The Role of the Superintendent of Schools in the Process of Collective Negotiations as Perceived by Local Bargaining Agents, Boards of Education and Superintendents in Selected School Districts of New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania

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THE ROLE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS IN THE
PROCESS OF COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AS PERCEIVED
BY LOCAL BARGAINING AGENTS, BOARDS OF EDUCATION
AND SUPERINTENDENTS IN SELECTED SCHOOL
DISTRICTS OF NEW JERSEY AND
EASTERN PENNSYLVANIA

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A relatively new and important responsibility has been added to the tasks of the public school superintendent. This is the phenomenon of negotiations or collective action which has been gaining increasing importance. "While collective action is not new to the scene of public education in the United States, it has nonetheless advanced with such force in recent years that it cannot be dismissed as 'just another fad.'"¹ Dramatic evidence in the amount of negotiations literature that has been published in the past ten years and is still being published indicates that change is and will continue to be the order of the day in relationships between public school teachers, boards of education and superintendents. The process of negotiations is definitely not a fad! Through their organizations in local school districts, teachers, who are seeking recognition and more powerful roles in policy formulation and administrative decision making, are using negotiations to reach their goal.

During the past several years more and more teachers across the United States have come to believe that positive group action is necessary in dealing with boards of education as a means of securing economic and other benefits.

¹W. Frederick Staub, "The Editor's Postscripts," Theory Into Practice, 9 (May, 1965), 79.
This positive group action which has led to more powerful teacher's organizations threatens one of the traditional concepts of public school management -- that school boards make policy, superintendents administer policy, and teachers teach. "The truth is that school boards sometimes administer policy, superintendents sometimes make policy, and one or the other often intrude themselves into the teaching process."  

Writing in the *Teachers College Journal*, Charles Perry reiterates what many writers in the field of public-school negotiations reported earlier as to why teachers have become so militant and why they are demanding a voice in policy and salary formulation. Perry identifies the following forces that have led to teacher militancy:

First, employment at all levels of government is increasing both absolutely and relatively. Public employees are a major organizational frontier for activity in this area. It is quite possible that existing collective bargaining relationships in the public services may have provided favorable examples for school teachers. Certainly the presidential executive order (President John F. Kennedy's Executive Order 10988 issued January 20, 1962) which

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2 Allan M. West, "What's Bugging Teachers?" The Education Digest, XXXI (February, 1966), 32.

extended certain collective bargaining rights to federal employees must have had an impact on the attitudes of teachers toward collective action.

Second, the interest of the trade union movement in the organization of white collar workers is increasing as a reflection of a stability in total union membership produced by shrinking blue-collar employment in the economy. In this respect, the support in personnel and funds given by the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO to the organizing efforts of the AFT is no simple philanthropic gesture. The assumption underlying such aid is the successful union organization of a relatively high status professional group, such as teachers, may well serve to undermine the traditional reluctance of white collar groups generally to affiliate with the trade union movement.

Third, the problems and pressures of the large city school system seem to have reached crisis proportions and have proven to be susceptible to conventional solutions. The big city teacher is surrounded by highly organized and powerful groups, including unions of city employees who in many cases enjoy full collective bargaining rights under comprehensive city labor relations programs such as exist in New York City, Detroit and Philadelphia.

Fourth, the changing composition of the teaching work force may have had, and will certainly have in the future, an impact on the attractiveness of organization if the experience of union organizers among white collar
groups in industry is at all relevant. The increasing percentage of men in the field and the drop in turnover rates imply a greater teacher career commitment, which in turn would seem to imply greater unwillingness to live with a sense of dissatisfaction and powerlessness. Traditionally, women and short service workers have been the hardest for unions to organize, and it is this segment of the teaching force which is diminishing. 

According to Blanke, today's teachers, who are better educated than those of any other era, are objecting to what they call paternalism on the part of administration and to being participants in only those parts in the program delegated to them by the administration. They believe that with professionalism come rights as well as responsibilities, and they are demanding the right to be partners in policy determination.

The initial and primary thrust by teacher groups, subsequent to the passage of state statutes permitting collective negotiations, was in the area of salary benefits. As the economic status of teachers has improved to a more "acceptable" level, teacher organizations have enlarged the scope of demands to include welfare benefits and conditions of work. Expanding the latitude of what were considered negotiable items, teacher groups treaked for the first time

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4 Ibid., pp. 103-105.

into the arena of traditional board and administrative prerogatives. Notable shifts in power relationships between boards, administrators and teachers resulted in a state of misunderstanding and confusion. One of the immediate effects of negotiations was the polarization of boards and teachers into adversary factions. The two groups viewed the role of the school superintendent in the collective bargaining process with studied ambivalence. Areas that the superintendent previously had considered the inviolate domain of the school administrator were being tested at the bargaining table. Thus, with the omnipotent role of the school superintendent waning, the issue of an administrator's appropriate behavior, particularly in the sphere of collective negotiations, has become spuriously clouded.

Is the superintendent the leader of the staff? What is the superintendent's leadership role? Who will represent the board's interest? Has the decade since the passage of legislation legitimatizing collective negotiations for teachers provided the time for superintendents to develop a satisfying and discernible role behavior in the collective bargaining process? These are only some of the questions that can be raised as the superintendent's role in collective negotiations is examined.
Statement of the Problem

In a period a little more than a century the school superintendency has gone through several evolutionary cycles. The first of these depicted the superintendent as a school master who needed very little specialized training. He was required to be slightly more knowledgeable in subject matter than the meagerly educated teachers whom he supervised.

We next see the superintendent portrayed as an educator who usually had more formal education than average for the times. He was considered to have broad vision and was committed deeply to the importance of public education.

Then came the concept of the superintendent as a scientific manager. He turned to the business and industrial world for insights and procedures which might be adapted to the operation of a school system. In realizing that business management did not adequately transfer to the educational world, and that he needed to have knowledge in school finance, school law, and personnel management, the superintendent then became a technician whose training consisted of detailed courses in school administration.

More recently the superintendent has been considered the professional school administrator who should have breadth and depth of knowledge, supplemented by many technical skills, deep convictions and a sense of mission to be performed through the institution of public education. No narrow preparation can suffice. The professional superin-
tendent needs, demands, and must have preparation that is truly professional.6

What is the role of the school superintendent in the negotiating process? Traditionally the superintendent's role has been that of executive officer of the board of education and professional leader and spokesman for the certificated teaching staff. Since the rise of teacher militancy and teacher demands to share in salary determination and policy formulation, however, some questions concerning the superintendent's traditional role have been raised. A review of the literature of teacher - board of education - superintendent negotiations, has led to the identification of five possible roles for the superintendent in the negotiating process.

The NEA takes the position that the superintendent should play a dual role in the negotiating process; that is, he should be the executive officer of the board and professional leader of the teachers. The authors of Guidelines for Professional Negotiation, the principal organ for the NEA on negotiations, state that:

The superintendent of schools should seek ways to bring the local association and the school board together so that they can develop a professional negotiating agreement. In assuming his responsibilities as the executive officer of the board and as a member of the profession, he recognized that

shared responsibility in policy determination is a professional concept. He can be of great assistance by helping the board to recognize that the achievement of educational goals requires this joint approach.\textsuperscript{7}

The American Association of School Administrators (AASA) concurs with the NEA that the superintendent serves in a dual role as executive officer of the board of education and leader of the professional staff. In this dual position, the superintendent in actual negotiations would be a resource person to both groups. Because of the stress from NEA, this dual role concept has received considerable space in the literature.

A second concept of what the role of the superintendent should be in the negotiating process is that of a single or managerial one. The advocates of this single or managerial role maintain that the superintendent can function in the negotiating process only as the executive officer of the board of education. The AFT has long maintained that superintendents serve managerial roles. "The American Federation of Teachers...thinks of the superintendent as a management person who serves his employers, namely, the board."\textsuperscript{8} This position is also expressed by Lieberman and Moskow when they speak of the superintend-

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\textsuperscript{8} Harry A. Becker, "The Role of the School Administrator in Professional Negotiations," \textit{American School Board Journal}, 150 (May, 1965), 20.
ent's role: "...they are the chief representatives or executive agent of the board...why, then, should there be any question that the superintendent is the representative of the school board in collective negotiations?" 9

The superintendent of schools at Oak Park, Illinois, Lester B. Ball, is one of the most staunch supporters of the third concept of the role of the superintendent in the negotiating process. Dr. Ball does not see a fixed role for the superintendent. He says:

Superintendents are political persons. They resolve differences, mediate between opposing forces, adjust structures to the teachers' need, community needs, to legal necessities, and try to find agreed-upon goals that they can all work for. They deal in the art of the possible. It means that the superintendent wants no fixed role in negotiations. He moves from problem to problem. 10

Ball sees, then, a pragmatic role for the superintendent in negotiations rather than a role of executive officer of the board and/or professional leader of the staff.

A fourth possibility for the role of the superintendent in the negotiating process is advocated by van Zwoll in his book, School Personnel Administration. James van Zwoll sees the superintendent as the leader and spokesman of the

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certificated teaching staff. His reasoning for this is that the superintendent was once a teacher and, therefore, is still part of the professional staff. van Zwoll sees the teacher as part of the executive branch of school operation. He says:

The two chief parties to possible collective agreement or joint action relative to school operation are the employer and the employee, i.e., the board of education on the one hand and the employed executive agents (all employees) on the other. In view of the essential unity of the executive group in the school situation, the role of the administrator is logically that of chief advocate for his executive family in terms of the needs voiced by its members.11

The superintendent in this concept of the role in negotiation would be the chief spokesman for the teachers in joint discussion with the board of education.

The fifth concept of the role for the superintendent in the negotiating process is that he is neutral and that he has no role. This concept of the role is prevalent in Canadian public school negotiations. Kratzman, an official of the Alberto Teachers' Association, sees this no role concept as a real possibility for American school superintendents in the near future. He says:

As the process becomes organized and experts or functionaries develop on each side of the bargaining table, as they have in Alberta, the superintendent plays a negligible role.

I predict that the United States school board associations will expand their operation to encompass

such functionaries who will be more and more influenced by state associations as they meet their counterparts among teacher groups. The superintendent will be forced to give up most of the trump cards in the salary game. 12

Thus, a review of the literature reveals five different concepts of the role of the superintendent in the negotiating process: (1) The dual role, which sees the superintendent as spokesman for the board and for the teachers in his capacity as executive officer of the board and professional leader of the certificated staff. (2) The single or managerial role, which sees the superintendent exclusively as the executive officer of the board of education and definitely not as a spokesman for the teachers' organization. (3) The non-fixed or pragmatic role that would not assign a definite role to the superintendent. The pragmatic position would have him survey the situation and act as the needs arise. (4) The concept of the superintendent in a single role of leader of the professional staff that holds that the superintendent was and still is a teacher and thus should represent them in negotiations with the board of education. (5) The concept that the superintendent plays no role in the negotiating process, as is the case in many of the collective negotiations in Canada. "It appears that the

real problem for the school administrator is that of role
definition."13 "On the sidelines, forced to wait for a clear
re-definition of his role, is the school superintendent."14

The State Legislatures of New Jersey and Pennsylvania passed resolutions and Statutes respectively, Chapter
(Pennsylvania) issuing permissive provisions for representa
tive teacher groups to confer, consult, and discuss economic
welfare matters with boards of education. Since that time
there has been much controversy concerning the role of the
superintendent of schools and the negotiations process.

This study determined similarities and/or differences in perceptions held by school board presidents,
school district superintendents and by teacher representa
tives concerning the role of the chief school administra
tive officer in the negotiations process.

Answers to the following questions were obtained:
1. What are the attitudes of the selected board presi
dents, school district superintendents and teacher
representatives concerning the superintendent's role
in policy formation?
2. What are the attitudes of the respondents concerning

13 Donald Duncanson, "School Board-Staff Relations,"
Teachers College Journal, 37 (December, 1965), 101.
14 Frank Lutz and J. J. Azzarelli, The Struggle for
Power in Education (New York: The Center for Applied Re
the superintendent's role in carrying out board policies.

3. How do the respondents perceive the superintendent's role in teacher negotiations?

4. Do the respondents believe that the superintendent's representative role changes depending upon the items being negotiated?

**Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this study was to compare the attitudes and opinions of school board presidents, school district superintendents and teacher representatives in New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania concerning teacher negotiations as allowed by New Jersey and Pennsylvania law. The study determined whether school board presidents, school district superintendents and teacher representatives perceived the role of the superintendent in teacher negotiations differently.

The justification for this investigation is obvious when the response from the study population is considered. A total of 79.6 per cent of the New Jersey and Pennsylvania superintendents polled responded to the survey instrument indicating the great interest superintendents have in teacher negotiations and the timeliness of the study topic.

The attitudes and opinions of these individuals in the field should be valuable to superintendents who are currently involved or who soon will be involved in negotia-
tions. Hopefully, the results of the study will be particularly meaningful to superintendents who soon will be faced with this phenomenon or are in the embryonic stages of teacher-board of education-superintendent negotiations.

