" and limiting communist expansion were the strategic "ends," the "ways" or methods used to employ resources varied across presidential administrations (J. L. Gaddis, 2009). However, American national identity of world leadership endured across both Republican and Democratic administrations (Art, 2003).

Defining Cold War Grand Strategy

Cold War grand strategy was predicated on U.S. activism in the world community, the product of a new American identity of leadership across multiple paradigms of national power, militarily, informationally, diplomatically, and economically. Emerging victorious from WWII, American identity of exceptionalism fueled the international activist tendencies of Cold War leaders. This new identity provided consistent geopolitical "ends" through all nine successive presidential administrations (J. L. Gaddis, 2009). It is this national identity, at odds with isolationist

tendencies of early American international traditions, that provides recurring debates in the current and future direction of American grand strategy.

American Cold War grand strategy was based on several key principles, at least partially divergent from previous era grand strategies and earlier American national identity (Art, 2003). Around the world, the United States relied on selected national and regional leaders to support American initiatives and quell the spread of socialist tendencies in local populations. Though the United States coordinated frequently with Western and Western-oriented partners for military initiatives, diplomacy, and economic sanctions, democracy promotion and the rule of law were consistent tenets of American foreign policy. Table 1 offers a composite summary of Cold War national security principles, accompanying policies, and examples of how the policy was executed.

Table 1

Cold War National Security Principle

National Identity Principle	Policy	Example
Exceptionalism	Democratic Republic icon	Aloof from European conflicts, hegemonic
International Activism	Interventionist activities	Led or participated in many major Western military actions
Regional Stability	Monroe Doctrine, dominate western hemisphere	Incursions into Mexico, Haiti, Grenada, etc.
Multilateralism	Created and lead global institutions, activities	United Nations, NATO, Operation Desert Storm
Pluralism	Promote democracy and anti-authoritarianism	Encouraged and supported national democratic initiatives around the world
Rule of Law, Impartial Justice	Adherence to international agreements and established norms	Sanctions on war criminals, foreign aid provides judicial, law enforcement development

Primacy and Hegemony	Military superiority, interventionism	Dominant defense budget, global commons guarantor
Benevolence	Support human rights and disaster relief in other countries	Foreign aid, disaster relief, sanctions to promote human rights

Note. From Art (2003).

The Problem Statement

The context for this problem is the assertion that United States did not have a clearly defined national identity for a post-Cold War grand strategy (J. L. Gaddis, 2002; Kissinger, 2001; Martel, 2012). Strategy must be based on a common understanding of American identity (Armed Services Committee, 2008), but research has suggested that the United States did not have a clearly articulated national identity to guide its immediate post-Cold War grand strategy, which led to political confusion, resource inefficiencies, and an absence of effective long-term planning and operations (Brands, 2016; Cheney, 2014; J. L. Gaddis, 2002). As the first post-Cold War president, Clinton was unencumbered by the Soviet Union and the global struggle that entailed. The problem this research attempted to resolve was understanding how Clinton identified and explained America's post-Cold War national identity as a justification for his chosen grand strategy. There has not been significant and deliberate research on American national identity and its influence on grand strategy in the post-Cold War era despite the creation of several collegiate grand strategy programs.

The Problem is Current, Relevant, and Significant

An effective grand strategy reflects American national identity, national values, protects national interests, and symbiotically organizes national resources to accomplish international security goals efficiently (Metz, 2010). But according to research,

American grand strategy based on a clearly defined national identity had been absent since the fall of the Soviet Empire through the end of the century (Art, 2003; Brands, 2016; Dueck, 2006, D. J. Gaddis, 2010; Kissinger, 2002). There were several dimensions to this problem. First, while there were several layers of published U.S. government security strategies, they were compartmentalized either by specific military service or the Department of Defense as a whole. The issue, however, was that grand strategy encompasses the whole of government approach, synchronizing all elements of national power and influence: DIME. Therefore, searching for a published grand strategy from an administration prior to 1986 was inconclusive. However, Section 603 of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act required the President to annually publish a national security strategy (NSS) and then listed elements of the definition of grand strategy as required components of this publication. This requirement dedicates at least a section of the president's published NSS to grand strategy.

Second, democracies tend to require elected leaders justify their policies to curry continuous public support. National identity provides useful components for this justification: a historically-based interpretation of "who we are" as a nation, the explicit cultural values that define Americans, the nation's purpose in the international community, and a basis for inclusion and exclusion of others from peers and allies. By connecting grand strategy proposals to these national identity components, presidents clarify and justify how and why their proposal supports America. Though the president has been described as the author and guarantor of national identity (Abshire, 2013;

Beasely, 2004; Huntington, 2004), this research found only one document published by the Clinton administration detailing the national identity components: the NSS.

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to examine post-Cold War American national identity and its impact on grand strategy. I examined historical documents, presidential speeches, and other publications to ascertain how President Clinton designed and projected his version of national identity as justification for his grand strategy choices. These varied sources are important because presidents often use surrogates to advance their messages. In terms of national security and international relations, there are few issues more important than a nation's ability to effectively and efficiently project its national power as a reflection of itself (Art, 2003; Brands, 2014; J. L. Gaddis, 2002). Who America is as a nation directly guides its priorities, its approach to international opportunities and threats, including where and how to use various elements of national power to project its image in the community of nations (Huntington, 2004).

Understanding that American grand strategy changes in response to a potential evolution of national identity enables successive administration officials, foreign policy elites, and national security scholars to assess and determine several important foreign policy factors. For example, President Woodrow Wilson revised his grand strategy, taking the United States into WWI with the Allied Powers, by describing American national identity as the guarantor of democracy around the world (Wilson, 1917). Understanding national identity's influence on grand strategy can better enable officials to comprehend how their identity messaging supports and reinforces foreign policy goals.

By determining American national identity after the elimination of its longtime Soviet nemesis, social and political scientists may better chart the evolution of core American international interests in the context of varying degrees of national security threats.

Research Questions

This research was based on one fundamental question, with a subsequent question:

RQ1: How did President Clinton define America's post-Cold War national identity?

RQ2: How did President Clinton use national identity to justify and implement his grand strategy?

Theoretical Foundation

This study's theoretical framework was based on constructivism to understand and assess potential changes in American national identity. Constructivism is the international relations theory that asserts nations are merely macrocosms of individuals and, as such, are prone to the same social dynamics of individuals and small groups (Dougherty & Phaltzgraff, 1997; Ghica, 2013). Constructivism also asserts that national identity is not only a social construct but also a principle determinant of national activity (Huntington, 2004; Wendt, 1992).

Constructivism framed the approach to understanding American national identity and how that identity defined America's role and purpose in the international arena. As an international relations theory, constructivism stipulates that the principles of human nature, along the lines of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, guide a state's national strategy

(Chadwick, 2003; McLeod, 2014). For example, as people feel the need for social inclusion in their community, states join regional and global coalitions and organizations to reaffirm their national identity and satisfy their social needs. Similarly, to enforce international norms, leaders of dominant states may organize with other states to impose sanctions and possibly ostracize offending states from international organizations and forums (Wendt, 1992). Further, Kantian and Hegelian assumptions of social psychology assert that a group's identity requires an alter-ego to justify critical elements of its social identity (Lebow, 2008). For example, the Soviet Union's demise essentially removed a critical pillar of American national identity, creating the need for redefinition (Huntington, 2004).

Grand strategy is also the product of national identity, which organizes how a nation determines and prioritizes its interests and projects its national power resources (DIME) in the international arena (Huntington, 2004). By observing potential changes in American identity, it is possible to observe corresponding changes in U.S. grand strategy (Metz, 2010). There is a basic assumption in grand strategy theory that asserts that every nation, with rational leaders, follows some strategic model regardless of how eclectic, erratic, or ambiguous their actions may seem, and regardless if that model was clearly defined or codified (Brands 2012, p. 76). This assumption provided an important foundation for this research—that America had at least some systematic approach to using national power for achieving international objectives. Post-Cold War changes in American grand strategy during the George W. Bush era were based on neo-realists' perceptions of power between states and non-state actors and American identity as the

moral leader of the free world (Dueck, 2006). In a constructivist sense, the new American grand strategy was reactive to changes in either national strategic culture (identity) or the distribution of power in the international arena (Dueck, 2006, p. 14).

Definition of Terms

Chairman of the joint chiefs of staff: The highest-ranking military official, the President's personal military advisor (Hastedt, 2004).

DIME: Diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power. Political power and cultural influence are considered a part of informational power (Art, 2003). Military and economic activities are considered "hard power," and diplomatic and informational are considered "soft power" (Nye, 2009).

Department of Defense: The Department of Defense comprises six subordinate departments (Joint Chiefs, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard), and various supporting agencies. The Department of Defense's purpose is threat deterrence and national defense through the projection of military power (Hastedt, 2004).

Department of State: The *Department of State* is the nation's diplomatic corps, charged with managing treaties and agreements across a spectrum of national interests, executing public diplomacy and informational affairs (Hastedt, 2004).

Defense strategic guidance: Published by the secretary of defense, this document explains the application of military force, along with defense-related agencies, as an instrument of national power to accomplish NSS objectives. The defense strategic guidance is written for consumption by agency leaders within the Department of Defense (Department of Defense, 2019a, p. 60).

Executive office of the president: The Executive Office of the President is the complex of departments that serve to organize and execute the President's directives (Kissinger, 2001).

Grand strategy: The doctrine that identifies a nation's identity, purpose, and position in the international arena, prioritizes goals and activities, and synchronizes resources to meet national security objectives (J. L. Gaddis, 2009).

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): A tri-lateral trade agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States in 1994 (NAFTA, 2020).

National defense strategy: Annual report by secretary of defense to Congress describing major military missions, their required force structure, and how the military will support the president's NSS (U.S. Congress, 1986, Sec. 104e).

National military strategy: Required publication by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff to explain the distribution and application of military power to achieve NSS and Defense Strategic Guidance objectives. The national military strategy explains the Joint Force (coordinated effort by all Department of Defense agencies), force development (through training and equipment), and force employment on military objectives (Department of Defense, 2019a, p. 152).

National security strategy (NSS): A congressionally mandated publication of presidential NSS (The Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986, Sec. 104(b)). A document approved by the president of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. (Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019). Because Section

603 of The Goldwater-Nichols Act listed elements of grand strategy's definition as required components of the NSS, at least a section of the NSS should be considered an explanation of current U.S. grand strategy.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I: Signed by American President Richard Nixon and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in May 1972, this agreement limited the number of nuclear launch sites and additional munitions restriction (Hastedt, 2004).

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II: Signed by American President George H.W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on January 3, 1993, this policy further reduced both nuclear arsenals to roughly 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear warheads, along with other munitions limitations (Sherman, 2014).

Whole of government: The collaborative relationship between different government branches on a program, policy, or event (Kissinger, 2001).

Assumptions

This research involved certain assumptions to enable the framework to function. There is a pragmatic definition of grand strategy that can be correctly applied to national activities in the international arena. A president's grand strategy may not be succinctly articulated or delineated yet may still exist (Brands, 2012). Presidents use rational approaches to determine how and when to employ American national power to influence international opportunities and challenges. These assumptions are necessary to ensure the logical and predictable use of power. Additionally, presidents use their explanation of national identity to justify their decisions on the international agenda. These narratives serve to define the nation, national goals, and what the nation aspires to become (Abshire,

2013, p. 51). This research was predicated on the determination that national identity tenets directly influence grand strategy priorities.

Limitations

In this case study, I examined examples where President Clinton and his administration used national identity to justify and explain grand strategic choices and activities. This study used a normative approach that required the interpretation of speeches and proclamations. The interpretation was that the president tried to legitimize grand strategy choices through rhetorical validation in the public sphere, most clearly with his NSSs. Unpopular or perceivably unjustifiable choices tended not to be accepted or pursued long term, and the U.S. Constitution provided the president with latitude in foreign affairs (Krebs, 2015). The greatest limitations are associated with the fact that not every instance of international coordination and conflict could be observed and measured for this study. There were classified decisions and activities with parameters unknown to the public that were made within the limits of President Clinton's published grand strategy.

Another possible limitation of this study was mentioned at a congressional hearing on grand strategy (Armed Services Committee, 2008). The Cold War's grand strategy of "containment" was devised in response to a known threat, identifiable, and straightforwardly confronted (Brands, 2016; J. L. Gaddis, 1982). But Dr. Mitchell Reiss (2008) explained to the 110th Congress that the post-Cold War era may be far too complex a strategic environment for a single over-arching grand strategy to be designed for (p. 27). His assumption was echoed by General Jack Keene, Vice Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (Armed Services Committee, 2008). However, this research was not intended to determine how a grand strategy is created, or if one can be designed considering the complications of the 21st century. Because Section 603 of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act required the inclusion of grand strategy tenets in the president's annually published NSS, this research asserts President Clinton did produce the requisite grand strategy explanations in each of his published NSSs from 1994 through 2000. It is President Clinton's seven NSSs, published annually, that were observed for this research. The literature review clarified this assertion with a broader understanding of grand strategy and national identity.

Delimitations

There were several delimitations to this research. I analyzed communications of senior administration officials that explained how and why they used national resources to solve challenges in the international arena. Some activities and communications were prioritized above others based on their proximity to the president. Activities and actions placed further from the president's sphere were valued less than others and excluded from this study simply because the need to limit and use the most valuable data possible. However, every effort was made to ensure the research questions were saturated with relevant data.

Selecting the temporal limits for this research was an important delimitation, as that automatically included and excluded some data sets. This research was bounded by the Clinton administration terms in office (1993–2000) because his terms represented the first new presidency after the fall of the Soviet Union, and it presented a finite amount of

data that could reasonably be accessed. Several authors specifically identified the December 25th, 1991, resignation of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and the dissolution of the Soviet Union as end of the Cold War and a turning point in the history of U.S. foreign policy (Brands, 2014; Bremmer, 2015; Nojeim & Kilroy, 2011). Additionally, the event was a critical junction in American national identity because the Cold War structure significantly influenced states' identities and roles based on their position in the international system (Dueck, 2006; Huntington, 2006; Kissinger, 1996). Therefore, the international structural change resulting from the end of the Cold War could have produced a new American national identity. However, I did not include the George H. W. Bush administration because they were steeped in Cold War traditions as evidenced by Bush's tenure in the Reagan administration and the Cheney/Wolfowitz Strategic Planning Guidance (Tyler, 1992) that proposed an aggressively hegemonic grand strategy. The Cheney/Wolfowitz strategy was rejected by President Bush and not officially published.

Delimitation was evidenced by the choices of speeches and communications included in this data. Though not every public pronouncement referred to national security, as much as possible I selected communications that specifically addressed both national identity and the use of national power. This choice helped ensure the data and findings were relevant and consistent with the research topic. It is important to note that limited oppositional narratives were considered as data. The relevance of various narratives offered by political opponents was specifically addressed by Krebs (2015) and helped focus data analysis.

Potential Sociopolitical Significance

This study offered the potential for significant contribution to the social and political implications of determining American foreign policy in addition to grand strategy implications. This research of American national identity evolution may contribute evidence of how the nation develops its foreign policy without predetermined ideological obligations. By conducting a case study of the first post-Cold War presidential administration, I was able to ascertain how America defined itself and determined its place in the immediate post-Cold War world without a global opponent. This research is not only teleological but introspective of American world leadership as well. Being scholarly in nature, this research produced results without the ideologically prescriptive requirements many journalists and political pundits find themselves obligated to produce.

The social implications for this research may be just as significant. Because this research was politically introspective, the results can help ascertain the social, political, and cultural implications of current and future generations determining America's place in the world through the construct of national identity. Just as the 21st century has seen considerable changes in American domestic politics, those changes are bound to influence American self-image, and by implications, its international obligations and the strategies to achieve them. This research may demonstrate that as American domestic culture evolves, so does its self-identity and corresponding national security assumptions.

Summary

I examined the activities and communications of the first post-Cold War American president to determine if and how he defined American national identity as a legitimating force for a chosen grand strategy. Grand strategy identifies the nation's identity, purpose, and position in the international arena, prioritizes goals and activities, and synchronizes resources to meet national security objectives (J. L. Gaddis, 2009). This chapter outlined the trajectory of American national identity, showing a nation developing its place in regional then global affairs. America consolidated its identity as the "leader of the free world" in World War II and the Cold War as the protagonist for regional stability in Europe, international security, and democracy promotion with the grand strategy that directly confronted the global Soviet threat. The Soviet Union imbued U.S. foreign policy with a clearly defined adversary and a noble national identity.

The end of the Cold War provided America the opportunity to reconceptualize its purpose, national identity, and position in the evolving global arena (Layne, 1998). This research is determined to settle the debate by determining if and how President Clinton redesigned America's national identity, world purpose, and required grand strategy. A thorough literature review helped clarify national identity as the ideational construct used to justify grand strategy selection, which is discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The primary research question was "How did President Clinton define America's post-Cold War national identity?" The secondary question was "How did President Clinton use national identity to justify and implement his grand strategy?" This literature review was designed to explore research on post-Cold War American national identity and its potential influence on grand strategy. A literature review helped review ideas concerning post-Cold War American grand strategy. Noted authors provided perspectives on important issues in American foreign policy and activity in the international arena. Yet this was not just a discussion of events but the reasons, theories, and decisions that created events in the immediate post-Cold War American era. The conceptual framework for grand strategy provided the foundation for understanding both the definitions and relationships of national identity and grand strategy.

Although Carl von Clausewitz (2015) developed the concept of a national grand strategy, and Liddell B. H. Hart (1991) coined the term in modern international relations following WWII, the term often invokes a variety of unclear definitions. Thus, clarifying a standard definition was important to this study. It was also important to identify what researchers found to be persistent tenets of American grand strategy because tracking changes in those tenets from one president to the next (or within administrations) can contribute to identifying types of grand strategy changes and points-in-time at which they occur.

I also sought to identify the various research methodologies used by scholars. Observing how other researchers and authors studied this topic presents various research methodologies and strategies that inform and focus this research effort. Although many prescriptive monographs did not identify a research methodology, a strategy could often be gleaned from the authors' presentation of facts and assertions, which I used to inform this study. Identification of research tools, tactics, and techniques also informed this study either by demonstrating which produced rigorous results or what did not. For example, it became clear that I would need to include a timeline of events considered vital to this research. I modified President Clinton's critical events timeline from the University of Virginia's Miller Center on The Presidency, excluding domestic and non-foreign affairs issues. See "National Power Projection Timeline" in Appendix C.

In addition, I sought other scholars' characterizations of each president's foreign policy in the hopes that information could help identify or explain substantive differences between administrations. Lastly, I looked for new questions that would emerge from the literature to better guide and focus this research. Specifically, the issue of varying national interests proved to be a helpful addition because that delineated and prioritized the major threats each president perceived and used to guide his new or adherence to a potentially preexisting grand strategy. The conclusion serves both to summarize critical aspects of the literature review and discusses implications for this research on social changes.

The Literature Search Strategy section provides an outline of the document search techniques and determinants used to find the best literature on post-Cold War American

grand strategy. I organized the bulk of the literature reviewed chronologically because I observed what I think are evolutionary changes in both tone and content of American grand strategy as the nation traversed important periods of national development and world history. Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, several authors attempted to ascertain what America's next grand strategy would be (J. L. Gaddis, 1991; Mead, W. R., 1993). For instance, the attacks on September 11, 2001 triggered what G. John Ikenberry (2001) called a "fundamental reorientation of foreign policy" (p. 19). However, though commentary on American grand strategy was plentiful, scholarly discourse analyzing changes in post-Cold War American grand strategy was sparse.

