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Nietzschean pedagogy: A revaluation for contemporary education

Arthur Gilmore Ogden

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NIETZSCHEAN PEDAGOGY: A REVALUATION
FOR CONTEMPORARY EDUCATION

by

Arthur G. Ogden
M.A., University of Delaware, 1970
B.A., LaSalle University, 1968



Dr. Morton I. Teicher, Faculty Advisor
Professor of Education
Walden university

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirement for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

WALDEN UNIVERSITY
August, 1995

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
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

This inquiry is intended to present a compilation of the work nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche offered in the field of philosophy of education. It focuses on three elements which attempt to offer some solutions to the problems facing our contemporary educational institutions, particularly public schools:

1. the similarities between our contemporary educational climate and the educational climate in Nietzsche's Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century;
2. the viability of an education which stresses personal achievement through academic rigor (i.e., teaching the *ubermensch*, the over-man, or the *higher state* of the human condition); and,
3. the necessity of establishing a philosophy of education which places the learner as the focus of the entire process in order to promote creativity and critical thinking.

An application of the elements of Nietzschean pedagogy to contemporary education will produce a knowledge delivery system which answers the needs of the student first, the society second.

The thrust of this dissertation is the justification of a *revaluation* of those *meta*-educational principles which have resulted in the mediocre conditions we find in our schools and institutions today.

Nietzsche's concern with education during his time resulted in his model of education which placed the receiver of education, the student, at the focal point. This model is specifically not student-centered, but rather, is a blueprint for the development of the *ubermensch*, or the *higher state* of being of the student

within the human condition, who will effect a *reevaluation* of values. Nietzsche posited a philosophy of education designed to promote individual creativity and critical thinking based upon four elements: love between the pedagogue and the learner, promotion of competition in the Greek tradition of *agon*, adherence to a doctrine of *amor fati*, and education of the whole person.

Essentially, this dissertation establishes the circumstances of our present-day educational institutions, makes a thorough examination of Nietzsche's concept of education, and then applies these concepts in presenting a framework for the *reevaluation* of our educational system through a Nietzschean pedagogy in the form of seven *Corollaries for a Reevaluation of Contemporary Education*.

For Rudy

The most magnificent Soul I have ever known.

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Nietzsche was right: *What does not destroy me, makes me stronger.*

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NIETZSCHEAN PEDAGOGY: A REVALUATION FOR CONTEMPORARY EDUCATION

*I teach you the superman. Man is something to be surpassed.
--Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Prologue*

Part the First: An Introduction

1.00 The Inquiry

Regardless of the fact that education in the United States is one of the most vulnerable of its institutions, the reality that there are problems of alarming proportions is undeniable today. We constantly hear of the deteriorating facilities, the violence, the poor nationalized test scores, the poor preparation of the teachers, the demoralizing atmosphere under which students are supposed to learn, and the cries of the politicians, as well as those of concerned taxpayers, over causes and solutions to the tragedy of contemporary education. So it is that with advancements in technology, the ever-increasing influence and imposition of state control, and the sense of helplessness by parents, students, and teachers alike, contemporary education would appear to be facing crises not only in terms of actual delivery of a viable product but also in terms of pedagogy *as*

pedagogy, and in terms of values.

Nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche faced a similar set of circumstances and issues surrounding education in his native Fatherland. His response was to offer a model of education which placed the receiver of education, the student, at the focal point of education. This model is specifically not student-centered, but rather, is a blueprint for the development of the *ubermensch*, or the *higher state* of being of the student within the human condition. Although his writing style was often aphoristic, poetic, and even mystical, at times, Nietzsche posited a philosophy of education designed to promote individual creativity and critical thinking. A concerted application of Nietzsche's treatises and pronouncements on education and teaching, as well as on knowledge and epistemology, presents an approach which re-affirms the individuality of the learner, thus promoting creativity and critical thinking.

Nietzschean Pedagogy: A Reevaluation for Contemporary Education examines Nietzsche's philosophy of education and offers the proposition that this philosophy is not only applicable to contemporary education, but also, that this philosophy presents an approach which may be pivotal in solving many of the problems plaguing our educational institutions today. The intent of this dissertation is to bring into one volume the various interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy of education, and then to evolve a *meta-educational pedagogy* based upon these observations and interpretations. Such a pedagogy is presented in Part the Fourth, Section 2.00, "Pedagogy of the *Ubermensch*." This pedagogical

philosophy is based upon four elements: love between the pedagogist and the learner; using and understanding the contest, or competition, as *agon*, in pedagogical endeavors; embracing the Nietzschean concept of *amor fati* as a liberating principle in learning; and the development of the *whole* being in pedagogical ventures.

2.00 Toward a Solution

Few would argue against the proposition that education in the United States today is suffering from a lack of consistent, concerted direction. This is often compounded by state regulations which add to the confusion of purpose we see in our schools today. Such confusion manifests itself in all aspects of our schools, from the Board Room to the class room, from the negotiating by teachers' unions to the mismanagement of administrators, from the maintenance of curriculum to the deterioration of facilities. In the November 1993 issue of *Harper's Magazine*, Benjamin Barber published an indicting article, entitled "America Skips School: Why We Talk So Much About Education and Do So Little". In his opening remarks he observed the following factual events as schools were to open for Fall.

On September 8, the day most of the nation's children were scheduled to return to school, the Department of Education Statistics issued a report, commissioned by Congress, on adult literacy and numeracy in the United States. The results? More than 90 million adult Americans lacked simple literacy. Fewer than 20 percent of those surveyed could compare two metaphors in a poem; not 4 percent could calculate the cost of carpeting at a given price from a room of a given size, using a calculator. As the DOE report was being issued, as if to echo its findings, two of the nation's

largest school systems had delayed their openings: in New York, to remove asbestos from aging buildings; in Chicago, because of a battle over the budget.¹

The issue of literacy is a direct reflection of the job we are doing in the classroom, not only as students and educators, but also as a society which has long boasted of its superiority in the halls of learning. It is this value which our society claims to associate with education which is at the core of our problems: we profess one thing, then perform in a different fashion.

Technology in its many shapes and forms has proven to be both a boon and a bane: while it opens many new possibilities in all sorts of inquiries, it can actually limit the scope and purpose of an education. There are many who believe that part of the problem with our educational institutions today is the fact that they are not specific enough to encompass what needs to be done on-the-job, that is to say, we need more training for a more technically oriented work force. Peter Shaw has offered an observation which flatly refutes this position. In "The Competitiveness Illusion: Does our Country Need to be Literate In Order to be Competitive? If Not, Why Read?", which appeared in the January 18, 1993, issue of *National Review*, Shaw sees the technology influx as a hindrance, rather than an enhancement, since its specificity actually requires less education and more patterned or conditioned behavior on the parts of the students. As a consequence, abilities to read, to write, and to think have diminished, and this is reflected in declining test scores since before World War II.

The technological society does not particularly depend on education. A glance at the record shows us that the rapid growth of the United States

into the world's greatest industrial power coincided with a steady drop in reading levels running from 1930 to the present. Rogna Lee Wood, a teacher, pointed out in an article in NR[*National Review*] (Sept. 14) that this falling off was followed by a related, long decline in SAT scores beginning in 1941. Technological society turns out to work in the opposite way from that usually supposed: namely by actually requiring less rather than more education of its workers. This is because modern industry depends on reducing human error, which means reducing dependence on the individual worker's expertise and judgment.²

We have assumed all along that it was technological training which actually enhanced the process of education, when in reality, all it was doing was tailoring the process to its own specific needs, thus creating and maintaining a kind of *status quo*. The result has been both unavoidable and obvious: we have trained workers in much the same fashion that the CIA trained operatives in the prime of the Cold War using the "mushroom" approach, that is keeping them "in the dark and feeding them nothing but manure". Their worldviews, *Weltanschauungen*, are myopic at best and their abilities to think critically, discern sensibly, and to analyze accurately have become severely hampered, if not altogether atrophied.

When we begin to add such factors as competency based testing, state mandates for specific performances, standardized teacher examinations, and major funding from both state and federal sources, we begin to see a pattern of governmental largesse exercising its unwieldy and arbitrary caprice over the most important institution our society has developed—our educational institution. It is not so much that the state seeks specific control, but rather, that it seeks a kind of standardization of education performance. Nevertheless, as the aphorism goes,

"The road to destruction is paved with the best of intentions." In like fashion, our schools have become subject to legislative mandates which have put serious shackles on the abilities of our students to think critically and to be more creative. In the standardization quest, all too often, the individuality of the student becomes secondary, and the integrity of the individual mind, to borrow from Ralph Waldo Emerson, becomes an obstacle to standardization. Thus, such measures taken by the state do little more than produce mediocrity and preserve the *status quo*. It is not so much that these outcomes are a design of state control, but rather, given the context of our social attitudes, and our attitudes toward education, there could be no other by-product today.

Friedrich Nietzsche's Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century exhibited eerily familiar social, economic, technological, and educational attitudes which we find extant in our country. The result for Germany was a kind of *nihilism* which infected every aspect of German culture. Nietzsche's works represent a rejection of this *nihilism*. The state had gained control over education, and technology had categorized training within empirical disciplines, holding liberal education a captive on the lowest level of the learning hierarchy. Spirituality had become obliterated by materialism, and culture was far less important than the accumulation of wealth. With it all, creativity and critical thinking were relegated to secondary positions at best. Nietzsche was fully aware that state control of education would result in a rigid maintenance of the *status quo*. His response was a philosophy based upon the *revaluation* of all values and

the creation of a class of well-educated people, in the classical tradition, who could lead as *ubermenschen*, or literally translated, *over-men*.

Ann Margaret Sharp in "Education and Culture: A Nietzschean Perspective," offers a summation of the cultural-educational climate which Nietzsche faced. It foretells conditions we are experiencing in America today in such a disquieting manner that one could easily substitute "The United States" for "Germany" wherever it appears.

Rather than a society that had the inherent power to change, reform and grow, the German society was laying emphasis on stability, with the resulting oppression that occurs whenever change is not tolerated. Slowly the German state had been gaining control over the educational processes with the result that training was taking the place of a liberal education and the resulting specialization presented no alternatives to the mores of the day. The German child was learning that the main aim of education was to make money in as short a time as possible, and that this money would lead to happiness. Education was a necessary evil and thus should be just long enough to train the student to take his place in society. Anything that advocated change or reform was threatening to happiness and well-being.

Friedrich Nietzsche was aware of the dangers of the state control over education as well as the dangers of the technical society in general. Dehumanization, loss of freedom and creative power, as well as the loss of the power of self renewal could spell the death of individual power as well as the eventual decay of a society. Man could well become nothing more than a cog in a machine of production and consumption. The human self whose center is the will to become more, or the will to power, will eventually have nothing to will anymore, and therefore, it will nothing. Nihilism will spread all over the West. Only an education which encourages a new conception of individual willing and freedom as the self affirmation of life against anything which attempts to turn it into an object, can rescue man from nihilism and total disintegration. He was aware that education as it existed in his day, had only one aim: "to turn men into machines." [*The Use and Abuse of History*, 64.] In order for personal freedom to be protected much more is needed than a reform of educational methodology or curriculum content. Educators must be trained who have the capacity to liberate students to the point that they can generate alternative values for themselves and recognize the dangers to life of the present society. These educators must have the knowledge and the

strength to bring students to the point where they recognize their own inadequacy, their own want of knowledge and then, via a slow process of educating, introduce the student to the dynamics of liberation. Without this educating, modern man could well become a slave of the technical society which he himself has created.³

With this as a backdrop to what Nietzsche saw in his culture, it is not difficult to realize his response to it. This response was the envisioning of an educational system which obviously celebrated critical thinking and creativity. At the same time, it would be creating a kind of elite class of educated individuals; however, this elitism was to have been based not on privilege, but rather, on service.

The ironic nature of our culture and of Nietzsche's brings an interesting inquiry, which is the subject matter of this dissertation. I believe it is entirely possible, indeed, perhaps even urgent, to re-examine Nietzsche's philosophy of education in an attempt to reevaluate our contemporary educational system. The parallels between the two cultures is almost *deja vu* in essence and invites an inquiry of this nature.

The kind of schooling Nietzsche calls us to promulgate is best summed up in Section 912 of his work *The Will to Power*. In this passage we can see the dimensions of education which will allow the individual to grow and to survive in an environment which seems filled with challenge and trepidation. In the final analysis, it is the struggle of learning and of adapting strategies to respond to challenge which form the student's will and character.

The most desirable thing is still under all circumstances a hard discipline *at the proper time*, i.e., at that age at which it still makes one proud to see that much is demanded of one. For this is what distinguishes the hard school as a good school from all others: that much is demanded;

and sternly demanded; that the good, even the exceptional, is demanded as the norm; that praise is rare, that indulgence is nonexistent; that blame is apportioned sharply, objectively, without regard for talent or antecedents.

One needs such a school from every point of view: that applies to the most physical as well as to the most spiritual matters; it would be fatal to desire to draw a distinction here! The same discipline makes both the good soldier and the good scholar; and looked at more closely, there is no good scholar who does not have the instincts of a good soldier in his makeup. To be able to command and also proudly to obey; to stand in the ranks, but also capable at any time of leading; to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh the permitted and the forbidden on a shopkeeper's scales; to be a foe more of the petty, sly, parasitic, than of the evil. -- What does one *learn* from a hard school? Obeying and commanding.⁴

Such an outline for a type of schooling may seem harsh, but, as clarified in this dissertation, the harshness to be developed in actuality prepares one for a more ascetic life of service to the culture. Education for Nietzsche is a grueling preparation for this life of service. Ultimately, it allows the individual to emerge as one of the *ubermenschen* who is capable not only of creativity and critical thinking, but also of personal accountability and irrefutable integrity.

This brief examination of the similarities between Nietzsche's times and ours is intended to serve as a kind of springboard in looking into the possibility of examining the legitimacy of some of Nietzsche's concepts of education as they seem to appropriately offer alternatives in assessing some of our problems with contemporary education. I, for one, believe that the cultural, social, economic, and intellectual climate is ripe for such an examination of the approach to pedagogy which Nietzsche suggests. He attacks all the sacred cows of the educational institution, not only of his era but of our era as well. Still, at the heart of the issue is the pleading question: *What should an education be doing for its*

society, its culture, its individual constituents?

My fascination with Nietzschean approaches to most philosophical issues is absorbing, but this has not skewed my objectivity; rather, it has heightened it to a level of greater appreciation of what Nietzsche means. Through the inquiry of this dissertation, I have come to understand more about a process of *wholeness*, not only for the culture but also, and most importantly, for the sanctity of the individual.

3.00 Purpose and Significance of the Inquiry

The purpose of any inquiry of this nature initially can be an esoteric venture for the searcher, but to keep it at that level is extremely myopic and ultimately makes no significant contribution to the general field of study to which it belongs. I must admit that this question of Nietzsche's pedagogy being a viable approach to contemporary education has been festering in the recesses of my soul for well over twenty years. Yet, as I began to see the changes taking place in our schools starting approximately two-and-a-half decades ago, I began to realize that somehow we had begun to drift from an education which gives students a broad base of knowledge and an inclination to develop critical thinking to an education which is rigidly specific in terms of its curriculum and is patterned to track students into predetermined career paths. My experiences as a high school English teacher for seven years convinced me that there must be a more suitable approach to students who no longer read, write, or think with the degree of

enthusiasm, efficiency, or effectiveness exhibited by their predecessors.

Add to this the tremendous surge for stronger state/federal control of education, and we have a situation which is identical to that which Nietzsche observed in his native Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century. Such control actually reduces educational processes to the whims of those who are in power. Students are swiftly apportioned to specific career tracks for the purpose of preserving the *status quo*. They become cogs in the wheel of state progress, thus sacrificing their individuality, their free exercise of expression, and their creativity. These circumstances give me cause for great concern, as they do with many of my fellow citizens.

As such, I have undertaken this inquiry with the intention of offering an update, if you will, of the work Nietzsche did in the field of philosophy of education. This dissertation focuses on three elements which attempt to offer some solutions to the problems facing our contemporary educational institutions, particularly public schools.

1. Similarities between our contemporary educational climate and the educational climate in Nietzsche's Germany during the second half of the Nineteenth Century;
2. The viability of an education which stresses personal achievement through academic rigor, i.e., teaching the *ubermensch*, the over-man;
3. The necessity of establishing a philosophy of education which places the learner as the focus of the entire process in order to promote creativity and critical thinking.

It is my firm conviction that by examining the elements of Nietzschean pedagogy in light of contemporary education we may discover a legitimate and viable knowledge delivery system which answers the needs of the student first, the

society second. At the same time, our technology need not be a hindrance, contrary to the view Nietzsche took when he encountered the technology of his era. Our technology may actually be a more appropriate vehicle for producing the kind of student which Nietzsche sought. With it all, nevertheless, it is my hope that this inquiry will open the field of the philosophy of education to the concept of educating with the purpose of developing a more complete person--one who is a critical thinker, who understands the meaning of culture, who appreciates the arts, who has control over his own spiritual being, and who can function in a world which seems to have lost its way on the "yellow brick road" to that siren of democracy, *freedom*.

There has been much written and said about Nietzschean philosophy during the second half of the twentieth century, and we are the beneficiaries of such Nietzschean scholars as C. K. Ogden, Walter Kaufmann, Arthur Danto, Richard Schacht, and Ann Margaret Sharp, to mention a few. Where possible, I have been in contact with these scholars. Additionally, the members of the North American Nietzsche Society have been most helpful in suggesting approaches and in reviewing some of my work. Many articles, too, have been published in the past ten years dealing with Nietzsche's philosophy of education. These have been extremely helpful in formulating my dissertation focus.

In the final analysis, however, I am proceeding with this quest in the hopes of examining a legitimate pedagogical alternative to draw our educators back to some of the elements with which our young country has long been associated,

namely, the development of a free-thinking, independent, critically analytic, creative, self-sufficient student of life who can make a viable contribution to his world. As grandiose as that may sound or appear, it is what the founders of this country had in mind when they endorsed mandatory education for all. In recent years we have seen a shift from this kind of education to a process which seems to merely placate the emotional states of the students, to entertain them into thinking, to by-pass the rigor of competition, and to mollify this process in terms of not damaging the fragile psyche of the student. In the process, we have nearly lost two-and-a-half generations of creativity and critical thinking. In Nietzsche's terms, it is necessary, nay, it is urgent that we concentrate on teaching the *ubermensch*, thus, taking the human condition to its next higher level.

4.00 Background of the Inquiry

Much of the background to this inquiry has already been interwoven into the previous sections, and it is not intended to be reiterated here; rather, this section will attempt to provide a bit more analysis to the inquiry.

Section 2.00 offered a kind of background in establishing the conditions we find in our school systems today. There the usual litany of problems and difficulties were cited. These were compared to similar difficulties which Nietzsche observed in the educational systems of his day. However, in light of our times, we look upon a lack of thorough education as the production-line of illiteracy. Nietzsche looked upon it as merely a production-line for more

members of "the herd", that mass of mediocrity which had become the result of education and society in nineteenth century Germany. Combining these two concepts, we find a drastic set of circumstances which yield a "herd of illiterates." Clearly, this is not what our educational institutions had set out to accomplish. Still, through a process which sought to enlighten the populace by offering the concept of equality, something was sacrificed. The sacrificial carcass was really a set of twins--individual creativity and critical thinking. It was thus with Nietzsche, and it is so with us.

This illiteracy has been analyzed again in Benjamin Barber's article (see Section 2.00). Barber sees national illiteracy as a product of our duplicitous approaches to education. Our students are told one thing, then see the establishment (i.e., parents and teachers) do something quite contrary or even contradictory to that which they have been told.

The illiteracy of the young turns out to be our own reflected back to us with embarrassing force. We honor ambition, we reward greed, we celebrate materialism, we worship acquisitiveness, we cherish success, and we commercialize the classroom--and then we bark at the young about the gentle arts of the spirit. We recommend history to the kids but rarely consult it ourselves. We make a fuss about ethics but are satisfied to see it taught as an "add-on", as in "ethics in medicine" or "ethics in business"--as if Sunday morning in church could compensate for uninterrupted sinning from Monday to Saturday.⁵

Barber here is striking at the core of our personal and societal commitment to education. He has observed that we have created a "do-as-I-say-not-as-I-do" atmosphere in which students cannot understand what is expected of them. As a consequence, they rebel, briefly, before they roll over and become absorbed into

the burgeoning system. What they bring with them when they are assimilated into the system is a carload of resentful attitudes which manifest themselves in a kind of *nihilism*--not unlike that encountered by Nietzsche in his time. It is exhibited in such cultural vehicles as music, dress, and in such anti-social behaviors as vandalism and other forms of violence, but it is still a progeny of *nihilism*, that sense of uselessness, of negativism, of nothingness.

It is time, therefore, that we take a more serious consideration of what Nietzsche had to say about education. He looks first to the educator, who must not only be able to communicate verbally, but also the educator must communicate by example as well. While the student's existential circumstances must not be overlooked, and, in fact, should be explicitly examined by the educator, it is through the firm love and fair guidance of the educator that the student becomes acquainted first with himself, then with the factual knowledge to be mastered. It takes a very special quality to become an educator in Nietzsche's eyes, for educators have the single-most important task in the entire scheme of the human condition--training those who would be the *ubermenschen*.

Assuming one thinks of a philosopher as a great educator, powerful enough to draw up to his lonely height a long chain of generations, then one must also grant him the uncanny privileges of the great educator. An educator never says what he himself thinks, but always only what he thinks of a thing in relation to the requirements of those he educates. He must not be detected in this dissimulation; it is part of his mastery that one believes in his honesty. He must be capable of employing every means of discipline: some he can drive toward the heights only with the whips of scorn; others, who are sluggish [*sic*], irresolute, cowardly, vain, perhaps only with exaggerated praise. Such an educator is beyond good and evil; but no one must know it.⁶

A note about the concept of the *ubermenschen*: as the dissertation elaborates, this concept has nothing to do with the creation of a super-race of superior beings, but rather with the creation within the individual of an overcoming of the self. It has to do with achievement, with asceticism, with self-sacrificing to become, with rigor, with enthusiastic acceptance of one's own fate--which Nietzsche calls *amor fati*--and with separation from the mediocrity of the "herd" mentality.

The word "overman," as the designation of a type of supreme achievement, as opposed to "modern" men, to "good" men, to Christians and other nihilists--a word that in the mouth of a Zarathustra, the annihilator of morality, becomes a very pensive word--had been understood almost everywhere with the utmost innocence in the sense of those very values whose opposite Zarathustra was meant to represent--that is, an "idealistic" type of a higher kind of man, half "saint," half "genius."

Other scholarly oxen have suspected me of Darwinism on that account. Even the "hero worship" of that unconscious and involuntary counterfeiter, Carlyle, which I have repudiated so maliciously, has been read into it.⁷

The *ubermensch*, the overman, is one who has complete control over personal emotions, over herd morality, and who loves personal destiny because he participates in it. The rigor to attain such a state of being is harsh, one of extreme self-denial in the pursuit of a *higher state* of personal existence. And for Nietzsche, this is the task of the educator--to train all students to strive for the *higher state* of personal being, the state of the *ubermensch*.

This quest to become such a higher being cannot come about so long as the student is bound by traditional concepts of good and evil; thus, Nietzsche proposes the state of being which is *beyond* good and evil. The morality of

Nietzsche's age made duplicitous overtures to society, so that morals had become mere sets of words, so to say. Society espoused one thing and did quite another. This fact was epitomized in Nietzsche's sociological pronouncement that *God is dead!* In God's absence, the moral base was left to the preference of those in power, whose whimsical caprices created a moral void. Hence, without traditional deity-based moral direction, the development of a type of *nihilism* was inevitable. It was not unlike America under Prohibition. While the law of the land forbade alcoholic consumption, society quietly ignored that law and continued to drink. The net result was a gross disrespect for the law. In nineteenth century Germany there had developed, in Nietzsche's eyes, a gross disregard for a sense of morality. As such, Nietzsche saw for the absolute need to develop a system of moral behavior which transcended that which was extant. It was to be developed by and for the *ubermensch* so that he could survive within a new and higher set of moral locutions. Once again, it was the educator who must instruct the student in the ways of such morality.

Make no mistake about it, Nietzsche was not seeking a master race; rather, he was seeking the creation of a newer, a better, a more select, a more moral state of the human condition. Those who have hacked away at his philosophy on this count have grossly misinterpreted and misunderstood what he was seeking.