Limitations

This study was conducted within the following limits:

1. The total population for the study constituted 250 school districts having legally certified teacher bargaining units in New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania. School districts were arbitrarily stratified into five categories in order that the final sample would contain school districts representative of the categories. School districts were divided into five types: Central City, City, Suburban, Industrial Town, and Rural. The two-hundred fifty school districts chosen for participation were randomly selected from the total number of districts within each size category.

2. The individuals participating in the study were school board presidents, school districts superintendents and the president of the elected teacher representative group during the school year 1971-72 in each of the school districts described above.
Research Questions

The following research questions were postulated for the study:

1. Has the school superintendent's role changed as a result of the collective negotiations movement?
2. Is there verifiable evidence of a role pattern for the superintendent?
3. Is there one right or proper role for the superintendent which would exclude every other role?
4. Are role expectations of superintendents more similar to those held by board members than to those held by teacher representatives?

Research Technique

The instrument used in this study was a questionnaire constructed by Ronald Benjamin Trenholm15 and revised by the writer to evoke responses from the entire population. The questions related to the role of the superintendent of schools in teacher negotiations with boards of education. The questionnaire method was chosen because of the great distance between the researcher and the respondents, and the opportunity it afforded to collect reactions from a

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number of persons in a relatively short period of time. The instrument is included in Appendix B.

The final form of the questionnaire was printed and mailed to the sample group of board presidents, district superintendents and local association presidents. In order to secure frank and willing responses, all respondents were assured that individuals participating in the study would not be identified in any way. The respondents were asked to return the completed questionnaire to the researcher in the self-addressed and stamped envelope provided them.

After the return of the questionnaire and subsequent verification of return, the mailing list was reviewed. A second cover letter and questionnaire was mailed to those who did not respond to the first inquiry.

Responses to the questionnaire were coded and punched onto computer cards for analysis through the use of computer programs. Relative frequency tables were prepared containing numerical and percentage responses by the three major categories of respondents: school board presidents; school district superintendents and teacher representatives. These three groups were compared by response to each question.

Findings have been presented in written and tabular form with general conclusions and recommendations for further study noted. This information is presented in Chapters IV and V.
Definition of Terms

1. **Superintendent** - The chief executive officer of a school district; the administrator who reports to the board of education.16

2. **Teacher's Organization** - The recognized negotiation agent for teachers in the school district. The organization may be made up of teachers, specialists and administrators or any combination thereof provided that it includes a majority of teachers and is the recognized negotiating unit for teachers.

3. **Professional Negotiations** - have been defined as a set of procedures, both written and oral, that have been officially adopted by the local teacher's organizations and school boards which provide an orderly method to negotiate on matters of mutual concern and to reach agreement on those matters.

4. **Board of Education** - The controlling body, typically chosen locally in accordance with constitutional or statutory provision, acting in the interest of the local district represented and within statutory and constitutional boundaries existing in the state in which the board resides.

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5. **Statutes** - refers to laws as enacted by the state legislature.

6. **School District** - The school district is an agent of the State for the purpose of fulfilling the State's function in education. The school district has only those rights and responsibilities that the State Legislature has delegated to it. The State Legislature, limited by constitutional prohibitions, may pattern and control education in any manner that it desires.

7. **Role** - Behavior patterns of functions expected of or carried out by an individual in a given societal context.  

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CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH AND LITERATURE

A review of periodicals, books and unpublished dissertations pointed up a considerable volume of writing on professional negotiations. Although the broad field of professional negotiations has received considerable attention from researchers, the specific role of the superintendent of schools in such negotiations is given only perfunctory attention in most publications. A brief summary of some of the most significant work done on the problem will be given in this chapter.

Origin and Development of Professional Negotiations

The concept of negotiation or bargaining between teachers' organizations and boards of education is a very recent development on the educational scene. The first mention of this idea occurred in the national union growth of the latter thirties by the American Federation of Teachers. However, the idea was not accepted then but rather provided background thought for the teacher unrest that was about to break out in the forties.

Two significant changes were developing within the teaching profession which were to be a driving force in

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the developing struggle for power. One was the changing male-female composition of the profession, especially at the secondary level. From a low of fourteen percent male public school teachers in 1920, the number of men in teaching grew to over twenty percent before 1950 and to over thirty percent in 1964. The influx of men into the profession caused a greater concern with welfare and personnel matters on the part of teachers because men carry family financial responsibility.

Moreover, the profession was changing radically in its educational and professional preparation for the task at hand. "In 1940 only nine states required a bachelor's degree for the initial elementary teacher's certificate. By 1955, thirty-one states required it."\(^2\) This increase was paralleled by a steady but less marked increase in the average amount of academic preparation of all teachers.\(^3\)

It was also during the period from the late thirties up to 1950 that the two national teachers' organizations were experiencing a rapid growth. After a long period of relatively stable membership, the N.E.A. experienced a short but rapid growth spurt during the twenties. This growth stabilized and during the forties the N.E.A. was adding about 45,000 teachers annually to its membership

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 134.

rolls. The American Federation of Teachers, on the other hand, after a period of decreasing membership during the twenties and early thirties doubled its membership from 1934 to 1944 and doubled again from 1944 to 1952. 4

These factors of growing teacher organizations, changes in teacher preparation and makeup, the advent of local salary schedules along with the national economic upsurge of the post World War II years brought into focus the dire financial plight of the teaching profession. In the absence of national teacher organization pressure, local teachers' organizations began to reflect their growing discontent and frustration with administrative and board policies. This inability of teachers' organizations and boards of education to settle local problems led to a series of work stoppages that reflected the scope of the problem.

The strikes of the late forties produced a few collective bargaining agreements although a formal contract was not the typical outcome of the work stoppages. Contracts, however, appeared in Butte, Montana; Bremerton, Washington; Cicero, Illinois; and Norwalk, Connecticut. The contract between the Norwalk Teachers' Association and the Norwalk, Connecticut Board of Education resulted from one of the aforementioned work stoppages. The contract agreement covered such areas as salary schedule, leave of absorption,

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in-service credit evaluation and grievance procedure.

The Norwalk, Connecticut contract and its subsequent court ruling together with the Committee of Nine reports and final adoption by the State Board of Education in April 1957, paved the way for the first teacher-board contract that provided for all aspects of negotiations as they are known today,\(^5\) that is, recognition, negotiation procedures, and appeal from impasse. Stinnett, et.al., reported that:

In 1957, the Norwalk teachers negotiated an agreement that provided an appeals procedure in the form of mediation by the State Commissioner of Education. This is believed to be the first agreement, under what is now termed professional negotiation, providing appeal provisions.\(^6\)

However, from the initiating movement of the early fifties, a number of agreements were being formulated between teachers' organizations and boards but were mostly in the form of board minutes or unwritten policies rather than hard and fast written contracts.

In June, 1961, the representative assembly of the National Education Association, largest teachers' organization in the United States with membership exceeding 1,000,000, passed the following resolution defining the policy it believes should be followed in teacher-board relationships:


...That professional education associations should be accorded the right, through democratically selected representatives using appropriate professional channels, to participate in the determination of policies of common concern including salary and other conditions for professional service....The seeking of consensus and mutual agreement on a professional basis should preclude the arbitrary exercise of unilateral authority by boards of education and the use of the strike by teachers as a means of enforcing economic demands.7

Perhaps the most dramatic clash of major proportions between the two teacher organization (N.E.A. and A.F.T.) occurred in New York City in the fall of 1961. The conflict centered around the election among New York City teachers to select an agent to bargain with the board of education.8 The change in the teacher spirit and the increased competition forced both the N.E.A. and the A.F.T. to attempt to develop highly visible agreements as showcases for the benefits to be gained through affiliation with their respective organizations.9

In 1963 the representative assembly of the N.E.A. reiterated its position concerning professional negotiations and added this statement to the resolution:

Under no circumstances should the resolution of differences between professional associations and

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boards of education be sought through channels set up for handling industrial disputes. Industrial disputes conciliation machinery, which assumes a conflict of interest and diversity of purpose between persons and groups, is not appropriate to professional negotiation in public education. The N.E.A. calls upon its members and upon boards of education to seek state legislation and local board action which clearly and firmly establish these rights for the teaching profession.10

On August 3, 1963, the Pasadena, California, Board of Education formally adopted the first known professional negotiations agreement to be developed as a result of this resolution.11

The National School Boards Association supports, in 1972, a similar position with regard to professional negotiations. However, in 1963, its policy read, in part:

School boards, subject to the requirements of applicable law, shall refrain from compromise agreements based on negotiation or collective bargaining, and shall not resort to mediation or arbitration, nor yield to threats of reprisal on all matters affecting local public schools, including the welfare of all personnel. They shall also resist by all lawful means the enactment of laws which would compel them to surrender any part of their responsibility.12

Subsequently, the executive secretary of the Utah School Boards Association stated, "school boards must adopt negotiation and grievance machinery...failure to do so

would force the transfer of control to some other group."\(^{13}\)

On January 17, 1962, President John F. Kennedy signed into law Executive Order \#10988\(^{14}\) which provided federal employees the rights of organization, recognition, and negotiation with certain federal agencies in respect to wages and personnel policies. Although it did not directly affect teachers, it changed the long-standing government policy toward employee negotiations and set a negotiation pattern for millions of public employees. The effect of Executive Order \#10988 was to strengthen considerably the teacher position in the quest for negotiation rights and negotiation legislation. It emphasized the teachers' rights to organize, be recognized as bargaining groups, and negotiate with school boards while temporarily quelling the fears of encroachment on the public interest.

Up to the mid-sixties, legislation affecting teacher-board negotiations had been minimal, but the year 1965 proved to be a turning point. New Hampshire (1955), Alaska (1959), and Wisconsin (1962) were joined by eight other states\(^{15}\) by act of separate state legislatures during that year. The laws differed, however, in their applicability as well as their provisions. While Massachusetts,

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\(^{14}\) Federal Register 555. 1962.

\(^{15}\) Stinnett, Kleinmann and Ware, op. cit., pp. 180-185.
Michigan, and Wisconsin made provision for other public employees, the remaining eight applied to teachers only. In Alaska, California, Florida, and New Hampshire no mediation procedure was provided in cases of impasse. In Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin mediation was provided via the state labor channels and in Connecticut, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington mediation was provided via the state department of education.

In addition to legislation, the mid-sixties produced the first texts devoted exclusively to teacher negotiations. Steffenson's purpose was to describe the current status of teacher-board negotiation procedures and to indicate some potential trends. He described the three approaches to negotiation then being utilized as well as devoting a minor portion of the study to the role of the superintendent of schools. The roles described were (1) negotiator for the board of education, (Denver, Colorado);17 special negotiator for and advisor to the board of education, (Butte, Montana);18 and advisor to both teachers' organization and board of education, (Webster Groves, Missouri).19

17 Ibid., p. 45.
18 Ibid., p. 46-47.
19 Ibid., p. 46-47.
Stinnett, Kleinmann and Ware\textsuperscript{20} presented a handbook type text that touched on the history and present status of negotiation as well as defining the National Education Association position in detail. It also provided much information in the area of sample legislation, sample contracts, and current documents that pertained to or were directly applicable to teacher-board negotiation. A sample of this documentation is the Presidential Executive Order \#10988 which is reproduced in its entirety. Stinnett emphasized the superintendent's role of independent third party in negotiations between the teachers' organization and the board of education. "And above all, build a reputation as a man who sides not with the board or the teachers but with the good of the students."\textsuperscript{21}

Lieberman and Moscow's volume on teacher-board negotiation is comprehensive in coverage and attempts the same approach as Stinnett but from a more independent point of view. In addition to the plethora of detail concerning actual and sample contracts, legislation and documents, the text follows a path closer to the American Federation of Teachers' position on teacher negotiations but recommends a cooperation between the American Federation of Teachers and the National


\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., p. 156.
Educational Association for the future benefit of both.

The advocated role of the superintendent in negotiation is that of Executive Officer of the board of education. It is pointed out, however, that "the superintendent can sit back and not get hurt"\textsuperscript{22} in the role of advisor to both parties. Although it is pointed out that the superintendent's role in negotiation will be determined largely by the size of the school district, the authors contend that "the superintendent's role must be clearly defined and commonly understood."\textsuperscript{23}

Negotiations in many school districts call for the superintendent to act primarily as the representative of the school board. He is given power to make recommendations concerning some matters and to act on others. He serves merely as a consultant during negotiations procedures in some districts. In others, the superintendent does not participate in the bargaining at all.

Epstein feels there would be danger if the superintendent "served in negotiations as a neutral, unconcerned consultant or that he ever be kept out of the negotiations entirely."\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 377.