The literature review then begins by exploring constructivism as a derivative of neo-liberalist theory, which explained the dynamics of inter-state activity through the lens of human cultural experience. I explore national identity as a pivotal determinant of national interests, which could produce a national grand strategy. The sitting president was identified as the official author of American national identity and grand strategy, ostensibly through the publication of the NSSs.

Literature Search Strategy

The literature search for this research project began at the Walden Library website in the policy and administration databases. I searched the following databases: The Political Science Complete, Political Science Complete: A Sage Full-Text Collection, International Security, Homeland Security Digital Library, and Academic Search Complete. I also used Google Scholar for essays and books on American grand strategy. However, not all databases were available or productive under specific headings, so I

began with political science, under which I added Academic Search Complete, e-book collection, Military and Government Collection, Political Science Complete, and International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center.

For all databases used, the search parameters included full text, scholarly (peer-reviewed) journals, and the earliest publication dates were set for 1990 (after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unofficial beginning of the end of the Cold War). Signed during November 1990, the Charter of Paris served as the official Soviet declaration of noncompetition in the Cold War and their commitment to self-determination. I assumed essays published prior to that year would not adequately address the post-Cold War era of American grand strategy since, at the time, no one would know the Cold War was ending. The search parameters were *grand strategy*, *American grand strategy*, *U.S. grand strategy*, *national security strategy*, *American national identity*, and *national identity* in the subject terms field. I also combined *identity* with *grand strategy*. *National security* was too broad of a term and did not produce titles specifically focusing on grand strategy, yet *national security strategy* was equated with grand strategy by the Department of Defense doctrine. English was the selected language and all types of documents were included. This yielded 140 results, although some were in other languages.

To broaden the scope of this literature review, I also searched several websites of noted national security think tanks for publications by noted scholars. The Council on Foreign Relations website and my subscription offered a few publications relevant to American post-Cold War grand strategy. Considered one of the elite foreign policy centers in America, the Council on Foreign Relations is composed of renowned

practitioners and scholars on American foreign policy. The Army War College (Strategic Studies Institute) and the National Defense University (Institute for National Strategic Studies) publications were valuable to this research because they added a military perspective.

The search also included conference proceedings and video lectures. The issue of American grand strategy has inspired significant academic and professional inquiries since the beginning of the 21st century. Of note are the lectures by John Mearsheimer, Joseph Nye, and John Lewis Gaddis. Several prominent universities have recently developed entire programs devoted to the study of American grand strategy. The Brady-Johnson Program at Yale, Duke University Grand Strategy Program, and Temple University's collaboration with the Foreign Policy Research Institute on the Hertog Program in grand strategy. The value these programs offered was syllabi, as a few publications common to two or more programs guided this research and are presented here.

Several databases were more challenging to work with than others. For example, EBSCO host database made it difficult to download adobe files. Consequently, other databases contributed search results with abstracts that looked promising. In addition, the search parameters were limited on several databases, SAGE Journals and Taylor Francis Online, for example. I was unable to select "peer-reviewed" as one of the search criteria.

Further, this research used databases provided by the Walden University Library and the Central Rappahannock Regional Library (librarypoint.org) in Northern Virginia. I requested books with prefaces that looked promising from the Central Rappahannock

Regional Library, as they have an extensive book loan agreement with Mary Washington University and George Mason University, both also located in Virginia. The only other search engine used was Google Scholar, which linked to Walden University Library. SAGE Research Methods Online was very helpful in finding research methodology information. I used the following Walden databases: ABI/INFORM Complete, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (eBook collection), Homeland Security Digital Library, International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, Political Science Complete, ProQuest Central, SAGE Premier, SAGE Research Methods Online, SoCINDEX with Full Text. I used the following Central Rappahannock Regional Library databases: Congressional Quarterly Researcher and JSTOR. C-SPAN was used for video conferences and speeches, The Clinton Presidential Library (online), and several collegiate sources, including The Miller Center at the University of Virginia, The National Defense University, and The American Presidency Project at The University of California for speeches, transcripts, and documents. I also used The National Security Strategy Archives for published NSSs, which is located on the Homeland Security Digital Library.

The primary search terms were *American grand strategy, U.S. grand strategy, post-Cold War grand strategy, grand strategy, American post-Cold War national identity,* and *American national identity.* However, after reading a few essays, it became apparent that searching for the critical components of grand strategy might also yield valuable tangential information on the subject. Adding *American national interests, post-Cold War national interests, American strategic interests, strategic narratives,* and

presidential narratives produced useful results that provided insight into American strategic history. Using these and other search terms was an iterative process.

Finding and Sorting the Literature for Review

Much of the literature rejected for this research offered little analytical depth or historical value, including the authors' preferences for grand strategy while criticizing the president. Few essays or books were the product of a scholarly research effort to identify and explain specific changes in post-Cold War American grand strategy. Much of the literature reviewed for this research included scholarly assessments of individual presidential foreign policy, such as British Professor John Dumbrell's (2005) lecture on the Bill Clinton foreign policy. Individual presidential assessments helped identify distinct trends that may have been unique to one president or one specific period in recent American international history.

As this was essentially a study of international relations, I specifically included non-American authors whose contributions helped broaden the perspectives on American grand strategy. Dumbrell (2005), wrote from the United Kingdom, Miller (2010), writing from Israel, and others served that purpose well. In international affairs, national identity is important, yet so is the perception from other sources in the international community.

Theoretical Foundation

Literature Review

The Nature of Constructivism

Constructivism is a state-based theory of international relationships grounded on the principles of human social interaction (Dougherty & Phaltzgraff, 1997; Ghica, 2013;

Wendt, 1992). This social theory suggests an international application of Maslow's hierarchy of needs (survival, safety, belongingness, self-esteem, and self-actualization; Chadwick & May, 2003; McLeod, 2014). However, constructivism's principle structure is that states relate to other states and situations based on ideational, intersubjective, and socially constructed and contextual understandings, the same as individuals and groups (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, the society of states is a cognitive structure of shared knowledge among nations and their leaders, which contributes to each state's national identity.

Constructivism stipulates that state identities are the product of both endogenous and external interaction in that a nation's domestic agenda shapes its international character and the broader society of states projects characteristics onto each nation, especially at the regional level (Wendt, 1992). How the community of nations perceive a specific state therefore influences that state's perception of itself and the national interests that are a product of that state's identity. This phenomenon is especially clear in international forums such as regional associations and the United Nations.

Because the nature of American democracy stipulates that the national government's character is a derivative of the domestic citizens' political character measured by votes, significant American cultural changes should preclude national adjustments in the international arena. In terms of American grand strategy, the social context and state identity define national interests.

The power of constructivist influence. The power of constructivism is its explanation that the society of nations resembles the group dynamics of humans; that

social order is an important, even pivotal causal factor of state behavior; that reality is normatively constructed by group participants; and that identity shapes and explains state behavior (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p. 143). Constructivism suggests that social pressures such as shaming, public exaltation, and the stigmatization of sanctions force states to adhere to shared international values and norms (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, the power to design and reinforce international norms and laws is a component of constructivism. For American grand strategy, this explanation bears two important implications: whether the United States follows or deviates from international norms and if the United States has the power and influence to impose domestic norms within other states (e.g., preventing state-sponsored genocide), or whether the U.S. can design international norms and influence other states to follow them. Constructivism's assumptions about structure and process are important precursors to this issue of creating and influencing domestic and international norms.

Additionally, numerous researchers have used constructivism to examine and explain international relations activities in various regions. For example, Yukawa (2017) used constructivism to explain the unique characteristics evident among Asian States. The "ASEAN Way" uses constructivism emphasis on ideational factors to validate the peaceful approach states' interactions (Yukawa, 2017). Yukawa focused on the norms and identities that states created which emphasized individual state tolerance of other regional actors' domestic activities.

Structure and process. Structure in international relations refers to enduring characteristics of the international system that do not change often, if at all, and infuse the

contextual nature of state activity (Wendt, 1992). Structures are institutions and norms built by iterations of state interactions. For example, realism indicates that one structural characteristic of the international system is its anarchic nature in that there is no world authority to impose order on the participants (Morgenthau, 2006). Another realist example, and one adopted by constructivists, is that security is the first goal of states in a "self-help" system (Wendt, 1992). Process, on the other hand, is the interaction of states in the international community and is concerned with how states interact (Wendt, 1992). Constructivism suggests that states may change their behavior based on learning and interacting with other states and institutions. Further, states do learn and change in reaction to exogenous activity (Wendt, 1992). Accordingly, constructivism asserts both processes and structures of the international system are inter-subjective. Therefore, the loss of America's international alter-ego should have produced a significant change in its self-perception and corresponding theory of international activity.

The issues of structure and process are important to this research for several reasons. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War changed the structure of the international system (Waltz, 1993, p. 45). The bipolar world then became a unipolar world, with the United States as the sole hegemonic power (Layne, 2006, p. 5). National interests are the state's international priorities which, using grand strategy, drive the allocation of resources and the priority of state activity (Brands, 2012). Realists consider interests unchanging and uninfluenced by factors such as institutions (process) and the redistribution of power (structural) in the international system (Wendt, 1992). This prevents realists from acknowledging that national interests change over time, often

in response to exogenous stimuli (Wendt, 1992, p. 394). On the other hand, constructivists assert national interests change based on intersubjective processes of identity transformation. This point is critical to this study of grand strategy because it allows the capture of American national interest changes in response to known changes in structure (the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world) and process (the terrorist attacks on 9/11/01).

Constructivist implications for grand strategy. Constructivism's offered significant implications for this research on grand strategy change in the post-Cold War era. First, constructivism explained national interests as defined by national identities, and that national identities are inter-subjective products of State-based relationships (Wendt, 1992). By observing evolving identities, this research may observe changes in national interests and inter-State relationships. Second, grand strategy is composed of prioritized national interests and the allocation of national resources to achieve those interests (Art, 2003). Therefore, as national interests change based on an evolving identity the accompanying grand strategy should reflect those changes accordingly. For this research, constructivism presented a paradigm to examine U.S. activities in the international arena based on changing identities that influenced national power.

The society-of-States is a cognitive structure of shared knowledge among nations that contribute to each State's national identity and ensuing their national interests are considered (Huntington, 2004). Constructivism, as used in this study, examined State-based activity based on ideational and social characteristics (Wendt, 1992). Therefore,

national identity was an ideational construct of a social position and purpose in the international arena.

Additionally, as grand strategy is the planned use of national power to achieve national interests, the value of several power dimensions can be explained through constructivist theory. Joseph Nye's (2010) TED Talk posited that America's "soft power" is by far the more effective power dimension for a multi-polar world. Nye's assertion is predicated on the attraction of independent nations in a multi-polar world, where there are competing centers of influence across different power dimensions. Nye also posits that attracting nations to America's banner through soft power issues like common values, reduces the number of states who might compete with U.S. interests in various regions. Attracting friends is much easier than defeating adversaries. Soft power's primacy reinforces the use of constructivism as a research paradigm.

Constructivism and American grand strategy. The ability to design and reinforce global norms and laws is a critical component of constructivism. Since WWII, America has significantly influenced the international agenda, norms, and laws; and, as one of the bipolar hegemonic powers, assumed the role of global policeman by reinforcing those norms and leading ad hoc coalitions to punish rogue actors. Wendt (1992) stipulates social identities determine national interests and roles in the global arena (p. 438). As the author of the modern international system, the U.S. was exceptionally positioned to influence its evolution through its grand strategy.

Katzenstein (1996) edited a 13-essay book examining normative influences on national security, including national identity. The authors examined how social science

tenets inform State activity. National identity was explained as the social construct of national leaders, often using narratives to communicate and inspire popular support (Huntington, 2006; Katzenstein, 1996; Krebs, 2015). While liberalism is a broad normative approach to international relations, constructivism specifically focuses on social constructs among nations, which include national identity's influence on State activity. Dueck (2006), Huntington (2006), Jervis (2010), and others, used constructivism to explain American national identity and the influence of strategic culture on American interests and national power use.

The use of constructivism in international relations. Constructivism is a relatively new theory within the spectrum of international relations. According to constructivism, the reward of inclusion and the consequence of exclusion are important stimuli for States (Wendt, 1992). For example, although the "Group of Seven" (G7) was formed from the most influential economic powers in the early 1970's, Russia was not "elevated" to the group until 1998, when their democratic transition was firmly established and consequently rewarded. President Bill Clinton urged Russia's inclusion into the group, which both rewarded Russian democratic growth and reinforced American leadership in the forum, making it the "G8" (Laub, 2014).

Conversely, to "punish" Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008, President George W. Bush considered removing them from the G8 (Laub, 2014). Russia's 2013 annexation of Crimea prompted the G8 to cancel the 2014 meeting of the group, slated to be held in Russia, and actually "suspended" Russian membership (Acosta, 2014). This converted the G8 back to the G7. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif

(2015) confirmed another powerful example of the constructivist assumptions about inclusion during an interview with Charlie Rose. Zarif explained the reason Iranians wanted to approve the pending nuclear deal with the P5+1 (U.K., U.S., Germany, France, Russia, and China) was not because of sanctions pressure, but because Iranians wanted to rejoin the community of nations without the stigma of sanctions.

Review of Identity Theory

Wendt (1992) explained identity theory as the perception of one's place in the society-of-States and the role-specific expectations that are the product of collective understanding (p. 397). Consequently, social constructivist theory broadly assumes people and States may have multiple identities in different social settings. For example, a State may project a mentor identity with the role of revisionist in third world settings by promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law through various aid programs. That same state may project an elitist identity with a status-quo enforcing role in Eastern Europe by defending existing State borders through the threat of force, sanctions, or the organization of coalitions against the aggressor State. Therefore, the role the U.S. sees itself assuming in the international system influences the decision-making system its leaders employ to gauge national interests and the resources and actions to promote those same interests.

Using constructivism, Huntington (1997) analyzed American national identity, its national interest products, and explained historical identity changes that may influence post-Cold War grand strategy. Huntington diagnosed trends during the 1990's in the international environment, such as the "clash of civilizations" and the resulting conflicts

within and between societies, a resurgence of power politics, and the conflicting global pressures of fragmentation and convergence (p. 28). Huntington added the technological, social, and demographic shifts in American society at the close of the Cold War and the twentieth century forced a redefinition of American national identity. He identified the "confused" nature of the various debates on U.S. national interests during this period, as well as the unifying effect the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks had on national identity and interests of the U.S. (p. 8).

Domestically, and speaking in cultural evolutionary terms, Huntington (1997) noted early American identity as the product of primarily Protestant British and Northern European traditions. These foundational principles of capitalism, limited government, and the individual's freedoms and role in society created the enduring core American culture, and national and international identity. Huntington also reiterated Michael Lind's four phases of American cultural evolution: Anglo-American (1789-1861), Euro-American (1875-1957), Multicultural America (1972-1996), and the fourth period includes resolutions of various socio-economic divisions and power sharing conflicts in 21st century American society.

Huntington (1997) directly linked the American cultural evolution from the colonial period to the end of the modern era to corresponding foreign policy changes because dominant political demographics evolved and influenced the progression and balance of isolationism and internationalism. However, Huntington also noted the demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War deprived the American national

identity of its self-defining “national cause”, which galvanized national and international support for the “Containment” grand strategy for nearly 50 years.

The Global War on Terror may have initially replaced the Cold War as America’s raison d’être. Dueck (2006) explained the attacks on 9/11 may have primed America’s strategic cultural identity to reinvigorate hegemonic tenets of American grand strategy that were dormant and unprovoked during the 1990s. Dueck also confirmed the causal relationship between cultural influences and foreign policy and validated the use of constructivism as a paradigm for measuring potential changes in American grand strategy (p. 14).

Additionally, Wendt (1992) posited that State identities promote national interests (p. 399). While Wendt, and other liberal constructivists, normally disagree with the structural influence argument of realists, here he suggests international institutions provide a “structure” for perceiving State identities. The structures are the norms and formal rules of the institution, and when a State joins the institution, it then adopts or adheres to the institution’s rules. These structures (norms and institutions) then contribute to both the State’s identity and a motivational force for determining State activities.

In terms of this research, scholars assume America’s self-identity is defined or at least influenced by participation in various international organizations. Indeed, applying Wendt’s (1992) assumptions that a State’s identity is influenced by organizations it joins, there is evidence the U.S. influences international organizations it helped create. When the U.S. helped create the United Nations, significant elements of American identity were

written into the U.N. charter, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations, 2020). Taking this one-step further, America sees itself not only as a follower of U.N. norms, but also as a shaper of world norms by assuming a leading role in creating several prominent international institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), among others.

To further support Wendt's (1992) theory of identity, he inserts constructivist theory into an example. Wendt's assumption that two people, representing States without endogenic power imperatives such as glory or conquest, meet for the first time and each bases its actions on the other's actions. While Wendt's example further involved the threat of violence through signaling, and the corresponding response of self-preservation, he did not explain the initial threatening action. Readers were left to assume there is fear; however, that was a missing component of the early scenario's explanation (Wendt, 1992, p. 404). The other fault with constructivist theory is that it does not consider the offensive nature of States to project their own values and images onto other States (especially neighbors) as a matter of self-preservation.

American National Identity and grand strategy. Huntington (2004) provided the lynch pin connecting national identity as a principal causal factor of grand strategy. During the Cold War, political ideology and the "leader of the free world" national identity served as the relevant impetuses for American grand strategy, with democracy promotion as a defining national interest (Huntington, 2004, p. 257). However, the Soviet Union's collapse and the end of the Cold War removed the "other" from American national identity, causing national culture to replace ideological differences as the leading

American grand strategy characteristic. This was reinforced by President Clinton, and other presidents, advocating the spread of American values around the world. Spreading values as a component of American national identity in the post-Cold War era replaced spreading democracy as the primary definition of American Cold War grand strategy (Huntington, 2004).

Robert Jervis (2010) astutely identified the influence of national identity on American grand strategy as expressed by presidential narratives. He explained national identity as the set of group attributes, values, and practices which members think best describe and differentiate their State from others (Jervis, 2010, p. 22). Jervis also emphasized the importance of differentiation, as national identity critically used to include States with similar attributes (allies) and exclude States that differ from us on pivotal issues (adversaries), such as being a representative democracy. For this research, Jervis (2010) and Huntington (2006) add important parameters for explaining national identity: it explains "who we are" and what cultural characteristics describe America. An important modern example was given in President Jimmy Carter's 1978 state of the union (SOTU) speech, when he explained "We must act in a way that is true to what we are… the very heart of our identity as a nation is our firm commitment to human rights" (Carter, 1978).

Eyre and Suchman (1996) used constructivism to explain conventional arms proliferation among Third World nations. Leaders' desire to improve their fledgling nation's "status" provoked regional arms races among impoverished and newly independent countries during the post-Colonial era. Projecting Eyre and Suchman's

(1996) use of constructivism to current situations on the Korean peninsula, the same explanation could be made for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's ongoing quest for nuclear weapons and the prominence it could afford him as Asia's second "nuclear power".