Educators, therefore, must recognize their main task as the development of such states of being, of such beings. It almost rings like the military recruiting slogan, "Be all you can be!" And this, indeed, was Nietzsche's concept of

education--to accept the student where he was, then bring that student to the highest level of his personal development. Such a being would be beyond good and evil. Such a being would help create a *revaluation* of all morals. A *revaluation* of this scope would entail a complete revision of the system of morality to that time, and would not be a captive of the herd morality, which Nietzsche saw as the product of a "slave mentality." It was the task of education, and of educators, to see to it that this *revaluation* became entrenched in the development of the student.

With this as a foundation, this dissertation examines the conditions of contemporary education, compares them with those which Nietzsche found, then seeks to propose a *revaluation* of *meta*-educational principles for contemporary education using Nietzsche's concepts of pedagogy and education as a framework.

5.00 Nature of the Inquiry

In structuring my dissertation, *Nietzschean Pedagogy: A Revaluation for Contemporary Education*, it has been essential that I establish a broad-based *qualitative* methodology, owing to the specific nature of the inquiry. That nature rests within the realms of ethnomethodology and hermeneutic inquiries. This is a narrative dissertation within the qualitative approach to research strategies. These are appropriate strategies since there is little to be quantified. Its verification and validation will come from the structure of the *revaluation* of contemporary education offered in Part the Fifth. Nevertheless, it is important

to emphasize that this inquiry is philosophical in nature. The quest is more *meta-educational* than educationally method-specific, that is, it is not a "methods course" approach. It will be, in short, a treatise in the *philosophy of education*.

5.01 Dispelling the Perception of Nietzsche as an Anti-Semite

It is important here to add a note as to the nature of Nietzsche's work in relation to his having been so misunderstood and misused by others wishing to force his philosophy into a political advantage, for we have all been exposed to the charge of his anti-Semitism, to the fact of his insanity, and to the fact of his obscure and obtuse meanings.

There are a variety of reasons Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy has been grossly and patently misunderstood, and, unfortunately, most of those reasons are through no fault of his own. The unfortunate fact that he went hopelessly insane in 1889, eleven years before his death, is too often overemphasized. That fact is that his major works were all published before his insanity occurred, and although there were works published after his insanity, they were, nevertheless, compiled from notes written prior to his illness. Still, it has remained a major obstacle to many who came in contact with Nietzsche. It was as if he were a man charged, and convicted, in an *ex post facto* fashion solely on the basis of this illness, when the fact is that the productive portion of his life was in no way affected by his insanity. To conclude that the labors of a man gone insane were or are to be discounted as mere ravings or meanderings of a lame mind is not

only ludicrous but also is the mark of an egregiously unacademic approach. It is far too simple to reject that which we have difficulty understanding and it is, at least, unfortunate to capitalize on such an event as insanity and to incorporate it as the major premise for a rejection of the author's work. Thus, it is imperative that we refuse any validity to the claim that Nietzsche's works are the mere babblings of a lunatic.

One result of Nietzsche's madness which did turn out to be integral in the confusion of his philosophy was the fact that his sister, Elizabeth, began to take an interest in her brother's work. It is she who emerges in the history of Nietzsche's philosophy as the primary villain, for it was through her greed and ineptitude the two main misunderstandings of Nietzsche's philosophy evolved. Briefly, these two misunderstandings are first, that his philosophy is not coherent, and second, that Nietzsche was a Nazi, with all the morbid implications entailed when one mentions "Nazi."

In early January, 1889, when Nietzsche was fruitlessly defending a horse from being flayed by its master, he collapsed on a street in Turin, Italy, never again to recover from insanity. It was in that same year that his sister saw her opportunity to, shall we say, "make it," by holding high the star of her brother's philosophy which had begun its steep ascent. She had married an anti-Semite, Bernhard Forster--a marriage which was strenuously opposed by Nietzsche--and had travelled to Paraguay where they established a colony for the preservation and perpetuation of the Teutonic Christianity. The colony was called Nueva

Germania and subscribed faithfully to the twisted racist doctrines which infected the Third Reich under Hitler and the Nazis. Ultimately, and, perhaps providentially, the colony had financial difficulties and did not become too successful. When Forster died, Elizabeth divided her time between the colony and the Fatherland in an attempt to make her husband a national hero.

About this time, Nietzsche's popularity began to rise somewhat. Calculating that she could enhance the racist doctrines of her husband, she changed her name to "Forster-Nietzsche", bought all publishing rights to her brother's works, and hoarded all his unpublished notes. Thus, with the only final writings of the rapidly growing philosophy of her brother, she became the undisputed authority of his works. In order to at least appear an authority she employed Rudolf Steiner, a Goethe scholar, to tutor her. The following is a quotation from Walter Kaufmann's *Nietzsche*, in which Steiner evaluates the private lessons and Frau Forster-Nietzsche.

The private lessons taught me this above all: that Frau Forster-Nietzsche is a complete laywoman in all that concerns her brother's doctrine. [She] lacks any sense for fine, and even for crude, logical distinctions; her thinking is void of even the least logical consistency; and she lacks any sense of objectivity. She believes at every moment what she says. She convinces herself today that something was red yesterday that most assuredly was blue.⁸

She further gained unquestioned authority over Nietzsche's works by refusing to publish certain remaining works.

The consequences were inevitable and obvious, for we experience them every time Nietzsche's name comes up. His key terms and phrases have all been

misunderstood--*the will to power, master morality, ubermensch, and blonde beast*, to mention a few--and we find no clear correction until we go to the source and find the clarifications. One such source, *Ecce Homo*, which functions as a kind of recollection of thoughts in Nietzsche's works, was withheld from publication by Elizabeth. We can easily see why, for there are many passages and notes which directly contradict and refute all the poison spread by Elizabeth. While she has painted her brother as the proto-type Teutonic son, Nietzsche had rejected such a label.

And from what side did all *great* obstructions, all calamities in my life emanate? Always from Germans. The damnable German anti-Semitism, this poisonous boil of *nevrose nationale*, has intruded into my existence almost ruinously during that decisive time when not my destiny, but the destiny of humanity was at issue. And I owe it to the same element that my *Zarathustra* entered this world as *indecent* literature--its publisher being an anti-Semite. In vain do I look for some sign of tact, of *delicatesse*, in relation to me: from Jews, yes; never yet from Germans.⁹

As such, we have one major source for much of the controversy which arises over Nietzsche's works--his own sister, Elizabeth.

Another and more modern misinterpretation comes from a philosophical hack, Alfred Baumler. Baumler was, in every sense of the word, a nobody in philosophy until he edited a truly terrible edition of *The Will to Power*. Being a Nazi, he was called to the Chair of Philosophy in Berlin when Hitler came into power. His views of Nietzsche, which were fantastic extensions of Elizabeth's, became the Nazi doctrine. Of course, *power* meant subjugation or conquering, *the blonde beast* became the blonde-haired, blue-eyed six-foot-plus brute, and *master morality* became the master race of Teutons. After the war, these gross

misinterpretations were never resolved, and *The Will to Power* was renounced an evil book. This was in part due to some British philosophers who were still stinging over comments Nietzsche had made about them and their philosophies. They saw an opportunity to secure their doctrines by destroying his. Nowhere was this more obvious than in Bertrand Russell's vivisection, if you will, of Nietzsche and his position as a philosopher.

Nietzsche, though a professor, was a literary rather than an academic philosopher. He invented no new technical theories in ontology or epistemology; his importance is primarily in ethics, and secondarily as an acute historical critic. His general outlook remained very similar to that of Wagner in the *Ring*; Nietzsche's superman is very like Siegfried, except that he knows Greek. This may seem odd, but that is not my fault.

[Nietzsche] attempts to combine two sets of values which are not easily harmonized: on the one hand he likes ruthlessness, war, and aristocratic pride; on the other hand, he loves philosophy and literature and the arts, especially music.

True virtue [for Nietzsche], as opposed to the conventional sort, is not profitable or prudent; it isolates its possessor from other men; it is hostile to order, and does harm to inferiors. It is necessary for higher men to make war upon the masses, and resist the democratic tendencies of the age. He prophesied with a certain glee an era of great wars; one wonders whether he would have been happy if he had lived to see the fulfillment of his prophecy.

He condemns Christian love because he thinks it is an outcome of fear. It does not occur to Nietzsche as possible that a man should genuinely feel universal love, obviously because he himself feels almost universal hatred and fear, which he would fain disguise as lordly indifference. His 'noble' man--who is himself in his day-dreams--is a being wholly devoid of sympathy, ruthless, cunning, cruel, concerned only with his own power. King Lear on the verge of madness, says: 'I will do such things--what they are yet I know not--but they shall be the terror of the earth.' This is Nietzsche's philosophy in a nutshell.¹⁰

Such was the prevailing attitude and general philosophical disposition toward Nietzsche for over two decades after World War II and the Nazi holocaust.

Nevertheless, all confusion connected with Nietzsche's works is not solely

due to these previously cited "exemplars of objectivity." It was and is due, also, to the way Nietzsche writes. He is, in a very real sense, a poet writing as a poet, using all the obscure metaphors and allusions characteristic of poets. He is not given to succinctly developing an argument, or to cogently evolving a doctrine. At times he shouts; at times he admonishes; at times he explodes; and at times he purposely deludes us in the hope of dragging out a problem. Arthur Danto describes this style in the preface to his excellent work, *Nietzsche as Philosopher*.

To dilate and then suddenly to circumscribe the meaning of a word, although he likely was not always aware that he was doing so, and was at times as misled by what he wrote as his puzzled readers must have been. He would take a word, which had a restricted usage, and begin to give it a far wider application, using it now to describe things that had never been seen as falling within the meaning of that term before. Then, having immensely widened the scope of the word, he would force it back into the context from which it was originally taken. The context is then charged with an overload of conceptual energy it was not made to withstand.¹¹

It is easy to understand how Nietzsche has been misunderstood through the misgiven efforts of his sister, Baumler, and the Nazis, and through his own aphoristic style of writing and of devising a system of philosophy.

Perhaps this notation has belabored the point, and I do not wish to appear an overzealous proselyte posing as an apologist, but the facts of history are designed, I believe, precisely to add to our understanding of a given circumstance or author. Nietzsche is no exception. The heartening aspect of rejuvenated studies of Nietzsche is that they have uniformly vindicated his position and his philosophy. The efforts of the late Professor Walter Kaufmann of Princeton, the work of Professor Arthur Danto of Columbia, and of Professor Richard Schacht

of the University of Illinois, to mention a few, have been monumental in bringing Nietzsche's star back on the rise--and rightly so.

5.02 Defining Pedagogy and Revaluation

It is appropriate in any inquiry of this kind to offer clarifications of major terms so that the arguments presented within it are not lost owing to lack of clear definition. One such term for this inquiry is *pedagogy*, which is used extensively here. Through history it has referred to teaching approaches, methods, and strategies. I have used it here in a broader context, adapting it to Nietzschean concepts. In the same vein, I will use the term *pedagogue* as opposed to the term *pedagogist*, since the latter term implies a certain imperialistic bent, which I believe is not compatible with either Nietzschean philosophy of education or with mine. A *pedagogue*, then, refers to the educator who sees his position as guide to the learner, as opposed to being the "font of knowledge" from which the learner is obliged to drink. This definition is in line with Nietzschean thought. At the same time, I shall take *pedagogy* to mean *the art of teaching, including those methods, approaches, strategies, and attitudes associated with imparting knowledge to the learner.*

Another vital point of definitional clarification needs to be made with regard to the use of the term *revaluation*. Nietzsche took *revaluation* to mean a *restructuring of the old order*, which included, for him, the complete revamping of our approaches to a given set of circumstances. His primary concern was with the *revaluation of values*. His quest, as the quotation from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*

cited at the beginning of this Part suggests, was to surpass the concept of "man" and move on to an "over-man". He did this with the concepts of morality, as well. Again, it was to be the task of the educator to bring about the attitudes and persuasions which would create the *ubermensch*, the "over-man". In effect, it was a *reevaluation* of "man", to which I prefer to name *the human condition*. I will adopt this approach in offering my *reevaluation* of contemporary education. To reiterate, this inquiry is *meta*-educational and philosophical in nature and, as such, the structure of the *reevaluation* will be philosophical.

5.03 The Seven Corollaries for a Reevaluation of Contemporary Education

In concluding this Part it seems appropriate to offer a summation of my *reevaluation* of contemporary education. Such *reevaluation* will be presented in the form of *Corollaries for Reevaluation* in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.

Corollaries for a Reevaluation of Contemporary Education

1. While the learner is to be the focus of education, the object of education is a quest of taking the learner beyond the confines of collective and individual mediocrity.
2. The educator is a guide for the attainment of the higher state of being in the learner.
3. Education is analogous to a Rorschach Ink Blot interpretation.
4. Learning is an internal process; teaching is an external process.
5. Values are inherently interwoven into the fabric of education, but are socially motivated and, as such, are trapped.
6. The structure of education must serve the development of the learner, not the preservation of the state. It must provide for a curriculum which fosters the development of creativity and critical thinking.
7. Elitism does not imply privilege. It demands service.

With this general introduction it is appropriate now to turn to a review of the literature which I have discovered is illuminating and extensive.

Endnotes: Part the First

1. Benjamin Barber, "America Skips School: Why We Talk So Much About Education and Do So Little," *Harper's Magazine*, November 1993, 39.
2. Peter Shaw, "The Competitiveness Illusion: Does Our Country Need to be Literate in Order to be Competitive? If Not, Why Read?" *National Review* 18 January 1993, 42.
3. Ann Margaret Sharp, "Education and Culture: A Nietzschean Perspective," *Humanitas* 11 (November 1975): 291-292.
4. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J.Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), Note 912.
5. Barber, 43.
6. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Note 980.
7. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), III - 1.
8. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 4-5.
9. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, IV - 1.
10. Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), 760-763, 766-767.
11. Arthur Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), 12.

Part the Second: Review of the Pertinent Literature

1.00 General Assessment of the Literature

Any review of researched literature indicates the precedents which have been set and established by previous academic researchers in the particular area of inquiry. This review should also offer a groundwork, a foundation from which the searcher within the inquiry can base observations, perceptions, and conclusions. In so doing, the searcher will simultaneously establish the framework of the inquiry, the limits of the inquiry, and the strategy of the inquiry. This review of pertinent literature is no exception and will adhere to these principles.

Attempts to categorize Friedrich Nietzsche's works have eluded philosophical scholars for at least eight decades. His pronouncements on all aspects of the human condition are broad-based, eclectic, and aphoristic in their presentations. Add to this dilemma the task of isolating his theories on education and pedagogy, then finding a common thread applicable to education today, and we have a rather formidable endeavor for research.

It was obvious that the first undertaking in this dissertation, *Nietzschean Pedagogy: A Revaluation for Contemporary Education*, was to establish the condition in which we find our educational institutions today. This condition, it must be

added, is taken as a *whole*: that is to say, the overall condition of education as it is operating presently. It is indisputable that there are obvious pockets of truly excellent education--in the Nietzschean sense--which are thriving in the United States today; however, it is the composite picture with which this inquiry is concerned. Literature here is plentiful and is examined in Section 2.00.

The literature on Nietzsche's educational philosophy has been obscured by the misuse of his works for various reasons, as cited in Part The First, Section 5.01. However, in the last three decades, a great deal of research has yielded a most interesting treasure trove revealing the great emphasis which Nietzsche placed on education. Until the past thirty years, his concepts of pedagogy had been attributed primarily to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*; however, much more has been found in works such as *Schopenhauer As Educator*, *Twilight of the Idols*, and "On The Future of our Educational Institutions" which was presented in a series of five lectures. Section 3.00 analyzes these works, as well as works by David E. Cooper, Ann Margaret Sharp, Timothy Murphy, and Martin Simons, to mention a few here.

The synthesis of these two research tasks presents the overall framework and conceptual structure of the dissertation. Essentially, it cites the circumstances of our present-day educational institutions, makes a thorough examination of Nietzsche's concept of education, hence his pedagogy, and then applies these concepts in presenting a framework for the *revaluation* of the principles for our educational system in the form of seven *Corollaries for a Revaluation of*

Contemporary Education.

2.00 Literature on Contemporary Education

Little needs to be said when it comes to a contemporary assessment of where our educational institutions are today with respect to performance. It has been established time and again by countless articles in journals, professional magazines, on television documentaries, and in Hollywood productions. At the same time, since our educational institution is an extension of the society which it serves, it is obvious that our schools are mere microcosms in which fester the greater social problems, but the schools project them more vividly since that is where we seem to focus on solutions--noble, but futile, since schools are, for all intents and purposes, controlled laboratories reflecting the problems, and the agents of change, in this instance the students, are ill-equipped to solve these overwhelming problems. Nevertheless, the extant problems of technological change, bureaucratic ineptitude within school systems, confused curriculum, and more confusing general leadership and direction within education have left American education in the final three decades of the twentieth century desperate for re-assessment--in much need of a serious and concerted *reevaluation*.

Benjamin Barber, alluded to in Part The First, has contributed a great deal to the concept of some type of *reevaluation* of our educational system in his extensive article "America Skips School: Why We Talk So Much About Education and Do So Little", which appeared in the November 1993 edition of *Harper's*

Magazine. In it he outlined the facts of technology, funding, curriculum, and moral duplicity on the part of society in actually doing something about education. He also touched upon an aspect of education which Nietzsche constantly analyzed, the concept of *liberty*. Although Nietzsche eschews liberty as a "slave mentality" perception, he, nonetheless, believes that the ultimate position to which we can educate our students is to a level which is *beyond* such concepts. Yet, without such a concept as a genesis for argument we cannot proceed to that next higher level of human existence. This is where Barber's application of education to liberty applies.

The fundamental task of education in a democracy is what Tocqueville once called the apprenticeship of liberty: learning to be free. I wonder whether Americans still believe liberty has to be learned and that its skills are worth learning. Or have they been deluded by two centuries of rhetoric into thinking that freedom is "natural" and can be taken for granted?¹

This is a similar query posed by Nietzsche, who recognized the disintegration of societal values in the educational institutions of his day. His solution was radical in that it proposed a complete *reevaluation* of society, and of all morality, as well.

Identifying a problem is sufficient in some circumstances; however, just to identify a problem in an institution so vital to our survival is not enough. Solutions can only come about when we isolate the causes. Having done this, we can debate the validity of various solutions. Identifying causes for the unfortunate condition of schools in America today has been an open field for researchers, none of whom seem to have taken the view of the big picture. Jonathan Kozol has identified some of the causes from a socio-economic

perspective in his major work, *Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools* published in 1991. This book posits the thesis that it has been through segregation and disproportionate funding that education, particularly in the major cities, has been on the decline. In a paper which Kozol delivered to the National Seminar of the Education Writers Association in 1988, he claims that more funding is necessary to re-establish quality education in our inner cities. Merely throwing money at a problem does not solve it, particularly in a society such as ours which is so bureaucratized. Nevertheless, Kozol does point us in one direction worth considering, but applicable only in that it helps to set the stage, if you will, for the justification of the *reevaluation* of education.

Bruce Joyce, another prominent education writer, looks to the improvement of staff development, as well to an amalgamation of all parties involved in the operations of our school systems as the major vehicle for bringing about necessary changes in education. In *Changing School Culture through Staff Development* published in 1990, he argues that "staff development will become a human resource development system designed to change the nature of schooling, the status of its personnel, and their relations with each other."² In effect, if we do not change the staff, we will not change the schools. In 1993, Joyce published *The Self-Renewing School* in which, again, he posits the necessity of establishing staff development in the creation of solutions to educational problems. There is more to it, however, and he goes on to state that "the interests of the educators and children as learners are intertwined."³ In so doing, Joyce becomes more

Nietzschean than he might otherwise have imagined, since Nietzsche, too, calls for superiority in a teacher. Using staff development as a springboard to effect change for the good is an element of which Zarathustra, himself, would be proud. Nevertheless, neither Kozol nor Joyce take their concepts far enough, for both of them are still bound to the concept of equality as the necessary by-product of education. Some will argue that this equality is more one of opportunity, but it is, rather, a justification for mediocrity. In effect, we have become more preoccupied with reducing one student's ability in order to raise that of another. The rationale has been this quest for equality of opportunity, but has the awful *reductio ad absurdum* of producing equal success, not merely opportunity. The finish line in an analogous sense has been moved farther away from those with ability so that those with lesser ability can finish with "equal" performance. Nietzsche would not agree.

Another reason for the cause of our failing school systems is offered by Seymour Sarason in *The Predictable Failure of Educational Reform: Can We change Course before It's Too Late?* Sarason claims that our schools are inherently opposed to change and that reformers within the system have not been able to cope with, address, or confront this inability to change.

Schools have been intractable to change and the attainment of goals set by reformers. A major failure has been the inability of reformers to confront this intractability. As a result, each new wave of reform learns nothing from earlier efforts and comes up with recommendations that have failed in the past.⁴

Confrontation is a major vehicle for change within the Nietzschean system, and

for us to deal with change in the system requires confrontation. Still, there are those whose timid souls allow them to develop their systems for change in the vacuum of their own, limited perceptions of the problem. Thus, we find that Sarason would be at home, so to speak, within a Nietzschean system.

Supporting Sarason on the issue of confrontation are David W. Johnson and Roger T. Johnson who believe that conflict enhances the development of critical thinking. In "Creative and Critical Thinking through Academic Controversy," which was published in the September-October 1993 issue of *American Behavioral Scientist*, they believe fervently that it is through conflict and controversy that students begin to develop effective critical thinking skills.

The dozens of studies conducted indicate that students who participate in an academic controversy recall more correct information, are better able to transfer learning to new situations, use more complex and higher-level reasoning strategies in recalling and transferring information learned, and are better able to generalize the principles they learned to a wider variety of situations.⁵

Again, we have a Nietzschean concept surfacing unbeknownst to the authors of the article. The concept of stressing the student, not in an emotional sense, but in a cognitive sense, will allow the student to develop more freely those inherent qualities with which he was born. It exhibits to the student the necessity of looking beyond the specifics of the problem to a higher realm of solution. In so doing, the student transcends the banality of the herd and seeks a harbor in the relevance of the solution to the self.

Technology has always been looked upon with jealousy, suspicion, and blatant disdain by many in the education establishment. Nietzsche saw

technology as another means by which humanity was to be stripped of its spirit. Today, however, technology can be seen as a very viable tool for the delivery of knowledge. We have found that the computer, CD-ROM, and video technology can make lessons more relevant and more meaningful. However, technology is just that--a *tool*--and any attempts to create it as an end unto itself are doomed to a dismal demise, for the human condition should never abdicate its place in God's nature. Peter Shaw sets the record straight on this count in "The Competitiveness Illusion: Does Our Country Need to be Literate in Order to be Competitive? If Not, Why Not?", which appeared in the January 18, 1993, issue of *National Review*. In this article he documents the decline of test scores from pre-World War II to the present and attributes it to our fascination, indeed, our infatuation with "technical training". This type of training replaces critical thinking with reaction, in a stimulus-response fashion; thus, traditional education became almost obsolete. The effects of this have produced a workforce which has more time on its hands, is more productive, but is less aware of its place in the grand scheme of operations.

Diversion from the basics has made the remainder of life less interesting as well. Workers in factories lack not the specific skills to do their jobs, but rather the ability to analyze their places in the larger scheme of things in their industry, region, country, and historical period.⁶

It is just this type of loss of overall vision of the self in relation to the whole that Nietzsche so vehemently opposed in his own era. It would mean the loss of a sense of being, of humanity. He charged that this type of "training" would reinforce the supremacy of the state and would do little more than to preserve the

mediocrity of the *status quo*. There could be no better restatement of a feeling of Nietzsche's than the final paragraph of Shaw's article.

In educationese--where special means ordinary, excellence means mediocrity, and enrichment means deprivation of knowledge--reform in the name of twenty-first-century competitiveness means continued erosion of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Those condemned to pass through a system with these distorted values will continue making do on their own. But it would be interesting to see what they might make of themselves if, for a change, their education supplied them with the proper tools.⁷

It would seem as if Nietzsche himself had dictated these words.

In sum, then, the literature I have reviewed in an effort to examine the different perceptions of the problems, which most of us acknowledge, being experienced by our educational system today, seems to be a body in sincere quest for some solutions. Owing to the burdens of a society which does not deliver on its promises to education, either materially or spiritually, these agents of change, these reformers, fall short more through a lack of consistent resolve, rather than lack of a cogent philosophical system. They all seem to want to change the system with a few, minor adjustments; yet, they all touch upon some aspect of Nietzschean educational philosophy.

3.00 Literature on Nietzsche

Few philosophers have been as misused and misinterpreted as Nietzsche, and few have been so mischaracterized for political gains. As was pointed out in Part The First, Section 5.01, Nietzsche was summarily dismissed for many years, particularly following World War II with its Nazi menace, and only in the

he richly deserves.