Story asserts that:

The superintendent should be the key figure in the negotiations. A partial list of his major responsibilities are: complete charge of the mechanics of negotiations, carrying out board's instructions in bargaining, supervising the functioning of the bargaining committee in framework of the board's instructions, and shaping the items in bargaining, including budget-making.25

In a survey of 247 school districts Donald K. Goe found that "the superintendent is an active part of the negotiations, regardless of the topic, in those districts reporting a collegial relationship." 26 Collegial relationships is defined as "the association of people within an organization in which decisions on certain matters are made jointly as co-equals."27

When the board of education and the school administration reflect natural community conservatism, as they often do, the collective action of teachers sometimes opposes that of the board of education and generates dissension between the two. There is no reason why the school board and the administration should be on one side of a local education issue and teachers on the other. Hipp suggests this solution,"...a table, surrounded by representatives of teachers, the board, and the superintendent, with each


27 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
striving to do his best to provide the finest education."

**The Role of the Superintendent**

Historically, through a process of evolution, legislative action, and delegated authority, superintendents have become the educational leaders of their communities and the chief executive officer of the school board. Superintendents have worked closely with the school staff, board and the community utilizing their professional training and experience. The board has naturally, and of necessity, looked to the superintendent for recommendations on policies and for rules and regulations to implement those policies. In addition, the superintendent has a leadership role with the staff and, above all else, a responsibility to provide a quality educational program for the student.

**Alteration of the Role of the Superintendent**

**By Negotiation**

Though it took 100 years for the position of the superintendent to develop, professional negotiations have altered the traditional role in less than a decade. Through negotiations, teachers and their organizations are obtaining a role in the formulation of major policies, especially those related to salaries and service conditions. "Whereas teachers traditionally were interested in protecting the

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decision-making autonomy of the administration and school boards from outside threats and influences, in the early 1960's teachers began to obtain some degree of control over the decision-making process."29

The superintendent's role has been fairly well defined in past years. The position was clarified enough that the superintendent could carry out his duties and responsibilities without experiencing serious role conflicts. According to Schooling, however:

"Today's administrator is like King Louis XVI of France, whom someone referred to as 'a fine man caught in a revolution.' His natural inclination is to resist the forces that alter a relationship that is familiar and comfortable. He is faced with the necessity of accommodating to pressures not clearly understood and at the same time of maintaining a relationship that permits him the obligations and responsibilities educational leadership imposes upon him.30"

Adolph Unruh is one of the same opinion, stating, "The increasing complexity of the problems and pressures impinging on education make his job more difficult and time consuming."31

Within the confusion caused by negotiations confrontations with teacher groups, boards of education and superintendents are faced with adapting to the changes in

traditional roles and relationships. The school superintendents' role, which is central to this study, faces serious difficulty in creating a definable role behavior for the superintendent relative to professional negotiations.

Work by Clark, Moore and Caldwell bears out the seeming inability to find a consensus, either from superintendents or from the various related professional organizations, on the role a superintendent is to play in collective bargaining. Thus, the superintendent's role is in transition. Connor, Executive Secretary of the American Association of School Administrators, prescribed as follows, the course of action that must be taken in order to give substance to a new role:

School administrators must reassess, and when appropriate, reshape and redesign their leadership role, using all the intelligence, insight and understanding which can be brought to bear.


The superintendent's future role, when it crystallizes, may be drawn from one of several possible postures. Lieberman, 36 Shils, 37 and Stinnett, 38 reviewed the positions of the national associations in regard to expectations held for the superintendent during the negotiation process. Shills and Whittier saw this problem as one caused by the conflicting attitudes and policies of the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers as well as by policies and beliefs of the National Association of School Boards and the American Association of School Administrators. 39

The National Education Association assigned to the superintendent a dual role which involved the superintendent as both a member of the school professional staff and the chief administrator of the board of education. The superintendent was seen as having a major responsibility to each of the parties engaged in the negotiations proceedings. 40 The superintendent's function was to act as impartial supplier

36 Myron Lieberman, op. cit., pp. 31-35.


38 Stinnett, Kleinmann and Ware, op. cit., Chapter V.


of data and information to the board and teachers alike. Role latitude, in this dual role, was given in terms of the superintendent's ability to motivate and stimulate the teacher and board to put forth the best effort possible in order to achieve agreements that were in the best interests of the school program.

The AASA saw the superintendent in a role similar to the aforementioned position of the NEA. No public stand was taken by the AASA to define the superintendent's role in collective bargaining until 1965. The terms of the AASA resolution regarding the superintendent's role appeared to support the NEA position; however, the wording of the resolution contained such ambiguous phrases as, "judicious statesmanship, professional insights, and primary commitment to improved educational services to pupils." Although this was a slight departure from the NEA's position, the superintendent was placed squarely in the middle owing allegiance to neither side.

The AFT was less inclined to be confused by deceptive or complex definitions of a role for the school superintendent. The AFT acknowledged that the superintendent was the chief executive of the board. This organization further

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41 Shils, op. cit., p. 21.
42 Stinnett, Kleinmann and Ware, op. cit., p. 105.
43 Ibid., p. 106.
44 Shils, op. cit., p. 147
characterized the superintendent as the leader of the opposition. The concern of critical observers was that, in addition, the AFT strongly supported by-passing the superintendent and dealing directly with the board of education.45 The superintendent had two paths open to him under the AFT philosophy. He could operate as the manager and "boss of the opposition" for the board or be cast aside and by-passed as a non-participant in the bargaining process.

The NASB viewed the superintendent as a "channel or interpreter." His task would still involve working with and between both parties. Teachers were expected to approach the school board through the superintendent. By-passing or attempting to circumvent official channels was frowned upon and the superintendent was seen, at least in part, as the board's agent.

As one observer noted, none of the foregoing roles are dynamic; "they will result in destroying the effectiveness of the superintendent with his own staff, with the community, and ultimately with the school board."46

Oram, discussed the "management function" at the bargaining table as viewed in the industrial context.

The decisions reached at the bargaining table concern every aspect of the management function from the financing of welfare benefits to the establishment of formulas for adapting wage structures to new machines and processes. Even more challenging is the

45 Shils, op. cit., p. 316.
46 Shils, op. cit., p. 30.
fact that today's collective bargaining decisions are inevitable of a long-range character, with consequences that extend far into the future. And the margin for error is uncomfortably small---competitive survival ten years hence may well depend upon a company's foresight in current negotiations.47

The material products of industry can hardly be compared with human products of education; however, certain aspects of the management function are applicable to both systems.

The superintendent of schools is the chief executive of the board of education and traditionally has been responsible for leadership of the total educational program. Collective bargaining has implications for administration that deeply involve the school superintendent. The success or failure of negotiation procedures may depend largely upon the role by the superintendent who is centrally involved in the process.48 Lutz and Azzarelli, defined the problem inherent in the role of the school superintendent as follows:

The superintendent has a major role in the interaction between the board and organized teachers. This role must not be one of deciding what the board should know on the one hand and the teachers on the other; nor should it be a messenger service, relaying information back and forth. There are those who advocate eliminating the position of superintendent from this interaction process. But how could such a


crucial part of the organization's activity be carried on without a person in the organization and who is highly trained and is in addition the chief executive officer? Such an omission cannot be defended, either by organizational theory or by previous history or practice in either professional organizations or union activity.49

The unique role of the superintendent is that he finds himself between the organized teacher group he once belonged to and the board of education who will not "unconditionally" accept him in the manager's role. He is forced to interact with both groups holding membership in neither. The administrative role he was trained for is no longer an acceptable one, and thus far, a clearly defined new role has not emerged.50

The superintendent's role can be described as pivotal to many groups, but the pivotal nature is most easily recognized in regard to board and teacher relationships. This triadic set of relationships is made more complex by the adversary nature of formalized negotiations. Evans illustrated this role dilemma as follows:

Role ambiguity and role conflict in collective negotiations are unique to public education. In the private sector of the American economy the negotiation process is viewed as a dyadic relationship between employees and employer. In public education, however, because of the historic factors the negotiations process is perceived as a triadic relationship involving the employees (teachers), employer (school


50 Schooling, op. cit., p. 34.
board), and the chief school officer. If it were not for the intervening historic factors which affect the role perceptions and expectations held for superintendents by teachers and school board members, as well as superintendents, one could apply the logical fit of the private sector dyadic relationship in which the superintendent as management would represent the employing school board.  

The role behavior of school superintendents is not based solely on the superintendent's perception of what the job entails. The school superintendent is the formally recognized chief executive. He is the most visible, the most vulnerable, and potentially the most influential member of the school organization. The superintendent when characterized as the most influential member of the school organization holds the key to the confusion that results when attempts are made to define role behavior in regard to collective negotiations. Conceptualizing a clear role portrayal of the superintendent is constrained by the knowledge that teachers may see him as a board tool, while the board may see him as a teacher who will do anything the teacher group asks. Both groups may question his motives when

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52 Ibid., pp. 10-12.
they deal with him during the stresses of collective negotiations.

Stinnett, Kleinmann and Ware saw three possible roles for the school superintendent in the negotiating process. The roles are characterized as managerial, dual and non-participant. The first role, that of managerial, is defined as a role function in behalf of the board of education. In this role the superintendent participates in negotiations as a representative of the board. He operates as the board's leader or "near leader" during the negotiation process. There is no doubt about the superintendent's role; it removes him from any collegial relationship with other members of the professional staff.

The second role classification is termed a dual role and is concerned with the superintendent's participation together with teachers and board. He is the third party to the negotiations. The dual role tends to be situational, serving both groups as the need arises. "What is best for the institution" serves as the guideline for this role.

The third role is described as a non-participating role. In this role the superintendent excludes himself or

55 Stinnett, Kleinmann, and Ware, op. cit., p. 113.
56 Ibid., p. 114.
57 Ibid., p. 115.
is excluded from the process. Minimum involvement whether by design or choice characterizes this role. The superintendent feels he cannot oppose teachers in certain matters and continue to function as their leader in others. Therefore, he avoids connecting himself in any way with the bargaining process.  

Each of these three roles can be identified with the positions taken by national associations. "Managerial" and "non-participant" are most easily associated with the two alternative paths for the superintendent suggested by the AFT philosophy. The "dual" role finds support in the philosophies of the NEA, AASA, and the NASB.

Charles R. Perry, a research associate at the Industrial Relations Center, University of Chicago, also sees three possible roles for the superintendent in the board of education-teacher-superintendent negotiations. The direct negotiations between the board of education and the teachers leave the superintendent with no role in the process. The tripartite negotiations, where the superintendent is called upon to act as a third force in the board of education-staff relationships, characterizes the superintendent's role as

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58 Lee O. Garber, "How to Free Superintendents from Negotiation Hazards," Nations Schools, XXXCVII (March, 1966), 139.

The third role discussed by Perry is one in which the superintendent or his staff does the major part in the negotiations. Perry concludes his discussion by saying, "Superintendents can and must adapt their roles to this new environmental force either by withdrawal or by negotiations."60

Alton W. Cowan, in an April, 1966, newsletter to Michigan school superintendents presents a slightly different slant on the possible roles of the superintendent in the negotiating process. Cowan, executive secretary for the Michigan Education Association, sees four models (roles) of administrative behavior and style in Michigan. Three of Cowan's models are similar to those outlined by Steffenson and Perry. Cowan's additional role for the superintendent is that of a spokesman for the instructional staff, a traditional paternalistic concept.

The third model involves the superintendent as spokesman for the instructional staff in bargaining for better wages, hours, terms and conditions of work. This is a traditional position in many districts. His involvement is usually as the wheeler and dealer and paternalistic representative of the first order. He is included in the educational family and perceives himself as its head. He is a leading constituent of the educational community.61

So far in this review, four role possibilities for the superintendent have been presented. Ball and Campbell,

60 Ibid., p. 107.
Cunningham and McPhee identify a fifth possible role for the superintendent in the negotiating process. These authors see the role as a political and a pragmatic role—one that is unfixed. Campbell, McPhee, and Cunningham spelled out the role of the superintendent as a political one—

....a major role of most superintendents must be that of arranging the environment so that the educational enterprise may remain vital.

....we are ascribing a political role to the superintendent, but it is a political role with educational underpinning. As long as education remains as decentralized as it is in the United States, we see no alternative.62

Then in a later discussion entitled "The Bargaining Role," these authors make this statement: "The role of the school superintendent will be affected sharply wherever direct negotiation with the board through a bargaining agent is instituted."63

Concurring with Campbell, et.al., Ball goes further to suggest an unfixed or pragmatic role for the superintendent. Ball says:

....Let's look at it (the role) in the light of new, and I call it the emerging role, of the superintendent of schools as a political person....They are political persons. They resolve differences, mediate between opposing forces, adjust structures to teachers' needs, community needs, to legal necessities, and try to find agreed upon goals that they can all work for. They deal in the art of the possible. It means that the superintendents want

62 Campbell, Cunningham, and McPhee, op. cit., p. 214.
63 Ibid., p. 281.
no fixed role in negotiation. He moves from group to group, from problem to problem. He assesses the common interests among the contenders. He performs an... 'advance arbitration' role. He packs his official punch with one and all and he uses his sparingly. He has power and prestige. He remains flexible as to where he stands and this is important to his success.64

Summary

Several major concepts are readily discernible from the literature reviewed. It is obvious that the role of the superintendent in collective negotiations is not clear, and the review of the literature offers a wide divergence of thought regarding what that role should be. The struggle between the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association for membership and dominance of education is clearly evident. The various role possibilities for public school superintendents were examined carefully in the literature and the research since this is the major emphasis for this study.