The social construction of Russia's resurgence. "The Social Construction of Russia's Resurgence" (Clunan, 2009) uses social identity at the national level and international relations theory to analyze how Russian elites used popular and historical "national interests" to shape Russia's 21st century identity. The sudden demise of the Soviet Union and the rebirth of Russia offered international relations researchers as close to a "natural" identity development experiment as one could expect (Clunan, 2009). Russian political elites specifically crafted parts of the nation's new identity to retain its certain elements of the country's historical prowess.

Russia's Cold War identity existed in the collective and dominant characteristics of its people because, even though the Soviet Union ceased to exist at the end of 1991, the history and legacy of the Russian people proved an enduring national phenomenon. However, Russian policy elites saw a unique opportunity to redefine the nation's concept of self and purpose as both a domestic vision and international aspirations. This is the premise of my research, that American political leaders interpret and define national identity as the determining factor for grand strategy.

Contextually, Russian resurgence occurred in the era of limited national economic and military power, globalization, the birth of the internet, and the expansion of international terrorism. Additionally, Russian leaders had to design their national identity

in terms of its relationship with the U.S. and Western Europe because these represented the dominant powers in the international arena. A revanchist approach to Russian identity would likely result in a new Cold War. Developing a Western-oriented identity would likely lead to increased international collaboration, especially on security and economic issues. Russia's 2008 incursion into Georgia, and 2014 annexation of Crimea (Simpson, 2014) can be considered evidence of the grand strategy born of the new Russian identity.

Russia's geopolitical history and economics almost guaranteed that whatever or whoever the nation became it would significantly influence the global arena, especially in terms of security and cooperation. The Russian domestic debate centered on two pivotal questions: "What is Russia? and What does Russia do? (sic)" (Clunan, 2009, p. 2). In fact, the processes demonstrated that Russian leaders debated limiting the influence of the need for international grandeur redefining "Stateliness" for the 21st century. Clearly, the identity question precedes and determines the question of national purpose. National purpose determines national interests, the founding components of grand strategy.

Clunan (2009) directly States that national identity defines a nation's foreign policy directions. Clunan also introduces "aspirational" constructivism as a modified approach to international relations that focuses on social psychology and social identity theory as the origin of national identity. While my research uses the traditional constructivist approach to international relations, it is noteworthy and encouraging to observe the scientific study of international relations growing. Additionally, Clunan's work relies heavily on social psychology; my research focuses on the international

relations theory aspect of the equation, specifically grand strategy as the actualization of national interests.

Review of Grand Strategy

This section introduced and defined the concept of grand strategy and its modern use by the United States to organize national interests and guide the use of national resources for strategic international objectives. The conceptual basis for this research began with a discussion of grand strategy's definition, its components, and the influence of national identity on national interests.

First, grand strategy is about identifying and prioritizing national interests (Metz, 2010). Secondly, a grand strategy identifies, prioritizes, and allocates resources against the principle threats to those national interests. The third function of grand strategy is to provide subordinate leaders the broad guidance they need to execute their specific national power paradigms (diplomatic, information, military, economic) to achieve American foreign policy goals (Brands, 2014). Finally, published grand strategy (here, through Clinton's NSSs) is a national communication: proposed domestically to political stakeholders, projected internationally to allies and adversaries. It informs allies of national priorities and goals, and alerts adversaries to activities and national interests the administration may challenge.

The architect of modern "grand strategy", British strategist B. H. Liddell Hart (1991), adopted Clausewitz's explanation of strategy, while noting the administrative discrepancy between "strategy" and "policy" (Hart B. H., 1991). Clausewitz defined tactics as the movements to win battles, and that strategy was the vision that won

campaigns and wars (Mead W. R., Power, Terror, Peace, and War America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk, 2004, p. 13). Clausewitz identified grand strategy as the province of kings and prime ministers because it determined which wars to fight and the political goals those wars should achieve (Mead, 2004, p. 13). Hart also considered the application of Clausewitz's definition of strategy too narrow, focused only on wartime activity for the dual purposes of military victory and the parameters of the ensuing peace.

Hart (1991) expanded Clausewitz's philosophy of grand strategy to encompass perennial State-based activity in the normal pursuit of various national goals in the international arena, such as national security. Liddell Hart also identified grand strategy as the highest form of Statecraft, using all the tools of national power to secure international objectives (Hart, 1991, p. 322). In his book *Strategy* (1991), Hart not only provided maxims for national strategy planning and execution, but also appeared to be the earliest author to associate the phrase "ends and means" in explaining national security objectives and the grand strategy to achieve them (p. 335). Hart's vision of grand strategy clearly incorporated national elements of power coordinated for political ends. However, many authors do not converge on a single grand strategy definition, which is why I address that issue below. For additional measures of national security analysis, see Appendix C.

Defining grand strategy. From the very narrow perspectives and uses, to the broadly theoretical and abstract, grand strategy is often characterized as a nebulous concept (Committee, 2008). Several authors offered divergent definitions and purposes for grand strategy. These views ranged from strictly military policy confined to wartime

operations, to the composite interests and goals of a nation in both peace and war. There also seemed to be a discrepancy in the priority of grand strategy to foreign policy. Considered by many to be the father of modern strategy, Prussian General Carl Von Clausewitz identified State-based strategy as the woven strands of national power to pursue political purpose and accomplish the highest national security objectives (Von Clausewitz, 2015). That comprehensive perspective was supported by B. Liddell Hart (1991).

Art (2003) agreed with the majority of authors that grand strategy identifies and prioritizes a nation's international goals, but stipulated the only national resource grand strategy uses is military power. Art posited *foreign policy* was the broader phenomenon that coordinated all the elements of national power: DIME (p. 2). Other authors also favored the military perspective to define grand strategy. Brimley (2008) equated grand strategy with the military phrase "commander's intent", where the leader identifies his priorities, the contextual factors, and the mission's goals, albeit at the national level for international goals. Mearsheimer (2011) explained grand strategy as the process of militarily securing regions of the world valuable to American economic security (Europe, North East Asia, and the Persian Gulf).

Emphasizing the broader perspective, several authors offered more comprehensive grand strategy definitions. Brands (2014), Layne (2006), Kennedy (1991), Payne (2012), and others held the exact opposite view to Art (2003), that grand strategy is "the highest form of Statecraft" (Brands, 2014, p. 1). Brands' case study delineated the ambiguous and "slippery" concept and defined grand strategy as the

"intellectual architecture" that provides organization and structure to a nation's foreign policy (p. 1). Kennedy (1991) also emphasized the broader use of grand strategy, incorporating the hard elements of national power: the military, economic, and political. Grand strategy, Kennedy proclaimed, provides the critical link between near term actions and long-term national interests and goals, without the military emphasis. Notably, Payne's explanation offered no emphasis on military aspects of grand strategy.

The grand strategy authors. Gray (2011) identified the U.S. president as the author of American grand strategy. This occurs primarily through the publication of the NSS, with incremental adjustments and clarifications made through public speeches, administration press releases, and official pronouncements that help to clarify emerging national interests. While Gray's perspective explains the president's unique role in designing the nation's grand strategy, it presents a possible explanation for continuity in the Cold War grand strategy of "Containment". If each of the presidents held synonymous views of the priority of international threats and courses of action to alleviate those threats, that would explain how "Containment" was supported by successive American presidents, even across four decades of oscillating political parties.

The erratic threat levels in the post-Cold War period may also have influenced each president's perception of the need for a particular and continuous grand strategy, or, as Kissinger (2001) explained of Clinton, a president could decide there was no need for a grand strategy at all. Gray's (2011) explanation may also offer insight into how and why American post-Cold War grand strategy may have changed in response to the evolving international threat levels. Gray explained that erratic threat levels and types

prevented the U.S. from developing a mature grand strategy in the post-Cold War era. He asserted the international threats changed significantly with the demise of the Soviet Union under Bush I and the Clinton era saw a relatively benign, if evolving, threat atmosphere, notwithstanding the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole and African embassies. However, hard and tumultuous attacks on September 11th under "Bush II" followed by a lower level but persistent threat scenario under Obama produced an evolving approach that was not yet fully developed into a mature and specific strategy.

The use of grand strategy by States is also a point of contention. A generous reading of Thucydides' (*trans*. 1956) account of the Peloponnesian War suggests he thought grand strategies were available only to leaders of large and powerful city-States. Thucydides asserted larger city-States could plan their expeditions (grand strategy), but the smaller and weaker States' leaders were often at the mercy of their dominating neighbors and perpetually reactive (Thucydides, 1956, p. 29). Thucydides (1956) suggested smaller States' leaders' grand strategy options were limited to collective security through city-State coalitions in the hopes that their combined strength would prevent more powerful States from attacking coalition members (p. 203).

Grand strategy tenets. A nation's grand strategy is the guiding paradigm through which it prioritizes national interests, allocates national resources against those interests, and determines the intellectual architecture that guides its policies, actions, and reactions to the myriad events and situations in the international arena (J. L. Gaddis, 2002). Historically speaking, Paul Miller (2012) identified five perpetual tenets of American grand strategy: homeland defense, promoting the democratic peace, maintaining a

favorable balance of power, the correction of rogue States, and the promotion of ally capabilities and good governance around the world (p. 7). Ikenberry (2001) offered similar but broader principles of American grand strategy since the nation's founding. Ikenberry suggested cooperative security and the promotion of liberalism and capitalism around the world are what traditionally drive American grand strategy. Coincidentally, cooperative security, the promotion of liberalism, and capitalist cooperation around the world were products of Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter (1941). Professor Jonathan Monten (2005) agreed with Ikenberry on the theoretical level, that liberalist tendencies have shaped American grand strategy. Ben Miller, (2010) concurred with the liberalist tradition, and added the promotion of human rights, democracy, and free trade. It appears 20th century American grand strategy and the U.S.'s support for the 1948 publication of the United Nations Declarations of Human Rights (UNDHR) influenced Miller's assertions.

What was interesting was that each of these broad, theoretical, and specific tenets of American grand strategy may be considered true and accurate descriptions albeit at different intervals in American history. The U.S. has consistently promoted human rights around the world since WWI, yet notably supported authoritarian regimes with horrendous human rights records when it was politically expedient during the Cold War. Although Ikenberry's (2001) and Miller's (2012) assumptions about American grand strategy were not mutually exclusive, there appeared to be an oscillation in the emphasis of evolving national interests that grand strategy is used to accomplish. This may

account for the variations in perception, characterization, and even the perceived lack of grand strategy.

Defining national interests. One of the key components of grand strategy research is the identification and prioritization of the national interests (Yetiv, 2008). Although many politicians and pundits proclaim their description of American national interests to be the purest, in terms of grand strategy, the sitting president is, in my opinion, the primary author of those interests by virtue of his authority to determine national security objectives and the allocation of national resources against those objectives. I deduced this opinion based on the president's authority outlined in Article II of the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, President Clinton's national security strategies published his national and international priorities, which in turn, guided U.S. policy during his term. Because national interests are often defined in terms of both domestic and international threats and opportunities, the identified national interests may change between presidents and even during a presidential administration. In advocating for a particular grand strategy, democratically elected presidents are compelled to publish their assessments of American national interests in order to garner public support their strategic goals.

Numerous authors proclaimed a few national interests as "foundational" for modern American grand strategy. Liberalism is one of America's most enduring national interests, prevalent in the international preferences of America's founding fathers (Ikenberry, 2001; Miller, 2010; Monten, 2005). Walt (2005) stipulated the promotion of peace and prosperity were cornerstones of the Great Republic since its founding. While

many early American presidents advocated liberalist tenets in their international policies, supporting the growth of democratic governments around the world became an enduring national interest after WWII.

The Department of Defense dictionary (2015) defined national interests as the "foundation" for national security goals (p. 165). While it did not mention grand strategy, the dictionary also defined NSS as the president's publication that organized instruments of national power to obtain national goals and contribute to national security (p. 165). Metz (2010) and Wormley (2009) correlated American grand strategy with the president's published NSS. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act required sitting presidents to annually submit their national security strategies to Congress. Wormley (2009) analyzed the national security strategies from 1986 to 2006 to analyze continuity in their "ends", the president's articulation of national interests. He identified four "enduring" national interests: 1) physical security of the continental U.S., 2) protecting the global economy, 3) promoting the growth of democracy and the protection of human rights, and 4) cooperative security through strategic alliances (Wormley, 2009, p. 2).

To many students of foreign policy, geopolitics was proven a cornerstone of international relations. Toward that end, understanding specific regions of the world that have proven themselves of concern to the U.S. helped further clarify national interests. The regions where the U.S. consistently focused in the modern era were Western Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia (Layne, 2006; Mearsheimer, 2001). These areas were perpetually identified as vital to U.S. national interests for political and economic security (Art, 1999; Brands, 2014; Miller, 2010). Conversely, Africa and Latin America have

only proven to be peripheral interests to American foreign policy and did not significantly impact the development or implementation of American grand strategy during President Clinton's tenure.

Variations of American grand strategy. Various authors addressed several variations in American grand strategy, both during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War period. Although J. L. Gaddis (1982) determined "Containment" to be America's Cold War grand strategy, he also observed strategic variations across administrations within the broader "Containment" strategy. A few authors touched on the ideological foundations of American grand strategy, instead favoring the strong influence of evolving threats and opportunities within the strategic environment.

Boyle (2008) and Walt (2005) suggested the U.S. has long used a combination of offshore balancing in the Middle East and Europe, and Selective Engagement elsewhere. Brands (2014) asserted a more complex view. He said every State has a grand strategy because leaders make decisions based on national priorities (p. 6). Brands, Ikenberry (2001), Kissinger (2001), and Mearsheimer (2011) all characterized American grand strategy under Clinton as unsynchronized, eclectic, or ad hoc. Under Bush II, Brands observed an initial dovish approach to primacy that yielded quickly to the rise of a hegemonic strategy after 9/11. Agreeing with Brands (2016), J. L. Gaddis (2009) described a lack of strategic coherency in the Bush I and Clinton administrations. J. L. Gaddis (2009) suggested national catastrophes and wars force States to actually choose a

grand strategy, resulting in the increased focus of the Bush II administration after the attacks on September 11th and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Conversely, Layne (2006), and Mead (2004) found strands of grand strategy continuity running from the end of WWII through their dates of publication. However, Layne characterized American grand strategy as traditionally extra-regional hegemony. Mead asserted American grand strategy was based on global hegemony, especially after 9/11. Schwenninger (2003) agreed with Mead but introduced a new term "muscular dominance" for the post 9/11 period. Mearsheimer's (2001) earlier work depicted American grand strategy as offshore balancing, but not hegemonic (p. 261). Payne (2012) found America did have a post-Cold War grand strategy, but identified it as cooperative security without the hegemonic tone of the previous Cold War era.

Modern American ideological traditions. Miller's essay "Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy" (2010) asserted that regardless of the methods, American grand strategy has consistently had the same liberalist objectives: the expansion of free trade and the spread of democracy and human rights. Chris Layne (2006) also discussed the liberalist traditions of American grand strategy, dating back to the nation's founding, for two reasons. Layne first asserted America's best strategy for security was the creation of like-minded capitalist democracies abroad (p. 118). Additionally, Layne stipulated that American security and prosperity were based on the Open-Door policy of international trade since the early days of the republic (p. 120).

Miller (2010) conjugated liberalism and realism into offensive and defensive versions to explain long-term ideological trends in U.S. grand strategy. Using these four

created paradigms (offense or defensive liberalism, offensive or defensive realism), Miller asserted U.S. grand strategy followed an offensive or defensive liberalist trend in methods at least since President Woodrow Wilson and continues today (p. 562). For example, Miller's "offensive liberalism" explained President George W. Bush's 2003 invasion of Iraq because he used force to democratize the country. This assertion ignores the preliminary "weapons of mass destruction" reasons for the invasion, so the point is not well-proven by his example. Miller's offensive realism equates to Kissinger's (2003) neo-realism as they both advocate U.S. military hegemony as the ideational premise for American security and world peace. Historically, Miller posited the end of the Cold War allowed the U.S. to shift from a realist paradigm (due to the benign international environment and the loss of great power challengers) to a liberalist-based grand strategy (p. 27).

Layne (2006) contrasts Miller (2010) by focusing only on the offensive and defensive realist patterns of American Cold War and post-Cold War grand strategy traditions. Layne asserted that primacy-based or hegemonic grand strategies inevitably lead to strategic over-commitment and are therefore inherently self-defeating. John Mearsheimer (2001) explained the benefits of offensive realism by suggesting the structural constraints of the international system lead great powers to choose regional hegemony. Layne and Mearsheimer raised the importance of geography in States selecting their grand strategies. Mearsheimer explained continental great powers are prone to hegemonic grand strategies due to powerful neighbors and an insecure environment. Layne accepted the U.S. did not have this concern during the post-Cold

War period (the 1990's) and did not seek a hegemonic grand strategy based on offensive realism. However, that assertion raises questions in light of the advance inter-State communications caused by globalism in the post-9/11 world.

Layne (2006) asserted offensive and defensive realism could be used as structural theories to gauge post-Cold War American grand strategy. This was validated by Mearsheimer's (1991) prediction the U.S. would pursue, and achieved, regional hegemonic grand strategy. However, that does not provide a comprehensive understanding of U.S. grand strategy prior to 9/11. In addition, Layne discounted Mearsheimer's successful assertion because, aided by two "vast moats", the U.S. had achieved hegemony in the Western hemisphere long before the end of the Cold War. In addition, Layne asserted previous great powers failed to achieve regional hegemony in Europe due to both the multi-polar atmosphere and the history of counterbalancing against rising powers.

Although Miller (2010) does not offer the observation, Layne (2006) asserts and Mearsheimer (1991) disagrees, that due to the Cold War's swing between offensive and defensive realism, the U.S. did employ an extra regional hegemonic grand strategy in addition to "Containment". This is proven by the continued presence of many American military bases in both Europe and Asia. During the Cold War, the choice for liberalism reigned when the international threats were low and the U.S. could promote other nations' pluralist transitions; the choice for realism reigned during periods of high international threat levels, such as the Cold War (Miller, 2010).

Miller (2010) asserted the post-Cold War period saw the rise of American defensive liberalism due primarily to the absence of a competing great power and the lack of an international existential threat, which contributed to the lack of realist-based grand strategies. America's benign support for and promotion of democracy in Haiti and Kosovo, respectively, signaled a defensive rather than offensive liberalist grand strategy (Miller, 2010, p. 46). The liberalist strategy also explained America's humanitarian interventions under Presidents George H. W. Bush in Somalia (1992-93) and Bill Clinton in Haiti (1994-99), Bosnia (with NATO, 1995), and Kosovo (with NATO, 1999) (Frontline, 2014).

Miller (2010) explained the rise of offensive liberalism in the post-9/11 period, under the President George W. Bush administration, as a defensive measure to eliminate the existential threat posed by Saddam Hussein and replace it with a liberal democracy (p. 45). Forcible regime change, according to Miller, is a perfect example of offensive liberalism. He also cited the unilateralist proclamations in the 2002 National Security Strategy as proof the U.S. was returning to its post-WWII hegemonic roots.