3.01 Works which Analyze and Explicate Nietzsche's Works

Beginning with *What Nietzsche Means* published in 1941 by Professor George A. Morgan, we began to see a more academic examination of Nietzsche's works and life. Morgan laid the foundation for an analysis free of the anti-Nazi prejudice which for so long haunted Nietzsche's body of work. This text was a good beginning.

Perhaps no one to date has done more to clarify and enhance the status of Nietzsche in the West than the late Professor Walter Kaufmann of Princeton University. In 1950, he published *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*. It was not only this text which has vindicated Nietzsche's position in philosophy, but it was also the many translations, notes, and commentaries which Kaufmann published which helped to establish the legitimacy of Nietzsche's work. Professor Richard Schacht, Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Illinois and former student of Kaufmann's, has stated,

He did more than anyone else in our part of the world has done to rescue Nietzsche from both his unjust detractors and his ill-motivated abusers, and to gain for him the attention and appreciation he deserves.⁸

Kaufmann's dedication to the *accurate* presentation of Nietzsche began with his attention to Nietzsche as a person. I corresponded with Professor Kaufmann in 1969 requesting, among other things, advice on the best approach to teaching Nietzsche, since I was teaching Existentialism at the University of Delaware and

1969 requesting, among other things, advice on the best approach to teaching Nietzsche, since I was teaching Existentialism at the University of Delaware and wanted so very much to present him appropriately. Professor Kaufmann corresponded to me:

A few suggestions for an approach to Nietzsche in your lectures: begin by bringing to life the man as a person, talk about his significance and influence, give an overview of his books, including those not assigned, outline the development of this thought, and then discuss with some care selected chapters in *Zarathustra*.⁹

Thus, Professor Walter Kaufmann emerged as, and continues to be, the most authoritative scholar on Nietzsche in the West.

In 1965 two separate books were published which continued the restoration, if you will, of Nietzsche's image on this continent. Professor Arthur Danto of Columbia University published *Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study*, in which Danto analyzed Nietzsche's works with the rigor usually associated with philosophical pursuits. He did not pay much attention to the negative image Nietzsche's works had acquired, but explicated his philosophy with the respect any other figure in philosophy would be accorded. Danto paid more attention to the nature of Nietzsche's philosophy.

Nietzsche was more than a critic of concept and a word-tormenting anarchist. He tried to construct a philosophy consistent with the extraordinary openness he felt was available to man, or at least a philosophy that would entail this openness as one of its consequences.¹⁰

It was a study principally concerned with the implications of Nietzsche's thought *as philosophy*, and not with the political ramifications of how others had misconstrued this thought.

The other book published in 1965 was Professor R.J.Hollingdale's *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy*. This study offers a solid background in the development of Nietzsche's thought. Still, Hollingdale felt compelled to justify Nietzsche's works in his Preface in light of the onslaught of destructive crusades being waged against Nietzsche at the time. Hollingdale calls the image attributed to Nietzsche prior to recent examinations of his works the *pseudo-Nietzsche*, which had been created by the Nazis and other anti-Semites. At the same time, Hollingdale intimates a certain element which put Nietzsche ahead of his time, after a fashion.

The cataclysm which wrecked the pseudo-Nietzsche was also responsible for the revival of the real Nietzsche: the reawakening of interest in him was closely connected with the recollection that the spiritual void of the 1940's was not merely prophesied in his philosophy but was actually its presupposition: Nietzsche *started* from the point Europe had just reached.¹¹

This observation was perhaps the most perceptive which could have been made with respect to the restoration of Nietzsche's works. It clearly puts a mark of connected realization on his works, which was beginning to crystallize in the thinking of Western philosophical scholars.

A most excellent study of Nietzsche was published in 1983 by Professor Richard Schacht, titled simply *Nietzsche*. This work is more in line with that which we assume philosophy to be; that is to say, it is not preoccupied with the vindication of Nietzsche. It is written in the same spirit we find in Danto's work: Friedrich Nietzsche was a legitimate philosopher who had a wide-ranging system which deserves appropriate inquiry. The preoccupation with justifying

work. More importantly, however, is the observation Schacht makes with regard to the eclectic nature of Nietzsche's philosophy, as well as to the organization of Nietzsche's presentations and investigations.

He did a prodigious amount of writing, and dealt with as broad a range of matters as almost anyone ever has. In addition to the considerable number of works he published and prepared for publication, he left a great mass of notes, which scholars undoubtedly will be mining for generations, and which can neither be entirely ignored nor easily digested. And even the work he completed for the most part consist chiefly in assemblages of rather loosely connected notes rather than sustained arguments and systematic treatments of particular topics. He had a great deal to say, about a great many things; and no single study can take account of more than a part of it.¹²

Little can be added to this observation: suffice it to say that through the efforts of Morgan, Kaufmann, Danto, Hollingdale, and Schacht, the restoration of Nietzsche's position based upon the content of his thought is an accomplishment well deserved and long overdue.

3.02 Specific Works in Nietzsche which Expound His Educational Philosophy

For many years the educational philosophy of Nietzsche was assumed to have been presented and thoroughly explicated in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In 1983, Professor David E. Cooper of the University of Surrey published the first comprehensive study of Nietzsche's educational philosophy under the title, *Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy*. It is dealt with in more detail in Section 3.03, but suffice it here to say that Cooper's work revealed that while *Zarathustra* offers an example of what educators are to emulate it did not offer a succinct system for educational institutions. Additionally, while

not offer a succinct system for educational institutions. Additionally, while Zarathustra himself is the pinnacle of pedagogical prowess and art, his aphoristic style is often cryptic at points which seem crucial to the development of his "system", if it can be so termed. It may very well be, as some scholars believe, that Zarathustra is Nietzsche, and therein lies some of the explanation for the obscurity we encounter in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. At any rate, it is now acknowledged that there are some very significant other works of Nietzsche's which have had greater bearing on the development of his educational philosophy, and which further provide for a framework of a system, such as it is.

Nietzsche published educational analyses at least eight years prior to *Zarathustra*, and in far less obscure language than appears in that book. Between 1873 and 1876, Nietzsche completed four essays of an originally planned thirteen, which would appear as *Untimely Meditations*. Two of his major treatises having to do specifically with education appear in *Meditations*, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life"--sometimes translated as "On the Use and Abuse of History"--and "Schopenhauer as Educator." The first of these treats such subjects in education as how history relates to science, the purposes and necessity of creating critical thinkers, of the importance of making education as scholarship an active enterprise, that is making it practical and relevant, and of how education was to survive the times in which it existed. "Schopenhauer" discusses, in great length, models of education which are "child-centered", the pedagogical significance of studying great figures in history, the place and importance of

studying philosophy as a rudimentary aspect of any curriculum, and of the precarious relationship between the state and the institution of education. These two works contribute more than any other systematic work by Nietzsche to the development of a fundamental pedagogy which can be identified as his.

In a series of five public lectures, published as "On the Future of Our Educational Institutions", Nietzsche amplified those points made in the essays in *Meditations*. Additionally, Nietzsche commented here on such topics as the obligations of an educator in a weak, or even bad, educational system; on the inherent contradiction between a "true"--"liberal arts"--education and a more "utilitarian"--"technical"--education designed solely to "make a better living"; and on the "sacred obligations" of mastering one's own language as a means of procreating both education and culture. These five lectures provide a solid basis upon which a *reevaluation* of educational institutions could comfortably rest. They add "muscle," if you will, to the skeletal framework of Nietzsche's educational philosophy established in his earlier works.

At or around the time of the publication of *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche had explicitly discussed and analyzed education and pedagogy in other works. Two essays are of significance here: "We Scholars" in *Beyond Good and Evil*, and "What the Germans Lack" in *Twilight of the Idols*. "Scholars" presents barbed comments on the place of "science"--"scholarship"--in philosophy in a fashion which really is a critique on educational approaches to all disciplines, and comments on the acquisition of knowledge as being an inherently good enterprise for its own sake.

"Germans" is a biting and sarcastic attack upon the society and culture of Nietzsche's day, which focuses upon its educational institutions, functions, and pedagogy. Ironically, it is entirely possible to substitute the nationalistic nomenclature "Americans" for "Germans" and find very little difference between Nietzsche's nineteenth century Germany and our twentieth going on twenty first century America. The educational atmospheres are strikingly similar.

There are also some important comments having to do with education which were posthumously collected, translated, and published as *The Will to Power*. While the observations in this publication are appropriate and timely, they are fragmentary and act more in a verifying capacity for the other works Nietzsche published on the philosophy of education.

The works which Nietzsche published on educational philosophy are all consistent with his attacks upon the *nihilistic* mind-set which had emerged during his era in Germany. They have been relatively neglected until the past two decades due in part to the animosity, already cited, created by the misinterpretations and misuses of his philosophy. Additionally, many of the translations of Nietzsche's positions with respect to education have been woefully inadequate. Perhaps even more significantly, this neglect has been due to scholars not having taken Nietzsche's views of education as a serious aspect of his concern. This, too, seems myopic at best, since we cannot take Nietzsche's concepts out of their global-context so clearly intended by their creator. The philosopher, by definition, must be concerned with the tasks and goals of

also as an epistemological process preoccupied with cognitive genealogy. This, then, has been the significance of Nietzsche's contribution to the philosophy of education--the recognition of its vital position in the culture from which it emerges, as well as its charge to create the *ubermensch*, a human phenomenon within, yet *beyond*, the human condition.

3.03 Works which Analyze Nietzsche's Philosophy of Education

As was cited in Section 3.02, Professor David E. Cooper's 1983 publication of *Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy* is arguably the best and most intense examination of Nietzsche's concepts of education. The book has three main goals: to present an overview of Nietzsche's philosophy, to present an investigation into Nietzsche's long-neglected views on education, and to evolve an effective appraisal of contemporary education with Nietzsche's philosophy of education as a backdrop and foundation. In an effort to either illuminate or to make more cryptic, Cooper's comment on the sub-title of this excellent book in the Preface seems very Nietzschean in and of itself.

The expression "educational philosophy" in the sub-title of this book is intended to be ambiguous: to refer both to a philosophy of education and to the gearing of a whole philosophy to an educative enterprise.¹³

This sets the pace for a most enlightening explication of Nietzsche's philosophy of education, which is intrinsically interwoven with the notion of *authenticity*.

Authenticity is a quest for illumination--the true self must be allowed to shine through, and the attempts made to harmonize one's life with its dictates as a journey, through a jungle of distracting, false selves, towards the real one.¹⁴

dictates as a journey, through a jungle of distracting, false selves, towards the real one.¹⁴

It is this concept which Cooper chooses to illustrate in his book rather than to succinctly define, and in so doing he makes the point, again, in a very *Nietzschean* fashion.

Cooper concurs with my assertion that there are some disconcerting parallels between our socio-economic and political climates and those extant in Nietzsche's nineteenth century Germany. As a case in point, Cooper's chapter on "Nature and Technicism"--the latter term being borrowed from Ortega y Gasset--focuses upon the problem of technology and government in collusion to protect the *status quo*. It is a theme not really articulated as well in our contemporary societal complex, more, I think, as a result of the liability it would suffer if it were to be so exposed. Nevertheless, it is more than adequately defined by Cooper, and serves well as an indicator of the tenor of his book.

By "technicism" I mean the broad, but identifiable, idea that the technological power at men's disposal is the fundamental feature of our times, and that their energies should primarily be directed towards utilizing this power for the sake of increased material welfare. In its political incarnation, technicism is the view that a prime role of government is to harness this power and channel these energies; a role which people's over-riding desire for increased material well-being gives it a mandate to perform. (How government is to play this role, whether as star of the show or discreetly from the wings, remains disputed.) In its educational form, technicism is the view that the main purpose of schools and higher institutions is to train people to contribute and accommodate to a society governed by the general technicist idea. It is not that everyone is to be a trained technologist, but that everyone is to be trained or prepared for filling the roles demanded in a technicist society. Hoteliers and caterers are not technologists, but there is an increasing demand for them in a technicist society; so that, in keeping with this educational idea, we find it urged that people be trained in these jobs at colleges and

universities, at the likely expense of more traditional subjects deemed less relevant to modern life.¹⁵

Cooper's work sets a solid foundation for my position in that it clearly presents and analyzes Nietzsche's views of education in a manner not available before, for reasons previously cited. It also vaulted Cooper to the position of being the preeminent authority on Nietzsche's philosophy of education.

Another publication of Cooper's took to task two authors who had placed Nietzsche's educational philosophy squarely in the realm of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Haim Gordon's "Nietzsche's Zarathustra as Educator" and Keith Jenkins' "The Dogma of Nietzsche's Zarathustra", both published in *The Journal of Philosophy of Education*, were the object of Cooper's article, "On Reading Nietzsche on Education", which also appeared in this journal. As was previously cited, Zarathustra is more an example of an educator, rather than a treatise of an educational system. Both Gordon and Jenkins were entrenched in an analysis solely dependent upon the observations of Zarathustra. In this regard, according to Cooper, both miss the point.

A remarkable feature of both papers is that neither mentions a single one of Nietzsche's several writings which are explicitly about education, in the familiar sense of having to do with schools, subjects, universities, and so on.¹⁶

Cooper goes on to cite other misconceptions presented by Gordon and Jenkins, one of the more common of which is that Nietzsche was a proponent of "child-centered" education, which is clearly not what Nietzsche had in mind. Still, the thrust of his article is that there is much more to Nietzschean pedagogy than

Zarathustra's quips and queries.

One of the more engaging and concise articles dealing with the socio-politico-economic atmosphere in which Nietzsche found his educational institutions was published by Ann Margaret Sharp in *Humanitas* under the title "Education and Culture: A Nietzschean Perspective". She has been quoted in Part the First, Section 2.00, but here suffice it to say that her analysis makes full application of Nietzsche's philosophy as it focuses upon education, including the concepts of freedom and the evolution of an elite based upon the notion of educating for the *ubermensch*, or, as I prefer to term it, the *higher state* of the human condition. This *higher state* of being in the human condition entails a certain refinement of "culture"; in a Nietzschean sense, the appreciation of the entirety of one's condition coupled with the ability to surpass it.

Culture for Nietzsche is a life long process of growing in knowledge and power manifest in action. Of its very essence it involves pain, suffering and the destruction that is involved with all creation. Man alone has the ability to overcome his nature and create himself whole. It is this creation of *wholeness* which justifies his very existence.¹⁷

Understanding what Nietzsche means by the concept of culture is vital in the apprehension of his concept of education. Sharp offers a most comprehensive view of Nietzschean pedagogy with his conception of culture as background and foundation.

In another article, "The Teacher as Liberator: A Nietzschean View", Sharp presents the concept that it is the educator, as pedagogue who "liberates" the learner from ignorance, to self-overcoming. This concept is presented in Part the

Fourth, Sections 1.02, 2.04, and 4.02. It examines the role of love between the pedagogist and the learner, as well as the three stages of spiritual development offered by Nietzsche in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*--the camel, the lion, and the child.

Timothy Murphy's dissertation, *Teaching the Dance: Nietzsche as Educator*, examines Nietzsche's philosophy of education and finds that it is to be found throughout the entire body of his work. This philosophy is embodied in teaching the dance, which combines all the attributes of a being who is educated. A further analysis of Murphy's work is found in Part the Fourth, Section 4.03.

An interesting and enlightening observation on Nietzsche's educational philosophy was presented by Martin Simons in his article "Montessori, Superman, and Catwoman," published in *Educational Theory* (Summer 1988). Few of us were aware of the influence which Nietzsche had on the development of Marie Montessori's educational concerns and philosophy. Simons reveals her as a kindred spirit of Nietzsche's, in that both of them fostered the concept of individuality as well as the importance of personal effort in overcoming any difficulties or obstacles to be faced. This article also offers an analysis of why Nietzsche felt that female "emancipation" during his time was misdirected: women should have developed within the framework of their own conceptions of what they should have been, not as mere reflections of already mediocre men. Montessori shared this conception, as well as a conception of the development of the *ubermensch*. The following passage from Simons' article serves to establish the understanding and appreciation Montessori exhibited for Nietzsche.

Montessori mentioned a passage from Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* where, as she understood, woman asks man, "Why do you desire me?" If it was for the sake of mere companionship, the male was to be dismissed. Something more important than love was envisaged: "I wish the man who has conquered himself, who has made his soul great. I wish the man who has conserved a clean and robust body. I wish the man who desires to unite with me, body and soul, to create a son! A son better, more perfect, stronger, than any created heretofore." Nietzsche cried: "Man is a thing to be surmounted. What have you done to surmount him?" Montessori:

To better the species consciously, cultivating his own health, his own virtue, this should be the goal of a man's married life. It is a sublime concept of which, as yet, few think. And the socialised home of the future, living provident, kindly; educator and comforter; is the true and worthy home of those human mates who wish to better the species, and to set the race forward triumphant into the eternity of life.¹⁸

Discovering this article was a revelation for me, but having reflected upon the reality of it, I do not find it so surprising that Nietzsche's thinking should have influenced Montessori's. It was here, too, that I found some solid insights as to my *Corollaries for the Reevaluation of Contemporary Education*.

In all, the literature available for an adequate investigation into the possibilities for applying Nietzschean concepts to a contemporary educational system is most appropriate and impressive. While I had believed that the idea had its genesis within my corpus of thinking, it is obvious that it has had its proponents all along. However, they have not attempted a direct application of Nietzschean pedagogy evolving into a definitive system of philosophical education. Perhaps Cooper, Sharp, and Murphy come closest, and perhaps Montessori prepared a type of application but, in the final analysis, there is still much work to do. The parallels of the circumstances of Nietzsche's Nineteenth Century Germany and contemporary America are striking. While the specifics

of these parallels are different, the overall effects of technology and state control of education are the same. As such, the legacy of a Nietzschean pedagogy can be seen to have a significant bearing on the future course of educational endeavors not only in the United States, but also in the industrialized world as well.

Endnotes: Part the Second

1. Benjamin Barber, "America Skips School: Why We Talk So Much About Education and Do So Little," *Harper's Magazine* November 1993, 41.
2. Bruce Joyce, *Changing School Culture through Staff Development*, 1990. ERIC, ED 315919.
3. Bruce Joyce, *The Self-Renewing School*, 1993. ERIC, ED 362946.
4. Seymour B. Sarason, *The Predictable Failure of Educational Reform: Can We Change Course before It's Too Late?* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990).
5. David W. Johnson and Roger T. Johnson, "Creative and Critical Thinking through Academic Controversy", *American Behavioral Scientist* 37(October 1993): 8.
6. Peter Shaw, "The Competitiveness Illusion: Does Our Country Need to be Literate in Order to be Competitive? If Not, Why Read?" *National Review* 18 January 1993, 43.
7. Ibid.
8. Richard Schacht, *Nietzsche* (New York: Routledge, 1983), x.
9. Walter Kaufmann, Letter to A.G. Ogden, July 3, 1969.
10. Arthur Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), 12.
11. R.J.Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), vii.
12. Schacht, xi.
13. David E. Cooper, *Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), viii.
14. Ibid., 8.
15. Ibid., 36.

16. David E. Cooper, "On Reading Nietzsche on Education", *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 17 (1983): 120.
17. Ann Margaret Sharp, "Education and Culture: A Nietzschean Perspective", *Humanitas* 11 (November 1975): 310.

Part the Third: Inquiry Strategy

1.00 Methodology

The inquiry strategy, as methodology, has been briefly outlined in Part the First, Section 5.00, for this dissertation, *Nietzschean Pedagogy: A Reevaluation for Contemporary Education*. Owing to the nature of this inquiry, it was necessary to establish a broad-based *qualitative* methodology. This nature is one which dictates that the inquiry be firmly fixed within the realms of ethnomethodology--in that it is an examination of given sociological phenomena as reflective of and reflected by education--and hermeneutics--in that it is a philosophical analysis of the conditions which best facilitate the establishment and structure of an effective and efficient educational system. The dissertation is presented in a narrative format within the designs of these research strategies. These approaches are appropriate since there is little to be quantified with respect to population samples and the like. The argument could very well be presented, nevertheless, that, since the research here depends upon assumptions made with respect to contemporary education, the methodology should rest within quantitative evaluations. In a very limited sense, this may have application; however, the fundamental research task here is to find those philosophical principles which devise an overall framework and structure as an *approach* to pedagogy and education. Relying upon quantification to achieve this seems futile to me since quantification is always a

measurement *post hoc*, and predictions derived from such data can be very static. Thus, the methodology in this dissertation will rely upon qualitative principles which allow much more latitude in interpretation and application. It will, as an intended consequence, present a more dynamic, more impacting, and more vivid dissertation. As such, its verification and validity will come from the structure of the *reevaluation* of modern education which is posited in the *Corollaries* in Part the Fifth, Section 3.00.

Consistently then, it is important to emphasize that this inquiry is, of necessity, philosophical in approach, analysis, research, design, and conclusion. The investigation rests more in the domain of *meta*-education rather than in method-specific education--that is to say, it does not offer an analysis of method specifics. As such, this dissertation is a treatise in the *philosophy of education*, as opposed to being a dogmatic analysis of some quantifiable, extant circumstance of education. That approach has always seemed to me to be, shall I say, "looking at the world through the rearview mirror." The *reevaluation* refers to extant circumstances of contemporary education solely as a point of departure, and not as a recounting of the events of the journey which may have brought us to this point.

2.00 Intent

The overall intent of this dissertation is to examine the works of the nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche in the areas of the

philosophy of education and of pedagogy, and then to propose his ideology to contemporary education with the aim of offering a viable option as an alternative to what presently exists. It is the hope of this inquiry that a *revaluation* will clear the mists which have obstructed the primary goal of education—that is, to develop and to generate individuals who are creative and who are critical thinkers.

It is appropriate here to justify the use of the term *revaluation*, in that it might seem far too radical a notion to be associated with education. I have borrowed this term directly from Nietzsche. It was his estimation that the values of his age were inadequate and had produced little else than the *nihilism* which, for Nietzsche, had brought the ruination of the human condition. In order to escape this tragic situation, he presented the concept of the *revaluation* of all values. Ironically, it was not his aim to necessarily legislate another system of values. He was unalterably opposed to the *status quo*, which, in his view, had held the human condition hostage to a value system undermining all that the human condition could achieve. Rather than a re-legislation of values, he proposed an individual re-examination of the values of his day with the hope of creating a value system worthy of positive production within the human condition. In *Ecce Homo* (IV 1), he offers the following observation, albeit given in his usual hyperbolic fashion.

Revaluation of all values: that is my formula for an act of ultimate self-examination by mankind which in me has become flesh and genius. My lot is that I must be the first *decent* human being, that I know myself to be in opposition against the mendaciousness of millennia.¹

This *revaluation* would come in the form of a personal discovery for each

individual.

A more thorough analysis of Nietzsche's concept of *revaluation* is presented in the Part the Fifth, Section 1.00 of this dissertation. What is important for present purposes is that the overall concept of a total re-examination in terms of a *revaluation* serves as the basis for my revaluation of contemporary education. It is intended to be a statement of offering, as was Nietzsche's case: but still, it presents a systematized alternative, if you will, for a more effective approach to education. Hence, the enigmatic term, *revaluation*, is used. Its intention is to call attention to the bankruptcy of those values in education which have resulted in the confusion and misdirection which has been the benchmark of education in America during the past four decades.

In this spirit, Part the Fifth of this dissertation presents seven *Corollaries for a Revaluation of Contemporary Education* outlined here, and briefly surveyed in Section 6.00 of this Part.

Corollaries for a Revaluation of Contemporary Education

1. While the learner is to be the focus of education, the object of education is a quest of taking the learner beyond the confines of collective and individual mediocrity.
2. The educator is a guide for the attainment of the higher state of being in the learner.
3. Education is analogous to a Rorschach Ink Blot interpretation.
4. Learning is an internal process; teaching is an external process.
5. Values are inherently interwoven into the fabric of education, but are socially motivated and, as such, are trapped.
6. The structure of education must serve the development of the learner, not the preservation of the state. It must provide for a curriculum which fosters the development of creativity and critical

7. thinking.
Elitism does not imply privilege. It demands service.

3.00 Presentation of Educational Research

In order to establish the fact of weaknesses inherent in contemporary education it is not wise to depend upon hearsay or negative predisposition, but, rather, a review of literature substantiating should be presented. This was cited in Part the Second, Section 2.00, above. In short, recent findings were analyzed and quoted so that a justified picture of where education is perceived to be today can be realized. Such researchers and scholars as Barber, Kozol, Joyce, Shaw, Perkins, Johnson and Johnson, Coker and White, and Sarason have isolated some of the instances, causes, and purported remedies to the circumstances of contemporary education. Their works have been crucial in the evolution of this dissertation.