To summarize the review of the literature, a superintendent may play the following roles in a negotiating process:

1. The role of the superintendent in the negotiating process is a dual one. The superintendent is a resource person to both the teachers and the board

of education. The superintendent serves as the leader of the professional teaching staff and as the executive officer of the school board. In this dual role, the superintendent is often called a "middle man."

2. The role of the superintendent in the negotiating process is a single or managerial one representing the board of education. The superintendent is the executive officer of the board of education, which employed him, and he owes his allegiance to them. The superintendent represents the school board either by selecting their negotiator or by acting in this capacity himself.

3. The role of the school superintendent in the negotiating process is that of a professional staff leader, who always represents the organized teacher organization. He is the leader and accepted representative of the teacher organization to the board of education, and is their spokesman.

4. The role of the school superintendent in the negotiating process is not fixed; it is political or pragmatic. The superintendent has no fixed function in the negotiating process; rather, he simply acts as the needs arise. He acts pragmatically toward both the teachers and the board of education. Neither group can claim his particular allegiance in negotiations.
5. The superintendent plays no role in the negotiating process. The superintendent represents neither the teachers nor the board of education. He is neutral during the negotiations. The teacher organization and the school board each selects its own negotiator without seeking the advice of the superintendent.
CHAPTER III

RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

In designing this study, attention was given to the selection of the basic population, the development of the research instrument, the procedures for gathering the data, and the statistical analysis used in the interpretation of the data. These aspects of the study are described in the following sections of this chapter.

Population

The population with which this study is concerned was the 1971-1972 school board presidents, school district superintendents, and the teacher organization president from the elected representative negotiating group in the 250 selected school districts in New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania. Only school systems having a local bargaining unit recognized by the school board were eligible to be considered as participants in this study.

For this study five categories of school districts were established. Using information gathered from the United States Census, 1970, school districts were divided into five types: Central City, City, Suburban, Industrial Town, and Rural. A central city school population was defined as one having a population of 100,000 inhabitants or more living in the boundaries of the school district. A city school district was considered as one having over 50,000 but less
than 100,000 inhabitants. A suburban school district was considered as one being on the fringe area of a central city which incorporated a population of 20,000 but less than 50,000 inhabitants. The industrial town was defined as a geographical entity having from 3,000 but less than 20,000 inhabitants. A rural school district was classified as being within incorporated places with less than 3,000 inhabitants residing in the school district.

The survey was designed to render a stratified random sample of the school districts in the geographical location of New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania.

The population was representative of the entire State of New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania touching every geographic region and involving school districts with from 15 to over 12,800 on the professional staff. Only the very small districts (those with fewer than 10 certificated persons) were not included.

Seven hundred and fifty respondents were solicited, and out of that number 512 (67.7 percent) responded. Table I shows numbers and percentages of returns under the three major categories of Board Presidents, District Superintendents and Teacher Representatives.

The negotiations laws of New Jersey (Chapter 303) and Pennsylvania (Act 195) permit all certificated staff members who do not act in a supervisory capacity to be elected members of the representative negotiating committee. Therefore, some teacher representative participants were guidance
counselors, some were elementary teachers, and some were secondary teachers.

TABLE 1.-Summary of Respondent Returns from the Two Hundred and Fifty Participating School Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Number Solicited</th>
<th>Number Returned</th>
<th>Percent Returned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>71.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The population was made up predominantly of males rather than females. A total of one hundred thirty-four board presidents responded of whom one hundred twenty-three were male and eleven were females. Of the one hundred ninety-nine superintendents who responded, one hundred ninety-six were males and three were females. One hundred forty-six males and thirty-three females responded as teacher representatives.

**Instrumentation**

The basic instrument used in this study was a questionnaire originally constructed by Ronald Benjamin Trenholm¹

and revised by the writer. This instrument was used to evoke responses from the entire population. The questions generated demographic information regarding the respondents, the school district represented, and also related to the role of the superintendent of schools in teacher negotiations with boards of education. The questionnaire method was chosen because of the great distance between the writer and the respondents. Moreover, it afforded the opportunity to collect reactions from a large number of persons in a relatively short period of time. The instrument is included in Appendix B.

The instrument contained sixty-four questions on four pages. The first twelve gathered demographic data. Questions 13 through 16 dealt with the determination of school district policies relating directly to teacher welfare and questions 17 and 18 with those policies not relating directly to teacher welfare.

Questions 19 through 33, a randomized group, pertained to the adequacy of New Jersey's and Pennsylvania's negotiations laws, the superintendent's ability to act in a dual capacity, the necessity of special training for teachers and administrators in procedures of negotiations, and the role of teachers and administrators in policy formation.

The superintendent's representative role, and as an agent for supplying information and alternatives were reflected in Questions 34 through 47.

Item 48 dealt with administrators' organizational
affiliation, and items 49 and 50, the possibility of persons other than the superintendent serving as advisors in negotiations.

Questions 51 through 59 sought responses concerning the superintendent's representative role in situations affecting teachers' working conditions, whereas, questions 60 through 64 concerned the superintendent's representative role in considerations of a curricular nature.

An evaluation of the revised survey instrument was secured from the writer's advisor, who is Assistant Professor of Psychology at Trenton State College and Adjunct Professor of Walden University. The evaluation of the instrument involved minor changes of wording and the addition of questions pertaining to demographic variables. The instrument was judged to be amenable to computer analysis, both in coding and in format.

**Procedures for Gathering the Data**

Surveillance to insure accuracy was maintained throughout the gathering of data for the study. The decision was made to administer the instrument through mailing procedures. In December, 1971, a letter and the questionnaire were sent to two hundred and fifty board presidents, two hundred and fifty district superintendents and two hundred and fifty teacher association presidents. The letter briefly described the essence of the study and solicited their cooperation for the completion of the questionnaire. The
respondents were asked to return the questionnaire to the investigator in the self-addressed and stamped envelope provided them.

Daily records were maintained for returns. In late January, 1972, a revised letter and a questionnaire were sent to those who had not responded to the initial request. When the decision was made to analyze the data which had been generated onto IBM cards, a total of five hundred and twelve questionnaires had been returned. This number represented 67.7 percent of those sent to prospective respondents.

**Methods of Analysis**

Data for each item on the questionnaire were programmed and analyzed at the Rutgers University and Princeton University Computer Centers. They appear in table form in Chapter IV. The Princeton computer is an IBM 360/91 and the Rutgers Computer is an IBM 360/67. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (S.P.S.S.)\(^2\) was the computer program used to tabulate the data.

Relative frequency tables were prepared containing numerical and percentage responses by the three major categories of respondents: school board presidents, school district superintendents, and teacher organization presidents.

Participants in the study were asked to respond to

the questions in two different ways. For the first group of questions, following the demographic items, they were asked to respond either "YES", "yes", "no" or "NO". A response of "YES" indicated that the respondent was answering in an emphatically positive manner, and a response of "yes" indicated that he was answering in a somewhat positive manner. A response of "no" indicated a somewhat negative answer, while a response of "NO" indicated an emphatically negative response.

For the second group of questions there were five possible responses: "Teachers", "Board", "Both", "Neither", and "Not Negotiable". This group was concerned with whether the superintendent should represent the teachers, the board, both the teachers and the board, or neither.

All information from the questionnaire was keypunched on IBM cards for data analysis. For questions requiring degrees of positive and negative responses, a chi-square test of homogeneity for the three major groups with a .05 level of significance was used to determine statistically significant differences.

The data from the research consisted of frequencies in discrete categories; therefore, this nonparametric test was used. Parametric tests require that the data under analysis result from a measurement of a least interval scale strength.

Whenever statistical tests, parametric or nonparametric, are used, certain assumptions are made. Nonparametric statistical tests are hemmed in by fewer and less stringent assumptions than parametric tests. They are particularly free of assumptions about the characteristics or the form of the distributions of the populations of research samples.
Thus they are also called distribution-free tests. As Siegel puts it, 'A nonparametric statistical test is a test whose model does not specify conditions about the parameters of the population from which the sample was drawn.'

Ferguson states that the chi-square distribution is used in tests of significance and that the null hypothesis is assumed. This hypothesis states that no actual difference exists between the observed frequencies and the expected frequencies. He further explains that a value of chi-square is calculated and if this value is equal to or greater than the critical value required for significance at an accepted significance level for the appropriate degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis is rejected. If the hypothesis is rejected, it may be stated that the differences between the observed and expected frequencies are significant.

---


CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

The primary purpose of this study was to compare the attitudes and opinions of school board presidents, school district superintendents, and teacher organization presidents in selected school districts in New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania, concerning the role of the superintendent in the process of negotiations. This chapter is a presentation and analysis of the data based on the procedures outlined in Chapter III.

Determination of Teacher Welfare Policies

Questions 13, 14, 15, and 16 were concerned with who should determine school district policies relating directly to teacher welfare.

School board presidents, superintendents and teacher representatives agreed that school boards should not unilaterally determine policies pertaining to teacher welfare, as shown in Table 2. Teacher representatives, however, had more intense feelings than board presidents and superintendents, which is to say, they felt more strongly than board presidents and superintendents that boards should not make such policies unilaterally. The board presidents and superintendents agreed at a vastly higher rate than teacher representatives that the board should determine policies relating to teacher welfare. The difference in intensity
of feeling was statistically significant.

TABLE 2.1—Do You Think School District Policies Relating Directly to Teacher Welfare Should be Determined by the School Board Only?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 110.14
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 12.59

As might be expected from the above findings, the groups agreed that teachers, administrators and school boards should cooperate in formulating policy about teacher welfare, as indicated in Table 3. There is a significant difference in negative responses wherein the teacher representatives indicate that a cooperative effort is not warranted.

1 Tables 2-31 will display the full 3 X 4 matrix and include in the lower right a chi-square statistic based on collapsing adjacent yes categories and the adjacent no categories with adjusted critical values along with the appropriate degrees of freedom (df).
TABLE 3.-Do You Think School District Policies Relating Directly to Teacher Welfare Should be Determined by the School Board with Teachers and Administrators Assisting?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th></th>
<th>yes</th>
<th></th>
<th>no</th>
<th></th>
<th>NO</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 18.40  3 X 4
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59  3 X 2
df = 6

The superintendents and board presidents were twice as vehement as the teacher representatives that teachers and administrators should not unilaterally determine teacher welfare policies without board influence, as shown in Table 4. Conversely, the teacher representatives indicated a very strong positive feeling that administrators and teachers should cooperatively develop teacher welfare policy. Superintendents were more likely than board presidents to respond that unilateral policy determination by employees is acceptable. These differences between the groups were statistically significant.

Neither board presidents nor district superintendents
believed that teachers should determine welfare policies independently of both administrators and school boards. Table 5 indicates, however, that 25 percent of teacher representative respondents believe that teachers alone should determine welfare policies. The differences between teacher representatives and board presidents and school superintendents are statistically significant. The perceptions of the school superintendents and board presidents are congruent.

TABLE 4.-Do You Think School District Policies Relating Directly to Teacher Welfare Should be Determined by Teachers and Administrators?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 X 4  
Calculated chi-square = 108.61  
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59

3 X 2  
df=6

Non-Welfare Policy Determination

There was very little agreement between board presidents, school superintendents, and teacher representatives.
regarding school boards unilaterally determining policies not related to teacher welfare. Teacher representatives rejected emphatically this procedure in policy formulation, as shown in Table 6. School superintendents had no particularly strong feelings; that is, they were fairly evenly divided in their responses among the affirmative and negative choices. School board presidents were inclined to feel that school district policies not relating directly to teacher welfare should be determined by the school board only. The difference in intensity of feeling was statistically significant.

TABLE 5.-Do You Think School District Policies Relating Directly to Teacher Welfare Should be Determined by Teachers Only?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 135.01
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 12.59
df=6

Teacher representatives maintained consistency in their beliefs about boards making unilateral policy decisions
in matters relating to teacher welfare and matters not relating to teacher welfare. Board presidents and school superintendents had much more intense feelings that teachers should be allowed to share in policy determination concerning teacher welfare. Likewise, board presidents were quite consistent in their beliefs about boards making unilateral policy decisions in matters relating to teacher welfare and matters not relating to teacher welfare.

TABLE 6.-Do You Think School District Policies Not Relating Directly to Teacher Welfare Should be Determined by the School Board Only?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>N %</th>
<th>N %</th>
<th>N %</th>
<th>N %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[3 \times 4\] \[3 \times 2\]

Calculated \(\chi^2\) = 104.67 \[70.77\]

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59 \[5.99\]

\(df=6\) \[df=2\]

Table 7 does reveal an inconsistency by school superintendents. While 43.2 percent believed that policies not relating directly to teacher welfare should be determined by the school board only, 83.6 percent believed that policies
not relating directly to teacher welfare should be determined by the school board and administrators assisting. Teacher representatives had more intense feelings than board presidents that non-welfare policies should be formulated by school boards with administrators and teachers assisting. School superintendents and teacher representatives were more congruent in their responses, wherein 92 percent of teacher representatives and 83 percent of the superintendents who responded indicated that teachers and administrators should assist the school board in developing policies not related to teacher welfare. The difference in intensity of feeling was statistically significant.