Strategic patterns in the modern American era. Layne (2006) contends WWII was a pivot point in American grand strategy, producing an extra-regional primacy-oriented grand strategy outside the Western hemisphere (p. 12). Layne identified only Western Europe, the Persian Gulf, and East Asia as regions of post-Cold War American national interest (p. 3), primarily for political and economic interests and with a strong concentration on the determinants of geo-politics. America has long held a symbiotic relationship with Western Europe, at the time the Persian Gulf provided the world's

necessary oil, and Asian trade has been a cornerstone of the U.S. Pacific strategy since Roosevelt's Open-Door Policy.

Layne's thesis is an expansion of John Mearsheimer's (2001) position that American grand strategy has been only regional hegemony, for the Western hemisphere, since the end of WWII. Mearsheimer supported this claim by asserting the U.S. serves only as an offshore balancer for East Asia, competing with China and Russia, and in the Western European theatre competing only with Russia.

In an earlier essay by Swarz and Layne (2002), they contend the U.S. post-Cold War grand strategy saw no major change from the previous era. However, Swarz and Layne clarified the continuation of Cold War strategy to be the acceptance of a multipolarity field as long as the U.S. retains primacy (p. 36). Swarz and Layne assert the U.S. is assertive in other regions just enough to confront competitors and regional disruptors, but also enough to prevent allies from feeling so insecure they consider growing their own military power. This military growth, Swarz and Layne assert, could lead other States to reduce their U.S. dependency and become regional competitors. Interestingly, they suggest that although the U.S. decries NATO and the EU's strategic dependence, that dependence ensures U.S. primacy because other States won't feel pressured to increase their own military capabilities.

Swarz and Layne's (2002) argument is unfolding in Turkey during the Trump administration. During the Clinton administration, the U.S. was Turkey's primary military supplier (Gabelnick, Hartung, & Washburn, 1999). However, Turkey's 2019 purchase of Russian air defense systems signals military growth beyond America's

control and created significant tension between Turkey, NATO, and the U.S. (Team, 2019).

Primary grand strategy options. Although other authors delineated a more extensive grand strategy typology, Posen and Ross (1997) identified only four "competing" grand strategies for American presidents to choose: Neo-Isolationist; Selective Engagement; Cooperative Security; and Primacy (p. 4). The authors detailed the theoretical foundations of the strategies and provided a table explaining the application of each strategy to current or recent international challenges the U.S. has faced (Posen and Ross, 1997, p. 4). However, there is a broader and more definitive typology of American grand strategy choices. Art (2003) identified eight grand strategies available to presidents:

- Selective Engagement-choose specific issues/causes to engage others on. This includes long-standing U.S. national interests yet suggests limited international activity. This grand strategy is primarily reactive in nature.
- Dominion/Primacy/Hegemony- "rule the world" strategy that requires American superiority across all dimensions of national power and all the regions of the world. This grand strategy is offensive and proactive, suggesting the U.S. inject itself into every major international situation to guarantee the outcome is favorable to U.S. interests.
- Global Collective Security- accepts American responsibility for global peace. Politically unattainable, this strategy requires global consensus that is

nearly impossible to achieve, and collective action on major American initiatives.

- Regional Collective Security- to keep the peace in selected regions around the world (e.g. Persian Gulf, to maintain oil flow). Similar to Selective Engagement, this grand strategy identifies world regions where the U.S. would declare its national interests require considerable engagement on behalf of allies and friends.
- Cooperative Security- reduces wars by limiting all States' offensive military capabilities, comparable to the U.S. Similar to global collective security, this grand strategy invites multiple treaties and security agreements around the world.
- Containment- efforts to limit the capabilities and growth of a declared adversary, often through proxy and with direct confrontation. Containment strategy may be considered a subsidiary of a comprehensive Selective Engagement strategy because it allows the protagonist to select when and where to engage to limit adversarial advancements.
- Isolationism- to avoid most wars, maintain freedom of action. This grand strategy dictates that U.S. involvement in external affairs be strictly limited to direct national security threats to its people or nation, and possibly its national interests.
- Offshore Balancing- expanded isolationism that includes limiting rising Eurasian great power rivals. This strategy requires the U.S. to accept a multi-

polar world so it may partner with allies to solve regional problems instead of direct engagement in multiple locations at once.

American post-Cold War grand strategy publications. Analyzing the literature on post-Cold War American grand strategy revealed a few interesting publication patterns. Periods of heightened interest in and increased publications on American grand strategy are noticeable around pivotal points in the era. For example, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, several authors explored the issue of America's role in the world, including future grand strategy speculations absent the Cold War nemesis of the Soviet Union.

In addition, the early post-Cold War literature seemed to focus research efforts on the comparison of State activity and proclamations by national leaders to determine and validate a grand strategy designation. However, after President George W. Bush's publication of the 2002 National Security Strategy, the focus on grand strategy research seemed to shift to the culture changes in both the group of presidential advisors (neo-conservatives) (Colodny & Shachtman, 2009).

Similarly, President George W. Bush's response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted a resurgence of interest, essays, and analysis of American grand strategy. Clearly, many authors found Bush's declaration of unilateralism and preemptive military engagement, as published in his 2002 National Security Strategy, to be the codification of American grand strategy gone awry (Brands, 2014). While others found strands of strategic continuity in Bush's actions, but noted his "tactical failures" problematic, it appeared his declaration of preemptive attack was considered controversial (Mead, 2005). The right of

preemption had a long-standing history in American foreign policy, Kennedy prepared to use it during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Reagan used it to justify invading Granada in 1983.

Grand strategy assessments. Whether or not American had a post-Cold War grand strategy, and what that strategy was during successive presidential terms proved the strongest points of contention in the literature. Several noted authors declared American post-Cold War presidents had "no grand strategy" (Brimley, 2008; Goldgeier, 2009; Kissinger, 2003; Suri, 2009). Many authors declared American post-Cold War grand strategy alive and well, sometimes described as a "continuation" of Cold War grand strategy (Brands, 2014; Layne, 2006; Miller, B., 2010; Miller, P., 2010; Monten, 2005; Payne, 2012). Still others decried an "oscillation" between several strategies (Biddle, 2005, Metz, 2010). These authors tended to deride the sitting president for lack of strategic continuity with America's traditional national interests.

American grand strategy is continuous. Several authors identified continuous national interests in American grand strategy. In *Peace of Illusions* (2006), Professor Christopher Layne declared that America has a continuous grand strategy borne after WWII (p. 25). Layne posited American grand strategy has been extra-regional hegemony and primacy both throughout the Cold War and during the post-Cold War period as well. Justifying this assertion in the post-Cold War period, Layne offered the Defense Planning Guidance (1992), written by then-Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney and his policy assistant Paul Wolfowitz. Layne focused on the document's assertion that the U.S. should "maintain" hegemony by preventing aspiring national competitors, such as China.

One could have considered Chaney's document "The First Draft of a (New) Grand Strategy" (Corporation for Public Broadcasting , 1992), however the document was immediately discredited by then-President George H.W. Bush. However, Layne cited successive NSSs by both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations that stipulated the same premise of maintaining the American global leadership role and eliminating rising rivals.

Miller (2012) also asserted the U.S. actually had a post-Cold War grand strategy and, like Layne (2006), that strategy was continuous since at least the end of World War II. While Miller identified ideological continuity in American grand strategy, he does not name a specific grand strategy, rather national interests. His description of homeland security, open door policy, economic growth, and democracy promotion as America's perpetual national interests are areas of grand strategy continuity. Miller suggested only the manner of grand strategy application changed after the Cold War, in response to changes in the threat environment. Losing the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union, Miller explained, allowed the U.S. to adjust its national interests and pursue a less "offensive" grand strategy style.

Interestingly, Miller (2012) identified specific grand strategies, such as balancing, as "instruments" for the broader American grand strategy "toolbox" (p. 15). However, Miller's assertion that domestic politics and ideology do not influence a State's grand strategy (p. 19), specifically contradicts Clunan (2009), Dueck (2006), and Huntington's (2004) premise that changes in American cultural identity specifically influenced changes in American grand strategy.

Dueck (2006) asserted “national interests”, a critical component of grand strategy, are inherently cultural determinants, and therefore subject to national cultural transitions (p. 14). While Dueck’s premise does not specifically eliminate external influences on American strategic thought, his priority is clearly domestically driven and therefore more reflective of national demographic and societal evolution. Dueck disagrees with Mearsheimer’s (1990) and Waltz’s (Brown, 1995) premise that realist traditions decry multipolar international systems. Dueck asserted the post-Cold War era would see the rise of other, albeit “lesser”, powers such as Japan and Germany. American grand strategy, Dueck noted, would have to evolve to maintain hegemony while accommodating the rise of multipolarity in the international system. It is this primacy, along with America’s exceptional responsibility to spread liberal democracy, which Dueck notes as the continuous tenets of American grand strategy, even through the Clinton and George W. Bush terms.

Strategic adjustment. This research revealed that several noted national security authors documented American grand strategy oscillation in the post-Cold War period (Dueck, 2006; Kupchan, 2002; Metz, 2010). Dr. Metz (2010) suggested that every nation, including America, does have a grand strategy that strategy tends to shift over time in response to the evolution of domestic pressures and external threats and opportunities (1:52). Waltz (2002) explained that both George Bush (Gulf War) and Clinton (Bosnian and Serbian Interventions) acted within the guidelines of long-standing international security institutions, such as the U.N., used America military power defensively and within the framework of multilateralism.

Strategic drift. Several authors identified America's apparently eclectic national interests and international activities as evidence of a lack of grand strategy. Brimley and. Flournoy (2003) conducted a 21st century version of President Eisenhower's 1953 Solarium Project to analyze and determine the best grand strategy options for America in the post-9/11 era. They equated the absence of a 2003 Iraq invasion strategy with an absence of the broader American grand strategy. Numerous other authors also noted the apparent lack of an American grand strategy into which smaller actions, even wars, could be explained (J. L. Gaddis, 2009; Suri, 2009).

Biddle (2005), Brands (2014), Suri (2009), and others, categorized several examples of American "strategic drift". They asserted the end of the Cold War and the absence of an international threat contributed to popular ambivalence concerning foreign policy, especially under Clinton. That resulted in a significant drop in foreign aid during the 1990's and allowed President Clinton to take an "ambivalent attitude" toward the requirement of a grand strategy (Brands, 2014, p. 146). That inattentiveness led to critical operational failures in grand strategy: ad hoc crisis management, opaque national interests, a lack of interest prioritization, and the emergence of too many minor problems without adequate attention or discipline focused on the important issues. Militarily, half measures in Somalia and Haiti, delays in the decisions to intervene in Bosnian and Kosovo, and undermining pro-Western Russian leaders by expanding NATO all contributed to the perception among scholars that the Clinton ship of State was strategically adrift (Biddle, 2012; Brands, 2014; Brimley, 2008; Suri, 2009; Walton, 2012; Yetiv, 2008).

Strategic cultural continuity and change. The political elites who plan and conduct American foreign policy are critical elements of the strategy formulation and execution process. In addition, people bring ideas and perceptions that may influence group thought and national security culture. Jeremy Suri (2009) mentioned the importance of having sophisticated strategists such as George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, and Dean Acheson to organize and guide American strategic thought during the Cold War. The "Wise Men" of the Cold War identified urgent threats, lucid national interests, and designed policies to secure interests at reasonable national costs (Suri, 2009, p. 613). That group preceded technocrats such Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, and Colin Powell. These like-minded national security advisors of the late-Cold War period produced and adhered to the flexible but rigorous policy guideline called "Containment". However, those generations of national security advisers, had largely receded from policy making until the George W. Bush term. As scholars observe new generations of advisers rise, scholars may also note new interpretations of American national identity and the grand strategies that identity is likely to produce.

The "policy elites" theory (Drezner, 2011) of continuity and change in American political leadership added a social dimension to the analysis of American national identity and grand strategy. Corporate leaders such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz, tried to apply a strategic framework from their Cold War era to the post-Cold War period in the 1994 Defense Planning Guidance (Burr, 2015). The Defense Planning Guidance was intended to propose a grand strategy that would prevent the emergence of an international rival and define the establishment of American international hegemony

for the post-Cold War era (Burr, 2015). Although President George H.W. Bush refuted the proposed strategy before leaving office, the same team of "Vulcans" resurrected that Cold War-era strategy under George W. Bush in 2002 National Security Strategy (Suri, 2009). This illustrated how the revolving door between corporate America and American political elites can influence national security theory and planning from one period to the next. However, as political parties change leadership roles in government with elections, the party elites, their constituencies' priorities, and corresponding policy preferences could change as well. While J. L. Gaddis (1982, 2002) observed remarkable grand strategy consistency during the Cold War, across varying political leaderships, the post-Cold War did not offer the political stabilizing force of an international alter-ego like the Soviet Union.

Multiple grand strategies. Yetiv (2008) indirectly offered an interesting observation: that the U.S. may actually be employing multiple grand strategies simultaneously (p. 11). This assertion assumed the U.S. could use different grand strategies at different times, and in response to different regional or national interest situations. Yetiv's book specifically examined U.S. grand strategy in the Persian Gulf from 1972 through 2005. However, the suggestion that U.S. presidents used a variety of grand strategies in response to changing situations and national interests creates a third option for this research: that the U.S. may have been alternating between grand strategies, and therefore gave various observers the perception that no particular grand strategy was prominent or adhered to during an observation period.

Grand strategies and presidential doctrines. Thinking about the evolution of the grand strategy concept in America President Eisenhower should be credited for codifying the process through rigorous analysis and comparison in the Solarium Project. It was President Eisenhower's military background that inspired him to essentially conduct military decision-making protocols on U.S. government Statecraft. It seems simple and intuitive for the national leader to test and validate his doctrine before publishing it, but in terms of modern American grand strategy, President Eisenhower set the example (Abshire, 2013).

President Obama's grand strategy included adherence to a broad variation of the Nixon Doctrine, in terms of providing military training and materiel to selected States. President Nixon's "Guam Speech" formally declared America as a "Pacific Power, and that America would provide a nuclear shield to U.S. treaty nations while requiring the native military (of South Vietnam) to be the primary fighting force for the conflict (Woolley & Peters, 1969). However, President Obama chose to adjust U.S. adherence to the unpublished Clinton Doctrine, which suggested the U.S. could and would get involved in any nation or region it considered necessary for national security. The Clinton Doctrine also proved the precursor to part of the Bush Doctrine by declaring American interests were global in nature.

The Bush (2002) Doctrine's preemptive strike declaration was a traditional presumption of U.S. presidents. Reagan used it in Grenada, George H.W. Bush in Somalia, Clinton in Haiti, and previous presidents in Mexico, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic, among other regions. Therefore, the popular surprise at the Bush Doctrine's

assertion of unilateralism was not actually all that surprising to students of American political history.

Effectively managing the balance of power, vis-a-vis other allies and adversaries, has been one of the five pillars of American grand strategy at least since the era of President Theodore Roosevelt (Miller P. D., 2012, p. 7). Noted geopolitical analyst Robert Kaplan explained the international center of gravity was moving away from Europe and to the Asian-Pacific region (Gardels, 2014). While some thought balance of power politics died with the rise of American unipolarity, President Obama recognized the issue's resurgence with China's rising geopolitical and economic power. Obama's intended "pivot to Asia" highlights a reorientation of American grand strategy toward the Pacific theater as the concentration of the 21st century's political and economic wealth (Campbell & Andrews, 2013).

Research Methodologies

Many of the essays included in this literature review presented research methodologies and techniques that may inform the study of post-Cold War American grand strategy. For example, Layne's *The Peace of Illusions* (2006) identified four empirical tests he used to assess changes in grand strategy across presidential administrations. First, he looked at that president's Stated aims or goals and characterized that strategy according to a predetermined typology. This also included ascertaining the consistency of policies during the administration. Second, Layne asked if the president favored multipolarity or unilateral action. Third, Layne asked if the military and broader DIME projection in the region appeared to support the broader

American grand strategy. Fourth, Layne asked if the grand strategy was consistent in peacetime as it was during hostilities (p. 25).

Brands' (2014) *What Good is Grand Strategy?* asserted grand strategy is not required to be formally announced in a speech or policy letter (p. 6). However, Brands also declared that because grand strategy making is an iterative process, it might be analyzed by observing the *way* a State's leaders manage a range of international problems over a specific period. Brands' enumerated definitions of seven grand strategy components offer specific and observable points at which a presidential administration might be gauged. Brands determined Clinton achieved some success with the modest expansion of NATO and free markets but failed to provide an overarching strategy. Similarly, he assessed George W. Bush was led by the "Hawkish Vulcans" (Cheney and Wolfowitz) and used the military inefficiently because he (Bush) did not theoretically link his activities to a higher international purpose.

The case study research strategy. Several authors who produced research results used the case study research strategy. Walton (2012) explained that case study strategy allowed him to categorize each president's grand strategy for analysis and comparison. Walton analyzed President George W. Bush's 2002 NSS to determine if its goals were clearly articulated and prioritized. He also compared Bush's own 2002 NSS to his 2006 version, and declared the comparison demonstrated critical faults in both years' documents which contributed to faults in national execution. The case study approach allowed me to compartmentalize and analyze President Clinton's policies to identify a possible cohesive and consistent strategy.

The Gap in the Literature

This literature review exposed a potential gap in the published knowledge about the relationship between America's evolving national identity and its influence on post-Cold War grand strategy. Congressional leaders and several authors expressed dismay at America's lack of grand strategy (Armed Services Committee, 2008). Understanding American grand strategy in terms of national identity may explain previously unnoticed points of strategic continuity.

While Huntington (2006) noted the importance of observing America's search for national identity in the post-Cold War era, his research did not examine the importance of presidential influence on that identity or its causal influence on grand strategy. Specific presidential narratives have not been examined to ascertain how they construct national identity or use it to justify and validate grand strategy choices. American post-Cold War national identity and grand strategy are yet not fully explored.

This study was needed to understand the connection between evolving national identity and its impact on grand strategy. Additionally, by observing the president's strategic narratives, speeches, and publications, I was able to ascertain how American national identity was constructed and presented to domestic and international audiences as justification for grand strategy choices in the immediate post-Cold War era. Additionally, because America stood with such prominence in world affairs during this period, the U.S. electorate, foreign policy scholars, practitioners, and observers should carefully consider the national identity proffered by political leaders, and the long-term impact of its resulting grand strategy.

Summary

This literature review explained constructivism as the relevant international relations theory for this research because of its reliance on ideational constructs of reality. I explained the value of national identity as a primary causal factor for determining national interests and grand strategy. This review also illuminated national identity as an ideational construct proffered by national leaders. This review also clarified the president as the author of American national identity, often through strategic narratives, and the accompanying grand strategy. Additionally, the principle tenets of American grand strategy, as specifically noted by Miller (2010), or ideologically explained by J. L. Gaddis (2002) may lend themselves to specific characteristics and qualities of national identity as explained by the President.

The qualitative case study approach emerged as the best research design for this study. Constructivism's explanation of national identity as the producer of national interests and grand strategy ensures this design remains within logical and reproducible guidelines. Clunan's (2009) use of constructivism to delineate Russia's resurgence further confirms this research designs' generalizability. Because the President's multidimensional authority enables him to determine both national identity and grand strategy, the link is clearly established. However, his communication parameters require a qualitative methodology to review normative data within the parameters of his tenure.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

This chapter reviews the research methodology for the examination and analysis of national identity's influence on post-Cold War American grand strategy during the Clinton administration. I review research strategies, data acquisition and analysis techniques, the researcher's role, and other relevant methodological issues. Because the research purpose guided critical decisions including research dimensions, the methodology, strategy, and data management, the research questions influenced specific research characteristics. The purpose of this research was to determine if and how American national identity was modified and used to validate grand strategic changes in the post-Cold War era.