4.00 Approaches to Researching Nietzsche's Work

Obviously, the most important research for this dissertation is a complete analysis of the views Nietzsche held on the *philosophy of education*. The specific works dealt with are cited in Part the Second, Section 3.00. Briefly, however, analyses of Nietzsche's educational concepts as found in *Beyond Good and Evil*, *Untimely Meditations*, *Twilight of the Idols*, *The Will to Power*, and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* are presented. Another work, a series of lectures entitled "On the

Future of Our Educational Institutions," immensely adds to the corpus of Nietzsche's educational philosophy.

One fact which cannot go untouched is the misrepresentation of Nietzsche as being anti-Semitic. Here, I have relied upon such Nietzschean scholars as Kaufmann, Hollingdale, Morgan, Danto, and Schacht to repudiate these inept claims. Under normal circumstances, Nietzsche would be treated as any other legitimate philosopher, but, owing to the sad fact of the bastardization of his works for political or other personal gains, such a refutation had to be presented.

In analyzing Nietzsche's educational philosophy *per se*, I turn to Cooper, Sharp, Murphy, and Simons to cite a few. What is consistent in all of their works is that Nietzsche presents a clear connection between the necessity of education in the total development of his philosophy. It is not possible to extract this part of his conceptual presentations from the rest of his work.

Within the context of Nietzsche's complete system the dissertation addresses his perspectivist epistemology as a foundation to substantiate his views of education. It is dealt with in Part the Fourth, Section 3.00 below.

5.00 A Synthesis of Nietzsche and Contemporary Education

Once the research of education in contemporary America and the research on Nietzsche's concepts of education are presented, a synthesis, if you will, of this research is ventured. This venture takes the form of establishing the parallels between Nietzsche's nineteenth century Germany and contemporary America. The

facts of state control of education, of technology serving as the justification for training as opposed to educating, and the lack of a comprehensive curriculum which fosters creativity and critical thinking are presented and analyzed. The similarities which exist between these two cultures separated by almost a century provides the justification for using Nietzschean pedagogy as a legitimate consideration in establishing the *reevaluation* of contemporary educational institutions.

6.00 Application

The final Part of this dissertation presents seven *Corollaries for a Reevaluation of Contemporary Education*. Those *Corollaries* have been presented in Part the First, Section 5.03 and in this Part, Section 2.00 and are briefly surveyed here.

Corollary 1: *While the learner is to be the focus of education, the object of education is a quest of taking the learner beyond the confines of collective and individual mediocrity.*

Education is to be the vehicle which can carry the student to a level which he thought impossible. The learner must be made to realize the full potential which he can gain by participating in concepts of creativity and critical thinking. Education must never accept anything but the most concerted effort on the part of the learner. At the same time, education is not to be student-centered, for in so doing it loses its universal appeal and its timeless nature.

Corollary 2: *The educator is a guide for the attainment of the higher state of being in the learner.*

An educator, in the Nietzschean sense, must be a mentor, even a *taunter* who inspires a learner to seek a higher level of personal effort and achievement. It is the educator who, of his own accord, must have reached that *higher state of being* and must lead the learner to that level.

Corollary 3: *Education is analogous to a Rorschach Ink Blot interpretation.*

A Rorschach Ink Blot interpretation may or may not have conclusive validity; however, it serves to make the point of the subjectivity of education. Just as the interpretation of what the ink blot represents is solely within the realm of the observer, so education is subject to the interpretation of it by the student. This is not to say that education does not have a more universal and timeless nature but, just as all concede that the ink blot is there, so we all concede that education is there. It is just that what is seen, or experienced is entirely within the confines of the individual student.

Corollary 4: *Learning is an internal process; teaching is an external process.*

While this may not rank with the most profound of comments on the nature of epistemology or of education, it serves a very utilitarian purpose. It forces us to keep in mind the nature of pedagogy, and, in this role, supports the first three *Corollaries*. So long as we remember the nature of the learning-teaching process, it is easier to assist, lead, and guide the student in his quest to gain

knowledge, as well as in developing creativity and critical thinking.

Corollary 5: *Values are inherently interwoven into the fabric of education, but are socially motivated and, as such, are trapped.*

The fact that without a society there would be little need for any values outside of those which enhanced personal gain is a given fact in moral philosophy. The society of which an educational institution is a part has its own set of value standards and, in turn, the educational institution must, of necessity, promote those values in order to fulfill its function which is defined by the society, *viz-a-vis*, the state. In this sense, values are trapped by that state; thus, education becomes trapped and cannot bring the student to the *higher state* of being.

Corollary 6: *The structure of education must serve the development of the learner, not the preservation of the state. It must provide for a curriculum which fosters the development of creativity and critical thinking.*

Contrary to what we have learned from such philosophers as John Dewey, education must not be the tool of the state. Should this become the case, the entire process of education becomes subject to the control of those who may be in power at the time. Education must keep in mind that it is the development of the learner which preserves it, not the preservation of the state which promotes it. Without a system which is designed independently from the state, education can never develop the *higher state* of being in the individual learner.

Corollary 7: *Elitism does not imply privilege; it demands service.*

The discussion up to this point has emphasized the development of a *higher state* of being within the student. For many, this notion smacks of elitism--and that is exactly what it is. However, in this sense elitism has as its aim the beneficial assistance to the entirety of the human condition. It is to serve as an example of the attainment of that *higher state* of being, in which individuals are more personally accountable, more aware, more willing to contribute, more able to apprehend a sense of self-control, and more obliged to serve the human condition.

7.00 Transitional Summation

In the final analysis, it will be the development of that *higher state* of being through the enhancement of creativity and critical thinking which allows the human condition to realize its fullest potential, its highest hopes, its most lofty of aspirations. It will be Nietzschean pedagogy which will allow a *reevaluation* of Contemporary Education resulting in the *higher state* of being. With this in mind, Part the Fourth: Nietzschean Pedagogy and Part the Fifth: The Reevaluation take a departure from the traditional dissertation presentation. Usually the fourth chapter of a dissertation presents the quantitative data as evidence of the research while the fifth chapter presents the conclusions of the research. As a consequence of my research and its qualitative nature, as was presented in Section 1.00, Methodology, of this Part, the final two Parts, as chapters, respectively present the

qualitative data from the various sources researched, and my *Corollaries* for a reevaluation of education as conclusion. As has been presented throughout this Part, the entire enterprise of this dissertation focuses on a methodology which depends upon qualitative approaches and is *meta*-educational and philosophical in nature. It would be inconsistent and rather inappropriate to present it in any other fashion. Nevertheless, throughout the final two Parts, as chapters, a consistent methodology and presentation are established and maintained, so that considerations of Nietzsche's work in the field of the philosophy of education can be presented in light of its essential meaning and of its importance to the field of education as pedagogy.

Endnotes: Part the Third

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), IV - 1.

Part the Fourth: Nietzschean Pedagogy

We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge--and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves--how could it happen that we should ever find ourselves? It has rightly been said: "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also"; our treasure is where the beehives of our knowledge are.

--On the Genealogy of Morals, Preface

1.00 Nietzsche's Observations on Education

The natures of philosophy and education have characteristically avoided each other, particularly in contemporary contexts. Education has seemed to be preoccupied with the development of some process, some system, some method to impart knowledge to the learner. On the other hand, philosophy has been viewed as some examination adjunct to, if not in opposition to, the enterprise of education. Parenthetically, perhaps this predicament is due to the proclivities of philosophers whose concern has been primarily with their esoteric inquiries, and to professional educators whose concern has been more with method than with theory. To be sure, there have been "philosophies of education," but, in the final analysis, these have been merely apologetics for some definitive, dogmatic approach to a given discipline or to a given institution, be it social, political, or economic. This approach to education has relegated it to the disposal of the state, with all its intrigues and sinister ulterior motives. Thus, the two as disciplines have typically been seen as distant cousins, at best, in the enterprises of the

human condition.

The reality, however, is that all philosophy began with the existential process of teaching, or pedagogy. Socrates and Plato without exception conceived of themselves as teachers. Aristotle is projected by many as the greatest teacher of all time, and was, in fact the personal tutor of Alexander the Great. For those of the Christian tradition, Jesus Christ was the most prolific teacher in history, as was Buddha for his followers. Such notable figures in the history of the human condition have all been recognized as "philosophers" or religious teachers, and Christ himself was referred to in the Judaic tradition as *rabbi*, or teacher. All philosophy, nevertheless, is preoccupied with the process of inquiry, not with any specific preconceived notion of the end result, but, rather, with the development of some feasible fashion by which to understand, comprehend, assimilate, and appreciate the exigencies of the human condition. The aim of this approach has been to establish a suitable blueprint, if you will, which allows the learner to find his way as an independent agent. In short, philosophy is preoccupied with understanding life as the human condition, for that is the only perspective we can ultimately apprehend. All disciplines in the field of philosophy point to this, in spite of our philosophical specialists who narrow their fields to logic, metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, epistemology, or the history of philosophy. Each of those fields contributes to understanding life as the human condition, albeit in somewhat esoteric fashions. Logic organizes and clarifies our arguments and justifications. Metaphysics offers a rationale for ventures in the human condition

which are not empirically verifiable. Aesthetics gives us a sense of appreciation for those things intended to add to the joys of the human condition. Ethics allows us to systematize behaviors and values which produce goodness and constructive approaches. Epistemology presents justification for that which we claim to know. And this history of philosophy presents us with a chronology of those philosophic and cognitive discoveries we have made to perpetuate the continuum of inquiry in the human condition. Inasmuch as education is concerned with imparting knowledge about the human condition, then it properly belongs within the realm of philosophy, since philosophy is concerned with the apprehension of the meaning, the direction, the significance, and the completeness of the human condition. In so analyzing these two ventures of the human condition, it is apparent that philosophy enjoys a preeminent position in the hierarchy of discovery, if you will, in the human condition.

It is in this climate which we find the works of Nietzsche, the cryptic, aphoristic, often irascible curmudgeon of his time, who was less concerned with his methods of approach than he was with spurring those of his world who would listen to become more than their self-limiting notions were willing to permit. And although he never delineated an identifiable *system* of educational philosophy, it is obvious that, owing to his understandings of the obligations of philosophers, he was deeply concerned with the development of an approach to education which was imbued with the principles of inquiry inherent in philosophy. As such, the philosophy of life, for him, was identical with the

philosophy of education. Timothy Murphy in his doctoral dissertation, *Teaching the Dance: Nietzsche as Educator*, has systematically established Nietzsche as a legitimate philosopher of education since Nietzsche proposes that the function of philosophy is to teach one how to live, and education is the process of imparting that knowledge.

In looking at the reasons for which commentators have accounted Nietzsche a philosopher, it has been seen that no philosophical interpreter has account [*sic*] Nietzsche as a philosopher because of his concern with education. Rather, they have focused on his metaphysical, analytic, and moral aspects. Moreover, a review of the history of the philosophy of education has revealed that Nietzsche has been given only the most summary of treatments there. However, looking at a wide range of his own remarks and styles [al]though Nietzsche does contribute to metaphysical and linguistic concerns, these concerns do not exhaust his notion of philosophy. Rather, since he took philosophy as tied to the art of human living, philosophy properly so called has an irreducible educative quality to it. A genuine philosopher translates his metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological visions back into the realm of actual life. And it is there that the issue of "truth" or "falsity" is decided. Ignorance of how to live spawns philosophy, and Nietzsche would have philosophy educate in living creatively. Nietzsche earns the rank of philosopher of education because he clearly reflected on and discussed alternatives to the institutions, process and product of contemporary education. To him, philosophy *meant* the educative enterprise in the widest sense. One could even claim that Nietzsche's whole corpus are his reflections on education since they discuss the lived goal that Nietzsche proposed for man.¹

Such an identification of Nietzsche as a philosopher of education has been necessary because of the nature of his works but, and even more so, because of the battering he has taken in the past for reasons alluded to Part the First, Section 5.01. The import here is that Nietzsche's works legitimately establish him as a viable philosopher of education not because he definitively evolved a system of education, but because he recognized that the processes of philosophical

investigation provide, in actuality, the only genuine educative method as pedagogy.

1.01 Philosophy and Education are the Same Activity

For Nietzsche, then, philosophy and education become one and the same enterprise in the human condition with education as process becoming the vehicle for the evolution of the development of a system for the resolution of not only surviving, but also of enjoying our individual plights. This interwoven tapestry of philosophy and education for Nietzsche becomes more apparent when we analyze some of his pronouncements in "Schopenhauer as Educator." Ann Margaret Sharp has quoted Nietzsche from "Schopenhauer" when he declared, "Your educators can be only your liberators,"² and has used this as the title of her examination of Nietzschean pedagogy, "The Teacher as Liberator: A Nietzschean View." This is an extensive article developed from her dissertation of the same title. In her introduction, she clearly establishes this connection between philosophy and education in the Nietzschean tradition and defines the concept of the "philosophy of education" to which Nietzsche firmly subscribes.

For Friedrich Nietzsche, educational philosophy and philosophy of life were one. If philosophy is unrelated to life, it is irrelevant and harmful. To the extent that it does not help one in his everyday life to create meaning, it can be suffocating. The aim of education and life is liberation, the endless process of self-overcoming, and the educator the means by which the student can become himself. Educational philosophy therefore must concern itself with the freedom of the individual student.³

Philosophy, then, becomes the ultimate end of education for Nietzsche. To make

attempts to differentiate them as two separate disciplines is futile and myopic.

Murphy concurs in this observation, but his observation is more along the lines of philosophy teaching the concepts of the human condition as approaches to life, or a "philosophy of life".

Since philosophy is so intimately tied to the immediate concern of life, Nietzsche is very much concerned with the *educative* powers of philosophy. Since education is, patently, tied to the art or mode of human living, it follows that Nietzsche cannot distinguish between philosophy and education at their highest levels, for the aims of both are identical. That Nietzsche claims his writings are for the few, and that genuine education likewise belongs to the elite is no objection to this claim, for all individuals must, to some extent, be philosophical in wondering about the conduct of their lives. A great philosopher and a great educator, then, would be the same in that they offer insight, instruction, and examples of responses to the existential ignorance that spawns philosophy in the first place.

The test for the value of education in Nietzsche, as for philosophy, is life, not rational systematizing power. This, furthermore, would seem to be the reason Nietzsche does not do in his own writings what commentators have done with them, namely add them up into a philosophy. If there are apparent contradictions at the level of rational interpretation, it might well be that at the level of life, one does not experience these as inconsistencies.⁴

It is here that there is the obvious convergence of philosophy, the philosopher, and education. For Nietzsche there is no distinction in the finest of senses. If one is a philosopher, one is a teacher; if one is educating, one is being a philosopher. As this dissertation later develops, the concept of the importance of this *non-*distinction between philosophy and education becomes clearer. For the moment, however, suffice it to say that education is a function of philosophy, and teaching is a function of the philosopher.

Murphy points out that in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the first words out of Zarathustra's mouth are "I teach,"⁵ which also is the introductory quotation of this

dissertation. The significance is that it emphasizes the interdependence of education, the educator, philosophy, and the philosopher. Murphy further amplifies this point.

If *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is Nietzsche's most important work, there is no denying that its form is a master speaking to disciples, and that the master is searching out kindred souls among them for the tasks that he would impart to them (Namely the tasks that they would initiate). In this sense, then, education and philosophy meet, for philosophy aims at teaching, and genuine education cannot take place without philosophical labor.⁶

That Nietzsche devised no system for the philosophy of education, then, would seem to be an element which he believed to be superfluous since philosophy and education, in his view, were the same activity in the human condition.

1.02 The Philosopher is the Educator

The purpose of education, then, is common with the purpose of philosophy --that is to say, to instruct the learner in the ways and means by which to conduct himself in the human condition. Still, there must be some criteria for the guide in the journey of this instruction--the educator. Yes, the philosopher is the educator, and vice-versa but, in order to be able to attain such a position in the structure of the human condition, there must be some substantive measures by which we determine the tasks and the legitimacy of such a one. Although Nietzsche himself would discount the concept of specific delineations, since the philosopher as educator would emerge as a product of his own being, he, nevertheless, offers some descriptions of this philosopher as educator, or educator as philosopher in a number of significant works.

Inasmuch as it is the primary goal of education and, thus, the primary task of the educator to develop the *ubermensch*, the educator, or pedagogist, must be at that level of development, the *higher state* of being, in order to impart it. The *higher state* of the human condition is that state arrived at through the constant process of self-overcoming, of self-realization, of self-attainment. There is a very significant passage in *The Will to Power* which identifies the qualities a Nietzschean educator as philosopher must possess.

Assuming one thinks of a philosopher as a great educator, powerful enough to draw up to his lonely height a long chain of generations, then one must also grant him the uncanny privileges of the great educator. An educator never says what he himself thinks, but always only what he thinks of a thing in relation to the requirement of those he educates. He must not be detected in this dissimulation; it is part of his mastery that one believes in his honesty. He must be capable of employing every means of discipline: some he can drive toward the heights only with the whips of scorn; others, who are sluggish [*sic*], irresolute, cowardly, vain, perhaps only with exaggerated praise. Such an educator is beyond good and evil; but no one must know it.⁷

This is perhaps the most definitive of Nietzschean allusions to the educator's qualities, and it clearly states the great self-discipline a philosopher as educator must master. How can this philosopher as educator hope to inspire or to motivate learners to a level which he has not attained prior to any educative activity? Such a level of educative experience would be unauthentic in the human condition were the educator as pedagogist not to have arrived at this *higher state* of the human condition prior to imparting his pedagogy.

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche gives us another indication of the duties of the great pedagogist in terms of purpose. Recognizing that the primary task

of the pedagogist is to bring the learner to the *higher state* of the human condition, as *ubermensch*, Nietzsche here points to the desired end of the educative process.

To teach man the future of man as his *will*, as dependent on a human will, and to prepare great ventures and over-all attempts of discipline and cultivation by way of putting an end to that gruesome dominion of nonsense and accident that has so far been called "history"--the nonsense of the "greatest number" is merely its ultimate form: at some time new types of philosophers and commanders will be necessary for that, and whatever has existed on earth of concealed, terrible, and benevolent spirits, will look pale and dwarfed by comparison. It is the image of such leaders that *we* envisage: may I say this out loud, you free spirits? The conditions that one would have partly to create and partly to exploit for their genesis; the probable ways and tests that would enable a soul to grow to such a height and force that it would feel the *compulsion* for such tasks; a revaluation of values under whose new pressure and hammer a conscience would be steeled, a heart turned to bronze, in order to endure the weight of such responsibility; on the other hand, the necessity of such leaders, the frightening danger that they might fail to appear or that they might turn out badly or degenerate--these are *our* real worries and gloom--do you know that, you free spirits?--these are the heavy distant thoughts and storms that pass over the sky of *our* life.⁸

It is through education, then, that leaders in the human condition are to be developed. Although this may indicate a privileged elite, that elitism is emphatically not to be based on privilege, but rather on service. Nevertheless, it is Nietzsche's goal that pedagogists bring about the emergence of a new being, and, as such, it is pivotal in the process that the pedagogist already has emerged at this *higher state* of the human condition.

In Nietzsche's eyes, the one, true educator was Schopenhauer, and in his tribute, "Schopenhauer as Educator", he further identifies those qualities and attributes which the pedagogist must exhibit. This is also the source of Sharp's treatise analyzing the educator as "liberator".

Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the true basic material of your being is, something in itself ineducable and in any case difficult of access, bound and paralysed: your educators can only be your liberators. And that is the secret of all culture: it does not provide artificial limbs, wax noses or spectacles--that which can provide these things is, rather, only sham education.⁹

This is obviously consistent with his directives for the evolution of the human condition to the *higher state*, the development within the learner of a sense of self-awareness, self-revelation, self-discovery, self-reliance, in service to the rest of the human condition. He further describes this evolution--and here it is important to note that "evolution" of this type is my term, and implies no Darwinian or biological metamorphosis, but, rather, a cognitive growth and enhancement--in terms which further outlines the qualities of the great pedagogue.

That educating philosopher of whom I dreamed would, I came to think, not only discover the central force, he would also know how to prevent its acting destructively on the other forces: his educational task would, it seemed to me, be to mould the whole man into a living planetary system and to understand its higher laws of motion.¹⁰

The "central force" to which he refers is an allusion to the emerging *self* of the learner, which is to be directed in constructive activity for the benefit of the human condition, for it is just as true, which Nietzsche clearly understands here, that it can be deployed in a negative and/or destructive fashion. The skill, the art of the pedagogue is to tap into that reservoir of cognitive and creative wealth within the individual learner and to direct it in beneficent, positive pursuits.

The Nietzschean pedagogue also has developed a kind of *self-gravity* which manifests itself in pure honesty. His descriptions here are descriptions of Schopenhauer, to be certain; however, they are also very central identifying

qualities which Nietzsche would have all pedagogists possess.

He is honest because he speaks and writes to himself and for himself, cheerful because he has conquered the hardest task by thinking, and steadfast because he has to be. His strength rises straight and calmly upwards like a flame when there is no wind, imperturbably, without restless wavering. He finds his way every time before we have so much as noticed that he has been seeking it; as though compelled by a law of gravity he runs on ahead, so firm and agile, so inevitably. And whoever has felt what it means to discover among our tragelaphine men of today a whole, complete, self-moving, unconstrained and unhampered natural being will understand my joy and amazement when I discovered Schopenhauer. I sensed that in him I had discovered that educator and philosopher I had sought for so long.¹¹

While describing Schopenhauer in this passage, Nietzsche also offers the formula for his ideal pedagogist.

Another passage from "Schopenhauer as Educator" more succinctly isolates those qualities characteristic of Nietzschean pedagogy. Again, the specific description is of Schopenhauer, but it is also the delineation of the effective pedagogist. This passage offers an approach which Nietzsche feels will assist in appreciating the philosophy of Schopenhauer, but, at the same time, it obviously denotes the definitive model for a Nietzschean pedagogist.

Individually, by the individual only for himself, so as to gain insight into his own want and misery, into his own limitedness, so as then to learn the nature of his antidotes and consolations: namely, sacrifice of the ego, submission to the noblest ends, above all to those of justice and compassion. He teaches us to distinguish between those things that really promote human happiness and those that only appear to do so: how neither riches nor honours nor erudition can lift the individual out of the profound depression he feels at the valuelessness of his existence, and how the striving after these valued things acquires meaning only through an exalted and transfiguring overall goal: to acquire power so as to aid the evolution of the *physis* and to be for a while the corrector of its follies and ineptitudes. At first only for yourself, to be sure; but through yourself in the end for everyone. It is true that this is a striving which by its nature

leads towards resignation: for what and how much is amenable to any kind of improvement at all, in the individual or in the generality.¹²

It is clear that Nietzsche would demand much of the learner, but what is clearer is the great expectations of the pedagogist who through a life of *self-overcoming* emerges not only as a guide to the learner, but also as an example of what can be achieved in this process.

1.03 The Purpose of Education is to Create the *Übermensch*

In all of his writings on the purpose of education, Nietzsche demands that its end be the creation of that creative, yet analytic being who can be *self-sufficient*, who can deny the mediocrity of the herd, and who can find that sense of, in my terms, *self-gravity*. This is the central purpose of education for Nietzsche. We see the basis of this, again, in "Schopenhauer as Educator" when Nietzsche speaks of personal accountability, or as Cooper terms it, authenticity.

We are responsible to ourselves for our own existence; consequently we want to be the true helmsmen of this existence and refuse to allow our existence to resemble a mindless act of chance. One has to take a somewhat bold and dangerous line with this existence.¹³

It is education, through the guidance of the pedagogist, which will permit and evolve those types of beings who can lead, but not in an imperial sense; rather, they lead in a courageous crusade against the mundane, the mediocre, the complacent form of existence which results in nihilism.

The task of the pedagogist, and hence of education, is a kind of "liberation," as Sharp points out in her explication of "Schopenhauer as Educator." This

liberation is not political, necessarily, but is cognitive and experiential, even sociological in essence. It is a liberation of the true self to a newer form of existence, the *higher state*, of the human condition.

It is Nietzsche's view that it is the main task of the educator to reach out for the student and to become his agent of liberation, aware that the end result will inevitably be the creation of men who will come into conflict with the prevailing norms of society and who will begin the process of the creation of new values for mankind. In order for this value-creator to become a reality, educators must *will* his existence consciously and then set about systematically to form him.¹⁴

While it is interesting to note Sharp's allusion to the creation of new values, the central concept of *revaluation* in this dissertation, the point, nevertheless, is that the thrust of any educational venture or institution is the production of a new kind of being, a new creation. The identifying characteristics of this kind of being far exceed the normal expectations of a "crusader against nihilism," which might be the perceived notion. It is much more than that, as Nietzsche outlines in the following passage from *The Will to Power*. This kind of new being will be, in Nietzsche's lexicon, "men of destinies" who are self-reliant, but, at the same time, understand both the present state of the human condition and the vision of the kind of *higher state* which will both liberate and lead.