TABLE 7.-Do You Think School District Policies Not Relating Directly to Teacher Welfare Should be Determined by the School Board with Teachers and Administrators Assisting?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square=

\[ 3 \times 4 \quad 3 \times 2 \]

\[ 39.15 \quad 30.61 \]

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level=

\[ 12.59 \quad 5.99 \]

\[ df=6 \quad df=2 \]
Adequacy of New Jersey and Pennsylvania Negotiations Laws

There is a statistical difference between the three groups responding to the adequacy of New Jersey and Pennsylvania negotiations Laws in maintaining the powers and duties of district school boards, as shown in Table 8.

TABLE 8.-Is (New Jersey's) (Pennsylvania's) Negotiations Law Adequate to Maintain the Powers and Duties of District School Boards Over Matters of Salaries and Economic Policies?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 39.16
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59

although the significant difference is not very large. Teacher representatives and school superintendents tend to agree more closely that the negotiations laws are adequate. There seems to be more congruency among the three groups in terms of moderate affirmation that the negotiations laws of New Jersey and Pennsylvania are adequate. Table 8 indicates,
however, that teacher representatives were more likely than board presidents to believe that negotiations laws in New Jersey and Pennsylvania are adequate to maintain the powers and duties of district school boards over matters of salaries and economic policies.

Table 9 shows that there is a significant difference

**TABLE 9.-Is (New Jersey's) (Pennsylvania's) Negotiations Law Adequate to Ensure Negotiations for Teachers?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 161.33
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59

between teacher representatives and the other two groups - school superintendents and board presidents in regards to New Jersey's and Pennsylvania's laws to ensure negotiations for teachers. Board presidents and superintendents agree very closely and emphatically that the negotiations laws in New Jersey and Pennsylvania are adequate to ensure
negotiations for teachers. Teacher representatives, on the other hand, are somewhat equally divided on the question - 43 percent responded yes, compared to 56.8 percent who responded no. Congruency of opinion is reflected in the moderately yes responses.

The Superintendent's Dual Role

Board presidents and teacher representatives agreed almost identically that it is not possible for the superintendent to represent both the interests of the teachers and the board when engaging in professional negotiations, as shown in Table 10. The responding superintendents also

### TABLE 10.-When Engaging in Negotiations, Is it Possible for the Superintendent to Represent Both the Interests of Teachers and the Board?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 15.06  4.63
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 12.59  5.99

\[
df=6 \quad df=2
\]
agreed to a high degree that this dual role is not possible. Superintendents were more inclined than the two other groups to believe that they can represent the interests of the teachers and the board. However, no significant difference between the groups could be established.

The three groups similarly believed that the superintendent cannot simultaneously perform both the functions of acting as agent for the board and as agent for the teachers, as shown in Table 11. Very close agreement is evident among the three groups of respondents. No statistically significant difference could be found.

There was close agreement between the three groups of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dist Superv</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Represent</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square=

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>3 X 4</th>
<th>3 X 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.79</td>
<td>4.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level=

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>df=6</th>
<th>df=2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.59</td>
<td>5.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was close agreement between the three groups of
respondents, Table 12, concerning the existence of a conflict

**TABLE 12.** When Engaging in Negotiations, is There a Conflict of Interest in the Dual Role of the Superintendent in Representing Both Teachers and the Board?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c}
\text{df} & 3 \times 4 & 3 \times 2 \\
\text{Calculated chi-square} & 27.65 & 6.98 \\
\text{Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level} & 12.59 & 5.99 \\
\text{df} & 6 & 2 \\
\end{array}
\]

of interest in the dual role of the superintendent in representing both teachers and the board when engaging in negotiations. All three groups believed that a conflict of interest does exist. Teacher representatives, however, had more intense feelings than board presidents and superintendents who reflected congruency in their feeling. All three groups remained consistent in their feelings with regard to the dual role of the superintendent, Tables 10, 11, and 12. Teacher representatives, board presidents and superintendents were quite emphatic in their belief that a conflict of interest does exist in the superintendent's dual role. The three
groups also believed that the superintendent cannot represent the interests of the teachers and the board and that the superintendent cannot act as agent for both parties simultaneously. A statistically significant difference was observed.

**Policy Formation**

School board presidents, district superintendents, and teacher representatives agreed to a very high degree that superintendents should play a significant role in school district policy formation, as shown in Table 13. Board

**TABLE 13.-Should the Local District Superintendent Play A Significant Role in School District Policy Formation?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square=

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>3 X 4</th>
<th>3 X 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86.35</td>
<td>24.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level=

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>df=6</th>
<th>df=2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.59</td>
<td>5.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

presidents and district superintendents had very intense
feelings in the affirmative. Teacher representatives, likewise, had strong affirmative feelings about the superintendent's role in school district policy formation; however, there was a substantial negative response which reflected a statistically significant difference.

In Table 14 a chi-square of 22.73 indicated a significant difference at the .05 level between teacher representatives and board presidents and district superintendents in regards to the question: Do superintendents presently play a significant role in school district policy formation? Board presidents and district superintendents responded in a strong affirmative. Teacher representatives likewise agreed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th></th>
<th>yes</th>
<th></th>
<th>no</th>
<th></th>
<th>NO</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 22.73

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59

\( df = 6 \quad df = 2 \)
that superintendents play a significant role in school
district policy formation; however, a significant number
of respondents indicated that the superintendent did not
play a significant role in school district policy formation.

The Teachers' Role in Policy Formation

School board presidents were nearly equally divided
on the question: Do you think teachers should share in over-
all district policy formation? A larger percentage of super-
intendents responded in the affirmative than board presi-
dents. Table 15 indicates that the difference in belief

TABLE 15.-Do You Think Teachers Should Share in Over-all
District Policy Formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 158.74
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59

\text{Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level} = 12.59
\text{df} = 6
\text{df} = 2
among the three groups of respondents was statistically significant.

District superintendents and board presidents responded that teachers presently play a significant role in district policy formation. Superintendents felt more keenly about this issue than board presidents. Among the teacher representatives, a larger percentage of respondents felt that the teachers do not play a significant role in district policy formation than those who responded in the affirmative. Table 16 indicates that the difference between the groups.

**TABLE 16.**—Do Teachers Presently Play a Significant Role in District Policy Formation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 39.46  
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59

was statistically significant.
Training For Teachers and Administrators

There was close agreement between district superintendents and teacher representatives regarding teachers obtaining special training in order to more effectively engage in policy formation. Board presidents shared a similar feeling; however, a substantial percent of the respondents felt that teachers should not obtain special training. Table 17 indicates that the groups differed significantly.

**TABLE 17.-Should Teachers Obtain Special Training in Order to More Effectively Engage in Policy Formation?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board President</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 30.98  26.70
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 12.59  5.99
df=6  df=2

Board presidents, district superintendents and teacher representatives agreed that the superintendent should obtain special training in order to more effectively engage
in negotiations. District superintendents felt very keenly that this special training is necessary. Teacher representatives did not respond in the affirmative as they did in regards to teachers obtaining special training. An inconsistency on the part of teacher representatives with respect to special training in order to more effectively engage in negotiations seems very evident. Although there is agreement on the part of each set of respondents, the difference between the groups was statistically significant, as shown in Table 18.

**TABLE 18.-Should the Local District Superintendent Obtain Special Training in Order to More Effectively Engage in Negotiations?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 34.14  3 x 4
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 12.59  3 x 2

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 5.99  df=6

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 2.71  df=2
Primary Duties of the Superintendent

Two groups, board presidents and district superintendents, agreed that the primary duty of the superintendent is not to act in the capacity of agent for the teachers in striving for policies necessary for the operation of the schools. Teacher representatives were nearly equally divided on this question. Board presidents felt more strongly than superintendents that this is not the primary responsibility of the superintendent. Table 19 indicates a statistically significant difference between the three groups.

School board presidents and district superintendents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 50.03
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59

3 X 4
3 X 2

df=6
df=2
responded identically in the affirmative that the primary duty of the superintendent was that of acting in the capacity of agent for the school board in carrying out board policies. These two groups were quite emphatic in their affirmative responses. Teacher representatives were divided on the question although a substantial percentage of the teacher representatives responded in the affirmative.

**TABLE 20.-Do You Consider the Primary Duty of the Superintendent as Acting in the Capacity of Agent for the School Board in Carrying Out Board Policies?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th></th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th></th>
<th>no</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 88.14  66.30
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 12.59  5.99
\( df=6 \)  \( df=2 \)

Table 20 shows that teacher representatives had considerably less intense feeling concerning this issue. The analysis indicated a statistically significant difference.
Should Boards Be Required to Negotiate?

Agreement existed between the three groups that the district school boards should be required to negotiate with teachers regarding salaries. Teacher representatives felt much more strongly concerning this issue, although board presidents and district superintendents responded in the affirmative at a very high rate, as shown in Table 21. Only five teacher representatives believed that boards should not be required to negotiate with teachers regarding salaries. The difference between groups was statistically significant.

Consistent with the responses in Table 21, the three
groups agreed in the matter of school boards being required to negotiate with teachers regarding working conditions, as shown in Table 22. Teacher representatives responded at the same rate to the questions in Table 21 and 22. Although a majority of the three groups believed that the boards should be required to negotiate with teachers regarding working conditions, teacher representatives felt much more strongly concerning the question. A substantial percentage of board presidents and district superintendents responded to the questions negatively. A statistically significant difference between groups was established.

TABLE 22.-In your Opinion, Should District School Boards be Required to Negotiate with Teachers Regarding Working Conditions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 235.14 53.17
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 12.59 5.99
df=6  df=2
The Superintendent's Representative Role

Board presidents and district superintendents agreed, that during collective negotiations, superintendents should not represent and be spokesman for the teachers and serve their interests. A majority of teacher representatives responded in like manner. There was a substantial number of affirmative responses by teacher representatives and superintendents. The difference between the groups was statistically significant, as shown in Table 23.

TABLE 23.-When Engaging in Collective Negotiations Should the District Superintendent Represent and be Spokesman For the Teachers and Serve Their Interests?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 41.10
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59

Board presidents and district superintendents were nearly equally divided on the question of whether the
superintendent should represent and be the spokesman for the board and serve its purpose, as shown in Table 24. Barely a

TABLE 24.-When Engaging in Collective Negotiations Should the District Superintendent Represent and be the Spokesman for the Board and Serve Its Interest?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 43.00  10.09
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 12.59  5.99
\( \text{df} = 6 \)  \( \text{df} = 2 \)

majority of board presidents and district superintendents believed that he should. Teacher representatives, to a much greater degree than the other two groups, believed that the superintendent should not represent and be spokesman for the board. A significant difference was computed.

The three groups agreed closely that the superintendent should not represent and be spokesman for both the teachers and the board in negotiations. These findings are very consistent with those reported in Table 10. The majority of the three groups believed that it is not possible
for the superintendent to represent both the interests of the teachers and the board; likewise, Table 25 shows that the

TABLE 25.—When Engaging in Collective Negotiations Should the District Superintendent Represent and be the Spokesman for Both the Teachers and the Board?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 15.03
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59

majority of the three responding groups do not feel that the superintendent should represent and be spokesman for both the teachers and the board. The groups did not differ significantly.

**Supplying of Information By the Superintendent**

District superintendents and board presidents agreed at a very high and similar rate, Table 26, that the superintendent should supply information to the board on his own initiative when involved in negotiations. Although a
majority of teacher representatives responded affirmatively, the intensity of negative responses was significantly different between the groups. Board presidents and district superintendents were more keen in their feelings that the superintendent should supply information to boards on his own initiative. Differences were significant.

TABLE 26.-When Engaging in Collective Negotiations Should the District Superintendent Supply Information to the Board on His Own Initiative?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendentes</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square=

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level=

A bare majority of the district superintendents and a majority of teacher representatives responded affirmatively that the superintendent should supply information to the teachers on his own initiative during collective negotiations. A large majority of board presidents, however, responded that superintendents should not supply information
to the teachers on his own initiative, as indicated in Table 27. A statistically significant difference was found.

**TABLE 27.-When Engaging in Collective Negotiations Should the District Superintendent Supply Information to the Teachers on His Own Initiative?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 37.16
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59

Both groups, superintendents and teacher representatives, similarly believed that the superintendent should supply information to both teachers and the board on his own initiative when engaging in collective negotiations. Board presidents, on the other hand, believed that the superintendent should not supply information to both teachers and the board, although substantial affirmative responses were made. A statistically significant difference was established, as shown in Table 28.
TABLE 28.-When Engaging in Collective Negotiations Should the District Superintendent Supply Information to Both Teachers and Board on His Own Initiative?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = $31.30$  
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = $12.59$  

Table 29 shows almost perfect agreement between the groups. The vast majority indicated that the administrator, when engaging in collective negotiations, should supply information to the board upon its request. The difference among the groups was not significant.