Research Design and Rationale

This study was designed to clarify a post-Cold War grand strategy by observing America's evolving national identity and how it influenced America's post-Cold War grand strategy. Because I examined presidential and senior administration communications in various formats, qualitative case methodology offered the most appropriate normative research paradigm. The qualitative research methodology provided a rich theoretical approach to understanding subjective human interaction at the strategic national level. Further, because national identity is an ideationally constructed social phenomenon, the qualitative case study using constructivism offered the best approach to data acquisition and analysis. The case study design enabled me to temporally bind this study to President Clinton's two terms in office (January 20, 1993–

January 20, 2001) and provided a finite approach to the data acquisition process. The case study design is also one of the public administration traditions that incorporates important data types such as documents and speech analysis, which provided the bulk of my research sources (McNabb, 2009). Additionally, case study research allows the incorporation of relevant contextual information, which helped highlight the use of instruments like venue and audience selection in the presentation of presidential pronouncements (Yin, 2006).

There are three different types of case studies that were considered for this study: naturalist, positivist, and constructivist (Given, 2008, p. 69). The primary goal of the naturalist case study is to produce detailed and pragmatic information on the research topic within the case parameters. But aspirational constructivism was pertinent to this research as a strategy reliant on social psychology (Clunan, 2009). Additionally, the positivist case study is focused on producing "law-like propositions" that are predictive in nature (Given, 2008, p. 69), which allowed this research to suggest future connections between national identity and grand strategy. Further, constructivists tend to view case studies as a check on standing literature and a contribution to the intellectual discourse on the research topic (Brands, 2014).

Other grand strategy researchers have also used the case study design. For example, Layne (2006) examined the extra-regional hegemonic theory of American grand strategy from 1940 to 2006, connecting variables with predicted outcomes to ascertain whether policymakers' actions and communications were consistent with the extra regional hegemony theory. Similar to this study, Layne also examined the

publications and communications of U.S. policymakers to determine if they were consistent with the nation's stated grand strategy. In terms of data, Layne's use of published NSSs as the codification of each president's grand strategy also identified a valid normative data source for this research. Additionally, Brands (2014), Kennedy (1991), and Miller (2010), among others, also used case studies to compartmentalize American presidential administrations and examine their use of national power to determine and compare respective grand strategies. Though Miller alone introduced empirical variables to test deviations in political ideology, the others all used historical analysis to understand each president's national interests and national power use.

Research Questions

RQ1: How did President Clinton define America's post-Cold War national identity?

RQ2: How did President Clinton use national identity to justify and implement his grand strategy?

The Study's Grounding Concept

This study's grounding concept was that every nation uses some grand strategic method to organize their national interests and determine how and when to use national resources to achieve those interests (Brands, 2014). A state's national identity is historically influenced, determines its role in the international community, and significantly influences its grand strategy because it informs national interests (Huntington, 2004). By comparing President Clinton's explanations of national identity

to the use of national power, I was able to determine a direct relationship between his constructed national identity and his chosen grand strategy.

The Researcher's Role

The researcher is an important data instrument for qualitative research (Huberman & Miles, 2002). Miles and Huberman also suggest that in qualitative studies, the researcher's role in acquiring data can range from a simple, nonparticipant observer to a participative questioner who fully engages the subject to extract as much information as possible. For this study, I objectively collected, sorted, coded, and analyzed relevant historical documents, speeches, videos, and publications related to post-Cold War American grand strategy and national identity during President Clinton's two terms in office (January 1993 through January 2001). Initially, I looked for references to human characteristics (e.g., "who we are as a nation") as justification for a specific use of hard or soft power components.

Another important researcher role is presenting the data and manuscript in an easily readable format (McNabb, 2009). A solid research project logically organizes the research questions and associated data and uses road maps or guiding paragraphs to outline manuscript sections and major issues (Creswell, 2009, p. 83). For this study, I produced a coherent and logical explanation of how President Clinton used his version of national identity to justify specific actions within his grand strategy. I read all Clinton's NSSs first, looking for references to grand strategy and national identity. Specifically, I looked for key words and phrases in the NSSs that referred to one or more of the established eight possible grand strategies outlined in the literature review. I also looked

for human identifiers and character traits that Clinton might have used to construct his version of American national identity. I focused on Clinton's reliance on "American values" as a consistent precursor to his national identity explanation.

Methodology

Data Management

The nature of the research influences all aspects of data management, including what data types are acceptable and how they are acquired, stored, coded, and analyzed (Patton, 2002). Because political science research often includes descriptive data types, such as speeches, essays, and human interviews, I adhered to established data coding and analysis techniques. Data were stored on my home computer, which uses several Internet Security protocols. Additionally, no personal data were acquired or stored for this research.

There were a few steps that I followed in the data collection and analysis process. First, I gathered research documents, relevant essays, and speeches by policymakers and foreign policy intellectuals (see Creswell, 2014). Second, case study data analysis steps include (a) organizing the data; (b) generating categories, themes, and patterns; (c) coding the data; (d) applying the ideas, themes, and categories to data; (e) searching for alternative explanations; and (f) preparing and presenting the report of findings (McNabb, 2009, p. 367). Steps (a) through (d) are iterative, and I expected at least three to five cycles of data analysis and organization, though I stopped counting after the ninth cycle. Third, by ensuring the analysis and coding process was rigorous, logical, and iterative, the research findings should withstand scrutiny and peer review.

I began the data search by looking for major international challenges during the Clinton administration. I compared lists of international activities from different sources such as the Clinton Presidential Library, the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, and the Clintonwhitehouse5.gov website, which is no longer updated. From the composite list, I looked for international incidents and choices that were publicly justified by President Clinton's explanation of national identity or national values. I checked the Miller Center's list of President Clinton's speeches against the Clinton Presidential Library's list; however, I only researched speeches relevant to national security, and foreign affairs.

President Clinton's NSSs provided the bulk of the data for this research because they clearly articulated justifications for his strategic preferences. I also compared the NSS explanations to the actual strategic decisions made during his tenure. I read all the NSSs from President Reagan's (1987) first through President Clinton's (2000) last. First, I searched for specific national identity phrases such as "who we are," "as a nation, we," "America's role," and "America is." Because a president's oratorical tool includes using human characteristics to define his version of national identity (Huntington, 2004), I also searched for descriptions of human values and characteristics attributed to the U.S. as a nation by Presidents Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton.

Primarily in the NSSs I looked for examples of grand strategy components, of which there were many, including descriptions of national interests and national goals, explanations of when and how national power could be projected in support of goals, and any references to the eight standing grand strategy descriptors listed in Chapter 2. To

ascertain any correlation between the results of the NSS observations and America's use of national power, I compared America's role in significant international incidents with the Stated policy.

Data Types

Qualitative case study research includes a wide variety of data types to saturate the study topic within the specific case boundaries (Given, 2008). Consequently, this project included a variety of written and spoken word data to identify how President Clinton justified and explained grand strategy choices in terms of national identity. Speeches and publications from President Clinton, senior administration policy makers, national security practitioners, scholars, and think tank contributors were analyzed to determine their explanations and analysis of the administration's grand strategy and the national identity used to justify that strategy.

Publications and speeches are data sources with a long history in national security research. For example, the National Security Directive #75, issued by President Reagan in 1983, identified specific goals for American policy toward the Soviet Union: "Containment", the retraction of Soviet international influence, and the promotion of pluralist economic and political trends in Soviet elite spheres. Additionally, the directive explained the diplomatic, political, military (usually through proxy), and economic means to achieve stated ends as negotiations, costly consequences for belligerent actions, and rewards for conforming to international standards (Reagan, 1983).

This research also included primary data sources such as the direct presidential or senior staff pronouncements. Using primary sources reduced the transference of bias.

For example, instead of researching Sciolino's (1996) article explaining why Clinton changed course on intervening in Bosnia, I reviewed his 1995 Oval Office speech to the nation when he invoked America's "values and interests" as the key motivator for international action (Clinton, 1995b).

This research also leaned on an extensive literature base, including historical, modern policy, and academic-oriented documents. I prioritized the data sources, granting more weight to the pronouncements from members of the National Security Council as opposed to others in the political arena. The Congressional Research Service identified the National Security Council as a major component in formulating and often implementing American national security policy (Best, 2011). Although different presidents reshape their National Security Council to suit personal preferences, the statutory members identified by the national security directive (National Security Agency 1947) are the president, vice president, and the secretaries of defense and state.

Because qualitative research in international relations often struggles with choosing relevant data, this research used data that directly supported the topic of grand strategy and national identity. The primary data sets included are incidents and pronouncements that involved the use or direction of America's primary sources of national power: DIME. For example, where and how the president employed military resources to defend or promote American interests were included.

Data Collection

I examined presidential and senior administration speeches, pronouncements, publications, and other communications using qualitative case study methodology. I used

C-Span, The National Defense University, The Clinton Presidential Library (online), The Miller Center at the University of Virginia, and The American Presidency Project at The University of California for presidential speeches, transcripts, documents, and The National Security Strategy Archives for published NSSs. Additionally, it is important for presidential narratives to use strict speech selection protocols. For example, televised speeches that focus on foreign affairs or national security, especially when presented before relevant audiences should be primary sources, which excludes the bulk of published presidential communications (Krebs, 2015).

Further, is is important for the political science researcher to try to compare similar items within the case study limits so the items reviewed have some semblance of situational equality and relationship (McNabb, 2009). This highlights one of the inherent limitations of qualitative research in international affairs; no two contexts are exactly the same, so comparisons and analyses rely on the researcher's adherence to established practices and data saturation. Consequently, I focused on presidential goals, the "ends" of American grand strategy. By focusing on the grand strategy ends, I reduced the influence of the president's personal tendency to use one national power source (e.g., the military) over others, and I concentrated on enduring grand strategy aspects more likely to survive presidential party shifts. No personal or confidential data were used for this research. Only publicly available research was considered for data corpus.

Data Analysis and Interpretation

Understanding qualitative data is not always as simple as reading the texts of speeches and drawing conclusions, especially when a researcher compares data across

situations within the same case limits (Ayres, Kavanaugh, & Knafl, 2003). To appreciate the value of the case study research strategy within the political science field, several key factors were incorporated into the data analysis and interpretation regime. First, data points were purposefully selected to provide significant contributions to the research and accurately reflect the values of the case (presidential administration) it represented (Creswell, 2014; McNabb, 2009). Toward that end, I endeavored to find situations where the president explained the use of national power as a product of his interpretation of national identity. This critical aspect binds the essential elements of this project (grand strategy and national identity) in the constructivist research paradigm. Published documents and speech transcripts were searched for reference to American national or cultural identity as justification for national power projection. The type of national power and context within which it was used were compared to the eight established grand strategy types.

Additionally, qualitative data analysis is an iterative process, allowing data inferences found later in the process to influence earlier data sets and inferences (McNabb, 2009). There are six critical steps in qualitative data analysis that I followed according to McNabb (2009):

1. Data were organized by creating folders labeled with preliminary codes based on the nature of the research questions and on Huntington's (2004) explanation of national identity. I looked for human characteristics used to explain national identity.

2. Categories, themes, and patterns were generated by reviewing and searching the data for explanations of strategic choices, national characteristics (especially those used to justify decisions), human values attributed to national identity, and grand strategy explanations.
3. Data was coded by grouping human character descriptors, strategic choices, explanations of national interests and national identity. I compared the nodes to determine if there was any continuity in the strategic thinking and explanation of strategic choices.
4. The report hopes to show the connections between human characteristics, values, and national identity descriptors. I also tried to reduce the themes to determine and validate the grand strategy theme that best fit the strategic choices President Clinton made.
5. Alternative explanations were searched for national identity and grand strategy by reviewing competing newspapers and publications relevant to the significant strategic situations I followed.

Data categories were initially developed based on the events' characteristics, justifications for international activity, and the explanations and descriptions provided by policymakers. Additionally, discourse analysis provides the important research strategy for deciphering narrative data sets and speeches by policymakers (Krebs, 2015; Milliken, 1999).

Using Krebs' (2015) explanation of discourse analysis, I identified dominant and alternative political narratives on national identity as a potential causal factor of national

power usage. Krebs' explanation of identifying, comparing, and analyzing narratives provided an important strategy. Milliken's (1999) explanation of discourse productivity explains how dominant narrators produce what they consider logical explanations for action and thereby exclude alternative narratives as illogical or inconsistent with proposed identity (p. 229). These guidelines established thematic assessments that created meaningful nodes, such as *national identity, national characteristics, explanations for national power use.*

Data Software

I used the Nvivo-12 data management program which provided several advantages. First, I was a little familiar with the program because I used it for several research courses with Walden. In addition, the program offered excellent coding features, including word search programs that analyzed uploaded documents for key words and phrases. Since this study analyzed the text of documents and speech transcripts of foreign policy makers and practitioners for key words and phrases that explained national identity and the use of national power, the ability to scan those documents for similarities saved time and increased coding accuracy. Some of these phrases and key words or ideas populated codes. The initial codes used were: national identity, human characteristics, strategic choices, national interests, national identity, hard power and soft power, and grand strategy.

Data Coding

Pollock (2009) considered coding raw data as the "sweat equity phase" of original research because it involves tedious attention to detail and the listing of important

research variables (p. 266). Coding strategies must be fully justified and followed if the research is to maintain rigor and validity. Additionally, I used the eight established grand strategies identified in the literature review as initial codes for the data (Art, 2003). The presidential exercise of national power in the pursuit of national interest may fit into these predetermined categories.

Effectively organizing the data is the first important requirement of managing qualitative research (McNabb, 2009, p. 354). Because reducing qualitative data is important in each of the six steps of data analysis, McNabb suggests establishing data categories that allow me to organize and compartmentalize information (p. 367). Therefore, I identify the president's grand strategy by the characterizations associated with it, the references that explain the strategy, and at least two examples of how that grand strategy uses each type (hard or soft) of national power. More categories of data may emerge as the research progresses. Secondly, developing thematic typologies for data addressing national characteristics is another critical step in data management.

McNabb (2009) explains coding as the application of meaningful identifiers to the data in order to extract relevant "concepts, categories, and characteristics" (p. 590). Krebs (2015) coded presidential narratives according to emerging themes in the speeches. While Krebs' charts of word counts did not seem to influence his findings, Nvivo software enabled me to develop and connect themes of national characteristics and national power usage.

The first iteration of my coding included reading the NSSs for recurring themes and dominant issues, of which there were many as the Clinton's (1994c) first appeared to

be used as baseline for successive ones, with only marginal changes from 1994 through 1997. As themes of "democracy promotion", national values, national identity, and the projection of national power emerged, I further developed nodes that offered more detailed descriptions of these and other themes. Additional iterations further refined the original and subsequent nodes and the saturation of themes began to emerge.

Quality Standards

In qualitative research, the standards of quality refer to various dimensions within the research paradigm. These dimensions helped ensure the selected data was directly related to the research topic, which contributed to the validity of the results. In addition, these quality standards helped ensure the research results accurately reflected both research data sets and the analysis process. I discuss validity, bias, credibility, and other dimensions of quality below.

Validity, Reliability, Bias, and Ethics

Underpinning the trustworthiness and authenticity of research findings were the issues of validity, reliability, and bias (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Creswell (2014) explains content validity as the ability of the research questions to accurately measure the research purpose, that is, does the research question tell you what you want to know? (p. 201). Internal validity refers to the research design's ability to limit alternative explanations. Scholars gauge a study's validity by the reader's ability to check and confirm the accuracy of the research findings through the employment of specific and standardized research procedures.

Validity. Because the social science I research intends to make rich, descriptive, and causal deductions about the world; I sought to order this research with logical conclusions that another researcher could reasonably be expected to find. This research process relied on important factors for internal validity. First, by using publicly available data within specified temporal limits, I ensured any subsequent research could also access the same finite data population. Second, by using frequent citations connecting critical data to their original sources, other researchers should be able to follow the research pattern with some ease, and, if they reach alternate conclusions, then determine where their research process deviated from mine. Third, by searching for alternate explanations of national identity in public media, I was able to reduce the likelihood that other causal factors (e.g. an alternate national identity) influenced or better explained the use of nation power components during this period. Additionally, discourse analysis techniques (McNabb, 2009, p. 473) enabled me to maintain experimental validity because I could focus on Clinton's narratives, linguistic themes, and rhetorical organization for answers to the research questions.

Reliability. A research study's reliability and dependability refer to the degree other researchers can reach the same or similar findings, interpretations, and conclusions given the same data and research processes (Creswell, 2014). Reporting and reconciling their different explanations were also be important. Producing a rich and accurate description of the research topic improved the validity of this research and will help convince readers of the findings' accuracy.

The validity and reliability strategies for this research study included triangulating data by determining if a two or more data sets propose the same or similar explanations for a specific American grand strategy. Here, I found significant similarities between all of President Clinton's seven NSSs along important dimensions. The national interests expressed in the NSSs were consistent in their references to American international engagement and leadership, the use of national values to determine national interests, the use of Selected Engagement as the grand strategy and justifications for the use of national power.

Another validity strategy I used was member checking, by reviewing the research findings with some of the assertions other scholars have made about the same topic to see if they reached comparable conclusions. Samuel Huntington (2006) is often cited here. Another aspect of reliability involves using standard qualitative methodologies and refraining from unique or improvised processes that cannot be recreated by other researchers. Creswell (2009) recommends these techniques help minimize reliability and validity concerns.

Bias. Marshall and Rossman (2011) identify bias as the influence of a researcher's personal values or individual identity on the research process (p. 96). Because bias can interfere with research objectivity, Marshall and Rossman suggest the researcher openly explain his views on the research topic so that readers may assess if or how the researcher's bias may have influenced results (p. 96). Creswell (2014) also explained that good research often includes researchers' comments and interpretations on the subject that are shaped by his personal history, culture, gender, and other factors.

Personally, I may have had some professional bias toward this research because I was a Soldier during this period and subject to President Clinton's grand strategy choices. I also observed friends who were sent to Bosnia to support America's mission. While I do not have a preference for any specific national identity or grand strategy, the topics are particularly and personally interesting, but not just during this period. I have a personal interest in the trajectory of American national identity and grand strategy as it may evolve through various eras and strategic situations. I do not think my personal experiences influenced this research as the volumes of data made it relatively easy to remain objective.

For political science research, McNabb (2009) suggested managing bias and validity fully exploring alternate explanations (p. 367). As I reach various conclusions, especially grand strategy clarifications, I reconsidered alternate explanations for the same data points. Had I found viable alternatives, I would have included or explained them in my results. I did not. Additionally, by considering alternate possible findings, the researcher then improves validity by ensuring logical explanations, other than the research findings, are considered and weighed on their merits. The reader has the opportunity to consider those alternatives and determine if they were given full consideration by the researcher.

Transferability. Transferability refers to the applicability of this research study's methodology and findings to a wider variety of public policy situations without an abundance of qualifiers (Creswell, 2009; Marshall and Rossman, 2011; McNabb, 2009). Ensuring robust results descriptions helped maintain a high transferability level for this

study's research findings because that showed details of the process-generated results. Additionally, extensive descriptions enable other scholars, researchers, and policymakers to analyze and understand post-Cold War influence of national identity on American grand strategy. Toward that end, this study used standard public policy parameters for defining and analyzing data, and adheres to standard qualitative case study procedures. By using established qualitative research standards, I ensured a broader audience could find generalizability in these research findings. Additionally, including a rich contextual description of the data points established clear parameters for transferability of research findings to similar contexts.