Men who are destinies, who by bearing themselves bear destinies, the whole species of *heroic* bearers of burdens: oh how they would like to rest from themselves for once! how they thirst for strong hearts and necks, so as to be free from what oppresses them at least for a few hours! And how vainly they thirst!--They wait; they look at everything that passes: no one approaches them with as much as a thousandth part of their suffering and passion, no one divines *in what way* they are waiting--at length, at length they learn their first piece of worldly prudence--not to wait any more; and soon another one: to be genial, to be modest, from now on to endure everyone, to endure everything--in short, to endure even a littler more than

they have endured so far.¹⁵

It is this type of being which Nietzsche would have emerge from the educative process--beings of destiny.

This development of the *higher state* of being must come from a system which is most demanding, most rigid, and most competitive. Without this approach we would forever be the captives of the nihilistic expectations of the herd. Thus, the institutions which produce this type of being must also be demanding.

The most desirable thing is still under all circumstances a hard discipline *at the proper time*, i.e., at that age at which it still makes one proud to see that much is demanded of one. For this is what distinguishes the hard school as a good school from all others: that much is demanded; and sternly demanded; that the good, even the exceptional, is demanded as the norm; that praise is rare, that indulgence is nonexistent; that blame is apportioned sharply, objectively, without regard for talent or antecedents.¹⁶

This, then, is the purpose of education--to bring about the development of the *higher state* of being within the human condition, to produce creative, analytic beings who can lead by example, and who, by their very natures, can effect the revaluation of all values.

2.00 Pedagogy of the *Urbmensch*

In the process of Nietzschean pedagogy, obviously there are some significant elements which have direct bearing upon the evolution of the *ubermensch* through a satisfactory system of education. Again, I have preferred to use the phrase *higher state* of the human condition for purposes of avoiding the

traditional negative connotations associated with the term *ubermensch*. Still, there is a clearly delineated corridor for teaching with the *higher state* of the human condition in mind. Nietzsche called for four fundamental approaches in his pedagogy of the *ubermensch*: love of the educator as pedagogue, pedagogy as a contest or competition, the application of his doctrine of *amor fati*, and the development of the whole person. Each of these rudimentary principles involves the establishment of a pedagogy specific enough to focus upon the learner, yet expansive enough to bring about the *higher state* of the human condition within the learner. I say these principles are "called for" by Nietzsche, but in reality he offered these in his usual cryptic fashion in segments throughout the entire corpus of his work. This is important to keep in mind since he was more concerned with the use of education as a process intrinsically interwoven with philosophy. Murphy amplifies this position in establishing Nietzsche as a legitimate philosopher of education.

Nietzsche's entire corpus of works centers around, of course, the relationship between life and values. And in that respect his concerns would be those of a grand teacher (and this is not necessarily equatable with a grand scholar) who attempts, through his criticism and example, to instruct humanity in a proper way to live. It would seem, moreover, that his very notion of philosophy cannot be understood but as being educative in nature.¹⁷

When we look at such works as *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, "Schopenhauer as Educator," and "On the Future of Our Educational Institutions," we can see his philosophical disposition being applied to pedagogy. However, in his sense pedagogy is more a quality of being than an approach; it is more an aspect of the

ubermensch personality than a dictum of methods to which the educator must subscribe. As such, there is a "pedagogy of the *ubermensch*," which is both worthy of examination and explication.

It is important here to make a clarification of the concept of the *ubermensch*, as was alluded to in Part the First, Section 4.00. Nietzsche's sociological concern, and hence his moral concern, had to do with the *nihilism* which he found rampant in his nineteenth century Germany. It had eaten away at the moral fiber of his country and he was seeking a doctrine which would oppose such a deterioration of the human condition. This *nihilism* was the result of what Nietzsche had observed in the pronouncement *God is dead!* It was not a theological dictum: rather, it was his sociological assessment of his time. Without belief in God, in a very real and active sense, the human condition was left to its own devices. Thus, humanity has become disoriented morally, preoccupied with material acquisition and with the fulfillment of gratification of the self for the self. The void created by the absence of God had become so great that values had become based on personal power and personal gain. Those in positions of power, be it financial or political, were the dictators of value, of purpose, and of social institutions. The only direction for Nietzsche was to find a manner in which one could emerge *beyond* the extant environment; thus, such a one would be above the morality and mentality of the herd. His concern focused upon the evolution of the *ubermensch*, or "overman." The implications of such a term have been incendiary largely due to the association of concepts with the Nazi movement, but

had Nietzsche been alive he would have soundly repudiated their applications of his philosophy, as explained in Part the First, Section 5.01. He was emphatically not seeking a super-race, but an improved, more aware, more responsible, more morally advanced, more creative, more sensitive, more analytic being. He speaks of such a being in *The Antichrist* when he defines "spiritual men." Here he offers the dimensions of his *ubermensch*.

The most spiritual men, as the *strongest*, find their happiness where others would find their destruction: in the labyrinth, in hardness against themselves and others, in experiments; their joy is self-conquest; asceticism becomes in them nature, need, and instinct. Difficult tasks are a privilege to them; to play with burdens which crush others, a recreation. Knowledge--a form of asceticism. They are the most venerable kind of man; that does not preclude their being the most cheerful and the kindest. They rule not because they want to but because they *are*; they are not free to be second.¹⁸

It implies an obligation to service, not a privilege to excess.

Dr. Morton Teicher, Dean Emeritus of the School of Social Work at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, has suggested that there is an apparent analogous relationship between Nietzsche's *ubermensch* and Jews as the "Chosen People." In this sense, it is more of an *imposed obligation* to serve the rest of humanity through leadership in spiritual and moral values. The concept of imposition, though not so stated in Nietzsche is clearly there. The behavior of Zarathustra, his allusions to "asceticism" as a way of life, the references to accepting the difficulties and hardships of life, and the concept of *amor fati*--that is, embracing one's fate willingly--all point to a kind of imposition. Zarathustra speaks of "commanding" and its burden which reveals this kind of imposition as

obligation.

Commanding is more difficult than obeying. And not only because the commander bears the burden of all who obey, and that this burden can easily crush him.

In all commanding there appeared to me to be an experiment and a risk: and the living creature always risks himself when he commands.

Yes, even when he commands himself: then also must he make amends for his commanding. He must become judge and avenger and victim of his own law.¹⁹

With this in mind, the concept of *ubermensch* allows the creation of an elite class. However, this entire elite is preoccupied with the task of constant self-overcoming, of facing the struggle of life, and of promoting the highest ideals of the human condition. As such, it is analogous to the imposed obligation of the Jews as the "Chosen People."

In the final analysis, the concept of the *ubermensch* entails an intense dedication to the attainment of the *higher state* of the human condition through self-overcoming, risk taking, asceticism, the pursuit of knowledge, and the creation of a morality not bound by the herd. It is rather like Gulliver in his experiences with the Lilliputians. Their ropes were but threads to him, but enough threads bound him securely until he could reach an agreement with them. His training as a physician allowed him to see the more gentle side of the human condition, but his physical stature made him a serious threat. Traditionally, the *ubermensch* has been viewed as a kind of Gulliver by the Lilliputians, Nietzsche's herd. Like Nietzsche's *ubermensch*, Gulliver had to overcome some of his internal inequities, if we can call them such, in order to lead; for his plight in Lilliput was to lead merely by his being there. So it is with the concept of the *ubermensch*. By

mere existence, he is called upon to lead—an imposed obligation.

It is this same kind of imposed obligation which imbues the pedagogist in educational pursuits with his students as learners. It pervades all that the pedagogist does in loving, in competing, in embracing one's fate as *amor fati*, and in the evolution of the whole person.

2.01 There Must Be Love between the Pedagogist and the Learner

One of the primary elements in the establishment of a Nietzschean pedagogy is understanding the relationship between the pedagogist and the student as learner. Sharp identifies this as a true-love relationship, even as eros. I believe that this takes license with Nietzsche and it should be viewed more in the metaphorical context which is consistent with the rest of Nietzsche's writings. Still, it is a crucial concept to examine since it lays the foundation for the entire pedagogist-learner enterprise.

In this concept of love, we find a strong sense of dedication, of selflessness, of sacrifice, of enduring even when the learner is reticent. This is apparent in "Schopenhauer as Educator" when Nietzsche addresses the concept of self-knowledge. It is most applicable when we see it in the context of the dedication of the pedagogist.

It is hard to create in anyone this condition of intrepid self-knowledge because it is impossible to teach love; for it is love alone that can bestow on the soul, not only a clear, discriminating and self-contemptuous view of itself, but also the desire to look beyond itself and to seek with all its might for a higher self as yet still concealed from it. Thus only he who has attached his heart to some great man is by that act *consecrated to culture*; the

sign of that consecration is that one is ashamed of oneself without any accompanying feeling of distress, that one comes to hate one's own narrowness and shrivelled nature, that one has a feeling of sympathy for the genius who again and again drags himself up out of our dryness and apathy and the same feeling in anticipation for all those who are still struggling and evolving, with the profoundest conviction that almost everywhere we encounter nature pressing towards man and again and again failing to achieve him, yet everywhere succeeding in producing the most marvelous beginnings, individual traits and forms: so that the men we live among resemble a field over which is scattered the most precious fragments of sculpture where everything calls to us: come, assist, complete, bring together what belongs together, we have an immeasurable longing to become whole.²⁰

It is here that we find the essential nature of the plight of the pedagogist in his relationship with the learner. The struggle is to bring about in the individual learner that *higher state* of the human condition, and it is only through a loving relationship that this can be achieved.

Sharp points this out in identifying the love a pedagogist must have in order to fulfill his obligations as a true educator.

Nietzsche's ideal teacher is a man who loves not only himself but all of mankind; he is characterized by an eros directed toward all of nature. Because his focus is always the potential freedom of students, he is a man of faith. He has faith in himself and in his students to endure the hardships of the liberation process.²¹

For Nietzsche, then, it is this kind of love which affirms the relationship between the pedagogist and the learner. In so doing it creates a bond between them which is unique to them, and is their exclusive property. It is just as if they were, in fact, two lovers seeking to build their own, singular relationship. The result is a kind of *oasis*, if you will, comprised of the parts of their individual personalities, yet being superseded by the establishment of this oasis. They do not lose

themselves in the oasis, they are expanded by it, enhanced by it, heightened by it, and the intended product is the *higher state* of the human condition, created, in this instance, by love. As Sharp further states,

Eros is the basis of the student-teacher relationship for Nietzsche. When Zarathustra comes down off the mountain, he says "I love mankind. I bring them a gift". The correlative of loving is giving out of gratitude for life itself. This eros is that which gives possibility to the student's continual ascent toward self-perfection.²²

It is crucial that the relationship be based upon trust, just as with lovers in any other sense. This trust comes from the first contact the student has with the pedagogue. The first time on a campus can be intimidating enough for a young learner, and a first lecture can be even more intimidating. It is at that moment that the pedagogue must extend the trust, as love, to the student. Furthermore, it must be present in every activity of the pedagogue to the extent that he gives of himself totally to the task of developing the *higher state* of the human condition within the student.

His lectures and classes, although important as a means of imparting knowledge, are only a corollary to his main role as lover. This role demands total giving of oneself. It demands men who are willing to risk themselves, who are open, who trust themselves and thus are not defensive.²³

This concept of love as presented by Sharp is reminiscent of the Biblical "love chapter" from St. Paul's first letter to the Corinthians. It has been quoted in many contexts before and has had many applications, but it seems quite appropriate here to allude to it so that the parallels between Nietzsche's "love" for his students is not misunderstood and appear to be predatory in nature, or even worse.

Love is patient and kind; love is not jealous or boastful; it is not arrogant or rude. Love does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or resentful; it does not rejoice at wrong, but rejoices in the right. Love bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.²⁴

Perhaps the most applicable of this passage is the final sentence, for here it presents the suffering a lover may be forced to endure, as the pedagogue may be forced to endure the pains of bringing about the *higher state* in the student.

Consistent with the rest of Nietzsche's concepts of over-coming in the human condition, there rests with the pedagogue a degree of suffering which is indicative of the life of the *ubermensch*. He never lets us forget that part of the human condition is the over-coming of personal loss and pain, and of not acquiescing to it. His explication of the love to be exhibited by the pedagogue is best presented by Zarathustra in his utterance on "Of Marriage and Children". While its focus is on the rationality of marriage and love in that specific context, it vividly explains the same relationship which is to exist between the pedagogue and the learner.

But even your best love too is only a passionate impersonation and a painful ardour. It is a torch which should light your way to higher paths.

One day you shall love beyond yourselves! So first *learn* to love! For that you have had to drink the bitter cup of your love.

There is a bitterness in the cup of even the best love: thus it arouses longing for the Superman, thus it arouses thirst in you, the creator!²⁵

When this love is effected, it is the genesis of the creative powers in the human condition and will precipitate creativity within the learner. It could not have been possible to produce had the relationship between the pedagogue and the learner been established without love.

The eros of the educator sets in motion that drive for creativity, continual self-renewal. The educator fertilizes the young student so that he may be capable of creating new ideas and moving toward self-perfection. The ideal is never reached but serves as a goal toward which the student strives. He becomes more aware of his limitations and ignorance as he moves closer to the ideal.²⁶

The great benefit of having arrived at the *higher state* of the human condition is the tremendous creativity which is an end result; thus, it is through this kind of love, metaphorically erotic, that the pedagogist is able to bring the learner closer to the attainment of it.

2.02 The Contest, as *Agon*, is the Foundation for Epistemic Discovery

Just as Sharp points to an attitude of love as a backdrop for the educator and his pedagogy, Murphy points out that one of the main tenets for a Nietzschean pedagogy is the recognition of competition in education as *agon*, the Greek for *contest*. It is reflective of a concept of methodology as we might find in any text on educational methods; however, its position is one of being a vehicle for the apprehension of knowledge. As a vehicle it provides the learner with experience in dealing with the contest, which is to be engaged not only with others, but primarily with the self, then to others, and finally with the rest of the cosmos.

The contest is not only an intellectual contest, but a contest of the quality of all life, of all meaning. The irreducible advantage of the contest is *experience*. And to the extent that the contest provides that experience, Nietzsche looks to it as the guiding notion of philosophy, of education, of life itself.²⁷

Perhaps we may substitute the word "challenge" for contest in our contemporary

educational systems, but that is too soft a word for Nietzsche. The challenge is a given notion in his structure of the cognitive and spiritual development of the human condition. Nietzsche believes that there must be a type of actual engagement of another self, another circumstance, another idea, another struggle. And it has a most significant place in the emergence of the *higher state* of being; thus, it must be a fundamental part of the educative process.

If education is to be faithful to human beings, then the contest must be structured into the very process of education. The educational process, therefore, must be literally *agonal*, a continuing series of contests provided such that the student can master his existential situation and in such a way that he not fall victim to a devastating partialism. That said, it would be well to point out that Nietzsche did not locate the value of the contest in the result of the contest necessarily, such that if one lost, then one gained nothing. Rather, he located the value of the contest *in the struggle* on behalf of some cause. Accordingly, he can say that "The value of a thing sometimes lies not in what one attains with it, but in what one pays for it." [*Twilight of the Idols*]²⁸

The intention is not to be antagonistic or belligerent, but to be engaged in an activity which would bring out the best in the human condition, and thus, the best in the development of the self. As Nietzsche puts it in *Homer's Contest*, "Not to the activity of fights of annihilation but to the activity of fights which are *contests*."²⁹

So vital to the concept of education is this idea of the contest that Nietzsche insists that it must be seen as producing positive ends.

Every talent must unfold itself in fighting: that is the command of Hellenic popular pedagogy, whereas modern educators dread nothing more than the unleashing of so-called ambition. And just as the youth were educated through contests, their educators were also engaged in contests with each other.³⁰

The unfolding of talent is indicative of the measure of the development of the self through the concept of the struggle with the self, with others, with life itself.

Still, the question of victory looms over this concept. Why do we worship it as much as we do? It is an affirmation of the self, but, what is more, it allows the clarification of our individual human quests to succeed in the apprehension and attainment of an ideal. As such, it is a process of cognitive development. Nietzsche is quick to point out that in this concept as an educative vehicle the contest must not produce a single victor, but many, constantly emerging victors. It is like the old game of "King of the Mountain." While one contestant may be victorious in any particular charge or exchange, the charges are continual, endless, and demand that each victor, no matter how elated, must be aware that the contest is never over.

Why should no one be the best? Because then the contest would come to an end and the eternal source of life for the Hellenic state would be endangered. Originally this curious institution is not a safety valve but a means of stimulation: the individual who towers above the rest is eliminated so that the contest of forces may reawaken--an idea that is hostile to the "exclusiveness" of genius in the modern sense and presupposes that in the natural order of things there are always *several* geniuses who spur each other to action, even as they hold each other within the limits of measure. That is the core of the Hellenic notion of the contest: it abominates the rule of one and fears its dangers; it desires, as a *protection* against the genius, another genius.³¹

The value of such a vehicle to education and to the educative process is that it calls upon the most ingenious of talents through experience. When Nietzsche says, "Every talent must unfold itself in fighting," he alludes to the creativity of the individual who while engaged in the struggle must call upon

every sense he has developed thus far in the attainment of the goal, regardless of its station in the overall scheme of things. It is an answer to the call of the struggle, and it brings about the most creative of our individual talents. In a very real sense, we can see this in athletic contests. Perhaps one has perfected dribbling the basketball, but an improvement on that is dribbling between one's legs. This is a direct response to the challenge of the contest, and it is creative. So it is in all educative activities.

The contest functions as the form of the creative process. Even Zarathustra himself had to struggle long and hard with truths about the world before he could turn them to his advantage. So, too, would Nietzsche have the noble human being grapple with the world in all its aspects, such that he can be master and dictator of them all. For if creativity follows from the condition of power, then creation itself is a contest, perhaps the most telling and taxing of all, since the paradigmatic meaning of creation is to bring something out of nothing. And since Nietzsche would arrogate to man all the predicates of god, then it would seem that he is putting man in complete charge of the world, and if he cannot bring something *ex nihilo*, then he can bring something from the possibility of man.³²

The true pedagogue recognizes the importance of the contest and brings it about as an effective vehicle in his art. And it must be central to the entire process, otherwise both pedagogue and learner become complacent and stagnant.

The nature of his instruction must be centered on the contest, for in failing to understand the role of the contest one fails to understand human life at all, or at least Nietzsche's vision that the world thrives only in struggle, only when it does not become complacent about its convictions.³³

Celebration of this struggle, as the contest, is at the heart of creativity in the human condition, and many of Nietzsche's aphorisms refer to it, albeit often cloaked in some other challenge, as with his admonition, "*Out of life's school of war: What does not destroy me, makes me stronger.*"³⁴ Without the contest, then,

there can be no means by which the creative talents within each learner can be brought forth simply because there would be no reason to do so. Even the best of authors and poets concede that through a kind of tension arises a challenge to tap their creative energies.

Whereas modern man fears nothing in an artist more than the emotion of any personal fight, the Greek knows the artist *only as engaged in a personal fight*. Precisely where modern man senses the weakness of a work of art, the Hellene seeks the source of its greatest strength.³⁵

Thus, we see that the most talented of pedagogists exercises the contest in his art to prompt creativity within the learner.

2.03 The Learner Must Be Taught to Embrace the Philosophy of *Amor Fati*

In the educative process there must be, of necessity, a given kind of tension, as with all circumstances of life. It is part and parcel of *the struggle* to which Nietzsche constantly refers, and which Murphy identifies in the contest as *agon*. Still, there are the depths of those valleys which often counteract the pinnacles of the mountain tops. It is in that environment which many find themselves hanging onto some treacherous precipice in their individual quests for self-attainment, self-fulfillment, self-identity. Nietzsche's response is more along the lines of a psychological approach when he gives us the doctrine of *amor fati*, or the love of one's individual fate. It is also, I maintain, another vital element in painting a picture of Nietzschean pedagogy, for without it the entire venture can seem meaningless, depressing, and futile.

In "Schopenhauer as Educator," Nietzsche sets the stage for a more detailed application of *amor fati* in the educative process. He acknowledges the necessity of individuals recognizing their own uniqueness, but also the necessity of accepting the responsibility for that uniqueness, and the acknowledgement of that uniqueness in the human condition.

We are responsible to ourselves for our own existence; consequently, we want to be the true helmsman of this existence and refuse to allow our existence to resemble a mindless act of chance.³⁶

But how is one to do this, to accept that responsibility with the daily onslaught of negativism which is rampant in the human condition and to which Nietzsche referred to as *nihilism*? It is far easier to succumb to the mediocrity of the herd and to join in their cacophony of misery. Nietzsche recognizes this plight.

But how can we find ourselves again? How can man know himself? He is a thing dark and veiled; and if the hare has seven skins, man can slough off seventy times seven and still not be able to say: "this is really you, this is no longer outer shell". Moreover, it is a painful and dangerous undertaking thus to tunnel into oneself and to force one's way down into the shaft of one's being by the nearest path. A man who does it can easily so hurt himself that no physician can cure him.³⁷

The danger to which Nietzsche refers is obviously psychological pain. And this is a legitimate concern of the educative process since the learner is constantly challenged, and not always affirmed in his attempts or in his existence. Without affirmation, no matter what the venture--but more importantly for educative ventures--the individual learner in the human condition can collapse or withdraw, and perhaps, most tragic of all, not to be retrieved.

The purpose of "Schopenhauer as Educator" is to share with the world

Nietzsche's admiration of a thinker whom he idolized as the *summum bonum* of individual triumph over the negativism, as *nihilism*, of the herd. Concurrent with this purpose is the delineation of a pedagogical approach for the educator, as well as a learning approach for the student. He bids us to find our own selves through a systematic program of self-discovery, self-examination, self-assertion, and to make that appeal to a higher set of values than is extant in the human condition.

For your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to be.³⁸

This appeal to a higher system of values, will bring with it a rejection of the herd mentality, the herd morality.

When the great thinker despises mankind, he despises its laziness: for it is on account of their laziness that men seem like factory products, things of no consequence and unworthy to be associated with or instructed. The man who does not wish to belong to the mass needs only to cease taking himself easily; let him follow his conscience, which calls to him: "Be yourself! All you are now doing, thinking, desiring, is not you yourself."³⁹

From this point he admonishes us to make the appeal to that higher set of values.

Along this same line, a quotation which is inscribed over the entrance to the cadet barracks at The Virginia Military Institute is most applicable. It is from the great Confederate general, Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson, himself a philosophy professor at VMI before the Civil War. It states simply, "You are what you resolve to be." Ironically, Nietzsche was but in his teens when Jackson uttered these words. Still, it embodies that to which Nietzsche is referring.

Nevertheless, we are left with the task of determining exactly what is an

appropriate approach in order to achieve this level of self-development, this level of self-overcoming. The problem lies in a psychological self-discipline which allows the individual to balance the negativism and *nihilism* which he faces, and yet still survive in a hostile, when not apathetic, human condition. This solution lies in the dictum of *amor fati*, presented in the essay "Why I Am So Clever" from *Ecce Homo*.

My formula for greatness in men is *amor fati*: that one should not wish things to be otherwise, not before and not after, in the whole of eternity.⁴⁰

That may all be well and good to face the windblasts of our individual fates undaunted; yet, it requires a very well-defined internal discipline to achieve. Granted it is an "affirmation" of not only the self, but additionally, it is a cheerful acceptance of the position in which the self finds itself within the human condition, as well.

Danto in *Nietzsche As Philosopher* offers an explication of this doctrine of loving one's fate.

For the attitude he felt he could and we should adopt, he provided the formula of *Amor Fati*--loving one's fate, accepting, without palliative or protection, the results of a most thoroughgoing critique of philosophical and scientific ideas, seen as fictions, the products of some human need for security; and then endeavoring to live in a world impervious to these needs, to say Yes to the cosmic insignificance, not only of oneself and of human beings generally but also of life and nature as a whole.⁴¹

It requires a different attitude than that to which we have become accustomed; a dauntless attitude imbued with self-affirmation and a sense of self-gravity. The application is clear for the pedagogue, as well as for the learner--open the universe within by receiving the universe without, with a sense of alacrity.