Teacher representatives, superintendents and board presidents agreed that the chief administrator should, while engaging in collective negotiations, supply information to the teachers upon their request, as indicated in Table 30. A significant difference in degree of belief was found, however, with teacher representatives being somewhat more emphatic in their affirmative responses than superintendents...
TABLE 29.-When Engaging in Collective Negotiations Should the District Superintendent Supply Information to the Board Upon Its Request?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 15.43
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59

TABLE 30.-When Engaging in Collective Negotiations Should the District Superintendent Supply Information to the Teachers Upon Their Request?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 82.93
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59
but considerably more emphatic in affirmative responses than board presidents.

Consistent with the findings reported in Tables 29 and 30, the groups agreed in the affirmative that the superintendent should supply information to both teachers and boards upon their request. Table 31 reveals the strong

**TABLE 31.—When Engaging in Collective Negotiations Should the District Superintendent Supply Information to Both Teachers and Board Upon Their Request?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES N</th>
<th>YES %</th>
<th>NO N</th>
<th>NO %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 62.54  \(3 \times 4\)  25.47 \(3 \times 2\)

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 12.59 \(df=6\)  5.99 \(df=2\)

attitude held by superintendents and teacher representatives. Board presidents did not reflect the strong affirmative feelings that the other two groups held in this matter. This difference between the groups was statistically significant.
Recommendations of Alternatives

There was considerable agreement between board presidents and district superintendents with regards to the superintendent recommending alternatives for the board to offer to teachers. This agreement was in the affirmative, as indicated in Table 32. Although there was general agreement on

TABLE 32.-When Engaging in Collective Negotiations Should the District Superintendent Recommend Alternatives for the Board to Offer to Teachers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 99.31 \]

\[ \text{Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level} = 12.59 \]

\[ \text{df} = 6 \]

\[ \text{Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level} = 5.99 \]

\[ \text{df} = 2 \]

this question by teacher representatives and the other two groups, considerable dissimilarity existed in degree of intensity between the teacher representatives and the board president-superintendent unity. This difference between groups was statistically significant.
There was general agreement between teacher representatives and district superintendents that chief school administrators, when engaging in collective negotiations, should recommend alternatives for the teacher to request of the board. This feeling was reflected by a majority of the teacher representatives and superintendents as shown in Table 33. A highly negative response was offered by board presidents, who did not believe that superintendents should recommend alternatives for the teachers to request of the board. A statistically significant difference was found.

Consistent with the findings reported in Table 33, a majority of superintendents and teacher representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th></th>
<th>yes</th>
<th></th>
<th>no</th>
<th></th>
<th>NO</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 31.15 28.73
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 12.59 5.99
df=6  df=2
believed that superintendents, during collective negotiations should recommend alternatives for both the teachers and the board. A majority of board presidents, however, believed that this duality of service should not materialize. Table 34 shows that a significant difference does exist.

**TABLE 34.-When Engaging In Collective Negotiations Should the District Superintendent Recommend Alternatives for Both the Teachers and the Board?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square=
3 X 4 3 X 2
33.94 23.45

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level=
df=6 df=2
12.59 5.99

between board presidents on the one hand and teacher representatives and superintendents on the other.

The Superintendent's Participation in Negotiations

There was considerable agreement among board presidents and superintendents that district superintendents
should not stay out of negotiations until an impasse is reached, as shown in Table 35. There was also agreement, although to a lesser degree, among teacher representatives that superintendents should not stay out of collective negotiations until an impasse is reached. Although close agreement was reached, there was sufficient dissimilarity in degree of response to establish a significant difference.

Similar to the findings reported in Table 35, board presidents and superintendents responded that superintendents should not stay completely out of negotiations between the board and the teachers. Superintendents had stronger negative feelings to the present question than they had in
responding to the question in Table 35. Teacher representatives had stronger affirmative responses to the present question, Table 36, than to the one in Table 35. The

TABLE 36.-Should the District Superintendent Stay Completely Out of Negotiations Between the Board and the Teachers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calculated chi-square=</td>
<td>45.69</td>
<td>28.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level=</td>
<td>12.59</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df=6</td>
<td>df=2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

difference between groups was statistically significant.

Professional Affiliation

School Board presidents and teacher representatives generally agreed that school administrators should continue to affiliate with the National Education Association through the American Association of School Administrators, as shown in Table 37. Superintendents, conversely, responded that they should not continue to affiliate with the National
Education Association. Although board presidents responded affirmatively, superintendents and board presidents were closer together in belief on this issue when compared to teacher representatives. A statistically significant difference was found.

**TABLE 37.**—Should School Administrators Continue to Affiliate With the National Education Association Through the American Association of School Administrators?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 76.09 52.49
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 12.59 5.99
df=6  df=2

Securing an Advisor for Negotiations

Two groups, superintendents and board presidents, agreed at a very similar rate that school boards should hire someone other than the superintendent - a person outside of education - to serve as advisor in negotiations. A substantial number of respondents representative of these groups
did feel that an "outside" advisor should not be hired for negotiations. A slim majority of teacher representatives indicated disapproval at hiring someone outside of education to advise in the process of negotiations. These feelings are reflected in Table 38. Teacher representatives were

**TABLE 38.-Do You Think the Board of Education Should Hire Someone Other Than the Superintendent Who Is Not An Educator to Serve as Advisor in Negotiations?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 34.10 25.36
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 12.59 5.99

nearly equally divided on this question. A statistically significant difference was found.

The three groups were generally agreeable on the question of whether the board of education should enlist the aid of another educator to serve as advisor in negotiations. Table 39 reveals that a statistically significant difference did not exist between the groups.
TABLE 39.-Do You Think the Board of Education Should Enlist the Aid of Another Educator (e.g., an Administrative Assistant) to Serve as Advisor in Negotiations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 4.21 2.23
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 12.59 5.99
df=6  df=2

Items Subject to Negotiations

Fourteen questions were concerned with items which personally affected teachers and items of a curricular nature. Respondents were asked to react to the representative role of the superintendent regarding them.

Board presidents, with a majority of responses, in regard to contract salaries, felt that the superintendent should represent the board of education. District superintendents had mixed feelings on this issue, as indicated in Table 40. Approximately 50 percent of the superintendents responded that they should represent the board of education,
TABLE 40.-With Regard to Contract Salaries, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not Negotiable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 182.67
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 15.51
df=8
whereas, 41 percent responded that they should represent both teachers and the board. Half of the teacher representatives felt that the superintendent should not represent either group. Respondents, 28.4 percent, felt that the superintendent should represent both groups. A statistically significant difference between groups was found.

Consistent with the findings in Table 40, school board presidents, referring to extra duty pay, in Table 41, feel that the superintendent should represent the board of education in this matter. Superintendents, likewise responded at a rate of 48.2 percent that they should represent the board and 42.6 percent responded that they should represent both groups. Teacher representatives have mixed feelings, although the largest group of respondents believe that superintendents should not represent either group. Differences in responses between groups were statistically significant.

Sabattical leave policy was deemed to be negotiable by board presidents, superintendents, and teacher representatives. Responses concerning this matter were consistent with those reported above in that the majority of board presidents favor the superintendent to represent the board, as shown in Table 42. Superintendents again have mixed feelings wherein the larger portion of respondents prefer to represent the board, and a smaller but significant percentage of respondents favor representing both teachers and the board. Teacher representatives have varied feelings
TABLE 41.-With Regard to Extra Duty Pay, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th></th>
<th>Board</th>
<th></th>
<th>Both</th>
<th></th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th></th>
<th>Not Negotiable</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 191.37
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 15.51
df = 8
TABLE 42.-With Regard to Sabbatical Leave Pay, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not Negotiable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 186.12

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 15.51

df = 8
about the representative role of the superintendent in negotiations. The largest group again prefers that the superintendent did not represent neither the board nor the teachers. The difference in belief was statistically significant.

With regards to sick leave policy, both groups affirmed the fact that it was a negotiable item. Table 43 indicates that teacher representatives, superintendents, and board presidents hold the same feeling about the superintendent's representative role concerning sick leave policy as they did toward his role in sabbatical leave policy. The difference in belief was statistically significant.

All three groups of respondents felt that the number of hours teaching is negotiable; however, a much larger percentage of board presidents and superintendents than teacher representatives felt that it is not negotiable. The majority of board presidents felt that the superintendent should represent the board with regard to number of hours teaching, as shown in Table 44. The greatest percentage of superintendents felt that superintendents should represent the board on this issue. Teacher representatives had mixed feelings, ranging from superintendents representing both teachers and the board, neither group, and the teachers. This difference between groups was statistically significant.

Although board presidents and superintendents felt that class size should be subject to negotiations, 34.3 percent of the board presidents, 39.1 percent of the superintendents and 3.4 percent of the teacher representatives
TABLE 43.—With Regard to Sick Leave, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not Negotiable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 160.74
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 15.51

97
TABLE 44.-With Regard to Number of Hours Teaching, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not Negotiable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 218.81

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 15.51

df=8
believed this item not to be negotiable. Table 45 illustrates that the largest percentage of board presidents felt that the superintendent should represent the board in matters of class size; 17.9 percent favored representation of both the teachers and the board. Superintendents favored board representation, followed by representation of teachers and the board of education. Teacher representatives reflected no majority opinion on this issue with opinions spread across the spectrum of categories. The difference between groups was statistically significant.

Duties other than teaching were held to be negotiable by the three groups. Board presidents and superintendents held similar views regarding the representative role of the superintendent with regard to duties other than teaching. Table 46 shows that teacher representatives would prefer to have the superintendent represent both the teachers and the board or neither group - another small group of teacher representative respondents favored the superintendent representing the teachers. Superintendents were more inclined to represent the board. Another large group of superintendent respondents favored representing both teachers and the board. A significant difference was found between groups.

Out of the total number of respondents, 21.6 percent of the board presidents, 34.5 percent of the superintendents and 3.4 percent of the teacher representatives felt that teaching assignments should not be subject to negotiations. It is illustrated, Table 47, that for those who believe this
TABLE 45.-With Regard to Class Size, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not Negotiable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 241.38
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 15.51

df=8
TABLE 46.-With Regard to Duties Other Than Teaching, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not Negotiable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 176.18

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 15.51
df=8
item to be negotiable, the majority of board presidents felt that the superintendent should represent the board. Superintendents were split on this issue; however, the majority of those who felt this is a negotiable item felt that superintendents should represent the board. Another group of superintendent respondents felt that they should represent both the teachers and the board. The beliefs of teacher representatives were fairly evenly distributed among the four responses of teachers, board, both, and neither. A significant difference was found between groups.

The three groups - board presidents, superintendents, and teacher representatives - agreed that retirement age should be subject to negotiation, as indicated in Table 48. Twenty-five percent of the board presidents and twenty-three percent of the superintendents felt that this issue is not negotiable. Teacher representatives beliefs were fairly evenly distributed among "teachers" and "board." The majority of those who feel that retirement age is a negotiable item believe that the superintendent should represent neither the teachers nor the board. Board presidents and superintendents were equally in agreement that the superintendent's representative role should favor the board. Likewise, both groups had a significant belief that the superintendent should represent both the board and the teachers. The difference was statistically significant.

Although the three groups agreed that team teaching should be subject to negotiations, 24.8 percent of the board
TABLE 47.-With Regard to Teaching Assignments, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th></th>
<th>Board</th>
<th></th>
<th>Both</th>
<th></th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th></th>
<th>Not Negotiable</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>34.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 181.79
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 15.51
df=8
TABLE 48.-With Regard to Retirement Age, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Neither</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 108.55
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 15.51

df = 8
presidents and 28.9 percent of the superintendents believed this matter not to be negotiable. Only 5.1 percent of the teacher representatives did not feel team teaching is a negotiable item. Table 49 illustrates that the largest percentage of board presidents and superintendents felt that the superintendent should represent both the board and the teachers. It further illustrates that the majority of the teacher representatives feel that the representative role of the superintendent should be for the teacher group. Group differences were statistically significant.

Modular scheduling was recognized as a negotiable issue, although significant respondents clearly negated unanimity in this regard. Table 50 shows that superintendents were more intense than board presidents and teacher representatives in their feeling that the superintendent should represent both teachers and the board in negotiating modular scheduling. Teacher representatives also had strong beliefs that the superintendent should represent teachers only on this negotiation issue. The groups differed significantly.

Tracking or Ability Grouping was considered a negotiable issue by the three groups of respondents. A significant number of board presidents and superintendents believed that tracking or ability grouping is not negotiable. Of those believing tracking or ability grouping to be negotiable, most respondents representing board presidents and superintendents felt that the superintendent should
TABLE 49.-With Regard to Team Teaching, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not Negotiable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 161.74
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 15.51
df=8
TABLE 50.-With Regard to Modular Scheduling, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th></th>
<th>Board</th>
<th></th>
<th>Both</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 155.86
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 15.51
df=8
represent the teachers and the board as illustrated in Table 51. Teacher representatives shared a similar view. In addition, teacher representatives, 39.2 percent, believed that the superintendent should represent the teachers. Group differences were statistically significant.