There may be other important elements of this study that could be generalized to other case studies, with similar contextual parameters. For example, because democratic societies require political leaders to compete for their positions through the voting process, elected leaders are compelled to explain the logic behind their strategic decisions in the hopes of swaying voters to at least understand if not support their decisions. If those leaders' explanations include descriptions of national identity characteristics, especially involving historical references and widely shared beliefs, then these research parameters may generate comparable results. Similarly, if the elected leaders are compelled to produce their national security rationale for the strategic use of national power, to the degree that document explains their proposed grand strategy, it could fit the terms of this research as well.

Ethical Considerations and Protections

Creswell (2009) and McNabb (2009) both suggest ethical considerations in scientific research refer to the researchers' and participants' adherence to the moral standards of social and professional conduct in the planning, conduct, and reporting of research findings. In dissertation research, the doctoral student is primarily responsible for maintaining strong ethical standards. The doctoral committee and the institutional review board assist the student by assessing the research process and findings to ensure maintenance of scientific standards. I maintained regular contact with my dissertation chair had any ethical questions arose, I would have sought his advice. No ethical issued emerged.

Sample Size

Because this project used historical data to populate the case study, the number of data points were uncertain at the outset, and based on several factors, such as the political magnitude of the event or national power exercised by the president, the activity's international context, and other contextual information. However, I endeavored to include at least two examples each of hard power and soft power use by the administration in order to provide predictable data sets and a balanced understanding of identity's influence on grand strategy choices. The quantity or size of the power projection activity considered, and the way the projection is explained by the policy maker, influenced this data set. If the two data points had not represented clear identity connections, I would have sought a third or fourth data point to better saturate the research.

In Beasley's (2004, p. 149) book on presidential rhetoric and American national identity, she explained that her primary data sources were presidential inaugural addresses and SOTU addresses because they afforded the presidents heightened public image, formal and ritualistic atmosphere, and an unfettered political forum for discourse. This research also closely reviewed these data sources; however, I found the NSSs more productive because they specifically included grand strategy tenets and addressed the strategic use of national power paradigms in context. Additionally, while the SOTU messages ritualistically included an automatic rebuttal from the opposing political party,

The actual data sources for this research included the NSSs from 1987 through 2000, including the first ones published, by President Reagan, as prescribed by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. President Clinton's speeches, especially SOTU addresses, were a valuable source for this research. Numerous books and peer-reviewed essays on American grand strategy, national identity, and the international relations of the Clinton era were also very useful. The New York Times and Chicago Tribune were searched for confirmation and contention of Clinton's proposed national identity during this period.

Summary

This research study of America's evolving national identity influence on post-Cold War grand strategy used a constructivist case study strategy to ascertain how President Clinton and his administration characterized and justified national power usage. I have shown how the research question determined the qualitative methodology as the most appropriate research framework, and how the case study design offers the best parameters for this public policy research topic.

The case study design and research software enabled me to manage available data sources, such as documents, speeches, and other sources to compare descriptions of national identity to the use of specific forms of national power. In addition, the qualitative methodology allows me as the researcher to become an integral data acquisition tool through the selection of rich and accurate data points while discarding fewer valuable data. I identified critical issues, such as validity, reliability, and bias, among others, and mitigated and managed them effectively. I established data management priorities according to their proximity to grand strategy design, operation, and analysis. The results of this study may provide valuable information for U.S. government policy makers to better assess and guide America's use of its national power in the international arena.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

In this study, I examined American post-Cold War national identity and its influence on foreign policy. The research questions posed in this study were "How did America's evolving national identity influence its post-Cold War grand strategy? and "How did President Clinton define America's post-Cold War national identity as a justification for using the four components of grand strategy to project American values?" The data showed that President Clinton defined and pursued a national security policy founded on the cultural values he defined as American national identity. That identity determined American national interests, the selection of activities to engage, and the national power resources to achieve strategic ends.

Data Management

Organizing data required creating and associating categories for information that contributed to answering the research questions. I created themed categories, such as hard power and soft power (Nye, 2009), for data that fit each description. For example, hard power related to data that demonstrated Clinton's use of either military or economic resources to achieve a specific national security goal. Similarly, soft power related to data that used diplomacy, information, and organizations to achieve results.

The presidential speeches, national security strategies, and other (declassified) national security archives were uploaded to the NVivo-12 research program. Primary nodes for hard power, soft power, cultural and national values, grand strategy determinations, and national interests were created with secondary nodes for goals,

collective action, and national characteristics, among others, were used to further refine the primary nodes. As significant words and phrases emerged (see the following section), they were identified across several national security strategies and speeches, helping establish continuity for the topics they described. For example, "values" was regularly prefaced by "human," "national," and "American" in describing the importance for international activity. This research uses direct quotes more than would ordinarily be expected in post-graduate work because the speakers' actual words significantly contributed to the topic's description, comparison, and the speakers' intent.

Data Analysis

Word search strategies were focused on several standard qualitative processes: word frequency, indigenous word sequences (specific to national security and international relations), and key words-in-context (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; Kellstedt & Whitten, 2009). Key search terms and phrases included *who we are*; *what we stand for*, *national identity*, *national interest*, *culture values*, *national security*, and *ideals*. Key words-in-context showed a frequent reference to "values" as *American values*, *democratic values*, *human* or *universal values*. "Ideals" was frequently prefaced by *democratic*, specifically associating *individual freedoms*, *pluralist government*, and *capitalism* as component definitions. Principal national security goals were also routinely grouped in the typical sequence of *security*, *economic prosperity*, and *democracy promotion*. The primary national "assets" were explained as military strength, economic prosperity, and strong national ideals of human and democratic rights and the attractiveness of American culture (Art, 2003; J. L. Gaddis, 2002). Clinton used the word

values 231 times in seven NSSs, often in conjunction with *American values*, *national values, "our" values, common values, social values, shared values,* or *democratic values*. The frequency of this term was important because it was often used as explanation or justification for Clinton's proposed policy agenda without delineating any specific value or characteristic. The key word frequency chart is at Appendix B.

In reviewing the Republican rebuttals to Clinton's eight SOTU addresses, the opportunity for the opposition party to offer alternative identity characteristics, I found only common references to conservative values of fiscal discipline, individual freedom, limited government, and strong security protocols. The University of Virginia Miller Center's "Clinton Key-events Timeline" was also used for tracking international activities during this administration. Additionally, I used the dates of key and potentially contentious events (plus 5 calendar days) to search for editorials in the New York Times and Chicago Tribune on their support or dissent for Clinton's narrative of American identity.

Coding and themes. Numerous codes emerged through iterations of document analysis. President Clinton's speeches were organized by venue. The annual SOTU speeches were useful in identifying Clinton's long-term strategic goals but were distinguished from the event or situation-oriented speeches. The NSSs were categorized by publication year, including from the Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, for comparison. Nodes for hard power and soft power were created then subdivided into diplomatic or information and economic or military. National interest nodes were created to capture descriptions of policy objectives.

National interests were subdivided into goals and opportunity, along with specific country or region oriented, such as Bosnia or Haiti, for example. The national identity node was divided into characteristics, producing 40 references in seven files, and values, with 11 references in six files.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

I established trustworthiness primarily through publicly available data and standard data analysis software. Credibility and dependability were supported by well-established data sources. The University of Virginia's Miller Center provided the bulk of President Clinton's speeches, and I found their chart of major national activities useful for calculating the use of national power. The NSSs were drawn from the National Security Archive, which is published by the executive branch of the U.S. government. The NSS reports are published to provide comprehensive articulation of American national interests, objectives, and goals. The National Security Strategy Archives is managed by a nonpartisan national security consulting firm called The Taylor Group. Credibility was also maintained by using documents from the Clinton Library, especially declassified documents that explained background information on such topics as the engagement in Rwanda, the Haitian crisis, and the Bosnian intervention. Because these documents are publicly available, they enhance the transferability and credibility of this research.

Results

The Use of Constructivism in Identity Politics

"The other" is sociopsychologically important in defining group membership at the national level (Huntington, 2004). The exclusion component of identity, identifying who is in the group and who is not, is also important to national identity (Huntington, 2004). President Clinton used the constructivist principles of social inclusion and exclusion regularly because collectivism was a stated process of his grand strategy. For example, Clinton used social characteristics to define the tenets of Americanism, which were the democratic values of individualism and pluralism, the capitalist values of free enterprise, private ownership, and economic competition, and the human values of self-determination and freedom from oppressive and coercive governments (Clinton, 2000b). Though Clinton's first inaugural speech did not mention national identity or American values, these two constructs soon became recurring elements of nearly all presidential speeches and publications.

American national values. The essential aspects of national identity are the core values that influence not only how Americans perceive and project themselves but also what their strategic interests are (Huntington, 2004). National values were the founding principles upon which President Clinton based his national security strategies, which were identified as representative democracy, free-market economics, and human rights (Clinton, 1994b). The important connection that emerged was Clinton's association of national ideals and values with the same level of influence as military and economic

interests. This reliance on constructivist precepts as the foundation for national strategy produced consistent national interests throughout Clinton's tenure.

National interests. Clinton's NSSs consistently relied on his stated national interests to define when, where, how, and what national power he might use for a specific goal. Clinton's national interests were divided into three categories. Vital national interests directly affected the physical security of the American homeland, its allies, citizens, and the informational and economic infrastructure that supports America's way of life (Clinton, 2000b, p. 8). Important interests were lesser threats that could disrupt or destabilize vital interests in various regions, including inter-state conflicts and issues that could indirectly impact U.S. economic prosperity (Clinton, 2000b, p. 9). Humanitarian interests were the third category, comprising natural and man-made disasters and democratic development (Clinton, 2000b, p. 9).

All of Clinton's NSSs identified the protection of national interests as the priority determining America's involvement in international affairs (Clinton, 2000b, p. 9). America's core values of promoting human rights, the rule of law, and economic and political freedoms guided both the selection of national interests and the national power resource(s) used to achieve those goals. For example, Clinton (1995a) cited the core value of human rights defense to justify the deployment of U.S. military air assets to Bosnia after diplomatic efforts failed.

Projecting economic prosperity was also a national security interest for President Clinton. Although the development of these organizations actually began years before he became President, the creation of the NAFTA and the WTO (formerly the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), Clinton's support and efforts significantly helped their ratification by the U.S. Senate. A list of Clinton's national power projection in the international arena is included in Appendix A.

American national identity. To understand America's national identity evolution, it is important to recognize how President Clinton's immediate predecessors explained American identity and the Soviet Union, which served as "the other" against which the United States defined itself. President Reagan labeled the Soviet Union the "Evil Empire" while emphasizing American identity as both politically and morally superior (Reagan, 1983). Reagan (1988a) described America as the "vigorous leader of the free world" (para. 43) Reagan (1988b) also claimed America's national values of individual freedom and democracy made the United States the "moral leader" of the world struggle for freedom. Similarly, citing Americans' willingness to collaborate despite racial, ethnic, tribal, and religious differences, Clinton (2000a) specifically distinguished the United States from Bosnia, Burundi, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, and the Middle East where these differences incited violent conflict. Clinton identified not only racial, ethnic, and social tolerance as pillars of Americanism, but he also explained the aversion to violent conflict as a solution for sociopolitical challenges.

Another important predecessor was President George H. W. Bush who at his 1993 Address at West Point also proclaimed American world leadership based on national values. Bush (1993a) advised against assuming the role of "world's policeman" because of the risk of over-committing limited resources, a sentiment echoed by his successor,

Clinton. Bush declared America the "only remaining superpower," with the moral and material responsibility to lead the world toward a widespread democratic peace.

Following the previous presidents, President Clinton endeavored to use national identity as justification for the use of national power. In his 1994 SOTU address, Clinton identified the United States as the "world's greatest power" and highlighted the international responsibilities accompanying that position. Clinton (1994b, p. 5) coined the term "indispensable" nation, referring to the necessity of American involvement in the resolution of prominent global issues. Clinton's address on Bosnia clearly explained that "our values and interests as Americans require that we participate" in implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement (Clinton, 1995a, para. 1). He noted that America was not just a place but a nation that acted on the ideals of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" for billions of people around the world (Clinton, 1995a, para. 3). American identity required the nation to lead the expansion of these ideals by promoting peace and spreading democracy and economic prosperity.

Strategy Publication and Support

The literature review explained the NSS as the codification of American grand strategy. The seven NSSs produced by the Clinton administration articulate grand strategy, including explanations of national security goals and preferred methods for achieving designated outcomes. To achieve the broadly stated goal of global security, the 1994 NSS listed such methods as the peace initiatives in the Middle East, the creation and expansion of NATO's Partnership for Peace, and denuclearization agreements with Russia and Ukraine (Clinton, 1994b, p. ii). For the promotion of economic growth,

Clinton listed the passing of NAFTA, the creation of the WTO, and the granting of Most Favored Nation trade status to China, along with the completion of over 80 trade agreements (Clinton, 1995b, ii).

Major national security themes. Clinton routinely emphasized soft power components of his national security agenda, including the use of international organizations, collective security processes and alliances, and the penchant for diplomatic engagement. All seven NSSs emphasized these components, especially the use of the WTO, NATO in Europe, the UN, and other regional and global organizations for various contingency operations prevalent during the 1990s. Clinton encouraged NATO to develop a new post-Cold War purpose in 1995, supporting the Dayton Peace Accords between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, providing regional security and peacekeeping operations (NATO, 2019). Additionally, Clinton's first NSS stated both American interests and national values, emphasizing its reflection of cultural underwriting of strategic interests (Clinton, 1994b, p. ii).

A critical observation emerged after reading this data. The NSSs appeared to be published partially for public (domestic and international) consumption as a general outline of national priorities, goals, and likely methods. Additionally, they appeared to be written to inform and explain guidelines for senior policymakers and executioners who applied the information to sectors under their control. However, the foreign policy speeches given by presidents are often specifically designed to generate public support for their international decisions (Dueck, 2006).

Additionally, after conducting a key word (and word derivates) search of important documents, the research produced another observation of the NSSs. The reference to "leader" more than doubled from 1994 to 2000. The use of the word "values" went from five in 1994 to 46 in 2000, and references to "ideals" increased from one to six in the same period. The term "selective" was used an average of four times in each of the NSSs in this period. This illustrates Clinton's increased reliance on cultural references to explain and justify his grand strategy of primacy and selective engagement.

Global leadership. In 1994, Clinton declared that because of America's democratic values and unparalleled economic and military power, the United States was indispensable to international peace and prosperity and therefore must use global leadership to ensure world peace and stability (Clinton, 1994b, p. 5). Clinton also identified America as the world's only "superpower," which brought both privileges of influence and responsibilities of global leadership. He used that title to admonish isolationists yet cautioned against strategic over-reach. This dichotomy was a recurring struggle within Clinton's calculus for international action (J. L. Gaddis, 2002; Kissinger, 2001).

Collective action. Clinton's reliance on economic growth contributed to the creation of major international institutions WTO and NAFTA. One of the pervasive themes in Clinton's NSSs is the proclivity for collective action on national security issues. Additionally, collective security fully supports the social aspects of constructivist theory. Collective security was used to justify and explain several important principles common among his published strategies and speeches. Clinton's support for the final

stages in the creation of both NAFTA and the WTO exemplified his use of international organizations and their collectivist approach to international trade. Clinton was a signatory on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, although the treaty has not been ratified by the Senate (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, 1996).

Assertive multilateralism. The U.N., NATO, the WTO, and others were useful to the President facing multiple humanitarian and diplomatic crises concurrently. While Cold War American presidents routinely supported the U.N., President Clinton's decision to align U.S. expeditionary ventures with U.N.-supported operations marked a distinction for collaboration in the new era. The U.S. support for U.N. efforts to return Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide following a 1991 military coup d'état is an example of Clinton's reliance on international organizations.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 reaffirmed nine previous resolutions aimed at reestablishing the constitutionally elected president of Haiti, by military force if necessary (U.N. Security Council, 1994). President Clinton increased his predecessor's soft power pressure with coercive diplomacy, and hard power efforts with broader military and economic sanctions on Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras' military regime (Office of the Historian, 2000). U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright declared this approach a break from Cold War-era norms and termed the policy "assertive multilateralism" (Office of the Historian, 2000).

When Cedras failed to comply with the 1993 Governor's Island Accord he signed with Aristide, the U.S. led the U.N. imposing a naval blockade on the island nation and

began planning a military intervention. Clinton hoped the threat of a U.S. invasion would force Cedras to step down, but he used the U.N. mandate to recruit support from Caribbean nations totaling a force of nearly 25,000, the vast majority from the U.S. Clinton also sent former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and then-former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell to negotiate with Cedras under threat of military invasion. General Hugh Shelton commanded the invasion force but accepted Cedras' peaceful transition without the use of force (Office of the Historian, 2000).

Clinton's foreign policy relied heavily on the use of institutions and organizations, prompting the Presidential Decision Directive/ National Security Council -25 (1994) and 56 (1997), which outlined protocols for the U.S. to manage complex humanitarian and contingency operations. Directive 25 declared multilateralism a "cost effective" method for managing multiple operations around the world. The directive listed the increased frequency of several crises unique to the post-Cold War era and declared the U.S. would lead the U.N.S.C. to create multilateral forces to address the challenges when appropriate.

Values-driven engagement. Throughout modern history, American leaders selectively supported various natural and man-made humanitarian crises. The end of the Cold War and the decentralization of international powers enabled numerous humanitarian conflicts to emerge, many of which were long suppressed by former authoritarian regimes. Consequently, the 1990s saw an increased interest in international humanitarian law, also known as the law of armed conflict (Roberts, 1999). Two significant changes of the U.N.'s humanitarian crises response procedures were supported by both President George H.W. Bush and President Clinton: the increased U.N. support

of non-combatants in humanitarian in spite of opposition from hostile authoritarian regimes, and the introduction of military "Peace Keeper" forces to support this engagement (Roberts, 1999).

President Clinton consistently determined national interests based on his definition of national values, prominently focusing on international humanitarian crises, with the notable decision not to push for stronger IC engagement during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The National Security Archive at George Washington University used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain evidence Clinton's 1993 and 1994 President's Daily Briefings included CIA warnings of the impending and ongoing slaughter of Tutsis by the Hutu nationalists (National Security Archive, 2017).

Additionally, almost 300 recently declassified diplomatic cables detail numerous warnings sent from the limited peace keeping force in Kigali to the U. N. Secretary General between January 11, 1994 and the beginning of killings in April 1994 (National Security Archive, 2017). Similar documents detail U.N.S.C. discussions about the Rwandan situation from 1992 through 1994, demonstrating the leading world powers were knowledgeable about and discussed the situation before and during the crisis, yet decided not to engage. Four years after the Rwandan crisis, Clinton's speech to the people of Rwanda highlighted very important human characteristics shared by all peoples, including Africans and Americans, and proposed future U.S. and IC engagement to support recovery and prevent future crises (Clinton, 1998b).