At the same time this doctrine calls for embracing self-fate, it is also a kind of imposition of the self onto the remainder of the human condition, even the universe. Kaufmann makes us mindful of this fact.

The projection of one's feeling toward oneself upon a cosmic scale may seem to hinge on a metaphysical premise, but it can be defended empirically. That I am here, now, doing this—that depends on an awe-inspiring series of antecedent events, on millions of seemingly accidental moves and decisions, both by myself and many others whose moves and decisions in turn depended on yet other people. And our very existence, our being as we are, required that our parents had to choose each other, not anyone else, and beget us at the precise moment when we were actually begotten; and the same consideration applies to their parents, and to all our ancestors, going back indefinitely. Thus any affirmation of the present moment points far beyond the present -- and it is a significant psychological corollary, on which Nietzsche frequently insists, that those who are dissatisfied with themselves usually project their dissatisfaction upon the world.⁴²

We have accepted the responsibility of rejecting *nihilism*. We are faced with the world *as it is*, and we must adopt a self-affirming attitude merely to survive in the environment in which we find ourselves. Thus, the imposition of the self is not so much a philosophical doctrine as it is a psychological, and definitely an epistemological, approach and attitude. It is this affirmation which becomes a cornerstone in Nietzsche's quest to have men rise above the mediocrity which marks the traditional human condition. Schacht points this out vividly.

From *Zarathustra* onward, he repeatedly recurs to the idea of such an "affirmation," and takes it to be of the utmost importance. It marks the point of his transcendence of nihilism; and, in conjunction with his comprehension of the 'total character' of existence that is thus affirmed, it yields the ultimate standard of value he identifies and proceeds to employ.⁴³

In an educational sense, *amor fati* contributes to an understanding of an

epistemology based upon a kind of self-gravity. This is beneficial to the pedagogue in his understanding of the perceptions and perspectives of the individual learners. As such, a pedagogy must take into account a concept of affirmation for the learner, as well as the pedagogue. Danto remarks on this, although his allusions are not directly associated with epistemology or education. Still, his observation is applicable.

For it leads to what it has led to and always will. What we do either has intrinsic meaning or it has none. It is we who give value together with significance. This we must accept if there is to be meaning to our life (for we could not change it if we wished to): we must affirm ourselves in our fate.⁴⁴

The affirmation of the self in its individual fate provides a basis of approach for the pedagogue, for it rejects a life of regretting, of resenting, of *nihilism*. As such, it promotes a concept of undaunted discovery in the human condition -- a concept of affirmation in the task of apprehending the precepts of our world -- and even though Nietzsche calls us to go beyond this limit, we could not achieve such a reaching beyond without adopting the philosophy of *amor fati*.

2.04 Education Must Be Geared To the Development of the Whole Person

The culmination of the educational process Nietzsche would have us establish is the *higher state* of the human condition in the person of the *ubermensch*. Through love, the contest, and *amor fati* the pedagogue can create an environment which is not only conducive to such a culmination, but also is one which evolves an entirely different approach to the educative process -- one which produces the

creative, analytic being who can effect the revaluation of values and reject the *nihilism* of the herd. To do this, the pedagogist must concentrate on educating the individual learner as a *whole* being, not as another element in the perpetuation of the state.

His educational task would, it seemed to me, be to mould the whole man into a living solar and planetary system and to understand its higher laws of motion.⁴⁵

Just as he admonished us to understand that "your educators can be only your liberators,"⁴⁶ so he encourages us to educate the "whole" being. Education becomes, then, the process of liberation, and the liberated learner moves that much closer to the *higher state* of the human condition.

There is an obvious equation between the concept of wholeness and the concept of "culture." It is significant to note here that Graham Parkes in his excellent exposition of Nietzsche's psychological concepts makes the point of clarifying the uses of the terms "culture" and "education" by Nietzsche. Nietzsche uses the German word *Bildung* when he talks of education, especially in *On the Future of Our Educational Institutions*. Parkes points out the implications of the translation of this word, as we begin to understand what Nietzsche means when he applies both "education" and "culture" in his analyses of educational institutions and enterprises.

The German translation, *bilden*, has the advantage of connoting the image (*Bild*) as well as the process of formation--which makes it all the more appropriate a term in the context of *Bildung*, which means both "education" and "culture."⁴⁷

Culture, and hence education in this context, for Nietzsche is equivalent to

liberation, and logically leads to the development of the whole being.

Culture is liberation, the removal of all the weeds, rubble and vermin that want to attack the tender buds of the plant, an outstreaming of light and warmth, the gentle rustling of nocturnal rain, it is imitation and worship of nature where nature is in her motherly and merciful mood, it is the perfecting of nature when it deflects her cruel and merciless assaults and turns them to good, and when it draws a veil over the expressions of nature's step-motherly mood and her sad lack of understanding.⁴⁸

It is another response to Nietzsche's abhorrence of *nihilism*, for we cannot find ourselves within nature if we have antipathy and ignorance of it. This is overcome by educating the learner as a whole being in order to liberate him from the confines of a system which will not allow him to evolve as a whole being. Murphy notes that Nietzsche's vehement complaints of the educational system of his day were based upon the recognition that those institutions did not, in fact, educate with this in view.

When he turns to no-saying towards existing social institutions and academic practices, it is for their failure to integrate the products of philosophical activities of the academy into a harmoniously constructed whole aiming at the education of man as a whole and the possibility of the overman in particular.⁴⁹

Obviously, Nietzsche was dismayed with the social climate of his time, and more especially with the educational institutions which had become effective tools of the state. Their concern was with education as a means of preserving the *status quo*, of educating students with specific economic and professional placements in mind, and with promoting the idea that education was a means to achieving a financially secure end. To this Nietzsche was unalterably opposed.

Two seemingly antagonistic forces, equally deleterious in their actions and ultimately combining to produce their results, are at present ruling over

our educational institutions, although these were based originally upon very different principles. These forces are: a striving to achieve the greatest possible *extension of education* on the one hand, and a tendency to *minimise [sic] and to weaken it* on the other. The first-named would fain spread learning among the greatest possible number of people, the second would compel education to renounce its highest and most independent claims in order to subordinate itself to the service of the State.⁵⁰

The solution was the pedagogist who would educate with these higher principles in mind, would consider the learner as an independent being, and would integrate these two facts of the human condition into an approach which allowed the learner to become himself.

Again, the concept of wholeness is interwoven with the concept of culture, and culture in regard to education goes hand in hand with wholeness, as Sharp points out.

Nietzsche envisioned the cultured person as one who had not only integrated the objects of culture into his very personality and being, but somehow had come to view knowledge as a tool in helping him to grow and become whole.⁵¹

Culture becomes a vehicle for the appreciation of knowledge within the learner, who can then use it to become whole (i.e., to evolve to the *higher state* of the human condition.)

Culture for Nietzsche is a life long process of growing in knowledge and power manifest in action. Of its very essence it involves pain, suffering and the destruction that is involved with all creation. Man alone has the ability to overcome his nature and create himself whole. It is this creation of *wholeness* which justifies his very existence.⁵²

It is not surprising that a Nietzschean pedagogy would involve a kind of love, devotion to the contest, adherence to *amor fati*, and focus upon educating the whole person. It is implicit in all that Nietzsche writes, and its application is

appropriate today.

3.00 Nietzschean Epistemology As Background

In a broad context, I term education to be the organization and effective delivery of knowledge, as the apprehension of facts, information, feelings, and interpretations of the world in which we find ourselves. The study of epistemology is concerned with the manner in which we achieve this, and, as such, is inseparable from education. This is to say, in order to understand or to implement a system of teaching as pedagogy, we must understand the system behind the approach or strategy of apprehending, justifying, and imparting knowledge. In attempting to categorize a Nietzschean pedagogy, therefore, it is appropriate to make a brief excursion into his concept of epistemology. This will be a brief excursion, too, in that a detailed explanation of his entire epistemology would involve far more than the limits of this dissertation. Still, I believe it is imperative to offer a survey of his epistemology so that his pedagogy has some foundational bearing.

Inasmuch as knowledge has to do with concepts of truth, it is rather startling to find that Nietzsche tells us that there is no truth.

There are many kinds of eyes. Even the sphinx has eyes -- and consequently there are many kinds of "truths", and consequently there is no truth.⁵³

He binds truth to interpretation, which itself is bound to the interpreter. This concept is referred to as *perspectivism*, and it has significant implications for the

pedagogue. He reinforces this connection with the pronouncement that "Rational thought is interpretation according to a scheme that we cannot throw off,"⁵⁴ and further, that "Necessity is not a fact but an interpretation."⁵⁵ Such damning utterances with regard to a rudimentary element of pedagogy and education seems antithetical to all his works and concerns with education, but in the inimitable Nietzschean sense, they do, in fact, offer a more clear vision in attempts to isolate a pedagogy which is uniquely Nietzschean.

3.01 Knowledge is a Personal Interpretation of the Universe

In the complex system which is our world, Nietzsche creates an epistemology which is grounded in personal observation, personal interpretation, and personal meaning. It includes personal truths, falsifications, and the establishment of a body of facts which allow us to proceed intelligibly in that world. Arthur Danto explains this concept of knowledge quite simply.

What passes at any time for knowledge is but a confection of simplifications and falsifications, brought forth out of ourselves, by means of which we may house ourselves in the blank, indifferent universe.⁵⁶

This is the basis for Nietzsche's concept of perspectivism. It involves setting the boundaries for truth and, therefore, for knowledge. Truth becomes a function of the perceiver and is "the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live."⁵⁶ Yet even the "error" is a function of the perceiver and his perspectival interpretation. We can know the world, therefore, but only on our individual terms.

In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is *interpretable* otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.-- "Perspectivism."

It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm.⁵⁸

Justifiable belief is also a tenet of epistemology and of our individual knowledge of our world, but belief alone, even if it is justifiable, is not enough to establish truth, according to Nietzsche.

But that a belief, however necessary it may be for the preservation of a species, has nothing to do with truth, one knows from the fact that, e.g., we have to believe in time, space, and motion, without feeling compelled to grant them absolute reality.⁵⁹

Even a willingness of truth does not establish it, except for the individual perceiving it and applying it to his world. As such, truth and, therefore, knowledge become functions of the perceiver who creates them.

Will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable, an abolition of the false character of things, a reinterpretation of it into beings. "Truth" is therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered --but something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end--introducing truth, as a *processus in infinitum*, an active determining--not a becoming-conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined.⁶⁰

Knowledge of our individual worlds, then, presents a problem in organizing it with the intention of expressing that organization in an extended fashion.

This means, then, that the only world we can significantly speak of is the world from where we are. Consequently we cannot, save as an abstract possibility, speak significantly of another world, and certainly not of one that could be intelligible to us, given the conditions under which we have evolved this one.⁶¹

This is the essence of perspectival epistemology, that the individual gives

meaning and significance to the world which he perceives and in which he functions; thus, there is no truth, only interpretations of fact. In effect, we each create our own universes which are subject to our willingness to extend them in any fashion, be it to another "universe" or to another concept.

Danto sums up perspectivism better than any explication which I have researched.

The doctrine that there are no facts but only interpretations was termed *Perspectivism*. To be sure, we speak of seeing the same thing from different perspectives, and we might allow that there is no way to see the thing *save* through a perspective and, finally, that there is no one perspective which is privileged over any other. These would be logical features of the concept of perspective itself. The only difficulty here is in talking about the "same thing" on which these are distinct perspectives. Certainly we cannot say what *it* is except from one or another perspective, and we cannot speak about it as it is in itself. "We cannot establish a fact *an sich*," Nietzsche wrote in an unpublished note, "and it is perhaps nonsense [*ein Unsinn*] to wish to do so." We can meaningfully say nothing, then, about whatever it is on which these are perspectives. We cannot speak of a true perspective, but only of the perspective that prevails. Because we cannot appeal to any fact independently of its relation to the perspective it is meant to support, we can do little more than insist on our perspective, and try, if we can, to impose it on other people. Common sense constitutes one perspective among many. And it, no less than the others, seeks to impose itself where it can: it is the metaphysics of the masses or, as Nietzsche will say, of the *herd*.⁶²

The world each of us perceives, then, is a function of our interpretation of it and is trapped by the extended or limited dimensions of our individual abilities not only to perceive but also to *conceive*, as well. Nietzsche is very Heraclitean in the sense that the world is one of "flux" and of becoming, as opposed to static being. This is the difficulty in ascertaining a definitive, fixed concept of truth, and therefore knowledge. Thus, granting the world meaning through individual

interpretation gives, at least, direction in establishing an epistemology.

Richard Schacht has offered a more analytic interpretation of perspectivism which begins to give some structure to Nietzsche's perspectival epistemology. His analysis deals more with the concept of "truth" and its relationship to the rest of the world.

If truth is conceived as a correspondence of thought and being, therefore, or of a structurally articulated proposition to a comparably ordered state of affairs the features of which are fixed independently of the process through which it becomes an object of experience, there is and can be nothing of the kind. When Nietzsche asserts that "there is no truth," his point is that no propositions are or can be true in this sense.⁶³

The process, then, becomes the thing by which truth is granted, and it is always tied to perspectival interpretation. Each perspectival interpretation becomes a function of a kind of "language game" each interpreter plays in establishing his own universe, and the objects to which meaning is given are framed within that linguistic structure.

What counts as an object, a difference between objects, and a relation between them, is determined by the concepts and rules of particular schemes of this sort, and has no standing or meaning independently of them.

The "truth" of a given proposition thus is a matter of its conformity to the linguistic-conceptual scheme within which it functions, together with its appropriateness in relation to some state of affairs holding among the objects that are fixed and constituted in accordance with this scheme.⁶⁴

It is an accurate inference, then, that language, being a function of the perspectival interpretation itself, becomes that symbol manipulator which assists in organizing the individual universe and, further, that since the organizing capabilities within the interpreter presuppose a kind of individual order unique

to the interpreter, then the truth obtained is an obvious function of the interpreter. Even when we organize our universes according to 'error', we do so with the intention of structuring that universe into a schematic which has meaning for us.

Such propositions represent certain states of affairs as obtaining which do so only *for us*, and cannot be supposed to obtain independently of the "perspective" within which we happen to be operating. The terms in which such propositions are cast cannot appropriately be applied to the way the world is apart from our schematization of it; and so, however things may actually stand with the world, in relation to its nature such "truths" turn out to be "errors."⁶⁵

As confusing as it may seem, the point is that truth and knowledge are functions of the perceiver. The difficulty is in the manner perspectivism is presented by Nietzsche. It was for him a venture which was not really completed. His references to it are scattered throughout his works, but are a bit more unified in his posthumously published *The Will To Power*, a collection of his previously unpublished notes. Danto sums up this circumstance of Nietzsche's perspectivism and attributes it to the newness of the "invention."

Like many innovators, he was not quite sure of the theory he invented, or perhaps that he had even invented a new theory. So the reader finds odd dissonances in his writing, somewhat like architectural disharmonies in a transitional church, where the style being groped toward has not yet emerged, and the architect might not even be sure that he is groping toward a new style at all.⁶⁶

3.02 Pedagogy Must Promote the Development of Personal Meaning in Education

It would seem that such an epistemology would produce nothing but another kind of solipsism confined to the whims and preferences of the perceiver, but such is not the case for a Nietzschean pedagogy. Murphy aptly identifies the

link between a pedagogy and perspectivism in declaring that "since one's knowledge must be of an experiential quality, not an abstract theoretical kind, Nietzsche urged the student to his own education."⁶⁷ This would not be possible if Nietzsche did not hold inviolate the sanctity of an individual perspective of the universe, and in the creation of individual universes within each learner. It is the learner who gives meaning to that which is experienced and ultimately learned.

Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has imported to them: the finding is called science, the importing--art, religion, love, pride. Even if this should be a piece of childishness, one should carry on with both and be well disposed toward both--some should find; others--*we* others!--should import!⁶⁸

The manner in which each learner finds value and meaning, furthermore, is the fashion in which he interprets the world in creating his own universe.

The value of the world lies in our interpretation(--that other interpretations than merely human ones are perhaps somewhere possible--); that previous interpretations have been perspective valuations by virtue of which we can survive in life, i.e., in the will to power, for the growth of power; that every elevation of man brings with it the overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every strengthening and increase of power opens up new perspectives and means believing in new horizons.⁶⁹

The belief in "new horizons" is the hope of pedagogy and, as such, provides an important foundation upon which to base an approach to education. Significantly, these new horizons are ones which Nietzsche finds to be personal for the learner. Herein lies the distinguishing element of Nietzsche's epistemology for the purposes of pedagogy: the pedagogist must, of necessity, understand and appreciate the view--the *perspective*--of the individual learner. It is a world which is uniquely internal, personal, aggressive, and tentative all at the

same time, and which further is under constant siege from the world outside it. The wise pedagogist, therefore, takes the learner on the learner's terms and through his own *art* assists the learner in expanding and achieving these new horizons.

A final comment as to the pedagogic approach offered by Nietzsche in his perspectivism comes from Zarathustra's observations "On War and Warriors." While it initially may appear to be an exultation of the glories of war as war, it really is an allusion to the apprehension of knowledge. The "warriors" are seeking wisdom and knowledge, and, if they cannot be "saints" in this "war," they can at least be "warriors." It is an application of perspectivism as applied to an aggressive pursuit of wisdom and knowledge, and it gives a wider scope to the meaning of perspectivism.

And if you cannot be saints of knowledge, at least be its warriors. They are the companions and forerunners of such sainthood.

I see many soldiers: would that I saw many warriors! "Uniform" one calls what they wear: would that what it conceals were not uniform!

You should have eyes that always seek an enemy--*your* enemy. And some of you hate at first sight. Your enemy you shall seek, your war you shall wage--for your thoughts. And if your thought be vanquished, then your honesty should still find cause for triumph in that. You should love peace as a means to new wars--and the short peace more than the long. To you I do not recommend work but struggle. To you I do not recommend peace but victory. Let your work be a struggle. Let your peace be a victory! One can be silent and sit still only when one has bow and arrow: else one chatters and quarrels. Let your peace be your victory!⁷⁰

The warrior of knowledge finds that "peace" in the apprehension of self-knowledge and must constantly remain in a state of "war" in order to achieve the *higher state* of the human condition.

Specific application of this concept of perspectivism comes in Part the Fifth, Section 3.03, with the explication of *Corollary 3* which makes an analogy between education and the interpretation of Rorschach Ink Blots. It is a vital concept in the revaluation of contemporary education, and it has its pedagogical roots in Nietzsche's perspectival epistemology.

4.00 Applications of Nietzschean Pedagogy

The initial thrust of this dissertation is to identify Nietzsche's concepts of education, and it has been shown that he was concerned with education as the vehicle for the development of the *ubermensch* or the *higher state* of the human condition. Section 2.00 identified four elements of Nietzsche's educational philosophy: the love of the pedagogue, the necessity of the contest as *agon*, adherence to the philosophy of *amor fati*, and the development of the whole person. Corollary to this thrust is the application of those four elements into a viable pedagogy which is applicable for contemporary learners and for contemporary education.

This section will examine three applications of Nietzschean educational philosophy which develop a pedagogy. David Cooper's *Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy* was introduced in Part the Second, Section 3.03. Ann Margaret Sharp's "Education and Culture: A Nietzschean Perspective" offers the cultural background of Nietzsche's educational concerns. Her dissertation developed into a major article entitled "The Teacher as Liberator: A Nietzschean

View" and was discussed in Section 2.01. Timothy Murphy's dissertation *Teaching the Dance: Nietzsche as Educator* was discussed in Section 2.02. All three authors develop elements of Nietzsche's educational philosophy into cogent systems. At the very least, they identify those important aspects of Nietzsche's pedagogy which are applicable today. They add to the validity of those concepts presented in Section 2.00, and this is their significant contribution not only to the dissertation at hand but also to the identification and development of a legitimate pedagogy which can be rightly identified as *Nietzschean*.

4.01 Cooper Identifies Nietzsche's Pedagogy as Being Predicated on *Authenticity*

In *Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy*, Cooper examines the scope of Nietzsche's philosophy and sees a legitimate connection between its main tenets and his philosophy of education, for Nietzschean educational philosophy is interwoven throughout all his works. The concept of "authenticity", as Cooper sees it, is the basis for understanding what Nietzsche really means when he talks of education.

Authenticity is a quest for illumination--the true self must be allowed to shine through, and the attempts made to harmonize one's life with its dictates as a journey, through a jungle of distracting, false selves, towards the real one.⁷¹

The question for the pedagogue, then, is *how* this can be achieved, and in the final chapter of his book, Cooper offers four *foci*, as he calls them, from which a pedagogical base can be established. The four foci are *philosophical, linguistic, aesthetic, and genealogical*,⁷² and Cooper is quick to make the point that he does not

intend to structure a curriculum as such, but rather, to offer approaches for the pedagogist.

I do not have in mind a schooling in which an hour of Descartes is followed by an hour of English grammar, with the afternoon dedicated to drawing or pottery. These foci are not to be thought of as *subjects*: they are attitudes, emphases, tactics perhaps, which are to permeate what goes on in the school, its teaching and other activities too. Nor are they to be thought of as clearly distinct from one another: like the spotlights in a theater, they criss and cross, sometimes merging to illuminate a single area, then parting, and always in soft outlines.⁷³

In this sense they are *meta*-educational, much along the lines of the *Corollaries* offered in Part the Fifth, Section 3.00. They make a clear distinction, nevertheless, between what education has been doing, and what it must do in a Nietzschean construct.

When one thinks of "philosophical" in terms of education it often conjures images of one seriously contemplating the great questions of the human condition; however, Cooper has something else in mind when he presents this focus. It is a consideration of how the learner develops a position, a stance, a firm set of convictions from which he can operate in his world.

The understanding to be developed through education [should] be of a type that is firmly geared to the individual's self-conscious adoption of stances towards the significant situation which he confronts as a human being.⁷⁴

It is that kind of understanding which develops into meaning for the individual learner. Each of us is expected to take a stance on issues of political, economic, or social circumstances, and it is education which must provide us the opportunity to engage them on an even plane with others, as well as on a plane

with our true selves. It also must provide us with the foundation from which we can firmly affix those stances. Thus, a philosophical understanding through education allows of a variety of investigations which contribute to the development of those stances. It may be reading great literature, solving a mathematical proof, analyzing some work of art or music, or just spending time in reflection. The pedagogist must be cognitively versatile enough to promote an atmosphere in which the learner can develop a philosophical understanding--which, in the Nietzschean sense, is the first step toward the *higher state* of the human condition.

The focus of "linguistic" understanding is "not to be sharply distinguished from the 'philosophical' one,"⁷⁵ as Cooper points out. It is more a sense of what the language means in its use. It is not to be construed as a concept outside itself; that is to say, the linguistic nuances of a particular set of symbols do not automatically imply a given meaning to a thing or concept. Often we assign meanings, or "essences" as Cooper calls them, to linguistic constructs which can overwhelm the learner. This overwhelming sense can be averted only by a thorough understanding of the language in all its complexity. Nietzsche called for a deeper study of language by all students--of course, he was a philologist by profession. Still, the point is valid: without understanding the meanings of words in the totality of their linguistic contexts, an education becomes limited at best.

As Cooper sums up,

The general point is that serious reflection on one's beliefs and values can only begin when one ceases to assume that the words or concepts arising

in this reflection express essences, that there need be any interesting uniformity across time or space, in what is being said, denied, valued, or condemned with their help.⁷⁶

To understand the linguistic distinctions in a given set of symbols, even with their deceptions, is of vital importance in the formulation of cognitive appreciation and awareness, and Cooper makes the point well.

Cooper's third focus is "aesthetic," but again, his concept does not fit the normal definition. He calls for a kind of balance with this focus--the balance between one's perception and one's sensation, between one's analyticity and one's appreciation. Education does this in the form of what Cooper calls "the play;" some may call it recess, some may refer to it as the balance achieved in the dance, as does Murphy. In this sense, however, Cooper's concept of authenticity applicable to learning is achieved in a "microcosm."⁷⁷ It gives the learner an opportunity to participate in his universe with a well developed sense of balance between what one senses and what one perceives.

The final focus for Cooper is "genealogical." In this focus, he is concerned with the ability of the learner to examine the genesis of his values and beliefs.⁷⁸ Through this kind of understanding and education, the learner is capable of establishing a personal history, if you will, of the value system he has developed. From this examination, he will be able to defend, explain, and expand his situation in a more cognitive context. His position will be more solidly founded, and this genre of examination will also yield a stronger sense of the self. As such, it affords a platform from which the *higher state* of the human condition can be

achieved.