Regarding ungrading or non-grading, the three groups affirmed the fact that it is a negotiable matter. Table 52 indicates that teacher representatives and board presidents held the same feeling about the superintendent's representative role concerning ungrading or non-grading. They believe he should represent both the teachers and the board on this matter. Board presidents held similar views - superintendents should represent both teachers and the board. A significant percentage of board presidents also believe that the superintendent should represent the board only. The groups differed significantly.

The use of lay readers and teacher aides was deemed to be negotiable by the board presidents, superintendents and teacher representatives, as shown in Table 53. Mixed responses prevailed on this issue. The majority of teacher representatives and superintendents responded that the superintendent should represent both the teachers and the board when negotiating the use of lay readers and teacher aides. School board presidents felt that superintendents should primarily represent the board on this issue and secondarily, represent both the teachers and the board. A statistically significant difference was found.
TABLE 51.-With Regard to Tracking or Ability Grouping, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not Negotiable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 155.08
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 15.51

df=8
TABLE 52.-With Regard to Ungrading or Non-Grading, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Board</th>
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<th>Neither</th>
<th>Not Negotiable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>70</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square = 152.51
Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level = 15.51
   df = 8
TABLE 53.-With Regard to Use of Lay Readers and Teacher Aides, Whom Should the Superintendent Represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Board</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Neither</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Presidents</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Superintendents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Representatives</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calculated chi-square= 184.45

Critical Value Necessary at .05 Level= 15.51

df=8
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter, a summary, findings, conclusions, and recommendations with regard to this dissertation are presented.

The primary purpose of this study was to compare the attitudes and opinions of school board presidents, district superintendents, and teacher representatives in selected school districts of New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania concerning the role of the superintendent in the process of collective negotiations. The study determined whether board presidents, district superintendents, and teacher representatives perceived the role of the superintendent in collective negotiations differently.

Right to bargain legislation for teachers has caused board members, superintendents and teachers to redefine the parameters of their influence and power. Changing relationships among these three groups has resulted in conflicting expectations regarding the appropriate role behavior for the superintendent involved in the collective negotiations process. The superintendent is caught on the one hand between the board members who insist upon his allegiance, and on the other hand by teachers who expect his allegiance.

Summary

As evidenced by this study and the writings of
experts in the field, there is much confusion in the assignment and execution of the superintendent's role in the negotiation process. Much of this conflict is derived from the national organizations.

Professional negotiation became official National Education Association policy at the Denver Convention in July, 1962. The resolution stated that "professional education associations have the right to participate with boards of education in the determination of policies of common concern, and procedures to effect this right must be through educational and not labor channels." The original statement has been endorsed each year with little variation by the National Education Association since that date.

The term "professional negotiation," as defined by the National Education Association, is a set of procedures written and officially adopted by the local teachers' association and by the local school district board of education which provides an orderly method for the school board and the local teachers' association to discuss matters of mutual concern through professional channels, to reach agreement on these matters, and to establish educational channels for mediation and appeal in the event of impasse.

Written professional negotiation procedures contain the following basic elements: recognition, channels, negotiation agreement, and impasse. These terms utilized by the National Education Association to describe professional negotiation procedures have often been misunderstood. The
word "negotiate" has a labor union connotation to many individuals. It should be understood by all groups concerned with education that the local board of education is the legally designated legislative or deliberative body for policy making, and is thus responsible for the ultimate policy decision. Decisions made by boards of education, however, without consulting those whom they affect have long been regarded as undesirable.

During the past decade, teachers' organizations in various states have sponsored legislation which requires local school boards to negotiate with the designated teacher representatives. Such bills have been enacted into law in the states of California, Connecticut, Oregon, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York and a host of others. At the time of this writing, several thousand agreements for professional negotiation have been adopted by school boards in the United States.

Historically the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 allowed private employees the right to collective bargaining but denied this right to public employees. In 1961, the state of Wisconsin recognized, by law, the right of public employees to organize and to bargain collectively with employers. In January, 1962, the late President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order #10988 giving federal employees the right to collective bargaining (although strikes
and an union shop were forbidden). Other states passed statutes authorizing and/or promoting collective bargaining for state and public employees.

A number of other factors added to the rapid rise of collective or professional negotiations among teachers. These factors include such things as the reduction of the average age of the teaching profession and an increase in the number of men entering the teaching profession. Men, who are often the sole support of their families, are more aggressive in obtaining improvements in their personal and professional welfare. Today's teachers are better educated and trained with fewer substandard credentials and more advanced degrees. Therefore, many teachers believe that they are qualified to participate in policy decisions which concern them.

Teacher militancy also has been a reason for emphasis on negotiating. Stinnett bore this out in an address to secondary school principals when he stated "...teachers have become increasingly restive in recent years regarding their lack of a greater voice in the determination of policies under which they work and what they consider as the economic neglect of the public schools in an affluent society."  

---


Stinnett approves the negotiation approach and views it as merely a cooperative venture. He views professional negotiations "...as a reaffirmation and formalization of the philosophy of staff relations which have been accepted in enlightened school districts for years," and "...it is the partnership approach, the cooperative approach to policy development."^3

**Purpose**

Under prevailing circumstances, most school district boards of education and administrators are being placed in the position of participating with teachers in formalized negotiating procedure. Within this framework, one of the more complex problems is the identification of the proper role of the superintendent in teacher negotiations. Two extreme positions are often voiced. The first is that he be chief negotiator representing only the board of education in all its dealings with the staff. The second is that he be completely bypassed and have absolutely no place in the process of negotiations.

This study has sought to determine differences in the perceptions of three distinct groups concerning the role of the superintendent in professional negotiations. The study determined whether school board presidents, district superintendents and teacher representatives perceived the

^3Ibid., 3.
role of the superintendent in teacher negotiations differently.

Procedure

The data for the study were obtained by the use of a questionnaire which was sent to the chosen respondents in the two hundred and fifty selected school districts in New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania. The four page instrument contained sixty-four questions and was sent to two hundred and fifty board presidents, two hundred and fifty teacher representatives. Completed questionnaires were received from fifty-three percent of the board presidents, seventy-nine percent of the district superintendents, and seventy-one percent of the teacher representatives.

Treatment of the Data

Numbers and percentages of responses were computed for each respondent in the three major categories of school board presidents, district superintendents, and teacher representatives for each item included in the questionnaire. A chi-square test was made on responses of each item to determine statistically significant differences between the three groups in their perceptions of the situations studied.

Findings

Major findings of this study relate to four
dimensions of the superintendent's role in collective negotiations: his role in policy formation, in policy execution, in professional negotiations, and in negotiations on the substantive issues involved.

Policy Formation

Board presidents, district superintendents, and teacher representatives agreed strongly that superintendents presently play a significant role in school district policy. The three groups also agreed that the superintendent should continue to play a significant role in district policy formation.

District superintendents and teacher representatives agreed strongly and board presidents were somewhat equally divided that policies relating directly to teacher welfare should not be determined by the school board only. The three groups agreed that the school board, with the assistance of teachers and administrators, should determine school district policy relating directly to teacher welfare.

Board presidents and district superintendents agreed that teachers and administrators should not determine teacher welfare policies without board participation. Teacher representatives, however, were more likely than board presidents and district superintendents to believe that unilateral policy determination by employees is acceptable. The three groups agreed that school district policies relating directly to teacher welfare should not be determined by teachers only. Teacher representatives were consistent in their responses.
regarding their beliefs that policies relating directly to
teacher welfare should be determined by boards and their
employees and not solely by the board only nor by the
teachers only.

An inconsistency by board presidents is revealed
concerning policy determination. While a majority believed
that policies not relating directly to teacher welfare
should be determined unilaterally by the board, sixty-three
percent believed that these same policies should be deter­
mined by the school board with teachers and administrators
assisting.

With regard to school district policies not relating
directly to teacher welfare, the three groups - board presi­
dents, district superintendents and teacher representatives -
agreed that teachers and administrators should influence
non-welfare policies adopted by the board.

**Policy Execution**

The groups agreed that the primary duty of the
superintendent was not to act in the capacity of agent for
the teachers in striving for policies necessary for the
operation of the schools. It was rather, that of acting as
agent for the school board in carrying out board policies.

Teacher representatives were somewhat inconsistent
in their beliefs concerning policy execution by the super­
tendent. An overwhelming majority (69.5%) believed that
the primary duty of the superintendent was to act as agent
for the school board in carrying out board policies, yet
51.4 percent of these same teacher representatives responded that the primary duty of the superintendent was to act as agent for teachers in striving for policies necessary for the operation of the schools.

Professional Negotiations

Board presidents, and teacher representatives agreed very closely and a majority of district superintendents responded that it is not possible for the superintendent to represent both the interests of teachers and the board, when engaging in negotiations.

Consistent with the finding that the primary duty of the superintendent was that of acting in the capacity of agent for the school board in carrying out board policies, the board presidents, district superintendents and teacher representatives agreed that the superintendent cannot perform both the functions of acting as agent for the board and as agent for the teachers simultaneously when engaging in negotiations. District superintendents, however, were more inclined to feel that the superintendent can perform both the functions of acting as agent for the board and as agent for the teachers simultaneously.

Further consistency was revealed when the groups agreed overwhelmingly that, when engaging in negotiations, a conflict of interests does exist in the dual role of the superintendent in representing both teachers and the board.

Teacher representatives, district superintendents and board presidents agreed conclusively that the local
superintendent should obtain special training in order to more effectively engage in negotiations. Superintendents felt more strongly than the other two groups for the need of special training. They further agreed that the superintendent should not be by-passed in the process of negotiations. Teacher representatives, however, felt more strongly than board presidents and superintendents that the superintendent should stay completely out of negotiations between the board and the teachers. They also felt that the superintendent should not stay out of negotiations until an impasse is reached.

Board presidents and district superintendents agreed that boards of education should hire someone other than the superintendent who is not an educator to serve as advisor in negotiations. Teacher representatives, on the other hand, were nearly equally divided on the issue. There was agreement among the three groups, however, that the board of education should not enlist the aid of another educator (e.g., an administrative assistant) to serve as advisor in negotiations.

Neither teacher representatives, board presidents, nor district superintendents felt that the superintendent should represent and be the spokesman for the teachers and serve their interests in professional negotiations. A higher rate of teacher representatives felt that the superintendent should represent them and serve their interests. The majority of board presidents and district superintendents believed
that the superintendent should represent and be the spokesman for the board and serve its interests, whereas, teacher representatives were emphatically opposed to this notion. Neither group believed that the superintendent should represent and be the spokesman for both the teachers and the board. Teacher representative responses indicate that the superintendent should not represent and be the spokesman for either the teachers or the board.

District superintendents and teacher representatives believed that, when engaging in negotiations, the superintendent should supply information to both teachers and the board on his own initiative. Board presidents were emphatic in their belief that the superintendent should not supply information to the teachers on his own initiative. Strong agreement prevailed that, when engaging in negotiations, the superintendent should supply information to both teachers and the board upon their request.

Consistent with findings, immediately above, district superintendents and teacher representatives similarly felt that the superintendent, when engaging in negotiations, should recommend alternatives for both the teachers and the board. Board presidents did not believe that the superintendent should recommend alternatives for the teachers to request of the board, when engaging in collective negotiations.

Role Dependence on Substantive Issues

The fourth dimension dealt with the respondent's beliefs regarding whether or not the superintendent's repre-
sentative role changes depending upon the items being negotiated. The three groups - board presidents, district superintendents and teacher representatives - believed that the issues regarding salaries, extra duty pay, sabbatical leave pay, sick leave, number of hours teaching, class size, duties other than teaching, teaching assignments, and retirement age are negotiable. The groups were divided on the representative role of the superintendent. School board presidents and district superintendents felt that the superintendent should represent the board of education with regards to the negotiable items mentioned above. Teacher representatives, however, were of a different opinion. With reference to contract salaries, extra duty pay, sabbatical leave pay, sick leave, and retirement age, teacher representatives felt that the superintendent should not represent either teachers or the board of education. The superintendent should represent both the teachers and the board when negotiating number of hours teaching, class size and duties other than teaching, according to the teacher representatives.

With regard to teaching assignments, the teacher representatives felt that the superintendent should represent the teachers. Teacher representative responses to the number of hours teaching, class size, duties other than teaching and teaching assignments indicating definite superintendent representation seems to conflict with the teachers' general response that the superintendent should not represent anyone.
Team teaching, modular scheduling, tracking or ability grouping, ungrading or non-grading, and the use of lay readers and teacher aides were believed to be negotiable items. District superintendents and board presidents felt much more strongly than teacher representatives that the foregoing items should not be negotiable. None the less, they believed that the superintendent should represent both the teachers and the board in the process of negotiation. Teacher representatives also felt that these matters should be negotiable. Consistent with the findings reported in the preceding paragraph, teacher representatives reflect a conflict with the teachers' general response that the superintendent should not represent anyone. In response to team teaching and tracking or ability grouping, this group felt that the superintendent should represent teachers. With respect to modular scheduling, ungrading or non-grading, and use of lay readers and teacher aides, teacher representatives believed that the superintendent should represent both teachers and the board.