U.N.S.C. Resolution 918 authorized increasing the U.N. Peacekeeping force to 5,500 personnel (Council, 1994). On July 22, 1994 President Clinton announced a

multilateral operation called “Support Hope”, sending a large contingent of U.S. and IC forces to Rwanda and neighboring Uganda (Cunitz, 1995). The first shipment of food arrived in Uganda, the staging area, two days later. Within two weeks, the killings were abated and humanitarian assistance began to reach areas deep in the country.

In 1996 the Clinton Administration launched the African Crisis Response Initiative. The program’s purpose was to coordinate with IC partners and African nations to plan and support both humanitarian and peacekeeping operations on the continent. The program supported several of Clinton’s grand strategy goals. First, because the program was limited to democratic nations, it supported Clinton’s “enlargement” goal of growing democracies. Second, the program allowed Clinton to selectively determine when and how to provide humanitarian assistance to other nations while still controlling limited U.S. resources.

The Use of National Power (Hard and Soft)

Grand strategy requires the use of national power to achieve national security aims (Kissinger, 1957). Clinton’s NSSs consistently identified two power methods for promoting strategic success: economic prosperity underwrites national security, and democracy promotion supports a safe international environment (Clinton, The NSS, 1994c, p. i). Clinton specifically favored certain types of national power, with unilateral military activity as the lowest frequency. With his first three NSSs entitled “Engagement and Enlargement” Clinton (1994c, 1995c, 1996c) identified hard power economics as his guiding international strategy. However, diplomacy provided him with pivotal successes in Western Europe (Good Friday Peace Accords, 1998), Eastern Europe (Dayton Peace

Accords, 1995), the Middle East (four peace agreements between Israel and her neighbors, 1993, 1994, 1998, and 2999), and the Caribbean (Haiti, 1994).

In Clinton's (1999b) Kosovo speech, he implied America led the world with intolerance for genocide or "ethnic cleansing" (p. 1). He also explained American strategy was to first try soft power (diplomacy) before employing hard power tactics in the promotion of democratic values. Clinton cautiously used military power unilaterally. On June 26, 1993, Clinton launched 23 Tomahawk missiles into Iraqi intelligence headquarters in downtown Bagdad in response to reports Saddam Hussein launched efforts to assassinate President George H.W. Bush during his April 1993 visit to Kuwait (The Miller Center, 2019). He also used economic power to lift the longstanding trade embargo against Vietnam, renewed Most Favored Trade status for China, ushered NAFTA and the WTO Center into existence. Clinton also used diplomatic power to bring the Oslo Accords Peace Plan between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Grand Strategy Determination

Under President Clinton, grand strategy was predicated on America's founding national values and ideals (Clinton, 2000a, p. 5). Contextually, his NSSs highlighted the political and economic interdependence globalization promoted between the U.S. and other nations. Clinton's NSSs also discussed advancing technology's impact on international communication, and problematic social and ethnic dynamics in Eastern Europe, Africa, and South America, including transnational refugees. Upon taking office, and reaffirmed at his second inaugural, Clinton identified his reliance on

international organizations, especially NATO and the U.N., and the use of collective security as essential pillars of American engagement (Clinton, 1997a).

Clinton's 1994 NSS, among others, clearly identifies "Selective Engagement" as the grand strategy guiding his use of national power, specifically military force (p. 10). While the NSS explains the necessity to efficiently husband scarce national resources, and it does not specify any specific scenarios for the deployment of U.S. forces, the assertion that the decisions were made "selectively" clearly explained the grand strategy scheme. Clinton (1994b) reaffirmed this choice by stating the U.S. would "engage" national interests selectively (p. 5), "target" military threats selectively (p. 10), or "employ" resources "selectively" (p. 13). Because each of Clinton's seven NSSs were nearly identical, with minor revisions, they all explain Selective Engagement at least five times.

Robert Art (1999) delineated a typology of seven grand strategy choices for post-Cold War America. Art's explanations of American national interests (e.g. great power peace, global economic freedom, and democratic expansion) support the Selective Engagement strategy expressed in each of Clinton's NSSs. Lastly, Art (1999) confirms America's "Selective Engagement" grand strategy through Clinton's choices to act or lead in a variety of international incidents, but not others, which are illustrated below.

Colin Dueck's (2006) provided the third confirmation of "Selective Engagement" as Clinton's grand strategy. Dueck cited the nearly five decades of liberal globalism that guided America's Cold War foreign policy as the long-standing trend Clinton was compelled to follow (p. 146). Additionally, Dueck noted America's liberal cultural

traditions provided the requisite domestic support for Clinton's choices. Dueck went on to systematically invalidate the grand strategy alternatives to "Selective Engagement". The three observations above provided the triangulation from different sources that confirm Clinton's grand strategy of "Selective Engagement".

However, it became clear that President Clinton supported and promoted the national identity of American exceptionalism, implementing a second grand strategy of American Primacy. Clinton's (1996e) speech on NATO specifically cited America as the "indispensable nation". Clinton predicated this identity on America's post-Cold War great power status, America's special responsibility to support the growth of democracy, and the nation's broad and unique global interests and responsibilities (Clinton, 1996c).

Major strategic themes. The major themes of Clinton's National Security Strategies were consistently identified and explained throughout the series of seven published strategies. The guiding principles were clearly Stated in each NSS publication: a) enhancing security, b) improving economic prosperity, c) democracy promotion, d) international engagement, e) the U.S. as the world's "leader", but not the world's "policeman", and f) a reliance on multilateralism with close allies (Clinton, 1994b). In fact, similar themes populated George H. W. Bush's (1993b) NSS as Clinton (1994b) listed many of the same threats his predecessor used: transnational threats included international organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental security, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction. Regional issues, such as varying humanitarian crises in Africa, Europe, and the Caribbean were of noticeable importance throughout his tenure. These threats produced similar goals: preventing regional

destabilization due to violence and refugee flow, stopping genocide and humanitarian crises, and the use of international organizations to address the issues (Clinton, The NSS, 1994c, p. 21).

Another regional issue was the protection of international trade, which supported American economic prosperity. Protecting commerce routes in the Pacific and Atlantic theaters were of paramount concern to President Clinton. Protecting world shipping lanes and trade routes became the American Navy's mantle since the end of WWII. Clinton continued the tradition. While Clinton clearly preferred multilateralism, he did use hard (military) power unilaterally several times during his tenure. Clinton attacked Saddam Hussein's military bases in retaliation for the ejection of international inspectors. He launched Operation Desert Fox in 1998 to degrade Iraqi chemical weapons capability (Department of Defense, 2019b).

National identity and grand strategy. This research showed that while President Clinton (1993a) did not mention national identity or American values in his first inaugural speech, he soon learned the importance of these references for explaining and justifying his use of national power. President Clinton used the traditions of American values and national history to inform his evolving narrative of American identity. Before the Joint Session of Congress, President Clinton (1993b) cited "old" American values of individual responsibility for family, faith, and community as founding principles for his "new" course for the nation. By April of his first year, President Clinton (1993c) cited national values of responsibility, opportunity, respect for each other, and community to promote volunteerism and national service. Clinton's 1996 and 1998 SOTU speeches

specifically explained American national identity in the context of liberalism's shared historical identity, celebration of diversity, and national unity (see Appendix B). Nearly all his successive speeches of international consequence cited American values as justification for strategic policy.

President Clinton's (1993d) address on the U.S. involvement in Somalia explained his reliance on the idea of American exceptionalism by explaining that "only the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time" (p. 1). Clinton Stated America's conscience and best tradition spurred national engagement to stop the humanitarian crisis. These ideational constructs justified the use of American military force in Somalia, and later in Bosnia (Clinton, 1995b), and were helpful in swaying public support. By the end of his second year in office, President Clinton (1994e) specifically Stated America's foreign policies would reflect her values. Additionally, in the 1996 presidential debate with Senator Robert Dole, President Clinton further aligned the most important use of national power, military deployment, with American values. Clinton (1996d) told the world that for him to deploy military forces Americas vital national interests and values must be at stake.

Clinton used America's Cold War tradition of international engagement, the idea of national exceptionalism, and the cultural power of traditional American values to justify U.S. foreign policy and the expenditure of national power. The only caveat to this process was evident in Clinton's NSSs, all of which routinely explained the variable of American national power expenditure would be "selective engagement" in international ventures that involved only the most vital national interests and the availability of

national resources. This mind map portrays President Clinton's use of national values and American history to construct his vision of American national identity as "exceptional". Clinton used this identity to define his grand strategy of Primacy and Selective Engagement, pivoting the deployment of national resources on the balance of national interests and values at stake. The figure below illustrates the evolution of President Clinton's development of national identity and its influence on American grand strategy.



Figure 1. National identity and grand strategy.

Alternate national identity definitions. Krebs (2015, p. 183) noted American national identity influences strategic engagement and power choices for presidents. Conversely, alternate identity definitions, often proposed by competing domestic political interests, may complicate or undermine a president's ability to define the strategic situation in a manner supportive of his choices. Dominating the national political narrative is essential for political leadership in democracies (Krebs, 2015, p. 31)

A review of the New York Times and Chicago Tribune editorials for up to five days after a major international event did not yield contrasts or challenges to Clinton's definition of American national identity or his reliance on democratic values for strategic decisions. All of the editorials reviewed for this research presented policy-centered agreement, dissent, or advice on various international situations. For example, Clinton's nuclear negotiations with North Korea, South Korea and Japan spanned nearly his entire tenure, with mixed results at best. The New York Times (1993) editorial advised Clinton to continue the diplomatic approach as the best course of action.

During terms in office, Clinton faced strong opposition from the Republican Party on a variety of issues. When the Republicans controlled the House of Representatives, Speaker Newt Gingrich provided consistent political opposition to Clinton. While Gingrich usually confined himself to domestic matters of political difference, he rarely offered alternative views on matters of foreign policy. The New York Times (Sciolino, 1995), and Washington Post (Kovaleski, 1995) reported an incident where Newt Gingrich publicly expressed an opinion that the U.S. should recognize Hong Kong as a State, in direct contrast to the long-standing "One China" policy codified during the Nixon

administration and adhered to by successive presidents, including President Clinton. As the Speaker of the House, and third in line for the presidency, Gingrich's comments carried some weight in the political discourse of the time. However, after Dr. Henry Kissinger called Gingrich from China, Gingrich later explained his comments as "a joke" (Kovaleski, 1995; Sciolino, 1995). Gingrich made further comments specifically removing himself from foreign policy conversations.

On Rwanda, the New York Times supported Clinton's decision not to send troops into the ongoing conflict because of concerns for troop safety and, as the editorial specifically explained, Rwanda did not present a clear and vital interest for the U.S. (The New York Times Editorial Board, 1994a). However, the Times did support sending humanitarian aid, and eventually U.S. forces in support of the U.N. mandate as long as the troops were not in direct conflict with hostile forces.

Conversely, the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune supported NATO's airstrikes on Bosnian Serbs as the aggressors against ethnic Muslims (The Chicago Tribune Editorial, 1994; The New York Times Editorial Board, 1994b). The New York Times editorial agreed with Clinton's recommendations for NATO's new post-Cold War role: as unbiased peacekeepers in support of U.N.S.C. resolutions. However, the New York Times disputed Clinton's estimation of the proposed NATO benefits by raising concerns Russia would view the process threateningly. The Chicago Tribune, normally supportive of a conservative agenda, approved of Clinton's 1993 unilateral Tomahawk missile strike on Iraqi intelligence facilities in response to the reported assassination

attempt on former President George H.W. Bush (The Chicago Tribune Editorial Board, 1993).

Republican rebuttals. In the Republican rebuttal to the 1993 SOTU address, Illinois Congressman Robert Michel warned the incoming president that the as long as his foreign policy adhered to "traditional" American values, they would support the policy (Michel, 1993). However, Michel cautioned if Clinton's explanation(s) for his strategic activity was not based on supporting American values and national interests, the Republicans would oppose the policy. This seemed like a warning to simply include values references in each activity's justification to preclude Republican opposition. The Congressman's rebuttal did not include a description or delineation of the values he required the President to support.

The Republican's 1994 SOTU rebuttal was the only instance of the party challenging President Clinton on national security issues. Kansas Senator Robert Dole's rebuttal speech celebrated and promoted the issue of American leadership in world affairs (Dole, 1994). Dole, a WWII veteran, specifically confronted Clinton's proposed budgetary "slashing" of defense spending, even though defense spending had steadily declined annually since the beginning of President Reagan's second term (Korb, Conley, & Rothman, 2011). However, Dole's push to expand American international leadership internationally did not mention that it was predicated on cultural values. Dole explained it was America's post-World War II *mission* to provide international leadership.

The Republican's 1996 SOTU rebuttal, again given by Senator Robert Dole, directly challenged President Clinton on the subject of American values, specifically

mentioning the characteristics of "self-reliance and family" (sic) (Dole, The American Presidency Project, 1996). However, the public policies disputed by Senator Dole included federal government budget deficits, growth of the welfare State, and the seating of partisan (in this case, "liberal) judges to the federal bench. As Senator Dole's recalled conservative American traditions reduced taxes and limited government, his rebuttal was focused only on domestic political issues without mention of international relations or national security.

Mississippi Senator Trent Lott gave the Republican's rebuttal to President Clinton's 1998 SOTU address. In keeping with the tradition of the era, Senator Lott disputed Clinton's policies on the federal deficit, limited government, "over-regulation" and taxation, Medicare expansion, and the "liberalization" of public education (Lott, 1998). Senator Lott (1998) specifically cited traditional American values of "family, faith, and freedom" as he proposed alternative domestic policies. However, directly addressing then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Senator Lott unequivocally exclaimed his support for President Clinton's defense of American national interests abroad and protection of the homeland.

Summarily, Republican rebuttals to the Clinton SOTU addresses were not used to propose alternative national identities or foreign policies, save Dole's push for greater American leadership in the early days of the Clinton administration. This research observed rare challenges to President Clinton on the issue of national identity and foreign policy. Conversely, Republicans routinely challenges President Clinton's domestic

policies, citing characteristics favored by conservatives as “traditional” American values juxtaposed to Clinton’s agenda.

Observations and Results

How did President Clinton define America’s post-Cold War national identity as a justification for using the four components of grand strategy to project American values?” Clinton’s (1994b) recurring expression of America as the “indispensable nation” solidified American identity as the global leader and sole superpower. Clinton’s “indispensable” label justified his grand strategy of Primacy, while his caution against becoming the world’s policeman signaled his aversion to indiscriminate international expeditions by being “selective” in choosing America’s missions abroad (Clinton, 1996c).

Continuity of national values as both the source and purpose of national power projection and the mantle of international leadership continued under President Clinton, transcending the last two Cold War presidents into the next period. Promotion of democracy, human rights, and rule of law by hard and soft power means were decades-long traditions of American Cold War strategy and cornerstones of Clinton’s (1994b) grand strategy. Collective security and interventionism also continued, although according to Clinton’s (1995c, p. 7) Selective Engagement calculations the U.S. would not be the “world’s policeman”. Unilateral military actions were relatively rare under Clinton.

How did America’s presidentially constructed national identity influence its post-Cold War grand strategy? President Clinton’s national security strategies specifically

identified long-standing American cultural values as the source and purpose of American NSS (Clinton, 1994b). President Clinton's use of both hard power and soft power to achieve national security ends clearly validated his Selective Engagement grand strategy because they showed his preference for diplomacy and aversion to international expeditions. President Clinton declared on multiple occasions and through different publications that he did not want to U.S. to become the world's policeman, so he chose which international activities fit within his description of national interests, abstaining from those situations he did not consider important enough for the expenditure of limited American power resources.

President Clinton's use of national values, predicated on liberalism and democracy, enabled him to leverage America's soft power tools of diplomacy and cultural affinity to forge difficult yet significant peace agreements in nearly every region of the world. In North America, Clinton's peaceful transition for Haiti was a significant accomplishment. His completion of NAFTA and financial support of Mexico helped stabilize the North American economic surge of the 1990s. In Asia, Clinton's support for China's entrance in the WTO and granting most favored nation status enabled that country to significantly improve its access to global markets. In Europe and the Middle East Clinton encouraged or participated in peace agreements between Northern Ireland and Britain, Bosnia, Croatia, Herzegovina, and Serbia; and the Russian nuclear reduction agreement helped reduce stockpiles of unsecured fuel and reduce the number of nuclear weapons (see Appendix A).

Constructivism proved a valuable research tool because soft power was pivotal to the vast majority of President Clinton's international successes. Clinton's use of diplomacy secured peace agreements in various world regions, including the Caribbean (Haiti), the Middle East (Israel and Palestine), and Europe (Northern Ireland and England). Even Clinton's rare use of national hard power (military) was coordinated within the context of U.N. approval and conducted with the support of allies.

Summary

As the first post-Cold War President, Clinton defined American national values consistent with his immediate predecessors and used those values to determine national strategic interests. Clinton identified a multi-prong grand strategy of Primacy and Selective Engagement to allow himself the freedom to restrain the U.S. from becoming the world's policeman, yet allow for international leadership on issues at the highest levels of national interest. Clinton's national security strategies, publications, and speeches clearly delineated his view of American values as justification for the expenditure of national resources for strategic ends.

The definition of national identity espoused by President Clinton went unchallenged at a pivotal point in American history. This research showed that the editorial boards of the New York Times, generally considered a liberal publication, and the Chicago Tribune, considered a conservative publication, did not effectively challenge Clinton's justifications for international engagement based on national identity or national values. Additionally, the Republican rebuttals to the annual SOTU addresses did not offer any significant challenge to President Clinton's description of national values,

constructed national identity, defined national interests, or use of national power resources. The lack of public discourse on national identity, especially when it's used to justify the use of national power, presents a very important opportunity for a renewed debate on national identity and a thorough examination of the detailed, not generalized, characterizations of national values.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

This study's purpose was to examine the narration of national identity as a pillar of grand strategy. Because a nation derives its purpose from its identity, determining the root of that identity helps illuminate the common determinants for different national security activities (Huntington, 2004). This research is important because President Clinton, as the first American post-Cold War leader, inherited a national security environment without great power threats, with nearly unlimited international political capital, and with undisputed national power at his disposal (Hyland, 1999). Clinton's grand strategy, and the national identity he used to validate that strategy, explained America's character and purpose in cultural and strategic terms. In many of his NSSs, Clinton explained that America's tradition role of world leadership would continue, promoting democratic values, human rights, and good governance, but that the United States would not act as the world's policeman, indiscriminately inserting itself into every national and international crisis (Clinton, 1994b, 1996b, 1998b). Thus, President Clinton continued many of the national characteristics and priorities of his immediate predecessors while resisting the temptation to enter international affairs (Clinton, 1995c, p. 7). This directly answered one of the research questions: How did President Clinton define American national identity as a foundation for national security decisions?

The other research question asked, "How did President Clinton define America's post-Cold War national identity as a justification for selecting his grand strategy?" Because constructivism explains national identity as a social construct, President

Clinton's narratives, including the SOTU and inaugural speeches, along with the annual NSS, routinely cited traditional American values and Cold War leadership to continue and reinforce the idea of American world leadership. President Clinton's 1994, 1995, and 1996 NSSs cited America's hard power strength (military and economic) and democratic values as the source of America being "indispensable" to peace and prosperity in world affairs. Clinton's SOTU narratives also routinely linked the promotion of peace and security abroad with domestic peace, security, and prosperity.