In all, Cooper's foci allow of a Nietzschean pedagogy in that they center on the development of values appealing beyond the herd mentality. These foci lay a good foundation for the *Corollaries* in Part the Fifth, Section 3.00, but more than that, they begin to explain Nietzsche's concern with education and its function in the human condition.

4.02 Sharp Analyzes the Educator as Liberator

I would be remiss if I were not to acknowledge Ann Margaret Sharp's dissertation, *The Teacher as Liberator: A Nietzschean View*, which gave rise to two articles having to do with the applications of Nietzsche's philosophy of education and which have been crucial in the development of this dissertation: "Education and Culture: A Nietzschean Perspective" and "The Teacher as Liberator: A Nietzschean View." Her observations significantly add to the spirit of this dissertation in that they isolate some of Nietzsche's educational concepts so that they can be formed into a meaningful pedagogy. Furthermore, they build upon what Cooper and Murphy have established. Her astute evaluations of Nietzsche's view of his nineteenth century Germany and their similarities to our twentieth century America were cited in Part the First, Section 2.00, and in Part the Second, Section 3.03, her assessments of the Nietzschean concept of culture were cited. The overall import of her work is that it presents an intriguing explication of Nietzsche's philosophy of education.

As an interesting aside, it might be added here that in researching this area of discovery in University Microfilm Dissertation Abstracts I was able to find only forty-six dissertations which have general application, and of those forty-six there were only a scant two which have direct bearing on this study--Sharp's and Timothy Murphy's *Teaching the Dance: Nietzsche as Educator*, which is expanded in the next section. It was, indeed, quite a revelation that this area of Nietzschean philosophy has received so little attention; thus, the work here may prove to be more significant than I had originally assumed.

It was Sharp's examination of the Nietzschean concept of love between the educator and the learner which occupied Section 2.01 of this Part. However, it is her treatment of Nietzsche's doctrine of the educator as liberator, alluded to in Section 2.04 of this Part, which is of major interest here. She expands on Nietzsche's pronouncement in "Schopenhauer as Educator" that "your educators can be only your liberators."⁷⁹ This liberation begins with the love which is established between the educator and the learner, but it becomes more clear as we view Sharp's assessment of the stages of the camel, the lion, and the child as are presented in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. These stages are the development of the spirit and entail the specific task of self over-coming.

Of three metamorphoses of the spirit I tell you: how the spirit becomes a camel, and the camel a lion and the lion finally a child.⁸⁰

Sharp's explication not only shows us what Nietzsche means with this metamorphosis, but also offers an in-depth analysis of the role the educator is to play at each stage in the process of this development. In her examination, we can

see a very succinct Nietzschean pedagogy.

It is first important to understand that "Nietzsche's philosophy of education is a dialectical process of moving from the stage of dependence to the stage of independence" and that "it requires the student's consistently engaging in self-overcoming."⁸¹ This process necessarily entails three distinct stages of education as overcoming, and a full appreciation of the difficult tasks it involves.

What is most difficult, O heroes, asks the spirit that would bear much, that I may take it upon myself and exult in my strength?

Or is it this: feeding on the acorns and grass of knowledge and, for the sake of truth, suffering hunger in one's soul?

Or is it this: stepping into filthy waters when they are the waters of truth, and not repulsing cold frogs and hot toads?

All these most difficult things the spirit that would bear much takes upon itself: like the camel that, burdened, speeds into the desert, thus the spirit speeds into its desert.⁸²

This is the stage of laying a foundation, if you will, upon which to build a corridor to self-overcoming and to self-discovery. No learner can master those skills of any venture until he has mastered the most rudimentary of its principles.

At this stage, the student begins the development of basic skills.

[The student] learns to develop skills in reading, writing, mathematics and rhetoric. It is characterized by the development of the right kind of habits that will be useful in solving experiential problems. It is during this time that the student also develops a reverence and respect for the great works of the past, not through dull and boring lectures but by virtue of his intimacy with his teacher.⁸²

An emphasis must be placed upon two pedagogical elements here: the position of the pedagogist and the importance of experiential learning. The pedagogist must realize his role as a perfect model for his learner, in addition to insisting that the learner participate in the process of learning on an individual and first-

hand level. This also implies that the basis is being laid for the creation of a better individual, as well as the creation of a better social structure--of not only self-overcoming, but also of overcoming the present social structure.

The task of the educator during this initial stage is to guide the student to an awareness of his capacity for critical thinking. Given the ability to think critically and to attain a knowledge of why things are, the student feels that man should cease being ashamed of himself and thus take upon himself the responsibility for creating a better community. Thus, by means of educators, the student could begin the process of self-liberation, which means ceasing to let one's life be some hapless accident and taking each moment seriously. It means developing the capacity for guiding and shaping one's future and in effect creating one-self.⁸³

It is at this stage of development, too, that the learner begins to understand the meaning of discipline and obedience. One could argue that Nietzschean pedagogy would stifle creativity with its heavy emphasis on "obedience," "discipline," and the like. In actuality, it is through this disciplining rigor that the learner comes to appreciate his creativity. Obedience implies a kind of self-discipline which enhances creativity. In this context, creativity was never meant to imply intellectual anarchy, nor a kind of loose-cannon approach to those creative urges each learner soon discovers within his soul. Thus, when Nietzsche speaks of "the hard school" which is designed to teach obedience, he is speaking of the self-overcoming of those elements of the spirit which would mislead and misdirect creativity. As such, obedience is a necessary element in the training and channeling of creativity. It can only be effectively released through self-overcoming, which can only emerge as a result of discipline and obedience. Yet, he is quick to point out that this is no easy task.

Everybody who is in earnest in this matter will have the same sort of experience as the recruit in the army who is compelled to learn walking after having walked almost all his life as a dilettante or empiricist. It is a hard time: one almost fears that the tendons are going to snap and one ceases to hope that the artificial and consciously acquired movements and positions of the feet will ever be carried out with ease and comfort. It is painful to see how awkwardly and heavily one foot is set before the other, and one dreads that one may not only be unable to learn the new way of walking, but that one will forget how to walk at all. Then it suddenly become[s] noticeable that a new habit and a second nature have been born of the practiced movements, and that the assurance and strength of the old manner of walking returns with a little more grace.⁸⁴

Perhaps this analogy is a bit laborious; however, it serves the purpose of pointing out how obedience and discipline are necessary in the process of self-overcoming, of learning. At the same time, it is a process which results in growth, and growth leads to the stage of the lion.

The stage of the lion is characterized by a further expansion of the learner's knowledge of his universe, but more, it is a continuation of the process of self-overcoming, which here yields an attitude of rejection, of negation, and of repudiation. It is a natural progression of the cognitive process, too, in that once the learner has been exposed to the fundamentals of self-discovery, he begins to question everything--even his pedagogist. Remembering the image of the spirit as camel speeding into the desert, at this stage we find the spirit alone in the desert evolving into a lion.

In the loneliest desert, however, the second metamorphosis occurs: here the spirit becomes a lion who would conquer his freedom and be master in his own desert. Here he seeks out his last master: he wants to fight him and his last god.⁸⁵

The spirit as a lion questions to the point of negation as a means to establishing

a firm base of knowledge, a sense of self, a sense of authenticity.

To the student in this stage anything is permitted which does not compromise his integrity. The intellectual conscience becomes the touchstone of the authenticity of his will to power. The student is beginning to view life as it is, together with the battle of the instincts, the contradiction of the senses, and the bold experimentation toward sublimation.⁸⁶

It is here that a sense of self-affirmation through a negation and through a confrontation with his pedagogist that the learner begins to deal with a sense of the synthesis of facts, knowledge, ideas, creativity, and ultimately with the critical analysis which accompanies self-overcoming. It is, at the same time, this profession of negation which is essential to freedom, and it functions as a prerequisite to creativity, and the quest to creating new values.⁸⁷ Without it, the reality the learner creates would have little validity, for it would still be tied to the interpretations of others. This negation eventually takes the form of confrontation with the pedagogist in a challenging posture--a repudiation of all for which the pedagogist has stood--in order to acquire a sense of synthesis of the universe which the learner is creating. Thus, the pedagogist must stand well affixed in his position during this stage, for the learner will realize to his own shock that *he* becomes responsible for his own fate, his own universe, his own pronouncements.

The educator must be there, strong, resolute, and acting with deep conviction, continuing to be himself--the model. This standing can reflect one's belief that, yes, the student has set out on his own, but he will be successful. Because the educator has gone through the same process himself and has attained the point where he could affirm and create, he not only realizes what is happening to the student but has faith that he will make it through this stage. He realizes that after his first dizziness

with negation the student will realize that he has negated all absolutes, all foundations, all ground, and will sense the horror of infinity. The educator knows it will be a painful process, and yet it is necessary.⁸⁸

The strength of the pedagogist in this stage will assist the learner in dealing with the "horror of infinity" and, thus, will lead to the final stage of the development of the spirit, that of the child.

In the stage of the child we see the affirmation to which Nietzsche views as essential in the efforts to reach the *higher state* of the human condition. The acceptance of *amor fati*, of embracing the struggle of life, and of saying "Yes!" to life are all achieved at the stage of the child, for the child is innocence.

The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred "Yes." For the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred "Yes" is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world.⁸⁹

The facing of infinity with all its complexities demands the acceptance of the nature of flux and of constant becoming within its concept. This can be a horrific realization if the learner does not embrace it with a feeling of openness, of willingness, of the stability of its changing composition. Only the child could joyfully employ such an approach, and this is the ultimate end of education--the creation of the individual in the *higher state* of the human condition who can be personally responsible and who can overcome not only himself but the mundane approaches of the herd.

The stage of the child is the aim and end of education. The child is Nietzsche's symbol of the overman...Nietzsche at times characterizes this stage as a stage of being which affirms the innocence of becoming. Devoid of resentment and revenge against the eternal flux of all becoming, the

child is totally affirmative, totally yea-saying and thus is capable of creativity.⁹⁰

This stage results in the freedom of the spirit, and the product of freedom is the discovery of true creativity. And it is here that the learner as a child becomes friends, colleagues with the pedagogist in the Nietzschean quest for the development of the *higher state* of the human condition.

They are both characterized by an affirmation toward all of existence and by a lack of revenge; they share a certain innocence, characterized by their acceptance of the constant flux of all becoming and their love of eternal recurrence. Because they can control their passions, they are not afraid of them. They love them and are able to use them in their work as creators of meaning. Out of fullness and joy they are capable of loving each other and working toward the creation of new values. They both share a certain quality of being which sets them apart from others. Their intense concentration on their own and each other's self-perfection flows into their every action, as does their gratitude for life itself. They give because they love and have something to give; they give because they are thankful. Somehow they are marked by a certain maturity.⁹¹

And so, the educator, the pedagogist becomes the liberator of the learner. He has brought the learner to the stage at which the learner can accept the universe as it is, see his place in it, and can begin to reevaluate its meaning. Perhaps Sharp best sums this up in the following excerpt.

Nietzsche's educational philosophy culminates in a picture of the free, powerful man who views existence as innocent. Master of himself, this man has become childlike again, full of wonder. He has mastered the art of self-overcoming and has learned to endure the pain of destruction in order to prepare for this self-creativity. He is constantly engaged in the process of integrating the antinomies of his nature into a unified whole; his instincts and passions are a very important part of him and manifest themselves in all of his actions.⁹²

The sense of wonder is still primal in the apprehension of knowledge, for wonderment is the beginning of all understanding, and for Nietzsche this is the

essence of self-overcoming--the attainment of that sense of innocent wonderment which allows one to see with a broader *Weltanschauung*, world-view. At the same time this development might be characterized as a journey from the sense of wonderment to the sense of appreciation. When the learner has apprehended his sense of wonderment, he develops a sense of appreciation. It is appreciation which allows him to participate in the essence of the object of appreciation so that the learner becomes a part of it, and it becomes a part of him. Understanding this journey from wonderment to appreciation indicates a crucial element in the evolution to the *higher state* of the human condition.

The control over one's passions is important in understanding self-overcoming for Nietzsche, and is vital in ascending to the *higher state* of the human condition. It is not so much a repression of passions as it is a sublimation of them, of directing them in a creative, integrated whole being who is at the same time a part of and beyond the pettiness of the world of the herd. A mark of this type of person in the *higher state* of the human condition is the ability to dance, and Timothy Murphy focuses on this concept.

4.03 Murphy's Teaching the Dance as a Model for Nietzschean Pedagogy

In his essay, "What the Germans Lack" in *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche names three components of a solid and comprehensive education: seeing, thinking, and, grouped together, speaking and writing.

The three tasks for which educators are required. One must learn to *see*, one must learn to *think*, one must learn to *speak* and *write*: the goal in all

three is a noble culture.⁹³

When he analyzes the importance of thinking he states, "That thinking wants to be learned like dancing, *as* a kind of dancing."⁹⁴ He further adds that dancing is to be part of a "noble education."

For one cannot subtract dancing in every form from a noble education--to be able to dance with one's feet, with concepts, with words: need I still add that one must be able to do it with the pen too--that one must learn to *write*?⁹⁵

It is this allusion to the dance which Nietzsche suggests throughout his works which is of significance in Timothy Murphy's dissertation, *Teaching the Dance: Nietzsche as Educator*. While this work does not suggest any specific pedagogical system which can be identified as Nietzschean, it does offer a groundwork and a *meta*-educational observation from which can be derived a Nietzschean pedagogy.

Murphy's analysis of the contest, the *agon*, has been presented in Section 2.02 of this Part, but it calls for education to embrace the concept of the contest as a constant struggle in the quest for education and knowledge. Without such a contest there would be little motivation to change, to understand, or to grow. The dance is a form of this contest, as *agon*. In the dance, all the elements of learning are present: perception, coordination, reflection, decision, and implementation. In effect, these elements represent the daily struggles of life in the human condition. It is the concept of the wholeness of an education, of a pedagogy which is embodied here, for clearly Nietzsche was concerned with teaching the philosophy of life.

For the symbol of dancing reflects Nietzsche's philosophical concern that human life be the subject ultimately of all activity, that the contest is the instrument of educational experiment, and that dance affords a symbol of the creative ethic which is the heart of his anthropological vision.⁹⁶

The dance, then, becomes a symbol for the integrated education of the whole person, the *ubermensch*, or the *higher state* of the human condition.

Murphy's call is for pedagogists to take this into account as they prepare an approach, a method for the delivery of knowledge. The approach must take into account the concept of wholeness.

The dance educates the whole human person. One cannot teach someone to dance by training only the arms, say, or the legs; one educates a dancer, not any of his/her constitutive elements. By holding the dance as the educational ideal, therefore, Nietzsche is proposing that culture as a whole should educate persons *in toto*. An education, properly speaking, trains, informs, and generates whole persons, not the kind of students [Nietzsche] saw emerging from the institutions of his day, students warped to the demands of scientism, technicism, or Statism...it is clear that Nietzsche thought that education should not develop merely some talents, but all those elements which compose both the margin and periphery of an individual. The dance quite adequately and beautifully symbolizes this concern; for a student of the dance cannot develop some part of his/her body to the exclusion of the others. Education must be thorough and of the whole person.⁹⁷

This call, then, gives the pedagogist the imperative to consider all the elements of the individual, the elements of the knowledge to be imparted, and the overview of an appeal to something which is beyond the traditional approaches to education.

Inasmuch as the goal of education in a Nietzschean construct is the development of the *higher state* of the human condition, which results in greater creativity and an ultimate revaluation of values, the image of the dance is most

appropriate to the enterprises of education and pedagogy. In it, we find the creative consolidation which for a Nietzschean pedagogy is fundamental and crucial. At the same time, it gives a clearer perspective to an individual's place in the scheme of nature, bringing him closer to nature, and, thus, to himself.

In short, dancing means to Nietzsche all the creative forms of existence that advance human power. All dances are not of equal value, of course, depending upon what values and meanings they embody. Nevertheless, as existence is a dance, so too is creativity. The dance is the playful struggle of man with meaning.⁹⁸

Through teaching the dance, we see the culmination of a pedagogy which embraces those elements of education leading to the development of the *higher state* of the human condition. All the grace, all the physical strength, all the cognitive decisions, all the applications of these facets of the human condition combine into one, unified, integrated action which is uniquely human: teaching the dance--a Nietzschean pedagogy.

5.00 Transitional Commentary

When we look at a Nietzschean pedagogy with its insistence upon personal excellence, personal responsibility, creativity, and critical thinking, we might make the misassumption that it is an esoteric exercise in which myopia looms larger than theory. Combined with the traditional prejudice which has been typical of approaches to Nietzsche's philosophical pronouncements this is not a surprising consequence; nevertheless, it is a *fallacia consequentis* of the most egregious genre. It can be seen from the research that Nietzsche's philosophy of education

permeated throughout the entire corpus of his work, that it was a preoccupation of his philosophy, for it was the vehicle from which the *ubermensch*, the *higher state* of the human condition, was to have emerged. Clearly the vehicle for the delivery of such a vital concept, of such an integral commodity for the enhancement of the human condition *had* to be one which would be consistent with the aims of the philosopher and the structure of the world he envisioned. As such, it is imperative that the importance of Nietzsche's philosophy of education not be minimized.

More important, however, is the fact that Nietzsche's educational and pedagogical precepts are much more than mere theory, more than mere symbolic manipulation of human ventures in a conceptual jaunt. This has been seen in the practical applications of Nietzsche's educational philosophy by such education theorists as Cooper, Sharp, Murphy, and, yes, even Montessori. Their work validates Nietzsche's philosophy in a general sense, but even more so, their work validates Nietzsche's philosophy of education in a very specific sense.

An extension of their observations and applications continues in the next Part where this dissertation presents seven *Corollaries for a Revaluation of Contemporary Education*. These *Corollaries* are a natural progression of Nietzsche's general concept of the *revaluation* of all values, the main task of the *ubermensch*, or that being who has achieved the *higher state* of the human condition. It is important, therefore, to examine Nietzsche's *revaluation* pronouncements as introduction to the *Corollaries*, for it is obvious that they lay the foundation upon

which the *Corollaries* stand. More significantly, perhaps, is that Nietzsche's concept of *reevaluation* presents an interesting alternative for our pedagogical enterprises in that they reaffirm a concept of education which will promote critical thinking, creativity, and individuality.

Endnotes: Part the Fourth

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4. Murphy, 29.
5. Murphy, 37.
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7. Friederich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage 1968), 980, p. 512.
8. Friederich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage 1989) 203, 117-118.
9. Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as Educator", 129.
10. Ibid., 131.
11. Ibid., 136.
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13. Ibid., 128.
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15. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 971, 509.
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17. Murphy, 2.
18. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. Walter

- Kaufmann, (New York: Viking Press 1966), 645-646.
19. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. F. J. Hollingdale, (Baltimore: Penguin, 1961), 137.
 20. Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as Educator", 163.
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 24. I Corinthians. 13:4-7. R. S. V, 1952.
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 37. Ibid., 129.
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42. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, (New York: Vintage 1968) 282.
43. Richard Schacht, *Nietzsche*, (New York: Routledge 1983) 397.
44. Danto, 212.
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49. Murphy, 5.
50. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Future of Our Educational Institutions, Homer and Classical Philology*, trans. J. M. Kennedy, vol.3, *The Complete Works*, ed. Dr. Oscar Levy. (Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1910), 12-13.
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53. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 540.
54. Ibid., 522.
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56. Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, 100.

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58. *Ibid.*, 481.
59. *Ibid.*, 487.
60. *Ibid.*, 552.
61. Danto, 78.
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63. Schacht, *Nietzsche*, 62.
64. *Ibid.*, 63.
65. *Ibid.*
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67. Murphy, 117.
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72. *Ibid.*, 133.
73. *Ibid.*
74. *Ibid.*
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76. *Ibid.*, 137.
77. *Ibid.*, 142.
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81. Sharp, "The Teacher as Liberator: A Nietzschean View", 399.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., 401.
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85. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 138.
86. Sharp, Op. cit., 409.
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90. Sharp, 413.
91. Sharp, 419.
92. Ibid., 415.
93. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 511.
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95. Ibid.
96. Murphy, *Teaching the Dance; Nietzsche as Educator*, 183.
97. Ibid., 186.
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Part the Fifth: The Revaluation

Education is not the filling of a pail, but the lighting of a fire.

--William Butler Yeats

1.00 Nietzsche's Concept of *Revaluation*

The term *revaluation* alluded to in Part the Third, Section 2.00, is of the genre which can conjure up all sorts of images, connotations, denotations, implications, and inferences, but, in the final analysis, its ominous echoes are not as apocalyptic as the imagination may envision. Still, the genesis of this concept of Nietzsche's was a very practical outcome of what he perceived to be the result of the *nihilism* which was prevalent in his nineteenth century Germany. His call for the "revaluation of all values" was a clarion trumpet to wake his contemporaries from a stupor which had given rise to a generation of mindless drifting, of paying tribute to institutions and practices which had taken the spirit of the human condition and had reduced it to the emptiness of negation. Creativity had become hollow, and critical thinking had become a redundant epithet to whatever powers had taken political or economic control.

The health of our civilization appeared to him severely threatened: it looked impressively good, but seemed to Nietzsche thoroughly undermined--a diagnosis which, though trite today, was perhaps no

mean feat in the eighteen-eighties.¹

With this as a backdrop, he sought the creation of a new breed of being who could see through the vapid morality of his time and could transcend not only himself, but all of humanity, to evolve an entirely different system of approach and behavior for the human condition--an approach and behavior which would be a *revaluation*.

1.01 Self-Examination for the Human Condition is Entailed in the *Revaluation*

To gain a better comprehension of this *revaluation*, we must turn to Kaufmann who clearly understood the concept as not a pouring of "new wine",² but rather, a rejection of those values which had brought about *nihilism*, negation, "no-saying".

In other words, the "revaluation" means a war against accepted valuations, not the creation of new ones.³

This becomes more lucid when we look at what Nietzsche reveals about the *revaluation* in *Ecce Homo*. In that text, he justifies and critiques his works in the chapter entitled "Why I Write Such Good Books". In the section having to do with *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche offers a more vivid motivation and explanation of this concept.

After the Yes-saying part of my task had been solved, the turn had come for the No-saying, *No-doing* part: the revaluation of our values so far, the great war -- conjuring up a day of decision. This included the slow search for those related to me, those who prompted by strength, would offer me their hands for *destroying*.⁴

The "great war" is the great task of self-overcoming, of emerging from the morass

of despair with the world as it is to the realization that the greatest of struggles are not external but are internal, and having once conquered, then engaging the world "out there", to transform it by the creation of values which are *re-valued*. In a lengthy excerpt from "Why I Am a Destiny" in *Ecce Homo*, this "war" becomes focused.

Revaluation of all values: that is my formula for an act of supreme self-examination on the part of humanity, become flesh and genius in me. It is my fate that I have to be the first *decent* human being; that I know myself to stand in opposition to the mendaciousness of millennia. --I was the first to *discover* the truth by being the first to experience lies as lies--smelling them out. --My genius is in my nostrils.

I contradict as has never been contradicted before and am nevertheless the opposite of a No-saying spirit. I am a bringer of glad tidings like no one before me; I know tasks of such elevation that any notion of them has been lacking so far; only beginning with me are there hopes again. For all that, I am necessarily also the man of calamity. For when truth enters into a fight with the lies of millennia, we shall have upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, a moving of mountains and valleys, the like of which has never been dreamed of. The concept of politics will have merged entirely with a war of spirits; all power structures of the old society will have been exploded--all of them are based on lies: there will be wars the like of which have never yet been seen on earth. It is only beginning with me that the earth knows *great politics*.⁵

This relates well to his concept of self-overcoming in the *higher state* of the human condition, as well as to the integration of human action with the human spirit in the human condition. The war is one of values, not necessarily of flesh and blood, although they may become the weapons and casualties in such a monumental conflict. Kaufmann reminds us again that

The "revaluation" is not a new value-legislation but a reversal of prevalent valuations--not from a new vantage point, nor arbitrary, but an *internal* criticism: the discovery of what Nietzsche variously refers to as "mendaciousness," "hypocrisy," and "dishonesty."⁶

It is a criticism based upon that which is already in place; that which will of its own weight cry for a redefinition, a restatement, a reaffirmation, a *revaluation*. It will not come about from the work of a lone philosopher--or pedagogist either, for that matter--but rather, will evolve and will be revealed when man reaches the *higher state* of the human condition.

The revaluation is not the accomplishment of the individual philosopher who enters the arena to tackle ancient valuations and to reverse them as a sport; rather, "the values we have had hitherto thus draw their final consequence" (*The Will to Power*, Preface 4); "the highest values devalue themselves" (*The Will to Power* 2). This Nietzsche can call the revaluation -- in the same note in which he defines it as "a courageous becoming conscious"--a "saying Yes to what has been attained" (*The Will to Power* 1007).⁷

The *revaluation* is the natural consequence of the existing value structure seeking its own balance, in a word. Once the no-sayers have saturated the structure, it will, of its own self-gravity, re-establish its initial mission.