Ancillary Findings

Several related questions were asked in the survey to which board presidents, district superintendents and teacher representatives responded.

The three groups agreed that the school board should be required to negotiate with teachers regarding working conditions. Teacher representatives were more emphatic than district superintendents and board presidents concerning
this issue.

Teacher representatives, board presidents and district superintendents agreed decisively that district school boards should be required to negotiate with teachers regarding salaries. Teacher representatives were significantly more emphatic than board presidents concerning salary negotiations.

The question of whether teachers should obtain special training in order to more effectively engage in policy formation reflected affirmative agreement. Teacher representatives felt more strongly than the two other groups; however, a significant majority of the three groups were in agreement.

Teacher representatives and board presidents agreed at the same rate that school administrators should continue to affiliate with the National Education Association through the American Association of School Administrators. District superintendents, conversely, felt that they should not affiliate with the NEA.

District superintendents, as well as teacher representatives in Eastern Pennsylvania and New Jersey, believed that the negotiations law in the two states is adequate to maintain the powers and duties of district school boards over matters of salaries and economic policies. Board presidents felt that the negotiations law in Pennsylvania and New Jersey is not adequate to maintain the powers and duties of district school boards over matters of salaries.
and economic policies. The three groups did agree, however, that New Jersey's and Pennsylvania's negotiations law is adequate to ensure negotiations for teachers.

Conclusions

Based upon the findings of this study, the following conclusions were reached:

1. Superintendents presently play a significant role in school district policy determination. A continuation of this role is also desired.

2. Teachers definitely want to influence all school board policies.

3. District superintendents and board presidents are willing to have teachers participate in both teacher welfare and non-welfare policy determination.

4. Unilateral policy determination by the board of education is rejected by teacher representatives.

5. The primary duty of the superintendent is to act in the capacity of agent for the school board in carrying out board policies. Board presidents, superintendents, and teacher representatives recognize this fact.

6. Superintendents should not represent and be spokesmen for teachers nor serve their interests in professional negotiations.

7. When engaging in negotiations, a conflict of interest exists in the dual role of the superintendent.
representing both teachers and the board.

8. A majority of teachers view the superintendent as an individual who can provide information and guidance to the board and teacher organizations. Board presidents tend to see him in this same light, although when faced with a crucial issue both groups expect the superintendent to speak for the board.

9. Teacher representatives favor a negotiating process which includes the superintendent, yet they desire to speak officially to the board on behalf of the group they represent.

10. Teacher representatives have no desire to bypass the superintendent and favor negotiation procedures in which both the superintendent and teacher representatives are in attendance.

11. Board presidents and district superintendents believe that a professional, who is not an educator, should be hired to serve as an advisor in negotiations.

12. Superintendents should obtain special training to more effectively participate in professional negotiations. Teacher representatives should also have special training. Board presidents do not consider special training for teacher representatives as important as for superintendents. This finding suggests that while board presidents may welcome teacher participation in policy determination, they
do not want teachers to be too skillful in exercising their influence.

13. Role expectations of superintendents are more similar to those held by board members than to those held by teacher representatives.

14. There is no one right or proper role for the superintendent which would exclude every other role.

15. There is no verifiable evidence of a role pattern for the superintendent.

16. The school superintendent's role has been altered as a result of the collective negotiations movement.

Recommendations

Boards of education and teachers have made and are making efforts to accommodate one another in the changing power relationships precipitated by collective negotiations legislation. The school superintendent has been caught between the board member and teacher organizations, finding it difficult, if not impossible to define his role in terms that will satisfy both groups.

Superintendent, board president and teacher perceptions of the superintendent's role in professional negotiations were important factors in this study. Whether or not boards and superintendents are helping to define formally for teachers, the superintendent's role behavior in the process of negotiations, is worthy of further research. It would be as important to investigate whether or not boards
and superintendents are formally defining the superintendent's role among themselves prior to or during the negotiation process.

The role of the superintendent in professional negotiations requires additional clarification. It would be useful, therefore, to study changes in this position periodically. The composition of personnel who participate in professional negotiations changes as elections are held, resignations take effect and retirements ensue. It would be useful to study the same population after a period of time to check for changes in opinions and judgments.

The knowledge gained from this study may contribute toward a clearer understanding of the changing role of the superintendent in the collective negotiations process.
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UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS


APPENDIX A

LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION
37 Underwood Road
Levittown, Pennsylvania
December 31, 1971

Dear __________:

As part of my doctoral study being conducted at Walden University under the direction of Dr. Pietro Pascale and Dr. Mary C. Rodgers, my dissertation committee, I am making an attitudinal survey of selected school district personnel in New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania. This particular survey concerns the role of the Superintendent in the collective negotiation process as perceived by boards of education, superintendents and presidents of local teacher organizations.

It has become increasingly important to obtain information about the emerging role of the superintendent in the collective negotiating process. It is felt that this investigation will be beneficial in that it will aid in the understanding of the superintendent's negotiation role and provide guidance in selecting the most effective role for such a key individual.

The purpose of this study is to identify and compare perceptions of those having had experience with teacher negotiations concerning the role of the superintendent in the negotiating process. To accomplish this purpose, we are asking you to complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it in the stamped addressed envelope at your earliest convenience. (The target date for processing the analysis of the data is January 18, 1972.)

You may be assured that the highest ethical procedures will be utilized throughout the study and at no time will a respondent's name or school system be identified in this study. When the study is concluded, I shall be happy to forward a summary to you if you will indicate on the questionnaire that you would like one.

Thank you for your assistance in this study.

Sincerely yours,

DOMINICK DiNUNZIO
Researcher

PIETRO J. PASCALE, Ed.D.
Professor of Education

DD/af
enc.

139
Dear 

Sometime ago I wrote you concerning a study presently being conducted at Walden University. This study is an attempt to assess the role of the superintendent of schools in the process of teacher negotiations (conferring, consulting and discussing in good faith) with district school boards on matters of salaries and related economic policies affecting professional services. Perceptions of those who have had experience in this process are very important to the completion of this study.

If you were unable to complete the questionnaire previously, perhaps you are in a position to do so now. YOUR EXPERIENCE IS OF GREAT VALUE AND YOUR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE VITAL!

You may be assured that the highest ethical procedures will be utilized throughout the study and at no time will a respondent's name or school system be identified in this study. When the study is concluded, I shall be happy to forward a summary to you if you will indicate on the questionnaire that you would like one.

Thank you for your interest, consideration and immediate response to this request.

Sincerely yours,

DOMINICK DIUNZIO
Researcher

DD/af
cnc. 1 Questionnaire
1 Return Envelope
APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE
THE ROLE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS IN THE PROCESS OF COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
AS PERCEIVED BY LOCAL BARGAINING AGENTS, BOARDS OF EDUCATION AND SUPERINTENDENTS
IN SELECTED SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF NEW JERSEY AND EASTERN PENNSYLVANIA.

Questionnaire: AS PERCEIVED BY LOCAL BARGAINING AGENTS, BOARDS OF EDUCATION AND SUPERINTENDENTS IN SELECTED SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF NEW JERSEY AND EASTERN PENNSYLVANIA.

DIRECTIONS: In responding to the following questions, write the NUMBER of your answer in the space provided beside the question number. Please answer every item with the one response which best relates your opinion.

______ (1) What is your recent connection with public education?

______ (2) How many years have you been connected with public education?
1. 0-4  2. 5-9  3. 10-14  4. 15-19  5. 20 or over

______ (3) Within which age bracket do you fall?
1. 20-29  2. 30-39  3. 40-49  4. 50-59  5. 60 or over

______ (4) Of which sex are you?
1. Male  2. Female

______ (5) What kind of support does the district superintendent enjoy?
1. Associate Superintendent  2. Assistant Superintendent  3. Business Manager (Administrator)  4. Personnel Director  5. All of the preceding 4  6. 3 of the 4  7. 2 of the 4  8. None of the 4

______ (6) Type of school district in which you are a member?
1. Central city (total population in your district is 100,000 or over)  2. City (total population in your district is over 50,000 but less than 100,000)  3. Suburban (total population in your district is 20,000 but less than 50,000)  4. Industrial town (total population in district is 3,000 but less than 20,000)  5. Rural (Total population in district is less than 3,000)
(7) What is the average income of families living within your school district?
1. $2000-$6000  2. $6001-$10,000
3. $10,001-$15,000  4. $15,001-$25,000
5. over $25,000

(8) How many students are enrolled in your school district?
1. 0-400  2. 401-1500  3. 1501-4000
4. 4001-10,000  5. 10,001 and over

(9) What is the predominant professional training of teachers employed in your school district?
1. Non-degree  2. B.A. or B.S.
3. B.A.+X credits  4. M.S.

(10) What is the male-female ratio of the members of the teaching staff?
1. 1-10  2. 1-8  3. 1-6
4. 1-4  5. 1-2  6. 1-1

(11) What teacher organization exists in your school system?
1. AFT affiliated organization  2. NEA affiliated organization
3. Both NEA-AFT affiliated organization  4. Local (non-affiliated teacher group)
5. None of the above

(12) Are specific written board policies concerning teacher negotiations now in effect in your district?
1. Yes  2. No

DIRECTIONS: In responding to the following questions, (13-50), write a 1 in the blank if your answer is EMPHATICALLY YES, a 2 if your answer is somewhat yes, a 3 if your answer is somewhat no, and a 4 if your answer is EMPHATICALLY NO.

1. EMPHATICALLY YES  2. somewhat yes
3. somewhat no  4. EMPHATICALLY NO

For questions 13-16, do you think school district policies relating directly to teacher welfare should be determined by:

(13) The school board only?

(14) The school board with teachers and administrators assisting?
(15) Teachers and administrators?

(16) Teachers only?

For questions 17-18, do you think school district policies not relating directly to teacher welfare should be determined by:

(17) The school board only?

(18) The school board with teachers and administrators assisting?

(19) Is (New Jersey's) (Pennsylvania's) negotiations law adequate to maintain the powers and duties of district school boards over matters of salaries and economic policies?

(20) When engaging in negotiations, is it possible for the superintendent to represent both the interests of teachers and the board?

(21) Should the local district superintendent play a significant role in school district policy formation?

(22) Is (New Jersey's) (Pennsylvania's) negotiations law adequate to ensure negotiations for teachers?

(23) Should teachers obtain special training in order to more effectively engage in policy formation?

(24) Do you consider the primary duty of the superintendent as acting in the capacity of agent for the teachers in striving for policies necessary for the operation of the schools?

(26) Can the superintendent perform both the functions of acting as agent for the board and as agent for the teachers simultaneously?

(27) In your opinion, should district school boards be required to negotiate with teachers regarding salaries?

(28) Do you consider the primary duty of the superintendent as acting in the capacity of agent for the school board in carrying out board policies?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>In your opinion, should district school boards be required to negotiate with teachers regarding working conditions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>Do teachers presently play a significant role in district policy formation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>When engaging in negotiations, is there a conflict of interests in the dual role of the superintendent in representing both teachers and the board?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>Do you think teachers should share in over-all district policy formation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>Should the local district superintendent obtain special training in order to more effectively engage in negotiations?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For questions, (34-47), in your opinion, when engaging in collective negotiations should the **district superintendent**:

1. **EMPHATICALLY YES**  
2. somewhat yes  
3. somewhat no  
4. **EMPHATICALLY NO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>Represent and be spokesman for the teachers and serve their interests?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>Represent and be the spokesman for the board and serve its interests?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>Represent and be the spokesman for both the teachers and the board?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>Supply information to the board on his own initiative?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>Supply information to the teachers on his own initiative?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>Supply information to both teachers and board on his own initiative?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>Supply information to the board upon its request?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>Supply information to the teachers upon their request?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>Supply information to both teachers and board upon their request?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(43) Recommend alternatives for board to offer to teachers?

(44) Recommend alternatives for the teachers to request of the board?

(45) Recommend alternatives for both the teachers and the board?

(46) Stay out of negotiations until an impasse is reached?

(47) Stay completely out of negotiations between the board and the teachers?

(48) Should school administrators continue to affiliate with the National Education Association through the American Association of School Administrators?

(49) Do you think the board of education should hire someone other than the superintendent who is not an educator (e.g., an attorney) to serve as advisor in negotiations?

(50) Do you think the board of education should enlist the aid of another educator (e.g., an administrative assistant) to serve as advisor in negotiations?

In the following items, (51-59), whom do you think the superintendent should represent?


(51) Contract salaries

(52) Extra duty pay

(53) Sabbatical leave pay

(54) Sick leave

(55) Number of hours teaching

(56) Class size

(57) Duties other than teaching

(58) Teaching assignments
(59) Retirement age

In the following items of a curricular nature, (60-64), whom do you think the superintendent should represent?


(60) Team teaching

(61) Modular scheduling

(62) Tracking or ability grouping

(63) Ungrading or non-grading

(64) Use of lay readers and teacher aides

Please write your name and address below if you want the results of the study sent to you.

__________________________

__________________________ Dominick DiNunzio, Researcher

__________________________