Summary of the Study

I examined the description and use of American national identity to support grand strategy. In 1994, President Clinton's first NSS identified "engagement and enlargement" as his foreign policy theme. Though Clinton continued his predecessors' reliance on the support for human rights, democracy promotion, and good governance in developing regions, he emphasized the hard power tools of economic engagement and trade to attract nations to the democratic model. He used the WTO, NAFTA, and trade agreements to enhance American influence in the region and around the world.

Clinton (1994b) also described American values of individual freedom, human dignity, and equality as the impetus for national interests and NSS (p. ii). In many speeches around the world, Clinton emphasized tolerance, fair treatment for minorities, human dignity, and human rights as the cornerstone of successful democracies (Clinton, 1995b, 1998b, 1999a). Thus, Clinton's narratives defined post-Cold War American national identity as the "indispensable nation" that promoted democracy and free trade

around the world but did not act as the world's policeman, engaging indiscriminately in every international dispute (p. 5).

Clinton (1994b, 1995c) NSSs also identified selective engagement as his chosen grand strategy because it afforded the latitude to carefully differentiate national interests from other situations of lesser importance to national security. This strategy allowed the president to preserve finite national resources and prevent American over-commitment in regional activities that were of lesser national concern. Further, Clinton relied on soft power to promote important peace agreements in Europe (Bosnia, Northern Ireland) and the Middle East (Israel), confirming the importance of U.S. influence in world affairs.

Along with the results on Clinton's grand strategy related to national identity, public debate on post-Cold War national identity was not evident in this research. For instance, review of the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune editorials did not uncover significant discussion of Clinton's definition of America's identity or role in world affairs. Speaker Gingrich's brief proposal about American foreign policy in Asia also did not produce lasting public debate on the issue. Further, the republican rebuttals to President Clinton's SOTU addresses did not present alternative national identity descriptions or significantly challenge him on national security.

Interpretation of the Findings

The research produced several conclusions. The assumption that President Clinton did not adhere to any specific grand strategy but was strategically adrift (Biddle, 2012; Suri, 2009; Walton, 2012) was not supported by this research. Clinton's NSSs showed significant similarity across important dimensions, including references to

American liberal culture and democratic values as the source and purpose of American national security policy. President Clinton consistently cited his definition of American national identity characteristics as justification for international engagement and national security policy.

Results also showed that Clinton identified and used selective engagement as his grand strategy, which disconfirmed several authors who either claimed that America did not have a coherent post-Cold War grand strategy or that the strategy was something other than selective engagement. For example, Biddle (2005), Brands (2014), and Suri (2009) described what they perceived as Clinton's their perceived lack of grand strategy as strategic drift. Layne (2006) also incorrectly identified American grand strategy as extra-regional hegemony.

Limitations of the Study

This study did not involve a longitudinal perspective of American national identity. This absence shows President Clinton's definition on national identity from a singular perspective in time instead of as a point on a continuum of American foreign policy across identifiable national or international periods. Observing and understanding American national identity at important points in international epochs could explain the trajectory of change and continuity since the nation's founding. These observations could then be compared to other significant international leaders, such as Greek-, Roman-, French-, and British-dominated periods.

Additionally, understanding American national identity at the end of the Cold War could allow political leaders, scholars, and national security practitioners to assess

and compare how American identity evolves and how that evolution impacts the use of national power in contemporary international situations. As each president proposes, defines, and projects his or her version of national identity, national leaders, scholars, and voters need to assess the degree to which that new definition comports with their understanding of traditional or contemporary America.

Recommendations

Presidential description of national identity can be a critical national security tool because it defines national purpose, national interests, and the sequence of acceptable tools used to accomplish international goals. Because national identity is pivotal to national security, it should be regularly analyzed and debated in the public sphere. Leading news outlets should challenge, support, and offer viable alternatives to presidential definitions when they are determined to be incongruent with America's best interests. Similarly, scholarly publications should examine presidential definitions of identity to determine their historical continuity or divergence.

Implications for Positive Sociopolitical Impact

This research offers insight into the creation and narration of American national identity at a critical junction in national and international history. Because that identity is used as a grand strategy determinant and justification for national security activities, the importance of identity should be deliberately debated in the public space to better ensure long term strategic continuity with American historical identity.

Understanding the power national identity wields in influencing and justifying national interests and strategic choices can be an invaluable tool for political and social

leadership. As America's world leadership evolves in the post-Cold War era, and other nations create new power centers in various regions and in different national security dimensions (i.e. political, cultural, economic) cultural affinity with international peers may prove to be the ultimate soft power, and far more effective than hard power. When presidents create national identities (such as the "leader of the free world") that international allies can associate with and aspire to, America increases its power through attraction, collaboration, and influence, which leads to cooperation on major national security initiatives (Krebs, 2015).

A rising China and a resurgent Russia have reignited and redefined great power competition in the 21st century. The U.S. can ill-afford to support right-wing dictators around the world, as it did during the Cold War, and both Russia and China currently serve as "spoilers" by vetoing controversial United Nations resolutions they deem unacceptable and militarily supporting authoritarian allies such as Kim Jong Il in North Korea and Bashad al Assad in Syria. Therefore, the U.S. must use its traditional national identity components (e.g., respect for human rights, multilateralism, support for democracy) to attract partners to its banner, organize and energize them into effective cohorts, emphasizing the significance of soft power to grow the alliance as President Clinton (1994c) strategy of "engagement and enlargement" sought to do.

The Trans Pacific Partnership , President Obama's strategic pivot to Asia in response to an emergent China, would have given the U.S. cultural and economic leadership in more than 40 percent of the global economy and the world's largest free trade zone (McBride & Chatzky, 2019). President Trump's decision to withdraw from

TPP eliminated that opportunity and a valuable international dimension to American regional leverage. Building and maintaining alliances with nations that share similar cultural tenets is important, but it is increasingly relevant to the security of America's future that the nation promote economic interdependence and liberal democratic values in regions and among nations where illiberal democracy or authoritarianism is the trend (Kupchan, 2007).

The potential impact of this research may be no less than influencing consideration for the way the most powerful nation on earth organized its interactions with other nations and used national power components in the immediate post-Cold War era. This research may affect the way American leaders and the broader public view national identity and its influence in determining national security objectives, tools, and methods of using national power to shape the international environment. For example, as President George W. Bush introduced "3-D National Security" (Defense, Diplomacy, and Development) by elevating foreign aid and development to near-cabinet level status in his 2006 National Security Strategy, he enhanced America's commitment to improve struggling national governments' capacities to function effectively and improve the their citizens' lives.

This research may also have the potential for international implications, assuming an isomorphic approach to linguistic and discourse analysis. As national leaders around the world seek to justify their national interests, they may rely on their own definitions of cultural and national identity to guide and justify their strategic policies. Primary

elements of the national identity will reassure their domestic stakeholders and buttresses their national concept of "self" in the community of nations.

Conclusion

Understanding American national identity is critical to understanding "who we are" as a nation, what identity-associated U.S. national security priorities are delineated in American grand strategy, and what national power resources elected and appointed national leaders should leverage to reach international goals. President Clinton demonstrated the link between national identity and national interests by using his explanation of national values as justification for strategic choices. However, Clinton leveraged the grand strategy variable of Selective Engagement to enable America to decline involvement in situations he deemed less vital to American interests (Clinton, The NSS, 1995c). Selective Engagement enabled Clinton to prevent his administration from becoming the "world's policeman" and entangling itself in the numerous crises around the globe as many long-smoldering societal and ethnic conflicts erupted in the power vacuum of dissolving authoritarian regimes and unstable national power structures.

American values, the justification for its grand strategy and international activity, proved a cogent dimension of America's soft power. In the 21st century, the rising prevalence of soft power over hard power is due in large part to the diffusion of influence within and among State and non-State actors on the international landscape. The increasing perception among scholars and practitioners that, in a growing number of situations, the value and influence of soft power supersedes that of hard power suggests

America's future influence rests less with her military capability than with her ability to attract and coordinate with friends and followers (Nye, 2004). This fits well within America's longstanding strategies of cooperative security and multilateralism. Rising powers, such as China, use their massive economic connections regionally and globally to increase their hard power alliances, yet China has struggled to attract and influence even regional allies largely because of its preference for hard power's dominating posture and abrasive tactics (Meade & Keeley, 2017).

Because this research observed an element of America's soft power (identity), and an important national power dynamic (grand strategy) using constructivist principles, there is cause for concern that President Trump's international machinations may be costing America supremacy in an increasingly important national power metric (Meade & Keeley, 2017). America's long-standing alliances with five of the top seven most powerful nations supports her sustained position as the world's most important nation (Meade & Keeley, 2017). While several global power rating organizations scored the U.S. as "most" powerful, the prevailing matrix was heavily favored toward hard power metrics of military capability and economic capacity. However, the Pew Research Center (2018) found indications that America's soft power is declining, due in large part to President Trump's international image of being untrustworthy to lead on global issues (p. 3).

If the U.S. wants to sustain or increase its international influence, it would need to ensure the presidents it elects offer and adhere to the values and traditions compatible with wielding the prolific tool of soft power. This research showed how President

Clinton's (1994c) preference for diplomatic leverage enabled him to build an important alliance with a declining Russia, an emerging China, and craft pivotal peace initiatives in some of the world's fiercest conflicts. President Clinton's constructed national identity of primacy, coupled with strong diplomatic economic and peace initiatives provided the international community with decisive and inclusive leadership. As a source of international influence, America's soft power is a potent resource for leaders who use America's liberal values to construct a welcoming national identity of inclusion and fairness. With the 2020 elections on the horizon, American would do well to listen carefully to the national identity vision each candidate offers, and, for those who value America's global leadership, consider well how each candidate's proposed identity may cost or contribute to American global leadership.

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Appendix A: National Power Projection Timeline 1993-2000

Hard Power- Military Incident
06/26/1993: Navy attacks Baghdad The U.S. Navy, under President Clinton's orders, attacks Iraqi intelligence operations in downtown Baghdad after learning that Iraqis had plotted to kill former President Bush during his April 1993 visit to Kuwait. The twenty-three tomahawk missiles fired reportedly kill eight people.
09/18/1994: Haiti general cedes power After a tense stand-off with the Clinton administration, Haiti's military government, led by General Raoul Cedras, agrees to cede power. The administration, along with the United Nations, had tried for over a year to restore the democratically elected president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been overthrown in a coup on September 30, 1991.
10/09/1994: Deterring invasion of Kuwait The Clinton administration announces plans to send more than 35,000 troops to the Persian Gulf to deter an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Less than three days after the announcement, Iraqi troops pull back from the Iraq-Kuwait border.
08/30/1995: NATO begins strikes on Serbia NATO, with a strong contingent of American forces, begins two weeks of air attacks on Serbian positions.
09/03/1996: Missile strikes Iraq President Clinton orders a cruise missile strike against Iraq after Saddam Hussein leads a siege against the Kurdish city of Irbil in northern Iraq.
12/16/1998: Retaliatory attacks on Iraq President Clinton orders a three-day bombing attack against Iraq after Saddam Hussein refuses to cooperate with United Nations weapons inspectors.
03/24/1999: NATO attack on Serbia In response to Serbian aggression in Kosovo and Albania, and reports of ethnic cleansing, the United States leads NATO attacks against Serbia. On February 23, Serbian and Kosovar representatives had agreed to a plan that would have granted more autonomy to Kosovo over a three-year period. Serbia reneged on the agreement, prompting U.S. and NATO military action.

Hard Power- Economic Incident
12/08/1993: NAFTA creates free trade zone After a hard-fought battle in Congress, President Clinton signs the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), eliminating nearly every trade barrier between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, creating the world's largest free trade zone.
02/03/1994: Vietnam trade embargo lifted President Clinton ends the nineteen-year old trade embargo against Vietnam, noting that Vietnam is indeed trying to locate 2,238 Americans listed as missing in action since the Vietnam War.
05/26/1994: China trade status renewed President Clinton renews China's Most Favored Nation trade status, even though China has not made as much progress on human rights issues as he had hoped.
01/31/1995: Emergency loans to Mexico President Clinton authorizes the U.S. Treasury Department to make an emergency loan of up to $20 billion to Mexico to forestall a financial crisis threatening the interconnected Mexican and American economies.
11/15/1999: Trade with China The United States and China agree to a trade treaty reducing tariffs and other trade barriers. The treaty is to come into effect after China joins the World Trade Organization and Congress grants permanent normal trade relations between the two countries.
03/08/2000: Permanent trade relations with China President Clinton sends a bill to Congress asking for permanent normal trade relations with China. After securing House (May 24) and Senate (September 19) approval, Clinton signs the bill on October 10.

Soft Power- Diplomatic Incident
07/25/1994: Israel-Jordan talks President Clinton meets with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and King Hussein of Jordan. The talks result in Israel and Jordan agreeing in principle to end nearly fifty years of official antagonism.
09/18/1994: Haiti general cedes power After a tense stand-off with the Clinton administration, Haiti's military government, led by General Raoul Cedras, agrees to cede power. The administration, along with the United Nations, had tried for over a year to restore the democratically elected president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been overthrown in a coup on September 30, 1991.
12/01/1994: General Agreement on Tariffs approved The Senate votes to approve the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that 117 nations, including the United States, agree to in December 1993. The agreement cuts tariffs by more than a third on a wide-range of products and creates a freer international market for goods.
12/05/1994: START I signed in Budapest President Clinton, along with the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, signs the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in Budapest, Hungary. The treaty eliminates more than 9,000 warheads.
07/11/1995: U.S. recognizes Vietnam The United States extended full diplomatic recognition of Vietnam, twenty-two years after the United States withdrew military forces from that country.
10/23/1995: Improving U.S.-Russia relations President Clinton and Russian president Yeltsin meet in Hyde Park, New York, and continue to discuss ways to improve relations between their two nations, especially with regard to the issue of nuclear arms.
11/21/1995: Dayton Peace Accords Reached On November 21, 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords were initialed in Dayton, Ohio; they were formally signed in Paris, France, on December 14, 1995. The agreement was reached between the warring nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia. It sought to end one of the worst European conflicts since World War II,
03/21/1997: Further nuclear negotiations begin President Clinton and President Yeltsin of Russia meet at Helsinki, Finland, and agree to begin negotiations on another nuclear arms reduction treaty (START III) as soon as both nations ratify START II. The United States Senate had ratified START II in January 1996.
04/24/1997: Chemical Weapons become illegal The Senate ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention, making illegal the production, acquisition, stockpiling, or use of chemical weapons.
10/28/1997: President Clinton welcomes President Jiang Zemin of China for an official State visit.

07/11/2000: Israeli peace summit
President Clinton hosts Israeli leader Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat at Camp David in the hope of reaching a peace agreement. After two weeks of unsuccessful talks, the summit breaks up with no agreement.

Soft Power- Informational Incident
11/29/1995: Clinton urges peace in Ireland During a tour of Europe, President Clinton urges the continuation of peace efforts in Northern Ireland where longstanding conflict between Irish Protestants and Catholics escalated to violence over issues of economic and political autonomy.
06/03/2000: First summit with Putin President Clinton holds his first summit meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin. They reaffirm their nations' commitment to strategic arms reductions, but disagree over American plans to research and develop a missile-defense system.

The Miller Center (2019)

Appendix B: Word Frequency Chart

Source	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	Avg.
Annual National Security Strategies									
leader		24	33	47	36	59	43	55	42.4
Values		5	10	12	15	18	19	46	17.9
Identity		0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.4
Ideals		1	4	5	2	3	2	6	3.3
Selective		3	4	5	4	2	5	4	3.9
Total pages		29	41	49	34	61	54	84	50.3
State of the Union Addresses									
Leader		7	14	6	6	6	8	7	7.7
Values		6	5	5	3	2	0	3	3.4
Identity		0	1	1*	0	1*	0	0	0.2
Ideals		0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0.6
Selective		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total pages		13	17	12	13	13	16	18	14.6
Inaugural Addresses									
Leader	0				0				0
Values	0				3				1.5
Identity	0				0				0
Ideals	0				2				1
Selective	0				0				0
Total pages	5				8				6.5

Note. * indicates specific reference to national identity. Searches included derivatives and at least 3 to4 word string for context

Appendix C: Strategic Analysis Models

1. **PESTEL**- An organization's structural analysis tool that considers the Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal external factors impacting their strategic environment (Sawalha, 2017). This model promotes the "contextualization" of chosen strategies that consider important dimensions of the operating environment.

2. **S=E+W+M**- Strategy is the combination of Ends (terminal objectives) and Ways (the chosen methods) and Means (the tools or chosen national resources) (Lykke, 1989). This concept was published by Colonel Lykke and has been the taught as the cornerstone of strategy planning by the military for decades (Cavanaugh, 2017). Grand strategy is often referred to as the coordination of the national interest "ends" and national power "means".

3. **SWOT**- A strategic planning tool primarily used for situational examination, as opposed to recurring long-term analysis. The tool compares an organization's Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats within specific temporal and spatial limits.

4. **Ascher-Overholt Model of Political Forecasting**- This strategic planning model, developed by William Ascher and William Overholt in 1983, decries quantitative methodologies as less-effective for political forecasting because they fail to account for social nuances. This strategic planning model focuses on three considerations for political forecasting: a) the power dynamics between individuals and organizations; b) the political environment within which political events play out; and c) the changes and continuities in actor strategies and authoritative policies. This scenario-based approach to

political forecasting is especially useful to political leaders with considerable influence over their national resources and the ability to weigh choices, like those in many republics (Ascher & Overholt, 1983)

5. **Porter-5 Forces**- The Porter-5 Strategic Model was developed by Dr. Michael Porter in the Harvard Business Review (1979). This model focuses on analyzing competitive forces, and their sources, within one's strategic environment.

The "5 I's" of the Porter-5 Forces are dimensions of analysis, which include: a) Internal organizational structure and processes; b) International arena, including regional competitors which constitute the competitive factors in the external environment; c) Information- risks include the timely access and transfer of critical information to decision-makers and local actors; d) Infrastructure risks include software and network vulnerabilities as well as physical equipment and structures; e) Influences include

external demands from stakeholders, laws, and higher-echelon policy mandates and treaties (Rice, 2010).

The unique aspect of this model is its observance on strategic competitors and stakeholders' underlying influences (sort of looking at the stakeholders' stakeholders). Analyzing underlying influences can significantly enhance the qualities and accuracies of predictive model. While this model was originally designed for industry-level perspectives, incorporating the model to national security requires substituting the international arena for the industry, and moving from a program or enterprise-level analysis to a security and national interests' perspective (Rice, 2010).

6. **DIME**- The 1988 NSS (p. 7) outlines the elements of American national military strategy as diplomatic, informational (public diplomacy and cultural attraction), military, and economic. President Reagan's NSS also included America's moral legitimacy and leadership in world affairs as critical components of national strength and opportunity. He also stipulated America's sources of national power work best when enlisted in harmonic balance and in conjunction with strong international alliances.

7. **Hard Power, Soft Power**- This phrase categorizing national power was coined by Joseph Nye (2004) to describe hard power as the use of military tools (e.g. prepositioning troops and tools of war, war, alliances), and economic tools (aid, sanctions, bribes, trade agreements) (p. 31). Soft Power is the use of diplomacy (attraction, cultural affinity, agreements) and information (public speeches, diplomatic signaling) to achieve international goals.