In this vein, then, it is a "Yes-saying" to the human condition, to the world of which it is a part, and from which it emerged. It is not a destruction of the old value system, but rather a rediscovery of those values for which it was originally established--the hopeful attainment of the *higher state* of the human condition. Through the *revaluation*, man can again affirm life, but now on a plane of existence which is higher, more fruitful, more meaningful.

1.02 Revaluation for Education is in an Analysis of the Stage of the Lion

The manner in which this *revaluation* relates to a Nietzschean pedagogy can be seen when we return to the three stages of the development of the spirit found

in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, referred to by Sharp in her analysis and cited in Part the Fourth, Section 4.02. The second stage is that of the lion who has fled to the desert to seek the sense of self. The self is sought through conflict with all that the lion has hitherto held dear, even his former pedagogist; but "for ultimate victory he wants to fight the great dragon."⁸ This great dragon is a metaphor for all that can hold the lion back from achieving his sense of self, his sense of destiny, his embrace of *amor fati*.

Who is the great dragon whom the spirit will no longer call lord and god? "Thou shalt" is the name of the great dragon. But the spirit of the lion says, "I will." "Thou shalt" lies in his way, sparkling like gold, an animal covered with scales; and on every scale shines a golden "thou shalt."

Values, thousands of years old, shine on these scales; and thus speaks the mightiest of all dragons: "All value of all things shines on me. All value has long been created, and I am all created value. Verily, there shall be no more 'I will.'" Thus speaks the dragon."⁹

There must be a reason for this yearning, this longing in the lion to seek such a confrontation. It is not an arbitrary whim or a capricious, momentary preference which may happen to dance across the emotions of the lion. This confrontation has a more solid base, for it leads to a freedom through a *reevaluation* of all that the lion has come to know and to accept--and even the lion's pedagogist, his mentor stands in the way.

To create new values--that even the lion cannot do; but the creation of freedom for oneself for new creation--that is within the power of the lion. The creation of freedom for oneself and a sacred "No" even to duty--for that, my brothers, the lion is needed. To assume the right to new values--that is the most terrifying assumption for a reverent spirit that would bear much. Verily, to him it is preying, and a matter for a beast of prey. He once loved "thou shalt" as most sacred: now he must find illusion and caprice even in the most sacred, that freedom from his love

may become his prey; the lion is needed for such a prey.¹⁰

This is the burden which the developing spirit must assume and accept—freedom through a *revaluation* of all which the spirit as lion has accepted without examination.

In short, from the perspective of Nietzsche's philosophy of education, the *revaluation* is a necessary development in the human condition: it is the practical application of that development within the spirit to the universe and to its institutions, for it leads to the stage of the child in which a true *revaluation* can manifest itself. The child is perfect innocence, perfect affirmation, perfect "Yes-saying" to the universe in which he finds himself. The *revaluation*, then, becomes personified in the being of the child--the transcendence of all the "mendaciousness" of the herd, to the *higher state* of the human condition.

2.00 *Revaluation* for Education

The intent of this dissertation is the justification of a *revaluation* of those *meta*-educational principles which have resulted in the mediocre conditions we find in our schools and institutions today. Those conditions have been recited in Part the First, Section 2.00. In that Section, too, we saw the similarities between Nietzsche's nineteenth century Germany and our contemporary social and educational climate. The similarities are too obvious to deny, and, for this reason alone, the application of a Nietzschean pedagogy is justifiable. And yet, his philosophy of education seems so radically and diametrically opposed to the

educational philosophy which has permeated our schools in the past eight decades that its application warrants a defense.

Briefly, our American education system during the past eight decades has been heavily influenced by the work of John Dewey, that great American philosopher whose views amalgamated our principles of democracy and of pedagogy. Our praise of "equality" through democracy--even to our worshipping of it at the expense of individuality--has bred almost a contempt for the strong being, the *ubermensch*. Our praise of the "average Joe" has been deified, and the sacrificial lamb, so to speak, has been the attainment of the *higher state* of the human condition. In fact, the history of anti-intellectualism has run rampant throughout our history beginning with the characterization of such symbols of education as "Ichabod Crane" in "The Headless Horseman", and culminating in the naming of intelligent beings as "eggheads", "nerds", and "geeks". Owing to Dewey's belief that socialization takes place best in the schools we have relegated our schools to the position in which they have become less a beacon for our societal structure and more a mirror of it. Instead of being the nest for the creation of beings with creativity and critical thinking, they have become the incubators of mediocrity, celebrating this mediocrity as the *summum bonum* in our quest for "equality". Without delving into the distorted definition we have ascribed to it, "equality" was never meant to be total egalitarianism--but that excursion warrants yet another dissertation which would be voluminous.

There have been two locutions which have served America well in its

development as a world leader: First, is the celebration of that uniquely American being who is the "rugged individualist"--a concept which Nietzsche would accept and also celebrate; second, is the Biblical directive to "help thy neighbor", to "be thy brother's keeper". We have long survived the tension between these two locutions in all our ventures, be they social, political, economic, philosophical, or educational. Yet within the past eight decades our concentration upon helping our neighbor has put us in a position of great peril in our schools, particularly in the development of beings who are characteristically creative and critically analytic. This fact owes its heritage to Dewey's conceptions of the purpose of our educational institutions. Those conceptions are best summed up in the following excerpt.

Education, according to Dewey, is the process of imposing on the impulse of infants the society or the set of group habits into which the infants are born; it is the perpetuation of society. But it is also a good deal more. For since one of the habits to be imposed upon impulse is that of acting intelligently, education must also foster the reform of society toward an ever better condition. To perpetuate intelligence is to begin its use, and the schools are thus the basis for social progress.¹¹

Thus, while Dewey seems to imply that somehow "acting intelligently" will emerge from an institution which has become a hostage to its social whims, it is apparent that such an emergence is mythical at best, owing to the sad fact of its insistence upon the perpetuation of its own bureaucratic security. In short, Dewey's views of education have emphasized the perpetuation of the social order --"help thy neighbor"--at the expense of the development of intelligence through creativity and critical thinking--the "rugged individual", in Nietzsche's terms, the

ubermensch. This may seem an over-simplification, but its verification comes by merely visiting any one of our schools, particularly in our inner cities. It is also apparent when one looks at what has happened to some of our more prolific institutions of higher learning in the past three decades, such as City College of New York. In his book review of James Traub's *City On a Hill*, Dr. Morton Teicher chronicles the kind of tragic consequences which have taken place at that fine institution in one sentence: "An academic giant was reduced to a curative college, teaching the six R's: remedial reading, remedial writing and remedial arithmetic."¹²

Carrying on this observation would degenerate into an odious diatribe; suffice it to say that a Nietzschean pedagogy fits well into the concept of "rugged individualism," as well as fitting in with Dewey's concern for the perpetuation of intelligence. The question, then, becomes one of defining the purpose of intelligence. Nietzsche would insist on its utility in the development of the *higher state* of the human condition, whereas Dewey would claim it is to be used in the utility of defining and improving the social order. And although Nietzsche would want that social order to be improved, at the same time he wants it to develop *beyond* the present, static state -- developed only through the emergence of the *ubermensch*, the *higher state* of the human condition.

In the context of this dissertation, then, the *reevaluation* of contemporary education rests with the reordering of priorities within the educational structure extant today. For this reason, I have chosen to use the term *reevaluation--*

admittedly a Nietzschean derivative--in offering the seven *Corollaries for a Reevaluation of Contemporary Education*.

3.00 *Corollaries for Contemporary Education*

In proposing and devising these *Corollaries* I have worked with the view that Nietzsche's philosophy of education never implied a specific pedagogy, but rather that it runs throughout the entire corpus of his work. While the explanations and examination of the *Corollaries* does not make any specific references to Nietzsche's works, it is important to remember that they are principles derived from his educational philosophy, that his teachings and reflections are immersed in them. His pedagogy is directed toward the development of the *ubermensch*, to which I have applied the term *higher state* of the human condition. The task of the being who has achieved the *higher state* of the human condition is to develop his creativity and his critical thinking skills to bring about the evolution of a *reevaluation* of all values which will raise the level of the human condition. It is in this light that I have developed and presented these *Corollaries*. They are intended to make an offering of principles which are Nietzschean in spirit and in practice, and which, furthermore, present a viable consideration in our efforts to organize our educational system with the view toward enhancing critical thinking and creativity.

Part the Fourth offered a more succinct system, if we can call it such, for a Nietzschean pedagogy. Cooper's *foci*, Sharp's analysis of the three stages of the

camel, the lion, and the child, and Murphy's metaphor of teaching the dance all point toward applications of an assumed pedagogy which can be called Nietzschean. Still, the challenge remains to offer an approach which is *meta-educational* in that it transcends the "mendaciousness", to use Nietzsche's vilification, of the mediocrity of the herd. It goes beyond that which is extant. All of these considerations have been present in the evolution of the *Corollaries*, and again, while they may not make specific reference to them, their presence should be understood to be implied and integral in each of the *Corollaries*.

Nevertheless, without intimating a defensive posture, I should like to quote Nietzsche in preliminary response to those who might otherwise find these *Corollaries* pedantic and imperious. In his preface to *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche identifies those to whom and for whom that work was written. They are a select group who embody the essence of the being in the *higher state* of the human condition.

Well then! Such men alone are my readers, my right readers, my predestined readers: what matter the *rest*? The rest--that is merely mankind. One must be above mankind in strength, in *loftiness* of soul-- in contempt.¹³

I feel a certain identity with this quotation, for the *Corollaries* are, indeed, intended for a select group of those who would understand them in the first place, and who would have the courage to implement them in the second place.

Again, however, it is important to emphasize that these *Corollaries* are philosophical in nature, and *meta-educational* in their discipline and application. They are not intended to propose a lexicon of directive methods, but rather, are

to be the formation of a framework which takes into account an appeal to a higher ideal for the human condition--the *higher state* of being within each individual who dares to engage such a task. Thus it is now that we take the excursion into the *Corollaries for a Reevaluation of Contemporary Education*.

Corollary 1: *While the learner is to be the focus of education, the object of education is a quest of taking the learner beyond the confines of collective and individual mediocrity.*

The comprehensive nature of education must include a more expansive view of its obligations to the development of that individual who would have the strength and courage to use his creativity and critical thinking in concerted efforts to redirect values in the human condition. As such, it cannot ignore the learner as the *focus* of all its activities. This is in opposition to contemporary education which has taken the Deweyan conception of the socializing aspect of education and has used it in an effort to create a class of "equals"--the mediocrity of the herd, as Nietzsche would see it.

The basic question, then, has to do with the fundamental aims of education. Is it to develop free-thinking, creative beings who can use their education to improve the human condition, or is it to be the vehicle by which the state promotes and perpetuates a false sense of security by making certain that no one is more privileged than another? One is reminded of Kurt Vonnegut's short story, "Harrison Bergeron." In that mythical futuristic society, those who were talented were forced to wear garish implements which would limit their

physical and mental capabilities. Any hint of purported superiority would be dealt with swiftly and severely by "Diana Moon Glampers," the "Handicapper General." In such a world, the individual was a threat to the artificial balance of the society, and his talents were clearly not the focus of educational efforts.

The development of the talents of the individual would not promote the *status quo*. Thus, the focus was on the promotion of the social structure.

In a Nietzschean pedagogy, the learner is the *focus*; but this is not to imply that education is to be a "student-centered" enterprise. Such an approach denies the essence of knowledge which reaches beyond the individual to the realms of historical developments of epistemological discovery in the human condition. That *higher state* of the human condition is predicated upon the accumulation of knowledge precedent to the present learner, and could not be reached without the existence of such a history of knowledge. It is reached by the learner who recognizes that he is within the continuum of higher developments of which he is a consequent, but at the same time, to which he is obliged to augment and to enhance. While not *at* the center of education, the learner is the direct beneficiary of educational enterprises and is, therefore, its *focus*. His inheritance is the opportunity to add to this continuum of knowledge through the development of his own creativity and critical thinking. When the learner realizes this, he can begin to reach beyond the traditional values in an effort to redirect, to redefine, to *reevaluate* them for the enhancement of the human condition.

Corollary 2: *The educator is a guide for the attainment of the higher state of being in the learner.*

The Nietzschean pedagogist must have reached the *higher state* of the human condition prior to being an effective pedagogist in any sense. In this sense, the Deweyan observation that "those who cannot do, must teach" is clearly contradicted. Since the goal of education is to propel the learner to the *higher state* of the human condition pedagogy is, in fact, a *doing* activity. No guide can lead the way without having been there prior to guiding. My brother, Dr. Frank Ogden, is a highly acclaimed fly fisherman who has fished in the Ten Thousand Islands in the Florida Everglades for many years. At the same time, he has trained many fledgling fishermen to become guides. It was his initial explorations of that beautiful mangrove forest *by himself*, however, which created his expertise --he has *been* there. His discovery in this pursuit is not unlike that of the Nietzschean pedagogist in that it was self-discovery. This is analogous to that of the educator as a guide. It is in this context, then, that the educator is a guide. His self-discovery has been an exercise in self-overcoming, thus, he can anticipate those moments in the learners experience which are critical in the quest for self-overcoming.

In the process of being such a guide, the educator liberates the learner from his own apprehensions and fears, assists him in overcoming the self-conceived notions of inadequacy, and, finally, sees the learner as a colleague, a fellow revolutionary in the *revaluation* of the human condition. The educator recognizes that while the task of being a liberating guide is consistent, his approaches to each

learner must take into account the individual uniqueness each possesses. He may even be a *taunter* to the learner, but always he is conscious of the constructive nature of the pedagogical process.

One is reminded of a song made famous by the British blues singer, Joe Cocker, "You Can Leave Your Hat On." That song seductively entices his female companion to disrobe, even offering specific instruction in this venture. When there is nothing left to remove, she is told, "You can leave your hat on." The hat, in the final analysis, is the symbol of her pride, so that while she exposes the beauty of her form, thus becoming quite vulnerable, it is clear that her dignity, her pride, will not be removed. In the same fashion, the educator must disrobe the learner's layers of misconceived or ill-founded notions in an effort to reveal to the learner the beauty of his own being; but just as the hat stays on Joe Cocker's disrobing image, so the pride must stay with the learner. The act of intellectually disrobing, in this instance, leaves the learner vulnerable, but the pedagogue is there to make certain that it becomes a constructive exercise in the quest of self-overcoming--of moving on to the *higher state* of the human condition. Thus, while it is the task of the pedagogue to make the learner vulnerable, the individual pride of the learner must remain intact. The pedagogue, as guide, must expose the learner to his own weaknesses, his own vulnerability, in order to bring about self-overcoming, and on to the *higher state* of the human condition.

Corollary 3: *Education is analogous to a Rorschach Ink Blot interpretation.*

Nietzsche's perspectival epistemology lays the foundation for an educational experience which is subject to the interpretations of the learner, and this provides the basis for the analogy between education and the Rorschach Ink Blot interpretation. While the validity of the Rorschach interpretations may still be a subject for debate within the psychological community, its existence serves as an example of how education must be approached. Just as the interpretation of what the ink blot represents is solely within the realm of the observer, so education is subject to its interpretation by the learner. This is not meant to imply that education has no meaning outside that interpretation, but rather, that the experiences of education are totally within the cognitive construction of the learner.

As a consequence, different learners may apprehend the Pythagorean Theorem, for example, but their applications of it will be dependent upon their perspectival interpretations of its utility. The engineer will use it for solving problems in land surveys; the poet will use it as metaphor for a given symmetry in nature; and the philosopher will use it as an example of cognitive reasoning within the human condition. Just as the ink blot is there, so the Pythagorean Theorem is there, but the interpretation of its significance is subject to each of the learners' perspectives.

The import for the pedagogist here is that it is incumbent upon him to understand and to approach his entire enterprise with the view that while he may

be presenting meaningful material, the learner will apply it in a fashion which is commensurate with his own interpretation of it. To insure that this interpretation is consistent with what the pedagogist realizes will be of crucial significance to the learner, the pedagogist must approach it in a manner which allows the learner to achieve a self-realization of it. The ink blot is there, that cannot be denied, and the learner must see this. It is significant that it is there; but what is more, is that the pedagogist must allow the learner to see *more* in it--to see his own creativity and critical analysis in the ink blot. This is the analogous nature between education and the ink blot: both are existentially present, yet both are subject to the interpretations of the perceivers. Such an acknowledgement by the pedagogist opens the door to a more meaningful approach to the entire educational process.

Corollary 4: *Learning is an internal process; teaching is an external process.*

This corollary is a logical extension of *Corollary 3* and is presented more as an emphasis of the perspectival nature of learning, and hence, of education. This corollary obviously may not rank with the most profound of observations in the world of education, but it serves a most utilitarian purpose. That purpose is to remind us of the nature of pedagogy and its relationship to learning. The validity which the pedagogist gains in his pursuits is dependent upon his having arrived at the *higher level* of the human condition prior to his becoming a pedagogist. He can empathize and sympathize with the learner, and thus, his approaches have

more meaning for the learner. While he cannot allow the learner to achieve self-discovery, self-realization, self-overcoming in the same manner which he achieved it, the pedagogist can show the learner how he did it. The great task, then, is to help the learner find his own way--the discovery of his own creativity, the development of his own critical analysis.

I am reminded of the late Professor Roland Holroyd of LaSalle University who said that the task of the educator is to "salt" the horse so that when he is led to the water he will "want" to drink. Understanding the nature of the relationship between teaching and learning, and between the educator and the learner is pivotal for the success of education, and for the achievement of the pedagogist.

Corollary 5: Values are inherently interwoven into the fabric of education, but are socially motivated and, as such, are trapped.

The recognition that values are captives of the society from which and for which they emerge is fundamental in understanding the function of education. The recurring question of education being a beacon for or a mirror of the society which it serves gains impact here. If education is merely the cradle of socialization, then it is merely a mirror of society. If, on the other hand, it is to be the beacon, the guiding light, of the society then it must constantly agitate that society. This is just what Nietzsche had in mind. Values are extant only for the purposes of socialization. Even the Ten Commandments provide for a compatible social order. The task of education being the development of beings in the *higher state* of the human condition presents an obvious contradiction for the pedagogist.

While education must serve its society, it must still reach for the highest possible level of achievement within its constituents. It must constantly challenge those precepts which have become, for lack of a better word, "tradition." Now, perhaps tradition gives a society a definition of itself, but it is, at the same time, antithetical to the purposes of education. Witness the monumental destruction attendant with societies which have fiercely and blindly clung to tradition, for the sake of tradition, especially when those traditions have been fundamentally antagonistic toward higher values.

We know that what is popular is not always right, and what is right is not always popular. Education, in the form of the pedagogist, must be diligent in its efforts to bring out that level of creativity and critical thinking in its learners which will promote higher values--the *higher state* of the human condition. The tension which exists between the proper goal of education and the promotion of the society, as the state, is one which must weigh in favor of educational pursuits even to the destruction of antiquated values and mores. Change is the fundamental constant in the human condition, a fact to which both Nietzsche and Heraclitus have paid great respect. This corollary is intended to heighten that tension so that pedagogist realize its impact upon education. When the values of a society become destructive of the ends of achieving the *higher state* of the human condition they must be reevaluated, and perhaps, even rejected. This *reevaluation* will be the task of the pedagogist in dealing with the learner. And as a consequence, it is vital that the pedagogist fully understand the genesis of

societal value structures.

Corollary 6: *The structure of education must serve the development of the learner, not the preservation of the state. It must provide for a curriculum which fosters the development of creativity and critical thinking.*

Concomitant with *Corollary 5*, this corollary emphasizes the necessity of having an educational system which promotes the learner with creativity and critical thinking. There is nothing so dangerous to those in power as an individual who thinks clearly for himself beyond the confines of the state. This is not to say that the state must not or should not promote education, but that the ends of that promotion must result in the development of the *higher state* of the human condition. It is education as an institution which must keep in mind that it is the development of the learner which preserves it, and not the preservation of the state which promotes it. The real danger is that strong state control of education brings with it the tragic consequence that education becomes a tool of those in political power at any given time. Often, this means that censorship and propaganda become the ends of education, and creativity and critical thinking become the casualties. Thus, education must be independent from the state in terms of its ends and implementation, for without this independence, education can never develop the *higher state* of being in the individual learner.

Corollary 7: *Elitism does not imply privilege; it demands service.*

That a Nietzschean pedagogy produces a kind of elitism is a given. The consideration, then, is the ends to which that elitism is directed. Traditionally,

elitism smacks of the implications of privilege, of a class of beings who by virtue of their mere existence not only claim entitlement to but also expect exception and privilege. However, this is not that case with beings who have evolved to the *higher state* of the human condition. Nietzsche repeatedly speaks of the hardships entailed in pursuing the *higher state* of being, of the sacrifices necessary with self-overcoming, of the demands of such an ascetic life. This is not consistent with the traditional views of elitism. The application of an "imposed burden," presented in Part the Fourth, Section 2.00, analogous to the "chosen" status of the Hebrew nation serves as an example here. It is the application of service, not of privilege, to which this elitist class is subject. That service is the obligation to evolve beings to the *higher state* of the human condition—to the privilege of using their creativity and their powers of critical thinking in the development of an enhanced human condition. It is the obligation of education, and hence, of the pedagogue, to bring the human condition to this *higher state*, such that what now appears "elitist" will become, hopefully and ultimately, the norm.

4.00 Commentary on the *Corollaries*

The *Corollaries for a Reevaluation of Contemporary Education* evolved with the intention of providing a referential framework for a pedagogy which is uniquely and distinctly Nietzschean. Their application into a specific methodology is left for others to venture. As such, the offering of a succinct curriculum encompassing specific courses, let us say, in language, history, science,

mathematics, physical education, music, dance, art, and the like, would limit and inhibit the scope and intention of this inquiry. Thus, I have not sought to do so. This exercise is meant to offer a beacon for pedagogists and education authorities in an effort to move away from the stagnation which has plagued American education for the past half-century--away from a philosophy which has sacrificed creativity and critical thinking in favor of some egalitarian utopia which has produced an entire apologetic litany for a welfare state, for the preservation of mediocrity, for a system which is exhausted from the weight of its own excess of liberalism in the futile quest for a definition of equality. If these *Corollaries* can awaken the intellectual soul of contemporary education, we may begin to realize the benefits of an education which will legitimately bring our learners to the *higher state* of the human condition.

Nevertheless, an acceptable point of departure in structuring any kind of curriculum implied by the *Corollaries* based upon a Nietzschean pedagogy would be with the training of those who would be pedagogists. A broad-based preparation for them would have to include more philosophical studies, more psychology, more exercises in personal creativity, more understanding of universal principles provided in studying the classics, and more critical analysis of history. From that base, less administrative intrusion into the classroom would have to ensue, so that these pedagogists could be free to allow the creativity of the learner to surface. These steps would provide an excellent foundation for devising a system which develops the *higher state* of the human condition in every

learner, regardless of the discipline being pursued. It was with this in mind that the entire inquiry here was begun, and it is the hope that their structure will offer a rudimentary framework from which we can launch a knowledge delivery system as education based upon Nietzschean pedagogy.

5.00 Concluding Comment

As a concluding note, it has been the quest of this dissertation to bring into a single volume the various interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy of education, and to evolve a *meta*-educational pedagogy based upon these observations and interpretations. To that end, I believe it has been satisfactory. What is left yet to do elsewhere is to develop a more concise definition and representation of a Nietzschean pedagogist--perhaps an *ubermensch* as pedagogist. What is certain, nevertheless, is that change will prompt and demand his advent in the human condition.

The ubermensch as pedagogist: such a one would feel too much of the cosmos, and thus, be its citizen; see too far into its depths, and thus, be its philosopher; so that his Soul would quake, his Spirit heighten as he realizes the immensity of his own Being -- and from that moment on bear the burden.

– AGO

Endnotes: Part the Fifth

1. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (New York: Vintage, 1968), 109.
2. *Ibid.*, 110.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage, 1989), 310.
5. *Ibid.*, 326-327.
6. Kaufmann, 112.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Baltimore: Penguin, 1961), 138.
9. *Ibid.*, 138-139.
10. *Ibid.*, 139.
11. Kingsley Price, "History of Philosophy of Education" in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1967 ed. 241.
12. Morton I. Teicher, "City College is Subject of Book", *Jewish Journal*, 16 March 1995.
13. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Viking Press, 196), 569.

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